tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/defense-spending-12237/articlesDefense spending – The Conversation2023-10-13T12:33:38Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2146672023-10-13T12:33:38Z2023-10-13T12:33:38ZEmpire building has always come at an economic cost for Russia – from the days of the czars to Putin’s Ukraine invasion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553555/original/file-20231012-15-bte4g9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C7276%2C5239&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Russian economy: A Potemkin village?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/women-walk-past-a-military-propaganda-poster-advertising-news-photo/1597113264?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has come at huge economic costs. By conservative estimates, the Russian economy has taken a <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2023/05/30/how-much-is-russia-spending-on-its-invasion-of-ukraine">US$67 billion</a> annual hit as a result of war expenses and the effects of economic sanctions. In the early stages of the invasion, some analysts put the costs even higher, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-spending-estimated-900-million-day-ukraine-war-1704383">at $900 million per day</a>.</p>
<p>These war costs show no sign of abating. The newly released Russian government budget for 2024 calls for a 70% defense expenditure increase, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/everything-front-russia-allots-third-2024-spending-defence-2023-10-02">an astonishing reallocation</a> of precious resources for a war that some observers <a href="https://theintercept.com/2022/10/05/russia-ukraine-putin-cia/">expected to last a week</a> at most.</p>
<p>Despite the toll of war and sanctions, the <a href="https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/09/28/the-costs-of-russias-war-are-about-to-hit-home">Russian economy has not collapsed</a> and seems to have proven somewhat <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3652bbb5-a0f9-4d54-adc6-03b645a44306">resilient against being shut out of global value chains</a>.</p>
<p>Indeed, if you were to tune in to broadcasts of state-run RT television’s <a href="https://www.rt.com/shows/crosstalk/583976-ukraine-support-west-doubt/">“CrossTalk”</a> with American host Peter Lavelle, you’d be reassured that hardly anyone notices “irrelevant” Western sanctions, with even some reputable <a href="https://www.cirsd.org/en/news/prof-sachs-%E2%80%9Csanctions-against-russia-ineffective-and-contrary-to-international-law%E2%80%9D">Western economists</a> claiming that sanctions are harming Europe more than Russia. </p>
<p>Certainly, Muscovite oligarchs can still stroll across Red Square to <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11685551/The-luxury-goods-famous-UK-brands-sale-Moscow.html">Agent Provocateur and the GUM luxury shopping mall</a> to buy lingerie for their wives and perhaps mistresses, too. And almost 8 in 10 Russians <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/western-sanctions-have-largely-spared-ordinary-russians">report to pollsters</a> that sanctions have not affected their daily lives.</p>
<p>But from our standpoint as <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=s25Y7l0AAAAJ&hl=en">experts on Russian</a> <a href="https://law.umn.edu/profiles/paul-vaaler">economic history</a>, it looks very much like a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Potemkin-village">Potemkin village</a> – a false facade that belies harsh economic realities, including unsustainable defense spending, a plummeting currency and rising bond yields. Meat and poultry prices in Moscow <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/09/business/economy/russia-economy-ukraine-war.html">continue to rise</a>, <a href="https://www.economicsobservatory.com/sanctions-against-russia-what-have-been-the-effects-so-far#:%7E:text=But%20the%20shock%20of%20the,lowered%20ordinary%20Russians'%20living%20standards.">retail sales across Russia have dropped</a> by nearly 8% since February 2022, and <a href="https://www.airport-technology.com/features/how-have-sanctions-against-russia-impacted-aviation/?cf-view">Russia’s aviation industry has plummeted</a> for lack of spare parts and maintenance. </p>
<p>Such an economic hit was to be expected. As we show in a <a href="https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2309.06885">preprint study</a>, imperial overreach from Russia in territories that are not its own has resulted in long-term damage to the Russian economy for over a century. More importantly, even during czarist times, rebellion in the modern-day lands of Ukraine against Russian rule led to the highest costs for the Russian economy.</p>
<h2>Huge boost in military spending</h2>
<p>Russia’s ability to seemingly absorb massive shocks since February 2022 is due in part to producers becoming accustomed to the milder sanctions that <a href="https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2015/07/13/sanctions-after-crimea-have-they-worked/index.html">began in 2014</a> with the initial invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. </p>
<p>However, a larger driver of performance has been the Russian government taking it upon itself to try to keep the economy afloat by increasing its <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-06/state-role-in-russia-economy-at-whole-new-level-watchdog-says?embedded-checkout=true">involvement in all sectors of the economy</a>, <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/06/15/putin-signs-secret-decree-to-buy-discounted-western-companies-ft-a81510">nationalizing formerly Western-owned businesses</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/31/world/europe/russia-war-economy.html">pumping money from the state budget</a> into the <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100157657">military industrial complex</a>.</p>
<p>This approach has continued with the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/everything-front-russia-allots-third-2024-spending-defence-2023-10-02/">Russian government’s 2024 budget</a>, which is currently on its way to be rubber-stamped in the Russian parliament, the Duma. While <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/09/29/russian-military-says-no-plans-for-new-mobilization-a82602">mobilization of troops</a> for Russia’s growing quagmire is moving in fits and starts, the Kremlin has proceeded with a full-scale economic mobilization. Expenditures on defense are forecast to be 6% of the country’s GDP, making up a full 29% of all Russian government spending, <a href="https://www.bofit.fi/en/monitoring/weekly/2023/vw202339_1/">according to an analysis by the Bank of Finland</a>, and with an additional 9% spent on “national security.” In contrast, social programs are a mere 21% of the budget. Compare this with the United States, where defense spending is 3% of GDP and <a href="https://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0053_defense-comparison">12% of all government expenditures</a>. </p>
