tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/eu-parliament-10113/articlesEU Parliament – The Conversation2022-12-14T10:48:01Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1965152022-12-14T10:48:01Z2022-12-14T10:48:01ZQatar lobbying: European Parliament scandal shows urgent need for tighter regulations<p>On 11 December, Eva Kaili, vice-president of the European Parliament, and three others were <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/mep-kaili-charged-with-corruption-by-belgian-prosecutors-reports/">charged and imprisoned</a> in connection with an investigation into suspected corruption linked to Qatar.</p>
<p>Ms Kaili, a Greek Socialist MP in charge of relations with the Middle East, had recently <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2022-11-21-INT-1-137-0000_EN.html">explained to her peers</a> that Qatar was “at the forefront of labour law” and its will to host the football World Cup signalled substantial democratic progress. Any elected representative critical of Qatar were engaging in “harassment”, she said.</p>
<p>On Saturday 10 December, Belgian police found bags of cash (<a href="https://greekreporter.com/2022/12/10/qatar-corruption-scandal-cash-found-greek-mep-kaili/">at least 600,000 euros</a>) at her home after intercepting her father with a large suitcase full of money, which he was about to take back to Greece. Another Socialist MP, the Belgian <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/belgian-mep-marc-tabella-cops-raid-belgian-meps-home-amid-qatar-scandal/">Marc Tarabella</a>, is also implicated. As vice-chairman of the European Parliament’s delegation for relations with the Arabian Peninsula, he recently said that Qatar was <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/qatar-world-cup-2022-human-rights-labor-laws-football-emmanuel-macron-gianni-infantino/">“an example to follow”</a> for other countries in the region.</p>
<p>This case cannot be said to be typical of what happens in the European Parliament. Indeed, the institution has never before been confronted with a corruption scandal of this magnitude. But the revelations act nevertheless as a wake-up call that illustrates two phenomena.</p>
<h2>Qatar’s methods under scrutiny</h2>
<p>The news shatters the narrative that <a href="https://www.qna.org.qa/fr-FR/News-Area/News/2022-09/15/l%E2%80%99entretien-de-son-altesse-avec-le-magazine-fran%C3%A7ais-le-point">Qatari authorities</a> and some of their supporters have been trying to weave for years – and even more so since the start of the World Cup competition – that the country is now ethically irreproachable.</p>
<p>If the accusations are proven, it would confirm suspicions that the country’s autocrats have long whitewashed its image in a bid to boost their <a href="https://www.lenouveleconomiste.fr/christian-chesnot-le-qatar-en-100-questions-95494/">international investment strategy</a> and develop business partnerships.</p>
<p>To date, Qatar has not shown that it is hosting the World Cup to learn from the ideas of fans from liberal democracies or to moderate its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Qatar/Government-and-society">highly conservative society</a>. Instead, the country’s leaders have been concentrating on <a href="https://theathletic.com/2976035/2022/11/22/explained-david-beckham-ambassador-for-qatar/">hiring consultants and spokespersons</a> and inviting influential figures to Doha to attend the celebrations.</p>
<p>If confirmed by the courts, the scandal could open up a Pandora’s box of corruption among the country’s political, administrative, economic and media elites. Meanwhile, the French justice system continues to investigate the conditions under which the World Cup was awarded to the monarchy, including an infamous <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2019/jun/18/sarkozy-psg-bein-sports-questions-michel-platini-qatar-2022-world-cup">lunch between then-president Nicolas Sarkozy and Qatari elites</a> in November 2010.</p>
<h2>Calls for change at the European Parliament</h2>
<p>This alleged scandal also illustrates the need for change and reform in the European Parliament.</p>
<p>Numerous cases revealed by the press show that the <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/12/12/calls-for-eu-lobbying-rules-to-be-reformed-grow-as-corruption-scandal-rocks-brussels">pressure of lobbies on its members</a> increases along with MEPs’ responsibilities and influence. The presence and activities of lobbyists are already <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/transparency/lobby-groups/">heavily regulated at the level of the European institutions</a> by comparison with many Member States, but the law and practice must constantly evolve to adapt to their renewed strategies.</p>
<p>We also need to create an environment that keeps lobbies and less ethically minded politicians at bay. For example, it is not right that MEPs should be able to work as <a href="https://euobserver.com/world/153221">consultants or lawyers in the margins of their mandate</a>, and that emissaries from non-EU countries should not be obliged to register in the <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/service-standards-and-principles/transparency/transparency-register_fr">transparency register</a> that is required of all other people who intend to frequent the European institutions.</p>
<p>It is also high time that MEPs declare all the people they meet in the course of their work, and that rules limit the work they do once they have left the European Parliament. Finally, it is essential that the parties pay more attention to the honesty of candidates for the European Parliament, and that the EU has an independent ethics committee with broad powers of investigation and sanction.</p>
<p>The European Parliament has been debating these issues for 30 years now, and many NGOs, think tanks and experts have made <a href="https://www.anticor.org/2019/02/12/les-propositions-danticor-pour-les-elections-europeennes-2019/">suggestions in this area</a>. Progress has been made, but at a pace too slow to circumvent the most unprincipled lobbyists and greedy MEPs.</p>
<h2>Lessons for the future</h2>
<p>Of course, no law will ever prevent corrupt parliamentarians from selling their influence to the highest bidder. But if the European Parliament were to fight abuses more firmly, if transparency, probity and ethics were at the heart of its work organisation, then the institution would stop attracting dishonest people and political parties would no longer take the risk of sending them there. Corruptors would also be more cautious in how they act.</p>
<p>It is also essential for European and national authorities let justice be done, and that the protagonists of the Qatari corruption scandal are will no longer be in positions of influence.</p>
<p>Finally, the relativism that underpins the EU’s foreign policy must be fought. Not all outside countries are friends, and not all their representatives behave in an acceptable manner. Some countries don’t hesitate to employ unscrupulous methods when working with European partners – and denial is not an appropriate response to such behaviour.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196515/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olivier Costa is a member of France's Observatory of Public Ethics</span></em></p>The ongoing corruption scandal in the EU Parliament casts a harsh light both on the practices of Qatar and on some of the flaws in the EU institutions.Olivier Costa, Directeur des Études politiques au Collège d'Europe, Directeur de recherche au CNRS, CEVIPOF, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1953382022-11-24T18:34:56Z2022-11-24T18:34:56ZUkraine recap: targeting power supply earns Russia new title of ‘state sponsor of terror’ as winter begins to bite<p>Temperatures are falling steadily across Ukraine. The UK’s Met Office forecasts light (but pretty cold) rain in Kyiv for the next day or two followed by snow, snow, snow, as the mercury drops steadily into minus numbers next week. </p>
<p>Large areas of Ukraine, including the capital, are now without power much of the time. And still Moscow persists with its strategy of targeting Ukraine’s power supply. It’s hard to argue – as the Kremlin continues to insist – that these are military targets.</p>
<p>Yesterday a two-day old baby was killed when what have been reported to be Russian missiles hit a maternity ward in Zaporizhzhia. The region is home to Europe’s largest nuclear power plant and has come under particularly bombardment recently. </p>
<p>The plant itself has been under Russian occupation since March, but the surrounding area is bitterly contested. It is one of four regions annexed by Russia at the end of September, but significant areas have been wrested back by Ukraine’s counteroffensive. </p>
