tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/counter-extremism-29963/articlesCounter-extremism – The Conversation2022-04-22T07:51:46Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1812082022-04-22T07:51:46Z2022-04-22T07:51:46ZNigeria’s banditry: why 5 government strategies have failed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457970/original/file-20220413-16-6ue7jb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In 2019, members of an anti-banditry vigilante group disarmed in Zamfara but this has not halted attacks from bandits.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Kola Sulaimon/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/02/18/rising-insecurity-in-northwest-nigeria-terrorism-thinly-disguised-as-banditry/">Heightened</a> violence and insecurity in the north-west and north-central regions of Nigeria has become an existential threat to many. </p>
<p>Reported security incident trends show the regions experienced 65% of the total security incidents in Nigeria in the first quarter of 2022, with 2,331 <a href="https://firebasestorage.googleapis.com/v0/b/beacon-consulting.appspot.com/o/reports%2F-1649948838636?alt=media&token=09a77e69-50fc-4a98-9878-afbdd2039638">fatalities</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-bandits-are-not-unknown-gunmen-why-the-label-matters-166997">Bandits</a> are largely responsible for stoking violence and insecurity in these regions.</p>
<p>Numerous bandit groups exist in north-west and north-central Nigeria but they do not have any central authority and there is little to suggest collaboration between them. The groups have different operational capacities and technical <a href="https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/the-bandit-warlords-of-nigeria/">capabilities</a>, and are mostly clandestine in their operations. Their main activities are cattle rustling, kidnapping civilians for ransom, armed attacks and community invasion. </p>
<p>Since 2016, the current government has adopted numerous military and other non military strategies to stamp out banditry. But the increasing activity and violence of the groups indicate that the government’s efforts have failed to achieve the desired results. </p>
<p>Based on my <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/358075158_The_effect_of_military_unprofessionalism_on_civil-military_relations_and_security_in_Nigeria">work</a> and analysis of security trends, I have identified five strategies adopted by the Nigerian government and analysed why they failed. I also have suggestions about what the government can do differently.</p>
<p><strong>Dialogue, settlement and peace missions</strong></p>
<p>In the early stage of banditry in 2016, some Nigerian state governments leaned heavily on negotiation and settlement to end it. <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/our-peace-reconciliation-initiative-best-way-to-address-armed-banditry-zamfara-govt/">Zamfara</a>, <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/09/18/ending-banditry-kidnapping-in-katsina-through-dialogue/">Katsina</a>, <a href="https://dailytrust.com/amp/despite-peace-deals-banditry-thrives">Sokoto</a> and <a href="https://punchng.com/banditry-el-rufais-changing-tune-on-negotiation/">Kaduna</a> states adopted different dialogue and settlement initiatives to end the killings, banditry and kidnappings. </p>
<p>The state governments paid <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/12/weve-paid-fulani-stop-killings-southern-kaduna-el-rufai/">money</a> as compensation to identified leaders of bandits in return for peace. Sokoto, Zamfara, and Katsina states further offered an <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/10/08/two-months-after-sokoto-zamfara-katsina-count-gains-of-amnesty-for-bandits/">amnesty</a> hinged on renouncing banditry and kidnapping, and the surrender of weapons.</p>
<p>Following the same logic, a famous Islamic cleric, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57007326">Sheik Ahmad Gumi</a>, initiated a peace mission aimed at reaching a consensus between the government of Nigeria and bandit leaders to end the violence. This wasn’t well received by the public. The Kaduna state <a href="https://dailytrust.com/el-rufai-to-gumi-we-cant-negotiate-with-bandits">governor</a>, for one, insisted that the Fulani would not abandon banditry to return to their nomadic life of tending animals. </p>
<p>Overall, the dialogue, settlement and peace mission failed to end the banditry. But it did reveal that the groups were mainly driven by economic motivations.</p>
<p><strong>Air bombardment and seizing telecommunication services</strong></p>
<p>As negotiations and settlements failed, in 2018 government efforts turned to military aerial bombardment of occupied forests used as bandit strongholds. The effort was strengthened by the <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2021/12/31/katsina-government-restores-telecoms-services-despite-bandits%E2%80%99-attacks">seizure of telecommunication services</a> in parts of the north-west for several weeks in the last quarter of 2021. Seizing the network was meant to undermine the ability of the groups to communicate and receive information about military activities.</p>
<p>The operation did not weaken the groups. The crisis worsened, and civilian casualties resulted from the military air raids in 2021 in <a href="https://saharareporters.com/2022/02/20/breaking-seven-dead-nigerian-air-force-fighter-jet-targeting-bandits-%E2%80%98mistakenly%E2%80%99-bombs">several communities</a>. </p>
<p>Lack of support by ground troops undermined the operation as bandits moved from one location to another to evade the aerial bombardments. Similarly, the shutting down of telecommunication services was not uniformly done across the north-west. Bandit groups could easily move elsewhere.</p>
<p><strong>Deploying women soldiers</strong></p>
<p>In Kaduna State, which has become the epicentre of banditry, <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2021/01/28/banditry-army-deploy-300-female-soldiers-to-kaduna-abuja-highway/amp/">300 soldiers</a> from the Nigerian Army Women Corps were deployed on the highly volatile A2 Abuja-Kaduna expressway in January 2021. This was done to complement and strengthen the ongoing security operations on the route.</p>
<p>In the first month of deployment, the A2 highway was free of abductions. But the A235 Kaduna-Kajuru-Kachia route and surrounding communities experienced a <a href="https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/">spike</a> in attacks and abductions.</p>
<p>Again, the attackers simply moved their operations.</p>
<p><strong>Ending ransom payment</strong></p>
<p>State governments decided, in 2020, not to <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/kaduna-attack-we-will-not-negotiate-with-bandits-%E2%80%95-el-rufai/">negotiate</a> with bandits. They also discouraged victims’ families from paying <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/01/stop-paying-ransom-to-kidnappers/">ransom</a> to bandits in exchange for their kidnapped <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/nwest/454100-i-wont-pay-ransom-even-if-my-son-is-kidnapped-el-rufai.html">family</a> members.</p>
<p>The Nigerian Senate considered passing the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Bill 2021. This would criminalise payment of ransom as a felony <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/knocks-cheers-over-plan-to-criminalise-ransom-payment/">punishable by 15 years</a> in prison.</p>
<p>The intention was to make kidnapping for ransom less attractive. But the bill attracted public criticism. Some government <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/02/navy-efcc-reject-senates-bill-to-criminalise-payment-of-ransom-to-terrorists/">agencies</a> rejected it and the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/kidnapping-and-ransom-payments-nigeria">government</a> is said to have paid ransom (though it denies this). </p>
<p>Successful rescue of victims by security forces would have discouraged Nigerians from paying ransom, but such rescues have been insignificant. Citizens are therefore not <a href="https://punchng.com/its-funny-kaduna-bandits-receive-recharge-cards-as-ransoms-but-government-claims-they-cant-be-tracked-sokapu-youth-president-john/">confident</a> that if they do not pay ransom, their kidnapped family members will be freed through security operations. </p>
<p>It remains unclear whether the Senate will still approve the bill after the public debates.</p>
<p><strong>Labelling bandits as terrorists</strong></p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/504177-just-in-nigerian-govt-gazettes-declaration-of-bandit-groups-as-terrorists.html">federal high court ruling</a> has compelled the federal government to proscribe bandits as terrorist organisations. This was intended to ensure that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-bandits-are-not-unknown-gunmen-why-the-label-matters-166997">appropriate level</a> of force, tactical and operational assets and resources were deployed against the groups. In essence, this should translate to tougher sanctions for the bandits, and the application of the Terrorism Prevention Act to penalise their informants and supporters. Yet these measures have not deterred the now sanctioned terror groups.</p>
<p>Recent terror attacks by the groups include an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gunmen-kill-19-soldiers-attack-nigerian-deputy-governors-convoy-2022-03-09/">ambush</a> of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gunmen-kill-19-soldiers-attack-nigerian-deputy-governors-convoy-2022-03-09/">convoy</a> of a deputy governor; killing of <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/nwest/522000-gunmen-kill-11-soldiers-three-vigilante-members-in-attack-on-military-base-nigerian-military.html">11 soldiers</a> at a military base; the Kaduna <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/519850-gunmen-attack-kaduna-airport-kill-official.html">airport attack</a>; the Kaduna-bound <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2022/03/29/many-feared-killed-others-kidnapped-as-bandits-attack-abuja-kaduna-train/">passenger train attack</a>; and kidnap of <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/523559-updated-bandits-abduct-female-students-in-zamfara.html">students</a> of the Zamfara State College of Health Technology, Tsafe.</p>
<p><strong>Recommendation</strong></p>
<p>Poverty, hunger and unemployment make people vulnerable to radicalisation and drive <a href="https://zjpd.com.ng/index.php/zjpd/article/download/30/33">conflict</a>. What is required is sincere policy implementation to lift Nigerians out of these circumstances.</p>
<p>In the short term, improved security collaboration with civilians would make individuals and communities feel safer and more willing to offer vital information to security forces. <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/ejc-crim-v33-n3-a6">Trust</a> in government security forces is <a href="https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/104931">lacking</a> in Nigeria. </p>
<p>There have been cases of violent extremist organisations infiltrating villages in retaliation for their <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/288-violence-in-nigerias-north-west.pdf">cooperation</a> with government security agencies. Government forces therefore need to keep their sources of information confidential. They must also prove themselves capable of finding and rescuing kidnapped victims so that ransom doesn’t have to be paid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181208/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sallek Yaks Musa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To end banditry, Nigeria first needs to tackle poverty, hunger and unemployment.Sallek Yaks Musa, Lecturer, University of JosLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1251772019-11-27T14:35:04Z2019-11-27T14:35:04ZHow to support the families of people at risk of radicalisation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/303552/original/file-20191125-74542-13lfhgc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C22%2C989%2C643&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/counseling-therapy-couple-family-adoption-psychology-1388237288"> Tero Vesalainen/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/western-states-must-repatriate-is-fighters-and-their-families-before-more-break-free-from-syrian-camps-125168">fate of foreign Islamic State (IS)</a> fighters and their families remains a heated diplomatic issue, particularly in the wake of the Turkish invasion of north-east Syria. Amid reluctance from some European countries to repatriate their citizens, Turkey has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/world/middleeast/turkey-isis-fighters.html">begun sending some former fighters</a> under its control back to their home countries. </p>
<p>In November, the UK government announced it was bringing back a group of orphaned <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-50506909">British children</a> from Syria to the UK. But some of the adults in the camps in Syria have had their citizenship stripped from them. </p>
<p>When the British government decided to revoke the citizenship of some suspected IS members in February 2019, the father of one of the three schoolgirls who left Bethnal Green for Syria in 2015, Hussen Abase, father of Amira, <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/father-of-is-bride-amira-abase-girls-should-be-forgiven-11637331">pleaded that</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Twisted minds can be straightened with teamwork, with the government and family. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>My <a href="https://t.co/709QlQ8EsR?amp=1">own research focuses</a> on encouraging and improving reporting of radicalisation and extremism in both the UK and Denmark, in particular looking at how to ensure those who do report such concerns are supported and empowered. The story of what’s happened in Denmark is one about family – and it helps show what is possible when families and authorities work in partnership. </p>
<h2>The Info-House in Aarhus</h2>
