tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/cognitive-psychology-30582/articlesCognitive psychology – The Conversation2023-04-25T14:06:58Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2042232023-04-25T14:06:58Z2023-04-25T14:06:58ZDobble: what is the psychology behind the game?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522365/original/file-20230421-16-7hgsp2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C5982%2C3997&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dobble is a card game with rules that makes it sound easier than it actually is.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/dobble-card-game-kids-billereaquitainefrance-08232021-2029552409">Ana Belen Garcia Sanchez/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Following birthday and Christmas presents, families often have a glut of new games to learn and play. Many of these games involve computers or games consoles, but with concerns about children’s <a href="https://www.forbes.com/health/family/how-much-screen-time-kids/">screen time</a> there has been a recent <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/12/24/board-game-popularity/">increase</a> in the popularity of traditional board and card games.</p>
<p>One non-electronic card game that has made its way into our homes is Dobble. It’s a game of observation, articulation and speed that was first released in France in 2009. </p>
<p>While the <a href="https://www.petercollingridge.co.uk/blog/mathematics-toys-and-games/dobble/">mathematics</a> behind the workings of this game is interesting, as cognitive psychologists we were also fascinated by the underlying cognitive processes that make this simple game so absorbing and challenging to play.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">How does Dobble work mathematically?</span></figcaption>
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<p>The aim of the game is to be the first player to get rid of all their cards by discarding them one at a time into a central pile. Players do that as soon as they can identify, and announce, the single common symbol between the card in their hand and that on top of the pile. </p>
<p>Players must be quick as the top card will change every time your opponent(s) are able to match and discard one of their cards before you. There are 55 cards, each containing eight symbols out of a possible 57. And in any pair of cards, only one symbol matches. </p>
<p>The first task in the game is to visually search the symbols on both the card in your hand and that on the top of the central pile to find the single match. Colour, size and location are typical <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1996-04250-015">cues</a> we use when searching. But this task is more difficult than it seems due to the number and variety of symbols. Their shared features sometimes give rise to false alarms when scanning quickly. For example, the lips, heart, maple leaf and fire symbols are all red in colour. </p>
<p>The fact the target items will likely be of a different size and orientation on each card also means that we <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=HktnDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA26&dq=perception+object+match+different+orientation&ots=wBLoJvKx-H&sig=IqWZ-6H9R4HpaOscqGXlbkjA3W4#v=onepage&q&f=false">perceive</a> the same symbol slightly differently. So a match is more difficult to identify. </p>
<p>Unlike, for example, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/news/where-s-the-brains-behind-wally-6261459.html">Where’s Wally?</a>, where the object of the search is clearly defined, with Dobble we do not know on any round which item we are searching for. Indeed, this will be different for each player. </p>
<p>The task requires dividing attention by searching two visual scenes in parallel. And also holding in memory the symbols that you have viewed on one card for comparison with those on the other. </p>
<p>We may <a href="http://matt.colorado.edu/teaching/highcog/fall8/m3.pdf">switch</a> between different strategies such as scanning the symbols on both cards in the hope that the match will just “pop out”. Or we may adopt a more structured approach where we peruse each symbol in turn. </p>
<p>When demands on attention are high, we are more likely to suffer <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Z2Sz7YgWIpQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA55&dq=inattentional+blindness+divided+attention&ots=2rrM836Idb&sig=IPiM1lTPKa-JlXAJ9QUHbZHmPvw#v=onepage&q=inattentional%20blindness%20divided%20attention&f=false">inattentional blindness</a>. That’s the phenomenon of “looking but not seeing”, whereby the item we are fixating on does not receive enough attention for us to actually notice it.</p>
<h2>Say the name</h2>
<p>Once you have found the matching symbol you must quickly announce what it is before placing your card down on the pile. This again sounds simple, but, just like producing the correct word in everyday speech, it requires the <a href="https://mybrainware.com/blog/brainware-safari-cognitive-skills-development-and-learning-to-read/">processes</a> of linking the desired concept – the symbol on the cards – with the name that represents it. </p>
<p>Also, you have to ensure that you select the appropriate word, for example saying “tortoise” rather than “turtle”. Plus you must select the correct sounds to utter that word, before finally saying it out loud. In the urgency of the game, you may find these processes don’t happen as quickly as you want them to.</p>
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<img alt="A pair of hands holds a collection of round cards. There is another pile of round cards on the table beneath the hands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522130/original/file-20230420-18-n8asch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6016%2C4016&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522130/original/file-20230420-18-n8asch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522130/original/file-20230420-18-n8asch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522130/original/file-20230420-18-n8asch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522130/original/file-20230420-18-n8asch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522130/original/file-20230420-18-n8asch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522130/original/file-20230420-18-n8asch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Dobble - it’s not as easy as saying what you see.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/verona-italy-february-2nd-2021-detail-1921867253">Claire Adams/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Once you have correctly articulated the matching symbol and played your card, the whole process starts again. Given the low chance of that previous symbol being the next correct match, you must inhibit (stop yourself thinking about) this recent item – its name, its location, even its colour – so that you can be open to a new search. However, you must not inhibit it completely as there is still a chance it could appear next. </p>
<p>Inhibition is also required if your opponent calls out a symbol on their card first. Even if you were about to articulate a match, you must now inhibit this vocalisation and instead restart the search for a new pairing since the reference card in the centre has now changed. This ability to switch between searches and inhibit unwanted information is one of a number of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13803395.2010.533157">“executive”</a> organisational cognitive processes that help us in the planning and coordination of activities.</p>
<h2>Under stress</h2>
<p>And of course, all of this occurs under time pressure. Stress can increase when it seems your opponent is discarding their cards quicker. We know that increased stress levels impair our <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tony-Buchanan/publication/320312261_Tip_of_the_Tongue_States_Increase_Under_Evaluative_Observation/links/59e0d8b1aca2724cbfd5e271/Tip-of-the-Tongue-States-Increase-Under-Evaluative-Observation.pdf">word-finding ability</a>, attention to information, inhibition of responses and <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28690203/">ability to adapt</a> to changing circumstances. All of those are vital to performing well in Dobble. </p>
<p>The bad news for parents is that many of the processes we have described <a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1038/s41598-020-80866-1.pdf">decline</a> as we get older, meaning that children may have the competitive edge at Dobble.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204223/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Dobble is a card game that originated in France in 2009. It involves observation, articulation and speed.Nick Perham, Reader in Applied Cognitive Psychology, Cardiff Metropolitan UniversityHelen Hodgetts, Reader in Applied Cognitive Psychology, Cardiff Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1929012022-10-21T12:18:48Z2022-10-21T12:18:48ZJust Stop Oil: do radical protests turn the public away from a cause? Here’s the evidence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490699/original/file-20221019-21-1lv2e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1%2C1272%2C716&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Just Stop Oil handout / EPA</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Members of the protest group Just Stop Oil recently <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LJ-dr4xyMgk">threw soup at Van Gogh’s Sunflowers</a> in the National Gallery in London. The action once again triggered debate about what kinds of protest are most effective. </p>
<p>After a quick clean of the glass, the painting was back on display. But critics argued that the real damage had been done, by alienating the public from the cause itself (the demand that the UK government reverse its support for opening new oil and gas fields in the North Sea).</p>
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<p>Supporters of more militant forms of protest often point to historical examples such as the suffragettes. In contrast with Just Stop Oil’s action, when the suffragette Mary Richardson went to the National Gallery to attack a painting called The Rokeby Venus, she <a href="https://journals.le.ac.uk/ojs1/index.php/mas/article/view/92">slashed the canvas</a>, causing major damage. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490702/original/file-20221019-13-wxw5cs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="painting of woman's rear, with slash marks" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490702/original/file-20221019-13-wxw5cs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490702/original/file-20221019-13-wxw5cs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490702/original/file-20221019-13-wxw5cs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490702/original/file-20221019-13-wxw5cs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490702/original/file-20221019-13-wxw5cs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490702/original/file-20221019-13-wxw5cs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490702/original/file-20221019-13-wxw5cs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The Rokeby Venus: the 17th century painting by Diego Velázquez was slashed by a suffragette, though later repaired.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rokeby_Venus#/media/File:Richardson-Venus.png">National Gallery / wiki</a></span>
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<p>However, many historians argue that the contribution of the suffragettes to women getting the vote was negligible or <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/State_and_Society_Fourth_Edition/J7ivJo9phvkC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=%22militancy+clearly+damaged+the+cause.%E2%80%9C&pg=PA152&printsec=frontcover">even</a> <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/The_Extension_of_the_Franchise_1832_1931/a-Rd0iLobaEC?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA160&printsec=frontcover">counterproductive</a>. Such discussions often seem to rely on people’s gut feelings about the impact of protest. But as a professor of cognitive psychology, I know that we don’t have to rely on intuition – these are hypotheses that can be tested.</p>
<h2>The activist’s dilemma</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Matthew-Feinberg-2/publication/338562538_The_activist's_dilemma_Extreme_protest_actions_reduce_popular_support_for_social_movements/links/5ea5eff892851c1a90728bd5/The-activists-dilemma-Extreme-protest-actions-reduce-popular-support-for-social-movements.pdf">one set of experiments</a> researchers showed people descriptions of protests and then measured their support for the protesters and the cause. Some participants read articles describing moderate protests such as peaceful marches. Others read articles describing more extreme and sometimes violent protests, for example a fictitious action in which animal rights activists drugged a security guard in order to break into a lab and remove animals.</p>
<p>Protesters who undertook extreme actions were perceived to be more immoral, and participants reported lower levels of emotional connection and social identification with these “extreme” protesters. The effects of this kind of action on support for the cause were somewhat mixed (and negative effects may be specific to actions that incorporate the threat of violence). </p>
<p>Overall, these results paint a picture of the so-called activist’s dilemma: activists must choose between moderate actions that are largely ignored and more extreme actions that succeed in gaining attention, but may be counterproductive to their aims as they tend to make people think less of the protesters.</p>
<p>Activists themselves tend to offer a different perspective: they say that accepting personal unpopularity is simply the price to be paid for the media attention they rely on to “<a href="https://twitter.com/michaelmezz/status/1582184473252098049?s=20&t=dnnbkSRMmIo8_1wJuPlEMw">get the conversation going</a>” and win public support for the issue. But is this the right approach? Could activists be hurting their own cause?</p>
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<h2>Hating protesters doesn’t affect support</h2>
<p>I’ve conducted several experiments to answer such questions, often in collaboration with students at the University of Bristol. To influence participants’ views of protesters we made use of a well-known framing effect whereby (even subtle) differences in how protests are reported have a pronounced impact, often serving to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Benjamin-Detenber-2/publication/229694828_Framing_Effects_of_Television_News_Coverage_of_Social_Protest/links/5f5777b692851c250b9d3036/Framing-Effects-of-Television-News-Coverage-of-Social-Protest.pdf">delegitimise the protest</a>. </p>
<p>For example, the <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11315449/Just-Stop-Oil-activists-throw-tomato-soup-Van-Goghs-Sunflowers.html">Daily Mail article</a> reporting the Van Gogh protest referred to it as a “stunt” which is part of a “campaign of chaos” by “rebellious eco-zealots”. The article does not mention the protesters’ demand.</p>
<p>Our experiments took advantage of this framing effect to test the relationship between attitudes to the protesters themselves and to their cause. If the public’s support for a cause depends on how they feel about the protesters, then a negative framing – which leads to less positive attitudes toward protesters – should result in lower levels of support for the demands. </p>
<p>But that’s not what we found. In fact, experimental manipulations that reduced support for the protesters had <a href="https://brookes.cloud.panopto.eu/Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=384ad6d2-e8c1-4f38-bb5f-af1e00e54fda">no impact on support for the demands of those protesters</a>.</p>
<p>We’ve replicated this finding across a range of different types of nonviolent protest, including protests about racial justice, abortion rights and climate change, and across British, American and Polish participants (this work is being prepared for publication). When members of the public say, “I agree with your cause, I just don’t like your methods,” we should take them at their word.</p>
<p>Decreasing the extent to which the public identifies with you may not be helpful for building a mass movement. But high publicity actions may actually be a very effective way to increase recruitment, given relatively few people ever become activists. The existence of a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/1/3/pgac110/6633666?login=false#369463521">radical flank</a> also seems to increase support for more moderate factions of a social movement, by making these factions appear less radical.</p>
<h2>Protest can set the agenda</h2>
<p>Another concern may be that most of the attention obtained by radical actions is not about the issue, focusing instead on what the protesters did. However, even where this is true, the public conversation opens up the space for some discussion of the issue itself. </p>
<p>Protest plays a role in <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/agenda-seeding-how-1960s-black-protests-moved-elites-public-opinion-and-voting/136610C8C040C3D92F041BB2EFC3034C">agenda seeding</a>. It doesn’t necessarily tell people what to think, but influences what they think about. Last year’s Insulate Britain protests are a good example. In the months after the protests began on September 13 2021, the number of mentions of the word “insulation” (not “Insulate”) in UK print media doubled.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490756/original/file-20221019-24-h4zka0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing mentions of 'insulation' in UK news media over time with a sharp rise between August and September 2021" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490756/original/file-20221019-24-h4zka0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490756/original/file-20221019-24-h4zka0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490756/original/file-20221019-24-h4zka0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490756/original/file-20221019-24-h4zka0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490756/original/file-20221019-24-h4zka0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490756/original/file-20221019-24-h4zka0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490756/original/file-20221019-24-h4zka0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Spot when the Insulate Britain protests began. (Author’s own research, using Factiva database to search UK broadsheet and tabloid newspapers)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Colin Davis</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>Some people don’t investigate the details of an issue, yet media attention may nevertheless promote the issue in their mind. A YouGov poll released in early June 2019 showed “the environment” ranked in the public’s top three most important issues for the first time. </p>
<p>Pollsters <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/06/05/concern-environment-record-highs">concluded</a> that the “sudden surge in concern is undoubtedly boosted by the publicity raised for the environmental cause by Extinction Rebellion” (which had recently occupied prominent sites in central London for two weeks). There’s also evidence that <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/boris-johnson-hatches-plan-to-insulate-britons-against-winter-bills-vg7xdjg3h">home insulation has risen up the policy agenda</a> since Insulate Britain’s protests.</p>
<p>Dramatic protest isn’t going away. Protagonists will continue to be the subject of (mostly) negative media attention, which will lead to widespread public disapproval. But when we look at public support for the protesters’ demands, there isn’t any compelling evidence for nonviolent protest being counterproductive. People may “shoot the messenger”, but they do – at least, sometimes – hear the message.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192901/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Colin Davis is a professor of psychology who is interested in protest both as a scientist and a practitioner. He has been active with various campaign groups including Extinction Rebellion and was arrested for a similar action earlier this year, but does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond his academic appointment. </span></em></p>People want to shoot the messenger, but they do hear the message.Colin Davis, Chair in Cognitive Psychology, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1865302022-08-11T12:14:03Z2022-08-11T12:14:03ZCognitive biases and brain biology help explain why facts don’t change minds<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478603/original/file-20220810-15-x8t51l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=179%2C300%2C4503%2C3436&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">It can feel safer to block out contradictory information that challenges a belief.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/shaven-headed-man-with-fingers-in-ears-royalty-free-image/84437014">Peter Dazeley/The Image Bank via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>“<a href="https://www.cnn.com/factsfirst/politics">Facts First</a>” is the tagline of a CNN branding campaign which contends that “<a href="https://www.cnncreativemarketing.com/project/cnn_factsfirst/">once facts are established, opinions can be formed</a>.” The problem is that while it sounds logical, this appealing assertion is a fallacy not supported by research.</p>
<p>Cognitive psychology and neuroscience studies have found that the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12394">exact opposite is often true when it comes to politics</a>: People form opinions based on emotions, such as fear, contempt and anger, rather than relying on facts. New facts often do not change people’s minds.</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=LB6MiT4AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">I study human development, public health and behavior change</a>. In my work, I see firsthand how hard it is to change someone’s mind and behaviors when they encounter new information that runs counter to their beliefs.</p>
<p>Your worldview, including beliefs and opinions, starts to form during childhood as you’re socialized within a particular cultural context. It gets reinforced over time by the social groups you keep, the media you consume, even how your brain functions. It influences how you think of yourself and how you interact with the world.</p>
<p>For many people, a challenge to their worldview feels like an attack on their personal identity and can cause them to harden their position. Here’s some of the research that explains why it’s natural to resist changing your mind – and how you can get better at making these shifts.</p>
<h2>Rejecting what contradicts your beliefs</h2>
<p>In an ideal world, rational people who encounter new evidence that contradicts their beliefs would evaluate the facts and change their views accordingly. But that’s generally not how things go in the real world. </p>
<p>Partly to blame is a cognitive bias that can kick in when people encounter evidence that runs counter to their beliefs. Instead of reevaluating what they’ve believed up until now, people tend to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x">reject the incompatible evidence</a>. Psychologists call this phenomenon belief perseverance. Everyone can fall prey to this ingrained way of thinking. </p>
<p>Being presented with facts – whether via the news, social media or one-on-one conversations – that suggest their current beliefs are wrong causes people to feel threatened. This reaction is particularly strong when the beliefs in question are aligned with your political and personal identities. It can feel like an attack on you if one of your strongly held beliefs is challenged.</p>
<p>Confronting facts that don’t line up with your worldview may trigger a “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1804840115">backfire effect</a>,” which can end up strengthening your original position and beliefs, particularly with politically charged issues. Researchers have identified this phenomenon in a number of studies, including ones about <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650211416646">opinions toward climate change mitigation policies</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.2013-2365">attitudes toward childhood vaccinations</a>. </p>
<h2>Focusing on what confirms your beliefs</h2>
<p>There’s another cognitive bias that can get in the way of changing your mind, called confirmation bias. It’s the natural tendency to seek out information or interpret things in a way that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x">supports your existing beliefs</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210423">Interacting with like-minded people and media</a> reinforces confirmation bias. The problem with confirmation bias is that it <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.100.2.298">can lead to errors in judgment</a> because it keeps you from looking at a situation objectively from multiple angles. </p>
<p>A 2016 Gallup poll provides a great example of this bias. In just one two-week period spanning the 2016 election, both Republicans and Democrats <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/197474/economic-confidence-surges-election.aspx">drastically changed their opinions</a> about the state of the economy – in opposite directions.</p>
<p><iframe id="J9K34" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/J9K34/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>But nothing was new with the economy. What had changed was that a new political leader from a different party had been elected. The election outcome changed survey respondents’ interpretation of how the economy was doing – a confirmation bias led Republicans to rate it much higher now that their guy would be in charge; Democrats the opposite.</p>
<h2>Brain’s hard-wiring doesn’t help</h2>
<p>Cognitive biases are predictable patterns in the way people think that can keep you from objectively weighing evidence and changing your mind. Some of the basic ways your brain works can also work against you on this front.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478604/original/file-20220810-6805-26kwy4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="woman with smirking look holding a cellphone" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478604/original/file-20220810-6805-26kwy4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478604/original/file-20220810-6805-26kwy4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478604/original/file-20220810-6805-26kwy4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478604/original/file-20220810-6805-26kwy4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478604/original/file-20220810-6805-26kwy4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478604/original/file-20220810-6805-26kwy4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478604/original/file-20220810-6805-26kwy4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">It can feel really satisfying to get the better of an opponent, even if you’re not actually right.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/studio-portrait-of-businesswoman-text-messaging-royalty-free-image/136597526">Rob Lewine/Tetra images via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Your brain is hard-wired to protect you – which can lead to reinforcing your opinions and beliefs, even when they’re misguided. Winning a debate or an argument triggers a flood of hormones, including dopamine and adrenaline. In your brain, they contribute to the feeling of pleasure you get during sex, eating, roller-coaster rides – and yes, <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250013644/the-winner-effect">winning an argument</a>. That rush makes you feel good, maybe even invulnerable. It’s a feeling many people want to have more often.</p>
<p>Moreover, in situations of high stress or distrust, your body releases <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK538239/">another hormone, cortisol</a>. It can <a href="https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.64.7.810">hijack your advanced thought processes, reason and logic</a> – what psychologists call the executive functions of your brain. Your brain’s amygdala becomes more active, which <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/biom11060823">controls your innate fight-or-flight reaction</a> when you feel under threat.</p>
<p>In the context of communication, people tend to raise their voice, push back and stop listening when these chemicals are coursing through their bodies. Once you’re in that mindset, it’s hard to hear another viewpoint. The desire to be right combined with the brain’s protective mechanisms make it that much harder to change opinions and beliefs, even in the presence of new information.</p>
<h2>You can train yourself to keep an open mind</h2>
<p>In spite of the cognitive biases and brain biology that make it hard to change minds, there are ways to short-circuit these natural habits. </p>
<p>Work to keep an open mind. Allow yourself to learn new things. Search out perspectives from multiple sides of an issue. Try to form, and modify, your opinions based on evidence that is accurate, objective and verified.</p>
<p>Don’t let yourself be swayed by outliers. For example, give more weight to the numerous doctors and public health officials who describe the preponderance of evidence that vaccines are safe and effective than what you give to one fringe doctor on a podcast who suggests the opposite.</p>
<p>Be wary of repetition, as repeated statements are often <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-021-00301-5">perceived as more truthful</a> than new information, no matter how false the claim may be. Social media manipulators and politicians know this all too well. </p>
<p>Presenting things in a nonconfrontational way allows people to evaluate new information without feeling attacked. Insulting others and suggesting someone is ignorant or misinformed, no matter how misguided their beliefs may be, will cause the people you are trying to influence to reject your argument. Instead, try asking questions that lead the person to question what they believe. While opinions may not ultimately change, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100612451018">chance of success is greater</a>.</p>
