tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/crimes-against-humanity-12799/articlesCrimes against humanity – The Conversation2024-01-25T13:17:44Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2201992024-01-25T13:17:44Z2024-01-25T13:17:44ZNazi genocides of Jews and Roma were entangled from the start – and so are their efforts at Holocaust remembrance today<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570420/original/file-20240119-27-9655vn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1%2C1022%2C680&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Franz Roselbach, a Roma survivor of the Holocaust who was sent to Auschwitz when he was 15, attends a ceremony at the former Sachsenhausen concentration camp in 2006. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/roma-survivor-of-the-holocaust-franz-roselbach-who-was-sent-news-photo/72830867?adppopup=true">Sean Gallup/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the United Nations passed a resolution to designate Jan. 27 International Holocaust Remembrance Day, it did not define the Holocaust. <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/u-n-resolution-establishing-holocaust-remembrance-day">The 2005 proclamation</a> merely noted that it “resulted in the murder of one third of the Jewish people, along with countless members of other minorities.”</p>
<p>Among those unnamed other minorities are Roma, who deserve to be part of the larger story of the Holocaust commemorated on this day. Their story is <a href="https://as.vanderbilt.edu/jewishstudies/people/faculty/ari-joskowicz/">closely connected with that of Jews’ suffering and struggle for recognition</a> – a relationship at the center of <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691244044/rain-of-ash">my 2023 book</a>, “Rain of Ash.”</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570426/original/file-20240119-25-j22s4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A blue and green flag with a red wheel design waves in front of a large stone monument with a statue on top." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570426/original/file-20240119-25-j22s4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570426/original/file-20240119-25-j22s4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570426/original/file-20240119-25-j22s4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570426/original/file-20240119-25-j22s4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570426/original/file-20240119-25-j22s4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570426/original/file-20240119-25-j22s4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570426/original/file-20240119-25-j22s4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A Romani flag waves during an event on International Romani Day in front of Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/romani-flag-hangs-at-a-pro-romani-demonstration-in-front-of-news-photo/468905978?adppopup=true">Adam Berry/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>A chilling report</h2>
<p>To understand the connections between Jewish and Romani experiences, it is useful to return to one of the key moments when Europe’s Jews began to realize that they faced a new type of threat: systematic mass murder.</p>
<p>In March 1942, a prisoner fled Chelmno, a Nazi extermination camp in present-day Poland, <a href="http://www.deathcamps.org/occupation/bajler.html">and escaped to the Warsaw Ghetto</a>. There, he told members of the ghetto’s underground resistance movement about mass killings in gas vans. </p>
<p>Szlamek, as the witness was known, recounted how Jewish prisoners had been <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/title/63902356">forced to dig mass graves</a> for truckload upon truckload of murdered Roma from Austria. In his vivid description of the process, he reported how these Jewish gravediggers warmed themselves by putting on the clothes of the Romani victims. Once their work for the day was done, the SS forced these Jews to lie on the bodies of those already in the burial pits before being shot themselves.</p>
<p>It’s a haunting image: Jews murdered on top of the Roma whose clothes they were wearing. It also encapsulates how connected the murders of these two groups were, even as the crimes committed against them continue to be remembered as distinct events.</p>
<h2>Missing chapter</h2>
<p>Younger generations in the United States are <a href="https://www.claimscon.org/millennial-study/">not able to identify basic facts about the Jewish Holocaust</a>, according to surveys by the Claims Conference, which advocates for restitution for Jewish victims and their descendants. Around half of millennial and Gen Z respondents could not name a single ghetto or concentration camp, and just over a third knew how many Jews had been murdered: around 6 million.</p>
<p>The public knows even less about the Romani Holocaust. Indeed, the history of <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/roma-eu/roma-equality-inclusion-and-participation-eu_en">Europe’s largest ethnic minority</a> is a blank slate for many Americans, even those who consider themselves well-informed.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571224/original/file-20240124-25-o43d27.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A faded photograph of a soldier and a man in a suit standing as they interview a shorter woman in a kerchief." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571224/original/file-20240124-25-o43d27.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571224/original/file-20240124-25-o43d27.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571224/original/file-20240124-25-o43d27.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571224/original/file-20240124-25-o43d27.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571224/original/file-20240124-25-o43d27.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571224/original/file-20240124-25-o43d27.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571224/original/file-20240124-25-o43d27.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Dr. Robert Ritter, whose pseudo-scientific work contributed to the Nazis’ forced sterilization and murder of Romani people, interviews a woman in 1938.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/gypsy-deportation-dr-robert-ritter-head-of-the-racial-news-photo/107759810?adppopup=true">Galerie Bilderwelt/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>This is not a matter of students ignoring, or not properly absorbing, the lessons available in their history textbooks, as is the case for the Jewish Holocaust. Romani history is rarely in the textbooks to begin with.</p>
<p>Romani activists are keenly aware of this, and frequently they see Jews’ relative success telling the story of their genocide as a model for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2019/10/30/roma-holocaust-amid-rising-hate-forgotten-victims-remembered">Romani struggles for recognition</a>.</p>
<p>Nazi Germany persecuted many groups; concentration camps were originally built to imprison the regime’s political opponents, while the first dedicated killing sites’ purpose was <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/euthanasia-program">to murder disabled people</a>. Among those persecuted, Roma and Jews were the only groups whom the Nazis and their allies systematically persecuted in large numbers as entire families – whether by deporting them to concentration and death camps, or <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/mass-shootings-of-jews-during-the-holocaust">systematically shooting them as racialized groups</a> in occupied areas of the Soviet Union. </p>
<p>As with Jews, many of Roma’s experiences of persecution and genocide occurred in locations well known to people who have learned something about the Holocaust, such as Auschwitz or <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/lodz">the Lodz ghetto in occupied Poland</a>. The Roma murdered in Chelmno <a href="http://www.lodz-ghetto.com/the_gypsy_camp.html,36">came from Lodz</a>, where the Nazis had deported over 5,000 Roma from Austria in November 1941. Many <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/roma-genocide/austria">Austrian Roma</a> who avoided these early deportations eventually ended up in Auschwitz. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570423/original/file-20240119-19-wp9t65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An index card filled in with personal information positioned between three photographs of the same woman's face and two handprints." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570423/original/file-20240119-19-wp9t65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570423/original/file-20240119-19-wp9t65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1272&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570423/original/file-20240119-19-wp9t65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1272&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570423/original/file-20240119-19-wp9t65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1272&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570423/original/file-20240119-19-wp9t65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1599&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570423/original/file-20240119-19-wp9t65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1599&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570423/original/file-20240119-19-wp9t65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1599&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Gestapo dossiers for Roma people, whom the Nazis persecuted and considered ‘foreign and inferior.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/sinti-and-roma-gestapo-dossiers-at-the-permanent-exhibition-news-photo/523965182?adppopup=true">Horacio Villalobos/Corbis via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>In the end, the Nazis killed approximately three-quarters of <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/roma-genocide/austria">Austria’s prewar Romani population</a>: approximately 9,000 men, women and children. Among countries where the Romani genocide took place, this was one of the highest rates of murder, next to <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/roma-genocide/latvia">Latvia</a>, <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/roma-genocide/estonia">Estonia</a> and the areas of today’s Czech Republic that the Nazis <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/roma-genocide/czech-republic">called the Protectorate</a>. </p>
<p>In many other locations, totals are less clear. Serious estimates for <a href="https://www.romarchive.eu/en/voices-of-the-victims/the-number-of-victims/">the overall number of victims</a> range widely, from 120,000 to over half a million.</p>
<h2>Many languages, many faiths, many countries</h2>
<p>Romani people are highly diverse. They have many religions: Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodox Christianity as well as Islam. Many <a href="https://rm.coe.int/roma-history-factsheets-eng/1680a2f2f8">speak Romani as their first language</a>, while others don’t. Whatever their relationship to the Romani language, all Roma are at home in at least one other language, depending on what country they live in. </p>
<p>Historically, many Romani families in Western Europe lived as itinerant traders and craftspeople, contributing to the popular image of them as travelers with wagon homes. Most Roma in Europe, however – particularly in Southeastern and East Central Europe, <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/10/20/sunday-review/a-diaspora-of-11-million.html">where the largest Romani populations live</a> – have been settled for many generations. Whether considered nomadic or settled, they were stigmatized: frequently isolated at the edge of settlements, excluded from civil rights, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/20/italys-treatment-of-roma-people-reflects-a-centuries-old-prejudice">targeted as a dangerous “nuisance</a>” by authorities.</p>
<p>When the Nazis and their allies persecuted this diverse population as “Gypsies,” they were able to <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/documentation-on-the-persecution-of-roma">rely on policies to police and surveil them</a> that had been <a href="https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/bavarian-precedent-roma-european-culture">in place since the late 19th century</a>.</p>
<p>These policies, including special identity cards with fingerprints, did not disappear after liberation. Instead, following the Second World War, Roma across Europe remained marginalized <a href="https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/6450629">and overpoliced</a> in ways that made it hard for them to gain recognition of the genocide they had experienced.</p>
<h2>Shared stories</h2>
<p>An international Romani civil rights movement that took shape in the 1970s, building on earlier local efforts to organize, slowly changed this. Organizations like <a href="https://iru2020.org/">the International Romani Union</a>, <a href="https://eriac.org/">the European Roma Institute for Arts and Culture</a> and <a href="https://zentralrat.sintiundroma.de/en/">the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma</a>, are forming a new landscape for Romani politics and recognition.</p>
<p>From the start, their efforts were tied together with those of Jewish victims. Jewish survivors could build on a much longer history of international organizing and philanthropy, and after 1945 they could rely on the help of the thriving U.S. Jewish community in their quest to document Nazi crimes and explain them to the wider public. Many of the oldest Jewish institutions in this field, such as <a href="https://wienerholocaustlibrary.org/">the Wiener Holocaust Library</a> in London, offered crucial support, as scholars and activists strove to tell the history of the Romani Holocaust. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570424/original/file-20240119-25-s0yn47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Five older men in suits and ties sit in a semicircle as one pulls up his sleeve." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570424/original/file-20240119-25-s0yn47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570424/original/file-20240119-25-s0yn47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570424/original/file-20240119-25-s0yn47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570424/original/file-20240119-25-s0yn47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570424/original/file-20240119-25-s0yn47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570424/original/file-20240119-25-s0yn47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570424/original/file-20240119-25-s0yn47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Hermann Hoellenreiner, a Sinto Holocaust survivor, shows his prisoner tattoo to David Lewin, a Jewish Holocaust survivor, as they and officials travel to a commemoration ceremony in 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/german-president-christian-wulff-looks-on-as-sinto-news-photo/108426185?adppopup=true">Jesco Denzel/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Roma and Jews found new ways to connect through their efforts for recognition and redress, though Jewish intellectuals, activists and institutions had much greater access to resources. <a href="https://vha.usc.edu/home">The Shoah Foundation’s Visual History Archive</a> is emblematic here: It has over 50,000 video interviews with Jewish survivors and 406 with Romani survivors. Yet this is nevertheless the largest dedicated collection of Romani testimony in the world.</p>
<p>While this unequal partnership has not dissolved, it is transforming. Jewish institutions are increasingly investing resources to preserve and digitize Romani history and to promote public education about both peoples’ experiences in collaboration with Romani activists. At the same time, Romani and Jewish activists are <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691244044/rain-of-ash">working together to overcome antisemitism and anti-Roma sentiment</a> – linked by a sense that understanding history is essential for the defense of liberal democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220199/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ari Joskowicz received funding from the American Philosophical Society, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies, the American Society of Learned Societies, and the Vienna Wiesenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies.</span></em></p>Many young people today know little about the murder of European Jews during the Holocaust, and even less about the murder of Romani communities.Ari Joskowicz, Associate Professor of History, Jewish Studies and European Studies, Vanderbilt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2134152023-09-24T12:01:18Z2023-09-24T12:01:18ZThe global approach to serious crimes is shifting to domestic trials – here’s what I found in three African countries<p>Domestic trials of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are considered quicker, cheaper and more responsive to victims’ needs than the International Criminal Court’s trials in The Hague. </p>
<p>But prioritising domestic accountability for the most serious crimes has both advantages and disadvantages.</p>
<p>In a recently published book, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/international-criminal-tribunals-and-domestic-accountability-9780198868842?cc=uk&lang=en&">International Criminal Tribunals and Domestic Accountability: In The Court’s Shadow</a>, I analyse the complex relationship between international and domestic accountability initiatives. I also look at how an ongoing shift from international to domestic trials has impacted the global fight against impunity.</p>
<p>I drew on the experiences of three African countries – the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Sierra Leone. I argue that national justice systems are likely to be the primary forum for trials of serious crimes in the foreseeable future. However, there’s a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isr/article-abstract/22/1/26/5253596">growing tendency to romanticise</a> what can be accomplished at the national level. Meanwhile, the ability of international criminal tribunals to serve the wider cause of human rights is being downplayed. </p>
<p>Going forward, I hope to spur a more nuanced conversation about how international and domestic justice should work together. </p>
<h2>Domestic justice</h2>
<p>International criminal justice is still associated with high-profile cases. One of these is the International Criminal Court’s recent <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and">arrest warrant against Russian president Vladimir Putin</a>. </p>
<p>However, national courts now prosecute far more people for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. This is true for most countries. Whether it be in the <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/91073-kasai-justice-against-all-odds.html">DRC</a>, <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/109654-map-of-war-crimes-trials-in-ukraine.html">Ukraine</a> or <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/44105-transitional-justice-the-fascinating-colombian-challenge.html">Colombia</a>, the International Criminal Court plays a backup role. And it’s had only a <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/cases">handful of convictions</a> over 20 years.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-and-the-icc-history-shows-just-how-hard-it-is-to-bring-a-head-of-state-to-justice-202247">Putin and the ICC: history shows just how hard it is to bring a head of state to justice</a>
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<p>This is one of the reasons that domestic justice is now celebrated as quicker, cheaper and more victim-friendly. Just two decades after the International Criminal Court was created, many stakeholders now argue that “<a href="https://www.nurembergacademy.org/fileadmin/user_upload/05_12-14_Concept_Note.pdf#page=1">the future of international criminal justice is domestic</a>”.</p>
<p>To better understand the relationship between international and domestic trials, I studied three African cases. I analysed the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc">International Criminal Court’s work in the DRC</a>, the <a href="https://rscsl.org/">Special Court for Sierra Leone</a> and the <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</a>. </p>
<p>Drawing on more than 200 interviews with civil servants, magistrates, diplomats and civil society representatives, I assessed what kind of “shadow effects” the three international tribunals had on prosecutions of serious crimes at the national level.</p>
<p>My findings confirm that the pursuit of accountability for serious crimes is complex. One shouldn’t expect quick and simple fixes when thousands of people suffer serious human rights violations. But based on 30 years of international criminal justice interventions on the African continent, I identified four trends. These reveal opportunities and challenges in the global fight against impunity.</p>
<h2>Trends shaping international interventions</h2>
<p>First, the numbers illustrate the declining importance of international trials. The Rwanda and <a href="https://www.icty.org/">Yugoslav</a> tribunals indicted hundreds of people starting in the mid-1990s. Sierra Leone’s special court prosecuted 13 suspects in the 2000s. Today, the International Criminal Court handles between one and four international cases per country. </p>
<p>Second, with international criminal tribunals <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13642980500170782">facing criticism</a> in the 1990s and 2000s, the international community shifted attention to state-level accountability processes. As the number of international trials decreased, domestic prosecutions increased in some countries. But the track record is mixed. Hundreds of national trials in Rwanda and the DRC can be contrasted with the (near) absence of cases in Sierra Leone. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/prosecution-or-compensation-what-kenyan-choices-tell-us-about-international-justice-187941">Prosecution or compensation? What Kenyan choices tell us about international justice</a>
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<p>Third, there’s still little evidence that domestic justice performs better than international criminal tribunals. Donors and NGOs increasingly prioritise capacity-building initiatives for national magistrates and attorneys. But they avoid the political dimensions of state-led justice efforts. The difficult questions they need to address include: why are some perpetrators prosecuted domestically but not others? Which national trials are unfair? What effects do selective national prosecutions have on nation-building?</p>
<p>For instance, hundreds of trials before Congolese mobile courts are rightly celebrated. But the Congolese army has used international support to <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/86538-transitional-justice-drc-congo-how-un-united-nations-put-in-drawer.html">consolidate its power</a> at the expense of the civilian justice sector. <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2725915">Scholars</a> have expressed similar concerns about the unintended consequences of Rwanda’s domestic justice process.</p>
<p>Fourth, the International Criminal Court was expected to encourage a domestic reckoning with serious crimes by casting a “positive shadow” over national judges, prosecutors and attorneys. Instead, international prosecutors and judges in The Hague have often adopted risk-averse readings of their powers. And they have often ignored the work – good and bad – of their domestic counterparts. This practice may promote selective national prosecutions that entrench the (authoritarian) power of ruling elites in countries like the DRC, Central African Republic, Libya or Mali. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>There are two main takeaways. First, international criminal tribunals sometimes unintentionally cast an “authoritarian shadow” over domestic justice efforts. Second, too much emphasis on national trials may promote illiberal tendencies in some contexts. I encourage a more critical look at how international and domestic justice relate to one another. Simple formulas like “the future of international criminal justice is domestic” don’t always help. </p>
<p>But the book is an appeal for action rather than despair. It proposes strategies to overcome obstacles to domestic accountability. These include greater civil society engagement, cooperation with domestic law enforcement actors and trial monitoring. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the global fight against impunity remains a work in progress. The search for a balance between international and domestic accountability efforts will require further study.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213415/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patryk Labuda received funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation for this research (grant no. 165419). </span></em></p>The push for national trials reflects a disappointment with the slow pace and high costs of international justice.Patryk I. Labuda, Research Fellow, University of ZurichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2113062023-09-18T21:13:45Z2023-09-18T21:13:45ZCanada’s war crimes investigation may not deter Russia, but it matters to Ukrainians<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/canadas-war-crimes-investigation-may-not-deter-russia-but-it-matters-to-ukrainians" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>In June 2022, United States Attorney General Merrick Garland <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/21/world/europe/merrick-garland-ukraine-war-crimes.html">travelled to Ukraine</a> to call for the prosecution of Russian war crimes. </p>
<p>“The United States is sending an unmistakable message” to those who have committed atrocities, he said. “There is no place to hide.” </p>
<p>There’s only one problem: American hands are tied when it comes to the international prosecution of war crimes. That’s because it opted out of the International Criminal Court (ICC) due to objections over the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works">court’s jurisdiction</a> that allows it, <a href="https://how-the-icc-works.aba-icc.org/">under certain conditions</a>, to pursue people outside their own state borders. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38005282#">Russia has also withdrawn from the ICC</a>. Ukraine isn’t a member; it signed but didn’t ratify the court’s statute.</p>
<p>That means it will fall to <a href="https://asp.icc-cpi.int/states-parties">third-country signatories to the ICC</a> like <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/icc-cpi/index.aspx?lang=eng">Canada</a> to investigate and prosecute Russian war crimes in Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Institutionalizing war crimes</h2>
<p>Around the First World War, the great powers began codifying the laws of war in <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/hague-conventions">several conventions</a> <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions">and treaties</a>. </p>
<p>Building on centuries of law, these agreements specified when countries could go to war and under what conditions, spelled out the treatment of both combatants and non-combatants and limited the use of weapons and other practices during warfare. </p>
<p>These fledgling agreements did little to prevent the outbreak of another global conflict, but they did provide the foundation for the world’s first international tribunals in Tokyo and Nuremberg following the Second World War.</p>
<p>That marked a decisive moment for international law, representing the first time national leaders were held accountable for war crimes on the world stage.</p>
<p>Under American stewardship, the immediate post-Second World War period witnessed a massive expansion of international law. </p>
<p>New treaties were drafted <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">criminalizing genocide</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml">crimes against humanity</a>. New organizations like the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/">United Nations</a> were born. </p>
<p>A liberal rules-based international order began to emerge, setting fundamental limits on state sovereignty — particularly in the conduct of war, and even within national boundaries. </p>
<p>But this progress halted with the start of <a href="https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/cold-conflict">the Cold War; the standoff between the Soviet Union and the U.S. put the prosecution of war crimes on ice</a>. </p>
<p>Few leaders were held accountable for their crimes as superpowers shielded them from prosecution. </p>
<h2>UN creates the ICC</h2>
<p>Following the Soviet collapse, and the emergence of the U.S. as the sole remaining global superpower, the UN Security Council organized <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/international-tribunals">international tribunals</a> to address genocide, war crimes and other atrocities committed during conflict. </p>
<p>These tribunals were situational, focused on conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The UN then used its renewed power to formalize them in the Rome Statute, <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf">the founding document of the ICC</a>.</p>
<p>This was made possible by a legal innovation: the creation of a permanent international tribunal that would enable signatories to bring war criminals to justice.</p>
<p>Even third parties, with no apparent interest, could investigate and refer war criminals to the international body under certain circumstances. </p>
<p>But in a dramatic about-face, the George W. Bush administration <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/05/06/united-states-unsigning-treaty-war-crimes-court">withdrew the U.S.</a> from the ICC, fearing the court <a href="https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2450&context=faculty_scholarship">might complicate</a> its so-called war on terror. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the ICC came into existence in 2002, and the court began issuing arrest warrants and prosecuting war criminals. </p>
<p>Without the U.S., however, its activities remained restricted. For the next decade, prosecutions were limited to the African continent, leading to allegations of <a href="https://iccforum.com/africa">systemic bias</a>. </p>
<p>There are still questions about whether the ICC can hold war criminals to account more broadly — and they’ve only intensified during the war in Ukraine. </p>
<h2>Canada’s role</h2>
<p>In March 2022, 39 countries, including Canada, <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-qc-situation-ukraine-receipt-referrals-39-states">referred the war in Ukraine to the ICC</a>. At the same time, the RCMP <a href="https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/news/2022/a-statement-the-partners-canadas-war-crimes-program-the-conflict-ukraine">launched an investigation</a> into alleged war crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine.</p>
<p>This is the first <a href="https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/SDIR/meeting-9/evidence">real-time war crimes investigation</a> in Canada’s history, and one of the first globally. </p>
<p>The ICC has laid charges against Russian President <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and">Vladimir Putin</a>, accusing him of human rights abuses in Ukraine.</p>
<p>These developments mark a major change in Canada’s appetite for investigating war crimes. Before joining the ICC, Canada had a checkered history of holding war criminals accountable, even when they arrived on its shores. Canada was accused, for example, of providing <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nazi-war-criminals-in-canada-1.1026670">shelter to Nazi war criminals</a> and collaborators. </p>
<p>Canada’s probe into alleged ongoing war crimes in Ukraine suggests it now has the <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/stories-histoires/2022/war-crimes-investigated_crimes-guerre-enquetes.aspx?lang=eng">political will</a> to investigate these atrocities even when they happen outside of its borders.</p>
<p>Given Canada’s <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/icc-cpi/index.aspx?lang=eng">role in the creation of the ICC</a>, the country’s leadership on this front is appropriate. </p>
<p>Efforts to hold Russia accountable have also engaged a keen and highly activist group: Ukrainian Canadians. </p>
<p>As they <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">welcome refugees</a> and lobby the government, Ukrainian Canadians have helped collect war crimes testimonials that could one day be used to prosecute Russia.</p>
<p>Newly arriving Ukrainians to Canada <a href="https://ukraine.rcmp.ca/responseForm?lang=en">are greeted by posters and pamphlets printed in English, French, Russian and Ukrainian</a> asking them to report their recollections to the RCMP while their memories are still fresh.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, despite the unprecedented steps Canada and other states are taking to put Russia on notice, it’s doubtful they’ll ultimately result in any concrete forms of Russian accountability. </p>
<h2>Creating a historical record</h2>
<p>Although some of these measures have apparently made top <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/11/lula-putin-g20-brazil-arrest">Russian officials more circumspect</a> when travelling internationally, it’s highly unlikely alleged Russian war criminals will end up before Canadian courts.</p>
<p>Globally, the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/04/icc-investigation-russia-ukraine-putin-war-crimes/">impact also seems limited</a>. Russia remains a nuclear power and UN Security Council member, further underscoring the improbability of future prosecutions. </p>
<p>However, the RCMP investigation is important. It signals a new path for Canada that prioritizes international law and corrects for past policy failures that saw the country provide safe harbour to war criminals. </p>
<p>For Ukrainian-Canadians, the investigation validates their experiences. Canada is helping create a historical record. The investigation will form one of the pre-eminent repositories of testimonials from recently arrived refugees. </p>
<p>Canada has taken on the sacred duty of creating and safeguarding a dark moment in Ukrainian history — and this matters to the victims of Russia’s war. </p>
<p>As Alexandra Chyczij, president of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, told us in an interview: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“What is important today is that the massive evidence of the myriad, systemic Russian crimes against humanity, war crimes and terrorism – committed under the direction of the Russian political leadership – be documented, collected and preserved.”</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211306/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The war crimes probe signals a new path for Canada that prioritizes international law and corrects past policy failures, while validating the experiences of Ukrainians.Jamie Levin, Assistant Professor of Political Science, St. Francis Xavier UniversityKiran Banerjee, Assistant Professor of Political Science & Canada Research Chair, Dalhousie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127282023-09-18T12:22:09Z2023-09-18T12:22:09ZGenocide fears in Darfur are attracting little attention − have nations abandoned their responsibility to protect civilians?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548147/original/file-20230913-29-frdmf4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=40%2C0%2C4500%2C2930&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A military convoy on the way to Port Sudan on Aug. 30, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/fighters-ride-in-a-vehicle-moving-in-a-military-convoy-news-photo/1633929430?adppopup=true"> Photo by AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mass atrocities are once again plaguing the people of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/08/29/sudan-darfur-genocide/">Darfur, Sudan</a>, with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sudan-war-military-rsf-darfur-6e13139742d52564e47847cb9bd4d2a5">talk of a genocide</a> taking place.</p>
<p>Twenty years after <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/sudan/case-study/violence/enormous-loss-of-civilian-life">genocide</a> began in the region, recent conflict and targeted violence have forced <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/sudan/">over 5 million people</a> to flee their homes across Sudan in just five months. In Darfur, non-Arab unarmed civilians have been <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/16/africa/darfur-sudan-geneina-massacre-account-cmd-intl/index.html">hunted down</a> and massacred, according to eyewitnesses and survivors. Women and girls have been subjected to <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/un-experts-alarmed-reported-widespread-use-rape-and-sexual-violence-against#:%7E:text=Reportedly%2C%20hundreds%20of%20women%20have,been%20particularly%20vulnerable%20to%20violence.">systematic rape, sexual violence</a> <a href="https://sihanet.org/kidnapping-and-slavery-the-rsf-is-committing-more-dangerous-rights-violations-in-this-malign-war-against-civilians-in-sudan/">and trafficking</a>.</p>
<p>With genocide and crimes against humanity once again taking place and so little international attention, one wonders if the international community has completely turned its back on a decades-old commitment to protect civilians from mass atrocities, known as the “<a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml">responsibility to protect</a>.”</p>
