tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-13042/articlesAbu Bakr al-Baghdadi – The Conversation2020-05-04T13:27:01Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1363402020-05-04T13:27:01Z2020-05-04T13:27:01ZIslamic State could be about to hit back – and the world is paying little attention<p>In the shadow of the coronavirus pandemic the crises of tomorrow can fester. A resurgence of Islamic State (IS) is likely to be one of them. </p>
<p>In recent weeks, IS has carried out <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/is-attacks-iraq-coronavirus-lockdown.html">a spate of attacks</a> on security forces in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-52514370">Iraq</a> and different <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/syria-east-deser-islamic-state-attacks-regime-iran.html">areas of Syria</a>. There are striking similarities between these current developments and events that happened in 2013-14 as IS seized huge swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria. </p>
<p>The threat of a resurgent IS is mounting and governments around the world could be about to make the same mistake again of missing it and reacting too late. Based on <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/eis/research/intel/intel-research-project">my ongoing research</a> investigating why the rise of IS in 2013 came as a strategic surprise to European governments, I’ve identified the seven most eye-catching parallels between 2013 and today. </p>
<h2>1. Declared dead prematurely</h2>
<p>After the death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, the various branches of al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Syria and Iraq, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel and Maghreb refocused more locally. The remaining leadership directly addressed grievances against their respective local governments. Al-Qaida seemed to be on the defensive and leaders in Europe and the US <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university">expected</a> it to stop posing a national threat. </p>
<p>Similarly to today, it was misleading to hope that IS would <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/435402-16-times-trump-declared-or-predicted-the-demise-of-isis">decline</a> after its leader <a href="https://time.com/5711828/al-baghdadi-dead-isis-future/">Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a> was killed in October 2019 in a US special forces raid. Like when it emerged out of al-Qaida in Iraq, IS might very well resurge under its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/isis-leader-confirmed-amir-mohammed-abdul-rahman-al-mawli-al-salbi">new leader</a>, Amir Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-Salbi. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/al-baghdadis-death-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-leader-of-islamic-state-125947">Al-Baghdadi's death: the rise and fall of the leader of Islamic State</a>
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<h2>2. Risk of prison breaks</h2>
<p>One of IS’s most successful operations was its 2012-13 prison escape campaign <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/inside-the-rise-of-isis/">Breaking the Walls</a> to free veteran fighters. The campaign was remarkable due to its length and level of organisation, including the major break of Abu Ghraib, Iraq in July 2013 in which more than 500 prisoners escaped.</p>
<p>The IS prisons in northern Syria are currently run by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the primarily Kurdish militia that defeated IS with the support of the west. Overcrowded and understaffed, <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/living-hell-for-isis-suspects-trapped-in-legal-limbo-8klj0npg3">the SDF has called</a> these prisons a ticking time bomb. </p>
<p>According to Iraqi intelligence, IS has been preparing a prison break campaign, which it calls <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7702493/ISIS-chiefs-hiding-Turkey-vast-sums-money-plotting-jailbreaks-Syria-Iraq.html">Break Down the Fences</a>. A systematic <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/30/islamic-state-prisoners-escape-from-syrian-jail-after-militants-riot">prison break campaign</a> similar to Breaking the Walls could pave the way for a resurgence of IS in Iraq and Syria.</p>
<h2>3. Car bombs and insurgency attacks</h2>
<p>In 2013 more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/26/world/middleeast/us-sends-arms-to-aid-iraq-fight-with-extremists.html">8,000 Iraqis were killed</a> by IS, mainly through choreographed suicide bombings. Today, IS is again launching increasingly sophisticated <a href="https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/100420201">insurgent attacks</a> in Syria and Iraq. This type of violence might be a prelude to a more forceful military return of IS in northern Iraq. </p>
<p>Concentrated in areas beyond the reach of Iraqi and Kurdish security forces, in January a <a href="https://undocs.org/S/2020/53">UN report warned</a> that IS is preparing for a steady and gradual return.</p>
<h2>4. Western fatigue</h2>
<p>The coalition against IS <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-47678157">proclaimed that the group</a> had been defeated in March 2019 when it liberated Baghuz, the last city under control of the group. Should IS surge again, the coalition’s efforts would have been in vain. Military action would have to be continued, the SDF further reinforced, and the Iraqi security forces strengthened – not what western governments were hoping for.</p>
<p>In 2013, US and UK <a href="https://www1.essex.ac.uk/news/event.aspx?e_id=5115">public opinion</a> was very negative about the Iraq war, which was largely considered a failure. This resulting “war fatigue” and the desire to militarily leave the Middle East <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/british-public-opinion-after-a-decade-of-war-attitudes-to-iraq-and-afghanistan/">affected</a> the UK’s decision not to intervene in Syria in 2013. </p>
<p>Today’s politicians are wary of contributing resources once again to the fight against this never-ending Jihadi whack-a-mole. The Iraqi parliament’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/iraqi-parliament-calls-expulsion-foreign-troops-200105150709628.html">non-binding resolution</a> to expel US troops after the American assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in January has added <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/us-troops-military-conflict-iraq-iran-trump-a9460496.html">another layer of complication</a>.</p>
<h2>5. Risk of a power vacuum in Iraq</h2>
<p>In a difference to 2013, the highly polarised sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shias in Iraq – one of the root causes of IS’s appeal to frustrated Iraqi Sunnis – seems to have <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/207-averting-isis-resurgence-iraq-and-syria">faded</a>. Yet, Iraq still has a very <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/widespread-protests-point-iraqs-cycle-social-crisis">fragile government</a> and a newly designated prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who faces <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51930601">huge challenges</a>. </p>
<p>For the time being the government is holding, although further protests like <a href="https://theconversation.com/violent-crackdown-against-iraq-protests-exposes-fallacy-of-the-countrys-democracy-124830">those which began in October 2019</a>, a lack of reforms, and a weakening economy might destabilise the country. Another round of chaos caused by a collapsing government would quickly be exploited by IS to recruit disenchanted citizens. </p>
<h2>6. Risk of a power vacuum in Syria</h2>
<p>One element that helped IS gain strength in 2013-14 was the ongoing war in Syria, which created a power vacuum that was filled by IS. Other factors that contributed to the group’s success included the departure of US troops from Iraq <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-withdrawal/last-u-s-troops-leave-iraq-ending-war-idUSTRE7BH03320111218">in late 2011</a>; and Turkey’s subsequent policy to relax its border controls with Syria, which allowed foreign fighters to join IS. </p>
<p>Today, the Syrian civil war and foreign actors might facilitate an IS revival. <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/02/16/isil-back-us-troop-withdrawal-warn-kurds/">American disengagement</a> from northern Syria and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-49956698?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cp7r8vgl2y7t/kurds&link_location=live-reporting-story">Turkey’s</a> military campaign in the country that started in October 2019 forced the SDF to redirect its forces towards the north-east. The SDF therefore has fewer resources to devote to the sustained efforts that are needed to prevent IS from resurging. </p>
<p>In early March 2020, a Turkish-Russian <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51763926">deal</a> was concluded, which among others agreed to stop the fighting in Idlib in Syria’s north west. Yet, given the strategic and symbolic importance of <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-syrias-idlib-turkey-is-trying-to-play-middle-man-between-russia-and-the-us-with-little-success-131852">Idlib for those involved in the conflict</a>, experts fear that the deal <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/russian-turkish-patrols-syrias-m4-highway-bumpy-start">might not last</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the SDF’s redeployment of forces to defend Kurdish regions against the Turkish incursion has already opened the door for IS to <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/has-turkeys-incursion-into-syria-opened-the-door-for-an-islamic-state-comeback/">regain footholds</a> in the Deir Ezzor area, IS’s last stronghold before its territorial defeat in March 2019.</p>
<h2>7. Foreign fighters and a global presence</h2>
<p>In 2013 and 2014, IS was able to attract large numbers of foreign fighters, at the time estimated at <a href="https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ICSR-Report-Greenbirds-Measuring-Importance-and-Infleunce-in-Syrian-Foreign-Fighter-Networks.pdf">11,000 from 74 nations</a>.</p>
<p>While the flow of foreign fighters coming to Iraq and Syria has now nearly halted, IS still maintains a strong propaganda machinery. Groups around the <a href="https://www.iswresearch.org/2019/10/baghdadi-leaves-behind-global-isis.html">world</a> have kept affiliations with IS, such as in <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/273-facing-challenge-islamic-state-west-africa-province">west Africa</a> and <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10604.pdf">south-east Asia</a>, and IS still has the capacity to prepare or inspire terrorist attacks around the world. </p>
<p>Given these elements, it seems highly probable that IS will regroup, gain territories, and pose a global threat once again. With <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/contending-isis-time-coronavirus?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=796e075ba2-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_09_05_07_56_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-796e075ba2-359936305">coronavirus now clouding the picture</a>, governments around the world have neither payed attention, nor devoted enough resources to prevent a possible IS surge. </p>
<p>The international community would be wise to learn from 2013 and tackle each of these different warning signals now. Addressing them individually is much more feasible and could prevent IS from rising again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136340/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The article is from research conducted as part of a project on intelligence, strategic surprise, and learning in European foreign policy (INTEL). The author gratefully acknowledges funding for this project by the UK’s ESRC. The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the author and should not be attributed to anyone else.</span></em></p>Seven striking similarities between developments regarding Islamic State today and the period before its surge in 2013-14.Aviva Guttmann, Research Associate in Intelligence and International Security, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1292162020-01-24T13:38:00Z2020-01-24T13:38:00ZIn the terrorism fight, Trump has continued a key Obama policy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310348/original/file-20200115-134789-10ozqvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=44%2C0%2C1952%2C1392&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. special operations troops are a crucial element of the fight against terrorism.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/EA-AP-I-AFG-XWS101-AFGHANISTAN-US-FORCES/f4e88254cbe0da11af9f0014c2589dfb/193/0">AP Photo/Wally Santana</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump has rescinded, reversed or otherwise ended many of former President Barack Obama’s signature policies – but not a prominent one. </p>
<p>When it comes to fighting terrorism, the current commander-in-chief has upheld, and even extended, his predecessor’s linchpin strategy: using U.S. military special operations forces and targeted killings on a grand global scale. </p>
<p>This strategy is highlighted by Trump’s recent orders for the military to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/14/politics/hamza-bin-laden-al-qaeda-dead/index.html">kill or capture al-Qaida leader Hamza bin Laden</a> in September 2019 and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/world/middleeast/al-baghdadi-dead.html">Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a> in October 2019 – and in January 2020, for a drone strike to kill Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=684&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=684&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=684&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=859&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=859&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=859&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Thomas Knowlton depicted at the battle of Bunker Hill.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Thomas_Knowlton_(The_Death_of_General_Warren_at_the_Battle_of_Bunker%27s_Hill_cropped).jpg">John Trumbull, Museum of Fine Arts/Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>The tactic of sending specially trained operatives into hostile territories dates back to <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/george-washingtons-commandos-special-ops-during-the-american-11572">America’s Colonial days</a>. In September 1776, Lieut.-Col. <a href="http://www.americanwars.org/ct-american-revolution/knowltons-rangers-1776.htm">Thomas Knowlton’s Rangers</a> carried out one of the first U.S. reconnaissance missions, identifying enemy positions around what today is Manhattan. They quickly found themselves engaged in a firefight with the British. </p>
<h2>Increasingly called upon</h2>
<p>In the mid-20th century, America developed groups of <a href="https://sofrep.com/news/rare-footage-of-lrrps-in-vietnam/">covert combatants</a>, including units that preceded <a href="https://www.navysealmuseum.org/about-navy-seals/seal-history-the-naval-special-warfare-storyseal-history-the-naval-special-warfare-story/seal-history-underwater-demolition-teams-in-the-korean-war">the Navy SEALs</a>, to operate in parallel with larger conventional military forces. For instance, during the Korean War, U.S. Underwater Demolition Teams accomplished what only specially trained troops could do consistently and effectively – <a href="https://www.navysealmuseum.org/about-navy-seals/seal-history-the-naval-special-warfare-storyseal-history-the-naval-special-warfare-story/seal-history-underwater-demolition-teams-in-the-korean-war">destroying bridges and railroad tunnels</a>.</p>
<p>The rise of international terrorism in the 1970s led President Jimmy Carter to establish the Army’s <a href="https://www.military.com/special-operations/delta-force.html">1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta</a>, better known as Delta Force.</p>
<p>Obama, however, transformed special forces from an auxiliary arm into the tip – and at times, the whole – of America’s counterterrorism spear. He boosted special operations forces <a href="https://time.com/5042700/inside-new-american-way-of-war/">by 15,000 troops and support staff, bumped their budget 12% to US$10.4 billion</a>, and deployed them much farther and wider – <a href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/176048/tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_a_secret_war_in_135_countries">more than doubling their geographical footprint from 60 to 135 countries</a>.</p>
<p>Trump has eagerly embraced this strategy, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000005450516/special-ops-war-on-terror.html">deploying 8,000 special operations personnel to 80 countries</a>. Today, they operate in predictable places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as <a href="https://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176060/tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_success,_failure,_and_the_%22finest_warriors_who_ever_went_into_combat%22/">surprising settings such as South America’s Andes Mountains and Africa’s Sahel region</a>.</p>
<p>It took me 10 years of research to fully grasp Obama and Trump’s shared approach. In 2017, I co-produced “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000005450516/special-ops-war-on-terror.html">How Special Ops Became Central to the War on Terror</a>” with Retro Report for the New York Times. PBS recently aired a <a href="https://www.pbs.org/video/retro-report-on-pbs-season-1-episode-7-how-us-came-rely-special-ops-forces/">shorter version</a>. I’m also directing “<a href="https://news.psu.edu/video/603135/2020/01/07/research/penn-state-professor-holocaust-survivor-documentary">Cojot</a>,” which tells the little-known story of a hostage who played a key role in the first special operations rescue mission in a hostile country – the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/25/entebbe-raid-40-years-on-israel-palestine-binyamin-netanyahu-jonathan-freedland">1976 Operation Thunderbolt</a>, better known as Israel’s daring Entebbe raid.</p>
<p>My conclusion is that this strategy offers significant benefits, often in terms of speed and competency, but brings along severe risks, as well – such as lack of transparency and accountability, and potentially conflicting national priorities.</p>
<iframe width="100%" height="332" src="https://player.pbs.org/viralplayer/3034688767/" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no" seamless="" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<h2>Clear advantages</h2>
<p>Using a select group of elite troops and choosing very specific targets can be a highly efficient way for presidents to advance military and foreign policy goals that otherwise might take countless years, hundreds of billions of dollars, massive deployments, intense debates with Congress and thorny international entanglements. </p>
<p>Imagine, for instance, if President George W. Bush had simply sent special operations troops to kill Iraqi president Saddam Hussein rather than getting mired in an endless war in that country. Trump recently offered an example, albeit on a smaller scale, of how this approach works: Shortly after announcing the pullout of U.S. troops from northern Syria, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/27/isis-islamic-state-leader-baghdadi-killed/">he successfully deployed Delta Force to take out al-Baghdadi</a>.</p>
<p>This strategy is also relatively inexpensive: Special operations spending in the 2020 federal budget amounts to <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf">US$13.8 billion</a> – an enormous sum that is nevertheless just 1.87% of the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/21/trump-signs-738-billion-defense-bill.html">$738 billion overall defense budget</a>. </p>
<p>And high-profile successes can boost presidents’ public approval ratings. Obama’s climbed from <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/147437/obama-approval-rallies-six-points-bin-laden-death.aspx">46% to 52%</a> after Osama bin Laden’s killing, and Trump’s rose from <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/president_trump_job_approval-6179.html">41% to 45%</a> after al-Baghdadi and Soleimani’s deaths.</p>
<p>Using small dedicated groups can also fill gaps in intelligence-gathering left by <a href="https://defensesystems.com/articles/2015/04/22/technology-has-changed-intelligence-gathering.aspx">satellites, drones and technological spying</a>. Special operations soldiers can track leads on the ground, interrogate suspects and flesh out information needed to make sound decisions and execute complex missions. Zeroing in on specific marks can minimize harm to civilians who might live or work nearby – rather than destroying a village to kill one man, commandos can just attack that individual in his home. </p>
