tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/foreign-policy-266/articlesForeign policy – The Conversation2024-03-28T12:50:35Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259912024-03-28T12:50:35Z2024-03-28T12:50:35ZThe amazing story of the man who created the latest narco-state in the Americas, and how the United States helped him every step of the way − until now<p>When Juan Orlando Hernández was <a href="https://apnews.com/article/honduras-president-juan-orlando-hernandez-corruption-trial-7c43423f12ff71859c370be2fc6ac5b0">convicted by a federal jury</a> in Manhattan in early March 2024, it marked a spectacular fall from grace: from being courted in the U.S. as a friendly head of state to facing the rest of his life behind bars, convicted of cocaine importation and weapons offenses.</p>
<p>“Juan Orlando Hernández abused his position as President of Honduras to operate the country as a narco-state where violent drug traffickers were allowed with virtual impunity,” said <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/juan-orlando-hernandez-former-president-honduras-convicted-manhattan-federal-court">U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland</a> following the jury conviction. <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/juan-orlando-hernandez-former-president-honduras-convicted-manhattan-federal-court">Anne Milgram</a>, administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, added: “When the leader of Honduras and the leader of the Sinaloa Cartel work hand-in-hand to send deadly drugs into the United States, both deserve to be accountable.”</p>
<p>The conviction was a victory for the Justice Department and the DEA. During Hernández’s two terms in office, from 2014 to 2022, he and his acolytes transported more than 400 tons of cocaine into the United States, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/juan-orlando-hernandez-former-president-honduras-convicted-manhattan-federal-court">according to U.S. prosecutors</a>. The former head of state now faces a mandatory sentence of up to 40 years in prison; sentencing is scheduled for June 26. </p>
<p>But there’s more to this story. </p>
<p>As I explore in the book “<a href="https://www.routledge.com/21st-Century-Democracy-Promotion-in-the-Americas-Standing-up-for-the-Polity/Heine-Weiffen/p/book/9780415626378">21st Century Democracy Promotion in the Americas: Standing Up for the Polity</a>,” written in collaboration with the <a href="https://www.open.ac.uk/people/bw4844">Open University’s Britta Weiffen</a>, Honduras is a tragic example of what happens when a country becomes a narco-state. While its people suffer the consequences – the World Bank reports that about <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/honduras/overview">half the country currently lives under poverty</a> – its leaders grow rich through the drugs trade.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the way Hernández came to power and maintained that position for so long could provide “Exhibit A” in any indictment of U.S. policy toward Central America – and Latin America more generally – over the past few decades. </p>
<h2>Growing ties with cartels</h2>
<p>Up to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-supreme-court-arrests-united-states-honduras-extradition-207d739fe73c844ad5cf182eec030a8a">Hernández’s arrest in Tegucigalpa</a>, the Honduran capital, and extradition to the United States in January 2022, his biggest enabler had been none other than the U.S. government itself. </p>
<p>Presidents <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/15/president-obama-announces-presidential-delegation-honduras-attend-inaugu">Barack Obama</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/honduras-president-narcotrafficking-hernandez/2021/02/11/1fa96044-5f8c-11eb-ac8f-4ae05557196e_story.html">Donald Trump</a> <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/18/readout-vice-president-bidens-meeting-honduran-president-juan-orlando">and Joe Biden</a> all backed Hernández and allowed him to inflict enormous harm to Honduras and to the United States in the process.</p>
<p>How so? To answer this question, some background is needed. </p>
<p>On June 28, 2009, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/28/honduras-coup-president-zelaya">a classic military coup took place</a> in Honduras. In the wee hours of the morning, while still in his pajamas, President Manuel “Mel” Zelaya was unceremoniously escorted by armed soldiers from his home and <a href="https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-lt-honduras-divided-070709-2009jul07-story.html">flown to a neighboring country</a>. The coup leaders alleged that, by calling for a referendum on reforming the Honduran Constitution, the government was moving toward removing the one-term presidential term limit enshrined in the country’s charter and opening the door to authoritarianism.</p>
<p>Initially, then-President Barack Obama <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE55S5J2/">protested the coup</a> and took measures against those responsible – the right-wing opponents of Zelaya. </p>
<p>But the administration eventually relented and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN07503526/">allowed the coup leaders to prevail</a>, largely due to pressure from Republicans, who saw Zelaya as being <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interview/honduran-politics-and-chavez-factor">too close to Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez</a>, whose leftist agenda was deemed by the GOP as a threat to U.S. interests. </p>
<p>The coup-makers simply ran the clock against the upcoming election date and installed their own candidate in the presidency, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/30/honduras-lobo-president">Porfirio Lobo of the National party</a>, whose son Fabio was also later convicted of cocaine trafficking. </p>
<h2>Washington looks the other way</h2>
<p>Lobo laid the foundations of Honduras as the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-56947595">new century’s first narco-state</a>, allowing drug cartels to infiltrate the highest echelons of government and the security apparatus as cocaine trade became an increasingly central plank of the country’s economy.</p>
<p>All the while, the U.S. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/08/american-funding-honduran-security-forces-blood-on-our-hands">pumped tens of millions of dollars</a> <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/should-the-u-s-still-be-sending-military-aid-to-honduras">into building up Honduras’ police and military</a>, despite widespread allegations of being engaged in corruption, complicit in the drugs trade and engaged in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/honduras">human rights abuses</a>.</p>
<p>The dollars continued to flow when Lobo was succeeded in 2013 by his buddy and fellow National party member, Juan Orlando Hernández.</p>
<p>In 2017, Hernández – an ardent supporter of the 2009 coup – ran for a second term after the Supreme Court of Honduras <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0NE2T9/">pronounced this to be perfectly legal</a>.</p>
<p>Many Hondurans believe Hernández <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-honduran-government-is-trying-to-steal-an-election/">stole the November 2017 elections</a>. The vote count was suspended in the middle of the night as Hernández was running behind, and when the polls opened in the morning, he <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-honduran-government-is-trying-to-steal-an-election/">miraculously emerged as a winner</a>.</p>
<p>Despite widespread allegations of election fraud, the U.S. quickly recognized the result, congratulating <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/22/politics/us-honduras-election-results/index.html">Hernández on his win</a>.</p>
<p>Emboldened by his success, Hernández continued to build up Honduras as the new century’s first narco-state of the Americas.</p>
<p>In 2018, the president’s brother, Juan Antonio “Tony” Hernández, a former member of the Honduran Parliament, was arrested in the United States for his association with the Cartel de Sinaloa, the Mexican drug cartel. This entity valued his services so much that <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-honduran-congressman-tony-hern-ndez-sentenced-life-prison-and-ordered-forfeit">they named a particular strain of cocaine after him</a>, stamping the bags as “TH.” Tony Hernández was convicted on four charges in 2019, sentenced to 30 years in prison, and has been in U.S. federal prison ever since. </p>
<p>President Hernández denied any association with the cartel, but the evidence pointed to the contrary. As <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2021/03/18/a-court-case-rocks-the-president-of-honduras">reported in The Economist</a>, in a New York City trial, one accused drug trafficker alleged that Hernández took bribes for “helping cocaine reach the United States.” Another witness testified that the president had taken two bribes in 2013, before being elected; a former cartel leader testified that the president had been paid $250,000 to protect him from being arrested.</p>
<h2>‘Complicit or gullible’</h2>
<p>Given Hernández’s history in Honduras, the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/08/juan-orlando-hernndez-honduras-convicted/">repeated claims of U.S. government officials</a> that they simply didn’t know of his crimes ring hollow.</p>
<p>Honduras became a narco-state, in part, because U.S. policymakers looked the other way as it did so. They embraced Hernández because he was ideologically more palatable and subservient to Washington’s wishes compared with his rival, Zelaya. But as the trial verdict in Manhattan makes clear, it was a decision with disastrous consequences.</p>
<p>As one State Department official put it, “Today’s verdict makes all of us who collaborated with (Hernández) <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/08/juan-orlando-hernndez-honduras-convicted/">look either complicit or gullible</a>.” </p>
<p>The latter may be the more charitable assessment. But the truth is more uncomfortable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225991/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I am a member of the Party for Democracy in Chile and and affiliated with the Foro de Political Exterior, a Chilean foreign policy think tank.</span></em></p>Washington looked the other way as coup leaders and drugs cartels conspired to turn Honduras into a center of the cocaine trade.Jorge Heine, Interim Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2255242024-03-21T17:53:21Z2024-03-21T17:53:21ZWhether it’s Trump or Biden as president, U.S. foreign policy endangers the world<p>Many observers of American politics are understandably terrified at the prospect of Donald Trump being re-elected president of the United States in November.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/11/9/has-us-democracy-failed-for-good">The U.S.</a> is already showing signs of a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/democracy-crisis">failed democracy</a>. <a href="https://www.citizen.org/news/twelve-years-since-citizens-united-big-money-corruption-keeps-getting-worse/">Its government</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/9/28/corruption-is-as-american-as-apple-pie">and politics</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/01/us/politics/government-dysfunction-normal.html">are often dysfunctional</a> and plagued <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/28/report-transparency-international-corruption-worst-decade-united-states/">with corruption</a>. </p>
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<p>A Trump victory would raise fears of a new level of decline into <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/20/us/politics/trump-rhetoric-fascism.html">fascist authoritarianism</a>. However, a second Trump presidency would not necessarily implement a foreign policy any more destructive than what is normal for the U.S. </p>
<h2>Violence part of U.S. foreign policy</h2>
<p>Since the start of the 21st century, the U.S. has unleashed enormous violence and instability on the global stage. This is a feature of American foreign policy, regardless of who’s president. </p>
<p>In 2001, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. launched its “war on terror.” It invaded and <a href="https://theconversation.com/by-not-investigating-the-u-s-for-war-crimes-the-international-criminal-court-shows-colonialism-still-thrives-in-international-law-115269">occupied Afghanistan</a>, then illegally invaded and occupied Iraq. </p>
<p>These actions <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/">caused the deaths of 4.6 million people over the next 20 years, destabilized the Middle East and caused massive refugee migrations</a>. </p>
<p>In 2007-2008, <a href="https://www.economicsobservatory.com/why-did-the-global-financial-crisis-of-2007-09-happen">the under-regulated U.S. economy caused a global financial crisis</a>. The <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2018/10/03/blog-lasting-effects-the-global-economic-recovery-10-years-after-the-crisis">associated political and economic fallout</a> <a href="https://hbr.org/2018/09/the-social-and-political-costs-of-the-financial-crisis-10-years-later">continues to resonate</a>. </p>
<p>In 2011, <a href="https://www.globalvillagespace.com/consequences-of-us-nato-military-intervention-in-libya/">the U.S. and its</a> <a href="https://www.cato.org/commentary/how-nato-pushed-us-libya-fiasco">NATO allies intervened in Libya</a>, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/libya-floods-nato/">collapsing that state, destabilizing northern Africa</a> and creating more refugees. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/11/opinion/nato-summit-vilnius-europe.html">The U.S. tried to</a> <a href="https://harpers.org/archive/2023/06/why-are-we-in-ukraine/">consolidate its dominance in Europe by expanding NATO</a>, despite Russia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/28/nato-expansion-war-russia-ukraine">warning against this for decades</a>. This strategy played a role in the Russia-Ukraine war in 2014 and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden’s administration <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/03/30/why-the-us-and-nato-have-long-wanted-russia-to-attack-ukraine/">has been accused both of helping to provoke the war</a> in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/25/russia-weakened-lloyd-austin-ukraine-visit/">hopes of permanently weakening Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/why-peace-talks-but-no-peace/">of resisting peace negotiations</a>.</p>
<p>Today, <a href="https://time.com/6695261/ukraine-forever-war-danger/">Ukraine appears to stand on the verge of defeat</a> and territorial division, and U.S. Congress <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/01/us-congress-support-ukraine-war/677256/">seems set to abandon it.</a></p>
<h2>Fuelling global tensions</h2>
<p>The U.S. has provoked tensions with China <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/11/harvard-guru-gives-biden-a-d-for-china-policy/">by reneging on American commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act (1979) to refrain from having official relations or an “alliance” with Taiwan</a>. <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/07/proposals-for-us-action-in-s-china-sea-should-worry-everyone/">The U.S. has also been accused</a> of <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2018/06/20/us-pundits-and-politicians-pushing-for-war-in-the-south-china-sea/">encouraging conflict in the South China Sea</a> as it has <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2023/2/14/david_vine_us_bases_china_philippines">surrounded China with hundreds of military bases.</a> </p>
<p>Israel’s assault on Gaza is partly the culmination of decades of misguided U.S. foreign policy. Unconditional American support of Israel has helped enable <a href="https://www.amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/israels-apartheid-against-palestinians-a-cruel-system-of-domination-and-a-crime-against-humanity/?psafe_param=1&gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAjw7-SvBhB6EiwAwYdCAVW84WyFFiEvbjzsIp5pPDN5CDlYOCBM52mCC6X6HGC6u52iuTDyyxoCM7MQAvD_BwE">the country’s degeneration</a> into what human rights organizations have called <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution">apartheid</a>, as the state has built illegal settlements on Palestinian land and violently suppressed Palestinian self-determination. </p>
<p>As Israel is accused <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68550937">of using starvation as a weapon against 2.3 million Palestinians in Gaza</a>, half of them children, the U.S. is fully <a href="https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/ccr-news/building-case-us-complicity">complicit in the Israeli war crimes</a> and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/south-african-lawyers-preparing-lawsuit-against-us-uk-for-complicity-in-israels-war-crimes-in-gaza/3109201">for facilitating a conflict</a> that is further inflaming a critically important region. </p>
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<p>Israel is of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/israel-strategic-liability">little to no strategic value</a> <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230804-israel-no-longer-serves-us-interest-says-ex-senior-white-house-official/">to the U.S</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3167/isf.2007.220205">American politicians contend that its overwhelming support for Israel reflects moral and cultural ties,</a> <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/11/us-ignores-israeli-war-crimes-domestic-politics-ex-official">but it’s mainly</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/13/us/politics/aipac-israel-gaza-democrats-republicans.html">driven by domestic politics</a>. </p>
<p>That suggests that for <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/7/24/5929705/us-israel-friends">domestic political reasons</a>, the U.S. has endangered global stability and supported atrocities. </p>
<h2>Biden/Trump foreign policy</h2>
<p>The Biden administration has continued many of the foreign policy initiatives it inherited from Trump. </p>
<p>Biden doubled down on <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2022/12/25/biden-escalates-the-economic-war-with-china/?sh=1f1caa1412f3">Trump’s economic</a>, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3253917/no-end-us-trade-war-china-biden-administration-pledges-policy-document">technological and political war against China</a>. </p>
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<p>He <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/biden-administration-continues-be-wrong-about-wto">reinforced Trump’s trade protectionism</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/08/wto-flops-usa-shrugs-00145691">left the World Trade Organization hobbled</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/07/09/1110109088/biden-is-building-on-the-abraham-accords-part-of-trumps-legacy-in-the-middle-eas">He built on Trump’s “Abraham Accords,”</a> an initiative to convince Arab states to normalize their relations with Israel without a resolution to the Palestine question. </p>
<p>The Biden administration’s efforts to push normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/11/analysis-why-did-hamas-attack-now-and-what-is-next">is considered part of Hamas’s motivation to attack Israel on Oct. 7, 2023</a>.</p>
<p>None of this inspires confidence in U.S. “global leadership.”</p>
<p>Biden and Trump share the same goal: <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/americas-plot-for-world-domination/">permanent American global domination</a>. They only differ in how to achieve this. </p>
<p>Trump <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/deconstructing-trumps-foreign-policy/">believes the U.S.</a> can <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/20/key-moments-in-trumps-foreign-policy">use economic and military might</a> <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_2020_the_year_of_economic_coercion_under_trump/">to coerce the world</a> into acquiescing to American desires, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-strong-arm-foreign-policy-tactics-create-tensions-with-both-us-friends-and-foes/2020/01/18/ddb76364-3991-11ea-bb7b-265f4554af6d_story.html">regardless of the costs to everyone else</a> and without the U.S. assuming any obligations to others. </p>
<p>In office, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/01/20/trump-the-anti-war-president-was-always-a-myth/">Trump tried to present himself as “anti-war.”</a> But his inclination to use of threats and violence reflected established American behaviour.</p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://jacobin.com/2022/10/biden-national-security-strategy-us-hegemony">follows a more diplomatic strategy</a> that tries to control international institutions and convince key states their interests are best served by accepting and co-operating with American domination. However, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/biden-warns-us-military-may-get-pulled-direct-conflict-russia-1856613">Biden readily resorts to economic and military coercion</a>, too. </p>
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<h2>Reality check?</h2>
<p>The silver lining to a Trump presidency is that it might force U.S. allies to confront reality.</p>
<p>American allies convinced themselves that <a href="https://www.policymagazine.ca/the-biden-doctrine-our-long-international-nightmare-is-over/">the Biden presidency was a return to normalcy</a>, but they’re still accepting and supporting American global violence. They’re also wilfully ignoring the ongoing American political decay that could not be masked by Biden’s defeat of Trump in 2020.</p>
<p>Trump is a <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/trump-symptom-diseased-american-democracy">symptom of American political dysfunction, not a cause</a>. Even if he loses in November, the Republican Party will continue its slide towards fascism and American politics will remain toxic.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/18/1232263785/generations-after-its-heyday-isolationism-is-alive-and-kicking-up-controversy">A second Trump presidency may convince American allies that the U.S. is unreliable and inconsistent</a>. It may undermine the mostly <a href="https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2024/03/14/how-europe-and-australia-can-end-our-slide-into-irrelevance-servility-national-press-club-of-australia-speech-13-march-2024/">western coalition that has dominated and damaged the world so profoundly</a>. </p>
<p>If Trump returns, traditional U.S. allies may recognize that their interests lie in reconsidering their relations with the U.S. </p>
<p>For American neighbours Canada and Mexico, a Trump presidency is only bad news. They’ll <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/joly-us-authoritarian-game-plan-1.6939369#:%7E:text=Politics-,Canada%20mulling%20'game%20plan'%20if%20U.S.%20takes%20far%2Dright,after%20next%20year's%20presidential%20elections.">have to somehow protect themselves from creeping U.S. fascism</a>. For the rest of the world, it may herald the start of a dynamic multipolar order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Narine has contributed to Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East and Jewish Voice for Peace.</span></em></p>A second Donald Trump presidency would not necessarily implement a foreign policy any more destructive than what is normal for the United States.Shaun Narine, Professor of International Relations and Political Science, St. Thomas University (Canada)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250672024-03-12T18:38:37Z2024-03-12T18:38:37ZCanada’s inaction in Gaza marks a failure of its feminist foreign policy<p><a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/assets/pdfs/iap2-eng.pdf?_ga=2.63794223.1840653675.1709657832-2101566470.1701624369">“Peace and prosperity are every person’s birthright.”</a> So opened then Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland’s introduction to Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP).</p>