<p>I’m an <a href="https://humanrights.uconn.edu/person/mike-brand/">adjunct professor</a> of genocide studies and human rights at the <a href="https://humanrights.uconn.edu/">University of Connecticut</a>, and the question of how the international community should confront genocide is an issue my students and I grapple with every semester.</p>
<p>Before unpacking that question, let’s look at why the expectation of civilian protection even exists. </p>
<h2>An important question</h2>
<p>In 2000, then-United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/413745?ln=en">asked the international community</a>, “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica — to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”</p>
<p>It was an important question. For centuries, the <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803121924198">principle of sovereignty</a> reigned supreme in international relations. It was largely understood that what happens within a country’s borders is that government’s responsibility. Governing authorities were pretty much free to do what they pleased, without fear of meddling from other international actors. </p>
<p>In the post-World War II era, states began to willingly give up some of their sovereignty to join the newly created <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un">United Nations</a> and engage in various agreements outlining common rules they would follow – collectively, these rules are now known as international law. However, even after witnessing the horrors of the Holocaust and pledging “<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2018/09/genocide-never-again-has-become-time-and-again">never again</a>,” the world watched genocide unfold in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">Rwanda in 1994</a> and <a href="https://www.irmct.org/specials/srebrenica/timeline/en/">Srebrenica the following year</a>. Annan’s question needed an answer if the international community were to effectively prevent or intervene to stop another genocide.</p>
<p>In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty sought to answer Annan’s question by presenting a new concept known as the “<a href="https://www.walterdorn.net/pdf/Responsibility-to-Protect_ICISS-Report_Dec2001.pdf">responsibility to protect</a>.” The framework re-imagined state sovereignty and the responsibility of states to protect their people from mass atrocities like genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. In cases when a state was unwilling to live up to its responsibility to protect civilians or was itself the perpetrator of mass atrocities, then the responsibility shifted to the wider international community through the United Nations.</p>
<h2>A revolutionary idea</h2>
<p>The commission outlined three key responsibilities for implementing the responsibility to protect: the responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild. </p>
<p>The responsibility to prevent focuses on addressing the root causes of conflict and preventing mass atrocities before they break out. </p>
<p>The responsibility to react refers to the international community’s response to ongoing mass atrocities through diplomatic interventions, sanctions and sometimes military intervention. </p>
<p>Finally, the responsibility to rebuild includes assisting a country in its recovery from conflict and any damage caused by external interventions in an effort to stabilize a post-conflict country and prevent future atrocities.</p>
<p>Often, it is the responsibility to react, and more specifically military intervention, that people associate with the responsibility to protect. However, the “responsibility to protect” framework clearly states that military intervention is to be used only as a <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/evans-interview-r2p-after-libya/">last resort</a>. As the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/prevention.shtml#:%7E:text=Therefore%2C%20prevention%20not%20only%20contributes,or%20dealing%20with%20their%20aftermath.">has said</a>, “Prevention is much less costly than intervening to halt these crimes, or dealing with their aftermath.” </p>
<p>The concept of the responsibility to protect was in many ways revolutionary. Member states adopted the principle at the U.N.’s <a href="https://www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/newyork2005">2005 World Summit</a> just four years after the concept was introduced. World leaders pledged in a joint statement: “We are prepared to take collective action … should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”</p>
<p>While it was a major accomplishment to get world leaders to endorse the responsibility to protect, it was not binding international law. There were no requirements that states live up to its provisions, and there were no penalties if states failed to protect populations from mass atrocities.</p>
<h2>The first test</h2>
<p>The urgency for responsibility to protect was evident in the fact that while the principle was being discussed and adopted, <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040909-10.html">genocide was underway in Darfur</a>. Just 10 years after <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">the genocide in Rwanda</a>, which was the impetus for the creation of the responsibility to protect, non-Arab civilian populations in western Sudan were being systematically targeted for destruction.</p>
<p>Some sanctions and strong words from the United Nations and several countries followed. But little direct action was taken for the first few years of the Darfur genocide. It took the United Nations four years to authorize and deploy a hybrid peacekeeping mission in the form of the <a href="https://unamid.unmissions.org/">United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur</a>. Even after this mission was finally deployed, violence continued. In all, between <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-07-24">200,000 and 400,000</a> Darfuris were killed, and millions were displaced. Many fled to <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/they-gave-us-two-options-leave-chad-or-be-killed">neighboring Chad</a>, where they remain today. The exact death tolls are disputed because of limited humanitarian presence and a lack of investigative capacity.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A Sudanese mother with scarf on her head is holding her malnourished son in a hospital." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548197/original/file-20230914-27-bvbwf0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Millions of Darfuris were displaced in the mid-2000s, many to Sudanese refugee camps in neighboring Chad.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ida-ibrahim-holds-her-malnourished-son-ahmad-saleh-13-news-photo/691913736?adppopup=true">Lynsey Addario/via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Several <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Responsibility-to-Protect-in-Darfur-From-Forgotten-Conflict-to-Global/Lanz/p/book/9781032570686">books</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26298897">academic articles</a> analyzed the response – <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4541909">or lack thereof</a> – to genocide in Darfur within the context of responsibility to protect. It has become the quintessential case study.</p>
<p>Yet most view the international community’s response to Darfur in the early 2000s as a <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Unwilling-and-Unable-The-Failed-Response-to-the-Atrocities-in-Darfur.pdf">responsibility-to-protect failure</a>, despite the peacekeeping mission, public attention and diplomatic engagement. Not only was there a failure to protect civilians, there was also a failure to hold perpetrators accountable for their crimes. Many of the <a href="https://medium.com/@atrocitiesprevention/sudan-genocide-warning-letter-ea8e78b671b1">same perpetrators</a> of the genocide in the early 2000s <a href="https://progressive.org/latest/genocide-is-once-again-plaguing-darfur-brand-230710/">are committing atrocities again now</a>, observers say, in a testament to the dangers of impunity. </p>
<h2>Even worse than before</h2>
<p>But there is an important distinction between today and the early 2000s – today there is little appetite among the international community to engage in a meaningful way that would protect civilians and bring an end to the slaughter. <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/tension-between-sudan-kenya-s-ruto-impedes-igad-mediation-effort-in-sudan/7195894.html">Kenyan President William Ruto</a> has called for a new peacekeeping mission to be deployed, but neither the United Nations nor the African Union has supported him. The UN’s former mission in Darfur ended in 2020.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates <a href="https://geneva.usmission.gov/2023/06/19/joint-statement-on-sudan-by-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirates-united-kingdom-and-united-states/">publicly called for peace</a> while <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-u-s-ally-promised-to-send-aid-to-sudan-it-sent-weapons-instead-82d396f">privately sending arms</a> to the very militia committing mass atrocities.</p>
<p>The United States has <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases?title=sudan&publication-start-date=&publication-end-date=">sanctioned</a> elements of the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese armed forces and has <a href="https://www.state.gov/statement-on-atrocities-in-darfur-sudan/">repeatedly</a> called for <a href="https://www.state.gov/on-civilian-casualties-in-sudan/">accountability for perpetrators of atrocities</a>. The United States ambassador-at-large for global criminal justice, Beth Van Schaack, has stated that the violence in West Darfur “serves as an ominous reminder of the horrific events that led the United States to determine in 2004 that a genocide was underway in Darfur.” But she stopped short of saying genocide was happening again. Historically, United States genocide determinations have been political decisions that are often <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/22/the-g-word-paradox-genocide-islamic-state-john-kerry/#:%7E:text=When%20used%20correctly%2C%20the%20word,or%20%E2%80%9Ccrimes%E2%80%9D%20ever%20can.">delayed by State Department lawyers</a>. </p>
<p>The question of the viability of the “responsibility to protect” principle goes beyond the crisis in Darfur. Over the past two decades, the international community has failed to protect civilians in <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/1370/2015/en/">Syria</a>, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/south-sudans-civil-war-spirals-genocide-leaving-ghost-towns-wake">South Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">the Democratic Republic of Congo</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/saudi-war-crimes-yemen/">Yemen</a>, <a href="https://www.state.gov/burma-genocide/">Myanmar</a> and <a href="https://www.state.gov/war-crimes-crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopia/">Ethiopia</a>. The responsibility to protect does not have a great track record. </p>
<p>It would appear that even the secretary-general of the United Nations has lost faith in the doctrine. In António Guterres’ recently released policy paper, <a href="https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/our-common-agenda-policy-brief-new-agenda-for-peace-en.pdf">New Agenda for Peace</a>, which outlines his vision for creating a more peaceful world, the term “responsibility to protect” does not appear once in the 40-page document.</p>
<p>Perhaps after two decades of limited success, flagrant violations and overall apathy, it is time to retire the responsibility to protect and find a new way to answer Annan’s question.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212728/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mike Brand does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The international community has also failed to protect civilians in Syria, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen, Myanmar and Ethiopia, a genocide expert writes.Mike Brand, Adjunct Professor of Genocide Studies and Human Rights, University of ConnecticutLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2113272023-08-11T12:37:23Z2023-08-11T12:37:23ZHitler, Burr and Trump: Show trials put the record straight for history but can also provide a powerful platform for the defendant<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542206/original/file-20230810-27-r6sqrb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5955%2C3979&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Washington, D.C., courthouse where Donald Trump's Jan. 6-related trial will likely take place.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/journalist-reports-outside-the-elijah-barrett-prettyman-u-s-news-photo/1575084535?adppopup=true">Bonnie Jo Mount/The Washington Post via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The trial of Donald Trump on charges that he conspired to undermine the peaceful transition of power will likely be a show trial – but not in the usual sense of the words. </p>
<p>The phrase “show trial” has two connotations. In the most common understanding of the term, those connotations are negative: Show trials in authoritarian regimes are sham trials used for propaganda purposes where the outcome is predetermined and the defendants condemned as traitors to the motherland. </p>
<p>Think of the <a href="https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/01/30/77436271.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0">show trials mounted by the Baathist regime under Saddam Hussein</a>, the <a href="http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/moscowpurge/moscowlinks.html">show trials of Josef Stalin’s dictatorship</a>, or those of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1970/08/23/archives/mao-makes-the-trials-run-on-time-mao-makes-the-trials-run-on-time.html">the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong</a>. These sham trials were used to persecute enemies and consolidate power through the fear they generated. </p>
<p>But trials that capture widespread public attention and expose wrongdoing by political or business figures may also produce highly constructive and positive outcomes as well. They can promote accountability for crimes against the state or against humanity. </p>
<p>Yet even these positive show trials, meant to affirm the laws and values of a democracy, can end badly, as with one prosecution in Germany in the mid-1920s – of <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/beer-hall-putsch-munich-putsch">the young Nazi party leader, Adolf Hitler</a>, who had led an unsuccessful revolt to overthrow the country’s democratic government.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542198/original/file-20230810-21-rbrer4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Nine men, most dressed in old-fashioned military uniforms. standing together outside a building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542198/original/file-20230810-21-rbrer4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542198/original/file-20230810-21-rbrer4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542198/original/file-20230810-21-rbrer4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542198/original/file-20230810-21-rbrer4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542198/original/file-20230810-21-rbrer4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542198/original/file-20230810-21-rbrer4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542198/original/file-20230810-21-rbrer4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Adolf Hitler, fourth from right, with his fellow defendants in the Munich Putsch trial of 1924 for their failed coup attempt by the Nazi party to seize power in Munich, Bavaria, in November 1923.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-defendants-in-the-munich-putsch-trial-aka-beer-hall-news-photo/1062153496?adppopup=true">Universal History Archive/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Prosecuting war crimes and corruption</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf1/mpunyb_koskenniemi_6.pdf">international law scholar Martti Koskenniemi</a> has astutely noted, political show trials may be useful “for establishing an impartial account of the past and for teaching younger generations of the dangers involved in particular policies.” Political trials that provide the public with a compelling narrative about crimes against the public trust can therefore have positive consequences for a democracy.</p>
<p>The Nuremberg trials after World War II <a href="https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/the-nuremberg-trial-and-its-legacy">highlighted Nazi atrocities</a> to the world, the 2002 trial of former Serbian President <a href="https://www.icty.org/en/content/slobodan-milo%C5%A1evi%C4%87-trial-prosecutions-case">Slobodan Milosevic exposed his war crimes</a>, and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">trials of Rwandans</a> held to account those who engaged in the mass slaughter of 800,000 Tutsis and Hutus. These trials served as an opportunity to expose the truth about the defendants’ actions and to hold them accountable for those actions for all the world to see.</p>
<p>Show trials are not only useful for exposing war criminals, however. In democracies, show trials of political officials – defined as such because they captivate public attention – promote the rule of law and order to a very wide audience. </p>
<p>Korean President Park Geun-hye was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43666134">indicted and charged with high-profile corruption charges</a> and convicted of the abuse of power in 2018; she was later pardoned. The high-profile trial of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has found him <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/03/world/middleeast/netanyahu-corruption-charges-israel.html">accused of accepting bribes and breaching the public trust</a> – that trial is ongoing. And after he left office, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/30/nicolas-sarkozy-guilty-illegally-financing-2012-election-campaign">convicted in 2021 and imprisoned</a> for illegal campaign financing. </p>
<p>These are but a few examples of heads of state in functioning democracies who have been <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/08/26/countries-where-former-leaders-jailed-charged">held to account</a> in trials that have riveted the public’s attention.</p>
<p>Even the U.S. has a history of political show trials. </p>
<p>In 1807, then-President Thomas Jefferson became personally involved in promoting the <a href="https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-great-trial-that-tested-the-constitutions-treason-clause">prosecution of his own vice president, Aaron Burr</a>, for treason. Burr was Jefferson’s political rival: He had challenged Jefferson for the presidency in a fight over electoral college votes in the House of Representatives. </p>
<p>Burr’s defense counsel claimed that the fairness of Burr’s trial was compromised by widespread news coverage of the event – an issue that was ultimately decided in the <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/159/78/">U.S. Supreme Court</a>, which held that exposure to news coverage did not compromise the trial. Burr was acquitted.</p>
<p>But there is a darker outcome lurking in show trials.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542200/original/file-20230810-27-hntwlu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Many people lined up outside some large buildings." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542200/original/file-20230810-27-hntwlu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542200/original/file-20230810-27-hntwlu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542200/original/file-20230810-27-hntwlu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542200/original/file-20230810-27-hntwlu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542200/original/file-20230810-27-hntwlu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542200/original/file-20230810-27-hntwlu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542200/original/file-20230810-27-hntwlu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Several hundred journalists line up outside the War Crimes Tribunal where former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic was being tried for alleged war crimes, July 3, 2001, in The Hague, Netherlands.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/several-hundred-international-journalists-line-up-outside-news-photo/1321665?adppopup=true">Photo by Michel Porro/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Hitler’s trial fueled rise to power</h2>
<p>The facts underlying many political trials arise in a historical context. The interpretation of that context – let alone the very facts of the history – may be disputed. </p>
<p>Although comparisons with Hitler are largely considered out of bounds when discussing current politics and politicians, it’s relevant to any discussion of high-profile political trials that the future Nazi dictator’s <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/peter-ross-range/1924/9780316383998/?lens=little-brown">rise to power was fueled in large part</a> by a show trial. </p>
<p>In 1923, Adolf Hitler led an effort to foment revolution in Bavaria. Known as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Beer-Hall-Putsch">Beer-Hall Putsch</a> because it literally began in a beer hall, Hitler and his followers sought to lead a revolt against the governing German Weimar democracy. His effort failed and he was tried for the crime of subverting the constitution of Germany.</p>
<p>But in the 1924 trial, presided over <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Nazi-Party#ref348483">by a judge sympathetic to the Nazi agenda</a>, Hitler <a href="https://famous-trials.com/hitler/2524-the-hitler-beer-hall-putsch-trial-an-account">used the courtroom as a platform</a>, writes law professor Douglas O. Linder, “to showcase his oratorical skills and promote his views to as wide an audience as possible.” </p>
<p>As Hitler used the trial to argue that German institutions were corrupt, his popularity grew substantially. Historian David King <a href="https://www.davidkingauthor.com/the-trial-of-adolf-hitler">writes in his book about the trial</a> that “the incident caused headlines all over the international press, and Hitler’s name became known thereafter. He could not have bought the kind of publicity he got at the trial even if he wanted to.”</p>
<p>And even though he was ultimately convicted, Hitler used his time in prison to write <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/mein-kampf">“Mein Kampf” – his manifesto for Nazism</a> – and to reinvigorate his political movement by building the Nazi party platform. By <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/hitler-comes-to-power">1933, Hitler was named chancellor</a>. After the staged <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/true-story-reichstag-fire-and-nazis-rise-power-180962240/">Reichstag fire</a>, the government capitulated to Nazi party rule, abolished elections and succumbed to Hitler’s dictatorship. </p>
<p>The United States has a justice system that is far more impartial than the German <a href="https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/hitlers-justice-courts-third-reich">judicial system</a> during Hitler’s rise to power. </p>
<p>But the history lesson remains relevant: Trials within a political context and the charging of political crimes have risks. Though they may be necessary to uphold the rule of law, these types of show trials may also provide the defendant with the opportunity to dispute the historical record and challenge the very governmental authority holding them to account.</p>
<p>Donald Trump has already begun <a href="https://apnews.com/article/trump-retribution-indictment-documents-biden-american-democracy-5a8ec37b359fee85d0f0956139d79f51">his version of that effort</a>.</p>
<h2>Significant political consequences</h2>
<p>With every indictment, Trump has become <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-66274979">more popular with</a> the GOP’s electoral base. His social media posts clearly reflect his efforts to undermine faith in the rule of law and in the justice system. </p>
<p>Most recently, Trump has made <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/08/04/feds-alert-judge-to-trumps-if-you-go-after-me-im-coming-after-you-post-00109944">statements</a> that seem aimed at goading U.S. District Court Judge Tanya Chutkan, who is overseeing the Jan. 6 case, into holding him in contempt of court. A public post by Trump stating, “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/trumps-threatening-post-flagged-by-us-prosecutors-judge-2023-08-05/">If you go after me I’m coming after you</a>,” seems tailor-made to convince a judge that the defendant is prepared to intimidate witnesses and disrupt the administration of justice. </p>
<p>History tells us that trials of political figures like Donald Trump – if he is found guilty of the crimes charged – may promote the rule of law and democracy. </p>
<p>But history also shows that trials may produce significant political consequences that reverberate well beyond the simple administration of justice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211327/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefanie Lindquist does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump’s trial for his efforts to overturn the 2020 presidential election will promote accountability – but could this show trial have a dangerous outcome, too?Stefanie Lindquist, Foundation Professor of Law and Political Science, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1953932023-07-21T13:43:39Z2023-07-21T13:43:39ZWhat Germany’s quest to define dignity – both before and after 1945 – tells us about society<p>We all know what <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-define-dignity-and-its-place-in-human-rights-a-philosophers-view-81785">dignity</a> looks like when it is taken from us. From job losses and <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-showed-i-daniel-blake-to-people-living-with-the-benefits-system-heres-how-they-reacted-73153">income deprivation</a>, to <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-racial-discrimination-does-to-young-peoples-wellbeing-141655">discrimination</a>, systemic <a href="https://theconversation.com/whiteness-is-at-the-heart-of-racism-in-britain-so-why-is-it-portrayed-as-a-black-problem-181742">racism</a> or oppression, throughout history there have been constant and countless instances of people being deprived, humiliated and <a href="https://theconversation.com/dehumanising-policies-leave-autistic-people-struggling-to-access-health-education-and-housing-new-review-202997">dehumanised</a>, their dignity refused.</p>
<p>The second world war – and the atrocities committed by the National Socialist regime in particular – represents a salient instance of dignity denied, of crimes against humanity. At its conclusion, in 1945, legal scholars, politicians and the wider public agreed that life without dignity was meaningless.</p>
<p>My doctoral research looks at the German quest, both before and after the conflict, to define dignity, in order to enshrine its protection in law. Tracing this task from German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s attempts at a universal definition, to the West German constitution drafted between 1948 and 1949, I have found that while a clear definition remains elusive, it is that very abstraction that ensures it is universal.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A sculpture of German words on a building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537493/original/file-20230714-22-a9slss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537493/original/file-20230714-22-a9slss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537493/original/file-20230714-22-a9slss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537493/original/file-20230714-22-a9slss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537493/original/file-20230714-22-a9slss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=557&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537493/original/file-20230714-22-a9slss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=557&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537493/original/file-20230714-22-a9slss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=557&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Human dignity shall be inviolable’, Frankfurt am Main.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_Law_for_the_Federal_Republic_of_Germany#/media/File:Landgericht-frankfurt-2010-ffm-081.jpg">Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>An inviolable attribute</h2>
<p>On September 1 1948, 65 members of the West German <em>Parlamentarischer Rat</em> (parliamentary council) convened in Bonn to draw up a constitution for the nascent democratic, federal state. The council wanted to draft an unwavering response to the atrocities Germany had committed. </p>
<p>Under Nazi law, human beings were excluded from community and thus dehumanised. <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/147631666.pdf">Dignity</a>, therefore, had to be firmly established in the new constitution. The law had to ensure that each person was positioned as a member of society and protected by society.</p>
<p>To do so, some argued that it first had to be defined. Others, including Theodor Heuss, the Free Democratic Party representative for West Germany and Berlin, disagreed. He advocated for dignity to be left as an “uninterpreted proposition”, purposefully abstract so as to be universal. </p>
<p>This, Heuss reasoned, would guarantee that the notion of dignity would be protected from political manoeuvring, yet still open to interpretation, according to different philosophical and religious backgrounds. Heuss considered defining dignity in this way to be the only proper refutation of the barbarism of National Socialism, a safeguard against ever again allowing the state to judge the value of human life.</p>
<p>Heuss’s argument <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-319-27830-8_14-1">prevailed</a>. The <em>Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland</em> (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany) was adopted on May 8 1949. <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#:%7E:text=(1)%20Human%20dignity%20shall%20be,of%20justice%20in%20the%20world.">Article 1</a>, which still has its distinctive validity today, reads:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority. The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A universal definition</h2>
<p>One and a half centuries earlier, in his 1785 volume, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant had sought to <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/41174358.pdf">democratise human dignity</a>. His idea was that all human beings have an inner worth and should be valued simply because they are human. All should be treated as ends in themselves rather than simply as means to an end.</p>
<p>Moreover, Kant defined dignity by distinguishing it from those things that could be costed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Illustration of a silhouette of a man in expensive 17th-century clothes." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537498/original/file-20230714-30-8k8z7x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537498/original/file-20230714-30-8k8z7x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537498/original/file-20230714-30-8k8z7x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537498/original/file-20230714-30-8k8z7x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537498/original/file-20230714-30-8k8z7x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1265&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537498/original/file-20230714-30-8k8z7x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1265&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537498/original/file-20230714-30-8k8z7x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1265&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Immanuel Kant by Puttrich Johann Theodor, 1793.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://wellcomecollection.org/works/djr8t98g/images?id=pfpyjc6s">Wellcome Collection Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Kant’s timeless formula did not, however, seem to fully anticipate what the second world war would go on to lay bare: the degree to which humans could deprive others of their dignity. It also stood at odds with the philosopher’s own espousal, for most of his career, of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/4139/chapter/145901251">scientific racism</a> and his ignorance of how such views precisely denied dignity to countless people. </p>
<p>So in retrospect, Heuss’s definition of human dignity proved wise. Kant’s framing of dignity may be concise, timeless, and universal, but his judgement of who is worthy of dignity – and who is not – was indeed marred by the ideologies of his own time. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/overcoming-racism-depends-on-respect-for-every-persons-dignity-201065">Dignity today</a> still appears as a visible horizon. Everything – politics, the rule of law, our societal compass, the way we each live our lives – is directed towards it, yet it remains difficult to reach. </p>
<p>Framing dignity by what it is not (indignity) or by what denies it (humiliation) runs the risk of our only ever thinking about it in terms of victimhood. Throughout history, though, there has also been this idea that, with dignity, comes something sublime that demands respect: a sense of <a href="https://theconversation.com/awe-can-alter-our-sense-of-self-and-open-us-to-new-possibilities-could-it-help-save-the-planet-205917">awe</a>. </p>
<p>This is of course most obvious in the way a <a href="https://theconversation.com/king-charles-iiis-coronation-oath-is-a-crucial-part-of-the-ceremony-experts-explain-202870">sovereign’s dignity</a> is traditionally hailed – if only in officialdom – with words such as “excellence”, “highness” and “majesty”. </p>
<p>The modern concept of democratic dignity might be seen as exactly this sublime status, formerly reserved for the nobility and now democratised. A <a href="https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_resources/documents/a-to-z/w/Waldron_09.pdf">universalised high social rank</a> could have a persuasive force. It would not only affirm the moral worth of each individual, it would also answer the yearning for recognition – of honour and status – that everyone experiences. </p>
<p>Quite how to define the dignity of all people depends on each person’s unique interpretation of the world. The law, however, cannot equivocate on its status: as a legally recognised human characteristic, dignity must remain inviolable. It must be constantly recreated and protected from any bias.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195393/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frederick Hauke does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The second world war showed that dignity had to be enshrined in law. Defining it in order to do so is no easy task.Frederick Hauke, PhD candidate, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2056902023-05-24T12:33:38Z2023-05-24T12:33:38ZPeace in Sudan depends on justice for the Darfur genocide<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526880/original/file-20230517-27418-2g9fwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudan's Omar al-Bashir (left) and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo tour Darfur in 2017.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ashraf Shazly/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>I asked the pilot to deviate from our approved flight path and go low over Darfur. It was 2003 and I was the United Nations Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator in Sudan investigating reports of violence. What I saw was a genocide unfolding on my watch.</p>
<p>This was a decade after the 1994 Rwanda genocide, which I also <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/15/lessons-from-a-personal-journey-through-the-genocide-in-rwanda/">witnessed first hand</a>, and where we had sworn “never again”. But <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WEUWU8JwnDI">here I was in Darfur</a> watching village upon village burning. </p>
<p>Large-scale horrendous brutalities were being committed across Darfur, a region in western Sudan that’s roughly the size of France. They were <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2707480/">racially directed</a>, targeting black African ethnic groups such as the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit. Eyewitness testimonies indicated that <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/05/06/darfur-destroyed/ethnic-cleansing-government-and-militia-forces-western-sudan">the perpetrators</a> were Arab militia, with Sudanese government backing. The <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/NR/rdonlyres/64FA6B33-05C3-4E9C-A672-3FA2B58CB2C9/277758/ICCOTPSummary20081704ENG.pdf">purpose</a> was the permanent removal of the black population in the area so that nomadic Arabs could take over. </p>
