tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/defence-policy-14662/articlesDefence policy – The Conversation2023-08-28T20:04:03Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2123602023-08-28T20:04:03Z2023-08-28T20:04:03ZTalk of a new Cold War is overheated – but NZ faces complex challenges in the era of ‘strategic competition’<p>As the general election nears, the campaign focus so far has been almost exclusively on domestic issues. And yet, over the past two months, no fewer than <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/roadmap-for-future-of-defence-and-national-security-released">five government documents</a> have been released outlining the significant defence and security challenges the country now faces.</p>
<p>If there is one theme that unites these reports, it is captured in the <a href="https://www.defence.govt.nz/publications/publication/defence-policy-review-defence-policy-and-strategy-statement-2023">Defence Policy and Strategy Statement</a>’s observation that “New Zealand is facing a more challenging strategic environment than it has in decades”.</p>
<p>That assessment matches other national security reports, defence reviews and Indo-Pacific strategies released in the past 12 months by Australia, Germany, Japan, Britain and South Korea. </p>
<p>All support the essential pillars of the post-1945 international system – including the US alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, the United Nations system, and the basic international capitalist economic framework – that have underpinned stability and prosperity.</p>
<p>That stability is now under sustained challenge from a combination of forces: US-China rivalry, Russian expansionism, nationalism, ethnic conflict, populist domestic politics, as well as climate change and possible future pandemics.</p>
<p>The situation is complicated by the deep economic relationships shared by those powers challenging aspects of the existing international order and those seeking to defend it: Russia is Germany’s key energy supplier and its fourth-largest non-European Union trade partner; China is the top trade partner of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea (and Germany’s second-largest).</p>
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<h2>No new Cold War</h2>
<p>As this complex picture has evolved, there has been careless talk of a “new Cold War” – but it’s a flawed comparison. </p>
<p>Unlike the Soviet Union, which dominated Eastern Europe after the second world war, Russia cannot even secure victory against a state on its periphery. Moscow’s Ukraine war is a strategic defeat that confirms its decline as a major power – not least by reinvigorating NATO. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/nzs-first-national-security-strategy-signals-a-turning-point-and-the-end-of-old-certainties-210885">NZ’s first national security strategy signals a 'turning point' and the end of old certainties</a>
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<p>At the same time, the US relationship with China is fundamentally different from its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union. Six years after the then US president, Donald Trump, declared a “trade war” with China, interdependence has actually increased.</p>
<p>The US and China are now each other’s top trading partner. In contrast, the Soviet Union and the US had significantly lower levels of trade. </p>
<p>During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the US had formidable global alliance systems. In 2023, the US has expanded its alliances into Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific, while China has only one formal ally, North Korea. </p>
<h2>The rise of ‘strategic competition’</h2>
<p>That said, the stakes of current US-China “strategic competition” are difficult to overstate. It will shape the character and rules of the international system for the 21st century and beyond.</p>
<p>China is a formidable competitor seeking to balance US power, not least in the Indo-Pacific, the powerhouse of the world economy. As the 2022 US <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf">National Security Strategy</a> states:</p>
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<p>[…] the post-Cold War era is definitely over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next [… The US] will partner with any nation that shares our basic belief that the rules-based order must remain the foundation for global peace and prosperity. </p>
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<p>Essentially, the US view is that alliances and partnerships will determine the course of world politics, even more than during the Cold War. </p>
<p>Membership of this sphere will yield privileges, while non-membership risks economic and military costs (something New Zealand will need to consider in its decision on joining pillar two of the AUKUS security pact). </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-defence-dilemma-facing-nzs-next-government-stay-independent-or-join-pillar-2-of-aukus-212090">The defence dilemma facing NZ's next government: stay independent or join 'pillar 2' of AUKUS?</a>
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<h2>Washington needs allies</h2>
<p>There are two important implications for New Zealand and its key partners (including Australia, most of the ASEAN nations, the EU, UK, Japan and South Korea).</p>
<p>The first involves the objective decline in US power since the 2008 global financial crisis and the rise of its allies and partners. </p>
<p>The stability and fortunes of the international order that Washington has constructed will increasingly hinge on the willingness of those allies and partners to defend key principles that underpin the system. </p>
<p>These include the defence of state sovereignty through cooperative relationships with international institutions, and the free flow of trade and investment. </p>
<p>It is notable, too, that New Zealand’s recent defence and security statements – like those from Australia, Britain, South Korea and Japan – use the US concept of “strategic competition” to characterise the central dynamic of this new era. </p>
<p>China’s national security planners will not have failed to notice this.</p>
<h2>Speaking truth to power</h2>
<p>The second implication involves the role America’s allies and partners expect it to play in the world. These countries are critical in sustaining the existing economic and political order, and expect US restraint in its defence of it.</p>
<p>An enlightened understanding of America’s own national interest is consistent with those expectations. For example, most reasonable observers in the US would now agree with the Helen Clark government’s position of “speaking truth to power” in <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/308164/nz-made-'right-judgement'-over-iraq">not backing</a> the invasion of Iraq in 2003. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-number-8-wire-days-for-nzs-defence-force-are-over-new-priorities-will-demand-bigger-budgets-211182">The 'number 8 wire' days for NZ's defence force are over – new priorities will demand bigger budgets</a>
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<p>And there is strength in numbers. The sooner the US internalises the view that constructive feedback from allies and partners is an asset in the age of strategic competition, the more likely it is that the current international order can last.</p>
<p>The next New Zealand government faces the most challenging set of circumstances and decisions since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/anzus-at-70-together-for-decades-us-australia-new-zealand-now-face-different-challenges-from-china-163546">breakdown of the ANZUS alliance</a> in the mid-1980s. It will have to define more clearly how the country’s independent foreign policy is reinforced by closer cooperation with allies and partners.</p>
<p>And it will no longer be able to use that idea of independence as a reason to avoid long overdue but necessary decisions on the funding of foreign policy and defence. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/anzus-at-70-together-for-decades-us-australia-new-zealand-now-face-different-challenges-from-china-163546">ANZUS at 70: Together for decades, US, Australia, New Zealand now face different challenges from China</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Khoo has received funding from the Asia New Zealand Foundation, the Australian National University, Columbia University, the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, and the University of Otago. </span></em></p>With the rise of China and shifting international power dynamics, New Zealand needs to find its place in a complex system of alliances and partnerships.Nicholas Khoo, Associate Professor of International Politics, University of OtagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1850322022-06-17T02:29:43Z2022-06-17T02:29:43ZMarles shifts tone on China at defence summit – but the early days of government are easiest<p>In its first month in power, foreign policy and national security have played a major part of the new government’s activities. </p>
<p>Very soon after the election, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese attended the Quadrilateral Security Initiative (Quad) leaders’ meeting in Tokyo. Foreign Minister Penny Wong has made trips to the South Pacific and Indonesia. And this month, Defence Minister Richard Marles met ministers and other key figures in Singapore and Japan.</p>
<p>Marles’ historic trip sheds some light on the new government’s approach to national security matters.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-great-albanese-is-in-indonesia-but-australia-needs-to-do-a-lot-more-to-reset-relations-here-are-5-ways-to-start-184446">It's great Albanese is in Indonesia, but Australia needs to do a lot more to reset relations. Here are 5 ways to start</a>
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<h2>Signalling a new approach</h2>
<p>Marles was in Singapore to join the first in-person Shangri-La Dialogue to be held since 2019.</p>
<p>This meeting, also known as the <a href="https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2022">Asia Security Summit</a>, has been run annually since 2002 by the think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies. It brings together defence ministers, chiefs of defence forces and related security policy makers from across Asia and beyond.</p>
<p>Marles’ plenary <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/rmarles/speeches/address-iiss-19th-shangri-la-dialogue-singapore">speech</a> at this meeting was one of the most interesting made by an Australian leader in some years.</p>
<p>It underscored the continuity in Australian policy: the importance of the UN and international law, the focus on the alliance and the commitment to defence expenditure increases made by the previous government. </p>
<p>But it also showed where key changes would be made, including a much greater focus on climate change, a change in attitude and approach to the South Pacific and a subtle but significant shift in tone toward China. </p>
<p>Marles’ predecessor had tended to paint China’s regional activity in <a href="https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/defence-and-foreign-affairs/prepare-for-war-peter-dutton-issues-ominous-warning-as-he-says-china-is-on-a-very-deliberate-course-at-the-moment/news-story/6807bf2105118d8a31da4a663292ee38">semi-apocalyptic terms</a>. </p>
<p>By contrast, the new defence minister emphasised recognising the reality of China’s rise but framed it in terms of responsibilities that come with it. He also stressed the need for China to accept and respect the restraints the great powers must exercise.</p>
<p>It was a thoughtful and measured approach that is a good sign of the direction of Australia’s regional policy.</p>
<h2>Getting back on track with France, sideline meetings with allies</h2>
<p>The deputy prime minister also had an extensive set of meetings on the sidelines of the dialogue.</p>
<p>This included 15 bilateral meetings with the defence ministers of Singapore, Solomon Islands, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Fiji, Indonesia, Canada, the US, Timor Leste, Philippines and Sri Lanka. </p>
<p>He also met with the French defence minister, himself newly appointed, making the point on <a href="https://twitter.com/RichardMarlesMP/status/1535747742441828352">social media</a> that Franco-Australian defence cooperation was “back on track”. </p>
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<p>While in Singapore, Marles took part in the latest meeting of the Trilateral Security Partnership, an initiative of Japan, the US and Australia to advance shared security goals.</p>
<p>This produced a wordy <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/rmarles/statements/united-states-japan-australia-trilateral-defense-ministers-meeting-2022">joint statement</a> of intent to strengthen their collaborative initiatives in Asia.</p>
<h2>An historic meeting with China’s defence minister</h2>
<p>But the meeting garnering the most attention was with China’s defence minister, Wei Fenghe.</p>
<p>This was notable less for its content, which by all accounts followed relatively routine patterns, but for the fact it happened at all. </p>
<p>There have been no meetings between Australian and senior Chinese government figures for some years. The Australian ambassador in China has had virtually no access and the broader diplomatic relationship has been essentially non-functional. </p>
<p>It was a brief meeting and involved no major breakthroughs. But the fact it happened at all indicates Australia should be able to navigate back to a working relationship with Beijing without having to make concessions.</p>
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<h2>Shoring up the Japan-Australia relationship</h2>
<p>Marles then travelled to Tokyo for meetings with counterparts in Japan. </p>
<p>Australia and Japan are one another’s most important security partners after the US, and each sees the other as a crucial component in their regional security strategy. </p>
<p>Despite considerable goodwill, this part of the trip did not yield any significant further developments in the two countries security cooperation – as was made clear by the somewhat sparse joint <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/rmarles/statements/joint-statement-advancing-defence-cooperation-tokyo-japan">statement</a> it produced. </p>
<p>This may well be a function of the fact the two are already doing a lot together. Their practical capacity to do a great deal more, particularly of any strategic significance, is relatively constrained by resource limitations.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C35%2C3956%2C2322&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C35%2C3956%2C2322&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Marles travelled to Tokyo for meetings with counterparts in Japan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kyodo via AP Images</span></span>
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<h2>The early days are the easiest</h2>
<p>The new Labor government has had a good first month or so on the foreign policy front.</p>
<p>It has been are active, engaged and well received by regional powers. It has struck a prudent balance between the changes it seeks and the importance of continuity. </p>
<p>Marles has played his part successfully, particularly in communicating the need to have a productive relationship with China while not giving ground on core issues. </p>
<p>But the early days are the easiest ones and the true test of the new government’s foreign policy has yet to come.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-wong-makes-her-mark-in-the-pacific-the-albanese-government-should-look-to-history-on-mending-ties-with-china-184144">As Wong makes her mark in the Pacific, the Albanese government should look to history on mending ties with China</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the think tank that runs the Shangri-La Dialogue.</span></em></p>Defence minister Richard Marles’ historic trip sheds some light on the new government’s approach to national security matters.Nick Bisley, Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences and Professor of International Relations at La Trobe University, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1771782022-02-16T21:38:33Z2022-02-16T21:38:33ZInvading Ukraine may never have been Putin’s aim – the threat alone could advance Russia’s goals<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446787/original/file-20220216-16-1kac8mx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=27%2C18%2C6035%2C4008&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">What he wants. What he really, really wants?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-speaks-during-a-joint-news-photo/1238505332?adppopup=true">Mikhail Klimentyev/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>An invasion is not the only way the crisis in Ukraine can play out.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/02/14/diplomatic-solution-putin-biden-ukraine/">diplomatic solution</a> may yet provide an off-ramp for Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose placement of <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-chief-russia-continuing-military-buildup-at-ukraine-border/">tens of thousands of troops</a> along Russia’s border with its smaller neighbor kicked off the current crisis.</p>
<p>Indeed, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/01/world/europe/putin-russia-ukraine.html">leaders of Russia</a> <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/13/1080464148/ukraine-leader-says-u-s-panic-is-playing-into-russias-strategy">and Ukraine</a> have throughout the weeks-long crisis accused the U.S. and U.K. of stirring panic with talk of an imminent invasion.</p>
<p>Invasion may <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/2/9/no-russia-will-not-invade-ukraine">never have been the point</a>. One interpretation is that President Putin mobilized his soldiers and sailors primarily to force a dialogue with the West over what the spheres of influence and interest in Eastern Europe should be.</p>
<p>As a scholar who has <a href="https://lsa.umich.edu/history/people/faculty/rgsuny.html">spent his entire career</a> studying Russian history, I see the current crisis in a broader context. If you zoom out from the events of the past few weeks, it is possible to see this dangerous standoff as part of the continuing fallout from the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Some 30 years on, the architecture of what is supposed to be the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/03/opinion/after-the-cold-war-we-need-to-build-a-new-world-order.html">new world order</a>” is still being built.</p>
<p>Russia is a <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/us-intel-russia-declining-disruptive-power-/31194504.html">regional power in decline</a> and feels insecure. If countries were able to experience emotions, Russia’s dominant feeling would be, I believe, humiliation. It feels it is a victim of Western expansion and wants a restoration of its lost influence.</p>
<p>This weakened but still ambitious regional power faces a global one, the United States, that is similarly fearful of losing its sway around the world in the face of a <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/does-the-great-retreat-from-afghanistan-mark-the-end-of-the-american-era">recent military retreat from Afghanistan</a> and the economic threat of China. That standoff – between two hegemons, one regional, the other global – leaves Ukraine as the pawn in the middle.</p>
<h2>Preserving ‘strategic depth’</h2>
<p>What is going on in Ukraine fits with a military concept called “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4284512">strategic depth</a>.” This refers to the territory between a country and what it perceives to be hostile enemies.</p>
<p>During <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cold-war-history">the Cold War</a>, the Soviet Union had extensive strategic depth. The <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/warsaw-treaty">Warsaw Pact</a> provided an alliance of pro-Soviet states in Eastern Europe that constituted a barrier between the Soviets and the West.</p>
<p>But from 1991, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-the-history-behind-russias-claim-that-nato-promised-not-to-expand-to-the-east-177085">NATO expanded eastward</a> until it enveloped most of those formerly Warsaw Pact countries. Poland, Romania and Bulgaria <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm">all became NATO members</a>, as did the three former Soviet Baltic republics of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/baltics-talks-increase-nato-troops-their-soil-estonian-pm-2022-01-12/#:%7E:text=Estonia%2C%20Latvia%20and%20Lithuania%2C%20once,long%20sought%20more%20NATO%20involvement.">Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia</a>.</p>
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<p>And then came the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm">Bucharest conference</a> in April 2008. The NATO heads of states at that meeting “welcomed” the aspirations displayed by Ukraine and Georgia and said it would hold the door open to future membership for both countries, though it pointedly did not invite Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance.</p>
<p>When, a few months after that conference, Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-ossetia/russia-georgia-seek-control-of-south-ossetia-capital-idUSL768040420080808">attempted to take back</a> the rebellious pro-Russian region South Ossetia, Russia sent in its troops – a clear signal that no further expansion of NATO into the former Soviet Union would be tolerated. Discussion subsided for the next 13 years.</p>
<p>Russia’s strategic depth had by that time already shrunk considerably since the early 1990s. Putin now seems to fear it will be further eroded.</p>
<p>Indeed, U.S. rockets have been <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/08/31/poland-readies-for-short-range-air-defense-deal-as-trade-show-approaches/">placed in Poland</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-shield/u-s-activates-romanian-missile-defense-site-angering-russia-idUSKCN0Y30JX">and Romania</a>. NATO member Turkey has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-03/ukraine-buys-more-armed-drones-from-turkey-than-disclosed-and-angers-russia">sold its powerful Bayraktar drones</a> – which pounded Armenia into defeat during a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/11/18/the-nagorno-karabakh-settlement-and-turkish-russian-relations">short war in restive Nagorno-Karabakh</a> in 2020 – to Ukraine. Meanwhile, the United States carries out <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-russia-suwalki-gap/nato-war-game-defends-baltic-weak-spot-for-first-time-idUSKBN1990L2">war games in the Baltic States</a>, and its troops are now <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-troops-head-to-eastern-europe-4-essential-reads-on-the-ukraine-crisis-175412">heading to Eastern Europe</a>.</p>
<p>In the same way that the U.S. reacts to any signs of Russian or Chinese military <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/world/americas/russia-putin-latin-america-bolsonaro.html">presence in Latin America</a>, so too is Moscow keen to keep its strategic depth. Putin does not want a neighboring state falling under the military influence of what he sees as unfriendly nations. He wants a buffer.</p>
<h2>Avoiding rash moves</h2>
<p>Putin tends to be cautious and realistic in foreign policy. He is not as erratic as sometimes portrayed in the West. He knows that he isn’t playing a strong hand.</p>
<p>Russia’s defense budget, as he is well aware, is <a href="https://sipri.org/media/press-release/2021/world-military-spending-rises-almost-2-trillion-2020">roughly 8% that of the U.S.’s alone</a>, never mind NATO as a whole, which spends almost 20 times what Russia spends on defense.</p>
<p>Economically, Russia is a declining power. Its <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=RU">GDP</a> is about half of that of the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/248023/us-gross-domestic-product-gdp-by-state/">state of California</a>. A petrostate dependent on exports of gas and oil, Russia is <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-impact-of-western-sanctions-on-russia/">suffering from the sanctions</a> the West imposed after Russia’s precipitous seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014.</p>