<p>Launched in 2017, the policy stated that Canada would take an explicitly feminist approach to international assistance, including a commitment to protecting women’s sexual and reproductive rights. Many considered it to be a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702020960120">forward-thinking policy that builds on the past work of NGOs and other international partners.</a></p>
<p>However, the policy also revealed shortcomings. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702020953424">It was criticized</a> for its <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2020/02/10/the-growth-of-feminist-foreign-policy/">fuzzy definition of feminism,</a> its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2019.1592002">surface-level engagement</a> with the <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1229039">overlapping forms of inequality</a> women actually face and for its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orz027">neoliberal approach to feminism</a> that seeks to fix problems within the Global South, with little engagement with how these problems arose in the first place.</p>
<p>And now, as Israel’s offensive on Gaza marches on unabated and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/29/gaza-death-toll-surpasses-30000-with-no-let-up-in-israeli-bombardment#:%7E:text=The%20death%20toll%20in%20%23Gaza,large%20majority%20women%20and%20children.">civilian death toll mounts</a>, Canada’s tepid response calls the strength and sincerity of its feminist commitments into doubt. Furthermore, the country’s <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-lawsuit-israel-military-exports-1.7134664">continued sale of military equipment to Israel</a> suggests where Canada’s stated feminist values conflict with other political interests leaving Palestinians by the wayside. </p>
<p>On a recent visit to Israel, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly expressed solidarity with Israeli victims of <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/oct-7-sexual-violence-united-nations-reasonable-grounds-1.7133305">sexual violence committed by Hamas</a> and announced <a href="https://x.com/melaniejoly/status/1767189501208666293?s=20">$1 million dollars</a> in support. In addition to funding, Joly also offered RCMP support to help investigate the crimes of sexual violence against Israeli women. </p>
<p>In December, Joly issued <a href="https://www.cp24.com/news/joly-condemns-hamas-rapes-of-israeli-women-after-weeks-of-pressure-1.6677943">strong condemnations</a> in response to allegations of rape committed by Hamas on Oct. 7, 2023. </p>
<p>In February 2023, Joly <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9491196/canada-joly-ukraine-visit/">also pledged millions for Ukrainian victims of sexual assault</a> along with Canada’s support for the investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence committed during Russia’s war against Ukraine.</p>
<p>Will Canada do the same for Palestinian women affected by military and sexual violence?</p>
<h2>Palestinian women’s rights long ignored</h2>
<p>Joly <a href="https://twitter.com/melaniejoly/status/1760435093342986384?s=20">condemned</a> the sexual and gender-based violence being committed against Palestinian women in Gaza in February 2024, but without explicitly naming who the perpetrators of violence are. </p>
<p>Her statement came after <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/02/israelopt-un-experts-appalled-reported-human-rights-violations-against">United Nations experts</a> expressed alarm over “credible allegations of egregious human rights violations to which Palestinian women and girls continue to be subjected in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.” They cited reports of arbitrary executions, killings, detentions and sexual abuse of Palestinian women and girls by Israeli forces.</p>
<p>Even before the current escalation of violence, Canada’s support of Israel’s actions have long been identified as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2020.1805340">significant limitation of FIAP</a>.</p>
<p>In the policy’s peace and security section, Canada commits to advocate for the “respect and protection of the human rights of women and girls in its international and multilateral engagements.” It also says that ensuring the safety and security of women and girls is one of the key steps to ensuring peace.</p>
<p>In Gaza, this security is not being assured. Israel’s bombardment and tightened blockade has killed more than 31,000 people, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/pentagon-walks-back-austins-gaza-casualty-figures-2024-02-29/">most of whom are women and children</a>. Those who survive live under constant threat and without access to basic medical aid, food and water. Over 85 per cent of the total population of Gaza — about 1.9 million civilians — <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15564.doc.htm#:%7E:text=A%20staggering%2085%20per%20cent,proposing%20that%20Palestinians%20should%20be">have been displaced</a> from their homes.</p>
<p>Palestinian women also face increased risk of sexual violence. There <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/22/claims-of-israeli-sexual-assault-of-palestinian-women-are-credible-un-panel-says">are credible</a> reports of sexual violence being used as a tool of war against both Israeli and Palestinian women. </p>
<h2>Reproductive health in Gaza in a dire state</h2>
<p>FIAP identifies a full range of reproductive healthcare <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9491196/canada-joly-ukraine-visit/#:%7E:text=Canada%20is%20pledging%20millions%20of,Russia%27s%20war%20on%20Ukraine%20nears.">as key to ensuring women and girls’ equality and empowerment</a>.</p>
<p>In Gaza, these rights are besieged daily. </p>
<p>An estimated <a href="https://prismreports.org/2024/02/13/reproductive-rights-organizations-failing-palestinians/">50,000 pregnant women in Gaza</a> are at <a href="https://jezebel.com/miscarriages-in-gaza-have-increased-300-under-israeli-1851168680">increased risk of miscarriage</a>, stillbirth and maternal death. This is in part due to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-uncertain-fate-of-patients-needing-life-saving-dialysis-treatment-in-gaza-220941">Israeli attacks on health-care facilities</a>. These attacks have led not only to direct casualties, but have also severely restricted access to prenatal and natal care. </p>
<p>Women are <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/21/gaza-childbirth/">giving birth without appropriate medical care</a>. This puts their lives and the lives of their babies at risk, contributing to higher rates of maternal and infant death.</p>
<p>The widespread food crisis has also had dire implications for reproductive and maternal health. The <a href="https://www.unicef.org/lac/en/press-releases/intensifying-conflict-malnutrition-and-disease-gaza-strip-creates-deadly-cycle">United Nations Children’s Fund has voiced concern</a> over the nutritional vulnerability of over 155,000 pregnant women and breastfeeding mothers. </p>
<p>Malnutrition can make breastfeeding difficult, if not impossible, and yet <a href="https://apnews.com/article/gaza-aid-babies-hamas-israel-war-e0f843a8f5f1af49efc45f6cb02005a6">formula has been difficult</a> (and for some, impossible) to access. This has been exacerbated by high prices and delays and restrictions on delivery of humanitarian aid. Malnutrition affects maternal health, and can also have long-term consequences for the health of mothers and their children.</p>
<h2>Canada must act</h2>
<p>After mounting public pressure, including country-wide protests, Canadian officials first uttered the word “ceasefire” in December, two months after the start of the war. They did so on Dec. 12, 2023, in a non-binding <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/un-onu/statements-declarations/2023-12-12-explanation-vote-explication.aspx?lang=eng">UN resolution vote</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Canadian exports of military equipment to Israel have not only continued, but have <a href="https://www.readthemaple.com/trudeau-government-authorized-28-million-of-new-military-exports-to-israel-since-october/">increased since October</a>. Global Affairs Canada claims these exports are only for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/9/demands-for-canada-to-stop-supplying-weapons-to-israel-grow-louder">non-lethal equipment</a>. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, they contribute to Israel’s military capacity. They undermine the legitimacy of Canada’s commitments to peacebuilding, and call into question whether its commitments to protecting the rights of women and girls extend to Palestinians.</p>
<p>Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/priorities-priorites/policy-politique.aspx?lang=eng">claims to be</a> “a reflection of who we are as Canadians.” It expresses the belief that “it is possible to build a more peaceful, more inclusive and more prosperous world… A world where no one is left behind.” </p>
<p>By its own standards, Canada has a responsibility to do more than verbalize support for a humanitarian ceasefire and <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/03/canada-announces-continued-assistance-for-people-in-gaza.html">provide humanitarian aid</a>. </p>
<p>Canada’s <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/london/israel-gaza-london-ceasefire-ontario-families-1.7056926">delayed</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/10/30/canada-clarifies-its-stand-on-a-humanitarian-truce-00124372">inconsistent response</a> to Israel’s military violence in Gaza represents a failure to evenly apply its own foreign policy.</p>
<p>Canada’s current strategy of <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canada-aid-gaza">providing humanitarian aid</a> to assuage the effects of military violence, while simultaneously continuing to <a href="https://www.readthemaple.com/trudeau-government-authorized-28-million-of-new-military-exports-to-israel-since-october/">sell military equipment</a>, points to paradoxes within its foreign policy. An effective feminist foreign aid policy needs political action to address the root causes of poverty, violence and sexual and reproductive harm. In Gaza, this includes military occupation, violence and blockade. </p>
<p>If Canada truly wants to create a more peaceful and prosperous world, they must not leave Palestinian women behind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225067/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacqueline Potvin previously received funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mayme Lefurgey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Canada’s tepid response to the war in Gaza and the severe harm caused to Palestinian women casts doubt on the sincerity of the government’s Feminist International Assistance Policy.Jacqueline Potvin, Research Associate, School of Nursing, Western UniversityMayme Lefurgey, Research Fellow, Department of Sociology, University of New BrunswickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2249152024-03-03T14:27:16Z2024-03-03T14:27:16ZBrian Mulroney’s tough stand against apartheid is one of his most important legacies<p>With his <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/brian-mulroney-passes-away-1.7130287">passing</a> announced on Feb. 29, Canadians have cause to reflect on the legacy of former prime minister Brian Mulroney. What will last when the great book of history is written is that Mulroney played a central role in the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. </p>
<p>This contribution, along with Canada’s contributions to the First and Second World Wars and <a href="https://www.warmuseum.ca/learn/canada-and-peacekeeping-operations/">the creation of peacekeeping</a>, will stand among the great foreign policy contributions in Canadian history. </p>
<p>At the outset, we must acknowledge that apartheid — the system of racial separation and white domination of Blacks and others in South Africa — was <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-politics-explainer-the-end-of-apartheid-101602">brought down principally by South Africans themselves</a>. Their internal opposition to the regime, their mobilization of world opinion and action against it and their courage and moral clarity was a necessary condition for its end. </p>
<p>But the end of apartheid was accelerated by allies in the democratic West, and <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-brian-mulroney-south-africa-ramaphosa/">at the head of that group stood Mulroney</a>. Indeed, there is good reason why <a href="https://macleans.ca/news/world/macleans-archives-mandelas-three-city-visit-to-canada/">Nelson Mandela made his first foreign visit to Canada’s Parliament</a> after his release from prison in February of 1990. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2015/12/08/statement-prime-minister-canada-former-prime-minister-brian-mulroney">South Africa awarded Mulroney its highest honour for foreign citizens</a> in 2015 for his “exceptional contribution to South Africa’s liberation movement and his steadfast support for the release of Nelson Mandela.”</p>
<p>It is important that we recognize this accomplishment not only for its moral merits, but because it can teach us how Canadian foreign policy — for moral and instrumental ends — can be done effectively. There are three lessons to learn (or relearn). </p>
<h2>Lesson 1: Mulroney recognized apartheid as indefensible</h2>
<p>Mulroney’s opposition to apartheid was not driven by simple domestic politics and certainly not by diasporic concerns. Opposition to apartheid was widely held in Canada in the late 1980s and it was a live issue. But it was not one that obviously favoured Mulroney politically. So, why did he oppose it? </p>
<p>First, the issue was to him one of simple justice and morality. Like his early political mentor, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/1771019570">John Diefenbaker</a>, he thought the system was indefensible and immoral. It could not be redeemed by instrumental appeals to anti-Communism or whatever other realpolitik defences <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/brian-mulroney-legacy-south-africa-apartheid-1.7130982">U.S. President Ronald Reagan or U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher</a> advanced. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/brian-mulroney-champion-of-free-trade-brought-canada-closer-to-the-u-s-during-his-reign-as-prime-minister-224852">Brian Mulroney, champion of free trade, brought Canada closer to the U.S. during his reign as prime minister</a>
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<p>Second, he thought it was contrary to Canadian values, which have their roots in the founding of the country as a place dedicated to bringing different groups closer together, rather than farther apart. To maintain Canada’s credibility in the world as a <a href="https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/middle-power">middle power</a>, Canada had to act in a way that was consistent with a system of values, and not simple power. </p>
<h2>Lesson 2: Mulroney leveraged political and personal power</h2>
<p>Mulroney was a master of the multilateral system. By the late 1980s, accelerating and amplifying pressure on apartheid South Africa required ever stronger and <a href="https://www.history.com/news/end-apartheid-steps">tighter sanctions</a>. This required as many nations as possible to agree to as strong a sanction regime as possible. </p>
<p>I had the opportunity to directly ask Mulroney about his international leadership in the campaign against apartheid. As director of the <a href="https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/event/conversation-rt-hon-brian-mulroney">Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy</a>, I hosted a conversation with Mulroney in September 2022. When I asked him how he used international institutions, Mulroney said:</p>
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<p>People who say that nations only have interests, no friendships, is nonsense. … Everybody has interests but also friendships. And you can’t deal at the international level with any hostility. You gotta try and bring people (together). Canada is a middle power. We’re not a superpower. So we have to leverage our assets as best we can.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The author of this article, Peter Loewen, in conversation with Brian Mulroney on Sept. 22, 2022, at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy.</span></figcaption>
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<p>By 1987 and 1988, Mulroney had managed to secure the chairmanship of three international organizations covering the majority of the democratic world: The Commonwealth, the G7 and the Francophonie. In each of those organizations, he built personal ties with leaders, reinforced by a deep appreciation for their own domestic concerns and motivations. </p>
<p>When push came to shove on <a href="https://doi.org/10.3138/jcs.25.4.17">tightening sanction regimes,</a> he had both personal power and agenda-setting power. He could put apartheid on the agenda, and he could use the depth of relationships to push and pull leaders to his own position. We have not had a prime minister since who has combined institutional power and personal connection to such an effect. </p>
<h2>Lesson 3: Mulroney played a long game</h2>
<p>Mulroney played a long(ish) game. When South African President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/11/world/south-africa-s-new-era-mandela-go-free-today-de-klerk-proclaims-ending-chapter.html">F.W. de Klerk announced in February 1990 the immediate release of Mandela from a prison</a> off the coast of Cape Town, he did not simultaneously agree to dismantle the laws enforcing apartheid. </p>
<p>Despite this, by Mulroney’s telling, he was under immediate and intense <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/07/14/thatcher-and-mulroney-clash-on-sanctions-against-s-africa/125f7806-a7f5-46aa-85ec-8f49f8c7f991/">pressure from Thatcher</a> to support the lifting of sanctions. Mulroney refused to do so until the system of racial separation in law was dismantled. </p>
<p>The broader context is important here. The Berlin Wall had fallen the year before and the world was experiencing a menacing uncertainty. Mulroney knew that the creation of a broader <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/664d7fa5-d575-45da-8129-095647c8abe7">rules-based order</a> with greater international security, more trade and more, not less, reconciliation depended deeply on defending democratic values. Those values had to be as deeply defended in South Africa as they were in a soon reunified Germany. They could not be abandoned as soon as attention moved elsewhere. </p>
<h2>Mulroney’s legacy</h2>
<p>We can arrive at different judgments of Mulroney’s legacy. To me, it is one marked by huge success and risky failures — but always an ambition to do big, consequential things. But in the final judgment, his confrontation of apartheid married moral clarity and effective politics. If only our politics had that same leadership again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224915/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Loewen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Brian Mulroney’s role in the campaign against apartheid in South Africa can teach us how Canadian foreign policy can be done effectively.Peter Loewen, Director, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2068772024-02-27T16:31:29Z2024-02-27T16:31:29ZEconomic sanctions can have a major impact on the neighbours of a target nation – new research<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577075/original/file-20240221-28-f59a63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=31%2C26%2C3463%2C2300&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/russian-flag-behind-bars-619236410">Vladfotograf/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-recap-prospect-of-renewed-us-funding-a-boost-for-beleaguered-zelensky-223682">Ukraine was invaded</a> in February 2022, countries and major corporations around the world quickly responded by trying to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-cost-of-war-how-russias-economy-will-struggle-to-pay-the-price-of-invading-ukraine-178826">inflict financial pain</a> on Russia through economic sanctions. </p>
<p>As Putin’s war rages on, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-putin-has-shrugged-off-unprecedented-economic-sanctions-over-russias-war-in-ukraine-for-now-199718">opinions vary</a> as to how effective those sanctions have been. But their enforcement shows how they are still widely considered to be a useful tool of coercive foreign diplomacy. </p>
<p>Exerting economic pressure on a target country to achieve a specific political or strategic goal remains a commonly used measure. Since 1966, the UN Security Council has <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information">established 31 sanctions regimes</a> around the world, in places including Sudan, Lebanon, Iran and Haiti. The EU even has an <a href="https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/main">online map</a> of all the countries where it has imposed various types of sanction.</p>
<p>In terms of their effectiveness, plenty of research has <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/23/4/1646/6309628">explored this</a>, revealing strong evidence that sanctions <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/price-war-macroeconomic-effects-2022-sanctions-russia">reduce the economic activity</a> of a targeted nation. </p>
<p>But what about the potential for unintended consequences of sanctions on their neighbours? What happens to a nation if it borders a country being punished by members of the international community?</p>
<p><a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/725678">Our recent research</a>, examines the effects of economic sanctions on 177 countries which had neighbours under sanctions at some point between 1989 and 2015. </p>
<p>We found that, on average, neighbouring countries experienced a significant decline in trade – around 9% – following the imposition of economic sanctions nearby. In most cases, proximity to a country under economic sanctions brings disruption to trading routes and relationships. It also leads to extra transportation and transaction costs. </p>
<p>Previous research reveals further evidence of this effect. There are studies which show how economic sanctions hurt neighbour countries <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01026.x">due to the great disruption</a> they inflict on trading routes and relationships with suppliers or customers. For example, 21 countries <a href="https://media.carnegie.org/filer_public/65/6f/656fea01-c0d4-463e-854a-231620c204ee/ccny_report_1996_sanctions.pdf">reported economic hardship</a> as a result of the sanctions imposed on Iraq. </p>