<p>Sudan’s <a href="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/f2060c73fcec41c6a483d8d4e8121788">insidious racism</a> has deep roots. It goes back to its ancient role as a marketplace for <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01440399908575286?journalCode=fsla20">black slaves</a>. The subsequent divide-and-rule <a href="https://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2407&context=luc_theses">Anglo-Egyptian colonialism</a> and <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/etudesafricaines/32202">supremacist Arab</a> militarised dictatorships further entrenched it. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526877/original/file-20230517-25-yc9w7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526877/original/file-20230517-25-yc9w7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526877/original/file-20230517-25-yc9w7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526877/original/file-20230517-25-yc9w7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526877/original/file-20230517-25-yc9w7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526877/original/file-20230517-25-yc9w7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526877/original/file-20230517-25-yc9w7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">One of many destroyed villages in Darfur.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carolyn Cole/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images</span></span>
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<p>Between 2003 and 2005, half of Darfur’s population of 5-6 million was <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/displaced-darfur">displaced</a>. Their fragile means for surviving the arid environment – such as wells and irrigated farming – were completely <a href="https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1480de/pdf/#page=63">destroyed</a>. At least 200,000 <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/darfur">Darfuris died</a>, and thousands of women and girls were raped. </p>
<p>This was <a href="https://www.mukeshkapila.org/books/against-a-tide-of-evil/">intentional</a> – as was confirmed by Sudanese authorities with whom I remonstrated. When they told me that they wanted a “final solution” to the Darfur insurgency, I was left in no doubt that the 1948 <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">Genocide Convention</a> – which prohibits ethnically targeted destruction – applied. </p>
<p>The UN and world powers <a href="https://unwatch.org/the-seven-excuses-of-inaction-for-darfur/">refused</a> to listen and <a href="https://www.hmd.org.uk/resource/dr-mukesh-kapila-cbe/">I lost my job</a> for speaking out publicly. But extensive lobbying extracted a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2004/sc8104.doc.htm">UN Security Council presidential statement</a> in 2004, and the first-ever <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm">UN Security Council referral</a> to the International Criminal Court in 2005. This meant that the court could exercise jurisdiction over Sudan and initiate formal investigations.</p>
<p>It was gratifying to provide evidence that enabled Omar al-Bashir to enter history in 2009 and 2010 as the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">first head of state indicted</a> for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. He was alongside <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur">five other associates</a> who obstructed us in bringing relief to Darfur.</p>
<p>But this was no consolation. Bashir remained in power despite international arrest warrants. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Darfuri lands, emptied of their African inhabitants, were rehabilitated with generous <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2007/12/13/the-politics-of-aid-helping-darfur/">foreign aid</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402650802068051?journalCode=cper20">re-populated</a> by Arab groups. With the demography of the region changed, this is a clear example of ethnic cleansing.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.gcsp.ch/our-experts/prof-mukesh-kapila-cbe">an expert in</a> humanitarian affairs, with particular expertise in tackling crimes against humanity, disaster and conflict management, I argue that without <a href="https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/rj-jr/index.html#:%7E:text=What%20is%20Restorative%20Justice%3F,the%20aftermath%20of%20a%20crime.%E2%80%9D">restorative justice</a> – justice that focuses on repairing the harm caused by involving those who have been affected – there cannot be peace.</p>
<p>The failure to hold Darfur rights abusers accountable emboldened the national government and security apparatus to redouble their oppression around Sudan. This ignited several violent rebellions and inevitable countrywide instability. In fact, the crisis in Sudan today involves key military players who rose to power under Bashir during this time. </p>
<h2>Darfur’s toxic legacy</h2>
<p>In 2013, as a Special Representative of the <a href="https://www.aegistrust.org/">Aegis Trust for the Prevention of Crimes against Humanity</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NQSj6eIW8IE">I witnessed</a> in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan state the scorched-earth policies of its governor, Ahmed Harun. He was a close associate of Bashir. Even though Harun had been <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/harun">indicted by the ICC</a> in 2007, he carried out new ethnically targeted crimes against black Africans of the Nuba and in Blue Nile state. His tactics were further <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2011-11-02-the-butcher-of-nubas-new-job/">brutal refinements</a> of what he had deployed in Darfur a decade earlier. </p>
<p>Bashir and Harun effected the original Darfur genocide through their <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-tracing-the-history-of-sudans-janjaweed-militia-118926">Janjaweed</a> militia, alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces. The Janjaweed were then formalised into the Rapid Support Forces. They were strengthened through <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/border-control-hell-how-eus-migration-partnership-legitimizes-sudans-militia-state">European Union (EU) funding</a> for border control to stem refugee flows into Europe. They gained further combat experience and money by being recruited to fight in <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/sudans-controversial-rapid-support-forces-bolsters-saudi-efforts-yemen/">Yemen</a>. </p>
<p>The international community’s pragmatic Sudan policy has favoured quick fixes rather than systematically tackling underlying problems. <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-conflict-has-its-roots-in-three-decades-of-elites-fighting-over-oil-and-energy-204389">Competitive self-interests</a> are also in play as nations vie for access to Sudan’s<a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/sudan-oil-and-gas"> oil</a>, <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/sudan-extractive-industries">mineral</a> and <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/sudan-agricultural-sectors">agricultural</a> riches. And so, deal-making trumped principles to boost the perpetrators instead of demanding their accountability.</p>
<p>Sudan’s military elites triumphed further when the international community undermined the popular pro-democracy uprising that led to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/11/sudan-army-ousts-bashir-after-30-years-in-power">Bashir’s removal in 2019</a>. In a massive policy error, the UN, US and EU pushed for a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/20/sudan-civil-war-biden-burhan-hemeti-foreign-policy/">transition</a> that left Bashir’s military successors in control: Chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan for the Sudanese Armed Forces, and Commander General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo – aka Hemedti – for the Rapid Support Forces. </p>
<p>The violent power competition between these two generals is the immediate trigger to Sudan’s current conflict. There are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65448691">catastrophic humanitarian</a> consequences amid <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65495539">peace mediations</a> that repeatedly fail. </p>
<h2>Making peace</h2>
<p>Peacemaking is never easy, but conflicts hallmarked by war crimes and crimes against humanity are impossible to end without restorative justice. Extraordinary hurts necessitate <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/5740.htm">exceptional journeys of recovery</a> through grieving, forgiving and healing. That requires acknowledging wrongs done, penalising wrongdoers, compensating victims and <a href="https://www.academia.edu/1858696/Memory_and_Justice?auto=download&email_work_card=download-paper">memorialising</a> their suffering through monuments that become places of pilgrimage to educate future generations.</p>
<p>That is how the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/documents/library-of-the-court-en.pdf">Nuremberg Tribunal</a> helped post-Nazi Germany and Europe to move on. And how the <a href="https://www.icty.org/">International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</a> strove to heal the Balkans from the 1995 <a href="https://srebrenica.org.uk/">Srebrenica</a> genocide.</p>
<p>Justice is best served closest to the people who suffer but, at the same time, crimes against humanity in one place are crimes against all humanity everywhere. So, the whole world must be part of legal processes that ensure transparency and fairness, provide lessons and reset global norms. The tribunals for the 1970s <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/cambodia/case-study/justice/tribunal">Cambodian</a> and 1994 <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994/Aftermath">Rwandan</a> genocides did that with hybrid domestic and international mechanisms.</p>
<p>Where this does not happen, old wounds fester, even ancient ones such as those from the <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-armenian-genocide-1915-16-overview">Armenian</a> genocide a century ago or the 1930s <a href="https://cla.umn.edu/chgs/holocaust-genocide-education/resource-guides/holodomor">Holodomor</a> genocide of Ukrainians. More recently, the unrectified genocides of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/marking-five-years-since-the-genocide-in-burma/">Rohingya</a>, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/01/20/german-lawmakers-recognize-yazidi-genocide-in-iraq_6012355_4.html">Yazidi</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/22/uk-mps-declare-china-is-committing-genocide-against-uyghurs-in-xinjiang">Uyghur</a>, and in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YAyN9LljW7M">Tigray</a> continue to cause turmoil and encourage impunity. That is why “never again” is happening “again and again”.</p>
<h2>Shabby peace deals</h2>
<p>There is no shortage of mediators for Sudan’s current crisis. But their impatient peace panaceas underestimate the impact of the generation-long Darfur genocide and its direct connection to current events. Shabby deals for short-term gains – appeasing the generals and further consolidating their power at the cost of civilian democracy – will unravel. </p>
<p>The bulk of the Sudanese at the centre, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27666997">dominated</a> by an Arabic elite – authorities, intelligentsia, rich – ignored the generation-long inhumanities at the peripheries of their vast land. But, sooner or later, there is no alternative to the path to peace in Sudan that is walked hand-in-hand by all its diverse peoples. </p>
<p>This will be a long journey. Short-changing justice and accountability will make it longer still. The handover of Bashir and other indictees to the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity in Darfur should be integral to all peace negotiations, and a condition for aiding recovery. Furthermore, fresh crimes being committed in the current conflict must not go unpunished. </p>
<p>Sudan’s stakeholders in Africa, the Middle East and globally serve the nation best – and also their own self-interests – by not standing in the way of peace through justice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mukesh Kapila does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The failure to hold the perpetrators of the Darfur genocide accountable has led to further instability in Sudan.Mukesh Kapila, Professor Emeritus in Global Health & Humanitarian Affairs, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2031152023-04-05T18:37:47Z2023-04-05T18:37:47ZI met 60 suspects of war crimes committed in Rwanda and Yugoslavia: what they had to say reveal cracks in our international justice system<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519313/original/file-20230404-22-9wuxgr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=20%2C11%2C1897%2C1267&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Croat leaders Jadranko Prlic, Bruno Stojic, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petkovic, Valentin Coric and Berislav Pusic stand trial at the Hague in 2013.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">Creative Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the <a href="https://museums.nuernberg.de/memorium-nuremberg-trials/">Nuremberg trials</a> (1945-1946), criminal jurisdictions such as those for the <a href="https://www.icty.org/">former Yugoslavia</a> and <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/">Rwanda</a> have aimed to judge the world’s most serious offenses: <a href="https://trialinternational.org/fr/topics-post/crimes-de-guerre/">war crimes</a>, <a href="https://trialinternational.org/fr/topics-post/crimes-contre-lhumanite/">crimes against humanity</a>, and <a href="https://trialinternational.org/topics-post/genocide/">genocides</a>.</p>
<p>These jurisdictions have inspired substantial legal, anthropological, and sociological analyses. Most of the research carried out has been either through field observations or interviews with victims and professionals. <a href="https://www.boutique-dalloz.fr/genocidaire-s-p.html">Our research</a>, however, looks at another angle: that of the criminal experience of the accused (whether they have been acquitted or convicted). The aim here is not to understand the criminal act, but the institutional processes that were set up to respond to it.</p>
<h2>Epistemology of a singular research</h2>
<p>We have therefore conducted interviews with sixty people tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) – a number no other journalist or researcher had until now been able to access – to learn about their justice experience. All interviews were conducted under conditions of anonymity, and most took place in the prisons where the convicted persons were held. </p>
<p>The idea of meeting people commonly referred to as <em>genocidaires</em> or <em>war criminals</em> is based on the teaching of the French philosopher Paul Ricœur. In a <a href="https://esprit.presse.fr/article/paul-ricoeur/l-acte-de-juger-11656">1992 article</a> published in the magazine <em>Esprit</em>, he explains:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The act of judging has reached its goal when the person who has, so to speak, won their case still feels able to say: my opponent, the one who lost, remains like me a subject of law: their cause deserved to be heard; their arguments were plausible, and they were heard. But recognition would only be complete if [the same] could be said by the condemned person; they should be able to declare that the sentence against them was not an act of violence but of recognition.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The study of international criminal justice is also guided by such questions. Indeed, it has a range of objectives: retribution, deterrence, and reintegration, but also the writing of history or memory, the satisfaction of victims, or cathartic release.</p>
<p>Such aims require that the suspects can be reached or, at the very least, approached. As we shall see, international criminal jurisdictions have not managed to enrol the perpetrators of crime into their view of justice like they have done with other war protagonists. </p>
<h2>“Who is that monster?”</h2>
<p>Although all the people I met say they support the idea of an international criminal justice that is “above suspicion” or that “allows the truth to be established”, the institutional and symbolic violence they feel they have been subjected to delegitimises this form of justice for them.</p>
<p>Thus, they describe a criminal process full of pitfalls: excessively framed by a legal terminology that, in their eyes, does not transcribe the reality they have experienced and that too rarely gives them a voice. When this was the case, it was mainly their attorneys (chosen by the defendants and often paid by the court) who spoke, and not the defendants themselves.</p>
<p>Moreover, the defendants say that they do not recognise themselves in the indictments they have faced. One respondent asked “who was that monster?”, expressing a sense of disconnect with what had been experienced. While this may be a denial of the acts committed, from our perspective as attorneys, it also points to a gap between the law in force and the facts.</p>
<p>Another will tell how, when the judge asked him “Do you plead guilty or not guilty?”, he tried to explain the context and the acts committed… but the judge simply wrote down: “The accused has pleaded not guilty”. He would have liked to speak more, but the judge did not give him the opportunity.</p>
<p>A large majority of those interviewed also felt that the justice system they faced was “out of touch”, imposed by “the West” and politically oriented, refusing to listen to any element of contextualisation (be them the context of war or, more broadly, that framing the crimes, both of which are inevitably political).</p>
<p>Respondents describe a “victors’ justice” system that overlooks the latter’s own <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/12/12/rwanda-tribunal-should-pursue-justice-rpf-crimes">war crimes or crimes against humanity</a> (mainly in Rwanda). Furthermore, they note a “two-tier” justice system that never tries the leaders of powerful states – notably American or European – and that mainly prosecutes nationals of “dominated” states.</p>
<p>Finally, and this is one of the most bitter criticisms of international criminal justice expressed, both the accused and the convicted regularly ask themselves: “Why me?” They reflect an unavoidable tension in international criminal law, which lies in weighing up individual guilt for mass crimes - crimes that have not only resulted in a dramatic and disproportionate number of victims, but been committed by a significant number of perpetrators. Thus, while suspects and and those convicted often admit to committing crimes, they nevertheless deny responsibility (which is symbolically attributed to them) for the entire mass crime. </p>
<h2>Pitfalls that undermine the reconstruction process</h2>
<p>Only one of the interviewees made a negationist statement during our interviews and only 3, out of 51 convicts we met, fully admit the justice of their conviction.</p>
<p>This means that the vast majority of those interviewed (some of whom had pleaded guilty before the international court) do not recognise either the acts reproached, their legal qualifications, their illegality, or the associated responsibilities. Although many <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-les-cahiers-de-la-justice-2011-1-page-65.htm">psychological factors</a> could be behind this non-recognition, it nonetheless remains a failure of international criminal law: to use Paul Ricœur’s formula, the sentence remains an act of violence and does not become, for the convicted person, an act of recognition.</p>
<p>This failure has consequences that go beyond the sole case of the convicted persons, insofar as it prevents a common (or consensual) memory from being created and influences the entire reconstruction process. It is accepted that mass crimes are generally committed by a mass of perpetrators. In Rwanda, for example, it has been said that between 100,000 and 150,000 people participated in the genocide against the Tutsis. </p>
<h2>Imagining a fairer international justice system</h2>
<p>It is therefore important to take into account the words of the accused as well as those of the other protagonists – the victims, the judges, and the populations affected by the war – and to note that they inevitably lead to other avenues of justice: <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-narrow-view-of-restorative-justice-blunts-its-impact-67258">restoration or reconciliation</a>, <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/traditional-justice-and-reconciliation-after-violent-conflict-learning-from-african-experiences_0.pdf">traditional</a> or <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interactional_justice">interactional</a>, local avenues that are culturally rooted and less politicised, or simply more symbolic. While some avenues have already been implemented, through more local and culturally rooted jurisdictions (such as the <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/temoigner/3537">gacaca</a> in Rwanda or <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Truth-and-Reconciliation-Commission-South-Africa">Truth and Reconciliation Commissions</a> in South Africa), the role of the accused remains to be defined and shaped, so that their experience is taken into account.</p>
<p>One possible way forward is to combine these different types of justice, as seems to be the case in <a href="https://www.ictj.org/publication/mixed-approach-international-crimes-retributive-and-restorative-justice-procedures">Colombia</a>. The peace process currently underway in the country taps into both the systems of criminal justice and restorative justice, which seeks to rehabilitate of offenders by reconciling them with victims and without condemnation. It also empowers all parties to write history, with the memories of perpetrators as well as victims featuring in trials and <a href="https://notevenpast.org/the-center-for-memory-peace-and-reconciliation-bogota-colombia/">memorial museums</a>. When perpetrators are not confronted to criminal law, they also appear to better explain their acts and the context in which they were committed - a notable benefit for victims seeking the truth.</p>
<p>While we can’t guarantee this will work, the laboratory holds out great hope by taking into consideration all the protagonists of the crimes, including the perpetrators. It is no longer a question of ending the enemy through law, but of rising with them through law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203115/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Damien Scalia has received funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Belgian Scientific Research Fund.</span></em></p>The International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have tried dozens of individuals. An investigation looks at how the accused experienced these trials.Damien Scalia, Professeur en droit international pénal, Études empiriques du droit, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2022472023-03-22T16:36:55Z2023-03-22T16:36:55ZPutin and the ICC: history shows just how hard it is to bring a head of state to justice<p>The arrest warrants <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and">issued recently</a> by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and his children’s commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova, represent the first time officials of a permanent member of the United Nations security council have been indicted for a war crime.</p>
<p>The charge is that they presided over the forced deportation of Ukrainian children from areas occupied by the Russian military. “There are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr Putin bears individual criminal responsibility for the aforementioned crimes,” the ICC <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and">said in a statement</a> on March 17. </p>
<p>The ICC is reportedly <a href="https://eurasianet.org/the-case-against-china-at-the-icc">considering evidence</a> of alleged crimes against humanity committed by another permanent member of the security council, China. The crimes under investigation include disappearances, forced sterilisations, executions and the detention of more than a million people. </p>
<p>Lawyers working on behalf of Uyghur exiles from the Xinjiang region where the crimes have allegedly taken place have reportedly submitted new evidence. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-updates-eu-agrees-2-billion-ammo-plan-for-kyiv/a-65045955">called on the ICC</a> to “respect the immunity of heads of state from jurisdiction under international law”. It is an indication that Beijing is at least taking the prospect of the ICC mounting a case against senior Chinese officials seriously.</p>
<p>It has been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2013.800737">rare</a> for a head of state to face justice in the court. Laurent Gbagbo, the former president of the Ivory Coast, was charged in 2011 with crimes against humanity along with Charles Blé Goudé, but he was acquitted in 2019. The court’s judgment said the <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/42384-why-icc-acquitted-laurent-gbagbo-charles-ble-goude.html">prosecution had failed</a> to “prove the existence of a common plan and/or a policy of large-scale or systematic attack”, the burden of proof required by the charges. </p>
<p>The ICC issued an arrest warrant in 2011 for the former leader of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, for crimes against humanity and war crimes. But he was murdered within months of the warrant being issued. At the time, ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo said the court had <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-warcrimes-idUSTRE7417VU20110502">strong evidence</a> of crimes including the shooting of civilians. </p>
<p>The case of former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">remains active</a>. Bashir was issued an arrest warrant in 2009 for orchestrating a campaign of mass violence including murder, torture, and rape against non-Arab ethnic groups in the Darfur region of west Sudan since 2003. At the time Sudan did not recognise the ICC, and the African Union also rejected the charge, alleging that the ICC was biased against African nations.</p>
<p>Bashir was forced from power in 2019 and jailed for two years for corruption and financial crimes. In 2021, Sudan <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/4/sudan-takes-first-step-towards-joining-international-criminal-court">voted to ratify</a> the Rome statute of the ICC, but the decision has yet to be approved by Sudan’s highest authority, the sovereign council. There is also a debate whether the conflict in Sudan – like the war in former Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda – might be cause to establish a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/12/sudan-omar-al-bashir-icc-war-crimes-darfur">special court for Darfur</a> in Sudan. </p>
<h2>A high bar</h2>
<p>As far as the charges against Putin are concerned, much may hinge on internal Russian politics. If the president is deposed, Russia could choose to ratify the Rome Statute and hand Putin over for trial. Or it could set up its own court to investigate alleged war crimes in Ukraine. </p>
<p>The European Union <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_1363">has also agreed</a> in 2023 to establish a new tribunal to prosecute Russian crimes of aggression committed during the war in Ukraine. In the meantime, Putin risks being handed to the ICC by any state he visits which recognises the court.</p>
<p>But for now, the warrant <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-iccs-putin-arrest-warrant-may-be-symbolic-but-must-be-the-beginning-of-holding-the-russian-leader-accountable-201907">seems more symbolic</a>. It effectively means that for much of the world – at least the 123 countries that recognise the ICC – Putin is a <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-the-pariah-war-crimes-arrest-warrant-deepens-russias-isolation/">pariah</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-icc-is-investigating-war-crimes-in-ukraine-could-putin-be-indicted-178005">isolated</a> in the international community.</p>
<p>The ICC’s charge will not necessarily be easy to prove. Investigators would <a href="https://theconversation.com/prosecuting-putin-for-abducting-ukrainian-children-will-require-a-high-bar-of-evidence-and-wont-guarantee-the-children-can-come-back-home-201833">need to show</a> that not only did the alleged abductors take the children against their will, but that they also did not intend to return the children to their legal guardians. In addition, the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/Publications/Elements-of-Crimes.pdf">Rome statute</a> requires that the prosecution must prove that “the perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national, ethnic, racial or religious group”. </p>
<p>Other charges the ICC might attempt to bring – for example, deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure such as medical facilities – will be <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-the-international-criminal-court-just-issued-an-arrest-warrant-for-putin-will-he-wind-up-behind-bars/">equally difficult</a> to show intent for.</p>
<h2>Heads of state</h2>
<p>But the fact that a sitting head of state has been charged with a crime against humanity is significant. There are those who believe that <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraq-war-bush-blair/index.html">George W. Bush and Tony Blair</a> should have been indicted with war crimes after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Incidentally, the pair were <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2011/11/28/kuala-lumpur-tribunal-bush-and-blair-guilty">found guilty</a> of crimes against peace by a war crimes tribunal in Malaysia in 2011. </p>
<p>Another leader who could realistically be concerned at facing ICC charges is the ruling head of the Myanmar military or Tatmadaw, Min Aung Hlaing, for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/rights-group-urges-icc-probe-of-myanmar-coup-leader/">his role</a> in directing alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity towards Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslim minority. Myanmar is not a party to the Rome statute, but because “an element” of the crimes was perpetrated in Bangladesh – which is under ICC jurisdiction – an <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-judges-authorise-opening-investigation-situation-bangladesh/myanmar">investigation has been opened</a>.</p>
<p>Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu is also vulnerable to accusations associated with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-west-bank-palestinian-territories-courts-crime-19117d4265f5d564256ea7fe75854aa6">alleged Israeli crimes in the state of Palestine</a>, which was admitted as a state party to the ICC in 2015. The ICC launched an investigation in 2021 for alleged Israeli crimes in the Palestinian territories since 2014, news which Netanyahu reacted to by <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-west-bank-palestinian-territories-courts-crime-19117d4265f5d564256ea7fe75854aa6">declaring</a>: “The state of Israel is under attack this evening.”</p>
<p>Israel has said it will not cooperate with the investigation. Similarly, it is hard to see Russia reacting any differently. But time and a <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/israeli-settlements-should-be-classified-as-war-crimes-says-special-rapporteur-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-opt-press-release/">growing mountain</a> of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-crimes-government-international-criminal-court-a6edd7e6ed0de527b42a1790dccc33ea">evidence</a> are against them. As one Rohingya victim <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RelatedRecords/CR2019_06862.PDF">argued to the ICC</a>: “Even if it takes long time to resolve the victims’ case and to get justice … we want the ICC to get our justice.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202247/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Gegout receives funding from the Leverhulme Trust, the British Academy and the European Union.</span></em></p>The International Criminal Court sets a high bar for prosecuting heads of state for crimes committed while they are in power.Catherine Gegout, Associate Professor in International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2014792023-03-19T12:18:51Z2023-03-19T12:18:51ZWars in cities: three rules for protecting the built environment during conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514768/original/file-20230311-2791-i5k8dp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">This is a digitally generated image of what a city might look like after a war.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>During the course of wars, the infrastructure of cities faces destruction. Fighting, regardless of its intentions, destroys roads, bridges, commercial and residential buildings, as well as the architecture they embody.</p>
<p>Throughout history and around the globe, calls to stop wars have focused on the value of people’s lives. In recent decades, there has been a lot of attention paid to protecting cultural heritage. However, there has been little consideration for the value of public places and people’s memories of these spaces.</p>
<p>Buildings – such as residential and commercial structures, schools and hospitals – are often destroyed in the chaos of conflict, leaving behind psychological trauma that can last for generations. In a recent paper, we set out why cities and their buildings need to be protected. This infrastructure, unique or not, represents people’s history, culture and social fabric. </p>
<p>In our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17549175.2023.2180076?src=&journalCode=rjou20">paper</a>, we coined the term “wartime urbanism” to describe what we believe needs to be done to preserve a city’s distinctive characteristics in times of conflict. </p>
<p>We propose three ways to do this: mapping a city’s real estate development and its relative urban value; enacting national and international laws that criminalise the destruction of physical assets; and raising public awareness about these laws and the importance of city assets.</p>
<p>During times of conflict, cultural heritage and city places can be protected <a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-wars-are-hurting-its-rich-heritage-how-the-law-can-help-180041">under various laws</a>. However, for these laws to be effective, governments must implement them during periods of peace.</p>
<p>We argue that politicians and urban practitioners should incorporate wartime urbanism into city planning and design. This would help protect buildings, infrastructure, services, facilities, and public and private places before, during and after wars. The less severe the material damage (in terms of human lives and physical structures) from conflict, the faster reconciliation can be.</p>
<h2>Protection from destruction</h2>
<p>Conflicts in different parts of the world have caused the displacement of millions of people, and the destruction of hundreds of thousands of buildings and critical infrastructure. When wars intensify, the protection of people is rightly prioritised. Protecting places, however, rarely finds mention.</p>
<p>Wars and the destruction they cause are considered <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml">crimes against humanity</a>. Prosecution for such crimes is most often enforced by international courts, like The Hague’s <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/the-court">International Criminal Court</a>. However, several countries have listed crimes against humanity under their domestic laws.</p>
<p>But there is more that can be done. For instance, the 1945 <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter#:%7E:text=The%20Charter%20of%20the%20United,force%20on%2024%20October%201945.">United Nations Charter</a>, which lists the actions the organisation can take on a variety of issues, doesn’t include the protection of human property. </p>
<p>The 1972 <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/convention/#:%7E:text=The%20Convention%20concerning%20the%20Protection%20of%20World%20Cultural%20and%20Natural,the%20Cultural%20and%20Natural%20Heritage.">Convention on the Protection of Cultural and Natural Heritage</a> provides guidelines on securing sites of significant global value. These sites are part of everyday human heritage, and destroying them during peacetime is a crime punishable by law. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-war-in-tigray-risks-wiping-out-centuries-of-the-worlds-history-179829">Ethiopia's war in Tigray risks wiping out centuries of the world's history</a>
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<p>However, during war, everything is exposed to extreme destruction. Aggressors often seek to cause irreversible damage to the history and civilisation of the country under attack. If not by genocide, then by destroying people’s homes, memorials and valuable architectural assets. This was seen in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-war-in-tigray-risks-wiping-out-centuries-of-the-worlds-history-179829">Ethiopia’s Tigray region</a> during the 2020-2022 war.</p>
<p>Urban planners can play a role in guiding <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/811/">urban conservation and preservation</a> of city places by creating detailed plans that identify the assets that need to be protected – and how they can be protected. They can also develop strategies that mitigate the damage of war by focusing on how to rebuild in the aftermath.</p>
<h2>Three rules of wartime urbanism</h2>
<p>Wartime urbanism emphasises the importance of protecting cities or public places, regardless of their structure. This approach means professionals in architecture, urban planners and urban designers should develop plans that address the possibility of regional, global and international-level conflicts. </p>
<p>To protect city places from the destruction of war – or to restore and rebuild them to normal after a conflict ends – we propose three rules.</p>
<p><strong>1. Pre-documentary mapping</strong></p>