<p>Recognize we all have these tendencies and respectfully listen to other opinions. Take a deep breath and pause when you feel your body ramping up for a fight. Remember, it’s OK to be wrong at times. Life can be a process of growth.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186530/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith M. Bellizzi receives funding from the National Institutes of Health. </span></em></p>Here are some reasons for the natural human tendency to avoid or reject new information that runs counter to what you already know – and some tips on how to do better.Keith M. Bellizzi, Professor of Human Development and Family Sciences, University of ConnecticutLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1850532022-06-21T12:47:52Z2022-06-21T12:47:52ZEye movements could be the missing link in our understanding of memory<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469790/original/file-20220620-12-5bng0x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C30%2C5104%2C2843&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/close-shot-eyes-beautiful-senior-woman-2106171818">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Humans have a fascinating ability to recreate events in the mind’s eye, in exquisite detail. Over 50 years ago, <a href="http://webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/ai.html">Donald Hebb and Ulrich Neisser</a>, the forefathers of cognitive psychology, theorised that eye movements are vital for our ability to do this. They pointed out we move our eyes not only to receive sensory visual input, but also to <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/jocn/article/9/1/27/3238/Spontaneous-Eye-Movements-During-Visual-Imagery">bring to mind</a> information stored in memory. Our <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rspb.2022.0964">recent study</a> provides the only academic evidence to date for their theory. </p>
<p>It could help research in everything from human biology to robotics. For instance, it could shed new light on the link between eye movements, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364661302019319">mental imagery</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/unravelling-the-mysteries-of-sleep-how-the-brain-sees-dreams-45889">dreaming</a>. </p>
<p>We can only process information from a small part of our visual field at a time. We overcome this limitation by constantly shifting our focus of attention through eye movements. Eye movements unfold in sequences of <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK10991/">fixations and saccades</a>. Fixations occur three to four times per second and are the brief moments of focus that allow us to sample visual information, and saccades are the rapid movements from one fixation point to another. </p>
<p>Although only a limited amount of information can be processed at each fixation point, a sequence of eye movements binds visual details together (for example, faces and objects). This allows us to encode a memory of what we can see as a whole. Our visual sampling of the world – through our eye movements – determines the content of the memories that our brains store.</p>
<h2>A trip down memory lane</h2>
<p>In our study, 60 participants were shown images of scenes and objects, such as a cityscape and vegetables on a kitchen counter. After a short break, they were asked to recall the images as thoroughly as possible while looking at a blank screen. They rated the quality of their recollection and were asked to select the correct image from a set of highly similar images. Using state-of-the-art eye tracking techniques we measured participants’ <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13428-012-0212-2">scanpaths</a>, their eye movement sequences,both when they inspected the images and when they recalled them. </p>
<p>We showed that scanpaths during memory retrieval was connected to the quality of participants’ remembering. When participants’ scanpaths most closely replicated how their eyes moved when they looked at the original image, they performed their best during the recollection. Our results provide evidence that the actual replay of an sequence of eye movements boosts memory reconstruction. </p>
<p>We analysed different features of how participants’ scanpaths progressed over space and time – such as the order of fixations and the direction of saccades. Some scanpath features were more important than others, depending on the nature of the sought-after memory. For example, the direction of eye movements was more important when recalling the details of how pastries were positioned next to each other on a table than when recalling the shape of a rock formation. Such differences can be attributed to different memory demands. Reconstructing the precise arrangement of pastries are more demanding than reconstructing the coarse layout of a rock formation.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Close up of the top half of a young woman's face, she has brown eyes" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469792/original/file-20220620-12-46531b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469792/original/file-20220620-12-46531b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469792/original/file-20220620-12-46531b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469792/original/file-20220620-12-46531b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469792/original/file-20220620-12-46531b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469792/original/file-20220620-12-46531b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469792/original/file-20220620-12-46531b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Eye movement is vital to memory recall.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/eyes-woman-young-beautiful-freckles-face-346433627">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Episodic memory allows us to mentally travel in time to relive past experiences. Previous research established that we tend to reproduce gaze patterns from the original event we are trying to call to mind and that gaze locations during memory retrieval have <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0956797613498260">important consequences for what you remember</a>. Those findings all relate to static gaze, not eye movements.</p>
<p>Donald and Ulrich’s 1968 theory was that eye movements are used to organise and assemble “part images” into a whole image visualised during episodic remembering. Our study showed that the way scanpaths unfold over time is critical to recreate experiences in our mind’s eye.</p>
<h2>A step forwards</h2>
<p>The results could be important for cognitive neuroscience and human biology research and in fields as diverse as computing and image processing, robotics, workplace design, as well as clinical psychology. This is because they provide behavioural evidence of a critical link between eye movements and cognitive processing which can be harnessed for treatments such as brain injury rehabilitation. For instance, eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing (<a href="https://www.apa.org/ptsd-guideline/treatments/eye-movement-reprocessing">EMDR</a>) is a well-established psychotherapy treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). </p>
<p>In this therapy, the patient is focusing on the trauma and engaging in bilateral eye movements, which is associated with a reduction in the vividness and emotion associated with the memory of the trauma. But the underlying mechanisms of the therapy are <a href="https://nyaspubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/nyas.13882">not yet well understood</a>. Our study shows a direct link between eye movements and the human memory systems, which may provide an essential piece of the puzzle.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185053/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Johansson was funded by the Swedish Research Council grant no. 2015-01206</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mikael Johansson was funded by the Marcus and Amalia Wallenberg Foundation award MAW2015.0043. </span></em></p>New research verifies 50 year old theory about memory.Roger Johansson, Associate professor, Lund UniversityMikael Johansson, Professor of Psychology, Lund UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1735052022-01-04T13:07:30Z2022-01-04T13:07:30ZWhy does experiencing ‘flow’ feel so good? A communication scientist explains<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/438296/original/file-20211218-25-1ktuz4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=87%2C227%2C2868%2C1623&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Research shows that people who have flow as a regular part of their lives are happier and less likely to focus on themselves.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/winter-holidays-in-ski-resort-royalty-free-image/1280113636?adppopup=true">Yulkapopkova/E+ via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>New years often come with new resolutions. Get back in shape. Read more. Make more time for friends and family. My list of resolutions might not look quite the same as yours, but each of our resolutions represents a plan for something new, or at least a little bit different. As you craft your 2022 resolutions, I hope that you will add one that is also on my list: feel more flow.</p>
<p>Psychologist Mihály Csíkszentmihályi’s <a href="https://www.harpercollins.com/products/flow-mihaly-csikszentmihalyi">research on flow</a> started in the 1970s. He has called it the “<a href="https://www.ted.com/talks/mihaly_csikszentmihalyi_flow_the_secret_to_happiness">secret to happiness</a>.” Flow is a state of “optimal experience” that each of us can incorporate into our everyday lives. One characterized by immense joy that makes a life worth living.</p>
<p>In the years since, researchers have gained a vast store of knowledge about what it is like to be in flow and how experiencing it is important for our overall mental health and well-being. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53468-4_1">In short</a>, we are completely absorbed in a highly rewarding activity – and not in our inner monologues – when we feel flow. </p>
<p>I am an <a href="https://communication.ucdavis.edu/people/rwhuskey">assistant professor of communication and cognitive science</a>, and I have been studying flow for the last 10 years. My <a href="https://cogcommscience.com/">research lab</a> investigates what is happening in our brains when people experience flow. Our goal is to better understand how the experience happens and to make it easier for people to feel flow and its benefits.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man paints on canvas in a studio." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/438884/original/file-20211222-21-jswvjh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/438884/original/file-20211222-21-jswvjh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/438884/original/file-20211222-21-jswvjh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/438884/original/file-20211222-21-jswvjh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/438884/original/file-20211222-21-jswvjh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/438884/original/file-20211222-21-jswvjh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/438884/original/file-20211222-21-jswvjh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Flow can arise when playing games or engaged in artistic pursuits, like writing, photography, sculpting and painting.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/young-asian-male-woman-paint-drawing-acrylic-color-royalty-free-image/1314904308?adppopup=true">Somyot Techapuwapat/Moment via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>What it is like to be in flow?</h2>
<p>People often say flow is like “being in the zone.” Psychologists Jeanne Nakamura and Csíkszentmihályi <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9088-8_16">describe it</a> as something more. When people feel flow, they are in a state of intense concentration. Their thoughts are focused on an experience rather than on themselves. They lose a sense of time and feel as if there is a merging of their actions and their awareness. That they have control over the situation. That the experience is not physically or mentally taxing.</p>
<p>Most importantly, flow is what researchers call an autotelic experience. Autotelic derives from two Greek words: autos (self) and telos (end or goal). Autotelic experiences are things that are worth doing in and of themselves. Researchers sometimes call these intrinsically rewarding experiences. Flow experiences are intrinsically rewarding.</p>
<h2>What causes flow?</h2>
<p>Flow occurs when a task’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9088-8_16">challenge is balanced with one’s skill</a>. In fact, both the task challenge and skill level have to be high. I often tell my students that they will not feel flow when they are doing the dishes. Most people are highly skilled dishwashers, and washing dishes is not a very challenging task.</p>
<p>So when do people experience flow? Csíkszentmihályi’s <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Beyond+Boredom+and+Anxiety%3A+Experiencing+Flow+in+Work+and+Play%2C+25th+Anniversary+Edition-p-9780787951405">research in the 1970s</a> focused on people doing tasks they enjoyed. He studied swimmers, music composers, chess players, dancers, mountain climbers and other athletes. He went on to study how people can find flow in more <a href="https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/mihaly-csikszentmihalhi/finding-flow/9780465024117/">everyday experiences</a>. I am an avid snowboarder, and I regularly feel flow on the mountain. Other people feel it by practicing yoga – not me, unfortunately! – by riding their bike, cooking or going for a run. So long as that task’s challenge is high, and so are your skills, you should be able to achieve flow.</p>
<p>Researchers also know that people can experience flow by using <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00318.x">interactive media</a>, like <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167207310026">playing a video game</a>. In fact, <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Beyond+Boredom+and+Anxiety%3A+Experiencing+Flow+in+Work+and+Play%2C+25th+Anniversary+Edition-p-9780787951405">Csíkszentmihályi said</a> that “games are obvious flow activities, and play is the flow experience par excellence.” <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/305501/reality-is-broken-by-jane-mcgonigal/">Video game developers</a> are very familiar with the idea, and they think hard about how to <a href="https://www.oreilly.com/library/view/theory-of-fun/9781449363208/">design games so that players feel flow</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439289/original/file-20220104-19-82f3iv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Diagram of the relationship between difficulty of a challenge, skill level and the experience of flow." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439289/original/file-20220104-19-82f3iv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439289/original/file-20220104-19-82f3iv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439289/original/file-20220104-19-82f3iv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439289/original/file-20220104-19-82f3iv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439289/original/file-20220104-19-82f3iv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439289/original/file-20220104-19-82f3iv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439289/original/file-20220104-19-82f3iv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Flow occurs when a task’s challenge – and one’s skills at the task – are both high.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Adapted from Nakamura/Csíkszentmihályi</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why is it good to feel flow?</h2>
<p>Earlier I said that Csíkszentmihályi called flow “the secret to happiness.” Why is that? For one thing, the experience can help people <a href="https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2021.39.4.526">pursue their long-term goals</a>. This is because research shows that taking a break to do something fun can help enhance one’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220941998">self-control, goal pursuit and well-being</a>. </p>
<p>So next time you are feeling like a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12107">guilty couch potato</a> for playing a video game, remind yourself that you are actually doing something that can help set you up for long-term success and well-being. Importantly, quality – and not necessarily quantity – matters. Research shows that spending a lot of time playing video games only has a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.202049">very small influence</a> on your overall well-being. Focus on finding games that help you feel flow, rather than on spending more time playing games.</p>
<p>A recent study also shows that flow helps people <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.05.005">stay resilient</a> in the face of adversity. Part of this is because flow can help <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000479">refocus thoughts</a> away from something stressful to something enjoyable. In fact, studies have shown that experiencing flow can help guard against <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2017.09.017">depression and burnout</a>.</p>
<p>Research also shows that people who experienced <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0242043">stronger feelings of flow had better well-being</a> during the COVID-19 quarantine compared to people who had weaker experiences. This might be because feeling flow helped distract them from worrying. </p>
<h2>What is your brain doing during flow?</h2>
<p>Researchers have been studying flow for nearly 50 years, but only recently have they begun to decipher what is going on in the brain during flow. One of my colleagues, media neuroscientist René Weber, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2009.01352.x">has proposed</a> that flow is associated with a specific brain-network configuration. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.pbr.2017.06.012">Supporting Weber’s hypothesis</a>, studies show that the experience is associated with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.08.019">activity in brain structures</a> implicated in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsr021">feeling reward</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsv133">pursuing our goals</a>. This may be one reason why flow feels so enjoyable and why people are so focused on tasks that make them feel flow. Research also shows that flow is associated with <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00169">decreased activity</a> in brain structures implicated in self-focus. This may help explain why feeling flow can help distract people from worry.</p>
<p>[<em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=weekly&source=inline-weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p><a href="https://www.medianeuroscience.org/">Weber</a>, <a href="https://www.jacobtfisher.com/">Jacob Fisher</a> and I have developed a video game called <a href="https://github.com/asteroidimpact/asteroid_impact_py3">Asteroid Impact</a> to help us better study flow. In my own research, I have participants <a href="https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-018-0612-6">play Asteroid Impact</a> while having their brain scanned. My work has shown that flow is associated with a specific brain network configuration that has <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqy043">low energy requirements</a>. This may help explain why we do not experience flow as being physically or mentally demanding. I have also shown that, instead of maintaining one stable network configuration, the brain actually <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqab044">changes its network configuration</a> during flow. This is important because <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.3470">rapid brain network reconfiguration</a> helps people adapt to difficult tasks.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Asteroid Impact" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/438518/original/file-20211220-18663-1qo5axk.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/438518/original/file-20211220-18663-1qo5axk.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/438518/original/file-20211220-18663-1qo5axk.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/438518/original/file-20211220-18663-1qo5axk.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/438518/original/file-20211220-18663-1qo5axk.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/438518/original/file-20211220-18663-1qo5axk.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/438518/original/file-20211220-18663-1qo5axk.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A player controls a spaceship to collect crystals and avoid asteroids in a video game called Asteroid Impact.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jacob Fisher via https://github.com/asteroidimpact/asteroid_impact_py3</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What more can the brain tell us?</h2>
<p>Right now, researchers do not know how brain responses associated with flow contribute to well-being. With very <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-018-5378-0">few exceptions</a>, there is almost no research on how brain responses actually cause flow. Every neuroscience study I described earlier was correlational, not causal. Said differently, we can conclude that these brain responses are associated with flow. We cannot conclude that these brain responses cause flow.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.05.005">Researchers think</a> the connection between flow and well-being has something to do with three things: suppressing brain activation in structures associated with thinking about ourselves, dampening activation in structures associated with negative thoughts, and increasing activation in reward-processing regions.</p>
<p>I’d argue that testing this hypothesis is vital. Medical professionals have started to use video games in <a href="https://www.akiliinteractive.com/">clinical applications</a> to help treat attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, or ADHD. Maybe one day a clinician will be able to help prescribe a Food and Drug Adminstration-approved video game to help bolster someone’s resilience or help them fight off depression. </p>
<p>That is probably several years into the future, <a href="https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/8cxyh">if it is even possible at all</a>. Right now, I hope that you will resolve to find more flow in your everyday life. You may find that this helps you achieve your other resolutions, too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173505/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Huskey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Research shows that people with more flow in their lives had a higher sense of well-being during the COVID-19 pandemic. Scientists are beginning to explore what happens in the brain during flow.Richard Huskey, Assistant Professor of Communication and Cognitive Science, University of California, DavisLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1700182021-12-21T20:49:50Z2021-12-21T20:49:50ZAre you a more holistic or analytic thinker? Take this quiz to find out<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433582/original/file-20211123-19-12imxym.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C957%2C5760%2C2871&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Left-brain or right-brain? Creative or critical? Analytic or holistic?</p>
<p>We love to divide the world into simple dichotomies. You’ve probably heard that left-brain dominant people are supposed to be more logical, while right-brain people are more creative. But there’s actually <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0071275">no scientific evidence</a> to support that idea.</p>
<p>What we do know, however, is that some of us are more “analytic” while others are more “holistic” in our dominant cognitive approach.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.551623">my latest research</a> with colleagues Steven Grover and Stephen Teo, I have developed a short survey to measure these individual differences in thinking style.</p>
<p>Knowing your own and others’ cognitive style is essential for mutual understanding and informed decisions. Learning how you and those around you process information can help you to become a more effective <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/applin/22.2.241">communicator</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2005.00502.x">strategist and leader</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-625" class="tc-infographic" height="400px" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/625/4af61f7d967c39600c6156e1266ff8377f82925e/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
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<p><strong><a href="https://ecuau.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_etXwGuiEAsjOq6q">Click here to take the Holistic Cognition Quiz and discover your style</a></strong></p>
<hr>
<h2>Analytic vs holistic style</h2>
<p>Analytic thinkers focus on individual objects, assigning them to categories based on their attributes. Holistic thinkers consider the context as a whole, focusing on the relationships between objects.</p>
<p>For example, when asked to describe a dining table, an analytic thinker might say it is made of dark wood and can seat six people. A holistic thinker may instead explain it is a space for getting together and sharing a meal.</p>
<p>While analytic thinkers seek to understand cause and effect by examining the characteristics and motivations of individuals, holistic thinkers examine the wider circumstances and the interactions between people.</p>
<p>Analytic thinkers tend to categorise statements as being true or false. Holistic thinkers often transcend contradictions and find truth in even opposing ideas. Both approaches are valuable, particularly if we acknowledge our cognitive biases and appreciate diverse perspectives as complementing our own.</p>
<h2>No, you weren’t born that way</h2>
<p>None of us are born as analytic or holistic thinkers. We learn these patterns from our environment. We have access to both analytic and holistic cognitive approaches, but a dominant and socially reinforced preference emerges through our interactions with others.</p>
<p>Think of these thinking styles as sets of cognitive tools to interpret and deal with the challenges of daily life.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/philosophical-toolkit-in-tow-scholar-travels-to-conflict-zones-42805">Philosophical toolkit in tow, scholar travels to conflict zones</a>
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<p>These tools were developed long ago, based on how people in different cultures interacted with one another and what they believed was important.</p>
<p>The precepts of analytic thinking were formulated in ancient Greece around 200-500BCE, with philosophers such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle seeking to understand the world through logic, inference and the discovery of rules.</p>
<p>The principles of holistic thinking were established in ancient China around the same time. Prominent Chinese philosophers such as Confucius, Mencius and Laozi advanced an understanding of the world based on harmony, balance and the acceptance of inevitable cyclical change.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The concept of yin and yang in Chinese philosophy expresses the way opposing forces may actually be complementary, interconnected and interdependent." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437439/original/file-20211214-27-16vp0m5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437439/original/file-20211214-27-16vp0m5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437439/original/file-20211214-27-16vp0m5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437439/original/file-20211214-27-16vp0m5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437439/original/file-20211214-27-16vp0m5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437439/original/file-20211214-27-16vp0m5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437439/original/file-20211214-27-16vp0m5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The concept of yin and yang in Chinese philosophy expresses the way opposing forces may actually be complementary, interconnected and interdependent.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These social contexts led to the development of two very different cognitive approaches.</p>
<p>So how come Westerners aren’t all analytic thinkers, and Easterners aren’t all holistic thinkers?</p>
<p>Well, as people have moved between places, jobs and social circles over the past 2000 years these mental toolkits have been picked up, shared and embraced along the way. It’s essentially no different to how potatoes were introduced to the Irish and coffee to Italians in the 16th century.</p>
<p>The result is that there now tends to be more cultural diversity <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11575-016-0283-x">within societies</a> than between them – including in thinking styles.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-does-it-mean-to-think-and-could-a-machine-ever-do-it-51316">What does it mean to think and could a machine ever do it?</a>
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</p>
<hr>
<h2>Using this quiz</h2>
<p>We’ve made the <strong><a href="https://ecuau.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_etXwGuiEAsjOq6q">Holistic Cognition Quiz</a></strong> to help you understand your own unique thinking style.</p>
<p>It’s likely to show that you use a mixture of analytic and holistic approaches, with one that’s more dominant. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1071791907311069">Building self-awareness</a> by better understanding how you think will help you work to your strengths and appreciate the strengths of others.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170018/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrei Lux works for Edith Cowan University and is a Director of the Australian and New Zealand Academy of Management. He has received funding from Macquarie University.</span></em></p>You weren’t born as an analytic or holistic thinker, you were made. Our quiz will show you how much you are one or the other, helping you to better understand yourself and others.Andrei Lux, Lecturer in Leadership and Course Coordinator (Management and International Business), Edith Cowan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1611382021-05-19T15:18:17Z2021-05-19T15:18:17ZAs trust between Israeli Jews and Arabs reaches new lows, Netanyahu rises again<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401643/original/file-20210519-15-1g7p6gv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5725%2C3837&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gives a briefing at the Hakirya military base in Tel Aviv on May 19, 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/israeli-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-speaks-during-a-news-photo/1232979500?adppopup=true">Sebastian Scheiner/Pool/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Pro-Palestinian demonstrators in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-57133635">the world’s capitals</a> in mid-May 2021 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/15/world/protests-israel-washington.html">blamed the Israeli government</a> for recent bloodshed in Israel and Gaza, and called on world leaders to pressure Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu into <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-hamas-ceasefire-biden-netanyahu/">calling a ceasefire</a>. Protesters emphasized the <a href="https://abc7chicago.com/israel-palestine-conflict-and-news/10646709/">perceived power imbalance</a> between Israel and Palestine. According to this view of the asymmetry between the two sides, Israel is a major economic and military power while Hamas-led Gaza is poor, weak and has suffered many casualties.</p>