<p>So sanctions imposed on a country to damage its economy often tend to do economic harm to its neighbours. But not always. </p>
<p>In some of the cases we looked at, sanctions actually have a <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/725678">positive effect</a> on neighbouring countries. </p>
<p>For example, following economic sanctions against Haiti in 1987, the Dominican Republic saw an increase in import trade. The same benefit – in both cases possibly due to cross-border trafficking – was experienced by Kenya when Somalia was hit with sanctions in 1992. </p>
<p>Even among a group of countries sharing a border with the same targeted state, we observed varied responses. Following the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia in 1991, Albania experienced a sharp increase in imports, while Bulgaria initially witnessed an increase, followed by a decline for the subsequent three years, and then a rebound over the following six years.</p>
<h2>Unintended consequences</h2>
<p>It seems then that economic sanctions can create significant opportunities for neighbouring countries as global manufacturers need to relocate their production facilities out of the target state. Some companies in Russia are said to be looking for ways to <a href="https://eurasianet.org/russian-companies-eye-relocation-to-kazakhstan-amid-sanctions">move their activities</a> to neighbouring countries such as Kazakhstan.</p>
<p>We found that sanctions can also benefit neighbouring countries by providing them with an opportunity to trade on behalf of the target country, or smuggling goods across the border. </p>
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<img alt="A demonstration with placard calling for Russia to be 'cut off'." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577386/original/file-20240222-30-wt3xwr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577386/original/file-20240222-30-wt3xwr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577386/original/file-20240222-30-wt3xwr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577386/original/file-20240222-30-wt3xwr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577386/original/file-20240222-30-wt3xwr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577386/original/file-20240222-30-wt3xwr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577386/original/file-20240222-30-wt3xwr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Sanctions are a popular response.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/downing-street-london-uk-202202-ukrainian-2135028235">Sandor Szmutko/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>In this way, EU sanctioned goods could be re-routed through third countries <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/impact-eu-sanctions-russian-imports">and then shipped to Russia</a>. There is evidence that countries not necessarily bound by the sanction regime, such as <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/lithuania-russia-vladimir-putin-stop-turning-blind-eye-to-back-doors-for-russian-trade-top-diplomat-tells-eu/">Kazakhstan</a> and <a href="https://en.odfoundation.eu/a/627027,russias-accomplices-in-the-war-against-ukraine-kazakhstan-and-kyrgyzstan-the-russian-armys-reliable-rear/">Kyrgyzstan</a>, have increased their trade with Ukraine’s invader. </p>
<p>Overall then, while economic sanctions can be effective in pressuring the targeted country, our findings indicate that they can have unintended consequences such as harming innocent bystanders.</p>
<p>By thoroughly examining those potential consequences, politicians can attempt to strike a balance between pursuing foreign policy goals and taking into account their broader economic effects. Recognising these effects should be part of imposing sanctions in the first place – and would help create more robust policies to ensure that they are effectively implemented.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206877/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vincenzo Bove has previously received funding from the AXA Research Fund, the British Academy, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Folke Bernadotte Academy, the Swedish Research Council, UNU-WIDER and the World Bank.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica Di Salvatore has previously received funding from the British Academy, the Folke Bernadotte Academy, UNU-WIDER and the World Bank.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roberto Nisticò has previously received funding from the European Economic Association (EEA), the Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), the Italian Ministry of University and Research (MUR), the Italian National Agency for the Evaluation of Universities and Research Institutes (ANVUR), the UniCredit Foundation, the University of Naples Federico II, UNU-WIDER, and VisitINPS. </span></em></p>The effects on other countries can be both negative and positive.Vincenzo Bove, Professor in Political Science, University of WarwickJessica Di Salvatore, Associate Professor, University of WarwickRoberto Nisticò, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Naples Federico IILicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2242452024-02-26T19:00:58Z2024-02-26T19:00:58ZShould world leaders worry about another Trump presidency?<p>Should American allies be worried that if Donald Trump returns to the White House next year, he will tear apart treaties, recast decades-old international arrangements and adopt a go-it-alone approach to global affairs?</p>
<p>Recent comments from Trump <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html">disparaging</a> NATO allies have put this question on the front burner in Washington and other world capitals.</p>
<p>Trump is, of course, in the middle of a presidential campaign and is seeking to show he would be a very different president from Joe Biden. Given Biden’s difficulties on foreign policy, it is easy to see why.</p>
<h2>Biden’s mixed foreign policy record</h2>
<p>Biden’s approval numbers are near historic lows – <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/610988/biden-job-approval-edges-down.aspx">just under 40% of Americans approve</a> of the job he is doing. In particular, Biden’s foreign policy has been a problem. His plunge in popularity began around the time of the catastrophically <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-joe-biden-failed-the-people-of-afghanistan-and-tarnished-us-credibility-around-the-world-166160">mismanaged</a> US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan two and a half years ago. </p>
<p>Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza – and the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Iranian proxy attacks against American forces in Iraq and Syria that followed – have only made Biden look weaker. In fact, <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/610988/biden-job-approval-edges-down.aspx">recent polls</a> show only <a href="https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/reports/monmouthpoll_us_022024/">a third of American voters approve</a> of his foreign policy.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/some-truths-are-self-evident-joe-biden-is-too-old-but-who-could-possibly-replace-him-223634">Some truths are self-evident: Joe Biden is too old. But who could possibly replace him?</a>
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<p>A resurgent Iran reminds older Americans of the more than 50 Americans <a href="https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises">taken hostage</a> in Tehran in 1979 and then-President Jimmy Carter’s failure to free them – one of the main reasons why Carter <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/mar/20/jimmy-carter-republican-sabotage-iran-hostage-john-connally">lost</a> the 1980 presidential election to Ronald Reagan. The hostages were freed the day Reagan took office. </p>
<p>Today, Biden faces the same potential election-year problem with the Gaza war. Younger, progressive Americans, as well as Arab-Americans, are more likely to be aghast at Biden’s support for Israel’s assault on Hamas in Gaza and the consequent civilian deaths. Many Biden supporters are concerned this could <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/22/us/politics/biden-michigan-gaza.html">affect his chances</a> against Trump in November’s election, particularly in swing states like Michigan, which has a large number of Arab-American voters.</p>
<p>Also working against Biden is the war fatigue felt by many Americans. After 20 years of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, many Americans are ready to take a break from global leadership responsibilities.</p>
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<h2>A long tradition of placing America first</h2>
<p>Biden’s foreign policy weaknesses opens the door for Trump to show voters he will take a different approach. </p>
<p>Over the past four decades, starting with Reagan, successful presidential candidates have criticised foreign adventures, instead emphasising domestic investment. Political scientists use the term “<a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/04/the-strategy-of-retrenchment-and-its-consequences/">strategic retrenchment</a>” to describe this, but politicians are more likely to use a phrase like “<a href="https://time.com/4273812/america-first-donald-trump-history/">America First</a>.”</p>
<p>In 1984, for instance, Reagan ran one of the most effective presidential campaign ads in history called “Morning in America”, which depicted a return to domestic tranquillity and prosperity.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Reagan’s ‘Morning in America’ ad from the 1984 presidential campaign.</span></figcaption>
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<p>In 1992, Democratic strategist James Carville <a href="https://politicaldictionary.com/words/its-the-economy-stupid/">coined another famous phrase</a>, “It’s the economy, stupid”, which then-candidate Bill Clinton’s campaign evoked successfully to focus on domestic economic issues in his race against President George H.W. Bush. </p>
<p>Then, in 2000, then-Republican challenger George W. Bush <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002/10/19/honoring-nation-building/15a113d0-7ee6-4f53-a4c6-82343c15f3b9/">sharply criticised</a> the Clinton administration’s focus on “<a href="https://world101.cfr.org/foreign-policy/tools-foreign-policy/what-nation-building">nation building</a>”, comparing it to “international social work”. </p>
<p>When it comes to Trump, bombast is a feature, not a bug. When he ran for the White House for the first time in 2016, he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/27/donald-trump-foreign-policy-speech">outlined</a> his isolationist, “America first” approach, criticising President Barack Obama and his secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, for their “reckless, rudderless and aimless foreign policy”. He said, if elected, </p>
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<p>I will return us to a timeless principle. Always put the interest of the American people and American security above all else.</p>
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<p>He has returned to this rhetoric in the current campaign, even encouraging Russia to invade NATO countries that don’t spend the required 2% of their GDP on defence. While offensive at first blush, these comments serve the very useful purpose of showing a huge difference from Biden.</p>
<h2>A 19th century, populist world view</h2>
<p>It is also important to understand a deeper truth about these comments. In his bones, Trump does not truly value any formal alliances formed before his ascent to power. Call it narcissism or isolationism if you must (and neither is entirely inaccurate), the former president sees formal alliances as a lower priority than fair play and power politics. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577826/original/file-20240226-30-vhr9am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577826/original/file-20240226-30-vhr9am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577826/original/file-20240226-30-vhr9am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577826/original/file-20240226-30-vhr9am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577826/original/file-20240226-30-vhr9am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577826/original/file-20240226-30-vhr9am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577826/original/file-20240226-30-vhr9am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Andrew Jackson portrait.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
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<p>In this, Trump is a prime example of the Jacksonian tradition in American politics. Described best by the scholar and columnist <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42897216">Walter Russell Mead</a>, the Jacksonian tradition is based on the political beliefs of former President Andrew Jackson, who was president from 1829 to 1837. </p>
<p>Jacksonians, like Trump and his most ardent supporters today, have a highly sceptical view of America’s involvement in global affairs. As Mead <a href="https://pmachala.people.amherst.edu/Current%20Politics/Case%20Studies%20in%20American%20Diplomacy%20-The%20Readings%20FOR%20the%20FIRST%20and%20SECOND%20Class/Mead,%20The%20Jacksonian%20Tradition.htm">writes</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>They prefer the rule of custom to the written law, and that is as true in the international sphere as it is in personal relations at home. Jacksonians believe that there is an honour code in international life […] and those who live by the code will be treated under it. But those who violate the code – who commit terrorist acts in peacetime, for example – forfeit its protection and deserve no consideration. </p>
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<p>For Jacksonians, when a country welches on its obligations (such as, in Trump’s view, the level of defence spending of many European NATO nations), it is morally right to punish them by calling into question treaty obligations.</p>
<p>Seen as a liar and fabulist by his opponents, Trump embodies this Jacksonian tradition of “customary honour” for his supporters, whose contempt for global elites and international institutions is deep and profound. (Trump was so enamoured with Jackson, in fact, he had a <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/22/andrew-jackson-donald-trump-216493/">portrait</a> of the former president hanging in the Oval Office.)</p>
<p>This means, if Trump becomes president again, America’s allies, whether in NATO or the Indo-Pacific or elsewhere, will have to de-emphasise lawyerly arguments about international obligations and adapt quickly to the Trump-Jacksonian customary honour approach to diplomacy.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-is-already-flustering-foreign-leaders-who-are-trying-to-prepare-for-a-possible-presidency-223767">Donald Trump is already flustering foreign leaders who are trying to prepare for a possible presidency</a>
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<p>Superficially, this will mean global leaders offering praise for Trump’s various political performances. Going deeper, it also means finding a way to demonstrate that their relationship with the US is congruent with his sense of customary honour (and is also materially beneficial to the US, and maybe even to Trump himself).</p>
<p>The model for this is the late prime minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe. Within days of Trump’s surprising election win over Hillary Clinton in 2016, Abe <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/16/politics/japan-abe-trump-visit/index.html">visited</a> him at Trump Tower in New York and gave him a gold-plated golf club worth almost US$4,000. Trump immediately identified Abe as “<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-golf-club-found-shinzo-abe-b2317572.html">friend</a>.”</p>
<p>After then-Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull had an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/04/full-transcript-of-trumps-phone-call-with-australian-prime-minister-malcolm-turnbull">unpleasant phone call</a> with Trump in 2017, the Australian ambassador to the US, Joe Hockey, <a href="https://www.9news.com.au/national/joe-hockey-plays-golf-with-president-donald-trump/f2bbe51e-10ed-4121-adf5-a39b3b4d3c09">took to the links</a> with Trump. </p>
<p>With good humour and some personal charm, Hockey helped restore the diplomatic relationship – not by emphasising legalistic constraints but by developing a personal relationship that was grounded in common sense and customary honour.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224245/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lester Munson is a Non-Resident Fellow at the U.S. Studies Centre. Lester Munson has worked for President George W. Bush and congressional Republicans during his public service career in Washington. </span></em></p>Here’s what to understand about Trump’s world view and what to expect, should he be elected president again.Lester Munson, Non-resident fellow, United States Studies Centre, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2234252024-02-13T03:13:44Z2024-02-13T03:13:44ZNew Zealand is reviving the ANZAC alliance – joining AUKUS is a logical next step<p>The National-led coalition government is off to a fast start internationally. In envisioning a more central role for the ANZAC alliance with Australia, and possible involvement in the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/aukus-explained-how-will-trilateral-pact-shape-indo-pacific-security">AUKUS</a> security pact, it is recalibrating New Zealand’s independent foreign policy.</p>
<p>At the inaugural Australia-New Zealand Foreign and Defence Ministerial (<a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/morningreport/audio/2018924310/australia-and-new-zealand-foreign-and-defence-ministers-in-inaugural-meeting">ANZMIN</a>) meeting in Melbourne earlier this year, the focus was on future-proofing the trans-Tasman alliance. </p>
<p>Detailed discussions took place on the defence and security aspects of the relationship. This included global strategic issues, the Indo-Pacific region, and the relevance of the partnership in the Pacific. </p>
<p>But the stage for this shift in New Zealand’s independent foreign policy had already been set by the Labour government in 2023. </p>
<p>In his foreword to the country’s first <a href="https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-11/national-security-strategy-aug2023.pdf">National Security Strategy</a> last year, then prime minister Chris Hipkins wrote that New Zealand “faces a fundamentally more challenging security outlook”. The strategy document called for a “national conversation on foreign policy”.</p>
<p>Christopher Luxon’s administration is taking the logical next step by increasing cooperation with Canberra. </p>
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<h2>In or out of AUKUS?</h2>
<p>New Zealand’s independent foreign policy emerged in the mid-1980s from the debris of the ANZUS alliance. It flourished in a historically rare era of muted great power rivalry and unprecedented economic globalisation. </p>
<p>It is abundantly clear that our holiday from history is over. </p>
<p>New Zealand’s independent foreign policy has to be redefined in response to present strategic circumstances rather than past interpretations, however well they may have served us. These historic positions, <a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/helen-clark-and-don-brash-aukus-nz-must-not-abandon-our-independent-foreign-policy/LLYEOE4WH5AY5DTV3D323OXRUU/">recently put forward</a> by former National leader Don Brash and former prime minister Helen Clark, have run their course. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-defence-dilemma-facing-nzs-next-government-stay-independent-or-join-pillar-2-of-aukus-212090">The defence dilemma facing NZ's next government: stay independent or join 'pillar 2' of AUKUS?</a>
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<p>At the sharp end of this recalibration is AUKUS, the technology partnership involving Australia, the UK and the US. New Zealand has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-zealands-luxon-talk-defence-economy-australia-2023-12-19/">expressed an interest</a> in participating in “pillar two” of the agreement, involving non-nuclear technology sharing.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-australia-new-zealand-ministerial-consultations-anzmin-2024">joint statement</a> released after the ANZMIN consultations stated that AUKUS was discussed as “a positive contribution toward maintaining peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific”. </p>
<p>The Chinese embassy in Wellington has <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/508280/chinese-embassy-deplores-opposes-australia-nz-joint-statement">expressed “serious concerns”</a>. It called AUKUS:</p>
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<p>a stark manifestation of Cold War mentality [which] will undermine peace and stability, sow division and confrontation in the region, and thus runs against the common interests of regional countries pursuing peace, stability, and common security.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Few neutral observers will be persuaded by Beijing’s characterisation.</p>
<h2>Labour on the fence</h2>
<p>AUKUS emerged in 2021, initiated in Canberra as a response to economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed on Australia by China in 2020. </p>
<p>New Zealand’s participation will invariably strengthen the ANZAC alliance. It is hard to see how non-involvement will not weaken that alliance. </p>
<p>This is something the Labour opposition will need to consider carefully. Having asked for a national foreign policy conversation while in government, it is now signalling disquiet over AUKUS membership.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-pact-born-in-secrecy-will-have-huge-implications-for-australia-and-the-region-168065">The AUKUS pact, born in secrecy, will have huge implications for Australia and the region</a>
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<p>Labour’s Foreign Affairs Spokesperson <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/508926/aukus-a-military-pact-designed-to-contain-china-says-labour">David Parker said recently</a> that “we’re questioning [AUKUS’] utility and whether it is wise”. His associate spokesperson Phil Twyford told parliament AUKUS is an “offensive war-fighting alliance against China”.</p>
<p>It is unclear how this position is consistent with Labour’s progressively stronger support for the ANZAC alliance and AUKUS since 2021, and its earlier willingness to explore participating in pillar two.</p>
<h2>The future of independent foreign policy</h2>
<p>Truth be told, the Luxon administration’s interest in AUKUS is a consequence of China serving as the architect of its own strategic problems. </p>
<p>Before the Beijing Olympics in 2008, China enjoyed a generally positive relationship with a range of countries across Asia and the Pacific.</p>