<p>Russians also know what it means to bogged down in a ground war as they <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/08/the-soviet-war-in-afghanistan-1979-1989/100786/">were in Afghanistan</a> for 10 years and as they are currently in the Donbass, in the eastern Ukraine. A full invasion would be a catastrophe for Russia.</p>
<p>The view of some in the West that <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/16/romney-russia-ukraine-nato-527207">Putin wants to rebuild</a> <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/19/russia-needs-to-stop-clinging-to-idea-of-reviving-soviet-union-ukraine.html">the Soviet Union</a> is, I believe, a fantasy that a realist like Putin has himself rejected. Yes, in 2005 Putin commented that the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7632057">collapse of the Soviet Union</a> was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century” and “a genuine tragedy” – a sentiment he <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/03/24/75-of-russians-say-soviet-era-was-greatest-time-in-countrys-history-poll-a69735">shares with a majority</a> of Russians. But pundits in the West are less eager to reference Putin’s <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Ox99AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA225&lpg=PA225&dq=He+who+does+not+regret+the+break-up+of+the+Soviet+Union+has+no+heart;+he+who+wants+to+revive+it+in+its+previous+form+has+no+head&source=bl&ots=6M_mZewx8a&sig=ACfU3U2fa33xb33ENHHb-ecdn0asTkMWXA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwir7pmigIX2AhWHdt8KHfcKAKIQ6AF6BAgxEAM#v=onepage&q=He%20who%20does%20not%20regret%20the%20break-up%20of%20the%20Soviet%20Union%20has%20no%20heart%3B%20he%20who%20wants%20to%20revive%20it%20in%20its%20previous%20form%20has%20no%20head&f=false">other pronouncement</a> that “He who does not regret the break-up of the Soviet Union has no heart; he who wants to revive it in its previous form has no head.”</p>
<p>Governments have been proved wrong recently when it comes to Putin’s desire to station troops in neighboring countries. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/blinken-warns-kazakhstan-that-russians-may-stay-01641581408">warned Kazakhstan</a> that inviting Russian troops in to quell unrest would lead to a lasting presence only to see those troops march back to Russia days later.</p>
<p>On the other hand, when it comes to Ukraine, the Russian president has in the past made rash moves. If he had hoped for a pro-Russian or neutral Ukraine, his precipitous seizure of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbass <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/22/ukraine-looking-forward-five-years-after-the-maidan-revolution/">after the Maidan revolution of 2014</a> produced a more anti-Russian, nationalist Ukraine and inclined Ukrainians to throw their lot in with NATO and the West.</p>
<h2>A road map out of crisis?</h2>
<p>Russia and Ukraine, working with European partners, tried to lay out a new structure for Russian-Ukrainian relations during the 2015 <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/minsk-conundrum-western-policy-and-russias-war-eastern-ukraine-0/minsk-2-agreement">discussions over the Minsk II protocols</a>, which were agreed to by Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany but never fully implemented. The breakaway Ukrainian regions bordering Russia were to be autonomous under a federal relationship with Kyiv. To Moscow, at least, Minsk II would have also provided assurances that Ukraine remain out of NATO. In June 2021 U.S. President Joe Biden and Putin “agreed to pursue diplomacy related to the Minsk agreement.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A tank sits by the side of an open road with a flag visible." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446847/original/file-20220216-22668-etzaa4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446847/original/file-20220216-22668-etzaa4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446847/original/file-20220216-22668-etzaa4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446847/original/file-20220216-22668-etzaa4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446847/original/file-20220216-22668-etzaa4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446847/original/file-20220216-22668-etzaa4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446847/original/file-20220216-22668-etzaa4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukraine’s Donbass region.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-of-a-tank-being-exhibited-as-diplomatic-efforts-to-news-photo/1238520260?adppopup=true">Ali Atmaca/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the protocol never came into effect – Ukraine and Russia never agreed on what was being agreed to.</p>
<p>The current threat of invasion could be Putin’s attempt to refocus minds around such an agreement and force parties back to a dialogue. Indeed, French President Emmanuel Macron <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/9/what-is-the-minsk-agreement-and-why-is-it-relevant-now">recently described Minsk II</a> as the “only path on which peace can be built.”</p>
<p>But if forcing a return to Minsk II, or something similar, was Putin’s intention, doing so by threatening invasion is a risky game. With nationalist feelings growing in Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky might not be able to agree to Minsk II and remain in power. Similarly, in the U.S. any concessions to Russia by Biden is already <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/sen-joni-ernst-calls-strong-response-russia/story?id=82415824">being characterized as appeasement</a>. In both states foreign policy is hostage to domestic politics.</p>
<p>Putin himself is facing hardliners back home. The Russian parliament has already given permission to recognize the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-parliament-asks-putin-recognise-breakaway-east-ukrainian-regions-2022-02-15">independence of Ukraine’s separatist regions</a>. And compared with some of the most rabid politicians and pundits jockeying for space on Russian media, Putin comes across as serious, sober and competent.</p>
<p>Mixed in with these domestic political dynamics is the ever-present struggle of two hegemons – one regional, one global – trying to reassert influence at a time of perceived decline. In so doing, they appear, to me at least, to be talking across each other.</p>
<p>[<em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177178/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronald Suny does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of Russian history breaks down what Putin’s aim might be in threatening military invasion, and why that might backfire.Ronald Suny, Professor of History and Political Science, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1296562020-01-20T11:41:14Z2020-01-20T11:41:14ZMilitary spending: Dominic Cummings may have met his match in trying to reform the Ministry of Defence<p>The British prime minister’s top special adviser Dominic Cummings has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/dec/16/dominic-cummings-seeks-to-launch-mod-spending-review">set his eyes</a> on reforming the Ministry of Defence (MoD). In this department, he has chosen a particularly difficult target to hit – and one that has eluded attempts to change it for decades.</p>
<p>Cummings believes he can contain the MoD’s budget by using new management techniques and restricting purchasing abilities. These broad aims are all we know so far, though there is already talk of increasing the emphasis on <a href="https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/5433-uk-mod-announces-4-million-ai-warship-contracts">artificial intelligence</a> and drone technology as opposed to traditional defence equipment. </p>
<p>In general, the focus is likely to be on gaining greater value for money in defence procurement. One way of achieving this would be reducing overspends and delays on equipment. But these attempts will likely fail, just like every other attempt by governments of all colours. It would appear that in order to remain a global player, either the MoD budget must be increased to a level unseen in decades in real terms, or the UK must accept a different role in today’s world. Spending has been increasing but the new prime minister has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ee18fbdc-2343-11ea-92da-f0c92e957a96">announced a “radical” review</a> and warned that costs must be reduced. </p>
<p>Undoubtedly, procurement processes at the MoD need reform. Many projects run over budget and are regularly delayed. Cummings used the example of two aircraft carriers, which together cost £6.2 billion and are unlikely to be put to much use in military operations unless as part of a coalition or on humanitarian operations.</p>
<p>While the ship has literally sailed in the debate over the utility of the aircraft carriers, the wider issue of <a href="https://www.civilserviceworld.com/articles/news/%E2%80%98dom-full-amazing-ideas%E2%80%99-%E2%80%93-mod-will-have-back-cummings-reform-plan-says-defence">defence spending</a> is desperately in need of attention. </p>
<p>Yet military procurement must consider the medium to long-term future as well as the present day. This is one of the major problems for defence procurement. It must seek to discover what the world will be like and what threats we will face in 20 to 30 years’ time. This never stands still and procurement must change with it.</p>
<p>It must be acknowledged that the latest military technology is always <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10430719308404758">very expensive</a>. The process of buying cutting-edge innovations is inevitably fraught with risk for both supplier and customer. It involves new systems, supply chains, even source materials that are of national security. </p>
<p>Despite these challenges, <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/military-spending">defence budgets globally have shrunk</a>. British defence spending in the second half of the 20th century has fallen from around 12% of GDP in the 1960s to around 2% today, thereby meeting the minimum required under NATO rule. Military services have had to find ways to do more with less, which has seen infrastructure repair neglected. The consequence is a massive hidden cost of almost continual running repairs. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, regularly committing to massive projects with costs running into billions of pounds over several years means that estimates of delivery times and final spending totals are likely to be optimistic to say the least. This optimism means money eventually has to be found from other budgets that would be used for the repair of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48795719">the wider crumbling MoD estate</a>.</p>
<h2>Outsourcing risk</h2>
<p>Cummings doesn’t seem to be considering the structural realities of defence procurement. Due to the sheer costs and risks, nations are less keen to carry the burden of the research and development costs, so they are not making their own technologies. The price for failure is seen to be too great a political risk. This burden is passed to private sector firms such as BAE Systems, with little guarantee of orders at the end of it. </p>
<p>To cover their risks, contracts provide protection for cancellation, often making it cheaper in real terms to continue to fund projects through to completion. This represents poor value to the taxpayer.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA116672">multinational co-operation</a> increasingly the norm for military procurement, compromises have to be made. No nation gets exactly what it wants from a <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&ved=2ahUKEwiiooWloPnmAhWSQEEAHbz6BpoQFjAEegQIARAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.publishing.service.gov.uk%2Fgovernment%2Fuploads%2Fsystem%2Fuploads%2Fattachment_data%2Ffile%2F653378%2FNavigating_NATO_Procurement.pdf&usg=AOvVaw32pVnSV8piG4UcR3upVjud">shared military procurement</a> project but for the MoD this is preferable to <a href="https://www.aerosociety.com/news/30-years-of-hurt-is-uk-combat-aircraft-design-coming-home/">expensive bespoke projects</a> that are regularly discarded or quickly obsolete. </p>
<p>The centralised approach to purchasing complex equipment and IT hardware doesn’t appear to satisfy anyone in defence or government. Technological advances occur at an exponential rate and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/magazine/f35-joint-strike-fighter-program.html">quickly outpace the technology level agreed with the supplier</a> at the start of contracts. This often means the MoD will intervene in the manufacturing process to have equipment modified, requiring either partial or complete re-designs. That, in turn, causes additional costs and delays.</p>
<p>Cummings may be able to push for better practices within the MoD itself, but suppliers will still put up fights to have contracts drawn up to their advantage and technological change will continue at a rapid pace. This will continue to outpace the MoD decision-making process. Wholesale reform of British defence procurement is a massive undertaking, no matter the person driving it or the force of their personality. </p>
<p>Difficult political decisions will have to be made either to properly fund defence or to allow the current situation to continue. But it will take a very brave politician or adviser to state that reality. Britain still wants to buy the best. It still wants to punch above its weight in international affairs. Therefore, without proper funding, overspending will continue to be the norm.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129656/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Buying the biggest and best technology is always going to be high risk and expensive.Matthew Powell, Teaching Fellow in Strategic and Air Power Studies, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1267102019-12-02T10:32:21Z2019-12-02T10:32:21ZNATO and the EU: a short history of an uneasy relationship<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304282/original/file-20191128-178114-hsatzr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C10%2C974%2C637&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The EU and NATO: aligned but not always together. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/1490273240?src=bd948cd6-9bf4-4db2-95e8-c4b7f7364598-1-28&size=medium_jpg">Nedelcu Paul Petru/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the face of growing security challenges to Europe, from an antagonistic Russia, to instability in the Middle East, cyberwar and terrorism, there is a growing recognition that enhanced cooperation between the EU and NATO will be key to an effective response.</p>
<p>Calibrating such cooperation to respond to perceived common threats, however, has never been straightforward. The political context, as well as rivalry between the EU and NATO, have often <a href="https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eu-and-nato">hampered the capacity</a> of the institutions to work together. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-leaders-set-ambitious-agenda-for-london-summit/">meeting of NATO leaders</a> in London on December 3-4 offers an occasion to further move that relationship forward. But having tracked <a href="https://www.routledge.com/EU-NATO-Relations-Running-on-the-Fumes-of-Informed-Deconfliction-1st/Smith-Gebhard-Graeger/p/book/9781138318557">EU-NATO relations</a> for over a decade, I wouldn’t count on any major strategic or political breakthroughs. </p>
<p>Ever since NATO was created in 1949, with the dual aim of keeping the peace among the Allies and providing a security alliance against the Soviet Union, there has been a tension between whether or not NATO should drive the security agenda in Europe. </p>
<p>Since 1949, a number of European-wide organisations have tried to coordinate European defence policy – from the failed attempt at a French proposal for an integrated <a href="https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/history-european-defence-community_V001-0010_ev">European Defence Community</a> in 1954, to its alternative, the <a href="http://www.weu.int/">Western European Union</a> (WEU), a military alliance of the UK, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. </p>
<h2>Forging a relationship</h2>
<p>The precursor to the EU, the European Community, didn’t really put security matters on its agenda. So it was in the mid-1990s following the Maastrict Treaty that the newly-formed EU began to develop its own common foreign and security policy and the relationship with NATO began to shift. </p>
<p>NATO had already developed a good working relationship with the WEU, but this really became germane in 1996 with attempts to use the WEU as an <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233708215_Some_Legal_Issues_Concerning_the_EU-NATO_Berlin_Plus_Agreement">institutional bridge between the EU and NATO</a>. </p>
<p>As long as the EU remained an organisation without a defence component to support its common security policy, and NATO an organisation focused strictly on collective defence of its members, the EU had little need to develop military ties with NATO. However, as some EU member states started to consider an autonomous EU defence and security instrument towards the end of the 1990s, this relationship became unavoidable.</p>
<p>After a <a href="https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2008/3/31/f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f/publishable_en.pdf">1998 joint summit</a> between the UK and France at Saint Malo, the formal process began towards creating the EU’s Security and Defence Policy (ESDP – now <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5388/shaping-common-security-and-defence-policy_en">termed CSDP</a>). Attention started to focus on an alternative arrangement to the WEU as the bridge between the two institutions. </p>
<p>Once the EU formally adopted the WEU’s “Petersberg Tasks”, which <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence-policy-_en">set out the conditions</a> under which militaries could be deployed, the relationship between the EU and NATO changed from one of informal meetings to something more institutionalised. Formal committees and structures began to be <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5392/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp-structure-instruments-agencies_en">mapped out by 1999</a>.</p>
<p>However, cultural and institutional differences between the EU and NATO still had to be reduced before any official arrangements could be finalised. NATO <a href="https://www.routledge.com/European-Security-and-Defence-Policy-An-Implementation-Perspective-1st/Merlingen-Ostrauskaite-Solana/p/book/9780415599528">retained a very strict security regime</a> dating back to its Cold War years, while in contrast, the EU was designed as an open and transparent organisation. In order to adapt to a stricter security policy, the EU modelled its security framework on NATO. This was also helped by the fact that most EU states have also been NATO member states – currently 22 are members of both. </p>
<h2>Formal and informal</h2>
<p>By 2000, both the US and France had overcome enough of their initial reservations about the relationship to pursue joint EU-NATO committees, set up to tackle various common security challenges. Formal political exchanges started up between NATO and the EU, such as those between the EU’s Political Security Committee (PSC) and NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC). </p>
<p>The <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5388/shaping-common-security-and-defence-policy_en">Berlin Plus agreement</a> was then negotiated between 1999 to 2002. This became the framework agreement between the two organisations to allow the EU to access NATO assets and capabilities that it did not possess (and in some cases, still do not) for its own operations such as the EU-led military <a href="https://shape.nato.int/page39511625.aspx">Operation ALTHEA</a> in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The <a href="https://shape.nato.int/resources/3/images/2013/althea/berlin%20plus-information%20note.pdf">Berlin Plus arrangements</a> also created an EU-NATO security agreement to allow non-NATO members access to classified NATO documents. </p>
<h2>Turkey and Cyprus</h2>
<p>The American NATO expert David Yost <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/44099/fp_03.pdf">set out</a> the problems at the heart of the EU-NATO relationship in a 2007 book. As he put it: “Difficulties include institutional and national rivalries, the participation problem, and disagreements about the proper scope and purpose of NATO-EU cooperation.”</p>
<p>The “participation problem” is a central impediment to formal EU-NATO relations that stems from the ongoing dispute between Turkey (a NATO-only member) and Cyprus (an EU-only member). This led to <a href="https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/55628">Turkey directly blocking</a> formal EU-NATO cooperation in 2004 beyond that of Operation ALTHEA. Formal meetings between the PSC and NAC were suspended as Turkey objected, and still does, to Cyprus sitting in on such meetings without a NATO security agreement – which Turkey refuses to allow. </p>
<p>Informal meetings do take place but these have been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2017.1352578">described to me</a> by both PSC and NAC ambassadors during my research as “dull”, “highly scripted” and “uninspiring”. As a result, there has been a move towards enhancing cooperation at the inter-organisational level to compensate for deficiencies at the formal political level.</p>
<p>As I <a href="https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/are-the-eu-and-nato-really-committed-to-the-international-order/">have argued elsewhere</a>, the reality today is that the EU and NATO cooperate far more outside of the formal Berlin Plus relationship than they do inside it. There has been a renewed impetus to enhance relations since the signing of a <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/08/eu-nato-joint-declaration/">EU-NATO Joint Declaration in 2016</a> but there are still major obstacles to an effective strategic partnership between the two institutions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126710/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon J Smith received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for research on the Drivers of Military Strategic Reform. </span></em></p>Why the EU and NATO have struggled to cooperate fully.Simon J Smith, Associate Professor of Security and International Relations, Staffordshire UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1124472019-03-07T11:18:44Z2019-03-07T11:18:44ZBrexit is not a retreat into isolationism – survey suggests public remains committed to global security role<p>Britain’s vote to leave the European Union has been taken by some as a signal that the British public want to retreat from having a global role. But a survey of their views on NATO and shared European defence suggests otherwise.</p>
<p>Defence poses both an opportunity and a challenge for Britain in terms of relations with Europe. As one of the few NATO nations that currently meets its commitment to spend more than 2% of its GDP on defence (the others are the US, Greece and Estonia), the UK is well positioned to project strength.</p>
<p>But Brexit has the UK expressing a desire to be less encumbered by Europe at a time when defence integration is high on the agenda in Brussels. Since the Brexit vote, the European Union <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-defence/bad-news-for-our-enemies-eu-launches-defence-pact-idUKKBN1E811Z">approved</a> a pact between 25 EU governments to fund, develop and deploy armed forces together. This is known as the European Union approved Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).</p>
<p>After Brexit, the UK needs to decide how to work with its continental neighbours. They will be divorcees in the Brexit saga, but they are also Britain’s allies in NATO.</p>
<h2>NATO first</h2>
<p>To examine how Britons feel about security and defence in a post-Brexit world, we conducted a survey via YouGov in December 2018 with a series of questions on defence policy. Responses to questions concerning relations with NATO indicate clearly that Brexit is not a retreat into isolationism. Only 4% of our sample agreed with withdrawing from NATO. Moreover, 62% agreed that leaving would “seriously threaten the United Kingdom’s security”.</p>
<p>As far as supporting NATO’s newer members, more than 45% agreed and only 10% disagreed that “UK armed forces should participate in NATO exercises in Eastern Europe” (the remaining respondents were neutral or unsure). Importantly, there is slightly more support for NATO than when we last asked these questions in 2014. </p>