<p>With this approach, the United States uses force more in line with its opponents. Unlike the skyjackers of the 1960s and 1970s, today’s ideological killers do not negotiate. They tend to be extremists, like religious fanatics or white supremacists, rather than attention-seeking secular political activists. They play by different rules, and so do special operations forces. </p>
<p>Unlike conventional forces, special operators do not have to constantly answer to the public, face media scrutiny or become a political punching bag. In fact, the American people have rarely demanded to know more about exactly what special operations forces are up to. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Special operations forces can function in ways regular troops don’t.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/US-Islamic-State/f469ceeec9cb49a0a6a251ee80741376/102/0">AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo</a></span>
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<h2>Serious drawbacks</h2>
<p>One of the problems with the dependence on special operations forces is that it exhausts the very people on whom it relies.</p>
<p>“The force has been stretched to the max,” <a href="http://javadc.org/news/press-release/wade-ishimoto-inducted-as-distinguished-member-of-the-special-forces-regiment/">former Delta Force intelligence officer Wade Ishimoto</a> says in my co-production with Retro Report, “How Special Ops Became Central to the War on Terror.” </p>
<p>“Special operations should not be the panacea for every kind of difficulty,” he continues.</p>
<p>Ishimoto warns that special operations soldiers are bound to burn out because there are too few of them to handle all the assignments in far-flung locations. Indeed, in recent years, they have experienced an increase in <a href="https://academic.oup.com/milmed/article/179/3/301/4160774">alcohol abuse</a> and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/suicides-nearly-triple-among-elite-forces-1315810">suicides</a>.</p>
<p>Yet Americans are often in the dark about their special operations. With specialized, clandestine forces, presidents likely find it easier to wage war without consulting Congress and without clear strategic plans. </p>
<p>The recently released <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/documents-database/">Afghanistan Papers</a> show presidents can <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-nation-building/">keep significant</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-strategy/">secrets</a> about wars, such as the 18-years-and-counting Afghanistan conflict. </p>
<p>The most obvious downside is that special operations missions can fail miserably. In April 1980, when Delta Force tried to rescue the American hostages held in Iran, the troops <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/05/the-desert-one-debacle/304803/">never made it past their initial rendezvous point</a> in the desert. In 2017, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/africa/u-s-soldiers-niger-were-pursuing-isis-recruiter-when-ambushed-n813746">al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists in Niger ambushed U.S. special forces soldiers</a>, killing four of them. </p>
<p>The enigmatic nature of the operations means it is possible some special forces deaths never make the nightly news or morning papers. </p>
<p>Still, I doubt this strategy will change in any significant way, regardless of who wins the November 2020 presidential election. It’s not just that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks – it’s that, to many people, <a href="https://www.strategy-business.com/article/09403?gko=c6aca">there is no better alternative</a>. If there were, Trump would probably be quite happy to scrap yet another Obama policy.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Boaz Dvir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sending specially trained operatives into hostile territories dates back to Colonial days. In the past decade, special operations forces have become central to America’s counterterrorism efforts.Boaz Dvir, Assistant Professor in Journalism, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1256362019-11-21T20:15:55Z2019-11-21T20:15:55ZBroken trust: How Iraqis lost their faith in Washington, long before the Kurds did<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302762/original/file-20191120-479-15lbg25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A mass grave is excavated in Khan Al-Rubea in 2003 that witnesses say is filled with the remains of Shia whom Saddam executed in 1991. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Iraq-IRAQ-M-/7ad839139fe5da11af9f0014c2589dfb/8/0">AP/Hasan Sarbakhshian</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In all the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/trump-betray-kurds-support/599737/">hand-wringing</a> that critics and commentators have done since President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of U.S. troops from northern Syria, one of the common refrains emphasizes the breach of trust between Washington and its Kurdish militia partners.</p>
<p>Some scholars of <a href="http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/S6800/courseworks/foreign_pol_walt.pdf">international relations</a> put little stock in trust. Countries are selfish, after all. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.princeton.edu/%7Eamoravcs/library/liberalism_working.pdf">Others</a> see trust in impersonal terms, embedded in the rules, norms, institutions and alliances that bind countries to each other. </p>
<p>It turns out, though, that trust does matter in international relations. And in the Middle East, trust is often seen in personal terms. </p>
<p>For the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/opinion/trump-turkey-kurds-syria.html">American personnel</a> who worked, ate and lived with the Syrian Kurds, trust-building was also a deeply personal experience. Trust underpinned the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/world/middleeast/isis-kurds-baghdadi.html">crucial intelligence cooperation</a> between the U.S. and its Kurdish partners. That cooperation helped plan and execute the raid that led to the capture killing of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.</p>
<p>As one former American special operator has <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/11/abandoning-kurds-america-hurt-itself/161201/">written</a>, “Trust is a powerful commodity that has saved many lives in shadowy battlefields across the Middle East. But it takes a long time to build and can be gone in an instant.”</p>
<p>By contrast, mistrust, even if it is based on perception alone, can linger for decades, thwarting Washington’s foreign policy goals.</p>
<h2>Defeating the Islamic State</h2>
<p>I observed the long-term consequences of broken trust next door to Syria, in Iraq. </p>
<p>I served as a U.S. diplomat in the southern Iraqi city of Basrah during 2015 and 2016, the height of the war against the Islamic State group, also known as IS.</p>
<p>At the time, after years of sectarian strife, dishonest governments and their broken promises, Iraqis seemed united around the common purpose of defeating IS. The <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/04/28/what-we-left-behind">corrupt and sectarian regime</a> of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had been ousted. And the U.S. was leading an international coalition to help the Iraqi government in the fight against IS, providing hundreds of millions of dollars in <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jul-13-2017-united-states-announces-additional-humanitarian-assistance-iraqi-people">humanitarian assistance</a>. </p>
<p>You might think that a war that the U.S. was fighting on behalf of the Iraqi people, a war that was truly an existential one for the majority Iraqi Shia, would have produced at least some goodwill toward the United States.</p>
<p>Instead, when I arrived in Basrah in 2015, I discovered that many Iraqis, including the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-27945271/iraq-crisis-the-sunni-shia-divide-explained">majority Shia Muslim</a> population among whom I lived, believed that the United States was somehow in cahoots with the Islamic State. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. tacit support for Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in the 1980s made Iraqis cynical about U.S. trustworthiness after Hussein was deposed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Iraq-SADDAM-/3b22e19e04f2da11af9f0014c2589dfb/42/0">AP photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Mistrust for decades</h2>
<p>The Middle East is rife with conspiracy theories. But this one was particularly jarring given that the United States was then engaged in a costly and very public effort to defeat the Islamic State, a terrorist group which declared the Shia apostates and said they must be killed.</p>
<p>Over time, I began to understand the roots of these attitudes. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT">Disinformation</a> and propaganda, especially from Iran, fueled them to some extent. </p>
<p>But there were deeper issues at play. </p>
<p>“The United States defeated Saddam’s armies in a matter of weeks,” incredulous Iraqis I met would say to me. “So how is it that you can’t defeat a ragtag army of jihadists in two years?” </p>
<p>Iranian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT">disinformation campaigns</a> blaming the U.S. for the Islamic State were effective because of a deep gulf of mistrust between the U.S. and Iraqis, which led to widespread cynicism among ordinary Iraqis about U.S. motives. </p>
<p>The origins of this mistrust go back decades, from tacit U.S. support for Saddam Hussein in the 1980s, when Washington turned a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/14/books/turning-a-blind-eye.html">blind eye</a> to the dictatorship’s atrocities against Iraqi Kurds. </p>
<p>The lack of trust helps explain why the U.S. had such a hard time stabilizing Iraq after 2003, despite toppling a feared despot and despite investing billions of dollars in the country. </p>
<h2>Roots in betrayal</h2>
<p>Iraqi Shia are the largest Muslim sect in the country, but have less political power than Sunni Muslims. The Shia in particular have painful memories of an event that they see as a massive breach of trust between them and the U.S. </p>
<p>In 1991, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/remembering-iraqi-uprising-twenty-five-years-ago">encouraged</a> by then-President George H.W. Bush, the Shia rose up against Saddam, only to be abandoned by the U.S. </p>
<p>Tens of thousands of Iraqi Shia were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2888989.stm">slaughtered</a>. </p>
<p>I visited a memorial to the victims of Saddam’s suppression of the uprising, where I saw a leaflet displayed that was dropped by U.S. and coalition aircraft calling on Iraqi soldiers and civilians to “fill the streets and alleys and bring down Saddam Hussein and his aides.” </p>
<p>“We thought this meant that the Americans would help us,” my guide at the museum told me.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Trump visited U.S. troops at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, Dec. 26, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Trump-Iraq/0c7bb5c680f7487b954c45e5c87a1d5d/11/0">AP/Andrew Harnik</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many Iraqis I met also recalled the devastating 1990s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/27/magazine/were-sanctions-right.html">sanctions</a> on their country that were championed by the United States. Others talked of Washington’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraq-without-a-plan/">failure to stabilize</a> the country after 2003. Then there was the perception that the Obama administration came late to the war against the Islamic State. </p>
<p>Other Iraqis I met – young ones – told me of their resentment at U.S. support for a political class in Baghdad that is seen as deeply corrupt. Some of them are no doubt <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/protesters-tahrir-square-iraq-191111195848776.html">protesting</a> in the streets and squares of Iraqi cities today. </p>
<p>I attended lots of meetings with Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders in the south. They saw the Obama administration’s <a href="https://www.npr.org/2015/12/19/459850716/fact-check-did-obama-withdraw-from-iraq-too-soon-allowing-isis-to-grow">2011 withdrawal of U.S. troops</a> and general disengagement from Iraq as a betrayal of trust. They saw it as handing over Iraq to Iranian influence, which they fear. </p>
<p>Ultimately, Iraqis did not see the U.S. as a credible, consistent or committed partner. Some <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/18/world/middleeast/iran-iraq-spy-cables.html">turned to Iran for assistance</a>, while turning against the United States. Perhaps it is no surprise that <a href="https://www.ndi.org/Poll_Points_Path_Forward_Iraq_Reconciliation">polls taken</a> at the time I worked in Basrah showed that Iraqis saw Iran and Russia as more favorable security partners.</p>
<h2>Can’t escape the past</h2>
<p>Iraq is by no means a perfect analogy for the shattered trust between <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/world/middleeast/kurds-sense-of-betrayal-compounded-by-empowerment-of-unsavory-rivals.html">Washington and its Syrian Kurdish allies</a>. Yet the the Iraqi experience shows that distrust of the United States has deep roots in past U.S. actions. </p>
<p>In Syria, too, the U.S. has left a legacy of mistrust since 2011, from <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/10/04/the-problem-with-obamas-account-of-the-syrian-red-line-incident/">Obama’s failure</a> to follow through on his call for Assad to step down, to his <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/4/15/17238568/syria-bomb-trump-obama-russia">failure to impose meaningful costs</a> on the Syrian regime for its use of chemical weapons. Trump’s withdrawal is just one episode in a longer story.</p>
<p>Despite breaches of trust, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/iraqi-official-us-support-vital-lasting-defeat">Iraqis continued to need U.S. support</a>. But that need paired with a lack of trust makes things difficult for American diplomats in Iraq. For me, it was often overwhelming to be at the receiving end of the immense disappointment, frustration and more rarely, hope, that the Iraqis have in the United States. </p>
<p>The Syrian Kurds, like the Iraqis, will still need the United States and continue to work with Washington. But the breach of trust will complicate cooperation, as it did in Iraq.</p>
<p>Not everything that Iraqis blame the United States for is fair. And it would be impossible for even the best-crafted U.S. policies to satisfy all of Iraq’s diverse people. </p>
<p>At times I tried to remind my unfailingly hospitable Iraqi interlocutors, especially those in the government, to be a bit more introspective about their own failings and responsibility for Iraq’s post-Saddam ills. I tried to remind them that the United States invested a lot in Iraq, with limited results. </p>
<p>In the end, the credibility of the message was undercut by a lack of trust in the messenger.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski has previously received funding from the United States government through a Fulbright grant.</span></em></p>Distrust of the US – even if misplaced – can linger for decades, thwarting Washington’s foreign policy goals. A former US diplomat in Iraq reflects on that country’s skepticism of US aid efforts.Mieczysław P. Boduszyński, Assistant Professor of Politics, Pomona CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1261752019-11-13T13:10:03Z2019-11-13T13:10:03ZWhat is a caliph? The Islamic State tries to boost its legitimacy by hijacking a historic institution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300751/original/file-20191107-10930-39lr05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An image of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who died on Oct. 26, 2019..</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/US-Islamic-State/fee3c4433beb4f088323b85b942a5c0c/38/0">Department of Defense via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Just days after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/27/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-isis-leader-killed-us-donald-trump">death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a> on Oct. 27, the Islamic State named <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50254785">Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi</a> as the new “caliph.” </p>
<p>In 2014, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2014/jun/30/isis-declares-caliphate-in-iraq-and-syria-live-updates">IS conquered vast swaths of Iraq and Syria</a> and declared itself to be the “caliphate.” </p>
<p>Defined and applied in different ways over the centuries, the fundamental idea behind the caliphate is the <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/hugh-kennedy/caliphate/9780465094394/?lens=perseus">just ordering of society</a> according to the will of God. </p>
<p>The Islamic State’s caliphate was never widely recognized among the global Muslim community and no longer has significant territory. But the Islamic State still uses the history of the caliphate to push their claims.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=cQRzNv8AAAAJ&hl=en">a scholar of global Islam</a>, every time I teach my “Introduction to Islam” class, questions about the caliphate come up, in part because of IS’s claims. </p>
<h2>Caliph conundrums</h2>
<p>The leader of a caliphate is called the caliph, meaning deputy or representative. All caliphs are believed to be the successor to Prophet Muhammad. Muhammad was not a caliph; <a href="https://quran.com/33/40">according to the Quran</a> he was the last and greatest of the prophets. </p>
<p>That means no one can replace Muhammad as the messenger of God. The caliph, for example, is not always seen as holding special spiritual authority. But he is meant to preside over the caliphate in the absence of Muhammad.</p>
<p>The debate over who was the rightful representative of the prophet began immediately after his death. <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=O36yXxCMiQIC&printsec=frontcover&dq=islam+a+brief+history&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">While the majority supported Abu Bakr</a> – one of the prophet’s closest companions – a minority opted for his young son-in-law and cousin, Ali. </p>
<p>Abu Bakr’s supporters would come to be known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">Sunni Muslims</a>, who believe that Muhammad did not leave instructions regarding his successor. Those who felt Ali was appointed by the prophet to be the political and spiritual leader of the fledgling Muslim community became known as Shiite Muslims. </p>
<p>Abu Bakr was the first caliph and Ali the fourth. </p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=EmN8tCx_jR4C&pg=PA9&dq=the+rashidun&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwisvPS13uHlAhUGjqQKHeqGB_0Q6AEIWjAH#v=onepage&q=the%20rashidun&f=false">The second and third caliphs were Umar and Uthman</a>. Under Umar, the caliphate expanded to include many regions of the world such as the lands of the former Byzantine and Sassanian empires in Asia Minor, Persia and Central Asia. Uthman is credited with compiling the Quran. </p>
<p>That al-Baghdadi adopted the name of the first caliph was no coincidence. Together, Sunni Muslims call the first four caliphs <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118455074.wbeoe277">the Rashidun, or the “Rightly Guided Caliphs,”</a> because they were close companions or relations of Muhammad. They are also believed to be extraordinarily pious. This period lasted about 30 years. </p>
<h2>The complex history of the caliphate</h2>
<p>After rebels assassinated Uthman in A.D. 656, Ali was elected caliph. However, a civil war soon broke out between Ali and Muʿawiya ibn Abi Sufyan. The civil war ended in Sufyan’s victory and the formation of the Umayyad caliphate in A.D. 661. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/isru/hd_isru.htm">The Umayyad dynasty lasted 89 years</a>.</p>
<p>The Abbasid dynasty descended from Muhammad’s uncle, Abbas ibn Abdul-Muttalib, and succeeded the Umayyads.</p>
<p>These two caliphates oversaw the continuing expansion of the empire. <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-24774-8_2">Under them architecture, the arts and sciences flourished</a>.</p>