<p>Since then, China’s relations with numerous regional states have deteriorated, in no small part due to actions initiated by Beijing in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/29/risk-of-miscalculation-rises-in-south-china-sea-as-beijing-ramps-up-aggressive-tactics">South China Sea</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/japan-china-islands-dispute-islands-coast-guard-f75404c5a877abd823fd5fe1711f78b1">East China Sea</a>, its <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53062484">contested border with India</a>, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/09/australia-china-decoupling-trade-sanctions-coronavirus-geopolitics/">sanctions on Australia</a> and <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/02/14/commentary/world-commentary/south-korea-missile-defense/">South Korea</a> for disagreements over Chinese foreign policy decisions.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-australia-signs-up-for-nuclear-subs-nz-faces-hard-decisions-over-the-aukus-alliance-201946">As Australia signs up for nuclear subs, NZ faces hard decisions over the AUKUS alliance</a>
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<p>New Zealand is committed to advancing its interests in a way that contributes to regional stability in what the ANZMIN joint statement described as “the most challenging strategic environment in decades”.</p>
<p>If New Zealand’s elected government determines that AUKUS is in the national interest, then it must seek the broadest consensus possible domestically. It also needs to unapologetically pursue that path internationally.</p>
<p>That is the essence of foreign minister Winston Peters’ response when asked whether Wellington’s interest in AUKUS would negatively affect relations with China:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>China is a country that practises something I have got a lot of time for – they practise their national interest […] and that’s what we’re doing.</p>
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<p>We are entering a new era for New Zealand’s independent foreign policy, one that includes a rebooted ANZAC alliance, with a possible AUKUS dimension.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223425/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Khoo has received research funding from the Australian National University, Columbia University, and the Asia New Zealand Foundation in Wellington. He is a Non-Resident Principal Research Fellow with the Institute of Indo-Pacific Affairs in Christchurch. </span></em></p>Global political unrest has highlighted the importance of a credible foreign policy. It may be time for the New Zealand government to consider the revitalisation of ANZAC and participation with AUKUS.Nicholas Khoo, Associate Professor of International Politics, University of OtagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2193432024-02-04T11:52:08Z2024-02-04T11:52:08ZSouth Africa’s military is expected to do more than ever with tighter budgets: how the force has declined over 30 years
<p>The South African National Defence Force marks 30 years this year, having been established on <a href="https://scholar.ufs.ac.za/items/85cca040-8e52-43ae-8451-942ca1874d11">27 April 1994</a>. It’s as old as the country’s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1994">constitutional democracy</a>, the result of a negotiated political settlement that ended apartheid. The <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/">defence force</a> consists of the <a href="http://www.army.mil.za/Pages/Home.aspx">army</a>, <a href="https://www.saairforce.co.za/">air force</a>, <a href="http://www.navy.mil.za/Pages/Home.aspx">navy</a>, and <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sa-defence/sa-defence-sa-defence/joining-the-south-african-national-defence-force/">military health service</a>.</p>
<p>It’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-military-is-set-for-personnel-reforms-why-it-matters-178064">an amalgamation</a> of the former apartheid era South African Defence Force, the militaries of the former nominally independent Bophuthatswana, Transkei, Ciskei and Venda, and the former liberation armies of the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania. It’s currently <a href="https://www.military.africa/2023/04/top-10-strongest-militaries-in-africa/">ranked third</a> in Africa, after Egypt and Algeria. </p>
<p>Where does the defence force find itself after three decades? How does it measure up to its <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/wp-content/uploads/Repository/A-Guide-to-the-SANDF/A-guide-to-the-SANDF-chapter-6-The-SANDF.pdf">mandate</a> of defending the country against external aggression, promoting security externally and internally, and supporting the population and government as needed? </p>
<p>The defence force has been expected to safeguard the country against external threats while simultaneously responding to political calls to assist with <a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1037">peace and security operations</a> in other African countries. It has also been called on to support the South African Police Service in <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-not-a-magic-bullet-south-africa-needs-to-do-more-for-long-term-peace-164717">policing</a> a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-police-are-losing-the-war-on-crime-heres-how-they-need-to-rethink-their-approach-218048">crime-ridden</a> society. </p>
<p>A mismatch has developed between what is expected of the military, and its budget and capabilities. Its budget declined to about 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the past decade. This is far too low compared to global average military spending of <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/2304_fs_milex_2022.pdf">2.2% of GDP</a>. </p>
<p>As a researcher who has studied the defence force as a foreign policy instrument for almost three decades, I’m not surprised it is often described as <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-to-lead-new-military-force-in-the-drc-an-expert-on-what-its-up-against-219264">“institutionally overstretched”</a>. It has been in decline for some time, especially since 2000, as its <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/170512review.pdf">budgetary allocation</a> from treasury has shrunk.</p>
<h2>Figuring out its primary role</h2>
<p>The government’s policies after 1994 committed the defence force primarily to safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The purchasing of new military equipment was based on the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/defence-review1998.pdf">South African Defence Review of 1998</a>. The review elaborated on the <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/155722/SouthAfrica1996.pdf">1996 White Paper for Defence</a> on such matters as posture, doctrine, force design, force levels, logistical support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-to-lead-new-military-force-in-the-drc-an-expert-on-what-its-up-against-219264">South Africa to lead new military force in the DRC: an expert on what it's up against</a>
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<p>This White Paper stipulated that the force design should be a high-technology core force, sized for peacetime, but expandable to meet any emerging threat. To this end, cabinet decided in November 1998 to buy <a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1037">new military equipment</a>. This was the infamous arms deal, mired in <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/the-arms-deal-what-you-need-to-know-2/">corruption</a>. The equipment included nine Gripen fighter aircraft, 12 Hawk aircraft, 30 light utility helicopters, four patrol corvettes and three submarines.</p>
<p><a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/45">Critics</a> felt that the corvettes, submarines and Gripen jet fighters could be regarded as offensive weapons. That would not align with South Africa’s foreign policy, specifically pertaining to <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/peacemissions1.pdf">participation in international peace missions</a> with the emphasis on cooperative defence and regional peacekeeping.</p>
<p>It was eventually decided that the defence force should be <a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1037">designed primarily to protect the country from external enemies</a>. It would also promote peace and security in Africa, as secondary functions. </p>
<p>Things have not quite panned out that way. Since 1998, the defence force has featured prominently as an instrument in South Africa’s foreign policy. Its so-called secondary functions have become <a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1037">the primary function</a>. But it has received no additional armour and personnel for this additional role.</p>
<p>The post-1994 government sought to rid the country of its apartheid-era image of being a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0021909620946851">pariah and a destabilising factor</a> in its neighbourhood. Instead, it was to be identified with the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0021909620946851">promotion of human rights, peace and development</a> in Africa.</p>
<p>The force became the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco#:%7E:text=The%20new%20mission%20has%20been,in%20its%20stabilization%20and%20peace">fifth largest troop-contributing nation</a> to the UN’s peacekeeping operation in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It also plays a <a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1404">pivotal role</a> in the Southern African Development Community mission in conflict-ridden northern Mozambique.</p>
<p>It has been in the <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/4846/">DRC since 1999</a>.
This UN mission will now be terminated after more than <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231219-un-to-launch-gradual-withdrawal-of-peacekeepers-from-dr-congo">24 years</a>, and be replaced by troops from the Southern African Development Community, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-to-lead-new-military-force-in-the-drc-an-expert-on-what-its-up-against-219264">led by the South African National Defence Force</a>.</p>
<p>But soldiers in the field haven’t always received good <a href="https://mg.co.za/news/2022-01-13-soldiers-plead-for-more-air-support-in-mozambiques-battle-against-insurgents/">logistical support</a>, especially in Mozambique. And poor coordination with the Department of International Relations and Cooperation has sometimes <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-south-africas-defence-force-up-for-new-thinking">left the country embarrassed</a>.</p>
<p>Among other peacekeeping missions, since 1994 the defence force has also been deployed to: </p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003021063-6/1998-south-africa%E2%80%93lesotho-operation-boleas-crisis-feliciano-de-s%C3%A1-guimar%C3%A3es">Lesotho, 1998</a>: restoring democracy and political stability, supported by the Botswana military</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.accord.org.za/publication/south-africas-peacekeeping-role-burundi/">Burundi, 2003</a>: peacekeeping alongside Mozambique and Ethiopia as part of the African Union Mission in Burundi</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/4846/">Sudan, 2005</a>: as part of the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Constraints</h2>
<p>Budgetary constraints have posed a growing challenge. Between 1995 and the 1998 the defence budget was <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/170512review.pdf">cut by 11.1%</a>.</p>
<p>In 2015, the defence force was <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/170512review.pdf">24% underfunded</a> in terms of its size and shape. <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/daily-news/international-news/world-military-expenditure-continues-to-climb-while-african-defence-expenditure-drops/#:%7E:text=South%20Africa's%20military%20spending%20fell,the%20military%20budget%20in%202022">Defence spending in 2022/23</a> was 8.4% lower than in 2021, and 21% lower than in 2013.</p>
<p>The country’s ailing economy and low growth put severe <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/06/15/cf-south-africas-economy-loses-momentum-amid-record-power-cuts">pressure on government finances</a>. </p>
<p>Because of the budgetary constraints, the serviceability and functionality of high-tech equipment – especially the Gripens, frigates and submarines – couldn’t be sustained. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-one-of-the-strongest-navies-in-africa-its-strengths-and-weaknesses-214393">South Africa has one of the strongest navies in Africa: its strengths and weaknesses</a>
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<p>The hollowing out of the armed forces was laid bare in 2023. The defence minister, Thandi Modise, disclosed that a staggering 85% of the air force’s aircraft fleet was out of action, leaving the country <a href="https://www.da.org.za/2023/10/exposed-south-african-air-force-in-critical-condition-as-85-of-fleet-remains-grounded">vulnerable to external security threats</a>.</p>
<p>By 2013, only two of the 26 Gripen fighter aircraft and three of the 24 Hawk aircraft were <a href="https://www.da.org.za/2023/10/exposed-south-african-air-force-in-critical-condition-as-85-of-fleet-remains-grounded">available for service</a>. </p>
<p>The funding crisis is so severe that some defence analysts are now proposing to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2023-10-25-the-south-african-air-force-has-become-an-expensive-dysfunctional-luxury/">reduce the air force to a mere air wing</a> of the defence force, which would have fewer than 75 aircraft.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.vryeweekblad.com/nuus-en-politiek/2023-02-10-poor-state-of-sas-naval-fleet-to-be-on-full-display-at-joint-exercise/">navy is in no better position</a>. All frigates, the navy’s primary combat and patrol vessels, are in urgent need of repair. The three submarines that were part of the 1999 arms deal also came with a limited number of spare parts, like the frigates. Sometimes none of the submarines are serviceable. </p>
<h2>Problems at home</h2>
<p>Border protection and support for <a href="http://www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/milscience/sigla/Documents/Briefs/Briefs%202023/SIGLA%20Brief%2011%202023.pdf">police operations</a> are now some of the force’s main activities. These include <a href="http://www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/milscience/sigla/Documents/Briefs/Briefs%202023/SIGLA%20Brief%2011%202023.pdf">internal or domestic operations</a> such as helping the police in combating gang warfare, fighting illegal mining syndicates, preventing the torching of commercial trucks, guarding power plants, and combating cash-in-transit heists. These responsibilities can now even be regarded as among the military’s primary functions. </p>
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<p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/military-not-a-magic-bullet-south-africa-needs-to-do-more-for-long-term-peace-164717">Military not a magic bullet: South Africa needs to do more for long term peace</a>
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<p>Two issues drive the increased role in domestic security. One is the declining capacity of the police. Secondly, politicians see the military as an instrument for policing roles and <a href="http://www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/milscience/sigla/Documents/Briefs/Briefs%202023/SIGLA%20Brief%2011%202023.pdf">other functions</a> – all contributing to the degeneration of South Africa’s defence capability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219343/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theo Neethling receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>South Africa’s defence force has been in decline for some time as its budget has shrunk while its duties have changed.Theo Neethling, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2183572024-02-02T02:17:39Z2024-02-02T02:17:39ZHow will Indonesia’s presidential election reshape its foreign policy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572714/original/file-20240201-27-dr6t1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1%2C374%2C250&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> </figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/the-professor-the-general-and-the-populist-meet-the-three-candidates-running-for-president-in-indonesia-217811">The three candidates</a> running in Indonesia’s presidential election – Anies Baswedan, Ganjar Pranowo and Prabowo Subianto – are in the last week of campaigning before the February 14 poll. </p>
<p>As current President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo approaches the end of his second term in office, questions about the trajectory of Indonesia’s foreign policy have also emerged, particularly whether his successor will continue or change the country’s relations with China, the US and its neighbours.</p>
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<p>
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<strong>
Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-professor-the-general-and-the-populist-meet-the-three-candidates-running-for-president-in-indonesia-217811">The professor, the general and the populist: meet the three candidates running for president in Indonesia</a>
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<p>Continuing the tradition of his predecessors, Jokowi has emphasised Indonesia’s “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20030977">free and active</a>” foreign policy, a peace-promoting and non-alignment approach introduced in 1948 by the country’s first vice president, Mohamad Hatta.</p>
<p>In 2022, Jokowi attempted to be a <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/paper/2022/06/19/jokowi-set-to-play-an-unexpected-global-role-as-peacebroker.html">peacebroker</a> in the Russia–Ukraine war. He <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/explainer-why-indonesia-s-leader-is-visiting-kyiv-moscow/6640961.html">visited</a> both countries and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/ukraines-zelenskyy-says-indonesian-president-invited-him-to-g20-meet/">invited Ukraine</a> to attend the G20 summit in Bali.</p>
<p>At a regional level, the ASEAN bloc, under Indonesia’s chairmanship this year, is trying to <a href="https://j-innovative.org/index.php/Innovative/article/view/5471/3918">maintain a neutral relationship</a> between the United States and China, continuing to prevent any potential conflicts from arising and ensuring regional stability.</p>
<p>So far, the three presidential candidates running in this year’s election have said they will maintain Indonesia’s <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/washington/en/pages/kebijakan_luar_negeri_ri/716/etc-menu">“free and active” foreign policy</a> tradition. But are there any areas where they differ?</p>
<h2>Anies: no more pragmatism</h2>
<p>Anies is an academic-turned-politician and former governor of Jakarta, who was widely believed to be <a href="https://books.google.co.id/books?hl=en&lr=&id=LVe_DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA155&dq=anies+back+by+muslim+conservative&ots=vcx09GNI0P&sig=MEkFmYsmvDu4O667ui-YRmKuGNk&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">backed by Islamist conservative groups</a> during his governorship election campaign. </p>
<p>When <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISfjRiXASX8">presenting his foreign policy platform</a>, he criticised the government’s current approach, calling it “<a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/11/08/indonesias-diplomacy-must-be-value-led-not-transactional-says-anies.html">excessively pragmatic and transactional</a>”.</p>
<figure class="align- centre ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572717/original/file-20240201-17-pcdk1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572717/original/file-20240201-17-pcdk1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572717/original/file-20240201-17-pcdk1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572717/original/file-20240201-17-pcdk1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572717/original/file-20240201-17-pcdk1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572717/original/file-20240201-17-pcdk1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572717/original/file-20240201-17-pcdk1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Billboard showing the presidential and vice presidential candidates in the 2024 election.</span>
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<p>After Jokowi secured the presidency in 2014, he <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/a-retreat-from-multilateralism-foreign-policy-restructuring-under-jokowi/">departed from his predecessor’s policy of embracing multilateralism</a>, which he believed had brought little benefit to the Indonesian economy. </p>
<p>This is why he decided not to attend <a href="https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/sidang-umum-pbb-kenapa-presiden-jokowi-selalu-absen-ke-new-york/7281995.html">several prestigious international forums</a> and focused more on <a href="https://intermestic.unpad.ac.id/index.php/intermestic/article/view/223">economic diplomacy</a> and improving <a href="https://www.scitepress.org/Papers/2018/102758/102758.pdf">bilateral relationships</a> with countries, thinking this would bring more economic benefits to Indonesia. </p>
<p>In contrast to Jokowi’s pragmatic approach, Anies wants to “globalise” Indonesia by taking more leadership roles in addressing global issues. His foreign policy would focus on elevating Indonesia’s role and participation in international affairs and the global order.</p>
<p>For example, Anies wants Indonesia to be a front-line leader in ASEAN to ensure a <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/11/08/indonesias-diplomacy-must-be-value-led-not-transactional-says-anies.html">peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific</a> region for the long term and make ASEAN the centre of dialogue between major powers.</p>
<h2>Prabowo: good-neighbour policy</h2>
<p>Prabowo was a general in the Indonesian military during former President Suharto’s authoritarian era. He was Jokowi’s rival during the 2014 and 2019 elections, but they have since become allies. Prabowo is running with Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, in next month’s contest.</p>
<p>Under his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mpZdLC2tRRI">foreign policy platform</a>, Prabowo has pledged to sustain Indonesia’s <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/washington/en/pages/kebijakan_luar_negeri_ri/716/etc-menu">“free and active” foreign policy</a> while strengthening the country’s defence.</p>
<p>This foreign policy direction may have been widely expected, given his military background and current position as minister of defence.</p>
<p>But similar to Anies, Prabowo’s approach also focuses on Indonesia’s role in regional stability. He wants Indonesia to be “a good neighbour” and maintain stable relationships with its neighbours in Southeast Asia.</p>
<p>He would also likely continue Jokowi’s foreign affairs approach of <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/jokowi-2-0-indonesia-amid-us-china-competition/">being reluctant</a> to choose sides in the global superpower rivalry.</p>
<p>Prabowo has emphasised how Indonesia must respect the US and its western allies, as well as China. He has also <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mpZdLC2tRRI">mentioned</a> how India and Russia are important partners for Indonesia, as well as African countries that share the same colonisation experience.</p>
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<span class="caption">Frontrunner and Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto (right) and Joko Widodo’s eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, registering themselves as candidates for the election.</span>