<p>Financial markets have reacted poorly to Russia’s most recent imperial adventure. The ruble’s turbulence is well known, once again <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/03/world/europe/russia-ruble-dollar-economy.html">breaking 100 rubles to the dollar</a> on Oct. 3, 2023, but Russia’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60672085">inability to service its debt</a> has been more under the radar.</p>
<p>For the first time since the Bolsheviks refused to honor the country’s foreign debt in 1918, <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/07/russian-debt-default-russia-global-financial-markets">Russia defaulted on its foreign currency payments</a> in June 2022, and major ratings agencies stopped rating Russian government bonds. </p>
<p>At the same time, bond yields on existing Russian government debt – an excellent measure of fiscal risk – have been climbing almost continuously since the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, rising to nearly 14% in 2014 and recently climbing to over 13%, <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/government-bond-yield">an 18-month high</a>. </p>
<h2>Ponzi-like scheme</h2>
<p>The combination of military aggression, stretched finances and battlefield stagnation are nothing new for Russia, especially in Ukraine. As our study shows, <a href="https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2309.06885">czarist fiscal management from 1820 to 1914</a> was based on a Ponzi-like scheme that funded land grabs and military expansion with government borrowing through bond issues, taxation of newly acquired territories and bond repayment by a government now overseeing a more geographically extensive state. </p>
<p>By 1914, Czar Nicholas II had bonds worth more than $155 billion in 2022 dollars trading abroad – by comparison, the <a href="https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781513511795/ch002.xml">value of British debt in 1914</a> equates to approximately $123 billion today. </p>
<p>Vladimir Putin’s handling of the economy since the early 2000s has been based on a similar pyramid scheme, we would argue. A combination of aggressive foreign borrowing and natural resource exports have financed foreign wars and domestic repression in territories of Russia’s near abroad: These have included <a href="https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_aug00bag01.html">conflicts in Chechnya</a> <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-2008-russo-georgian-war-putins-green-light/">and Georgia</a> in the 2000s; <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html">Crimea and the Donbas</a> in the 2010s; and the rest of Ukraine in the 2020s. Until this current round of aggression toward Ukraine, the outcome of these conflicts appeared to favor Russia, with its seemingly strong central government, military and economy. </p>
<p>However, Russia may now be at an inflection point. Historically, when Russia’s military was successful, it was able to finance both its war machine and industrialization. </p>
<p>Yet even past military success put the regime on very shaky ground that allowed small setbacks to threaten its foundation. Military reversals such as the stunning <a href="https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=qb_pubs">loss to Japan in 1905</a> or even the costs associated with pacifying troublesome territories such as <a href="https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/LP20_Russian-SovietUnconventionalWars.pdf">in the Caucasus</a> created more difficulties and risk for Russian bond markets and its economy. Indeed, unrest, armed rebellion and serf revolts in the far reaches of the empire raised Russian bond yields by approximately 1%. This risk was much higher than if such unrest occurred even in St. Petersburg or Moscow. </p>
<p>And perhaps most importantly, in Ukraine the cost of empire during czarist times was the largest, with each rebellion or bout of unrest in Ukraine raising Russian yields by between 3% and 3.5%. </p>
<p>With its newest defense budget <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/putin-redirects-russias-economy-to-war-production-1e14265f">going “all in</a>” on its already faltering invasion of Ukraine, Russia appears to have learned none of the lessons of its past. Then as now, Ukraine and Ukrainian defiance constituted a grave threat to Russian territorial ambitions. </p>
<p>In 2024, that defiance just might prove too determined and too costly for an increasingly fragile Russian economy. And as in 1917, the consequences could be far beyond the control of <a href="https://time.com/6218211/vladimir-putin-russian-tsars-imperialism/">the modern-day czar</a> in the Kremlin.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214667/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new study traces how Russia’s empire building, especially in Ukraine, resulted in long-term economic damage and fomented rebellion for over a century.Christopher A. Hartwell, Professor of International Business Policy, ZHAW School of Management and LawPaul Vaaler, Professor of Law and Business, University of MinnesotaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1645882021-09-01T12:07:44Z2021-09-01T12:07:44ZCalculating the costs of the Afghanistan War in lives, dollars and years<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418456/original/file-20210830-15-1wfwsc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C33%2C4493%2C2964&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Heading for the exit.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/member-of-the-afghan-police-and-us-soldiers-leave-a-school-news-photo/495500609?adppopup=true">Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The U.S. invaded Afghanistan in late 2001 to destroy al-Qaida, remove the Taliban from power and remake the nation. On Aug. 30, 2021, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/rockets-fired-kabul-airport-us-troops-race-complete-evacuation-2021-08-30/">U.S. completed a pullout of troops</a> from Afghanistan, providing an uncertain punctuation mark to two decades of conflict.</p>
<p>For the past 11 years I have closely followed the post-9/11 conflicts for the <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/">Costs of War Project</a>, an initiative that brings together more than 50 scholars, physicians and legal and human rights experts to provide an account of the human, economic, budgetary and political costs and consequences of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.</p>
<p>Of course, by themselves figures can never give a complete picture of what happened and what it means, but they can help put this war in perspective.</p>
<p>The 20 numbers highlighted below, some drawn from figures released on Sept. 1, 2021, by the Costs of War Project, help tell the story of the Afghanistan War.</p>
<h2>From 2001 to 2021</h2>