<p>Specialists in architecture and urban planning prepare maps that detail the development of a city, town or urban space. These maps should be kept in safe places physically and virtually. Should a war break out, developers can use these maps to rebuild infrastructure and restore city functions destroyed by conflict. This would help ensure that a city goes back to what it was, which would help minimise people’s psychological trauma. </p>
<p>These maps also preserve invaluable information about a city’s history and culture that can be used to inform future development and restoration projects. Because such maps document city assets, they can be used by international protection agencies to better measure the scale of destruction caused by war. They can also help identify areas of potential conflict – or spaces at risk of being targeted. Maps can further be used to advocate the rights of local populations when rebuilding after war. </p>
<p><strong>2. Criminalising destruction</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/en/our-work/maintain-international-peace-and-security#:%7E:text=Preventive%20Diplomacy%20and%20Mediation&text=The%20United%20Nations%20plays%20an,political%20missions%20in%20the%20field.">United Nations</a> and <a href="https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/odesa-inscribed-unescos-world-heritage-list-face-threats-destruction?hub=66116">Unesco</a> should add an item to their charters that states that ordinary buildings within a city should not be targeted and destroyed. This would give such buildings the same degree of importance as architecture and cultural artefacts. It would help rally people around protecting ordinary structures, and help reduce the risk of displacement and displacement-related poverty. </p>
<p><strong>3. Raising public awareness</strong></p>
<p>Educational institutions and the media need to raise public awareness on the impacts of war. Conflict not only affects lives, but places too. Destroying people’s homes, for instance, exacerbates poverty and trauma. </p>
<p>Public awareness efforts should also highlight laws around crimes against humanity, and other international and local statutes that punish those who sabotage the structure of cities. This would help deter aggressors from attacking infrastructure, and give citizens a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/civil-war-to-blame-for-surge-in-online-sales-of-ethiopian-artifacts/a-61069797">greater understanding</a> of the importance of their physical spaces. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-wars-are-hurting-its-rich-heritage-how-the-law-can-help-180041">Africa's wars are hurting its rich heritage: how the law can help</a>
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<p>By following these three rules, politicians and citizens can work together to preserve their cities. This would help reduce the time and money spent on rebuilding what wars destroy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201479/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abeer Elshater is now affiliated with Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Egypt and on temporary leave from Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hisham Abusaada does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Urban spaces are a repository of people’s beliefs, memories and collective conscience.Hisham Abusaada, Professor of Architecture and Urban Design, Housing and Building National Research CenterAbeer Elshater, Professor of Urban Morphology, Ain Shams UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1991702023-02-27T13:23:30Z2023-02-27T13:23:30ZCan mass atrocities be prevented? This course attempts to answer the question<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512232/original/file-20230224-1648-wr1thv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2000%2C1245&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People gather around a hole being dug in search of water in Darfur, Sudan, in 2004.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SudanalBashirsFate/a74921ed1ca247fc8e76c82186cdcf35/photo">AP Photo/Ben Curtis</a></span></figcaption></figure><figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Text saying: Uncommon Courses, from The Conversation" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/uncommon-courses-130908">Uncommon Courses</a> is an occasional series from The Conversation U.S. highlighting unconventional approaches to teaching.</em> </p>
<h2>Title of course:</h2>
<p>“Introduction to Genocide Studies”</p>
<h2>What prompted the idea for the course?</h2>
<p>Many genocide classes take a historical view, spending a lot of time on the <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/learn">Holocaust</a> or <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/cambodia/case-study/introduction/cambodia-1975">Cambodia’s Killing Fields</a>. As a <a href="https://humanrights.uconn.edu/person/mike-brand/">scholar-practitioner</a> in the field of atrocities prevention and human rights, I wanted something that would make clear to students that mass atrocities – genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing – are not just in the past, but are very much happening in the present. </p>
<p>By exploring recent and ongoing mass atrocities in places such as <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/syria">Syria</a>, <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/ethiopia">Ethiopia</a>, <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/south-sudan">South Sudan</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/saudi-war-crimes-yemen/">Yemen</a>, students are able to better connect to the material once they realize that these issues have happened during their lifetimes, not decades or centuries ago. </p>
<p>Between exploring recent mass atrocities and focusing on U.S. foreign policy, I try to keep the course grounded in a way that makes some of these abstract concepts much more tangible.</p>
<h2>What does the course explore?</h2>
<p>The course starts off by exploring <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/learn-about-genocide-and-other-mass-atrocities/definitions">the definitions of mass atrocities</a> and the associated crimes, how their definitions are similar and different from one another, and constraints within international law.</p>
<p>We review several case studies of mass atrocities. Students also learn about successes and failures of different intervention tactics, everything from peacekeeping to sanctions to military intervention. And we discuss efforts to seek justice, including international tribunals like the <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</a>, national court systems and the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/the-court">International Criminal Court</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd gathers around a pile of sacks containing food." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Refugees from the Rwanda genocide in 1994 get food at a refugee camp in neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo, then known as Zaire.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/NetherlandsRwandaGenocideTrial/b7f052d2abfb4c2fadc02c6880d8ed5b/photo">AP Photo/Javier Bauluz</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We then explore the ethical principle called “responsibility to protect,” committed to in a <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/2005-world-summit-outcome-a-60-l-1/">United Nations agreement in 2015</a>, including its first test with the <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/sudan">genocide in Darfur, Sudan</a>. Individual governments are responsible for preventing their citizens from experiencing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. However, if a government is unable or unwilling to protect its people, then the international community must do so.</p>
<p>We also look at the modern-day global anti-genocide movement and efforts to prevent mass atrocities, including by sanctions – though <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2016.1240516">there is little evidence to suggest</a> they work – and military intervention, which is quite rare.</p>
<p>Then we discuss U.S. foreign policy efforts, including <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1158/text">the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act</a> of 2018, which made it the policy of the United States to “regard the prevention of atrocities as in its national interest.” We also discuss the development of a
<a href="https://www.state.gov/united-states-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability/">governmentwide strategy</a> to prevent and respond to mass atrocities around the world.</p>
<p>I’ve found that students appreciate learning about what the U.S. government is and is not doing to confront mass atrocities.</p>
<p>The course culminates with a group presentation and individual research into an ongoing mass atrocity situation. After they complete their projects, students often make comments like “I had no idea this was happening” or “I can’t believe I never heard about this before.”</p>
<h2>Why is this course relevant now?</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, this course will likely be relevant for years to come as mass atrocities continue to occur in several places around the world. The <a href="https://truthout.org/articles/more-military-spending-wont-end-atrocities-we-must-focus-on-preventing-them/">ongoing atrocities in Ukraine</a> and <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/determination-of-the-secretary-of-state-on-atrocities-in-xinjiang/index.html">genocide against the Uyghurs in China</a> show how intractable these issues are when a powerful nation is the one committing atrocities. </p>
<h2>What’s a critical lesson from the course?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/03/yemen-airstrikes-saudi-arabia-mbs-us">United States has been accused of complicity in the commission of war crimes</a> in Yemen through its continued support of violence committed by Saudi Arabia and allied forces. This provides an example of how the U.S. does not always play a positive role on the international stage.</p>
<h2>What materials does the course feature?</h2>
<ul>
<li><p>The documentary “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1e0HFCKcVhc">Watchers of the Sky</a>” provides the students with a strong background on the topic of mass atrocities. It discusses the creation of the term “<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2192363">genocide</a>” in 1944, and explores key examples, including the <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/subsequent-nuremberg-proceedings-case-9-the-einsatzgruppen-case">Nuremberg trials</a> in the wake of World War II and more recent efforts by the International Criminal Court.</p></li>
<li><p>Chapters from Scott Straus’ “<a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/reports-and-resources/fundamentals-of-genocide-and-mass-atrocity-prevention">Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention</a>” provide a great overview of some key topics. </p></li>
<li><p>David Moshman’s 2001 paper “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520120097224">Conceptual constraints on thinking about genocide</a>,” which discusses how not all genocides will resemble the Holocaust. It is important to know that a situation may fit the definition of genocide – intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group – without employing death camps and gas chambers.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What will the course prepare students to do?</h2>
<p>I believe the course provides my students with tangible ways they can get more involved in atrocities prevention advocacy and programs.</p>
<p>They also learn how to research U.S. legislation that is relevant to genocide, contact members of Congress, write op-eds and create fact sheets.</p>
<p>By giving assignments like this, in addition to more traditional papers, my students learn how to effectively engage in human rights advocacy, even in a small way.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199170/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mike Brand is affiliated with the University of Connecticut and George Mason University’s Raphaël Lemkin Genocide Prevention Program. </span></em></p>Many genocide classes review the Holocaust or Cambodia’s Killing Fields. A scholar wanted to show that genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing still happen today.Mike Brand, Adjunct Professor of Genocide Studies and Human Rights, University of ConnecticutLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1997442023-02-22T17:11:50Z2023-02-22T17:11:50ZRussia’s invasion of Ukraine is proof the EU needs to get better at stopping mass atrocities<p>The Russian invasion of Ukraine shows that identifying mass atrocity risks is not a niche concern. Many who thought it would be irrational for Russia to launch an attack minimised long-standing Russian rhetoric that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/23/putin-genocide-language-ukraine-wipe-out-state-identity/">denied Ukrainian statehood and national identity</a>. If policymakers had used a “mass atrocity lens”, then they would have seen that a war of aggression was not only plausible but was likely to be accompanied by mass atrocities, taking into account Russia’s track record in Chechnya and Syria. </p>
<p>The fear of extermination explains why Ukrainians feel they are fighting for their survival and why the atrocities committed by Russian troops in <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/09/russia-committing-genocide-ukraine">Bucha and elsewhere</a> dealt a significant blow to any prospects of a peace agreement. A strategy on mass atrocities, therefore, is not only about empowering the European Union to save lives, but fulfil its declared ambitions to be a principled geopolitical actor in a divided world, effective at conflict prevention, management and resolution. </p>
<p>Ten years ago, the Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities published a <a href="http://massatrocitiestaskforce.eu/Home.html">report</a> that weighed the EU’s strengths and weaknesses in preventing and halting mass atrocities. To strengthen the EU’s capacity in this area, we recommended that it:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>make explicit a commitment to preventing mass atrocities in strategic policy documents and through high-level statements;</p></li>
<li><p>cultivate expertise on mass atrocity prevention, especially country/regional expertise, and run training programmes to improve experts’ analytical and warning skills;</p></li>
<li><p>strengthen its early warning response system to enable earlier action against mass atrocity risks;</p></li>
<li><p>mitigate mass atrocity risks through diplomacy, including trade and development policies, and cooperation with other international players;</p></li>
<li><p>improve its capabilities to react quickly to ongoing mass atrocities.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>To what extent has the EU made progress in line with our recommendations and where is there room for improvement?</p>
<h2>Commitment to preventing mass atrocities: still unclear</h2>
<p>The EU’s commitment to mass atrocity prevention is scattered across various documents. It has not followed the US in declaring mass atrocity prevention to be <a href="https://www.state.gov/2022-united-states-strategy-to-anticipate-prevent-and-respond-to-atrocities/">“a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility”</a>. Preventing atrocity crimes is included in documents such as the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_action_plan_on_human_rights_and_democracy_2020-2024.pdf">“EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, 2020-2024”</a>, but not in other key documents such as the EU’s <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-0_en">Strategic Compass</a>, which assesses the security challenges facing the EU and makes specific proposals to strengthen the EU’s security and defence capabilities.</p>
<p>Neither the Council of the EU, the bloc’s diplomatic service, the European External Action Service (EEAS), nor the European Commission have responded to the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-7-2013-0180_EN.html">European Parliament’s 2013 call</a> for an interinstitutional “consensus on the responsibility to protect”. Instead, the EU’s 2016 <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy_en">Global Strategy</a> merely states that the EU “will promote the responsibility to protect’ (R2P), without indicating how the EU might <em>actively</em> protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing. </p>
<p>In 2016 the <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/gr2p/12/4/article-p369_369.xml?language=en">EU became the first regional organisation</a> to appoint an "R2P focal point”, an official who facilitates internal EU coordination of atrocity prevention mechanisms, but we could not discern the identity of the current EU focal point from the EEAS website or organigram and we found no evidence of engagement with relevant stakeholders. Although the EU expresses support for R2P at the UN, EU Member States have been uneasy about the increasing politicisation of R2P: Russia, for example, contested the legitimacy of R2P references in the context of NATO’s intervention in Libya but <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/04/how-kremlin-distorts-responsibility-protect-principle">brought up R2P language</a> to legitimise its own war efforts in Georgia and Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Early warning response system and external action instruments: some progress</h2>
<p>In late 2018, the EEAS released an <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_r2p_atrocity_prevention_toolkit.pdf">“Atrocity Prevention Toolkit”</a> to help EU staff recognise and respond to atrocity crimes, by listing structural risk indicators, imminent warning signs and concrete measures to take to mitigate risks. Assessments of risks in conflict-affected or fragile countries now include analyses of the prevalence of hate speech, societal inequalities, a history of mass atrocities or failed recognition of past abuses. The toolkit feeds into the EU’s early warning system, which has been built since 2014. </p>
<p>Moreover, the EU’s toolkit goes further than one developed by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/early-warning.shtml">United Nations</a> and uses a gender lens in the assessment of atrocity risks. However, there is still a lingering belief within the EEAS that a focus on human rights, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354066119883001">democratisation</a>, and conflict prevention is sufficient to assess atrocity risks and act upon them.</p>
<p>Under the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-has-new-powerful-tool-protect-human-rights-eu-global-human-rights-sanctions-regime-0_en">Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime</a>, the EU can impose sanctions on individuals responsible for human rights violations including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, which proved successful in cases like <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/joup/24/3-4/article-p367_367.xml">Guinea</a>. EUROJUST, the EU’s agency for criminal justice cooperation, runs a European network for investigating and prosecuting atrocity crimes, and is supporting a <a href="https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/eurojust-and-the-war-in-ukraine">joint investigative team in Ukraine</a>. The <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/">European Peace Facility</a> (EPF) is structured around human rights conditionality, but the extent to which mass atrocity risks are factored in remains unclear. The EU will need to ensure that it does not enable the acquisition of military equipment by governments in contexts where mass atrocities are likely.</p>
<h2>Capabilities to react quickly to mass atrocities: room for improvement</h2>
<p>The EU is developing a 5,000-strong <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-rapid-deployment-capacity_en">rapid deployment capacity</a> (EU RDC) – a substantial upgrade of the bloc’s current <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/33557_en">EU Battlegroups</a>, which comprises 1500 personnel. However, none of the current planning scenarios for the EU RDC involve a focus on preventing or stopping mass atrocities. Yet these force packages could play a key role in the prevention or mitigation of mass atrocity risks if appropriately trained and speedily deployed, and mandated to help protect civilian lives, as preventive peacekeeping deployments in <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/sierra-leone/">Sierra Leone</a> and <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/27396/chapter-abstract/197201817?redirectedFrom=fulltext">North Macedonia</a> demonstrated.</p>
<h2>Overall assessment</h2>
<p>In the past decade, the EU has taken some steps to strengthen its capacity to prevent mass atrocities, but there is <a href="https://peacelab.blog/2019/07/first-things-first-prioritize-mass-atrocity-prevention">still a lack of consensus</a> within the EU on taking preventive action, and any <a href="https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/EU-and-RTP-in-an-illiberal-era.pdf">action taken in mass atrocity situations has often been fragmented</a>. Furthermore, in an increasingly divided international context, in which “liberal norms’ such as the responsibility to protect have been fiercely contested by developing countries and authoritarian regimes, the <a href="https://jcms.ideasoneurope.eu/2020/05/13/the-european-union-and-the-responsibility-to-protect/">EU’s ambivalence about R2P prevents it from leading globally on mass atrocity prevention</a>.</p>
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<p><em>Professors Christoph Meyer and Karen E. Smith were co-chairs of the task force, and Dr Chiara De Franco served as its coordinator.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199744/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chiara De Franco is a member of the International Studies Association (ISA). She has received funds from the Independent Research Fund Denmark to study how the EU protect civilians in conflict-torn territories. Her work for the Task Force for the EU's prevention of mass atrocities was funded by the Budapest Foundation for the international prevention of genocide and mass atrocities.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Meyer has received funding in the past from UK research council (ESRC) for the INTEL project, but not directly related to this research. He was also supported by the Budapest Foundation as the Task-Force Co-chair 10 years ago. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karen E. Smith est membre de International Studies Association, UACES, and British International Studies Association. </span></em></p>The war’s one-year anniversary is eerily close to that of an EU report on the prevention of mass atrocities. Ten years later, its authors reflect on what the bloc could have done differently.Chiara De Franco, Associate Professor in International Relations, University of Southern DenmarkChristoph Meyer, Professor of European and International Politics, King's College LondonKaren E. Smith, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1910602022-09-23T01:45:18Z2022-09-23T01:45:18ZA UN-backed tribunal on Khmer Rouge crimes just confirmed the conviction of key leader Khieu Samphan. What now?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486202/original/file-20220922-8022-3dfuxy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C2%2C2000%2C1323&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nhet Sok Heng/Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia via AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A United Nations-backed tribunal in Cambodia has just concluded its largest trial, concerning crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime. The tribunal’s appeal judges yesterday confirmed the conviction against 91-year-old <a href="https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/indicted-person/khieu-samphan">Khieu Samphan</a>, the former head of state, for his role in these crimes.</p>
<p>Yesterday’s decision was a turning point. After this, there will be no further trials in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. But what will the lasting impacts of these trials be?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/khmer-rouge-genocide-nuon-cheas-death-has-major-implications-for-justice-in-cambodia-121582">Khmer Rouge genocide: Nuon Chea's death has major implications for justice in Cambodia</a>
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<h2>What was the Khmer Rouge regime?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-10684399">Khmer Rouge</a>, otherwise known as Communist Party of Kampuchea, held power in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979. Their ascent to power followed a period of violent authoritarianism, conflict and the loss of half a million lives during US <a href="https://gsp.yale.edu/sites/default/files/walrus_cambodiabombing_oct06.pdf">bombing</a> in the Vietnam war. </p>
<p>While many Cambodians initially welcomed the Khmer Rouge’s victory, this popular support was short-lived. Life under Khmer Rouge rule meant forced labour, starvation, and the constant threat of torture, imprisonment and death. </p>
<h2>Prosecuting the crimes of the Khmer Rouge</h2>
<p>In 1979, the Vietnamese defeated the Khmer Rouge and installed a tribunal to prosecuted Communist Party of Kampuchea Prime Minister Pol Pot and Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary in absentia.</p>
<p>After that largely symbolic effort, there was no accountability for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge for several decades.</p>
<p>However, following negotiations between the Cambodian People’s Party (still in power) and the UN, in 2003 a tribunal was established to prosecute senior Khmer Rouge leaders and “those most responsible” for the crimes.</p>
<p>Known officially as the <a href="https://www.eccc.gov.kh/">Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia</a>, this UN-backed tribunal started work in 2006. Its jurisdiction covers crimes defined in Cambodian law and international law, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. </p>
<p>There is now a permanent court to prosecute these kinds of crimes: the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/">International Criminal Court</a> in The Hague. But it can only address crimes committed after 2002, whereas the UN-backed tribunal in Cambodia’s mandate reaches back to the 1970s.</p>
<h2>The trials</h2>
<p>In its 16 years of operation, the UN-backed tribunal in Cambodia has completed just three trials. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/90">first trial</a>, it found Kaing Guek Eav (alias “Duch”), former head of the S-21 prison, guilty of crimes against humanity and war crimes. </p>
<p>S-21 was used to torture suspected enemies of the regime. An estimated 12,000 men, women and children were detained there; only 12 are known to have survived. Duch’s conviction was upheld on appeal, and he died in prison in 2020.</p>
<p>The next case concerned four Communist Party of Kampuchea senior leaders: Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/indicted-person/ieng-thirith-former-accused">Ieng Thirith</a> was found unfit to stand trial in 2012 and <a href="https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/indicted-person/ieng-sary-fomer-accused">Ieng Sary</a> died in 2013, leaving only two defendants in the case.</p>
<p>Due to the complexity of the case, the tribunal split it into two phases. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/document/court/case-00201-judgement">2014</a>, the tribunal convicted Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan of crimes connected to the expulsion of Cambodia’s urban population into rural worksites. This conviction was mostly upheld in <a href="https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/document/court/appeal-judgement-case-00201">2016</a>, with both defendants receiving a life sentence. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/document/court/case-00202-judgement">2018</a>, it convicted both men of further crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.</p>
<p>This conviction covered forced labour, the torture and execution of suspected dissidents, crimes targeting ethnic, political and religious groups, and orchestrating forced marriages with a view to incentivising population growth.</p>
<p>The judgement also recognised many rapes by Khmer Rouge cadre in worksites and prison sites, although these crimes were not formally charged. </p>
<p>Both men appealed the 2018 judgement, but Nuon Chea <a href="https://theconversation.com/khmer-rouge-genocide-nuon-cheas-death-has-major-implications-for-justice-in-cambodia-121582">died</a> shortly after at age 93, leaving Khieu Samphan as the sole appellant.</p>
<h2>Genocide</h2>
<p>The case that ended yesterday was the Cambodia tribunal’s only case to include charges of genocide.</p>
<p>Nuon Chea was convicted of genocide against the ethnic Vietnamese and Cham groups; Khieu Samphan was convicted of genocide against the ethnic Vietnamese only.</p>
<p>These legal findings do not necessarily square with popular conceptions of genocide in Cambodia, where “genocide” has come to mean the atrocity crimes against the entire population. </p>
<p>But in <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">international law</a>, “genocide” is defined more narrowly – it only captures crimes committed with an intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. </p>
<p>Nor do the tribunal’s genocide findings necessarily accord with the perspectives of the targeted groups. Our research suggests the <a href="https://reparations.qub.ac.uk/assets/uploads/Cham-Culture_Book_LV06.pdf">Cham</a> and <a href="https://search.informit.org/doi/abs/10.3316/agispt.20190322008162?casa_token=mQfkRaa8F5oAAAAA%3A4Eh93XegG0k6CSEhBIAOgvsc5iYmIB4SKVjbMmnKYr6rfDg9EmjS6POkXPKD8Ha-kZw0MEKlQyQ0kg">ethnic Vietnamese</a> communities do not always draw clear distinctions between their experience, and that of the broader Cambodian population. While they wanted the tribunal to recognise their suffering, this did not have to include a conviction of genocide targeting them exclusively. </p>
<p>But ultimately, these legal details may not matter. It seems the 2018 genocide conviction was meaningful for many Cambodians, who viewed it as affirming their experience of “genocide”.</p>
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<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Many Khmer Rouge leaders died before they could be indicted, and attempts to prosecute other suspects were <a href="https://www.justiceinitiative.org/publications/political-interference-extraordinary-chambers-courts-cambodia">blocked</a> by the Cambodian government.</p>
<p>Now, attention is turning to the tribunal’s <a href="https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/co-rapporteurs-residual-functions-related-victims-deliver-their-report">legacy</a>.</p>
<p>Already, there are signs it affected the historical record. For example, the pattern of forced marriage and sexual violence recorded in its judgements was not widely acknowledged by Cambodian or Western historians prior to these trials.</p>
<p>But the full extent of the tribunal’s impact will take decades to assess.</p>
<p>It is yet to be seen whether it effected the rule of law in Cambodia, whether its judgements and reparations brought a meaningful sense of justice to survivors, and how the judgements will influence understandings of the regime and its crimes. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cambodians-await-crucial-tribunal-finding-into-1970s-brutal-khmer-rouge-regime-106078">Cambodians await crucial tribunal finding into 1970s brutal Khmer Rouge regime</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191060/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rosemary Grey receives funding from the Australian Research Council and University of Sydney, and has previously received funding from the Sydney Southeast Asia Centre.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rachel Killean does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many Khmer Rouge leaders died before they could be indicted, and attempts to prosecute other suspects were blocked by the Cambodian government. Now, attention is turning to the tribunal’s legacy.Rosemary Grey, Lecturer in Law, University of SydneyRachel Killean, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1835862022-05-23T11:40:32Z2022-05-23T11:40:32ZWar crimes trial of Russian soldier was perfectly legal – but that doesn’t make it wise<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464667/original/file-20220522-12-knzvfz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=47%2C89%2C3946%2C2568&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The trial of Russian soldier Vadim Shishimarin could be mirrored with similar war crimes prosecutions by Moscow.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-soldier-vadim-shishimarin-suspected-of-violations-news-photo/1240787487?adppopup=true">Maxym Marusenko/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-soldier-asks-forgiveness-ukraine-war-crimes-trial-2022-05-19/">war crimes trial of a Russian soldier</a> in Ukraine – <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-kharkiv-2fb1355f5c0b5724adfc5b4367807335">which concluded on May 23, 2022 with a conviction and life sentence for the defendant</a> – was permissible under international law. And with the eyes of the world on them, Ukrainian authorities would have wanted the proceedings to be played entirely by the book.</p>
<p>But nonetheless, conducting a war crimes trial during active hostilities, and by a civilian court, is not normal. Nor may it be wise.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/goldman/bio">expert on the law of war</a> – that is, the set of international legal protocols and conventions that set out the rules of what is allowed during conflicts – I am concerned that trying a prisoner of war in such circumstances is problematic for several reasons. Further, it could set a disturbing precedent. While the Ukrainian trial may well have been conducted under due process of law, the same may not be true if Russia decides to follow suit. </p>
<h2>The right time to prosecute war crimes</h2>
<p>There are, of course, advantages to holding a trial so close to an alleged crime – in this case, the shooting death of an unarmed civilian in the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/why-did-you-do-this-the-story-behind-ukraines-first-war-crimes-trial-11653226541">Ukrainian village of Chupakhivka on Feb. 28</a>, 2022. For example, it makes it easier to gather evidence because the crime scene is still fresh and eyewitness memories more recent. Such trials could also provide timely justice for the loved ones of civilians killed.</p>
<p>Moreover, Ukraine has the moral high ground here. The country is the victim of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589">clear-cut aggression from Russia</a>. And rights experts have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/clear-patterns-found-that-russia-violated-humanitarian-law-ukraine-osce-2022-04-13/">detailed a pattern of war crimes</a> and crimes against humanity carried out by Russia since its invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Rules governing war crimes trials are set out in <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions">the Geneva Conventions</a> – a set of treaties and additional protocols that establish accepted conduct in wars and the duties to protect civilians. Both Russia and Ukraine are signatories to the convention, and Ukraine is also bound to its commitments to the <a href="https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf">European Convention on Human Rights</a>.</p>
<p>There is nothing in international law prohibiting war crimes trials taking place during hostilities. Nonetheless, some commentators have expressed concerns about the practice. In one of its commentaries on the Geneva Conventions, the International Committee of the Red Cross expressly <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/COM/380-600168?OpenDocument">warned against war crimes trials proceeding during wartime</a>. The commentaries, which collectively are seen as the authorities on interpreting the conventions, note that it is difficult for an accused person “to prepare his defense during hostilities,” adding: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“It seems to be a good rule, therefore, that the trial of a person accused of war crimes should not take place at a time when it is impossible for him to adduce proofs which could lessen his responsibility or disprove it.”</p>
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<p>In fact, it is very hard to think of an example in which a war crimes trial has been conducted during hostilities other than <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-war-crimes-31b1d5a9464684c2cb8386c634d8c96c">one case involving a soldier during the Bosnian war</a> in the early 1990s.</p>
<h2>‘Direct part of hostilities’</h2>
<p>The trial in Ukraine is unusual for another reason that I find concerning: It is taking place in a civilian court, not a military one.</p>
<p>The Third Geneva Convention <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.32_GC-III-EN.pdf">is pretty clear on this</a> point:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular offense alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war.”</p>
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<p>The Russian soldier was prosecuted under a part of the Ukrainian criminal code that addresses conduct during war. And the issue is muddied by the detaining power, Ukraine, having <a href="https://dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Military_Justice_Guidance_Note_eng.pdf">abolished military courts</a> in 2010.</p>