<p>In Israel – where I’ve lived and worked for 25 years, and from where I write these lines from the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merkhav_Mugan">reinforced concrete saferoom</a> legally required in all apartments erected here since Saddam targeted Israeli civilians during <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=1991_Iraqi_rocket_attacks_on_Israel&oldid=1023143340">the first Gulf War</a> – debate is raging over different asymmetries. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401566/original/file-20210519-21-10q64rw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A laptop computer on a desk" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401566/original/file-20210519-21-10q64rw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401566/original/file-20210519-21-10q64rw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401566/original/file-20210519-21-10q64rw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401566/original/file-20210519-21-10q64rw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401566/original/file-20210519-21-10q64rw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401566/original/file-20210519-21-10q64rw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401566/original/file-20210519-21-10q64rw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">In front of a window with a steel covering, the saferoom desk at which the author wrote this article while Hamas shot missiles at Israeli cities.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eli Gottlieb</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Where <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/video-john-oliver-accusing-israel-war-crimes-last-week-tonight-goes-viral-1592301">Israel’s critics</a> see a powerful nation attacking a weak one, Israelis see a sovereign state defending itself against terrorists who deliberately target civilians. And where Israeli right-wingers see violent betrayal of Israeli Jews by Arab citizens with whom they’ve coexisted for decades, Israeli left-wingers see a Jewish majority that hasn’t done enough to ensure equal rights for its Arab minority.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://gwu.academia.edu/EliGottlieb">cognitive psychologist</a>, I am not surprised by the mirror images that different sides in the conflict hold of the asymmetries between them. Asymmetries are perceptions and, just like optical illusions, people can look at the same sets of facts and events and see – or be persuaded to see – different things.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="InstagramEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.instagram.com/tv/CPAKj8ppyeU","accessToken":"127105130696839|b4b75090c9688d81dfd245afe6052f20"}"></div></p>
<h2>Israel-Hamas asymmetry</h2>
<p>In op-eds and viral <a href="https://www.facebook.com/AmitSegalNews/posts/325162538974685">social media posts</a>, many Israelis have been contrasting Arab aggression with Jewish restraint. They talk about Hamas targeting missiles at Israeli civilians and inflaming dormant inter-ethnic tensions in Israel’s mixed cities. And they describe themselves as going to unprecedented lengths to minimize civilian casualties in Gaza and to preserve a delicate coexistence that took years to construct between Israel’s Jewish and Arab citizens.</p>
<p>This asymmetry is diametrically opposed to the one emphasized by Israel’s critics. Palestinians and their supporters cast Israel as the aggressor and the Palestinians as weak victims. Most Israelis see Hamas and their Arab Israeli supporters as the aggressors, and perceive the group to be <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.HIGHLIGHT-has-hamas-already-won-1.9806250">growing stronger</a>, as the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/world/middleeast/gaza-rockets-hamas-israel.html">range of its missiles</a> and <a href="https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/israel-is-winning-battles-hamas-is-winning-the-war-analysis-668280">incitement of anti-Jewish violence</a> extends ever deeper into Israeli territory, threatening its major cities.</p>
<h2>Right-left asymmetry</h2>
<p>But there is a split in Israeli politics. Those on the right see Israel’s Arab citizens <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-57085023">attacking innocent Jews, torching synagogues and destroying property</a> in neighborhoods they’ve shared for years. Those on the left, however, see their government’s <a href="https://www.jpost.com/opinion/the-superfluous-argument-about-symmetry-in-the-jewish-arab-conflict-668354">continued disregard for the rights of Israel’s Arab citizens</a> and reluctance to apply the full force of the law <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-riots-police-chief-pans-terrorists-from-both-sides-irking-minister/">equally to Arab and Jewish rioters</a>. </p>
<p>Posts by right-wing commentators this week contrasted the <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/IsraelPalestine/comments/neohgx/there_is_no_symmetry/">relative frequency</a> of acts of violence committed by Arab Israelis on Jewish Israelis and their property with the relative absence of corresponding violence perpetrated by Jewish Israelis on Arab Israelis.</p>
<p>Left-wing commentators, on the other hand, focused on Israel’s shared responsibility for, and moral duty to address, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-israel-s-oppression-managed-to-unite-palestinians-on-both-sides-of-the-green-line-1.9818313">the pent-up frustrations</a> of Israel’s Arab minority.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401447/original/file-20210518-17-15of3uj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A famous optical illusion" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401447/original/file-20210518-17-15of3uj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401447/original/file-20210518-17-15of3uj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=323&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401447/original/file-20210518-17-15of3uj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=323&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401447/original/file-20210518-17-15of3uj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=323&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401447/original/file-20210518-17-15of3uj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401447/original/file-20210518-17-15of3uj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401447/original/file-20210518-17-15of3uj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this famous optical illusion, both lines are exactly the same length.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/museo_ilusionario/6072927163">Juan Luis Roldan via Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The role of framing and social context</h2>
<p>Cognitive psychologists deal with such differences in perception all the time.</p>
<p>One example is the <a href="https://dictionary.apa.org/muller-lyer-illusion">Muller-Lyer illusion</a>, in which two lines of identical length are made to seem shorter or longer by the addition of “fins,” which slope inward or outward, respectively at each end. Similarly, in the current conflict, perceptions of who is aggressor and whom victim are shaped by the inclusion or exclusion of additional data, such as who has suffered the most casualties, who has more effective defenses, and so on. Like the fins in the Muller-Lyer illusion, such data can shape perception irrespective of their relevance.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/iRh5qy09nNw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Solomon Asch’s famous conformity experiment, explained.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Another example is <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2011-16966-001">Solomon Asch’s conformity experiment</a>, in which a group of participants is required to identify which of three lines on one card is the same length as a reference line on another card. But there’s a catch: All but one of the participants has been told in advance to select a line that is obviously shorter than the reference line. The uninitiated participant usually changes his correct answer to conform with the incorrect answer chosen by the rest of the group.</p>
<p>A similar dynamic seems to be playing out on social media around the current Israel-Palestine conflict. Some celebrities who initially posted relatively balanced messages later adopted more partisan positions in response to pressure from followers.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="InstagramEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.instagram.com/p/CO9htFxDrdT","accessToken":"127105130696839|b4b75090c9688d81dfd245afe6052f20"}"></div></p>
<h2>The impact on domestic politics</h2>
<p>One person who has gained from Israelis’ shifting views on Jewish-Arab asymmetries is Netanyahu himself.</p>
<p>Earlier this month, an “anyone but Bibi” coalition government seemed about to be formed following Israel’s fourth inconclusive election in two years. <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/HkShJWODd">Unprecedentedly</a>, Naftali Bennett, leader of the right-wing, and largely Jewish, Yamina (“Rightwards”) party, was deep in talks with Mansour Abbas, leader of the United Arab List party. Last week, <a href="https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/bennett-change-coalition-is-out-of-the-question-now-668117">Bennett pulled out of the talks</a>. One week, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/gaza-deaths-mount-as-israel-says-hamas-leaders-are-its-target-11621339740">3,000 Hamas missiles</a> and <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/right-wing-rioters-smash-windows-of-arab-owned-businesses-in-bat-yam-667993">several more riots</a> later, the prospect of such talks being revived seems farther away than ever. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/yiQEkNMLTr4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Israeli firefighters on site after a synagogue was torched in Lod.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So Bibi is back on top, performing very publicly the role of <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israeli-officials-expect-gaza-cease-fire-within-days-as-rockets-fired-at-south-1.9821476">heading Israel’s military response</a> and reaping the political rewards of the greatest crisis of trust in decades between Israel’s Jewish and Arab citizens. <a href="https://oupacademic.tumblr.com/post/66321507640/misquotation-a-week-is-a-long-time-in">A week is a long time in politics</a>.</p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161138/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eli Gottlieb does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are two splits in public opinion about the current Israel-Palestine violence, though everyone has the same set of facts. A cognitive psychologist explains how this can happen.Eli Gottlieb, Senior Visiting Scholar in Education and Human Development, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1418442020-07-03T10:55:03Z2020-07-03T10:55:03ZHow the brain builds a sense of self from the people around us – new research<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345498/original/file-20200703-21-nm87g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Our sense of self depends on understanding how others think about the world.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Barney Moss/Flickt</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>We are highly sensitive to people around us. As infants, we observe our parents and teachers, and from them we learn how to walk, talk, read – and use smartphones. There seems to be no limit to the complexity of behaviour we can acquire from observational learning. </p>
<p>But social influence goes deeper than that. We don’t just copy the behaviour of people around us. We also copy their minds. As we grow older, we learn what other people think, feel and want – and adapt to it. Our brains are really good at this – we copy computations inside the brains of others. But how does the brain distinguish between thoughts about your own mind and thoughts about the minds of others? Our new study, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-16856-8">published in Nature Communications</a>, brings us closer to an answer.</p>
<p>Our ability to copy the minds of others <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-do-children-learn-empathy-56623">is hugely important</a>. When this process goes wrong, it can contribute to various mental health problems. You might become unable to empathise with someone, or, at the other extreme, you might be so susceptible to other people’s thoughts that your own sense of “self” is volatile and fragile. </p>
<p>The ability to think about another person’s mind is one of the most sophisticated adaptations of the human brain. Experimental psychologists often assess this ability with a technique called a “<a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-1-4419-1698-3_91#:%7E:text=Definition,world%20may%20contrast%20with%20reality.">false belief task</a>”. </p>
<p>In the task, one individual, the “subject”, gets to observe another individual, the “partner”, hide a desirable object in a box. The partner then leaves, and the subject sees the researcher remove the object from the box and hide it in a second location. When the partner returns, they will falsely believe the object is still in the box, but the subject knows the truth. </p>
<p>This supposedly requires the subject to hold in mind the partner’s false belief in addition to their own true belief about reality. But how do we know whether the subject is really thinking about the mind of the partner?</p>
<h2>False beliefs</h2>
<p>Over the last ten years, neuroscientists have explored a theory of mind-reading called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulation_theory_of_empathy#:%7E:text=Simulation%20theory%20of%20empathy%20is,as%20the%20expression%20of%20emotions.">simulation theory</a>. The theory suggests that when I put myself in your shoes, my brain tries to copy the computations inside your brain. </p>
<p>Neuroscientists have found compelling evidence that the brain does simulate the computations of a social partner. They have shown that if you observe another person receive a reward, like food or money, <a href="https://www.pnas.org/content/107/32/14431">your brain activity is the same as</a> if you were the one receiving the reward. </p>
<p>There’s a problem though. If my brain copies your computations, how does it distinguish between my own mind and my simulation of your mind? </p>
<p>In our experiment, we recruited 40 participants and asked them to play a “probabilistic” version of the false belief task. At the same time, we scanned their brains using <a href="https://theconversation.com/brain-scanners-allow-scientists-to-read-minds-could-they-now-enable-a-big-brother-future-72435">functional magnetic resonance imaging</a> (fMRI), which measures brain activity indirectly by tracking changes in blood flow. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155836/original/image-20170207-30937-1epizb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155836/original/image-20170207-30937-1epizb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155836/original/image-20170207-30937-1epizb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155836/original/image-20170207-30937-1epizb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155836/original/image-20170207-30937-1epizb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155836/original/image-20170207-30937-1epizb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155836/original/image-20170207-30937-1epizb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">fMRI scanner.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">wikipedia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In this game, rather than having a belief that the object is definitely in the box or not, both players believe there is a probability that the object is here or there, without knowing for certain (making it a <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/8/130812-physics-schrodinger-erwin-google-doodle-cat-paradox-science/">Schrödinger’s box</a>). The object is always being moved, and so the two players’ beliefs are always changing. The subject is challenged with trying to keep track of not only the whereabouts of the object, but also the partner’s belief.</p>
<p>This design allowed us to use a mathematical model to describe what was going on in the subject’s mind, as they played the game. It showed how participants changed their own belief every time they got some information about where the object was. It also described how they changed their simulation of the partner’s belief, every time the partner saw some information.</p>
<p>The model works by calculating “predictions” and “prediction errors”. For example, if a participant predicts that there is a 90% chance the object is in the box, but then sees that it’s nowhere near the box, they will be surprised. We can therefore say that the person experienced a large “prediction error”. This is then used to improve the prediction for next time. </p>
<p>Many researchers believe that the prediction error is a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predictive_coding">fundamental unit of computation in the brain</a>. Each prediction error is linked to a particular pattern of activity in the brain. This means that we could compare the patterns of brain activity when a subject experiences prediction errors with the alternative activity patterns that happen when the subject thinks about the partner’s prediction errors. </p>
<p>Our findings showed that the brain uses distinct patterns of activity for prediction errors and “simulated” prediction errors. This means that the brain activity contains information not only about what’s going on out there in the world, but also about who is thinking about the world. The combination leads to a subjective sense of self. </p>
<h2>Brain training</h2>
<p>We also found, however, that we could train people to make those brain-activity patterns for self and other either more distinct or more overlapping. We did this by manipulating the task so that the subject and partner saw the same information either rarely or frequently. If they became more distinct, subjects got better at distinguishing their own thoughts from the thoughts of the partner. If the patterns became more overlapping, they got worse at distinguishing their own thoughts from the thoughts of the partner. </p>
<p>This means that the boundary between the self and the other in the brain is not fixed, but flexible. The brain can learn to change this boundary. This might explain the familiar experience of two people who spend a lot of time together and start to feel like one single person, sharing the same thoughts. On a societal level, it may explain why we find it easier to empathise with those who’ve shared similar experiences to us, compared with people from different backgrounds. </p>
<p>The results could be useful. If self-other boundaries really are this malleable, then maybe we can harness this capacity, both to tackle bigotry and alleviate mental health disorders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141844/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Ereira does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How does the brain distinguish between the “self” and the “other”? A new study gives a clue.Sam Ereira, Postdoctoral researcher of Computational and Cognitive Neuroscience, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1385152020-05-26T02:39:23Z2020-05-26T02:39:23ZSeeing is believing: how media mythbusting can actually make false beliefs stronger<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337476/original/file-20200526-106862-12gbnn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5368%2C3575&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the COVID-19 pandemic has swept the world, politicians, medical experts and epidemiologists have taught us about flattening curves, contact tracing, R<sub>0</sub> and growth factors. At the same time, we are facing an “<a href="https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/srp-04022020.pdf">infodemic</a>” – an overload of information, in which fact is hard to separate from fiction.</p>
<p>Misinformation about coronavirus can have serious consequences. Widespread myths about “immune boosters”, <a href="https://7news.com.au/news/health/false-virus-cure-kills-hundreds-in-iran-c-768920">supposed “cures”</a>, and conspiracy theories linked to <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-5g-radiation-doesnt-cause-or-spread-the-coronavirus-saying-it-does-is-destructive-135695">5G radiation</a> have already caused <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-05/church-selling-bleach-claims-cures-coronavirus-australia/12201348">immediate harm</a>. In the long term they make may people more complacent if they have false beliefs about what will protect them from coronavirus. </p>
<p>Social media companies are <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-17/facebook-to-alert-users-when-they-interact-with-false-virus-info/12156188">working</a> to reduce the spread of myths. In contrast, mainstream media and <a href="https://www.kidneyfund.org/kidney-today/covid-19-myths-vs-facts.html">other information channels</a> have in many cases ramped up efforts to address misinformation. </p>
<p>But these efforts may backfire by unintentionally increasing public exposure to false claims.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/were-in-danger-of-drowning-in-a-coronavirus-infodemic-heres-how-we-can-cut-through-the-noise-131303">We're in danger of drowning in a coronavirus 'infodemic'. Here's how we can cut through the noise</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The ‘myth vs fact’ formula</h2>
<p>News media outlets and health and well-being websites have published countless articles on the “myths vs facts” about coronavirus. Typically, articles share a myth in bold font and then address it with a detailed explanation of why it is false. </p>
<p>This communication strategy has been used previously in attempts to combat other health myths such as the ongoing anti-vaccine movement. </p>
<p>One reason for the prevalence of these articles is that readers actively seek them out. The Google search term “myths about coronavirus”, for example, saw a prominent global spike in March.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337457/original/file-20200525-106842-1gwzo0u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337457/original/file-20200525-106842-1gwzo0u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337457/original/file-20200525-106842-1gwzo0u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337457/original/file-20200525-106842-1gwzo0u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337457/original/file-20200525-106842-1gwzo0u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337457/original/file-20200525-106842-1gwzo0u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337457/original/file-20200525-106842-1gwzo0u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">According to Google Trends, searches for ‘myths about coronavirus’ spiked in March.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?q=myths%20about%20coronavirus">Google Trends</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Debunking false information, or contrasting myths with facts, intuitively feels like it should effectively correct myths. But research shows that such correction strategies may actually backfire, by making misinformation seem more familiar and spreading it to new audiences. </p>
<h2>Familiarity breeds belief</h2>
<p>Cognitive science research shows people are biased to believe a claim <a href="https://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2017/08/gut-truth">if they have seen it before</a>. Even seeing it once or twice may be enough to make the claim more credible. </p>
<p>This bias happens even when people originally think a claim is false, when the claim is not aligned with their own beliefs, and when it seems relatively implausible. What’s more, research shows thinking deeply or being smart does not make you immune to this cognitive bias. </p>
<p>The bias comes from the fact humans are very sensitive to familiarity but we are not very good at tracking where the familiarity comes from, especially over time. </p>
<p>One <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/426605?seq=1">series of studies</a> illustrates the point. People were shown a series of health and well-being claims one might typically encounter on social media or health blogs. The claims were explicitly tagged as true or false, just like in a “myth vs fact” article. </p>
<p>When participants were asked which claims were true and which were false immediately after seeing them, they usually got it right. But when they were were tested a few days later, they relied more on feelings of familiarity and tended to accept previously seen false claims as true. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337493/original/file-20200526-106866-1dv21ow.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337493/original/file-20200526-106866-1dv21ow.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337493/original/file-20200526-106866-1dv21ow.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337493/original/file-20200526-106866-1dv21ow.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337493/original/file-20200526-106866-1dv21ow.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337493/original/file-20200526-106866-1dv21ow.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337493/original/file-20200526-106866-1dv21ow.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Older adults were especially susceptible to this repetition. The more often they were initially told a claim was false, the more they believed it to be true a few days later.</p>
<p>For example, they may have learned that the claim “shark cartilage is good for your arthritis” is false. But by the time they saw it again a few days later, they had forgotten the details. </p>
<p>All that was left was the feeling they had heard something about shark cartilage and arthritis before, so there might be something to it. The warnings turned false claims into “facts”.</p>
<p>The lesson here is that bringing myths or misinformation into focus can make them more familiar and seem more valid. And worse: “myth vs fact” may end up spreading myths by showing them to new audiences.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-it-so-hard-to-stop-covid-19-misinformation-spreading-on-social-media-134396">Why is it so hard to stop COVID-19 misinformation spreading on social media?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What I tell you three times is true</h2>
<p>Repeating a myth may also lead people to overestimate how widely it is accepted in the broader community. The more often we hear a myth, the more we will think it is widely believed. And again, we are bad at remembering where we heard it and under what circumstances. </p>
<p>For instance, hearing one person say the same thing three times is <a href="https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/psp-925821.pdf">almost as effective</a> in suggesting wide acceptance as hearing three different people each say it once.</p>
<p>The concern here is that repeated attempts at correcting a myth in media outlets might mistakenly lead people to believe it is widely accepted in the community. </p>
<h2>Memorable myths</h2>
<p>Myths can be sticky because they are often concrete, anecdotal and easy to imagine. This is a cognitive recipe for belief. The details required to unwind a myth are often complicated and difficult to remember. Moreover, people may not scroll all the way through the explanation of why a myth is incorrect. </p>
<p>Take for example <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/health/2020-04-04/coronavirus-three-pervasive-health-myths-busted/12106820">this piece on coronavirus myths</a>. Although we’d rather not expose you to the myths at all, what we want you to notice is that the fine details needed to debunk a myth are generally more complicated than the myth itself. </p>
<p>Complicated stories are hard to remember. The outcome of such articles may be a sticky myth and a slippery truth.</p>
<h2>Making the truth stick</h2>
<p>If debunking myths makes them more believable, how do we promote the truth? </p>
<p>When information is vivid and easy to understand, we are more likely to recall it. For instance, we know placing a photograph next to a claim increases the chances people will remember (<a href="https://www.anu.edu.au/news/all-news/photos-make-people-believe-anu-study">and believe</a>) the claim. </p>
<p>Making the truth concrete and accessible may help accurate claims dominate the public discourse (and our memories). </p>
<p>Other cognitive tools include using concrete language, repetition, and opportunities to connect information to personal experience, which all work to facilitate memory. Pairing those tools with a focus on truth can help to promote facts at a critical time in human history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138515/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Norbert Schwarz has received funding for related research from National Institute of Aging (USA). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Dawel, Eryn Newman, and Madeline Jalbert do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Instead of debunking false claims, psychology shows promoting the facts is a more effective way to fight the spread of misinformation.Eryn Newman, Lecturer, Australian National UniversityAmy Dawel, Lecturer, Australian National UniversityMadeline Jalbert, PhD Candidate in Social Psychology, University of Southern CaliforniaNorbert Schwarz, Provost Professor of Psychology and Marketing and co-director of the Dornsife Mind & Society Center, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1384972020-05-22T12:19:31Z2020-05-22T12:19:31ZHumanizing the coronavirus as an invisible enemy is human nature<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336850/original/file-20200521-102682-filij6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1380%2C980%2C2210%2C1486&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The coronavirus is really just an inanimate packet of genetic material.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/covid-19-virus-and-pandemic-concept-royalty-free-image/1214039876?adppopup=true&uiloc=thumbnail_same_series_adp">Carol Yepes/Moment via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump has called the coronavirus an “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/04/09/trump-coronavirus-invisible-enemy-177894">invisible enemy</a>” that’s “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/world/coronavirus-women-leaders.html">brilliant</a>” and “tough and smart,” adding that we are “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/04/09/trump-coronavirus-invisible-enemy-177894">tougher and smarter</a>.”</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1246884203419099137"}"></div></p>