<p>On Sept. 18, 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives voted <strong><a href="https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/107-2001/h342">420-1</a></strong> and the Senate <strong><a href="https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=107&session=1&vote=00281">98-0</a></strong> to <a href="https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf">authorize</a> the United States to go to war, not just in Afghanistan, but in an open-ended commitment against “those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.” U.S. Rep. Barbara Lee of California cast the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2021/08/17/barbara-lee-afghanistan-vote/">only vote opposed</a> to the war.</p>
<p>In other words, the U.S. Congress took <strong><a href="https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf">7 days</a></strong> after the 9/11 attacks to deliberate on and authorize the war.</p>
<p>At <strong><a href="https://www.timeanddate.com/date/durationresult.html?m1=10&d1=7&y1=2001&m2=08&d2=31&y2=2021">7,262 days</a></strong> from the first attack on Afghanistan to the final troop pullout, Afghanistan is said to be the U.S.’s longest war. But it isn’t – the U.S. has <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/why-korean-war-never-technically-ended">not officially ended the Korean War</a>. And U.S. operations in Vietnam, which began in the mid-1950s and included the declared war from 1965-1975, also rival Afghanistan in longevity.</p>
<p>U.S. President <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html">George W. Bush told</a> members of Congress in a joint session on Sept. 20, 2001 that the war would be global, overt, covert and could last a very long time.</p>
<p>“Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. … Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen,” <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html">he said</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="President George W. Bush addressing US troops." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418462/original/file-20210830-13-1wrt01x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418462/original/file-20210830-13-1wrt01x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418462/original/file-20210830-13-1wrt01x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418462/original/file-20210830-13-1wrt01x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418462/original/file-20210830-13-1wrt01x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418462/original/file-20210830-13-1wrt01x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418462/original/file-20210830-13-1wrt01x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President George W. Bush speaks to soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-george-w-bush-speaks-to-soliders-from-the-10th-news-photo/525617790?adppopup=true">Brooks Kraft LLC/Corbis via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The U.S. started bombing Afghanistan a few weeks later. The Taliban surrendered in Kandahar on Dec. 9, 2001. The U.S. began to fight them again in earnest in March 2002. In April 2002, President Bush promised to help bring “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/18/world/a-nation-challenged-the-president-bush-sets-role-for-us-in-afghan-rebuilding.html">true peace</a>” to Afghanistan: “Peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan develop its own stable government. Peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan train and develop its own national army. And peace will be achieved through an education system for boys and girls which works.” </p>
<p>The global war on terror was not confined to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. now has counterterrorism operations in <strong><a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2021/USCounterterrorismOperations">85 countries</a></strong>.</p>
<h2>The human cost</h2>
<p>Most Afghans alive today were not born when the U.S. war began. The median age in Afghanistan is just <strong><a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/afghanistan-population">18.4 years old</a></strong>. Including their country’s war with the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989 and civil war in the 1990s, most Afghans have lived under nearly continuous war. </p>
<p>There are, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, <strong><a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/vet.htm#cps_veterans.f.1.">980,000 U.S. Afghanistan war veterans</a></strong>. Of these men and women, <strong><a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/vet.htm#cps_veterans.f.1.">507,000 served in both Afghanistan and Iraq</a></strong>.</p>
<p>As of mid-August 2021, <strong><a href="https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf">20,722</a></strong> members of the U.S. military had been wounded in action in Afghanistan, not including the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/26/afghanistan-kabul-taliban-live-updates/">18 who were injured</a> in the attack by ISIS-K outside the airport in Kabul on Aug. 26, 2021.</p>
<p>Of the veterans who were injured and lost a limb in the post-9/11 wars, many lost <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23192067/">more than one</a>. According to <a href="https://www.health.mil/News/Articles/2021/08/09/Since-Gulf-War-Advanced-Prosthetic-Technology-Saves-Lives-Careers">Dr. Paul Pasquina</a> of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, of these veterans, “About 40% to 60% also sustained a brain injury. Because of some of the lessons learned and the innovations that have taken place on the battlefield … we were taking care of service members who in previous conflicts would have died.”</p>
<p>In fact, because of advances in trauma care, more than <a href="https://www.pennmedicine.org/news/news-releases/2020/july/us-military-has-improved-mortality-since-world-war-ii-but-there-have-been-some-alarming-exceptions"><strong>90%</strong></a> of all soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq who were injured in the field survived. Many of the seriously injured <a href="https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamasurgery/article-abstract/2729451">survived wounds</a> that in the past might have killed them.</p>
<p>In all, <strong><a href="https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf.">2,455 U.S. service members</a></strong> were killed in the Afghanistan War. The figure includes 13 U.S. troops who were killed by ISIS-K in the Kabul airport attack on Aug. 26, 2021.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The casket of a US soldier is seen through a doorway during a full military honors burial ceremony" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418458/original/file-20210830-26-k50cwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418458/original/file-20210830-26-k50cwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418458/original/file-20210830-26-k50cwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418458/original/file-20210830-26-k50cwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418458/original/file-20210830-26-k50cwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418458/original/file-20210830-26-k50cwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418458/original/file-20210830-26-k50cwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A burial for one of 2,455 U.S. troops who died in
Afghanistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Olivier Douliery/AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>U.S. deaths in Operation Enduring Freedom also include 130 service members who died in other locations besides Afghanistan, including Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Yemen.</p>
<p>The U.S. has paid <strong><a href="https://militarypay.defense.gov/Benefits/Death-Gratuity/#:%7E:text=The%20death%20gratuity%20program%20provides,of%20the%20cause%20of%20death.">US$100,000 in a “death gratuity</a>”</strong> to the survivors of each of the service members killed in the Afghanistan war, totaling <strong>$245.5 million</strong>. </p>
<p><strong>More than <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures">46,000 civilians have been killed</a></strong> by all sides in the Afghanistan conflict. These are the direct deaths from bombs, bullets, blasts and fire. <a href="https://unama.unmissions.org/protection-of-civilians-reports">Thousands more have been injured</a>, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>And while the number of Afghans leaving the country has increased in <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-do-afghanistans-refugees-go-166316">recent weeks</a>, more than <strong><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58283177">2.2 million displaced Afghans</a></strong> were living in Iran and Pakistan at the end of 2020. The United Nations Refugee Agency reported in late August 2021 that since the start of that year, <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/88385">more than 558,000</a> people have been internally displaced, having fled their homes to escape violence. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/07/1095922">United Nations</a>, in 2021 about a third of people remaining in Afghanistan are malnourished. <strong><a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/07/1095922">About half of all children under 5 years old</a></strong> experience malnutrition.</p>
<p>The human toll also includes the hundreds of Pakistani civilians who were killed in <strong><a href="https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/americas-counterterrorism-wars/the-drone-war-in-pakistan">more than 400 U.S. drone strikes</a></strong> since 2004. Those strikes happened as the U.S. sought to kill Taliban and al-Qaida leaders who fled and sheltered there in late 2001 after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistani civilians have also been killed in crossfire during fighting between militants and the Pakistani military.</p>
<h2>The financial cost</h2>
<p>In terms of the federal budget, Congress has allocated a bit over <strong>$1 trillion</strong> to the Department of Defense for the Afghanistan War. But all told, the Afghanistan War has cost much more than that. Including the Department of Defense spending, more than <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/BudgetaryCosts"><strong>$2.3 trillion</strong></a> has been spent so far, including increases to the Pentagon’s base military budget due to the fighting, State Department spending to reconstruct and democratize Afghanistan and train its military, interest on borrowing to pay for the war, and spending for veterans in the Veteran Affairs system.</p>
<p>The total costs so far for all post-9/11 war veterans’ disability and medical care costs are about <strong>$465 billion</strong> through fiscal 2022. And this doesn’t include the future costs of all the post-9/11 veterans’ medical and disability care, which <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/lbilmes/home">Harvard University scholar Linda Bilmes</a> <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2021/CareforVeterans">estimates</a> will likely add about $2 trillion to the overall cost of care for veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars between now and 2050.</p>
<p>The war in Afghanistan, like many other wars before it, began with optimistic assessments of a quick victory and the promise to rebuild at war’s end. Despite Bush’s warning of a lengthy campaign, few thought then that would mean decades. But 20 years later, the U.S is still counting the costs. </p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This article was updated on Sept. 1, 2021 to correct the total death gratuity paid to survivors of service members killed in the Afghanistan war to $245.5 million.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164588/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Neta C. Crawford receives funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. She is co-director of the Costs of War Project based at Brown University.</span></em></p>Following the completion of the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, Neta Crawford, the co-director of the Costs of War Project, reflects on 7,268 days of American involvement in the conflict.Neta C. Crawford, Professor of Political Science and Department Chair, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/738242017-03-09T04:18:49Z2017-03-09T04:18:49ZWhy Trump’s ‘skinny’ budget is already dead<p>The Trump administration is about to formally lay out its spending priorities for the country in its first budget proposal. </p>
<p>Some of the outlines <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/27/press-briefing-press-secretary-sean-spicer-2272017-17">are already out there</a>, signaling a massive increase in military appropriations that will be offset by deep cuts to other discretionary spending, including <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/us/politics/trump-program-eliminations-white-house-budget-office.html">foreign aid, the National Endowment for the Arts </a>and <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/trump-coast-guard-budget-235750">the Coast Guard</a>. President Donald Trump himself <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/28/politics/donald-trump-congress-speech/">touched on some of these themes</a> in his recent speech before Congress. </p>
<p>But some key <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-budget-faces-gop-resistance-235467?lo=ap_d1">Republicans wasted little time</a> before deeming the president’s budget blueprint “<a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-02-28/lindsey-graham-trump-budget-dead-on-arrival-in-congress">dead on arrival</a>,” with Senator Lindsey Graham calling it “politically unrealistic.” </p>
<p>A more apt description, however, might be “dead before arrival.” </p>
<p>Why would that be? Partly because it’s challenging to craft a budget during a transition year. More importantly, however, it’s because Trump’s proposal combines a slap-dash process with heavy-handed non-defense-spending cuts. </p>
<h2>How the budget process works</h2>