<p>But the problem hinted at in the Geneva Conventions’ strong desire to have war crimes trial only in military courts is that international humanitarian law is a highly specialized area. Military court officials will have the training required to understand the nuances in a way that civilian courts will, by and large, not.</p>
<p>And an issue central to the Russian soldier’s case – whether the civilian killed could be seen as a legitimate target – is a highly technical area that only an expert of the law of war will understand.</p>
<p>Under <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/470">protocol I of the Geneva Conventions</a>, a treaty added in 1977, a civilian loses immunity when he or she directly participate in hostilities.</p>
<p>And this is where it gets tricky. If the Russian soldier believed that the civilian he shot posed an immediate threat, say by reporting his position to Ukrainian military, then it would not be unreasonable for the defense to argue that the civilian was a legitimate target. Indeed, in the current trial, the court heard that the Russian soldier <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/world/russian-soldier-trial-vadim-shishimarin.html">was ordered to shoot the man for that very reason</a> - his superior believed the civilian may have been using a cellphone to give away their location.</p>
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<img alt="A row of body bags are lined up in front of a graveyard next to a church." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464669/original/file-20220522-31005-sywqu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464669/original/file-20220522-31005-sywqu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464669/original/file-20220522-31005-sywqu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464669/original/file-20220522-31005-sywqu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464669/original/file-20220522-31005-sywqu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464669/original/file-20220522-31005-sywqu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464669/original/file-20220522-31005-sywqu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Officials exhume the bodies of civilians killed in a Russian attack.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/officials-exhume-the-bodies-of-civilians-who-died-during-news-photo/1239895652?adppopup=true">Metin Aktas/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Discerning when a civilian takes a “direct part in hostilities” is highly situational; that is, it depends on the circumstances of the case. The conventions state that civilians lose immunity when they are preparing for, in the act of or returning from participation in hostilities. For example, if a civilian picks up a gun or a Molotov cocktail – and as such show intent to participate in hostilities – they lose immunity.</p>
<p>But other examples may appear less clear cut. For example, a munitions worker manufacturing weapons in Detroit for use in conflict overseas would not be seen as taking a “direct part” in hostilities. But someone in Iraq making improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, to be used by others would be.</p>
<p>It may well be the case that the court would not have accepted the argument that by simply being on a cellphone, the Ukrainian civilian was taking a “direct part” in the war. But the fact that the Ukrainian man was apparently using a cellphone opens up a line of defense that doesn’t appear to have been argued in court.</p>
<p>Bolstering the view that it should have at least been entertained as a defense is <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf">2009 guidance on the issue</a> of when a civilian becomes a “direct part of hostilities” under humanitarian law issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross. It notes that “an unarmed civilian sitting in a restaurant using a radio or mobile phone to transmit tactical targeting intelligence to an attacking air force would probably have to be regarded as directly participating in hostilities.”</p>
<p>Vadim Shishimarin, the 21-year-old Russian soldier accused in the case, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/world/russian-soldier-trial-vadim-shishimarin.html">has pleaded guilty</a>. But the optics of him being tried during wartime by a detaining authority engaged in conflict raises questions over the confession.</p>
<p>The Geneva Conventions are explicit in that <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=1CAB9739A62DEA9CC12585850054ABB1#:%7E:text=%5B32%5D%20Article%2061%20of%20the,of%20which%20they%20are%20accused.&text=3967%20Article%2099(2)%20prohibits,coercion'%20to%20induce%20a%20confession.">no form of coercion</a> can be used to extract a confession of guilt – and there is no evidence to suggest that Shishimarin was forced into confessing.</p>
<h2>Show trials and Russian justice</h2>
<p>But there is a broader concern with how this case is being presented. Even if observers accept that the soldier was given adequate counsel and the trial was conducted entirely by the book, that isn’t how it is likely to be presented to the Russian people.</p>
<p>And Russia is <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/05/18/1099767017/russian-soldier-pleads-guilty-ukraine-war-crimes-trial">reportedly preparing war crime trials of its own</a> for Ukrainian soldiers captured in the conflict.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/07/autocrats-russia-kremlin-protest-fines-jail/">treatment of dissidents and opponents</a> of President Vladimir Putin suggests that the concept of rule of law has been eroded. And with around 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers from Mariupol currently in Russian custody, there are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/20/world/europe/russia-azov-mariupol-trials.html">concerns that show trials</a> could be on the way.</p>
<p>Of course, there is a propaganda aspect to Ukraine’s prosecution too. Anything that underscores the view that Russian forces are engaged in war crimes will serve Ukrainian interests.</p>
<p>But there is nothing in the propaganda of the trial in itself that is unlawful. Under international law, a line is only crossed when the the detaining authority fails to meet the minimum standards of due process – say, by coercing confession, refusing the right to appeal or not providing counsel for the accused.</p>
<p>No one is suggesting that has been the case in Ukraine’s war crimes trial. But in holding the trial during hostilities, Ukraine runs the risk of Russia doing likewise – and subjecting its prisoners of war to Russian justice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Goldman is the President of the International Commissions of Jurists.</span></em></p>Holding war crimes trials during active hostilities is rare. Proceedings in Ukraine also open the risk of Russian show trials, argues a law of war expert.Robert Goldman, Professor of Law, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1811812022-05-12T13:14:05Z2022-05-12T13:14:05ZUkraine: ordinary Russian soldiers face war crimes charges but the big fish are likely to avoid punishment – here’s why<p>Ukraine’s chief prosecutor has announced plans to <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-to-launch-first-war-crimes-trial-against-russian-soldier-live-updates/a-61765730">hold the first war crimes trial</a> over Russia’s invasion. Ukraine’s prosecutor general, Iryna Venediktova, said more than 10,700 war crimes had been lodged by investigators and 600 suspects had been identified. Venediktova said a 21-year-old Russian sergeant had been charged with the murder of an elderly civilian in the village of Chupakhivka in the north-east of the country.</p>
<p>Two other low-ranking Russian soldiers are also expected to be charged for deliberately targeting civilian buildings and a fourth, who is believed to have committed rape and murder, has been identified but remains at large.</p>
<p>As investigations continue in areas of Ukraine that had previously been occupied by Russian troops, evidence of crimes committed against civilian populations continues to mount. An <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5561/2022/en/">Amnesty International report</a> released on May 6 documents what it says is a range of crimes, from extrajudicial executions to the use of banned weapons in Russia’s unsuccessful assault on towns and cities in the Kyiv region.</p>
<p>In mid-April, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky announced he had <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-zelenskys-special-mechanism-for-prosecuting-war-crimes-explained-180902">approved a decision</a> to create a “special mechanism of justice in Ukraine” to investigate Russian “crimes” in Ukraine. This would run alongside any international war crimes investigations and follows Ukraine’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/21/ukraine-international-crimes-bill-adopted">adoption of a new law</a> to create the mechanism to investigate and prosecute war crimes committed in the east of the country, where conflict has been ongoing since 2014.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-zelenskys-special-mechanism-for-prosecuting-war-crimes-explained-180902">Ukraine: Zelensky's 'special mechanism' for prosecuting war crimes explained</a>
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<p>So far, only low-ranking military personnel have been charged. Whether the people directing the war, including Vladimir Putin and his defence minister Sergei Shoigu, will be brought to justice is another matter.</p>
<p>History is replete with massacres and barbaric acts in warfare, but it took until the second part of the 19th century for a body of law to be developed <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1065693">to punish these crimes</a>. It wasn’t until <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/nuremberg-trials-a-warning-to-war-criminals-and-dictators/a-55634256">the Nuremberg trials</a> after the second world war for a prosecution of such crimes to take place. The <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-0173.pdf">Geneva Conventions of 1949</a> subsequently incorporated grave breaches of international humanitarian law as war crimes and linked these violations of the laws of war with criminal liability. </p>
<p>A turning point in the accountability for war crimes came with the institution by the UN Security Council of two ad hoc international war crimes tribunals: one to try offences committed in the war in the former <a href="https://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_827_1993_en.pdf">Yugoslavia</a> in the mid-1990s, the other for crimes against humanity during the conflict in <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/955">Rwanda</a> in 1994. This showed the need for a permanent international mechanism for trying and punishing war crimes and other crimes against humanity. Accordingly, in 1998, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established.</p>
<h2>ICC investigation</h2>
<p>The ICC chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, has already <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-qc-situation-ukraine-i-have-decided-proceed-opening">opened an investigation</a> into reports of crimes committed in Ukraine since the invasion. Given the amount of digital evidence available, such as satellite and video images, it must be plausible to assume that this investigation will result in arrest warrants being issued. Yet, once arrest warrants are issued, it is more doubtful if they will be ever executed.</p>
<p>The International Criminal Court has currently 123 members (not including the US, Russia and China, which have not recognised the court). Under the Rome Statute, member states are obliged to arrest and extradite to The Hague any people against which the court has issued an arrest warrant. But, in practice, this rarely happens. </p>
<p>In the case of Sudan’s former president Omar al-Bashir, for example, the court <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/who-is-obliged-to-arrest-bashir/">issued an arrest warrant in 2009</a> for Bashir’s role in the Darfur genocide in the early years of the 21st century, yet Bashir managed to continue visiting countries in Africa, countries – even states that are members of the court, including <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11117662">Kenya</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/world/africa/icc-south-africa-sudan-bashir.html">South Africa</a>.</p>
<p>The two countries argued that, as Sudan’s head of state, Bashir enjoyed immunity from ICC prosecution. This prompted <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-iccs-immunity-debate-the-need-for-finality/">debate among legal scholars</a> about exactly who might be <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/who-is-obliged-to-arrest-bashir/">subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction</a>. Meanwhile, Bashir remained at large despite the arrest warrants.</p>
<p>And here’s the rub, as it stands, any acting government officials can argue immunity under international law. But this immunity does not extend to covering army officers. Generals involved in planning the operations in Ukraine could indeed find themselves in a situation where their possible arrest will always hover above their heads like a Damocles sword should they decide to travel, particularly in western countries.</p>
<h2>Convictions could be difficult</h2>
<p>Even if arrests can be made for war crimes in Ukraine, it’s far from certain they will lead to convictions. For example, while <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf">article 28 of the ICC Statute</a> holds that military commanders are accountable for events about which they should have been aware, both sides are using de facto mercenaries – so Russian and Ukrainian senior officers could argue that not only did they not order certain atrocities, but they could not be expected to be aware that they were taking place.</p>
<p>Operational arguments can also render any convictions more difficult. According to the laws of war, states have the right to target combatants, but civilians are protected. They cannot be targeted and any applied force must not lead to excessive civilian harm vis-a-vis the expected military advantage. But when wars are being fought in urban areas where combatants fight from street to street, this can provide the attacking force an opportunity to argue that any civilian casualties constituted “collateral damage” and could not be avoided. </p>
<p>This adds up to a bleak picture of the prospect of being able to prosecute war crimes as a result of Russia’s invasion and war in Ukraine. It doesn’t mean that nobody will be tried or convicted, but it’s unlikely to be the “big fish” who end up in the dock. Instead of seeing Vladimir Putin or his defence minister Sergei Shoigu facing prosecution, it’s more likely that field commanders associated with the ordering of certain operations resulting in heavy civilian casualties – as in Bucha or Mariupol – will be brought before the ICC.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181181/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Solon Solomon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The first war crimes charges are being laid against Russian soldiers in Ukraine, but will the architects of the war face justice?Solon Solomon, Lecturer in the Division of Public and International Law and co-Director of the Brunel University London International Law Group, Brunel University LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1820142022-05-02T19:05:41Z2022-05-02T19:05:41ZDebate: In Ukraine, the West cannot allow itself to sleepwalk into another Syrian catastrophe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460317/original/file-20220428-22-kt2bex.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C1%2C1024%2C676&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Syrians demonstrate in Idlib province on 1 April 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Omar Haj Kadour/AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It has been said over and over again: the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/04/ukraine-russian-forces-extrajudicially-executing-civilians-in-apparent-war-crimes-new-testimony/">war crimes</a>, or – to take the view of US president Biden – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/13/observer-view-russian-war-crimes-against-humanity-ukraine">crimes against humanity</a> or <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/12/politics/biden-iowa-genocide/index.html">genocide</a> committed by the Russian regime in Ukraine, resemble those <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/03/03/l-onu-accuse-la-russie-de-crimes-de-guerre-en-syrie_1780442/">perpetrated in Syria</a> since 2015 and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2003/11/25/massacres-en-tchetchenie-un-document-officiel-accable-l-armee-russe_343409_3214.html">in Chechnya</a> in 1999-2000. Be it in Mariupol, Bucha, Kramatorsk, or Borodianka, each day brings its share of macabre revelations.</p>
<p>Western leaders have been quick to express their <a href="https://www.ouest-france.fr/monde/guerre-en-ukraine/video-guerre-en-ukraine-apres-le-massacre-a-boutcha-les-reactions-internationales-tombent-4ea2f78f-76c8-4129-802a-3af5a936e826">shock</a>. However, this emotional display should itself unsettle us when the international community has spent years looking away from the Russian regime’s crimes. The Russian army’s history in Syria and Chechnya, as well as Putin’s declarations on his intentions in Ukraine, meant the Ukrainians’ fate was predictable. And new crimes will be committed soon should we fail to do all that is in our power to stop them: the major offensives in the Donbass is nothing but a confirmation of Putin’s will of destruction. Russia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrias-war-of-extermination-signals-the-end-of-the-international-community-66708">war of extermination</a> in Syria goes on in Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine: same old</h2>
<p>As in Syria, hospitals are being <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/health-60866669">deliberately targeted</a>, civilians <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-zelenskyy-kyiv-europe-war-crimes-ffe9c24e89689b081b93518c6b7bff1f">murdered</a> and no one knows whether the Russian regime might resort to deploying <a href="https://theconversation.com/chemical-weapons-how-will-we-know-if-they-have-been-used-in-ukraine-181339">chemical weapons</a> the next day, in the same way it had authorised the Syrian president, Bashar Al-Assad, <a href="https://www.gppi.net/media/GPPi_Schneider_Luetkefend_2019_Nowhere_to_Hide_Web.pdf">to do so</a>. In Syria, Russian forces alone have killed <a href="https://forward.com/opinion/440051/russia-is-carrying-out-a-scorched-earth-policy-in-syria-and-theyre-getting/">more Syrian civilians</a> than Isis – including countless children.</p>
<p>Like in Syria, the Kremlin is pushing propaganda about Ukraine that is not even meant to be credible anymore. The purpose is to sow doubt. In the case of the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-mariupol-hosital-bombed-russia/31744934.html">bombing of the Mariupol paediatric hospital</a>, it has not hesitated to put forward three contradictory takes: firstly, accusing the Ukrainians, secondly, claiming the images were fake, and finally, recognising that Russian forces had destroyed it, but did so because the hospital served as a shelter for a nationalist battalion.</p>
<p>The regime’s propagandists abroad worked to amplify Putin’s claim that in Ukraine, Russia would primarily be dealing with “neo-Nazis”, endlessly hammering in the example of the <a href="https://desk-russie.eu/2022/04/08/le-regime-azov.html">Azov battalion</a>. They had done the same thing for Syria when they mirrored the Kremlin’s assertions that jihadists hid in schools and hospitals. By using terms such as “Nazis” or “terrorists”, they are in fact designating civilians, as though they were people who do not have the right to life.</p>
<h2>The West’s ongoing inertia</h2>
<p>The comparison doesn’t stop there. The Ukrainian conflict most tragically recalls the Syrian one in the West’s failure to take action that could radically change the situation. In other words, save Ukraine and ensure that Russia loses – completely.</p>
<p>Granted, the West is supplying Ukraine with <a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/monde/enjeux-internationaux/loccident-multiplie-les-livraisons-darmes-a-lukraine-1394442">defensive and now even offensive arms</a> and <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/">heavy sanctions</a> have been adopted against the Russian regime. A broader awareness of its reality has emerged: after some hesitation, war crimes have now finally been <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/04/28/1095277848/ukraine-russia-war-crimes?t=1651477777840">named as such</a>. Europeans have also <a href="https://www.vox.com/22983230/europe-ukraine-refugees-charts-map">welcomed Ukrainian refugees</a>.</p>
<p>But this progress makes our shortcomings even more damning. No one can be sure today the fate of Ukraine in a few months or years will not warrant new points of comparison with Syria: just as Assad continues to rule over Syria and launch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2021/12/08/syrie/russie-12-civils-tues-pres-didlib-par-des-tirs-dartillerie">murderous attacks on the Idlib region</a>, parts of Ukraine could well remain at war and occupied.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460328/original/file-20220428-25-9sthzy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460328/original/file-20220428-25-9sthzy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460328/original/file-20220428-25-9sthzy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460328/original/file-20220428-25-9sthzy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460328/original/file-20220428-25-9sthzy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460328/original/file-20220428-25-9sthzy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460328/original/file-20220428-25-9sthzy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Borodyanka, North West of Kyiv on 10 April 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ronaldo Schemidt/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Military aid, sparingly granted at the beginning, has recently made significant progress. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinken-and-secretary-austins-travel-to-ukraine/">visit to Kyiv on 24 April</a> has paved the way for a dramatic increase in Washington’s military aid to Ukraine. Recognising Russia’s invasion as a “turning point” that threatened the entire post-World War II order, even Germany broke its <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-war-russia-germany-still-blocking-arms-supplies/">longstanding practice</a> of not transferring lethal weapons it controlled to a conflict zone.</p>
<p>While this certainly allows Kyiv to better retaliate against Putin’s army, the pace is still not sustained enough. Indeed, the weapons provided to Ukraine may not be sufficient for them to expel Russian troops in the weeks and months to come. They are both not numerous enough and sometimes not the most efficient ones. For example, the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-will-deliver-anti-aircraft-tanks-to-ukraine/a-61595798">anti-aircraft Gepard tanks</a> supplied by Germany were developed in the 1960s and are another sign of the poor state of the Bundeswehr.</p>
<p>While sanctions are increasing, they’re still insufficient, and it is difficult to comprehend why the West failed to unleash them in their full force from the onset. This would mean: an absolute embargo on Russian gas and oil, in conformity with <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220401IPR26524/meps-demand-full-embargo-on-russian-imports-of-oil-coal-nuclear-fuel-and-gas">MEPs’ wish</a>; the disconnection of all Russian banks, <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/eu-should-sanction-sberbank-and-other-russian-banks-it-ponders">notably Sberbank and Alpha Bank</a>, from the Swift interbank payment system, along with an asset freeze and travel ban on a greater number of Russian personalities close to power – the figure of <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/16253-navalny-s-foundation-lists-putin-s-6-000-bribe-takers-and-warmongers">6,000 has been often mentioned</a>. These measures should have been taken long before the war, and the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline should have been abandoned.</p>
<p>While the war crimes have indeed been named, some still shy away from designating their main perpetrator as a war criminal. We know the fallacious reason: such a public assignment would represent a “provocation” that would make him less inclined to compromise. As if, given the immensity of his crimes, this should change anything about his future behaviour.</p>
<p>As for the remarkable solidarity observed in Europe toward Ukrainian refugees, no one knows if it will be sustained in the long run. Such gestures may also provide an excuse for leaders to evade the more pressing task of taking a military stance in the war. For Syrians, the story is here again all too familiar: a good number of politicians had opted to concentrate their resources on tackling the “humanitarian crisis” as a convenient way to make up for their inertia in the face of Assad.</p>
<p>We cannot allow this scenario to reproduce itself in Ukraine: if we are to push the aggressor outside of the country, the only solution is to considerably increase military aid to Kyiv. Focusing on humanitarian aspects, however necessary, will not solve the humanitarian issue or the Russian war on Ukraine – as evinced in Syria by the ongoing <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-8000-idps-rukban-camp-need-urgent-humanitarian-intervention-enar">misery of refugee camps</a>, forced exile of 6 million Syrians and massacres.</p>
<h2>The persistent hold of the Kremlin rhetoric</h2>
<p>The same rhetorical devices that are so sweet to the Kremlin’s ear and were already heard in the case of Syria can also be found in the Ukrainian conflict.</p>
<p>First up is the talk of so-called “red lines”. After Barack Obama’s <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20180414-syria-chemical-weapons-red-line-obama-macron-assad-russia-usa-france-idlib">disastrous U-turn</a> in the 2013 chemical attack in Ghouta, no White House occupant in their right mind ought to resort to it again. However, Joe Biden’s warnings Russia’s use of chemical and biological weapons would trigger a “proportional” US response appear to match his predecessor’s words.</p>
<p>Such talk is legally and strategically untenable.</p>
<p>On the legal front, chemical and biological weapons are certainly prohibited by international conventions, but so are cluster munitions, which are particularly destructive to civilian populations, and which, <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2022/03/11/these-are-the-cluster-munitions-documented-by-ukrainian-civilians/">according to several investigations</a>, appear to have been used by Russia in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Strategically, prioritising a response to the use of chemical or biological weapons implicitly amounts to minimising crimes committed in a “conventional” fashion against populations. It is also a way of shirking one’s responsibilities in the event war crimes are perpetrated through other methods; if there is to be a red line, it should lie within war crimes and crimes against humanity. This is what happened in Syria where war as well as the related collapse of health infrastructure may have caused <a href="https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/revolte-en-syrie/syrie-on-va-vers-une-famine-salarme-le-medecin-raphael-pitti_4638683.html">more than a million deaths</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/EDJVeO_Mw0g?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Drone footage shows scale of devastation in Mariupol (<em>Guardian</em>, 24 mars 2022).</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Moreover, we continue to be told that “the solution to the crisis can only be political” – albeit in a less explicit fashion than before. Besides the fact that this is not a crisis, but a war, we know where this language led to in Syria. There was no political solution because there simply could not be one so long as Assad remained in power. The leaders locked themselves into unworkable UN resolutions and the fiction of a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/middle-east_un-mediator-deplores-slow-pace-syrian-constitutional-talks/6201091.html">constitutional committee</a> that predictably achieved nothing. This has only strengthened Assad and his Russian and Iranian allies. To think that it could be in the case of Russia’s war against Ukraine is a similar denial of responsibility.</p>
<p>Finally, the illusion of a way out through negotiations continues to be promoted in some circles. Some will say that President Zelensky is open to negotiations; this is the case, but with two conditions <em>sine qua non</em>:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Any solution will have to be accompanied by an international security guarantee in return for Ukraine’s neutrality – which, if we recall, was Ukraine’s status in 2014 under the Budapest Memorandum violated by Russia. This guarantee should be equivalent to that provided by <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">Article 5</a> of the North Atlantic Treaty, if not go beyond it. As Ukraine’s lead negotiator recently said, this would mean it would automatically apply, which is not the case with Article 5.</p></li>
<li><p>The <a href="https://www.lopinion.fr/international/guerre-en-ukraine-zelensky-defend-lintegrite-territoriale-de-son-pays-en-amont-de-pourparlers-avec-la-russie">territorial integrity of Ukraine is non-negotiable</a>, which means that there can be no question of a lasting Russian occupation of Donbass and Crimea.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These demands run counter to Putin’s plans, who wants Kyiv to recognise his hold on Donbass and Crimea – and probably on the whole area linking these two territories. His project is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-invasion-of-ukraine-attacks-its-distinct-history-and-reveals-his-imperial-instincts-177669">destruction of Ukraine as a free nation</a>.</p>
<h2>Have we learned the Syrian lesson?</h2>
<p>If some Western governments were to try to push Kyiv into accepting concessions on these points, they would be calling into question the sovereignty of Ukraine as well as the foundations of international law. The Syrian example had already taught us negotiations only help to <a href="https://theconversation.com/pourquoi-il-ne-faut-pas-negocier-avec-la-russie-de-poutine-54748">strengthen the Russian regime’s stances and army</a>.</p>
<p>We must now apply the Syrian lesson to Ukraine. Any retreat, accommodation, appeasement with Putin’s regime will result in greater crimes on the ground. If the West delays in decisively helping Ukraine to regain its territory by providing it with all the necessary armaments to do so, the result will be an even greater number of deaths.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicolas Tenzer is president of the Centre d'étude et de réflexion pour l'Action politique (CERAP), an association independent of parties and interest groups, director of the journal Desk Russia and non-resident senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).</span></em></p>When it comes to war crimes in Ukraine, the Kremlin is intimately following the Syrian playbook. To prevent further atrocities, leaders must now draw the lessons from the conflict in Western Asia.Nicolas Tenzer, Chargé d'enseignement International Public Affairs, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1800172022-04-01T12:44:32Z2022-04-01T12:44:32ZIs Russia committing genocide in Ukraine? A human rights expert looks at the warning signs<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455602/original/file-20220331-11604-kj80a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Ukrainian soldier observes a destroyed shopping mall in Kyiv on March 29, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/soldier-with-a-machine-gun-is-on-duty-near-the-destroyed-retroville-picture-id1239634146?s=2048x2048"> Mykhaylo Palinchak/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>There’s a real threat that Russia will commit genocide in Ukraine. As evidence of war crimes emerges, there is reason to believe it may already be taking place. </p>
<p>“Russia’s forces have committed war crimes in Ukraine,” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://www.state.gov/war-crimes-by-russias-forces-in-ukraine/">said in a statement</a> on March 23, 2022. Blinken cited as evidence for his allegation Russia’s destruction of “apartment buildings, schools, hospitals, critical infrastructure” and a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-maternity-hospital-pregnant-woman-dead-c0f2f859296f9f02be24fc9edfca1085">maternity hospital</a> in the besieged city of Mariupol that was marked with the Russian word for children.</p>
<p>Russia has <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/03/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-30-march-2022">killed at least</a> 1,189 civilians and wounded 1,901 additional Ukrainians since it began its attack on Ukraine in February 2022, according to the United Nations. This actual death toll is likely much higher. </p>
<p>Such attacks on civilians during conflict are considered <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/war-crimes.shtml">war crimes</a> under international law.</p>
<p>But war crimes also often take place in tandem with other atrocity crimes – <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/defining-the-four-mass-atrocity-crimes/">a legal term</a> that also encompasses ethnic cleansing, <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml">crimes against humanity</a> and genocide. </p>
<p>And indeed, there is evidence Russia has also committed <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml">crimes against humanity</a>, or widespread attacks <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/03/23/world/europe/ukraine-civilian-attacks.html">against Ukraine’s civilian population</a>. Such attacks include killings, enforced disappearances, <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/russia/600247-ukraine-opens-first-investigation-into-claims-of-rape-by-russian/">rape and</a> torture. </p>
<p>These also include the mass <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russian-invasion-ukraine-deportations-claims-kidnapping-rcna21542">deportations of Ukrainians into Russia</a> that the Kremlin is reportedly carrying out in eastern Ukraine. </p>
<p>Some observers warn that this violence has the potential to <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/is-it-time-to-call-putins-war-in-ukraine-genocide">become genocidal</a>, particularly given Russian propaganda and physical destruction of Mariupol and other cities. </p>
<p>Ukrainian officials claim genocide has already begun. “The aerial bombing of a children’s hospital,” President Volodymyr Zelenskyy <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/mar/09/ukraine-news-russia-war-ceasefire-broken-humanitarian-corridors-kyiv-russian-invasion-live-vladimir-putin-volodymyr-zelenskiy-latest-updates">said on March 9, 2022</a>, “is the ultimate evidence that genocide of Ukrainians is happening.” </p>
<p>Other experts disagree, sometimes arguing that the Russian violence doesn’t meet the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/russia-committing-atrocity-crimes-ukraine-not-genocide">legal requirements of genocide</a>.</p>
<p>Given the scale of Russian violence in Ukraine, however, genocide warnings need to be taken seriously.</p>
<p>The field of genocide studies, in which <a href="https://sasn.rutgers.edu/about-us/faculty-staff/alex-hinton">I have long worked</a>, has developed frameworks for assessing the threat of genocide in such volatile situations. These tools, including <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/about-us/Doc.3_Framework%20of%20Analysis%20for%20Atrocity%20Crimes_EN.pdf">one used by the U.N.</a>, indicate Ukraine is indeed at considerable risk for genocide. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455605/original/file-20220331-15-ez9rs8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An elderly woman is seated in a wheelchair, carried across dirt by five men, some wearing army uniforms" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455605/original/file-20220331-15-ez9rs8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455605/original/file-20220331-15-ez9rs8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455605/original/file-20220331-15-ez9rs8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455605/original/file-20220331-15-ez9rs8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455605/original/file-20220331-15-ez9rs8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455605/original/file-20220331-15-ez9rs8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455605/original/file-20220331-15-ez9rs8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People help an elderly woman in a wheelchair flee Irpin, Ukraine, on March 7, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/people-help-an-elderly-woman-in-a-wheelchair-as-they-flee-the-city-of-picture-id1239006253?s=2048x2048">Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Historical precedent</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">Genocide</a> refers to “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”</p>
<p>These acts involve not just killing people, but seeking to destroy the target group by causing “serious bodily or mental harm,” creating harsh “conditions of life,” preventing births and “forcibly transferring” children to another group. </p>