<p><a href="https://sspkoege.dk/ung/infohus-kommune">Infohus</a>, or Info-House, is a small building near the police station in Aarhus, Denmark’s second biggest city. As you enter, Info-House feels like someone’s home rather than an official building. Although other rooms are very much like any other office, the first room you are guided into has a cosy, living room feel, giving visitors the impression that they are visiting someone in their home. In fact, they are visiting a counter-terrorism specialist. </p>
<p>Info-House launched in 2010 as part of the “Aarhus Model”, a pilot collaboration between the Aarhus local authority and East Jutland police, focusing on prevention and rehabilitation. The Info-House provides guidance and support to vulnerable people and their families, as well as the general public and professionals. The support they provide to vulnerable people is similar to other programmes, such as the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a82e18b4-1ea3-11e9-b126-46fc3ad87c65">Channel programme</a> in the UK, part of government’s Prevent strategy. One main difference in Denmark, however, is that the family gets support too, not just the returnee or person at risk of radicalisation. </p>
<p>One project there called the Parent Network acted like group counselling for families in a similar situation and was open to both parents of vulnerable people and their siblings over 18-years-old. The programme is currently on hold due to resource issues. </p>
<p>During my <a href="https://t.co/709QlQ8EsR?amp=1">research interviews</a> with people who used Info-House and worked there, I found that active engagement with families, including the Parent Network, had helped more families come forward. My analysis of data from Info-House found that this active family engagement had resulted in a 63% year-on-year increase of reports by families between 2011 and 2017.</p>
<p>The people who work at Info-House are also big believers in dialogue and informal discussions. Once they receive a call, they approach the vulnerable person, as well as the person who made the report, for a casual coffee to discuss it further. If vulnerabilities are spotted, work then begins with the person and their family. In the UK, there is also an informal discussion prior to reporting, but this mainly takes place when the person knows who their assigned local Prevent coordinator is or has a good relationship with the neighbourhood police.</p>
<p>The team at Info-House are also relatable and empathic and try to connect to the people they work with on a personal level, which helps to break down barriers and encourage strong relationships. They don’t try to judge the families – instead they ensure they are supported. In one case, Info-House worked with a high-profile former jihadi who ended up reporting her own two sons to prevent them from travelling to Syria. </p>
<p>In the UK, working with families does not happen at this level. Some families in the UK are offered a liaison officer, but the provision and expertise of these officers can be inconsistent due to lack of resources. Instead, the detectives on the case may support these families, which can make the process feel focused on getting police intelligence. </p>
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<h2>Empathy needed</h2>
<p>Radicalisation and extremism are complex and ambiguous notions – not to mention highly stigmatised. But families are often left alone and uncertain about what to do if their loved one becomes at risk. This leaves them vulnerable to organisations that can take advantage of them by providing them with unhelpful advice. Often, these families are the forgotten victims of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism.</p>
<p>They need a safe place to discuss their concerns without fear of repercussion, where they can access professionals who deal with such matters on a daily basis, and preferably one point of contact. </p>
<p>By including these families in a response to radicalisation, the responsibility of prevention and safeguarding is not taken away from them. They are still given a sense of control over the situation. An engagement officer I spoke to in Aarhus put it perfectly: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The parents are the most important thing … We try to give the responsibility back to them in an organised way. We cannot be the second parents, it is not realistic.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The people I spoke to who had reported a family member wanted a supportive place that they could go to for help. These families judge themselves harsher than anyone else – what they need is support.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125177/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Neda Richards received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for her PhD.</span></em></p>Families of those at risk of extremism need to be supported, not judged.Neda Richards, PhD Candidate, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1243952019-10-02T12:24:37Z2019-10-02T12:24:37ZCultural studies key to national security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/295097/original/file-20191001-173407-16p8a84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A lack of understanding between American and Middle-Eastern culture is a national security risk.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/iran-us-missile-conflict-united-states-1429973180?src=l3iVtGQpBw7ItLApPu3TzA-2-12">Lightspring/shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a commission formed to figure out why the attacks occurred. One of the culprits, according to the commission’s <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/911Report.pdf">9/11 report</a>, was “lack of imagination.”</p>
<p>With few exceptions, the report stated, government officials could not imagine that Osama bin Laden and his affiliates, hidden in a remote part of Afghanistan, could strike at the heart of America’s financial, military and political power.</p>
<p>“To us, Afghanistan seemed very far away,” the report stated. “To members of al Qaeda, America seemed very close. In a sense, they were more globalized than we were.” </p>
<p>Prior to 9/11, according to the report, few colleges or universities offered courses in Middle Eastern languages or Islamic studies. The commission maintained that this made it difficult to recruit officers qualified for counterterrorism. Even though the U.S. has <a href="http://titlevi50th.msu.edu/announcement/">funded programs</a> in foreign languages and area studies since the Cold War, the 9/11 attacks exposed our comparative ignorance of the Middle East.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://ncmideast.org/">Duke-UNC Consortium for Middle East Studies</a> would seem to represent the answer to the 9/11 report’s call for a broader educational approach to national security. <a href="http://ncmideast.org/about/">Founded in 2005</a>, the consortium has a <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/media/Duke-UNC%20CMES%20Response%20September%202019.pdf">substantial number</a> of students studying foreign languages. The program has 300 students studying Arabic, 44 studying Persian, and 91 students studying Urdu, the highest enrollment in Urdu language courses in the United States. Lack of Arabic linguists has been cited as one of the reasons the United States <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/19/books/chapters/chapter-unfriendly-fire.html">missed critical messages</a> sent by al–Qaiida about the 9/11 attacks a day before they occurred.</p>
<p>The Duke-UNC’s program <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/media/Duke-UNC%20CMES%20Response%20September%202019.pdf">teaches on topics</a> such as cybersecurity and countering violent extremism. Students may also take courses on music and movies in the Middle East.</p>
<p>But to the Trump administration, the Duke-UNC consortium <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/09/17/2019-20067/notice-of-a-letter-regarding-the-duke-unc-consortium-for-middle-east-studies">isn’t doing what it’s supposed to do</a> when it teaches students about Middle Eastern culture through movies, music and concerts. </p>
<h2>A ‘fundamental misalignment’</h2>
<p>In August, assistant secretary for postsecondary education Robert King <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/09/17/2019-20067/notice-of-a-letter-regarding-the-duke-unc-consortium-for-middle-east-studies">told</a> the Duke-UNC consortium they were using federal funds the wrong way. In a letter published in the “Federal Register,” King informed the consortium that they are spending Title VI funds on unauthorized activities. <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/20/1121">Title VI</a> of the Higher Education Act funds, among other things, strengthening undergraduate education, research on different areas of the world, and improvement of foreign language training. </p>
<p>“Although Iranian art and film may be of subjects of deep intellectual interest,” King explained, such offerings represent “a fundamental misalignment” between the course offerings and Title VI’s <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/20/1121">requirement</a> that the programming
advance the “security, stability, and economic vitality of the United States.” </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/09/17/2019-20067/notice-of-a-letter-regarding-the-duke-unc-consortium-for-middle-east-studies">his letter</a>, King criticizes the consortium for using federal money to support the writing of a paper titled <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/higher-education/unc-duke-program-too-positive-on-islam-trump-officials-say/2019/09/19/c5966a88-daf9-11e9-a1a5-162b8a9c9ca2_story.html">“Radical Love: Teachings from Islamic Mystical Tradition.”</a> He also had a problem with the program <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/09/17/2019-20067/notice-of-a-letter-regarding-the-duke-unc-consortium-for-middle-east-studies">sponsoring a concert series</a> that included a performance by hip hop artist Marco Pavé, also known as the “millennial Muslim from Memphis.”</p>
<p>In my view as a political scientist who has <a href="https://www.fordham.edu/download/downloads/id/2953/nicholas_tampio_cv.pdf">written extensively about Islamic political thought</a>, I maintain that these kinds of cultural programming can support America’s national security interests widely construed.</p>
<p>Movies teach a society what other peoples think and feel. They also offer insights into what their legitimate grievances are, such as American support for the Shah before the Iranian Revolution, and what attracts other people to America, such as freedom and music. Films such as “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0808417/">Persepolis</a>” – about an Iranian girl who grows up during the Islamic Revolution – help to humanize Iranians and shed light on the complex relationship they have with Islamic fundamentalism.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/295100/original/file-20191001-173393-nomxxy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/295100/original/file-20191001-173393-nomxxy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/295100/original/file-20191001-173393-nomxxy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/295100/original/file-20191001-173393-nomxxy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/295100/original/file-20191001-173393-nomxxy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/295100/original/file-20191001-173393-nomxxy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/295100/original/file-20191001-173393-nomxxy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The film ‘Persepolis’ showed the Iranian Revolution in a unique light.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/galaxyfm/520648957">Sony Pictures</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Resources for security</h2>
<p>The federal government has given the Duke-UNC consortium an annual $235,000 Title VI grant as a National Resource Center to provide <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/media/Duke-UNC%20CMES%20Response%20September%202019.pdf">a “full understanding” of the Middle East</a>. </p>
<p>The Duke-UNC consortium’s grant has been <a href="https://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2019/09/duke-unc-consortium-middle-east-funding-education-department-controversy">continued</a> for the 2019-2020 academic year. However, by questioning the consortium’s course offerings, the Trump administration is signaling that it has little regard for <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/09/25/federal-inquiry-middle-east-studies-program-raises-academic-freedom-concerns">academic freedom</a> and that it has a narrow view of what’s important to national security.</p>
<p>When America’s college students – who are America’s future policymakers, security analysts, government and military leaders – watch foreign movies, go to concerts and learn about other religions, it better prepares them for the work that they have to do to keep America safe. This includes recognizing threats as well as establishing peaceful relations with people around the globe. As Terry Magnuson, UNC’s Chancellor for Research, stated <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/media/Duke-UNC%20CMES%20Response%20September%202019.pdf">in his reply</a> to King’s letter: “Cultural and historical programs provide essential preparation for work in areas of national need.” </p>
<h2>Diverse perspectives</h2>
<p>To better understand the Duke-UNC consortium controversy, it pays to look at the broader context. <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2014/09/18/pro-israel-groups-question-federal-funds-middle-east-centers">Since at least 2014</a>, pro-Israel groups have pushed for the federal government to tighten the leash on how Middle Eastern centers use Title VI funds.</p>
<p>This spring, the Duke-UNC consortium hosted a conference on the <a href="http://gazaconference.web.unc.edu/">conflict over Gaza</a>. U.S. Rep. George Holding, R-NC, <a href="https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article229272714.html">asked</a> Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos to investigate. DeVos <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6155155-DeVos-Letter-to-Holding.html#document/p1">promised</a> to look into whether the consortium was supporting activities that “reflect diverse perspectives.” Then, King took up the baton with his <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/09/17/2019-20067/notice-of-a-letter-regarding-the-duke-unc-consortium-for-middle-east-studies">letter to the Duke-UNC consortium</a>.</p>
