tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/coup-detat-43877/articlesCoup d'etat – The Conversation2024-02-21T12:29:46Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2228262024-02-21T12:29:46Z2024-02-21T12:29:46ZFree movement in west Africa: three countries leaving Ecowas could face migration hurdles<p>For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, a recent decision to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">withdraw</a> from the <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (Ecowas) has thrown up questions about how they will navigate regional mobility in future. </p>
<p>Ecowas covers a variety of sectors, but migration is a major one. The bloc’s protocols since 1979 have long been seen as a <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97322-3_2">shining example</a> of free movement on the continent. They gave citizens the right to move between countries in the region without a visa, and a prospective right of residence and setting up businesses.</p>
<p>As multidisciplinary scholars we have previously researched <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/en/political-economy-west-african-migration-governance-wamig-2">migration governance in west Africa</a>, at the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2084452">regional level</a>, and in particular contexts like <a href="https://ecdpm.org/work/what-does-regime-change-niger-mean-migration-cooperation-eu">Niger</a>. </p>
<p>We argue that Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if their departure from Ecowas curtails mobility. But it is likely that informal mobility will continue anyway. </p>
<h2>Why free movement matters</h2>
<p>In September 2023, the three countries created a <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">mutual defence pact</a>, named <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sahel-coups-niger-tchiani-mali-burkina-faso-insecurity-e96627c700aa4fcf8d060dd9d2d16667">the Alliance of Sahel States</a>. This indicated their solidarity in dealing with insecurity. </p>
<p>Yet they also depend on neighbouring countries in the region, which puts these three countries in a difficult position.</p>
<p>The three countries that announced their withdrawal from Ecowas are connected in a web of mobility. Notably, Niger, seen as a key transit country for refugees and other migrants on their way to Europe, received <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/migration-and-society/3/1/arms030107.xml">major funds and support</a> from the European Union to prevent onward migration to Libya and beyond. </p>
<p>One central measure was <a href="https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/2015/fr/123771">Loi 2015-36</a>, a law which punished people transporting migrants with fines and prison sentences. The law was <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/european-dominance-of-migration-policy-in-niger-31383/">mostly developed</a> by external actors and had detrimental effects on the <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/multilateral-damage.pdf">local economy</a>. It also made migration journeys across the Sahara desert even <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc4138add1-visit-niger-report-special-rapporteur-human-rights-migrants">more dangerous</a>. </p>
<p>In November 2023, the law, which <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/sites/default/files/medam_niger_jegen.pdf">arguably violated</a> the principles of free movement under Ecowas, was repealed by the Nigerien coup leaders. </p>
<p>Mali is another major transit country in the region, as well as a country of origin for regional migration. It has a complicated history of <a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/72355">migration cooperation</a> with Europe. </p>
<p>Of less relevance to Europe, but more for regional dynamics, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-39814-8_11">Burkina Faso</a> is at the centre for <a href="https://www.mideq.org/en/migration-corridors/burkina-faso-cote-divoire/">regional migration</a>, often seasonal. Labour migration supports Côte d'Ivoire’s cocoa industry. After withdrawal from Ecowas, such labour migration may be difficult unless people resort more to informal migration. </p>
<p>As we have shown in our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2084452">previous research</a>, informal mobility has always existed along with formal mobility governance. Official border crossing points are often not used, despite the legal requirement to do so. </p>
<p>Hence, leaving Ecowas may increase corruption and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/imig.12766">problems of harassment</a> at formal border crossings as well as <a href="https://mixedmigration.org/resource/human-rights-migrants-smuggling-mali-niger/">increased use of mobility facilitators</a>, or “passeurs”. These are people who negotiate passage through formal border crossings and organise journeys through other routes. </p>
<p>The legal gaps that the current situation creates could be very expensive for businesses and individuals. People may in the near future require visas. And for those who have migrated regionally, the right to stay in a country of residency may soon be under threat. </p>
<h2>An immediate exit</h2>
<p>Days after they <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">announced</a> their withdrawal from <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/">Ecowas</a>, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.ewn.co.za/2024/02/08/burkina-mali-and-niger-reject-one-year-period-to-quit-ecowas">insisted</a> they were not bound by <a href="https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Revised-treaty-1.pdf#page=53">rules stipulating</a> a one year notice period before their final exit. </p>
<p>The announcement about leaving Ecowas outside the normal regulations was dramatic, but not unexpected. Military governments that took power in a series of coups in August 2020 and May 2021 in <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/mali-un-coup-dans-le-coup">Mali</a>, September 2022 in <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup/">Burkina Faso</a> and July 2023 in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">Niger</a> rule the three countries.</p>
<p>Ecowas has exerted political and economic pressure on the three countries to return to constitutional rule, through sanctions and the <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/policy-briefs/military-intervention-niger-imperatives-and-caveats">threat</a> of military intervention. </p>
<p>In Niger, for example, Ecowas <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-bazoum-coup-sanctions-ecowas-c7bdfd06559f1cfbfb856bea5b11a55f">closed</a> official border crossings, cut off more than <a href="https://punchng.com/niger-nigeria-cuts-power-supply-ecowas-vows-to-confront-junta/">70% </a> of electricity, and suspended financial transactions with other countries in the region. </p>
<p>International assets <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/31/nigers-planned-51-mln-bond-issuance-cancelled-due-to-sanctions">were frozen</a> and international aid halted. Even before the coup, <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/thousands-children-niger-risk-severe-nutritional-crisis-border-closures-leave-trucks-stranded#:%7E:text=Furthermore%2C%20prior%20to%20the%20political,least%20one%20form%20of%20malnutrition.">3.3 million people</a> in Niger experienced acute food insecurity. </p>
<p>The Ecowas sanctions made daily life even worse and in all likelihood added to the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate">popularity</a> of the coup leaders. </p>
<p>Similar sanctions were applied in Mali. The population has suffered as a result and the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-arent-sanctions-preventing-coups-in-africa">effectiveness</a> of the sanctions is questionable. </p>
<p>Sanctions in Burkina Faso included <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-arent-sanctions-preventing-coups-in-africa">travel bans</a> against members of the military government.</p>
<h2>Potential ways ahead</h2>
<p>For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, there are several considerations when it comes to regional mobility in their post-Ecowas era. These may include exploring the provisions of the <a href="https://www.uemoa.int/en">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a>; a return to bilateral agreements with individual neighbours; or relying on the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">African Union Protocol on Free Movement</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Monetary union:</strong> The three countries are still part of the <a href="https://www.uemoa.int/en">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a> (Waemu), a union around the common currency, the CFA franc.</p>
<p>The regional monetary union also has provisions for free movement of people and goods across its member countries. With this option, access to seaports, a major issue for all three landlocked countries, is ensured through other members of the monetary union, including, for example, Senegal. </p>
<p>On the downside is the fact that a major argument for leaving Ecowas was the perceived role of external influence over the regional bloc. The strong anti-imperialist discourse of the military governments does not bode well for the regional monetary union either. The union is the institutional framework for regional monetary policy over which France <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745341798/africas-last-colonial-currency/">continues</a> to exert significant influence. </p>
<p>Burkina Faso has already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-may-quit-west-african-currency-union-not-mali-2024-01-31/">announced</a> its intention to leave the monetary union too. </p>
<p>The West Africa Economic and Monetary Union also excludes major trading partners like Nigeria – of major importance to landlocked <a href="https://www.inter-reseaux.org/en/publication/51-special-issue-nigeria/nigerias-role-in-nigers-food-security/">Niger</a> for food supplies. Trade and commerce between Nigeria and Niger provides a lifeline and is among the most intense areas of cross-border activity in west Africa. </p>
<p>For these reasons, the regional monetary union option seems an unlikely alternative.</p>
<p><strong>Bilateral agreements:</strong> Another option for the three countries could be a return to bilateral agreements with individual countries to facilitate free movement. This can be likened to what former Ecowas member <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00083968.2014.936696">Mauritania</a>, which left in <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2000/12/28/mauritania-pulls-out-ecowas">2000</a>, did. </p>
<p>However, at the moment, given the sanctions, this option is off the cards, and could take many years to work out. </p>
<p><strong>African Union protocol:</strong> At a continental level the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">African Union Protocol on Free Movement</a> may offer a distant way forward. So far only <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-sl-PROTOCOL_TO_THE_TREATY_ESTABLISHING_THE_AFRICAN_ECONOMIC_COMMUNITY_RELATING_TO_FREE_MOVEMENT_OF_PERSONS-1.pdf">32 countries</a> have signed it and four have ratified it, among them Mali and Niger (Burkina Faso is a signatory). </p>
<p>One way to move forward would be for countries to ramp up ratifications of this document, to ensure that cooperation on free movement can continue whatever happens to Ecowas. </p>
<p>Of course, other countries within Ecowas could also unilaterally open up for visa-free entry like <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/03/rwanda-announces-visa-free-travel-for-all-africans//">Rwanda</a> or Kenya have done, though the process has had its <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/09/kenya-backlash-over-new-visa-free-entry-policy-many-describe-as-hectic//">hiccups</a>. </p>
<p>Such visa arrangements are also unlikely to include the rights of residence and establishment guaranteed under the Ecowas framework.</p>
<p>Given the current political context, an institutionalised option seems unlikely in the near future. The most likely option would be that migration will simply continue – informally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222826/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Franzisca Zanker received funding from the Mercator Stiftung for a research project "The Political Economy of West African Migration Governace" in 2019 which provided relevant background for this piece.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanda Bisong is a policy officer at the ECDPM, Maastricht, The Netherlands.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leonie Jegen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if they cannot migrate to and from neighbouring countries in Ecowas.Franzisca Zanker, Senior research fellow, Arnold Bergstraesser InstituteAmanda Bisong, PhD candidate, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLeonie Jegen, PhD Candidate, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227202024-02-07T13:27:05Z2024-02-07T13:27:05ZEcowas: why withdrawal of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso signals fresh trouble for the Sahel<p><em>On 27 January 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-mali-burkina-faso-say-they-are-leaving-ecowas-regional-block-2024-01-28/">announced</a> their plan to withdraw from membership of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), despite repeated efforts at reconciliation.</em></p>
<p><em>Diplomacy scholar Nicholas Westcott explains how the decision may be the latest symptom of a deepening crisis in the Sahel, the area south of the Sahara desert stretching from Mauritania in the west to Chad in the east.</em></p>
<h2>Why does their decision pose a threat to the region?</h2>
<p>The coastal states in Ecowas fear <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f9c0ca66-8c32-4906-9e22-f2d3fc0e8c67">contagion</a> from both jihadism and political disorder in the Sahel. If the three Sahelian countries leave Ecowas, that risk increases. So does the risk of potential hostility to Malian and Burkinabe migrants in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Stopping free movement between these three countries and the rest of west Africa would have serious economic consequences for all concerned.</p>
<p>Other governments in the region also fear damage to their own democracies – if not from coups, then from anti-western populists. </p>
<p>Guinea already has a military government. Others such as Cameroon, Togo and Sierra Leone may be vulnerable. </p>
<p>With elections ahead in <a href="https://ec.gov.gh/electoral-system/">Ghana</a>, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/6/senegal-parliament-delays-election-to-december-15-after-chaotic-vote">postponement</a> of the election in Senegal, this year will test democracy in the region.</p>
<p>This schism in Ecowas is also a risk for Africa’s partners in Europe and the US. Recent research in the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/advance-article/doi/10.1093/afraf/adad034/7564826?searchresult=1">African Affairs journal</a> showed that resentment of the increased French military presence was a key reason for the Nigerien military backing the coup led by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66430115">General Abdourahmane Tchiani</a> rather than elected <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-you-need-know-about-nigers-ousted-president-2023-08-14/">president Mohamed Bazoum</a>. </p>
<p>Other western countries risk being tarred with the same neocolonial brush unless they reform international institutions to reflect African concerns. They need to expedite the changes necessary to ensure that the multilateral system works for the benefit of small poor countries.</p>
<p>If this doesn’t happen, China’s narrative that the existing system works only to the benefit of “the west” will gain traction on the continent.</p>
<h2>What are the drivers?</h2>
<p>All countries in west Africa face a multilayered crisis. This has been brought on by years of sluggish growth following the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/great-recession.asp">2008 financial crisis</a>, <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1">COVID</a> and the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine">Ukraine war</a>, the impact of climate change and population growth. </p>
<p>Elected governments are finding it increasingly difficult to satisfy the expectations of their citizens. This is particularly true of the growing number of unemployed young people who have become disillusioned with democracy and are open to violent regime change, whether through jihad or a coup d’etat. </p>
<p>It is almost a re-run of the 1970s when drought, corruption and development failures led to a rash of coups in the region. People who cannot make a living legitimately will find other ways to do so.</p>
<p>Jihadism and banditry have <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-survey/2023/from-global-jihad-to-local-insurgencies/">increased</a> despite western efforts to combat them. Western support has thus lost credibility, even if the real failure is primarily political and economic. </p>
<h2>Why have regional bodies like Ecowas not been able to help?</h2>
<p>Faced with the juntas’ threat of secession, African regional organisations, in this case Ecowas and the African Union, face a dilemma. Do they to stick to their principles and exclude states that have experienced unconstitutional changes of government until they re-establish governments accountable to their citizens? Or do they compromise their principles to preserve at least nominal unity, and allow authoritarian governments back into the club? </p>
<p>Reconciliation efforts by Togo, through its <a href="https://lpsf.africa/lpsf-2023/">Peace and Security Forum</a> in Lomé last November, and by Nigerian Islamic leaders have not borne fruit. Nevertheless, it’s possible that the departure announcement is a bargaining chip to get more lenient terms for their reintegration into Ecowas. </p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-communique-on-burkina-faso-mali-niger/">responded</a> by saying that it had not yet received formal notification, which means, according to the regulations, that the countries can only leave in a year’s time. This provides all parties with negotiation time. The <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240130/communique-withdrawal-three-ecowas-member-states">AU</a> has also urged negotiation to keep Ecowas together. For its part, Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-notifies-west-african-bloc-ecowas-decision-leave-2024-01-29/">response</a> has been less accommodating.</p>
<h2>What lies behind the military regimes’ announcement?</h2>
<p>Regime survival has become their overriding objective. Their explicit intention seems to be to undermine the principle that African nations should apply standards to each other. The fact that African governments themselves signed up to these principles is as irrelevant to the insurrectionists, who want to retain power, as it is to the jihadists, who want to seize it. </p>
<p>They have set out the following <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">justifications</a> for their withdrawal:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Ecowas provided no support against the jihadists</p></li>
<li><p>Ecowas has imposed “illegal” sanctions that are harming the people </p></li>
<li><p>Ecowas has fallen under the influence of foreign governments.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These arguments are weak. They reflect an attempt to look like defenders of the poor and opponents of western influence.</p>
<p>It seems to be working. Populations are being <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/burkina-faso/313-armer-les-civils-au-prix-de-la-cohesion-sociale">mobilised and armed</a> to fight the jihadists.</p>
<p>The juntas appear to be donning the mantle of <a href="https://www.thomassankara.net/facts-about-thomas-sankara-in-burkina-faso/?lang=en">Thomas Sankara</a>. The revered former president of Burkina Faso, who seized power himself, is seen as a hero for his opposition to corrupt elites and French influence, his modesty and principles, and his concern for the ordinary Burkinabe. </p>
<p>It also plays conveniently into a narrative that both <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/09/21/china-wants-to-be-the-leader-of-the-global-south">China</a> and Russia are promoting: that current global institutions have been set up to defend neocolonial western interests, that adherence to “western values” (such as democracy and human rights) denies countries their right to develop in their own way; and that only China and Russia are true defenders of the interests of the global south.</p>
<p>Russia is putting its guns where its mouth is. There are an estimated <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/russian-mercenaries-behind-slaughter-in-mali-village-un-report-finds">1,000</a> Russian troops in Mali – formerly Wagner, now state-run and re-branded the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russian-troops-deploy-burkina-faso-2024-01-25/">Africa Corps</a> – and the first 100, with more to follow, have arrived in Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>Others are being recruited for Niger. Their official justification may be anti-terrorist duties, but their real purpose is to protect the regime from further threats of mutiny, coup or invasion. </p>
<p>The danger is that the Sahelian states could become unaccountable regimes, protected by Russia in return for gold, and living off the illicit trafficking of people and goods across the Sahara. </p>
<p>The migrant trade is already <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/54581/niger-migrants-return-to-the-route-towards-the-mediterranean">thriving again in Agadez</a>, the key transit point in northern Niger to the Mediterranean coast. And nothing worries European countries more than a dramatic increase in African migration. So they will be watching developments with concern.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Westcott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their intention to leave Ecowas. This may be a pointer to a deeper crisis in the Sahel region.Nicholas Westcott, Professor of Practice in Diplomacy, Dept of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216962024-01-29T13:08:07Z2024-01-29T13:08:07ZNiger and Russia are forming military ties: 3 ways this could upset old allies<p>In July 2023, Niger’s military took over in <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">a coup</a> just two years after the country’s first transition to civilian power. The coup has brought into sharp focus the role of foreign countries in Niger’s politics.</p>
<p>Before the coup, France and the US were the <a href="https://www.gmfus.org/news/coup-niger">main security allies</a> of Niger. But the coup leaders, led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, were open about their antagonism to France, the country’s former colonial ruler, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/12/25/niger-suspends-cooperation-with-international-francophone-body">ordered the French military to leave</a>.</p>
<p>Now the attention of many people in Niger has shifted to Russia.</p>
<p>Since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">coup</a>, several analysts have <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/niger-russia-sahel/a-66494597">highlighted</a> the role of Russia. Some analysts and regional experts believe Russia might have played a role <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4135841-the-niger-coup-exposes-russias-grand-strategy-for-africa/">directly or indirectly</a> in the military takeover. </p>
<p>Others (including myself) <a href="https://theconversation.com/scramble-for-the-sahel-why-france-russia-china-and-the-united-states-are-interested-in-the-region-219130">argue</a> that Russia is increasing its grip on the country and actively seeking to benefit from the coup. This was evident when Russia and Niger recently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/">agreed</a> to develop military ties. </p>
<p>Although the details of this partnership are still sketchy, Russia promised to increase the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/">“combat readiness”</a> of Niger’s military. In addition, there are discussions to partner in the areas of agriculture and energy. </p>
<p>I have been <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">researching</a> the security dynamics of the region for over a decade. The Niger junta’s romance with Russia has potential implications for peace and security in the region and beyond. </p>
<p>I have identified three main potential implications for Niger and other allied countries:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>escalation of tensions between Niger and France</p></li>
<li><p>discontent between Niger and its regional allies</p></li>
<li><p>likely disruption of a <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/648851468123254494/pdf/957770PID0P1500Box391429B00PUBLIC0.pdf#page=3">US$13 billion</a> gas pipeline project from Nigeria to the European Union through Niger.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Russia in the region</h2>
<p>After the 2023 coup, France and the regional economic bloc Ecowas <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ecowas-threatens-use-of-force-against-niger-junta/a-66398008">threatened</a> to use force to reinstate the deposed president. </p>
<p>Russia <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warned</a> against such a move. </p>
<p>The military junta then expelled French soldiers. France responded by closing its embassy in Niger. </p>
<p>The US also reduced its military and economic cooperation. Washington cut aid to the country by more than <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231010-france-turns-a-page-as-troops-begin-leaving-coup-hit-niger">US$500 million</a> and removed the country from its <a href="https://credendo.com/en/knowledge-hub/usas-removal-uganda-niger-gabon-and-central-african-republic-agoa-has-only-limited">duty free export</a> programme. </p>
<p>The European Union also <a href="https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/eu-adopts-new-niger-sanctions-framework/">instituted sanctions</a>. Niger then cancelled its security and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231127-niger-junta-revokes-anti-migration-law-in-setback-to-eu-strategy">migration agreements</a> with the European bloc.</p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/west-african-bloc-maintains-sanctions-against-niger/3079035">sanctioned</a> Niger. Another major ally, Nigeria, <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2023/08/03/coup-nigeria-cuts-off-power-supply-to-niger-republic/">cut electricity</a> and instituted further sanctions. </p>
<p>The sanctions, coupled with an increase in insecurity, weakened and isolated Niger. </p>
<p>Rather than budge, the junta looked for alternative partners – like Russia and China. It also recently joined Mali and Burkina Faso to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">announce a withdrawal</a> from Ecowas. </p>
<p>For its part, Russia was positioning itself as a reliable ally. In December 2023, a <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/04/russian-officials-visit-niger-to-strengthen-military-ties/">Russian delegation visited Niger</a> and in January 2024, Niger’s Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/">visited Moscow</a> to discuss military and economic ties. </p>
<p>Russia is no stranger to the region. Over the last three years it has set up <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">security arrangements</a> with the juntas running Niger’s neighbours: Mali and Burkina Faso. This has been done through the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, a private security company supported by Russia, whose operations in Africa were renamed <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/12/17/africa-corps-russia-s-sahel-presence-rebranded_6352317_124.html">Africa Corps</a> in early 2024. </p>
<p>Russian military advisers have been operating in Mali since 2021. In addition, the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">Wagner group has 400 mercenaries</a> in the country. Russia also <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/08/10/mali-gets-more-military-equipment-from-russia/">delivered military hardware</a> to the country in 2022. </p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>There are three main potential implications for Niger and other allied countries. </p>
<p>First, a potential escalation of tensions between Niger and France. This will happen if Niger grants Russia uranium exploration rights that affect French companies with existing licences. Niger <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-24/top-uranium-producer-niger-launches-mining-sector-overhaul?leadSource=uverify%20wall&embedded-checkout=true">has suspended new mining licences</a> and is currently auditing existing ones. This could affect French companies. France has <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-emmanuel-macron-warn-attack-embassy-niger/">vowed</a> to protect its economic interests in Niger. </p>
<p>It depends on how the partnership between Russia and Niger develops, in particular how Niger intends to pay for its share of any military cooperation. If this involves the Wagner group, as is the case in security partnerships between Russia and Burkina Faso and Mali, the issue of <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/the-wagner-groups-playbook-in-africa-mali/">mining concessions</a> will come into play. Mali and Burkina Faso have paid for Wagner’s involvement by <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/03/a-heavy-price-to-pay-2/">offering</a> mining concessions in return for arms, ammunition and mercenaries. </p>
<p>Second, any security tie involving the Wagner group would create further discontent between Niger and its regional allies, especially Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon. </p>
<p>Following the coup, Niger announced it was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67605967">leaving</a> the G5 Sahel, which was set up to coordinate security operations in the Sahel. This has turned attention to the country’s participation in the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a>. </p>
<p>Both institutions were set up to fight insurgency in the region and Niger has been an active contributor. The other countries in the joint task force, such as Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Benin Republic, will be wary of working with Niger if it is in active partnership with Wagner, which is <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/massacres-executions-and-falsified-graves-wagner-groups-mounting-humanitarian-cost-mali">notorious</a> for human rights abuses.</p>
<p>The third likely major fallout from Russia’s involvement revolves around Niger’s relationship with the EU. The EU is currently constructing a <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/648851468123254494/pdf/957770PID0P1500Box391429B00PUBLIC0.pdf#page=3">US$13 billion</a> gas pipeline from Nigeria to the bloc through Niger. The pipeline project was designed to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian gas.</p>
<p>Based on Russia’s animosity with the EU, I believe Russia could use the security alliance to disrupt the project in order to secure its gas delivery to the EU. </p>
<p>The junta can use the pipeline project as leverage against the EU by demanding major financial concessions, putting the delivery of the project at risk and strengthening Russia’s position. </p>
<p>Migration is another area of contention when it comes to the EU. Niger now <a href="https://www.ewn.co.za/2024/01/24/nigers-gateway-to-the-desert-open-again-for-migrants-1">allows</a> mass illegal migration through its territory for onward journey to Europe. This will create more problems for the EU. </p>
<p>The active presence of Russia in Niger could change the security and economic landscape of the region and affect all parties. </p>
<p>I maintain my <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-ecowas-must-do-these-3-things-to-break-the-stalemate-212403">initial position</a> that rather than use force, the Niger junta should be encouraged to restore democracy as soon as possible. At the same time, some of the sanctions should be lifted to encourage dialogue and reduce the influence of Russia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221696/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Niger’s recent military romance with Russia could escalate tensions with France, regional allies and the European Union.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2191302024-01-08T13:58:09Z2024-01-08T13:58:09ZScramble for the Sahel – why France, Russia, China and the United States are interested in the region<p>The Sahel, a region <a href="https://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569">3,860km wide located south of the Sahara Desert</a> and stretching east-west across the African continent, has been a focus of attention around the world recently. </p>
<p>In the last decade, issues such as <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15365.doc.htm#:%7E:text=drivers%20of%20insecurity.-,From%201%20January%20to%2030%20June%202023%2C%20the%20region%20recorded,displaced%20persons%20exceeding%206%20million.">terrorism</a>, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1132332#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CIndeed%2C%20the%20central%20Sahel%20continues,in%20Ukraine%2C%E2%80%9D%20she%20added.">insecurity</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137072">trafficking</a> have characterised the region. </p>