<p>Not surprisingly, Britons are more uncomfortable with the need for deeper European defence integration outside of NATO. Only 15% of the sample agreed that “Europe will not be fully secure until a true European army is formed”. Support increases slightly if adversaries are mentioned: 23% of the sample agrees with the statement: “A European Army is necessary to fully protect Britain against threats posed by China and Russia.”</p>
<p>On the surface, it appears that PESCO is just the type of shift towards an “ever closer union” that a majority of UK voters said they wanted to leave behind in the 2016 referendum. Low support likely reflects the UK’s rejection of the European project. Still, there is only a modest correlation between voting Leave in the referendum and feeling negatively towards PESCO.</p>
<p>The logic here is that while Leave voters are distrustful of European governance and free movement, those with defined foreign policy viewpoints are mainly hawkish. They are willing to see Britain’s military get involved to solve world conflict and they are sceptical of dovish approaches, such as expanding foreign aid to secure peace. Although those falling into the isolationist camp are also overwhelmingly supportive of Brexit, this group is small in comparison to the hawks.</p>
<p>In short, Brexiteers prefer overwhelmingly for the UK to project power via its role in NATO, but the desire to see the continent secure may counterbalance concerns about an “ever closer union” in the realm of foreign affairs. If the mission is right and involvement does not mean permanently tethering the British military to the EU, Eurosceptic public opinion should not pose a barrier to British involvement, nor should it portend a retreat from Britain’s historical internationalist role.</p>
<p>This suggests that the British public won’t oppose involvement in European defence initiatives if the goals suit Britain’s needs. The EU and Britain face common threats from an emboldened Russia, a growing China, and the consequences of failed African and Middle Eastern states. In this environment, a relative UK public consensus that Britain’s military power should be maintained or increased should work in favour of EU-British defence cooperation because foreign policy goals are shared. But if the objectives and aims of the EU and Britain were to diverge post-Brexit, support for cooperation could decline among the Eurosceptic hawks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112447/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Scotto receives funding from the ESRC, which funded the collection of survey data employed in this article. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>The research discussed in this article was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK). Jason Reifler has received research funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK), European Research Council (EU), National Science Foundation (US), the Volkswagen Foundation, and other sources. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy B. Gravelle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>British interests come first, but Leave voters don’t necessarily want to retreat from international obligations.Thomas Scotto, Professor of Government and Public Policy, University of Strathclyde Jason Reifler, Professor of Political Science, University of ExeterTimothy B. Gravelle, Senior Research Fellow, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/922782018-03-29T00:24:57Z2018-03-29T00:24:57ZWhat we’re looking for in Australia’s Space Agency: views from NSW and SA<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212394/original/file-20180328-109182-1lmtme1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">We're all waiting to hear what shape Australia's Space Agency will take. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/business-vision-team-searching-success-concept-744376240?src=JBgN4ioXcVUwu5ymHVoqgw-2-33">from www.shutterstock.com </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s been a long time coming, but Australia is finally going to have a Space Agency. This will enable Australian space industries to benefit from agency-to-agency agreements and collaborations, and facilitate our participation in the growing global space market.</p>
<p>The Federal Government appointed an <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/industry/IndustrySectors/space/Pages/Review-of-Australian-Space-Industry-Capability.aspx">Expert Review Panel</a> to map out how the Agency should operate. As we wait for its report – the final strategy was scheduled to be submitted in March 2018 – two space experts offer their perspectives on what we might expect.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lost-in-space-australia-dwindled-from-space-leader-to-also-ran-in-50-years-83310">Lost in space: Australia dwindled from space leader to also-ran in 50 years</a>
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<h2>What will an Australian Space Agency need in terms of people, resources and infrastructure?</h2>
<h3>Andrew Dempster:</h3>
<p>It seems clear there is a real appetite on both sides of politics for an agency for our times, that embraces the excitement being generated by “Space 2.0” – that is, commercial entities, low-cost access to space and avoiding some of the baggage of the older legacy agencies. </p>
<p>It’s likely the focus will be on growing the Australian space industry, with less emphasis on space exploration, human space flight and space science. However, for the agency to have any impact or credibility, the people, resources and infrastructure must be provided at an adequate level. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://theconversation.com/investing-in-space-what-the-uk-space-agency-can-teach-australia-28559">in the past</a> pointed to the UK agency as a good model – it basically cost “nothing” initially and significant funding followed when it succeeded. Now, I don’t think we can afford to replicate this in Australia. The agency needs to be properly funded from the beginning. Penny-pinching will kill it.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/investing-in-space-what-the-uk-space-agency-can-teach-australia-28559">Investing in space: what the UK Space Agency can teach Australia</a>
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<h3>Alice Gorman:</h3>
<p>We’ve been here before and seen how a lack of resourcing plays out. The 1980s Australian Space Board was managed by a small office within the Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce, but it fizzled out after ten years and we were back to square one. There’s a strong feeling in the Australian space community that a substantial investment in a stand-alone agency is the only way to avoid another death by bureaucracy. </p>
<p>In terms of personnel, we’ll need leadership with credibility and experience in the global space arena, people familiar with how existing space activities across government departments work, and probably there’ll be a role for some kind of advisory or expert panels.</p>
<p>The structure will also be important. <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/">NASA</a>, for example, runs 11 research centres, and the <a href="https://www.esa.int/ESA">European Space Agency</a> has nine centres or facilities, including the Kourou launch site in French Guiana. They support human spaceflight programs as well as deep space exploration. Both organisations use private contractors, and large chunks of the private space sector rely on them as clients. This is not a model that Australia can sustain. </p>
<p>Personally, I think it’s critical that the new agency also takes Indigenous interests on board. Indigenous people can’t be left out of conversations about the future of Australian space technologies.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-the-silence-of-ediacara-the-shadow-of-uranium-72058">Friday essay: the silence of Ediacara, the shadow of uranium</a>
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<h2>How strongly should the Space Agency be linked with Defence programs?</h2>
<h3>Andrew Dempster:</h3>
<p>Recently the Australian Strategic Policy Institute <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/australias-future-space">argued</a> that we must develop a solid space industry for our own strategic and Defence needs. However, strong industries such as that in the US have a dominant civilian space sector. </p>
<p>So I would argue that to avoid this strategic weakness, it is more important to reinforce the independence of the civilian agency from Defence. It is the job of the agency to ensure this independence. Being overly close to Defence is likely to hamper the current civilian commercial drive so effectively being driven by the start-up community. Having a thriving civilian space sector can only benefit Defence anyway.</p>
<h3>Alice Gorman:</h3>
<p>I agree with Andrew that forging a new civil and commercial space identity is essential.</p>
<p>Because the <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/woomera/about.htm">Woomera</a> rocket launch site, one of our most significant space assets, is located in South Australia, as well as the <a href="https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/">Defence Science and Technology Group</a> – which grew out of the Cold War weapons program – South Australia has traditionally been the focus of Defence-related space activities. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212395/original/file-20180328-109185-mvc1ab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212395/original/file-20180328-109185-mvc1ab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212395/original/file-20180328-109185-mvc1ab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212395/original/file-20180328-109185-mvc1ab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212395/original/file-20180328-109185-mvc1ab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212395/original/file-20180328-109185-mvc1ab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212395/original/file-20180328-109185-mvc1ab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A recent rocket launch from Woomera, South Australia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Defence Image Gallery</span></span>
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<p>At this stage we can be hopeful that a properly funded space agency will allow equal participation across all states. </p>
<h2>Where should Australia’s Space Agency be located?</h2>
<h3>Alice Gorman:</h3>
<p>There’s interest in where the agency will be located because there will be jobs associated with it. I’ve had so many enquiries from acquaintances – and strangers – asking about this. </p>
<p>People probably are thinking it will be something like NASA, with a whole industrial complex. We’re not anything like that scale. Having said that, a Canberra-based headquarters supported by state-based centres makes a lot of sense.</p>
<h3>Andrew Dempster:</h3>
<p>I’ve <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/andrew-dempster-254/articles">written a lot</a> about Australia’s space agency, and recently I outlined an example of why a federal approach is essential: using <a href="https://theconversation.com/preventing-murray-darling-water-theft-a-space-agency-can-help-australia-manage-federal-resources-83727">space assets to monitor the Murray Darling Basin</a> to avoid water theft. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/preventing-murray-darling-water-theft-a-space-agency-can-help-australia-manage-federal-resources-83727">Preventing Murray-Darling water theft: a space agency can help Australia manage federal resources</a>
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<p>In terms of location, I agree there will need to be an administrative presence in Canberra, to interact with the Federal Government. Other satellite sites should reflect where the action is. </p>
<p>If there are to be satellite offices, they need to be close to where the industry is currently active, and where it is developing. This may require some sort of representation in each state. </p>
<p>Senator Kim Carr’s recent <a href="http://www.senatorkimcarr.com/labor_to_create_space_industry_jobs">announcement</a> of Labor’s policy of several hubs and centres lends itself very well to distributed activity around the country. Bipartisanship on that issue would be very helpful.</p>
<h2>Which Australian states have relevant space capabilities right now?</h2>
<h3>Alice Gorman:</h3>
<p>I live in South Australia, so am naturally well acquainted with this state’s space achievements! A number of exciting new start-ups such as <a href="https://www.fleet.space/">Fleet</a>, <a href="http://neumannspace.com/">Neumann Space</a> and <a href="http://myriota.com/">Myriota</a> are based in Adelaide. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.sasic.sa.gov.au/">South Australian Space Industry Centre</a> funds space accelerator and incubator programs. Every year, we host the <a href="http://www.unisa.edu.au/spaceprogram">International Space University Southern Hemisphere Space Studies Program</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-sports-car-and-a-glitter-ball-are-now-in-space-what-does-that-say-about-us-as-humans-91156">A sports car and a glitter ball are now in space – what does that say about us as humans?</a>
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<p>The three universities in South Australia have strengths in satellite telecommunications, space law and space heritage. At the international level, South Australia has been developing relationships with the French national space agency (<a href="https://cnes.fr/en">CNES</a>), as well as French aerospace industries. </p>
<h3>Andrew Dempster</h3>
<p>I am from NSW so I have a particular interest in the <a href="https://consult.industry.gov.au/space-activities/review-of-australian-space-industry-capability/consultation/view_respondent?_b_index=120&uuId=173909982">NSW Department of Industry submission</a> to the expert review panel. It suggested “the future Australian Space Agency should be based in NSW” and goes on to list 17 reasons why NSW dominates in space, such as having the largest space workforce, revenue, research effort, number of start-ups, venture capital and law presence. </p>
<p>The only <a href="http://www.acser.unsw.edu.au/">centre</a> funded by the Australian Research Council on space is in NSW, and two of the four satellites built and launched last year involved my university.</p>
<p>However, I don’t believe there is any benefit to highlighting one state over another. I’m with Raytheon Australia, whose <a href="https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/1952-state-rivalry-for-defence-work-reaching-hysterics-raytheon-australia">official position</a> is that state rivalry for Defence work is getting “hysterical” and we should be avoiding that with space work.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/three-new-reports-add-clarity-to-australias-space-sector-a-crowded-and-valuable-high-ground-88004">Three new reports add clarity to Australia's space sector, a 'crowded and valuable high ground'</a>
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<p>Really exciting things are happening in space all over Australia. Australia’s launch company <a href="https://www.gspacetech.com/">Gilmour Space Technologies</a> operates out of Queensland. A lot of space start-ups are being nurtured by <a href="https://www.moonshotspace.co/">Moonshot X</a> in Victoria. Western Australia boasts the <a href="http://fireballsinthesky.com.au/">Desert Fireball Network</a> and the only Australian picosat (small satellite) developer, <a href="http://picosat.systems/">Picosat Systems</a>. The ACT hosts the large testing facility, the <a href="http://rsaa.anu.edu.au/aitc">Advanced Instrumentation and Technology Centre</a>.</p>
<h3>Alice Gorman:</h3>
<p>Back in 1958, the beginning of the Space Age, Australia was one of the founding members of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. We’ve been kind of <a href="https://theconversation.com/lost-in-space-australia-dwindled-from-space-leader-to-also-ran-in-50-years-83310">missing in action</a> ever since. </p>
<p>The new Space Agency will allow us to have a credible voice on issues that may impact Australia – such as revisions to the international space treaties. It’s going to be exciting times ahead!</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92278/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Dempster is director of Seaskip Pty Ltd. He receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Defence Materials Technology Centre. He sits on the Advisory Committee of the Space Industry Association of Australia. He made a personal submission to the Expert Review Panel. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alice Gorman is a Director on the Board of the Space Industry Association of Australia, and a member of the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies. Opinions expressed here are her own.</span></em></p>What will Australia’s space agency look like? Two experts agree it needs deliberate investment from government, and that it should facilitate participation across states and territories.Andrew Dempster, Director, Australian Centre for Space Engineering Research; Professor, School of Electrical Engineering and Telecommunications, UNSW SydneyAlice Gorman, Senior Lecturer in archaeology and space studies, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/930052018-03-15T19:06:41Z2018-03-15T19:06:41ZPartnerships between universities and arms manufacturers raise thorny ethical questions<p>The Australian government is undertaking its biggest defence build-up since the second world war. Research partnerships between Australian universities and defence industries raise major ethical concerns, and may be at odds with the principles of academic freedom.</p>
<p>In its <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/">2016 Defence White Paper</a>, the Australian government committed to an <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/australias-defense-budget-to-jump-81-over-next-decade/">81% increase</a> in the Defence budget over a decade. The paper also outlined plans to recruit 4400 new Australian Defence Force employees. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/defence-white-paper-an-extra-29-9-billion-spending-over-a-decade-55326">Defence white paper: an extra $29.9 billion spending over a decade</a>
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<p>Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull also recently announced a <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/obscure-agency-handed-3-8b-boost-to-fund-australian-arms-exports-20180131-p4yz3o.html">$3.8 billion investment</a> in the arms manufacturing industry. The hope is Australia will become one of the world’s <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-29/aid-groups-lash-coalition-plan-to-become-major-weapons-exporter/9369962">top 10 weapons exporters</a>.</p>
<p>The government has turned to higher education to help fulfil these goals. It needs graduates with the skills to grow and sustain the military and weapons industry, and academic research that contributes to the development of military technologies.</p>
<p>Intensifying ties between universities, the Department of Defence and weapons manufacturers make sense within the government’s wider militarisation efforts. But they may not be ethically justifiable.</p>
<h2>Research partnerships</h2>
<p>Last year, the University of Melbourne announced a <a href="https://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/au/what-we-do/stelarlab-research-development-operations-centre.html">research partnership with Lockheed Martin</a> – the world’s <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/12/11/the-worlds-biggest-arms-companies-infographic/#57deb17a475a">largest weapons manufacturer</a> – through the Defence Science Institute. They established a co-joint research centre adjacent to the University of Melbourne campus. </p>
<p>This is Lockheed Martin’s <a href="http://newsroom.melbourne.edu/lockheedmartin">first research centre</a> outside of the US. The centre will “will provide PhD scholarships and internships, while directly funding research projects and co-authoring applications in the future”. Only a fortnight ago, the University of Melbourne <a href="https://www.baesystems.com/en-aus/article/education-benefits-growing-at-fishermans-bend">signed another similar agreement</a> – this time with UK weapons manufacturer BAE Systems.</p>
<p>Victorian universities are not alone. Adelaide University, Flinders University and University of South Australia are all part of a <a href="https://www.baesystems.com/en-aus/article/bae-systems-welcomes-flinders-university-to-national-innovation-network"> research network funded by BAE Systems</a>. According to a BAE Systems press release, this partnership involves “creation of new defence-focused courses and targeted research and development”.</p>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/news/2014/07/26/new-program-strengthen-defence-research">32 Australian universities</a> participating in the Defence Science Partnerships program, so more research partnerships will likely emerge soon. In addition, last year Australia’s Department of Defence partnered with the US Department of Defence on the <a href="https://www.business.gov.au/assistance/us-australia-international-multidisciplinary-university-research-initiative">Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative</a>. This program provides grant funding to Australian universities willing to produce research on “designated topics” with “potential for significant future defence capability”. </p>
<h2>Ethical issues</h2>
<p>These partnerships raise serious ethical concerns. In the past, Lockheed Martin has faced allegations of corruption for political <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/08/24/after-allegations-that-it-lobbied-with-federal-money-to-block-competition-lockheed-martin-agrees-to-pay-almost-5-million/?utm_term=.f5ab77153c8c">lobbying</a> in the US. In the 1970s, senior officers were found to have coordinated a “program of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1977/05/27/lockheed-paid-38-million-in-bribes-abroad/800c355c-ddc2-4145-b430-0ae24afd6648/?utm_term=.3c09155e4d51">foreign bribery</a>”. The company still sells its weapons to repressive regimes and governments accused of war crimes, such as <a href="https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/corporate/documents/2016-annual-report.pdf">Israel, and Saudi Arabia</a>. </p>
<p>BAE Systems has faced allegations of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/oct/25/kpmg-bae-systems-investigation">bribery</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/apr/01/serious-fraud-office-bae-plea-bargain">fraud</a>. Its <a href="https://investors.baesystems.com/%7E/media/Files/B/Bae-Systems-Investor-Relations-V3/Annual%20Reports/annual-report-2016-28032017.pdf">third largest customer</a> is Saudi Arabia (representing 21% of its sales), and its <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/exposed-british-made-bombs-used-civilian-targets-yemen">airplanes</a> are used in Saudi Arabia’s current bombardment of Yemen. BAE Systems continue to sell to Saudi Arabia despite <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-18/human-rights-groups-demand-saudi-arabia-be-put-on-blacklist/8821528">protest from non-government organisations</a>, and research showing that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/16/third-of-saudi-airstrikes-on-yemen-have-hit-civilian-sites-data-shows">one in three air raids have hit civilian sites</a> in Yemen. </p>
<p>Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems are also major <a href="https://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/nuclear-weapon-producers/#toggle-a-quick-guide-who-produces-which-arsenal">manufacturers of nuclear weapons</a>, which are subject to categorical prohibition in the new <a href="http://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8">UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</a>. A growing number of financial institutions are <a href="https://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/2018-hof/">divesting</a> from companies that develop these weapons. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-must-sign-the-prohibition-on-nuclear-weapons-heres-why-83951">Australia must sign the prohibition on nuclear weapons: here's why</a>