<p>In his letter, King argued that the consortium appears “to lack balance.” He complained that the consortium emphasizes the “positive aspects of Islam” but not the discrimination faced by religious minorities in the Middle East, including of Christians and Jews.</p>
<h2>A campaign against academic freedom</h2>
<p>Scholars have stated that the Trump administration’s action represents an “<a href="https://mesana.org/advocacy/letters-from-the-board/2019/09/25/18-major-scholarly-societies-join-mesa-in-expressing-concern-about-the-department-of-educations-interpretation-of-title-vi">unprecedented</a>” intervention into academic matters.</p>
<p>Christopher S. Rose, a former Title VI officer, <a href="https://christophersrose.com/2019/09/22/wading-into-the-duke-unc-middle-east-consortium-mess/">remarked</a> that he has never seen a department of education official “ridiculing courses based on their title.”</p>
<p>Jay Smith, a history professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/education-department-threatens-funding-for-university-program-it-sees-as-biased/2019/09/19/321b5010-db04-11e9-bfb1-849887369476_story.html">argues that</a> the Trump administration’s action constitutes “political meddling.” He also said it poses a “clear threat to academic freedom.”</p>
<p>Cliff Smith, Washington project director for the Middle East Forum, <a href="https://www.dailywire.com/news/smith-trumps-department-of-education-cracks-down-on-title-vi-abuse">defends the Trump’s administration scrutiny</a> of programming that receives education funds dedicated to national security. He offers this thought experiment: “If you were a professor in charge of a class on geopolitical strategy focusing on Iran, and a student wrote a paper analyzing gender roles in Iranian films, would you give the student a passing grade? Would it even matter if his film analysis happened to be good?”</p>
<p>It is fine for academics to debate among themselves how to balance course offerings in the humanities and social sciences in a National Resource Center. For many academics, though, it sends <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/21/opinions/duke-unc-middle-eastern-studies-controversy-perry/index.html">a chill down our spine</a> when a federal agency threatens to defund academic programming whose value it does not see. </p>
<p>One of the <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/911Report.pdf">recommendations</a> of the 9/11 report was to “institutionalize imagination.” The Duke-UNC program helps further this goal. Courses about Iranian movies, hip hop music and Islam’s mystical tradition are not just of “intellectual interest.” <a href="https://faculty.fordham.edu/tampio/Tampio_TE_Politics_of_Garden.pdf">Art and culture</a>, I believe, can help the country envision new threats as well as how to establish good relations across the globe.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124395/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Tampio does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>National security isn’t just about warding off physical attacks. It’s also about understanding cultural forces that drive a society to think, feel and act in certain ways, a political scientist says.Nicholas Tampio, Professor of Political Science, Fordham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1208582019-07-25T10:22:36Z2019-07-25T10:22:36ZWhat does extremism mean? The British public aren’t sure<p>Only a quarter of the British public feel able to define what extremism is, according to <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/819185/Call_For_Evidence_Summary.pdf">a survey</a> by the Commission for Countering Extremism. The findings, released in mid July, suggest that the Home Office needs to do more to get across its message on extremism and how it might be tackled.</p>
<p>More than 2,500 members of the public responded to a call for evidence from the commission as part of an effort to measure the public’s understanding of extremism and their experiences of it. Led by human rights activist Sara Khan, the commission was established in March 2018 to understand and help tackle extremism in England and Wales.</p>
<p>While those who put themselves forward to answer surveys are rarely considered to be a representative sample of the public at large, the data provide strong clues about the nation’s attitudes.</p>
<p>The government currently <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-extremism-strategy">defines extremism</a> as:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also regard calls for the death of members of our armed forces as extremist.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But only a quarter of the respondents said they found this definition helpful, raising questions as to whether it remains fit for purpose.</p>
<p>Despite these uncertainties around what extremism means, around half of the respondents appear to know it when they see it, whether in their local area, further afield or online. And 52% said they had witnessed something they would regard as extremism.</p>
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<p>The data also shed light on public sensitivity towards “Muslim or Islamist extremism”. Nearly 60% had witnessed it in some form, nearly twice as many as had experienced far-right extremism. This presents a challenge for the Home Office. How does it address public concerns around Islamist extremism without limiting the democratic rights and freedoms of a sizeable minority of the population? </p>
<p>One answer might be to focus on victims and concrete examples of victimisation rather than on the more common abstract notions of a general threat to everyone. In late July, the then home secretary, Sajid Javid, <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/stop-spread-of-hatred-javid-appeals-as-he-warns-of-worstever-extremism-threat-a4193841.html">said reports of extremism</a> were rising in the UK, a threat “now worse than ever”.</p>
<p>But statements such as these leave important questions unanswered. Where is the threat of extremism rising? By how much? And for whom? Are there particular people and groups who are more vulnerable to beliefs and actions that seek to harm, coerce or exclude than others? And are there factors that increase vulnerability? </p>
<h2>What it is and how to tackle it</h2>
<p>While a third of respondents agreed that everyone is at risk from extremism, religious and ethnic communities were identified as the most vulnerable social groups. These are important insights that could provide the basis for an approach that puts victims at the centre of counter-extremism policy. </p>
<p>The survey also revealed that the public is ready to identify a wider range of extremism than some might have supposed. Nearly a third of respondents had witnessed “far-left extremism” and one in five had witnessed “anti-government or anarchist extremism”. </p>
<p>The data also shed light on the attitudes, activities and behaviours witnessed by those who responded. Respondents were asked: “What attitudes, activities or behaviours have you witnessed that you regard as extremism?” In terms of “Muslim or Islamist extremism”, criminal offending, terrorism links and segregation were the most frequently selected responses. In terms of “far-right extremism”, extremist events, criminal offending and propaganda were the most frequently selected. </p>
<p>These findings show that respondents linked criminality to extremism but also that they were sensitive to the differences between its two most frequently recognised forms – far-right and Islamist. </p>
<p>While 71% were unsure about whether more should be done to tackle extremism, 38% placed emphasis on faith groups and leaders having a role in improving counter-extremism. Only half as many respondents said social media and tech companies and national government should improve counter-extremism, 21% for each. These findings suggest a public appetite for a more focused and bottom-up approach to tackling religious extremism.</p>
<h2>A conversation worth having</h2>
<p>The appointment of Khan and the ongoing work of the commission have been criticised by people and groups who represent, or claim to represent, the interests of British Muslim communities, including the Conservative peer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jan/24/leading-muslim-campaigner-sara-khan-head-anti-extremism-drive">Sayeeda Warsi</a> and the campaigning organisations <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-42807560">MEND</a> and <a href="https://www.cage.ngo/wp-content/uploads/woocommerce_uploads/2019/01/CAGE-CCE-Exposed-report.pdf">Cage</a>. Initial criticisms focused on Khan’s suitability as a leader given her previous government ties as a member of a Home Office extremism and radicalisation working group, and included allegations that the commission seeks to unfairly target British Muslim communities.</p>
<p>We should expect differences of opinion given that there an <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/29/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/">estimated 4m</a> British Muslims. But more recent criticisms from <a href="https://www.cage.ngo/sajid-javid-lectures-cage-on-british-values-to-divert-attention-from-another-hollow-cce-report-and-mask-the-uk-governments-complicity-in-torture">Cage</a> about the commission’s “abject failure” are unhelpful for two reasons. First, the commission is collecting valuable information on far-right groups that are seeking to stir up and legitimise anti-Muslim hatred. Second, its data could lead to far more meaningful debates around what the British public considers to be extreme. </p>
<p>As a plural and diverse nation, the UK may never agree on where the mainstream ends and extremism begins. But a better-informed public debate, the kind the commission is seeking to encourage, may help us forge a broader consensus.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120858/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julian Hargreaves is a member of the Expert Group of the Commission for Countering Extremism - a role performed on a voluntary basis. He is employed by the Woolf Institute and in that capacity has provided paid consultation services to the Commission.</span></em></p>A survey by the Commission for Countering Extremism revealed many don’t feel able to define extremism – or found the government’s definition helpful.Julian Hargreaves, Research Fellow at the Woolf Institute, Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Islamic Studies, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1203752019-07-19T09:00:37Z2019-07-19T09:00:37ZHow far-right groups use Britain’s extremism definition to argue they aren’t extremist<p>The government’s definition of extremism is so unfit for purpose that far-right groups with clearly dangerous ideology are using it to “prove” that they are not extremist. </p>
<p>I’ve written about this in <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-action-links-between-the-far-right-extremism-and-terrorism">a new study</a> published by the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/commission-for-countering-extremism#content">Commission for Countering Extremism</a> as part of a wider set of research aimed at improving understanding about far-right extremism in Britain. </p>
<p>The government <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-extremism-strategy">defines extremism</a> as the: </p>
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<p>Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs … calls for the death of members of our armed forces (are also) extremist. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>My own research on the definition looks at how it was used by groups such as National Action, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/national-action-what-i-discovered-about-the-ideology-of-britains-violent-neo-nazi-youth-movement-83527">gained notoriety in December 2016</a> when it became the first far-right group in the UK to be proscribed, or banned under terrorism legislation. This made it a criminal offence to be a member of the group, organise meetings and wear clothing or symbols linked to it. </p>
<p>National Action was a youth-focused group that adhered to an extremely traditional interpretation of National Socialism. Routinely glorifying Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich, the group spoke about the need to undertake a “white jihad” as a means of establishing a “white homeland” in the UK. While National Action are easy to mock given the headlines that have accompanied recent successful convictions – the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/national-action-nazis-trial-miss-hitler-alice-cutter-a8832326.html">Miss Hitler beauty competition</a>, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/national-action-neo-nazi-couple-adolf-hitler-baby-adam-thomas-claudia-patatas-jail-court-case-a8686691.html">naming a baby Adolf</a> and having <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/neo-nazi-terrorism-couple-swastika-shape-cutlery-adam-thomas-claudia-patatas-a8579751.html">swastika-shaped cookie cutters</a> – doing so undermines the group’s very real commitment to enact extreme violence. Not only had the group begun stockpiling weapons but they had also begun planning to use them, evident in <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/national-action-terror-plot-labour-mp-machete-jack-renshaw-rosie-cooper-neo-nazi-a8450591.html">plots to kill</a> the Labour MP Rosie Cooper. </p>
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<p>Even though National Action adhered to an extremist ideology and its members engaged in extremist activities, the government had to resort to using terrorism-related legislation to ban the group. This is despite the government stating in both the 2015 and 2016 Queen’s speeches that it would introduce a counter-extremism bill in order to criminalise “extremist activity”, the current definition of which is far too broad to be suitable for legislation – a point the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation <a href="https://www.scottishlegal.com/article/uk-government-abandons-attempts-to-define-extremism-in-law">made earlier in 2019</a>. This means that no group can be banned for extremism under current law.</p>