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<p>Prabowo is the only candidate who deliberately and openly discusses the importance of being a good neighbour. Under his leadership, Indonesia would therefore need to show that its presence in the region is non-threatening to neighbouring countries.</p>
<h2>Ganjar: redefining a ‘free and active’ foreign policy</h2>
<p>Ganjar is the former governor of Central Java, Indonesia’s second-largest province, and is endorsed by the country’s largest political party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).</p>
<p>Ganjar’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_HNhR1ZYjl4">foreign policy platform</a> focuses on <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-olOvmrwXLJjjlE9B_oTnCMMRVQYSuse/view">four pivotal global issues</a>: the regression of democracy, global inequality, economic decline and escalating conflicts in certain regions. </p>
<p>He specifically draws attention to the intensifying tensions in Asia, pinpointing the worsening relations between North and South Korea, China and Taiwan, and the South China Sea dispute.</p>
<p>Ganjar also aims to maintain Indonesia’s “free and active” foreign policy, but with a slight revamp to align it with the current geopolitical situation and make it more effective. This includes formulating strategies on how Indonesia can be more proactive – not passively responsive – in international affairs.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572722/original/file-20240201-19-zr0n4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572722/original/file-20240201-19-zr0n4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572722/original/file-20240201-19-zr0n4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572722/original/file-20240201-19-zr0n4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572722/original/file-20240201-19-zr0n4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572722/original/file-20240201-19-zr0n4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572722/original/file-20240201-19-zr0n4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ganjar Pranowo on the campaign trail.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The platforms of each candidate have provided a glimpse into Indonesia’s future foreign policy trajectory. A continued “free and active” foreign policy will likely prevail, regardless of the upcoming election outcome. However, each contender has also emphasised certain priorities that set them apart.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218357/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hangga Fathana tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>The three presidential candidates share a similar approach to Indonesia’s foreign relations, but there are key differences.Hangga Fathana, Assistant Professor in International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII) YogyakartaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215122024-01-24T12:34:21Z2024-01-24T12:34:21ZSouth Africa’s genocide case against Israel is the country’s proudest foreign policy moment in three decades<p>On 11 January 2024, South Africa <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192">hauled</a> Israel before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the charge of violating the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">1948 Genocide Convention</a>. This was for Israel’s indiscriminate bombing and siege of Gaza following the deadly 7 October attack on Israel by Hamas which claimed 1,200 Israeli lives.</p>
<p>More than 25,000 Palestinians, at least half of them children, have reportedly <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-gaza-health-ministry-health-death-toll-59470820308b31f1faf73c703400b033">been killed </a>in Israeli retaliatory attacks. The siege has led to a humanitarian crisis, as civilians struggle to get food and and have no access to hospitals, which have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/21/analysis-the-military-logic-behind-israels-total-gaza-siege">all but totally destroyed</a>.</p>
<p>The South African team of lawyers pleaded with the court to impose <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-expert-sets-out-what-to-expect-from-the-international-court-of-justice-220692">provisional measures</a> – temporary orders to stop irreparable harm, including an immediate ceasefire – while the court considers the merits of the case.</p>
<p>As observers of South Africa’s international relations, we believe this move to be the high-water mark in the country’s foreign policy since the end of apartheid in 1994.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-under-ramaphosa-has-seen-diplomatic-tools-being-used-to-provide-leadership-as-global-power-relations-shift-218966">South Africa's foreign policy under Ramaphosa has seen diplomatic tools being used to provide leadership as global power relations shift</a>
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<p>South Africa’s liberation is sometimes portrayed as the <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/postscripts-on-independence-9780199479641?cc=us&lang=en&">last act</a> of 20th century decolonisation: the crowning moment of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/money/topic/Third-World">“Third World”</a> solidarity. The country’s new approach to foreign policy symbolised the hopes of countries that struggled for freedom. The (now governing) ANC’s discussion document of 1994 <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/policy-documents-1994-foreign-policy-perspective-in-a-democratic-south-africa/">stated</a>: </p>
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<p>a democratic South Africa will be in solidarity with all those whose struggle continues.</p>
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<h2>From Mandela to Ramaphosa</h2>
<p>Nelson Mandela, the first president of democratic South Africa, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-africa/1993-12-01/south-africas-future-foreign-policy">advocated for human rights</a>, sometimes even at the expense of <a href="https://www.icirnigeria.org/mandela-begged-abacha-not-to-execute-ken-saro-wiwa-and-companions/">African partners</a>. That early promise was progressively whittled down. </p>
<p>In 1995, for example, Mandela pleaded with then Nigerian military head of state <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sani-Abacha">Sani Abacha</a> to spare the lives of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ken-Saro-Wiwa">Ken Saro-Wiwa</a> and eight other Ogoni activists. Critics of the Nigerian government’s failure to act against foreign oil companies causing environmental damage, they were accused of murdering Ogoni chiefs. Mandela’s pleas fell on deaf ears and they were <a href="https://www.icirnigeria.org/mandela-begged-abacha-not-to-execute-ken-saro-wiwa-and-companions/">executed</a>.</p>
<p>In his <a href="https://archive.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/za-com-mr-s-1576">scathing response</a>, Mandela called for Nigeria to be expelled from the Non-Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth until it established democratic rule. South Africa also recalled its High Commissioner to Lagos for consultations.</p>
<p>From the late 1990s, under the succeeding presidencies of Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa, the South African government has often supported authoritarian regimes in the global south, often in repudiation of people’s struggles. Examples are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/27/dalai-lama-banned-south-africa">China</a>, <a href="https://www.actionsa.org.za/human-rights-will-be-the-light-that-guides-actionsas-foreign-policy/">Russia</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/6/icc-s-africa-broke-rules-by-failing-to-arrest-bashir">Sudan</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/6/8/south-africa-is-failing-and-its-failing-zimbabwe-too">Zimbabwe</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-and-russia-president-cyril-ramaphosas-foreign-policy-explained-198430">South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy explained</a>
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<p>South African foreign policy is often described as being <a href="https://open.uct.ac.za/items/9dbfd78a-e95b-469c-8131-f2bd263f385d">inconsistent</a>, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.18772/22010105027.14">unclear and insincere</a>. </p>
<p>Palestine remains the single issue on which South Africa’s support for a people’s struggle has been unquestionably consistent. </p>
<h2>Solidarity with Palestine</h2>
<p>During the Cold War, the apartheid South African and Israeli states <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/unspoken-alliance-israels-secret-relationship-apartheid-south-africa-sasha-polakow-suransky">collaborated</a> on military, diplomatic and nuclear issues. The liberation movements of these two countries – namely the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the African National Congress (ANC) – practised an alternative form of internationalism. This was subversive and inspired by people’s solidarity in the Third World. </p>
<p>In 1974, when the PLO leader Yasser Arafat <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2535860?seq=1">addressed</a> the United Nations General Assembly, the first liberation leader to do so, he called for the same right to be extended to other liberation movements. Arafat used the occasion to denounce the apartheid regime with the same vehemence as he used to criticise Israel.</p>
<p>Two years later, the then ANC president, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">Oliver Tambo</a>, stood before the same body and both <a href="http://www.gutenberg-e.org/pohlandt-mccormick/pmh03i.html">applauded</a> Arafat’s leadership on this matter and expressed “unswerving solidarity” with the Palestinians.</p>
<p>In addition to diplomatic support, the two movements shared resistance tactics.</p>
<p>Arafat’s own faction within the PLO, Fatah, assisted the ANC and other resistance movements <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/armed-struggle-and-the-search-for-state-9780198292654?lang=en&cc=gb">to acquire training and arms</a>. Importantly, the relations between Tambo and Arafat were based on trust. In 1988, Tambo asked Arafat to help with securing funding from the Middle Eastern countries and requested the PLO to become a financial trustee of funds from that region. </p>
<h2>The lodestar</h2>
<p>This consistency of approach and support was reflected in South Africa’s case before the ICJ. It has put the promise of liberation back into South Africa’s national consciousness. This imaginative initiative reveals a sense of clarity that the country’s foreign policy has lacked due to its <a href="https://open.uct.ac.za/items/9dbfd78a-e95b-469c-8131-f2bd263f385d">inconsistencies</a> which resulted in contradictory choices in the 21st century.</p>
<p>It stays true to the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-africa/1993-12-01/south-africas-future-foreign-policy">founding principles</a> of the post-apartheid polity. Not only was this needed in the country’s approach to international affairs, but it is vitally important to restore its self-image. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-new-paper-sets-the-scene-but-falls-short-on-specifics-188253">South Africa's foreign policy: new paper sets the scene, but falls short on specifics</a>
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<p>South Africa’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-legal-team-in-the-genocide-case-against-israel-has-won-praise-who-are-they-221019">team</a> at The Hague included opponents of the ANC government. As they argued the legal and ethical case against Israel’s genocidal ambitions, their country watched in hope. </p>
<p>Could its international relations finally live up to the high ideals the country set for itself when apartheid ended? </p>
<p>South Africa’s appearance before the ICJ is an affirmation of the moral compass that the ANC government has <a href="https://pari.org.za/new-book-state-capture-in-south-africa-how-and-why-it-happened/">lost</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221512/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Palestine remains the single issue on which South Africa’s support for a people’s struggle has been unquestionably consistent.Peter Vale, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria., University of PretoriaVineet Thakur, Assistant Professor, International Relations, Leiden UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2180102024-01-12T13:28:25Z2024-01-12T13:28:25ZBiden, like Trump, sidesteps Congress to get things done<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568634/original/file-20240110-21-zk1t05.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=18%2C4%2C3008%2C2032&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former President Donald Trump and President Joe Biden.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-combination-of-pictures-created-on-september-29-2020-news-photo/1228795132?adppopup=true">Jim Watson,Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>With two presidents – one current and one former – running against each other <a href="https://theconstitutionalist.org/2023/02/12/can-trump-pull-a-cleveland/">for the first time since 1912</a>, the 2024 election presents voters with the unique opportunity to compare how Democrat Joe Biden and Republican Donald Trump, who are <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/potential-rematch-between-biden-and-trump-in-2024-could-shake-up-american-politics">each likely to get their party’s nomination</a>, actually used the authority of the presidency. </p>
<p>Examining Biden and Trump from this perspective, it’s clear that while they pursued vastly different policies, they often used presidential power in remarkably similar ways.</p>
<p>Both Trump and Biden have tried to achieve their policy goals in ways that avoided having to get Congress’ cooperation. There are a few exceptions, with major legislation passed early in the presidents’ terms when they had a unified government – Trump with the <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-to-sign-tax-bill-before-leaving-for-holiday/">2017 tax cuts</a> and Biden with the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/11/15/1055841358/biden-signs-1t-bipartisan-infrastructure-bill-into-law">2021 infrastructure bill</a> and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/cleanenergy/inflation-reduction-act-guidebook/#:%7E:text=On%20August%2016%2C%202022%2C%20President,change%20in%20the%20nation%27s%20history.">2022 Inflation Reduction Act</a>.</p>
<p>But more frequently, they aimed to accomplish their objectives either through their power over the executive branch and administrative agencies or in foreign policy, where a president possesses more discretion than in domestic affairs.</p>
<p>Such similarities in men who could not be more different in their political values and policy priorities naturally raise the question: Why do Trump and Biden seem so alike in how they are using presidential power? <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=9I_KwakAAAAJ&hl=en">As a scholar</a> who studies how the constitutional structure of American political institutions effects the authority and behavior of individuals operating within those institutions, I see these similarities as being driven by the fact that, as presidents, they faced the same incentives and constraints.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568655/original/file-20240110-23-axkvme.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a suit, seated at a desk, holding up a signed document and flanked by two other men in suits who are standing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568655/original/file-20240110-23-axkvme.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568655/original/file-20240110-23-axkvme.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568655/original/file-20240110-23-axkvme.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568655/original/file-20240110-23-axkvme.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568655/original/file-20240110-23-axkvme.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568655/original/file-20240110-23-axkvme.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568655/original/file-20240110-23-axkvme.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">President Donald Trump holds up a signed executive order on June 24, 2019, to increase sanctions on Iran, flanked by Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, left, and Vice President Mike Pence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TrumpExecutiveOrders/a89440a71ec14f0384a2f0d9dda60685/photo?Query=Trump%20executive%20order%20visa%20muslim&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1309&digitizationType=Digitized&currentItemNo=NaN&vs=true&vs=true">AP Photo/Alex Brandon, File</a></span>
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<h2>Policy through executive order</h2>
<p>One place where this similarity is particularly evident is in the number and scope of Trump’s and Biden’s executive orders, which recent presidents have used to order administrative agencies to enact particular policies unilaterally. </p>
<p>Through their first three years in office, the two presidents issued a comparable number of executive orders – <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Joe_Biden%27s_executive_orders_and_actions">127 for Biden</a> <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-documents/executive-orders">and 137 for Trump</a>, often for major policy objectives. </p>
<p>For example, Trump’s infamous 2017 “Muslim ban” restricting the immigration into the U.S. of people from several majority-Muslim countries, as well as immigrants from Venezuela and North Korea, was instituted through two <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/02/01/2017-02281/protecting-the-nation-from-foreign-terrorist-entry-into-the-united-states">executive</a> <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/03/09/2017-04837/protecting-the-nation-from-foreign-terrorist-entry-into-the-united-states">orders</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, Biden’s sweeping effort <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/24/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-student-loan-relief-for-borrowers-who-need-it-most/#:%7E:text=Forgive%20loan%20balances%20after%2010,debt%2Dfree%20within%2010%20years.">in 2022</a> to <a href="https://www.nasfaa.org/news-item/27820/Answering_the_10_000_Question_Biden_Takes_Executive_Action_on_Student_Loan_Cancellation_Extends_Repayment_Pause">cancel student loan debt</a> was also initiated through an executive order. </p>
<p>In foreign policy, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/15/trump-abraham-accords-palestinians-peace-deal-415083">Trump was able to conclude the Abraham Accords</a> in 2020, normalizing relations between Israel and several Middle Eastern nations. He also unilaterally pulled <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html">out of the Paris climate accord</a> in 2017 without congressional input. </p>
<p>When Biden entered office in 2020, he reversed Trump’s action and <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-officially-rejoins-the-paris-agreement/">reentered the Paris climate accord</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/31/us/politics/biden-defends-afghanistan-withdrawal.html">ended the war in Afghanistan</a> by withdrawing U.S. troops there.</p>
<h2>Trouble in the party</h2>
<p>One reason for the two presidents’ similar exercise of executive power is the circumstances of their presidencies. </p>
<p>Despite their differences, Trump and Biden have faced many of the same isolating conditions that prevent them from achieving great victories through legislation, which forced them to act in those areas where presidential power is stronger. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://spia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/carson/forum17.pdf">both had</a> <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/usa_us-politics_control-white-house-and-congress-democrats-have-2-years-make-big-changes/6201047.html">unified government</a> in the first half of their terms with their party controlling both houses of Congress, both of their parties were internally fractured. </p>
<p>Trump’s attempt to repeal President Barack Obama’s Affordable Care Act was <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-gop-effort-repeal-obamacare-fails-n787311">famously torpedoed</a> by a dramatic thumbs-down from Republican Sen. John McCain. </p>
<p>These Republican fractures became even more evident as Trump’s presidency wore on. One crucial example of this division: Trump was the only president to have <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/01/14/956621191/these-are-the-10-republicans-who-voted-to-impeach-trump">members of his own party</a> <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/trump-impeachment-trial-live-updates/2021/02/15/967878039/7-gop-senators-voted-to-convict-trump-only-1-faces-voters-next-year">vote for his removal</a> from office in his two historic impeachments. </p>
<p>Biden has been forced to deal with the consistent threat of potential defections from Democratic Sens. Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema. To get their crucial votes, he had to substantially <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-politics-kyrsten-sinema-joe-manchin-congress-c0d40a6f2490b2613a690995daca7e11">water down</a> his “Build Back Better” infrastructure bill. </p>
<p>Sinema has since left the Democratic Party to <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/kyrsten-sinema-is-becoming-an-independent-what-does-that-mean-for-the-senate">become an independent</a>, and Manchin is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-15/joe-manchin-absolutely-considering-2024-presidential-run-he-says">exploring a third-party run for president</a> against Biden. The <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/joe-manchin-switching-party-democrat-independent-senate-slim-majority-1819160">Democrats’ Senate majority is too slim</a> to allow the White House to ignore either of these troublesome senators.</p>
<p>After the midterm elections, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-divided-government-means-for-washington-11668642809">both presidents found</a> <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/health-care-trump-animate-voters-survey-shows-1541548869">themselves facing divided government</a>, with the House of Representatives held by the opposing party. </p>