<p>CNN host Chris Cuomo, recovering from the virus, attributed malicious intent to it, saying it “<a href="https://news.yahoo.com/cnn-anchor-chris-cuomo-reveals-020652500.html">wants us to lay down</a>.” He warned his audience not to cooperate.</p>
<p>Other people called the coronavirus “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/03/23/coronavirus-isnt-alive-thats-why-its-so-hard-kill/">sneaky</a>,” “<a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/health/hard-to-make-vaccines-for-tricky-coronavirus-un-body/1838118">tricky</a>,” “<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/science/medical-dispatch/its-hard-to-stay-afloat-hope-and-exhaustion-in-the-coronavirus-fight">merciless</a>,” “<a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-cruel-covid-new-normal-11588526503">cruel</a>” and “<a href="https://news.yahoo.com/cuomo-coronavirus-truly-vicious-162954948.html0">vicious</a>.” One reporter wrote that in a nursing home, the virus “<a href="https://wnytimes.com/2020/04/19/nyregion/coronavirus-nj-andover-nursing-home-deaths.html">found</a>” the people who were most frail.</p>
<p>Speaking of the coronavirus as if it were a person, then, is common. But why do we all do it, despite knowing that the virus is just a tiny bundle of inanimate genetic material?</p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Michaela_Porubanova">As cognitive</a> <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Stewart_Guthrie">scientists</a> who study the human mind we suggest that this <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341297299_Faces_in_Clouds_and_Voices_in_Wind_Anthropomorphism_in_Religion_and_Human_Cognition">tendency to see human features everywhere</a> is an innate human characteristic, one that automatically alerts you to signs of other people – and helps you make sense of a confusing world. </p>
<h2>It’s human nature to see human features everywhere</h2>
<p>Attributing human characteristics to nonhuman things and events is called anthropomorphism or personification. Philosophers and psychologists suggest that it is a human universal, found among all of us, regardless of culture or upbringing. For instance, <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/">philosopher David Hume</a> wrote in the 18th century that “<a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6mgpp1DrqnsC&pg=PA29&lpg=PA29&dq=We+find+human+faces+in+the+moon,+armies+in+the+clouds;+and...+ascribe+malice+or+good-will+to+every+thing,+that+hurts+or+pleases+us.&source=bl&ots=2ja_zBKmqi&sig=ACfU3U0e1yXgfSbu5s57gwoKaqdzHPRXJw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj9g6a938DpAhVfGDQIHZlxCgYQ6AEwA3oECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=We%20find%20human%20faces%20in%20the%20moon%2C%20armies%20in%20the%20clouds%3B%20and...%20ascribe%20malice%20or%20good-will%20to%20every%20thing%2C%20that%20hurts%20or%20pleases%20us.&f=false">We find human faces in the moon, armies in the clouds; and… ascribe malice or good-will to every thing, that hurts or pleases us</a>.” Most recently, people find “enemies” in viruses. </p>
<p>They do so, Hume wrote, because the world is complex and unpredictable, and often threatens you with unexpected calamities such as earthquakes, floods and plagues. In order to predict and control these dangers, he said, people want to understand their causes, but often cannot. Baffled, they resort to the most familiar explanations, those based on their own experiences and those of other people.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/335467/original/file-20200515-138654-az7ie8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/335467/original/file-20200515-138654-az7ie8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/335467/original/file-20200515-138654-az7ie8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=240&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/335467/original/file-20200515-138654-az7ie8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=240&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/335467/original/file-20200515-138654-az7ie8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=240&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/335467/original/file-20200515-138654-az7ie8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/335467/original/file-20200515-138654-az7ie8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/335467/original/file-20200515-138654-az7ie8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Anthropomorphizing viruses is common.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://xkcd.com/2306/">xkcd</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This habit often results in the mistake of thinking you see persons, or features of persons, where they don’t exist, as with the new virus. But having a human-like model–indeed, having any model–to apply to such a mysterious, invisible and dangerous entity as the coronavirus provides some measure of apparent control, and thus comfort.</p>
<p>And although people may not consciously believe that the coronavirus is like a person, their language and behavior suggest that they do so unconsciously.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336849/original/file-20200521-102682-1yd7u4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336849/original/file-20200521-102682-1yd7u4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336849/original/file-20200521-102682-1yd7u4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336849/original/file-20200521-102682-1yd7u4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336849/original/file-20200521-102682-1yd7u4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336849/original/file-20200521-102682-1yd7u4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=601&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336849/original/file-20200521-102682-1yd7u4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=601&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336849/original/file-20200521-102682-1yd7u4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=601&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A detail from ‘Winter’ by Giuseppe Arcimboldo. Humans intuitively and automatically attribute and see human features where there are none.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Giuseppe_Arcimboldo_-_Winter,_1573.jpg">Giuseppe Arcimboldo</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The assumption that persons and features of persons may be present is spontaneous and irrepressible. For example, 16th-century Italian artist Giuseppe Arcimboldo <a href="https://www.nga.gov/content/dam/ngaweb/Education/learning-resources/an-eye-for-art/AnEyeforArt-GiuseppeArcimboldo.pdf">painted a series of faces</a> composed of various objects. In one work, “Winter,” you can’t help seeing a face in a tree stump, perhaps reflecting a face that the artist had imagined in a real stump. It is virtually impossible not to see the face emerging from Arcimboldo’s assemblage of objects.</p>
<h2>The upside of anthropomorphizing</h2>
<p>Interpreting many phenomena as human in origin is the safest bet, while dismissing them as irrelevant may be dangerous if you’re wrong.</p>
<p>When you find possible traces of humans – faces in stumps, voices in the wind or footsteps in a house’s creaks – it opens a wide repertoire of important possibilities. Is it an enemy who might harm me? A friend who will comfort me?</p>
<p>Thus, a high sensitivity to human-like features and a low threshold for deciding they are present have evolutionary advantages. Their disadvantage is that you’re often mistaken, when no human feature is really there. But most such mistakes are less consequential than missing someone you need to see, whether friend or foe.</p>
<p>Humans, then, are a special stimulus for us, and cognitive neuroscience provides further evidence of it. For example, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/icd.241">infants are born ready to recognize a face</a> – or anything <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0561-66">resembling one</a> – and by a few months of age, infants <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/nature06288">prefer a block that “helps”</a> another block up a slope to one that “hinders” it. So babies are born ready to see shapes as human anatomy, and quickly see even inanimate objects as having social relationships. People never outgrow this tendency, and throughout life see aspects of ourselves in cliff “faces,” river “mouths” and mountain “majesties,” and purpose and meaning everywhere.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336839/original/file-20200521-102667-1f5qb5u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336839/original/file-20200521-102667-1f5qb5u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336839/original/file-20200521-102667-1f5qb5u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336839/original/file-20200521-102667-1f5qb5u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336839/original/file-20200521-102667-1f5qb5u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336839/original/file-20200521-102667-1f5qb5u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336839/original/file-20200521-102667-1f5qb5u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336839/original/file-20200521-102667-1f5qb5u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nietzsche wrote of his ‘belief in intention… that every event is a deed, that every deed presupposes a doer….’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Stewart Guthrie</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Scanning for human features in the environment – and ending up anthropomorphizing – appears built into human beings. It is supported by what neuroscientists call the social brain, <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17366164/">an evolved “person network</a>.”</p>
<p>This brain network is activated by any stimulus that even suggests a person, such as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1152/jn.00513.2004">stick figure</a> or <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/brb3.500">emoji</a>. For instance, part of this network, the fusiform face area, responds both <a href="https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.17-11-04302.1997">to a human face </a>and to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0113885">anthropomorphized car headlights</a>, grill and bumper.</p>
<p>No wonder it’s so easy to talk about the coronavirus as human-like. Anthropomorphic narratives provide models of the virus and its behavior that feel familiar and accessible. They’re a way to grasp these unseen beings, and this grasp, illusory or not, provides a bit of the confidence and sense of control so crucial to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2010.08.001">mental well-being</a>.</p>
<p>[<em>You need to understand the coronavirus pandemic, and we can help.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=upper-coronavirus-help">Read The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138497/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stewart Guthrie received related funding from the National Science Foundation, the American Council of Learned Societies and the Fulbright Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michaela Porubanova does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Thinking of SARS-CoV-2 as an invisible enemy with an evil personality and humanlike motivations is a natural offshoot of the way people evolved to anthropomorphize so as not to overlook threats.Michaela Porubanova, Associate Professor of Cognitive Psychology, Farmingdale State CollegeStewart Guthrie, Professor Emeritus of Anthropology, Fordham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1369652020-05-01T05:05:29Z2020-05-01T05:05:29ZNo wonder isolation’s so tiring. All those extra, tiny decisions are taxing our brains<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/331907/original/file-20200501-42903-1hjriy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=2%2C1%2C995%2C559&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/young-tired-unhealthy-mixed-race-woman-1477334066">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Anxiety, depression, loneliness and stress are <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-28/coronavirus-data-feelings-opinions-covid-survey-numbers/12188608">affecting</a> our sleep patterns and <a href="https://theconversation.com/here-is-why-you-might-be-feeling-tired-while-on-lockdown-135502">how tired we feel</a>. </p>
<p>But we may be getting tired for another reason. All those tiny decisions we make every day are multiplying and taking their toll. </p>
<p>Is it safe to nip out for milk? Should I download the COVIDSafe app? Is it OK to wear my pyjamas in a Zoom meeting?</p>
<p>All of these kinds of decisions are in addition to the familiar, everyday ones. What shall I have for breakfast? What shall I wear? Do I hassle the kids to brush their teeth? </p>
<p>So what’s going on?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/here-is-why-you-might-be-feeling-tired-while-on-lockdown-135502">Here is why you might be feeling tired while on lockdown</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>We’re increasing our cognitive load</h2>
<p>One way to think about these extra decisions we’re making in isolation is in terms of “cognitive load”. We are trying to think about too many things at once, and our brains can only cope with a finite amount of information.</p>
<p>Researchers have been looking into our limited capacity for cognition or attention for decades.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.elsevier.com/books/perception-and-communication/broadbent/978-1-4832-0079-8">Early research</a> described a “bottleneck” through which information passes. We are forced to attend selectively to a portion of all the information available to our senses at a given time. </p>
<p>These ideas grew into research on “<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0079742108604521">working memory</a>”: there are limits on the number of mental actions or operations we can carry out. Think of remembering a phone or bank account number. Most people find it very hard to remember more than a few at once.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/say-what-how-to-improve-virtual-catch-ups-book-groups-and-wine-nights-134655">Say what? How to improve virtual catch-ups, book groups and wine nights</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>And it can affect how we make decisions</h2>
<p>To measure the effects of cognitive load on decision-making, researchers vary the amount of information people are given, then look at the effects. </p>
<p>In one <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30617746">study</a>, we asked participants to predict a sequence of simple events (whether a green or red square would appear at the top or bottom of a screen) while keeping track of a stream of numbers between the squares. </p>
<p>Think of this increase in cognitive load as a bit like trying to remember a phone number while compiling your shopping list.</p>
<p>When the cognitive load is not too great, people can successfully “divide and conquer” (by paying attention to one task first).</p>
<p>In our study, participants who had to learn the sequence and monitor the numbers made just as many successful predictions, on average, as those who only had to learn the sequence. </p>
<p>Presumably they divided their attention between keeping track of the simple sequence, and rehearsing the numbers.</p>
<h2>More and more decisions take their toll</h2>
<p>But when tasks become more taxing, decision making can start to deteriorate. </p>
<p>In another <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324804535_Taxing_Cognitive_Capacities_Reduces_Choice_Consistency_Rather_Than_Preference_A_Model-Based_Test">study</a>, Swiss researchers used the monitoring task to examine the impact of cognitive load on risky choices. They asked participants to choose between pairs of gambles, such as:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A) 42% chance of $14 and 58% chance of $85, or </p>
<p>B) 8% chance of $24 or 92% chance of $44. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Participants made these choices both with their attention focused solely on the gambles, and, in another part of the experiment, while also keeping track of sequences of letters played to them via headphones.</p>
<p>The key finding was not that increasing cognitive load made people inherently more risk-seeking (tending to choose A) or risk-averse (B), but that it simply made them more inconsistent in their choices. Increased cognitive load made them switch.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/331896/original/file-20200501-42908-b7sk9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/331896/original/file-20200501-42908-b7sk9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/331896/original/file-20200501-42908-b7sk9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/331896/original/file-20200501-42908-b7sk9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/331896/original/file-20200501-42908-b7sk9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/331896/original/file-20200501-42908-b7sk9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=634&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/331896/original/file-20200501-42908-b7sk9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=634&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/331896/original/file-20200501-42908-b7sk9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=634&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The fruit salad or the cake? Well, it depends partly on your cognitive load.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/chocolate-cake-fruit-salad-on-white-224509534">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is a bit like choosing the fruit salad over the cake under normal circumstances, but switching to the cake when you are <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1999-15817-004">cognitively overloaded</a>. </p>
<p>It is not because a higher cognitive load causes a genuine change in your preference for unhealthy food. Your decisions just get “noisier” or inconsistent when you have more on your mind.</p>
<h2>‘To do two things at once is to do neither’</h2>
<p>This proverbial wisdom (attributed to the Roman slave <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publilius_Syrus">Publilius Syrus</a>) rings true – with the caveat that we sometimes can do more than one thing if they are familiar, well-practised decisions. </p>
<p>But in the current business-not-as-usual context there are many new decisions we never thought we’d need to make (is it safe to walk in the park when it is busy?). </p>
<p>This unfamiliar territory means we need to take the time to adapt and recognise our cognitive limitations.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/personalities-that-thrive-in-isolation-and-what-we-can-all-learn-from-time-alone-135307">Personalities that thrive in isolation and what we can all learn from time alone</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Although it might seem as though all those tiny decisions are mounting up, it perhaps isn’t just their number. The root cause of this additional cognitive load could be the undercurrent of additional uncertainty surrounding these novel decisions. </p>
<p>For some of us, the pandemic has displaced a bunch of decisions (do I have time to get to the bus stop?). But the ones that have replaced them are tinged with the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02699930903132496?casa_token=0FsQX-LdyogAAAAA%3AxR7f9J7x2rmG6NjO5IoONJwfzi2cfQGBUKne6yqgWaZ4llppqGI0ZkseMnmAlrJlACD4PSN5_wLy">anxiety</a> surrounding the ultimate cost that we, or family members, might pay if we make the wrong decision.</p>
<p>So, it is no wonder these new decisions are taking their toll.</p>
<h2>So what can I do?</h2>
<p>Unless you have had ample experience with the situation, or the tasks you are trying to do are simple, then adding load is likely to leader to poorer, inconsistent or “noisier” decisions.</p>
<p>The pandemic has thrown us into highly unfamiliar territory, with a raft of new, emotionally tinged decisions to face. </p>
<p>The simple advice is to recognise this new complexity, and not feel you have to do everything at once. And “divide and conquer” by separating your decisions and giving each one the attention it – and you – deserve.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136965/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Newell receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>Is it safe to nip out for milk? Should I download the COVIDSafe app? Is it OK to wear my pyjamas in a Zoom meeting? All these extra decisions are taking their toll.Ben Newell, Professor of Cognitive Psychology, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1235782019-09-18T09:52:29Z2019-09-18T09:52:29ZThe partisan brain: cognitive study suggests people on the left and right are more similar than they think<p>This is the age of partisanship. As our beliefs become increasingly polarised and digital <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-problem-of-living-inside-echo-chambers-110486">echo chambers</a> begin to dictate our realities, many of us are finding ourselves inadvertent partisans. In this time of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-filter-bubble-isnt-just-facebooks-fault-its-yours-69664">filter bubbles</a>, we have been taught to rely on the left-right political distinction as an essential tool for measuring who is likely to think like us and with whom we should bond.</p>
<p>But partisanship isn’t just a matter of <em>direction</em> – that is, whether one’s beliefs and identity lean politically left or right. Partisanship also has a second, often overlooked, dimension captured by the intensity or <em>extremity</em> of one’s beliefs and identity.</p>
<p>For instance, a person could lean left in their political views and hold these beliefs strongly and dogmatically, and another could be politically right-wing but feel only a weak attachment to conservative parties and be receptive to alternative viewpoints. When we speak about political partisanship, the labels of “left” and “right” are therefore insufficient: we must consider both partisan direction and extremity.</p>
<h2>The partisan brain</h2>
<p>The American thinker Eric Hoffer believed we could generate deep insights about human history, psychology, and politics by examining how people come to hold extreme ideological identities.</p>
<p>In his famous book, <a href="https://www.harpercollins.com/9780060505912/the-true-believer/">The True Believer</a> (1951), Hoffer argued that extreme adherents to an ideology or political party tend to have a particular psychological character that makes them susceptible to joining any ideological group, regardless of the specific beliefs it advocates. He wrote:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>All movements, however different in doctrine and aspiration, draw their early adherents from the same types of humanity; they all appeal to the same types of mind.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>What are the characteristics of the “type of mind” that is most susceptible to thinking in extreme and dogmatic ways? Hoffer hypothesised that low self-esteem and a sense of personal frustration are the key ingredients for ideological extremity. My colleagues and I at the University of Cambridge decided to take a different, more modern approach to answering this question, using the tools of cognitive science.</p>
<p>We set out to investigate the psychology of the “ideological mind” and hypothesised that partisan rigidity and extremity might emerge from a general psychological tendency to process information in rigid and inflexible ways.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2011.11.001">neuropsychological literature</a>, an individual who is cognitively rigid tends to perceive objects and stimuli in black-and-white terms, and this makes it difficult for them to switch between modes of thinking or to adapt to changing environments.</p>
<p>We reasoned that individuals with a tendency towards cognitive rigidity in how they perceive and react to the world generally might be more likely to be rigid and dogmatic about their political beliefs and identities as well.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/a64c5e_d74504da38e04b428f632aaeb64fcd61.pdf">recent published study</a>, we invited 750 US citizens to complete multiple objective neuropsychological tests that allow us to measure their individual levels of cognitive rigidity and flexibility. We found that individuals who are extremely attached to the Democratic party or to the Republican party display greater mental rigidity on these cognitive tests relative to those who are only moderately or weakly attached. Regardless of the direction and content of their political beliefs, extreme partisans had a similar cognitive profile.</p>
<p>This suggests that partisan extremity is psychologically significant – the intensity with which we attach ourselves to political doctrines may reflect and shape the way our mind works, even at the basic levels of perception and cognition. Notably, these findings would have remained hidden if we only considered whether participants were politically left- or right-wing.</p>
<h2>Learning flexibility</h2>
<p>These results prompt many questions about the relationship between our minds and our politics. The first is a question of causality: does engagement with an extreme ideology lead to mental rigidity? Or does cognitive inflexibility foster a proclivity towards ideological extremism? The answer is likely to be – as for most complex phenomena – an interaction of both. Scientifically, we would need longitudinal studies that track people over long periods of time to determine cause and effect.</p>
<p>We might also consider whether these findings can help us counter some of the negative aspects of living in the partisan age. One of the neat properties of cognitive flexibility is that it is, in itself, malleable. Studies have shown that education and training can help cultivate and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0070350">amplify our mental flexibility</a>, thereby improving our capacity to switch between different styles of thinking and adapt our behaviour in the face of change and uncertainty. Would heightening our flexibility help us to build more tolerant and less dogmatic societies?</p>
<p>While the conservatism or liberalism of our beliefs may at times divide us, our capacity to think about the world flexibly and adaptively can unite us. Extremity in either direction can lead us to see the world in black and white and forget to appreciate those crucial shades of grey in between.</p>
<p>Yet it is often within these intermediate greys that we can find creative, constructive solutions to societal troubles and remember to place our common humanity above abstract ideals. Is it time for an age of plasticity to replace the age of partisanship? Only if we learn to recognise that, despite the differences that sit on the outside, we are more similar than we think within.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leor Zmigrod receives funding from Gates Cambridge Trust. </span></em></p>A particular type of mind could be more susceptible to political partisanship, on either side of the traditionally defined political spectrum.Leor Zmigrod, Research Fellow, Department of Psychology, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1138812019-06-07T13:00:41Z2019-06-07T13:00:41ZAre brain games mostly BS?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278190/original/file-20190605-40754-idwobz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1879%2C3948%2C3043&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">You might just be getting better at the game you're practicing.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/Plii16U9bOU">Malcolm Lightbody/Unsplash</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>You’ve probably seen ads for apps promising to make you smarter in just a few minutes a day. Hundreds of so-called “brain training” programs can be purchased for download. These simple games are designed to challenge mental abilities, with the ultimate goal of improving the performance of important everyday tasks.</p>
<p>But can just clicking away at animations of swimming fish or flashed streets signs on your phone really help you improve the way your brain functions?</p>
<p>Two large groups of scientists and mental health practitioners published consensus statements, months apart in 2014, on the effectiveness of these kinds of brain games. Both included people with years of research experience and expertise in cognition, learning, skill acquisition, neuroscience and dementia. Both groups carefully considered the same body of evidence available at the time.</p>
<p>Yet, they issued exactly opposite statements.</p>
<p><a href="http://longevity.stanford.edu/a-consensus-on-the-brain-training-industry-from-the-scientific-community-2/">One concluded</a> that “there is little evidence that playing brain games improves underlying broad cognitive abilities, or that it enables one to better navigate a complex realm of everyday life.”</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cognitivetrainingdata.org/the-controversy-does-brain-training-work/response-letter/">The other</a> argued that “a substantial and growing body of evidence shows that certain cognitive training regimens can significantly improve cognitive function, including in ways that generalize to everyday life.” </p>
<p>These two competing contradictory statements highlight a deep disagreement among experts, and a fundamental dispute over what counts as convincing evidence for something to be true. </p>