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<p>It is, of course, a war crime to deliberately target civilians or civilian infrastructure. But power facilities are a grey area as they could be seen as legitimate military targets. And, to be fair, this has been a tactic used time and time again during wars in the 20th and 21st century. German Zeppelins targeted electricity supplies in the first world war and the Germans also targeted the Soviet grid in a bid to regain the initiative after Stalingrad in world war two. The US has done the same in both Vietnam and, more recently, Iraq.</p>
<p>But the EU parliament has used Russia’s attacks on power stations, schools and hospitals to justify its decision this week to designate Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism – a distinction hitherto only afforded to Cuba, North Korea, Iran and Syria. </p>
<p>“Today, the European parliament recognised Russia as a terrorist state,” the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky declared in response, adding; “And then Russia proved that all this is true by using 67 missiles against our infrastructure, our energy grid, and ordinary people.” </p>
<p>Scott Lucas, an expert in international security at University College Dublin, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-eu-parliament-names-russia-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-but-it-wont-stop-the-missiles-195309">believes that</a> the EU’s move will have few real-world consequences. Russia is already subject to a harsh regime of sanctions, which is one of the penalties that comes with the European parliament’s decision. But the move will lend weight to the arguments of western governments when it comes to continuing to provide huge packages of military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the face of a cost-of-living crisis biting pretty much everywhere.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-eu-parliament-names-russia-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-but-it-wont-stop-the-missiles-195309">Ukraine war: EU parliament names Russia a 'state sponsor of terrorism' – but it won't stop the missiles</a>
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<p><strong><em>This is our weekly recap of expert analysis of the Ukraine conflict.</em></strong>
<em>The Conversation, a not-for-profit newsgroup, works with a wide range of academics across its global network to produce evidence-based analysis. Get these recaps in your inbox every Thursday. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapTop">Subscribe here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Russia’s bombardment of Ukrainian infrastructure appears to have become Moscow’s default strategy in the face of significant military setbacks over the past two months or so. We recently reported that Ukraine had reoccupied the city of Kherson, important both strategically and in terms of morale. It’s the capital of one of four regions annexed by Russia in September. </p>
<p>Military strategist, Frank Ledwidge of the University of Portsmouth, says the victory in Kherson opens the way up for an eventual advance on Crimea, which – <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-after-recapture-of-kherson-the-conflict-is-poised-at-the-gates-of-crimea-195025">he writes</a> – is seen by both sides as Russia’s “centre of gravity”, the key to the war.</p>
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<p>This will be a far cry from Kyiv’s counteroffensives so far. As Ledwidge notes, unlike the rest of the occupied territories in Ukraine, most Russians agree that Crimea – with its majority Russian population – is legitimately a Russian territory. It has also, over several centuries and various conflicts including the second world war, proved a hard nut to crack. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-after-recapture-of-kherson-the-conflict-is-poised-at-the-gates-of-crimea-195025">Ukraine war: after recapture of Kherson the conflict is poised at the gates of Crimea</a>
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<h2>Wartime economies</h2>
<p>One aspect of the war we haven’t focused on specifically up to now has been how Ukraine’s economy has held up after nine months of conflict (something gently pointed out to us by a reader a couple of weeks ago). Like pretty much everywhere else, Ukraine found the COVID-19 pandemic very challenging, but bounced back strongly in 2021 recording GDP growth of 3.2%. But the war has dropped the economy off a cliff. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Bar chart showing effect war on Ukraine's economy." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497249/original/file-20221124-13-z7ar2o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Bar chart showing effect war on Ukraine’s economy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">State Statistics Service of Ukraine</span></span>
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<p>Ukrainian scholar, Dmitriy Sergeyev – a professor of economics at Bocconi University in Milan – highlights the way the war has affected some sectors more than others. Some industries are relatively easy to relocate. For example, Ukraine’s burgeoning IT sector has endured relatively well, but steel production and other heavy industry have taken an enormous hit. For Ukraine’s massively important agricultural sector, the decision to renew the grain deal will bring in welcome export revenues, which – <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-the-economy-has-kept-running-at-a-time-of-bitter-conflict-195312">he says</a> – may even be enough to plant for the next season. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-the-economy-has-kept-running-at-a-time-of-bitter-conflict-195312">Ukraine war: how the economy has kept running at a time of bitter conflict</a>
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<p>The outlook for the Russian economy, meanwhile, “bodes poorly for Vladimir Putin’s ability to fund Russia’s war in Ukraine,” according to a recent report in the Wall Street Journal, which adds that “mobilisation, sanctions and falling energy prices” are hurting Russia badly. </p>
<p>Alexander Hill, a Canada-based scholar with a particular interest in Russian affairs, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-russian-economy-is-defying-and-withstanding-western-sanctions-194119">reports in The Conversation that</a> mobilisation has hit Russian industry pretty hard, causing labour shortages in key areas. </p>
<p>But, writes Hill, a bumper harvest has allowed Russia to export huge amounts of grain, while the replacement of western companies which pulled out of Russia after the start of the war with new Russian enterprises. (McDonald’s, for example, has been replaced with a burger chain called <em>Vkusno i tochka</em> – “Tasty, full stop”). Inflation is falling and pensions, salaries and the minimum wage are reportedly keeping pace. Hill believes the west may have underestimated Russia’s ability to cope with sanctions.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-russian-economy-is-defying-and-withstanding-western-sanctions-194119">How the Russian economy is defying and withstanding western sanctions</a>
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<h2>Banksy in Ukraine</h2>
<p>One of the themes that has run through reporting from Ukraine since the invasion began in February is the buoyant morale among Ukrainians, whether civilians or military. On the home front, particularly, this has been underpinned by an explosion of artwork drawing attention to, and reinforcing, the resilience of Ukrainian people and culture.</p>
<p>Now it seems that Banksy, the Scarlet Pimpernel of graffiti artists, has been doing his bit to help. Earlier this month, Banksy posted a picture to his Instagram of a gymnast doing a handstand, painted on the side of a building devastated by shelling in Borodyanka in the Kyiv region.</p>
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<p>He later confirmed that he was responsible for six other artworks in Kyiv and other cities across Ukraine, including one which depicted Vladimir Putin being thrown by a child in a judo match. War historian Rachel Kerr of King’s College London <a href="https://theconversation.com/banksy-in-ukraine-how-his-defiant-new-works-offer-hope-194952">has the story</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/banksy-in-ukraine-how-his-defiant-new-works-offer-hope-194952">Banksy in Ukraine: how his defiant new works offer hope</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a weekly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195338/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Some of the key articles from our coverage of the war in Ukraine over the past week.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1953092022-11-24T15:42:03Z2022-11-24T15:42:03ZUkraine war: EU parliament names Russia a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ – but it won’t stop the missiles<p>The EU parliament has declared Russia to be a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/european-lawmakers-declare-russia-state-sponsor-terrorism-2022-11-23/">state sponsor of terrorism</a>. The largely symbolic resolution, which passed by a 494-58 vote on November 23, has no particular real-world consequences, but reflects MEPs’ condemnation of Russia’s “deliberate physical destruction of civilian infrastructure and mass murder of Ukrainian civilians with the aim of eliminating the Ukrainian people”. </p>