<p>While Congress is ultimately responsible for writing the federal budget – which last year contained about US$4 trillion in spending – the legally mandated proposal provided by the executive branch is essential to getting it done. That’s because <a href="https://theconversation.com/obama-may-be-a-lame-duck-but-his-final-budget-isnt-54784">Congress does not have the capacity</a> to replace the extensive work done by all the departments when they prepare the president’s annual budget request. </p>
<p>Current law <a href="http://budget.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=276880">requires</a> that the president send his budget to Congress by the first Monday in February. During transition years, however, that <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20752.pdf">usually gets pushed</a> to April or May because it takes a while for incoming presidents to staff key positions. This delay happens despite the fact that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) includes hundreds of professional examiners who exemplify the practice of “<a href="http://www.whitehousetransitionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/WHTP2017_22_OMB_an_Insiders_Guide.pdf">neutral competence</a>” – providing expert analysis to both Democratic and Republican presidents.</p>
<p>In fact, prior to 1990, <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20752.pdf">lame duck presidents submitted their own budget blueprints</a> because Congress required one before Inauguration Day, and their successors either edited it a bit or, in a couple cases, left it as is. </p>
<p>But after the deadline was extended in 1990, the past three presidents have had to hastily assemble their own vision for the country, largely from scratch, in what eventually became known as a “skinny budget,” meaning it skimped on many of the usual details. </p>
<p>Now it’s Trump’s turn to propose a budget for fiscal year 2018, which starts Oct. 1. Trump’s skinny budget, expected to come out around March 16, will be a lot skinnier than usual.</p>
<h2>Sneak previews</h2>
<p>The announced focus of Trump’s budget will be on discretionary spending, which for fiscal year 2017 is projected to total <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52370">$1.2 trillion</a>, or about 30 percent of the overall budget (the rest includes Social Security, Medicare and other mandatory spending such as interest payments on the national debt). About half of discretionary spending funds the military, while the rest pays for a wide range of programs from education to environmental protection. </p>
<p>Most notably, Trump reportedly wants to increase defense spending by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/us/politics/trump-budget-military.html?_r=0">$54 billion</a> and fully offset that amount by cutting other discretionary programs. According to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/27/press-briefing-press-secretary-sean-spicer-2272017-17">OMB Director Mick Mulvaney</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“It reduces money that we give to other nations, it reduces duplicative programs, and it eliminates programs that simply don’t work.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While Mulvaney declined to describe where exactly those cuts would fall, elements of the plan have <a href="http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2017/03/here_are_42_of_president_donal.html">leaked</a>. Examples include a 69 percent cut to the EPA’s spending on climate change and 78 percent for its environmental justice programs. These cuts are designed, it seems clear, to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bannons-dangerous-deconstruction/2017/02/26/0d1aab0e-fad2-11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html?utm_term=.9e10514415b6">reduce the ability of the government</a> to regulate business groups that have supported the Republican Party. </p>
<p>But some cuts are already meeting strong resistance. Even Trump’s hand-picked Environmental Protection Agency director, Scott Pruitt – who as Oklahoma attorney general repeatedly sued the agency he now runs – has <a href="http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2017/03/03/New-EPA-Chief-Scott-Pruitt-Balking-Trump-s-Big-Budget-Cuts">voiced opposition</a> to the reduced EPA spending. </p>
<p>A closer look at the process of how these plans were reached reveals a significant flaw and the reason this budget will not be acceptable to Congress. </p>
<h2>A top-down process</h2>
<p>The process of creating a spending blueprint typically begins during “budget season” – October through December – when government agencies submit their wish lists to the OMB, which then compares requests with the president’s desired policies and edits them as necessary. </p>
<p>That didn’t happen during this transition, because the Obama administration – as sometimes happens when there’s a change in government – asked departments only to submit estimates of continuing current policies rather than the usual full requests that would have been reviewed by the outgoing government. That gave Trump’s team a slow start, which was <a href="http://www.rollcall.com/news/mick-mulvaney-omb-director-trump">made worse</a> by the transition’s delays in identifying key political appointees. </p>
<p>Yet the overall direction of the budget was still set at the top by the president. OMB Director <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/27/press-briefing-press-secretary-sean-spicer-2272017-17">Mulvaney summed up how this budget was prepared</a> this way: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“We are taking his words and turning them into policies and dollars.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In reality, however, as is clear from a reading of what is proposed, Mulvaney has relied on conservative advocacy organizations such as the <a href="http://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/report/blueprint-reform-comprehensive-policy-agenda-new-administration-2017">Heritage Foundation</a> to identify many of those specific “policies and dollars.” </p>
<p>That groups affiliated with the incoming president have such influence is nothing new. What is different this time is that their proposals did not receive much of a vetting. </p>
<p>In the typical process, the budget requests that have been trimmed by OMB analysts are sent back as “passbacks” to originating departments for potential appeal, giving them a chance to explain why certain spending or programs are necessary. But when Mulvaney revealed the outline of his budget, he made the remarkable admission that the OMB had not yet delivered its passbacks to the departments – less than three weeks before the budget would be released. </p>
<p>The bottom line is that the White House publicized a <a href="http://www.cbpp.org/blog/trump-plans-big-cut-in-domestic-programs">target of $54 billion</a> (11 percent of 2017 discretionary spending) in cuts without receiving any feedback from agencies about the feasibility of making them. Further, because the administration and Congress have also already called for increases in spending in certain areas – such as <a href="http://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=394662">veterans health programs</a>, <a href="http://federalnewsradio.com/hiringretention/2017/02/will-take-hire-15000-new-border-immigration-agents/">doubling the number of border patrol agents</a> and <a href="http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article128492614.html">infrastructure investments</a> – that means the $54 billion hammer will fall even harder on everything else. </p>