<p>The House in both cases was not afraid to flex its muscle against the president, freely employing its impeachment authority against both of them. They <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/us/politics/trump-impeached.html">impeached Trump</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/us/politics/trump-impeached.html">twice</a> and have opened an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/hunter-biden-impeachment-inquiry-house-republicans-51576c5fe4294be2605a14fa81075196">impeachment inquiry</a> against Biden, which may soon lead to a formal impeachment vote.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568664/original/file-20240110-29-4iicgx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A young girl sits at a table holding a pen, surrounded by adults." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568664/original/file-20240110-29-4iicgx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568664/original/file-20240110-29-4iicgx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568664/original/file-20240110-29-4iicgx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568664/original/file-20240110-29-4iicgx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568664/original/file-20240110-29-4iicgx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568664/original/file-20240110-29-4iicgx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568664/original/file-20240110-29-4iicgx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Gianna Floyd, the daughter of George Floyd, holds a pen used by U.S. President Joe Biden at the White House on May 25, 2022, to sign an executive order enacting further police reform.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/gianna-floyd-the-daughter-of-george-floyd-holds-a-pen-used-news-photo/1399292579?adppopup=true">Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>The Constitution rules</h2>
<p>Both presidents have been similarly unpopular with Americans. According to Gallup, both presidents had an <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/329384/presidential-approval-ratings-joe-biden.aspx">average approval rating of 43%</a> in the third year of their administrations, and this unpopularity has meant that neither Trump nor Biden has been able to effectively utilize the bully pulpit to force change.</p>
<p>In these conditions, it is no surprise that Trump and Biden turned to the one source of power still available to them: the Constitution. </p>
<p>The structure of American political institutions, <a href="https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-government#:%7E:text=Learn%20about%20the%20executive%2C%20legislative,will%20have%20too%20much%20power.">set up by the Constitution</a>, affects the authority and behavior of individuals operating within those institutions. With that in mind, it is apparent that the policy successes and failures of the Trump and Biden administrations have largely lined up with the powers that the Constitution does and does not give presidents. </p>
<p>With Congress either too obstinate or too polarized to act on the president’s agenda, a president will naturally use the tools that are available to him. The Constitution dictates that those tools are primarily found in administrative actions and foreign policy.</p>
<p>By looking at the Trump and Biden administrations from this constitutional perspective, it’s clear how, despite the hyperpolarization of our politics, the Constitution continues to be influential in the power it grants presidents operating without the cooperation of Congress. </p>
<p>Trump and Biden are very different presidents. Yet, in working from the same constitutional toolbox, they used the means available to their office in similar ways, even in the pursuit of very dissimilar ends.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jordan Cash does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Biden and Trump are polar opposites when it comes to policy. But they have wielded the power of the presidency in similar ways.Jordan Cash, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2134562023-10-01T19:16:37Z2023-10-01T19:16:37ZCloser relations between Australia and India have the potential to benefit both nations<p>The structure of Andrew Charlton’s <a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/australia-s-pivot-india">Australia’s Pivot to India</a> is built on three promises: the promise of India; the promise of the Australia-India relationship; and the promise of the Indian diaspora becoming a powerful mainstream force in Australian politics. </p>
<p>At a time when the Indian diaspora is attracting attention globally, this book – launched on Wednesday by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese – will be read, and read widely. </p>
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<p><em>Review: Australia’s Pivot to India – Andrew Charlton (Black Inc.)</em></p>
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<p>Unfortunately, the successes of the diaspora have been temporarily overshadowed by the Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/justin-trudeaus-india-accusation-complicates-western-efforts-to-rein-in-china-213922">accusation</a> that Indian government agents were involved in the assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Vancouver. Nijjar was an advocate for a separate Khalistan Sikh state and the government of India believed he was involved in terrorist activities. India has categorically denied Trudeau’s charge.</p>
<p>Written for a discerning but popular audience, Australia’s Pivot to India is an elegant volume that treads ground familiar to those who have followed the bilateral relationship. The book serves as a primer and a political manifesto embedded in Charlton’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Worldview">weltanschauung</a>. It is written with finesse and fluency, but hurriedly: there is at least one sentence borrowed from my writings, used without attribution. </p>
<p>Charlton, the federal member for Parramatta and a rising star of the Australian Labor Party, is a believer. He is persuaded by India’s contemporary success and advocates the need for even greater intimacy between New Delhi and Canberra. For him, India’s rise is almost inevitable. As he puts it: </p>
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<p>For all its twists and turns, India’s journey has brought it to a point of extraordinary promise. Just as the twentieth century was said to be the American Century, and the nineteenth century was the Age of Empire, we may well end the twenty-first century with India on top. </p>
<p>India is already the largest nation in the world by population. And it’s growing so quickly that by 2070 its population should rival that of China, the United States and the European Union combined. India also has the fastest economic growth of any major nation. It has the second-largest armed forces and the fastest growing military capability in the world. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Will this book, and the earlier Peter Varghese report <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade-and-investment/india-economic-strategy/ies/index.html">An India Economic Strategy to 2035</a>, do for India what the <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/series/china-update/china-next-twenty-years-reform-and-development">Ross Garnaut report</a> and Kevin Rudd’s writings did for China three decades ago? </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/india-has-landed-on-the-moon-heres-what-the-political-and-economic-gains-are-212313">India has landed on the Moon: here's what the political and economic gains are</a>
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<h2>Amrit Kaal</h2>
<p>Charlton’s book is dedicated to the people of Parramatta and the Indian diaspora across Australia. But his India-focused political vision speaks beyond the Little India of his Parramatta electorate.</p>
<p>For his electorate and the Indian audience of his book, Charlton is preaching to the converted. Indians, including its diaspora across the world, believe in India’s rise probably more strongly than the most generous outsider. </p>
<p>While the Chinese were content to emerge after just 150 years of Western humiliation, many Indians believe Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of <a href="https://www.investindia.gov.in/team-india-blogs/new-india-amrit-kaal">Amrit Kaal</a> – literally the “age of immortality” – will see the return of the “Golden Age” of India after nearly 2000 years of suppression. Amrit Kaal refers to the period between 75 years and 100 years of India’s independence (2022-2047): a period in which it is projected that India will transition to become a developed country.</p>
<p>While Charlton focuses on India’s staggering demographics and its growth story, more recent news has also celebrated the country’s rise. As the Economist <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/09/07/the-g20-summit-will-be-a-resounding-success-for-india">recently suggested</a>: </p>
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<p>In 2008 China used the Beijing Olympic games as a “coming-out party” to show itself off to the world. For India, the Presidency of the G20 has served much the same purpose.</p>
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<p>The <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2023/09/09-10/">G-20 Summit in September</a> demonstrated India’s convening power and its ability to generate a consensus at what is arguably the most important forum engaged with the globe’s most consequential problems. The summit, and 200-odd meetings held all over India this year, brought the diversity, colour and genius of the Indian people onto the world stage with a new confidence.</p>
<h2>Civilisational strength</h2>
<p>Soft power is too vulgar, too belittling a term, to describe arguably the most resilient source of India’s power: a civilisational strength often suppressed by a lack of self-confidence. This has changed, and changed in such a way that India is being perceived as a key destination for dialogue and debate over the most contentious of issues. </p>
<p>Despite the seductive force of realpolitik, India seems to be able to retain its core values and its space, as well as its conscience. The theme of India’s G-20 presidency – <em>Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam</em>: a Sanskrit term meaning one earth, one family, one future – signalled this. The theme was fleshed out in the <a href="https://www.g20.org/content/dam/gtwenty/gtwenty_new/document/G20-New-Delhi-Leaders-Declaration.pdf">G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration</a>:</p>
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<p>We meet at a defining moment in history where the decisions we make now will determine the future of our people and our planet. It is with the philosophy of living in harmony with our surrounding ecosystem that we commit to concrete actions to address global challenges.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Simultaneously, India has become the voice for an alternative technological vision. Just ahead of the summit, <a href="https://datatopics.worldbank.org/g20fidata/">World Bank G20 Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion</a> released a document that endorsed the transformative impact in India of <a href="https://www.ibm.com/topics/api">Application Programming Interfaces</a> (APIs), which allow different computer programs to communicate with each other. </p>
<p>It pointed out that a comprehensive data coordination system, known as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JAM_Yojana">JAM trinity</a>, has increased rates of participation in the Indian financial system from 25% in 2008 to over 80% of adults in last six years, and that it could do for much for the world. </p>
<p>The government established an electronic identification system, known as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aadhaar">Aadhaar</a>, which provides a unique identification number, based on biometrics, to everyone resident in India. Its electronic financial inclusion program, the <a href="https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/major_initiatives/pradhan-mantri-jan-dhan-yojana/">Jan Dhan Yojana</a>, lets every citizen open a bank account, which provides access to a debit card, accident insurance cover, an overdraft facility and transfer of all direct benefits from the government. All transactions can be done through a mobile phone. </p>
<p>This technology is part of what has come to be known as the <a href="https://indiastack.org/">India Stack</a> – open-access software that can be provided to all those interested in the Global South. </p>
<p>India’s insistence on the African Union’s inclusion in the now G-21 was also rooted in this “alternative” vision of not losing your heart, even while being dictated by your head.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/au-and-g20-membership-will-give-africa-more-say-on-global-issues-if-it-speaks-with-one-voice-213737">AU and G20: membership will give Africa more say on global issues – if it speaks with one voice</a>
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<h2>Mutual understanding</h2>
<p>All of these developments complement the argument Charlton develops in Australia’s Pivot to India and will surely find place in the next edition of the book. The bulk of his book is concerned with examining the past, present and future of the bilateral relationship.</p>
<p>Charlton does well to look beyond the clichés of the “3Cs”: Commonwealth, cuisine and cricket. He considers multiple sectors where there are enormous opportunities for the relationship to grow. The “3Cs” lead to the “4Ds”: democracy, defence, <em>dosti</em> (friendship) and the diaspora. </p>
<p>Business, politics, media, education and culture are also identified by Charlton as potential areas of development. As he incisively points out: </p>
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<p>Australia’s pivot to India should aspire to build a distinctive relationship that goes beyond transactional engagement and circumstantial alignment […] the essence of the partnership is to deepen the relationship with mutual investment in common endeavours across every sphere of our interactions. </p>
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<p>The aim should be “to increase mutual understanding, build relationships and breed familiarity”. With their “expertise and energy”, the almost one-million-strong diaspora can play a key role in cementing the relationship and is therefore a “vital part of Australia’s pivot to India”.</p>
<p>In fleshing out areas of cooperation, Charlton illustrates the huge potential of the Australia-India partnership. As I have written in the foreword of historian Meg Gurry’s book on the <a href="https://www.mup.com.au/books/australia-and-india-mapping-the-journey-electronic-book-text">bilateral relationship</a> (the only full-length study on the relationship, which Charlton cites extensively): </p>
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<p>After six decades characterised by misperception, lack of trust, neglect, missed opportunities and even hostility, a new chapter in India’s relations with Australia has begun.</p>
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<p>Consider this: in 1955, Robert Menzies decided Australia should not take part in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Bandung-Conference">Bandung Afro-Asian</a> conference, which had been organised by India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma (Myanmar) and Ceylon (Sri Lanka). In doing so, Menzies – who would later confess that Occidentals did not understand India – alienated Indians, offended Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and left Australia unsure about its Asian identity for decades.</p>
<p>In 2011, when I became the inaugural director of the <a href="https://aii.unimelb.edu.au/">Australia India Institute</a> (whose seminal role in building the bilateral relationship Charlton almost completely ignores), I made a giant leap of faith. I had not visited Australia before and had little knowledge of the country. My friends warned me I was literally going “Down Under”, soon to become irrelevant and marginal to all policy issues in India. My teenage daughters were told they risked being bashed up in school and college. My extended family was astounded.</p>
<p>But today I have no doubt it was one of the best decisions of my life. With not one unpleasant experience in the country, as a family we have found Australians open, friendly, fair, accepting and generous, and the country a model of good governance.</p>
<p>In September 2014, when Liberal prime minister Tony Abbott visited India – <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-03/first-meeting-for-tony-abbott-and-india27s-new-leader-narendra/5716150">the first</a> stand-alone state visit to be hosted by the Modi government – he brought a sordid chapter of bilateral relations to a close. When asked why Australia had agreed to export uranium to India, which is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Abbott was unequivocal: “We trust you!” </p>
<p>No better declaration could have been made to reflect the new Australian belief in the promise and potential of this relationship, for it was the deficit of understanding and faith that severely undermined the relationship in the past. </p>
<p>In a reciprocal gesture, in November of that year, Mr Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit Australia <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/indian-prime-minister-narendra-modi-draws-thousands-to-sydney-olympic-park-20141117-11oe5f.html">in 28 years</a>, adding new ballast to the relationship. Since then, the bilateral relationship has grown in strength, and across the board.</p>
<p>Today there are few countries in the Indo-Pacific which share so much in common, in both values and interests, than India and Australia. From water management and clean energy, to trauma research, skills and higher education, counter-terrorism, maritime and cybersecurity, there is a world of opportunities that awaits the two countries if they work in close coordination with each other.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213456/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amitabh Mattoo was the inaugural director of the Australia India Institute.</span></em></p>Today there are few countries in the Indo-Pacific which share so much in common, in both values and interests, than India and Australia. Andrew Charlton’s new book examines the possibilities.Amitabh Mattoo, Honorary Professor of International Relations, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2146332023-09-29T03:32:07Z2023-09-29T03:32:07ZForeign policy has been missing from NZ’s election campaign – voters deserve answers to these big questions<p>Tax cuts, crime, the cost of living, potholes and co-governance … these and various other issues are now familiar to most voters. But there has been one major election area missing the serious debate it needs: foreign policy.</p>
<p>Whichever parties form the next government, and whoever becomes prime minister, they will also be charged with negotiating New Zealand’s place in a dynamic and changing world.</p>
<p>Military and security alliances, trade, climate change and foreign aid are all presenting significant challenges. So here are some of the questions any incoming administration should be able to answer to the satisfaction of voters.</p>
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<h2>Defence and security</h2>
<p>Having recently deepened military relationships with <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/488205/australia-new-zealand-sign-army-cooperation-deal">Australia</a> and <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/closer-defence-cooperation-between-new-zealand-and-japan">Japan</a>, New Zealand needs to be clear about whether it will join “pillar two” of the AUKUS security pact between the US, UK and Australia.</p>
<p>Directly related to the AUKUS question are the hard military implications: who or what would New Zealand fight for? Were the US and China to square off over Taiwan, with Australia (New Zealand’s only <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-07/26-australian-new-zealand-agreement-1944">formal ally</a>) drawn into such a conflict, would New Zealand send military help?</p>
<p>Less speculatively, will New Zealand continue to send naval assets to support exercises aimed at defending freedom of the seas, given the very recent history of Chinese <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/300907470/nz-frigate-confronted-by-chinese-navy-in-south-china-seas-investigation-reveals">military confrontation</a> in the disputed South China Sea?</p>
<p>The Pacific is also in a state of geopolitical flux. New Zealand has upgraded its military relationship with <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-and-fiji-strengthen-defence-relationship">Fiji</a>, and the <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/situation-report/us-papua-new-guinea-full-text-defense-pact-reveals-significant-us-presence-incoming">US has secured</a> “unimpeded access” to strategic ports and airports in Papua New Guinea. But how does New Zealand respond to the “<a href="https://english.news.cn/20230923/1875e6d9e27f40bb961b234acd935c60/c.html">comprehensive partnership</a>” just announced between China and Timor-Leste covering military exchanges, training and exercises?</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/talk-of-a-new-cold-war-is-overheated-but-nz-faces-complex-challenges-in-the-era-of-strategic-competition-212360">Talk of a new Cold War is overheated – but NZ faces complex challenges in the era of ‘strategic competition’</a>
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<h2>Ukraine and defence budgets</h2>
<p>The war in the Ukraine will also demand attention. While New Zealand is not directly involved, it provides military training, financial, legal and humanitarian <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/increase-nz-support-ukraine">assistance</a>. Does this continue or ramp up, or does the level of aid depend on what New Zealand’s allies do?</p>
<p>Further to that, what is New Zealand’s official position on what peace would look like for Ukraine? Would New Zealand support a peace deal that involved territory trade-offs or did not include the prosecution of war crimes?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aukus-is-already-trialling-autonomous-weapons-systems-where-is-nzs-policy-on-next-generation-warfare-207201">AUKUS is already trialling autonomous weapons systems – where is NZ's policy on next-generation warfare?</a>
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<p>Related to that is the uncertainty over US commitment to supporting Ukraine, given some Republican resistance. New Zealand’s next government will face potentially very unpredictable outcomes from the US presidential election in November 2024. What happens if Donald Trump returns to power?</p>
<p>Many of New Zealand’s key allies (including NATO countries) are spending or aiming to spend 2% of GDP (or more) on their militaries. New Zealand currently only spends about 1.5% of GDP. Ideally, voters would know whether that will increase, by how much, and by when. </p>
<p>More specifically, would any extra spending see the New Zealand Defence Force adopt militarised artificial intelligence technologies?</p>
<h2>Trade and sanctions</h2>
<p>An open, predictable and rules-based global economy can no longer be taken for granted. Regional trade integration has been disrupted, with a shift towards unilateral trade policies and agreements. </p>
<p>What is New Zealand’s response, and will local exporters be encouraged and helped to diversify their markets?</p>
<p>Beyond the simple mantras of negotiating new trade agreements with India or the US, how will that diversification and continued growth be achieved?</p>
<p>Will New Zealand support <a href="http://nz.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zxgxs/202308/t20230817_11128028.htm">China’s application</a> to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership – or would it back <a href="https://www.ey.gov.tw/otnen/6035C94D1B8705A1">Taiwan’s</a>?</p>