<p>Then, in 2016, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission entered into the fray with a series of rulings, including a US$50 million judgment (later reduced to $2 million) <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/01/lumosity-pay-2-million-settle-ftc-deceptive-advertising-charges">against one of the most heavily advertised brain training packages</a> on the market. The FTC concluded that Lumos Labs’ advertisements – touting the ability of its Lumosity brain training program to improve consumers’ cognition, boost their performance at school and work, protect them against Alzheimer’s disease and help treat symptoms of ADHD – were not grounded in evidence.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278193/original/file-20190605-40710-15m7ppb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278193/original/file-20190605-40710-15m7ppb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278193/original/file-20190605-40710-15m7ppb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278193/original/file-20190605-40710-15m7ppb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278193/original/file-20190605-40710-15m7ppb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278193/original/file-20190605-40710-15m7ppb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278193/original/file-20190605-40710-15m7ppb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278193/original/file-20190605-40710-15m7ppb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">What does clicking away on a laptop really improve?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/old-asian-woman-learning-use-laptop-1219427392">Akkalak Aiempradit/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In light of conflicting claims and scientific statements, advertisements and government rulings, what are consumers supposed to believe? Is it worth your time and money to invest in brain training? What types of benefits, if any, can you expect? Or would your time be better spent doing something else?</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=W9Ow0H8AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">I’m a cognitive scientist</a> and member of Florida State University’s <a href="https://isl.fsu.edu/">Institute for Successful Longevity</a>. I have studied cognition, human performance and the effects of different types of training for nearly two decades. I’ve conducted laboratory studies that have directly put to the test the ideas that are the foundation of the claims made by brain training companies.</p>
<p>Based on these experiences, my optimistic answer to the question of whether brain training is worth it would be “we just don’t know.” But the actual answer may very well be “no.”</p>
<h2>How well does research measure improvements?</h2>
<p>My colleagues and I have argued that most of the pertinent studies <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100616661983">fall far short of being able to provide definitive evidence</a> either way.</p>
<p>Some of these problems are statistical in nature.</p>
<p>Brain training studies often look at its effect on multiple cognitive tests – of attention, memory, reasoning ability and so on – over time. This strategy makes sense in order to uncover the breadth of potential gains.</p>
<p>But, for every test administered, there’s a chance that scores will improve just by chance alone. The more tests administered, the greater the chance that researchers <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611417632">will see at least one false alarm</a>.</p>
<p>Brain training studies that include many tests and then report only one or two significant results cannot be trusted unless they control for the number of tests being administered. Unfortunately, many studies do not, calling their findings into question.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278194/original/file-20190605-40715-2bxfx5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278194/original/file-20190605-40715-2bxfx5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278194/original/file-20190605-40715-2bxfx5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278194/original/file-20190605-40715-2bxfx5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278194/original/file-20190605-40715-2bxfx5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278194/original/file-20190605-40715-2bxfx5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278194/original/file-20190605-40715-2bxfx5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278194/original/file-20190605-40715-2bxfx5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Picking the one task that she improved on out of many casts doubt on the study’s validity.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/elderly-woman-typing-on-smartphone-338814812">De Visu/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Another design problem has to do with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691613491271">inadequate control groups</a>. To claim that a treatment had an effect, the group receiving the treatment needs to be compared to a group that does not. It’s possible, for example, that people receiving brain training improve on an assessment test just because they’ve already taken it – before and then again after training. Since the control group also takes the test twice, cognitive improvements based on practice effects can be ruled out. </p>
<p>Many studies that have been used to support the effectiveness of brain training have compared the effect of brain training to a control group that did nothing. The problem is any difference observed between the training group and the control group in these cases could easily be explained by a placebo effect.</p>
<p>Placebo effects are improvements that are not the direct result of a treatment, but due to participants <a href="https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.1994.03510440069036">expecting to feel or perform better</a> as a result of having received a treatment. This is an important concern in any intervention study, whether aimed at understanding the effect of a new drug or a new brain training product.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s41465-018-0115-y">Researchers now realize</a> that doing something generates a greater expectation of improvement than doing nothing. Recognition of the likelihood for a placebo effect is shifting standards for testing the effectiveness of brain games. Now studies are much more likely to use an active control group made up of participants who perform some alternative non-brain training activity, rather than doing nothing.</p>
<p>Still, these active controls don’t go far enough to control for expectations. For instance, it’s unlikely that a participant in a control condition that features computerized crossword puzzles or educational videos will expect improvement as much as a participant assigned to try fast-paced and adaptive commercial brain training products – products specifically touted as being able to improve cognition. Yet, studies with these inadequate designs <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0134467">continue to claim to provide evidence</a> that commercial brain training works. It remains rare for studies to measure expectations in order to help understand and counteract potential placebo effects.</p>
<p>Participants in our studies do develop expectations based on their training condition, and are especially <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s41465-017-0050-3">optimistic regarding the effects of brain training</a>. Unmatched expectations between groups are a serious concern, because there is growing evidence suggesting cognitive tests are susceptible to placebo effects, including tests of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2011.592500">memory</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1601243113">intelligence</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s41465-019-00130-x">attention</a>.</p>
<h2>Is there a likely mechanism for improvement?</h2>
<p>There’s another important question that needs to be addressed: Should brain training work? That is, given what scientists know about how people learn and acquire new skills, should we expect training on one task to improve the performance of another, untrained task? This is the fundamental claim being made by brain training companies – that engaging in games on a computer or mobile device will improve your performance on all sorts of tasks that are not the game you’re playing. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278184/original/file-20190605-40738-18t0qj5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278184/original/file-20190605-40738-18t0qj5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278184/original/file-20190605-40738-18t0qj5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=690&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278184/original/file-20190605-40738-18t0qj5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=690&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278184/original/file-20190605-40738-18t0qj5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=690&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278184/original/file-20190605-40738-18t0qj5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=867&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278184/original/file-20190605-40738-18t0qj5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=867&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278184/original/file-20190605-40738-18t0qj5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=867&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brain training programs ‘gamify’ the process to keep people practicing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/guspim/1789247323">Gustavo da Cunha Pimenta/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As one example, “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/62.special_issue_1.19">speed of processing training</a>” has been incorporated into commercial brain training products. The goal here is to improve the detection of objects in the periphery, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1097/01.opx.0000175009.08626.65">which can be useful in avoiding an automobile crash</a>. A brain game may take the form of nature scenes with birds presented in the periphery; players must locate specific birds, even though the image is presented only briefly. But can finding birds on a screen help you detect and avoid, for example, a pedestrian stepping off the curb while you’re driving?</p>
<p>This is a crucial question. Few people care much about improving their score on an abstract computerized brain training exercise. What is important is improving their ability to perform everyday tasks that relate to their safety, well-being, independence and success in life. But <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100616661983">over a century of research</a> suggests that learning and training gains tend to be extremely specific. Transferring gains from one task to another can be a challenge.</p>
<p>Consider the individual known as SF, who was able, with extended practice, to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7375930">improve his memory for numbers</a> from seven to 79 digits. After training, he was able to hear a list of 79 randomly generated digits and immediately repeat this list of numbers back, perfectly, without delay. But he could still remember and repeat back only about six letters of the alphabet.</p>
<p>This is just one of many examples in which individuals can vastly improve their performance on a task, but demonstrate no training gains at all when presented with an even slightly different challenge. If the benefits of training on remembering digits do not transfer to remembering letters, why would training on virtual bird-spotting transfer to driving, academic performance or everyday memory?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278192/original/file-20190605-40747-1a4bl3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278192/original/file-20190605-40747-1a4bl3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278192/original/file-20190605-40747-1a4bl3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278192/original/file-20190605-40747-1a4bl3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278192/original/file-20190605-40747-1a4bl3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278192/original/file-20190605-40747-1a4bl3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278192/original/file-20190605-40747-1a4bl3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278192/original/file-20190605-40747-1a4bl3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">There are other proven ingredients for healthy aging.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/P0F_zH39qhs">Val Vesa/Unsplash</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Staying mentally spry</h2>
<p>Brain training programs are an appealing shortcut, a “get smart quick” scheme. But improving or maintaining cognition is likely not going to be quick and easy. Instead, it may require a lifetime – or at least an extended period – of cognitive challenge and learning.</p>
<p>If you’re worried about your cognition, what should you do?</p>
<p>First, if you do engage in brain games, and you enjoy them, please continue to play. But keep your expectations realistic. If you’re playing solely to obtain cognitive benefits, instead consider other activities that might be as cognitively stimulating, or at least more fulfilling – like learning a new language, for instance, or learning to play an instrument. </p>
<p>Some evidence suggests that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617707316">physical exercise can potentially help maintain cognition</a>. Even if exercise had no effect on cognition at all, it has <a href="https://order.nia.nih.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/nia-exercise-guide.pdf">clear benefits to physical health</a> – so why not move your body a bit?</p>
<p>The most important lesson from the literature on training is this: If you want to improve your performance on a task that’s important to you, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1553-2712.2008.00227.x">practice that task</a>. Playing brain games may only make you better at playing brain games.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113881/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Walter Boot receives funding from the National Institutes of Health.</span></em></p>There are reasons to be skeptical, of both the quality of the evidence presented so far and the questionable assumptions that underlie claims of improved cognitive function after brain training.Walter Boot, Professor of Cognitive Psychology, Florida State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1079732018-12-20T11:32:49Z2018-12-20T11:32:49ZWhat if consciousness is just a product of our non-conscious brain?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/251294/original/file-20181218-27761-i4t1pn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/profile-young-man-mental-activity-brain-1226454388?src=EgvMjLFf5dk6UsauMVjUnA-1-9">Lia Koltyrina/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the very word used to describe it has been “<a href="https://archive.org/details/psychologyscienc00millrich">worn smooth by a million tongues</a>”, consciousness is a fertile topic for confusion. We all know what it is to be conscious. It is, basically, being aware of and responding to the world. Similarly, we all possess a common sense notion of <a href="http://cogprints.org/6453/1/How_to_define_consciousness.pdf">how consciousness works</a>. </p>
<p>But common sense can be easily confused. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/685443?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">Consider these questions</a> for example: if you felt pain in an amputated leg, where is the pain? If you say it is in your head, would it be in your head if your leg had not been amputated? If you say yes, then what reason have you for ever thinking you had a leg? </p>
<p>One source of confusion when explaining “consciousness” stems from common sense and formal accounts that frame the study of mental life. These are typically discussed <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3767904/">in terms of a binary split</a> between conscious intentional processes versus non-conscious involuntary processes – the latter of which are outside our awareness. When walking, for example, we have a conscious awareness of the intention to go somewhere. Yet putting one foot in front of the other is a non-conscious action.</p>
<p>Following this, most of us consider consciousness – our subjective awareness – to be responsible for creating and controlling our thoughts, memories and actions. At the same time, we recognise that some of these psychological processes are carried on beyond our awareness. For example, when picking up a pen we may know what we are going to write about but the selection and articulation of individual words are non-conscious processes. </p>
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<p>The key driver behind this traditional distinction stems from our own powerful belief that causality links subjective awareness with the daily experience of appearing to have control over our thoughts, feelings and actions. Over the past 100 years, however, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264940806_The_biological_function_of_consciousness">a growing body of evidence</a> has begun to question this binary distinction. There is now increasing agreement that most, if not all, of the contents of our psychological processes – our thoughts, beliefs, sensations, perceptions, emotions, intentions, actions and memories – are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612460684">actually formed backstage</a> by fast and efficient non-conscious brain systems.</p>
<h2>The non-conscious nature of being</h2>
<p>Previously, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-if-consciousness-is-not-what-drives-the-human-mind-86785">we argued that</a> while undeniably real, the “experience of consciousness” or subjective awareness is precisely that – awareness. No more, no less. We proposed that while consciousness is created by brain systems, it <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01924">has no causal relationship with or control</a> over mental processes. The fact that personal awareness accompanies the contents of the personal narrative is <a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.180416/page/n5">causally compelling</a>. But it is not necessarily relevant to understanding and explaining the psychological processes underpinning them.</p>
<p>This <a href="https://archive.org/details/psychologyscienc00millrich">quote from George Miller</a> – one of the founders of cognitive psychology – helps explain this idea. When one recalls something from memory, “consciousness gives no clue as to where the answer comes from; the processes that produce it are unconscious. It is the result of thinking, not the process of thinking, that appears spontaneously in consciousness”.</p>
<p>Taking this further, <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01924">we propose</a> that subjective awareness – the intimate signature experience of what it is like to be conscious – is itself a product of non-conscious processing. This observation, was well captured by pioneering social psychologist Daniel Wegner when <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/illusion-conscious-will">he wrote</a> that, “unconscious mechanisms create both conscious thought about action and the action, and also produce the sense of will we experience by perceiving the thought as the cause of the action”.</p>
<p>Our proposition that both the subjective experience of consciousness (personal awareness) and associated psychological processes (thoughts, beliefs, ideas, intentions and more) are <em>products</em> of non-conscious processes is consistent with the fact that non-conscious automatic brain systems reliably carry out all of our core biological processes (such as respiration and digestion) efficiently, and often without our awareness. </p>
<p>It is also consistent with a wider prevailing observation found in the natural sciences – especially neurobiology. In this field conscious primacy is not nearly as prevalent as it is in psychology. Complex and intelligent design in living things are <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00064.x">not assumed to be driven by conscious processes</a>. Instead they are thought to come from adaptive processes which accrued through natural selection. </p>
<h2>Moving on from the divide</h2>
<p>If we are indeed “<a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02173/full">subjects of unconscious authoring</a>” then continuing to characterise psychological states in terms of being conscious and non-conscious is unhelpful. It constrains the theoretical understanding of psychological processes. Furthermore, if all psychological processes and their products rely on non-conscious systems, then the idea that the brain has automatic and controlled processes needs a rethink too. It might be better to describe them as differences on a continuum of non-conscious processing, rather than alternative systems. </p>
<p>Such a proposal does not dispense with the common sense reality of one’s personal qualitative experience, nor with the previous findings of cognitive neuroscience. However, it offers an opportunity to reduce some of the confusion that comes with use of the terms “consciousness” and “contents of consciousness”. Both of which continue to imply that consciousness has a functional role in distinguishing psychological processes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107973/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If consciousness is a by-product of our brains’ nonconscious processes, where does that leave us?Peter W Halligan, Hon Professor of Neuropsychology, Cardiff UniversityDavid A Oakley, Emeritus Professor of Psychology, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1086472018-12-18T14:13:09Z2018-12-18T14:13:09ZWhy are people religious? A cognitive perspective<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250690/original/file-20181214-185240-1i86r8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In prayer.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/woman-hands-praying-god-bible-pray-1008546292?src=0HOhqMCOJ8pRG_VfCZQ_sA-1-29">Es5669/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The quick and easy answer to why people are religious is that God – in whichever form you believe he/she/they take(s) – is real and people believe because they communicate with it and perceive evidence of its involvement in the world. Only <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/05/christians-remain-worlds-largest-religious-group-but-they-are-declining-in-europe/">16% of people worldwide</a> are not religious, but this still equates to approximately 1.2 billion individuals who find it difficult to reconcile the ideas of religion with what they know about the world. </p>
<p>Why people believe is a question that has plagued great thinkers for many centuries. Karl Marx, for example, called religion the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jun/26/religion-philosophy">opium of the people</a>”. Sigmund Freud felt that god was an illusion and worshippers were reverting to the childhood needs of security and forgiveness. </p>
<p>A more recent psychological explanation is the idea that our evolution has created a “<a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg23631561-000-effortless-thinking-the-godshaped-hole-in-your-brain/">god-shaped hole</a>” or has given us a metaphorical “<a href="https://www.csicop.org/si/show/the_god_engine">god engine</a>” which can drive us to believe in a deity. Essentially this hypothesis is that religion is a by-product of a number of cognitive and social adaptations which have been extremely important in human development. </p>
<h2>Adapted for faith</h2>
<p>We are social creatures who interact and communicate with each other in a co-operative and supportive way. In doing so we inevitably have stronger attachments to some individuals more than others. British psychologist John Bowlby demonstrated <a href="https://www.learning-theories.com/attachment-theory-bowlby.html">this influence of attachments</a> on children’s emotional and social development, and showed how these can suffer when they are threatened through separation or abuse. We continue to rely on these attachments in later life, when falling in love and making friends, and can even form strong attachments to non-human animals and inanimate objects. It is easy to see that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10508619.2012.679556">these strong attachments could transfer</a> to religious deities and their messengers.</p>
<p>Our relationships depend on being able to predict how others will behave across situations and time. But the things that we form attachments to don’t necessarily need to be in front of us to predict their actions. We can imagine what they would do or say. This ability – known as <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=R5c4AAAAIAAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=decoupled+cognition+development&ots=EguvU5WaPt&sig=vFzsPLOgvR-DVKo45otxPToTL-s#v=onepage&q=decoupled%20cognition%20development&f=false">cognitive decoupling</a> – originates in childhood through pretend play. It is a small leap from being able to imagine the mind of someone we know to imagining an <a href="http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/271772">omnipotent, omniscient, human-like mind</a> – especially if we have religious texts which tell of their past actions.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250692/original/file-20181214-185264-1ttrhi1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250692/original/file-20181214-185264-1ttrhi1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250692/original/file-20181214-185264-1ttrhi1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250692/original/file-20181214-185264-1ttrhi1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250692/original/file-20181214-185264-1ttrhi1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250692/original/file-20181214-185264-1ttrhi1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250692/original/file-20181214-185264-1ttrhi1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Sharing faith.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/religious-asian-muslim-man-teaching-his-1025214310?src=xJq-CfMEkH7HNIzjswblNg-1-12">Mamma Belle and the kids/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Another key adaptation that may help religious belief derives from our ability to to anthropomorphise objects. Have you ever seen the outline of a person only to realise that it is actually a coat hung on the door? This capacity to attribute human forms and behaviours to non-human things shows we also readily endow non-human entities, such as gods, with the same qualities that we possess and, as such, make it easier to connect with them.</p>
<h2>Behavioural benefits</h2>
<p>In addition to these psychological aspects, the ritual behaviour seen in collective worship makes us enjoy and want to repeat the experience. Dancing, singing and achieving trance-like states were prominent in <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4958132/">many ancestral societies</a> and are still exhibited by some today – including the <a href="https://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/sentinelese">Sentinelese people</a>, and <a href="https://www.aboriginal-art-australia.com/aboriginal-art-library/aboriginal-ceremonial-dancing/">Australian aborigines</a>. As well as being acts of social unity, even more formal rituals also <a href="https://www.salon.com/2014/01/04/this_is_your_brain_on_religion_uncovering_the_science_of_belief/">alter brain chemistry</a>. They increase levels of serotonin, dopamine, and oxytocin in the brain – chemicals that make us feel good, want to do things again and provide a closeness to others.</p>
<p>These cognitive adaptations are facilitated by educational and household norms which don’t tend to dispute religious ideas. While we are encouraged to challenge other ideas presented to us early in childhood that may not have a strong evidence base – such as Father Christmas or the Tooth Fairy – this is not the case with religion. These challenges are often discouraged in religious teachings and <a href="https://www.christianpost.com/news/billy-graham-its-sin-in-the-eyes-of-god-to-criticize-your-pastor.html">sometimes regarded as sinful</a>.</p>
<p>Regardless of your point of view, the impact of religion and religious thinking on human functioning and evolution is a captivating intellectual debate that shows no sign of ending. Of course, one might argue that god creates everything outlined above but then this leads us onto another, bigger question: what is the evidence for god?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108647/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Perham does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>These psychological adaptations help us to sustain belief in religion.Nick Perham, Senior Lecturer in Psychology, Cardiff Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/989902018-06-28T18:00:31Z2018-06-28T18:00:31ZWhy your brain never runs out of problems to find<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225230/original/file-20180627-112604-13hg2n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=276%2C256%2C4222%2C2713&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Why do people constantly 'move the goalposts' when making judgments? </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/soccer-goal-on-field-green-grass-504723661">JoeNattapon/Shutterstock.com </a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/por-que-nuestro-cerebro-siempre-encuentra-problemas-101172"><em>Leer en español</em></a>.</p>
<p>Why do many problems in life seem to stubbornly stick around, no matter how hard people work to fix them? It turns out that a quirk in the way human brains process information means that when something becomes rare, we sometimes see it in more places than ever.</p>
<p>Think of a “neighborhood watch” made up of volunteers who call the police when they see anything suspicious. Imagine a new volunteer who joins the watch to help lower crime in the area. When they first start volunteering, they raise the alarm when they see signs of serious crimes, like assault or burglary.</p>
<p>Let’s assume these efforts help and, over time, assaults and burglaries become rarer in the neighborhood. What would the volunteer do next? One possibility is that they would relax and stop calling the police. After all, the serious crimes they used to worry about are a thing of the past.</p>
<p>But you may share the intuition my research group had – that many volunteers in this situation wouldn’t relax just because crime went down. Instead, they’d start calling things “suspicious” that they would never have cared about back when crime was high, like jaywalking or loitering at night.</p>
<p>You can probably think of many similar situations in which problems never seem to go away, because people keep changing how they define them. This is sometimes called “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2016.1082418">concept creep</a>,” or “moving the goalposts,” and it can be a frustrating experience. How can you know if you’re making progress solving a problem, when you keep redefining what it means to solve it? My colleagues and I <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap8731">wanted to understand</a> when this kind of behavior happens, why, and if it can be prevented.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225231/original/file-20180627-112607-1d9rjgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225231/original/file-20180627-112607-1d9rjgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225231/original/file-20180627-112607-1d9rjgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225231/original/file-20180627-112607-1d9rjgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225231/original/file-20180627-112607-1d9rjgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225231/original/file-20180627-112607-1d9rjgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225231/original/file-20180627-112607-1d9rjgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225231/original/file-20180627-112607-1d9rjgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After violent crime starts going down, loiterers and jaywalkers may start to seem more threatening.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/victoria-british-columbia-canada-6-september-721737862">Marc Bruxelle/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