<p>For example, the “Dome of the Rock,” a shrine in the Old City of Jerusalem, was built under an Umayyad caliph as <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233604991_The_Dome_of_the_Rock_Origin_of_its_Octagonal_Plan">a monument</a> to the rising supremacy of their empire.</p>
<p>The Grand Library of Baghdad, also known as the “House of Wisdom,” was supported by Abbasid patronage. The “House of Wisdom” is credited with being a center of translation, scientific study and academic exchange. This period of flourishing, from the eighth to the 14th century, is often referred to as the <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=O36yXxCMiQIC&pg=PA39&dq=islamic+golden+age&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiGvsuz4OHlAhU9wAIHHdFcBmo4FBDoAQgvMAE#v=onepage&q=islamic%20golden%20age&f=false">“Islamic Golden Age</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dome of The Rock, in Jerusalem.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/rayinmanila/24665287394">Ray in Manila</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Both before and after the fall of the Abbasids in A.D. 1258, a succession of various empires <a href="http://teachmideast.org/articles/timeline-of-islamic-dynasties/">made overlapping and competing claims</a> to the caliphate. These included the Mamluks of Cairo and the Umayyads in Cordóba, Spain. </p>
<p>In 1517, the Turkish Ottomans amassed enough land and power throughout Asia Minor, North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and Eastern Europe to claim the title “caliphate.” Ottoman sultans, however, were not universally recognized as caliphs. <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/declaring-caliphate-doesnt-make-one-caliph">Many Muslims believe</a> that the caliphate effectively ended after the Mongol conquest of Abbasid Baghdad in A.D. 1258.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the Ottomans effectively held on to that title until 1924, when the Turkish nationalist and secularist Kemal Ataturk <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=R3SYDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=ataturk+abolished+caliphate&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi_tJ-e4eHlAhVS2KQKHTeXA4kQ6AEISDAE#v=onepage&q=ataturk%20abolished%20caliphate&f=false">abolished the caliphate</a>. </p>
<h2>Resurrecting the caliphate?</h2>
<p>The idea of the caliphate, which the Islamic State has forcefully promoted, recalls a time and a place when Islamic states flourished politically, economically and socially. It also summons up a spiritual vision of a supposedly more devout and dedicated Muslim community than exists today. </p>
<p>Other modern-day Islamists have called for a <a href="https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4287&context=gc_etds">resurrection of the caliphate,</a> or at least its ideals, as a way to recapture the vibrancy of the past. However, only violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida or the Islamic State have tried to make it a tangible reality.</p>
<p>Killing al-Baghdadi has not quashed the Islamic State’s version of the caliphate. The idea <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state">lives on and continues to motivate</a> its members in enclaves across the globe. It is worth mentioning that the name of their new caliph is an honorific title for a member of Prophet Muhammad’s family – “al-Qurashi.” This prophetic lineage is one more way IS is trying to resurrect the history of the caliphate for its destructive purposes. </p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ken Chitwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Islamic State has appointed yet another ‘caliph’ after the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. What is the idea behind the caliphate?Ken Chitwood, Lecturer, Concordia College New York, Concordia College New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1263172019-11-07T21:15:46Z2019-11-07T21:15:46ZAlpha dogs in the Trump era<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300565/original/file-20191107-12506-1wtngb2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4717%2C3057&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A dog thought to be Conan, the working military dog that played a role in the capture of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is displayed on a monitor at a Pentagon news conference on Oct. 30, 2019. U.S. President Donald Trump lauded the dog despite frequently using the word 'dog' to attack his foes.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andrew Harnik)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The morning after <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/the-rise-and-fall-of-isis-leader-al-baghdadi-1.5337580">the recent American raid</a> on the compound of elusive ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, U.S. President Donald Trump put his penchant for media spectacle on triumphant display.</p>
<p>He delivered a dramatic 48-minute news conference during which he <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/donald-trump-makes-the-raid-that-killed-al-baghdadi-all-about-him">embellished or fabricated</a> the description of the raid and even <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/officials-cringe-trump-spills-sensitive-details-al-baghdadi-raid-n1073001">revealed</a> some classified information. </p>
<p>At several points, Trump called attention to the military working dog that took part in the raid and was slightly injured, and employed an abundance of canine imagery to refer to ISIS and al-Baghdadi. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Q6YvsrGILrw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Washington Post.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>He lavished praise on the “beautiful” and “talented” dog that chased al-Baghdadi into a tunnel where he detonated his own suicide vest, killing himself and some children. In contrast, Trump labelled ISIS followers “sick puppies” and al-Baghdadi “a sick and depraved man,” “a coward” who, “whimpering, screaming and crying” “died like a dog.”</p>
<p>Al-Baghdadi’s responsibility for widespread torture, rape and murder is undisputed. The raid was named in honour of the late <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/27/baghdadi-operation-named-after-kayla-mueller-isis-hostage">Kayla Mueller</a>, an American aid worker who was raped by al-Baghdadi. </p>
<p>However, since the news conference, it’s been the dog — a Belgian malinois identified as Conan — that has taken <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/media/veteran-offers-purple-heart-medal-to-military-working-dog-the-presidents-instincts-are-right-to-award-the-medal">centre stage</a>, not Mueller, Trump, al-Baghdadi or ISIS. </p>
<p>The Pentagon, acknowledging the high level of interest in Conan and its K-9 program, stated that military working dogs are “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2019/10/30/baghdadi-raid-video-release-syria-sot-vpx.cnn">critical members of our forces</a>” and perform several roles, among them protecting soldiers, separating combatants from non-combatants and saving civilian lives. </p>
<h2>Dogs often used in wartime</h2>
<p>Indeed, specially trained dogs have long been engaged in wartime, policing and crowd control and, since 9-11, in the “war on terror.” </p>
<p>In fact, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/08/08/getting-bin-laden#ixzz1UMp907aC">Cairo, another Belgian malinois</a>, was part of the 2011 U.S. Navy SEAL operation that led to the assassination of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden when Barack Obama was president.</p>
<p>The death of such dogs is generally seen as a tragedy; when Diesel, a Belgian malinois involved in a 2015 raid on a suspected ISIS terrorist hideout in Paris was killed, many proclaimed <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/trending/je-suis-chien-diesel-dog-1.3324856">“Je suis chien” and “Je suis Diesel”</a> in tribute.</p>
<p>The public fascination with these dogs highlights the peculiar place occupied by the species <em>Canis lupus familiaris</em> in the western world. Sought after for their domestic companionship and superior sense of smell and hearing, dogs are also valued for the savagery they can unleash on command. </p>
<h2>Racialized people targeted</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/05/dogs-bloodhounds-slavery-police-brutality-racism/">Cuban bloodhounds</a> were used in the Americas in the service of colonization. In the American South, <a href="https://sniffingthepast.wordpress.com/2012/02/23/slavery-and-dogs-in-the-antebellum-south/">bloodhounds working with slave hunters</a> tracked the scent of African-American fugitive slaves, often injuring them upon capture. Slaves escaping bondage reported being more afraid of the dogs than the wild animals they encountered. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300570/original/file-20191107-12464-1dbogq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300570/original/file-20191107-12464-1dbogq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300570/original/file-20191107-12464-1dbogq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300570/original/file-20191107-12464-1dbogq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300570/original/file-20191107-12464-1dbogq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300570/original/file-20191107-12464-1dbogq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300570/original/file-20191107-12464-1dbogq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300570/original/file-20191107-12464-1dbogq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This statue in Birmingham shows how dogs were used to attack children during a Civil Rights march.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andy Montgomery/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During the Civil Rights movement, police dogs confronted Martin Luther King Jr.’s <a href="http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-3944">Children’s Crusade.</a> Media coverage of white male police officers leading German shepherds that lunged at young African-American students drew negative publicity to Birmingham, Ala. <a href="https://alabamanewscenter.com/2017/05/02/on-this-day-in-alabama-history-may-2/">The city’s memorial</a> to the crusade depicts just this scenario.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.foxnews.com/story/prisoner-says-gitmo-detainees-abused-with-attack-dogs-drugs">Guantanamo Bay</a> and <a href="https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5293136">Abu Ghraib</a> trophy photos showed American soldiers subjecting Iraqi and Afghan prisoners to horrific tortures, including snarling German shepherds threatening both clothed and naked prisoners. </p>
<p>In some instances, senior military staff encouraged soldiers to treat prisoners like dogs; some, including <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/05/24/england.case/index.html?iref=allsearch">a white female soldier</a>, forced prisoners to wear dog collars and leashes. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300571/original/file-20191107-12450-tzycc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300571/original/file-20191107-12450-tzycc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300571/original/file-20191107-12450-tzycc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300571/original/file-20191107-12450-tzycc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300571/original/file-20191107-12450-tzycc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300571/original/file-20191107-12450-tzycc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300571/original/file-20191107-12450-tzycc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300571/original/file-20191107-12450-tzycc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This photo shows a U.S. soldier holding a dog in front an Iraqi detainee at Abu Ghraib prison on the outskirts of Baghdad.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/The Washington Post)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Statistics demonstrating that police dogs are more likely to be found patrolling <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/racist-la-police-dogs-only-bite-latinos-and-african-americans-8874913.html">African-American and Latino neighbourhoods in Los Angeles</a> provide more evidence that military and police working dogs have been co-opted into dehumanizing racialized populations.</p>
<h2>‘Alpha dog’</h2>
<p>In effect, specially trained dogs perform by proxy the dominance attributed to the slave owners of the past and today’s mostly white military and police and, regardless of the gender of the dogs or their handlers, hegemonic masculinity.</p>
<p>Trump’s use of canine imagery against the ISIS leader and his followers establishes the president’s alpha dog status over subordinates, and their submission to him. </p>
<p>Indeed, Trump, the first president in a century not to keep a pet dog at the White House, <a href="https://slate.com/technology/2019/10/donald-trump-and-dogs-whats-the-deal.html">has long used the word “dog”</a> to deride and humiliate enemies, critics and women in particular. </p>
<p>Flesh-and-blood Conan appears to have elicited warmer feelings. Trump, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/06/trumps-draft-avoidance-excuses-get-more-incoherent/">who shirked service in the Vietnam War</a>, faces an impeachment inquiry and is eager to best Obama’s achievements, understandably wishes to capitalize on the dog’s “American hero” status. </p>
<p>He tweeted an image of himself awarding a medal to a real-life Vietnam veteran who was <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-baghdadi-killing-dog-conan-medal-twitter-a9178771.html">photo-shopped to look like Conan</a> and has even invited the dog to visit the White House. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1189601417469841409"}"></div></p>
<p>Trump’s newfound and likely <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/opinion/trump-military-dog.html">transactional affection</a> for a high-performing dog should not distract a nation from his administration’s disgraceful dealings with <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/us-immigration-policy-program/data-and-analysis-related-trump-administration-actions">migrants</a>, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/11/trump-refugee-decrease-immigration-044186">refugees</a> and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/conway-defends-trump-s-charlottesville-remarks-darn-near-perfection-n999266">minorities</a>. </p>
<p>And the rapturous stories of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/opinion/the-dogs-of-the-vietnam-war.html">heroism</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_ASrwqD1fc">sacrifice</a> of specially trained military and police dogs, however moving, should not obfuscate the history of their ugly deployment against racialized peoples, and their current use doing the same work.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/ca/newsletters?utm_source=TCCA&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126317/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christabelle Sethna receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada</span></em></p>The rapturous stories of the heroism and sacrifice of specially trained military and police dogs should not obfuscate the history of their ugly deployment against racialized peoples.Christabelle Sethna, Professor, Institute of Feminist and Gender Studies, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1260292019-10-31T02:32:04Z2019-10-31T02:32:04ZDogs of war: are military dogs war heroes or just tools? It’s time the law protected our furry troops<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299595/original/file-20191031-17868-mdc7hc.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C818%2C1023&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">This military dog chased the Islamic State leader down a tunnel and is being called a hero. </span> </figcaption></figure><p>In the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/us/trump-transcript-isis-al-baghdadi.html">dramatic account</a> of the raid and killing of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, one thing captured widespread attention. A military working dog was singled out for praise, reportedly chasing al-Baghdadi down a tunnel before the IS leader detonated a suicide vest, killing himself and his three children. </p>
<p>The Joint Chiefs <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2019/10/29/world/middleeast/29reuters-mideast-crisis-trump-dog.html">acknowledged</a> the dog was “slightly wounded and fully recovering” and still on active duty. </p>
<p>Dogs used by militaries around the world are seen as vital assets to military operations, with <a href="https://www.kut.org/post/documentary-explores-bond-between-military-dogs-and-their-handlers">close bonds</a> created between dogs and their handlers. Many descriptions of military working dogs describe them as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/powerup/2019/10/29/powerup-why-the-name-of-the-beautiful-and-talented-dog-from-baghdadi-operation-is-still-classified/5db742ea602ff10cf14f9833/">fellow soldiers</a>, no different in treatment, status and respect, than their human counterparts. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/for-a-nation-of-dog-lovers-britain-treats-its-canine-veterans-shamefully-88505">For a nation of dog lovers Britain treats its canine veterans shamefully</a>
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<p>So it’s interesting that the legal frameworks governing militaries and the operation of armed conflict have so little to say about the use, protection, or treatment of animals during war. This gap is particularly notable as the use of animals as soldiers is nothing new. </p>
<h2>War dogs in history</h2>
<p>This isn’t the first dog to become famous with such raids. <a href="https://dogs-in-history.blogspot.com/2017/07/cairo-part-of-navy-seal-team-that.html">Cairo</a> was a lauded member of Operation Neptune Spear, the US Navy SEALs operation that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden. </p>
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<p>But the history of the use of animals in warfare goes back further. Dogs were recorded in warfare as <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/641375?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">early as 600 BCE</a>, and mentioned in the works of Homer, Herodotus, and Polynaeus. And while technological advancements have reduced the need for many species to be used by militaries, dogs are still seen as vital to their work. </p>
<p>The Australian Defence Forces <a href="https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/5046-photo-essay-adf-s-military-working-dogs">extensively use dogs</a> in their operations, and for many purposes. This includes sniffing out explosive devices, detecting narcotics, locating the wounded, and patrolling and protecting missions and bases. </p>
<p>The RAAF has been trialling a <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/FOI/Docs/Disclosures/169_1819_DocumentsIR.pdf">welfare dog program</a>, placing dogs with chaplains to serve as therapy animals for deployed soldiers, in association with the <a href="https://youngdiggers.com.au/dogs">Young Diggers Dog Squad</a>. </p>
<p>In 2017, the Australian Defence Force commissioned the <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/Medals/GeneralInfo/Canine-Operational-Service-Medal.asp">Canine Operational Service Medal</a>, becoming the first military in the world specifically to honour the contributions made by military working dogs. </p>
<p>The medal is emblazoned with the image of <a href="https://www.aussiewardogs.org/content/media/dogumentation/CAD%20QUAKE.pdf">Quake</a>, an army combat assault dog, who died on operation in Afghanistan in 2012. </p>
<h2>Military dogs are ‘equipment’, at best</h2>
<p>The close bonds formed between military dogs, their handlers, and their units – and the hero status the public is eager to give these dogs – is not reflected in their legal status during armed conflicts. </p>
<p>In the United States, military dogs are labelled as “equipment”. A <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/4103?r=1">bill was introduced in 2012</a> to reclassify them as “canine members of the armed force”, but this bill ultimately lapsed without being passed into law. In practice, they are treated as noncommissioned officers, and given <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/powerup/2019/10/29/powerup-why-the-name-of-the-beautiful-and-talented-dog-from-baghdadi-operation-is-still-classified/5db742ea602ff10cf14f9833/?wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1">higher ranks</a> than their handlers to ensure respect. But this is symbolic and brings with it no legal protection when in the theatre of war. </p>