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<p>Research conducted by the <a href="https://projectindefensible.org/">World Peace Foundation</a> and the <a href="https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2011/01">Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</a> show bribery, fraud, sales to repressive regimes and poor environmental practices are endemic to the arms trade. </p>
<p>Universities have downplayed the nature of these companies and the purpose of their research and products. Promotional materials refer to “<a href="http://mag.alumni.unimelb.edu.au/13m-centre-to-boost-innovation/">advanced technology companies</a>” rather than weapons manufacturers. There is no mention of war and surveillance, only “<a href="http://news.flinders.edu.au/blog/2017/02/20/flinders-joins-bae-systems-national-innovation-network/">cutting edge technology</a>”. </p>
<h2>Academic freedom could be at risk</h2>
<p>Another significant ethical concern is military funded research will be <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-universities-under-fire-for-taking-pentagon-contracts-a-935704.html">expected to demonstrate military value</a>.</p>
<p>In the US, universities are highly reliant on Pentagon funding, particularly for STEM disciplines. US academics have debated the ethics of military-funded research in <a href="http://web.mit.edu/fnl/volume/205/jackson.html">many fields</a>, most recently <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.1001289">neuroscience</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/margaret-gardner-freezing-university-funding-is-out-of-step-with-the-views-of-most-australians-92570">Margaret Gardner: freezing university funding is out of step with the views of most Australians</a>
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<p>The likelihood of academic research being directed towards military objectives is heightened if military funding begins to crowd out alternative sources. This is a possibility in Australia, given the defence budget increase and the wealth of overseas weapons manufacturers. </p>
<p>As Australian <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-26/australias-medical-research-funding-by-the-numbers/8215016">research councils struggle</a> and universities face a <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-17/freeze-leaves-10000-uni-places-unfunded-universities-australia/9334370">funding freeze</a>, academics with limited funding options may be driven to seek military funding. This could undermine their control over the direction and use of their research. Academics may be less inclined to speak out against military funding if their department, colleagues, or PhD students rely on it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93005/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tilman Ruff is founding international and Australian chair of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and is a co-president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alex Edney-Browne does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Research partnerships between Australian universities, the Department of Defence and weapons manufacturers may not be ethically justifiable.Alex Edney-Browne, PhD Candidate, International Relations, The University of MelbourneTilman Ruff, Associate Professor, International Education and Learning Unit, Nossal Institute for Global Health, School of Population and Global Health, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/778652017-05-18T05:00:43Z2017-05-18T05:00:43Z$89b shipbuilding plan is a major step forward – but sovereignty remains a problem<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169882/original/file-20170518-24325-7fkw17.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The naval shipbuilding plan is undoubtedly a major step forward for industrial capability in Australia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/David Mariuz</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia’s long-awaited <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/navalshipbuildingplan/">naval shipbuilding plan</a>, released earlier this week, claims it is a national endeavour:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… larger and more complex than the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme and the National Broadband Network.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Irrespective of this particular claim’s validity, the investment of A$89 billion for nine new frigates, 12 submarines and 12 offshore patrol vessels is a substantial commitment to Australia’s security. The plan is a comprehensive approach to establishing a continuous program for building these platforms in Australia. </p>
<p>Apart from the future introduction of these and other vessels into service, one of the plan’s key outcomes is a “sovereign Australian capability to deliver affordable and achievable naval shipbuilding and sustainment”. The development of a sovereign capability is stated as “the government’s clear priority”.</p>
<p>But what is sovereignty in this context? And is it attainable from the naval shipbuilding plan?</p>
<h2>Two clear weaknesses</h2>
<p>The plan has two interconnected weaknesses when it comes to sovereignty.</p>
<p>First, the Australian defence industry environment is dominated by companies whose parentage and ultimate control rest offshore. This is not necessarily a bad thing. But given the shipbuilding plan’s focus on Australian jobs and resources, it is a reality that needs confronting. </p>
<p>To that end one might have expected to see, both in this document and in earlier ones, a definition of Australia’s defence industry – what it is and, importantly, what it is not. </p>
<p>The UK’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272203/6697.pdf">2005 description</a> of its defence industry embraces the combination of local and offshore companies contributing to defence outcomes in terms of:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… where the technology is created, where the skills and intellectual property reside, where the jobs are created and sustained, and where the investment is made. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>A similar definition for Australia would provide a foundation for sovereignty in the shipbuilding environment to be properly assessed. The plan suggests the Australian subsidiaries of offshore companies will be considered as sovereign without discussing how local control might be maintained, and how Australian sensitivities might be tackled.</p>
<p>The proposed definition for defence industry also highlights the second weakness of the shipbuilding plan: it is focused on building and sustaining the structural component (the “float” and “move” aspects), rather than the total capability the ship or submarine represents.</p>
<p>The lists of skills cited as necessary are those primarily associated with building and sustaining the structure. The shipbuilding plan gives scant coverage to the important combat system and weapons elements upon which the war-fighting capability rests. </p>
<p>The plan does not address the industrial capabilities necessary for the local maintenance and improvement of these ships. Access to the detailed design information for the combat and sensor systems in particular is required so that such systems can be upgraded locally if required. An offshore equipment supplier may not give the same priority to our needs. </p>
<p>The plan for naval shipbuilding in Australia says it will source many systems of the future frigate and other naval platforms from the US. However, the closest it gets to recognition of this reality in the context of sovereignty is that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Australia’s alliance with the US, and the access to advanced technology and information it provides, will remain critical. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The plan therefore implies that sovereignty is sought for the “float” and “move” aspects of the naval capabilities, but not necessarily for the important “fight” aspects. This means the systems elements of ships and submarines will be tackled in some other context – outside the naval shipbuilding plan.</p>
<h2>More than just ‘doing stuff’</h2>
<p>The naval shipbuilding plan is undoubtedly a major step forward for industrial capability in Australia. </p>
<p>A successful implementation will provide significant benefits for the Navy in terms of force structure, for industry in terms of a long-term enterprise upon which to grow overall capability and capacity, for innovation, for workers in terms of continuity of effort, and for the development of shipbuilding-related STEM skills. These are all worthy outcomes.</p>
<p>But sovereignty is more than just “doing stuff” in the country. </p>
<p>If the plan really wanted to tackle sovereignty, it should have provided a foundation on which aspects of industrial and operational sovereignty could be properly assessed, prioritised and managed. It would also have addressed the systems aspects of ships, rather than just the structure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77865/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Graeme Dunk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia’s long-awaited naval shipbuilding plan has two interconnected weaknesses when it comes to sovereignty.Graeme Dunk, PhD Candidate, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/656502016-12-09T04:26:08Z2016-12-09T04:26:08ZFifty years on, Pine Gap should reform to better serve Australia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149179/original/image-20161208-31391-1ht2mdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Pine Gap facility, southwest of Alice Springs.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://nautilus.org/briefing-books/australian-defence-facilities/felicity-ruby-images-of-pine-gap-2/">Felicity Ruby/Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On December 9, 1966, the Australian and US governments <a href="http://arena.org.au/our-poisoned-heart-by-richard-tanter/">signed a treaty</a> for establishing the Pine Gap intelligence facility a few kilometres southwest of Alice Springs.</p>
<p>In the last 50 years, Pine Gap’s growth has burst its original security compound. There are now <a href="http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/the-antennas-of-pine-gap/">33 separate antenna systems</a> at Pine Gap, ten times the number it had when it became operational in 1970.</p>
<p>The beating heart of the base, the Operations Building, is now five times the size of its 1970s original, with <a href="http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/PG-Managing-Operations-18-November-2015.v2.pdf">a floor space</a> that would cover the playing field of the Melbourne Cricket Ground.</p>
<p>Pine Gap’s <a href="http://arena.org.au/our-poisoned-heart-by-richard-tanter/">primary Cold War role</a> was to provide national level electronic intelligence on Soviet missile capabilities. This was essential for US military planning and, at a later stage, US verification of Soviet adherence to arms control agreements.</p>
<p>Pine Gap’s primary mission then, as now, had both defensive and offensive characteristics relating to US nuclear war planning. The satellites also intercepted signals from Soviet radars, revealing their location and technical characteristics. This information then enabled US B-52 bombers on nuclear missions to either evade or jam the radars.</p>
<p>Today, Pine Gap controls the much larger and more powerful electronic surveillance satellites that still do all of that for Russia, and for a great many more countries, including China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, as well as for US allies South Korea and Japan.</p>
<p>Also, these satellites and Pine Gap’s three more recently established other surveillance systems now provide:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>early warning of a nuclear attack on the US</p></li>
<li><p>information about which Russian and Chinese land missile silos have not been fired, making them key targets in a nuclear retaliatory strike</p></li>
<li><p>the essential technology that makes the US-Japanese missile defence system viable</p></li>
<li><p>the ability to detect the heat blooms of small missiles and fighter aircraft</p></li>
<li><p>battlefield electronic intelligence for US-led wars in the Middle East; and</p></li>
<li><p>intelligence gathering for space warfare operations.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>As a bonus during the Cold War, Pine Gap’s satellites collected valuable intelligence on the Soviet leadership from car phones and long distance phone calls over microwave towers. </p>
<p>Today, three of Pine Gap’s antennas point up at Chinese, Russian, Indonesian, and many other telecommunications satellites positioned above the equator, intercepting their downward transmissions on an industrial scale.</p>
<p>In the world of Edward Snowden and the <a href="https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/51">Five Eyes network</a>, Pine Gap has become a key node in the US global network of electronic surveillance, military and civilian, “mashing” diverse types of information in real time into intelligence pictures for combat and counter-terrorism operations.</p>
<p>Australia is an <a href="http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/australias-participation-in-the-pine-gap-enterprise/">enthusiastic participant</a> in every aspect of the base’s operations. Australians make up half the base’s 800-plus personnel.</p>
<p>More than ever, Pine Gap remains at the heart of the Australian alliance with the US. In gaining access to all areas of the base, the Australian Defence Force now has the capability — with borrowed American technology – to use some of Pine Gap’s capabilities for its own purposes. This is, though, mostly in connection with planning for coalition war with US forces.</p>
<p>Australia is hardwired into the US global surveillance system and military operations, with consequent legal and moral responsibilities and a default strategic position aligned to the US.</p>
<p>Desmond Ball, who brought Pine Gap to the notice of Australians in his classic 1980 book <a href="http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/10099484">A Suitable Piece of Real Estate</a>, died recently. Through the 1980s and 1990s, Ball reluctantly supported retention of Pine Gap because, despite its role in nuclear war planning, its interception of Soviet missile telemetry was essential for verifying compliance with US-Soviet arms control agreements.</p>
<p>Several years ago <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2014/s4066678.htm">Ball announced</a> that he no longer accepted this justification, and was appalled by the base’s role in illegal drone assassinations. There is, he noted, few serious attempts at arms control, and all nuclear weapons states are modernising their arsenals.</p>
<p>Whatever happens at Pine Gap, Ball argued, must be governed by tight rules and procedures. These should in turn be derived from law and the genuine defence interests of Australia, not simply as a result of being embedded in the American alliance.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/opinion/topic/2016/10/01/what-really-happens-pine-gap/14752440003801">his last public interview</a>, just before his death in October, Ball said that Pine Gap now offers Australia “everything, and nothing”. He meant that Australia’s all-areas access at Pine Gap does not meet the country’s real intelligence requirements. </p>
<p>After three disastrous American-led wars of choice in Afghanistan and Iraq/Syria, and a worrying lack of long-term and independent thinking about China, there are good strategic reasons for understanding that those moments when Australian and US interests do not align are more common and more compelling than Australian governments are willing to consider.</p>
<p>The base has capabilities that could genuinely contribute to the defence of Australia. This would depend on the will and resolution of an Australian government capable of identifying these. </p>
<p>It would mean calling for the curtailing of repugnant and strategically dangerous aspects of the base’s operations – most obviously contributing to drone assassination targeting and planning for nuclear war operations. It would also mean indicating to a US administration that the base could only continue with major changes in its operations. Then reform might be conceivable – in theory.</p>
<p>However, given the almost comprehensive inability of recent Australian governments to separate Australian and American interests and to pursue an autonomous Australian foreign policy, the prospect of reform of Pine Gap is a distant one. It will most likely prove impossible for the foreseeable future.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article draws on research papers by Desmond Ball, Bill Robinson, Richard Tanter and other colleagues published by the Nautilus Institute as <a href="http://nautilus.org/briefing-books/australian-defence-facilities/pine-gap/the-pine-gap-project/">The Pine Gap Project</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65650/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Tanter is chair of ICAN Australia: the International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons - Australia.</span></em></p>More than ever, Pine Gap remains at the heart of the Australian alliance with the United States, but serious reform is needed.Richard Tanter, Senior Research Associate, Nautilus Institute, and Honorary Professor in the School of Political and Social Studies, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/620902016-09-13T00:40:38Z2016-09-13T00:40:38ZWomen’s key role in Islamic State networks, explained<p>Late last week, three women were arrested in Paris for attempting to <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-guided-women-in-paris-terrorist-plan-prosecutor-says-1473439808">detonate a car bomb</a> outside Notre Dame cathedral.</p>
<p>“If at first it appeared that women were confined to family and domestic chores by the Daesh terrorist organization, it must be noted that this view is now completely outdated,” <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/world/europe/france-paris-isis-terrorism-women.html">François Molins</a>, a French prosecutor, told reporters in announcing the arrests. Molins used the <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-versus-daish-or-daesh-the-political-battle-over-naming-50822">French term</a> in referring to the Islamic State.</p>
<h2>Data and disciplines</h2>
<p>It is exactly this stereotype of women doing little more than playing supporting roles in IS and other terrorist organizations that is the subject of recent research at the University of Miami. </p>
<p>My co-investigators and I wanted to compare the role of women and men in terrorist organizations as a whole – not focus on particular stand-out individuals. As a result, we took a systems-level view. Systems analysis looks at phenomena that emerge from a collection of complex interacting objects – for example, networks of people. </p>
<p>To understand the value of a systems approach, think about traffic. Taking apart 1,000 cars will never help you understand a traffic jam since traffic jams come from how groups of cars interact. Answering our research question about women’s roles in terrorist networks required social analysis, data collection and quantifying the evolution of groups in networks over time, so we assembled an interdisciplinary team made up of physicists, computer scientists, sociologists and terrorism experts. </p>
<h2>The data sets</h2>
<p>Our work was made possible by access to data sets from arguably the two most successful terrorist organizations in history: the Islamic State and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. </p>
<p>Our Islamic State data consisted of the membership of their online support network. This network has been instrumental in promoting the organization’s growth by attracting recruits. This list of IS supporters was collected from open-source information on the social networking site <a href="https://theconversation.com/disrupting-pro-isis-online-ecosystems-could-help-thwart-real-world-terrorism-60995">VKontakte</a>. </p>
<p>Members of the online groups in the network routinely exchange operational information and <a href="http://science.sciencemag.org/content/352/6292/1459">attempt to generate</a> recruits. Their discussions frequently included details of fund-raising for potential fighters who wanted to travel to Syria or transferring funds for fighters already there. They shared details about survival skills such as how to use cellphones and the internet without being detected by security services. They also shared details on how to prevent or repel a drone attack and evade certain types of drones. </p>
<p>Since these online groups are always trying to attract further support, each group typically leaves its information freely available for anyone with an internet connection to see. This enabled us to do our work without knowing the individual’s identities beyond their open declaration of gender. As these groups were supporting violent extremism, most were shutdown by online moderators within a few weeks of being created. However, the users would simply go on to form another group or join an existing group that was still evading shutdown. The open-source data revealed that 41,880 individuals took part in these pro-IS groups over a two-month period. Of these, 24,883 were men and 66 had no declared gender. About 40 percent – or 16,931 – were women.</p>
<p>The second data set emerged from a recent comprehensive analysis by our coauthors, John Horgan from Georgia State University and Paul Gill from University College London, of the pre-internet terrorist campaign by Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland. The data comprised a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2012.664587#.V4LALlflfRo">list</a> of individuals known to have participated in each of the attacks by the Provisional IRA. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Provisional IRA managed to sustain a successful and highly innovative <a href="https://www.ucl.ac.uk/scs/rsch-coct/ira-lethal-connections">improvised explosive device</a> campaign against British interests. This was despite being subject to the security constraints imposed by the United Kingdom. Of the 1,382 total number of Provisional IRA individuals listed, only 70 people were women.</p>
<h2>Women emerge as better connected</h2>
<p>We then reconstructed a time-dependent social network for both the hardcore, online pro-IS network and the offline, on-the-street Provisional IRA network. </p>
<p>We did this by seeing which individuals were members of the same pro-IS online group and the Provisional IRA attack group at each moment in time. For example, suppose person A is in a pro-IS online group on a given day with person B and C; then A and B, B and C, and A and C all have connections between them on that day. Since people were constantly joining and dropping out of the groups, the networks continuously evolved. </p>
<p>We were surprised to find that in both the online IS and offline Provisional IRA networks, women acted as a far stronger “glue” than men in holding the network together. This was despite women being in the minority in both cases.</p>
<h2>The spaces between</h2>
<p>In network language, this means the women possess a “higher betweenness.” They provide a <a href="http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/2/6/e1501742">disproportionately</a> richer resource for conflict resolution within the network, as well as providing better conduits for propaganda, financing and operational information.</p>
<p>In plain terms, the women effectively hold the key to the flow of information, ideas and material between members within the group.</p>
<p>The following diagram shows what having “high betweenness” means for a representative portion of these networks in which men are the majority (M1, M2, M3 and M4) and one woman (W). If you are a man in the network, you could not possibly reach all the other men without the woman being present. The connections between the men, who form the majority population, therefore, rely on the women – who are in the minority.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133174/original/image-20160804-505-13ub7kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133174/original/image-20160804-505-13ub7kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133174/original/image-20160804-505-13ub7kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133174/original/image-20160804-505-13ub7kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133174/original/image-20160804-505-13ub7kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133174/original/image-20160804-505-13ub7kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133174/original/image-20160804-505-13ub7kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Example of a portion of the network showing one woman (W) and four men (M1, M2, M3 and M4). The woman has a higher betweenness than any of the men, which means that she acts like the glue holding the network together.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Neil Johnson</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For the hardcore pro-IS online support, for example, our results suggest that any given woman will be a conduit for at least twice as many pieces of information, know-how and materials than a man on average. </p>