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<h2>Looking for trouble</h2>
<p>To study how concepts change when they become less common, we brought volunteers into <a href="http://wjh-www.harvard.edu/%7Edtg/gilbert.htm">our laboratory</a> and gave them a simple task – to look at a series of computer-generated faces and decide which ones seem “threatening.” The faces had been <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0032335">carefully designed by researchers</a> to range from very intimidating to very harmless.</p>
<p>As we showed people fewer and fewer threatening faces over time, we found that they expanded their definition of “threatening” to include a wider range of faces. In other words, when they ran out of threatening faces to find, they started calling faces threatening that they used to call harmless. Rather than being a consistent category, what people considered “threats” depended on how many threats they had seen lately.</p>
<p>This kind of inconsistency isn’t limited to judgments about threat. In another experiment, we asked people to make an even simpler decision: whether colored dots on a screen were blue or purple.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225225/original/file-20180627-112634-1ipauky.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225225/original/file-20180627-112634-1ipauky.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225225/original/file-20180627-112634-1ipauky.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=264&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225225/original/file-20180627-112634-1ipauky.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=264&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225225/original/file-20180627-112634-1ipauky.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=264&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225225/original/file-20180627-112634-1ipauky.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225225/original/file-20180627-112634-1ipauky.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225225/original/file-20180627-112634-1ipauky.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">As the context changes, so do the boundaries of your categories.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Levari</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As blue dots became rare, people started calling slightly purple dots blue. They even did this when we told them blue dots were going to become rare, or offered them cash prizes to stay consistent over time. These results suggest that this behavior isn’t entirely under conscious control – otherwise, people would have been able to be consistent to earn a cash prize.</p>
<h2>Expanding what counts as immoral</h2>
<p>After looking at the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap8731">results of our experiments</a> on facial threat and color judgments, our research group wondered if maybe this was just a funny property of the visual system. Would this kind of concept change also happen with non-visual judgments?</p>
<p>To test this, we ran a final experiment in which we asked volunteers to read about different scientific studies, and decide which were ethical and which were unethical. We were skeptical that we would find the same inconsistencies in these kind of judgments that we did with colors and threat.</p>
<p>Why? Because moral judgments, we suspected, would be more consistent across time than other kinds of judgments. After all, if you think violence is wrong today, you should still think it is wrong tomorrow, regardless of how much or how little violence you see that day.</p>
<p>But surprisingly, we found the same pattern. As we showed people fewer and fewer unethical studies over time, they started calling a wider range of studies unethical. In other words, just because they were reading about fewer unethical studies, they became harsher judges of what counted as ethical. </p>
<h2>The brain likes to make comparisons</h2>
<p>Why can’t people help but expand what they call threatening when threats become rare? Research from cognitive psychology and neuroscience suggests that this kind of behavior is a consequence of the basic way that our brains process information – we are constantly <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2155">comparing what is front of us to its recent context</a>.</p>
<p>Instead of carefully deciding how threatening a face is compared to all other faces, the brain can just store how threatening it is <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2005.10.003">compared to other faces it has seen recently</a>, or compare it to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1217854110">some average of recently seen faces</a>, or <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0022602">the most and least threatening faces it has seen</a>. This kind of comparison could lead directly to the pattern my research group saw in our experiments, because when threatening faces are rare, new faces would be judged relative to mostly harmless faces. In a sea of mild faces, even slightly threatening faces might seem scary.</p>
<p>It turns out that for your brain, relative comparisons often use <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0959-4388(00)00237-3">less energy than absolute measurements</a>. To get a sense for why this is, just think about how it’s easier to remember which of your cousins is the tallest than exactly how tall each cousin is. Human brains have likely <a href="https://doi.org/10.1242/jeb.017574">evolved to use relative comparisons in many situations</a>, because these comparisons often provide enough information to safely navigate our environments and make decisions, all while expending as little effort as possible.</p>
<h2>Being consistent when it counts</h2>
<p>Sometimes, relative judgments work just fine. If you are looking for a fancy restaurant, what you count as “fancy” in Paris, Texas, should be different than in Paris, France.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225198/original/file-20180627-112634-1c7w86s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225198/original/file-20180627-112634-1c7w86s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225198/original/file-20180627-112634-1c7w86s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=799&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225198/original/file-20180627-112634-1c7w86s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=799&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225198/original/file-20180627-112634-1c7w86s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=799&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225198/original/file-20180627-112634-1c7w86s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225198/original/file-20180627-112634-1c7w86s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225198/original/file-20180627-112634-1c7w86s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">What once seemed banal can be recategorized as a threat in a new context.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/0tmERNeC6Pg">louis amal on Unsplash</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>But a neighborhood watcher who makes relative judgments will keep expanding their concept of “crime” to include milder and milder transgressions, long after serious crimes have become rare. As a result, they may never fully appreciate their success in helping to reduce the problem they are worried about. From medical diagnoses to financial investments, modern humans have to make many complicated judgments where being consistent matters.</p>
<p>How can people make more consistent decisions when necessary? My research group is currently doing follow-up research in the lab to develop more effective interventions to help counter the strange consequences of relative judgment.</p>
<p>One potential strategy: When you’re making decisions where consistency is important, define your categories as clearly as you can. So if you do join a neighborhood watch, think about writing down a list of what kinds of transgressions to worry about when you start. Otherwise, before you know it, you may find yourself calling the cops on dogs being walked without leashes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This research was funded by the National Science Foundation. </span></em></p>It’s a psychological quirk that when something becomes rarer, people may spot it in more places than ever. What is the ‘concept creep’ that lets context change how we categorize the world around us?David Levari, Postdoctoral Researcher in Psychology, Harvard UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/953752018-05-07T20:12:12Z2018-05-07T20:12:12ZGood science doesn’t guarantee public acceptance – diverse evidence may help<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216811/original/file-20180430-135851-1385x8h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">From understanding climate change to defining what a bird is, people prefer evidence that is diverse. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cindy Zhi/The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It takes more than just robust science to convince people to take on a certain point of view – consider topics such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-complementary-medicine-practitioners-can-help-get-kids-vaccinated-89854">vaccination</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/perceptions-of-genetically-modified-food-are-informed-by-more-than-just-science-72865">genetically modified foods</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-use-critical-thinking-to-spot-false-climate-claims-91314">climate change</a>. </p>
<p>Our recent <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378017300961?via%3Dihub">study</a> looked how at the balance of evidence can shape the likelihood that people are convinced by it – and in particular how a psychological phenomenon known as “the diversity effect” plays out in assessing scientific evidence. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-might-appear-to-be-common-sense-is-not-always-based-on-scientific-evidence-95228">What might appear to be common sense is not always based on scientific evidence</a>
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<p>Here’s an example of the diversity effect – consider the following two arguments. (A bit of information first: a sesamoid bone is a bone embedded in a tendon or muscle – but you don’t need to know this to follow these arguments). </p>
<p><strong>Argument 1</strong> – <em>Sparrows</em> have sesamoid bones. <em>Robins</em> have sesamoid bones. Therefore, all birds have sesamoid bones. </p>
<p><strong>Argument 2</strong> – <em>Sparrows</em> have sesamoid bones. <em>Penguins</em> have sesamoid bones. Therefore, all birds have sesamoid bones. </p>
<p>You find the second argument more convincing, right? </p>
<p>This preference is the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13546783.2011.566703">diversity effect</a>. It’s where people believe that conclusions supported by “diverse” evidence (that is, evidence from very different sources) are more persuasive than conclusions supported by non-diverse evidence. </p>
<p>Sparrows and penguins are very different, so it stands to reason that something that’s true of both may be true of all birds. By comparison, sparrows and robins are pretty similar in other respects, so things that are true of them may not generalise to lots of other birds.</p>
<h2>When evidence gets complex</h2>
<p><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/wcs.1459">Existing studies</a> of people’s reasoning have focused on simple arguments like the ones above. But many consequential real-world arguments, such as those from the sciences, are more complex. </p>
<p>Evidence can be gathered using different measurement tools, or different experimental designs. Even conclusions based on a single measurement can be supported by evidence from different sources. </p>
<p>Consider the case of climate change: evidence such as temperature readings can be drawn from different geographical locations, or from different time periods.</p>
<p>While having many different kinds of evidence supporting a scientific argument strengthens it in the eye of the scientist, how can we communicate the strength of scientific theories to the general public? </p>
<p>We know from the recent history of climate science communication that having a strong, well-supported theory <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Zoe_Leviston/publication/284563911_Australian_attitudes_to_climate_change_and_adaptation_2010_-_2014/links/5706110c08ae44d70ee34ca4/Australian-attitudes-to-climate-change-and-adaptation-2010-2014.pdf">doesn’t necessarily</a> translate into strong public belief in that theory. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-you-calling-anti-science-how-science-serves-social-and-political-agendas-74755">Who are you calling 'anti-science'? How science serves social and political agendas</a>
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<p>Yet public acceptance of climate science is important as we need public support to ensure that effective policies are put in place to mitigate climate change. </p>
<p>So perhaps we can turn to the cognitive psychology literature to help us find simple and effective ways to present scientific arguments to non-experts. </p>
<p>This brings us back to the diversity effect. We wanted to see whether the diversity effect also holds for non-expert evaluation of real-world scientific arguments. </p>
<h2>Our Study</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378017300961?via%3Dihub">We examined</a> whether lay people used evidence diversity to reason about arguments in two domains where science has an important role in informing public policy: climate science and public health. </p>
<p>We manipulated whether the evidence presented to lay reasoners (people with little formal training in either discipline) differed on a number of characteristics: </p>
<ul>
<li>geographical diversity – evidence taken from different parts of the world (e.g. Australia and the UK) or similar parts of the world (e.g. Australia and New Zealand)</li>
<li>socio-cultural diversity – e.g. Australia and the UK, or Australia and Papua New Guinea), or</li>
<li>temporal diversity – evidence taken from the 1990s and the 1950s, or both pieces of evidence from the 1990s. </li>
</ul>
<p>Using a method that allowed us to measure the independent contributions of each kind of diversity to argument evaluations, we found that the diversity effect does indeed hold. But we found that people are selective about how much they attend to each source of diversity. </p>
<p>For example, non-experts thought a conclusion about sea levels rising across the globe was better supported by evidence taken from distant geographical locations (e.g. Australia and the UK) over geographically nearby locations such as (Australia and New Zealand). </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australians-attitudes-to-vaccination-are-more-complex-than-a-simple-pro-or-anti-label-74245">Australians' attitudes to vaccination are more complex than a simple 'pro' or 'anti' label</a>
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<p>But they weren’t sensitive to whether the socio-cultural dimension of the argument was diverse or not – that is, their evaluations of these arguments weren’t influenced either way whether evidence came from the socio-culturally similar Australia and UK or the socio-culturally dissimilar Australia and Papua New Guinea. </p>
<p>In contrast, for an argument about use of modern contraception rising across the world, non-experts were more sensitive to socio-cultural diversity than geographical diversity. They were more convinced by an argument featuring Australia and Indonesia than an argument featuring Australia and Canada.</p>
<h2>Better science communication</h2>
<p>To our knowledge, we are the first researchers to demonstrate that the diversity effect generalises to non-expert evaluations of scientific arguments. We argue that science communicators can apply this technique to get their message across quickly and effectively. </p>
<p>Our study suggests that emphasising evidence that comes from different sources convinces non-experts more than presenting evidence coming from similar sources. </p>
<p>While we have presented results from climate science and public health arguments, the method we applied in our study could also apply for other scientific topics. To test this, researchers could run focus groups to see what kinds of diversity matter for non-experts in their topic area. </p>
<p>An import caveat of our research is that good science communication doesn’t guarantee public acceptance. In highly politicised topics such as climate science or genetically modified foods <a href="http://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate1547">ideological factors</a> can have an influence too. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/perceptions-of-genetically-modified-food-are-informed-by-more-than-just-science-72865">Perceptions of genetically modified food are informed by more than just science</a>
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<p>Nevertheless, to give the best chance for science to break through these barriers, we need to present our arguments to the public in the most convincing ways we have available. </p>
<p>And to do that, science communicators can turn to cognitive psychology research to take advantage of basic preferences like the diversity effect.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95375/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Newell receives funding from the Australian Research Council </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brett Hayes receives funding from the Australian Research Council</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arthur Kary does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To give the best chance for science to have an impact, we need to present our arguments to the public in the most convincing ways we have available. Applied psychology can help.Arthur Kary, PhD Candidate, School of Psychology, UNSW SydneyBen Newell, Professor of Cognitive Psychology, UNSW SydneyBrett Hayes, Professor, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/950312018-04-16T19:01:32Z2018-04-16T19:01:32ZBrexit: how cognitive psychology helps us make sense of the vote<p>In an era of increasing ideological polarisation, many people are trying – and struggling – to understand the minds of those holding opposing views.</p>
<p>We often look to age, gender or education to explain divisions. We analyse campaign strategies and the language politicians use to win our support. My colleagues and I at the University of Cambridge chose to turn to <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/cognitive-psychology-30582">cognitive psychology</a> for more answers.</p>
<p>In a study of over 300 UK citizens, we <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/34orcoevfibww5b/AADw28g7tdSn2zVquloRT8Dda?dl=0&preview=PNAS+Final+Proof.pdf">tested</a> participants’ tendencies towards “cognitive flexibility” – their ability to adapt to change – and “cognitive persistence”, which reflects a preference for stability and uniformity.</p>
<p>We found that people who displayed higher cognitive flexibility were less likely to support authoritarian and nationalistic ideologies. They were also more likely to think the UK should remain in the EU.</p>
<p>Those who exhibited tendencies towards cognitive persistence were more likely to endorse conservative and nationalistic attitudes. They, in turn, were more likely to support <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/eu-referendum-2016">Brexit</a>. </p>
<h2>Adapting to change</h2>
<p>We measured cognitive flexibility by asking participants to complete tests which assessed their cognitive information processing styles. These tests do not make any reference to politics or ideologies. </p>
<p>In one <a href="https://www.psytoolkit.org/experiment-library/wcst.html">test</a>, participants were presented with four cards featuring different geometric figures of various colours and shapes. The participants were asked to match a fifth card from a separate deck to one of these four cards. There were multiple potential rules for matching the cards. They could be matched according to the colour, number, or shape of the geometric figures.</p>
<p>At the start of the task, participants learnt an initial rule for classifying the cards (for example, according to colour). But after learning the rule, the classification rule suddenly changed (for example, they now needed to match the cards according to shape). This allows us to measure how easily individuals adapt to change. Do they quickly change their responses to the new rule (which is indicative of flexibility)? Or do they tend to persist with the previously-learnt rule (which is a marker of persistence)? </p>
<p>Across multiple behavioural measures, we found a link between mental flexibility and nationalistic ideology. We asked participants about their support for immigration, the European Union, free movement of labour, and access to the EU single market. We found that cognitive flexibility and tolerance for uncertainty were related to support for flexible immigration and fluid national borders. Cognitive persistence was linked to opposition to immigration and free movement of labour.</p>
<p>A similar pattern emerged when we asked participants about the extent to which they agreed with the statement: “The government has a right to remain in the EU if the costs of Brexit are too high.” We found that the belief that the UK government ought to be flexible in its implementation of Brexit in light of potential costs was positively correlated with cognitive flexibility. Psychologically flexible individuals appear to evaluate policies in more flexible, context-dependent ways.</p>
<p>Our ideological stances may therefore be tied to our general psychological adaptability to change.</p>
<h2>Head and heart</h2>
<p>These findings suggest that we don’t just vote with our hearts, we also vote according to our cognitive style. In fact, the results imply a parallel between our cognitive preferences and our ideological preferences. The flexibility with which we process non-political and non-emotional information reveals how flexibly we process ideological arguments.</p>
<p>Our study points to general trends and tendencies rather than the psychological characteristics of any particular individual. It’s important to remember that the reasons behind <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/voting-737">why we vote</a> the way we do are varied, idiosyncratic and complex. Cognitive flexibility is only one piece of an intricate puzzle.</p>
<p>But understanding the psychological processes that underpin our ideologies and voting choices will help us to better understand each other. That’s a crucial step towards bridging the echo chambers and ideological gaps that often divide our families, our communities and our world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95031/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leor Zmigrod does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Research into cognitive processes found people who adapted their thinking to changing situations were more likelyLeor Zmigrod, PhD Candidate, Department of Psychology, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/939972018-03-30T03:09:06Z2018-03-30T03:09:06ZWhy you stink at fact-checking<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212708/original/file-20180329-189798-1e5kzp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=440%2C350%2C4805%2C3341&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">We don't automatically question information we read or hear.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/true-false-choice-on-keyboard-490626529">Gaelfphoto/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Here’s a quick quiz for you:</p>
<ul>
<li>In the biblical story, what was Jonah swallowed by?</li>
<li>How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the Ark? </li>
</ul>
<p>Did you answer “whale” to the first question and “two” to the second? Most people do … even though they’re well aware that it was Noah, not Moses who built the ark in the biblical story.</p>
<p>Psychologists <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=AUtiwQQAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">like me</a> call this phenomenon <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00273">the Moses Illusion</a>. It’s just one example of how people are very bad at picking up on factual errors in the world around them. Even when people know the correct information, they often fail to notice errors and will even go on to use that incorrect information in other situations. </p>
<p>Research from cognitive psychology shows that people are naturally poor fact-checkers and it is very difficult for us to compare things we read or hear to what we already know about a topic. In what’s been called an era of “fake news,” this reality has important implications for how people consume journalism, social media and other public information. </p>
<h2>Failing to notice what you know is wrong</h2>
<p>The Moses Illusion has been studied repeatedly since the 1980s. It occurs with a variety of questions and the key finding is that – even though people know the correct information – they don’t notice the error and proceed to answer the question.</p>
<p>In the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-5371(81)90165-1">original study</a>, 80 percent of the participants failed to notice the error in the question despite later correctly answering the question “Who was it that took the animals on the Ark?” This failure occurred even though participants were warned that some of the questions would have something wrong with them and were given an example of an incorrect question.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212700/original/file-20180329-189830-2fvsmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212700/original/file-20180329-189830-2fvsmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212700/original/file-20180329-189830-2fvsmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212700/original/file-20180329-189830-2fvsmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212700/original/file-20180329-189830-2fvsmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212700/original/file-20180329-189830-2fvsmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212700/original/file-20180329-189830-2fvsmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212700/original/file-20180329-189830-2fvsmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Who lined the animals up two by two?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Noahs_Ark.jpg">Edward Hicks</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Moses Illusion demonstrates what psychologists <a href="http://marshlab.psych.duke.edu/publications/MarshCantorBrashier2016.pdf">call knowledge neglect</a> – people have relevant knowledge, but they fail to use it. </p>
<p>One way my colleagues and I have studied this knowledge neglect is by having people read fictional stories that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0749-596X(03)00092-5">contain true and false information about the world</a>. For example, one story is about a character’s summer job at a planetarium. Some information in the story is correct: “Lucky me, I had to wear some huge old space suit. I don’t know if I was supposed to be anyone in particular – maybe I was supposed to be Neil Armstrong, the first man on the moon.” Other information is incorrect: “First I had to go through all the regular astronomical facts, starting with how our solar system works, that Saturn is the largest planet, etc.”</p>
<p>Later, we give participants a trivia test with some new questions (Which precious gem is red?) and some questions that relate to the information from the story (What is the largest planet in the solar system?). We reliably find positive effects of reading the correct information within the story – participants are more likely to answer “Who was the first person to step foot on the moon?” correctly. We also see negative effects of reading the misinformation – participants are both less likely to recall that Jupiter is the largest planet and they are more likely to answer with Saturn. </p>
<p>These negative effects of reading false information occur even when the incorrect information directly contradicts people’s prior knowledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028649">In one study</a>, my colleagues and I had people take a trivia test two weeks before reading the stories. Thus, we knew what information each person did and did not know. Participants still learned false information from the stories they later read. In fact, they were equally likely to pick up false information from the stories when it did and did not contradict their prior knowledge. </p>
<h2>Can you improve at noticing incorrect info?</h2>
<p>So people often fail to notice errors in what they read and will use those errors in later situations. But what can we do to prevent this influence of misinformation?</p>
<p>Expertise or greater knowledge seems to help, but it <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2016.1152377">doesn’t solve the problem</a>. Even biology graduate students will attempt to answer distorted questions such as “Water contains two atoms of helium and how many atoms of oxygen?” – though they are less likely to answer them than history graduate students. (The pattern reverses for history-related questions.) </p>
<p>Many of the interventions my colleagues and I have implemented to try to reduce people’s reliance on the misinformation have failed or even backfired. One initial thought was that participants would be more likely to notice the errors if they had more time to process the information. So, we presented the stories in a book-on-tape format and slowed down the <a href="https://doi.org/10.3758/PBR.15.1.180">presentation rate</a>. But instead of using the extra time to detect and avoid the errors, participants were even more likely to produce the misinformation from the stories on a later trivia test.</p>
<p>Next, we tried <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2010.543908">highlighting the critical information in a red font</a>. We told readers to pay particular attention to the information presented in red with the hope that paying special attention to the incorrect information would help them notice and avoid the errors. Instead, they paid additional attention to the errors and were thus more likely to repeat them on the later test. </p>