<p>The parliament urged the European Union’s 27 member states to adopt the designation “with all the negative consequences this implies”.</p>
<p>Thanking the EU for this move, the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, summed the situation up in <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/watch-ukrainian-president-zelenskyy-thanks-eu-for-declaring-russia-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism">two sentences</a>: “Today, the European parliament recognised Russia as a terrorist state … And then Russia proved that all this is true by using 67 missiles against our infrastructure, our energy grid, and ordinary people.”</p>
<p>Wednesday November 23 began with a reported <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/23/europe/russia-ukraine-zaporizhzhia-maternity-hospital-strike-intl/index.html#">Russian missile strike on a maternity ward</a> in a hospital in southern Ukraine, which killed a newborn baby. It was the latest of almost recorded <a href="https://www.anews.com.tr/world/2022/11/21/who-reports-over-700-attacks-on-ukrainian-health-infrastructure">700 assaults on medical facilities</a> during the nine-month invasion.</p>
<p>In the afternoon, the Russians responded with the <a href="https://en.defence-ua.com/news/ukraines_air_defense_forces_shot_down_51_of_70_cruise_missiles_5_kamikaze_drones_launched_by_russian_terrorists-4933.html">launch of 70 missiles and five attack drones</a>. Ukraine’s air defence downed 51 of the missiles and all the Iranian-supplied drones. But those that reached targets knocked out power across the country. </p>
<p>Ukraine was already without half of its electricity grid because of waves of Russian assaults since October 10. Three nuclear plants were taken offline, joining the Russia-occupied <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-is-being-shut-down-operator-says/">Zaporizhia nuclear power plant</a>, the largest in Europe, which shut down in September.</p>
<p>Ten people were killed across Ukraine – seven in the Kyiv region alone. Three died when a two-storey residential building <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3620361-three-people-killed-in-kyiv-due-to-russian-missile-attack.html">was destroyed</a>. The toll would have been higher had a kindergarten on the lower ground floor not been evacuated when air raid sirens sounded.</p>
<p>Zelensky summarised the situation in his <a href="https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/speech-by-president-zelensky-at-the-un-security-council-meeting-nov-23/">address to the UN security council</a>: “We cannot be hostage to one international terrorist … When we have the temperature below zero, and scores of millions of people without energy supplies, without heating, without water, this is an obvious crime against humanity.”</p>
<h2>Symbolism and substance</h2>
<p>On its own, the European parliament’s designation of the Russian “terrorist state” is symbolic rather than substantive. The MEPs have no authority to add to the international sanctions on Moscow, the investigations into Russian war crimes or the financial and military support for Ukraine’s resistance.</p>
<p>But it’s a powerful symbol which adds to substance. For months, the Zelensky government has sought the designation. Now, as Ukraine faces the possibility of a harsh winter and Putin’s attempt to break its people by depriving them of heat and water, Ukrainians have been assured that Europe is watching.</p>
<p>The resolution also calls on the EU to put in place the “proper legal framework” to add Russia to an official list of terrorist states, and member states have been prompted to proceed with their own measures. Five European Union countries — Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia – have <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/eu-lawmakers-name-russia-a-state-sponsor-of-terror/a-63818422">already labelled</a> Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism.</p>
<h2>Defeating Putin</h2>
<p>The extent of additional restrictions on Moscow is still to be determined. EU members are debating the level of the price cap to be imposed on Russian oil. It is thought that Hungary could be an impediment to further sanctions, as its president, Viktor Orbán, is <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/20/viktor-orban-is-the-wests-pro-putin-outlier/">friendly towards Vladimir Putin</a>. But even the reinforcement of existing measures is a powerful political statement adding to the isolation of the Kremlin. </p>
<p>One of Putin’s many unsuccessful gambles in this invasion was that he could rally support from other countries through propaganda, disinformation, pressure and bargaining. That support is now largely confined to “kamikaze” drones from Iran, munitions from North Korea, and the allegiance of Putin’s neighbouring vassal state, Belarus. </p>
<p>At the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-china-talks-biden-and-xi-attempt-to-play-down-superpower-tensions-but-ukraine-and-taiwan-loom-large-194471">G20 summit last week</a>, China’s Xi Jinping further distanced Beijing from the Kremlin’s attacks and India’s Narendra Modi sat on the fence, offering only anodyne statements about “diplomacy”.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, there is no sign of the international assistance to Ukraine easing. Amid the missile strikes, countries from Sweden to Germany have committed to supply air defence systems and munitions. Earlier this month, the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3087750/400-million-in-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/">US announced</a> another US$400 million (£330 million) in military aid including weapons, munitions and air defence equipment. For the first time, the UK is supplying helicopters.</p>
<p>Putin is now facing defeat on the battlefield. Since August, Ukrainian counter-offensives <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-after-recapture-of-kherson-the-conflict-is-poised-at-the-gates-of-crimea-195025">have regained territory</a> in the northeast and south, with the liberation of strategic cities such as Izyum, Lyman and – most recently – Kherson. Strikes have destroyed or degraded Russia’s bases, ammunition depots, logistics, and supply routes.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-after-recapture-of-kherson-the-conflict-is-poised-at-the-gates-of-crimea-195025">Ukraine war: after recapture of Kherson the conflict is poised at the gates of Crimea</a>
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<p>Putin’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putin-announces-annexation-of-four-regions-but-his-hold-on-them-may-be-flimsy-191641">“annexation” of four Ukraine provinces</a>, two in the east and two in the south, is now in tatters. The question is no longer whether Russia can hold areas it has seized this year, but whether Ukraine will regain territory — in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the east and Crimea in the south — occupied by Moscow and its proxies since 2014.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putin-announces-annexation-of-four-regions-but-his-hold-on-them-may-be-flimsy-191641">Ukraine war: Putin announces annexation of four regions, but his hold on them may be flimsy</a>
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<p>So the Kremlin’s last hope is the winter strikes, even as its missile stocks are being depleted and it relies on Iran for drones. Before spring, it has to break the Ukrainian people, or at least the support for those people from outside Ukraine.</p>
<p>The designation of Russia as “terrorist” won’t stop the missiles. But as Ukrainians repair and recover each time, it is the necessary marker that Putin, the Kremlin, and their allies will not have unrestricted political space for their attacks — and they will not escape accountability when those attacks ultimately fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195309/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s a purely symbolic gesture with no real-world consequences.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1866012022-07-07T23:13:04Z2022-07-07T23:13:04ZBoris Johnson’s messy political legacy of lies, scandals and delivering Brexit to his base<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473018/original/file-20220707-24-1vup09.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C89%2C4600%2C2967&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Will Boris Johnson be back? The chances may be slim.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/prime-minister-boris-johnson-returns-inside-after-news-photo/1407301546?adppopup=true">Carl Court/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Boris Johnson, the now outgoing prime minister of the United Kingdom, had wanted to follow in the footsteps of his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/boris-johnson-reached-the-top-but-was-felled-by-his-flaws/2022/07/07/96ca34f0-fdd8-11ec-b39d-71309168014b_story.html">idol Winston Churchill</a> and be remembered as a leader of consequence. He aspired to greatness and desired to stay in office longer than the 11 years <a href="https://metro.co.uk/2022/06/26/boris-johnson-says-he-wants-to-still-be-prime-minister-in-the-2030s-16892594/">enjoyed by Conservative icon Margaret Thatcher</a>.</p>