<p>Military takeovers have been a major source of concern in the region and beyond in the last few years. Since 2020, the region has had <a href="https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/understanding-crisis-democracy-west-africa-and-sahel">four successful coup d’états</a> and three failed ones. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://acleddata.com/2023/08/03/fact-sheet-military-coup-in-niger/">coup in Niger</a> particularly attracted attention. This is because Niger was seen as a “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/west-africa/nigers-coup-and-americas-choice">darling of the west</a>” and a model for democratic governance in the region. </p>
<p>Despite the challenges facing the region, the scramble for the Sahel remains intense. </p>
<p>The main actors in this scramble are the <a href="https://european-union.europa.eu/index_en">European Union</a>, France, Russia, China and the United States.</p>
<p>The EU relies on Sahelian countries, especially Niger, to stop mass illegal immigration into the bloc. Niger is a major transit country in the region. Niger had security and defence partnerships with the EU until recently when the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/niger-ends-security-and-defence-partnerships-with-the-eu/">country unilaterally cancelled the deals</a>. This is a source of concern to the EU. </p>
<p>Why are these foreign powers interested in the Sahel?</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">scholar</a> in international relations and having <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/Olayinka-Ajala-2181806326">researched</a> the region for over a decade, I see the main reasons as follows: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>availability of natural resources</p></li>
<li><p>strategic location of the region in Africa</p></li>
<li><p>economic interests of the countries involved in the scramble</p></li>
<li><p>defence and security cooperation in the form of arms sales.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Foreign powers all have their reasons to be involved in the scramble for the Sahel.</p>
<h2>France</h2>
<p>Most of the countries in the Sahel region were colonised by France. Unlike Britain, France has maintained strong links with former colonies. They cooperate in the economy, defence and resource extraction, to mention a few areas. </p>
<p>France has the <a href="https://www.ieri.be/en/publications/wp/2019/f-vrier/france-still-exploiting-africa">first right</a> to buy any natural resources discovered in all its former colonies. Although the relationship between France and its former colonies appeared cordial, recent coups in Francophone countries and <a href="https://theconversation.com/france-in-africa-why-macrons-policies-increased-distrust-and-anger-212022">anti-France sentiments</a> across Africa have revealed the opposite. </p>
<p>The coups have been followed by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/huge-protests-niger-call-french-forces-leave-after-coup-2023-09-02/">large demonstrations</a> against France and in support of the putschists. </p>
<p>Despite these cracks, France is keen to maintain its grip on these countries, especially pertaining to military cooperation and resource extraction. France was reluctant to pull its military out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger despite the countries severing military partnerships. It continues to extract natural resources in these countries.</p>
<h2>Russia</h2>
<p>The relationships between Russia and many Sahelian countries were established during the cold war and colonial era. More recently, the emphasis by western countries on <a href="https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-72-the-impact-of-counter-terrorism-measures-on-muslim-communities.pdf">human rights</a>, especially during counterterrorism operations, has pushed Sahelian countries closer to Russia.</p>
<p>While western allies demand the rule of law, democracy, and human rights in return for security and economic support, Russia portrays itself differently. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/2022-Russian-invasion-of-Ukraine">invasion</a> of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 also increased Russia’s interest in the Sahel because it is keen to maintain allies in Africa. </p>
<p>Russia has <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">openly backed</a> military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warned</a> against any military intervention in Niger when the military took power. Furthermore, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, the controversial private military company which is controlled by Russia, cooperates with some countries in the Sahel. Niger has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231204-niger-s-junta-ends-key-security-agreements-with-eu-turns-to-russia-for-defence-deal">cancelled defence agreement with the EU</a> and switched to Russia. All of these factors explain Russia’s interest in the Sahel. </p>
<h2>China</h2>
<p>Like Russia, China portrays itself as an alternative to the traditional ally (France) of Sahelian countries. With a mantra of “<a href="https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=94683">non-interference</a>” and “<a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/praxis/files/2020/05/1.-Condon.pdf">respecting sovereignty</a>”, China has entrenched itself as a “partner” of countries in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The Sahel region is rich in natural resources such as oil, uranium, natural gas and lithium. Chinese state-owned enterprises <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">operate</a> in Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>For instance, Mali potentially has <a href="https://www.mining-technology.com/features/top-ten-biggest-lithium-mines/?cf-view">one of the largest</a> lithium reserves in the world and China’s Ganfeng Lithium has <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">invested</a> heavily in the country. In addition, despite China’s development in military hardware, most of the weapons are untested. China is keen to use the conflicts in the Sahel to <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/WF_93_Rajosefa_The_Future_of_Strategic_Competition_in_the_Sahel_Region.pdf">test</a> its arms products. </p>
<h2>The United States</h2>
<p>In 2019, the US opened its <a href="https://intellinews.com/us-in-danger-of-losing-control-of-its-extensive-drone-base-in-niger-289069/#:%7E:text=The%20Agadez%20drone%20base%2C%20officially,by%20the%20US%20Air%20Force.">largest drone base</a> in Africa in Agadez-Niger. A year before that, I had <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">written</a> about the security implications of the base for the region. </p>
<p>Unlike France and China, which both have extensive economic interests in the Sahel, the US has a strong military interest. Niger, in particular, is strategically located and the US can easily fly surveillance and reconnaissance drones from the country to cover the Sahel, west and central Africa. </p>
<p>As France is being militarily dislodged by its former colonies in the region, the US has been trying to fill the void to prevent Russia and China from establishing further military presence. </p>
<p>The US took several months to label the military takeover in Niger a coup so as not to lose strategic military cooperation and dominance. </p>
<p>The year 2023 has been particularly challenging for the countries in the Sahel. With issues ranging from economic instability to insecurity, the region remains fragile. Despite the instability and fragility, the scramble for the region remains intense with traditional allies such as France losing its grip and other powers stepping up. </p>
<p>The Sahel is one to keep an eye on in 2024 and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Foreign powers’ interest in the Sahel is driven by its natural resources and strategic location for security and illegal migration control.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2189822023-12-06T13:28:36Z2023-12-06T13:28:36ZKissinger’s obsession with Chile enabled a murderous dictatorship that still haunts the country<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563455/original/file-20231204-25-6iv62u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C75%2C5064%2C3684&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet greets U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1976.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chilean-president-augusto-pinochet-greets-secretary-of-news-photo/515114332?adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Noticing my nonappearance at the start of a black-tie dinner at the Johannesburg home of <a href="https://theconversation.com/harry-oppenheimer-biography-shows-the-south-african-mining-magnates-hand-in-economic-policies-205494">Harry Oppenheimer</a>, a mining magnate and Africa’s richest man, the host assumed I was boycotting the event on principle. It was a reasonable assumption: I was the Chilean ambassador to South Africa, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tortured-and-deadly-legacy-kissinger-and-realpolitik-in-us-foreign-policy-192977">Henry Kissinger</a> was the chief guest.</p>
<p>By then, a quarter century had passed since the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/09/10/1193755188/chile-coup-50-years-pinochet-kissinger-human-rights-allende">military coup that toppled</a> the democratically elected Chilean President Salvador Allende – an event that gave rise to Gen. Augusto Pinochet’s brutal 17-year-long military dictatorship – but the issue still lingered. Many Chileans bitterly remembered the role of the U.S. government, and of Kissinger in particular, in the breakdown of Chilean democracy.</p>
<p>It was something Kissinger himself acknowledged during that dinner – which I did attend, just late due to encountering a hailstorm. Kissinger explained that he always declined invitations to visit my home country out of fear over what “Allende Chileans” would do to him.</p>
<p>Plenty of Chileans still despise Kissinger. On news of his death at the age of 100 on Nov. 29, 2023, <a href="https://twitter.com/jg_valdes/status/1730066974116323584">Juan Gabriel Valdes, Chile’s ambassador to the U.S.</a>, summed up that sentiment when he posted in Spanish on X, the platform previously known as Twitter: “A man has died whose historical brilliance never managed to conceal his profound moral misery.” </p>
<p>It’s hard to overestimate the role Kissinger played in Chile. As <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/29/us/henry-kissinger-dead.html">national security adviser and secretary of state</a> during the Nixon and Ford administrations, he oversaw policies that helped install and then prop up a dictator.</p>
<h2>Chile’s 1973 coup</h2>
<p>Upon <a href="https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/6399554/allende-wins-50-years-later-declassified-documents-show-reactions">Allende’s election on Sept. 4, 1970</a>, Kissinger became obsessed with blocking his inauguration. The measures approved by Kissinger included a botched kidnapping attempt of <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2020-10-22/cia-chile-anatomy-assassination">Chilean Army Chief René Schneider</a>, engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency, that ended with the general’s assassination.</p>
<p>Kissinger insisted on a hard line with the Allende administration. He did everything possible to make the “Chilean road to socialism” fail, among other things, by “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-latin-american-studies/article/abs/make-the-economy-scream-economic-ideological-and-social-determinants-of-support-for-salvador-allende-in-chile-19703/47F57E51ED3046DD69EFB93F221A4497">making the economy scream</a>,” as President Richard Nixon put it.</p>
<p>After a meeting with Kissinger in November 1970, a <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8i.htm">CIA cable to its station in Santiago stated</a> that “it is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown in a coup.”</p>
<p>The <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve16/ch5">CIA’s covert financing of Chilean opposition parties</a>, funding of the country’s <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2017-04-25/agustin-edwards-declassified-obituary">right-wing media</a> and <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d311">support for the 1972 truckers strike</a> that snarled the nation’s freight and commerce for months were <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94chile.pdf">amply documented by a U.S. Senate committee</a> a few years after the coup.</p>
<p>Not content with having helped to topple Allende, Kissinger then wholeheartedly supported Pinochet’s regime.</p>
<p>When the U.S. ambassador to Chile relayed his efforts to persuade the military to act less brutally against political prisoners, Kissinger wrote on the margins of the cable, “<a href="https://web.mit.edu/hemisphere/events/kissinger-chile.shtml">… cut out the political science lectures</a>.” At a 1976 Organization of American States meeting in Santiago, far from urging Pinochet to tone down his regime’s repression, as some of Kissinger’s staff had recommended he do, he told the general, “<a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/">we want to help, not undermine you</a>.”</p>
<h2>Operation Condor</h2>
<p>Kissinger’s support for repressive military dictatorships extended beyond Chile’s borders.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men in military uniforms chat in a black and white photo." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=836&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=836&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=836&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1051&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1051&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1051&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Argentina’s dictator Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla, right, confers with Chile’s Gen. Augusto Pinochet, in Mendoza, Argentina, in 1978.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ObitArgentinaVidela/5da45b83d8f74a63bee16d422fc13b9f/photo?boardId=37be9465fcce45d283d5431cccb20a6a&st=boards&mediaType=audio,photo,video,graphic&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=484&currentItemNo=3">AP Photo/Eduardo Di Baia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>He supported <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/sep/03/operation-condor-the-illegal-state-network-that-terrorised-south-america">Operation Condor</a>, an international undertaking that coordinated intelligence and operations among many of South America’s right-wing military regimes – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia and Uruguay – from 1975 to 1983. The operations contributed to the widespread <a href="https://www.ox.ac.uk/research/research-impact/operation-condor">detention, torture and murder</a> of many left-wing opposition activists across three continents.</p>
<p>By September 1976, the excesses of Operation Condor were clear, and the U.S. State Department prepared an important diplomatic message, <a href="https://fam.state.gov/fam/07fam/07fam0030.html">known as a demarche</a>, strongly objecting to the repressive policies. Amazingly, <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21757-document-04">Kissinger stopped it</a> in its tracks. It was never delivered to those foreign ministries – and the timing was ominous.</p>
<p>Five days later, on Sept. 21, 1976, <a href="https://www.zinnedproject.org/news/tdih/car-bomb">Orlando Letelier, an exiled Chilean diplomat</a> who had served as Allende’s ambassador to the U.S. and in his cabinet in three different roles, was assassinated in Washington, D.C. He died after a bomb blew up the car he was driving – fatally injuring him and a colleague, <a href="https://ips-dc.org/remembering_ronni/">Ronni Karpen Moffitt</a>. Letelier was giving her and her husband, <a href="https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/05/13/Michael-Moffitt-who-survived-a-car-bomb-that-killed/4177358574400/">Michael Moffitt</a>, a ride to work. Michael was thrown from the vehicle but survived.</p>
<p>Preceding 9/11 by 25 years, the Letelier assassination was the first foreign-sponsored terrorist act on U.S. soil. Years of investigations revealed that Chile’s secret police planned and executed the plot to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2016/09/20/this-was-not-an-accident-this-was-a-bomb/">get rid of a prominent political figure</a> with influential contacts in Washington, D.C.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a brown suit crouches down to touch a plaque strewn with flowers." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chilean President Gabriel Boric touches a memorial to Orlando Letelier and Ronni Karpen Moffitt at Sheridan Circle in Washington, D.C., in 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ChileCoupAnniversary/cc733873aac14518b4e88a0196bf6d4f/photo?boardId=37be9465fcce45d283d5431cccb20a6a&st=boards&mediaType=audio,photo,video,graphic&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=484&currentItemNo=12">AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Breaking the mold</h2>
<p>Mocking Chile’s supposed lack of strategic significance, <a href="https://eltecolote.org/content/en/kissinger-the-last-condor-an-obituary-by-one-of-his-victims/">Kissinger once dismissed</a> the long and narrow country as “a dagger pointing straight at the heart of Antarctica.” Yet, he devoted full chapters to Chile in each of the <a href="https://www.librarything.com/nseries/25589/Kissingers-Memoirs">first two volumes of his memoirs</a>.</p>
<p>What made <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/">Kissinger take such deadly aim at Allende</a> was his new political model, a “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405198073.wbierp0329">peaceful road to socialism</a>.”</p>
<p>It represented something else entirely from the revolutionary movements that were coming to the fore in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In Chile, an established and stable democracy had elected a Socialist president with an ambitious program of <a href="https://portside.org/2023-09-03/defending-allende">social and economic reforms</a>.</p>
<p>Allende’s Popular Unity coalition, which brought together an array of leftist and left-of-center political parties, could easily be replicated in Europe, in countries like France and Italy, leading to anti-U.S. governments – Washington’s worst nightmare. In this, Kissinger was not wrong. <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780312129088/francoismitterrand">French Socialist leader Francois Mitterrand</a> visited Chile in 1971, met with Allende, recreated such a coalition in France and repeatedly won presidential elections.</p>
<p>Successful democratic socialist countries did not fit Kissinger’s long-held design for the world, inspired by his realist perspective, to create a balance of power between the United States, Europe, the Soviet Union, China and Japan.</p>
<p>This view <a href="https://classicsofstrategy.com/2016/02/05/henry-kissinger-a-world-restored-1957/">sprang from his studies</a> of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400844746-004">Europe’s long peace</a> in the 19th century, which was anchored in a balance of power between Great Britain, France, Prussia, Russia and Austria-Hungary.</p>
<p>To Kissinger, what in the 1970s was called the Third World, and today is known as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959">Global South</a>, played no role in this grand design – to him, nothing important could come from the South. History was shaped by the great powers, such as the U.S., China and the Soviet Union. </p>
<h2>Big body count</h2>
<p>It is estimated that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/17/chile-families-search-disappeared-pinochet">more than 3,000 people were killed</a> by Chile’s military dictatorship, at least 1,000 of whom are still “disappeared” – meaning their bodies were never found.</p>
<p>These numbers pale in comparison to the estimated <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/argentina-death-flight-plane-dictatorship-returned-home-florida/">30,000 deaths in Argentina</a> under its junta; the <a href="https://theconversation.com/henry-kissingers-bombing-campaign-likely-killed-hundreds-othousands-of-cambodians-and-set-path-for-the-ravages-of-the-khmer-rouge-209353">hundreds of thousands of deaths in Cambodia</a> caused by the U.S. bombings directed by Kissinger; the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/01/bangladesh-kissinger-henry-genocide-pakistan-east-legacy/">millions who died in Bangladesh</a> in their 1971 war of independence against a U.S.-backed Pakistan; and the estimated 200,000 killed by the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/12/06/indonesia.timor.us/">Indonesian armed forces in East Timor in 1975</a> with Kissinger’s explicit approval.</p>
<p>They were casualties of the misguided geopolitical obsessions of a man blinded by a 19th century European view of world affairs. That perspective casts all developing nations as mere pawns in the games played by the great powers.</p>
<p>To this day, Chile lives under the shadow of Pinochet’s 1980 constitution, which <a href="https://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article/120/823/43/115914/Chile-s-Constitutional-Moment">greatly expanded presidential powers</a> and enshrined the <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691208626/the-chile-project">neoliberal economic model</a> he imposed on the country. On Dec. 17, 2023, Chileans will vote for a second time in two years on a referendum that could <a href="https://apnews.com/article/chile-constitution-boric-pinochet-hevia-e752d1656e7f3c648fb771ab786a3b48">replace Pinochet’s constitution</a> with a new one.</p>
<p>That referendum may or may not turn a page in Chilean history. Regardless of the outcome, the scars will remain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218982/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span> I am a member of Diplomats Without Borders (DWB), of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) and of the International Studies Association (ISA). I am also affiliated with the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), and I am a member of the Party for Democracy, a Chilean political party.</span></em></p>It’s hard to overestimate the role Henry Kissinger played in Chile. A former Chilean diplomat describes the mark that the powerful statesman made in his country and elsewhere in the Global South.Jorge Heine, Interim Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2144422023-10-03T14:42:00Z2023-10-03T14:42:00ZFrance’s decision to leave Niger was a bad move: three reasons why<p>After about two months of wrangling between France and the new military regime in Niger, President Emmanuel Macron finally <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/president-macron-says-france-will-pull-ambassador-and-troops-out-of-niger-by-end-of-the-year-12969438">decided</a>, on 24 September, to withdraw the French ambassador and pull out French military forces from Niger. </p>
<p>This was a U-turn. Only four weeks earlier, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230831-niger-junta-revokes-french-ambassador-s-diplomatic-immunity-orders-his-expulsion">Macron had refused to follow</a> the instructions of the putschists who’d ordered the ambassador and French forces to leave the country. He argued that he did not <a href="https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/Niger-France-does-not-recognize-any-legitimacy-to-the-declarations-of-the-military-junta-in-power/">recognise</a> the new junta, which took power on 26 July, and insisted that his forces would remain in the country. </p>
<p>As a scholar of <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">politics and international relations</a>, I have been exploring the security situation and the rise of insurgency in the Sahel for over a decade. In my view, France’s actions have created unnecessary uncertainty in a region already beset by insecurity from increasing jihadist activities, as well as six successful coups in the last three years. </p>
<p>In my opinion, France has made a strategic mistake. Though it did not recognise the junta, it should have maintained communication, especially after falling out with other former colonies such as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/5/how-malis-military-fell-out-with-its-french-ally">Mali</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-marks-official-end-french-military-operations-its-soil-2023-02-19/">Burkina Faso</a>. </p>
<p>The other prominent external actor in Niger was the US. The US decided to negotiate with the junta. Unlike France, it did not label the military takeover a coup d'etat. The US <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/u-s-resumes-counterterrorism-drone-operations-from-niger-68e8c903">resumed operations</a> in some of its bases in Niger, having secured agreement from the junta. </p>
<p>Macron’s actions could have three negative outcomes for the region. It will hurt the fight against terrorism. It also opens the door to greater influence of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60947877">Wagner</a>, the Russian-backed mercenary group. And finally it has implications for Europe’s migrant crisis.</p>
<h2>The fight against terrorism</h2>
<p>Niger plays a significant role in the security architecture of the Sahel. The country is actively involved in and contributes to security organisations such as the <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Counter-terrorism-projects/G5-Sahel">G5 Sahel</a> and the <a href="https://isij.eu/article/interorganizational-cooperation-and-fight-against-terrorism-west-africa-and-sahel">Multinational Joint Task Force</a>. </p>
<p>These organisations are involved in the fight against terrorism in the region. Apart from contributing funds to both organisations, especially the G5 Sahel, France is also involved in training Nigerien forces and flying reconnaissance and attack drones, actively combating terrorists in the region.</p>
<p>The decision by France to pull out of Niger will have an impact on counter terrorism operations in the region. France has been involved there for a long time and has soldiers who thoroughly understand the region. Losing these officers will create a gap that Niger might struggle to fill in the short term. </p>
<p>Like France, the US also has a large military presence in Niger, where it operates its largest drone base in Africa. I have previously analysed the <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-journal/us-drone-base-agadez-security-threat-niger">importance and security implications</a> of the drone base to the region. </p>
<p>For its part, the EU also contributes to the security of the region by providing <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_768">funding</a> for the G5 Sahel and Multinational Joint Task Force. This momentum must be sustained in order not to lose what has already been achieved in the form of an established security architecture. </p>
<p>The withdrawal of French forces will negatively affect the morale of the soldiers in the security alliance and embolden insurgent groups. An <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66922754">increase in terrorist attacks</a> has been recorded since the coup. </p>
<h2>Russia versus the US</h2>
<p>The terms of the agreement between the US and the military junta were not published. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to assume that one of Washington’s reasons for making sure it remained in Niger was the fear that it might lose the country to Russia. </p>
<p>In Mali, the military junta replaced French troops with Wagner forces. Since 2022, Russia <a href="https://www.unav.edu/en/web/global-affairs/a-change-in-mali-the-french-out-wagner-in">has gained influence through the Wagner Group</a> after the exit of France.</p>
<p>Washington would want to avoid losing further ground to Russian influence. With the Wagner group already present in Mali, there is suspicion that the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/09/17/mali-niger-burkina-faso-sign-mutual-defence-pact//">recently signed military pact</a> between the three countries (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) could expand the presence of the group. </p>
<p>In addition, the US has invested heavily in the Sahel, especially in Niger. In the last decade the US has invested hundreds of millions of dollars on security infrastructure, including a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">drone base in Agadez</a> (central Niger). </p>
<p>The US understands the role “ungoverned spaces” in the Sahel could play in breeding terrorism. Such was the case of the regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan where Al-Qaeda launched attacks against the US and its western allies. </p>
<h2>What it means for migration</h2>
<p>Other major players in Niger such as the European Union also cannot afford to follow the path of France. The EU needs stability in Niger to stem trafficking and avoid another humanitarian catastrophe as seen in 2015-16. Europe witnessed the highest number of migrants <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/asylum-seekers-refugees-and-migration-niger-may-2015">transiting through Niger</a> and Libya into Europe during this period.</p>
<p>There is no doubt that the civilian regimes of presidents <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mahamadou-Issoufou">Mahamadou Issoufou</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-you-need-know-about-nigers-ousted-president-2023-08-14/">Mohamed Bazoum</a> contributed to the reduction in the flow of migrants through Niger to Libya. While serving as interior minister, Bazoum was instrumental in passing a law against people smuggling through Niger. The law was championed by Bazoum but also believed to have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/23/niger-observers-link-coup-to-president-mohamed-bazoum-support-of-eu-migration-policies-people-smuggling">contributed to his ousting</a> by the military. The junta could threaten to cancel the agreement and look the other way as migrants again transition through Niger into the EU. </p>
<p>The EU needs to maintain a strong diplomatic channel with the junta to maintain stability, prevent an increase in smuggling and continue efforts towards the return of democratic order. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>While I understand that increased diplomacy with the junta cements its authority, I think foreign powers should accept that there is a government in Niger that has some degree of popularity among the citizens. Frozen channels of diplomacy must be reactivated to prevent a total collapse of the Sahel’s security architecture and in order to achieve a quick transition to democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214442/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>France’s withdrawal from Niger could hurt the regional fight against terrorism, create an opportunity for Wagner’s influence and increase Europe’s migrant crisis.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2128092023-09-05T13:40:23Z2023-09-05T13:40:23ZGabon coup has been years in the making: 3 key factors that ended the Bongo dynasty<p>The recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabonese-military-officers-announce-they-have-seized-power-2023-08-30/">military intervention</a> that put an end to the Bongo family’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-bongo-run-re-election-august-2023-07-09/">56-year hold</a> on power in Gabon has been many years in the making. </p>
<p>Its roots can be traced back to when deposed president Ali Bongo Ondimba <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/29/gabon-president-ali-bongo-hospitalised-in-saudi-arabia">suffered a stroke</a> in 2018. </p>
<p>The political crisis caused by Bongo’s illness and the opaque manner in which he <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/gabonese-president-ali-bongo-defies-illness-father-s-shadow-4c2dba69">continued</a> to hold the reins of power through close family members during his convalescence created tensions within the power circles. </p>
<p>On one side were critics who <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gabon-cabinet-idUSKCN0RC0I720150912">demanded</a> his resignation and sought to end the Bongo dynasty’s grip on power in the oil rich Central African country. These critics were mostly responsible for the emergence of <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/09/01/albert-ondo-ossa-everything-must-be-done-so-that-general-oligui-nguema-hands-over-power-to-me_6119686_124.html">Albert Ondo Ossa</a> as a consensus opposition presidential candidate at the 2023 elections. </p>
<p>On the other side were loyal members of the ruling <a href="https://pdg-gabon.org/">Parti Démocratique Gabonais</a>. The party was founded by former <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/gabon-omar-bongo-death-reports">president Omar Bongo</a>, who ruled the country from 1967 to 2009. In this group were party members who continued to play an institutional charade of cabinet meetings and rubber-stamp legislation that masked the troubling absence and incapacitation of Ali Bongo. </p>
<p>The group also includes powerful clan members inside the Bongo dynasty jockeying for position and wealth in the uncertainty surrounding Ali Bongo’s health.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.ags.edu/international-relations/agsird-faculty/douglas-a-yates">political scientist</a> specialising in African politics and the politics of the oil industry in Africa, I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/240810975_The_Rentier_State_in_Africa_Oil_Rent_Dependency_and_Neocolonialism_in_the_Republic_of_Gabon">researched</a> the implications of oil rent dependency and neocolonialism in Gabon.</p>
<p>My view is that the corrupt oil-rentier dynastic regime that ruled Gabon for the past half century was brought to an end by a combination of three factors. They are Ali Bongo’s illness; the contagion effect of other recent successful coups in Africa; and the power tussle between General Brice Oligui Nguema (the coup leader, who is said to be Bongo’s distant cousin) and Sylvia Bongo Ondimba, Ali Bongo’s wife. The former first lady was believed to be preparing her son, Noureddine Bongo, to succeed his father. </p>