<h2>Picking apart the extremism definition</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/proscribing-national-action-has-it-been-effective/">targeting groups and individuals</a> by National Action on the basis of their “race”, ethnicity, gender, sexual identity and disability – all of which are key components of traditional National Socialism – did not contravene the definition’s quite bizarre requirement to only show respect and tolerance towards different faiths and beliefs. The definition doesn’t deem being intolerant on the basis of race, ethnicity and so on as being extremist. </p>
<p>It’s highly unlikely than anyone within today’s British far right would openly state that they were against “democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty”. On the contrary, many including <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-britain-first-the-far-right-group-retweeted-by-donald-trump-88407">Britain First</a>, the <a href="https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2018/04/13/the-football-lads-alliance-the-latest-far-right-street-movement/">Democratic Football Lads Alliance</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/tommy-robinson-the-martyr-how-the-far-right-builds-its-victim-narrative-98261">Tommy Robinson</a> can be seen to actively espouse – albeit with some caveats – a commitment to Britain and its values as a means of distancing themselves from Muslims in particular. A number of far-right figures and groups <a href="https://www.europenowjournal.org/2018/10/01/defending-free-speech-a-new-front-for-resisting-islamification/">claim to defend various liberal and civil rights</a> including free speech and gender equality.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-new-right-how-a-frenchman-born-150-years-ago-inspired-the-extreme-nationalism-behind-brexit-and-donald-trump-117277">The New Right: how a Frenchman born 150 years ago inspired the extreme nationalism behind Brexit and Donald Trump</a>
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<p>The weakness of the government’s extremism definition was actually addressed by National Action prior to its proscription. It stated on its website at the time that:</p>
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<p>Despite there being a bunch of legislation existing against it nobody seems to know what extremism actually ‘is’ … An extremist is somebody who uses or encourages illegal violence or terrorism to achieve their goals. </p>
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<p>While some National Action members clearly had a propensity to use illegal violence or terrorism to achieve their ideological goals, its rebuttal of the government’s extremism definition highlights just how little clarity the definition provides on what is invariably a subjective and contextual concept. Nor does the definition make any specific reference to violence, thereby conflating both violent and non-violent forms of extremism. </p>
<h2>The problem of fundamental British values</h2>
<p>Central to the problem is the government’s insistence on using “fundamental British values” to define extremism: these are the democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. </p>
<p>They first appeared in the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-strategy-2011">Coalition government’s review of Prevent</a> – the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy – in 2011. But at this time, the overwhelming focus of the government’s approach to counter-terrorism and subsequently counter-extremism was on forms of that were <a href="http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/26705/1/121.pdf">Islamist and inspired by Islamic State</a>. While the threat posed by the far right <a href="https://journals.le.ac.uk/ojs1/index.php/lias/article/view/3074/2792">is thankfully now being taken seriously</a>, the same was not true when the definition of extremism – or fundamental British values – were conceived. This is part of the reason why the existing definition fails to take into account of the broad spectrum of extremism.</p>
<p>As I concluded in my recent paper, despite the fact that National Action has been irretrievably damaged by the successful convictions against some members, the very real threat posed by the ideologies and activities of the far right will continue for the foreseeable future. That some of these ideologies and activities cannot be incorporated in the government’s existing definition of extremism is hugely problematic and will no doubt have a detrimental impact on those seeking to counter that threat. Rather than allowing those within the far right to continue to exploit this loophole, the Commission for Countering Extremism, and the government more widely, must ensure that extremism in all its forms is appropriately defined and more importantly, addressed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120375/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Allen received funding from the Commission for Countering Extremism to research and write the paper referred to in this article.</span></em></p>Why the extremism definition is unfit for purpose.Chris Allen, Associate Professor in Hate Studies, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/937202018-04-11T04:25:55Z2018-04-11T04:25:55ZASEAN-Australia special summit has much work to do on women’s role in peace and security<p>The first outcome of last month’s ASEAN-Australia Special Summit was a planned <a href="https://ministers.pmc.gov.au/2018/promoting-gender-equality-across-our-region">round table on Women, Peace and Security</a> to be held in Melbourne from April 17-19. </p>
<p><a href="http://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/">ASEAN members</a> and Australia have a lot to talk about to improve their understanding and implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Discussions should include barriers to women’s participation in regional peace and security institutions, countering violent extremism, foreign fighters, sexual violence in conflict, and the Rohingya crisis.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-asean-australia-special-summit-marks-a-step-toward-a-deeper-relationship-91816">The ASEAN-Australia Special Summit marks a step toward a deeper relationship</a>
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<h2>Women’s role in peace and security initiatives</h2>
<p>The Women, Peace and Security agenda came into being in October 2000. The United Nations Security Council passed <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenElement">a resolution</a> that requires member states to protect women from sexual violence in armed conflict and increase women’s participation in conflict prevention, mitigation, resolution, relief and recovery. Since passing this resolution, the Security Council has passed seven more resolutions on the agenda.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2242(2015)">one of those resolutions</a>, the Security Council urged member states to:</p>
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<p>ensure the participation and leadership of women and women’s organisations in developing strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism. </p>
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<p>They also called for:</p>
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<p>greater integration by Member States and the United Nations of their agendas on women, peace and security, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism.</p>
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<h2>Counter-terrorism efforts continue to exclude women</h2>
<p>Directly before the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit, experts from the region discussed the <a href="http://asean.org/asean-australia-sign-mou-on-counter-terrorism/">need for coherent and comprehensive action to counter radicalisation and violent extremism</a>. But counter-terrorism policies and practices in the region and their ongoing development continue to exclude women.</p>
<p>There are also a range of barriers to women’s participation in peace and security institutions. One example is <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/22/indonesia-no-end-abusive-virginity-tests">compulsory virginity testing for prospective policewomen in Indonesia.</a></p>
<p>A worryingly <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/aseans-islamic-state-conundrum/">high number of foreign fighters</a> travelled from ASEAN countries to Syria and Iraq to fight with Da’esh and other extremist groups. Indonesians represent <a href="http://www.news.com.au/world/asia/indonesia-in-number-two-on-worldwide-list-of-foreign-islamic-state-jihadists-arrested-in-turkey/news-story/75f00d11a254935fb49a9925c379c25e">the second highest</a> nationality of foreign fighters arrested in Turkey. In part, this may be because of the number of women, children, and whole families who have travelled to Syria and Iraq. But the statistic is still alarming. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w22190.pdf">Some estimates</a> have over 100 foreign fighters from both Malaysia and the Philippines. But <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/aseans-islamic-state-conundrum/">other estimates</a> place the overall number of foreign fighters from South East Asia at over 1000. This includes a unit of 700 people largely from Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, but also a few from Singapore. </p>
<p>Deradicalisation and reintegration of returned fighters requires a comprehensive social policy approach, specifically involving women, who are vital contributors to the community and social networks.</p>
<h2>Greater commitment to prosecuting international crimes is needed</h2>
<p>Many of those foreign fighters may have committed the international crimes described in <a href="http://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2106(2013)">another of the Security Council resolutions</a>, calling for an end to impunity for sexual violence in armed conflict. </p>
<p>When sexual violence is perpetrated as part of an armed conflict, it is a war crime. When that violence is widespread or systematic, it’s a crime against humanity. When it’s used to destroy in whole or in part, an ethnic, racial or religious group, it is genocide.</p>
<p><a href="https://prosecutedontperpetrate.com/">Da’esh has perpetrated all three of these crimes</a>. Individual perpetrators need to be held accountable. Only two of the ten ASEAN members are signatory to the statute that requires national courts to prosecute such crimes. </p>
<p>Australia is also a signatory. Australia <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/pain-hearing-australia-parliament-recognises-yazidi-genocide">has called for</a> investigations and prosecutions of these crimes. </p>
<p>Both the foreign minister and attorney-general have stated Australia will investigate and prosecute alleged perpetrators. The logistics and funding of this are yet to be resolved. But Indonesia has asked for a <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/01/27/indonesia-immigration-and-returning-foreign-fighters/">regional approach to the issue of foreign fighters</a>, so there may be benefit to discussing regional approaches to investigation and prosecution.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-need-to-end-impunity-for-sexual-violence-in-armed-conflict-87754">Why we need to end impunity for sexual violence in armed conflict</a>
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<h2>The elephant in the room</h2>
<p>In any ASEAN Women, Peace and Security discussion, the elephant in the room is the Rohingya crisis. The evidence that <a href="http://www.broadagenda.com.au/home/rohingya-crisis-the-hidden-truth-about-women-as-weapons-of-war/">Burmese forces have used sexual violence</a> as a weapon of war and a tool of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya is overwhelming. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/11/16/all-my-body-was-pain/sexual-violence-against-rohingya-women-and-girls-burma">Human Rights Watch</a> has reported the actions of the military, border police and militias amount to crimes against humanity under international law.</p>
<p>At the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit, Malaysia was alone in its <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-18/asean-malaysia-pm-confronts-aung-san-suu-kyi/9560112">condemnation of the atrocities Myanmar is perpetrating against the Rohingya</a>. While ASEAN discussions are characterised by extreme delicacy, these crimes need to be accounted for in ongoing regional engagement with the Burmese military and in regional contributions to humanitarian needs.</p>
<h2>A national action plan for Australia</h2>
<p>Australia is in the process of updating its <a href="https://www.pmc.gov.au/office-women/international-forums/australian-national-action-plan-women-peace-and-security-2012-2018">National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security</a>. There have been some key developments since the release of the last plan. </p>
<p>The international community has agreed on a new <a href="http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/">framework for sustainable development</a>. This includes goals on <a href="http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/">gender equality</a>, and <a href="http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/">peace and justice</a>. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has made a <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/documents/hrbodies/cedaw/gcomments/cedaw.c.cg.30.pdf">binding recommendation</a> on how that <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CEDAW.aspx">convention</a> applies for women in conflict prevention, conflict, and post conflict situations.</p>
<p><a href="https://actionplans.inclusivesecurity.org/">Indonesia and The Philippines</a> are the only two ASEAN members with national action plans. </p>