<p>It wasn’t to be.</p>
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<p>Instead, on July 7, 2022, Johnson announced that less than three years after becoming prime minister, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-62081380">he was resigning</a> and would remain in office only until a successor emerged. It marks a stunning repudiation of a leader who had delivered Brexit to his supporters and scored a major electoral mandate a mere two and half years previously.</p>
<p>The scandal that brought his downfall wasn’t Johnson’s first. Indeed, throughout his career – and time in office – Johnson has been regarded as <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/boris-johnson-manner-keep-character/">a political Houdini</a>, skilled at political survival and endlessly able to rebound from mishaps. </p>
<p>But even he could not overcome the succession of scandals in recent months, not least “<a href="https://theconversation.com/order-order-a-guide-to-partygate-and-the-uks-rambunctious-parliament-176206">Partygate</a>,” which involved revelations around his government’s repeated and brazen ignoring of its own COVID-19 lockdown rules. In the end it was his handling of a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/62048687">tawdry affair involving the promotion</a> of a member of parliament accused of serious sexual wrongdoing that proved the final straw. That scandal precipitated a <a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnsons-nightmare-day-how-to-read-between-the-lines-in-resignation-letters-from-government-ministers-186510">rash of cabinet resignations</a> that made clear Johnson could no longer rely on the support of his own party. </p>
<p>Yet, Johnson’s legacy will not be confined to the scandals. His tenure coincided with major challenges in the U.K. Some, like the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Europe, were not of his making. Others, notably Brexit, were of his own hand.</p>
<h2>First came Brexit</h2>
<p>Boris Johnson and Brexit will forever be inextricably bound. </p>
<p>Johnson had long been a prominent political figure before Britain’s exit from Europe came to dominate U.K. politics. Aside from serving as a member of parliament, he was also the mayor of London as well as a well-known media personality. Throughout, Johnson, a fiscal conservative by nature, developed a reputation <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/apps-johnson/boris-johnson-inspired-appointment-or-diplomatic-disaster-idINKCN0ZU2L6">for being polarizing</a> – witty and charming to some, but dishonest and untrustworthy to others.</p>
<p>He was long talked of as a future prime minister. But it was the 2016 Brexit referendum on whether the U.K. should remain in the European Union that eventually propelled Johnson to power. He became the face of the Leave campaign, <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/factcheck-send-350m-week-brussels">at times taking liberties with the truth</a> to make his case for exiting the EU. While he did not become prime minister immediately after the U.K. public opted to exit the EU, his time would come three years later. </p>
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<img alt="A tabby cat is seen sitting in the foreground in front of the front door of 10 Downing Street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473093/original/file-20220707-14-wmzwme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473093/original/file-20220707-14-wmzwme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473093/original/file-20220707-14-wmzwme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473093/original/file-20220707-14-wmzwme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473093/original/file-20220707-14-wmzwme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473093/original/file-20220707-14-wmzwme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473093/original/file-20220707-14-wmzwme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Prime ministers come and go, but Larry the Downing Street cat remains in place.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/larry-the-downing-street-cat-sits-on-the-pavement-in-front-news-photo/1241721664?adppopup=true">Leon Neal/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>When Prime Minister Theresa May resigned in summer 2019, weakened by major divisions over how to implement Brexit within the Conservative Party, Johnson seized his chance. </p>
<p>He promised to “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/jul/07/toxic-spell-broken-boris-johnson-trips-over-own-lies">Get Brexit Done</a>” and to end the major deadlock in British politics over what sort of relationship the country would have with the EU. </p>
<p>On that front, he delivered. The December 2019 election was a resounding success for Johnson, <a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnsons-big-election-victory-academics-on-what-it-means-for-the-uk-and-brexit-128850">earning a substantial majority for the Conservative Party</a> and enabling him to force through his vision of Brexit. His brand of populism, charm, disregard for rules and effective communication not only shored up the Conservative base in that election, but also helped attract many traditional left-wing Labour voters, securing a clear mandate for his party.</p>
<p>With that victory in hand, Johnson was free to complete the formal departure of the U.K. from the EU on Jan. 31, 2020. Later that year, after tumultuous talks, his government negotiated the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/relations-non-eu-countries/relations-united-kingdom/eu-uk-trade-and-cooperation-agreement_en">Trade and Cooperation Agreement</a> with the EU – defining the future relations between the U.K. and its European partners.</p>
<p>Brexit was and remains very divisive in the U.K. But neither supporters nor opponents would deny how consequential that decision was, and it could not have happened without Johnson’s involvement.</p>
<h2>… then the pandemic</h2>
<p>Any hopes that Johnson could bask in the glory of Brexit came quickly crashing down within weeks of it becoming a reality. </p>
<p>The start of the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically changed the situation for the U.K. Johnson and his government fumbled its initial pandemic response, acting slowly and in a lackluster manner – Johnson himself <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/19/michael-gove-fails-to-deny-pm-missed-five-coronavirus-cobra-meetings">was absent for some of the crucial meetings</a> called to discuss the pandemic in its early days. </p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2021/10/12/1045219737/the-u-k-s-early-approach-to-pandemic-cost-thousands-of-lives-a-new-report-says">government report</a> released in October 2021, the government’s decision to delay a strict lockdown allowed the virus to circulate widely and caused many thousands of additional deaths. And it nearly killed Johnson himself, who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/17/boris-johnson-and-coronavirus-inside-story-illness">spent a week in the hospital</a> in April 2020.</p>
<p>While Johnson recovered from his own bout with the virus, his government also managed to steady the ship. It introduced a series of stringent lockdowns and restrictions in the following year and presided over a <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/372/bmj.n421">successful vaccination rollout</a>. But these same COVID-19 restrictions would also ironically highlight one of Johnson’s main character traits: a disregard for rules that would eventually lead to his political undoing.</p>
<h2>… and on to the lies</h2>
<p>Prior to becoming prime minister, Johnson was no stranger to controversy and to a delicate relationship with the truth. </p>
<p>The Times newspaper, where he once worked as a reporter, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/boris-johnson-reached-the-top-but-was-felled-by-his-flaws/2022/07/07/96ca34f0-fdd8-11ec-b39d-71309168014b_story.html">sacked him for inventing a quote</a>. And in 2001 he lost his senior position in the Conservative Party <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/boris-johnson-reached-the-top-but-was-felled-by-his-flaws/2022/07/07/96ca34f0-fdd8-11ec-b39d-71309168014b_story.html">for lying about an affair</a>.</p>