<h2>Factors in favour of coup</h2>
<p>Before the coup d’état there was little hope that Ali Bongo Ondimba would lose his third re-election bid. </p>
<p>His party had over <a href="https://data.ipu.org/node/62/elections?chamber_id=13398">80%</a> of the seats in the legislature, control of regional and municipal governments, and a hold on the courts and the security apparatus of the state. </p>
<p>Ali Bongo was said to have won <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/gabon-election-idAFKBN30507D">64.27%</a> of votes cast in the election, which the opposition described as a sham. According to the electoral umpire, Bongo’s main challenger, Albert Ondo Ossa, came second with 30.77%. That was before the military struck. </p>
<p>One of the factors that encouraged the military intervention in Gabon is the contagion effect of recent successful coups in Africa. A series of coups in Mali (2020), Chad (2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022) and Niger (2023) appear to have demonstrated to Gabon’s military that not only was a successful coup possible, it was acceptable. </p>
<p>After the coup, crowds came out in Libreville and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/8/30/photos-hundreds-celebrate-in-gabons-capital-after-soldiers-seize-power">danced</a> in the streets. </p>
<p>The second factor is a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/9/1/has-gabons-all-powerful-bongo-dynasty-really-lost-its-55-year-grip">power tussle</a> between the coup leader, Nguema, and Sylvia Bongo. The deposed president’s wife is widely believed to have grown in influence after her husband suffered a stroke in 2018. Nguema was relieved of his duties as head of the president’s security.</p>
<p>If it is true that Sylvia was preparing her son to succeed his father, Noureddine would have been the third generation of the Bongo family to rule Gabon. Ali Bongo <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46885467">succeeded</a> his father in 2009. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Prior to the 30 August coup, the only thing that seemed to have united the numerous opposition parties in Gabon (who barely managed to rally around a joint candidate just nine days before the 26 August poll) was the desire to remove Ali Bongo from office. </p>
<p>Now that a coup appears to have achieved that, it will be difficult for Albert Ondo Ossa to take office.</p>
<p>Given what appears like the <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2023/08/31/US-urges-Gabon-military-to-preserve-civilian-rule-">willingness</a> of France and the United States to accept this palace coup, the only question is whether Nguema will lead a transition to civilian rule, hold elections, refuse to present himself for office, or become the next member of the Bongo clan to rule.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212809/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Yates does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ali Bongo’s illness, the contagion effect of other recent successful coups and palace power tussles are factors responsible for Gabon’s recent coup.Douglas Yates, Professor of Political Science , American Graduate School in Paris (AGS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122022023-08-28T14:43:16Z2023-08-28T14:43:16ZNiger’s coup weakens regional fight against Boko Haram: four reasons why<p>Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">detained and deposed</a> on 26 July by his military guard under the command of General Abdourahamane Tchiani. </p>
<p>The unconstitutional change of government has been widely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-president-says-democracy-will-be-saved-following-coup-2023-07-27/">condemned</a> internationally. Ecowas, the regional group, also issued sanctions and <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/08/11/coup-review-your-military-threat-sanctions-against-niger-%E2%80%90-fulani-group-tells-ecowas/">threatened</a> military intervention. </p>
<p>However, other military juntas in the region have been <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/613369-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-declare-support-for-niger-coup-as-soldiers-arrest-politicians.html">sympathetic</a> to the cause of the coup leaders. </p>
<p>The Niger coup has changed the security priority of key actors in the Lake Chad region, from fighting Boko Haram to addressing the political crisis.</p>
<p>Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency emerged in Nigeria in 2009 and spread across the Lake Chad region: Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The group has directly or indirectly killed more than <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2021/09/23/boko-haram-war-over-300000-children-killed-in-northeast-unicef/">300,000 children</a> and displaced <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/boko-haram-five-million-displaced-in-lake-chad-buhari/">five million</a> people in the region.</p>
<p>At its peak in early 2015, the insurgents <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003211525-1/boko-haram-lake-chad-basin-temitope-oriola-freedom-onuoha-samuel-oyewole">controlled</a> about 20,000 square miles (over 50,000km²) of Nigerian territory. </p>
<p>Early in the fight against Boko Haram, especially between 2010 and 2013, neighbouring states in the Lake Chad region displayed inadequate interest in cooperating with Nigeria. </p>
<p>Regional discord allowed the terrorists to attack targets in Nigeria and escape to neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>From around 2013, the region showed growing interest in the fight against Boko Haram, as terrorist attacks spread beyond Nigeria. The 2014 Paris and London <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047227">conferences</a> further encouraged common frontline and international support against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region.</p>
<p>Cameroon opened the second front against Boko Haram, deploying over <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html">3,000 troops</a> to its northern region in July 2014. Around the same time, Niger Republic <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047227">granted</a> the Nigerian military the right to pursue terrorists across the border. </p>
<p>Niger later declared a state of emergency and deployed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">3,000 troops</a> to the Differ region, threatened by Boko Haram, in February 2015. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">Chad</a> deployed 4,500 troops against the insurgents in early 2015. At the same time, Nigeria and Cameroon <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">raised</a> their forces to 25,000 and 7,000 respectively. </p>
<p>In July 2015, the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/about/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> became operational against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. With headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad, the force established sectors in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The force is made up of 10,000 troops drawn from the four frontline countries and Benin Republic.</p>
<p>To support them, France, the US, Belgium, Italy and Germany maintain varying degrees of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868798">military presence</a> in Niger. </p>
<p>This coordinated response is now threatened by the shift in focus from fighting Boko Haram to removing the coup leaders in Niger. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=vU7aPGIAAAAJ&citation_for_view=vU7aPGIAAAAJ:43bX7VzcjpAC">researched</a> Boko Haram and its operations in the Lake Chad region for the last 13 years. Based on my <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Boko-Harams-Terrorist-Campaign-in-Nigeria-Contexts-Dimensions-and-Emerging/Oriola-Onuoha-Oyewole/p/book/9781032077840">research</a> and <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html">understanding</a> of the region, I see four ways in which the events in Niger will make the regional fight against Boko Haram more difficult:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Ecowas’s attention is divided</p></li>
<li><p>Niger’s attention is diverted</p></li>
<li><p>the gaps in security may give Boko Haram the opportunity to regroup and restrategise</p></li>
<li><p>suspension of western aid to Niger could fuel poverty and drive recruitment into Boko Haram.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Niger’s coup and its benefits to Boko Haram</h2>
<p>The member states of the Lake Chad security arrangement and their western partners have condemned the Niger coup, and become hostile to the junta. </p>
<p>Ecowas, led by Nigeria, has <a href="https://ecowas.int/final-communique-fifty-first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">sanctioned</a> Niger. Ecowas suspended financial and commercial relations, closed land borders and restricted flights to and from Niger. The regional bloc also threatened military intervention to restore constitutional order in the country. </p>
<p>This means the Nigerian military has been preoccupied with possible Ecowas intervention in Niger. Data extracted from the <a href="https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/">Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project</a> as of 23 August shows that the last offensive operation against Boko Haram by the Nigerian military was on 25 July. Since then, four insurgent attacks have been recorded, where 12 civilians were killed and 15 were kidnapped in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The military priority of Niger has also shifted from fighting against Boko Haram and other violent extremist groups. Now it is regime security. Niger’s military is preoccupied with a potential Nigeria-led Ecowas military intervention. </p>
<p>The junta has thus <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/07/africa/niger-coup-deadline-intl/index.html">prioritised</a> defence of the national capital and south-western borders. This is to the detriment of south-eastern borders, where Boko Haram is a threat. </p>
<p>Boko Haram is already taking advantage of this shift. On 15 August, <a href="https://punchng.com/17-niger-soldiers-killed-in-attack-near-mali-ministry/#google_vignette">17 Niger soldiers</a> were killed in an attack by suspected jihadists near the country’s border with Mali. The attack was described as the first in over a year. </p>
<p>Many western countries have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-loses-aid-western-countries-condemn-coup-2023-07-29/#:%7E:text=NIAMEY%2C%20July%2029%20">suspended</a> critical development and security aid to Niger. This is to the detriment of the country’s counter-insurgency capacity. </p>
<p>Niger’s military junta is mobilising anti-colonial and anti-imperial sentiment. It has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66365376">severed</a> defence cooperation with France and is aligning with pro-Russian forces. </p>
<p>Boko Haram can exploit the Niger crisis to regroup and re-strategise. Terrorist movement from Sahel to the Lake Chad region was recently <a href="https://dailytrust.com/niger-coup-iswap-migrating-from-sahel-to-lake-chad-north-west/#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20top%20ISWAP%20fighters%20and,of%20the%20Lake%20Chad%20region">reported</a>.</p>
<p>The humanitarian effects of Ecowas sanctions and suspension of western aid may also fuel terrorist recruitment and a new wave of insecurity in the region. </p>
<p>The anti-western mobilisation of the junta can advance Boko Haram’s agenda to end western influence and establish Islamic State in the Lake Chad region and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212202/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samuel Oyewole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Boko Haram may be the unintended beneficiary of the crisis created by the recent coup in Niger.Samuel Oyewole, Lecturer, Political Science, Federal University, Oye EkitiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2115492023-08-17T10:20:48Z2023-08-17T10:20:48ZNiger: Ecowas military intervention could trigger 3 bad outcomes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542849/original/file-20230815-21-ogk7ja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigeria-led Ecowas artillerymen land by helicopter on 10 January, 1999 in Freetown. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jean-Philippe Ksiazek/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66465146">threat</a> of military force to end the coup in Niger has led to significant divisions in the region.</p>
<p>It has heightened tensions in Niger itself, as well as among its neighbours. </p>
<p>There are more and more signs that any military intervention is likely to be met with stiff opposition. <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/niger-coup-supporters-rally-as-regional-force-mulls-intervention-/7222246.html">Growing support</a> for the junta has emboldened the coup plotters to stay in power and call the bluff of the <a href="https://ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a>, Ecowas. </p>
<p>In reaction to the threat of force, more Nigeriens took to the streets to show their opposition, with one <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/08/military-junta-thousands-of-coup-supporters-gather-near-french-military-base-in-niger/">protest</a> held close to a French military base in Niamey. </p>
<p>The option of military force has divided countries in west Africa and the Sahel. Ecowas members are fully aware that an all-out war would increase the fragility of the region. A meeting of Ecowas military chiefs in Ghana on <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230817-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-ecowas-military-chiefs-to-meet-over-niger-coup">17 and 18 August</a> will discuss intervention options. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Ecowas parliament is <a href="https://punchng.com/ecowas-parliament-divided-over-planned-military-action-in-niger/">divided</a> over a military intervention. Member countries such as Nigeria, which currently holds the rotating chair, are also being put under internal pressure. <a href="https://punchng.com/niger-kano-residents-protest-planned-standby-force/">Protesters</a> took to the streets in Kano, the biggest city in northern Nigeria, against a possible invasion of Niger. </p>
<p>For their part, countries that neighbour Niger but do not belong to Ecowas, such as Chad and Algeria, have <a href="https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/niger-chad-and-algeria-opposed-to-military-intervention-would-aggravate-the-situation/">opposed</a> the use of force. </p>
<p>As a scholar of <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">politics and international relations</a>, I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329456894_US_Drone_Base_in_Agadez_A_Security_Threat_to_Niger">researched</a> the implications of foreign military bases in Niger. My view remains as I have <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">previously argued</a> that a military intervention in Niger is unlikely. </p>
<p>However, the threat of force means tensions remain high. This is understandable as a great deal is at stake. I have identified three major implications of a full-blown war. </p>
<p>The first casualty would be the ongoing regional war against terrorism because countries currently committed to this fight would have their armies and resources diverted. </p>
<p>The second is that there would be a mass influx of refugees into the seven countries bordering Niger. This would have a knock-on effect as more refugees seek to find their way to Europe. </p>
<p>The third is that the conflict would heighten tensions between Niger and France. The junta blames France for the country’s insecurity and economic woes. </p>
<h2>Counting the cost of war</h2>
<p>Nigerien soldiers, through the <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Counter-terrorism-projects/G5-Sahel">G5-Sahel</a> and <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a>, are involved in the fight against <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html">Boko Haram</a>, <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/islamic-state-west-africa-province">Islamic State West Africa Province</a> (ISWAP) and other terrorist groups around the Lake Chad Basin and other regions of the country. An attack led by Ecowas on Niger would distract the soldiers and divert critical resources. </p>
<p>Terrorist groups could then take advantage of borders weakened by conflict. They could also benefit from a situation where armies which previously fought side by side against insurgents such as Boko Haram and ISWAP were now fighting one another.</p>
<p>The example of Syria and how ISIS <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets/">quickly emerged</a> in the region gives a glimpse of what could happen. </p>
<p>Most of the Nigerien population lives in the southern part of the country next to the borders with Nigeria, Republic of Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali. These countries would suffer an influx of refugees, further destabilising what are already fragile states.</p>
<p>A war between the Nigerien military and Ecowas would embolden human traffickers and lead to more Africans taking advantage of the chaos to travel north towards Europe. </p>
<p>Niger has several bilateral and multilateral arrangements with the European Union and other countries in Europe to <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_4536">curb mass migration</a> through Libya and the Mediterranean sea.</p>
<p>Agadez in central Niger used to be a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20171213-focus-niger-agadez-desert-migrant-hub-people-smuggling-sahel-hotspots-route-libya">major hub for illegal migration</a> but this has changed as a result of the concerted effort between Niger and its European allies. </p>
<p>Military intervention would lead to a total collapse of the relationship between France and Niger’s people. There is already anger among a large part of the Nigerien public against the former colonial master and its activities in the country. </p>
<p>Niger was a French colony from 1922 till independence in 1960 and Paris has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230803-niger-coup-brings-france-s-complicated-relationship-with-its-former-colonies-into-the-spotlight">continued</a> to play a critical role in the domestic political and economic affairs of the country.</p>
<p>If people believe that Ecowas is being pushed to take military action by France and its allies, Nigeriens could look to Russia which has issued its own <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warning</a> against military intervention.</p>
<p>While Russia might not have the capacity and resources to fully mobilise in support of the junta, it might engage the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60947877">Wagner Group</a>, the Russia-backed private military contractor, which already has a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali">presence</a> in neighbouring Mali. </p>
<p>Russia has been careful not to support the coup plotters so as not to upset its allies in Africa, such as South Africa and Namibia, who both oppose the coup. But a full-scale military intervention would provide Moscow with an opportunity to get involved and “gain another ally”. The military leaders in Burkina Faso for instance have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/5/interim-burkina-faso-president-hails-russia-as-strategic-ally">strengthening </a> their relationship with Russia.</p>
<h2>Limited options</h2>
<p>Ecowas is desperate to “do something” after the junta defied its <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/ecowas-threatens-force-gives-7-day-ultimatum-for-return-to-democracy-in-niger">seven-day ultimatum</a> to step down.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the junta is not showing any signs of backing down. </p>
<p>I think the best option is to rule out military action and to negotiate a short transition period to restore democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211549/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The use of force to end the coup in Niger would come at great cost and cripple the regional fight against terrorism.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111362023-08-08T12:28:33Z2023-08-08T12:28:33ZNiger coup: why an Ecowas-led military intervention is unlikely<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541537/original/file-20230807-34367-f6znll.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Niger's coup leaders waving at a crowd of supporters in Niamey on August 6, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Balima Boureima/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hopes are fading for a quick resolution of Niger’s coup or the potential use of force by the <a href="https://ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (Ecowas) to free Nigerien president Mohammed Bazoum and restore him to power.</p>
<p>Ecowas leaders gave the Nigerien military junta <a href="https://ecowas.int/final-communique-fifty-first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">an ultimatum</a> to cede power within seven days of 30 July or face a military intervention.</p>
<p>The deadline of 6 August came and went, and the putschists remained. Ecowas meets again on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/7/ecowas-calls-for-second-emergency-summit-to-discuss-niger-coup">10 August</a> to discuss the situation in Niger. However, hopes of a Nigeria-led Ecowas military intervention in Niger now appears dim. </p>
<p>The first indication that it would be difficult to immediately restore democracy in the country surfaced when <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/6/thousands-in-niger-rally-in-support-of-coup-leaders">demonstrations</a> in support of the coup started. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-coup-mohamed-bazoum-military-junta-sahel-88ccaa2f004db44601e59475199c5fbe">attack</a> on the French embassy in Niamey was followed by a daily protest in support of the coup. The size of the protest increased daily. </p>
<p><a href="https://indepthnews.net/niger-coup-reflects-anti-french-sentiment-in-the-region/">Anti-France sentiments</a> also increased, with more people supporting the junta. </p>
<p>Niger shares a border with <a href="https://www.worlddata.info/africa/niger/index.php">seven countries</a> in the region, four of which are members of Ecowas. Of those four, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230801-burkina-faso-and-mali-say-intervention-in-niger-would-be-declaration-of-war">Mali and Burkina Faso</a> have been suspended due to similar coups d'etat. </p>
<p>Both countries have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/1/burkina-faso-and-mali-warn-against-foreign-intervention-after-niger-coup">threatened</a> to support Niger if Ecowas tries to use force. The remaining two countries in the bloc bordering Niger are Nigeria and Benin. Outside Ecowas, Chad and Algeria have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230806-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-pressure-mounts-on-niger-coup-leaders-as-ecowas-deadline-approaches">both ruled out</a> participating in any military action and Libya has its own challenges. </p>
<p>The likelihood of a military intervention further diminished when Nigerian legislators <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/318122/nigerias-senate-rejects-military-intervention-in-niger-as-ultimatum-to-coup-leaders-expires/">rejected</a> the idea. They argued for the use of “other means” than force. Nigeria is the largest country in the Ecowas bloc and <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/118585-nigeria-ecowas-largest-donor-continually-outsmarted-by-smaller-west-african-countries.html">principal financier</a> of the bloc. </p>
<p>It will be difficult for Ecowas to carry out military intervention without the full support of Nigeria. As a scholar of <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">politics and international relations</a> I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329456894_US_Drone_Base_in_Agadez_A_Security_Threat_to_Niger">researched</a> the implications of foreign military bases in Niger. I have also previously <a href="https://isij.eu/article/interorganizational-cooperation-and-fight-against-terrorism-west-africa-and-sahel">analysed the role Nigeria plays</a> in regional organisations such as Ecowas and the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Taskforce</a> in the region. </p>
<p>My view is that the unwillingness of Nigeria’s politicians to support military intervention, coupled with growing local support for the junta in Niger, will make the use of force almost impossible. This leaves Ecowas with little or no option than to pursue a diplomatic resolution. </p>
<h2>Why military intervention is unlikely</h2>
<p>There are three main reasons why the use of force is becoming more unlikely.</p>
<p>First, the increasing popularity of the putschists in the country is a cause for concern. The growth of protests in support of the coup is an indication of a wider acceptance than previously envisaged.</p>
<p>Hundreds of youths <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/deadline-arrived-nigers-junta-reinstate-president-residents-brace-102053037">joined</a> military personnel to stand guard at the entrance to Niamey. Some of these youths vowed to join the military to fight any incursion.</p>
<p>Second, politicians in Nigeria and Ghana fear that any military intervention would result in human catastrophe, which would further destabilise the region. Politicians from Nigeria <a href="https://north-africa.com/nigerian-president-tinubu-under-pressure-to-avoid-war-with-northern-neighbor-niger/">argue</a> that any war in Niger will have a serious impact on northern Nigeria, a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2020.1811662">region that is already strained</a> by insurgency. </p>
<p>Apart from Islamist terror organisation, <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html">Boko Haram</a>, which has ravaged the north-eastern part of the country, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2020.1811662">clashes</a> between farmers and pastoralists have also destabilised other parts of northern Nigeria. </p>
<p>Seven Nigerian states share borders with Niger. An attack on Niger would lead to a large influx of refugees into Nigeria. This has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66420693">created anxiety</a> in northern Nigeria. President Bola Tinubu, who took office only recently, will find it difficult to ignore the senators from the region who <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/614494-niger-coup-nigerian-senators-reject-tinubus-request-for-troops-deployment.html">rejected</a> any military intervention.</p>
<p>Third, Niger has fought terrorism in the region and has been a reliable partner. The country is a member of the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> and the <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Counter-terrorism-projects/G5-Sahel">G5 Sahel</a>, two key organisations tasked with countering terrorism and fighting trafficking in the region. </p>
<p>A military intervention in Niger which could result in a full blown war would embolden terrorist groups. It will also result in soldiers previously fighting side by side against terrorist groups now fighting against each other.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/islamic-state-west-africa-province">Islamic State West Africa Province</a>, an Isis affiliate, already operating in the region, an attack on Niger could create a situation similar to what happened in Syria. Isis took advantage of the fighting in Syria to establish a caliphate in 2014.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Since military intervention to restore democracy in Niger is unlikely, diplomacy remains the only solution. </p>
<p>The de facto leader General Abdourahamane Tiani was on the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/318026/10-things-to-know-about-niger-coup-leader-general-abdourahamane-tiani/">verge of being removed</a> as leader of the presidential guard before the coup d'etat. Many high-ranking military officers in the country are involved in the mutiny and it is almost impossible they will be able to work with Bazoum again. They could be <a href="https://www.pgaction.org/ilhr/adp/ner.html">tried for treason</a>, which is punishable by death in Niger.</p>
<p>As I have <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721#:%7E:text=In%20addition%20to%20insecurity%20and,labelled%20as%20having%20foreign%20origins.">explained</a> elsewhere, the mutiny was partly a result of the large presence of foreign military troops in the country. It has further weakened the relationship between the Nigerien military and France. </p>
<p>The military junta has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/niger-coup-leaders-end-military-cooperation-with-france-deepening-concerns-over-anti-western-turn-e7fae57e">cancelled</a> military cooperation with France. </p>
<p>If Bazoum is released and restored as president, he will have to remove several military leaders who participated in the coup or renegotiate Niger’s military alliance with France. Both options are fraught with difficulties. </p>
<p>The most likely diplomatic option is for Ecowas to negotiate a short transition window with the military junta. This will include a quick return to democratic rule. </p>
<p>This will calm the tension and give some assurance to partners within and outside the region. With the level of support the junta has received from the Nigerien public and outside the country, Ecowas negotiators must be open to making concessions. </p>
<p>Third party countries with lower stakes in Niger must lead these negotiations and France must be willing to change its relationship with the country to one of mutual benefit. At the moment, Nigeriens see France as an exploiter and are keen to end their long-held relationship. </p>
<p>In all, there’s no easy solution to the impasse in Niger.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211136/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A combination of Nigerian and Nigerien factors dim prospects of Ecowas military intervention in Niger.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2107212023-07-31T13:33:38Z2023-07-31T13:33:38ZWhat caused the coup in Niger? An expert outlines three driving factors<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540134/original/file-20230731-17-4d3tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Niger's Gen Abdourahamane Tchiani declares himself head of state on 28 July 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">ORTN-Télé Sahel/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>At an emergency meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, on 30 July, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/pro-coup-protests-niger-west-african-leaders-meet-2023-07-30/">demanded</a> the “immediate release and reinstatement” of Niger’s elected president, Mohamed Bazoum. He had been held by the military since 19 July.</p>
<p>The regional bloc gave the military in Niger a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/30/west-african-govts-give-niger-coup-leaders-a-week-to-cede-power">one-week ultimatum</a> to comply and warned it would take all measures necessary – including force – to restore constitutional order. </p>
<p>On 28 July, the head of Niger’s presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230726-presidency-sealed-off-in-coup-prone-niger">declared himself</a> head of state after the military seized power. </p>
<p>Beyond warning against any regional and foreign interventions, the military leaders in Niger have given no indications of ways forward. </p>
<p>This coup d’etat will have a significant impact on peace and stability in Niger and the entire Sahel region. </p>
<p>Although Niger has recently enjoyed its longest democratic rule since independence, there has been a constant threat of coups. When Bazoum was elected president in 2021, there was a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-56589168">coup attempt</a> about 48 hours before his inauguration. It failed as presidential guards fought off the coup plotters. </p>
<p>As a political scientist with expertise on international security, conflict analysis and governance in Africa, including knowledge on Niger, I <a href="https://theconversation.com/botched-coup-in-niger-points-to-deep-fissures-in-the-country-158330">explained</a> then, the coup attempt pointed to deep fissures in the country. It suggested that the military had not fully embraced democracy. </p>
<p>The current coup plotters have blamed rising insecurity and a lack of economic growth. They <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/soldiers-nigers-presidential-guard-blockade-presidents-office-security-sources-2023-07-26/">stated</a> that the intervention was necessary to avoid “the gradual and inevitable demise” of the country. I believe, however, there are other issues that precipitated the latest coup d’etat. These are: ethnicity; the presence of foreign forces; and the weakness of regional bodies.</p>
<h2>Factors that led to the coup</h2>
<p>There are no doubts that the rise in insecurity and <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview">declining economic prospects</a> contributed to fragility in the country. </p>
<p>Despite the increase in foreign forces, especially from the <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/02/20/niger-military-base-contractor/">US</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/which-western-countries-have-foreign-forces-niger-2023-07-28/#:%7E:text=FRANCE,in%202021%20and%202022%2C%20respectively.">France</a>, and military bases in Niger, the leadership has been unable to stop insurgent attacks.