<p>One predictor for genocide is a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/no-lessons-learned-from-the-holocaust-assessing-risks-of-genocide-and-political-mass-murder-since-1955/FBA37FA563AC35E1CB6F7B57F8140F2C">history</a> of mass human rights violations and atrocity crimes, including genocide. </p>
<p>Russia has a <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691162041/terror-in-chechnya">long history</a> of mass violence against Ukrainians and other groups.</p>
<p>Perhaps most infamously, the Soviet Union enacted land policies that prompted a food shortage and a famine, killing millions of Ukrainians from 1932 to 1933. This is known as the <a href="https://www.history.com/news/ukrainian-famine-stalin">Holodomor</a>, a Ukrainian word meaning meaning “death by hunger.” </p>
<p>Other <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691152387/stalins-genocides">Soviet atrocities</a> include forced deportation of national and ethnic groups and massive political purges.</p>
<p>After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia committed mass violence against civilians <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691162041/terror-in-chechnya">in Chechnya</a>, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/syria-and-chechnya-foretell-a-grim-direction-for-ukraine-war/">Georgia and Syria</a>. It bombarded and obliterated cities like <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/journey-into-hell-in-chechnya-russian-forces-new-year-s-assault-on-grozny-in-1995/30357519.html">Grozny</a> in 1995 and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/world/middleeast/russias-brutal-bombing-of-aleppo-may-be-calculated-and-it-may-be-working.html">Aleppo in 2016</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455608/original/file-20220331-21-zwa4ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black and white photo shows two boys in a pit outside, with a bag full of potatoes." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455608/original/file-20220331-21-zwa4ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455608/original/file-20220331-21-zwa4ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455608/original/file-20220331-21-zwa4ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455608/original/file-20220331-21-zwa4ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455608/original/file-20220331-21-zwa4ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455608/original/file-20220331-21-zwa4ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455608/original/file-20220331-21-zwa4ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Two boys with a bag of potatoes they found during the human-caused Holodomor famine in Ukraine in 1934.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/two-boys-with-a-cache-of-potatoes-they-have-found-during-the-manmade-picture-id156265714?s=2048x2048">Daily Express/Hulton Archive/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Political upheaval</h2>
<p>Genocide and atrocity crimes are also strongly correlated with political upheaval, especially war. Such upheaval destabilizes a society and makes it less secure – especially for vulnerable groups of people who may be blamed for the political or economic instability. </p>
<p>Genocide has taken place during global conflicts, as illustrated by the <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/extermination-ottoman-armenians-young-turk-regime-1915-1916">Armenian</a> genocide during World War I, and the <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/introduction-to-the-holocaust">Holocaust</a> during World War II.</p>
<p>And then there are genocides associated with <a href="https://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/MosesEmpire">colonial conquest</a> and invasion, like the destruction of <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/colonial-genocide-in-indigenous-north-america">Indigenous peoples in North America</a>. </p>
<p>Such countries as <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374533991/tombstone">China</a> and <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520241794/why-did-they-kill">Cambodia</a> have also undertaken social engineering projects resulting in genocide. </p>
<p>Russia has experienced a number of political upheavals, including <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/03/27/1089072525/what-a-russian-financial-crisis-could-mean-for-the-rest-of-the-world">a current economic crisis</a>. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the sort of armed conflict often associated with atrocity crimes. </p>
<h2>Ideology and demonization</h2>
<p>Genocide is justified by propaganda and language that devalues and demonizes target populations. Historical examples abound, ranging from European colonial caricatures of Indigenous “<a href="https://thenewpress.com/books/exterminate-all-brutes">brutes</a>” and “savages” to Nazi representations of Jews as <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/der-ewige-jude">rats</a>.</p>
<p>Russia is using this type of demonizing language to justify its invasion of Ukraine. First, Russia depicts its violence as necessary to “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/24/putin-denazify-ukraine/">denazify</a>” Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin, for example, has referred to the Ukrainian leadership as a far-right “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2022/feb/25/putin-references-neo-nazis-and-drug-addicts-in-bizarre-speech-to-russian-security-council-video">gang of drug addicts and neo-Nazis</a>.”</p>
<p>And second, Putin has suggested that Ukrainian identity is not real and that, historically, “Russians and Ukrainians are one people – <a href="https://apnews.com/article/entertainment-oliver-stone-europe-russia-ukraine-3fe3ff2299994fae97825381765b831c">one nation, in fact</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455609/original/file-20220331-7236-vevj2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The words 'Judd Suss' are shown above the face of a man, demonized with green skin and elongated features" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455609/original/file-20220331-7236-vevj2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455609/original/file-20220331-7236-vevj2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=877&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455609/original/file-20220331-7236-vevj2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=877&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455609/original/file-20220331-7236-vevj2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=877&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455609/original/file-20220331-7236-vevj2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1102&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455609/original/file-20220331-7236-vevj2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1102&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455609/original/file-20220331-7236-vevj2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1102&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Propaganda, like this 1940 antisemitic advertisement demonizing a group of people, is one warning sign of genocide.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/poster-for-the-nazi-antisemitic-propaganda-film-jud-suss-starring-picture-id84278340?s=2048x2048">Galerie Bilderwelt/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Understanding the risk</h2>
<p>Proving genocidal intent is difficult, especially in a court of law. This is evident in current debates – including an <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/178">ongoing court case</a> at the International Court of Justice – about whether Myanmar committed genocide against <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/burma/case-study/introduction/the-plight-of-the-rohingya">the Rohingya people</a>, a Muslim minority group.</p>
<p>But it can be inferred by patterns of violence consistent with the legal <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">definition of genocide</a>. </p>
<p>[<em>There’s plenty of opinion out there. We supply facts and analysis, based in research.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=politics&source=inline-politics-no-opinion">Get The Conversation’s Politics Weekly</a>.]</p>
<p>Has Russia carried out genocidal acts? </p>
<p>Russia has targeted and killed civilians and reportedly forcibly deported hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, including children, to Russia. It has bombed a maternity hospital. </p>
<p>Russia has also created “<a href="https://www.mercycorps.org/blog/quick-facts-ukraine">harsh conditions of life</a>” in parts of Ukraine. It has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/over-900-ukrainian-communities-without-power-heat-or-water-supply-ukrainian-2022-03-07/">destroyed electrical</a> and water supplies, deprived Ukrainians of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/chloesorvino/2022/03/16/hungry-ukrainians-trapped-by-russian-attacks-get-food-deliveries-from-drivers-risking-their-lives/?sh=3c94ac1d62ee">food and humanitarian aid</a> and displaced <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">more than 10 million people</a> within and outside of Ukraine. </p>
<p>Russia seeks to seize <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/vladimir-putins-ukraine-war-is-a-blueprint-for-genocide/">and Russify</a> Donbas and other parts of eastern Ukraine, where, if Putin is taken at his word, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/01/28/putin-russia-ukraine-myths/">an “imaginary”</a> Ukrainian identity will be erased. </p>
<p>There is a significant risk that Russia will commit genocide in Ukraine. It is possible that a genocide has already begun.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180017/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Hinton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are a few warning signs that genocide is happening. In the Russian war on Ukraine, all of those are present.Alexander Hinton, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology; Director, Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights, Rutgers University - NewarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1797372022-03-29T12:36:45Z2022-03-29T12:36:45ZCalling Putin a ‘war criminal’ could spark even more atrocities in Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453873/original/file-20220323-17-130h5u7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3196%2C1911&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vladimir Putin celebrated Russia's annexation of Crimea on March 18, 2022, the eighth anniversary of the move.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-attends-a-concert-marking-news-photo/1239295205">Mikhail Klimentyev/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the war in Ukraine continues, officials in the U.S. and <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/european-union-accuse-russia-of-war-crimes-in-ukraine-but-unlikely-to-impose-new-sanctions">Europe</a> are sounding alarms about <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/17/explainer-who-is-a-war-criminal">alleged war crimes</a> being committed by Russian troops there. U.S. President Joe Biden has called Russian President Vladimir Putin a “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/16/politics/biden-calls-putin-a-war-criminal/index.html">war criminal</a>,” as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-senate-unanimously-condemns-putin-war-criminal-2022-03-15/">has the U.S. Senate</a>, on the grounds that <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-finds-russian-troops-have-committed-war-crimes-in-ukraine/ar-AAVqb1Z">schools, hospitals and civilian shelters</a> appear to have been deliberately targeted by Russian forces. </p>
<p>If Putin is formally accused of war crimes, there are three kinds of courts that might call him to answer for them. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=DV5ECYgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">We</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=1-C0q3IAAAAJ">are</a> scholars of dictators and conduct research on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746997.001.0001">how they are held accountable</a> for their actions. None of the available methods are likely to punish Putin any time soon, and they may even lead to more potential war crimes.</p>
<h2>International Court of Justice</h2>
<p>The International Court of Justice was established in 1945 as part of the United Nations system. The court can settle disputes only between <a href="https://www.justia.com/international-law/the-international-court-of-justice/">countries that voluntarily ask for its rulings</a>. It cannot criminally prosecute individuals, much less people who do not consent to its jurisdiction. </p>
<p>Further, the court has no real <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-international-court-of-justice-has-ordered-russia-to-stop-the-war-what-does-this-ruling-mean-179466">enforcement power</a>. National leaders can safely ignore its judgments, though their <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-international-court-of-justice-has-ordered-russia-to-stop-the-war-what-does-this-ruling-mean-179466">reputations may suffer</a> and doing so may lead to further isolation. </p>
<h2>Special international tribunals</h2>
<p>In the past, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/03/politics/putin-war-crimes-russia-ukraine-us-what-matters/index.html">world leaders accused of atrocities</a> – like Liberia’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2012/4/27/charles-taylor-trial-highlights-icc-concerns">Charles Taylor</a> and Serbia’s <a href="https://www.icty.org/en/case/slobodan_milosevic">Slobodan Milosevic</a> – have stood trial before special courts created by the U.N. to deal with crimes committed during particular conflicts. These courts, however, were created only after the alleged crimes had already been committed.</p>
<h2>International Criminal Court</h2>
<p>Created in 2002, the International Criminal Court can <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/uicceng.pdf">prosecute individuals</a> responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. It was created, in part, to avoid the need for ad hoc specialized tribunals for each successive conflict. The idea was that the existence of a permanent court would <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818316000114">deter leaders from committing grave violations</a> of international law.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453880/original/file-20220323-25-pvf0st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A person wearing a sweater and gloves uses a tape measure on a window" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453880/original/file-20220323-25-pvf0st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453880/original/file-20220323-25-pvf0st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453880/original/file-20220323-25-pvf0st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453880/original/file-20220323-25-pvf0st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453880/original/file-20220323-25-pvf0st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453880/original/file-20220323-25-pvf0st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453880/original/file-20220323-25-pvf0st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian citizens’ apartment buildings have been damaged by the Russian attack.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXRussiaUkraineWar/55c58716865e48e0bde6395658bf2f75/photo">AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Some opportunity for accountability</h2>
<p>Through these three systems, the international community has sought to hold world leaders responsible for their atrocities. But it can be incredibly difficult and time-consuming.</p>
<p>In 1999, Milosevic became the <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9905/27/kosovo.milosevic.04/">first sitting head of state</a> to be charged with war crimes by an international tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. He was indicted for crimes committed during the Kosovo war from 1998 to 1999. But he was arrested only after he was ousted from power in 2000. </p>
<p>Even then, his extradition from Serbia was difficult because he sued to block it, and his successor as Serbia’s president, Vojislav Kostunica, and the Yugoslavian Constitutional Court <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/06/29/serb-leaders-hand-over-milosevic-for-trial-by-war-crimes-tribunal/a209e0ed-e7d5-428e-a462-d0999d29961c/">refused to send him out of the country to stand trial</a>. Kostunica wanted to win over Serbian voters who were sympathetic to Milosevic.</p>
<p>In the end, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/10/world/us-makes-arrest-of-milosevic-a-condition-of-aid-to-belgrade.html">U.S. pressure</a> led to a trial in 2002. But <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/mar/11/warcrimes">Milosevic died</a> in 2006 before the court could issue a sentence.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453881/original/file-20220323-15-kbdb03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a suit and tie sits at a desk waving his hand in the air" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453881/original/file-20220323-15-kbdb03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453881/original/file-20220323-15-kbdb03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453881/original/file-20220323-15-kbdb03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453881/original/file-20220323-15-kbdb03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453881/original/file-20220323-15-kbdb03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=610&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453881/original/file-20220323-15-kbdb03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=610&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453881/original/file-20220323-15-kbdb03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=610&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Slobodan Milosevic gestures during his 2002 trial before the International Criminal Court.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/WarCrimesTribunal/68ad2f1579dc4ddc96587d48773c8584/photo">ICTY via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Not effective deterrents or punishments</h2>
<p>None of these three tools is likely to have much, if any, effect on Putin’s choices in Ukraine.</p>
<p>The International Court of Justice has <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114052">declared Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unjustified</a> and has urged an immediate halt to Russian military operations there. But it has said nothing about Putin because the court looks at the actions of states, not specific people – not even national leaders. And one day after the court’s announcement, the Kremlin <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/russia-rejects-international-court-ruling-to-stop-invasion-of-ukraine/">rejected it</a>.</p>
<p>The existence of the International Criminal Court was meant to relieve the need for special tribunals. However, Russia – <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1970312.stm">like the U.S.</a> – is <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/russias-withdrawal-of-signature-from-the-rome-statute-would-not-shield-its-nationals-from-potential-prosecution-at-the-icc/">not a member of the court</a> and claims the court has no jurisdiction over Russia or its officials.</p>
<p>In addition, Russia is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, so it can block that body’s referrals to the International Criminal Court.</p>
<p>The possibility of prosecution did not deter Putin when his security forces allegedly committed crimes in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/02/29/war-crimes-chechnya-and-response-west">Chechnya</a> in the 1990s and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23639898?seq=1">Georgia</a> in 2008, such as indiscriminate and disproportionate bombing of civilian targets.</p>
<p>Ukraine is also <a href="https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx#U">not a member of the court</a>. But in 2015 the International Criminal Court and the Ukrainian government agreed that the court could <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1146">begin an investigation</a> into alleged crimes committed by Russian-backed groups in Crimea and eastern Ukraine since February 2014, when Russia first <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/8/15/6006281/russia-ukraine-war-what-we-know">invaded</a> that region and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html">annexed Crimea</a>.</p>
<p>On March 3, 2022, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/03/icc-launches-war-crimes-investigation-russia-invasion-ukraine">court launched another investigation</a> into war crimes by Russian soldiers and their commanders elsewhere in Ukraine. Since then, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/15/europe/ukraine-mariupol-destruction-footage-intl/index.html">Russian attacks on civilians</a> in Ukraine have intensified.</p>
<p>It’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-puts-international-justice-on-trial-betting-that-the-age-of-impunity-will-continue-178836">not clear whether Putin</a> might eventually be indicted by the International Criminal Court. But if he is, the chief obstacle to prosecuting him will be bringing him before the court for trial. The court <a href="https://accessaccountability.org/index.php/2019/09/26/criticisms-and-shortcomings-of-the-icc/">depends on member nations</a> to arrest the accused and transfer them to The Hague for trial. If Putin stays in power, that will most likely never happen.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453903/original/file-20220323-17-3ulgm7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man's body lies amid rubble in Kyiv, Ukraine." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453903/original/file-20220323-17-3ulgm7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453903/original/file-20220323-17-3ulgm7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453903/original/file-20220323-17-3ulgm7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453903/original/file-20220323-17-3ulgm7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453903/original/file-20220323-17-3ulgm7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453903/original/file-20220323-17-3ulgm7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453903/original/file-20220323-17-3ulgm7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A man’s body lies amid rubble in Kyiv, Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/dead-body-of-an-old-man-lying-on-the-sidewalk-in-the-rubble-news-photo/1239192887">Mykhaylo Palinchak/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>International justice may backfire</h2>
<p>It is also possible that international efforts seeking to <a href="https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol70/iss1/7/">hold leaders responsible</a> for human rights crimes <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137476">could backfire</a>. </p>
<p>Leaders who face the prospect of punishment once a conflict ends have an incentive to <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501750212/the-justice-dilemma/#bookTabs=1">prolong the fighting</a>. And a leader who presides over atrocities has a strong incentive to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000484">avoid leaving office</a>, even if that means using increasingly brutal methods – and committing more atrocities – to remain in power. </p>
<p>When losing power is costly, leaders may be more likely to fight to the death, as Libyan dictator <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/28/muammar-gaddafi-death-impact-libya">Moammar Gadhafi</a> did after the ICC issued arrest warrants for him and other close relatives in 2011.</p>
<p>[<em><a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=politics&source=inline-politics-important">Get The Conversation’s most important politics headlines, in our Politics Weekly newsletter</a>.</em>]</p>
<p>In contrast, when <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/human-rights-prosecutions-and-autocratic-survival/F54745E360BC9C9261A4B5ABC769A219">losing power</a> comes with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/106591298203500407">credible</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002795039001005">domestic immunity from prosecution</a> for ex-rulers, international justice campaigns may <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/power-of-human-rights/3E62C6D43DE50B0F6179C2BD2B3D3EBB">help mobilize domestic opposition</a> to dictators. That can boost the chances of a peaceful transition from authoritarian rule – as was the case in some <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2478.00083">South American</a> countries in the 1980s. However, the flip side of domestic immunity is that ex-rulers are not held accountable. </p>
<h2>Justice for Putin?</h2>
<p>An International Criminal Court indictment of Putin, or even an investigation, might backfire because of how he rules Russia. His style of government is called a “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-09-26/new-dictators">personalist dictatorship</a>,” in which power is <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-new-kremlinology-9780192896193?cc=us&lang=en&">centralized in the leader</a> and a <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/putins-historic-miscalculation-may-make-him-a-war-criminal">small core of close associates</a>, rather than in a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/how-dictatorships-work/8DC095F7A890035729BB0BB611738497">supporting political party or the military</a>. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738866">research</a> <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/foreign-pressure-and-the-politics-of-autocratic-survival-9780198746997?cc=es&lang=en&">shows</a> that personalist rulers are more likely than other leaders to be violently ousted from power. That increases the chances they will be punished after losing power. Strongmen typically undermine the political institutions, such as a cohesive military or strong political party, through which they or their allies could retain influence after stepping down. Unable to protect themselves at home, deposed personalist dictators often seek protection in exile.</p>
<p>However, a potential International Criminal Court prosecution makes it less likely any nation will <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/688225">promise to protect Putin in exile</a> – so <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12352">that method of ending the conflict</a> may now be off the table – providing Putin with further incentives to tighten his grip on power. </p>
<p>If Putin wants to avoid consequences for his actions, his most likely approach is to prolong the conflict, strive for victory – even a limited one – and ramp up political repression at home.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179737/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Wright has received funding from the U.S. National Science Foundation and the Minerva Research Initiative of the U.S. Department of Defense. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abel Escribà-Folch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>None of the available methods for holding Russian President Vladimir Putin accountable are likely to actually punish him, and they may even make new atrocities more likely.Joseph Wright, Professor of Political Science, Penn StateAbel Escribà-Folch, Associate Professor of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu FabraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1788362022-03-15T12:16:05Z2022-03-15T12:16:05ZPutin puts international justice on trial – betting that the age of impunity will continue<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451997/original/file-20220314-101106-1r6jxz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C67%2C4985%2C3255&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A pregnant woman is carried away from a shelled maternity hospital. She later died.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraineWarMaternityHospital/0c824c429f0f4bfbb1c5cea372219a22/photo?Query=maternity%20ukraine&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=136&currentItemNo=5">AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Images of pregnant women <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-europe-2bed71c00916d44ea951c5809b446db3">fleeing a bombed maternity ward</a> in Mariupol, Ukraine, raised again the question of how far the Russian military will be willing to go to conquer the country – and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/3/10/is-russia-committing-war-crimes-by-bombing-hospitals-in-ukraine">whether war crimes are being committed</a>.</p>
<p>In just over two weeks of the invasion, <a href="https://extranet.who.int/ssa/LeftMenu/Index.aspx?utm_source=Stopping%20attacks%20on%20health%20care%20QandA&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=Link_who">the World Health Organization has verified</a> 39 attacks by Russians on health care facilities. Ukraine <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/mar/11/first-thing-russian-forces-have-killed-more-civilians-than-soldiers?utm_term=622b4edc7d657dbab80fe20b1e5cd689&utm_campaign=GuardianTodayUS&utm_source=esp&utm_medium=Email&CMP=GTUS_email">claims more civilians</a> than Ukrainian soldiers have already been killed. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf">International humanitarian law</a>, constituting agreements between countries on the laws of conduct in war, requires militaries to avoid the deliberate targeting of civilians and the use of weapons like cluster munitions that are indiscriminate – in other words, have a high chance of affecting civilians. </p>
<p>It also calls on warring nations to prevent extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, such as schools, residential buildings and hospitals. Simply stated, under these criteria, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-icc-is-investigating-war-crimes-in-ukraine-could-putin-be-indicted-178005">war crimes</a> take place when there is excessive destruction, suffering and civilian casualties. Rape, torture, forced displacement and other actions may also constitute war crimes.</p>
<p>There are other international crimes, including genocide and crimes against humanity. The latter consists of similar acts like rape and murder <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml">undertaken as part of widespread or systematic attack</a> directed against a civilian population.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://udayton.edu/directory/artssciences/hrc/inglis-shelley.php">scholar of human rights and the law</a>, I believe there is clear evidence that Russia has already engaged in violations of international law, including war crimes. Although the potential for holding Russian commanders, and even President Vladimir Putin, accountable and punishing them for international crimes is more likely than in the past, the path is likely long and difficult. Moreover, it is unknown what effect, if any, the specter of prosecution will have on the course of the war.</p>
<p>That’s because international justice has been unable to either prevent or prosecute many perpetrators of war crimes in the past decade.</p>
<h2>History repeating</h2>
<p>International law experts point to <a href="https://theweek.com/russo-ukrainian-war/1010764/putins-brutal-record-in-chechnya-and-syria-is-ominous-for-ukraine">the earlier ravages of Russian military actions in both Chechnya and Syria</a> as an indicator of the tactics Putin is willing to use in the invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>Russia fought two wars against the breakaway republic of Chechnya in the years following the fall of the Soviet Union. The second – in which Putin cut his teeth as a wartime leader – was seen as particularly brutal.</p>
<p>During that 1999-2000 conflict, advocacy group <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/press/2000/04/chech0421.htm">Human Rights Watch collected evidence</a> that Russia <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/02/29/war-crimes-chechnya-and-response-west#">carpet-bombed the capital Grozny and other towns</a>, causing heavy civilian casualties – estimates run into <a href="https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/5415049">the tens of thousands killed</a> – and leaving much of the capital destroyed. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman dragging a cart walks away from the edifice of buildings destroyed by missiles." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The city of Grozny was destroyed by Russian shells.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-combination-of-photos-created-on-july-29-shows-a-news-photo/1158372463?adppopup=true">Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There is also compelling evidence that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed during Russia’s occupation of <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=20220310-prosecutor-statement-georgia">South Ossetia in Georgia in 2008</a> and in relation to its annexation of <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=201211-otp-statement-ukraine">Crimea and engagement in eastern Donbas region</a> in Ukraine in 2014.</p>
<p>In 2015, Russia participated in Syria’s civil war on the side of President Bashar al-Assad by providing Russian air support to Syria’s army. According to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/01/russia/syria-war-crimes-month-bombing-aleppo">Human Rights Watch</a>, the aerial bombardment of Aleppo supported by the Russians in 2016 was “recklessly indiscriminate, deliberately targeted at least one medical facility, and included the use of indiscriminate weapons such as cluster munitions and incendiary weapons.” </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/02/russia-committed-war-crimes-in-syria-finds-un-report">United Nations concluded</a> that the Russian air force was <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=25638&LangID=E">responsible for war crimes in the Syrian province of Idlib in 2019</a>, having bombed indiscriminately a major marketplace and a displaced persons camp, killing and injuring scores of men, women and children. Russian denied any culpability. And no charges against Putin or Russian military commanders have ever been formally pursued internationally for alleged crimes in Chechnya or Syria. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/11/politics/joe-biden-warning-chemical-weapons/index.html">United States recently raised</a> the prospect of <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity">Russia’s deploying prohibited chemical weapons</a> in Ukraine. If it does so, it will be following the lead of Putin ally Assad, whose government <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity">is known for its use of prohibited chemical weapons</a> against civilians in Syria.</p>
<p>Either way, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/09/russian-ukraine-war-will-get-worse-before-it-gets-better-army-secretary-christine-wormuth-says.html">military experts</a> expect Russia’s tactics in Ukraine to only intensify in its brutality and disregard for the laws of war.</p>
<h2>In search of accountability</h2>
<p><a href="https://opiniojuris.org/2022/02/25/more-than-rhetoric-international-criminal-justice-crime-semantics-and-the-role-of-the-icc-in-the-ukraine-conflict/">Many scholars</a> pin their hopes for accountability on <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/">the International Criminal Court</a>, which was established under the Rome Statute in 1998 with 123 states parties. <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-international-criminal-court">The aim of the court</a> is to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. </p>
<p>Although neither Russia nor Ukraine is a party to the Rome Statute, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/7/is-putin-likely-to-face-the-icc-over-russias-actions-in-ukraine">ICC has initiated an investigation</a> into alleged crimes based on <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1146">a special declaration by Ukraine</a>. This gives the ICC legal authority to investigate and prosecute alleged crimes committed in Ukraine since 2014. </p>
<p>But while this early action means that evidence might be collected in real time and speed up the usually slow process of international justice, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/icc-faces-myriad-challenges-prosecute-war-crimes-ukraine-2022-03-04/">there are still substantial problems in prosecuting these alleged crimes</a>. </p>
<p>The standards set for proving massive and complex international crimes are more daunting than for domestic crimes. It is even harder to <a href="https://theconversation.com/civilians-are-being-killed-in-ukraine-so-why-is-investigating-war-crimes-so-difficult-178155">prove command responsibility by a head of state</a>, such as Putin, particularly when there is no cooperation between the ICC and the country of the accused. <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/prosecuting-heads-of-state/F6143E3825D0C7EACA922A0E9BF1C9A5">Successful cases are few</a> and have taken place only after a leader’s fall from power and only if the court has cooperation with the country. That’s how Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia was prosecuted by the <a href="https://www.icty.org/">International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</a>. Similarly, former President Charles Taylor of Liberia was prosecuted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. </p>