<h2>Passing along information</h2>
<p>We also found that the women simultaneously manage to maintain fairly low profiles. This turns out to be favorable for individual survival given the individual risks involved in such extreme activities. </p>
<p>The lifetime, or resilience, of an online group of pro-IS followers faced with continual shutdowns by the online moderators tends to increase as the ratio of women to men increases. Such a result is <a href="http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/2/6/e1501742">consistent</a> with women’s tendency to be better embedded in the network.</p>
<p>One practical consequence of our findings is that a sensible way of dealing with a terrorist network would be to engage with the women involved. This is true even if the women are in the minority and also may not currently be deemed key figures. </p>
<p>We believe our results could also be of interest more generally, since they suggest that society could usefully redefine how it judges the importance of any minority group or individual in a network. Instead of the usual measure of how much of a “star” any individual is, our results urge decision-makers to worry more about who is the glue holding the whole group together.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62090/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Neil Johnson receives funding from the National Science Foundation (NSF) grant CNS1522693 and Air Force (AFOSR) grant FA9550-16-1-0247</span></em></p>The recent arrest of female terrorists in France brought attention to the role women play in IS. A group of American academics studied this issue – with a surprising result.Neil Johnson, Professor of Physics, University of MiamiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/641632016-08-26T03:59:11Z2016-08-26T03:59:11ZAustralia’s stance on nuclear deterrence leaves it on the wrong side of history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134887/original/image-20160822-30366-si96zn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">For Australia, the US election should provide an opportunity to rethink defence relationships, especially as they relate to nuclear weapons. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Issei Kato/Reuters</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>There has been much hand-wringing at the thought of Donald Trump becoming US president. If, by some miracle, Trump succeeds in November, he will have his hand on the nuclear trigger. </p>
<p>But this concern, while great political fodder, is dangerously simplistic. It presupposes there are “safe hands” when it comes to nuclear weapons. There are not.</p>
<p>The US has around <a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2016/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-nuclear-forces-2016">7,000 nuclear weapons</a>. Hundreds of these can be launched within minutes. While the global community has outlawed other indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons are yet to be banned. </p>
<p>The Cold War’s MAD (<a href="http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-mutual-assured-destruction.htm">Mutually Assured Destruction</a>) doctrine has morphed over the years into a framework of nuclear deterrence. Many governments globally have played a double game: supporting nuclear disarmament on the one hand, while relying on a nuclear defence on the other.</p>
<p>One such government is Australia’s. Despite consecutive governments insisting they support nuclear disarmament, Australia’s reliance on Extended Nuclear Deterrence (END) means it is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/21/australia-attempts-to-derail-un-plan-to-ban-nuclear-weapons">frustrating attempts at a total ban</a>. </p>
<h2>When defence conflicts with deterrence</h2>
<p>END is based on the assumption the US would offer a nuclear response to Australia as a select protégé ally in the event of a nuclear threat or attack. These arrangements are <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_nuclear_deterrence.pdf">publicly documented</a> between the US and NATO states, Japan and South Korea.</p>
<p>The first official articulation of the position in Australia is in its <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/Publications/wpaper1994.pdf">1994 Defence White Paper</a>. This professes a reliance on, and support for, a US nuclear capability to “deter any nuclear threat or attack on Australia”. </p>
<p>Importantly, the paper also noted that reliance on END was an “interim” measure until a total ban on nuclear weapons could be achieved. Each subsequent defence white paper has continued to assert this reliance on US nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf">2016 Defence White Paper</a> created more ambiguity about the END arrangement. It claimed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Only the nuclear and conventional military capabilities of the United States can offer effective deterrence against the possibility of nuclear threats against Australia. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>After 22 years of white paper reliance on END, it is no longer a temporary aberration. The risk is we normalise both the need for and use of nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Australian defence white papers offer no clarification on the conditions under which nuclear weapons would be used on our behalf. Given the known humanitarian, environmental and cultural <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/international-review/human-cost-nuclear-weapons">devastation</a> caused by their use, significant questions remain – including under what circumstances policymakers and defence experts would consider justifying the deployment of nuclear weapons in Australia’s name.</p>
<h2>The global trend of nuclear renewal</h2>
<p>Anyone watching US President Barack Obama’s speech in Hiroshima in March 2016 might be mistaken for thinking his pledges to end the nuclear weapon threat were sincere. <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/27/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan-hiroshima-peace">He said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Among those nations like my own that hold nuclear stockpiles, we must have the courage to escape the logic of fear and pursue a world without them. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This would seem to undermine the utility of nuclear deterrence, but the reality is different.</p>
<p>The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute <a href="https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2016/global-nuclear-weapons-downsizing-modernizing">(SIPRI)</a> has claimed the US:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… plans to spend US$348 billion during 2015–24 on maintaining and comprehensively updating its nuclear forces. Some estimates suggest that the USA’s nuclear weapon modernisation program may cost up to $1 trillion over the next 30 years.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite Trump’s assertion that countries under the US END umbrella should be <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-japan-south-korea-might-need-nuclear-weapons/">developing their own nuclear capacity</a>, neither Trump nor his Democratic presidential rival, Hillary Clinton, are likely to discontinue the nuclear renewal programs.</p>
<p>For Australia, the change in the US presidency provides an opportunity to rethink defence relationships, especially those relating to nuclear weapons. </p>
<h2>An opportunity to re-evaluate our stance</h2>
<p>With some arguing a Trump presidency would <a href="http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australian_outlook/a-trump-victory-and-the-us-australia-alliance/">undermine alliance relationships</a>, Australia has a chance to strike a new path. The uncomfortable presumption of END in our defence policies is one area we should be actively challenging.</p>
<p>While Australia is a highly militarised middle power in the region, it has few, if any, discernible nuclear threats of its own to counter. It has forsworn such weapons through <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/non-proliferation-disarmament-arms-control/nuclear-weapons/Pages/nuclear-disarmament.aspx">international law agreements</a> and has at times been a strong voice on efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>The revival of concern about the <a href="http://www.icanw.org/the-facts/catastrophic-harm/">humanitarian impacts of these weapons</a> is shifting old assumptions. Growing impatience with the slow pace of change and continual delays in meeting even the most basic of expectations in relation to nuclear disarmament have meant <a href="http://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/majority-of-un-members-declare-intention-to-negotiate-ban-on-nuclear-weapons-in-2017/">support for a ban on such weapons</a> has grown internationally to include the majority of UN member countries.</p>
<p>Australia’s reliance on END keeps us on the wrong side of history. And it has led <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/diplomats-ducked-push-for-nuclear-ban-in-favour-of-defence-20131001-2uqs2.html">previous</a> governments and the <a href="http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/08/23/Australia-writes-itself-out-of-nuclear-disarmament-diplomacy.aspx">current government</a> to <a href="http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/oewg/2016/august/reports/11122-oewg-report-vol-2-no-19">actively oppose</a> the growing calls for a ban on nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Instead of blindly following US nuclear policies into whatever a future president might envisage, Australia should carefully consider its non-nuclear defence and challenge all claims, surrogate or otherwise, to nuclear weapons.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64163/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dimity Hawkins has been involved in activism and advocacy around nuclear disarmament for many years, including as a Board Member of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) Australia.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julie Kimber does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Is Australia’s reliance on nuclear defence agreements keeping us on the wrong side of history?Dimity Hawkins, PhD Candidate, Swinburne University of TechnologyJulie Kimber, Senior Lecturer in Politics and History, Swinburne University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/621632016-07-07T07:57:55Z2016-07-07T07:57:55ZWhen Australia goes to war, public trust depends on better oversight<p>The world is absorbing the implications of the long-awaited release of the <a href="http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/">Chilcot inquiry</a> into the United Kingdom’s decision to go to war in Iraq. Australia, however, has spent comparatively little time learning lessons from the deployment of thousands of troops to fight overseas in recent years.</p>
<p>An official war history has just been commissioned; if past form is any guide, it will be at least a decade before it is completed. In any event, its brief is to recount what took place, not to reflect on whether it was the best course of action for Australia.</p>
<h2>Australia’s path to war</h2>
<p>My new Quarterly Essay, <a href="https://www.quarterlyessay.com/essay/2016/06/firing-line">Firing Line: Australia’s Path to War</a>, argues Australia needs a National Security Council to guide any decision in the future to go to war. </p>
<p>It is also important to restore public trust in the decision to go to war. For this, better democratic accountability is essential. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129647/original/image-20160707-30693-kda3xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129647/original/image-20160707-30693-kda3xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129647/original/image-20160707-30693-kda3xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129647/original/image-20160707-30693-kda3xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129647/original/image-20160707-30693-kda3xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129647/original/image-20160707-30693-kda3xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1056&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129647/original/image-20160707-30693-kda3xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1056&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129647/original/image-20160707-30693-kda3xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1056&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Black Inc</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This is not just about giving parliament a vote on military deployments; after all, a prime minister will always command the approval of the lower house of parliament. Instead, democratic accountability means developing a system capable of exercising genuine oversight of the national security agencies and departments, particularly Defence.</p>
<p>Currently, that oversight takes place in a few ways: through overly adversarial and hasty questioning at Senate estimates, abridged discussion in the lower house when prime ministers and their cabinets deign to allow discussion of national security or defence issues, and in the committee system.</p>
<p>Here, it is telling to compare Australia’s parliamentary committees for defence and national security with their counterparts in Canada and <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-say-do-our-elected-representatives-have-in-going-to-war-51860">the UK</a>.</p>
<p>Australia’s oversight of national security is underdone and weak: one joint standing committee covers <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade'">foreign affairs, defence and trade</a> as a whole. A separate joint committee was established to cover <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security">intelligence and domestic security</a> after the Hope royal commission into intelligence in the 1980s.</p>
<p>It is extraordinary that so little infrastructure is dedicated to parsing the issues of war. </p>
<p>The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), on which the government will <a href="https://myplace.ndis.gov.au/ndisstorefront/news/statement-bruce-bonyhady.html">spend A$22 billion each year</a>, has an <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/National_Disability_Insurance_Scheme">entire committee</a> dedicated to its oversight. The <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/WhatAustraliaisdoing/Pages/NationalSecurityAgencies.aspx">national security apparatus</a>, which accounts for <a href="http://www.budget.gov.au/2016-17/content/bp4/html/09_staff.htm">more than 100,000 Commonwealth employees</a> and will soon absorb more than <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1516/Quick_Guides/Budget1617">$45 billion each year</a>, is entirely under-scrutinised. And it shows.</p>
<p>If one scans the list of issues examined, they pale by contrast with the omissions, which include the strategy underpinning the acquisition of Australia’s submarines, defence white papers, military education and defence diplomacy.</p>
<p>The next parliament needs committees dedicated to assessing each of the Australian Defence Force, the Department of Defence, national strategy and foreign affairs. This expanded committee system will require trained staff and political advisers with the necessary experience and judgement to grapple with the world of strategy and the opaque language of war – skills that are currently in short supply. </p>
<p>The problem extends to the military itself. Australia’s military gives priority to tactical rather than strategic excellence, and the ability to do battle in the realm of ideas has been more of a liability than an asset.</p>
<p>That is starting to change, but only slowly. Our military colleges are not yet universities for the study of war and our universities still view war as a morally tainted activity. </p>
<p>Furthermore, when so much defence decision-making is based on classified assessments and considerations routinely unavailable to members of the opposition, there is a role for a body that can equip parliamentarians to discuss national security policy. </p>
<p>For these reasons, it might prove necessary to create a parliamentary defence office, which seeks to improve the security debate in the same way as the <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Budget_Office">Parliamentary Budget Office</a>, established in 2012, has in the area of economics.</p>
<p>The need for full parliamentary approval before any substantial military action by the prime minister would inhibit an effective response to a crisis. Successive prime ministers have rightly resisted this. But there is a compelling case for parliament to review whether a military deployment is in the national interest within a period of, say, 90 days. </p>
<p>Here, we have a model in the way the Australian parliament deals with foreign treaties. It is the executive’s role to sign treaties with other countries and, in the past, it was entirely up to the foreign minister to present these treaties to the parliament for domestic legislation. But, in 2005, reforms were introduced that require a new <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Treaties">joint committee on treaties</a> to prepare a statement on whether a treaty is in the national interest or not, and table it before the parliament. </p>
<p>A similar system could be applied to the decision to go to war.</p>
<h2>Ten questions to guide decisions on war</h2>
<p>When should Australia go to war? The more we can think through the circumstances in which this question might arise, the less likely we will be to err in our calculations. Here are ten questions to be asked the next time our leaders want to commit Australian forces:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Are our vital national interests threatened?</p></li>
<li><p>Is there a clear political objective?</p></li>
<li><p>Are our military aims linked to this political objective?</p></li>
<li><p>Can the case be made to the Australian people that this campaign is in their interests, and can their support for the campaign be sustained through casualties and setbacks?</p></li>
<li><p>Do we understand the costs – to the country, to civilian victims, to the enemy and to our veterans?</p></li>
<li><p>What new dangers might this campaign cause?</p></li>
<li><p>What proportion of the Australian Defence Force will it commit?</p></li>
<li><p>What options will close to us if we take this action, and if we don’t?</p></li>
<li><p>Will the opposition remain committed, should it form government?</p></li>
<li><p>How does this end?</p></li>
</ul>
<hr>
<p><em>This is an edited extract from Quarterly Essay 62 – <a href="https://www.quarterlyessay.com/essay/2016/06/firing-line">Firing Line: Australia’s Path to War</a> – by James Brown.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62163/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Brown is a member of the Liberal Party.</span></em></p>It is important to restore public trust in any future decision for Australia to go to war. For this, a system that provides better democratic accountability is essential.James Brown, Adjunct Associate Professor and Research Director, US Studies Centre, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/585882016-04-29T04:26:46Z2016-04-29T04:26:46ZWhat do we want from Australia’s new submarines?<p>The Australian government’s decision to spend A$50 billion to <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-company-dcns-wins-race-to-build-australias-next-submarine-fleet-experts-respond-58060">double its submarine fleet to 12</a> was based on a number of considerations about what the new submarines would be required to do.</p>
<p>In military parlance, the value of submarines can be discussed in terms of the missions they can carry out and the military effects they can create, such as:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Sea denial – the threat of attack by submarines can deny an adversary the use of a strategic area of the sea. An example is the exclusion zone that British submarines enforced around the Falklands Islands in the war with Argentina in 1982. </p></li>
<li><p>Maritime strike – the ability to attack and destroy enemy forces and capabilities.</p></li>
<li><p>Intelligence collection – which can take several forms, such as the gathering of technical information about the capabilities and operational practices of enemy forces, or information that indicates the current or future intentions of an adversary. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The missions</h2>
<p>Submarines carry out <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-does-australia-need-submarines-at-all-58575">various kinds of missions</a>, including:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Anti-surface warfare – attacking ships, either merchant shipping carrying supplies or naval ships. This has always been the primary role of most submarines. </p></li>
<li><p>Anti-submarine warfare – submarines can be employed to track and possibly attack other submarines, contributing to anti-submarine operations, which are likely to involve surface ships and maritime aircraft as well. Anti-submarine warfare demands a higher level of capability and proficiency than anti-surface warfare and not all submarines are capable of carrying out this role.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Estimating the capability offered by submarines of a particular design is done through a combination of systems performance analysis and operations analysis.</p>
<p>Systems performance analysis models the submarine and its subsystems to estimate measures such as range, endurance, speed, stealth and sensor detection range. Operations analysis models what the submarine is can do to estimate its mission effectiveness.</p>
<p>The utility of submarines largely derives from stealth, uncertainty, persistent presence and firepower. In plain terms, a submarine can hang around, unseen, in places where other forces might not be able to go and inflict damage when required.</p>
<p>Sustained presence involves requirements for the endurance, the length of time that the presence of the submarine must be sustained, and the number of operational areas that need to be covered.</p>
<h2>The design</h2>
<p>There are a multitude of interconnected drivers in the design of a submarine. These drivers can be modelled starting with high-level requirements for sustained presence and the missions to be undertaken.</p>
<p>The drivers result in a design involving the synthesis and integration of many complex systems and subsystems. To provide a context for this, a Collins class submarine has about 500,000 parts to be assembled. This is about five times as many parts as a large commercial airliner and about three times as many as a frigate.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the important characteristics of submarines can be understood in terms of a few basic building blocks. These are the hull and the manoeuvring control systems, the propulsion system, power and energy, stealth, habitability and the combat system. </p>
<p>Generally the back half of a submarine is devoted to propulsion systems, which for a diesel-electric submarine means the diesel generators, the main electric motor and the electrical power conversion and control equipment.</p>
<p>The front half contains the control room where the sensor information is processed and the submarine is commanded, the crew’s living quarters and the weapon stowage. </p>
<p>Tanks containing fuel and fresh water are distributed around the submarine. The batteries are located along the bottom of the hull where they also act as ballast. </p>
<p>Diesel-electric submarines store electrical energy in a large set of batteries, which are recharged using a diesel generator. While fully submerged, traditional diesel-electric submarines use a battery-powered electric motor to turn the propeller.</p>