There are several insurgent groups, such as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/al-Qaeda">Al-Qaeda</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29052144">Islamic State</a> affiliates, as well as <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html#:%7E:text=Boko%20Haram%2C%20which%20refers%20to,replace%20it%20with%20a%20regime">Boko Haram</a> operating in the country. </p>
<p>These attacks have resulted in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel">thousands of deaths and displacements</a> in the last decade. Hundreds of youths in the capital, Niamey, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/28/power-impasse-continues-in-niger-48-hours-after-coup">gathered to celebrate</a> the July coup, waving Russian flags and chanting “Wagner”. This suggests that some people in Niger believe the military, supported by Russia and the private military contractor, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, would do a better job of fighting insurgents.</p>
<p>In addition to insecurity and economic stagnation, three other issues help explain the recent coup d’etat.</p>
<p>First, the debate over the ethnicity and legitimacy of Bazoum was an issue during the last election campaign. Bazoum is from Niger’s ethnic Arab minority and has always been <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/02/19/who-is-nigerien-presidential-candidate-mohamed-bazoum/">labelled</a> as having foreign origins. </p>
<p>This did not sit well within the military circle, which is predominantly composed of the larger ethnic groups – even though Bazoum got <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/22/nigers-top-court-confirms-mohamed-bazoums-election-win">about 56%</a> of the vote and is from the same party as former president Mahamadou Issoufou. </p>
<p>There is a lot of emphasis on ethnic military composition in the country; understanding this helped Issoufou complete two terms as president. Appointments in the military are made <a href="https://theconversation.com/botched-coup-in-niger-points-to-deep-fissures-in-the-country-158330">along ethnic lines</a>. </p>
<p>Second, the large number of foreign military troops and bases in the country has not been well received by the military. They believe this undermines them. Niger is a key ally of western countries in the fight against insurgency in the region. France’s <a href="https://www.africanleadershipmagazine.co.uk/france-eyes-africas-mining-industry-with-550m-investment/">huge investments</a> in Niger’s mining sector are another reason for its interest in security. </p>
<p>In 2019, the US opened a <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/02/20/niger-military-base-contractor/">drone base</a> in Niger despite protests. As I have <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">pointed out</a> before, the drone base could make Niger a target for terrorists and increase instability.</p>
<p>In 2022, France and other European allies withdrew their forces from neighbouring Mali. Bazoum was quick to invite them to Niger. The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/18/after-mali-exit-niger-accepts-foreign-forces-to-secure-border">Nigerien military leadership</a> and some influential individuals in the country denounced the increase in foreign forces. </p>
<p>Third, I suggest the failure of regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the African Union to take a firm stance against military power seizures in Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali emboldened the Nigerien military. ECOWAS leaders have <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/07/31/ecowas-leaders-give-niger-one-week-ultimatum-to-restore-president/">now threathened to use force</a> to restore Bazoum if the coup plotters do not reinstate him. </p>
<p>In the last four years, there have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">seven coup d’etats</a> in the region. Three were successful. Leaders of ECOWAS and the African Union have threatened sanctions on these three countries, but nothing much has been done to deter other opportunistic military leaders. </p>
<p>In a round table organised by the think tank Chatham House London on the impact of military intervention in west Africa, one of the leaders from the region stated that they kept avenues of communication open with the three military presidents as a courtesy. This creates an impression that there is no deterrence for military takeovers. </p>
<h2>Implications for Niger and the region</h2>
<p>The latest coup d’etat has severe consequences for Niger and the entire Sahel region. Niger is a strong ally of western nations, especially France, the US and the European Union in fighting insurgency and curbing illegal migration to Europe. </p>
<p>Efforts to address these issues will be affected. And the new military leaders will want to use these issues as leverage in negotiations and to force acceptance of the new regime. </p>
<p>The new leaders in Niger might also engage with the Wagner group to combat the Islamist insurgency. The leader of the group has already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exiled-russian-mercenary-boss-prigozhin-hails-niger-coup-touts-services-2023-07-28/">praised</a> them for seizing power. The influence of Russia and Wagner in the region could grow. </p>
<p>Yet Wagner has been unable to halt terrorist advancement in Mali and Burkina Faso.</p>
<p>Finally, a successful military takeover in Niger would be a major drawback for democracy in the region and Africa as a whole. The military regimes of Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso already plan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-guinea-mali-juntas-plan-three-way-partnership-2023-02-10/">to form a “military alliance”</a>, supposedly to combat insecurity. </p>
<p>African leaders need to do more to prove that they are working for the masses.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210721/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethnic politics, the presence of foreign troops and the weaknesses of past responses to coups encouraged Niger’s recent military takeover.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1973962023-01-09T04:17:54Z2023-01-09T04:17:54ZDemocracy under attack in Brazil: 5 questions about the storming of Congress and the role of the military<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503569/original/file-20230109-24-csu9q6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=20%2C251%2C6679%2C4205&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of former President Jair Bolsonaro clash with security forces.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-former-president-jair-bolsonaro-clash-with-news-photo/1246099064?phrase=Brazil&adppopup=true">Joedson Alves/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Thousands of far-right supporters of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro <a href="https://apnews.com/article/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-government-caribbean-0c03c098a5e2a09ac534412c30ae8355">stormed the country’s Congress, Supreme Court and presidential palace</a> on Jan. 8, 2023.</em></p>
<p><em>In images similar to those from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/january-6-us-capitol-attack-128973">Jan. 6, 2021, assault on the U.S. Capitol</a>, demonstrators were seen overwhelming and beating police while breaching the security perimeter of the buildings.</em></p>
<p><em>It comes weeks after <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/10/30/1132561987/brazil-election-lula-da-silva">Bolsonaro was ousted in an election</a> that saw the return of leftist former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The Conversation asked Rafael Ioris, an <a href="https://liberalarts.du.edu/about/people/rafael-r-ioris">expert on Brazilian politics at the University of Denver</a>, to explain the significance of the attack and what could happen next.</em></p>
<h2>Who was behind the storming of the Brazilian Congress?</h2>
<p>What we saw was thousands of hardcore supporters of Bolsonaro – those who share his extreme right-wing agenda – attempting to take matters into their own hands after the recent election. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Scores of protestors in yellow and green stand on a structure with a white dome in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503551/original/file-20230109-17-yxxit5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503551/original/file-20230109-17-yxxit5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503551/original/file-20230109-17-yxxit5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503551/original/file-20230109-17-yxxit5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503551/original/file-20230109-17-yxxit5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503551/original/file-20230109-17-yxxit5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503551/original/file-20230109-17-yxxit5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supporters of Brazilian former President Jair Bolsonaro invade the National Congress in Brasilia on Jan. 8, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-brazilian-former-president-jair-bolsonaro-news-photo/1246096642?phrase=Brazil&adppopup=true">Sergio Lima/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even though Bolsonaro wasn’t there in the capital while the attack took place – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/08/world/americas/bolsonaro-florida-brazil-protests.html">he was in Florida</a> – I believe he is ultimately responsible for what occurred. While he was in power he encouraged distrust in political institutions, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/brazil/2021-11-01/democracy-dying-brazil">advocating the closure of Congress</a> and <a href="https://brazilian.report/liveblog/2022/09/07/bolsonaro-renews-attacks-supreme-court/">attacking the Supreme Court</a> – two of the institutions targeted by demonstrators.</p>
<p>Others were also behind what happened. Protests have been taking place for weeks, and there are big funders of the demonstrations, <a href="https://veja.abril.com.br/coluna/radar/alexandre-de-moraes-ordena-mega-acao-da-pf-contra-bolsonaristas/">such as large landowners and business groups</a> who helped pay for the busing in of thousands of Bolsonaro supporters to the capital, Brasilia.</p>
<p>And then there is the role of the military. Leading military figures have been supportive of Bolsonaro’s extreme right agenda for a long time and even recently have <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/world/americas/2022/11/18/brazil-militarys-tolerance-of-coup-demands-a-worry-for-lula/">displayed outright support for several pro-coup demonstrations unfolding in different parts of the country</a> in the lead-up to the attack. </p>
<p>The lack of security preventing the storming of key institutions in the capital also leads me to ask: Were they negligent, or were they complicit?</p>
<h2>Can you expand on the role of the military?</h2>
<p>Street security is not a responsibility of the armed forces, but the military’s <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/brazil/might-and-right-how-far-will-brazils-military-back-bolsonaro">continued support for Bolsanaro’s agenda</a> has helped provide legitimacy for the holding of such views among <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-governors-express-concern-bolsonaro-support-among-state-police-2021-08-24/">members of the state-run military police</a>. And it was the military police who were tasked with keeping the demonstrations in check in Brasilia.</p>
<p>The pro-Bolsonaro demonstrators are demanding a military intervention to overturn what they claim – with no evidence – to be a fraudulent election that saw Lula come to power.</p>
<p>Their hope is that senior members of the military – many of whom have expressed support for Bolsonaro and sympathy for the protest camps that have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20221226-terrorists-threaten-brazil-s-presidential-inauguration-incoming-justice-minister">been set up near army bases</a> – would support the push to oust Lula.</p>
<p>Brazil has a long history of the armed forces not accepting civilian rule. The <a href="http://nytimes.com/1964/04/05/archives/brazil-coup-affects-whole-continent-overthrow-of-goulart-is.html">last military coup was in 1964</a>. Of course, circumstances are different now from then – when in the heat of the Cold War, the coup was supported by outside governments, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.12518">including the U.S</a>.</p>
<p>Bolsonaro cultivated close ties to the Brazilian military by moving key military people into positions in government. Right-wing generals friendly with Bolsonaro became ministers of defense, chief of state and even the minister of health at the height of the COVID-19 crisis. Moreover, it is <a href="https://latinoamerica21.com/en/the-militarization-of-the-bolsonaro-administration/">estimated about 6,000 active military personnel were given jobs in nonmilitary positions</a> in government in the last eight years.</p>
<p>Some generals in both the Navy and the Air Force especially have <a href="https://brazilian.report/liveblog/2022/11/10/defense-ministry-voter-fraud-election/">been supporting the protests</a>. Since the election, you have had generals proclaim that demonstrations demanding military intervention were legitimate.</p>
<p>I think it is fair to say that segments of Brazil’s military were encouraging what happened. </p>
<p>But when it came down to it, the armed forces were quiet. The military may have nurtured the protest, but when it came to the idea of a traditional coup – tanks on the streets stuff – that just didn’t happen.</p>
<h2>So would you characterize this as an attempted coup?</h2>
<p>That is a central question. As events unfurled on Jan. 8, it looked more like a protest that got violent and out of hand – the level of destruction inside some of the buildings attests to that. </p>
<p>But it was weeks in the making and well financed, in that <a href="https://fortune.com/2023/01/08/brazil-bolsonaro-supporters-invade-congress-echo-pro-trump-jan-6-riot/">hundreds of buses were paid for</a> to get Bolsonaro supporters to the capital. And the expressed aim of many protesters was military intervention. So in that sense, I would say it more akin to an attempted coup.</p>
<h2>What does the attack tell us about democracy in Brazil?</h2>
<p>Brazil has been at a crossroads. The Bolsonaro presidency saw the country backslide on democracy, as trust in institutions eroded under attack from the president himself and through corruptions scandals. And <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2022-brazil-election/">close to half of the country voted for him</a> despite his record of undermining democracy. But the election of Lula seems to indicate that even more want to rebuild democratic institutions in the country after four years of attack from Bolsonaro.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A protestor in a yellow top is surrounded by a cloud of smoke." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503546/original/file-20230109-13-b6x4xo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=27%2C46%2C6111%2C4040&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503546/original/file-20230109-13-b6x4xo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503546/original/file-20230109-13-b6x4xo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503546/original/file-20230109-13-b6x4xo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503546/original/file-20230109-13-b6x4xo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503546/original/file-20230109-13-b6x4xo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503546/original/file-20230109-13-b6x4xo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Democracy under attack in Brazil.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-former-president-jair-bolsonaro-clash-with-news-photo/1246099103?phrase=Brazil&adppopup=true">Joedson Alves/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So this could be a turning point. The media in Brazil has come out strongly in denouncing the actions of demonstrators. In the coming days and weeks, there will be investigations into what happened, and hopefully some degree of accountability. What will be key is Lula’s ability to address the anti-democractic elements of the military.</p>
<h2>Are comparisons to the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol valid?</h2>
<p>Trumpism and Bolsonarismo <a href="https://www.pacificcouncil.org/newsroom/similarities-and-differences-between-trump-and-bolsonaro">share a narrative</a> of stolen elections, with supporters drawn from the right who support issues such as gun rights and traditional family structures.</p>
<p>An important difference is the role of the military. Although former <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/capitol-riot-january-6-military-ties/">military personnel were at the Jan. 6 attack in D.C.</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-capitol-military/in-rare-joint-message-top-u-s-military-leaders-condemn-capitol-riot-idUSKBN29H2WF">top U.S. military figures condemned it</a>. Nor was the aim in the U.S. to see military intervention, unlike the Jan. 8, 2023, attack in Brasilia.</p>
<p>But there are clear parallels – in both we saw extreme right-wing, powerful groups and individuals refusing to accept the direction of a country and trying to storm institutions of power.</p>
<p>Now I’m wondering if there will also be parallels in what happens after the attack. </p>
<p>In the U.S., authorities have done a good job punishing a lot of people involved. I’m not sure we will see the same in Brazil, as they might need to confront powerful groups within the military and police forces around the country. So, democratic actors within and outside of the county will be essential in supporting the task of defending democracy in Brazil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197396/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rafael R. Ioris does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The sacking of key democratic institutions in Brasilia has parallels with the Jan. 6 assault on the US Capitol but was different in one key way: the position of the military.Rafael R. Ioris, Professor of Modern Latin America History, University of DenverLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956642022-12-22T06:14:50Z2022-12-22T06:14:50ZWest Africa has experienced a wave of coups - superficial democracy is to blame<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501303/original/file-20221215-19-ea9qw6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A small group of protesters holds Russia and Burkina flags as they protest against the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>West Africa has seen <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">coups</a> and military takeovers in three countries in 2022. Like those of the past, they came with promises of a quick return to civilian regimes once socio-economic and political challenges had been met. The challenges are usually listed as inept governance, corruption, rising insecurity and popular revolts amid economic hardship.</p>
<p>One <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49348-6_1">view</a> of governance on the African continent is that liberal democracy has spread since the 2000s, bringing an end to dictatorships. Most African countries, it’s argued, have multiparty democracies with elected governments.</p>
<p>My own <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49348-6_2">view</a> is that a mere introduction of electoral democracy is not sufficient. A strong democracy needs strong institutions to build resilience against fragility. Poverty and insecurity are an indication of fragility. They show that institutions are not efficiently distributing wealth. Civil rule is under threat as long as institutions remain fragile.</p>
<p>In my opinion, based on <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49348-6_2">my research</a>, is that the failure of civilian governments to improve living conditions, provide leadership and protect citizens is a major threat to democracy in the west African sub-region.</p>
<h2>The military never left</h2>
<p>The military continues to wield huge influence in governance in the region. Citizens don’t seem willing or able to challenge this.<br>
In Nigeria, for example, since the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/abacha-abiola-and-nigerias-1999-transition-civilian-rule">return to civil rule in 1999</a>, former military generals have largely led the country. By the end of the current regime in May 2023, former military rulers will have been civilian presidents too for 16 out of 24 years of civil rule. </p>
<p>Similarly, in Sierra Leone, former military head of state <a href="https://embassyofsierraleone.net/about-embassy/brig-rtd-julius-maada-wonie-bio-president-republic-sierra-leone">Brigadier Maada Bio</a> returned as elected civilian president in 2018.</p>
<p>Election periods in these countries see frequent trips by candidates to the homes of previous military or autocratic leaders, seeking their endorsement. </p>
<p>An example is the move by the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Adama-Barrow">Gambian president Adama Barrow</a> to form an alliance with the hitherto sit-tight dictator <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58924630">Yahya Jammeh</a>. Jammeh ruled the country for 22 years, starting with a 1994 coup, and sustained himself in office through incessant <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/24/gambia-commission-uncovered-ex-presidents-alleged-crimes">human rights violations</a>. </p>
<p>Barrow gave Jammeh a soft landing before going on to renege on his agreement to resign and transfer power. He is now relying on support from the old order to stay in power, knowing that his popularity with the people has diminished. </p>
<h2>A toothless regional bloc</h2>
<p>The return of civil rule to Nigeria in 1999 ushered in a sense that military coups and autocratic regimes in the region would end. </p>
<p>The presidency of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Olusegun-Obasanjo">Olusegun Obasanjo</a> and the <a href="https://ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (ECOWAS) were diplomatically active against military coups. But more recently it appears that the regional bloc is <a href="https://dailytrust.com/of-coup-detat-and-political-fragility-in-west-africa/">relatively weak and individual countries are challenged by economic, social, political and security issues</a>. </p>
<p>Citizens are dissatisfied with multilateral institutions – such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2018.1417899?journalCode=rsaj20">ECOWAS</a> and the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a>. These bodies may be quick to condemn military takeovers, but they are slow to express concern about poor governance, such as altering of constitutions for regime survival. </p>
<p>Governments have failed to deliver on the promises that got them elected. This failure has led to growing dissatisfaction and a quest for alternatives. In some cases, citizens welcome the military, as witnessed in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-crowd-celebrates-west-africas-latest-coup-2022-01-25/">Burkina Faso</a>.</p>
<p>Common to most of the military takeovers in the sub-region is the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/07/contagious-coups-what-is-fuelling-military-takeovers-across-west-africa">failure of the civilian regimes to deliver</a>. Rising insecurity and worsening living conditions remain the fate of the people. These factors have acted as incubators for the return of the military. </p>
<p>In the last 24 months, governments in <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/08/five-things-know-about-malis-coup">Mali</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58461971">Guinea</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/5/coup-in-burkina-faso-what-you-need-to-know">Burkina Faso</a> were toppled in quick succession. </p>
<p>In Mali, outrage over the erstwhile <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60015898">president Ibrahim Keita’s</a> ineffective leadership in the face of rising insecurity and corruption led to his ousting. </p>
<p>In Guinea, the attempt to stay in power by altering the constitution, even in the face of rising inequality, corruption, gross under-performance and human rights violations, led to the ousting of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alpha-Conde">President Alpha Conde</a>. </p>
<p>In Burkina Faso, civilian <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Roch-Marc-Christian-Kabore">president Roch Marc Christian Kabore</a> was removed because of rising internal displacement, widespread poverty, inequality and insecurity. Security forces were also <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60112043">discontented</a> over his failure to adequately support them against militants linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.</p>
<h2>Democracy is not necessarily good governance</h2>
<p>Although the region has made some headway with efforts to propagate democracy, it remains superficial. Its dividends, in the form of good governance, remain elusive. </p>
<p>Periodic elections are held, which legitimises civilians in power. But the critical fundamentals that foster democracy are missing: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>informed and active participation</p></li>
<li><p>separation of powers</p></li>
<li><p>respect for the rule of law</p></li>
<li><p>fundamental human rights</p></li>
<li><p>accountability. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>As insecurity rises and living conditions worsen, will the region experience more military takeovers? </p>
<p>Democracy appears to have come to stay in parts of the region, such as Nigeria, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. Others still have work to do in getting the military back to the barracks permanently. </p>
<p>Even governments in the rather more stable nations cannot afford to be complacent. They will have to intensify efforts to deliver the dividends of democracy, if they are to avoid civil unrest or military incursion. </p>
<h2>What will shape the future of democracy in the region</h2>
<p>Nigeria still exhibits fault lines of religion and ethnicity, as well as abuse of privilege by the elites over the rest of the citizens. </p>
<p>Failure to protect the lives, property and rights of citizens fuelled the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2021/02/nigeria-end-impunity-for-police-violence-by-sars-endsars/">“EndSARS” protest</a>, which is fast crystallising into a social movement with potential to make a strong political statement in the <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/514001-updated-inec-changes-dates-for-2023-general-elections.html">February 2023</a> elections. </p>
<p>In Ghana, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/police-disperse-protest-over-economic-hardship-ghana-2022-06-28/">local lobby groups have staged street protests</a> amid growing anxiety over <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/business-news/560180-ghanaian-cedi-world-worst-performing-currency-as-naira-also-struggles.html">economic conditions</a> in the country and rising allegations of corruption and government lethargy.</p>
<p>The future of democracy in the region will depend on the level of development in democratic institutions, level of military sophistication and professionalism, level of literacy, and presence of a broad based elite class that is not self-serving. </p>
<p>Elected civilians need to respect their social contracts with citizens. Citizens need to feel better off with civilians in power. </p>
<p>Nepotism, graft, outright theft of public funds and constitutional manipulations create grounds for military coups.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195664/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Temitope J. Laniran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although West Africa has made some headway with efforts to propagate democracy, its dividends, in the form of good governance, remain elusive.Temitope J. Laniran, Research Associate, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1867892022-08-16T16:13:53Z2022-08-16T16:13:53ZOperation Condor: why victims of the oppression that swept 1970s South America are still fighting for justice<p>Between 1976 and 1978, an extrajudicial <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/audio/2020/sep/18/operation-condor-the-cold-war-conspiracy-that-terrorised-south-america-podcast">campaign</a> of violent repression was waged by South American dictatorships against <a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/product/978-1-4438-9709-9">political dissidents and exiles</a> who spoke out against domestic repression and military rule. </p>
<p>Operation Condor, as this campaign was known, has since inspired multiple <a href="https://www.penguinlibros.com/es/literatura-contemporanea/281637-libro-las-cenizas-del-condor-9788420461618">novels</a>, plays and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569325.2020.1801398">exhibitions</a>, not to mention a forthcoming <a href="https://www.mexicanist.com/l/the-ashes-of-the-condor/">HBO series</a>. The latter, based on The Ashes of the Condor, the 2014 novel by Uruguayan writer Fernando Butazzoni, tells the story of a young man whose parents fled Uruguay during the military dictatorship. </p>
<p>In 1992, a cache of about 700,000 documents were discovered in a police station in Asunción, Paraguay. Dubbed the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20774985">Archives of Terror</a>, these papers comprehensively recorded the activities of the Paraguayan secret police throughout the dictatorship of General Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989). Ever since, <a href="https://discovered.ed.ac.uk/discovery/fulldisplay?vid=44UOE_INST:44UOE_VU2&tab=Everything&docid=alma9910784973502466&context=L&search_scope=UoE&lang=en">scholars</a> and <a href="https://thenewpress.com/books/condor-years">journalists</a>, in Chile, <a href="https://theconversation.com/truth-justice-and-declassification-secret-archives-show-us-helped-argentine-military-wage-dirty-war-that-killed-30-000-115611">Argentina</a> and <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780742536876/Predatory-States-Operation-Condor-and-Covert-War-in-Latin-America">the US</a> have investigated this <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3185071">transnational terror network</a>. </p>
<p>Between 2017 and 2020, I compiled the first <a href="https://sites.google.com/view/operationcondorjustice/database?authuser=0">database</a> on human rights violations in South America. I recorded at least 805 victims of abductions, torture, sexual violence, baby theft as well as extrajudicial executions and disappearances, taking place between 1969 and 1981. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Judges with official ribbons stand behind a wooden desk in a panelled court room." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475199/original/file-20220720-26-758013.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475199/original/file-20220720-26-758013.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475199/original/file-20220720-26-758013.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475199/original/file-20220720-26-758013.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475199/original/file-20220720-26-758013.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475199/original/file-20220720-26-758013.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475199/original/file-20220720-26-758013.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A largely female cohort of judges presides over the 2019 Appeals verdict in the Condor trial in Rome.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Janaina Cesar</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How Operation Condor came about</h2>
<p>As I explain in my new book, <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/page/detail/?k=9780300254099">The Condor Trials</a>, a <a href="https://ladiaria.com.uy/justicia/articulo/2022/7/comenzaron-las-audiencias-por-el-segundo-juicio-contra-troccoli-en-italia/">new case</a> which has been brought against Italo-Uruguayan navy officer Jorge N Troccoli, constitutes the 48th criminal investigation into these years of terror, since the 1970s. The first hearing was held in Rome on July 14, 2022. Troccoli stands accused of the 1970s murders of two Italo-Argentinians and one Uruguayan national. </p>
<p>My research has shown that the <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300254099/the-condor-trials/">majority of Condor victims</a> (48%) were Uruguayan nationals. Argentina was the key theatre of operations with 69% of all victims being targeted there. Furthermore, the primary targets were political activists (40%), followed by members of guerrilla groups (36%).</p>
<p>Research normally places Condor’s beginnings in 1974-1975. My research, however, has shown that from as early as 1969, <a href="http://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/images/documentos/Capitulo6/Capitulo%206.pdf">Brazilian refugees</a> in Uruguay, Argentina and Chile were targeted and, in many cases, killed. </p>