<p>Yet despite many setbacks usually of his own doing, Johnson had an uncanny ability to rebound, leading former prime minister David Cameron <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/may/20/boris-johnson-survival-superpower-last-tory-angry-partygate">to liken him</a> to a “greased piglet” who could not be caught.</p>
<p>His time in office was in keeping with precedent, littered by multiple scandals that continually led to questions about Johnson’s credibility. That included, among other unfavorable stories, that Johnson had received <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-56878663">a secret undisclosed loan</a> to pay for the costs of the renovation of his private quarters at 11 Downing Street, beyond his public allowance; or the reports of a close ally in parliament <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/11/10/boris-johnson-sleaze-scandal/">breaking lobbying rules by accepting payments from companies he was promoting</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, those paled in comparison to the repercussions from “Partygate.”</p>
<p>The revelations in late 2021 and early 2022 that Johnson and his government had been <a href="https://theconversation.com/wine-time-friday-and-invites-for-200-five-of-the-most-interesting-findings-from-sue-grays-partygate-report-183866">repeatedly breaking COVID-19 restriction rules</a> over the course of a year – including many alcohol-fueled parties and accusations that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/23/partygate-photos-boris-johnson-dominic-cummings-lockdown-breaches-sue-gray-report">Johnson lied to Parliament</a> over his attendance at some gatherings – shocked the U.K. public. This scandal led to Johnson’s approval rating <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2022/07/07/he-resigns-boris-johnsons-favourability-drops-lowe">plummeting in 2022</a>. It also, slowly but surely, resulted in Johnson losing the support of his own party. </p>
<p>The war in Ukraine gave him temporary reprieve, and he narrowly survived a <a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnson-what-the-result-of-the-confidence-vote-means-for-the-pm-and-the-conservative-party-184500">vote of no-confidence in early June</a>. But he was now vulnerable. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-62032329">His latest scandal</a>, which surfaced when it became apparent Johnson was lying about what he knew about the transgressions of another close ally in Parliament, Chris Pincher, was the final nail in his political coffin. </p>
<p>Deserted by most of his allies, Johnson had to accept the inevitable.</p>
<h2>A second act?</h2>
<p>Churchill famously <a href="https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/how-winston-churchill-and-the-conservative-party-lost-the-1945-election">lost the parliamentary elections in the summer of 1945</a>, shortly after leading the U.K. to victory in World War II.</p>
<p>Ousted by an electorate wanting a break with Churchill’s old-world policies, and a different post-war Britain, he was still able, six years later, to return to office. </p>
<p>Such a second act seems unlikely for Johnson. Yes, he delivered on Brexit, and his supporters will remember that. But his chaotic departure, leaving his country and party very divided, as well as the legacy of his scandals, will be extremely hard to shake off – even for a “greased piglet.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Garret Martin receives funding from the European Union for the Transatlantic Policy Center that he co-directs at American University. </span></em></p>The UK prime minister tendered his resignation after a slew of resignations by former allies in his government.Garret Martin, Senior Professorial Lecturer, Co-Director Transatlantic Policy Center, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1125762019-03-01T15:37:12Z2019-03-01T15:37:12ZBrexit delay: what it would take for the EU to agree article 50 extension<p>For the first time – 23 months after the UK triggered the article 50 negotiations to begin the process of leaving the European Union – Theresa May acknowledged that <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-47373246/brexit-may-statement-on-future-votes-and-article-50-extension">it might be necessary</a> to delay Brexit day. Reportedly under pressure from a number of the Remainers in her cabinet, keen to emphasise her own opposition to a delay, but also hoping to push hard-line Brexiteers towards support of her deal, the prime minister conceded that an extension of the two-year article 50 period beyond March 29 might be necessary.</p>
<p>Missing from the discussion in the House of Commons was any reference to what say the other member states – the EU27 – would have in the matter. Such an omission is typical of what has gone on in the UK in the past few years. Much of the debate about the negotiations and the UK’s future relationship with the EU has proceeded without any reference to the position of the EU27, still less recognition of their interests, aims or strategy.</p>
<p>An extension to article 50 could, however, disrupt the UK’s solipsism. If it looks like the UK is heading down this course, loose talk about the desirability of extending the negotiations will confront a hard reality: the UK cannot unilaterally decide on an extension to the negotiations. London would have to make a proposal, to which the EU27 would have to agree – with unanimous consent.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-how-article-50-could-be-extended-to-delay-uks-departure-from-the-eu-109966">Brexit: how article 50 could be extended to delay UK's departure from the EU</a>
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<h2>Not yes to every request</h2>
<p>Let’s assume that May fails again to get her deal through the UK parliament and that MPs vote “no deal” off the table in mid-March when given the option. She then decides to ask the EU for an extension. This would already be a difficult move for the prime minister, who has reiterated – <a href="https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/top-stories/bill-cash-and-peter-bone-on-theresa-may-brexit-betrayal-1-5907600">reportedly 108 times</a> – that the UK will leave the EU on 29 March. </p>
<p>The EU27’s response to such a request would depend on the circumstances. Generally positive comments on the issue have come from the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, who said he now regarded an extension as a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2019/feb/25/donald-tusk-article-50-extension-rational-solution-brexit-video">“rational solution”</a>, and president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, who said a request from the UK <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-juncker/no-one-in-europe-would-oppose-extension-to-brexit-talks-juncker-idUKKCN1Q71RF">would be welcomed</a>.</p>
<p>But as the French president, Emmanuel Macron, said on February 27, the reason would <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-article-50-extend-macron-merkel-theresa-may-france-germany-eu-talks-a8799506.html">need to be “clear”</a>. It’s unlikely, for example, that the EU27 would agree to an extension in order to renegotiate the EU-UK withdrawal agreement, or the complicated issue of the Irirhs backstop. They consider both issues closed. They would also want to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/feb/28/extension-article-50-must-be-one-off-brussels-eu27-uk-brexit-delay">avoid repeated requests</a> from the UK.</p>
<p>The EU’s first preference since the referendum has for been for a change of mind in the UK and for the country to remain in the EU. If that isn’t possible, the EU wants an orderly departure. It regards “no deal” as a disaster, even if the EU27 stand to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-no-deal-brexit-would-be-less-costly-for-the-eu-than-the-uk-110407">less badly hit</a> than the UK. </p>
<p>It’s unlikely, however, that the EU27 would give their consent to just any request from London. They see no evidence that May has been able to make any progress since the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/withdrawal-agreement-and-political-declaration">withdrawal agreement</a> was agreed in late November 2018, and they have little confidence in her ability to secure a majority for her deal at Westminster.</p>
<h2>Two, three or six months</h2>
<p>The prime minister told MPs that any extension would <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-47373246/brexit-may-statement-on-future-votes-and-article-50-extension">have to be short</a>. She would be subject to intense political pressures from Brexiteers in her party, sections of the press, and public opinion, which polls suggest would favour no more than three months. May would also want to avoid UK participation in elections to the European parliament. She said that people would find it strange for a country that is about to leave the EU to vote in the elections. </p>