<p>Hence the negative reaction from Congress, which understands how <a href="http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/315537-trump-gop-set-to-battle-on-spending-cuts">politically popular</a> many of the programs targeted for cuts are. Some previous proposals to impose similar cuts were defeated, such as in the successful campaign to “<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/23/AR2005062301897.html">save Big Bird</a>.”</p>
<p>After all, non-defense appropriations have already been cut greatly since 2010, when they <a href="http://www.cbpp.org/blog/trump-plans-big-cut-in-domestic-programs">tallied an inflation-adjusted $612 billion</a>. Spending caps adopted in 2010 placed a ceiling of $516 billion for such spending. Trump’s budget would drop it further to $462 billion. </p>
<p>So even though Trump’s skinny budget will propose big cuts – and some will be adopted – Congress will not rubber-stamp many of them.</p>
<p>And oddly, there was no reason to rush in the first place. </p>
<p>The government is currently running on a continuing resolution for fiscal year 2017 after Republicans decided not to pass regular appropriations bills – which were supposed to be enacted by last October – until after President Trump took office. That continuing resolution expires on April 28. </p>
<p>So Congress will need to pass 2017 appropriation bills before it can even look at the 2018 budget. Clearly the administration could have taken its time before releasing its proposal. </p>
<h2>Budgets are complicated too</h2>
<p>In other words, the lack of substance combined with politically toxic spending cuts mean Trump’s first budget blueprint stands little chance of full adoption.</p>
<p>Over the rest of the year, if Republicans are to enact a full budget for 2018, there will have to be a meeting of the minds between Congressional Republicans and President Trump – which currently seem very far apart on key issues. </p>
<p>Most Republicans tend to advocate for a balanced budget and debt reduction. In contrast, the nonpartisan Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget <a href="http://www.crfb.org/papers/promises-and-price-tags-preliminary-update">estimated</a> before the election that adopting all of Trump’s campaign promises – including tax cuts, the “wall” and infrastructure spending – would increase the public debt to 105 percent of GDP from 86 percent today. And that’s in part because he’s also promised not to touch entitlements like Social Security and Medicare. </p>
<p>There are also large differences between Trump and Republican lawmakers on how to change the tax code, how to replace the Affordable Care Act and whether to subsidize corporations for creating jobs. </p>
<p>To date, Trump has not shown much facility to resolve these budgetary conflicts – or in the realization that some subjects, like this and <a href="http://www.vox.com/2017/2/27/14750944/trump-health-care-complicated">health care</a>, are in fact very complicated. And so in the absence of presidential leadership that wrestles with the complexities of government, don’t expect his skinny budget to provide a consistent vision for the nation – or to have a future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73824/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roy T. Meyers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trump is proposing a budget with little substance and filled with politically toxic spending cuts, making it very unlikely to go anywhere, even in a Republican Congress.Roy T. Meyers, Professor of Political Science and Affiliate Professor of Public Policy, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/622152016-07-11T01:46:08Z2016-07-11T01:46:08ZNATO summit: Despite high public support for defense spending in Europe, discord over burden sharing emerges<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129957/original/image-20160711-24101-1pq5c2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Obama with UK Prime Minister David Cameron.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">NATO</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The NATO summit in Warsaw that wrapped up on July 9 demonstrated once again that the defense spending effort of European allies remains a contentious issue in the alliance. </p>
<p>On the eve of the summit, <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-to-press-europe-at-warsaw-summit-for-higher-military-spending-1467974996">news reports</a> indicated that American officials had prepared a briefing designed in part to “name and shame” NATO members who had failed to meet the agreed alliance commitment to devote two percent of GDP to defense. At the close of the summit, President Obama, who had recently offered his opinion that <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/">“free riders aggravate me,”</a> stated in his <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/obama-europe-always-count-us-165544715.html?ref=gs">press conference</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The majority of allies are still not hitting that two percent mark… So we had a very candid conversation about this.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>High support for spending</h2>
<p>There is some irony in the debate being reopened at just this moment. As the graphic below shows, European public support for increased defense spending in 2016 is higher than at any time since 2002. Between 2002 and 2012, a majority supported increasing defense in only two countries – Poland and the United Kingdom.</p>
<p>In 2016, majority support exists in all but one country – Spain. </p>
<p>The graphic shows net support for increased defense spending: that is, the percentage who support increased spending relative to the total who have an opinion about change in spending. More details on the source of these surveys are <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/ikesworldofpolls/2016/06/15/europeans-support-for-defense-spending-is-higher-than-any-time-in-the-last-fifteen-years/">here</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129937/original/image-20160710-24087-1qf5uf5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129937/original/image-20160710-24087-1qf5uf5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129937/original/image-20160710-24087-1qf5uf5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129937/original/image-20160710-24087-1qf5uf5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129937/original/image-20160710-24087-1qf5uf5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129937/original/image-20160710-24087-1qf5uf5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129937/original/image-20160710-24087-1qf5uf5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129937/original/image-20160710-24087-1qf5uf5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Graph conversation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">German Marshall Fund of the United States and Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2016</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Perhaps not surprisingly, NATO governments have already acted on this increased level of support by announcing plans to increase defense spending. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.janes.com/article/51079/french-defence-budget-boost-swaps-a-7-cut-for-a-4-jump">France</a> and <a href="http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2016/01/28/germany%E2%80%99s-defense-budget-increase-analytically-wrong-politically-right">Germany</a>, which have two of the largest defense budgets on the European side of the alliance, both have announced plans for multiyear increases after many years of cuts. <a href="http://www.janes.com/article/57051/poland-to-raise-defence-budget">Poland</a> and the <a href="http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nations-around-baltic-sea-increasing-defense-spending">Baltic states</a> of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have also announced substantial increases. </p>
<p>In a statement delivered in Warsaw July 8, NATO Secretary General <a href="http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_133276.htm?selectedLocale=en">Jens Stoltenberg</a> noted the planned increases in spending and observed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“We still have a long way to go. But, I believe that we have turned a corner.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Will it last?</h2>
<p>Despite this confidence, it would be premature to conclude that public support for increasing defense will continue to be high. </p>
<p>One reason is that support for defense tends to decline after spending is increased – a phenomenon that political scientist Christopher Wlezien labeled a “thermostat effect” in his <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Christopher_Wlezien/publication/231864427_Dynamics_of_Representation_The_Case_of_US_Spending_On_Defense/links/55adc37008aed9b7dcdaf109.pdf">signal study</a> of American public opinion on defense spending. Richard Stoll and I found the same thermostat effect in a <a href="http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/47/4/399.short">study of European public opinion</a>. </p>
<p>This thermostat phenomenon is visible in the below graphic, which shows net support for defense spending for four countries for which we have historical opinion data. In these four countries, when defense spending was declining, support for more defense increased, and the reverse is also true. Other things being equal, then, we would expect that several years of increases in defense spending would yield a subsequent decline in public support for continuing that increase.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129938/original/image-20160710-24060-1ejneds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129938/original/image-20160710-24060-1ejneds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129938/original/image-20160710-24060-1ejneds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129938/original/image-20160710-24060-1ejneds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129938/original/image-20160710-24060-1ejneds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129938/original/image-20160710-24060-1ejneds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129938/original/image-20160710-24060-1ejneds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129938/original/image-20160710-24060-1ejneds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Graph conversation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Richard Eichenberg, Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe, Cornell University Press, 1989; see figure above for additional sources</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In light of President Obama’s observation that “free riders aggravate me,” it is important to point out that free riding does not seem to motivate European public opinion. Quite the contrary: Richard Stoll and I have shown in a <a href="http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/09/01/0022002715600760.abstract">recent study</a> that Europeans who favor strong American global leadership and close partnership with the U.S. are more likely to support increased defense spending. Were free riding on their minds, the opposite would be the case.</p>
<p>Of course, other factors may affect public opinion. For example, should Europe be so unfortunate as to experience another major terrorist attack, or should Russia initiate additional aggressive actions in Ukraine or the Baltics, then support for defense spending is unlikely to reverse in a dramatic way.</p>
<h2>A changing Europe</h2>
<p>An additional factor in determining spending will be the condition of the European economy. Recovery from the financial crisis of 2008 has been sluggish in most of Europe, and several key members of NATO remain under economic and budgetary pressure. </p>
<p>For example, France, Italy and Spain, all countries with substantial defense budgets, have high unemployment rates and budget deficits. Italy’s <a href="http://www.vox.com/2016/7/8/12119242/brexit-italy-eu-crisis">banks are in trouble</a> and may require some form of bailout from national or European institutions. </p>
<p>The departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union, so-called “Brexit,” may also create constraints on its defense budget. Responding in part to direct <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/">criticism from President Obama</a>, U.K. Prime Minister Cameron had agreed in 2015 to minimize intended cuts to the defense budget. However, most analysts expect that Brexit will lead to at least some economic dislocation that will slow revenues and require budget cuts, including cuts to <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/06/24/after-brexit-whats-next-defense/86333926/">the defense budget</a>.</p>
<p>Among these uncertainties, however, one thing seems certain: Germany will play a key role in NATO’s future. </p>
<p>Germany is unique among the major European NATO allies. Its economy is strong and its public finances are sound. Historically, <a href="http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends/country-profiles-2014/country-profiles-germany-2014/">support for NATO and transatlantic ties</a> have been strong in Germany. As noted above, support for defense spending is currently high compared to past trends. Finally, in recent years leading German politicians have expressed a willingness to reverse the traditional reticence Germany has displayed toward <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bba9464e-bcfe-11e4-9902-00144feab7de.html#axzz4DqDNNBb8">exercising a leadership role in international affairs</a>.</p>
<p>However, it would be unwise for Americans to assume that Germany will be an uncomplicated partner. For one thing, despite the recent increase in support for defense spending, Germans remain skeptical of military force as an instrument of policy. </p>