<p>Within the geopolitical context of the cold war, the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414088021003004">national security doctrine</a> was formulated in the <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116191.pdf">United States</a>, founded on the idea that achieving national security trumped all other governmental concerns. Military leaderships in South America took inspiration from this doctrine to wrest control of their own civil governments.</p>
<p>The 1954 coup d'état in <a href="https://theconversation.com/paraguays-new-president-recalls-an-old-dictatorship-95993">Paraguay</a>, which saw President Federico Chávez’s government overthrown by the army, was the first. Putsches followed in <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-dilma-rousseff-stumbles-how-will-brazils-military-react-51088">Brazil</a> (1964), <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-zimbabwe-to-bolivia-what-makes-a-military-coup-127138">Bolivia</a> (1971), Uruguay, <a href="https://theconversation.com/general-pinochet-arrest-20-years-on-heres-how-it-changed-global-justice-104806">Chile</a> (1973) and Argentina (1976). </p>
<p>The military dictatorships thus installed <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781137527349">brutally repressed</a> all forms of political opposition. Thousands of illegal arrests were made. Torture and sexual violence was prevalent. Disappearances, baby thefts and extrajudicial executions were committed. The violence saw citizens throughout South America flee their home countries. </p>
<p>Brazilians sought safe haven in Uruguay and Chile from 1968, when domestic repression in Brazil intensified. They were the first to be targeted. </p>
<p>By early 1974, thousands of Brazilians, Bolivians, Chileans, Paraguayans, and Uruguayans were living in Argentina. Active in denouncing the <a href="https://sitiosdememoria.uy/sites/default/files/2021-07/libro_tribunal_russel.pdf">crimes against humanity</a> being committed across the region, they came under increasing fire from their <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/745598">respective dictatorships</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A wall of black and white headshots in a gallery setting." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475446/original/file-20220721-10497-ly2qo4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475446/original/file-20220721-10497-ly2qo4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475446/original/file-20220721-10497-ly2qo4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475446/original/file-20220721-10497-ly2qo4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475446/original/file-20220721-10497-ly2qo4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475446/original/file-20220721-10497-ly2qo4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475446/original/file-20220721-10497-ly2qo4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 2010 exhibition on the people who were disappeared following the 1973 putsch in Chile.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Desaparecidos_Chile_1973.JPG">Marjorie Apel | Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On November 25, 1975, representatives of the security forces of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay were invited by the head of Chile’s secret police to a <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB239d/PDF/19751000%20%5binvitacion%5d.pdf">working meeting of national intelligence</a> in Santiago, Chile. Operation Condor was born. </p>
<p>The Condor system was composed of four elements. First, the secret <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/19870-national-security-archive-doc-4-dia-intelligence">Condortel</a> communications system allowed members to share intelligence. Second, <a href="https://www.penguinlibros.com/es/literatura-contemporanea/255015-ebook-los-anos-del-condor-9789566042501">Condoreje</a>, a forward command office, located in Buenos Aires, oversaw operations on the ground in Argentina in particular. Third, a databank in Santiago, Chile, centralised shared intelligence information. And four, the secret <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/18424-national-security-archive-doc-08-cia-report">Teseo</a> unit was tasked with carrying out attacks against leftist targets in Europe.</p>
<h2>How women have fought for justice</h2>
<p>A group of justice seekers – survivors, victims’ relatives, activists, legal professionals and journalists – have <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Left-in-Transformation-Uruguayan-Exiles-and-the-Latin-American-Human-Rights/Markarian/p/book/9780415541626">long been dedicated</a> to bringing these human rights violations to light. Many of these campaigners are women: the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3694051#metadata_info_tab_contents">mothers</a>, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/tla.12213">grandmothers</a>, wives, sisters and daughters whose lives have been directly impacted by Condor. As Argentinian prosecutors told me, <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/page/detail/the-condor-trials/?k=9780300254099">these justice seekers</a> “absolutely galvanised all investigations that occurred: without them, nothing would have happened”. </p>
<p>American journalist Jack Anderson first used the term “Condor” in <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/272795380/Anderson-Condor-South-American-Assassins">August 1979</a>, in an article in the Washington Post. However, as early as 1976, Uruguayan journalist <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03064227708532672">Enrique Rodriguez Larreta</a> and former trade union activist <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/amr130831977eng.pdf">Washington Perez</a> testified to Amnesty International and the <a href="http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/79.80eng/Argentina2155.htm">Inter-American Commission on Human Rights</a> about the ordeals suffered in Buenos Aires and Montevideo.</p>
<p>The Argentine general election of 1983 hailed the gradual return of democracy and constitutional rule to South America. Brazil and Uruguay followed suit in 1985, then Paraguay in 1989, and Chile in 1990. </p>
<p>In countries including <a href="https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=6849">Chile</a> and <a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l6683.htm">Brazil</a>, the outgoing regime sought to guarantee its own impunity with new amnesty laws. In others, including <a href="http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/20000-24999/21864/norma.htm">Argentina</a> and <a href="https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/15848-1986">Uruguay</a>, newly democratic parliaments aimed to prevent the return of military rule with similar laws. As a result, all criminal investigations into past atrocities were shelved. </p>
<p>Despite these setbacks, since the late 1970s, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-latin-american-studies/article/abs/operation-condor-on-trial-justice-for-transnational-human-rights-crimes-in-south-america/C2A765BAB0E45A1260053E1E8DC0AE82">multiple</a> criminal investigations into <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/latin-american-research-review/article/remnants-of-truth-the-role-of-archives-in-human-rights-trials-for-operation-condor/2AF7021DD3F8050CB4FBED77487DFEBF">Condor atrocities</a> have gone ahead. Thirty of these cases have gone to <a href="https://global.ilmanifesto.it/in-a-historic-sentence-italian-court-orders-life-sentences-for-operation-condor-torturers/">sentencing</a>, four trials are currently ongoing, three have been shelved and 11 are in pre-trial. </p>
<p>To date, 112 South American military and civilian officials, including former dictators and government ministers, have been brought to justice. This most likely only represents a fraction of those guilty. While there is no official estimate of the total number of perpetrators, it is likely to be in the thousands. </p>
<p>This process is important for the victims, their families and the wider societies that suffered in the past. It is also crucial in preventing such atrocities from being perpetrated in the future. </p>
<p>Moreover, <a href="https://theconversation.com/khashoggi-murder-how-states-are-increasingly-repressing-dissidents-beyond-their-borders-106124">transnational repression</a> of <a href="https://theconversation.com/has-uzbekistans-repressive-government-helped-radicalise-its-emigrants-and-exiles-86887">exiles and dissidents</a> remains a pressing issue the world over. According to the US thinktank Freedom House, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/Complete_TransnationalRepressionReport2022_NEW_0.pdf">85 such incidents</a> occurred in 2021 alone. Justice for Operation Condor stands, therefore, as a clarion warning to authoritarian states today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186789/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francesca Lessa’s project on Operation Condor received funding from the University of Oxford John Fell Fund, The British Academy/Leverhulme Trust, the University of Oxford ESRC Impact Acceleration Account, the European Commission under Horizon 2020, and the Open Society Foundations. She has advised lawyers, activists, and prosecutors involved in the Condor Trial in Italy. She is the Honorary President of the Observatorio Luz Ibarburu, a network of human rights NGOs in Uruguay. </span></em></p>Instigated by multiple governments in South America, Operation Condor resulted in hundreds, potentially thousands, of human rights violations and extrajudicial killings.Francesca Lessa, Lecturer in Latin American Studies and Development, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1876712022-07-26T20:53:43Z2022-07-26T20:53:43ZTop democracy activists were executed in Myanmar – 4 key things to know<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476125/original/file-20220726-21-93tuny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Activists including Myanmar citizens protest in Tokyo on July 26, 2022, against Myanmar's recent execution of four prisoners </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/activists-including-myanmar-nationals-take-part-in-a-rally-to-protest-picture-id1242118205?s=2048x2048">Philip Fong/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The current conflict in Myanmar raised new <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-all-options-on-table-to-punish-myanmar-junta-over-executions-/6673458.html">international concern</a> when the country’s military <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/25/world/asia/myanmar-executions.html">announced on</a> July 25, 2022, that it had executed four pro-democracy activists and political prisoners. </p>
<p>The high-profile killings were the latest signal that the civil conflict in the Southeast Asian country is deepening, almost 18 months after the military <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/myanmar-news-protests-coup.html">staged a coup</a> and overtook the democratically elected government in February 2021.</p>
<p>The military killed two leading political leaders who opposed the junta – Kyaw Min Yu, a writer and activist known as Jimmy, and Phyo Zeya Thaw, a hip-hop musician turned lawmaker under the old political regime – citing counterterrorism charges. </p>
<p>Two other people – Hla Myo Aung and Aung Thura Zaw – <a href="https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-terrorism-democracy-aung-san-suu-kyi-government-and-politics-ca87f032cb6c7407b1d776574f15c5a8">were executed after they were convicted of</a> killing a woman who they reportedly thought was a military informer. </p>
<p>The executions follow a recent report from human rights group Amnesty International that the military is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/20/amnesty-accuses-myanmar-of-war-crimes-over-landmines">laying land mines</a> in residential areas to hurt and kill civilians. </p>
<p>I am a scholar of Myanmar <a href="https://www.niu.edu/clas/world-languages/about/directory/than.shtml">politics and culture</a>. Here are four key points to help untangle the country’s complicated conflict and the meaning behind the executions. </p>
<h2>The military government is sending a message</h2>
<p>The political executions of these activists were the first <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/25/myanmar-junta-executes-democracy-activists-state-media">in many decades</a> for Myanmar, which has vacillated from military control to emerging democratic leadership over the past few decades. The military wants to send a message to other citizens – and to the world – that it is in charge. </p>
<p>But behind a thin veneer of control, the military’s fears of public opposition and uprisings can be detected by people in Myanmar and outside observers alike.</p>
<p>Soldiers overthrew Aung San Suu Kyi, the former leader and foreign minister of Myanmar, in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/06/aung-san-suu-kyi-sentenced-to-four-years-in-prison-for-incitement">early 2021</a> and first placed her under house arrest. </p>
<p>The coup <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-s-spring-revolution">sparked a wave of protests</a> across the country – over 4,700 anti-coup events were reported by the end of June 2021. The military responded with conducting mass arrests and killing civilians. </p>
<p>The military then sent Aung San Suu Kyi to prison on multiple corruption charges <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61239881">in April 2022</a> that the nonprofit Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/27/world/asia/myanmar-coup-trial-aung-san-suu-kyi.html">has called “bogus</a>.”</p>
<p>Executing four revolutionary leaders will likely escalate nationwide resistance to the military.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Protesters in Bangkok hold photos of Aung San Suu Kyi as they march through the streets, with umbrellas and flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters in Bangkok hold photos of Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s detained former leader, on July 26, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/protesters-shout-slogans-and-hold-photos-of-detained-myanmar-civilian-picture-id1242117862?s=2048x2048">Manan Vatsyayana/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The conflict’s complicated back story</h2>
<p>When the military staged the 2021 coup, the generals made a miscalculation. </p>
<p>Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party, the National League for Democracy, had won a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54899170">landslide victory</a> against the military-backed opposition in November 2020. Military generals demanded another election, offering little evidence of irregularities, but recognizing that power was slipping from their hands. </p>
<p>Military representatives still held an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-35457290">allocated 25% of parliament seats</a> because of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/10/myanmar-democracys-dead-end">the constitution</a>, but without their allied political parties, their political leverage was limited. </p>
<p>At the time, there was a global pandemic. The <a href="https://www.adb.org/countries/myanmar/economy">economy slowed down</a>. </p>
<p>The generals likely hoped that the coup would be merely a smooth transition back to the old system – before Aung San Suu Kyi’s party was first elected in 2015 – when the different generations of generals had controlled everything, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya">from 1962</a> onward.</p>
<p>But the National League for Democracy’s ascension to power brought about many positive changes, particularly in the country’s heartland, where a <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2021/the-importance-of-ethnic-minorities-to-myanmars-future/">major ethnic group, Bamar</a>, lives. The country’s <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/myanmar/gdp">gross domestic product, an indicator of economic growth</a>, was also at an all-time high in 2020. </p>
<p>Many could see life was improving for them and for their children. The generals did not foresee the outrage that would follow the coup.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An assault weapon and the uniformed legs of a soldier are visible in the back of a truck as seen through the window of a bus on a busy city street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women look out the window of a bus at armed soldiers patrolling a street in Yangon, Myanmar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/two-women-look-out-the-window-of-a-bus-as-armed-soldiers-patrol-a-picture-id1242116402?s=2048x2048">STR/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How political resistance has played out</h2>
<p>Early days of peaceful demonstrations after the coup quickly turned to armed resistance when the army did not respect the people’s demands to return power to the government they elected.</p>
<p>U.N. human rights experts <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/06/1120292">have said</a> the military junta is a “criminal enterprise” that is systematically committing murder, torture and forced disappearances. The junta <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/06/myanmar-un-experts-condemn-militarys-digital-dictatorship">has also blocked access</a> to many social media sites, like Facebook, and engaged in <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/06/1120292">widespread human rights violations</a>, including attacks on civilians, according to the U.N.</p>
<p>Many young people joined ethnic revolutionary groups, many of which had been fighting <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-brutal-military-was-once-a-force-for-freedom-but-its-been-waging-civil-war-for-decades-158270">the army since 1948</a>, when Myanmar – then known as Burma – <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Myanmar/The-initial-impact-of-colonialism">became independent</a> from British rule.</p>
<p>Ethnic armies supported the young people who decided to join the resistance, and housed, fed and trained them. </p>
<p>Some Myanmar citizens, meanwhile, have donated their incomes, houses and cars to help support revolutionary groups. It’s become popular for people to visit websites and play <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/video-game-allowing-players-to-shoot-junta-soldiers-online-funds-resistance-efforts-in-myanmar/ar-AAZP7MQ">online games</a> created by Myanmar tech developers – generating money that goes to these groups. </p>
<p>This bypasses the military’s crackdown on mobile <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b167-cost-coup-myanmar-edges-toward-state-collapse">money transfers</a> to members of the armed groups, and the <a href="https://restofworld.org/2021/myanmars-military-coup-has-pushed-its-fledgling-digital-economy-to-the-brink-of-collapse/">closure of many banks</a>. </p>
<p>The military is also <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/myanmars-military-losing-ground-rebels-and-ethnic-armies-part-1">losing some territorial control</a>, as more and more regions slowly form their own <a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/topics/5052">administrations</a>, which the military does not recognize.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A cat walks in front of a row of men holding guns. Only their bodies are shown." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A cat walks in front of members of the People’s Defense Force – a armed group in Myanmar that opposes the military government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/cat-walks-in-front-of-the-peoples-defence-force-members-lining-up-picture-id1241835141?s=2048x2048">David Mmr/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Other countries are mostly staying out of it</h2>
<p>The United States and other major powers have largely been absent as Myanmar has experienced a coup and subsequent political and economic crisis. </p>
<p>While the Myanmar army <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/27/holdstronger-togethermyanmarrussiaparademilitary-relationship">continues to get support and military supplies from Russia</a>, other countries have taken a wait-and-see approach. </p>
<p>One reason is that Myanmar’s situation is internal, and its military is not fighting other countries. Now, hundreds of internal groups in Myanmar are fighting over their vested interests, including territory. </p>
<p>I believe no clear winner will walk away from this civil war – and staging little to no interference has been the <a href="https://hir.harvard.edu/why-has-the-world-forgotten-about-myanmar/">international community’s general position</a>. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-61243316">People of Myanmar</a> have interpreted this stance as willful ignorance to their plight. </p>
<p>There are, however, some symbolic victories for the opposition by way of international engagement. </p>
<p>Ousted political leaders from the National League for Democracy and others against the junta formed a new shadow government, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/myanmars-national-unity-government-and-its-prospects-military-victory">the National Unity Government</a>, in May 2021. Most of their top members operate “undercover or through members based abroad,” <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/07/asia/myanmar-nug-peoples-war-intl-hnk/index.html">according to CNN</a>.</p>
<p>The U.N. has not formally recognized the National Unity Government but has allowed representatives to speak at the U.N. on behalf of Myanmar.</p>
<p>The U.S. has hosted National Unity Government <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-deputy-secretarys-meeting-with-nug-representatives/">delegations</a> <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/10/myanmars-unity-government-meets-nsa-sullivan-gains-further-traction">several times</a> – but <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-usa-fed-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-blocked-myanmar-junta-attempt-to-empty-1-billion-new-york-fed-account-sources-idUSKCN2AW2MD">it has yet to unfreeze</a> the US$1 billion the previous Myanmar government held at a U.S. Federal Reserve bank. </p>
<p>Both the National Unity Government and <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/US-hits-Myanmar-junta-with-1bn-asset-freeze-and-other-sanctions">the military</a> claim rights to this money. </p>
<h2>An uncertain future</h2>
<p>The coup triggered <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/myanmar-on-brink-of-economic-collapse-one-year-after-military-coup/a-60621514">an economic collapse</a>, plunging Myanmar’s currency to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/myanmars-currency-falls-to-all-time-low-amid-post-coup-turmoil/">an all-time low</a>. </p>
<p>Many Myanmar citizens <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56356213">feel trapped</a> in the entrenched war. </p>
<p>The country is fast-forwarding into the past, when it was <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/04/a-rare-glimpse-into-burma/390567/">deeply isolated</a> from the world. And there is no clear end in sight to the conflict. </p>
<p>The military hosted <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-04-23/myanmar-s-ruling-military-offers-minorities-new-peace-talks/101010628">peace talks </a> in April and May, but fewer than half of the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/myanmar-leader-begins-peace-talks-ethnic-militia-groups-84861289">country’s major 21 ethnic armed groups</a> attended. </p>
<p>Many of these groups together with the newly formed armed People’s Defense Forces, part of the National Unity Government, have vowed to fight on, especially after the executions. Because of their determination, many people in the country feel that the future is uncertain – but not hopeless.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187671/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tharaphi Than does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Myanmar’s military junta is losing some control over the country, but its execution of four high-profile leaders and prisoners sends a warning to Myanmar citizens and the rest of the world.Tharaphi Than, Associate Professor, Department of World Cultures and Languages, Northern Illinois UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1772802022-02-17T12:59:50Z2022-02-17T12:59:50ZSahel security: what a wave of military coups means for the fight against jihadi groups in West Africa – podcast<p>Mali. Guinea. Burkina Faso. Military juntas in West Africa have seized power in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-is-beset-with-coups-and-conflicts-how-the-trend-can-be-reversed-177252">series of coups in recent months</a>. In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a>, we ask security experts what the coups mean for the war against jihadi insurgents in the Sahel – and for the presence of French and European soldiers in the region. </p>
<p>And, we talk to a psychologist who’s been trying to find ways to alleviate the discrimination faced by people who speak English with a foreign accent. </p>
<iframe src="https://embed.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/620e36777b2790001219df97" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="190px"></iframe>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-561" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/561/4fbbd099d631750693d02bac632430b71b37cd5f/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The French military intervention in Mali began in 2013 when the government requested help to fight an Islamist insurgency that threatened the capital Bamako. French troops have been in Mali ever since as part of Operation Barkhane, a regional mission to fight jihadist groups across the Sahel. </p>
<p>But two military coups in Mali, in August 2020 and then May 2021, severely strained the relationship between Mali and France. Mali <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/5/thousands-in-mali-celebrate-expulsion-of-french-ambassador">expelled the French ambassador</a> in early February 2022 and a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220208-mali-pm-accuses-france-of-seeking-country-s-partition">war of words ensued</a>. On February 17, France <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20220217-live-macron-holds-conference-on-sahel-engagement-as-france-poised-to-withdraw-troops-from-mali">announced it would withdraw its troops</a> from Mali, although it plans to continue fighting the insurgency from neighbouring countries. The European Union’s special forces Takuba taskforce in the region also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/17/france-allies-announce-military-withdrawal-from-mali">announced its withdrawal</a> from Mali. </p>
<p>France and the EU have limited options for regional military partners in the Sahel. In September 2021, Guinea’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/guinea-has-a-long-history-of-coups-here-are-5-things-to-know-about-the-country-167618">President Alpha Condé</a> was also deposed in a military coup, and then in January 2022, <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-coup-latest-sign-of-a-rise-in-the-ballot-box-being-traded-for-bullets-175642">Burkina Faso’s President Roch Kaboré</a> was overthrown by a military junta. People took to the streets to celebrate the military takeovers in both Guinea and Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>“Those coups are very problematic,” says Thierry Vircoulon, a researcher at the University of Paris in France and an associate research fellow at the French Institute of International Affairs think tank. Vircoulon predicts the departure of French troops will lead to “a deterioration of the security situation,” both in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel. Attacks have already spread into neighbouring countries, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220211-death-toll-in-benin-national-park-attacks-rises-as-france-opens-terror-probe">such as Benin</a>. </p>
<p>“The conflict is expanding and it’s also becoming more and more complicated with more and more entrepreneurs of violence with very different backgrounds,” says Vircoulon. “It’s not only a counter terrorism war, it’s also a civil war, a conflict for resources, and a war between trafficking networks.”</p>
<p>Mady Ibrahim Kanté is a lecturer at the University of Legal and Political Sciences of Bamako in Mali. He says he’s heard frustration at the French presence in Mali first hand from local people during a number of research visits to the north of the country. “They haven’t been able to protect the population,” says Kanté. “A number of villages have been completely destroyed by the terrorists that were not very far from military bases, whether that’s a French military base from Operation Barkhane, or one from the G5 Sahel force (a regional military coalition between Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad).” </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mig2022-01-surge-militant-islamist-violence-sahel-dominates-africa-fight-extremists/">Africa Center for Strategic Studies</a>, the number of attacks increased 70% between 2020 and 2021. An estimated 2.4 million people have been displaced during the years of conflict. </p>
<p>Folahanmi Aina, a PhD candidate in leadership studies at King’s College London in the UK, says the jihadist insurgencies in the region “revealed the fragility of these states” and their “inability to provide protection and security for their citizens.” Aina says the military has capitalised on this vacuum. “As long as jihadism remains prevalent across the region, there’s every tendency for the military to use this as a justification for acquiring and seizing political power under the guise of being guardians of the state,” he warns. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/mapping-the-contours-of-jihadist-groups-in-the-sahel-168539">Mapping the contours of Jihadist groups in the Sahel</a>
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<p>In our second story in this episode, we hear about new research searching for ways to alleviate discrimination faced by people who speak English with a foreign accent. Studies show native English speakers <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08853134.1991.10753857">rate salespeople</a> as less knowledgeable and convincing if they have an accent, and employers <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2012-10713-003">can overlook</a> people with accents during hiring or promotion decisions. Shiri Lev-Ari, a lecturer in psychology at Royal Holloway University of London in the UK, and her colleagues ran experiments to <a href="http://pc.rhul.ac.uk/sites/SNL/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Budoch-Grabka-Lev-Ari-2021-Exposing-individuals-to-foreign-accent-increases-their-trust-in-what-nonnative-speakers-say.pdf">reduce the bias against non-native speakers</a>. She tells us what they found. Listen from 31m40s.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-why-people-might-discriminate-against-foreign-accents-new-research-172539">Here’s why people might discriminate against foreign accents – new research</a>
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<p>And Jack Marley, an environment editor for The Conversation in Newcastle, England, recommends some recent articles on the ethical questions raised by eating meat. Listen from 43m40s.</p>
<p>This episode of The Conversation Weekly was produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware, with sound design by Eloise Stevens. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a> or <a href="mailto:podcast@theconversation.com">via email</a>. You can also sign up to The Conversation’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">free daily email here</a>. </p>
<p>Newsclips in this episode are from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hi_wAbwzPVQ">Boima TV</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zZZPPqZMGMY">Al</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNfSwAWeeqg">Jazeera English</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txNx5kJJ4Y0">Reuters</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EVPODscYcW8">France</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=75v3Ty6NPFU">24</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mo3_AJupDeo">English</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=axSeQN76xHk">RFI</a>.</p>