<p>When Pacific countries were initially coming to terms with their obligations, the Pacific Islands Forum developed a regional action plan. Perhaps ASEAN could do the same. As promised in the <a href="https://aseanaustralia.pmc.gov.au/Declaration">Sydney Declaration</a>, such a plan would certainly show a commitment “to the principles of the women, peace and security agenda and to strengthen collaboration on promoting the role of women in building and sustaining peace.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Hutchinson has undertaken consulting work with the Australian Government on the implementation of women, peace and security agenda. Susan is the architect of the 'prosecute; don't perpetrate' campaign calling on governments to investigate and prosecute their own nationals for sexual violence perpetrated as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide while fighting with Da'esh in Syria and Iraq. She is also a member of the Australian Civil Society Coalition on Women, Peace and Security. </span></em></p>Talks should include barriers to women’s participation in peace and security institutions, countering violent extremism, foreign fighters, sexual violence in conflict, and the Rohingya crisis.Susan Hutchinson, PhD Candidate, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/854742017-12-20T12:46:57Z2017-12-20T12:46:57ZBy casting teachers as informants, British counter-extremism policy is promoting violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199258/original/file-20171214-27593-qci83f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A place for dialogue, not suspicion.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">via shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Muslim children in my classroom withdrew from political debate when the Prevent counter-terrorism strategy cast me as an informant. </p>
<p>Prevent infers a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/prevent-duty">duty</a> on all teachers and doctors in England, Scotland and Wales to report signs of so-called “extremism” and “radicalisation” in their pupils and patients. Applying this duty is particularly difficult as “extremism” has not been legally defined by the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36858631">Home Office</a>.</p>
<p>Working as a secondary school teacher in London from 2005 to 2017, I was required to implement the Prevent counter-extremism strategy. My concern over the impact it was having on the dynamic of my and other classrooms led me to <a href="http://www.rwuk.org/rights-watch-uk-launches-landmark-report/">speak out</a> against Prevent and counter-extremism strategy more generally. </p>
<p>When my Muslim students learned of my concerns, some of them approached me to express their anxiety that Prevent was a state surveillance strategy which was targeting them as a result of racial profiling – concerns supported by <a href="https://cage.ngo/publication/the-science-of-pre-crime/">academic research</a>. The children told me they hadn’t talked to other adults about this for fear that their vocal opposition to this controversial strategy would result in them being reported to the security services.</p>
<p>Some of the children told me that they no longer challenged the views of others that they perceived to be extreme. They feared that speaking out on sensitive issues would result in them being referred under Prevent, just by association. I have been offered examples of this happening in the classroom, on the street and in children’s homes. </p>
<p>Whether the children’s fears were justified or not, Prevent was altering their behaviour. I’ve heard similar examples repeated to me in focus groups I arranged of children from different schools in the London borough of Tower Hamlets. </p>
<h2>Dialogue makes a classroom</h2>
<p>Teachers, academics and politicians disagree over whether Prevent <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/prevent-duty-schools-colleges/">promotes</a> or <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-35907831">stifles</a> debate in classrooms. This disagreement will continue until all of those with an interest in education recognise that there are different types of classroom debates. </p>
<p>The education expert Robin Alexander argues that <a href="http://www.robinalexander.org.uk/dialogic-teaching/">authentic dialogue</a> in classrooms is rare. Instead of having genuine conversations that may result in children and their teachers changing their preconceived views, children tend to be expected to offer their teachers anticipated answers. But authentic dialogue is crucial if schools are to promote a more harmonious society – for it is through genuine debate that we all moderate our views.</p>
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<p>Before Prevent was imposed on schools, some of the children at the secondary school where I taught approached me to discuss how they had begun to feel alienated from society. Concerns such as the impact of British foreign policy on civilians in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria were a frequent topic of conversation. When my students raised these concerns, I was often able to tell them that I shared them – and this helped us think of possible responses. </p>
<p>The children raised suggestions of travelling to war zones, but quickly dismissed them in favour of peaceful, democratic solutions. Through talking, they learned to write to MPs, raise funds for refugee charities and contribute to human rights campaigns. Threats of nationalist violence were also dismissed as we explored our values through dialogue – dialogue that my students have since told me they no longer engage in.</p>
<h2>When all that’s left is violence</h2>
<p>Many theorists have argued that peace in a democracy relies on people having their say. Belgian political theorist, Chantal Mouffe, wrote in her book <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/On_the_Political.html?id=MrufwdOhhaMC">On The Political</a> that violence “tends to flourish in circumstances in which there are no legitimate political channels for the expression of grievances”. She describes the shutting down of discourse in a democracy as “letting death in”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-can-all-be-a-little-radicalised-recognising-this-will-help-tackle-extremism-63144">We can all be a little radicalised: recognising this will help tackle extremism</a>
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<p>The late French philosopher, <a href="http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo3638835.html">Jacques Derrida</a>, in his conversations on 9/11 and other work, described what he called the “autoimmunity of liberalism”. This results from the liberal contradiction of simultaneously trying to suppress dissent while also promoting freedom. Derrida wrote that this contradiction at the core of liberalism results from an aspiration to consensual politics but can result in a violent backlash. </p>
<p>In my ongoing research, I am analysing over a million words of government policy on counter-extremism. It’s revealed that the definitions of “extremism” and “radicalisation” progressively changed to become <a href="http://robfaurewalker.blogspot.co.uk/2017/06/extremism-pathologising-undefinable.html">synonymous with violence</a> between 2005 and 2015. The meaning of words affects how we perceive the world and aligning extreme and radical views with violence not only creates a perceived need for counter-extremism strategy but also acts as a catalyst for the violence that the strategy purports to address.</p>
<p>A strategy such as Prevent that targets radical and extreme views becomes necessary if we accept this change in the meaning of what it is to be “radical” or “extreme”. However, the experiences of my pupils show that the expression of extreme and radical views can actually help to reduce violence.</p>
<p>This moderation of extreme views extends beyond the classroom. People protesting against <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/dec/10/home-office-defends-anti-fracking-groups-extremism-claims-prevent">fracking</a> as well as other <a href="https://newint.org/blog/2014/07/29/student-activist-prevent-extremism">student protesters</a> have been referred to the Prevent programme. Silencing dissenting voices undermines the mechanisms by which democracy helps us to avoid violence. Labelling those who oppose the status quo as violent adds a catalyst to this already dangerous situation.</p>
<p>The Home Office is currently in the final stages of recruitment for a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-office-advertises-for-extremism-commissioner">counter-extremism commissioner</a>. While the lack of a legal definition for “extremism” makes it difficult to anticipate what this role will involve, surely the successful candidate will want to reduce political violence. Removing the Prevent duty that compels teachers to inform on their students would be a good start.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85474/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rob Faure Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The government’s increasing focus on ‘extremism’ may be promoting rather than preventing violence.Rob Faure Walker, PhD Candidate and Tutor in MA Education, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/793232017-06-15T10:52:38Z2017-06-15T10:52:38ZThe UK’s plan to deny terrorists ‘safe spaces’ online would make us all less safe in the long run<p>In the wake of the recent attacks in Manchester and London, British Prime Minister Theresa May has called on social media companies to <a href="https://www.facebook.com/TheresaMayOfficial/posts/1757704577579641">eliminate “safe spaces” online</a> for extremist ideology. Despite losing the majority in the recent election, she is <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/theresa-may-election-latest-internet-regulation-downing-street-speech-manifesto-a7783186.html">moving forward with plans</a> to <a href="https://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2017/06/tech-giants-fines-uk-france-extremism/">regulate online communications</a>, including in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/12/may-macron-online-terror-radicalisation">cooperation with</a> newly elected French President Emmanuel Macron.</p>
<p>May’s statement is just one of several initiatives aimed at “cleaning up” the internet. Others include Germany’s proposal to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/technology/germany-hate-speech-facebook-tech.html?_r=0">fine social media companies</a> that fail to remove illegal content and the Australian attorney general’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/12/george-brandiss-salvo-in-cryptowars-could-blow-a-hole-in-architecture-of-the-internet">call for laws requiring internet companies to decrypt communications</a> upon request.</p>
<p>It is understandable to want to do something – anything – to help restore a lost sense of security. But as a human rights lawyer who has studied the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=858831">intersection of human rights and technology</a> for the last 10 years, I think May’s proposal and others like it are extremely concerning. They wrongly assume that eliminating online hate and extremism would reduce real-world violence. At the same time, these efforts would endanger rather than protect the public by curtailing civil liberties online for everyone. What’s more, they could involve handing key government functions over to private companies. </p>
<h2>Weakening security for all</h2>
<p>Some politicians have suggested <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-security-rudd-tech-idUSKBN1711W2">tech companies should build “back doors” into encrypted communications</a>, to allow police access. But determined attackers will simply turn to <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/bitwise/2015/11/encryption_backdoors_won_t_make_us_safer_from_terrorism_john_brennan_john.html">apps without back doors</a>. </p>
<p>And back doors would inevitably reduce <a href="https://theconversation.com/bypassing-encryption-lawful-hacking-is-the-next-frontier-of-law-enforcement-technology-74122">everyone’s online safety</a>. Undermining encryption would leave us all more vulnerable to <a href="http://www.gizmodo.co.uk/2017/03/5-reasons-why-the-home-secretarys-proposed-encryption-ban-is-aggressively-stupid/">hacking, identity theft and fraud</a>. As technology activist <a href="http://boingboing.net/2017/06/04/theresa-may-king-canute.html">Cory Doctorow</a> has explained: “There’s no back door that only lets good guys go through it.” </p>
<h2>The harms of speech?</h2>
<p>May’s statement also reflects a broader desire to prevent so-called “<a href="http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/options-and-strategies-countering-online-radicalization-united-states">online radicalization</a>,” in which individuals are believed to connect online with ideas that cause them to develop extreme views and then, ultimately, take action.</p>
<p>The concept is misleading. We are only beginning to understand more about the conditions under which <a href="https://dangerousspeech.org/the-ghost-of-causation-in-international-speech-crime-cases/">speech in general</a>, and particularly <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/12/isis-internet-radicalization/419148/">online speech</a>, can incite violence. But the evidence we have indicates that online speech plays a limited role. People are radicalized through <a href="https://www.wired.com/2017/06/theresa-may-internet-terrorism/">face-to-face encounters and relationships</a>. Social media might be used to <a href="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf">identify individuals open to persuasion, or to reinforce people’s preexisting beliefs</a>. But viewing propaganda does not <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/12/isis-internet-radicalization/419148/">turn us into terrorists</a>.</p>
<p>If it isn’t clear that removing extreme or hateful speech from the internet will help combat offline violence, why are so many governments around the world <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/may/01/social-media-firms-should-be-fined-for-extremist-content-say-mps-google-youtube-facebook">pushing for it</a>? In large part, it is because we are more aware of this content than ever before. It’s on the same platforms that we use to exchange pictures of our children and our cats, which puts pressure on politicians and policy makers to look like they are “doing something” against terrorism.</p>
<h2>Overbroad censorship</h2>
<p>Even if online propaganda plays only a minimal role in inciting violence, there is an argument that governments should <a href="http://www.governing.com/columns/potomac-chronicle/gov-insurer-of-last-resort.html">take every measure possible</a> to keep us safe. Here again, it is important to consider the costs. Any effort to remove only “extremist” content is destined to affect a lot of protected speech as well. This is in part because <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/23/britain-extremism-global-effects">what some view as extremism</a> could be viewed by others as legitimate political dissent.</p>