<p>In Australia, the status of military working dogs is not addressed in legislation. But on the public-facing website of the <a href="https://www.airforce.gov.au/technology/combat-support-capability/military-working-dogs">Air Force</a>, they’re placed under the category of “technology”, alongside bushmasters and fire trucks.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299596/original/file-20191031-165458-1is6la5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299596/original/file-20191031-165458-1is6la5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299596/original/file-20191031-165458-1is6la5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299596/original/file-20191031-165458-1is6la5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299596/original/file-20191031-165458-1is6la5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299596/original/file-20191031-165458-1is6la5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1790&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299596/original/file-20191031-165458-1is6la5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1790&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299596/original/file-20191031-165458-1is6la5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1790&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The medal awarded to military dogs when they’re very good.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Department of Defence</span></span>
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<p>This classification as “things” comes at a time when much attention is being given to the status and rights of animals in many parts of the world, and a move away from classifying animals as property. The ACT has just <a href="https://theconversation.com/acts-new-animal-sentience-law-recognises-an-animals-psychological-pain-and-pleasure-and-may-lead-to-better-protections-124577">passed law recognising animal sentience</a>, acknowledging their ability to feel pain and to perceive the world around them.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/icrc-databases-international-humanitarian-law">international law governing war</a> – known as international humanitarian law or the laws of war – says even less. Despite the long history of animals used in warfare, there is not a single reference to the use of dogs or any other animal during war. </p>
<p>This silence does have consequences for military working dogs, beyond just outdated perceptions of non-human species. </p>
<h2>Canine combatants</h2>
<p>International humanitarian law is largely premised on a <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/law/principle-distinction">fundamental distinction between combatants and civilians</a>. </p>
<p>Combatant status brings with it the right to be involved in hostilities, but also the burden of being a legitimate target for attack by the other side. Civilians are granted fundamental protections of not being a legitimate target, but lose this protection if they start participating in the hostilities. </p>
<p>The laws of war also provide protections for combatants to not be targeted in circumstances where they are surrendering, wounded, and provide for special protections for prisoners of war. </p>
<p>If dogs are nothing more than military equipment, then neither the protections of combatant or civilian status apply - they can be targeted and destroyed as if any piece of inanimate military gear. </p>
<p>If equipment or technology, then there is no obligation to treat them with respect if captured or wounded.</p>
<p>For example, there is no international law in place prohibiting the use of dogs, as they were used by the Soviets in World War II and beyond, as <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/canine-corner/201011/war-morality-and-exploding-dogs">suicide bombers</a>. </p>
<h2>Dogs need legal protection</h2>
<p>The solution isn’t as simple as recognising dogs having the same combatant status as humans. </p>
<p>Combatants must comply with the rules of international humanitarian law. This means they commit, at all times, to distinguish between civilians and combatants, to not attack the wounded, and more.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/acts-new-animal-sentience-law-recognises-an-animals-psychological-pain-and-pleasure-and-may-lead-to-better-protections-124577">ACT's new animal sentience law recognises an animal's psychological pain and pleasure, and may lead to better protections</a>
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<p>Military working dogs are unlikely to be able to fully and independently comply with this large body of law. What’s needed are protections specifically targeting their role in armed conflicts.</p>
<p>The animal rights movement still has a long way to go when it comes to a universal recognition of the personhood of animals generally, and the laws of war are just a small facet of the bigger picture. </p>
<p>But the simultaneous treatment of dogs who are used on battlefields and in operations as heroes, while offering none of the legal protections given to their human counterparts, shows an irreconcilable dilemma in our current approach.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126029/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shireen Daft does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Australian Defence Forces use dogs for many purposes, including sniffing out explosive devices, detecting narcotics, locating the wounded, and patrolling and protecting missions and bases.Shireen Daft, Lecturer, Macquarie Law School, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1259472019-10-28T10:46:51Z2019-10-28T10:46:51ZAl-Baghdadi’s death: the rise and fall of the leader of Islamic State<p>Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Islamic State (IS), is dead. After US special forces raided his safe house in Idlib province in north-west Syria, Baghdadi <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-50200339">reportedly fled and detonated a suicide vest</a>, killing himself and three of his children. Over the past several years, there have been constant reports of his death but up until now, none of these reports have been verified. </p>
<p>The death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 did not lead <a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection">to the end of al-Qaeda</a>, but what does al-Baghdadi’s death mean for IS?</p>
<p>Al-Baghdadi was most likely born in the Iraqi city of Samarra in 1971. Though he was a poor student with bad eyesight, he rose to command al-Qaeda’s Iraqi division. He was captured by US forces in a raid in 2004 in Falluja, Iraq, but <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-declassified-iraq-prison-file-2015-2?r=US&IR=T">was not considered </a> to be particularly important at the time. Few would predict that al-Baghdadi would rise to such a position of power. He was <a href="https://www.ibtimes.com/baghdadi-ghost-jihadist-chief-who-oversaw-rise-fall-2854683">not noted</a> for being particularly charismatic or memorable. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/baghdadis-death-is-a-huge-blow-to-islamic-state-but-history-suggests-it-wont-guarantee-a-safer-world-125930">Baghdadi's death is a huge blow to Islamic State, but history suggests it won't guarantee a safer world</a>
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<p>By 2010, al-Baghdadi took control of the group that would be eventually called the Islamic State, a group whose predecessor was Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI had been led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2006/jun/09/guardianobituaries.alqaida">was killed in 2006</a>. Under the helm of al-Zarqawi, AQI had become one of the region’s most brutal and effective insurgent groups, controlling the flow of resources and foreign fighters into Iraq. By 2007, the group had almost faded away, but by 2009 it was <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state">gaining support</a> in Sunni tribal areas now known as the Islamic State in Iraq.</p>
<h2>Split with al-Qaeda</h2>
<p>By the time al-Baghdadi took over, a rift had grown between the wider al-Qaeda group and IS, which had been simmering since al-Zarqawi led AQI. To al-Qaeda, Baghdadi was excessively violent and counter-productive to al-Qaeda’s objectives. <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets">Extravagant brutality</a> such as beheading Muslims would alienate most Muslims. Al-Qaeda was also alarmed at IS’s predatory strategy of taking territory and resources from other rebel groups.</p>
<p>Al-Baghdadi, for his part, had no interest in subsuming IS under the wider leadership of al-Qaeda. He sent delegates (who were mostly of Syrian descent) into Syria after the Syrian war began in March 2011, a decision which al-Qaeda <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state">rejected</a>. After repeated attempts by al-Qaeda to convince al-Baghdadi to move out of Syria, it officially <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/world/middleeast/syria.html">cut its ties</a> with him in February 2014. </p>
<p>Al-Baghdadi believed that al-Qaeda was ineffective, and had failed to set up an actual state. </p>
<h2>Declaration of the caliphate</h2>
<p>In June 2014, al-Baghdadi made his first public appearance delivering a sermon from a mosque in the recently captured city of Mosul, where he claimed to come from the same tribe as the prophet Muhammad. He also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/27/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-obituary">brazenly declared</a> himself to be the caliph – or the political and religious leader of the Muslim community. Though this declaration was universally rejected by Islamic authorities, his plan of setting up a caliphate attracted thousands of foreign fighters to his cause.</p>
<p>At the height of al-Baghdadi’s power, IS had set up organisational structures across multiple countries and created a de facto state, the size of Belgium with 8m people <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-many-ways-to-map-the-islamic-state/379196/">living under its control</a>. He established a brutal justice system, legalised slavery, collected taxes and provided a handful of public services.</p>
<p>While bin Laden was more concerned with overthrowing modern Arab dictators, eliminating Israel and knocking over Western symbols of power, al-Baghdadi focused more on reviving the glory <a href="https://theconversation.com/understanding-islamic-state-where-does-it-come-from-and-what-does-it-want-52155">of the past</a>. His dramatic vision for IS attracted those that wanted to be considered to be part of a line of warriors that extended back to the Prophet Muhammad.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/there-is-nothing-medieval-about-islamic-state-atrocities-theyre-just-cruel-and-brutal-31383">There is nothing ‘medieval’ about Islamic State atrocities – they’re just cruel and brutal</a>
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<h2>Fall from power</h2>
<p>By 2017, IS’s fortunes started to turn. It had inspired or helped to plan a series of terrorist attacks in Belgium, the US, France and Turkey that drew increasing resolve from the West to step up efforts to eliminate the group. Iraq’s forces also became more effective against IS, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/09/world/middleeast/mosul-isis-liberated.html">eventually retaking Mosul</a> in 2017.</p>
<p>By March of 2019, IS surrendered its final territorial stronghold in Baghouz, Syria after extensive fighting with the mostly Kurdish, Syrian Democratic Forces. IS <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/29/inside-the-fall-of-the-islamic-state/">no longer had territory</a> that it could lay claim to, and without territory, it could not claim to be a valid caliphate.</p>
<p>In an attempt to strengthen his standing, al-Baghdadi appeared in a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-baghdadi/islamic-state-airs-video-purporting-to-be-leader-al-baghdadi-idUSKCN1S51QB">video in April</a> to demonstrate that the group could still exist, even if it lacked territory. He tried to energise his fighters to redouble their efforts. This would be only the second time that he would <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/death-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-end-era/600880/">appear to the public</a>. </p>
<p>His decision not to appear in person was about ensuring his own safety. Airstrikes had already caused a series of injuries. To <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/tomnamako/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-isis-leader-dies">avoid being caught</a>, he never used mobile phones and frequently changed safe houses.</p>
<p>This makes his presence in Idlib province in Syria where he died somewhat surprising. The province <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/19/idlib-faces-a-fearsome-future-islamist-rule-or-mass-murder-syria-civil-war-hayat-tahrir-al-sham/">is controlled</a> by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an Islamist militia fiercely opposed to IS. The region is also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/27/who-is-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-why-important-isis-caliph">currently under siege</a> by Russian and Syrian forces. </p>
<h2>What’s next for IS?</h2>
<p>As I’ve argued in <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=5GowDgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=violent+non+state+actors+global+politics&ots=LDKvdsLhN-&sig=NmRP7Izn6uKln1jmrvAPlbT1las&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=violent%20non%20state%20actors%20global%20politics&f=false">my own research</a>, for most terrorist groups which are hierarchically organised, the death of a leader signals its demise. In fact <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2017.1361411">most terrorist groups fall apart</a> within a year of forming once the group has been decapitated. Terrorist groups that are larger and more cellular in structure, such as al-Qaeda, have been able to weather the deaths of leaders, helping to <a href="https://media.mcclatchydc.com/static/pdf/Jordan.pdf">explain the group’s longevity</a>. </p>
<p>IS will likely name a successor to lead the group, and al-Baghdadi tried to prepare his followers that he would not live forever. But it could now start to operate in a way similar to al-Qaeda with a cell like structure, where it may attempt to plan terrorist attacks to signal its continued relevance to its followers. It needs to attract new numbers as it has seen its membership dwindle since its territory has disappeared. </p>
<p>The US decision to pull out of Syria <a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-why-the-kurds-had-little-option-but-to-do-a-deal-with-bashar-al-assad-125333">has compromised the Kurds</a>, who were managing detention centres holding captured IS fighters. The Turkish advance into Kurdish held territory in north-eastern Syria has <a href="https://theconversation.com/western-states-must-repatriate-is-fighters-and-their-families-before-more-break-free-from-syrian-camps-125168">led to the escape of several hundreds</a> of IS fighters. The US, however, already claims it has gathered further intelligence from al-Baghdadi’s compound that will continue to weaken IS. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00157">Studies of terrorist groups</a> that have managed succession raise concerns that when one leader dies, the leadership that follows can be less disciplined, more violent and determined to exact revenge. Given Baghdadi’s penchant for brutality, it’s hard to imagine how that’s possible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125947/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From US captive to head of Islamic State, the life of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who died in Syria.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1259302019-10-28T07:48:01Z2019-10-28T07:48:01ZBaghdadi’s death is a huge blow to Islamic State, but history suggests it won’t guarantee a safer world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298894/original/file-20191028-113958-ff6cnt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi may not be irreplaceable, but in many respects he was uniquely suited to the times in which he led.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/ al Furqan ISIS media wing handout</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>“A very bad man” has been killed and “the world is now a much safer place”. The sentiment behind US President Donald Trump’s announcement of the death of Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is difficult to argue with. Baghdadi was certainly a very bad man. And under his decade-long leadership of the Islamic State (IS) movement, many thousands of people in the Middle East and around the world suffered terrible brutality or death. </p>
<p>Common sense would suggest the world is indeed now a much safer place with Baghdadi’s passing. Unfortunately, however, there is no guarantee this will prove to be true in practice. </p>
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<p>The 18 year-long so-called Global War on Terror in the wake of the September 11 attacks – the international military campaign to fight al-Qaeda, and then IS – has been almost entirely reactive and tactical. </p>
<p>It has lacked <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/looking-beyond-syria-and-isis-americas-real-strategic-needs-middle-east">any consistent strategic purpose</a>, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, the Philippines or anywhere else.</p>
<p>The strongest military coalitions the world has ever seen have fought the largest and most powerful terror networks that have ever existed. And this has led, directly and indirectly, to hundreds of thousands of lives lost, trillions of dollars spent and remarkably <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/peace-afghanistan-iraq-syria-libya-and-yemen">little progress overall</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-retreat-from-syria-could-see-islamic-state-roar-back-to-life-125311">US retreat from Syria could see Islamic State roar back to life</a>
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<p>The <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/27/politics/isis-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-operation-donald-trump/index.html">special forces raids</a> targeting Baghdadi, in Idlib, and his deputy, IS spokesperson Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir, in Aleppo, were undoubtedly significant achievements representing tactical victories of great consequence.</p>
<p>IS has been dealt an enormous blow. But just how long its impact will last is not clear. The lessons of the past two decades make it clear this will certainly not have been a fatal blow.</p>
<p>The IS insurgency, both on the ground in Iraq and Syria, and around the world, was rebuilding strength before these strikes and will not be stopped in its tracks by losing its two most senior public leaders.</p>
<h2>Baghdadi as IS leader</h2>
<p>Baghdadi may not be irreplaceable but in many respects <a href="http://csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/essays/2015/thebeliever.html">he was uniquely suited</a> to the times in which he led. He oversaw the rebuilding of IS from its previous low point a decade ago. He played a key role in expanding into Syria, replenishing the leadership ranks, leading a blitzkrieg across northern Iraq, conquering Mosul and declaring a caliphate. In the eyes of his support base, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/middle-east/who-was-islamic-state-leader-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-20191028-p534rh.html">his credibility</a> as an Islamic scholar and religious leader will not easily be matched. </p>
<p>He was not a particularly charismatic leader and was certainly, as a brutal, fundamentalist loner, not truly inspirational. But he played his role effectively, backed up by the largely unseen ranks of former Iraqi intelligence officers and military commanders who form the core of the IS leadership. </p>
<p>He was, in his time, the caliph the caliphate needed. In that sense, we will not see his like again.</p>
<p>Incredibly, 15 years after Abu Musab al-Zarqawi established al-Qaeda in Iraq, and almost ten years after Baghdadi took charge of the Islamic State in Iraq, there is so much about the leadership of IS we don’t understand. </p>