<p><em>You can listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a>, or find out how else to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177280/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thierry Vircoulon is a researcher associated with the l'Institut Français des Relations Internationales et a collaborator with the think-tank Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime. Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment. Mady Ibrahim Kanté also teaches at École de Maintien de la Paix - Alioune Blondin Bèye de Bamako and is a member of the African Union's African Science and Technology Advisory Group.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shiri Lev-Ari does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Plus, why do people with a foreign accent get a hard time – and how to prevent it. Listen to The Conversation Weekly podcast.Gemma Ware, Editor and Co-Host, The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationDaniel Merino, Assistant Science Editor & Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1772522022-02-16T15:13:57Z2022-02-16T15:13:57ZAfrica is beset with coups and conflicts: how the trend can be reversed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446741/original/file-20220216-27-wyyu7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Thousands of people have fled inter-ethnic clashes in northern Cameroon.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by DJIMET WICHE/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the evening of 15 February 2022, <a href="https://www.somalidispatch.com/latest-news/djibouti-guelleh-arrests-army-and-police-chief-over-a-coup-plot/">reports emerged</a> that key police and military officials in Djibouti were put under house arrest, reportedly amid fears of a coup d’état. </p>
<p>This was the latest in the string of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">successful and attempted coups</a> in Africa – from Mali to Madagascar and Guinea to the Central African Republic (CAR).</p>
<p>The popularity of some of the coups, combined with the perceived inability of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to stem the tide of democratic reversals and insecurity, has generated a crisis that calls for a fundamental rethinking of the values, role, mandate, capacity and resources of these institutions.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">Why West Africa has had so many coups and how to prevent more</a>
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<p>The Djibouti incident came barely 10 days after an <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-union-summit-tackles-coups-covid-tigray/a-60686782">AU Heads of State and Government Summit meeting</a>. In its <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-union-condemns-wave-of-military-coups/a-60678794">final communique</a> it lamented the “wave” of coups and pervasive insecurity across the continent.</p>
<p>Since its last in-person summit in early 2020 (they met virtually in 2021) there have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">successful military coups</a> in Mali <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/05/28/another-coup-mali-heres-what-you-need-know/">(twice)</a>, Chad, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Sudan, and attempted coups in Madagascar, CAR, Niger, Guinea Bissau, and possibly in Djibouti. </p>
<p>The continent also witnessed <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-faces-a-new-threat-to-democracy-the-constitutional-coup-72011">constitutional coups</a> where incumbents manipulated the constitutional framework to extend their terms. This happened in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-guinea-election-idUSKBN21E39O">Guinea</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/9/ivory-coast-president-ouattaras-disputed-third-term-confirmed">Cote d’Ivoire</a> (2020). In <a href="https://dawnmena.org/saieds-textbook-self-coup-in-tunisia/">Tunisia</a> the incumbent president governs through decrees, without any institutional checks on his power. </p>
<p>Africa has also seen new and expanding conflicts. Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous country, has been embroiled in a spiral of <a href="https://theconversation.com/eritrea-is-involved-in-tigray-to-boost-its-stature-why-the-strategy-could-backfire-175591">the largest and deadliest conflict in recent African memory</a>. The AU appointed a <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">special envoy for the Horn of Africa</a> and engaged in ‘quiet diplomacy’, but this is yet to bear any fruit.</p>
<p>In the Sahel, the zone of insecurity – arising from insurgencies and Islamic jihadists – has expanded. It has <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2022/1/61e137ac4/decade-sahel-conflict-leaves-25-million-people-displaced.html">entrapped and killed thousands, displaced millions, and caused tremendous suffering</a>. In the process the legitimacy and capacity of nascent democratic regimes has been undermined.</p>
<p>And in northern Mozambique, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/violence-ripples-in-islamist-hit-mozambique-as-insurgency-evolves-20211210">a rebellion</a> rooted in government neglect and sense of dispossession metamorphosed into an Islamist insurgency. Hundreds of thousands have been displaced and the country’s security forces have been overwhelmed.</p>
<p>Enduring instability in South Sudan, Libya and Somalia have made little progress. Here too the AU has largely been on the sidelines, despite its military presence in Somalia.</p>
<p>Each of these occurrences has a unique context. Nevertheless, they are broadly linked to a democratic deficit and governments’ inability to deliver either freedom or peace and development. These failure of nominally elected governments has denied leaders – as well as the democratic system – a vanguard popular constituency.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-faces-a-new-threat-to-democracy-the-constitutional-coup-72011">Africa faces a new threat to democracy: the 'constitutional coup'</a>
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<p>On top of this, the COVID-19 pandemic has decimated the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/economic-recovery-covid-19-prospects-sub-saharan-africa">economic gains of the last decade</a>. This has left behind an avalanche of unemployed youth, and worsened the public debt burden of virtually all countries. In turn this has deprived incumbents of economic rents they could deploy to appease the public and co-opt and silence key civilian and military officials.</p>
<p>The structural conditions that have made the coups and insecurity in the various countries possible obtain in a large majority of African countries. Moreover, the successes and apparent popularity of some of the coups have set a precedent that may inspire copycats.</p>
<p>But, an impoverished, insecure and coup-prone Africa is not inevitable. In fact, the continent continues to witness the resilience of democracy in Malawi and Zambia, among other countries. </p>
<p>Addressing the ailments and setting on a path to peace, freedom and sustainable development requires two key things. Firstly, a mental paradigm shift. Secondly, bold moves to accelerate the continent’s economic, security and political integration. </p>
<h2>From rejection to introspection</h2>
<p>Both the AU and ECOWAS have rejected the military coups. The AU has suspended four countries in a year, the highest since its formation in 2002. For its part ECOWAS is operating without 20% of its membership. Three of its 15 member states suspended. In addition it’s imposed crippling sanctions on Mali following a second coup and failure to agree an acceptable transition timeline.</p>
<p>But the AU hasn’t been wholly consistent. For example, it didn’t suspend Chad after an effective military takeover in the country. Instead, it put preconditions for a relatively quick transition, national dialogue and exclusion of transition leaders from standing for election.</p>
<p>It has remained largely silent on Tunisia too despite anti-democratic developments there.</p>
<p>ECOWAS has been acting according to the books on military coups. Nevertheless it failed to publicly criticise the constitutional coups in Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. </p>
<p>These inconsistencies have bred accusations of hypocrisy. Some have gone as far as accusing the two institutions of merely serving as <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/27/the-african-unions-hypocrisy-undermines-its-credibility/">protection for their club of incumbents</a>. </p>
<p>If the AU and ECOWAS want to be taken seriously, they must look inwards and stand up for constitutional democracy, regardless of the perpetrators – whether incumbents or men in military fatigue.</p>
<p>And here, they have an opportunity to redeem themselves through some quick wins. </p>
<p>Current presidents of Senegal (Macky Sall) and Benin (Patrice Salon) are serving their second and last terms. Nevertheless, there are concerns that they are resorting to democratically questionable manoeuvres. And that they may even be considering a constitutional manoeuvre to stay in power.</p>
<p>The AU and ECOWAS should proactively engage these leaders and secure public commitments that they will step down after the end of their terms, and continue the nascent legacy of their countries in peaceful alternation of power.</p>
<h2>From crisis to opportunity?</h2>
<p>The sense of crisis must spur the AU and ECOWAS into action. The ECOWAS Heads of State and Government have tasked the ECOWAS Commission to expedite the process of reviewing the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/CompilationDemocracy/Pages/ECOWASProtocol.aspx">Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance</a>. This is a chance to strengthen ECOWAS’ capacity to respond to incumbent constitutional and electoral manipulations. This could include re-tabling the region-wide two term limit on presidents that it abandoned in 2015.</p>
<p>The AU should similarly enhance its capabilities to check unconstitutional changes of government as well as the undemocratic exercise and retention of power.</p>
<p>And it should accelerate its institutional reform drive. Notably, it must work towards boosting the <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/peace-fund-lies-dormant-as-member-states-discuss-its-use">Peace Fund</a>. A well-supported fund would allow the AU to prevent political instability from degenerating into large scale conflict and insurgency.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africans-want-consensual-democracy-why-is-that-reality-so-hard-to-accept-164010">Africans want consensual democracy – why is that reality so hard to accept?</a>
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<p>The experiences of the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/b178-winning-peace-mozambiques-embattled-north">coordinated responses</a> to the insurgency in northern Mozambique, involving soldiers from the Southern African Development Community and Rwandan forces, could provide an important prototype. This must include measures to address the root causes of governance deficit, exclusion and wanton exploitation of natural resources.</p>
<p>In the long term, the AU, ECOWAS and other regional economic communities should strengthen security and economic integration. This would go some way to ensuring that nascent democracies deliver freedom as well as stability and a steady improvement of peoples’ economic fortunes.</p>
<p>Getting the <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2022/key-pillars-mostly%C2%A0-place-%C2%A0speed-%C2%A0africas%C2%A0free-trade-2022">African Continental Free Trade Area</a> into gear and the protocol on free movement of people implemented is critical.</p>
<p>Regional organisations should also boost their anti-corruption mechanisms and address problems of mismanagement of resources.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the primary responsibility for stability, prosperity and freedom lies at the national level. But if African leaders desire the protection of the AU, ECOWAS and other sub-regional communities, they must strengthen these institutions.</p>
<p>The ambitious mandate and expectations of these institutions must be matched with perquisite tools, power and resources. Incumbent safety may lie in sharing power: horizontally by addressing the curse of winner-takes-all politics at the domestic level through inclusion of the opposition in governance; and vertically by empowering regional and sub-regional organisations. </p>
<p>Africans must, of course, be the masters of their destiny. But external partners such as the United Nations, US and China should support efforts to enhance the continent’s stability and economic progress.</p>
<p><em>The views and opinions expressed in the article are the sole responsibility of the author and are not endorsed by any of the institutions he is affiliated with.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Advisor in the Constitution Building Programme of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, and Vice President (East Africa), African Network of Constitutional Lawyers.</span></em></p>The failures of nominally elected governments has denied leaders - as well as the democratic system - a vanguard popular constituency.Adem K Abebe, Extraordinary Lecturer, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1767052022-02-09T12:39:50Z2022-02-09T12:39:50ZAprès un quatrième coup d'État en Afrique de l'Ouest, il est temps de réajuster la réponse internationale<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445081/original/file-20220208-16-ftqcke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C926%2C618&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Des manifestants tiennent une photo du lieutenant-colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, qui a mené le coup d'État contre le président du Burkina Faso, Roch Kaboré.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Olympia De Maismont/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Le <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-president-kabore-detained-military-camp-sources-tell-reuters-2022-01-24/">dernier coup d'État</a> au Burkina Faso est le quatrième perpétré en Afrique, dans la région sahélienne, en moins de 18 mois. Les trois autres ont eu lieu en août 2020 au Mali, en avril 2021 <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/24/chads-military-ruler-mahamat-deby-names-transitional-parliament">au Tchad</a>, et le « <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-malis-coup-within-a-coup-161621">coup d’État dans un coup d’État</a> » au Mali en mai dernier.</p>
<p>Pourtant, les dirigeants européens et américains semblent actuellement <a href="https://apnews.com/article/burkina-faso-africa-chad-niger-europe-64a6e0e36a6a7753325446aa209dea90">plus préoccupés</a> par la présence de mercenaires du Groupe Wagner, qui a des liens avec la Russie, que par les problèmes politiques fondamentaux de la région.</p>
<p>Tous ces coups d'État illustrent les risques liés à la priorisation de la lutte contre le terrorisme (et de la concurrence avec la Russie) par les acteurs régionaux et internationaux qui ignorent par la même occasion les autres signaux s'alerte. Il s'agit notamment d’<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-burkina-election/burkina-faso-president-kabore-secures-re-election-preliminary-results-show-idUKKBN2861JZ">élections faussées par une faible participation</a>, des <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/burkina-faso-why-citizens-are-disenchanted-with-president-kabore/a-60540479">dirigeants déconnectés</a> et de <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-25/burkina-faso-extends-internet-shutdown-before-nov-27-protests">musèlement</a> de la liberté d'expression. </p>
<p>À cela s’ajoutent une pauvreté extrême (observée bien <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/10-Burkina-Faso-growth-without-poverty-reduction.pdf">avant</a> la crise actuelle) et des niveaux étonnants de <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1109772#:%7E:text=In%20Burkina%20Faso%20seul%2C%20the,in%20the%20last%2012%20months.">déplacements internes</a>, ainsi qu’<a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/11/22/burkina-faso-us-relations/">une trop grande importance accordée à la lutte contre le terrorisme</a>.</p>
<p>Le coup d'État au Burkina Faso a fait l'objet de <a href="https://apnews.com/article/burkina-faso-africa-chad-niger-europe-64a6e0e36a6a7753325446aa209dea90">réunions urgentes de coordination régionale</a> et d'un <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/w-african-bloc-ecowas-suspends-burkina-faso-after-military-coup-sources-2022-01-28/">sommet virtuel d'urgence</a> de la Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest le 28 janvier, qui a décidé de suspendre ce pays.</p>
<p>J'ai étudié l'islam et la politique en Afrique du Nord-Ouest au cours des seize dernières années, en me concentrant sur les 20ème et 21ème siècles. Mon livre le plus récent, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/jihadists-of-north-africa-and-the-sahel/C1C391EC226A65858CCF45322879ED1B">Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel: Local Politics and Rebel Groups</a> (Djihadistes d’Afrique du Nord et du Sahel : politiques locales et groupes rebelles), s'appuie sur des études de cas réalisées en Algérie, en Libye, au Mali, au Niger, au Burkina Faso et en Mauritanie, qui permettent d’examiner les mouvements djihadistes de l'intérieur, en dévoilant leurs activités et leurs luttes internes au cours des trois dernières décennies.</p>
<p>A mon avis avec ce dernier coup d'État, les décideurs politiques ouest-africains, les décideurs politiques ouest-africains, français et américains sont à la croisée des chemins. Ils peuvent décider de laisser passer le coup d'État et confirmer de facto la domination militaire dans tout le Sahel ou alors tracer une ligne rouge et exiger le retour à l'ordre constitutionnel.</p>
<h2>De la révolution à l'échec</h2>
<p>Le renversement du président du Burkina Faso, Roch Kaboré, a notamment été précédé à l’échelon national par une série de coups d'État remontant à 1966. Dans les tumultueuses années 1980, le grand vainqueur a été un dictateur militaire nommé Blaise Compaoré qui a fermé la porte à la promesse révolutionnaire de Thomas Sankara, son prédecesseur, qui n'est pas un homme parfait mais n'en demuere pas moins admirable, en se déclarant de fait président à vie. Compaoré a été renversé par une révolution populaire en 2014.</p>
<p>La révolution a survécu à son premier défi majeur – une tentative de coup d'État préparée en 2015 par des loyalistes de Compaoré ; par la suite, elle a échoué grâce à Kaboré qui a été élu en 2015 et réélu en 2020. Ce dernier, qui était proche de Compaoré jusqu'au début des années 2010, a rejoint l'opposition tardivement et s'est révélé être un piètre porte-parole des aspirations de la révolution menée par les jeunes. </p>
<p>Les alternatives classiques ne valaient guère mieux. En 2015 comme en 2020, les candidats finalistes étaient des politiciens liés à Compaoré, dont l'ancien ministre des Finances, Zéphirin Diabré. Au cours de ses premier et deuxième mandats, Kaboré s’est laissé porter par le courant sans avoir un véritable programme.</p>
<p>Pendant ce temps, la sécurité a régressé dans une grande partie du pays. L'explication facile – beaucoup trop facile – parfois donnée est que Compaoré avait signé un <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-jihadist-terrorism-threatens-to-destabilize-burkina-faso-and-its-neighbors/">accord officieux avec les djihadistes</a> basés au Mali et au-delà, ce qui aurait apparemment mis le Burkina Faso à l’abri de leurs attaques. Cependant, après sa chute, selon la rumeur, les djihadistes se seraient amassées dans le pays.</p>
<p>Une autre explication simpliste consiste à dire que les djihadistes ouest-africains, aux poches pleines d’argent et possédant un savoir-faire tactique provenant <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/west-africa-must-confront-its-foreign-terrorist-fighters">de l'étranger</a>, sont des maîtres à penser en matière de stratégie, qui écrasent tout sur leur passage dans toute la région.</p>
<p>La réalité est nettement plus complexe : les djihadistes sahéliens ont connu des hauts et des bas, et il a fallu la convergence de nombreux facteurs – au-delà de la chute de Compaoré ou de la perspicacité stratégique des djihadistes – pour faire du centre du Sahel l'une des pires zones de conflit au monde. </p>
<p>Dans le centre du Mali, une nouvelle vague de mobilisation djihadiste, qui a débuté en 2015, s’est formée sur d’anciens griefs liés à un accès inéquitable à la terre, à des hiérarchies sociales figées et aux réactions brutales et irréfléchies des forces de sécurité maliennes.</p>
<p>De l'autre côté de la frontière, dans le nord du Burkina Faso, des évolutions similaires sont apparues en 2016, avec comme point de départ les des griefs <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/254-social-roots-jihadist-violence-burkina-fasos-north">très axés</a> sur les aspects locaux, l'échange de personnel et d'idées à travers la frontière Mali-Burkina Faso, et la détérioration de la situation dans toute la sous-région.</p>
<h2>Corruption de l’armée et coups d'état militaires</h2>
<p>Alors que la crise malienne se transformait en crise sahélienne, les militaires de la région ont été simultanément et collectivement poussés à obtenir plus de résultats, autrement dit, à tuer plus de djihadistes. Les éléments de langage condescendant de Paris, Washington et de Bruxelles à propos des <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/08/28/sahel-a-new-partnership-for-the-g5-the-morning-call/">« partenariats »</a> et des <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210603-counter-terrorism-in-the-sahel-a-training-session-with-french-special-forces">«formations»</a> cachent à peine leur mépris. Des troupes terrestres, des hélicoptères et des drones européens et même américains sillonnent la région, laissant les armées sahéliennes jouer les seconds rôles ou les court-circuitant complètement. </p>
<p>Les litanies sur la « bonne gouvernance » dénoncent la corruption en termes génériques, mais portent rarement sur des responsables spécifiques, ce qui fait que les militaires et les civils ont peu de comptes à rendre. Les scandales liés à la corruption dans l’armée sont régulièrement mis sous le boisseau ont été régulièrement <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220107-niger-le-gouvernement-s-exprime-sur-l-affaire-des-d%C3%A9tournements-de-fonds-%C3%A0-la-d%C3%A9fense">balayés de la main</a> comme, entre autres, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-arms-audit/niger-lost-120-million-in-arms-deals-over-three-years-government-audit-idUSKBN233215">celui</a> du Niger – maintenant le prochain pays où les craintes de coup d'État s'intensifient.</p>
<p>Pendant ce temps, les forces de sécurité sahéliennes subissent des pertes occasionnées par des ennemis qui se fondent dans la campagne, ce qui fait que les soldats et les gendarmes ont peur et ont le gâchette facile contre les civils, aggravant ainsi l'insécurité.</p>
<p>En raison de toute cette dynamique, les colonels – les principaux artisans des récents coups d'État – sont pris en étau entre des présidents inefficaces, des généraux complaisants et leurs propres troupes mécontentes. Les élections n'apportent aucun changement substantiel, les principaux leaders de l'opposition proposent de vagues alternatives et des manifestations massives éclatent périodiquement dans les capitales sahéliennes pour exiger une alternative à un statu quo désastreux. </p>
<p>On peut comprendre la réaction des colonels et la raison pour laquelle de nombreux civils soutiennent souvent les coups d'État dans un premier temps. Toutefois, ceux-ci aggravent la situation globale en superposant de nouvelles crises politiques aux crises existantes découlant de l'insécurité, des urgences humanitaires et de l'incapacité des politiciens civils à résoudre les problèmes fondamentaux.</p>
<h2>Fixer les limites à ne pas franchir</h2>
<p>La réaction de la France, des États-Unis et de la CEDEAO face à la dernière série de coups d'État au Sahel et en Afrique de l'Ouest a été de les dénoncer tout en l'acceptant discrètement comme un fait acompli. </p>
<p>Une « réalité politique » s'installe dès l’instant où le dirigeant évincé accepte à contrecœur de démissionner sous la contrainte, décrétant de ce fait que de tels dirigeants ne reviendront jamais au pouvoir. La « communauté internationale », avec la Communauté économique des États d'Afrique de l'Ouest comme principal négociateur, marchande alors avec chaque junte sur les paramètres d'une transition vers un retour à un régime civil. </p>
<p>À cause de ce modèle d’approche, la diplomatie régionale s’enlise dans des négociations prolongées avec des juntes qui ne sont pas disposées à respecter les règles; ce genre de situation affecte de plus en plus le Mali. </p>
<p>Paris et Washington, pendant ce temps, semblent systématiquement très pressés de reprendre leurs activités habituelles avec celui qui détient les rènes du pouvoir. Dans ce cas, ce statu quo implique de mener des campagnes de lutte contre le terrorisme, qui sont soi-disant un moyen de renforcer la stabilité politique, mais qui limitent en réalité les réponses efficaces à apporter sur le plan diplomatique aux coups d'État, aux cas de corruption, aux irrégularités électorales et aux violations des droits de l'homme.</p>
<p>Pourquoi faudrait-on considérer qu'il est politiquement fantaisiste de tenter d’inverser des coups d'État ? Les exemples de coups d'État inversés sont rares, mais cela ne signifie pas que Washington ne doit pas essayer. Au moins, Washington peut prendre l'initiative sur le plan rhétorique de ne pas se contenter d'« exprimer son inquiétude » ou de « demander la libération » des présidents détenus et renversés, mais d'exiger le rétablissement des dirigeants déchus. </p>
<p>Toute préoccupation de « perte crédibilité » est à relativiser étant donné que Washington semble déjà faible et profondément hypocrite en matière promotion de la démocratie et de respect des droits de l'homme.</p>
<p>Il n'est jamais trop tard pour tenter de faire preuve de cohérence, y compris dans des affaires désormais supposées complètement réglées. Le régime de la junte tchadienne, par exemple, est aussi inconstitutionnel aujourd'hui qu'il l'était en avril 2021, lorsqu'il étatit arrivé au pouvoir. Au-delà de la rhétorique, il existe de nombreuses options pour faire pression sur les juntes, comme des sanctions, des suspensions de l'aide, des retraits d'ambassadeurs, des suspensions d'organisations régionales et internationales, etc.</p>
<p>La CEDEAO a renoncé à des sanctions économiques draconiennes immédiatement après le coup d'État d'août 2020 au Mali, mais elle a fini par les imposer environ 17 mois plus tard, après s'être rendu compte que la junte ignorait dans le fond les injonctions de l'institution régionale.</p>
<p>Ne pas utiliser ces outils au moment où ils seraient les plus efficaces – immédiatement après chaque coup d'État – revient à se rendre complice de la militarisation de cette région. Cela est vrai pour les périphéries éloignées où gravitent les djihadistes, mais aussi pour les autres capitales du Sahel.</p>
<p>Cet article a d’abord été publié sous forme de blog dans <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/01/27/another-west-african-coup-after-burkina-faso-time-to-rethink-military-aid/">Responsible Statecraft</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander John Thurston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Avec le dernier coup d'État au Burkina Faso, les décideurs politiques ouest-africains, français et américains sont à la croisée des chemins.Alexander John Thurston, Asst Professor, Political Science, University of Cincinnati Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1762652022-02-03T12:42:12Z2022-02-03T12:42:12ZCoup d'Etat au Burkina : une fois de plus, la force des armes s'impose à celle des urnes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444006/original/file-20220202-17-18scprx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C924%2C655&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">L'ancien président Roch Marc Christian Kaboré a été mis aux arrêts.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Koch / MSC/Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Lorsqu'on a appris que des soldats s'étaient mutinés au Burkina Faso, il n’y a pas vraiment eu d’effet de surprise. L'histoire de ce pays a été marquée non seulement par des <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/4/17/soldiers-mutiny-in-burkina-faso">mutineries dans l'armée</a>, mais également par des <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/25/burkina-faso-foiled-military-coup">coups d'État militaires</a>. </p>
<p>Plus tôt cette année, une <a href="https://theconversation.com/another-coup-has-been-averted-in-burkina-faso-but-for-how-long-175074">tentative a été déjouée</a>, mais il était clair, à ce moment-là, que ce n'était peut-être qu'une question de temps avant une autre tentative.</p>
<p>Les événements récents dans la région ont, en outre, envoyé un signal fort. Au cours des deux dernières années, des coups d'État ont été perpétrés en <a href="https://theconversation.com/guinea-has-a-long-history-of-coups-here-are-5-things-to-know-about-the-country-167618">Guinée</a> et au <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56830510">Tchad</a>, plusieurs coups d'État ont eu lieu au <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/12/after-two-coups-mali-needs-regional-support-bolster-democracy">Mali</a>, et une tentative a échoué l'an dernier au <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210331-attempted-coup-in-niger-france-24">Niger</a> voisin.</p>
<p>En ce qui concerne les tentatives de coup d'État, le Burkina Faso était la pièce manquante sur la carte des coups d’État organisés dans la zone allant de l'Atlantique à la mer Rouge.</p>
<p>Que cette région soit en proie aux coups d'État pourrait sembler normal pour certains, la note moyenne des pays de cette zone dans l’<a href="https://fragilestatesindex.org/">Indice des États fragiles</a> étant de 98, bien pire que les pays qui ont connu récemment des coups d'État comme la Birmanie ou la Libye, un soit-disant «État défaillant. D'où leur place plus proche du Yémen et de la Syrie, qui occupent le bas du classement, que de pays comme le Sénégal ou le Ghana. </p>
<p>Par rapport à d'autres régions, le Sahel fait face à des <a href="https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/sahel-emergency">défis extraordinaires</a>, néanmoins ce nombre élevé de coup d'État en si peu de temps est étonnant. </p>
<p>Le secrétaire général des Nations unies, Antonio Guterres, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/an-epidemic-coups-un-chief-laments-urging-security-council-act-2021-10-26/">récemment déploré</a> ce qu'il a appelé une « épidémie de coups d'État », tout en reconnaissant qu’une « dissuasion efficace n’existe pas ». Selon lui, les réactions aux coups ont été limitées, parce que les potentielles autorités anti-putsch étaient aux prises avec leurs propres problèmes pendant la pandémie, ce qui a créé</p>
<blockquote>
<p>un environnement dans lequel certains chefs militaires ont un sentiment d'impunité totale : ils peuvent faire ce qu'ils veulent car il ne leur arrivera rien. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Déclin des contrepoids contre les coups d'État</h2>
<p>Selon diverses estimations, <a href="https://militarycoups.org/">l'Afrique</a>, l'Afrique postcoloniale a connu plus de 200 tentatives de coup d'État, dont la moitié environ a abouti à la destitution du dirigeant. De plus, même si ce phénomène représentant une menace n’a pas totalement disparu ces dernières années, sa mise en pratique avait <a href="https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2017/09/18/silent-guns-examining-the-two-year-absence-of-coups-in-africa/">considérablement diminué</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442433/original/file-20220125-27-51qnic.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442433/original/file-20220125-27-51qnic.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442433/original/file-20220125-27-51qnic.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442433/original/file-20220125-27-51qnic.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442433/original/file-20220125-27-51qnic.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442433/original/file-20220125-27-51qnic.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442433/original/file-20220125-27-51qnic.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Screenshot at AM.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Depuis 1999, jamais une année civile n'avait connu autant de coups d'État couronnés de succès et, depuis 1980, aucune année n’en avait enregistré plus. Même si l'année 2021 a paru exceptionnelle, le coup d'État au Burkina Faso ne semble pas être le fruit du hasard non plus.</p>
<p>Bien qu’un grand nombre de ces pays aient en commun des environnements politiques nationaux fragiles, beaucoup d’observateurs se sont exprimés sur l'effritement d'une supposée <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/african-union-as-a-norm-entrepreneur-on-military-coups-detat-in-africa-19522012-an-empirical-assessment/34F81D3A221ABD0C1D4591412454C03C">norme anti-coup</a>, présentée comme étant au moins <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12116-015-9210-6">à l'origine</a> de la baisse des coup d'État.</p>
<p>Dans le passé, les régimes post-coup d'État ont fait l’objet de suspensions maintenues jusqu'au retrait complet du pouvoir des principaux putschistes : dans le cas de Madagascar, cela a duré <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-madagascar-sanctions/african-union-welcomes-madagascar-back-after-power-handover-idUSBREA0Q0DN20140127">près de cinq ans</a>. Ces mesures ont fait place à une nouvelle donne: la réintégration des membres suspendus au sein de l'Union africaine et l'abandon des sanctions tant que des élections sont organisées, même si les putschistes y participent.