<p>Further, the exact same material might <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/opinion/making-google-the-censor.html?_r=1">mean different things in different contexts</a> – footage used to provoke hate could also be used to discuss the effects of those hateful messages. This is also why we are not likely to have a technological solution to this problem any time soon. Although work is underway to try to develop algorithms that will help social media companies identify <a href="https://dangerousspeech.org/">dangerous speech</a>, these efforts are in early stages, and it is not clear that a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/opinion/making-google-the-censor.html?_r=1">filter could make these distinctions</a>.</p>
<h2>The risks of private censorship</h2>
<p>Trying to eliminate extremist content online may also involve broad delegation of public authority to private companies. If companies face legal consequences for failing to remove offending content, they’re likely to <a href="http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5886&context=fss_papers">err on the side of censorship</a>. That’s counter to the public interest of limited censorship of free speech.</p>
<p>Further, giving private companies the power to regulate public discourse reduces our ability to hold censors accountable for their decisions – or even to know that these choices are being made and why. Protecting national security is a state responsibility – not a task for private companies. </p>
<p>If governments want to order companies to take down content, that’s a public policy decision. But May’s idea of delegating this work to Facebook or Google means shifting responsibility for the regulation of speech to entities that are not accountable to the people they are attempting to protect. This is a risk to the <a href="https://www.manilaprinciples.org/">rule of law</a> that should worry us all.</p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>There is, of course, online material that causes real-world problems. Workers tasked with reviewing flagged content <a href="http://newsroom.ucla.edu/stories/who-watches-out-for-the-watchers">risk harm to their mental health</a> from viewing violent, obscene and otherwise disturbing content every day. And <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674368293">hate crimes online</a> can have extraordinary impacts on people’s real-world lives. We need to develop better responses to these threats, but we must do so thoughtfully and carefully, to preserve freedom of expression and other human rights.</p>
<p>One thing is certain – a new international treaty is not the answer. In her June 4 statement, May also called on countries to create a new treaty on countering the spread of extremism online. That is simply an invitation to <a href="https://cyber.harvard.edu/pubrelease/internet-control/">censor online speech</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/04/chinese-official-slams-internet-censorship">even more</a> than <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/11/facebook-censorship-thailand/">some nations</a> <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-blocks-wikipedia-internet-erdogan-online-wiki-is-it-down-a7708941.html">already do</a>. Nations need no additional incentives, nor international support, for cracking down on dissidents.</p>
<p>Human rights treaties – such as the <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx">International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a> – already provide a strong foundation for balancing freedom of expression, privacy and the regulation of harmful content online. These treaties acknowledge legitimate state interests in protecting individuals from harmful speech, as long as those efforts are lawful and proportional. </p>
<p>Rather than focusing on the straw man of “online radicalization,” we need an honest discussion about the harms of online speech, the limits of state censorship and the role of private companies. Simply shifting the responsibility to internet companies to figure this out would be the worst of all possible worlds.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79323/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Molly Land is an alternate on the board of directors of the Global Network Initiative, of which the University of Connecticut is a member.</span></em></p>Cracking down on extremism online won’t solve the problem of extremist violence, will inevitably censor speech that’s important to protect and risks harming political dissidents and democracy itself.Molly Land, Professor of Law, University of ConnecticutLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/790682017-06-08T12:03:41Z2017-06-08T12:03:41ZExplainer: what’s the difference between TPIMs and control orders?<p>In the wake of the recent terrorist attacks in London and Manchester, Theresa May <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/06/theresa-may-rip-up-human-rights-laws-impede-new-terror-legislation">says</a> the security services need more counter-terror powers. The prime minister said the UK should be “doing more to restrict the freedom and the movements of terrorist suspects when we have enough evidence to know they present a threat, but not enough evidence to prosecute them in full in court”. She <a href="https://theconversation.com/tearing-up-human-rights-law-wont-protect-us-from-terrorism-79044">went on</a>: “If human rights laws stop us from doing it, we will change those laws so we can do it.” </p>
<p>May was referring to Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures, known as TPIMs. These were introduced in 2011 under the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/23/pdfs/ukpga_20110023_en.pdf">Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act</a>, and replaced a previous system of control orders.</p>
<p>Control orders emerged under the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/2/pdfs/ukpga_20050002_en.pdf">Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005</a>, introduced by Tony Blair’s Labour government. They could be imposed by the home secretary, but with court review, on the basis of reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorism-related activity. In their earliest iteration as “heavy-touch” orders, they were used to impose a range of curbs on the liberty of terrorist suspects. The curbs included 18 hours of house detention a day, sometimes combined with forced relocation. </p>
<p>In 2012, David Anderson QC, then independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, <a href="https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/control-orders-2011.pdf">found</a> that control orders were under-used. Between 2005 and 2011, 52 people had been subjected to control orders, but by the end of 2011, only nine were in force. </p>
<p>In 2010, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/jan/02/nick-clegg-scrap-control-orders">influenced</a> by the Liberal Democrats, the Conservative-led coalition government decided to abandon control orders. It deemed they had been discredited after some high-profile cases in which the courts ruled control orders had <a href="https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2010/06/16/control-order-breached-human-rights-say-supreme-court/">breached human rights</a>.</p>
<p>But the rise in “home-grown” terrorism meant that the search for effective measures to use against nationals deemed a threat remained a concern. The government decided to retain a version of the control orders model by introducing TPIMs, which are more compliant with Article 5 of the <a href="http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf">European Convention on Human Rights</a> which protects the right to liberty. </p>
<p>TPIMs allow for much briefer periods of house arrest and in their first iteration (TPIMs Mark I) did not allow for forced relocation. The lengthier house detention requirements under control orders were relaxed, becoming only an <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/23/schedule/1/paragraph/1/enacted">“overnight residence requirement”</a>. TPIMs <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/23/schedule/1/paragraph/12/enacted">provide for</a> a range of more limited restrictions on a suspect’s movement (including electronic tagging), communication and property. Travel abroad is now prevented without permission of the secretary of state. A TPIM can only be imposed for a two-year maximum period.</p>
<h2>Ramping up of TPIMs</h2>
<p>TPIMs, like control orders before them, were under-used and only three TPIMs were <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/473603/51973_Cm_9151_Transparency_Accessible.pdf">still in force</a> at the end of August 2015. This led to <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2014-12-02/debates/14120262000001/Counter-TerrorismAndSecurityBill?highlight=have%20not%20worked#contribution-14120262000243">criticism</a> that they were too ineffective to deploy and recommendations that they needed strengthening. That occurred under the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/contents/enacted">Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015</a>, which created TPIMs Mark II. </p>
<p>The forced relocation obligation previously available under control orders was reinstated by the 2015 Act in somewhat modified form and a new restrictive travel measure was introduced.</p>
<p>New prohibitions relating to access to firearms and explosives were also included. Suspects can also be required to attend appointments with specified persons to further their de-radicalisation. Proof of involvement in terrorism-related activity to the civil standard of proof is now needed, not merely reasonable belief, placing a somewhat higher burden on the state to impose a TPIM. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/27/only-one-tpim-terror-control-order-is-in-place-in-britain-amid-s/">modest increase</a> in the use of TPIMs from mid-2016 onwards then occurred, but the number of TPIMs in place, even in their somewhat strengthened form, currently remains low. In October 2016, reports <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/26/six-people-are-subject-to-tpims-home-office-reveals">suggested</a> that only six were in force. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172768/original/file-20170607-29570-jf3pda.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172768/original/file-20170607-29570-jf3pda.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172768/original/file-20170607-29570-jf3pda.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172768/original/file-20170607-29570-jf3pda.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172768/original/file-20170607-29570-jf3pda.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172768/original/file-20170607-29570-jf3pda.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172768/original/file-20170607-29570-jf3pda.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Confined indoors.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">unsplash.com</span></span>
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<p>Alongside the TPIMs Mark II, draft legislation exists that would allow for the introduction of an enhanced version called ETPIMs. These were written into a draft version of the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/98424/etpim-draft-bill.pdf">Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill</a> in 2012. Although not yet enacted, this Bill could be brought forward at any time as emergency legislation under “exceptional circumstances”. The level of risk posed currently by certain very high risk suspects, including returnees from fighting with so-called Islamic State in Syria, might provide a basis for its enactment. </p>
<p>The fact that some of the perpetrators of the recent terrorist attacks in London and Manchester <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40167432">were</a> “home-grown”, has led May to consider a wider use and strengthening of TPIMs – possibly by introducing ETPIMs. Such strengthening would probably mean enabling a TPIMs Mark III to impose longer periods of house detention, and possibly to extend the current maximum two-year maximum duration. </p>
<h2>A fine line</h2>
<p>Yet, both TPIMs and control orders before them have been very <a href="https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/control-orders-2011.pdf">sparingly used</a>, suggesting that the security services do not view their widespread use as valuable. Suspects can abscond from a TPIM (two <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/04/missing-terror-suspect-theresa-may-statement">did so</a> in 2012 and 2013), so a determined terrorist under one is unlikely to be deterred from carrying out an attack. </p>
<p>In order to place a suspect under a TPIM, he or she must be identified first as posing a possible threat. For that to happen, the intelligence must be there – and shared with the relevant authorities. It is not apparent that a TPIM would or could have been imposed on the men who carried out the Westminster and London Bridge attacks, since the security services did <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/london-attack-khuram-butt-terrorist-known-police-before-stabbing-confirmed-a7774576.html">not deem them</a> to represent an imminent threat. It is <a href="http://metro.co.uk/2017/05/25/there-are-up-to-3000-terrorists-on-uk-streets-at-the-moment-6662165/">estimated</a> that about 3,000 people are in the UK who could be high risk; but it may be very difficult to differentiate between the levels of risk they present. Radicalisation can happen rapidly, and a person might become high risk suddenly. </p>
<p>If someone is identified as high risk, they will be subject to resource-intensive continuing surveillance. Placing them instead on a TPIM could mean that the opportunity to gather evidence for a prosecution of a <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/contents">terrorism offence</a> is lost.</p>