<p>Because there are few moving parts with electric drive, a diesel-electric submarine can be extremely quiet when running on batteries. </p>
<h2>Submerged</h2>
<p>The length of time a diesel-electric submarine can stay fully submerged is limited by the amount of energy that can be stored in the battery. The submerged endurance of a diesel-electric submarine while running on its battery depends on its speed for two reasons.</p>
<p>First, the hydrodynamic resistance to moving through water increases steeply as speed increases.</p>
<p>Second, the total amount of energy that can be extracted from a lead-acid battery reduces the faster it is discharged. This means that while a submarine might be able to stay submerged for a few days if it travels slowly, it could exhaust its battery in an hour or two travelling at maximum speed.</p>
<p>Understanding the power requirements of submarines and their interplay with stealth is a key determinant in the design of a submarine. There are two major components that affect the need for power.</p>
<p>One is the power required for propulsion, mentioned above. There is also the power required for the crew (including atmosphere control, victuals and garbage management), for data processing associated with the sensor and combat systems, the platform subsystems and delivery of weapons and countermeasures.</p>
<p>This second component is virtually independent of speed and is sometimes called the “hotel load”. </p>
<h2>Silent running</h2>
<p>The ability of a submarine to operate successfully hinges on its stealth. Stealth underpins survivability and mission success in high-threat environments.</p>
<p>Once a submarine is detected, its mission may be compromised and it is liable to be tracked and destroyed. The ability to remain underwater is paramount to submarine stealth and survivability.</p>
<p>The primary way to detect a submerged submarine is sonar (detection of underwater sound), leading to an ongoing endeavour to make submarines increasingly quieter and harder to detect. </p>
<p>There are two types of anti-submarine sonars: active and passive.</p>
<p>Passive sonar detects the noise radiated by the submarine. This is the most likely way a submerged submarine will be initially detected. The greatest attention must be given during design, and also in maintenance, to eliminating or controlling sources of noise on the submarine. </p>
<p>Active sonar transmits a pulse of sound and detects echoes from the submarine. This transmission can be intercepted by the submarine on its own sonar system, which alerts it to the presence of the threat. This gives it some information about the type, location and movement of the threat.</p>
<p>A submarine can generally detect active sonar at a greater range than the threat sonar can detect the submarine. This is because the sound only has to travel one way to get to the submarine, but has to be reflected and travel back to the threat sonar, losing more signal strength in the two-way round trip.</p>
<p>The control of noise includes addressing sources internal to the submarine as well as the noise generated by the flow of water over the hull and propeller. </p>
<h2>Why 12 submarines?</h2>
<p>A key measure of submarine capability is the level of presence that the fleet as a whole can sustain in operational areas. The level of presence depends on the availability of submarines for operations.</p>
<p>Every submarine goes through a cycle of availability and periods of maintenance. Once or twice during the life of a submarine it will be docked for a deep maintenance period lasting a year or more.</p>
<p>During deep maintenance, the pressure hull may be opened to allow access to major machinery to be repaired or upgraded. Major capability upgrades requiring new masts or sonar arrays may be carried out during deep maintenance. </p>
<p>In addition to the deep maintenance periods, there may be mid-cycle docking for extended, but lesser, maintenance lasting several months.</p>
<p>When a submarine emerges from a major maintenance period, it needs to spend some time working up at sea. During this time, its systems are tested and the crew complete drills and training before deploying on operations.</p>
<p>It is an inescapable fact that for any submarine fleet about half of the boats will be unavailable for operations at any time. The smaller the fleet, the more susceptible it is to fluctuations in availability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58588/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janis Cocking works for the Department of Defence </span></em></p>Australia’s new submarine fleet will be designed for a range of different missions in our challenging maritime environment.Janis Cocking, Chief of Science Strategy and Program Division, Defence Science and Technology OrganisationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/577962016-04-26T05:01:49Z2016-04-26T05:01:49ZSubmarines decision ultimately shows the merits of partisan debate on defence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/120132/original/image-20160426-1359-qi3my0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">If Tony Abbott is disappointed by the failure to choose Japan to build Australia's new submarines, the only one he can blame is himself.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Ben Macmahon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Contrary to conventional wisdom, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-company-dcns-wins-race-to-build-australias-next-submarine-fleet-experts-respond-58060">announcement</a> that French firm DCNS will build Australia’s next fleet of submarines came sooner – and in a better fashion – because of partisan politics.</p>
<p>This hugely technical, expensive and highly secret military capability has been the subject of major public debate, partisan divides and international media campaigns. It has been handled by four prime ministers and six defence ministers.</p>
<p>Like oil and water, party politics and good defence policy are presumed not to mix. And this process has been all about party politics. </p>
<h2>The role of party politics</h2>
<p>The Coalition came into office in 2013 distrusting government support for local industry, and wanting value for money. However, dire polling – particularly in South Australia – would lead the Abbott government to completely reverse course and insist on a large local build.</p>
<p>Labor has been more consistent, though no less partisan. It prefers domestic construction; it is happy to spend government money inefficiently to sustain local industry; and it saw a real opportunity to attack the Abbott and Turnbull governments in vulnerable electorates.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, federal senator Nick Xenophon and his new party seem to have decided that the foremost purpose of Australian defence policy is to protect the jobs of South Australians. </p>
<p>The net cost to Australia? We’re paying <a href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1093.html">potentially as much as 30-40%</a> more for these already hugely expensive machines.</p>
<p>So no party can claim, hand on heart, that their decisions were made purely on the basis of the national interest. But nor should we expect them to do so. </p>
<p>The notion of isolating policy from politics is a myth. Authoritarian leaders pay attention to politics just as much as democratic populists. And contrary to the usual norm of bipartisanship, the partisan debate over Australia’s submarines has largely been to the country’s benefit.</p>
<p>Time and again during this process, partisan politics has improved – not weakened – the government’s choice. Party politics brought the issue before the public. Party politics helped create a real debate about where the submarines would be built. </p>
<p>Internal party politics helped lead to the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-09/submarines-open-tender-process-falls-short-federal-promise/6078882">competitive evaluation process</a>, which switched the leverage from the supplier to the buyer. This potentially alleviated some of the costs of a local build. And party politics helped ensure a decision was made early in 2016, before the election.</p>
<p>No doubt many who supported the Japanese bid will publicly rue the decision’s political nature. But if former prime minister Tony Abbott in particular is disappointed by the failure to choose Japan, he can only blame himself. </p>
<p>Abbott chose to initiate a competitive evaluation process with multiple bidders. It was his decision to mandate that much of the build <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-15/more-submarine-building-jobs-for-adelaide,-pm-says/6699706">had to occur</a> in South Australia. And it was ultimately his failure to sell the public and national security community on the wisdom of tighter security links with Japan via a submarine deal.</p>
<h2>Lessons for next time?</h2>
<p>The submarine decision could have been better handled in many ways. </p>
<p>Australians never received a sensible explanation from the Rudd government about why 12 was the right number for the size of the fleet. It was never clear why the Gillard government couldn’t make a decision in its term. </p>
<p>The competitive evaluation process was an obvious political fix for Abbott to keep his promise that South Australian companies could be involved in the final build. And it was often uncomfortable watching Bill Shorten demean the Japanese and friendly foreign nations. </p>
<p>Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and Defence Minister Marise Payne have much work to do to convince the public that this is the right choice, within the right time frame, and for the right price.</p>
<p>Many are still uncomfortable with the notion that defence is like any other area of national policy and open for rambunctious debate in the Australian fashion. But given the worsening strategic environment of today’s Asia-Pacific, getting the public informed, and hopefully supportive of this significant decision, is vital. </p>
<p>Australia’s security is aided most not by choosing one particular submarine over the other, but rather by having a public willing to support and fund the military we need, and comfortable with the roles we want them to play. If that means a bit more bickering, or slightly less cost-efficient purchases, it is worth the cost.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57796/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Carr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Like oil and water, party politics and good defence policy are presumed not to mix. And the process to buy Australia’s next fleet of submarines has been all about party politics.Andrew Carr, Research Fellow in Strategic and Defence Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/580602016-04-26T03:22:48Z2016-04-26T03:22:48ZFrench company DCNS wins race to build Australia’s next submarine fleet: experts respond<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/120129/original/image-20160426-1335-1a18zxy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">DCNS' ‘Shortfin Barracuda’ was the winning design for Australia’s next submarine fleet.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/DCNS Group</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia’s next fleet of submarines will be built by French company DCNS but constructed in South Australia, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull <a href="http://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/future-submarine-program">announced on Tuesday</a>.</p>
<p>DCNS beat competing bids from German and Japanese manufacturers to win the contract. The fleet of 12, which is to replace the Collins-class submarines, will come at an estimated cost of A$50 billion. The government claims the project will:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… directly sustain around 1,100 Australian jobs and a further 1,700 Australian jobs through the supply chain.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Conversation’s experts respond to key aspects of the announcement below.</p>
<hr>
<h2>What does it mean for local jobs and South Australia?</h2>
<p><strong>John Spoehr, Director, Australian Industrial Transformation Institute, Flinders University</strong></p>
<p>This announcement is one of the building blocks needed to accelerate transformation of South Australia’s ailing manufacturing industry. </p>
<p>Next year will see the closure of the heart of Australia’s automotive manufacturing industry – much of which is concentrated in South Australia. This alone was going to lead to the loss of thousands of jobs in Adelaide’s northern and southern suburbs. </p>
<p>The threat of closure of Arrium’s steel manufacturing and mining operations now hangs over the state. These operations employ around 3,000 people in Whyalla.</p>
<p>A circuit-breaker like the submarine project was urgently needed to instil some hope in South Australia. On its own it won’t solve the short-term problem of job losses in the automotive industry, but it can lay the foundations for the growth of a robust advanced manufacturing sector in South Australia.</p>
<p>Projects of this scale and complexity help underpin more rapid uptake and diffusion of advanced technologies and workplace innovation. This is essential to the successful roll-out of a project like this. And it is enormously beneficial for other industry sectors that can grow more rapidly on the back of this long-term investment.</p>
<p>The choice of the French option is particularly interesting. The Japanese were the favourites to begin with, but they were not as committed to a local build as the other bidders. The Germans offered a local build. The French put forward a hybrid build – with the first of the submarines being manufactured in France. </p>
<p>From an economic development and jobs point of view, the challenge will be to ensure a smooth and certain transition to a local build as soon as possible. This will require a sophisticated knowledge-and-skills-transfer program to ensure that opportunity is maximised.</p>
<h2>What does it mean for our foreign relations?</h2>
<p><strong>Nick Bisley, Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe University</strong></p>
<p>Since the 2009 Defence White Paper, Australia has been committed to a new generation of submarines. The Abbott government got within weeks of announcing that Japanese contractors would build the boats. The unsuccessful leadership spill in February 2015 resulted in the competitive evaluation process that led to the selection of the French firm DCNS.</p>
<p>The government has rightly emphasised that the decision was a merit-based one. The most important factors related to questions such as cost, reliability, operations and the like. </p>
<p>But a fleet of submarines is not a fleet of trucks. The decision has obvious strategic and foreign policy implications. </p>
<p>The conventional wisdom had been that Australia would take the J-option as the culmination of significant tightening of the strategic links between two of America’s most important Asian allies. That Australia did not go with Japan will clearly hurt that relationship to some degree, but it won’t be a major setback.</p>
<p>Although relationship management will be challenging because of the humiliating way in which information was leaked prior to the formal announcement, overall the decision will be more of a roadbump than a significant roadblock. </p>
<p>Japan and Australia have become one another’s most important strategic partners after the US. The reasons for this – the convergence of strategic interests and their shared commitment to the prevailing regional order – mean that the underlying relationship will continue on its long-run trajectory. </p>
<p>Unusually, Australia has a relatively strong hand in the relationship. Japan needs support for its broader security transformation, and it has relatively few friends in Asia. It had been thought that the submarine deal was part of this support – with Australia helping Japan to become a defence exporter – yet it is likely that there will be some other defence procurement of a lower profile and lower risk that Australia will put toward Japan.</p>
<p>While China is likely to be pleased that Japan was unsuccessful, it was not overly concerned about the decision itself. Its concerns remain with what it perceives to be a regional order stacked against its interests.</p>
<p>After Japan, the US will probably be the most disappointed party. The US clearly was hoping that Australia would go with Japan due its desire to support Japan’s broader strategic development and the ties that it would cement between two of its key partners. </p>
<p>That the decision pleases China and displeases both Japan and the US means that Australia’s submarine choice might be seen as a metaphor for Australia’s broader strategic dilemma. But this is to misunderstand the more complex forces that Australia needs to balance in its international dealings. </p>
<p>Australian diplomats will be managing the fact that many will make this mistake. And it is testimony to the region’s febrile nature that this decision has taken on such a stature.</p>
<h2>What were the technological considerations?</h2>
<p><strong>Stephan Fruehling, Associate Professor, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University</strong></p>
<p>By selecting a French bidder to build its next fleet of submarines, Australia is entering a long-term relationship with the only Western country that designs and builds both conventional and nuclear-powered submarines.</p>
<p>Since the survival of a large part of France’s nuclear arsenal hinges on the survival of its submarines, Australia’s new partner is committed to remaining at the forefront of submarine technology.</p>
<p>Australia’s own submarine requirements are driven by the long distances its navy has to deal with in the Indo-Pacific region. No existing submarine provides the range and endurance Australia is looking for. Japan offered a modification of the existing Soryu submarine; Germany’s Thyssen-Krupp proposed a new design based on the smaller Type 214.</p>
<p>DCNS’ proposal is a conventionally powered boat derived from the Barracuda class – the “Shortfin Barracuda”. It was the largest design in the competition at 4,500 tonnes. </p>
<p>In recent weeks, reports that Japan’s design had been ranked third seem to have confirmed the judgement of many submarine experts that the Soryu contained several limitations in its layout and acoustic proofing.</p>
<p>Choosing France’s proposal over Germany’s, Australia will avoid the risks that may come with significantly scaling up a smaller submarine design. However, the Shortfin Barracuda also comes with its own unique technical risks. In particular, Australia’s new submarines will be the only conventionally powered boats using pump jets for propulsion, rather than a propeller at the rear. </p>
<p>While pump jets promise acoustic quieting and are common on nuclear-powered boats, some experts have questioned its efficiency and performance at the slower patrol speeds typical for conventional submarines. At the same time, the German technology for air-independent propulsion is generally seen as more advanced than France’s.</p>
<p>There was a lot of focus on the strategic implications of the Japanese bid. But France’s own position as a regional power – with sovereign territory in the oceans to Australia’s west and east, and a continuing military presence in the region – promises much of the commonality of interest without the strategic drawbacks that some saw in the Japanese proposal. </p>
<p>And, perhaps most importantly, France can offer one thing that Japan and Germany cannot, even if it is unlikely to have featured in the evaluation of the bids: if Australia ever wants to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, it now has a partner that could offer that too.</p>
<h2>Will it meet our needs?</h2>
<p><strong>Hans J. Ohff, Visiting Fellow, University of Adelaide</strong></p>
<p>I have my doubts as to whether any of the three contenders had the right answer for Australia’s future naval needs. Australia owns the intellectual property of the Collins-class submarines. At 3,000 tonnes, an evolved Collins would match or better anything a 4,500-tonne boat can throw at it. </p>
<p>At more than 4,500-tonne submerged displacement, a conventional submarine loses its signature advantage (noise, infrared, radar when on the surface) compared to a nuclear-powered submarine.</p>
<p>The French Navy operates submarines across the five oceans. The French bidder, DCNS, argued that the experience and propulsion technology they transferred from their conventional and nuclear submarines made them the preferred candidate to build Australia’s future submarines. And they turned out to be right.</p>
<p>But it’s a shame that in Australia we always reach for the stars rather keeping our feet on the ground. While the French ran a brilliant campaign, the Germans and Japanese both ran very poor campaigns.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: you can read Hans Ohff’s analysis piece on the decision <a href="http://theconversation.com/why-the-french-submarine-won-the-bid-to-replace-the-collins-class-58223">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58060/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hans J. Ohff is the former CEO of the Australian Submarine Corporation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley is a member of the Australian Institute for International Affairs' national executive.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Spoehr and Stephan Fruehling do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Conversation’s experts respond to key aspects of the announcement that French company DCNS will be build Australia’s next fleet of submarines.John Spoehr, Director, Australian Industrial Transformation Institute, Flinders UniversityHans J. Ohff, Visiting Fellow, University of AdelaideNick Bisley, Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe UniversityStephan Fruehling, Associate Professor, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/577912016-04-18T03:50:04Z2016-04-18T03:50:04ZAustralia still hasn’t had the debate on why we even need new submarines<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119001/original/image-20160417-26305-rtt43u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Japan is believed to be winning the race to build Australia's new submarine fleet.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Franck Robichon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia is about to make its biggest-ever investment in <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/defence-white-paper-new-submarine-fleet-to-cost-taxpayers-150-billion-20160224-gn32kg.html">military hardware</a>. Although we don’t know yet whether Germany, France or Japan will be awarded the contract to build our 12 new submarines, it is possible to make a few confident predictions.</p>
<h2>What to expect</h2>
<p>First, the actual cost of the submarines when completed will be much higher than the figure that is proposed now. </p>
<p>If cost were the only consideration, it would actually make more sense to let the successful bidder build them in their own country. But the construction is now seen as a de-facto industry policy <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02-25/any-australian-build-of-submarines-to-be-based-in-adelaide/7199504">for South Australia</a>, a politically important state that has <a href="https://theconversation.com/arriums-whyalla-steelworks-another-threat-to-fragile-manufacturing-sector-57475">haemorrhaged manufacturing jobs</a> of late.</p>
<p>There are good arguments for maintaining a manufacturing capacity in Australia – even on national security grounds. But given the <a href="http://www.couriermail.com.au/ipad/costs-sinking-our-submarine-fleet/story-fn6ck51p-1226167951592">cost blowouts</a> in the construction and maintenance of the troubled Collins-class submarines, it’s not unreasonable to ask whether building submarines is really our collective strong suit. </p>
<p>Second, it’s a pretty safe bet that Japan will <a href="https://theconversation.com/defence-white-paper-why-australia-will-opt-for-japanese-built-submarines-55224">awarded the contract</a> to build the submarines. This has nothing to do with the debates about the boats’ technical capacities, however. The principal reason Japan is likely to get the contract is that it will consolidate the relationship between America’s regional alliance partners and the collective effort to discourage Chinese aggression.</p>
<p>There may be much to be said for such efforts. Plainly, China has become more aggressive in its pursuit of highly implausible-looking <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349">territorial claims</a> in the South China Sea. This is something Australians might collectively feel <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-16/turnbull-returns-from-first-visit-to-china/7331912">alarmed about</a>. </p>