<p>For example, among eight NATO members surveyed by the Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2015, Germans <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/nato-publics-blame-russia-for-ukrainian-crisis-but-reluctant-to-provide-military-aid/russia-ukraine-report-46/">ranked last in their willingness</a> to come to the defense of its allies. Further, although support for defense spending is high at the moment, historically this support is among the lowest in the alliance. And as I suggested above, if you look at past trends in public opinion, the planned increases in German defense spending are likely to yield a decline in support.</p>
<p>Although public support for defense spending is currently high, a number of factors suggest that the future is likely to bring continuing debate and contention on the issue of sharing the burden of defense in NATO.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62215/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard C. Eichenberg is affiliated with Chicago Council on Global Affairs (nonresident Senior Fellow in Public Opinion and Foreign Policy). From 2004-2014, he was an academic adviser to the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Trends survey.</span></em></p>Obama has said he expects European allies to chip in their fair share of defense spending, and European public opinion supports it. But as a Tufts expert points out, many challenges in Europe remain.Richard C. Eichenberg, Associate Professor, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/313082014-09-05T01:23:44Z2014-09-05T01:23:44ZDefence: sub-optimal naval gazing
<p>Rumour has it Australia is about to spend an awful lot of money buying some new submarines. This may not be the sort of thing to get the pulses of the casual reader racing, but it ought to be, not least because it highlights a whole series of intersecting public policy questions that are costly and strategic in every sense of the word.</p>
<p>Submarines – even the sort that are plagued with problems and only occasionally go to sea – are very expensive. The notorious Collins-class submarine was the most costly single defence project ever undertaken in Australia when it was commissioned in 1987 under the then Labor government. This possibly unwanted record was eclipsed by the even more expensive ANZAC Class frigate project a few years later. </p>
<p>There’s some debate about just how much these two projects have cost altogether. Design flaws that had to be corrected, construction problems that had to be overcome, and increased maintenance have all contributed to a blowout in the overall cost of both projects. Indeed, the only certainty about defence acquisitions is that they always cost more than we expect. </p>
<p>The Air Warfare Destroyer program has been particularly badly affected by cost overruns, and was about A$2 million over budget per week, largely because of poor productivity in Australian shipyards. The bottom line seems to be that we’re not very good at these sorts of high-tech projects. This would be something of an indictment of Australia’s manufacturing capacity at the best of times. It’s especially problematic at the moment for at least three reasons.</p>
<p>First, Australia’s manufacturing capacity is being hollowed-out at precisely the same time that the resource boom is patently running out of steam and raising profoundly important, but thus far unanswered questions about where high skill, high pay jobs will come from in the future.</p>
<p>Second, many of the blue-collar jobs that are disappearing are doing so from places like South Australia, which is also the centre of the country’s naval shipyards. The consequences of a further haemorrhaging of manufacturing jobs could be a major political problem. Or it may not, given that South Australia is the last redoubt of the equally beleaguered Labor Party. The Coalition’s promise to build a new generation of subs and warships in SA may go the way of many other recent commitments.</p>
<p>Third, it’s generally not thought to be a good idea to rely entirely on other countries for defence needs. Market forces plainly have their place, but some would argue that the self-reliance is a vital part of overall national security and the bottom line is not the only consideration. But while there may be good reasons to favour some sort of coherent industry policy to revive manufacturing, this sort of project is unlikely to provide the sort of continuity and spillovers that can sustain it. </p>
<p>All of this matters because it seems as if the Abbott government is about to award our “best friend” in Asia – Japan, in case you’d forgotten – a contract to build 12 new submarines to replace the trouble-plagued, ruinously expensive Collins-class. The Japanese, it seems, are very good at building submarines and can offer an “off the shelf” model significantly more cheaply and efficiently than we could.</p>
<p>But there is another aspect to this debate that ought to get an airing but which rarely does. Despite the fact the Collins-class subs were unreliable and rarely available in the way their supporters had hoped and claimed, did it actually make any difference to the security of the country? Not so you’d notice.</p>
<p>This is not a flippant point. The new subs are supposedly going to be vital components of our overall strategic capability, allowing us to gather intelligence and patrol the sea-lanes to our north. No doubt freedom of trade and navigation is vital for an island continent, but are 12 - or even 20 submarines - likely to prove a decisive factor in any actual conflict situation that anyone can imagine? </p>
<p>Does anyone – other than Jacqui Lambie, perhaps – really think that would-be aggressors are only stopped from invading Australia by our naval capabilities? While it may be easy to belittle Senator Lambie’s claims, it’s also important to recognise that they are actually not that far removed from the conventional wisdom. </p>
<p>While some of Australia’s more sophisticated strategic thinkers may not be expecting an imminent Chinese invasion, perhaps, they do think Australia’s military capacity is capable of making a difference to our overall strategic environment – or why would they, too, be advocating yet more military spending?</p>
<p>It currently costs around A$1 billion a year to keep one, at best, two of the Collins-class submarines at sea. No doubt the new ones will be more cost effective and reliable; they could hardly be less so. Whether they are actually an indispensable part of our national security is another question, but one we are unlikely to hear seriously debated in the current security-obsessed environment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31308/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Rumour has it Australia is about to spend an awful lot of money buying some new submarines. This may not be the sort of thing to get the pulses of the casual reader racing, but it ought to be, not least…Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.