<p>Since the elections are <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/elections">scheduled for 23-26 May</a>, that would allow an extension of just under two months. Or, if the aim is for any extension to finish before the members of the European parliament (MEPs) take up their seats on July 1, that could allow for an extension of three months. Though since hearings to select a new commission president – one of the new parliament’s first major tasks – will not begin until the autumn, six months might be a possibility.</p>
<p>On the EU side, however, there is scepticism about what a short extension would achieve. Although the timing of the European elections does complicate the situation, the problem they present is not insurmountable. Even the fact that seats have been re-allocated in anticipation of the UK’s departure <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/the-european-council-establishes-the-composition-of-the-european-parliament/">could be dealt with</a>. </p>
<p>From an EU perspective, the obligation to contribute to the EU budget beyond March 29 on the part of the UK would not be overly problematic. As part of the arrangements for the transition period built into the withdrawal agreement, the UK has already agreed that it would maintain its contributions in 2019 and 2020. Problems would arise only if an extension period went beyond 2020, since that’s when the current EU budget period ends and the EU is currently negotiating the EU budget for the seven-year period that follows.</p>
<p>In the event, if the alternative is a no-deal Brexit with the disruption that such an outcome would entail, the EU27 may reluctantly agree to a short extension. However, it’s unlikely to do so without imposing conditions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112576/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hussein Kassim receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council. He is an Associate Fellow of 'The UK in a Changing Europe'.</span></em></p>Even if parliament votes to delay Brexit beyond March 29, the EU27 would have to unanimously agree. Would they?Hussein Kassim, Professor of Politics, Political, Social and International Studies, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1071272018-11-19T15:02:34Z2018-11-19T15:02:34ZBrexit: what has to happen in UK and EU parliaments to ratify withdrawal and future trade agreements<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246201/original/file-20181119-76150-k164qs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tick tock.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/alarm-clock-colors-eu-flag-one-1191458215">Ivan Marc/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite Westminster’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-mays-brexit-deal-is-dead-in-the-water-now-what-for-britain-107029">convulsions over Brexit</a>, now that a draft Withdrawal Agreement is on the table, the next stage of the process governing the UK’s exit from the European Union has been set in motion. But what actually needs to happen next for the different parts of the Brexit deal to get ratified, and what role do different parliaments have in the process? </p>
<p>The Draft <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_withdrawal_agreement_0.pdf">Withdrawal Agreement</a> that was published on November 14 lays down the rules for the first two of three phases of Brexit: the UK’s actual withdrawal from the EU on March 29, 2019 and a transition period until the end of 2020 – with one possible extension. </p>
<p>The third phase is the new future trade relationship between the EU and the UK, a short outline for which was published in an accompanying <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/756378/14_November_Outline_Political_Declaration_on_the_Future_Relationship.pdf">political declaration</a>. This political declaration is not legally binding, but would be the subject of a second agreement on the future that would require its own ratification process. </p>
<p>The UK parliament must approve both agreements. But the role of the EU parliament and the parliaments of each of the 27 member states differs in ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement and the future trade agreement.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-draft-withdrawal-agreement-experts-react-107027">Brexit draft withdrawal agreement – experts react</a>
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<h2>Getting the divorce agreed</h2>
<p>The Withdrawal Agreement is an international agreement or treaty. Treaties are typically negotiated by the government or executive branch, in this case the UK government on the one side and the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier, acting on behalf of the Council of the European Union. The Council represents member states’ interests in the institutional architecture of the EU, and is made up of ministers of the member states. </p>
<p>In the UK, treaties must be laid before parliament under the so-called <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldconst/236/23612.htm">Ponsonby rule</a> before the government ratifies them. This process was codified in law <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/25/contents">in 2010</a> and means parliament can object to a treaty within 21 parliamentary sitting days and delay its ratification indefinitely. </p>
<p>However, for both the Withdrawal Agreement and the framework for the future relationship agreement, parliament’s role has been enhanced and MPs will have a “meaningful vote” on the content of both documents. This was put into law under Section 13(1) of the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/16/section/13/enacted">European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018</a>, which requires the draft agreement to be put to both houses of parliament. MPs must approve it and at the same time pass implementing legislation. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-happens-if-parliament-rejects-a-brexit-deal-103939">What happens if parliament rejects a Brexit deal?</a>
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<p>The EU parliament, including the MEPs from the UK, must consent by simple majority to the Withdrawal Agreement – but does not have the power to amend it. In this case, the Council of the EU needs to adopt it by super-qualified majority. This means it <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/qualified-majority/">needs to get support</a> of 72% of the 27 participating member states (or 20 member states), and the support must also represent 65% of the population of the 27 member states. Although the UK is still a full member of the EU with full rights in the Council of the EU, it is not participating or taking part in the council’s decisions concerning Brexit.</p>
<p>But there is no role for national parliaments of the 27 member states in the context of the Withdrawal Agreement, meaning for example that the French, Spanish or Polish parliaments do not have to agree to it.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246202/original/file-20181119-76160-1ajqr7e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246202/original/file-20181119-76160-1ajqr7e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/246202/original/file-20181119-76160-1ajqr7e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/246202/original/file-20181119-76160-1ajqr7e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/246202/original/file-20181119-76160-1ajqr7e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/246202/original/file-20181119-76160-1ajqr7e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/246202/original/file-20181119-76160-1ajqr7e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">MEPs will need to ratify the Withdrawal Agreement at the EU parliament.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/strasbourg-france-june-14-2017-european-674499817?src=-tsj1mnlR9WCBv3YfMM7og-1-14">DiegoMariottini/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The future relationship</h2>
<p>A full agreement governing the future relationship between the UK and the EU, that puts into the law the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/756378/14_November_Outline_Political_Declaration_on_the_Future_Relationship.pdf">short outline</a> published in mid-November, is still some years away. It can only be negotiated once the UK has left the EU, as only then will the UK regain its power to conclude international trade agreements.</p>
<p>When it comes to any future trade agreements, it is unclear whether the UK parliament will get the enhanced involvement in ratifying it that it has in the context of the Withdrawal Agreement, or whether only the ordinary rules relating to treaties apply, as the <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2017-12-13/HCWS342">government has implied</a>. The House of Commons Committee on Exiting the European Union has been <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwisyqmVzuDeAhVETMAKHVsqBSAQFjAAegQICRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublications.parliament.uk%2Fpa%2Fcm201719%2Fcmselect%2Fcmexeu%2F1240%2F1240.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2E3tYIIZDuL95Q9yFGQkZC">critical of this</a>, calling the ordinary process “inadequate” as it does not guarantee “a debate or vote on a treaty before it is ratified.” </p>