<p>The one thing that does seem to help is to act like a professional fact-checker. When participants are instructed to edit the story and highlight any inaccurate statements, they are <a href="https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-013-0339-0">less likely to learn misinformation</a> from the story. Similar results occur when participants read the stories sentence by sentence and <a href="https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03193260">decide whether each sentence contains an error</a>.</p>
<p>It’s important to note that even these “fact-checking” readers miss many of the errors and still learn false information from the stories. For example, in the sentence-by-sentence detection task participants caught about 30 percent of the errors. But given their prior knowledge they should have been able to detect at least 70 percent. So this type of careful reading does help, but readers still miss many errors and will use them on a later test.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212713/original/file-20180329-189798-1rxpa05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212713/original/file-20180329-189798-1rxpa05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212713/original/file-20180329-189798-1rxpa05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212713/original/file-20180329-189798-1rxpa05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212713/original/file-20180329-189798-1rxpa05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212713/original/file-20180329-189798-1rxpa05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212713/original/file-20180329-189798-1rxpa05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212713/original/file-20180329-189798-1rxpa05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Our natural mode isn’t to critically push back against all information we encounter.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://pixabay.com/en/reading-newspapaer-newspaper-man-2706960/">hitesh014/Pixabay.com</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Quirks of psychology make us miss mistakes</h2>
<p>Why are human beings so bad at noticing errors and misinformation? Psychologists believe that there are at least two forces at work. </p>
<p>First, people have a general bias to <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.46.2.107">believe that things are true</a>. (After all, most things that we read or hear are true.) In fact, there’s some evidence that we initially process all statements as true and that it then takes cognitive effort to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.65.2.221">mentally mark them as false</a>.</p>
<p>Second, people tend to accept information as long as it’s close enough to the correct information. Natural speech often includes errors, pauses and repeats. (“She was wearing a blue – um, I mean, a black, a black dress.”) One idea is that to maintain conversations we need to go with the flow – accept information that is “good enough” and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00158">just move on</a>.</p>
<p>And people don’t fall for these illusions when the incorrect information is obviously wrong. For example, people don’t try and answer the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-5371(81)90165-1">question</a> “How many animals of each kind did Nixon take on the Ark?” and people don’t believe that Pluto is the largest planet after reading it in a <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13421-013-0359-9">fictional story</a>.</p>
<p>Detecting and correcting false information is difficult work and requires fighting against the ways our brains like to process information. Critical thinking alone won’t save us. Our psychological quirks put us at risk of falling for misinformation, disinformation and propaganda. <a href="https://factcheckingday.com/">Professional fact-checkers provide an essential service</a> in hunting out incorrect information in the public view. As such, they are one of our best hopes for zeroing in on errors and correcting them, before the rest of us read or hear the false information and incorporate it into what we know of the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93997/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lisa Fazio receives funding from the Rita Allen Foundation. </span></em></p>Cognitive psychologists know the way our minds work means we not only don’t notice errors and misinformation we know are wrong, we also then remember them as true.Lisa Fazio, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Vanderbilt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/841682017-09-29T14:22:32Z2017-09-29T14:22:32ZCould it be that religion is more like sex than school?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187812/original/file-20170927-24173-2h23sb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=91%2C212%2C1820%2C1522&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Ecstasy of St Theresa, by Gianlorenzo Bernini in Santa Maria della Vittoria, Rome.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rom,_Santa_Maria_della_Vittoria,_Die_Verz%C3%BCckung_der_Heiligen_Theresa_(Bernini).jpg">Dnalor 01</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A lot of arguments about religion treat it like going to school: a religion is a set of lessons to be learned, tests to pass and rules to follow, all watched over by the great headmaster in the sky. That assumption shapes the sorts of questions we ask of religions and religious people: are your teachers telling the truth? Have they trained you to behave properly? And why do you think it’s a good idea to go to school anyway?</p>
<p>But there’s an increasing body of evidence to suggest that we need to think about religion in a different way: not as a process of training or indoctrination, but as arising from some deep-seated instincts, hardwired into our brains and then shaped by our cultures. This is more like the way we think about sex, emotions and relationships. </p>
<p>The shift in thinking arises from a field of study known as the <a href="https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/volume-24/edition-4/cognitive-science-religion">cognitive science of religion</a>, where cognitive psychologists and evolutionary theorists have joined forces to address a puzzling question. In the words of <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-believing-primate-9780199557028?cc=gb&lang=en&">Jeffrey Schloss</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Why, despite a century of presumed secularisation, does religion persist in the western world, and why does it seem easier for human beings to be religious than to be secular?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The answer they propose is that our brains are hardwired with cognitive biases that have evolved in order to help us to survive, but which have the side-effect of making it natural to develop religious belief. For example, we are cognitively predisposed to imagine that every rustle in the bushes is a creature watching our every move: this <a href="http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/hyperactive-agency-detection/">hyperactive agency detection device</a> was of real benefit to early humans alone in the jungle. It might have caused our early ancestors to run away from a few imaginary tigers, but they also will have escaped one that might otherwise have eaten them. The side effect, however, is that we see unseen watchers everywhere. From this point, it is a relatively easy leap to believe in gods that watch over us, unseen. </p>
<p>According to this model, we did not evolve to be religious, but ended up with religion as a spandrel, an <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nup.12139/full">unintended by-product of the main evolutionary process</a>. Nevertheless, unintended consequence or not, it is now part of our mental architecture and culturally infused throughout our societies – and this is why religious behaviour proves so durable and persistent. </p>
<p>The hyperactive agency detection device and other mechanisms become incorporated into our social and cultural life. They help keep us honest with each other, help us to care for each other and fight our common enemies, and they become codified into the religions that survive and evolve alongside human societies. It is in this sense that religion is more like sex than like school – we might choose to ignore it or decide to have nothing more to do with it, but it will keep returning to haunt us in some form or another. </p>
<h2>A new perspective</h2>
<p>This evolutionary account of the existence and persistence of religion in most, if not all, human societies (it depends a lot on how you define it) is hotly debated and open to criticism from a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/bjps/article/63/3/457/1541451">number of angles</a>. Opponents point out that the move from identifying in-built biases in human cognition to a theory of why we create entire religious universes that structure societies looks suspiciously like a “<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/09/17/it-aint-necessarily-so">just-so story</a>” – one that is highly speculative and requires us to make some assumptions for which there is little or no evidence. The cognitive science of religion gives us an interesting account of why we have religious <em>intuitions</em>, but tells us nothing about how these are translated into particular religious beliefs and practices. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/188203/original/file-20170929-22066-14a12a0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/188203/original/file-20170929-22066-14a12a0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188203/original/file-20170929-22066-14a12a0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188203/original/file-20170929-22066-14a12a0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188203/original/file-20170929-22066-14a12a0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188203/original/file-20170929-22066-14a12a0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188203/original/file-20170929-22066-14a12a0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Religion means different things to different people.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Antonio Lacerda</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nevertheless, its description of religion as driven by deep-seated desires rather than rival accounts of reality opens up an intriguing set of questions and possibilities.</p>
<ol>
<li><p><em>Whatever floats your boat</em>. We no longer believe that everybody’s sexual life has to be the same. Some people choose to give up sex altogether, others have multiple partners. There is a whole range of LGBTQI+ preferences now recognised alongside “vanilla” heterosexual monogamy. Perhaps our religious desires and impulses should be allowed the same diversity and recognition?</p></li>
<li><p><em>You mean the whole world to me but …</em> I do not expect everybody else to see how absolutely wonderful and perfect my partner is. What is absolutely true to me, religiously, may not make any sense to you. And that’s OK. Truth claims do not belong in affairs of the heart, or in affairs of the spirit. Arguments about whose religion is true similarly miss the point.</p></li>
<li><p><em>Don’t shut me out</em>. Although the religious drive is nothing like as powerful or fundamental as the sex drive for most people, it would be unwise to attempt to repress it completely. Perhaps the rise of extremism religion is partly to do with the “<a href="http://www.encyclopedia.com/psychology/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/return-repressed">return of the repressed</a>”, the violence with which an aspect of our character may reassert itself when it has been pushed down and ignored for too long. </p></li>
<li><p><em>I love you … I just don’t like you</em>. We have ambiguous relationships with our partners, sometimes adoring them and sometimes hardly able to be in the same room as them. Sexual attraction is part habit, part mystery, part madness. Most religious people, if pushed, might say something similar about how their spiritual involvement or commitment fluctuates and varies over time. It’s much more complicated than can be captured by simple questions like “What do you believe?” or “Are you religious?”</p></li>
</ol>
<p>This sort of approach to religion has the potential to upset devoutly religious people but also the “devout atheists” who can see no place for it. It provides an explanation of religion which can sit alongside, but does not require, appeals to the call of god or the truth of religious claims. It also stands as a warning to the devout atheists that religion will never go away, and that attacks on religious people as irrational will not make any real difference. At the same time, it opens up a new and intriguing set of possibilities for thinking differently about how religion fits into our world, and how we might learn to express our religious instincts in a diverse society without blind dogmatism or violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84168/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Kevern does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Arguments over religion miss the point that we have religious urges, whether or not we think they are justified.Peter Kevern, Associate Professor in Values in Care, Staffordshire UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/778252017-06-06T00:25:26Z2017-06-06T00:25:26ZIllusions influence our predictions about how well we’ll remember in the future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171718/original/file-20170531-23531-u3e0ms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">OK, I've got this....</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/illinoisspringfield/11210575433">Illinois Springfield</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Every day we make decisions based on how we think our memory works. A student decides how long to study for an exam. A shopper decides whether or not to make a grocery list. An FBI director decides whether to write the contents of a concerning conversation in a memo or to trust he would never forget such critical details.</p>
<p>Yet too often we find ourselves wishing we had studied harder or written down a detail we were previously convinced we would remember. Why does this happen? </p>
<p>The answer may lie in the study of metamemory illusions – situations that lead people to consistently overestimate or underestimate their future memory of something. The way information is presented influences how well people predict they’ll remember it. In our research, we test how subtle cues, such as volume, influence people’s judgments about memory.</p>
<h2>Easy to take in, easy to remember?</h2>
<p>Psychologists have identified several factors that make people incorrectly gauge how good their memory will be. For example, people overestimate their memory for information <a href="https://doi.org/10.3758/PBR.16.3.550">presented at a loud volume</a>. Similarly, people judge information presented in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013684">very large or very clear font as more memorable</a> than information presented in small or difficult-to-read font.</p>
<p>However, volume, font size and font clarity actually have little to no effect on memory. What each of these factors share is that they presumably make the information easier to process – literally easier to hear or read. This led to the theory that people unknowingly base their memory judgments on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023719">how easy it was to process the information</a> when they learned it. The idea is that if you don’t have to strain in the first place to read a nicely laid out chunk of text, for instance, you expect that it will be easy to recall later.</p>
<p>It’s not necessarily a bad idea to use ease of processing as a shortcut to determine how well you’re learning. The two often do go hand-in-hand, with many of the factors making something easy to process also related to memory.</p>
<p>For example, when someone reads a book a second time, she can read it faster and with less effort; there’s an increased ease of processing. Repetition – reading the book a second time – also improves memory for the book’s contents. Thus, the increased ease of processing coincides with an increase in memory, in this case. But it’s the repetition and not the ease of processing itself that improved memory.</p>
<p>Likewise, if new details fit with what someone already knows, it makes processing the new information easier and also makes recalling it easier. Thus, ease of learning is often, but not always, a good indicator of future memory. </p>
<h2>Investigating the illusion</h2>
<p>However, <a href="https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-012-0343-6">recent research challenges the idea</a> that people rely on ease of processing to judge their future memory. Researchers found that many people believe that volume and font size affect memory without actually hearing or reading the words beforehand. According to this view, ease of processing in the moment is not related to memory judgments at all – those judgments simply reflect people’s general beliefs about how memory works. That is, people predict that they will remember more loud words because they believe that volume actually affects memory. </p>
<p>So do people base their memory judgments off of ease of processing or beliefs about memory? To test these two different theories, we devised a study to pit them against each other.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171885/original/file-20170601-25664-180ijxv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171885/original/file-20170601-25664-180ijxv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171885/original/file-20170601-25664-180ijxv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=601&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171885/original/file-20170601-25664-180ijxv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=601&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171885/original/file-20170601-25664-180ijxv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=601&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171885/original/file-20170601-25664-180ijxv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=756&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171885/original/file-20170601-25664-180ijxv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=756&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171885/original/file-20170601-25664-180ijxv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=756&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">If you crank it up, will you remember it better?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/black-volume-control-knob-closeup-135538982">Alexey Laputin via Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We told 136 college students they would hear a series of words, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/xlm0000332">some loud, others quiet</a>. Before playing any words, we asked students to guess the percentages of loud and quiet words they would remember. When students indicate they’ll recall more loud words, it suggests a general belief about volume affecting memory.</p>
<p>Then students heard each word, one at a time. Immediately after the actual experience of hearing it (at whichever volume), they rated how likely they were to remember each word. </p>
<p>We found that students who already believed beforehand that loud words would be remembered better fell victim to the illusion: they gave much higher future-recall ratings to each loud word after it was presented. However, many students who did not believe that volume had any effect on memory still fell victim to this illusion – but to a lesser extent. Thus, it appears that people use a combination of both preexisting beliefs and ease of processing when making memory judgments. </p>
<p>So what do our results say about the accuracy of people’s memory predictions?</p>
<p>Understanding that volume itself will not influence memory helps people make realistic predictions. Even if you realize that, though, processing ease still induces an illusion.</p>
<p>Since ease of processing often does indicate better later memory, it’s not completely wrong to rely on it.</p>
<p>But be wary whether the processing ease comes from the information itself, indicating your high level of learning, or comes from arbitrary external factors like volume. If you’re an FBI director, or anyone else needing to remember something really important, take some extra time learning it or write it down, just to be safe.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77825/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Beatrice Kuhlmann receives funding from the Baden-Wurttemberg Ministry of Arts, Sciences, and Research and the German Research Foundation. Note that this funding is not for her research discussed here. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David J. Frank does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Feel like something will be easy to remember? Your prediction may be influenced by how clearly the information was presented in the first place.David J. Frank, Postdoctoral Scholar in Psychology, Case Western Reserve UniversityBeatrice G. Kuhlmann, Assistant Professor of Cognitive Psychology, University of MannheimLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/706342017-01-11T02:08:11Z2017-01-11T02:08:11ZGetting a scientific message across means taking human nature into account<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152315/original/image-20170110-29024-qr971p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Yeah, I'm not hearing that.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic.mhtml?id=452192425">Woman picture via www.shutterstock.com.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>We humans have collectively accumulated a lot of science knowledge. We’ve developed vaccines that can eradicate some of the most devastating diseases. We’ve engineered bridges and cities and the internet. We’ve created massive metal vehicles that rise tens of thousands of feet and then safely set down on the other side of the globe. And this is just the tip of the iceberg (which, by the way, we’ve discovered is melting). While this shared knowledge is impressive, it’s not distributed evenly. Not even close. There are too many important issues <a href="http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/01/29/public-and-scientists-views-on-science-and-society/">that science has reached a consensus on that the public has not</a>. </p>
<p>Scientists and the media need to communicate more science and communicate it better. Good communication ensures that scientific <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-academics-are-losing-relevance-in-society-and-how-to-stop-it-64579">progress benefits society</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/science-communication-is-on-the-rise-and-thats-good-for-democracy-62842">bolsters democracy</a>, weakens the potency of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-challenge-facing-libraries-in-an-era-of-fake-news-70828">fake news</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-social-media-can-distort-and-misinform-when-communicating-science-59044">misinformation</a> and fulfills researchers’ <a href="http://www.nature.com/news/why-researchers-should-resolve-to-engage-in-2017-1.21236?WT.mc_id=TWT_NatureNews">responsibility to engage</a> with the public. Such beliefs have motivated <a href="http://www.centerforcommunicatingscience.org/">training programs</a>, <a href="https://www.aaas.org/pes/communicating-science-workshops">workshops</a> and a <a href="https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23674/communicating-science-effectively-a-research-agenda">research agenda</a> from the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine on learning more about science communication. A resounding question remains for science communicators: <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-does-research-say-about-how-to-effectively-communicate-about-science-70244">What can we do better?</a></p>
<p>A common intuition is that the main goal of science communication is to present facts; once people encounter those facts, they will think and behave accordingly. The <a href="https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23674/communicating-science-effectively-a-research-agenda">National Academies’ recent report</a> refers to this as the “deficit model.”</p>
<p>But in reality, just knowing facts doesn’t necessarily guarantee that one’s opinions and behaviors will be consistent with them. For example, many people “know” that recycling is beneficial but still throw plastic bottles in the trash. Or they read an online article by a scientist about the necessity of vaccines, but leave comments expressing outrage that doctors are trying to further a pro-vaccine agenda. Convincing people that scientific evidence has merit and should guide behavior may be the greatest science communication challenge, particularly in <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-a-post-truth-election-clicks-trump-facts-67274">our “post-truth” era</a>.</p>
<p>Luckily, we know a lot about human psychology – how people perceive, reason and learn about the world – and many lessons from psychology can be applied to science communication endeavors.</p>
<h2>Consider human nature</h2>
<p>Regardless of your religious affiliation, imagine that you’ve always learned that God created human beings just as we are today. Your parents, teachers and books all told you so. You’ve also noticed throughout your life that science is pretty useful – you especially love heating up a frozen dinner in the microwave while browsing Snapchat on your iPhone.</p>
<p>One day you read that scientists have evidence for human evolution. You feel uncomfortable: Were your parents, teachers and books wrong about where people originally came from? Are these scientists wrong? You experience <a href="http://www.simplypsychology.org/cognitive-dissonance.html">cognitive dissonance</a> – the uneasiness that results from entertaining two conflicting ideas.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152316/original/image-20170110-29019-1s8m21j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152316/original/image-20170110-29019-1s8m21j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152316/original/image-20170110-29019-1s8m21j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152316/original/image-20170110-29019-1s8m21j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152316/original/image-20170110-29019-1s8m21j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152316/original/image-20170110-29019-1s8m21j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152316/original/image-20170110-29019-1s8m21j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152316/original/image-20170110-29019-1s8m21j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">It’s uncomfortable to hold two conflicting ideas at the same time.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic.mhtml?id=463867253">Man image via www.shutterstock.com.</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Psychologist Leon Festinger <a href="http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=3850">first articulated the theory of cognitive dissonance</a> in 1957, noting that it’s human nature to be uncomfortable with maintaining two conflicting beliefs at the same time. That discomfort leads us to try to reconcile the competing ideas we come across. <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-science-issues-seem-to-divide-us-along-party-lines-66626">Regardless of political leaning</a>, we’re hesitant to accept new information that contradicts our existing worldviews.</p>
<p>One way we subconsciously avoid cognitive dissonance is through <a href="https://theconversation.com/confirmation-bias-a-psychological-phenomenon-that-helps-explain-why-pundits-got-it-wrong-68781">confirmation bias</a> – a tendency to seek information that confirms what we already believe and discard information that doesn’t. </p>
<p>This human tendency was first exposed by <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14640746808400161">psychologist Peter Wason</a> in the 1960s in a simple logic experiment. He found that people tend to seek confirmatory information and avoid information that would potentially disprove their beliefs.</p>
<p>The concept of confirmation bias scales up to larger issues, too. For example, psychologists John Cook and Stephen Lewandowsky asked people about their beliefs concerning global warming and then <a href="http://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12186">gave them information stating that 97 percent of scientists agree</a> that human activity causes climate change. The researchers measured whether the information about the scientific consensus influenced people’s beliefs about global warming. </p>
<p>Those who initially opposed the idea of human-caused global warming became even less accepting after reading about the scientific consensus on the issue. People who had already believed that human actions cause global warming supported their position even more strongly after learning about the scientific consensus. Presenting these participants with factual information ended up further polarizing their views, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-science-for-climate-change-only-feeds-the-denial-how-do-you-beat-that-52813">strengthening everyone’s resolve in their initial positions</a>. It was a case of confirmation bias at work: New information consistent with prior beliefs strengthened those beliefs; new information conflicting with existing beliefs led people to discredit the message as a way to hold on to their original position.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152318/original/image-20170110-29036-1lcs417.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152318/original/image-20170110-29036-1lcs417.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152318/original/image-20170110-29036-1lcs417.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152318/original/image-20170110-29036-1lcs417.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152318/original/image-20170110-29036-1lcs417.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152318/original/image-20170110-29036-1lcs417.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152318/original/image-20170110-29036-1lcs417.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152318/original/image-20170110-29036-1lcs417.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Just shouting louder isn’t going to help.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic.mhtml?id=518718154">Megaphone image via www.shutterstock.com.</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Overcoming cognitive biases</h2>
<p>How can science communicators share their messages in a way that leads people to change their beliefs and actions about important science issues, given our natural cognitive biases?</p>
<p>The first step is to acknowledge that every audience has preexisting beliefs about the world. Expect those beliefs to color the way they receive your message. Anticipate that people will accept information that is consistent with their prior beliefs and discredit information that is not.</p>