<p>What is clear is the insurgent movement benefited enormously from so-called “de-Baathification” - the ridding of Arab nationalist ideology – in the wake of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/06/16/iraqs-crisis-dont-forget-the-2003-u-s-invasion/">2003 invasion of Iraq</a> and toppling of the authoritarian regime of Saddam Hussein. The sacking of thousands of mostly Sunni senior military leaders and technocrats proved to be a windfall for the emerging insurgency. </p>
<p>IS has always been a hybrid movement. Publicly, it presents as a fundamentalist religious movement driven by religious conviction. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-hidden-hand-behind-the-islamic-state-militants-saddam-husseins/2015/04/04/aa97676c-cc32-11e4-8730-4f473416e759_story.html">Behind the scenes</a>, however, experienced Baathist intelligence officers manipulated religious imagery to construct a police state, using religious terror to inspire, intimidate and control.</p>
<p>This is not to say Zarqawi and Baghdadi were unimportant as leaders. On the contrary, they were effective in mobilising religious sentiment first in the Middle East and then across the world. In the process, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47286935">more than 40,000 people</a> travelled to join the ranks of IS, inspired by the utopian ideal of religious revolution. Baghdadi was especially effective in playing his role as religious leader and caliph.</p>
<p>An optimistic take on Baghdadi’s denouement is that IS will be set back for many months, and perhaps even years. It will struggle to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/baghdadis-death-a-turning-point-for-islamic-state/2019/10/27/2d28c3b6-f900-11e9-9e02-1d45cb3dfa8f_story.html">regain the momentum</a> it had under his leadership.</p>
<p>Realistically, the extent to which this opportunity can be capitalised upon turns very much upon the extent to which the emerging leaders within the movement can be tracked down and dealt with before they have a chance to establish themselves.</p>
<h2>What might happen now?</h2>
<p>It would appear IS had identified the uncontested spaces of north-western Syria in Idlib and Aleppo, outside of the control of the Assad regime in Damascus, of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Northeast Syria, and beyond the reach of the Iraqi government in Baghdad, as territory in which its leadership could relocate and rebuild.</p>
<p>Continuing the optimistic take, there is the slim hope that the success of Sunday’s <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/27/isis-islamic-state-leader-baghdadi-killed/">raids</a> in which the partnership between US special forces and the SDF was so critical will lead to Trump being persuaded to reverse his decision to part ways with the SDF and pull out their <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/10/us-intelligence-disaster-looming-syria/600226/">special forces partners</a> on the ground, together with accompanying air support. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ceasefire-in-syria-is-ending-heres-whats-likely-to-happen-now-125492">The 'ceasefire' in Syria is ending – here's what's likely to happen now</a>
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<p>The fact Baghdadi and Muhajir were both found within five kilometres of the Turkish border suggests Turkish control of northern Syria is, to say the least, wholly unequal to the task of dealing with emerging IS leaders.</p>
<p>A reset to the pattern of partnership established over the past five years with the largely Kurdish SDF forces in north-eastern Syria could prove critically important in cutting down new IS leaders <a href="https://time.com/5711828/al-baghdadi-dead-isis-future/">as they emerge</a>. It’s believed <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/isis-new-leader-baghdadi-running-things-1468025">the locations in northern Syria</a> of the handful of leaders most likely to step into the void left by Baghdadi’s passing are well-known.</p>
<p>But even in the best-case scenario, all that can be realistically hoped for is slowing the rebuilding of the IS insurgency, buying time to rebuild political and social stability in northern Syria and northern Iraq.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125930/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton is engaged in a range of projects working to understand and counter violent extremism in Australia and in Southeast Asia that are funded by the Australian government.</span></em></p>How much the leader’s death might hinder the reemergence of IS greatly depends on how quickly its next leaders can be tracked down and dealt with.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/869172017-11-05T23:38:20Z2017-11-05T23:38:20ZHow the Islamic State uses ‘virtual lessons’ to build loyalty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193289/original/file-20171104-1032-9b54zs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A nine-year-old boy plays on his damaged street in Mosul, Iraq in this July 2017 photo. U.S.-backed forces have wrested Mosul from the Islamic State, and the terrorist group lost Raqqa, in northern Syria, last month. Nonetheless the Islamic State is using virtual information sessions to keep its members committed to the cause.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo/Felipe Dana)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Islamic State has lost <a href="https://www.vox.com/videos/2017/8/14/16125970/isis-syria-after-iraq-mosul">most of its territory</a> and key cities like <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-loses-mosul-al-nuri-mosque-al-hadba-minaret-iraq-forces/">Mosul</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/17/raqqa-recaptured-from-islamic-state-us-backed-forces-announce">Raqqa</a>, and more recently <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41856330">Deir al-Zour and al-Qaim</a>, have fallen to the global coalition fighting the terrorist group. In the face of such challenges, it’s tried to maintain legitimacy through what some have called a <a href="http://www.quilliaminternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf">virtual caliphate</a>.</p>
<p>Within this virtual space, what strategies does the Islamic State use to preserve group cohesion and sustain the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/social-identity-theory">social identity</a> of its members and sympathizers?</p>
<p>One of the ways influential members of the Islamic State’s digital community are involved in maintaining the organization’s group identity and sense of purpose is through “virtual” durūs (from the singular: dars) — lessons and IS propaganda shared in the context of a virtual study group. </p>
<p><a href="https://asam.sas.upenn.edu/sites/asam.sas.upenn.edu/files/The%20Dars.pdf">Durūs often centre on the study of the Qur’an</a>, but in some contexts, they are also seen as social events where one can learn about and discuss religious as well as personal issues. In the case of the Islamic State, influential members in encrypted chats lead regular durūs that advocate <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/293162479_Self-categorization_theory">self-categorization</a> and group rivalry.</p>
<p>The idea is to show, both privately and publicly, that IS and its supporters are superior to all other jihadi groups worldwide, which they often characterize as being deviant from what they consider to be the true Islam.</p>
<p>What the durūs also clearly reveal is that IS influential members and sympathizers understand and apply various religious ideas differently from other jihadi groups. <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/10/02/divisions-within-the-global-jihad-a-primer/">These rival interpretations of Islamic concepts</a> pose a challenge for counter-radicalization efforts, since people who embrace IS’s ideology and world view consider all other perspectives a form of deviance.</p>
<h2>How the IS virtual durūs operate</h2>
<p>In some encrypted chats, durūs take place two or three times a week. At first, the “sheik” or an influential member of the chat will temporarily restrict members of the group from writing messages in order to post an uninterrupted lesson of the day.</p>
<p>Sessions usually begin with praise to Allah: “Bismillahir Rahmānir Raheem (In the name of God, most Gracious, most Compassionate). All praises belong to Allah, Lord of the Worlds, and may peace and salutations be upon the Messenger of Allah, his family, and his Companions.” </p>
<p>The “sheik” will then either teach on a specific topic to reinforce group cohesion or respond to topics proposed by individuals in the group or to certain external events.</p>
<p>After the lesson is completed, the chat is opened to members for a Q-and-A session, followed by a brief quiz using a <a href="https://telegram-store.com/blog/telegram-polls/">Telegram poll bot</a>. Members who answer incorrectly are questioned by the “sheik” about why they answered that way, and offered corrections. The Q-and-A as well as the quiz session give the “sheik” an opportunity to interact with the group and for members to bond with each other.</p>
<h2>Issues addressed in IS virtual durūs</h2>
<p>Virtual durūs cover a wide range of topics such as aqīdah (the creed or belief system), the manner of praying, takfīr (ex-communication) and teachings about other jihadi groups. The lessons often reinforce self-categorization and group rivalry. </p>
<p>For example, there is a series of durūs that focus on worldwide jihadi groups, where the “sheik” first covers what he deems to be deviant groups and contrasts them to IS and its affiliates. In this virtual space, people learn about the origins, leaders, contributions to global jihad and belief systems of other deviant groups. The goal is to compare and contrast these “false” belief systems and actions to those of the Islamic State. </p>
<p>During one such session, for example, the teaching focused on how al-Qaida deviated from the path of Allah when it expressed reluctance to establish full sharia law after conquering territory. Al-Qaida’s insistence on seeking popular support to successfully establish sharia is, to IS supporters, a form of deviance and thus severely criticized in several durūs sessions.</p>
<p>In another context, a session can also extol the virtues of IS affiliate groups and their actions as a way to build and strengthen the social identity of their supporters.</p>
<p>In some lessons, the Islamic State is celebrated for bringing about jamaa’ah (unity of people for a common purpose) and tamkeen (stability; empowerment) in the wilāyāt (provinces; districts); something deviant groups were unable to achieve. For example, a session on the Yemeni wilāyāt contrasted the aqīdah (creed) and manhaj (method of attaining the truth) of the Islamic State to that of the deviant al-Qaida group in the Arabian Peninsula known as AQAP. The lesson noted the fact that several members of AQAP deserted their group to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of IS.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193293/original/file-20171104-1068-1147qyb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193293/original/file-20171104-1068-1147qyb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=695&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193293/original/file-20171104-1068-1147qyb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=695&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193293/original/file-20171104-1068-1147qyb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=695&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193293/original/file-20171104-1068-1147qyb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193293/original/file-20171104-1068-1147qyb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193293/original/file-20171104-1068-1147qyb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, head of the Islamic State.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Creative Commons)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The session also condemned AQAP for its weak position and treatment of the murtaddeen (apostates) in Yemen, but extolled IS for fighting against the Houthis, a predominantly Shia-led religious-political movement that emerged in northern Yemen in the 1990s.</p>
<p>Group rivalry is also an important aspect in the creation and maintenance of the Islamic State’s group identity. The main rhetorical strategy used to sustain group competition is that of declaring takfīr (ex-communication).</p>
<p>In certain durūs, for example, someone can ask what the Islamic State’s official stance is on al-Qaida and its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. This type of question inevitably generates a discussion about how other groups like al-Qaida are also “deviant,” pointing out their irjā’ (postponing), a theological concept associated to the Murji’ah school of thought that favours deferred judgment about people’s beliefs; faith is a matter only between man and God.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193292/original/file-20171104-1032-1mn7k9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193292/original/file-20171104-1032-1mn7k9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193292/original/file-20171104-1032-1mn7k9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193292/original/file-20171104-1032-1mn7k9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193292/original/file-20171104-1032-1mn7k9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193292/original/file-20171104-1032-1mn7k9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193292/original/file-20171104-1032-1mn7k9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaida, is seen in this 2001 photo with Osama bin Laden, the 9-11 mastermind. ISIS considers al-Qaida a deviant jihadi group.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Creative Commons)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Murijites, an early Islamic sect, were not in the business of killing apostates. Since al-Qaida refuses to pronounce judgment on a believer’s ’īmān (faith), it is comparable to the Murijites and therefore is seen by the Islamic State as an enemy of the faith and candidate for takfīr/ex-communication.</p>
<p>What’s it all mean? Despite the fact that IS lost Mosul in July 2017 and that its capital Raqqa just fell to the hands of the Syrian army, the group still manages to inspire, motivate and maintain the social identity and cohesion of its members.</p>
<p>Virtual durūs are used as a way to validate members within the group; if it’s not done, members will leave the group. The Islamic State caters to the members’ self-esteem in order to keep them faithful and strengthen their sense of belonging.</p>
<p>One of the greatest challenges before us is to convince people attracted by the Islamic State that the lenient treatment of murtaddeen (apostates), the rival interpretations of takfīr (ex-communication) and aqīdah (creed) and the refusal to judge the authenticity of a person’s ’īmān (faith) are not necessarily marks of deviance.</p>
<p>Countering the Islamic State’s ideology requires a better understanding of how it uses religious categories as a means to construct and maintain the social identity of its members, and how it ignites rivalries with other jihadi organizations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86917/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marc-André Argentino received funding from the FQRSC for his PhD from 2014 to 2016</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Gagné does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite the fact that the Islamic State is on the run, the terrorist group still manages to inspire, motivate and maintain the social identity and cohesion of its members. Here’s how.André Gagné, Associate Professor, Politico-Religious Extremism and Violence; Social Identity and Movements, Concordia UniversityMarc-André Argentino, PhD candidate Individualized Program, 2020-2021 Public Scholar, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/812462017-09-18T01:04:46Z2017-09-18T01:04:46ZOn Yom Kippur, remembering Mosul’s rich and diverse past<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186213/original/file-20170915-8102-1lp2iuv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A 1932 photograph showing the minaret of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri, Mosul.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/mpc2010001703/PP/">Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Yom Kippur each year, as Jews around the world pray for atonement, the biblical <a href="http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/book-of-jonah">Book of Jonah</a> is <a href="http://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/jonah-yom-kippur/">read in its entirety</a>. </p>
<p>Jews recall the story of how God summons Jonah to go to the city of Nineveh to tell its inhabitants to turn from their evil deeds. At first reluctant, Jonah is famously humbled by God, who causes him to be swallowed by a fish. Jonah then returns to Nineveh; the city repents and is spared from destruction.</p>
<p>The newer, but still ancient, city of Mosul is located next to Nineveh in northern Iraq. The Islamic State, during its occupation of Mosul, deliberately destroyed many of the <a href="http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/04/160419-Islamic-State-ISIS-ISIL-Nineveh-gates-Iraq-Mosul-destroyed/">excavated remains of Nineveh</a>.</p>
<p>As a scholar of Islamic art, <a href="http://notevenpast.org/carved-in-stone-what-architecture-can-tell-us-about-the-sectarian-history-of-islam/">I know</a> that such acts of deliberate, ideologically based destruction are unusual in Islamic history. Although today Mosul is famous outside of Iraq primarily as a site of conflict, its rich and diverse history forms an important legacy. </p>
<h2>What was lost in Mosul?</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186048/original/file-20170914-24296-x589ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186048/original/file-20170914-24296-x589ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186048/original/file-20170914-24296-x589ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186048/original/file-20170914-24296-x589ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186048/original/file-20170914-24296-x589ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186048/original/file-20170914-24296-x589ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186048/original/file-20170914-24296-x589ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The heavily damaged al-Nuri mosque.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Felipe Dana</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The precise date of the city’s foundation is unknown, but at least from the medieval era it was known in the Arabic spoken by Jews, Christians and Muslims in the city as “Madinat al-anbiya’,” or “City of the Prophets,” with <a href="http://www.monumentsofmosul.com/">dozens</a> of tombs, shrines, synagogues and churches. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most famous of these was the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonah">Tomb of the Prophet Jonah</a>, a figure revered by all three faiths alike. For Jews, Jonah is venerated as a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2010/08/the-sullen-prophet-a-commentary-on-the-book-of-jonah/61210/">symbol of repentance</a> – the reason for which the Book of Jonah is read on Yom Kippur. And in Islam, <a href="https://quran.com/10/98-108">Jonah evokes the themes</a> of justice, mercy and obedience – seen as exemplary models for human behavior. </p>
<p>There were <a href="https://www.academia.edu/34200898/Shrines_for_Saints_and_Sultans_On_the_destruction_of_local_heritage_sites_by_ISIS_English_">numerous other sites</a> in Mosul linked to prophetic figures: among them, the Monastery of Elijah or <a href="http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/in-iraq-a-monastery-rediscovered-12457610/">Dar Eliyas</a>, a 1,400-year-old Christian monastery thought to be the oldest in Iraq but also visited by people of many faiths. </p>
<p>The Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul was founded in the 12th century by one of Islam’s most famous rulers, <a href="https://archnet.org/system/publications/contents/11993/original/DTP104378.pdf?1498152426">Nur al-Din ibn Zangi</a>. In the medieval period it was considered the “<a href="https://squarekufic.com/2017/06/23/the-mosque-al-nuri-in-mosul-what-was-lost/">ultimate in beauty and excellence</a>.” It was famous for its soaring, 150-foot <a href="https://www.wmf.org/project/al-hadba%E2%80%99-minaret">minaret</a>, the tallest in Iraq and nicknamed <a href="https://archnet.org/sites/3840">“al-Hadba’”</a> or “the Hunchback” because it leaned to one side, like an Islamic Tower of Pisa. </p>