<p>Will New Zealand continue to support the use of sanctions outside the United Nations’ system (such as those <a href="https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2022/0006/latest/whole.html">imposed on Russia</a>), and will it consider extending sanctions to countries for grievous human rights abuses (such as those <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-sanctions-and-travel-bans-iran#:%7E:text=New%20Zealand%20has%20now%20sanctioned,death%2C%E2%80%9D%20Nanaia%20Mahuta%20said.">imposed on Iran</a>)?</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-number-8-wire-days-for-nzs-defence-force-are-over-new-priorities-will-demand-bigger-budgets-211182">The 'number 8 wire' days for NZ's defence force are over – new priorities will demand bigger budgets</a>
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<h2>Climate and foreign aid</h2>
<p>Climate change presents extreme challenges domestically and internationally. New Zealand’s overall performance is rated “highly insufficient” by the independent <a href="https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/new-zealand/">Climate Action Tracker</a>. So what will the next government do at a global level?</p>
<p>Where does New Zealand stand on mechanisms such as the <a href="https://www.greenclimate.fund/">Green Climate Fund</a>, the world’s largest multilateral fund dedicated to helping developing countries address the climate crisis, and will it increase <a href="https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/1706-status-pledges-website-aug-31-2023.pdf">pledged funding</a> for it?</p>
<p>And will New Zealand continue to believe in and support the <a href="https://www.globalmethanepledge.org/#about">Global Methane Pledge</a>, a joint US-European Union initiative to reduce global methane emissions by at least 30% from 2020 levels by 2030?</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-zealands-strategic-priority-in-the-indo-pacific-is-not-aukus-its-helping-to-defeat-russia-in-ukraine-213354">New Zealand’s strategic priority in the Indo-Pacific is not AUKUS – it's helping to defeat Russia in Ukraine</a>
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<p>The UN sets a target for all developed nations to give 0.7% of their gross national income as aid to developing countries, but New Zealand only manages to give <a href="https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm">0.23%</a> – well below the <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/10883ac5-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/10883ac5-en">OECD average</a>. Will the next government seek to increase or even decrease this? And would it support the creation of a regional development bank or cooperative aid projects with China?</p>
<p>Finally, New Zealand will need to confirm if it will keep taking <a href="https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/what-we-do/our-strategies-and-projects/supporting-refugees-and-asylum-seekers/refugee-and-protection-unit/new-zealand-refugee-quota-programme">1,500 refugees</a> annually.</p>
<p>These are not easy questions. But the New Zealand public should know the answers before they vote – and before the next government positions the country in an increasingly turbulent global order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214633/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From the war in Ukraine and China’s role in the Pacific, to multi-billion-dollar military decisions, New Zealand will face huge challenges during the next term of government.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2130482023-09-12T12:27:00Z2023-09-12T12:27:00ZUS response to Gabon and Niger coups suggests need for a new West Africa policy in Washington<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547570/original/file-20230911-8175-ma4a9g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C56%2C2524%2C1673&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Niger's pro-coup National Council for Safeguard of the Homeland celebrate</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-nigers-national-concil-for-safeguard-of-the-news-photo/1657635765?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent coups in the West African nations of Gabon and Niger <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/blindsided-hours-coup-niger-us-diplomats-said-country-was-stable-rcna99708">caught U.S. diplomats a little off guard</a>. They also indicate Washington may need to reassess its policy in the region or risk becoming increasingly irrelevant to the new governments.</p>
<p>Despite following similar overthrows of governments <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62037317">in Mali</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/5/coup-in-burkina-faso-what-you-need-to-know">Burkina Faso</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/chads-covert-coup-and-the-implications-for-democratic-governance-in-africa-159725">and Chad</a> in recent years, the U.S official reaction to the coups in Gabon and Niger has come across to <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/us-africa/">some observers as makeshift and uncertain</a>.</p>
<p>In Niger, U.S. diplomats have resisted referring to the overthrowing of President Mohamed Bazoum in July as a coup. Doing so would <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/06/us/politics/biden-niger-coup-aid.html">mandate the cutting off of military and economic assistance</a> to the country, in which America has sizable military bases. Nonetheless, Washington <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/niger-us-seeks-hang-best-counterterrorist-outpost-west-102008004">later threatened to cut millions of dollars in aid</a>. In Gabon, America acknowledged the coup, which brought down President Ali Bongo Ondimba, and called for the restoration of a democratic process.</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://udayton.edu/directory/artssciences/history/amin_julius_a.php">scholar of U.S—Africa relations</a>, and my forthcoming book, “<a href="https://www.routledge.com/Sixty-Years-of-Service-in-Africa-The-US-Peace-Corps-in-Cameroon/Amin/p/book/9781032584836">Sixty Years of Service in Africa: The U.S Peace Corps in Cameroon</a>,” examines the nature of U.S.-Africa relations. From my position, Washington’s reaction to coups suggests U.S. policy is out of step with the needs of the region. It is reactive rather than proactive, and based on notions that prioritize Washington’s security needs over the aspirations of the countries of West Africa. It also risks <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/china-russia-cooperation-in-africa-and-the-middle-east/">diminishing U.S. influence in West Africa</a> at a time when rivals – Russia and China – are expanding links.</p>
<p>Such signs are already evident. When U.S Acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland met with the military junta in the Nigerien capital of Niamey in early August 2023, she was <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/08/07/niger-coup-leaders-refuse-to-let-senior-u-s-diplomat-meet-with-deposed-president-00110207">denied access to the deposed leader</a>. </p>
<h2>The contours of US policy in Africa</h2>
<p>U.S. policy toward Africa was shaped – and is still scarred – by <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2001/03/01/rethinking-u.s.-policy-in-africa-pub-834">Cold War considerations</a> and European colonial ideologies. </p>
<p>From nationalist struggles to earning their independence, African people were often <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195396096.001.0001">dismissed by U.S. diplomats</a> as backward, incapable and inferior. Washington’s policy often treated African nations as junior partners to Europe and often <a href="https://archive.org/details/jfk-ordeal-in-africa">deferred to former colonial powers on issues concerning the former colonies</a>. </p>
<p>These perceptions of Africa and its people have endured, so it was not surprising when former President Donald Trump <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/11/politics/immigrants-shithole-countries-trump/index.html">dismissed African nations as “shithole”</a> places dominated by chaos, violence and poverty.</p>
<p>Such thinking and American policy have largely failed to understand the rapid changes taking place on the continent, I believe. African people are <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/19/us-africa-leaders-summit-china-russia-competition-scramble/">no longer prepared to be lectured</a> to about who to engage with in their development. Yet American officials <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-09-08/niger-gabon-coups-the-us-must-tread-more-carefully-in-africa?embedded-checkout=true">stand accused of being too slow</a> to recognize this shift.</p>
<h2>Openings for China and Russia</h2>
<p>Such sluggishness has created avenues for China and Russia to move into the Sahel region and East Africa. </p>
<p>China’s serious advancement in the continent <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf">began at the Bandung Conference</a> in 1955, where its leaders aligned themselves with African nationalists, emphasizing dogmas of “win-win partnership,” “equality and mutual benefit” and “<a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitpse/2015-04/22/content_20509374.htm">mutual respect for sovereignty</a>.” Today, China’s premier makes frequent visits to Africa, while the country invests <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/02/chinese-firms-african-labor-are-building-africas-infrastructure/">billions of dollars in the region</a> on infrastructure and other projects. </p>
<p>Like China, Russia engaged Africa gradually. In 1958, Russia’s ignorance of the continent was revealed <a href="https://www-sup.stanford.edu/books/title/?id=20981">when it included snow plows</a> among its aid package to Guinea, a country located in tropical Africa. But today, African leaders <a href="https://summitafrica.ru/en/">overwhelmingly participate in the Russia-Africa Summits</a> that have taken place in 2019 and 2023, during which Moscow has aid and trade deals and pledged to become an alternative to Western influence.</p>
<p>And Russia has <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-still-progressing-africa-whats-limit">surpassed China in arms sales to Africa</a>, accounting for 40% of its major weapon shipments. It supplies about 30% of the continent’s grain, and African leaders are increasingly seeing Russia as a counter to the action of other powers, such as France.</p>
<p>Russia and China can easily flatter African leaders with gifts, money, support and state visits, making them feel respected. Both nations have a <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/03/16/south-africas-love-affair-with-russia">long history of siding with African nationalists</a> on anti-colonial struggles and in opposing South Africa’s Apartheid.</p>
<p>More recently, at the U.N. vote to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many African nations <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/figure-of-the-week-african-countries-votes-on-the-un-resolution-condemning-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/">either remained neutral or abstained or opposed the U.S. position</a>.</p>
<p>Already, there have been suggestions that the coups may be <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66562999">exploited to serve the interests of Russia</a> <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/niger-chinas-path-stability-may-093000342.html">and China</a>. The Wagner Group, a pro-Russian mercenary group, was supportive of the coup in Niger, seeing it as an opportunity to enhance Russia’s involvement there <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66436797">as it did in Mali</a>. Officially, China has said it remains <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/niger-coup-can-blight-chinese-investments-in-africas-sahel-region/articleshow/102688818.cms">concerned about the impact of the coups</a> but stuck to its position of not interfering in other nations’ internal affairs. </p>
<h2>Where does the US go from here?</h2>
<p>Africa’s shifting allegiance to Moscow and Beijing comes at the expense of Washington’s influence – and that could hurt U.S. economic and strategic interests.</p>
<p>The Sahel region and the rest of Africa is <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/32091/chapter/268011948">home to immense and valuable resources</a>, most notably cocoa, coffee, timber, cotton, diamond, gold, manganese, cobalt, uranium, titanium and coltan.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in a suit stands in front of a map of Africa." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Barack Obama was the last U.S. president to make an official state visit to Africa, in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-barack-obama-delivers-a-speech-at-the-african-news-photo/482183512?adppopup=true">Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Sahel region is also of huge strategic importance in the battle against Boko Haram and other extremist organizations. The continent, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/africa-can-play-a-leading-role-in-the-fight-against-climate-change/">is crucial in the struggle</a> to safeguard the environment and addressing climate change. It also contains some of the the fastest-growing nations in the world. Nigeria is set to <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf">double its population to 375 million by 2050</a> – and in the process potentially overtake the U.S.</p>
<p>It is for good reason, therefore, that U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://editorials.voa.gov/a/secretary-blinken-visits-kenya-nigeria-senegal/6343059.html">noted in 2021 that</a> “Africa will shape the future … of the world.”</p>
<p>But for too long, America has fallen back on discarded notions to shape its African policy rather than look to the continent’s future. By focusing on its own security needs, America has, in my view, failed to understand that alleviating the political, economic and social conditions of locals remains a vital part of the struggle. In Niger, for example, America spent millions of dollars via the government and the U.S. military’s Africa Command, yet 43% of its people <a href="https://concernusa.org/news/poverty-in-niger/">still live in poverty</a>. And to them, resolving problems including chronic unemployment, poor governance and weak democratic institutions is more important than military spending. </p>
<p>U.S. policy risks becoming increasingly ineffectual if it fails to better focus on alleviating conditions that create political unrest, rather than just reacting when it happens. For example, America <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/10/the-u-s-should-bid-biya-goodbye-cameroon-security-foreign-policy-yaounde/">can better pressure the continent’s autocrats</a>, such as Paul Biya of Cameroon and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, to institute genuine democratic reforms and make way for new leadership. </p>
<p>The Biden administration pledged at 2022’s U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/15/u-s-africa-leaders-summit-strengthening-partnerships-to-meet-shared-priorities/">invest US$55 billion</a> in the continent over a three-year period.</p>
<p>But while Secretary Blinken has endorsed an equal partnership with African nations, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/us-africa-policy-biden-administration/2021/11/19/cc11c95c-4933-11ec-95dc-5f2a96e00fa3_story.html">past practices of marginalizing the continent continue</a>. Joe Biden has not visited sub-Saharan Africa as president – nor did his predecessor. You have to go <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/07/26/president-obama-travels-kenya-and-ethiopia">back to 2015</a> for the last time a U.S. president – Barack Obama – set foot on sub-Saharan Africa as part of an official state visit. </p>
<p>To many on the continent, that speaks volumes about Washington’s priorities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213048/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julius A. Amin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>No US president has set foot on sub-Saharan Africa since 2015 – and it hasn’t gone unnoticed.Julius A. Amin, Professor of History, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2120222023-09-05T15:07:08Z2023-09-05T15:07:08ZFrance in Africa: why Macron’s policies increased distrust and anger<p>French west Africa has experienced <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">five coups</a> in the past three years. Underpinning most of these coups is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66406137">hostility</a> towards France, a former colonial authority. Mohamed Bazoum of Niger’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-underlies-the-coup-in-niger/">downfall</a> in July 2023 comes after coups in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/7/mali-military-promises-return-to-civilian-rule-in-march-2024">Mali</a> in August 2020, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/06/chad-deby-coup-leader-democracy/">Chad</a> in April 2021, <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup/">Burkina Faso</a> in September 2022 and Gabon in September 2023.</p>
<p>The perpetrators of these coups have, among their <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/coups-in-west-africa-is-france-to-blame/">justifications</a>, mentioned the overbearing influence of France and its president, <a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-in-africa-a-cynical-twist-to-repair-the-colonial-past-while-keeping-a-tight-grip-189175">Emmanuel Macron</a>, in their affairs. The influence of France in military affairs and maintenance of dominance in business has been a key cog of the Macron agenda. Unlike other former colonial powers, France still has military <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/06/06/france-will-further-cut-back-military-presence-in-africa_6029304_7.html">bases</a> in Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Gabon. </p>
<p>At the same time, Macron has put forward <a href="https://www.nation.sc/archive/259549/macron-embraces-african-entrepreneurship">entrepreneurship</a> as the best form of development assistance. This strategic pivot away from personal relationships with African leaders is rooted in Macron’s <a href="https://jacobin.com/2021/03/emmanuel-macron-neoliberalism">neoliberal beliefs</a>. This is a political approach that favours free-market capitalism, deregulation and a reduction in government spending. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://www.uu.nl/staff/fplgerits">historian</a> who has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2019.1576170">researched</a> the relationship between France and its former colonies.</p>
<p>In Africa, Macron’s neoliberal turn has stripped France of the long-standing myth that it was somehow a more benevolent coloniser because of the cultural links it established with African elites. Macron’s approach has only increased distrust and anger because a large military presence has not been replaced by a <a href="https://www.president.go.ke/new-financial-order-will-help-the-world-overcome-poverty-and-climate-change/#:%7E:text=President%20William%20Ruto%20has%20said,the%20hands%20of%20the%20few.%E2%80%9D">new international economic order</a>, but with <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-emmanuel-macron-africa-reset-strategy-francafrique/">small-scale business deals and start-ups</a>. This is not what Africans <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/43?ln=en">wanted</a>, but it is what they got.</p>
<h2>Neoliberal values are French values</h2>
<p>Rather than a remaking of the economic and financial infrastructure, Macron has pushed entrepreneurship as development assistance: promoting start-ups and training Africa’s youth. <a href="https://www.afd.fr/fr">Agence Française de Dévelopment</a> (France’s main institution for policy implementation) is still investing in education, agriculture and infrastructure. But what Macron wants observers to notice is that increasingly, French development aid in Africa has to be run by French businesses. </p>
<p>French corporations are no longer making money in secret, as in the era of <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/macron-and-the-future-of-francafrique-6781/">Françafrique</a>. This was a period when French presidents supported African dictators to maintain influence. Rather, Macron’s speeches put forward business activities and neoliberal values as French values that benefit the continent. </p>
<p>This reliance on French culture and values can be seen as a continuation of a strategy that started with the French colonial project. Macron’s values, however, are the values of neoliberalism. At home he has pushed through a pension plan to limit French state debt. Abroad, he wants French development policy to be driven by private initiatives. </p>
<p>In light of that strategy, it becomes clear that sentiments among Africans have not become more anti-French. Rather, by elevating economics to a core value of his relationship to Africa, Macron has played into a widely accepted African worldview in which underdevelopment is the product of dependency on Europe and neocolonial exploitation.</p>
<p>Every visitor who talks to cab drivers or vendors in Dakar figures out quite quickly that the French are seen as colonisers first, possible friends second. What has changed is that Macron has unknowingly confirmed African suspicions about his intentions: he never wanted to change economic structures. Instead Africans get bread crumbs in the form of start-up money. </p>
<h2>The free market as the dividing line in west Africa</h2>
<p>Entrepreneurship is not universally loved on the continent. The belief in the free market as an engine for development has redrawn the battle lines in west Africa. Countries within the regional body Ecowas like Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal – which have had high economic growth in the past decade – are clashing with Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso – which have experienced deepening poverty. </p>
<p>While other African countries like Kenya are confronted with similar debates about how to stimulate development – Kenyan president William Ruto famously believes in the “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220913-william-ruto-kenya-s-hustler-in-chief-president">hustler nation</a>” – climate change and terrorism have led to a more combustible mix in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The juntas that have come to power therefore do not only present themselves as caretakers who are trying to do the job politicians will not do. They are also claiming they want a new ideological direction for their countries. <a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/insight/ibrahim-traore-why-burkina-fasos-leader-attracts-attention-14479334">Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso</a> has styled himself to be the successor to Thomas Sankara, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66282417">Assimi Goïta</a> has cast himself as a reformer not a revolutionary. </p>