<p>But if Australia is trying to influence China’s behaviour, a sternly worded diplomatic note is likely to have as much effect and would be rather cheaper, too. The reality is that Australia can do very little to influence the outcome of the growing tensions in the South China Sea, with or without the new submarines.</p>
<p>The third point to make about the submarines is that they will almost certainly never be used in anger. </p>
<p>It is worth asking what the world would look like if we were ever in a situation where we did have to use them. The strategic – not to say economic – circumstances would be so apocalyptic that having the enduring capacity to destroy part of a notional enemy might be the least of our worries.</p>
<p>In reality, the subs are supposed to “deter” our notional foe. The idea is that simply by possessing these sorts of weapons, the likes of China will be discouraged from acting aggressively. But if China is not deterred by the prospect of nuclear annihilation at the hands of the US, why should we imagine that our 12 submarines would do the trick?</p>
<p>Will the subs deter other rising regional powers, such as Indonesia or Vietnam, from having hostile intentions toward us? It is quite possible that we may risk “invasion” from Indonesia – as we did from Vietnam many years ago – but this is likely to take the form of political, economic and environmental refugees in fishing boats, not the Indonesian army’s rather underwhelming might.</p>
<p>The submarines could certainly deter asylum seekers, but this could probably be achieved in more cost-effective ways. It might not do much for Australia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-does-international-condemnation-on-human-rights-mean-so-little-to-australia-53814">rather battered international reputation</a> either.</p>
<h2>The flow-on effects</h2>
<p>China rightly points out that, unlike the US and Australia, it has not been involved in a war worthy of the name since the 1970s, when it received a humiliating bloody nose at the hands of Vietnam.</p>
<p>Australia, however, has fought in Iraq (twice), Afghanistan and Syria in recent times. </p>
<p>Given Australia’s enthusiasm for foreign military adventures, no matter how remote the conflict, our neighbours may feel understandably alarmed at both the submarine purchase and the relative diminishing of their security as a consequence. </p>
<p>This is a classic <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636410903133050">“security dilemma”</a> in which each side feels less secure because of the actions of the other. The all-too-predictable response is to increase spending on national defence in a futile effort to enhance security.</p>
<p>History suggests that arms races end badly. The first world war had complex causes, but the simultaneous ramping-up of national defence spending by the potential belligerents didn’t help. When war did break out, the modernised, more lethal weapons systems were put to astoundingly effective use.</p>
<p>The principal consequence of the inevitable but little-debated decision to acquire these boats is to contribute to a rapidly escalating regional arms race.</p>
<p>This would be a ruinously expensive, dangerous and ultimately futile exercise at the best of times. But in a part of the world where there are still much better uses for public money, despite remarkable improvements in economic development, such expenditures seem entirely unjustifiable. </p>
<p>At the very least, political leaders and strategic thinkers ought to be compelled to give a much more plausible and specific account of the new submarines’ real benefits and demonstrated deterrent effects.</p>
<p>Being secure is undoubtedly a desirable thing. Quite what it means and how it is best achieved ought not to be left entirely to the pointy-heads in the defence establishment, though.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57791/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Beeson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The principal consequence of Australia’s inevitable but little-debated decision to acquire submarines is to contribute to a rapidly escalating regional arms race.Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/535542016-02-25T22:39:35Z2016-02-25T22:39:35ZThe end of 2%: Australia gets serious about its defence budget<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/112877/original/image-20160225-15160-yklsln.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The new defence white paper marks a return to seriousness in its approach to spending.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Mick Tsikas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Compared to Tony Abbott, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and his defence minister, Marise Payne, see themselves as having a different emphasis in the way they view security challenges, how Australia should fund its defence, and different philosophies for how to protect the nation’s interests in our region.</p>
<p>Nowhere is this clearer than in Australia’s new <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/">defence white paper</a>. It seeks a certain product differentiation to Abbott’s often idiosyncratic, and arguably crude, strategic posturing.</p>
<h2>Budget concerns</h2>
<p>The biggest return to seriousness is the document’s approach to the defence budget. While <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com.au/australias-defence-white-paper-flags-a-massive-29-9-billion-in-extra-spending-over-the-next-decade-2016-2">media reporting</a> and even the white paper itself highlights that the defence spending target of 2% of GDP will remain, the link between what the Australian Defence Force gets and the health of the economy has been unmistakably broken.</p>
<p>Rather than stating that “2%” was all that would be needed to fix Australia’s defence spending bottom line each year, the white paper uses the 2% target as a once-off only. The projection of what this figure will be in 2025-26 is around A$58.7 billion. This is up from A$32 billion in the next financial year.</p>
<p>The paper explicitly says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The ten-year funding model will not be subject to any further adjustments as a result of changes in Australia’s GDP growth estimates.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So, even if growth slows, Australia’s economic fortunes will not dictate the share of government spending defence has. This is a sensible and well-considered move. </p>
<p>The 2% target was an “arbitrary” number, as Turnbull recognised. Australia’s security bears no relation to whether we meet this target. By putting the funding first, any hopes for good planning and efficiency would be curtailed.</p>
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<h2>Strategic thinking</h2>
<p>Another serious contribution is the paper’s attempt to link threats to national security and economic prosperity with capability planning and what sort of military upgrades and investments will best help resolve these problems.</p>
<p>This paper attempts to actually “do” strategy. It presents a cohesive ethos in style as well as substance. It is measured in its judgements, keeps Australian interests at the forefront and is cautious of friends and foes.</p>
<p>That can’t be said of some past efforts. The more confrontational <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2009/">2009 white paper</a> pointed to China’s rise as a concern, stated the intention to buy 12 submarines, and left everyone else to fill in the blanks about how the latter dealt with the former.</p>
<p>There are components of China’s recent behaviour, including in the South China Sea, that are deeply troubling. The white paper does not put this issue on ice, but instead stresses the need for:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… a stable, rules-based global order which supports the peaceful resolution of disputes, facilitates free and open trade and enables unfettered access to the global commons to support economic development.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To better appreciate the increasingly complexity of such big strategic issues, careless and emotive rhetoric that takes contemporary problems and reframes them in the simplistic clothing of past eras should be avoided.</p>
<p>So, it was disappointing to see Turnbull mimic Abbott’s line that in 2012 defence spending had been reduced to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/factcheck-is-defence-spending-down-to-1938-levels-17427">“lowest level since 1938”</a>. Turnbull is right, though, to complain about the A$16 billion or more that Defence lost under Julia Gillard and the harm it did to impending decisions related to designs, process and capacity.</p>
<p>But there is no comparison between the two eras. Australia had 10,000 personnel in its defence force in 1938. Today it has 58,000 and that will grow to 63,000. Australia has 18,000 public servants looking at threats, guiding policy and planning for security. In 1938, this number was just 57.</p>
<p>Turnbull and Payne were wise to explicitly reject the use of GDP as the basis for analysis in their figures. They should ensure they also do so in their political rhetoric. It suggests a flippancy about these issues that undermines the serious and considered nature of the document they have just released.</p>
<p>A more cautious approach seems to have been taken to defence engagement. Excessive claims about the practice creating new habits and norms that would bring peace to Asia have been quietly dropped. Instead, there is a focus on practical co-operation – such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-diplomatic-fallout-from-flight-mh370-reveals-a-region-on-edge-24831">responding to Flight MH370</a> – and training with allies.</p>
<p>The paper still makes some ambitious and questionable claims. NATO gets a strong run. There’s a hint of belief that the China challenge can be abated if more defence personnel from Australia and China talk to one another. </p>
<p>Payne declared that defence engagement was a “core defence function”. Yet there’s at least regular caveats that co-operation with countries in places like the Middle East occurs “where it is in our interest do so”.</p>
<p>If that’s the standard – with benefits and improvements today and tomorrow the main concern rather than re-aligning the world in 20 years’ time – then it should be applauded.</p>
<h2>Into the future</h2>
<p>No government gets everything right. Concerns and disagreements about defence capability or force structure and acquisition will still abound. And any good policy will not necessarily sell itself.</p>
<p>But part of a more visionary, responsible approach to leadership requires avoiding preoccupation with immediate and too-often-ideological pet projects. It appreciates that new threats might require new forms of action, comprising items like cyber and space warfare units as well as reconnaissance aircraft. </p>
<p>This also means recognising that accurately predicting the future is a perilous business. In 2035, Australia may look back and wish it had spent more. Or it may realise it overspent and misunderstood or misinterpreted threats.</p>
<p>But to the white paper’s credit, it has recognised the current environment’s uncertainties and tried to respond seriously, neither hiding nor panicking about Australia’s preparedness. This is long overdue.</p>
<p>In doing so, the overall presentation of a strategic rationale that attempts to align policy prescriptions, political priorities and shifting international circumstances indicates a welcome return to a more mature, serious debate about the use of Australia’s military and diplomatic assets.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53554/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia’s security bears no relation to whether we meet the target of raising defence spending to 2% of GDP.Daniel Baldino, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of Notre Dame AustraliaAndrew Carr, Research Fellow in Strategic and Defence Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/552242016-02-25T02:05:17Z2016-02-25T02:05:17ZDefence white paper: why Australia will opt for Japanese-built submarines<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/112686/original/image-20160224-32745-dz0yxi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Defence Minister Marise Payne is still to announce who will build Australia's next generation of submarines.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Ben Macmahon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With the release of its much-delayed <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Default.asp">defence white paper</a>, the Coalition has laid out its stall on matters of defence and security. It entails a commitment to increase spending to the <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/2-percent-can-we-should-we-will-we/">magical 2% of GDP</a>, a troop expansion of the Australian Defence Force, and a strong focus on the Navy. </p>
<p>At the heart of the paper is the decision to acquire a fleet of 12 long-range submarines at a potential overall cost of A$150 billion.</p>
<p>The new fleet is needed, the paper says, because Australia will be required to project naval power further from home in a regional security environment increasingly shaped by China’s growing military weight. This basic position appeared in both the <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf">2009</a> and <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf">2013</a> defence white papers under Labor. </p>
<p>What this white paper is silent on, however, is where these submarines will be acquired.</p>
<h2>The subs debate</h2>
<p>By some accounts, former prime minister Tony Abbott had locked in a decision to buy <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/tony-abbott-and-a-japanese-sub/">submarines from Japan</a>. This unravelled in response to the first challenge to Abbott’s leadership in February 2015. In an effort to shore up partyroom support, he <a href="https://defence-ministers.govspace.gov.au/files/2015/06/Terms-of-Reference.pdf">committed to</a> a nebulous “competitive evaluation process”. </p>
<p>This opened the door to bids from submarine-makers from around the world. It also enabled the government to try to get at least some aspects of the construction process based in Australia.</p>
<p>The Turnbull government has maintained the same public message. Lobbying has become intense and increasingly public, with the politics of the purchase now part of the various parties’ sales pitch. European manufacturers are openly claiming that one of the advantages in buying boats from Germany is that Australia won’t <a href="https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co16038-australias-submarine-decision-a-matter-of-grand-strategy/#.Vs0M1JN96Cc">inflame relations with China</a> as, by implication, buying boats from Japan would.</p>
<p>Japan’s pitch similarly emphasises the politics. Not only does it say its subs have the closest operational fit to what Australia wants from the vessels, but the purchase would strengthen the bilateral relationship and be good for the broader US-centred regional security arrangements. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.afr.com/news/world/asia/submarine-contract-could-lock-in-quasi-military-alliance-with-japan-20160220-gmzfal">Debate in Australia</a> has turned on the purchase’s economic impact and the extent to which it could lead the country into an alliance-type relationship with Japan. By binding itself to Japan, so the argument goes, Australia runs the risk of being dragged into fights it might otherwise have avoided.</p>
<p>Clearly, buying submarines involves a great deal more than buying a Camry, and not only because of the cost. There is a need to develop a kind of technical intimacy with which defence types are always uneasy. </p>
<p>However, those who argue that the J-option will tie Australia into a quasi-alliance with Japan are wrong. In this case, the technological link will follow a strategic choice that has long been made. The submarine decision will flow from Australia having committed itself to an extremely close long-term strategic relationship with Japan – not the other way around.</p>
<h2>A deepening relationship</h2>
<p>For the better part of a decade, strategic policymakers in Japan and Australia have developed a remarkably tight set of relations. The ties between the two are now <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/Pages/japan-country-brief.aspx">publicly acknowledged</a> as both countries’ most important after the US.</p>
<p>In 2007 Japan and Australia inked a <a href="http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html">security declaration</a> that laid out the foundation for a series of agreements relating to intelligence sharing, cross-servicing arrangements and defence technology transfer. Australia is also <a href="http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2015/jb_mr_150919.aspx?w=tb1CaGpkPX%2FlS0K%2Bg9ZKEg%3D%3D">strongly supportive</a> of the controversial <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/08/03/the-trouble-with-japans-new-security-bills/">security and defence policy reforms</a> that the Abe government has been pursuing to allow it to do more with its defence forces abroad.</p>
<p>Australia is so keen on Japan and supportive of these reforms primarily because it is profoundly invested in the indefinite perpetuation of the strategic status quo that has prevailed in East Asia since the late 1970s. This is an arrangement that is centred on US military predominance. </p>
<p>The problem is that China’s scale, wealth and ambition mean that things will have to change for the underlying status quo to remain viable. </p>
<p>The most important adjustment that has to occur is for Japan to take on a military and political weight that matches its economic size. Australia knows that Japan has to be able to do more and that the two countries equally have to be able to act together, and in alignment with the US, if the underlying setting in the region is to be sustained in the face of China’s rise. Hence the rapid move to become one another’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/turnbull-aims-to-retain-closest-friend-tag-in-first-japan-visit-52434">best friends</a> in the region.</p>
<p>This is a big strategic decision by Australia. It has bipartisan support but is unexplained by politicians on either side of politics. It is also the reason the J-option will prevail, whatever fig leaves the government tries to put on the “competitive evaluation process”.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>You can listen to Nick Bisley discuss the submarines issue in more detail in this podcast, produced by LaTrobe University.</em></p>
<iframe width="100%" height="450" scrolling="no" frameborder="no" src="https://w.soundcloud.com/player/?url=https%3A//api.soundcloud.com/tracks/248775995&auto_play=false&hide_related=false&show_comments=true&show_user=true&show_reposts=false&visual=true"></iframe><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55224/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley is a member of the Australian Institute for International Affairs' (AIIA) National Executive. The AIIA is a non-partisan not-for-profit organisation which aims po promote interest in and understanding of international affairs in Australia. </span></em></p>The defence white paper is silent on where Australia’s new fleet of 12 submarines will be acquired.Nick Bisley, Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/533912016-01-26T04:05:09Z2016-01-26T04:05:09ZWhy South Africa’s plans to militarise humanitarian work are misguided<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109049/original/image-20160122-417-19ufjhc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African National Defence Force soldiers help to unload maize for flood victims in
Mozambique.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African Defence Review, the country’s new defence policy, was approved in March 2014. It guides policy-making for the next two to three decades. </p>
<p>The promotion of stability and peace in Africa is a priority for South Africa. The <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-defence-review-2014">Defence Review</a> says it will contribute to the prevention and resolution of conflict by integrating its diplomatic, military and other efforts. In some instances this will be supported by appropriate military capabilities that strengthen the country’s capacity to influence international developments. </p>
<p>South Africa’s involvement is informed by a desire to support conflict management, peace-building and reconstruction in Africa. There are also geopolitical, security and economic interests at play.</p>
<p>The Defence Review took three years to complete. One would expect this to have been enough time to come up with a sound policy document. But there are two major problems with the role envisaged for the <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/">South African National Defence Force</a> in relation to African peace and stability.</p>
<h2>“Armed” humanitarian assistance</h2>
<p>The first is the plan to involve the country’s military in providing</p>
<blockquote>
<p>critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities during and immediately after military operations.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM_HumPrinciple_English.pdf">four principles</a> which guide humanitarian activities in conflict zones are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>humanity,</p></li>
<li><p>neutrality,</p></li>
<li><p>impartiality, and</p></li>
<li><p>independence. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Using armed forces to distribute humanitarian assistance in conflict or complex post-conflict areas violates the humanitarian principles. This includes foreign peacekeepers. The review does not even acknowledge humanitarian principles. This is an odd omission as they have been endorsed by the <a href="http://www.southafrica-newyork.net/speeches_pmun/view_speech.php?speech=3647798">government</a>. And they are crucial in any debate about engagement in conflict zones.</p>
<p>Humanitarian and military actors differ profoundly in terms of their training. This includes differences in skills, aims, mandates, agendas, operational methods and institutional cultures. Because of this, the responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance rests primarily with humanitarian and aid organisations. </p>
<p>The role of peacekeepers is to contribute to creating stability and security. They are also tasked with ensuring freedom of movement for local and international humanitarian aid workers.</p>
<p>South African peacekeepers will endanger humanitarian efforts if they get involved in humanitarian work. Instead of helping bring peace, stability and relief, they will compromise the work of humanitarian organisations.</p>
<h2>Developmental peacekeeping</h2>
<p>The second problem with South Africa’s new defence policy is the plan to engage in “developmental peacekeeping.” The review notes that the defence force</p>
<blockquote>
<p>can contribute greatly to socio-economic development by employing its diverse capabilities, such as its planning capability, in line with peace-operation forces.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The SANDF’s capabilities for socio-economic development are questionable. The force is in a critical state of <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-defence-review-2014">decline</a>. Its myriad problems include high HIV/Aids infection rates, skills and equipment shortages, indiscipline and an ageing force. </p>
<p>The army has limited capacity to meaningfully assist South Africa’s own development and growth, let alone post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa’s conflict zones.</p>
<p>But the real problem is the envisaged involvement of the military in socio-economic development in war torn countries. Post-conflict reconstruction <a href="http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=112187">takes place</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>in synergy with peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. On a practical level this would mean that post-conflict reconstruction practitioners and resources are deployed alongside peacekeepers. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In short, peacekeepers are supposed to contribute to the establishment of stability and security that enables reconstruction and development.</p>