<p>Sadly, <a href="https://mcmprodaaas.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/reports/Iraq_NebiYunis_422015_0.pdf">none of these monuments</a> – neither the tomb of Jonah, nor the monastery of Elijah – <a href="https://apnews.com/5093ba551d1b45b08fe8a26363b88f54/only-ap-oldest-christian-monastery-iraq-razed">survived</a> <a href="http://www.monumentsofmosul.com/">the destruction of IS</a>. The mosque was <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/21/islaimic-state-blows-landmark-great-mosque-al-nuri-famous-leaning/">destroyed</a> in June this year.</p>
<h2>World trade, intellectual center</h2>
<p>Mosul was also an important center for trade as well as scholarly exchange. </p>
<p>It sat at a key junction on the <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/the-silk-roads-9781408839973/">Silk Road</a> – a rich network of premodern superhighways – stretching over mountains, deserts and plains across three continents – that moved goods from lands that seemed impossibly distant and exotic to those at either end. Mosul itself was known for some of the most <a href="http://www.metmuseum.org/metmedia/video/collections/isl/blacas-ewer">luxurious inlaid metalware</a> of the medieval era.</p>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-116" class="tc-infographic" height="400px" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/116/45b10421d26387bb4cb34a6f493a8604c713ee88/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>As a center of such exchange, the city was home to a <a href="http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Iraq_Mosul_Ethnic_lg.png">diverse</a> group of people: Arabs and Kurds, Yazidis, Jews and Christians, Sunnis and Shias, Sufis and dozens of saints holy to many faiths. </p>
<p>It was also a center for poets, scholars and philosophers, such as the 10th-century philosopher <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=2wS2CAAAQBAJ&pg=PR46&lpg=PR46&dq=philosopher+al-mawsili&source=bl&ots=MOgBVUPXWY&sig=bwwiIxICiwr6DzmQCkGkqjjRKbk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj_xZy2kaTWAhXoq1QKHbonCVgQ6AEIPDAF#v=onepage&q=al-mawsili&f=false">al-Mawsili</a> and the 11th-century astronomer al-Qabisi, <a href="https://nyupress.org/books/9780814780237/">one of a line of famous Mosul astronomers</a> who helped formulate a <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Fz5kgjMDnOIC&pg=PA228&lpg=PA228&dq=critique+of+ptolemaic+astronomy+mosul&source=bl&ots=_bVpqJQEk9&sig=-vpa-RRxNKklDk6e-IzaIglNGH0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjF6cHWl6TWAhXliVQKHXO5AqcQ6AEISDAF#v=onepage&q=critique%20of%20ptolemaic%20astronomy%20mosul&f=false">critique of the Earth-centered model of the universe</a>. That model would eventually make its way to Europe to inform Copernicus’ view of the solar system. Mosul also produced one of Islam’s most famous historians, <a href="https://archive.org/details/IbnAlAthirInCicilianMuslims">Ibn al-Athir</a>, who completed his magnum opus, a monumental universal chronicle called “The Complete History,” in the city in 1231.</p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=HwpxDQAAQBAJ&pg=PT132&lpg=PT132&dq=medieval+mathematics+in+mosul&source=bl&ots=ytT7_LkuIA&sig=4pM1xX5wW4WQk6uaWJAGJNIMoUo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiQtYSox6fWAhXFKVAKHaPFDlUQ6AEINTAF#v=onepage&q=medieval%20mathematics%20in%20mosul&f=false">Important works of mathematics</a>, including a commentary on the Greek mathematician Euclid that was later translated into Latin, <a href="https://www.ircica.org/mathematicians-astronomers-and-other-scholars-of-islamic-civilization-and-their-works-7th-19th-c/irc601.aspx">were written in Mosul</a>. It was also a center for significant medical advances, including an early description of surgery to remove <a href="http://www.muslimheritage.com/article/eye-specialists-islamic-cultures#ftn2">cataracts</a>.</p>
<p>As mosques were traditionally places of <a href="http://www.muslimheritage.com/article/education-islam-role-mosque">knowledge transmission</a> and learning, it is entirely possible that some of these scholars’ ideas were formulated, discussed and refined within the mosque of al-Nuri’s walls. </p>
<p>Mosul’s medieval past informed its contemporary history as well: In modern times, the city was home to some of the most important museums, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/mosuls-library-without-books">libraries</a> and universities in Iraq, including a renowned <a href="http://medicinemosul.uomosul.edu.iq/en/page.php?details=15">medical school</a>. </p>
<h2>The meaning of the mosque in Iraq</h2>
<p>Although the mosque of al-Nuri was transformed over the centuries, it remained a beloved symbol of the ancient city and its diverse heritage. In 1942, much of the mosque, with the exception of the minaret, the prayer niche and some of its columns, went through significant <a href="https://archnet.org/system/publications/contents/11993/original/DTP104378.pdf?1498152426">renovation</a>. But the mosque did not lose its value for the citizens of Mosul – in fact, it appeared on the <a href="https://www.safedinar.com/10000-iraqi-dinar/">Iraqi 10,000 dinar bill</a>.</p>
<p>In June of 2014, when IS originally captured the city and approached the mosque with explosives, residents of the town <a href="http://nationalpost.com/news/world/israel-middle-east/iraqis-save-840-year-old-crooked-minaret-from-isis-after-militants-blow-up-old-testament-prophets-tomb/wcm/3cd00209-9c67-4fae-b8a4-963895b57db2">formed a human chain</a> around it. </p>
<p>Only a few short weeks later, in a complete about-face, IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi stood at the pulpit of that same mosque and <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iconic-al-nuri-mosque-mosul-destroyed/">declared</a> the creation of his “caliphate.” </p>
<h2>Mosul past and future</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186214/original/file-20170915-8102-yzeyr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186214/original/file-20170915-8102-yzeyr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186214/original/file-20170915-8102-yzeyr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186214/original/file-20170915-8102-yzeyr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186214/original/file-20170915-8102-yzeyr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1054&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186214/original/file-20170915-8102-yzeyr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1054&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186214/original/file-20170915-8102-yzeyr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1054&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The leaning minaret.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/matpc.12380/">Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mosul <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/global-development/la-fg-global-rebuilding-mosul-20170717-story.html">has already begun to rebuild</a> its damaged mosque, its Jewish shrines and its churches. But for those of us outside Iraq, who today know Mosul largely through newspaper stories of war and intolerance, the loss of these sites will make it that much harder to imagine the diverse intellectual and religious world that once characterized not only Mosul but all of the Middle East. </p>
<p>Although there were conflicts, Christians, Jews and Muslims lived in <a href="https://15minutehistory.org/2015/01/21/episode-62-sunni-and-shia-in-medieval-syria/">pragmatic cooperation</a> for much of their history. It was the Christians of the city, after all, who said that the minaret leaned because it was bowing toward the tomb of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/isis-blows-up-mosque-in-mosul-where-baghdadi-declared-caliphate/2017/06/21/7070ff30-56b9-11e7-840b-512026319da7_story.html?utm_term=.16b49173b533">the Virgin Mary</a>.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of a piece originally published on Sept. 17, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81246/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephennie Mulder does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Mosul rebuilds, its history is a reminder that people of many faiths lived in cooperation in the city. In the city was the Tomb of Prophet Jonah, venerated by Jews, Christians and Muslims alike.Stephennie Mulder, Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Studies, The University of Texas at AustinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/554372016-03-02T19:05:50Z2016-03-02T19:05:50ZOut of the ashes of Afghanistan and Iraq: the rise and rise of Islamic State<p><em>Since announcing its arrival as a global force in June 2014 with the declaration of a caliphate on territory captured in Iraq and Syria, the jihadist group Islamic State has shocked the world with its brutality.</em></p>
<p><em>Its seemingly sudden prominence has led to much speculation about the group’s origins: how do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State? In the final article of <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">our series examining this question</a>, Greg Barton shows the role recent Western intervention in the Middle East played in the group’s inexorable rise.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Despite precious little certainty in the “what ifs” of history, it’s clear the rise of Islamic State (IS) wouldn’t have been possible without the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. Without these Western interventions, al-Qaeda would never have gained the foothold it did, and IS would not have emerged to take charge of northern Iraq.</p>
<p>Whether or not the Arab Spring, and the consequent civil war in Syria, would still have occurred is much less clear. </p>
<p>But even if war hadn’t broken out in Syria, it’s unlikely an al-Qaeda spin-off such as IS would have become such a decisive actor without launching an insurgency in Iraq. For an opportunistic infection to take hold so comprehensively, as IS clearly has, requires a severely weakened body politic and a profoundly compromised immune system. </p>
<p>Such were the conditions in Goodluck Jonathan’s Nigeria from 2010 to 2015 and in conflict-riven Somalia after the fall of the Barre regime in 1991. And it was so in Afghanistan for the four decades after conflict broke out in 1978 and in Pakistan after General Zia-ul-Haq declared martial law in 1977. </p>
<p>Sadly, but even more clearly, such are the circumstances in Iraq and Syria today. And that’s the reason <a href="http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf">around 80% of all deaths due to terrorist attacks</a> in recent years have occurred in five of the six countries discussed here, where such conditions still prevail.</p>
<h2>An unique opportunity</h2>
<p>The myth of modern international terrorist movements, and particularly of al-Qaeda and its outgrowths such as IS (which really is a third-generation al-Qaeda movement), is that they’re inherently potent and have a natural power of attraction. </p>
<p>The reality is that while modern terrorist groups can and do operate all around the globe to the point where no country can consider itself completely safe, they can only build a base when local issues attract on-the-ground support. </p>
<p>Consider al-Qaeda, which is in the business of global struggle. It wants to unite a transnational <em>ummah</em> to take on far-off enemies. But it has only ever really enjoyed substantial success when it has happened across conducive local circumstances. </p>
<p>The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s provided an opportunity uniquely suited to the rise of al-Qaeda and associated movements. It provided plausible justification for a defensive jihad – a just war – that garnered broad international support and allowed the group to coalesce in 1989 out of the Arab fighters who had rallied to support the Afghans in their fight against the Soviets. </p>
<p>Further opportunities emerged in the Northern Caucasus, where local ethno-national grievances were eventually transformed into the basis for a more global struggle. </p>
<p>The declaration of independence by Chechnya in 1991 led to all-out war with the Soviet military between 1994 and 1996, when tens of thousands were killed. After a short, uneasy peace, a decade-long second civil war started in 1999 following the invasion of neighbouring Dagestan by the International Islamic Brigade. </p>
<p>The second civil war began with an intense campaign to seize control of the Chechen capital, Grozny. But it became dominated by years of fighting jihadi and other insurgents in the Caucasus mountains and dealing with related terrorist attacks in Russia. </p>
<p>In Nigeria and Somalia, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab now share many of the key attributes of al-Qaeda, with whom they have forged nascent links. But they too emerged primarily because of the failure of governance and the persistence of deep-seated local grievances.</p>
<p>Even in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda struggled to transform itself into a convincing champion of local interests in the 1990s. After becoming increasingly isolated following the September 11 attacks on the US, it failed to gain support from the Afghan Taliban for its global struggle.</p>
<p>But something new happened in Iraq beginning in 2003. The Jordanian street thug <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/">Musab al-Zarqawi</a> correctly intuited that the impending Western invasion and occupation of Iraq would provide the perfect conditions for the emergence of insurgencies. </p>
<p>Al-Zarqawi positioned himself in Iraq ahead of the invasion and deftly rode a wave of anger and despair to initiate and grow an insurgency that in time came to dominate the broken nation. </p>
<p>Initially, al-Zarqawi was only one of many insurgent leaders intent on destabilising Iraq. But, in October 2004, after years of uneasy relations with the al-Qaeda leader during two tours in Afghanistan, he finally yielded to Osama bin Laden’s request that he swear on oath of loyalty (<em>bayat</em>) to him. And so al-Zarqawi’s notorious network of insurgents became known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). </p>
<h2>From the ashes</h2>
<p>Iraq’s de-Ba'athification process of May 2003 to June 2004, during which senior technocrats and military officers linked to the Ba'ath party (the vehicle of the Saddam Hussein regime) were removed from office, set the stage for many to join counter-occupation insurgent groups – including AQI.</p>
<p>Without the sacking of a large portion of Iraq’s military and security leaders, its technocrats and productive middle-class professionals, it’s not clear whether this group would have come to dominate so comprehensively. These alienated Sunni professionals gave AQI, as well as IS, much of its core military and strategic competency.</p>
<p>But even with the windfall opportunity presented to al-Zarqawi by the wilful frustration of Sunni interests by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nouri_al-Maliki">Nouri al-Maliki’s</a> Shia-dominated government from 2006 to 2014, which deprived them of any immediate hope for the future and confidence in protecting their families and communities, AQI was almost totally destroyed after the Sunni awakening began in 2006. </p>
<p>The Sunni awakening forces, or “Sons of Iraq”, began with tribal leaders in Anbar province forming an alliance with the US military. For almost three years, tens of thousands of Sunni tribesmen were paid directly to fight AQI, but the Maliki government refused to incorporate them into the regular Iraqi Security Force. And, after October 2008 – when the US military handed over management of these forces – he refused to support them.</p>
<p>The death of al-Zarqawi in June 2006 contributed to the profound weakening of the strongest of all post-invasion insurgent groups. AQI’s force strength was reduced to several hundred fighters and it lost the capacity to dominate the insurgency.</p>
<p>Then, in 2010 and 2011, circumstances combined to blow oxygen onto the smouldering coals. </p>
<p>In 2010, the greatly underestimated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a local Iraqi cleric with serious religious scholarly credentials, took charge of AQI and began working to a sophisticated long-term plan.</p>
<p>Elements of the strategy went by the name “breaking the walls”. In the 12 months to July 2013, this entailed the movement literally breaking down the prison walls in compounds around Baghdad that held hundreds of hardcore al-Qaeda fighters. </p>
<p>Islamic State, as the group now called itself, also benefited from the inflow of former Iraqi intelligence officers and senior military leaders. This had begun with de-Ba'athification in 2003 and continued after the collapse of the Sunni awakening and the increasingly overt sectarianism of the Maliki government. </p>
<p>Together, they developed tactics based on vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and the strategic use of suicide bombers. These were deployed not in the passionate but often undirected fashion of al-Qaeda but much more like smart bombs in the hands of a modern army. </p>
<p>And the US military withdrawal from Iraq in late 2011, well telegraphed ahead of time, provided an excellent opportunity for the struggling insurgency to rebuild. As did the outbreak of civil war in Syria.</p>
<h2>A helping hand</h2>
<p>Al-Baghdadi initially dispatched his trusted Syrian lieutenant, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, to form a separate organisation in Syria: the al-Nusra front. </p>
<p>Jabhat al-Nusra quickly established itself in northern Syria. But when al-Julani refused to fold his organisation in under his command, al-Baghdadi rebranded AQI (or Islamic State in Iraq) Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham/the Levant (ISIS/ISIL).</p>
<p>Then, a series of events turned IS from an insurgency employing terrorist methods to becoming a nascent rogue state. These included: the occupation of Raqqa on the Syrian Euphrates in December 2013; the taking of Ramadi a month later; consolidation of IS control throughout Iraq’s western Anbar province; and, finally, a sudden surge down the river Tigris in June 2014 that took Mosul and most of the towns and cities along the river north of Baghdad within less than a week.</p>
<p>IS’s declaration of the caliphate on June 29, 2014, was a watershed moment, which is only now being properly understood. </p>
<p>In its ground operations, including the governing of aggrieved Sunni communities, IS moved well beyond being simply a terrorist movement. It came to function as a rogue state ruling over around 5 million people in the northern cities of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and defending its territory through conventional military means.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took charge of AQI and began working to a sophisticated long-term plan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Furqan Media</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At the same time, it skilfully exploited the internet and social media in ways the old al-Qaeda could not do – and that its second-generation offshoot, al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), had only partially achieved. </p>
<p>This allowed IS to draw in tens of thousands of foreign fighters. Most came from the Middle East and Northern Africa, but as many as 5,000 came from Europe, with thousands more from the Caucasus and Asia. </p>
<p>Unlike the case in Afghanistan in the 1980s, these foreign fighters have played a key role in providing sufficient strength to take and hold territory while also building a global network of support.</p>
<p>But without the perfect-storm conditions of post-invasion insurgency, this most potent expression of al-Qaedaism yet would never have risen to dominate both the region and the world in the way that it does. </p>
<p>Even in its wildest dreams, al-Qaeda could never have imagined that Western miscalculations post-9/11 could have led to such foolhardy engagements – not just in Afghanistan but also in Iraq. </p>
<p>Were it not for these miscalculations, 9/11 might well have precipitated the decline of al-Qaeda. Instead, with our help, it spawned a global jihadi movement with a territorial base far more powerful than al-Qaeda ever had.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is the final article in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55437/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton is co-director of the Australian Intervention Support Hub, a CVE capacity-building initiative supported by the Australian government and based at the ANU and Deakin University. He previously led an ARC Linkage grant project researching radicalisation and disengagement from violent extremism. He is currently a research professor at the Alfred Deakin Institute.</span></em></p>The final article of our series on the historical roots of Islamic State examines the role recent Western intervention in the Middle East played in the group’s inexorable rise.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation; Co-Director, Australian Intervention Support Hub, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/521552016-02-15T19:21:12Z2016-02-15T19:21:12ZUnderstanding Islamic State: where does it come from and what does it want?<p><em>Since announcing its arrival as a global force in June 2014 with the declaration of a caliphate on territory captured in Iraq and Syria, the jihadist group Islamic State has shocked the world with its brutality.</em> </p>