<p>Other options for criminal trials <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/03/russia-war-crimes-putin-prosecute.html">exist outside the ICC but also face major obstacles</a>. Advocates have harnessed <a href="https://lieber.westpoint.edu/water-finds-way-universal-jurisdiction-justice-syria/">the concept of universal jurisdiction</a> – inspired by <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/chile98/index.htm">the efforts of Spain to bring former dictator Augusto Pinochet of Chile</a> to justice – to bring perpetrators of war crimes in Syria to trial in European courts. </p>
<p><a href="http://opiniojuris.org/2022/03/08/de-bunking-the-role-of-international-law-in-the-ukrainian-conflict/">Legal experts are also</a> looking at the prosecution of Putin and Russian leadership directly for <a href="https://crimeofaggression.info/role-of-the-icc/definition-of-the-crime-of-aggression/">the crime of aggression</a> in regards to Ukraine. </p>
<p>For this crime, the ICC does not have legal authority to prosecute Putin without a U.N. Security Council referral. Given that Russia has a seat on the Security Council, where it wields a veto, that won’t happen. Options include establishing a special tribunal by Ukraine <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/80395/united-nations-response-options-to-russias-aggression-opportunities-and-rabbit-holes/">with U.N. General Assembly endorsement</a> or other international support. </p>
<p>But the ICC and special courts are “made from scratch” institutions, with limited capacity and without a police force. Practically, getting Putin or other Russian leaders into any court is an issue. For example, the ICC still struggles <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">to capture former Sudan President Omar al-Bashir, accused of genocide and other crimes in Darfur</a>, despite issuing arrest warrants for him in 2009 and 2010. </p>
<h2>Age of impunity</h2>
<p>Advocates point out <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-05-13/age-impunity">that impunity</a> – the ability to escape responsibility for violations of international law – has been on the rise for many years, along with authoritarianism.</p>
<p>That means the initiation of criminal investigations might have little impact on the calculations of Putin, senior Russian leadership or commanders and soldiers on the ground in Ukraine. Some <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Simmons_Paper.pdf">international law experts argue</a> that even where actual prosecution and punishment might not be immediate, actors who care about their legitimacy domestically or internationally are more likely to be deterred from committing more crimes by potential prosecutions. However, there are no <a href="https://internationallaw.blog/2017/04/06/the-approach-to-deterrence-in-the-practice-of-the-international-criminal-court/">firm conclusions</a> about the preventive or deterrent effect of international justice. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 150,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-150ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>The actions of Russia in Ukraine <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/14/vladimir-putin-war-crimes-icc-sajid-javid-hague">might spur investigations at an unprecedented</a> pace. And the ICC can issue <a href="https://iccforum.com/rome-statute#Article58">arrest warrants in order to prevent the further commission of crimes</a>. Such warrants would affect the accused’s ability to travel and officially represent the country.</p>
<p>When, or if, the formal label of accused “war criminal” gets attached to specific Russian names, it is possible that the prospect of accountability will become a more significant factor in the decision-making of those responsible for the ruthless war in Ukraine. But it will still be too late for the many victims already being identified.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178836/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shelley Inglis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin has a history of flattening cities in time of conflict. But alleged war crimes in Chechnya and Syria never resulted in charges, let alone prosecutions. Will Ukraine be any different?Shelley Inglis, Executive Director, University of Dayton Human Rights Center, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1736042021-12-14T18:35:24Z2021-12-14T18:35:24ZHow an independent tribunal came to rule that China is guilty of genocide against the Uyghurs<p>After 18 months of deliberations and three hearings of evidence from witnesses and experts – including anthropologists, political scientists and international lawyers – the London-based <a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/">Uyghur Tribunal</a> has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/09/uyghurs-subjected-to-genocide-by-china-unofficial-uk-tribunal-finds">ruled</a> that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is guilty of crimes against humanity and genocide, by coercive birth control.</p>
<p>The Uyghur Tribunal is an independent people’s tribunal. Its <a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Uyghur-Tribunal-Summary-Judgment-9th-Dec-21.pdf">verdict</a> is not legally binding. The tribunal was chaired by the British lawyer, Geoffrey Nice, known for his role as prosecutor in <a href="https://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/tdec/en/11213JD516912.htm">the trial</a> of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević for crimes against humanity.</p>
<p>The tribunal was established in June 2020, following the request of Dolkun Isa, president of the World Uyghur Congress, an advocacy group. Its purpose was to investigate crimes against humanity and <a href="https://theconversation.com/legal-expert-forced-birth-control-of-uighur-women-is-genocide-can-china-be-put-on-trial-142414">genocide</a> under international law, allegedly perpetrated by the Chinese state against <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-the-uyghurs-and-why-is-the-chinese-government-detaining-them-111843">Uyghurs</a>, Kazakhs and other Turkic-speaking Muslims in north-western China. </p>
<h2>Witness evidence</h2>
<p>In its investigations, the tribunal publicly requested evidence from witnesses, experts and governments. It did not judge Chinese values, citizens of the PRC, authoritarian governance, or Communist ideology. </p>
<p>Uyghurs turned to this civic forum because international courts and the Chinese legal system have no mechanisms by which Uyghur, or any minority peoples’ claims, can be heard without consent of the accused party – in this case, the PRC. </p>
<p>No government was willing to share evidence and the tribunal’s specific requests to the US, UK, and Japan were declined. This reflects how many governments’ policy decisions include trade-offs between economic interests and upholding human rights as established under international law. </p>
<p>The tribunal heard extensive <a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/statements/">witness accounts</a> of children and families being routinely separated, women being subjected to <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/sterilizations-iuds-and-mandatory-birth-control-the-ccps-campaign-to-suppress-uyghur-birth-rates-in-xinjiang/">coercive birth controls</a>, the sexual torture of men and women and people being forced to take unknown medications.</p>
<p>One witness, Sweden-based data analyst <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/12/16/china/uyghurs-silenced-abroad-intl-dst-hnk/index.html">Nyrola Elimä</a> testified to her family’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7aI-wr9TtYo&ab_channel=UyghurTribunalUyghurTribunal">arbitrary detainment</a>. No official explanation was given for detainment of her cousin, <a href="https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=5417">Mahire Yaqup</a>, who, Nyrola said, looked “like skin stretched on a skeleton” when they last spoke three years ago. Echoing Uyghurs’ fears amid widespread family separations, Nyrola explained the risks she was taking by speaking publicly: “The Chinese government can take my parents”, she said, “I am scared. I can feel the threat closer and closer”. </p>
<p>Further witnesses described visceral experiences when questioned how they knew cellmates in the detainment camps were taken by guards to be gang raped after dark. <a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/04-0930-JUN-21-UTFW-005-Qelbinur-Sidik-English-1.pdf">Qelbinur Sidik</a> could “hear the screams”. <a href="https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=5524">Zumret Dawut</a> could “see the guilt”, and “sense when they were taken and wouldn’t come back”. <a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/04-1020-JUN-21-UTFW-018-Omir-Bekali-English.pdf">Omir Bekali</a> stopped to think, “are they human?”, while hanging upside down and tortured with thin wire. </p>
<p>The tribunal’s legal counsel verified case details using government documents and legal papers. They had to ask necessary but disconcerting questions to establish the facts. </p>
<h2>Expert evidence</h2>
<p>These testimonies correlate with evidence collected by social anthropologists on China’s <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/696114/in-the-camps-by-darren-byler/">camp system</a>. They are familiar to researchers of Uyghur and Kazakh claims of <a href="https://lausan.hk/2021/camp-land/">settler-colonialism</a> and <a href="https://coremiddleeast.com/uyghur-people-in-the-concentration-camps-they-carry-out-various-types-of-torture-and-abuse/">genocide</a>. </p>
<p>China <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-tyne-56545200">symbolically sanctioned</a> several academics and vocal politicians ahead of the tribunal’s first hearing. Nevertheless, the UK’s leading experts on the region (and myself) <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AWCwLvUIV0g">presented</a> a co-authored <a href="https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/05-0940-JUN-21-David-Tobin-et-al-State-Violence-in-Xinjiang-English.pdf">report</a> to the tribunal, entitled State Violence in Xinjiang. </p>
<p>Our findings show that since 2017, the Chinese state has implemented planned, systematic, and co-ordinated practices of forced labour, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families">child-separation</a>, coercive birth controls, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting">sexual violence</a>, and repression of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/25/thousands-of-xinjiang-mosques-destroyed-damaged-china-report-finds">religion</a> and culture. Together, these practices prevent intergenerational transmission of Uyghur identities. The key findings correspond with those of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting">NGOs</a>, international <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/uyghurs/the-uyghur-genocide-an-examination-of-chinas-breaches-of-the-1948-genocide-convention/">thinktanks</a>, and <a href="https://barhumanrights.org.uk/bhrc-publishes-new-report-outlining-the-responsibility-of-states-under-international-law-to-uyghurs-and-other-turkic-muslims-in-xinjiang-china/">legal</a> bodies. </p>
<p>Chinese president Xi Jinping’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2021.2001556">assimilation policies</a> of “fusion” and “Sinicisation” are intended to solve what the party-state terms China’s “ethnic problem”. They have interned over <a href="https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/features/where-did-one-million-figure-detentions-xinjiangs-camps-come">one million</a> Turkic-speaking Muslims in <a href="https://atlantic-books.co.uk/book/in-the-camps/">“re-education” camps</a>, where they experience <a href="https://www.shu.ac.uk/helena-kennedy-centre-international-justice/research-and-projects/all-projects/laundered-cotton">forced labour</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting">sexual violence</a> and children are <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/03/the-nightmare-of-uyghur-families-separated-by-repression/">separated</a> from their parents. Outside the camps, Uyghurs live under <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass">hi-tech surveillance</a> and endure <a href="https://www.dpa-international.com/topic/memories-trauma-torture-follow-xinjiang-camp-survivors-urn:newsml:dpa.com:20090101:190311-99-328705">psychological trauma</a>. </p>
<p>Social anthropologists and political scientists have analysed how Uyghur history narratives are prosecuted by the Chinese state as <a href="https://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/CRF.1.2004/b1_Criminalizing1.2004.pdf">terrorism</a>. Their research has shown how Uyghur language was gradually <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634930701517482">removed</a> from public life and religion had to be <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14631360120017988">practised</a> in private. Uyghur <a href="https://www.cup.columbia.edu/book/the-uyghurs/9780231147583">speech</a> has been conflated with armed resistance and Uyghur identities treated as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/securing-chinas-northwest-frontier/417E88E45DFE0D7E2800E7B94B25A019">security threats</a>. Scholars concluded these policies created <a href="https://www.etaa.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Roberts_WorkingPaper_March2012.pdf">mass discontent</a> and exacerbated cycles of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/struggle-of-life-or-death-han-and-uyghur-insecurities-on-chinas-northwest-frontier/ACA97E9682101081E35CFE46518C9111">Han-Uyghur violence</a>. </p>
<h2>Genocidal processes</h2>
<p>To date, there has been limited open debate on how the genocide term applies to Uyghur experiences. The human rights scholar <a href="https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015005077436&view=1up&seq=6">Rafael Lemkin</a> originally defined genocide in 1944 as “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves”. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/confronting-evils/1BDD56BFFABFD218A011E86B11B97799">international law</a> today, genocide does not refer to the complete elimination of a group. <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol7/iss1/3/">Genocide theorists</a> tend to define genocide as planned <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/hypatia/article/abs/genocide-and-social-death/E155AE3FDEB816A08D7FDD5D301FAF9C">social destruction</a>, not physical annihilation. </p>
<p>As Nice made duly clear in the tribunal’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rbT_ctbEof0">detailed judgement</a> of crimes against humanity and genocide, the latter ruling was in respect of the UN Genocide Convention article 2D “imposing measures to prevent births within the group”. He noted that genocide in law remains broader than its misconception as mass killings. </p>
<p>Research interviews in Xinjiang are conducted anonymously to protect people’s safety. But since the emergence of the internment camps, Uyghurs have increasingly <a href="https://international.thenewslens.com/article/113718">spoken publicly</a> in desperation and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-47210039">in hope</a> of seeing family. As Nyrola Elimä explained to me in an interview: “While the world debates a word, we are dying”.</p>
<p>In his verdict, Nice reminded observers that universal rights are matched by personal duties. “It can never be right to look away,” he said. The judgement will vindicate Uyghurs’ and Kazakhs’ long-term experiences of state violence. </p>
<p>In response, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/un-publish-xinjiang-findings-soon-2021-12-10/">UN spokesperson</a> noted “similarly identified patterns” and that the tribunal has “brought to light more information that is deeply disturbing”. The question now is, who will act?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173604/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Tobin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Governments declined to take part in the Uyghur Tribunal’s investigation. But the body of scholarly evidence for its claims, and its ruling, is thorough and extensive.David Tobin, Lecturer in East Asian Studies, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1729062021-12-08T14:14:20Z2021-12-08T14:14:20ZWhy it’s time to make ecocide a crime: for the sake of its victims<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436341/original/file-20211208-141178-1gh66xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5176%2C3445&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Campaigners against ecocide are calling for it to become an international crime.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/menetekel/50531272807">Menetekel/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In November, the world’s first <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/oct/05/global-citizens-assembly-to-be-chosen-for-un-climate-talks">global citizens’ assembly</a> – made up of 100 people chosen by lottery from around the world – declared its recommended responses to the climate crisis at the UN climate conference <a href="https://theconversation.com/glasgow-climate-pact-where-do-all-the-words-and-numbers-we-heard-at-cop26-leave-us-171704">COP26</a>. Among these recommendations was that causing severe environmental destruction, or “ecocide”, should become a crime. </p>
<p>The assembly drew from a proposal by the <a href="https://www.stopecocide.earth/">Stop Ecocide</a> foundation, which <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jun/22/legal-experts-worldwide-draw-up-historic-definition-of-ecocide">defines ecocide</a> as “unlawful or wanton acts committed with the knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to the environment being caused by those acts”.</p>
<p>Campaigners hope that this definition will be adopted by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-next-for-the-troubled-international-criminal-court-129038">International Criminal Court</a> (ICC). If it were, ecocide would join genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf">list</a> of the world’s most serious crimes.</p>
<p>Calls to criminalise ecocide date back to the <a href="http://rbdi.bruylant.be/public/modele/rbdi/content/files/RBDI%201973/RBDI%201973-1/RBDI%201973.1%20-%20pp.%201%20%C3%83%C2%A0%2027%20-%20Richard%20Falk.pdf">1970s</a>, following America’s devastating use of the chemical <a href="http://ewa.home.amu.edu.pl/Zierler,%20The%20Invention%20of%20Ecocide-Introduction.pdf">Agent Orange</a> in the Vietnam War. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/agent-orange-exposed-how-u-s-chemical-warfare-in-vietnam-unleashed-a-slow-moving-disaster-84572">enormous harm</a> it caused to both the environment (destroying forests and decimating biodiversity) and humans (harming or killing thousands of people) sparked proposals for an international law against ecocide. </p>
<p>While initially unsuccessful, recent years have seen an unprecedented surge in support for the criminalisation of ecocide, including from the <a href="https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP18/GD.VAN.2.12.pdf">Republic of Vanuatu</a>, the <a href="https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP18/GD.MDV.3.12.pdf">Republic of Maldives</a>, <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5ca2608ab914493c64ef1f6d/t/5fe1e759b356721fce380f27/1608640346408/GD.BEL.14.12+%282%29.pdf">Belgium</a>, <a href="https://www.stopecocide.earth/press-releases-summary/france-writes-ecocide-into-law-in-two-ways">France</a> and the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0014_EN.html">EU</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Fire burns in a field" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436339/original/file-20211208-25-1yvrh0x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436339/original/file-20211208-25-1yvrh0x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436339/original/file-20211208-25-1yvrh0x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436339/original/file-20211208-25-1yvrh0x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436339/original/file-20211208-25-1yvrh0x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436339/original/file-20211208-25-1yvrh0x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436339/original/file-20211208-25-1yvrh0x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ecocide reparations could help damaged landscapes be restored.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/5559102272">UN_photo/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Campaigners claim that this will put an end to <a href="https://www.stopecocide.earth/making-ecocide-a-crime">corporate immunity</a> by holding individuals in positions of corporate power to account for their destructive decisions. But less attention has been given to another benefit: the ICC’s power to award reparations to victims. </p>
<h2>What are reparations?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/ReparationCompensation.aspx#:%7E:text=Reparations%20may%20include%20monetary%20compensation,victims%20in%20the%20particular%20case.">Reparations</a> are forms of compensation made to victims of crimes. The ICC has established that reparations can be <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/04-01/06-3129">awarded</a> for physical or psychological harm committed against a natural person (meaning a human being) or a legal person (meaning some organisations). </p>
<p>Currently, these reparations cannot be awarded to non-human beings like animals, or to the natural world itself. This means that currently, any reparations awarded for ecocide would have to be to humans and human organisations. Nevertheless, the ability to award reparations could provide victims of ecocide with the opportunity to restore, or memorialise, what they’ve lost – as well as potentially helping to prevent future environmental destruction.</p>
<p>For example, the ICC could award funds for an environmental restoration project benefiting victims of ecocide. This might include a reforestation or <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-biodiversity-and-why-does-it-matter-9798">biodiversity project</a> for a community that had previously relied on a damaged ecosystem for sustenance. </p>
<p>While the ICC hasn’t done this before, previous examples can be found elsewhere. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has <a href="https://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_245_ing.pdf">awarded</a> reforestation programmes to the Kichwa Indigenous community in Ecuador, while the New South Wales Land and Environment court in Australia has <a href="https://efface.eu/sites/default/files/publications/Presentation%20-%20Rob%20White%20-%20Tailored%20Sanctions%20in%20Australia/index.pdf">ordered</a> people convicted of destroying endangered animals’ habitats to arrange and fund restoration projects.</p>
<p>What’s more, the law could allow victims to be financially compensated for things like the pollution of rivers used for fishing or the destruction of spiritually significant land. Other courts have <a href="http://cidh.org/countryrep/indigenous-lands09/Chap.X.htm">awarded compensation</a> for similar harms: such as to the Saramaka Indigenous community in <a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_172_ing.pdf">Suriname</a> for the loss of spiritual connections to their territory, marred by logging. </p>
<p>Reparations could even be used to provide access to clean water, food and environmentally sustainable income for locals. The ICC – through its associated body, the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/tfv">Trust Fund for Victims</a> – has previously <a href="https://www.trustfundforvictims.org/en/about/two-mandates-tfv/assistance">supported</a> beekeeping training and tree planting in Northern Uganda, to help victims of the <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opensecurity/what-will-it-take-to-end-conflict-with-lra/">conflict</a> between the Lord’s Resistance Army and national authorities earn money. </p>
<p>The ICC could also explore <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ijtj/article/14/1/165/5803872">symbolic reparations</a>. This could involve the convicted person publicly apologising and acknowledging the suffering they’ve caused. This might not seem as valuable as providing money or restorative projects to victims. However, it could help acknowledge the reality of what has been lost and establish ecocide as a serious crime on the world stage.</p>
<p>Taking inspiration from environmental <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/peace-parks">peacebuilding efforts</a> around the world, symbolic reparations could include creating restorative memorial parks, or “<a href="https://prize.equatorinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/formidable/6/Salween-Peace-Park-Briefer-2018.pdf">peace parks</a>”. These could be used by suffering communities as memorials, while supporting local conservation work. </p>
<p>Going further, the ICC might consider awarding even more “<a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/04-02/06-2659">transformative reparations</a>” that challenge social inequality. These could be designed to allow marginalised communities more say in managing natural resources.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A stone mural in a park" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436336/original/file-20211208-137612-1sadja1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436336/original/file-20211208-137612-1sadja1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436336/original/file-20211208-137612-1sadja1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436336/original/file-20211208-137612-1sadja1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436336/original/file-20211208-137612-1sadja1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436336/original/file-20211208-137612-1sadja1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436336/original/file-20211208-137612-1sadja1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Peace parks, like this one in Santiago, Chile, might play a role in memorialising environmental crimes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Santiago_Chile_-_Peace_Park-1.jpg">David Berkowitz/Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A type of transformative reparation is a “<a href="https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/guaranteeing-non-repetition-human-rights-violations#:%7E:text=Guarantees%20of%20non%2Drepetition%20are,action%20that%20reinforce%20each%20other.">guarantee of non-repetition</a>”, designed to stop similar crimes from happening again. In an example from Mali, the ICC <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/12-01/15-236">requested</a> that its Trust Fund for Victims collaborate with the Mali government to prevent future attacks against <a href="https://theconversation.com/timbuktu-destruction-landmark-ruling-awards-millions-to-malians-82540">Timbuktu</a>’s protected cultural heritage.</p>
<p>In the context of ecocide, guarantees of non-repetition might involve training local people in environmental protection, or strengthening weak environmental regulations. However, these broader goals would require government or corporate support to achieve and would need to be explicitly linked to the crimes of the convicted person.</p>
<p>This highlights a key limitation of the ICC: that it is <a href="https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/a-missed-opportunity-for-accountability/">constrained</a> in what it can do alone. Meaningful environmental restoration in the aftermath of ecocide requires a whole host of participants, including national governments and corporations, who may not be willing to cooperate. And since the ICC doesn’t hold jurisdiction over corporations, it can’t demand broader changes in corporate practices that may be causing environmental harm.</p>
<p>But getting the ICC involved in the fight for ecological justice still allows us to treat ecocide as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/human-progress-is-no-excuse-to-destroy-nature-a-push-to-make-ecocide-a-global-crime-must-recognise-this-fundamental-truth-164594">life-altering</a>, extraordinarily destructive crime it is. When faced with a climate crisis and an age of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-a-mass-extinction-and-are-we-in-one-now-122535">mass extinction</a>, we must use all the tools in our arsenal – including law – to protect and repair the natural world. </p>
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<img alt="Imagine weekly climate newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rachel Killean does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Criminalising ecocide means its victims will be able to receive reparations, helping to rebuild destroyed ecosystems and communities.Rachel Killean, Senior Lecturer in Law, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1703322021-10-21T12:44:36Z2021-10-21T12:44:36ZBolsonaro faces ‘crimes against humanity’ charge over COVID-19 mishandling: 5 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427628/original/file-20211020-18921-1915pjp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C91%2C5551%2C3609&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Reckless policies are to blame for Brazil's high death toll.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/brazilian-president-jair-bolsonaro-gestures-during-the-news-photo/1235980576?adppopup=true">Evaristo Sa/AFP via Getty Image</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A Brazilian <a href="https://apnews.com/article/coronavirus-pandemic-crime-pandemics-homicide-covid-19-pandemic-1a1f8bf555e837c16dcfeaec111a7d3e">congressional panel has recommended</a> that President Jair Bolsonaro be charged with “crimes against humanity” over his alleged bungling of the country’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/19/world/americas/bolsonaro-covid-19-brazil.html">near-1,200 page report</a>, formally presented on Oct. 20, 2021, holds Bolsonaro culpable for worsening a crisis that has to date killed some 600,000 Brazilians, outlining how his <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-senator-says-bolsonaro-never-wanted-covid-19-vaccines-preferred-herd-2021-05-22/">failed policies</a> allowed the virus to spread among the population. The president denies any wrongdoing.</p>
<p>An earlier draft had called for Bolsonaro to be indicted for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/19/world/americas/bolsonaro-covid-19-brazil.html">homicide and genocide</a> as well, given how the ravages of the coronavirus have <a href="https://theconversation.com/judge-orders-brazil-to-protect-indigenous-people-from-ravages-of-covid-19-142356">disproportionately hit Brazil’s Indigenous groups</a>. But those charges were dropped from the final report.</p>
<p>Since the beginning of the pandemic, The Conversation’s authors have been chronicling the crisis in Brazil – and Bolsonaro’s role in letting it happen.</p>
<h2>1. In bad company</h2>
<p>Bolsonaro certainly doesn’t stand alone among world leaders when it comes to mishandling a health crisis that has now lasted more than 18 months. But he is one of the worst, according to a panel of scholars who put together <a href="https://theconversation.com/worlds-worst-pandemic-leaders-5-presidents-and-prime-ministers-who-badly-mishandled-covid-19-159787">a rogues gallery of presidents and prime ministers</a> who stand accused of letting down their population.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://eaesp.fgv.br/en/faculty/elize-massard-fonseca">Elize Massard da Fonseca</a>, at Fundação Getulio Vargas, and <a href="https://sph.umich.edu/faculty-profiles/greer-scott.html">Scott L. Greer</a>, at University of Michigan, explained, the Brazilian president didn’t just fail to respond, he actively worsened the crisis.</p>
<p>“Bolsonaro used his <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.11927713.29">constitutional powers to interfere in</a> the Health Ministry’s administrative matters, such as clinical protocols, data disclosure and vaccine procurement. He <a href="https://www.nexojornal.com.br/expresso/2020/08/04/Quais-os-vetos-de-Bolsonaro-a-medidas-de-combate-%C3%A0-pandemia">vetoed legislation</a> that would have both mandated the use of masks in religious sites and compensated health professionals permanently harmed by the pandemic, for example. And he obstructed state government efforts to promote social distancing and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-brazil-idUSKBN22N308">used his decree power to allow many businesses to remain open as ‘essential,’</a> including spas and gyms,” Massard da Fonseca and Greer write. But it doesn’t end there: “Bolsonaro also aggressively <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/13/world/americas/virus-brazil-bolsonaro-chloroquine.html">promoted unproven medicines</a>, notably hydroxychloroquine, to treat COVID-19 patients.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/worlds-worst-pandemic-leaders-5-presidents-and-prime-ministers-who-badly-mishandled-covid-19-159787">World's worst pandemic leaders: 5 presidents and prime ministers who badly mishandled COVID-19</a>
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<h2>2. Testing positive</h2>
<p>Bolsonaro backed up his disdain for masks and social distancing with personal action. While the virus spread throughout the early months of the pandemic, he could be seen pressing the flesh with supporters and campaigning without a face covering. He duly got COVID-19 in July 2020. As <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/people/anthony-pereira">Anthony Pereira</a>, at King’s College London, <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazils-jair-bolsonaro-has-coronavirus-what-it-could-mean-for-him-politically-142232">wrote</a>: “The most surprising thing about Jair Bolsonaro’s positive test for coronavirus … was how long it took to happen.”</p>
<p>It could have been a pivotal moment; Bolsonaro could have used his personal experience to stress the risks of catching the virus and doubled down on efforts to contain the spread. He didn’t. Instead, he took hydroxychloroquine – an anti-malarial drug that has been found to have <a href="https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-safety-and-availability/fda-cautions-against-use-hydroxychloroquine-or-chloroquine-covid-19-outside-hospital-setting-or">no beneficial effects</a> in combating COVID-19 and which health experts warn could instead cause harm.</p>
<p>Worse, he “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/13/world/americas/virus-brazil-bolsonaro-chloroquine.html">tried to push the drug</a> on state health services, despite <a href="https://theconversation.com/chloroquine-and-hydroxychloroquine-no-proof-these-anti-malarial-drugs-prevent-novel-coronavirus-in-humans-134703">concerns over its uses</a>.”</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/brazils-jair-bolsonaro-has-coronavirus-what-it-could-mean-for-him-politically-142232">Brazil's Jair Bolsonaro has coronavirus – what it could mean for him politically</a>
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<h2>3. Accused of genocide</h2>
<p>Of course, Bolsonaro had the benefit of having access to the best health care available in Brazil. Many, many others were not so fortunate.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.binghamton.edu/lacas/people/profile.html?id=nadia.rubaii">Nadia Rubaii</a>, co-director of the Institute for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention and a professor at Binghamton University, and <a href="https://www.jota.info/autor/julio-jose-araujo-junior">Julio José Araujo Junior</a>
of Rio de Janeiro State University, <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazils-bolsonaro-has-covid-19-and-so-do-thousands-of-indigenous-people-who-live-days-from-the-nearest-hospital-141506">note</a>: “Most of Brazil’s roughly <a href="http://www.funai.gov.br/index.php/indios-no-brasil/o-brasil-indigena-ibge">896,000 Indigenous people live in the Amazon region</a>, where the nearest hospital may be days away by boat and offer <a href="https://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1809-43412019000100204">limited care</a>.”</p>
<p>Indigenous Brazilians also suffer from <a href="https://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-311X2014000400855">higher rates of malnutrition, anemia and obesity</a> – all of which puts them at a higher risk of death from COVID-19.</p>
<p>And in prescient words, given the discussion of charges against Bolsonaro, Rubaii and Araujo Junior lay out the argument that the right-wing leader’s policies – which had led to deforestation and the curtailment of Native land rights – had already amounted to “inciting genocide” against Indigenous Brazilians. </p>
<p>“While genocide often involves explicit killing, it can also include causing serious harm to a population and destroying their way of life,” the scholars write. There were already <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Confronting-Evil-Engaging-Responsibility-Genocide/dp/0199300704">warning signs</a> that this process was underway. COVID-19 “could be the final straw.”</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/brazils-bolsonaro-has-covid-19-and-so-do-thousands-of-indigenous-people-who-live-days-from-the-nearest-hospital-141506">Brazil's Bolsonaro has COVID-19 – and so do thousands of Indigenous people who live days from the nearest hospital</a>
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<h2>4. Poor, Black and vulnerable</h2>
<p>That the COVID-19 pandemic should hit minority groups should not come as too much of a surprise – it is a dynamic repeated the world over, including <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/racial-ethnic-disparities/index.html">in the United States</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://aaad.unc.edu/faculty-staff/kia-caldwell/">Kia Lilly Caldwell</a> at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Edna-Araujo-3">Edna Maria de Araújo</a> of State University of Feira de Santana in Brazil explain how, just as in the U.S., <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-is-deadlier-for-black-brazilians-a-legacy-of-structural-racism-that-dates-back-to-slavery-139430">this is a result of structural racism</a> that stretches back to the days of slavery. It has resulted in economic and health disparities in Brazil that heightened the risk of the country’s Black population getting COVID-19 and suffering worse from the virus.</p>