<p>However, the situation on the EU side is constitutionally more complex than with the divorce part of the Brexit process. In addition to the EU parliament, which must consent to the future trade agreement, all 27 member states will need to ratify it according to their national constitutional provisions. </p>
<p>This is because the future trade agreement between the UK and the EU would be a mixed agreement, dealing with some matters for which the EU is responsible and with some matters which fall into what’s called “shared competence” between the member states and the EU. For example, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=190727&doclang=EN">ruled in 2017</a> that provisions relating to investor-state dispute settlement procedures and non-direct foreign investments fall into areas of shared competence.</p>
<p>The exact process depends on the constitutional requirements in each member state, but comprehensive free trade agreements have to be approved by all national parliaments. There is a risk that a single member state may not ratify the deal and so could block the agreement from coming into effect. This risk became reality in the case of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ceta-was-brexit-rather-than-the-walloons-behind-trade-deal-stutter-67800">Canada-EU Trade Agreement</a> (CETA), when one of the regional parliaments of Belgium, the parliament of Wallonia, rejected the deal in 2016. Italy also threatened not to ratify CETA, while Austria and Germany delayed ratification pending the outcome of judicial proceedings. CETA’s <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-ceta">full ratification</a> is still pending. </p>
<p>All this means that while the biggest hurdle for the Withdrawal Agreement remains getting it agreed by the UK parliament, ratifying the future trade agreement will be a much more complex process that could be rocky and take years. For the UK parliament it is a potential opportunity for an increased role in international treaty making.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107127/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katja Ziegler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What role do EU institutions and the parliaments of 27 member states have in agreeing the next steps of the Brexit process.Katja Ziegler, Sir Robert Jennings Professor of International Law, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/744702017-04-05T10:13:18Z2017-04-05T10:13:18ZDual nationality and the hurdles facing Britons who want to keep EU citizenship after Brexit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163279/original/image-20170330-15599-d07ygh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">How to keep both.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">via shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the major implications of leaving the European Union for British nationals is the loss of EU citizenship. British nationals will no longer be able to enjoy the right to free movement within the EU or the right to live in any member state. They will also lose the right to equal treatment in other EU member states on the same terms as nationals of those countries.</p>
<p>In principle, the UK government could reach an agreement with the EU which will allow British citizens living elsewhere in the EU to continue to enjoy their current rights and offer a reciprocal arrangement for EU nationals who live and work in the UK. </p>
<p>One of the possibilities would be to provide British nationals who want to remain part of the European project with associate EU citizenship, an idea which has been <a href="http://www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/interview/charles-goerens-associate-citizenship-for-brits-is-an-offer-not-an-obligation">proposed</a> by a liberal MEP from Luxembourg, Charles Goerens. If accepted by the European Parliament, it could enable British nationals who opt for the new status to continue to travel and reside freely within the European Union.</p>
<p>Both the British <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-commons-statement-on-triggering-article-50">prime minister Theresa May</a> and the president of the EU Council, Donald Tusk, have <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/president/">stressed</a> that clarifying the status of both EU citizens living in the UK and British citizens elsewhere in Europe will be top priority as Brexit negotiations begin. Until then, many face uncertainty – and are angered at being used as bargaining chips. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"846802586070069254"}"></div></p>
<p>So it is not surprising that some Britons have tried to take the matter into their own hands by looking for ways to get dual nationality with another member state. There has been some political support for this by the German Green party who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/23/germany-green-party-fast-track-british-citizenship-applications">called</a> on the German government to fast-track the applications of Britons wishing to become German citizens ahead of Brexit. </p>
<p>Within a few months of the referendum vote in June 2016, there was a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/19/huge-increase-britons-seeking-citizenship-eu-states-brexit-looms">surge</a> in applications by Britons for naturalisation in other EU member states. In some straightforward cases, a connection with another member state gives the right to acquire its nationality. For example, British nationals of Irish descent – and anybody born in Northern Ireland – have the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/13/huge-rise-in-britons-applying-for-irish-citizenship-after-brexit-vote">right</a> to acquire Irish citizenship. British nationals who are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/30/uk-descendants-of-jewish-refugees-seek-german-citizenship-after-brexit-vote">descendants</a> of Jewish World War II German refugees also have the right to acquire German nationality. </p>
<h2>Trouble in Spain</h2>
<p>Yet, there are different nationality laws across the EU. The UK recognises dual nationality from anywhere in the world. Most other EU member states also accept dual nationality, but not all. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia do not permit dual nationality. The Netherlands, <a href="https://ind.nl/en/dutch-citizenship/Pages/Naturalisation.aspx">requires</a> applicants for naturalisation to renounce their previous nationality unless the personal circumstances of the applicant meet a number of exceptions. The same applies to naturalisation <a href="http://eudo-citizenship.eu/NationalDB/docs/AT%20Nationality%20Act%201985%20%28consolidated%20version%20as%20by%20Law%2037%202006%29.pdf">in Austria</a>.</p>
<p>Spain <a href="http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/en/ServiciosAlCiudadano/InformacionParaExtranjeros/Paginas/Nacionalidad.aspx">recognises</a> dual nationality only with countries with which it has a specific connection: Ibero-American countries, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea and Portugal. Britons applying for Spanish nationality therefore need to renounce their UK nationality. Following naturalisation in Spain, the continued use of UK nationality <a href="http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/en/ServiciosAlCiudadano/InformacionParaExtranjeros/Paginas/Nacionalidad.aspx">may lead to</a> loss of Spanish nationality. </p>
<p>Spanish citizens who wish to obtain another nationality, such as those living in the UK, do not face this dilemma. They can have dual nationality if they inform the Spanish authorities of their intention to maintain their Spanish citizenship <a href="http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/en/ServiciosAlCiudadano/InformacionParaExtranjeros/Paginas/Nacionalidad.aspx">within three years</a> from the moment they acquire UK nationality. Because of this inequality, an agreement on the status of British nationals in Spain – the country that is home to the largest number of British citizens in the EU – is particularly important to address in the Brexit negotiations.</p>
<h2>German dilemma</h2>
<p>The national rules on loss of nationality upon acquiring a foreign citizenship are complex and vary from one member state to another. Another potentially complicated situation arises for Britons who want to apply for German nationality. Germany accepts dual nationality <a href="https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzestexte/EN/Staatsangehoerigkeitsgesetz_englisch.pdf?__blob=publicationFile">only</a> with other member states of the EU. Therefore, while the UK remains an EU member state, UK nationals can apply for German nationality without the need to renounce UK nationality. After Brexit, new applicants will have to give up their UK nationality.</p>