<p><em>Its seemingly sudden prominence has led to much speculation about the group’s origins: how do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State?</em></p>
<p><em>In the article kicking off <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">our series on the genesis of the group</a> below, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History James Gelvin cautions against easy answers. It’s a logical fallacy, he adds, to think that just because one event followed another, it was also caused by it.</em> </p>
<p><em>Far better to look at the interplay of historical and social forces, as well as recognising that outfits such as Islamic State often cherry-pick ideas to justify their ideas and behaviours.</em></p>
<p><em>Our series attempts, in a dispassionate way, to catalogue many of the forces and events that can arguably have played a part in creating the conditions necessary for these jihadists to emerge. We have tried to spread the net wide, but we make no claim to being comprehensive or having the final word on the origins of Islamic State.</em></p>
<p><em>Over the next two weeks, a selection of religious studies scholars and historians – modern and medieval – from around the world will bring their expertise to our discussion of what led to the most notorious jihadist group in recent history.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>How far back in history does one have to go to find the roots of the so-called Islamic State (IS)?</p>
<p>To the <a href="http://vm136.lib.berkeley.edu/BANC/ROHO/projects/debt/oilcrisis.html">oil shock of 1973-74</a>, when Persian Gulf oil producers used the huge surplus of dollars flowing into their coffers to finance the spread of their severe interpretation of Islam?</p>
<p>To the end of the first world war, when the victorious Entente powers sparked resentment throughout the Arab world by <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553">drawing artificial national borders</a> we hear so much about today? </p>
<p>How about 632 AD, the date of the <a href="http://www.cyberistan.org/islamic/death.html">death of the Prophet Muhammad</a>, when the early Islamic community split on who should succeed him as its leader — a breach that led to <a href="http://origins.osu.edu/article/tradition-vs-charisma-sunni-shii-divide-muslim-world/page/0/0">the Sunni-Shi'i divide</a> that IS exploits for its own ends?</p>
<p>The possibilities seem endless and would make for an entertaining variation on the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Degrees_of_Kevin_Bacon">Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon</a> parlour game (which suggests any two people on earth are six or fewer acquaintance links apart) were the subject not so macabre. </p>
<p>But to look at any and all historical phenomena through a simple string of causes and effects is to ignore the almost infinite number of possible effects that might follow from any one purported cause. </p>
<p>It also opens the door to one of the most pernicious logical fallacies historians might commit: <em>post hoc, ergo propter hoc</em> (after this, therefore because of this). So rather than tracing the rise of IS to one or more events in the past, I suggest we take a different tack.</p>
<h2>A long line</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Muhammad Ahmad, one of a long line of self-professed redeemers of the Islamic faith.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Ahmad#/media/File:Muhammad_Ahmad_al-Mahdi.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>IS is an instance of a phenomenon that recurs in most religions, and certainly in all <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/monotheism">monotheistic religions</a>. Every so often militant strains emerge, flourish temporarily, then vanish. They are then replaced by another militant strain whose own beginning is linked to a predecessor by nothing more profound than drawing from the same cultural pool as its predecessor.</p>
<p>In the seventh century, there were <a href="http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0047.xml">the Kharijites</a> (the first sect of Islam), a starkly puritanical group that assassinated two of the early caliphs. Like IS, the Kharajites thought they knew best what and who were truly Islamic, and what and who were not.</p>
<p>In the 18th century, there were the followers of <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Muhammad-ibn-Abd-al-Wahhab">Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab</a>, a central Arabian preacher whose followers included <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_bin_Saud">Muhammad ibn Saud</a>, the founder of the Saudi dynasty. Believing that the worship of saints and the construction of mausoleums were impious acts, ibn Saud’s army destroyed sites holy to both Sunnis and Shi‘is in Arabia and present-day Iraq, much as <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/isis-destruction-of-palmyra-syria-heart-been-ripped-out-of-the-city">IS targets sites from antiquity</a> today. </p>
<p>During the 19th century, <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Muhammad_Ahmad">Muhammad Ahmad</a>, a member of a religious order in what is now Sudan, proclaimed himself mahdi (redeemer of the Islamic faith), just as <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27801676">Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a>, inventor and leader of IS, recently proclaimed himself caliph (leader of the Islamic faith) — a more prosaic position. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Khartoum">Ahmad’s army overran Khartoum</a>, where it massacred a British-led garrison and beheaded its commander.</p>
<p>Between Muhammad Ahmad and al-Baghdadi there were many, many others.</p>
<p>While tempting, it would be a mistake to believe that each militant group “gave rise to” the next (although later militants have sometimes drawn from or been inspired by their predecessors). That would be the equivalent of saying that <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/Zealot">the ancient Zealots</a> (a Jewish sect that fought the Romans) gave rise to militant Israeli settlers on the West Bank, or that <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/crusades">medieval Crusaders</a> gave rise to abortion-clinic bombers. </p>
<h2>The right stuff</h2>
<p>From time to time (it’s impossible to predict when), some figure emerges in each tradition who puts his own spin on that tradition. To be successful, that spin must capture the imagination of some of that tradition’s adherents, who then try to put it into practice. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A newspaper featuring former al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ali Jasim/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some spins, such as that of contemporary <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-wahhabism-in-saudi-arabia-36693">Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabis</a>, have sticking power. This is not because they are somehow “truer” than others, but because those who advocate for them are better able to mobilise resources – a core group of committed followers, for instance, military capabilities, or outside support – than others. Most do not.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27801676">Al-Baghdadi</a> is one such figure (as was al-Qaeda founder <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10741005">Osama bin Laden</a>). His spin melds together three ideas that come from the Islamic tradition. </p>
<p>The first is <em>khilafa</em> (caliphate). Al-Baghdadi believes that Islam requires a caliphate — governance in accordance with Islamic law over territory that’s under the authority of a caliph (a righteous and knowledgeable descendant of the prophet). </p>
<p>When <a href="http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/100620153">his forces took over Mosul</a> in the summer of 2014, al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself caliph and burnished his credentials for the job by changing his name to Caliph Ibrahim al-Quraishi al-Hashimi. The last two names signify he’s a member of the tribe of Muhammad and a descendant of the prophet.</p>
<p>The second idea al-Baghdadi brought into the mix is <em>takfir</em> – the act of pronouncing Muslims who disagree with IS’s strict interpretation of Islamic law to be apostates, which makes them punishable by death. This is the reason for IS’s murderous rampages against Shi‘is; rampages that even al-Qaeda central finds counter-productive, if not repugnant.</p>
<p>Resurrecting the concept of <em>takfir</em> was the idea of <a href="http://www.cfr.org/iraq/profile-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/p9866">Abu Musab al-Zarqawi</a>, founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq. His strategy was to use the concept to tighten communal ties among Iraq’s Sunnis by mobilising them against its Shi‘is, thus making post-American-invasion Iraq ungovernable. </p>
<p>Al-Baghdadi has gone one step further, finding the concept useful in his effort to purify the territory of the caliphate which, he believes, will soon stretch across the Islamic world.</p>
<p>Finally, there is <em>hijra</em>, the migration of Muslims from <em>dar al-harb</em> (the abode of war, that is, non-Muslim majority countries) to <em>dar al-Islam</em> (the abode of Islam) – just as Muhammad and his early companions migrated from Mecca to Medina, where they established the first permanent Islamic community. </p>
<p>IS wants a great incoming of Muslims into the caliphate. This is both because it needs skilled administrators and fighters and because it considers emigration from “non-Muslim territory” to “Muslim territory” a religious obligation. </p>
<h2>A dangerous distraction</h2>
<p>According to some commentators, al-Baghdadi brought a fourth idea to the table: <a href="http://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250080905">an apocalyptic vision</a>. They base this on the name of IS’s glossy magazine, Dabiq (the site in northern Syria where, Islamic tradition has it, the Battle of Armageddon will take place), articles in the magazine and propaganda videos.</p>
<p>It’s not too much of a stretch to attribute an apocalyptic vision to IS — after all, just as every monotheism is prone to militant strains, all are prone to apocalyptic visions as well. Nevertheless, I remain unconvinced that the concept represents a significant part of IS’s worldview. </p>
<p>Whatever the future may hold, IS, like some <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/06/end-of-world-7-october-ebible-fellowship">apocalyptic Christian groups</a>, has proved itself so tactically and strategically adept that it has obviously kicked any “end of days” can well down the road (roughly the same distance al-Qaeda kicked the re-establishment of the caliphate can).</p>
<p>Further, much of the IS leadership consists of hard-headed <a href="http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate/">former Iraqi Ba‘th military officers</a> who, if they think about an apocalypse at all, probably treat it much as Hitler’s generals treated the purported musings of Nazi true believers – with a roll of their eyes. </p>
<p>Foregrounding IS’s apocalyptic worldview enables us to disparage the group as irrational and even medieval – a dangerous thing to do. If the recent past has demonstrated one thing, it’s that IS thrives when its adversaries underestimate it.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is the first article in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52155/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James L. Gelvin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How far back in history does one have to go to find the roots of the so-called Islamic State? The first article in our series on the genesis of the terrorist outfit considers some fundamentals.James L. Gelvin, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/415972015-05-11T03:01:45Z2015-05-11T03:01:45ZWith jihadists among us, is IS more of a threat than communism was?<blockquote>
<p>True, it has been called, by some, a religion. But it is a religion of hatred; it derives from the darkest recesses of the human mind.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is not Julie Bishop’s recent assessment of the variety of Islam espoused by Islamic State (IS or <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-isis-isil-islamic-state-or-daesh-40838">ISIS</a>), but rather Robert Menzies <a href="http://electionspeeches.moadoph.gov.au/speeches/1951-robert-menzies">describing communism</a> in 1951. With the threats of Nazism and Japanese imperialism defeated, Menzies tried to galvanise the nation against the newest perceived security threat - international communism - through <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_referendum,_1951">a referendum</a> that would ban Australia’s Communist Party. The referendum failed.</p>
<p>Once the domestic threat was “reds under the beds”; today it is jihadists in our midst. <a href="http://www.news.com.au/national/breaking-news/timeline-in-vic-counter-terror-raids/story-e6frfku9-1227348142009">Counter-terrorism raids</a> in the suburbs, the latest <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-10/greenvale-terrorism-raid3a/6458724">in Melbourne on Friday</a>, and allegations of <a href="http://www.9news.com.au/national/2015/05/08/15/11/police-conduct-raids-in-melbourne-s-northern-suburbs">imminent attacks</a> reinforce the sense of threat.</p>
<p>Like the contemporary threat of radical jihadist Islam, which was the topic of the foreign minister’s <a href="http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2015/jb_sp_150427.aspx?ministerid=4">recent speech</a> to the Sydney Institute, communism was seen during the Cold War as both an external and internal threat. Communism, it was said, was externally driven by the Soviet Union and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/16/weekinreview/the-nation-fifth-column-the-evil-that-lurks-in-the-enemy-within.html">domestically sustained by a shadowy cadre</a> of radicalised individuals who rejected the political status quo. </p>
<p>Not unlike contemporary concerns about the seemingly universalist aspirations of IS, communism’s internationalist leanings were also viewed as a direct threat to liberalism’s own claims to global ideological hegemony.</p>
<p>Yet for Julie Bishop, the Cold War balance of terror, with the hands of the <a href="http://thebulletin.org/timeline">Doomsday Clock</a> locked at two minutes to midnight, was not as dangerous as the ragtag <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-theoreticians-have-honed-plans-for-battle-and-a-state-40813">caliphate of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a>. This was, she declared:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a pernicious force that could, if left unchecked, wield great global power that would threaten the very existence of nation states.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>At its most literal level, this claim is unsustainable. The military planners of the West during the Cold War would have wept for joy if their strategic focus could have switched from the USSR, bristling with a nuclear arsenal, to a Middle Eastern insurgency struggling to hold a handful of cities in a region completely destabilised by earlier foreign incursions and civil war.</p>
<h2>Is sovereign nations’ future at risk?</h2>
<p>But sheer military capacity was not really what Bishop was talking about. Her real concern is the threat that IS poses not to any particular nation, but to the very notion of national sovereignty. </p>
<p>In her speech, Bishop argued that the problem is not that IS is militarily more dangerous than the Soviet Union (it clearly is not). Rather, she argued that its transnational, seemingly de-territorialised nature poses a deeper threat to the entire state system.</p>
<p>Following common usage, Bishop declared this system, based on the sanctity of the nation state’s sovereignty within internationally recognised borders, to be “Westphalian”, and hallowed by 400 years of history. By this she presumably meant Western history, given that the ceaselessly expanding global empires of Europe hardly deferred to indigenous notions of sovereignty prior to World War Two.</p>
<p>In fact, the current state system has very little to do with the substance of the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/641170/Peace-of-Westphalia">treaties signed in Münster and Osnabrück</a> in 1648. The principle of the sanctity of the nation state’s sovereignty within its own borders is a thoroughly modern convention. It has developed for the most part for eminently sensible reasons. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, this principle has been more often honoured in the breach than in the observance. As anyone who has watched recent great power intervention in Iraq, Libya and Ukraine can attest, the principle of the sanctity of the sovereign state has already been placed under enormous strain – and not by IS.</p>
<p>Focusing not on the threat that some states pose to the sovereignty of other states, Bishop instead spoke at length about “malevolent non-state actors” operating under the rubric of “global terrorism”. Notwithstanding the fact that IS really is malevolent and terrorist, on the finer point of whether it actually represents a threat to the contemporary “Westphalian” system, Bishop’s analysis slightly misses the point. </p>
<p>Given that its first order of business has been to carve out a territorial state for which it seeks recognition, IS is hardly post-“Westphalian” in its outlook. ISIS may represent a geostrategic threat to stability in the Middle East and North Africa, but this threat is not necessarily a systemic one.</p>
<h2>Islamic State needs failed states to survive</h2>
<p>This is not to undervalue the nature of the challenge posed by IS. Although more Australians continue to be killed by bee stings, the danger posed by jihadists is very real in some countries. With IS in Syria, Iraq and Libya, now having been joined by <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-virtual-significance-of-boko-harams-pledge-of-allegiance-to-isis-38690">Boko Haram</a> in Nigeria, and with <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-attack-al-shabaabs-violent-radicalism-cant-be-tackled-by-force-alone-39714">al-Shabaab</a> in Somalia currently <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-global-war-for-relevance-can-al-qaeda-reclaim-the-jihadi-crown-39430">shifting its allegiances from al-Qaeda</a> to the caliphate, IS certainly represents the most coherent militant Islamist movement in the Middle East and North Africa.</p>
<p>Looking at this list of nations, however, it becomes clear that the danger is most acute in states where central governments are at their weakest. In this sense, Bishop has mistaken cause for effect. Failed or weak states have offered space for Islamic State and other militant jihadis.</p>
<p>Islamic State is not, however, the reason these states have failed. Where the “Westphalian” state is strong, the Caliphate has no hold. It has recourse only to atrocities that, while terrifying and shocking, do not pose a systemic threat.</p>
<p>Interestingly, three of the states where IS is most entrenched, namely Iraq, Libya and Syria, were until recently firmly, indeed ruthlessly, controlled by (more or less) secular dictators: Saddam Hussein, Bashar al-Assad (still technically in office) and Muammar al-Gaddafi (ostensibly the most pious of the three). Often for good reason, all of them were unpopular with the Western great powers. Crucially, however, the erosion of the sovereignty of each of these by large powers has played a significant role in weakening the hold of the state over its territories.</p>
<p>This is hardly in keeping with the notion of “Westphalian” sovereignty to which Bishop appealed. When these states were strong, radical Islamists could not find a foothold. This is not for want of trying, as Hafez al-Assad’s <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982_Hama_massacre">massacre of the Muslim Brotherhood</a> in Syria in 1982 demonstrates.</p>
<p>In concluding her speech, Bishop stressed the importance of tight security measures, which she sees as necessary to protect nation states from transnational jihadis. This might pay a minor dividend in apprehending radicalised individuals domestically. </p>