<p>TPIMs may have value in relation to certain suspects in the sense of decreasing the likelihood that they might engage in terrorism-related activity for the duration of the TPIM (up to two years). They received the support of the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97972/review-findings-and-rec.pdf">counter-terror review 2011</a>, and of the previous independent <a href="https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/control-orders-2011.pdf">reviewer of terrorist legislation</a>. But the practical problems and lack of use made of them over the last six years, while the threat level has remained high, do not suggest that it is wise to turn to TPIMs as a significant part of the solution to the current terror threat.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79068/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helen Fenwick does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An outline of the ways laws to restrict the activities of terrorist suspects have evolved.Helen Fenwick, Professor of Law, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/787812017-06-07T11:45:36Z2017-06-07T11:45:36ZFact Check: are only one in eight counter-terrorism referrals to Prevent made by Muslims?<blockquote>
<p>We need to get the Muslim community itself to sign up to the Prevent programme. Only one out of eight referrals to Prevent come from within the Muslim community. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Paul Nuttall, leader of UKIP, speaking during the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b08t0l7v/bbc-election-debate-2017-live-with-mishal-husain">BBC Election Debate</a> on May 31.</strong></p>
<p>Paul Nuttall’s comment about the number of referrals under the government’s counter-terrorism strategy, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-strategy-2011">Prevent</a>, used a statistic that was incorrectly quoted and dropped into the debate without context. The only publicly available statistic – quoted in <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/muslims-stay-silent-on-extremism-tip-off-scheme-r8mjg3ncg0j">The Times</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/dec/25/prevent-programme-lacking-referrals-from-muslim-community">The Guardian</a> in December 2015 – stated that out of 3,288 referrals to the Prevent programme in the first half of 2015, only 280 or 8.6% came from within the Muslim “community, family, friends and faith leaders”. Using Nuttall’s comparison, this would make it one in 12 referrals. </p>
<p>The figures were provided by the National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC) in response to a freedom of information request and refer to the first half of 2015. They are not official published government data. Other information is <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/counter-terrorism-statistics">held</a> by the Home Office on the gender, age, ethnicity and religion of people arrested under counter-terrorism legislation, but it does not publish data on those who make the referrals. </p>
<p>When I asked the NPCC, its press office stated that: “Those figures were given out under freedom of information requests” – but the information provided cannot be found on the relevant <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/FreedomofInformation/FOIandSubjectAccessRequests/FOIDisclosureLogs.aspx">part of its website</a>. </p>
<p>It should also be noted that referrals are made in line with Prevent legislation to the police, MI5, and on the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/report-terrorism">online anti-extremism website</a>, and not to what Nuttall calls the “Prevent programme”. If an individual is deemed vulnerable to all types of extremism and terrorism, they may be referred to what’s called the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance">Channel</a> programme. Between 2007 and 2014, other <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/FreedomofInformation/NationalChannelReferralFigures.aspx">data published by the NPCC</a> indicates there have been a total of 3,934 referrals to Channel and that 56% of those referred between April 2012 and March 2014 were recorded as Muslims.</p>
<p>UKIP were contacted twice for comment by The Conversation about Nuttall’s claim, but didn’t respond.</p>
<h2>Missing context</h2>
<p>Nuttall’s claim also misses much of the context surrounding the available statistics. It is not clear how the religion of the person making the referral to the Prevent programme was determined. The Times article assumes that “community, family and friends” will be, by default, Muslims. However, use of the terms “community” and “friends” indicates a wider pool of informants. </p>
<p>The statistics also have to be considered within the context of the number of Muslims that can potentially report radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. If 8.6% of all referrals did come from the local community, this represents a high number of reports coming from the Muslim population, as the <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/religioninenglandandwales2011/2012-12-11">2011 census</a> states that Muslims make up only 5% of the British population. </p>
<p>But looking at the number of referrals made to the Prevent programme is not indicative of its success or failure. Salman Abedi, who detonated a suicide bomb in Manchester in late May, was <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/24/security-services-missed-five-opportunities-stop-manchester/">reported to authorities</a> on several occasions by members of his community and friends, but this did not prevent the attack. Further focus needs to be placed on the intelligence processes.</p>
<p>However, there has been a marked deterioration in attitudes towards the Prevent strategy. A 2011 NPCC report <a href="https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/new-research-indicates-muslim-communities-welcome-engagement">stated</a> that “Muslims welcome engagement”, but increasing terror attacks have caused some to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/society-of-mosques-to-boycott-anti-terror-prevent-programme">question</a> Prevent amid claims it is targeting Muslims.</p>
<p>Another NPCC research <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/ACT%20Campaign/NPCC%20Counter%20Terrorism%20Research%20Key%20Findings.pdf">report</a> on counter-terrorism published in January 2017 highlighted concerns raised by Muslims and other ethnic minorities over anonymity and fear of unfair treatment by the police. Growing disdain has been shown for the continuing need for the Muslim population to apologise for terrorist attacks, when the rise of the far-right has not stimulated the same response. </p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>The statistics quoted by Nuttall are incorrect, misleading and divisive. By claiming that Muslims are not doing enough he implies that the Muslim population knows more than they are letting on and are able to do something about it. This is not an internal problem for Muslims alone. Placing the responsibility of reporting suspicion on the Muslim population demonises them and makes them the only actors responsible for stopping future attacks.</p>
<p>Understanding that Muslims – like any other group, religious or secular – are part of the larger population will help to contextualise any statistics provided on their participation in counter-terrorism programmes. Assumptions that the Muslim community is cohesive and aware of the actions of every other Muslim must also be dispelled. </p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p><strong>Sarah Marsden, lecturer in politics, philosophy and religion, University of Lancaster</strong></p>
<p>The author is right to point out the difficulty in unpacking the statistics on the Prevent policy and its implementation. A primary source of information on Prevent referrals comes from freedom of information requests. These respond to specific queries rather than systematically reporting data. This makes it difficult to make sense of a complex picture, and allows people like Paul Nuttall to make political capital against a backdrop of unclear information.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, there are more up-to-date figures than the article suggests. More <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/NPCC%20FOI/CT/043%2016%20NPCC%20response%20att%2001%20of%2001%2014042016.pdf">recent statistics</a> suggest that as many as 10,250 people have been referred to Channel between 2007 and March 2016. Approximately 70% of these are for what is defined as “international (Islamist) extremism”. Of these, the <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/NPCC%20FOI/CT/097%2016%20Channel%20Referrals.doc">majority</a> have been referred by statutory bodies, and notably, over 4,800 have come from the education sector. However, it is not clear what role individuals outside of these institutions play in what is a maturing system for managing <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-happens-to-people-who-are-suspected-of-being-radicalised-53652">Channel referrals</a>. For example, a parent may tell the person at a school who is responsible for Prevent that they are concerned about a child. The referral may then be taken forward by the school, but its origin would have been from a member of the community.</p>
<p>But the author is right to challenge the assumptions that sit beneath Nuttall’s criticism of Muslim communities. Placing responsibility for reporting those who may be involved in terrorism with Muslim communities is deeply divisive. It overlooks the responsibility we all share to prevent terrorism, and the not insignificant challenges facing efforts to identify those who may be “at risk” of radicalisation. It also risks stigmatising Muslims, many of whom are distrustful of Prevent because of the perception that it unfairly targets their communities. Indeed, this scepticism may be a more powerful explanation for reporting patterns than any unwillingness to take responsibility for community safety.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78781/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We asked two academics to check the claim made by UKIP leader Paul Nuttall.Sameera M. Khalfey, Research Fellow in Defence, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/696052016-12-13T16:20:40Z2016-12-13T16:20:40ZFar right threat has slipped under the radar of a counter-extremism strategy targeting Muslims<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149643/original/image-20161212-26056-7ljim4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Looking the right way?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yorkman/shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In late November, Ben Wallace MP, the security minister, <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-10-31/debates/D67A3442-5433-4F42-A51D-38618DF4FBC8/OnlineRadicalisation">told British parliamentarians</a> that there had been an increase in the number of people from the far-right being referred to deradicalisation programmes. This followed the conviction of Thomas Mair for the murder in June of the MP Jo Cox, who had been outspoken in her support for her constituency’s ethnic and religious diversity. The judge <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/23/thomas-mair-found-guilty-of-jo-cox-murder">said</a> Mair’s act of “lone-wolf” terrorism was inspired by “an admiration for Nazis and similar anti-democratic white supremacist creeds”. </p>
<p>On December 12, the government <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/national-action-british-neo-nazi-group-to-be-classed-as-terror-organisation-and-banned-first-time-a7468136.html">moved</a> to proscribe a neo-Nazi group called National Action. This is welcome, particularly as in recent years the government’s counter-extremism strategy has been heavily targeting those suspected of “Islamist” extremism, and not doing enough to stop those who espouse anti-Muslim hate and anti-Semitism online. </p>
<h2>Most affected group</h2>
<p>The government has two tools it can use to address the growth of extremism in the UK. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/20/almost-4000-people-were-referred-to-uk-deradicalisation-scheme-channel-last-year">A deradicalisation programme</a> called Channel was piloted in 2007 to deal with those people suspected of being drawn into extremism. Since then, the programme has expanded significantly. In 2015, the government introduced the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/439598/prevent-duty-departmental-advice-v6.pdf">Prevent</a> duty, a requirement on schools and universities to report those vulnerable to radicalisation. </p>
<p>My <a href="http://faith-matters.org/2016/05/18/numbers-counter-terrorism-powers-disproportionately-affect-ethnic-religious-minorities-britain/">analysis</a>, based on a freedom of information disclosure from the <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/NPCC%20FOI/CT/099%2015%20Channel%20Referrals.pdf">National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC)</a>, showed that before the Prevent duty was introduced, Muslims were already far more likely to be referred to the Channel programme than non-Muslims. </p>
<p>More recently, <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/NPCC%20FOI/CT/069%2016%20Channel%20Referrals.doc">NPCC data</a> demonstrates that counter-extremism powers continue to be used disproportionately on individuals with Muslim backgrounds. For example, the referral of Muslims aged under 18 far outpaces the referral of their counterparts from any other religion. Across England and Wales, Muslims were 50 times as likely as Christians to be referred to Channel between March 2014 and March 2016.</p>
<iframe id="datawrapper-chart-nU3HI" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/nU3HI/2/" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen" webkitallowfullscreen="webkitallowfullscreen" mozallowfullscreen="mozallowfullscreen" oallowfullscreen="oallowfullscreen" msallowfullscreen="msallowfullscreen" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>While these calculations are only indicative, the absolute number is more revealing: of the 1,747 under-18s referred to Channel between March 2014 and March 2016, 1,194 of them (68%) were Muslim. To put this in context, just over 8% of under-18s in England and Wales are Muslim, according to the <a href="http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/DC2107EW">2011 Census</a>. </p>