Non seulement d’anciens putschistes comme <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/10/egypts-sisi-takes-over-as-new-head-of-african-union">Abdel Fattah el-Sisi</a> et Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz ont été réintégrés, mais ils ont même été choisis pour présider l'organisation. </p>
<p>Plus récemment, l’Union africaine a tout simplement choisi d'ignorer les coups d'État <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/12/5/how-the-african-union-got-it-wrong-on-zimbabwe">en 2017 au Zimbabwe</a> et <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/the-au-reneges-on-its-stance-against-coups-detat">en 2021 au Tchad</a>. </p>
<p>Le comportement des puissances mondiales n'a pas non plus été dissuasif. La Chine, notamment, a adopté une approche « sans conditions » pour ses prêts et son assistance, considérant les coups d'État occasionnels un peu comme étant <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adr022">« le prix à payer pour faire des affaires »</a> dans la région. Bien que les États-Unis aient régulièrement suspendu leur aide à la suite de coups d'État, tout comme l'UA, ils ont été heureux de mettre fin à ces suspensions sous réserve de voir les putschistes se soumettre au vote. </p>
<p>Les putschistes soudanais, par exemple, prévoyaient peut-être une évolution <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/12/3/america-and-china-opened-the-door-for-african-coups-to-return">semblable à celle</a> de l'Égypte selon laquelle toute <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-africa-sudan-khartoum-96e7b33b6e1045fce01189e81b36814a">suspension de son programme d'aide de 700 millions de dollars</a> serait temporaire. Dans le cas de l'aide militaire, même si les États-Unis ou d'autres acteurs occidentaux réagissent avec sévérité, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/mali-russian-military-advisers-arrive-amid-western-pullback/a-60363317">des alternatives sont de plus en plus souvent proposées</a>.</p>
<p>Autrement dit, la leçon tirée des coups d'État est que les coûts à payer, quels qu’ils soient, sont éphémères.</p>
<p>En plus de l'évolution du contexte international, il semble qu’un changement d'attitude est perceptible chez les personnes vivant dans les pays qui subissent des coups d'État. Les citoyens vivant dans des endroits comme <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/25/burkina-faso-foiled-military-coup">le Burkina Faso</a> se sont, par le passé, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002716685611">mobilisés pour contrecarrer les coups d'État</a>. Plus récemment, les populations semblent de plus en plus disposés à tolérer les coups d'État.</p>
<p>Le Mali voisin a vu sa population <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/14/malians-rally-after-army-calls-protests-over-ecowas-sanctions">protester contre les sanctions post-coup d'État de la CEDEAO</a>, tandis qu'un récent sondage indique que que plus de <a href="https://twitter.com/BridgesFromBKO/status/1483114244296130562?s=20">90 % des personnes interrogées</a> à Bamako soutiennent le régime militaire. Les données les plus récentes d’<a href="https://afrobarometer.org/">Afrobaromètre</a> – un réseau de recherche indépendant qui mesure les attitudes du public sur les questions économiques, politiques et sociales en Afrique – ont estimé le soutien national au régime militaire au <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/blogs/democracy-mali-dying-not-if-citizens-voices-are-heard">Mali à environ 31 %</a>. </p>
<p>Comparativement, <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r7_policypaperno54_africans_views_of_democracy1.pdf">50 % des répondants burkinabè</a> ont soit approuvé soit fortement approuvé le régime militaire dans le même échantillon, soit une hausse de 10 % par rapport à la décennie précédente.</p>
<h2>La politique par les armes</h2>
<p>A chaque fois qu'un coup d'État ne fait pas l'objet de réaction vigoureuse – de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur – les putschistes en puissance se sentent enhardis.</p>
<p>La normalisation des coups d'État ne signifie pas seulement une hausse des transferts « irréguliers » de pouvoirs, elle renvoie aussi à une plus grande acceptation de la politique par le recours aux armes. La <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/burkina-faso-kabore-detained-coup-b1999317.html">tentative</a> d'assassinat du président Roch Kaboré pourrait également être le signe d’un retour à une époque antérieure de coups d'État. En effet, il existe une tendance souvent négligée liée au déclin des coups d'État : ils sont devenus beaucoup moins susceptibles d'être associés à des assassinats politiques.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442434/original/file-20220125-23-1mpfd4l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442434/original/file-20220125-23-1mpfd4l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442434/original/file-20220125-23-1mpfd4l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442434/original/file-20220125-23-1mpfd4l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442434/original/file-20220125-23-1mpfd4l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442434/original/file-20220125-23-1mpfd4l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442434/original/file-20220125-23-1mpfd4l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Capture d'écran à AM.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>À l’époque où <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/04/10/president-of-niger-assassinated/c8287bd2-32c8-42dc-92c4-d38c7218ea0c/">le président Ibrahim Baré Mainassara a été tué</a> lors d'un coup d'État perpétré au Niger en avril 1999, 14 des 82 dirigeants africains évincés avaient été éliminés pendant ou à la suite de ces tentatives de putsch. </p>
<p>Après le coup d'État d'avril 1999 au Niger, une période qui a coïncidé avec l’établissement par le continent d'une norme anti-coup d'État, aucun dirigeant n'a été tué au cours des 24 derniers coups d'État réussis. Il est vrai que cette série résulte, au moins en partie, d'une étrange définition de la notion de coup État puisque puisque le <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bissau-attack/guinea-bissaus-president-army-chief-killed-idUSTRE5210RR20090302">meurtre du président bissau-guinéen, João Bernardo Vieira</a>, est généralement considéré comme un simple « assassinat ». </p>
<p>Toutefois, par rapport aux époques antérieures, les coups d'État des 20 dernières années ont été relativement moins violents. Il faut noter que les putschistes reconnaissent qu'ils utilisent la violence, même si le degré de violence qui leur est associé a considérablement diminué au fil du temps, et ce n'est pas une coïncidence. Des leaders, tels que <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/142678/togo-who-killed-sylvanus-olympio-the-father-of-togolese-independence/">Sylvanus Olympio</a> mort en 1963 et <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/in-depth/leading-up-to-thomas-sankaras-trial/">Thomas Sankara</a> en 1987, n'ont pas été tués par accident, ce sont des victimes de meurtres dont la mort avait pour but de faciliter le succès d'un coup d'État et d'éliminer une future menace politique. </p>
<p>La normalisation des armées en tant qu'acteurs politiques implique inévitablement l’utilisation de la boîte à outil militaire en politique. </p>
<p>Étant donné le soutien grandissant en faveur de l'intervention de l'armée et le peu d'intérêt pour la prévention des putsch, ceux qui se méfient du retour aux armes contre les urnes vivent des moments difficiles.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176265/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>L'Afrique a connu plus de tentatives de coup d'État en 2021 qu’au cours des cinq années précédentes réunies.Jonathan Powell, Associate professor, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1750742022-01-18T05:35:45Z2022-01-18T05:35:45ZAnother coup has been averted in Burkina Faso: but for how long?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/441084/original/file-20220117-23-bkmkzy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An honorary guard of Burkina Faso soldiers. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Olympia De Maismont/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Within a few weeks of the start of a new year and West Africa had its first attempted coup d’état. On January 12 the Burkinabè government <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/eight-soldiers-arrested-in-burkina-faso-over-coup-plot">announced</a> that it foiled a plot from within the armed forces to destabilise the state. </p>
<p>At a <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/08/28/burkina-faso-vows-major-security-changes-after-deadly-attack//">press conference</a>, Minister of Defence, General Aimé Barthélemy Simporé, announced that 10 soldiers and five civilians had been arrested in connection with the plot. They will be tried by military tribunal.</p>
<p>Military governments are already in power in <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/mali-s-military-authorities-propose-5-year-extension-of-transition-period-/6382307.html">Mali</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/guinea-coup-has-left-west-africas-regional-body-with-limited-options-but-there-are-some-168092">Guinea</a>, <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30028/chad-s-political-transition-is-a-smokescreen-for-military-rule">Chad</a>, and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59033142">Sudan</a> following four coup d’états in the last year. </p>
<p>Speculation and rumour that a coup plot might topple Ouagadougou next has swirled over social media. For now, that crisis has been averted but there are still many reasons to be concerned. </p>
<p>Burkina Faso has a <a href="https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1944">long legacy</a> of military intervention. In the first 27 years of independence, Burkinabè soldiers staged five coups d’état and one autogolpe – a military coup initiated or abetted by a country’s elected leader. </p>
<p>The last coup killed the famed <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/10/11/only-survivor-of-1987-burkina-coup-relives-thomas-sankara-s-assassination//">Captain Thomas Sankara</a>. He gave Burkina Faso its name, meaning land of the upright people. The coup saw Sankara’s second-in-command Captain Blaise Compaoré installed as president.</p>
<p>Compaoré put an end to Burkina Faso’s coups. After taking power, he ruthlessly <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Blaise-Compaore">eliminated</a> his rivals. With few to stand in his way, Compaoré succeeded in restructuring the military, creating the <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/338958/politique/burkina-officiers-de-lex-regiment-de-securite-presidentielle-remis-liberte-provisoire/">Régiment de la sécurité présidentielle</a>, an elite unit that functioned as a sort of special forces and praetorian guard. </p>
<p>The unit answered only to Compaoré operating under a separate hierarchy and exhibited the sine qua non of coup proofing tactics. It insulated him from coup threats, even helping him endure a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/4/17/soldiers-mutiny-in-burkina-faso">widespread mutiny</a> in 2011.</p>
<p>But they were unable to protect him from citizens demanding change. </p>
<p>In 2014, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/10/protesters-storm-burn-burkina-faso-parliament/100843/">millions of protesters</a> filled the streets demanding that Compaoré adhere to, rather than reform, presidential term limits barring him from contesting another election. The insurrection ultimately forced him to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/7/burkina-ex-leader-compaore-to-snub-trial-on-sankara-assassination">resign and flee</a> into exile. </p>
<p>This popular movement then transformed into a political transition to democracy. </p>
<p>The transition was nearly overturned when Compaoré loyalists within the unit staged their own <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/25/burkina-faso-foiled-military-coup">coup d’état</a> in September 2015. But Burkinabè citizens refused to stand by and again took to the streets. </p>
<p>To support them, a detachment of the regular army operating under the orders of civilian transitional authorities, surrounded the putschists and ended the failed coup. The political transition culminated in the country’s freest, fairest, and most competitive elections to date.</p>
<p>What is unclear today, however, is the armed forces’ continued commitment to civilian leadership. The recent coup attempt calls into question the coherence of a republican and professional ethos among Burkinabè military officers. </p>
<h2>Deja vu?</h2>
<p>Past military interventions into politics have resulted from popular pressures for change. Similar pressure may be building anew, driven by a growing insecurity in the country.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1251496/download">Militant Islamist groups</a> have been gaining ground across the country’s territory. Violence has displaced nearly two out of every 25 citizens from their homes. The insecurity wrought by these groups and other criminal opportunists, has grown exponentially over the last five years. </p>
<p>The number of violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in Burkina Faso more than <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/6/un-outraged-as-death-toll-in-burkina-faso-attack-rises-to-132">doubled</a> from nearly 500 in 2020 to more than 1,150 in 2021. This put Burkina Faso well ahead of Mali’s 684 and Niger’s 149 violent events.</p>
<p>The inability to get the security situation under control has <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/burkina-faso-prime-minister-dabire-resigns-amid-security-crisis/a-60063223">soured support</a> for the current administration led by President Roch Kaboré. Now in his second term, Kaboré has seen his unprecedented election in 2015 shift from a beacon of democratisation to a test of the country’s strength. </p>
<p>Violence initiated by militant Islamist groups has torn at Burkina Faso’s well known social tolerance. It has sparked inter-communal violence and reprisal attacks. It has also brought war economies and child soldiers to the landlocked nation.</p>
<p>In June, civilians working in and around an artisanal gold mine were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/child-soldiers-carried-out-burkina-faso-massacre-say-un-government-2021-06-24/">massacred by teenagers</a> presumably armed and deployed by militant Islamist groups seeking to control the resource. In response to popular outcry over the event, Kaboré sacked his Minister of Defense. </p>
<p>Four months later dozens of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/17/burkina-faso-death-toll-security-post-attack-jumps-to-53">gendarmes were killed</a> by militants after having gone weeks without resupply. A letter from the unit explained that they had run out of rations and had been relying on poaching to feed themselves. The event laid bare serious dysfunction within the military’s administration and command.</p>
<p>Given these circumstances, discontent among the rank and file and up the chain of command is understandable. As is the impatience and disillusionment of Burkinabè citizens. The country is in disarray. The government must confront multiple crises that it has failed thus far to even contain. </p>
<p>Ominously, the situation resembles that of Mali prior to the August 2020 coup d’état: an embattled administration scrambling to address a quickly evolving and spreading security crisis in the country’s hinterland, a frustrated military lacking the basics tools to confront the enemy and growing popular dissatisfaction with the perceived shortcomings of their elected officials. In short, a recipe for a coup d’état.</p>
<h2>Key difference</h2>
<p>But there’s a key difference to the Malian experience. Little more than six years ago and no doubt still present in the minds of many Burkinabè citizens, the military stood up and defended the people and constitution against soldiers seeking power. </p>
<p>Burkina Faso has never been more in need of such a service from the military. Burkinabè soldiers and civilians have an opportunity to further strengthen their democratic institutions by remaining firmly against any extra constitutional seizure of power. </p>
<p>Those citizens who stood against the Régiment de la sécurité présidentielle putschists in 2015 may need to be called on again to protect Burkina Faso’s democratisation. </p>
<p>Democracy is messy. It facilitates change, but through an imperfect process of self correction. This requires patience, engagement, and commitment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175074/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Eizenga received funding for research in Burkina Faso as part of grant FA9550-12-i-0433 awarded from the United States Department of Defense to the University of Florida. He is currently a Research Fellow with the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not an official policy or position of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.</span></em></p>Democracy is messy. It facilitates change, but through an imperfect process of self-correction. This requires patience, engagement, and commitment.Daniel Eizenga, Research Fellow, Africa Center for Strategic StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1676542021-09-11T01:40:37Z2021-09-11T01:40:37ZCe qu’il faut pour mettre un terme à la guerre civile en République centrafricaine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420276/original/file-20210909-23-8xzhzl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C926%2C616&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Un véhicule blindé russe de transport de troupes dans les rues de Bangui.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Crédit photo Camille Laffont/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ces derniers mois, des politiciens et des journalistes centrafricains ont partagé des images de militaires posant devant différents panneaux de la ville – apparemment comme preuve que l'État <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210224-pro-government-central-african-forces-capture-ex-president-s-boziz%C3%A9-stronghold">reprend le contrôle</a> d'un pays pris dans une guerre civile depuis <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2015/speculating_on_crisis/">presque une décennie</a>.</p>
<p>Celle-ci a commencé lorsque des groupes rebelles du nord-est du pays ont formé une coalition en 2012 pour renverser le président François Bozizé. Ils ont alors déclaré vouloir défendre les intérêts d'une population marginalisée qui réclamait plus de développement. </p>
<p>Il est fort probable que la rébellion ait cependant été déclenchée par la tentative de Bozizé de prendre le contrôle de l’<a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/dangerous-little-stones-diamonds-central-african-republic">activité minière</a> lucrative des groupes armés.</p>
<p>Cette rébellion a rapidement pris de l'ampleur et a facilement submergé une armée centrafricaine faible qui n'avait aucun intérêt à défendre son <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/press-freedom-under-threat-in-central-african-republic/a-16785956">dirigeant autocratique</a>. Même si les rebelles ont été délogés de la capitale sous la pression internationale, et par une mission de maintien de la paix en 2014, ils restent actifs dans l'arrière-pays.</p>
<p>Si on jette un regard sur <a href="https://natoassociation.ca/rumble-in-the-jungle-a-special-report-on-the-central-african-republic/">l'histoire</a> centrafricaine, on se rend compte que le contrôle militaire a toujours été de courte durée dans ce pays vaste et <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/centralafricanrepublic/overview">peu peuplé</a>. </p>
<p>Dans une <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/de/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/african-government-politics-and-policy/security-arena-africa-local-order-making-central-african-republic-somaliland-and-south-sudan?format=HB">étude approfondie</a> qui compare la République centrafricaine (RCA) au Soudan du Sud et au Somaliland, j'ai découvert que l'empreinte de l'État dans les zones périphériques de la RCA était de loin la plus faible. </p>
<p>À mon sens, ce n’est qu’en accordant la priorité aux aspects civils de la gouvernance, tels que l'éducation et la santé ainsi que la construction d’infrastructures, que l'État sera protégé des rébellions qui remettent en cause son pouvoir, à l’avenir.</p>
<h2>Une longue histoire de conflits</h2>
<p>La République centrafricaine a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic">pendant longtemps</a> été considérée comme le point de rencontre de sociétés issues de différentes régions d'Afrique et, plus récemment, des colons européens. Ces rencontres ont souvent débouché sur des violences. </p>
<p>Au cours des siècles, les esclavagistes y ont traqué les populations locales, les sociétés concessionnaires françaises y ont imposé avec brutalité le travail non rémunéré et les milices étrangères y ont établi leur camp lorsqu'elles étaient chassées de leur propre pays. </p>
<p>De telles pratiques ont entraîné des divisions au sein des populations vivant à l'intérieur des frontières de la République centrafricaine, <a href="https://history.state.gov/countries/central-african-republic">créée</a> le 13 août 1960. Des débats houleux portant sur qui est ressortissant de souche par opposition au ressortissant étranger, sur les questions de statut et de famille ont eu lieu. </p>
<p>Les politiciens et les personnalités publiques remettent souvent en question l’identité centrafricaine réelle de personnes qui, selon eux, sont venues d'ailleurs ou ne parlent pas la langue nationale.</p>
<p>Les institutions publiques n'ont pas efficacement traité ces questions. Après la mort du héros fondateur de la nation, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Barthelemy-Boganda">Barthélémy Boganda</a>, peu avant l'indépendance, un petit cercle d'élites installé dans la capitale, Bangui, s'est concentré sur la conquête et le maintien du pouvoir.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/David-Dacko">David Dacko</a>, qui est devenu président grâce à un accord douteux avec les parlementaires au moment de l'indépendance, a été renversé par un coup d'État perpétré par le commandant de l'armée <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/bokassa-jean-bedel-1921-1996/">Jean-Bédel Bokassa</a> en 1965. </p>
<p>Bokassa <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1979/09/21/archives/bokassa-is-reported-overthrown-in-coup-in-central-african-empire.html">a gouverné avec brutalité</a>, et toute contestation de son pouvoir renforçait sa paranoïa. Il a été <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13150040">destitué</a> en 1979 avec l’aide de la France, et remplacé à nouveau par Dacko. Ce dernier a été rapidement renversé par un autre coup d'état militaire d’<a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Andre-Kolingba">André Kolingba</a> en 1981. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ange-Felix-Patasse">Ange-Félix Patassé</a> a remporté les élections en 1993 et s'est montré méfiant vis-à-vis de l'armée, convaincu que ses rangs comptaient des loyalistes présumés de Kolingba. Celui-ci a, en effet, tenté un coup d'État sans succès au début des années 2000. Mais c'est un autre commandant militaire, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55387951">François Bozizé</a>, qui a réussi à renverser Patassé avec le soutien du Tchad en 2003. </p>
<p>Compte tenu de ces antécédents historiques, les dirigeants successifs ont cessé de financer les institutions de sécurité. De ce fait, l’armée affaiblie a été incapable de faire face à la grande <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/seleka-rebellion-car-sparks-cycle-violence">rébellion Seleka</a> en 2013. </p>
<p>Depuis 2014, les capacités de l'armée ont à nouveau été renforcées grâce au <a href="https://www.irsem.fr/data/files/irsem/documents/document/file/1219/NR_IRSEM_36.pdf">soutien</a> international. </p>
<p>Cependant, cette situation a donné lieu à une approche militaire consistant à exercer le contrôle de l'État. Les représentants du gouvernement critiquent régulièrement l’<a href="https://operationalsupport.un.org/en/security-council-renews-central-african-republic-arms-embargo">embargo sur les armes</a> qui frappe leur pays et les empêche de progresser face aux rebelles. Les puissances étrangères tentent de s'attirer les faveurs du gouvernement en lui fournissant de l’armement et des formations. </p>
<p>La mission de l'ONU surveille et <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-un-report-calls-urgent-end-mounting-human">met en garde</a> contre les transgressions passées et actuelles de l'armée nationale. Cette dernière est ainsi devenue l'élément central de la négociation sur le rôle de l'État à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur de ses frontières. </p>
<h2>Rétablissement de l'autorité de l'État</h2>
<p>Le retour de l'État et surtout de ses militaires dans les localités périphériques est, effectivement, souvent <a href="https://www.cordaid.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2020/02/Securing-legitimate-stability-in-CAR-External-assumptions-and-local-perspectives.pdf">invoqué</a> par des gens sur le terrain, du ministre à Bangui à l’agriculteur de la région de Ndélé, dans le nord. </p>
<p>Toutefois, il ressort des discussions plus approfondies que les gens attendent de l'État – contrairement aux groupes rebelles et aux forces étrangères – qu'il s’occupe des questions qui leur tiennent le plus à cœur : l’appartenance et le statut.</p>
<p>Bien des gens ont des attitudes <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/apr/10/foreigners-central-african-republic-coronavirus-fears-grow">xénophobes</a> à l’encontre des habitants d'origine arabe présumée – qu'ils appellent « Tchadiens ». Beaucoup d'autres sont prêts à accueillir les rapatriés déplacés dans les pays voisins en raison de la guerre civile, en espérant qu'ils contribueront à relancer l'économie. </p>
<p>Les Centrafricains s’attendent à ce que l'État ne soit pas simplement une puissance militaire, mais qu'il mène un débat ouvert sur la question de savoir ce que signifie être Centrafricain et qui a le droit de revenir au pays. </p>
<p>La population est lasse de l'impunité dont jouissent les auteurs de violences, alors que les groupes armés ont la mainmise sur de nombreuses régions. Elle attend de l'État non seulement qu'il reprenne le contrôle, mais aussi qu'il rende justice pour les crimes passés et mette fin à l'impunité à l'avenir. </p>
<p>Enfin, les services publics sont presque inexistants car l'État central n'a jamais cherché à développer les périphéries. Le conflit en cours bloque toute tentative de développement. Les personnes auxquelles j'ai parlé souhaitent que l'État consacre ses ressources au service public et fournisse des emplois et un statut à ses citoyens.</p>
<p>Compte tenu de l'histoire de la République centrafricaine, indissociable des groupes armés étrangers et des fréquents coups d'État au sein d'un cercle élitiste restreint, il n'est pas surprenant que ses citoyens doutent des intentions des acteurs actuels de rétablir l'autorité de l'État. </p>
<p>Pour obtenir le soutien durable de la population aux institutions mises en place – une armée nationale plus forte et une administration publique plus importante, il faudra s'attaquer aux problèmes d'appartenance, de statut et de service public. Une simple reconquête militaire ne créera pas de stabilité durable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167654/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Tim Glawion reçoit un financement pour ses recherches universitaires de la Fondation allemande pour la science. Il est chercheur à l'Institut allemand d'études mondiales et régionales (GIGA).</span></em></p>Ce n’est qu’en accordant la priorité aux aspects civils de la gouvernance, tels que l'éducation et la santé, que l'État sera protégé des rébellions susceptibles de remettre en cause son pouvoir.Tim Glawion, Research Fellow, German Institute of Global and Area StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1618552021-06-02T15:07:58Z2021-06-02T15:07:58ZMali: top 5 implications of the latest palace coup<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403761/original/file-20210601-17-z8e5fv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A convoy of Malian armed forces escorts the vehicle of the country's coup leader as he returns from a recent ECOWAS summit where Mali was suspended. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Michele Cattani/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57255601">events</a> in Mali have caused consternation among state actors, domestically and externally, in addition to non-state actors such as jihadi groups operating across the Sahel. </p>
<p>What’s causing <a href="https://theconversation.com/malians-welcomed-previous-coups-but-not-this-one-161723">particular alarm</a> is the fact that there’s been another coup in the country, just nine months after the last one.</p>
<p>The military’s recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/24/military-arrest-malis-president-pm-following-govt-reshuffle">arrest</a> of Mali’s interim president and prime minister is an outright infringement on the country’s nascent democracy. Events in Mali matter not only to ordinary Malians, but to the region and the world. This is because groups associated with both Al-Qaeda and ISIS have found a <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/163177/f18726c3338e39049bd4d554d4a22c36.pdf">use for the country as a base</a> from which to launch attacks across the region. This has destabilised neighbouring countries and threatened the interests of the US, the UK, France and the European Union.</p>
<p>This article explores the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/08/five-things-know-about-malis-coup">top five</a> likely implications of the recent palace coup, and potential solutions. In particular, it points to the need for the political will of key stakeholders to move the needle on Mali’s protracted state decay before it degenerates into full state collapse. </p>
<h2>The five factors that will shift the dial</h2>
<p><strong>Democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law.</strong> As is commonly the case in the event of a coup, the military has disavowed every semblance of democratic tenets by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/14/mali-to-form-new-broad-based-transition-government">suspending</a> the constitution. </p>
<p>This disregard for the provisions of the constitution abrogates the rule of law, which, in turn, breeds anarchy. </p>
<p>The implication is that <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/mali%E2%80%99s-unfortunate-military-coup-unnecessary-setback-democracy">gains in democracy</a>, such as the political compromises that have been made over the years among opposing groups in Mali, will be truncated. And <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/central-mali-uprising-making">local tensions</a>, such as disenchantment towards the state over corruption and in certain cases human rights abuses among the security forces, are likely to increase. </p>
<p>All of this will make it more difficult for the machinery of governance, such as courts, to function. </p>
<p>There is also the strong likelihood of press freedom being stifled, and the shrinking the civic space. </p>
<p>The inevitable outcome would be more chaos and a breakdown into civil unrest. The Sahel region already has <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2013/sahel-one-region-many-crises">pockets of civil unrest</a>. Events in Mali could potentially tilt the scale further. </p>
<p><strong>The economy – regime survival over state survival:</strong> Mali is one of the <a href="https://www.unocha.org/story/sahel-5-things-you-need-know-about-one-world%E2%80%99s-poorest-and-most-vulnerable-regions">poorest countries in the Sahel</a>. The economy continues to experience sub-optimal economic growth and development. The situation has been further complicated by the effects of the <a href="https://www.uncdf.org/article/5609/blog-mali-and-covid">COVID-19 global pandemic</a>. </p>