<p>In terms of Bishop’s broader point about the international state system, however, it seems that the best way to protect nation states from ISIS or other forms of terrorism is by respecting the “Westphalian” principle of the sovereignty of nation states. In this way, unpalatable strong states might not be transformed into even more unpalatable failed states.</p>
<p>Interestingly, Bishop’s speech offered a small sign that this message might be breaking through. Two small references showed that Australia has perhaps begun to understand that ignoring national sovereignty and pursuing “regime change” is not the most productive way to deal with non-liberal polities. Whereas a few short years ago all signs pointed to an impending Western invasion of Iran, Bishop approvingly referred twice to the insights <a href="https://theconversation.com/ms-bishop-goes-to-tehran-a-story-of-good-news-and-bad-news-40463">she had garnered</a> from Australia’s apparent newest Middle Eastern ally, Iran. During the Cold War, such overtures might have been called <a href="http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/detente.htm">détente</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41597/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matt Fitzpatrick is a member of the ALP.</span></em></p>Dire government warnings and counter-terrorism raids in our suburbs paint a picture of the worst threat Western nations have ever faced. A little historical perspective is in order.Matt Fitzpatrick, Associate Professor in International History, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/408132015-04-28T00:40:31Z2015-04-28T00:40:31ZIslamic State theoreticians have honed plans for battle and a state<p>What is Islamic State’s (IS) political program? What is its ideology? Who are its theoreticians? The answers to these questions can be found in its propaganda.</p>
<p>IS has transformed from an ultra-minority party into one of the major political actors in the Middle East within a few months. It is tempting to explain this rapid evolution by the existence of a combination of favourable circumstances. Chief among these is the prolonged weakness of the Syrian and Iraqi governments, an obvious enabling factor for IS.</p>
<p>However, another major cause is less well known but equally decisive: the internal development of the organisation, which has been able to learn from the past failures of other jihadist movements and refine and sharpen its strategy.</p>
<h2>Learning from many years of jihadist setbacks</h2>
<p>The jihadists of IS are no small players. They follow a battle plan developed over many years by seasoned and experienced theoreticians. The British-American journalist <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Bergen">Peter Bergen</a>, who met the most famous of these, the Syrian <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mustafa_Setmariam_Nasar">Abu Musab al-Suri</a>, in the 1990s, was highly impressed by him.</p>
<p>“He was tough and very smart,” the reporter recalls in an article published in the French daily Le Monde in April 2013. Bergen saw in al-Suri a real intellectual, well versed in history, who was very serious about his objectives. He was even more impressed by him than by Osama bin Laden.</p>
<p>Abu Musab al-Suri knows what he is talking about when it comes to armed struggle. His experience dates back to the Muslim Brotherhood <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2011/aug/01/hama-syria-massacre-1982-archive">uprising in Hama</a>, Syria, and its bloody suppression in February 1982 by the troops of Hafez al-Assad, the father of President Bashar al-Assad.</p>
<p>Musab al-Suri, who was among these rebels, has spent the ensuing years writing a series of articles on the uprising’s strategic aspects. These articles focus on the major errors committed by the insurgents. These include a list of 17 “bitter lessons” for future jihadists.</p>
<p>Al-Suri says that the Muslim Brotherhood’s main mistake was not to develop its strategy sufficiently before launching the uprising. A second mistake was to share too little information about its ideology and goals. A third mistake was to rely too heavily on outside support and not sufficiently develop its own resources.</p>
<p>Mistake number four was to place too heavy a reliance on mass recruitment instead of identifying and winning over elite fighters. Mistake number five was to have launched a war of attrition against the Syrian regime rather than a combination of terrorist acts and guerrilla warfare. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Ymeaa3zKDI4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">This online video featuring a doctor is part of Islamic State’s strategy of projecting the creation of a new order.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>IS project has solid foundations</h2>
<p>The lessons drawn by Musab al-Suri have provided the basis for creating a politico-military project as solid as it is comprehensive. Today, IS follows many of al-Suri’s advices. It has refrained from depending on foreign aid and has developed its own financial resources through kidnapping and the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/08/iraq-syria-oil-smuggling-islamic-state-turkey.html">sale of crude oil</a>. </p>
<p>Its doctrine and objectives are also clearly explained to its fighters. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, momentarily <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/06/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-isis">came out of hiding</a> on July 4, 2014, to present his views at the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul. His propaganda agencies broadcast news flashes on the internet.</p>
<p>After publishing several issues of IS Report, a periodical of only a few pages, IS began issuing in July of last year the online magazine Dabiq. This is a substantially more ambitious publication named after a small town in northern Syria where, according to Muslim tradition, a major battle will take place before the end of time. The IS also uses social networks intensively.</p>
<p>IS propaganda stresses the “oppression” and “humiliation” of which Muslims are victim throughout the world, but particularly in Western countries. It promises a final and liberating revenge for these humiliations. The first issue of Dabiq declared:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The time has come for those generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, being nursed on the milk of humiliation and being ruled by the vilest of all people, after their long slumber in the darkness of neglect – the time has come for them to rise.</p>
<p>Soon, by Allah’s permission, a day will come when the Muslim will walk everywhere as a master, having honour, being revered, with his head raised high and his dignity preserved … Whoever was heedless must now be alert. Whoever was sleeping must now awaken. Whoever was shocked and amazed must comprehend. The Muslims today have a loud, thundering statement, and possess heavy boots.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The ongoing war in Syria and Iraq is especially meaningful, as it is described as a throwback to heroic periods in the history of Islam. The setbacks suffered by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi are deemed to remind Muslims of those of the Prophet Muhammad, who was forced to leave Mecca and then defeated at the Battle of Uhud. The violence perpetrated by the IS jihadists is considered legitimate and is supposed to correspond with that of Abu Bakr, the successor of the Prophet and the first Caliph.</p>
<p>In addition to the “bitter lessons” learnt during the uprising at Hama, the jihadist theoreticians have another major source of inspiration, according to <a href="http://www.mei.edu/profile/michael-ryan">Michael W.S. Ryan</a> of the Middle East Institute in Washington and one of the best experts on jihadist movements. They are well read in the history of modern Far Eastern and Western insurgency strategists, from Mao Zedong, Che Guevara and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to Vo Nguyen Giap, Emiliano Zapata and Ho Chi Minh. In his seminal work The Call to Global Islamic Resistance, Abu Musab al-Suri writes that he has carefully read American journalist Robert Taber’s book on Fidel Castro’s guerrilla warfare strategy during the Cuban Revolution.</p>
<p>Dabiq magazine reflects these influences. Its first issue outlines a strategy to seize power through three steps reminiscent of the methods used by Maoist China. This strategy is also echoed by another influential jihadist theoretician, Abu Bakr Naji, who has presented his views in his book <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Management_of_Savagery">The Management of Savagery</a>. </p>
<p>He argues that “Allah’s fighters” must continually attack the vital economic sectors of some key political regimes to incite these to concentrate all their forces in these areas. It will be then possible for the fighters to increase their presence in the periphery of these countries, forcing the enemy to multiply law enforcement actions to regain control of the lost ground. </p>
<h2>‘Savagery’ has a particular purpose</h2>
<p>This is when the second stage should begin, that of “savagery”, in which the violence will reach such a level that people will turn away from the government and be ready to join any force capable of restoring peace. Large parts of Iraq and Syria are now enduring this second stage, according to these theoreticians. </p>
<p>The third and last stage is the restoration of law (Sharia) and order through the establishment of a caliphate. Afghanistan is supposedly an example of a place where this final stage had taken place, with the coming to power of the Taliban after a long and bloody reign of local warlords.</p>
<p>This strategy, which is not unique to jihadism, implies that an explosion of violence will happen during the second phase of the insurgency. Jihadist theoreticians do not consider this bloodshed an act of wanton cruelty but a necessary means to achieve victory. Abu Bakr Naji chillingly writes in The Management of Savagery that jihadist fighters should “drag the masses into the battle”, which means that they must:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“make [that] battle very violent, such that death is a heartbeat away, so that the two groups will realise that entering this battle will frequently lead to death. That will be a powerful motive for the individual to choose to fight in the ranks of the people of truth in order to die well, which is better than dying for falsehood and losing both this world and the next.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Focus is now on rebuilding lost base as caliphate</h2>
<p>Jihadist movements share many common ideas, such as the rejection of democracy, nationalism and Western culture, but they are at loggerheads on strategy. Abu Musab al-Suri had some harsh words to say about Osama bin Laden and his taste for high-profile attacks on government institutions, security forces and symbolic buildings. He severely criticised the September 11 attacks, which, he believes, incurred the wrath of the United States against the Taliban in Afghanistan. This consequently denied the “holy war” its most precious territory and wasted the time of the jihadist movement.</p>
<p>Fourteen years on, IS’s ambition is to rebuild this territory – though now in Syria and Iraq – in the shortest possible period by <a href="https://theconversation.com/isis-does-not-have-enough-public-support-to-extend-its-caliphate-in-iraq-28940">establishing a “caliphate”</a>. This will become the central base for the spread of the international jihad.</p>
<p>In this perspective, the putative caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has recently changed the IS’s focus from “savagery” to the onset of a new order. One of his current priorities is to establish, in places where the military situation is sufficiently stabilised, a number of public services: law and order, of course, but also trade networks, food supplies, education and health care.</p>
<p>This was the background to his July 2014 speech, which he sought to spread far and wide:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Oh Muslims, hasten to your new state. We make a special call to the scholars and callers, especially the judges, as well as people with military, administrative and service expertise, and medical doctors and engineers of all different specialisations and fields.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Islamic State knows what it wants, and it is striving to put the new “caliphate” on a permanent footing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40813/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Rousseau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Islamic State is a project built on solid foundations by jihadist theorists with decades of experience. The savagery of terrorism precedes the next stage of a caliphate that delivers longed-for order.Richard Rousseau, Associate Professor of Political Science, American University of Ras Al KhaimahLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/327292014-10-21T03:33:40Z2014-10-21T03:33:40ZIslamic State lacks key ingredient to make ‘caliphate’ work: eunuchs<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/62062/original/4577rhh4-1413521375.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Ottoman Chief Eunuch was an influential figure. In this and other caliphates, eunuchs supervised the harem, the princes, the financial affairs of the palace and the mosques, as well as controlling access to the ruler. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo postcard 1912</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed Islamic State (IS) as a Muslim caliphate on June 29, 2014, with himself as caliph, a term reserved for a successor to the prophet Muhammad (PBUH). His would be the newest caliphate in a line extending from the Rashidun Caliphate (632-661), through the Umayyads (661-750), Abbasids (750-1517) and Ottomans (1453-1924). Each of these earlier caliphates, however, had a feature that IS lacks and which may not even be possible for the newly proclaimed “state”.</p>
<p>Currently, IS is more of a marauding horde than functioning state. IS operates more like the Vandals or the Ostrogoths of European history rather than any historic caliphate. Its “citizens” are self-described warriors (jihadists) killing men, capturing women and grabbing booty as they go. Many of its fighters are foreigners from Europe, North America or other Middle Eastern countries, rather than locals who are the core citizenry for anything that can legitimately be called a state.</p>
<p>Beyond effective use of social media for recruitment, there appears to be little of the governance that makes this state a true state. IS’s goal is clear: “purifying” Islam through eliminating competing religious ideologies, whether they are held by other Muslims, such as the Shi'a, or practitioners of other religions, such as the Yazidi and Christians.</p>
<h2>What is a state without a capital?</h2>
<p>While al-Baghdadi has appeared in the Syrian provincial capital of Ar-Raqqah, IS has yet to establish a proper capital. A true state needs a central place to which taxes are paid and from which laws, regulations and other administrative functions descend. Thus far, funding for the IS seems to come largely from smuggling oil, extortion and bank robbery, and not from taxpaying citizens.</p>
<p>Creating a stable capital will be difficult. With the weaponry IS has acquired, it can fight a ground war. But previous caliphate capitals had walls to protect their seat of government from attack. Such defences would be ineffective now. As the recent air assault by the US and its allies shows, a <a href="http://kilyos.ee.bilkent.edu.tr/%7Ehistory/topkapi.html">Topkapi</a> today would be fragile in the face of modern ballistics.</p>
<p>No above-ground capital would be safe for IS. To protect its control centre from bombardment, the caliphate would need to bury itself in tunnels, like termites (or al-Qaeda). But even a buried bastille would need to be some 60 metres down to be safe from bunker-busting munitions like the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator.</p>
<p>Should the IS manage to create a political state with a capital, how closely could it model its governance upon the historic caliphates it claims to emulate? In all preceding caliphates, power was demonstrated, in part, by the number of women the caliph controlled. Hundreds of women were impounded in the palace from which government decisions emanated. Most of the women were not for sexual pleasure, but simply to demonstrate dominance.</p>
<p>At the moment, IS’s systematic killing of men and taking of women performs as a predatory horde rewarding its warriors more than as an organisation developing the governance of a true caliphate. A core question is whether the new caliph will be able to maintain and control the women he acquires as well as his predecessors did. And who will handle the daily governance for the new caliphate to maintain cohesion in the state?</p>
<h2>Caliphates relied on eunuchs</h2>
<p>All previous caliphates relied on a special class of bureaucrats to provide stability and statesmanship. Those were eunuchs, who were unable to impregnate the women sequestered in the palace. Eunuchs were without family and dependent upon the caliph for support. </p>
<p>For four millennia and through many different Asian empires and caliphates, eunuchs proved themselves to be efficient governors. Their presence was, again, a sign of the power and authority of the ruler.</p>
<p>The number of women and eunuchs in the central palace during the various caliphates could be quite large. The Caliph al-Muqtadi (908-932) presided over a palace that contained 4000 women, 7000 eunuch guards and menial labourers, plus 4000 eunuch bureaucrats to administer the realm. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/62168/original/qksr54vm-1413756537.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/62168/original/qksr54vm-1413756537.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62168/original/qksr54vm-1413756537.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62168/original/qksr54vm-1413756537.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62168/original/qksr54vm-1413756537.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62168/original/qksr54vm-1413756537.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62168/original/qksr54vm-1413756537.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Sultana Served by Her Eunuchs, 18th-century painting.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons/Charles-Amédée-Philippe van Loo (1719-95)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When the Fatimid caliphate fell in 1171, the seat of government had 12,000 members. Only Caliph al-‘Adid and his immediate male relatives had intact testicles. The rest were women and eunuchs.</p>
<p>As long as IS persists in beheading rather than castrating the males it captures, it has little hope of resurrecting a historic caliphate. Granted IS is already acquiring women, but it has no-one to guard them for the caliph and no infertile functionaries to enact the authority of the state.</p>
<p>While it has been less than a century since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, it is clear that a key concept for continuity with the great caliphates of the past has been lost. Simply stated, if the IS doesn’t build a deeply fortified city and start producing eunuch bureaucrats, it will never have the stability and endurance of historic caliphates. The best it can hope for is to be recognised as a 21st-century predatory horde.</p>
<p>It is an academic questions as to which is more barbaric: to behead (murder) or to castrate (mutilate). But of the two choices, if IS continues along its current path, it is likely to be remembered like the Vandals – that is, as murderous marauders who get brief mention in high school history classes. </p>
<p>There is no reason to believe that the state IS aims to develop will be less barbaric than its fighters’ current “jihad”. But al-Baghdadi will have to change how his followers process prisoners if he is sincere about getting his caliphate up and running.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32729/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed Islamic State (IS) as a Muslim caliphate on June 29, 2014, with himself as caliph, a term reserved for a successor to the prophet Muhammad (PBUH). His would be the newest…Thomas W. Johnson, Professor Emeritus, Department of Anthropology, California State University, ChicoRichard J. Wassersug, Adjunct Professor, Australian Research Centre in Sex, Health and Society at LaTrobe University, and Department of Urologic Sciences, University of British ColumbiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.