<p>Another <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/NPCC%20FOI/CT/043%2016%20NPCC%20response%20att%2001%20of%2001%2014042016.pdf">NPCC disclosure</a> shows that from March 2012 to the end of March 2016, the vast majority of referrals were for “Islamist” extremists. During this period, the number of “Islamists” referred to the Channel deradicalisation programme increased at a much higher rate than referrals for the “far right”, as the graph below shows. </p>
<iframe id="datawrapper-chart-Y24PN" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Y24PN/2/" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen" webkitallowfullscreen="webkitallowfullscreen" mozallowfullscreen="mozallowfullscreen" oallowfullscreen="oallowfullscreen" msallowfullscreen="msallowfullscreen" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>In 2015-16, the first financial year in which the Prevent duty applied – there was an 82% increase in referrals for “Islamists” and a 74% increase in referrals for the “far right”. While referrals for right-wing extremism have also increased, the increase has not kept pace with referrals for “Islamism”.</p>
<p>Of all people referred to Channel from 2012 to 2016, 40% of them were judged by Channel panels, composed of police officers and officials from the local authority, the NHS, and other safeguarding bodies, not to be in any need of deradicalisation support. The remaining 60% were recommended for <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-happens-to-people-who-are-suspected-of-being-radicalised-53652">deradicalisation programmes</a>.</p>
<h2>An outdated strategy</h2>
<p>Prevent and Channel are optimised for detecting and referring Muslims that might be under the influence of extremism. While there is improvement with regard to referring right-wing extremists, much is going unchallenged. The <a href="http://tellmamauk.org/">Tell MAMA (Monitoring anti-Muslim Attacks)</a> charity, where I am also a senior researcher, records increasing numbers of anti-Muslim incidents and crimes every year. </p>
<p>Part of the problem is the government’s outdated understanding of the dynamics of contemporary right-wing extremism and white supremacy. The current <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf">Counter-Extremism Strategy</a> cites the Stormfront forum, a neo-Nazi site started by a Ku Klux Klan member in the early 1990s. Stormfront is certainly an important site for right-wing extremists to communicate, but they have started to rely more on social media platforms to spread their ideology. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are the primary platforms of right-wing radicalisation – just as they are for <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-how-radical-groups-like-islamic-state-use-social-media-to-attract-recruits-58014">“Islamist” extremism</a>. </p>
<p>Britain First, for example, fashions itself as a group of “patriots” who use a massive Facebook following of over 1.5m to disseminate anti-Muslim memes as well as videos of their “Christian patrols” in Muslim neighbourhoods. Other blogs such as Farenheit 211, recently <a href="http://www.fahrenheit211.net/2016/11/20/have-you-played-pakemon-yet-catch-and-deport-them-all/">advertised</a> a <a href="http://tellmamauk.org/anti-jihadi-frog-account-linked-racist-pokemon-stickers-london/">grossly offensive campaign</a> in which racist stickers were placed on London’s public transport network and which led to an arrest in <a href="http://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/man-arrested-over-racist-pmon-stickers-found-on-tube-network-a3409901.html">early December</a>.</p>
<p>Twitter took down <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/05/twitter-deletes-isis-accounts-terrorism-online">125,000 pro-ISIS extremist accounts</a> after political pressure between mid-2015 and early 2016. Yet in the past, Tell MAMA <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2895458/Facebook-Twitter-allowing-Islamophobia-spread-refusing-report-offensive-postings.html">struggled</a> to suspend an account that calls for the mass deportation of Muslims. To Twitter’s credit, it has now <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/17/alt-right-fake-black-twitter-accounts-hate-speech-ban">started to act</a> on blocking “alt-right” accounts, but this has been too little, too late. </p>
<p>It is time for politicians and social media platforms to take more responsibility for countering right-wing extremist content on social media platforms. Some might object, suggesting that these groups are non-violent, pose no threat to the safety of the public and that religiously-motivated extremists are surely the bigger threat. Yet, <a href="https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/lone-actor-terrorism-final-report">research has demonstrated</a> that ideological networks can lead to lone-actor terrorism such as the massacre perpetrated by Anders Breivik in Norway in 2011 and Mair’s murder of Cox in 2016. Research has also <a href="http://www.springer.com/gb/book/9789400729803">shown</a> that right-wing extremists constitute the largest proportion of lone-actor terrorists and are the most deadly. </p>
<p>In light of the threat, it is imperative that the government understands that right-wing extremism plays a significant threat to the stability of diverse communities across the UK.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bharath Ganesh is a Senior Researcher at Tell MAMA, a project of Faith Matters. His doctoral studies in Geography at University College London, focussing on multiculturalism, race, and tolerance, were funded by The Bonnart Trust (<a href="http://www.fbbtrust.org.uk">www.fbbtrust.org.uk</a>). Views expressed in this article are the author's own do not represent those of Tell MAMA or Faith Matters.</span></em></p>Despite the growing threat from far-right groups, deradicalisation programmes have been largely targeting Muslims.Bharath Ganesh, Researcher in multiculturalism, hate crime, and extremism, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/632862016-08-03T13:23:47Z2016-08-03T13:23:47ZTreating ‘honour-based’ violence as terrorism will only harm more women and girls<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132795/original/image-20160802-17198-11ccbtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A counter-terrorism strategy will not stop honour-based crimes. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mansoreh/www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On July 20, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/29/friends-fear-british-woman-was-tricked-and-murdered-in-honour-killing">death in Pakistan of Samia Shahid</a>, a 28-year-old British woman from Bradford, was reported to Pakistani authorities in what is now believed to have been an “honour killing”. Her husband says she was tricked into going to Pakistan by her family. </p>
<p>That same day, Theresa May gave her first <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2016/july/prime-ministers-questions-20-july-2016/">prime minister’s questions</a> and agreed with Nusrat Ghani MP that so-called <a href="http://safe.met.police.uk/crimes_of_honour/get_the_facts.html">“honour-based” violence</a> should be re-categorised as an act of terror in the UK. This has caused <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/23/theresa-may-wrong-link-honour-killings-terrorism">consternation</a> among campaigners who fear that certain crimes against women could now be treated as terror-related. </p>
<p>Some feminists do believe that all forms of patriarchal violence should be <a href="http://womensenews.org/2012/07/domestic-violence-terrorism-more-victims/">understood as terrorism</a>, but May’s comments move the debate in a different direction. Considering this kind of violence – which mainly affects black and minority ethnic women – as terrorism is another example of the government’s damaging conflation of the issue with race, religion and immigration. </p>
<p>“Honour-based” violence is where a person, usually a girl or woman, is attacked by relatives who believe dishonour has been brought to their family. If this kind of violence is treated as a form of terrorism, there will be serious questions about where the authorities draw the line between domestic violence and an “honour-based” crime.</p>
<h2>Shift in emphasis</h2>
<p>There is no empirical evidence to suggest that “honour-based” violence, or other forms of domestic violence, are linked to the <a href="https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels">current terrorism threat</a>. While there are examples of individual terrorists with <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-36861840">histories of domestic violence</a>, arguing that perpetrators of domestic violence might go on to become terrorists is a very different claim. </p>
<p>Despite this, over the past decade government policy has referred with increasing regularity to certain “illegal cultural practices” as an integral part of the forms of extremism which lead to terrorism. In 2015, when the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance">Prevent</a> counter-terrorism guidance was placed on a statutory legal footing, the then-prime minister David Cameron <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/extremism-pm-speech">placed</a> these forms of gender-based violence squarely in the realm of extremism.</p>
<p>They are now enshrined in the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-extremism-strategy">Counter Extremism Strategy</a> and anticipated to be included within the Counter Extremism and Safeguarding Bill which was <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/524040/Queen_s_Speech_2016_background_notes_.pdf">proposed</a> in the 2016 Queen’s Speech. In a section on “building cohesive communities”, the Prevent strategy implies that more integrated communities which adhere to <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/promoting-fundamental-british-values-through-smsc">“British values”</a> and therefore somehow reject gender-based violence will be more resilient to the risk of radicalisation. </p>
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<p>May’s response is therefore not <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-06-13/debates/1606133000017/ExtremismAndRadicalisation">new</a>, but it clearly underlines the paradigm shift that has taken place over three successive governments. Forms of violence directed mainly at black and minority ethnic women in Britain are no longer viewed as <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/522166/VAWG_Strategy_FINAL_PUBLICATION_MASTER_vRB.PDF">“violence against women”</a> – they are viewed through the lens of threats to national security.</p>
<h2>A public health issue</h2>
<p>Activists have battled for years to make sure that violence against women and girls, particularly when it occurs in the private sphere and within families, should not be treated solely as a criminal justice issue but as a <a href="http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2013/violence_against_women_20130620/en/">public health one</a>. Reducing harm is of paramount importance. Yet, intimate partner or familial violence is a complex issue. Women do not necessarily want to criminalise their partners or family members and it is not always safe for them to do so. Women should feel safer in the knowledge that they can seek help at their nearest hospitals and walk-in centres without necessarily involving police, particularly when their most urgent requirement is medical assistance. But treating this violence in the context of counter-extremism means police are involved from the outset.</p>
<p>Most people would agree that perpetrators of violence against women should be brought to justice, but to attempt to do so by incorporating such violence into a counter-terrorism strategy is a blunt instrument. It casts the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33424644">ordinary, everyday abuse</a> of some black and minority ethnic women – which requires sensitive responses to the complex needs and wishes of victims – as violence that is unusual, exceptional and extraordinary. </p>
<p>This can only serve to further stigmatise and even criminalise vulnerable women and girls. They may already lack the confidence needed to report the violence they are experiencing – now we risk marginalising victims even further. This also makes an association between race, culture and religion in the public imagination about who society is meant to perceive to be potential terrorists. By prioritising counter-extremism over the needs of women and girls, the government is riding roughshod over the needs of victims. </p>
<h2>One chance to save a life</h2>
<p>On average, women will endure <a href="http://www.refuge.org.uk/get-help-now/what-is-domestic-violence/domestic-violence-the-facts/">35 incidents of domestic violence</a> of abuse before contacting police and this is likely to be higher for black and minority ethnic women. It is believed that there are almost <a href="http://ikwro.org.uk/2011/12/nearly-3000-cases-of-honour-violence-every-year-in-the-uk/">3,000 reported cases</a> of “honour-based” violence each year; but in 2014-15 only <a href="http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/cps_vawg_report_2015_amended_september_2015_v2.pdf">158 cases</a> were successfully prosecuted. </p>
<p>In a December 2015 report on dealing with “honour-based” violence, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary described the first contact a victim has with police as the <a href="https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/the-depths-of-dishonour.pdf">“one chance rule”</a> – one chance to save a life. By continuing to abandon certain groups of black and minority ethnic women who have suffered violence by subsuming them under the ever-expanding rubric of counter-extremism and counter-terrorism, this becomes the “no chance” rule. </p>
<p>In order to keep all women and girls in the UK safe, we call on the government to urgently review the incorporation of “illegal cultural practices” into the strategy and proposed legislation on counter extremism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63286/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Will McGowan receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leona Vaughn, PhD does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Treating ‘illegal cultural practices’ as a form of terrorism could lead to more marginalisation.Leona Vaughn, PhD, PhD candidate, University of LiverpoolWill McGowan, PhD Candidate, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.