<p>There’s a strong likelihood that the military junta won’t prioritise economic growth and development but will be more interested in consolidating its hold on political power. Added to this is the fact that potential foreign investors are likely to be more sceptical about bringing in much needed foreign direct investments. The Malian people will bear the brunt.</p>
<p><strong>Distrust and dissatisfaction:</strong> The social contract that exists between the Malian state and the Malian society has come under <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/mali-peace-and-social-cohesion-tormented-multidimensional-crisis">severe pressure</a>. This has resulted in distrust and dissatisfaction between society and the state, eroding the state’s authority and legitimacy. This is worsened by the military’s continued hold on political power. </p>
<p>The military’s interference in domestic politics has reinforced local grievances among groups with divergent interests. The political cost of these rising tensions in the absence of an inclusive political solution is the danger that the country will slip into civil war. This would have dire consequences on the entire Sahel region and the broader West African sub-region. </p>
<p><strong>The war on insurgency and jihadi groups:</strong> The greatest beneficiaries of the unfolding events are the insurgency and jihadi groups seeking to <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/2021-03-02-response-jihadist-groups-sahel-perouse-de-montclos.pdf">derail</a> the Malian state. Having lost state legitimacy, the current military coup makes it difficult for the military junta to “win the hearts and minds” of local people in its fight against these violent extremist groups. </p>
<p>A military junta at the helm of affairs also implies the likelihood of an over-militarised approach at the expense of addressing non-militaristic root causes such as poverty, inequality, the absence of public goods and social services, and functional state institutions. This will exacerbate local tensions that created the situation in the first instance. </p>
<p>Mali cannot afford to lose the war against the jihadist groups. Doing so would have a catastrophic effect on peace and security in and outside the country.</p>
<p><strong>Peace and security in the Sahel and West African sub-region:</strong> As the situation in Mali continues to deteriorate the likelihood of a “domino effect” across weaker states in the Sahel and the broader West African sub-region can’t be ignored. </p>
<p>There’s the danger that the military in other states could also decide to take political power. This would result in a plethora of pariah states. This would, in turn, lead to diminished support from international actors such as the US, the UK, the European Union and France, and prolonged insecurity and instability requiring more foreign military interventions. </p>
<h2>Going forward, what must be done?</h2>
<p>To avert these kinds of consequences there’s a need for a number of quick steps to be taken. </p>
<p>The first is for the current military junta to step aside and reinstate the deposed civilian political leadership. Doing so would serve to strengthen whatever is left of Mali’s nascent democracy. </p>
<p>Secondly, the regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), needs to act firmly beyond mere rhetoric and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-coup-leader-attend-emergency-west-african-summit-2021-05-30/">Mali’s suspension</a>. It must pressure the military regime to relinquish power by imposing targeted sanctions. ECOWAS must then take the lead in working closely with the African Union to facilitate political consultations among the various groups to pave the way for political compromise. This should include people who have been mostly marginalised.</p>
<p>Lastly, the international community must be careful not to impose its will on the political process. It should instead support an “African-led solution to an African problem”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161855/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mali’s state decay must be halted before it collapses: here are five areas that need attention.Folahanmi Aina, Doctoral Candidate in Leadership Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1616212021-05-26T19:02:40Z2021-05-26T19:02:40ZInside Mali’s coup within a coup<p>On the afternoon of May 24, the Malian transitional president, Bah Ndaw, and his prime minister, Moctar Ouane, were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57236104">arrested</a> by members of the armed forces and taken to the Soundiata Keïta military facility in Kati, a camp that has <a href="https://www.lci.fr/international/tensions-au-mali-le-camp-de-kati-deja-a-l-origine-du-coup-d-etat-de-2012-2162015.html">been at the heart of every coup</a> that has taken place in the country. Two days later, Ndaw and Ouane resigned, according to a spokesperson for the military junta, known as the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP).</p>
<p>Mali has been under a transitional government for 18 months, following the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53830348">coup d’état of August 18, 2020</a>, in which the military overthrew President Ibrahim Boubacar Kéita. General elections are <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20210415-mali-le-pouvoir-fixe-les-%C3%A9lections-pr%C3%A9sidentielle-et-l%C3%A9gislatives-%C3%A0-d%C3%A9but-2022">scheduled for early 2022</a>, between February and March.</p>
<p>This current situation seems to be taking the country back to the starting point of August 2020. So how did Mali get here?</p>
<h2>A tense background</h2>
<p>The popular fervour that accompanied the 2020 coup d’état faded very quickly. The junta, which had initially embodied the much hoped-for change, eventually appeared to be a repeat of the system it overthrew. None of the dignitaries of the old regime were questioned, including those against whom there were strong accusations.</p>
<p>On May 14, Ouane submitted the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/14/mali-to-form-new-broad-based-transition-government">resignation of his government</a> to Ndaw, who then immediately reappointed the prime minister to his post and asked him to begin discussions with the political class with a view to forming the next government. This was seen as a welcome step, because it re-established a dialogue between the new authorities and the political class, which had broken down in the months since the 2020 coup. But it seems to have gone badly.</p>
<p>The May 14 cabinet reshuffle took place in an extremely tense context. The M5 protest movement – which opposes the transitional government and is calling for the <a href="https://www.studiotamani.org/index.php/themes/politique/26776-mali-le-m5-rfp-demande-le-limogeage-du-pm-et-la-dissolution-du-cnt">dissolution</a> of the National Transitional Council – had already scheduled a demonstration for June 4.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Mali National Workers’ Union (UNTM) had begun a <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/mali-la-centrale-syndicale-entame-la-deuxi%C3%A8me-phase-de-sa-gr%C3%A8ve/2252494">second straight week of strike action</a>, which was to continue until May 28. Given the political situation, and having no one to talk to in the absence of a government, the union suspended its strike and called on its members to return to work on May 26 until the situation returned to normal.</p>
<p>The colonels of the “ex-CNSP” were informed of the new government at the same time as ordinary Malians – that is, through the media when the list of new ministers was published on May 24. They were surprised to see that two of their members: the minister of defence, Sadio Camara, and the minister of security and civil protection, Modibo Koné, had been left out.</p>
<p>Their reaction was not long in coming: barely an hour after the publication of the new composition of the government, Ouane and Ndaw were arrested and taken to the military camp in Kati.</p>
<h2>The role of the vice-president</h2>
<p>Colonel Assimi Goita, the vice-president of the transitional government, who is also the leader of the junta, could not have been clearer in a communiqué which was read out on national television on May 25. In it, he denounced the prime minister and the president for forming the new government “without consultation with the vice-president”, namely himself.</p>
<p>Goita also underlined his attachment to the <a href="https://www.dw.com/fr/mali-que-pr%C3%A9voit-la-charte-de-la-transition/a-55134016">transition charter</a>. But this charter clearly stipulates that he does not have the right to replace the transition president. The post of vice-president did not exist before the coup, and was created specifically to be occupied by a member of the junta – it’s therefore seen as a way for the junta to plan for the possibility of leading the transition.</p>
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<p>For this reason, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) made the lifting of sanctions on Mali <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/mali-la-cedeao-veut-des-pr%C3%A9cisions-sur-les-pouvoirs-du-vice-pr%C3%A9sident-/1992288">conditional</a> on adding to the charter a provision clearly stipulating that the vice-president cannot himself replace the president of the transitional government.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether the detention of the president and prime minister is a temporary impediment or a permanent removal. In the second case, which seems to be the most likely, Mali is facing a coup d’état within a coup d’état.</p>
<h2>Courting M5</h2>
<p>On May 25, ECOWAS sent its <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/26/us-mali-politics">transitional envoy</a>, former Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan, to Mali. The attitude of ECOWAS, and more generally of the international community – France, the United States and the UN through its Malian mission, <a href="https://minusma.unmissions.org/">Minusma</a> – will be decisive in the outcome of events.</p>
<p>The coup plotters are aware of this and are now seeking to secure the support of the people and political actors, in particular M5 – the protest movement that, in weakening Kéita’s power, allowed the 2020 coup to take place.</p>
<p>Although M5 was at the heart of the earlier coup, it ended up being mostly excluded from the transition, with the exception of a few of its members. Things may not be the same this time. The junta invited the M5 movement’s leaders to Kati just hours after the arrest of the president and prime minister. This may have been a way for the military to offer the leaders of the movement new positions in government, both to secure their support and to make amends for excluding them in the past.</p>
<h2>France v Russia</h2>
<p>Since the president and his prime minister were arrested, a certain opinion has been formed by supporters of the junta who believe that the current situation comes down to a confrontation of two divergent points of view.</p>
<p>The first, represented by the arrested executive, is seen as beholden to the interests of France – the publication of the new cabinet came barely 48 hours after Ndaw’s return from Paris. The second, representing the junta, opposes the influence of Mali’s former coloniser, promoting instead a rapprochement with Russia.</p>
<p>This latter argument carries a lot of weight with those who have a negative view of the French military presence in Mali, and who regularly <a href="http://lhistoireenrafale.lunion.fr/2021/01/20/mali-une-manifestation-contre-la-presence-de-la-force-barkhane/">protest</a> against operations in the country.</p>
<p>An immediate analysis that can be made regarding this latest power grab is that the members of the junta are worried they have not been sufficiently involved in the formation of the new government, especially after the dismissal of two of its members.</p>
<p>Beyond the simple loss of these ministerial posts, it’s probable the junta saw the announcement of the new government as the beginning of the process of its removal from Mali’s political affairs. This could also have meant the beginning of legal problems for those involved, given that the Malian constitution makes coup d’état a crime for which there is no statute of limitations.</p>
<p>What happens next? The transitional government will probably receive the support of ECOWAS and of Mali’s international partners, first and foremost France. It is now up to these different players to intervene, because they are the only ones able to resolve this fast-moving situation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161621/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Boubacar Haidara ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Mali’s president and prime minister have just been arrested and dismissed by the military junta which brought them to power in the first place a few months ago. How did this happen?Boubacar Haidara, Chercheur associé au laboratoire Les Afriques dans le Monde (LAM), Sciences-Po Bordeaux., Université Bordeaux MontaigneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1528032021-01-07T02:10:33Z2021-01-07T02:10:33ZWas it a coup? No, but siege on US Capitol was the election violence of a fragile democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377439/original/file-20210106-15-jwk6ne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Insurrection at the US Capitol, Jan. 6, 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bill Clark/CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Did the United States just have a coup attempt? </p>
<p>Supporters of President Donald Trump, following his encouragement, stormed the U.S. Capitol building on Jan. 6, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-protesters-again-dispute-trumps-defeat-d-c-police-make-arrests-11609945368">disrupting the certification</a> of Joe Biden’s election victory. Waving Trump banners, <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/watch-hundreds-of-trump-supporters-storm-capitol-hill-break-fences-and-fight-with-police-2021-01-06">hundreds of people</a> broke through barricades and smashed windows to enter the building where Congress convenes. One <a href="https://www.fox5dc.com/news/woman-shot-killed-after-pro-trump-protesters-charged-us-capitol-identified">rioter and one police officer died</a> in the clash and <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/trump-us-capitol-dc-protest-2021-01-06/">several other police officers were hospitalized</a>. Congress went on lockdown.</p>
<p>While violent and shocking, what happened on Jan. 6 wasn’t a coup. </p>
<p>This Trumpist insurrection was election violence, much like the election violence that <a href="https://theconversation.com/once-you-engage-in-political-violence-it-becomes-easier-to-do-it-again-an-expert-on-political-violence-reflects-on-events-at-the-capitol-152801">plagues many fragile democracies</a>.</p>
<h2>What is a coup?</h2>
<p>While coups do not have a single definition, researchers who study them – <a href="https://oefresearch.org/activities/coup-cast">like ourselves</a> – agree on the key attributes of what academics call a “coup event.” </p>
<p>Coup experts <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343310397436">Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne</a> define a coup d’etat as “an overt attempt by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of state using unconstitutional means.”</p>
<p>Essentially, three parameters are used to judge whether an insurrection is a coup event:</p>
<p>1) Are the perpetrators agents of the state, such as military officials or rogue governmental officials? </p>
<p>2) Is the target of the insurrection the chief executive of the government?</p>
<p>3) Do the plotters use illegal and unconstitutional methods to seize executive power?</p>
<h2>Coups and coup attempts</h2>
<p>A successful coup occurred in Egypt on July 3, 2013, when army chief Abdel Fattah al-Sisi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html">forcefully removed</a> the country’s unpopular president, Mohamed Morsi. Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected leader, had recently overseen the writing of a new constitution. Al-Sisi suspended that, too. This qualifies as a coup because al-Sisi seized power illegally and introduced his own rule of law in the ashes of the elected government. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377457/original/file-20210106-23-hydyzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Civilians and soldiers in fatigues holding weapons cheer on a balcony, at night" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377457/original/file-20210106-23-hydyzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377457/original/file-20210106-23-hydyzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377457/original/file-20210106-23-hydyzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377457/original/file-20210106-23-hydyzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377457/original/file-20210106-23-hydyzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377457/original/file-20210106-23-hydyzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377457/original/file-20210106-23-hydyzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Egyptian protesters celebrate the military overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi along with officers of the Egyptian Republican Guard, July 3, 2013, in Cairo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/egyptian-opposition-protesters-and-officers-of-the-egyptian-news-photo/172570168?adppopup=true">Ed Giles/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Coups don’t always succeed in overthrowing the government.</p>
<p>In 2016, members of the Turkish military <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-will-turkeys-failed-coup-and-massive-purge-affect-its-economic-future-62947">attempted to remove Turkey’s strongman president, Reçep Erdogan, from power</a>. Soldiers seized key areas in Ankara, the capital, and Istanbul, including the Bosphorus Bridge and two airports. But the coup lacked coordination and widespread support, and it <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/take-to-the-streets-turkeys-failed-coup-one-year-later/">failed quickly</a> after President Erdogan called on his supporters to confront the plotters. Erdogan remains in power today. </p>
<h2>What happened at the US Capitol?</h2>
<p>The uprising at the Capitol building does not meet all three criteria of a coup.</p>
<p>Trump’s rioting supporters targeted a branch of executive authority – Congress – and they did so illegally, through trespassing and property destruction. Categories #2 and #3, check.</p>
<p>As for category #1, the rioters appeared to be civilians operating of their own volition, not state actors. President Trump did <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2021/01/06/washington-dc-protest-twitter-facebook-silence-donald-trump/6569864002/">incite his followers</a> to march on the Capitol building less than an hour before the crowd invaded the grounds, insisting the election had been stolen and saying “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-protests/trump-invited-supporters-to-wild-protest-and-told-them-to-fight-they-did-idUSKBN29B24S">We will not take it anymore</a>.” This comes after months of spreading unfounded electoral lies and conspiracies that created a perception of government malfeasance in the mind of many Trump supporters. </p>
<p>Whether the president’s motivation in inflaming the anger of his supporters was to assault Congress is not clear, and he tepidly <a href="https://abc7.com/president-donald-trump-news-twitter-washington-dc-protest/9414371">told them to go home as the violence escalated</a>. For now it seems the riot in Washington, D.C., was enacted without the approval, aid or active leadership of government actors like the military, police or <a href="https://twitter.com/tedcruz/status/1346911179042484230">sympathetic GOP officials</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377475/original/file-20210107-14-pnllvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A Congress staffer holds his hands up while Capitol Police SWAT team clears an office" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377475/original/file-20210107-14-pnllvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377475/original/file-20210107-14-pnllvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377475/original/file-20210107-14-pnllvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377475/original/file-20210107-14-pnllvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377475/original/file-20210107-14-pnllvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377475/original/file-20210107-14-pnllvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377475/original/file-20210107-14-pnllvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">SWAT police try to clear the Capitol building of pro-Trump rioters, Jan. 6, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/congress-staffer-holds-his-hands-up-while-capitol-police-news-photo/1230457711?adppopup=true">Olivier Douliery/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>American political elites are hardly blameless, though. </p>
<p>By spreading conspiracy theories about election fraud, numerous Republican senators, including <a href="https://www.vox.com/2021/1/4/22213246/republican-senators-hawley-cruz-cotton-trump-electoral-college-presidential-election-joe-biden">Josh Hawley and Ted Cruz</a>, created the conditions for political violence in the United States, and specifically electoral-related violence. </p>
<p>Academics have documented that <a href="https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2020/10/13/assessing-the-risk-of-electoral-violence-in-the-united-states/">contentious political rhetoric</a> fuels the risk of election-related violence. Elections are high-stakes; they represent a transfer of political power. When <a href="https://www.dartmouth.edu/%7Enyhan/democratic-norms.pdf">government officials demean and discredit democratic institutions</a> as a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546550902950290">simmering political conflict</a> is underway, contested elections can trigger political violence and mob rule.</p>
<h2>So what did happen?</h2>
<p>The shocking events of Jan. 6 were political violence of the sort that too often mars elections in young or unstable democracies. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/01/22/world/bangladesh-protests-violence-arrests/index.html">Bangladeshi elections suffer from</a> perennial mob violence and political insurrections due to years of government violence and opposition anger. Its 2015 and 2018 elections looked more like war zones than democratic transitions.</p>
<p>In Cameroon, armed dissidents perpetrated violence in the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/12/cameroon-election-violence-anglophone-regions">2020 election</a>, targeting government buildings, opposition figures and innocent bystanders alike. Their aim was to delegitimize the vote in response to sectarian violence and government overreach. </p>
<p>The United States’ electoral violence differs in cause and context from that seen in Bangladesh and Cameroon, but the action was similar. The U.S. didn’t have a coup, but this Trump-encouraged insurrection is likely to send the country down a politically and socially turbulent road. </p>
<p><em>This story has been updated to reflect the death toll of the Jan. 6 Capitol insurrection.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152803/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clayton Besaw is a senior analyst with the One Earth Future Foundation and the Open Nuclear Network, a non-profit organization that promotes peace and security in post-conflict countries and the mitigation of nuclear weapons proliferation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Frank is an analyst with the One Earth Future Foundation and the Open Nuclear Network, a non-profit organization that promotes peace and security in post-conflict countries and the mitigation of nuclear weapon proliferation.</span></em></p>Trump supporters stormed the US Capitol on Jan. 6, disrupting Congress’s certification of Joe Biden as president-elect. Coup experts explain this violent insurrection wasn’t technically a coup.Clayton Besaw, Research Affiliate and Senior Analyst, University of Central FloridaMatthew Frank, Master's student, International Security, University of DenverLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1502002020-11-16T15:05:21Z2020-11-16T15:05:21ZPeru ‘coup’: public fury forces resignation of interim president leaving dangerous power vacuum<p>Peru is in deep crisis. The week-long regime of interim president Manuel Merino has been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-54953546">brought crashing down</a> in the face of mass protests by tens of thousands of angry protesters. Three people were killed and dozens injured throughout the week when demonstrators took to the streets in Peru’s major cities, including the capital Lima, to protest the ousting of popular president Martín Vizcarra. </p>
<p>Vizcarra was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/10/impeachment-kicks-out-president-martin-vizcarra-of-peru">deposed as president</a> on November 9 over bribery allegations which he denies and which many are denouncing as a “parliamentary coup”. </p>
<p>Merino’s resignation followed the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/peru-s-interim-leader-resigns-after-upheaval-over-popular-president-n1247869">resignation of 13 cabinet ministers</a> over police brutality and the interim president’s handling of the crisis. It is now up to congress to elect a successor. </p>
<p>It’s the latest development in more than a week of political turmoil in Peru, which began when congress announced it had voted to dismiss Vizcarra for corruption, arguing that he was “morally incapable” of ruling the country. This prompted much <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/10/peru-coup-accusations-head-of-congress-made-president-predecessor-ousted">speculation</a> as to the thin line between impeachment and coup.</p>
<h2>‘Moral incapacity’</h2>
<p>Article 117 of Peru’s <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Peru_2009.pdf?lang=en">Constitution</a> only allows impeachment under charges of treason, preventing the celebration of elections, and/or dissolving or obstructing the work of congress. The concept of “moral capacity” refers not to impeachment, but to “presidential vacancy” – situations where the president is unable to discharge his or her duties. Under Article 113 the presidency is vacant if the incumbent dies, resigns, flees, is impeached or suffers from “permanent physical or moral incapacity”.</p>
<p>This term, “moral incapacity” is a 19th-century term meant to apply in cases of insanity, where a person is no longer able to distinguish “good” from “evil” – in other words, if the presidency was vacant because the office-holder was incapacitated by reason of mental disability. Invoking Article 113 to remove a president required a medical certificate – not articles of impeachment.</p>
<p>But in 2000, the then president <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-16097439">Alberto Fujimori</a> – who is presently serving jail time for corruption and crimes against humanity – fled the country and resigned the presidency. An outraged congress refused to accept his resignation and instead declared the presidency vacant by reason of “moral incapacity”. </p>
<p>Fujimori did not suffer from any mental disability, but was instead deemed “too immoral to rule”. At the time this was seen as a practical fix for a once-in-a-lifetime crisis – a move that expressed the country’s collective sense of censure towards Fujimori’s actions, not a precedent to be used frequently. It had not been successfully used again until last week.</p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.tvperu.gob.pe/noticias/locales/ipsos-el-78-considera-que-el-presidente-vizcarra-debe-continuar-en-el-cargo">popular with the voters</a>, Vizcarra had no congressional majority. His anti-corruption reforms, including attempts at curtailing parliamentary immunity, angered a congress where <a href="https://caretas.pe/politica/estos-son-los-68-congresistas-que-tienen-procesos-en-investigacion-en-el-ministerio-publico/">68 of 130</a> members are facing various criminal investigations. </p>
<p>The Fujimori “precedent” became a convenient political tool for the 2020 congress. Instead of the traditional interpretation, where the presidency vacates because of a specific event (for example, resignation, death or incapacity), congress decided “vacancy” was rather a congressional prerogative, where lawmakers can remove the president provided enough of them vote to do so. </p>
<p>Under this interpretation, immorality becomes anything congress defines it to be – without regard for due process. In Vizcarra’s case, the excuse was a still ongoing investigation for bribes allegedly received before his tenure as president. Vizcarra was removed before the investigation ended and without any legal certainty that a crime had been committed. </p>
<h2>Power vacuum</h2>
<p>Once Vizcarra had been removed, Merino – as speaker of the congress – assumed the presidency. Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/12/peru-ousting-president-threatens-rule-law">warned</a> that: “There is every reason to suspect that they [supporters of the vote to remove the president] will use Vizcarra’s ousting to further undermine the rule of law.” </p>
<p>Protesters took to the streets, bringing a savage response from security forces. As the week wore on, Merino’s position came under more and more pressure and, after the resignation of the majority of his cabinet, he resigned and congress declared the presidency vacant.</p>
<p>Peru is not the first Latin American country to experience this kind of parliamentary “coup”. In the past decade, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/28/honduras-coup-president-zelaya">Honduras</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/24/paraguay-president-fernando-lugo">Paraguay</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/aug/31/dilma-rousseff-impeachment-brazil-what-you-need-to-know">Brazil</a> have all experienced similar manipulations of constitutional law. Acknowledging this trend, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights has been trying to establish <a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/solicitudoc/sor_01_18_ing.pdf">clear guidelines</a> to separate parliamentary coups from impeachment procedures. </p>
<p>In the specific case of Peru, it recently <a href="http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2020/270.asp">stated</a> that “lack of an objective definition [for moral incapacity] gives [congress] a high degree of discretion that may undermine the principle of democratic institutionality”. In fact, in October 2017, the commission requested an <a href="https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/docs/pdfs/2017/Solicitud-OpinionConsultiva-JuicioPolitico-en.pdf">advisory opinion</a> from the Inter-American Court on the issue of distinguishing impeachments from parliamentary coups. Regrettably, the court <a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/solicitudoc/sor_01_18_ing.pdf">refused</a> the request in 2018.</p>
<p>The growing popularity of parliamentary coups in Latin America is frequently overlooked outside of the region, but it is nonetheless an extremely worrying practice. What has happened in Peru should be seen by the international community as a renewed opportunity to examine this new kind of antidemocratic procedure. In the meantime, without a clear consensus on how to move forward and restore stability, there will be difficult months ahead for Peru – and Latin American democracy in general.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150200/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Peru is the latest in a chain of Latin American countries where a leader has been removed via a ‘parliamentary coup’.Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg, PhD researcher, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.