<p>The national laws on dual nationality will also affect applications of nationals of other member states for naturalisation in the UK. Nationals of member states that do not recognise dual nationality could potentially lose their nationality of origin. </p>
<p>All this means that dual nationality is one of the solutions to losing EU citizenship, but it is by no means a substitute for a comprehensive political solution which would allow all affected British nationals to secure their rights in other member states following Brexit.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74470/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oxana Golynker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Different EU countries have different rules about who can have dual nationality.Oxana Golynker, Lecturer in Law, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/259842014-04-28T07:59:59Z2014-04-28T07:59:59ZRise of Euroscepticism masks general apathy about EU vote
<p>One month to go until the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections. The candidates have been chosen, the posters printed and the media interpretation of the results (probably) decided. “A wake-up call for Europe”, “Euroscepticism triumphs”, “Europe’s populist revolt” and the inevitable “Return of the far-right in Europe” are the types of headline I expect to see on opinion pieces in the last days of May. </p>
<p>Certainly, the great and the good of the international media have been rehearsing their lines for long enough. Both <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/15/far-right-threat-europe-integration">The Guardian</a> and the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/19/opinion/is-fascism-returning-to-europe.html?_r=3&">The New York Times</a> ran op-eds best described as misguided in November 2013 about how the far-right was supposedly on the march once again across Europe. Likewise, The Economist dedicated a whole <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21592666-parties-nationalist-right-are-changing-terms-european-political-debate-does">special section</a> in January 2014 to the apparently sudden rise of Europe’s “populist insurgents”.</p>
<p>My favourite line from The New York Times piece (by Federico Finchelstein and Fabián Bosoeris) is “many fear that the European Parliament may be at risk of a right-wing populist takeover following elections in May 2014”. Finchelstein and Bosoeris don’t tell us who “many” is, which is probably just as well for the unnamed “many”, given that there is no chance whatsoever of this actually happening. Nor, as claimed by John Palmer in The Guardian, has the post-2008 economic crisis in Europe caused a clear and uniform rise of the far-right – see Cas Mudde’s fine piece <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2013/11/04/a-european-shutdown-the-2014-european-elections-and-the-great-recession/">here</a> debunking that particular myth. And nor is there anything particularly new in Europe about populist parties doing well. They have been increasing their share of the vote for the past two decades.</p>
<p>All the above notwithstanding, 2014 will indeed almost certainly be a “Eurosceptic success” since the total Eurosceptic vote is likely to reach its highest level to date. The key point though here is that we are talking about a “total vote”, not that of a single, unified block. Euroscepticism does not denote a homogenous ideological category or a single party family. Rather, it encompasses parties not only of the radical Left and Right, but also environmental and conservative ones – most of which would not entertain the idea of sitting alongside one another simply due to some shared Eurosceptical beliefs. </p>
<p>Indeed, one party’s Euroscepticism may be very different from another’s. The term includes a vast range of conflicting positions on Europe – from left-wing parties which denounce the EU’s pro-market policies to right-wing ones which condemn the loss of national sovereignty; from parties which are critical of the EU’s current direction and want to change it (but deem integration a fundamentally good idea), to those that reject European integration as a ruinous elite-driven project which should be quickly abandoned.</p>
<h2>Runner and riders</h2>
<p>Their many differences aside, who are the Eurosceptic runners and riders worth keeping an eye on over the next month? Looking at the surveys on the excellent <a href="http://metapolls.net/category/europe/euroelections-2014/#.U11OWVWSxLw">Metapolls</a> website, a number of interesting races stand out for me. In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party is very impressively <a href="http://metapolls.net/category/europe/euroelections-2014/denmark-euroelections-2014/#.U1qB1Kh_uHU">leading the pack</a> with around a quarter of the vote (having finished fourth in the 2009 EP election), while in Italy the Five-Star Movement <a href="http://metapolls.net/category/europe/euroelections-2014/italy-euroelections-2014/#.U1qDMqh_uHU">may improve</a> on its spectacular February 2013 debut general election result of 25.6% – leaving those commentators who foolishly predicted it would decline after <a href="http://theconversation.com/on-italys-streets-five-star-still-twinkles-14825">poor local election results</a> last year with a lot of egg on their faces. </p>
<p>Likewise, in Britain, UKIP appears to be going from strength to strength in the polls, having just been placed first on 31% in a <a href="http://metapolls.net/category/europe/euroelections-2014/united-kingdom-euroelections-2014/#.U11R_lWSxLx">YouGov survey</a> published on Sunday. Although far less significant in terms of its vote share, the possible breakthrough of the Alternative for Germany (AFD) – <a href="http://metapolls.net/category/europe/euroelections-2014/germany-euroelections-2014/#.U11TJFWSxLx">currently on 6-7% in polls</a> – is another one to watch given that country’s absence to date of a notable right-wing Eurosceptic party.</p>
<p>A lot of media attention will of course be focused on the members of the new radical right Eurosceptic alliance fronted by Marine Le Pen’s Front National and <a href="http://theconversation.com/geert-wilders-is-back-and-he-has-european-domination-on-his-mind-15775">Geert Wilders’</a> Freedom Party. Its star performer looks certain to be Le Pen’s party which is <a href="http://metapolls.net/category/europe/euroelections-2014/france-euroelections-2014/#.U1qDX6h_uHU">vying for first place</a> with the mainstream centre-right on 22-24% – which would be by far its best election result to date and a massive improvement on the 6.3% it took in the 2009 EP elections under Le Pen senior. </p>
<p>As for Wilders’s party, it has slipped back over the past month, but remains well-placed with support ranging from 15 to 18% <a href="http://metapolls.net/category/europe/euroelections-2014/netherlands-euroelections-2014/#.U11UeFWSxLx">in different polls</a>. The Austrian Freedom Party has also <a href="http://metapolls.net/category/europe/euroelections-2014/austria-euroelections-2014/#.U11VAVWSxLx">declined slightly of late</a>, still easily above its 13% result in 2009, but firmly in third place. Bringing up the rear of this group will be the Northern League in Italy – which looks <a href="http://metapolls.net/category/europe/euroelections-2014/italy-euroelections-2014/#.U1qDMqh_uHU">set to gain just half</a> of the 10% share it received in 2009 – and the Sweden Democrats on <a href="http://metapolls.net/category/europe/euroelections-2014/sweden-euroelections-2014/#.U11VulWSxLw">around 5%</a>.</p>
<p>Some of the above will be the main “Eurosceptic winners” we’ll be reading about in a month’s time in assorted opinion columns. The consolation for Europhiles is that, even taken as an implausible whole, the Eurosceptics will receive only a fraction of the total votes given to those parties which continue to support the EU and European integration. </p>
<p>However, the very broad and divided churches of Europhiles and Eurosceptics will almost certainly each be outnumbered by a less vocal category, which will be the real “winner” of these elections: the Euroabstainers. [Turnout has declined](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-(1979-2009) at each of the six European Parliament elections since 1979, reaching a new low of 43% in 2009. And while it may not make for such an appealing headline, it is the extent of this apathy rather than Euroscepticism, populism or the purported rise of a new right which – at least for the moment – should really worry those who profess to believe in the EU.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/25984/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
One month to go until the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections. The candidates have been chosen, the posters printed and the media interpretation of the results (probably) decided. “A wake-up call for…Duncan McDonnell, Marie Curie Fellow, European University InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.