<h2>Irresponsible and misguided policy-making</h2>
<p>South Africa needs to do more to help Africa’s war-torn countries stabilise and recover. But it is puzzling that the new policy would envisage the defence force being involved in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction and development in complex crises.</p>
<p>It is even more puzzling that this irresponsible and misguided thinking is part of a defence policy that will steer the defence force in the next few decades.</p>
<p>This could have been avoided if the defence review committee had consulted the literature on aid and development in conflict and post-conflict settings, and particularly these two documents:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the UN’s Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for <a href="http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47da82a72.pdf">Complex Emergencies</a>, and</p></li>
<li><p>South Africa’s own Revised White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/16893/">Missions</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>South Africa needs to engage in Africa in a strategic and pragmatic way. It also needs to ensure that tasks and responsibilities are delegated correctly. The defence force’s modest peacekeeping capabilities must be used properly. Most importantly, the guiding principle of any engagement should be “do no harm”.</p>
<p>Humanitarian work in Africa should be left to humanitarian and aid agencies. Reconstruction and development should be left to the New Partnership for Africa’s <a href="http://www.nepad.org/">Development</a>, development organisations and local actors.</p>
<p><em>This article is based on my <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2015.1124794">paper</a> published in African Security Review.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53391/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Savo Heleta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The South African military’s capabilities for socio-economic development are questionable, even in its own country. The force is in critical decline, but is expected to aid humanitarian efforts.Savo Heleta, Manager, Internationalisation at Home and Research, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/510022015-11-24T14:11:32Z2015-11-24T14:11:32ZPoll says 66% of Labour members support Corbyn – but it’s hard to find a friend in parliament<p>After a barrage of bad press over his position on Trident and his flip-flop over the so-called “shoot-to-kill” policy for armed terrorists, you’d expect Jeremy Corbyn’s stock to be sinking fast, even among the most starry eyed of the “Jez-we-can” supporters who voted him in as leader of the Labour party in September. But a new <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/politics/article4622011.ece">YouGov poll reported in The Times</a> has found that Corbyn enjoys the support of 66% of party members, a remarkable rise of seven points over the 59% who supported him at the leadership vote.</p>
<p>But his parliamentary colleagues aren’t as enthusiastic, to say the least, and his authority on the opposition benches will be sorely tested in coming days. First the party must respond to the government’s plans on defence spending and, within a matter of days, he and his team must also craft an effective response to the chancellor of the exchequer’s autumn statement. </p>
<p>To make matters even more tricky for Labour, the government will present new proposals to parliament on how to tackle the threat from Islamic State that may involve plans to extend the air campaign against the group from Iraq into Syria. </p>
<p>On all of these issues, the <a href="http://www.organizedrage.com/2015/07/interview-with-labour-party-leadership.html">broadly pacifist instincts of Corbyn</a> and his grassroots supporters are at odds with what his colleagues in the Parliamentary Labour Party feel is a more belligerent mood in the country. And the as the uneasy truce between the two sides begins visibly to break down, the Labour Party finds itself in a Mexican stand-off that could end very badly for all involved.</p>
<h2>Treble trouble</h2>
<p>Labour’s troubles are threefold. The first and most obvious source of conflict is ideological. Ever since World War I, when the the likes of the UK Labour Party, the Australian Labor Party and the German Social Democratic Party <a href="http://www.youngfabians.org.uk/labour_and_the_first_world_war">split over the slaughter in the trenches</a>, left-of-centre parties have been divided between a principled pacifist wing and what has normally been a majority prepared to back military force when considered necessary. </p>
<p>As I <a href="https://theconversation.com/plenty-for-labours-new-recruits-but-corbyn-speech-was-no-vote-winner-48290">have written here</a> questions of defence, and in particular the future of the Trident nuclear deterrent, have the potential to split Labour. Corbyn’s recent remarks, in which he undermined Labour policy by stating that <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2015/09/jeremy-corbyn-says-he-would-never-push-button-trident">he would never sanction a nuclear strike</a>, and more recently when he changed his mind over the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34840708">so-called “shoot-to-kill”</a> policy in the event of a potential Paris-style attack in the UK, have deeply angered many members of the parliamentary group.</p>
<p>The second problem is one of competence. Given that they have spent their careers on the backbenches, it is no surprise that left wingers like Corbyn and John McDonnell lack experience in managing the news cycle across a range of complex policy areas and ensuring that colleagues are all singing from the same hymn sheet. </p>
<p>It is a little more surprising to see colleagues such as Diane Abbott and Ken Livingstone, both of whom have more experience of running things, shooting from the hip as they have done in recent weeks. In the month since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-a-spin-why-seumas-milne-is-the-wrong-spokesman-for-jeremy-corbyn-49621">controversial appointment of Seamus Milne</a> as Corbyn’s head of communications things have, if anything, deteriorated further. In a private exchange, a Labour insider recently likened the party to a novelty advent calendar, in which every day the British public can open a new door to reveal a fresh calamity, an instance of surreal posturing, or just an example of rank incompetence. </p>
<p>The third problem, however, does not lie with Corbyn and his supporters but rather with some of his parliamentary opponents. For whether they like it or not, Corbyn is the democratically elected leader of the Labour Party and enjoys the support of the majority of the membership. If he were to be removed by parliamentary colleagues against the wishes of ordinary members there would be civil war.</p>
<h2>Problem of discipline</h2>
<p>No potential successor, such as Chuka Umunna or Dan Jarvis, would want to take over in such disarray. At the same time, no serious political party can tolerate the kind of sniping from the wings and briefings against the leader that we are currently seeing and still remain credible with the voters. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, Corbyn and his supporters appear to be unwilling to discipline the worst offenders (for example the MP Simon Danczuk) for fear of appearing to carry out a sectarian purge of the Labour right. At present all involved in Labour’s Mexican stand-off have a gun pointed directly at their own feet.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"665959284690305024"}"></div></p>
<p>So where does Labour go from here? Corbyn’s leadership is not drinking in the last-chance saloon just yet, but a failure to perform convincingly in the defence debate could be deeply damaging. And, even if he does manage to cobble together a compromise on the broad parameters of Britain’s defence, the question of Trident remains unresolved and seemingly intractable. </p>
<p>In an effort to avoid conflict, Corbyn has put the Trident issue out to internal review – but the clock is ticking. The government plans to bring the issue to parliament before the end of the year and there is no sign that Labour will be able or willing to present a united front in one of the most important strategic debates of our time.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51002/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Lees is a member of the Labour Party.</span></em></p>Corbyn can’t replicate his wider popularity among MPs. Will it cost him?Charles Lees, Professor of Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/397132015-04-23T10:04:17Z2015-04-23T10:04:17ZManifesto Check: Plaid Cymru’s defence policy is ‘vague and uncosted’<h2>Defence</h2>
<p><strong>Keith Hartley, Emeritus Professor at the University of York</strong></p>
<p>To begin with, it is worth noting that Plaid Cymru is not calling for defence to be devolved to Wales. Even so, <a href="http://www.partyof.wales/2015-manifesto/">the party’s manifesto</a> contains a vague and uncosted defence policy. There is just one costed commitment; namely, opposition to a Trident replacement, which the party claims (<a href="https://theconversation.com/fact-check-will-renewing-trident-cost-100-billion-39002">more or less correctly</a>) would cost £100 billion. Other commitments refer to basing Welsh army units in Wales, support for veterans and cyberdefence.</p>
<p>The manifesto fails to refer to, or identify, any specific defence and security threats to the UK and Wales. Nor is there any reference to the party’s preferred level of UK defence spending – though its leader’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/sep/12/plaid-cymru-leader-wales-prosper">previous statements on the matter</a> indicate that they would prefer a much lower level. </p>
<p>In its manifesto, Plaid Cymru pledge to use any savings from the cancellation of a Trident replacement to provide public services and safeguard jobs. The <a href="http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/trident_commission_defence-industrial_issues_keith_hartley_0.pdf">costs of Trident</a> are incurred over a 50 year lifetime, which means an annual average saving from cancellation of some £2 billion per year. These savings would accrue to the UK, with the Welsh share amounting to 5% – or £100 million per year – based on population. </p>
<p>No details are given as to which public services will be provided and how many jobs in which sectors will be safeguarded. Nor is there any recognition of the cancellation costs of the Trident replacement and the <a href="http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/trident_commission_defence-industrial_issues_keith_hartley_0.pdf">loss of potential jobs</a> from its cancellation. </p>
<p>There is a commitment to base Welsh army units in Wales to improve relationships with the local community and help soldiers’ families. This commitment lacks any details of the likely numbers involved, the impact on military effectiveness and the costs of re-basing. Presumably, current army units will need to be re-located and provided with appropriate training facilities. This will not be a costless option. The closest example in <a href="http://www.army.mod.uk/structure/33834.aspx">current policy</a> is the re-location of the British Army from Germany to the UK, which is set to cost £1.8 billion. </p>
<p>Plaid Cymru plans to provide improved support for veterans. Again, this is a vague policy which lacks details and costings. We are not informed of the problem, its magnitude, how it will be solved, or the likely costs. <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-5890.2002.tb00064.x/abstract;jsessionid=79A4ED613FA337AE3DBB92C361C31559.f03t04">Evidence suggests</a> that the defence industry makes a direct contribution to the supply of highly qualified labour in the UK. Plaid does not provide any evidence on the employability of veterans, and whether measures such as improved training would offer a cost-effective solution. </p>
<p>There is a mention of “looking after our Armed Forces by providing a peaceful and secure world, not by putting them unnecessarily in harm’s way”. But this proposal fails to recognise that Armed Forces are likely to be involved in conflicts to provide security and protection for UK citizens, and that inevitably such conflicts will put military personnel in “harm’s way”. This raises profound questions about the definition of unnecessary conflicts, and new models of governance in a potential federal state of Wales. </p>
<p>There is also a proposal for an EU civilian peace corps. This appears to be an attractive suggestion but again, it is long on emotion and short on details. There is no indication of how much would it cost, and how the burden would be shared between EU member states. </p>
<p>Plaid also pledges to “bolster cybersecurity defence capabilities to increase security and prevent cyber-attacks”. No details are given as to how this threat will be countered, or at what cost. Cyber-attacks are certainly a real threat, but it is a UK-wide threat and not a threat specific to Wales. </p>
<h2>Tackling extremism</h2>
<p><strong>Benedict Wilkinson, King’s College London</strong></p>
<p>At only 70 words long, Plaid Cymru’s policy on tackling extremism leaves many questions unanswered. Its basic assertion is that a Welsh civic identity, promoted through a variety of channels including schools and community organisations, will challenge the ideologies that drive individuals towards extremist views and activity. Under this logic, a stronger, more inclusive identity creates a more cohesive and resilient society, which dampens extremist tendencies and cuts the extremism problem off at the roots.</p>
<p>This might sound good, but it is not without issues. First, there’s the question of what constitutes this Welsh civic identity, and how such a thing could be promoted, while maintaining its legitimacy. It’s unclear how Plaid Cymru would persuade both real and potential extremists to relinquish their radical ideological views and adopt those it prefers; particularly since the current government’s <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/6504.htm">Prevent initiatives</a> to promote “identities” are widely <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8593862.stm">viewed with suspicion</a>. </p>
<p>A second issue concerns the scope of the policy – there is no mention of how much funding will it receive, or whether it will target violent extremism, non-violent extremism, or both. Nor does Plaid explain whether its policies will focus on all forms of extremism – including eco-terrorism and right wing extremism – or purely on Islamist extremism. </p>
<p>Plaid Cymru claims that its policies sits in opposition to “the UK Government’s divisive and stigmatising proposals that blame particular groups”. But in reality, they are not that far removed from one of the existing aspects of Prevent, which advocates for a “<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf">stronger sense of ‘belonging’ and citizenship that makes communities more resilient to terrorist ideology and propagandists</a>” and “<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf">depends on integration, democratic participation and a strong interfaith dialogue</a>”.</p>
<p><em>The Conversation’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/manifesto-check-2015">Manifesto Check</a> deploys academic expertise to scrutinise the parties’ plans.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/39713/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Hartley receives funding from Research Councils, the EC, EDA, UN, UK Government and private industry. These funds were for academic research none of which involved Wales, and this article does not reflect the views of the research councils. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benedict Wilkinson has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. He is an Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute. Views expressed here are his own.</span></em></p>Plaid Cymru doesn’t have much detail to offer when it comes to defence.Keith Hartley, Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of YorkBenedict Wilkinson, Research Fellow, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/363542015-02-05T19:38:13Z2015-02-05T19:38:13ZShaping 2015: Andrews must show $30b defence budget is well spent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70418/original/image-20150129-22295-1s6xqhb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Defence’s year in 2015 will be defined primarily by its response to the forthcoming white paper.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Hugh Peterswald</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia has decisively responded to the strategic uncertainty of contemporary East Asia by forming committees and undertaking reviews. 2015 brings with it Australia’s third defence white paper in six years, along with a growing list of major <a href="http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2014/08/05/defence-minister-announces-first-principles-review-panel/">supporting reviews</a>. The challenge for the new minister, Kevin Andrews, will be to help the Department of Defence figure out how to implement it all.</p>
<p>As an organisation, Defence has come a long way in recent years, particularly under the guidance of <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/secretary/Biography.asp">Dennis Richardson</a>, perhaps Australia’s leading public servant. But even Richardson, who has stints as ambassador to the US and head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade under his belt, needs a strong minister to help him get the civilian and uniform sections of Defence moving in co-ordination. </p>
<p>Expect debate on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-joint-strike-fighter-is-it-the-right-aircraft-for-australia-25911">F-35 Joint Strike Fighter</a> and whether Australia should buy <a href="https://theconversation.com/government-in-a-rush-to-make-the-wrong-decision-on-submarines-33544">Japanese subs</a> to continue in 2015. Both speak to larger unresolvable issues, like Australia’s relationships with bigger countries and domestic manufacturing, with entrenched positions on either side.</p>
<h2>The upcoming white paper</h2>
<p>Defence’s year in 2015 will be defined primarily by its response to the <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/">white paper</a> expected some time mid-year. Andrews has come into the portfolio too late to significantly influence the document. Given his lack of expertise in military matters that is no bad thing.</p>
<p>The white paper is unlikely to provide a major new organising strategic concept that easily identifies Defence’s priorities and force structures. Where the Cold War could offer multiple such ideas — notably <a href="http://vietnam-war.commemoration.gov.au/vietnam-war/australia-enters-1962.php">“forward defence”</a> and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_of_Australia_policy">“Defence of Australia”</a> – the modern era has no such clarity.</p>
<p>Instead, the 2015 Defence White Paper is likely to largely accept the mixed judgement about Australia’s strategic environment that guided the <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2009/">2009</a> and <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/">2013</a> papers. Rather than debating China as friend or foe, the document will most likely focus on the back end, identifying capabilities and command systems that are flexible yet effective enough to respond to a wide range of challenges.</p>
<p>Past defence white papers were proud to talk about the major assets the government should purchase and the idealistic environments they hoped to build. But how the former achieved the latter was often left unsaid – a matter for back-office bureaucrats to resolve long after the minister had moved on. </p>
<p>If Andrews can influence just one thing in the final drafting process it should be this relationship. The minister should be insisting the document is explicit in identifying the “strategic bridge” that links particular capabilities (ships, planes, troops) to the political outcomes Australia seeks. </p>
<p>In other words, how does the <a href="http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2014/05/13/minister-for-defence-budget-2014-15-defence-budget-overview/">nearly A$30 billion</a> the Australian public spends on defence directly achieve the type of world we want?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70423/original/image-20150129-22292-hqsn3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70423/original/image-20150129-22292-hqsn3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70423/original/image-20150129-22292-hqsn3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70423/original/image-20150129-22292-hqsn3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70423/original/image-20150129-22292-hqsn3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70423/original/image-20150129-22292-hqsn3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70423/original/image-20150129-22292-hqsn3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kevin Andrews has come into the defence portfolio too late to significantly influence this year’s white paper.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Lukas Coch</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Tackling funding questions</h2>
<p>Bereft of a grand organising concept, the Abbott government is likely to hedge its bets: closer co-operation with allies without needlessly antagonising potential opponents; a diversified, rather than focused, force. </p>
<p>But to make these flexible strategies work, the operational motor behind it all – the looming city on a hill that is the <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/id/_Master/docs/ncrp/act/1004,%20Russell%20Offices,%20ACT.pdf">Russell Defence offices</a> – has to be smooth and efficient.</p>
<p>In this regard, Andrews’ main task is one he has almost a decade’s worth of experience in: managing a major government department and keeping large-scale reforms – many already well underway – in train. There’s a reason Prime Minister Tony Abbott <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/kevin-andrews-faces-battles-on-multiple-fronts/story-fn59niix-1227163766880">chose</a> one of his most experienced colleagues for this portfolio. Defence has a nasty habit of ruling ministers, rather than the other way around, ensuring Andrews will need all his guile and authority as a minister to stay in charge.</p>
<p>In return, Andrews also needs to provide a vital service to Defence. While other areas are seeing budgets slashed and priorities questioned, the Abbott government has committed to substantially expanding Defence’s budget to reach <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/2-percent-can-we-should-we-will-we/">2% of Australia’s GDP</a>. </p>
<p>This largely passed without public comment last budget. But if there is another hostile reaction to Treasury’s axe swinging in May, the public will rightly ask why Defence has not only escaped the chopping block, but has seemingly been able to write its own cheque.</p>
<p>To protect Defence from another crippling round of start-stop funding promises, Andrews needs to convince the public of the merits of higher defence spending. This can’t just be through a fear campaign about foreign bogeymen. He needs to seriously engage the public, admit the limited basis upon which judgements have to be made, discuss the range of plausible threats and find a justification for perhaps the largest-ever peacetime expansion of national military spending.</p>
<p>If Andrews can perform these two acts of service – giving his senior bureaucrats the support to turn the incoming torrent of talk into the fuel for implementing their reforms, while crafting a public narrative that sustains Defence’s funding stream – he will have had a very successful 2015. But it is unlikely any of his colleagues will be envious of the task ahead.</p>
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<p><em>This is the final piece in The Conversation’s Shaping 2015 series. Catch up on the rest <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/shaping-2015">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36354/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Carr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia has decisively responded to the strategic uncertainty of contemporary East Asia by forming committees and undertaking reviews. 2015 brings with it Australia’s third defence white paper in six…Andrew Carr, Research Fellow in Strategic and Defence Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.