<p>Caldwell and de Araújo noted that while Brazil’s coronavirus outbreak originated in wealthy neighborhoods, it quickly spread to poorer, densely populated urban locations.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-is-deadlier-for-black-brazilians-a-legacy-of-structural-racism-that-dates-back-to-slavery-139430">COVID-19 is deadlier for black Brazilians, a legacy of structural racism that dates back to slavery</a>
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<h2>5. Spread from rich to poor</h2>
<p>A quirk of the early coronavirus outbreak in Brazil was that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-rio/a-brazilian-woman-caught-coronavirus-on-vacation-her-maid-is-now-dead-idUSKBN21B1HT">many victims were maids</a> who were infected by their employer.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.springer.com/br/book/9783030332952">Mauricio Sellmann Oliveira</a>, a visiting scholar at Dartmouth College, explains how this contributed to the spread of the virus among Brazil’s poorer, Black population.</p>
<p>He <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-brazils-raging-pandemic-domestic-workers-fear-for-their-lives-and-their-jobs-138163">explains that after the abolition of slavery</a> in 1888, Black women were largely forced into taking menial jobs, many as domestic workers. Today, Black women still make up <a href="https://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/TDs/td_2528.pdf">almost two-thirds</a> of Brazil’s “domésticas.” Most have only limited access to quality health care and have to commute long distances from the richer neighborhoods they serve to the poorer ones in which they live, and through which COVID-19 spread rapidly.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-brazils-raging-pandemic-domestic-workers-fear-for-their-lives-and-their-jobs-138163">In Brazil's raging pandemic, domestic workers fear for their lives – and their jobs</a>
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<p>While COVID-19 spread among the population with devastating effect – especially for Brazil’s poor, Black and Indigenous people – Bolsonaro, it is alleged, ignored the growing evidence on masks, vaccines and other measures that would have slowed infections. Indeed, according to the report released Oct. 20, 2021, his policies can essentially be blamed for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/19/world/americas/bolsonaro-covid-19-brazil.html">more than half of Brazil’s total COVID-19 death toll</a> – some 300,000 people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170332/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
More than 600,000 Brazilians have died of COVID-19 since the beginning of the pandemic. A new report says the policies of President Jair Bolsonaro are responsible for around half.Matt Williams, Senior International EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1669792021-08-30T15:30:50Z2021-08-30T15:30:50ZChad’s deposed dictator Hissène Habré passed away in prison: here’s the legacy of his trial<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418463/original/file-20210830-27-vpkegx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chad’s former head of state, Hissène Habré, who has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58316923">died</a> at the age of 79, was serving a life sentence in Senegal following his conviction for war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture. </p>
<p>Habré was tried by a <a href="https://theconversation.com/moment-of-truth-for-chadian-dictator-convicted-of-crimes-against-humanity-74264">specially constituted tribunal</a> set up by an agreement between the African Union, Senegal and Chad. Staffed mostly by local judicial professionals, it investigated crimes committed in Chad from 1982 to 1990 while Habré was in power. Tribunal investigators <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-president-on-trial-9780198858621?cc=dk&lang=en&">travelled to Chad four times and collected thousands of interviews</a> which informed Habré’s prosecution and <a href="https://theconversation.com/moment-of-truth-for-chadian-dictator-convicted-of-crimes-against-humanity-74264">2016 conviction</a>. </p>
<p>The tribunal was unprecedented. It represented Africa’s first locally produced international criminal law, its first application of universal jurisdiction, and its first judicial challenge to a former dictator’s quiet retirement. </p>
<p>Habré’s trial and conviction were significant and legally innovative in many ways. And his trial and conviction was great news for international criminal law, in part because it was some of the only good news for the field in the past decade.</p>
<p>But as I argue in <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/book/the-justice-laboratory/">my forthcoming book</a>, the trial should be seen as a failure to the degree that it was only able to neutralise Hissène Habré, the man, and not the criminal state governance practices he oversaw. The repressive state apparatus and practices Habré built up remain in place today.</p>
<h2>The beginning</h2>
<p>The field of international criminal law emerged after the second world war, when allied powers put defeated German and Japanese leaders on trial in Nuremberg and Tokyo. International criminal law allows individuals to be criminally charged for their roles in state-sponsored atrocity. The words <a href="https://www.amazon.com/East-West-Street-Genocide-Humanity/dp/0525433724">“crimes against humanity”</a> and later <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">“genocide”</a> entered the lexicon of the law for the first time. </p>
<p>Whereas international human rights law instructs states to change their practices, international criminal law investigates and prosecutes specific individuals for their roles in committing crimes against humanity, war crimes, or genocide.</p>
<p>After the legal innovations of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, international criminal courts lay dormant until the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, violence in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda led to UN-sponsored tribunals in <a href="https://www.icty.org/">The Hague</a> and <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/">Arusha</a>. In 1998, countries around the world negotiated the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf">Rome Statute</a>, leading to the founding in 2002 of the International Criminal Court, the first permanent court applying international criminal law. </p>
<p>The International Criminal Court currently has 123 member states. It has held several trials and has five convictions for atrocity crimes. In 2015, it moved into its <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1180">permanent headquarters</a>, a grand building complex in The Hague. A plaque in the entrance reads, “<a href="https://m.facebook.com/InternationalCriminalCourt/photos/a.660335857495462/1355467631315611/?type=3&source=57&__tn__=EH-R">Towards a more just world”</a>.</p>
<p>Despite these considerable achievements, the court faces numerous existential challenges. It’s <a href="https://ecdpm.org/publications/international-criminal-court-african-union/">focus</a> on African conflicts and African defendants has led to resistance. The African Union has on numerous occasions <a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2017-02-10/african-union-resolution-urges-states-to-leave-icc/">instructed</a> African states to withdraw from it. </p>
<p>The court has also struggled to elicit cooperation from member states, rendering investigation impossible. Moreover, some of the world’s most powerful states, including India and three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – Russia, China and the US – are not members and often oppose the court.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/african-trial-of-chadian-dictator-habre-is-a-landmark-against-impunity-60469">African trial of Chadian dictator Habré is a landmark against impunity</a>
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<p>In this charged landscape, Habré’s trial and conviction was a boon both to the field of international law as well as to the beleaguered International Criminal Court. </p>
<p>Although the special court constructed to try Habré for atrocities committed in Chad from 1982 – 1990 might look like a competitor to the International Criminal Court, the Habré tribunal is better understood as an ally. </p>
<p>First, Habré’s case could never have been taken on by the International Criminal Court, which can only hear cases involving crimes that have occurred after its founding in 2002. </p>
<p>Second, Habré’s trial conformed to both the principles and the particulars of international criminal law. The International Criminal Court is a court of last resort, designed to intervene only when local courts cannot or will not. Therefore, local prosecution of crimes recognised by the International Criminal Court fulfils the the court’s mandate. Moreover, since international criminal law challenges the idea that might makes right, challenging sovereign immunity and impunity is one of the International Criminal Court’s aims. </p>
<p>Finally, Senegal’s tidy administration of the case set an example for how local institutions can perform international criminal law adjudications. The trial was completed on time, with a minimal budget, and unmarred by witnesses casualties or bureaucratic corruption.</p>
<p>Thus even though there was a lot of focus on the Habré trial as an <a href="https://www.ijmonitor.org/2015/10/the-extraordinary-african-chambers-a-new-approach-to-victim-participation-in-international-criminal-tribunals/">“African institution”</a> often in order to distinguish it from the unpopular “western” International Criminal Court, the Habré tribunal was good news for the International Criminal Court and its international criminal law project. </p>
<h2>Mixed legacy</h2>
<p>The legacy of Habré’s trial and conviction is more mixed when we consider what it means for Chad. As discussed in <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-president-on-trial-9780198858621?cc=dk&lang=en&">my co-edited book</a> about the trial, the case against Habré was in many important respects driven by his victims, and his conviction represented an official recognition that the harms they suffered were crimes. </p>
<p>This paradigm shift between unfortunate harm and punishable – and therein preventable – crime is a central aspect of the value that international criminal law promises.</p>
<p>On the other hand, Habré’s conviction arguably represents a somewhat empty gesture against low-hanging fruit. For example, while wrongs towards victims are recognised by the verdict, the reparations that <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/81192-habre-death-final-blow-or-wake-up-call-reparations.html">the court ordered</a> have not been collected or dispersed. </p>
<p>Courts in Chad have also ordered reparations, to no avail.</p>
<p>Moreover, the repressive state apparatus Habré oversaw <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/20/chad-deby-leaves-legacy-abuse">was continued by his successor, Idriss Déby</a>. Déby was a major funder and supporter of the legal case against Habré up to the point where the tribunal began investigating crimes where he was involved. At this point his cooperation abruptly ended. </p>
<p>Déby ruled Chad despotically for more than 30 years until his <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56815708">unexpected death</a> in a military skirmish earlier this year. He has been replaced by his son, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who has so far overseen regime abuses <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/24/chad-post-deby-crackdown-abuses">reminiscent of those committed by Habré</a>.</p>
<p>The value of the rule of law is to challenge and constrain power. In this sense, the legacy of Habré’s trial and conviction is mixed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166979/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kerstin Bree Carlson receives funding from Dreyers Foundation to conduct fieldwork in Africa. </span></em></p>The value of the rule of law is to challenge and constrain power. In this sense, the legacy of Habré’s trial and conviction is mixed.Kerstin Bree Carlson, Associate Professor International Law, Roskilde UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1628072021-07-06T12:10:32Z2021-07-06T12:10:32ZWhy reparations are always about more than money<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/408012/original/file-20210623-27-16s0rs3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=13%2C13%2C1005%2C663&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Consulting with the communities that have suffered the most harm from past acts of mass violence is a key part of a successful reparations process. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RacialInjusticeReparationsColleges/c9fd2db8c55f4af6a080806e6cfc78db">Steven Senne/AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Between 1904 and 1908, German soldiers and settler colonists killed about half of all Nama people and over 80% of the Herero ethnic group. On May 28, 2021, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/28/africa/germany-recognizes-colonial-genocide-namibia-intl/index.html">acknowledged that Germany committed genocide in what is today Namibia</a>. Maas’ statement was Germany’s first official description of these events as “genocide.” Maas also announced that Germany would pay Namibia roughly US$1.3 billion to answer for these crimes. Many refer to this gesture as reparations.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409531/original/file-20210702-25-1fkfwzd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A photo from 1904/5 showing Herero captives in chains." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409531/original/file-20210702-25-1fkfwzd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409531/original/file-20210702-25-1fkfwzd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409531/original/file-20210702-25-1fkfwzd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409531/original/file-20210702-25-1fkfwzd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409531/original/file-20210702-25-1fkfwzd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409531/original/file-20210702-25-1fkfwzd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409531/original/file-20210702-25-1fkfwzd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Germany recently acknowledged that it committed genocide in what is today Namibia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/german-south-west-africa-herero-rebellion-captives-in-news-photo/545722415?adppopup=true">ullstein bild/ullstein bild via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Meanwhile, in the United States, <a href="https://theconversation.com/revisiting-reparations-is-it-time-for-the-us-to-pay-its-debt-for-the-legacy-of-slavery-151972">reparations to Black Americans</a> for slavery are gaining traction. A growing number of universities, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/us/georgetown-slavery-reparations.html">including Georgetown</a> and <a href="https://vts.edu/mission/multicultural-ministries/reparations/">Virginia Theological Seminary</a>, along with a few cities such as <a href="https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article244688107.html">Asheville, North Carolina</a>, have started reparations programs. In April, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/14/us/house-reparations-bill.html">U.S. House of Representatives voted</a> to <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/40">advance a bill</a> exploring reparations at the national level.</p>
<p>As a scholar who <a href="https://www.binghamton.edu/i-gmap/index.html">researches</a> how societies deal with histories of mass atrocities and also <a href="http://www.auschwitzinstitute.org/">works with governments</a> on policies to protect those at risk, I argue that past atrocities do not end when the physical violence comes to an end. The violence <a href="https://www.rutgersuniversitypress.org/resonant-violence/9781978825550">continues to affect</a> the social, cultural and economic lives of those targeted far into the future – making societies sometimes turn to reparations.</p>
<h2>What are reparations?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/reparations">Reparations are</a> part of a set of tools that societies use to respond to past mass violence. Often called <a href="https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice">transitional justice</a>, these tools also include things like <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Unspeakable-Truths-Transitional-Justice-and-the-Challenge-of-Truth-Commissions/Hayner/p/book/9780415806350">truth commissions</a>, <a href="https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/criminal-justice">criminal trials</a> and <a href="https://www.ssrc.org/publications/view/57EFEC93-284A-DE11-AFAC-001CC477EC70/">institutional reform</a>. </p>
<p>Transitional justice has emerged from international human rights laws requiring United Nations member states to <a href="https://www.kairoscanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/UN-Joinet-Orentlicher-Principles.pdf">bring perpetrators of mass atrocities to justice and redress survivors</a>. But many victims never receive reparations, while initiatives that do occur often fall short. </p>
<p>The first major reparations program began in 1952, when 23 Jewish organizations formed the <a href="https://www.claimscon.org/">Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany</a> to seek redress for Holocaust victims and their families. The Claims Conference has gone on to distribute over $80 billion dollars in reparations.</p>
<p>In the 1980s and 1990s, governments themselves began implementing reparations programs. Such Latin American countries as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/ipp0000041">Argentina</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/0199291926.001.0001">Chile</a> offered reparations to victims of the right-wing military dictatorships that engulfed the region during the Cold War. During this period, hundreds of thousands of people in the region suffered disappearance, torture and death because they were deemed to be political subversives. In the 1990s, Central and Eastern European countries like <a href="https://doi.org/10.5840/symposion20163212">Romania</a> and <a href="https://ruj.uj.edu.pl/xmlui/handle/item/238519">Poland</a> began reparations programs to restore property to those who lost it during the Communist era. </p>
<h2>How do reparations work?</h2>
<p>In the United States, when people hear the term “reparations,” they often think of direct payments of money. But there are many forms that reparations can take. “Compensation” is the direct payment of money. “Restitution” is the return of rights and property. “Rehabilitation” includes things like giving victims mental and physical health care. </p>
<p>There are also “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijaa001">symbolic reparations</a>,” such as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/19962126.2008.11864943">official apologies</a>, <a href="http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.2.1447">public memorials</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137265173_6">holidays or commemorations</a>. </p>
<p>Purely symbolic initiatives may feel empty to victims. Material reparations without public and visible symbolic gestures may feel insufficient. So typically, a successful reparations program includes both. </p>
<p>But so far the Germany-Namibia program, as well as many U.S. efforts, seem to be focusing on material compensation alone. In doing so, they ignore two other important principles of transitional justice: “complementarity,” or the idea that transitional justice works best when multiple tools are used at once, and “consultation.”</p>
<h2>Money is just one part of reparations</h2>
<p>Mass atrocities arise from complex social and political processes that target certain identity groups. So addressing all of their legacies successfully requires many different policy initiatives working hand in hand, or complementarity.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_282.htm">Argentina</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2019.1668360">Peru</a>, for instance, national truth commissions investigated and brought to light the abuses that victims suffered. The commissions then recommended several forms of material and symbolic reparations to respond to those harms, including payments to victims, official acknowledgments and public memorials. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004377196_020">Cambodia</a>, on the other hand, reparations were ordered by the justices in the <a href="https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/node/39457">Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia</a>. This is a special court set up to try members of the Khmer Rouge regime, which controlled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 and was the responsible for the murder of as many at 1.5 million people.</p>
<p>In Germany’s case, the offer of reparations to Namibia is not being complemented by other measures to deal with the past. In fact, the government <a href="https://globalvoices.org/2021/06/10/germany-recognizes-colonial-era-genocide-in-namibia-but-survivors-say-its-not-enough/">refuses to call the payments “reparations” at all</a> and prefers to call it “development aid.” <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/28/germany-agrees-to-pay-namibia-11bn-over-historical-herero-nama-genocide">According to an article in The Guardian</a>, calling the payment “reparations” could open the door for further civil claims against Germany.</p>
<p>When reparations measures aren’t met with initiatives responding to the structural causes of violence, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2997871">they can be perceived as “blood money,</a>” as victims believe accepting the payment means giving up their right to justice. It may also <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/ipp0000041">cause victims to question their own right to redress</a>. But when accompanied by efforts to seek justice and reform the institutions that violated victims’ rights, I argue, reparations can be a starting point for rebuilding trust and community.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A poster for the exhibition 'German Colonialism' with a historic German spiked helmet displayed outside the German Historic Museum in Berlin, Friday, Jan. 6, 2017." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/408016/original/file-20210623-13-1h0y53x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/408016/original/file-20210623-13-1h0y53x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408016/original/file-20210623-13-1h0y53x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408016/original/file-20210623-13-1h0y53x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408016/original/file-20210623-13-1h0y53x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408016/original/file-20210623-13-1h0y53x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408016/original/file-20210623-13-1h0y53x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The German and Namibian governments have yet to include many Herero and Nama leaders in the reparations process for Germany’s genocide of the two tribes’ ancestors in the early 20th century.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/GermanyNamibia/e2bc33945ee94c238c7001ea8601eca8">Markus Schreiber/AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Putting survivors at the center</h2>
<p>If a reparations package is determined by political elites behind closed doors, it may fail to restore the trust that has been decimated by past wrongs. So, as argued by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/NationalConsultationsTJ_EN.pdf">consultation with the communities that have suffered the most harm</a> must be at the center of determining what reparations look like.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/0199291926.001.0001">In Chile</a>, tens of thousands of victims were tortured during the 1973-1990 military dictatorship for being “political subversives.” Additionally, thousands were disappeared. When victims and their families sought reparations after the dictatorship ended, the government began a thorough consultation process that led to creative solutions. </p>
<p>Based on these consultations, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/NationalConsultationsTJ_EN.pdf">reparations were paid in the form of monthly pensions</a> instead of lump sums. Additionally, reparations included <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/docs/110331ictj.pdf">funding for the higher education of the children of victims</a>. These solutions may not have been discovered without consulting with victims.</p>
<p>The German package, by contrast, has been primarily negotiated with the Namibian government, which contains few <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/germany-colonial-era-genocide-reparations-offer-not-enough-namibia-vice-2021-06-04/">members of the Herero and Nama ethnic groups</a>. Herero and Nama leaders have responded by calling the German proposal a “<a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-officially-recognizes-colonial-era-namibia-genocide/a-57671070">PR stunt</a>.” </p>
<p>In the U.S., Georgetown and the Jesuit priests who run it have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/15/us/jesuits-georgetown-reparations-slavery.html">pledged $100 million</a> as reparations to the descendants of the enslaved people sold to finance the university. But some descendants have criticized Georgetown’s consultation process. One descendant told the news outlet Quartz that <a href="https://qz.com/2010943/georgetown-and-the-jesuits-slavery-reparations-plan-falls-short/">only around 50 of the thousands of descendants</a> were actually involved in the consultation process.</p>
<p>The modern history of reparations is only a few decades old, but it already demonstrates that reparations are always about more than the money. If the process includes compensation, but ignores complementarity and consultation, the effort may fail to truly answer for the past.</p>
<p>But when all three principles are central, reparations can mean far more than money in someone’s pocket. They can contribute to repairing the social fabric that has been torn apart by mass violence. </p>
<p>[<em>Insight, in your inbox each day.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=insight">You can get it with The Conversation’s email newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162807/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kerry Whigham is affiliated with the Auschwitz Institute for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities. </span></em></p>From Germany to Georgetown, the Global North has a lot to learn about reckoning successfully with past human rights wrongs.Kerry Whigham, Assistant Professor of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention, Binghamton University, State University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1608722021-05-19T10:09:23Z2021-05-19T10:09:23ZGenocide in Ethiopia? Why answering the question will be a challenge<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400493/original/file-20210513-12-52iho4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters chant "Stop the genocide in Tigray!" during a demonstration against Ethiopia's war against Tigray regional forces on May 07, 2021 in Berlin, Germany. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Sean Gallup/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The head of Ethiopia’s Orthodox Church, Abune Mathias, recently condemned the ongoing armed conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region and the suffering it’s causing the civilian population. In a video message he was seen <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/ethiopian-orthodox-church-head-says-genocide-is-taking-place-tigray-2021-05-09/">saying</a> “genocide is being committed now”.</p>
<p>Abune Mathias may be the highest-profile figure to label the alleged criminal acts against Tigrayans as genocide, but he’s not the first. In January, the leader of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and former president of Tigray – Debretsion Gebremichael – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55877939">accused</a> the Ethiopian and Eritrean forces of waging a “devastating and genocidal war” in Tigray. Tigrayans around the world have echoed the same message on <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23TigrayGenocide&src=hashtag_click">social media</a> and at <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QBZ5w3gcWLY">protest rallies</a>. </p>
<p>In addition to this, there have been <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/05/12/africa/tigray-axum-aid-blockade-cmd-intl/index.html">numerous</a> reports by media agencies and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/05/ethiopia-eritrean-forces-massacre-tigray-civilians">rights groups</a> that corroborate the targeting of civilians.</p>
<p>But what exactly constitutes a genocide?</p>
<p>According to the United Nations, genocide <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">is when</a> certain acts are committed with the intention of destroying, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. These acts are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Killing members of the group;</p></li>
<li><p>Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;</p></li>
<li><p>Deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about a group’s physical destruction in whole or in part;</p></li>
<li><p>Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;</p></li>
<li><p>Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The major difference between other grave international crimes – such as crimes against humanity and war crimes – and genocide is that genocidaires have <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-review-of-the-red-cross/article/what-does-intent-to-destroy-in-genocide-mean/636C654F125D59B1CCE36994485A20D7">two intentions</a>: the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-review-of-the-red-cross/article/what-does-intent-to-destroy-in-genocide-mean/636C654F125D59B1CCE36994485A20D7">intent to</a> commit crimes against a group and the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.</p>
<p>I’m an international law expert and have extensively studied cases of past <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1156697">genocide in Ethiopia</a>. Establishing whether a genocide is happening in the country requires an independent and objective investigation. This should, preferably, be carried out by a United Nations (UN) <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/COIs.aspx">mandated</a> commission of inquiry. Such investigations form the basis of whether the case should be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the UN Security Council. </p>
<p>In Ethiopia, this investigation needs to cover <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/ethiopia-investigation-reveals-evidence-that-scores-of-civilians-were-killed-in-massacre-in-tigray-state/">all major incidents</a> against the country’s Tigrayan population since the start of the conflict. </p>
<p>The challenge is that various actors are involved in the war in Tigray. These include Ethiopia’s national army, the Amhara region’s militia and para-military forces and Eritrea. Not all have the same objective. Any credible investigation needs to separately examine the role played by each to determine whether they harboured a genocidal intent. </p>
<p>No government will announce its genocidal intentions to the world and only a credible investigation can get to the bottom of the allegations.</p>
<h2>Genocide trials</h2>
<p>Raphael Lemkin, a Polish lawyer, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3137437">coined</a> the word “genocide”
<a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">in 1944</a> partly in response to the systematic murder of Jewish people by the Nazis. It was <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">also a response</a> to previous actions that targeted groups, such as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Armenian-Genocide">Armenians in Turkey</a> and the Herero by the Germans in <a href="https://combatgenocide.org/?page_id=153">Namibia</a>. </p>
<p>Genocide was codified into international law in 1948 via the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide-convention.shtml">UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide</a>. This treaty is ratified by <a href="https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4">152 countries</a>. In Ethiopia, the <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/et/et011en.pdf">Ethiopian Criminal Code</a> criminalises genocide, though it goes beyond the Genocide Convention by adding political groups to the protected groups.</p>
<p>Prior to the establishment of the ICC, the international community relied on ad hoc tribunals, such as the <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/nuremberg-trials">Nuremberg</a> and <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nuremberg">Tokyo Tribunals</a>, and more recently the UN tribunals for former <a href="https://www.icty.org/">Yugoslavia</a> and <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/">Rwanda</a>. Only 123 countries are party to the ICC, and Ethiopia is not one of <a href="https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=_en">those</a>. </p>
<p>Typically, even for members of the ICC, local courts have the primary responsibility to prosecute genocide. But whether local courts are willing and able to do the task is a different matter.</p>
<p>Ethiopia has a history of prosecuting genocide crimes. In 2007, after a 12-year trial, Ethiopia’s former leader Mengistu Haile Mariam was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-mengistu-genocide-idUSL1286585920061212">found guilty of genocide in absentia</a>. The investigation and prosecution was carried out by Ethiopia’s office for the special prosecutor. Regular courts handled the trials. Senior members of Mengistu’s military regime were convicted <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article-abstract/5/2/513/869782?redirectedFrom=PDF">for carrying out</a> the criminal acts with a view to destroying political opponents. </p>
<p>But prosecuting an overthrown regime is not the same thing as prosecuting an incumbent.</p>
<h2>Crimes in Tigray</h2>
<p>At the national level, Ethiopia’s Federal Attorney-General is responsible for investigating <a href="https://www.lawethiopia.com/images/federal_proclamation/proclamations_by_number/943.pdf">atrocities</a>. And this office has already begun to look into allegations of crimes committed in Tigray. </p>
<p>One of these was conducted in the historic town of Axum. There are <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/05/ethiopia-eritrean-forces-massacre-tigray-civilians">reports that</a>, in November 2020, Ethiopian and Eritrean forces indiscriminately attacked the town, killing and wounding civilians. This continued after they had control of the town. There are allegations that several hundred residents were executed by Eritrean forces. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s attorney general’s office <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/12/ethiopias-axum-findings-ignore-massacre-civilians">released its findings</a>. It <a href="http://www.ethiopianembassy.net/ethiopian-news/press-release-concerning-criminal-investigation-on-crimes-committed-in-axum-city-attorney-general/">stated</a> that most of those killed were fighters who died in clashes with Eritrean troops, and not civilians.</p>
<p>I believe it’s unlikely that this was an independent or comprehensive investigation. It probably won’t lead to the prosecution of suspects implicated in the crimes.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, it’s unlikely that the Ethiopian authorities can conduct credible investigation into events in Tigray. Only a UN mandated commission of inquiry can make a finding of whether the matter should be referred to the ICC for further investigation and prosecution of suspects. </p>
<p>Because Ethiopia isn’t party to the ICC, the case would need to be <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf">referred</a> by the United Nations Security Council. But China and Russia are two permanent members of the Security Council that <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/15/un-security-council-needs-act-ethiopias-tigray-region">typically oppose</a> external investigations into what they regard as “internal affairs”. </p>
<p>Another option is that, as a non-ICC member, Ethiopia could refer itself. But, as Lemkin <a href="http://pscourses.ucsd.edu/poli120n/Lemkin1946.pdf">once stated</a>, genocide by its very nature “is committed by the state or by powerful groups with the backing of the state. A state would never prosecute a crime instigated or backed by itself.” </p>
<p>I believe it’s unlikely that the Ethiopian government would refer itself or carry out a credible investigation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160872/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Firew Tiba does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Establishing whether a genocide is happening in Ethiopia requires an independent and objective investigation – which probably won’t happen.Firew Tiba, Senior Lecturer, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.