<p>Then, focus on <a href="http://collabra.org/articles/10.1525/collabra.68/">framing</a>. No message can contain all the information available on a topic, so any communication will emphasize some aspects while downplaying others. While it’s unhelpful to cherry-pick and present only evidence in your favor – which can backfire anyway – it is helpful to focus on what an audience cares about.</p>
<p>For example, <a href="http://collabra.org/articles/10.1525/collabra.68/">these University of California researchers point out</a> that the idea of climate change causing rising sea levels may not alarm an inland farmer dealing with drought as much as it does someone living on the coast. Referring to the impact our actions today may have for our grandchildren might be more compelling to those who actually have grandchildren than to those who don’t. By anticipating what an audience believes and what’s important to them, communicators can choose more effective frames for their messages – focusing on the most compelling aspects of the issue for their audience and presenting it in a way the audience can identify with.</p>
<p>In addition to the ideas expressed in a frame, the specific words used matter. Psychologists <a href="http://doi.org/10.1126/science.7455683">Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman first showed</a> when numerical information is presented in different ways, people think about it differently. Here’s an example from their 1981 study:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is ⅓ probability that 600 people will be saved, and ⅔ probability that no people will be saved.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Both programs have an expected value of 200 lives saved. But 72 percent of participants chose Program A. We reason about mathematically equivalent options differently when they’re framed differently: <a href="http://www.apa.org/monitor/mar05/misfires.aspx">Our intuitions</a> are often not consistent with probabilities and other math concepts.</p>
<p>Metaphors can also act as linguistic frames. Psychologists Paul Thibodeau and Lera Boroditsky found that people who read that crime is a beast proposed different solutions than those who read that crime is a virus – even if they had no memory of reading the metaphor. The <a href="http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0016782">metaphors guided people’s reasoning</a>, encouraging them to transfer solutions they’d propose for real beasts (cage them) or viruses (find the source) to dealing with crime (harsher law enforcement or more social programs).</p>
<p>The words we use to package our ideas can drastically influence how people think about those ideas.</p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>We have a lot to learn. Quantitative research on the efficacy of science communication strategies is in its infancy but <a href="https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23674/communicating-science-effectively-a-research-agenda">becoming an increasing priority</a>. As we continue to untangle more about what works and why, it’s important for science communicators to be conscious of the biases they and their audiences bring to their exchanges and the frames they select to share their messages.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70634/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rose Hendricks receives funding from the US NSF GRFP. </span></em></p>Quirks of human psychology can pose problems for science communicators trying to cover controversial topics. Recognizing what cognitive science knows about how we deal with new information could help.Rose Hendricks, Ph.D. Candidate in Cognitive Science, University of California, San DiegoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/697182016-12-14T05:19:29Z2016-12-14T05:19:29ZSimple thinking in a complex world is a recipe for disaster<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149771/original/image-20161213-25510-1glwr8g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The modern world is a complex place, even if we don't think it is.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ants are simple creatures. They live by simple rules: if you see a scrap of food, pick it up; if you see a pile of food, drop the food you are carrying. Out of such simple behaviour, an ant colony emerges.</p>
<p>We humans are like the ants. For all our sophistication, we react to the world in simple ways. Our world is complex, but our ability to cope with it is limited. We seek simple solutions that hide or ignore the complexity. </p>
<p>The result is that our actions often have unintended side-effects. These produce unwelcome trends, accidents and disasters. </p>
<p>Our senses are constantly bombarded with far more data than our brains can process. Our sensory systems filter it, extracting features, such as movement, that we need to make sense of our surroundings. </p>
<p>The limits of short-term memory further increase the need to simplify. The psychologist <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/George-A-Miller">George Miller</a> found that short-term memory can process only a few chunks of information at a time (the so-called “seven-plus-or-minus two” rule). </p>
<p>Given a string of random letters, you might recall just seven at a time, but if the letters form identifiable chunks, such as words or phrases, then you can remember longer strings of text. </p>
<h2>Making life simple</h2>
<p>Our brains cope with complexity by identifying important features and filtering out unnecessary detail. On seeing that the space you enter has four walls, a floor and a ceiling, you know you have entered a room and can usually ignore the details. This is an example of what the French psychologist <a href="http://www.simplypsychology.org/piaget.html">Jean Piaget</a> termed a “schema”, a mental recipe we learn for responding to common situations.</p>
<p>As individuals, we deal with complexity in our lives by removing or hiding it. Our mental schemas are one way of doing that. Habits are another. </p>
<p>We also simplify complex decision-making by using received wisdom. This includes following simple rules of thumb (“a stitch in time”), following the advice of people we respect or trust, and conforming to the beliefs and attitudes of whatever group we belong to. </p>
<p>Society has many ways of managing complexity. Commonly seen is the “divide and rule” approach to management, which leads to hierarchical division of large organisations. </p>
<p>Another is to use constraints, such as laws, road rules and commercial standards, all of which limit the potential for harmful interactions to occur. The design of a home simplifies living space by dividing it into separate rooms for sleeping, eating and other activities.</p>
<h2>Why simple doesn’t always work</h2>
<p>Simplicity is a virtue, so long as the world around us behaves in the way we expect. However, our world is complex, even more so than any way we represent it, either in our mental models, or even in scientific models. </p>
<p>Influences omitted from consideration can cause a model to fail, especially when conditions change. A simple example is failing to put personal items – say, your keys – in their usual place. </p>
<p>Your “model” of where the keys should be fails and you face a long hunt to find them. Changed conditions also underlie most accidents. The history of aviation shows that despite its increasing safety, unexpected conditions continue to surface and lead to disaster.</p>
<p>New technologies are usually introduced to simplify our lives, but inevitably they have unexpected side effects on society. For instance, the introduction of labour-saving devices into the home set off cascades of social changes, such as the decline of the nuclear family. </p>
<p>It makes life simpler to rely on others to provide solutions to complex problems. We assume that mentors, experts or political leaders have answers to society’s problems. </p>
<p>However, their models are just as susceptible as anyone’s. A study by <a href="http://www.sas.upenn.edu/tetlock/">Philip Tetlock</a> showed that experts who base predictions on sweeping, general ideas, such as political ideologies, are usually the best known, most influential and most widely trusted; they are also the ones who are most often wrong.</p>
<p>Our inability to fathom complexity leads to a belief that any worthwhile solution to a situation must be simple. This attitude perhaps explains the widespread mistrust of science today: it has become too complex and technical for the public to understand. So people often ignore or reject its messages, especially when its findings are unpalatable. </p>
<p>Any change introduces complexity into people’s lives. Rather than face issues that are complex, some people retreat into denial, preferring to believe in a simpler future in which there is no change and their lives can go on as they always have. </p>
<p>The world today is undergoing rapid change. Economic growth, environmental threats and the explosion of new technologies are enormously complex and threaten social upheaval. Brexit, the US election result, and climate change denial all appear to have roots in the desire for simplicity. </p>
<p>In an era of post-truth and pseudoscience, what can you do? More than ever, avoid following simple slogans uncritically. Avoid dismissing uncomfortable facts out of hand (<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-fascists-to-feminazis-how-both-sides-of-politics-are-biased-in-their-political-thinking-69493">confirmation bias</a>). </p>
<p>Above all, remember that complexity arises from the richness of interconnections between things. To ignore the wider context, to fail to consider the side effects of actions and ideas, is to do so at our peril.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Green receives funding from the Australian Research Council and from Monash University.</span></em></p>Humans have limited ability to understand complexity, but there are serious dangers if we oversimplify things too much.David Green, Professor of Information Technology, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/636522016-08-25T02:08:52Z2016-08-25T02:08:52ZWhat you see is not always what you get: how virtual reality can manipulate our minds<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135446/original/image-20160825-30228-1pl5rb8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Who are you really talking to in your virtual chat?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is often said that you should not believe everything you see on the internet. But with the advent of immersive technology – like <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/virtual-reality-5439">virtual reality</a> (VR) and <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/augmented-reality-2801">augmented reality</a> (AR) – this becomes more than doubly true. </p>
<p>The full capabilities of these immersive technologies have yet to be explored, but already we can get a sense of how they can be used to manipulate us.</p>
<p>You may not think you are someone who is easily duped, but what if the techniques used are so subtle that you are not even aware of them? The truth is that once you’re in a VR world, you can be influenced without knowing it.</p>
<p>Unlike video conferencing, where video data is presented exactly as it is recorded, immersive technologies only send select information and not necessarily the actual graphical content. </p>
<p>This has always been the case in multiplayer gaming, where the gaming server simply sends location and other information to your computer. It’s then up to your computer to translate that into a full picture.</p>
<p>Interactive VR is similar. In many cases, very little data is shared between the remote computer and yours, and the actual visual scene is constructed locally. </p>
<p>This means that what you are seeing on your end is not necessarily the same as what is being seen at the other end. If you are engaged in a VR chat, the facial features, expressions, gestures, bodily appearance and many other factors can be altered by software without you knowing it.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/IIGFGF1hQmw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Stanford researchers examine the psychology of virtual reality.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Like you like me</h2>
<p>In a positive sense VR can be helpful in many fields. For example, research shows that eye contact increases the attentiveness of students, but a teacher lecturing a large class cannot make eye contact with every student. </p>
<p>With VR, though, the software can be programmed to make the teacher appear to be making eye contact with all of the students at the same time. So a physical impossibility becomes virtually possible. </p>
<p>But there will always be some people who will co-opt a tool and use it for something perhaps more nefarious. What if, instead of a teacher, we had a politician or lobbyist, and something more controversial or contentious was being said? What if the eye contact meant that you were more persuaded as a result? And this is only the beginning.</p>
<p>Research has shown that the <a href="http://phys.org/news/2011-01-virtual-affect-reality.html">appearance of ourselves</a> and others in a virtual world can <a href="http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2016/02/how-your-vr-self-influences-your-real-life-self.html">influence us in the real world</a>. </p>
<p>This can also be coupled with techniques that are already used to boost influence. Mimicry is one example. If one person mimics the body language of another in a conversation, then the person being mimicked will become more favourably disposed towards them. </p>
<p>In VR it is easy to do this as the movements of each individual are tracked, so a speaker’s avatar could be made to mimic every person in the audience without them realising it. </p>
<p>More insidious still, all the features of a person’s face can easily be captured by software and turned into an avatar. <a href="https://vhil.stanford.edu/mm/2011/bailenson-ieee-vr-social.pdf">Several studies</a> from Stanford University have shown that if the features of a political figure could be changed even slightly to resemble each voter in turn, then that could have a significant influence on how people voted. </p>
<p>The experiments took pictures of study participants and real candidates in an mock up of an election campaign. The pictures of each candidate were then <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morphing">morphed</a> to resemble each participant in turn. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/2vSF0FvPlzM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Stanford researcher Jeremy Bailenson explains how political manipulation was easily done in VR experiments.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>They found that if 40% of the participant’s features were incorporated into the candidates face, the participants were entirely unaware the image had been manipulated. Yet the blended picture significantly influenced the intended voting result in favour of the morphed candidate. </p>
<p>What happens in the virtual world does not stay in the virtual world. We must therefore be mindful when we step into this new realm that what we see is not always what we get.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63652/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr David Evans Bailey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Subtle manipulation of virtual reality can radically change how we respond without us even realising it.Dr David Evans Bailey, PhD Researcher in Virtual Reality, Auckland University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/615522016-08-24T02:06:11Z2016-08-24T02:06:11ZGetting serious about funny: Psychologists see humor as a character strength<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135250/original/image-20160824-30216-zdyfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Don't laugh at the psychological study of humor.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/pic-398241004.html">Laughing image via www.shutterstock.com.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Humor is observed <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-humor-code/201109/the-importance-humor-research">in all cultures and at all ages</a>. But only in recent decades has experimental psychology respected it as an essential, fundamental human behavior.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.degruyter.com/viewbooktoc/product/5472">Historically</a>, psychologists <a href="http://www.springer.com/us/book/9780306464072">framed humor negatively</a>, suggesting it demonstrated superiority, vulgarity, Freudian id conflict or a defense mechanism to hide one’s true feelings. In this view, an individual used humor to demean or disparage others, or to inflate one’s own self-worth. As such, it was treated as an undesirable behavior to be avoided. And psychologists tended to ignore it as worthy of study.</p>
<p>But research on humor has come into the sunlight of late, with humor now viewed as a character strength. <a href="http://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.5.410">Positive psychology</a>, a field that examines what people do well, notes that humor can be used to <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/tps0000063">make others feel good</a>, to <a href="http://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.1962">gain intimacy</a> or to <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15332985.2014.884519">help buffer stress</a>. Along with gratitude, hope and spirituality, a sense of humor belongs to the <a href="http://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2011/01/05/measuring-your-character-strengths/">set of strengths</a> positive psychologists call <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2011.592508">transcendence</a>; together they help us forge connections to the world and provide meaning to life. <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17439760701228938">Appreciation of humor correlates with other strengths</a>, too, such as <a href="http://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.5.410">wisdom and love of learning</a>. And humor activities or exercises <a href="http://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2011.577087">result in increased feelings of emotional well-being and optimism</a>. </p>
<p>For all these reasons, humor is now welcomed into mainstream experimental psychology as a desirable behavior or skill researchers want to understand. How do we comprehend, appreciate and produce humor?</p>
<h2>What it takes to get a joke</h2>
<p>Understanding and creating humor require a sequence of mental operations. Cognitive psychologists favor a <a href="http://doi.org/10.1515/humr.1990.3.1.53">three-stage theory of humor</a>. To be in on the joke you need to be able to:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Mentally represent the set up of the joke.</p></li>
<li><p>Detect an incongruity in its multiple interpretations.</p></li>
<li><p>Resolve the incongruity by inhibiting the literal, nonfunny interpretations and appreciating the meaning of the funny one.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>An individual’s knowledge is organized in mental memory structures called schemas. When we see or think of something, it activates the relevant schema; Our body of knowledge on that particular topic immediately comes to mind.</p>
<p>For example, when we see <a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_5iwQA4JJdUs/S_hBozdXqZI/AAAAAAAABco/swEcaydKG4s/s1600/cows.png">cows in a Far Side cartoon</a>, we activate our bovine schema (stage 1). But when we notice the cows are inside the car while human beings are in the pasture grazing, there are now two mental representations in our conscious mind: what our preexisting schema mentally represented about cows and what we imagined from the cartoon (stage 2). By inhibiting the real-world representation (stage 3), we find the idea of cows driving through a countryside of grazing people funny. “I know about cows” becomes “wait, cows should be the ones in the field, not people” becomes an appreciation of the humor in an implausible situation.</p>
<p>Funny is the subjective experience that comes from the resolution of at least two incongruous schemas. In verbal jokes, the second schema is often activated at the end, in a punchline. </p>
<h2>That’s not funny</h2>
<p>There are at least two reasons that we sometimes don’t get the joke. First, the punchline must create a different mental representation that conflicts with the one set up by the joke; timing and laugh tracks help signal the listener that a different representation of the punchline is possible. Second, you must be able to inhibit the initial mental representation.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135213/original/image-20160823-30238-fk3rgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135213/original/image-20160823-30238-fk3rgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135213/original/image-20160823-30238-fk3rgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=744&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135213/original/image-20160823-30238-fk3rgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=744&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135213/original/image-20160823-30238-fk3rgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=744&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135213/original/image-20160823-30238-fk3rgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=935&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135213/original/image-20160823-30238-fk3rgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=935&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135213/original/image-20160823-30238-fk3rgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=935&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">You need some new material.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/hopkinsarchives/6049073817">Special Collections at Johns Hopkins University</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
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<p>When jokes perpetuate a stereotype that we find offensive (as in ethnic, racist or sexist jokes), we may refuse to inhibit the offensive representation. Violence in cartoons is another example; In Roadrunner cartoons, when an anvil hits the coyote, animal lovers may be unable to inhibit the animal cruelty meaning instead of focusing on the funny meaning of yet another inevitable failure.</p>
<p>This incongruity model can explain <a href="http://doi.org/10.1159/000351005">why older adults do not comprehend jokes</a> as frequently as younger adults. Due to declines tied to the aging process, <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S135561770396005X">older adults may not have the cognitive resources</a> needed to create multiple representations, to simultaneously hold multiple ones in order to detect the incongruity, or to inhibit the first one that was activated. Getting the joke relies on working memory capacity and control functions. However, when older adults succeed in their efforts to do these things, they typically show greater appreciation of the joke than younger adults do and <a href="http://doi.org/10.1007/s00391-009-0090-0">report greater life satisfaction than those who don’t see the humor</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135212/original/image-20160823-30228-1fjqw3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135212/original/image-20160823-30228-1fjqw3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135212/original/image-20160823-30228-1fjqw3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135212/original/image-20160823-30228-1fjqw3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135212/original/image-20160823-30228-1fjqw3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135212/original/image-20160823-30228-1fjqw3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135212/original/image-20160823-30228-1fjqw3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135212/original/image-20160823-30228-1fjqw3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Advancing age can set the stage for an appreciation of humor.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/yooperann/5837772027">Ann Fisher</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
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<p>There may be other aspects to humor, though, where older adults hold the advantage. <a href="http://doi.org/10.2190/N76X-9E3V-P1FN-H8D8">Wisdom</a> is a form of reasoning that increases with age and is <a href="http://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.5.410">correlated with subjective well-being</a>. <a href="http://doi.org/10.1515/HUMR.2009.023">Humor is linked with wisdom</a> – a wise person knows how to use humor or when to laugh at oneself.</p>
<p>Additionally, <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000062">intuition is a form of decision-making</a> that may develop with the expertise and experience that come with aging. Like humor, intuition is enjoying a bit of a renaissance within psychology research now that it’s been reframed as <a href="http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2010.07.004">a major form of reasoning</a>. <a href="http://doi.org/10.1515/humor-2015-0070">Intuition aids humor</a> in schema formation and incongruity resolution, and we perceive and appreciate humor more through speedy first impressions rather than logical analysis.</p>
<h2>Traveling through time</h2>
<p>It’s a uniquely human ability to parse time, to reflect on our past, present and future, and to imagine details in these mental representations. As with humor, <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1271">time perspective</a> is <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10902-015-9656-2">fundamental to human experience</a>. Our ability to enjoy humor is enmeshed with this mental capacity for time travel and subjective well-being. </p>
<p>People <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.03.006">vary greatly in the ability</a> to <a href="http://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2010.537279">detail their mental representations</a> of the past, present and future. For example, some people may have what psychologists call a negative past perspective – frequently thinking about bygone mistakes that don’t have anything to do with the present environment, even reliving them in vivid detail despite the present or future being positive.</p>
<p>Time perspective is <a href="http://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X07086304">related to feelings of well-being</a>. People report a greater sense of well-being depending on the quality of the details of their past or present recollections. When study participants focused on “how” details, which tend to elicit vivid details, they were more satisfied with life than when they focused on “why,” which tend to elicit abstract ideas. For example, when remembering a failed relationship, those focusing on events that led to the breakup were more satisfied than those dwelling on abstract causal explanations concerning love and intimacy.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135251/original/image-20160824-30259-gticif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135251/original/image-20160824-30259-gticif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135251/original/image-20160824-30259-gticif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135251/original/image-20160824-30259-gticif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135251/original/image-20160824-30259-gticif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135251/original/image-20160824-30259-gticif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135251/original/image-20160824-30259-gticif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135251/original/image-20160824-30259-gticif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The way you think about the past is tied up with your sense of humor.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/pic-218222707.html">Pensive image via www.shutterstock.com.</a></span>
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<p>One study found that people who <a href="http://doi.org/10.2466/16.10.PR0.113x17z9">use humor in positive ways held positive past time perspectives</a>, and those using self-defeating humor held negative past time perspectives. This kind of study contributes to our understanding of how we think about and interpret social interactions. Such research also suggests that attempts to use humor in a positive way may improve the emotional tone of details in our thoughts and thereby our moods. <a href="http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00456">Clinical psychologists are using humor as a treatment</a> to increase subjective well-being.</p>
<p>In ongoing recent work, my students and I analyzed college students’ scores on a few common scales that psychologists use to assess humor, <a href="http://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-015-9382-2">time perspective</a> and the <a href="http://doi.org/10.2753/JOA0091-3367360104">need for humor</a> – a measure of how an individual produces or seeks humor in their daily lives. Our preliminary results suggest those high in humor character strength tend to concentrate on the positive aspects of their past, present and future. Those who seek humor in their lives appear in our study sample also to focus on the pleasant aspects of their current lives.</p>
<p>Though our investigation is still in the early phase, our data support a connection between the cognitive processes needed to mentally time-travel and to appreciate humor. Further research on time perspectives may help explain individual differences in detecting and resolving incongruities that result in funny feelings.</p>
<h2>Learning to respect laughter</h2>
<p>Experimental psychologists are rewriting the book on humor as we learn its value in our daily lives and its relationship to other important mental processes and character strengths. As the joke goes, how many psychologists does it take to change a light bulb? Just one, but it has to want to change.</p>
<p>Studying humor allows us to investigate theoretical processes involved in memory, reasoning, time perspective, wisdom, intuition and subjective well-being. And it’s a behavior of interest in and of itself as we work to describe, explain, control and predict humor across age, genders and cultures. </p>
<p>Whereas we may not agree on what’s funny and what isn’t, there’s more consensus than ever among experimental psychologists that humor is serious and relevant to the science of behavior. And that’s no laughing matter.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61552/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janet M. Gibson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>No longer dismissed as an undesirable negative trait to be avoided, humor is having a heyday among experimental psychologists.Janet M. Gibson, Professor of Cognitive Psychology, Grinnell CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.