<p>In the past, the fires of African instability and anti-French sentiment were fanned by the French underdelivering on their – sometimes cynical – promises of big structural change. Today, instability is being fed by the opposite. It is African leaders who demand big structural change, but are met with small business efforts to maintain French influence on the cheap.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212022/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Gerits does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The French president has struggled to maintain the influence his country gained in Africa through colonialism.Frank Gerits, Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, South Africa and Assistant Professor in the History of International Relations, Utrecht UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122732023-08-29T13:33:47Z2023-08-29T13:33:47ZBrics: African countries face opportunities and risks in alienating China or the US - an expert weighs in<p><em>South Africa recently hosted a <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/">Brics summit</a>. The event attracted international attention because the group has recently begun to emerge as a possible rival against US dominance of world affairs. The US and China lie at the heart of this debate. They are the two biggest trading partners of most African countries and both have strategic interests that they are determined to protect. The Conversation Africa’s politics editor, Thabo Leshilo, asked international relations expert Christopher Isike to explain.</em></p>
<h2>How might Brics affect US-African ties?</h2>
<p>Altering diplomatic relations between African countries and the US on account of Brics would have its pros and cons for the continent. Some potential gains from alienating the US would include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Increased autonomy for African countries in their foreign policy decisions. They might be able to align more closely with their own interests and priorities without the perceived influence of a major global power. </p></li>
<li><p>The potential of diversifying partnerships and alliances with other countries or regional blocs that Brics presents. This could lead to more economic, political and security relationships, reducing reliance on any single nation. </p></li>
<li><p>Stronger regional cooperation and integration. This could unify efforts to address common challenges such as security, infrastructure development and economic growth. Such regional cooperation offers more fertile ground for the <a href="https://au-afcfta.org/">African Continental Free Trade Area</a>to thrive. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>However, a strained relationship with the US could also come at a cost. Some of the losses would include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Reduced trade opportunities, foreign direct investment and economic aid, potentially leading to economic setbacks for the continent. Beneficiaries of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (<a href="https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html">Agoa</a>), which provides preferential access to the US market, would be hit the hardest. </p></li>
<li><p>The US has been accused of militarising the continent to advance its own interests. But it plays a significant role in <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/io/pkpg/c10834.htm">supporting peacekeeping efforts</a> and <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/commentary-who-thinks-wins-how-smarter-u-s-counterterrorism-in-the-sahel-can-pay-dividends-for-great-power-competition/">counterterrorism initiatives</a> in various African regions. Alienation could therefore affect security and stability, leaving a void in terms of resources, expertise, and coordination in these critical areas. </p></li>
<li><p>Alienating a major global player like the US could also lead to diplomatic isolation for many African countries on the international stage. This could weaken their influence in international organisations, negotiations and decision-making processes.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What if African countries alienated China?</h2>
<p>On gains, African countries would be able to diversify their economic and political partnerships by reducing dependence on China. This could lead to increased engagement with other countries and regions, potentially resulting in a more balanced and varied international relations portfolio.</p>
<p>African countries could also enhance their bargaining power in negotiations. This could lead to more favourable terms in trade deals, investment agreements and development projects. Other countries including the US, EU members and Australia might see an opportunity to fill the void. </p>
<p>Some Africans see China’s influence as overly dominant, potentially leading to <a href="https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwik_ufxrv-AAxX3YPEDHanLDBcQFnoECDUQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theelephant.info%2Ffeatures%2F2021%2F05%2F10%2Fwhat-africans-think-of-china-and-america%2F&usg=AOvVaw27sl28dalUXdGrayDchrvJ&opi=89978449">concerns about sovereignty and autonomy</a>. Alienating China could be seen as a way to assert national interests and prevent over-reliance on a single foreign partner.</p>
<p>That said, African countries can ill afford to alienate China. </p>
<p>China is a major economic partner for many African countries, providing investments, trade opportunities and infrastructure projects. Alienating it could lead to economic setbacks, including reduced trade and foreign direct investment. </p>
<p>Second, China is involved in various <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/183370/china-is-delivering-over-30-of-africas-big-construction-projects-heres-why/">infrastructure development projects across Africa</a>. These include roads, railways, ports and energy facilities. A strained relationship with China might hinder the completion of these projects or slow down future infrastructure development, potentially affecting economic growth and connectivity.</p>
<p>Third, China is a significant player in international diplomacy and geopolitics. So, alienating it could lead to reduced influence in global forums where China has a presence. These include the United Nations and various other international organisations. This might limit African countries’ ability to advance their interests on the global stage.</p>
<p>However, it must be noted these gains and losses from alienating either the US or China are speculative and would depend on a wide range of factors. For example, the relationship between African countries and both of these superpowers is multifaceted and complex. Any decision to alienate either of them should involve careful assessment of both the short-term and long-term consequences, and the evolving geopolitical landscape. The trick is for Africa to articulate its own interests and pursue them consistently. </p>
<h2>Is there a common African position on the US and China?</h2>
<p>African countries have diverse foreign policy priorities and alliances. Their responses to international conflicts can vary widely. Some might choose to align with major powers like the US, China, the European Union or Russia. Others might opt for neutrality or noninterference in the conflicts of other regions.</p>
<p>These strands have played out in the voting patterns on the three UN General Assembly votes to <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-showed-disunity-in-un-votes-on-russia-south-africas-role-was-pivotal-180799">condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>It would help African countries to have a common position on the Ukraine war. This should be based on its impact on food and energy security in the continent. They should act consistently in line with that common position. They could also have a common position on Brics instead of leaving it entirely to South Africa to define an African agenda for Brics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Isike does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It would help African countries to have a common position on the Ukraine war. This should be based on its impact on food and energy security in the continent.Christopher Isike, Director, African Centre for the Study of the United States, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2118662023-08-24T04:24:41Z2023-08-24T04:24:41Z8 GOP candidates debate funding to Ukraine, Trump’s future and – covertly, with dog whistles – race<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544430/original/file-20230824-17-fh9qsh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=43%2C8%2C5759%2C3854&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Eight GOP candidates for president after they entered the debate hall in Milwaukee on Aug. 23, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/republican-presidential-candidates-former-arkansas-gov-asa-news-photo/1634793463?adppopup=true">Scott Olson/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>After weeks of speculation over who was going to participate, eight Republican candidates seeking their party’s presidential nomination <a href="https://apnews.com/live-blog/republican-debate-live-updates">appeared on stage together</a> in Milwaukee on Aug. 23, 2023, for the first debate of the 2024 election season. Lest this sound like a normal event, it was not – the leading candidate, former President Donald Trump, <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-primary-r/2024/national/">who’s getting more than 50%</a> in national primary polls, chose not to come. But that may have been a benefit to the debaters, who were able to spend their time talking about issues and not simply fighting off attacks by Trump.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. asked three experts – foreign policy scholar <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=W1MuqgYAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Jordan Tama</a> from American University, Michigan State law professor <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=tySgS4QAAAAJ">Brian Kalt</a> and Arizona State historian <a href="https://newsroom.asu.edu/expert/calvin-schermerhorn">Calvin Schermerhorn</a> – to watch, listen and analyze the debate. Here are their contributions:</em> </p>
<h2>Speaking about race in code</h2>
<p><strong>Calvin Schermerhorn, Arizona State University</strong></p>
<p>At a time when the Republican Party is <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/07/12/demographic-profiles-of-republican-and-democratic-voters/">struggling to gain the support of minority voters</a>, their first debate featured a chorus of dog whistling on issues of race. </p>
<p>In response to a question about rising urban crime rates, biotech entrepreneur <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/who-is-vivek-ramaswamy-republican-presidential-hopeful-2023-08-23/">Vivek Ramaswamy</a> whistled the loudest. He would put more cops on the streets who did not have to “look over their shoulder for getting sued,” a jab at <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2020/11/blm-police-accountability-george-floyd-breonna-taylor-election-ballot-measures/">Black Lives Matter</a> and the broader <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/george-floyd-murder-one-year-later-police-accountability/">push for police accountability</a>. </p>
<p>Ramaswamy vowed to “end the teachers’ unions” and impose a civics test on 18- to 24-year-olds in order for them to vote, echoing <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/11/opinion/vivek-ramaswamy-voting-rights.html">Jim Crow literacy tests</a> that were imposed on Black voters. “Reverse racism is racism,” he added in closing.</p>
<p>Not to be out-dog-whistled on the crime issue, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-63293633">Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis</a> accused liberal philanthropist <a href="https://www.forbes.com/profile/george-soros/">George Soros</a> of “funding radical left-wing district attorneys,” who, in this view, turn a blind eye to street crime at the urging of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/George-Soros">93-year-old Jewish billionaire</a>. </p>
<p>DeSantis has partially built his brand on <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/educators-students-slam-florida-gov-ron-desantis-battle/story?id=96491298">clamping down on school curricula</a> around race and racism. On the stage he claimed to have “eliminated critical race theory” and “eliminated gender ideology” from Florida schools, declaring that “we need education in this country, not indoctrination in this country.” </p>
<p>Not to be outdone, former United Nations ambassador <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/08/18/us/politics/nikki-haley-republican-candidates-2024-issues.html">Nikki Haley</a> said, “There’s a lot of crazy woke things happening in schools.” </p>
<p>Former Vice President <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4168133-pence-ramaswamy-tangle-at-debate-let-me-explain-it-to-you-vivek/">Mike Pence</a> opposed bail reform, <a href="https://www.usccr.gov/news/2022/us-commission-civil-rights-releases-report-civil-rights-implications-cash-bail">a civil rights measure</a> that is strongly supported by progressive voters.</p>
<p>Haley, Ramaswamy and U.S. Sen. <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/05/22/tim-scott-55-things-you-need-to-know-00097711">Tim Scott</a> of South Carolina stood shoulder to shoulder with the five white men on stage, each claiming to have boot-strapped their way up. Yet, in this <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/06/23/republican-presidential-candidates-diverse-2024">historically diverse field of Republican candidates</a>, there was not a diversity of views regarding race.</p>
<p>Scott mentioned repeatedly that he was raised in a single-parent home and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/01/trump-black-americans-policies-433744">touted the Trump-Pence administration’s low unemployment rate</a> for Black and Hispanic workers. </p>
<p>Yet Scott didn’t deviate from the conservative script that government aid hurts families and vowed to “break the backs of the teachers’ unions.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544435/original/file-20230824-17-evu6v6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two people arguing at podiums and pointing at each other." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544435/original/file-20230824-17-evu6v6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544435/original/file-20230824-17-evu6v6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544435/original/file-20230824-17-evu6v6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544435/original/file-20230824-17-evu6v6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544435/original/file-20230824-17-evu6v6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544435/original/file-20230824-17-evu6v6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544435/original/file-20230824-17-evu6v6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Republican presidential candidates, Vivek Ramaswamy (L) and former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley, had a sharp exchange over U.S. foreign policy during the debate.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/republican-presidential-candidates-vivek-ramaswamy-and-news-photo/1634937369?adppopup=true">Win McNamee/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Candidates spar over funding the Ukraine war</h2>
<p><strong>Jordan Tama, American University School of International Service</strong></p>
<p>The debate moderators pivoted to foreign policy questions in the second half of the two-hour debate revealing an <a href="https://theconversation.com/first-republican-debate-set-to-kick-off-without-trump-but-with-the-potential-to-direct-the-gops-foreign-policy-stance-211856">important divide within the Republican Party</a> over the United States’ role in the world. </p>
<p>The candidates all agreed on the importance of countering China and securing the southern border with Mexico, but disagreed sharply over whether the U.S. should continue providing military and other kinds of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts#:%7E:text=Since%20the%20war%20began%2C%20the,Economy%2C%20a%20German%20research%20institute.">support to Ukraine</a>, now in its <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682">second year of war</a> with Russia. </p>
<p>DeSantis said that he would make U.S. aid to Ukraine contingent on <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-states-america/eu-assistance-ukraine-us-dollars_en?s=253">European countries providing more funding</a>. Ramaswamy, meanwhile, countered that the U.S. should not prioritize the war in Ukraine, arguing that, “We have to put the interests of Americans first, secure our own border instead of someone else’s.”</p>
<p>Former New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie, Pence and Haley then pounced on Ramaswamy, making the case for a more robust vision of American leadership on the world stage. </p>
<p>“Anybody who thinks we cannot solve the problems here in the U.S. and be the leader in the free world has a pretty small view of the greatest nation in the world. We can do both!” Pence said. </p>
<p>Haley also took Ramaswamy to task for suggesting that China, not Russia, represented the real threat to the U.S., expressing her belief there’s an important <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90135">connection between the two countries</a>. “A win for Russia is a win for China,” Haley said. </p>
<p>This quick exchange captured Republican politicians’ core differences on fundamental foreign policy issues. Will the Republican Party – and possibly, the U.S. – stand for international engagement, democracy and freedom? Or will Republicans adopt a narrower, inward-looking vision?</p>
<p>The first debate shows that this question remains on the table.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544395/original/file-20230823-17-7zbc4d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A dark-haired person in sunglasses and a red shirt holding a Trump sign in front of a large building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544395/original/file-20230823-17-7zbc4d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544395/original/file-20230823-17-7zbc4d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544395/original/file-20230823-17-7zbc4d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544395/original/file-20230823-17-7zbc4d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544395/original/file-20230823-17-7zbc4d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544395/original/file-20230823-17-7zbc4d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544395/original/file-20230823-17-7zbc4d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trump did not attend the debate, but his supporters did, including this one outside the Fiserv Forum in Milwaukee.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporter-of-republican-presidential-candidate-former-u-s-news-photo/1633808724?adppopup=true">Win McNamee/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Pardoning Trump – and its limits</h2>
<p><strong>Brian Kalt, Michigan State University</strong></p>
<p>As the debate’s discussion of Donald Trump wound down, Ramaswamy reiterated his pledge to pardon Trump if elected, and asked Pence if he would do the same. Pence responded by saying he would give due consideration to a pardon, but suggested that he would only do so if Trump was convicted and showed contrition.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.justice.gov/pardon/apply-pardon">Presidential pardons</a> typically are, similar to what Pence described, given only to restore the civil rights of people who have been convicted, served their sentences and shown contrition. But presidents have the power, if they want to use it, to grant pardons to people who have shown no contrition at all. They <a href="https://www.whitehousehistory.org/the-history-of-the-pardon-power">occasionally do so</a>.</p>
<p>Presidents also have the power to <a href="https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/publications/washingtonletter/dec-2020-wl/legal-fact-check-pardons-1220wl/">issue pardons preemptively</a>, to people who have not been convicted or even charged yet. Thus a President Ramaswamy would be able to use his pardon power not only to reverse a Trump conviction but also to end any ongoing federal prosecution or investigation against him.</p>
<p>But it is important to remember that <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/presidential-pardons-settled-law-unsettled-issues-and-a-downside-for-trump/">presidential pardons cannot reach state crimes</a>. So a President Ramaswamy would not be able to completely end the prosecution of Trump, only the federal part of it; any state prosecution – such as those in New York and Georgia – could still go forward.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211866/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From immigration and federal spending to Ukraine and the state of American schools, eight GOP presidential candidates had a lot to say.Jordan Tama, Associate Professor of International Relations, American University School of International ServiceBrian Kalt, Professor of Law and Harold Norris Faculty Scholar, Michigan State UniversityCalvin Schermerhorn, Professor of History, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2098542023-07-31T20:00:31Z2023-07-31T20:00:31ZAustralian foreign policy is traditionally hitched to the US – but the rise of China requires a middle path for a middle power<p>Few nation-states have been shaped by their underlying physical geography and location in the world quite as much as Australia. </p>
<p>Since notional foreign policy independence was uneasily embraced during the second world war, Australia’s policymaking elites have had trouble deciding whether it was a curse or a blessing to be in possession of an entire continent and a long way from potential sources of conflict. This is still considered a defining challenge.</p>
<p>The traditional way Australia’s leaders have dealt with the pervasive sense of vulnerability that geographic isolation engendered was to ingratiate themselves with “great and powerful friends”. Not much has changed in this regard either, although our current notional protector – the United States – is neither as reliable nor as powerful as policymakers in the US or this country seem to believe. </p>
<p>Even more alarmingly for Canberra’s cognoscenti, part of the reason for America’s relative decline is the reemergence of China as the most powerful economic and strategic actor in our immediate neighbourhood. </p>
<p>Dealing with an Asian “great power” adds another layer of complexity for policymakers who instinctively cleave to traditional allies, as the recently agreed AUKUS security pact demonstrates.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Review: Pacific Power Paradox: American Statecraft and the Fate of the Asian Peace – Van Jackson (Yale University Press); Engaging China: How Australia can lead the way again – edited by Jamie Reilly and Jingdong Yuan (Sydney University Press).</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Aspects of this awkward reality are directly or indirectly analysed in the two books under review here. </p>
<p>Although Van Jackson’s outstanding, historically informed analysis of US statecraft in the Asia-Pacific deals with Australia only in passing, <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300257281/pacific-power-paradox/">Pacific Power Paradox</a> is an essential guide to the regional geopolitics upon which our national peace and prosperity overwhelmingly depend. </p>
<p><a href="https://sydneyuniversitypress.com.au/products/222075">Engaging China</a>, edited by Jamie Reilly and Jingdong Yuan, looks at what this rapidly evolving and increasingly unpredictable environment means for Australia’s relations with the People’s Republic. </p>
<p>One hopes these books will be the proverbial “must reads” for our strategic and economic elites, and that their important lessons will be absorbed and even acted upon. To judge by recent events, however, nothing seems less likely. The contentious decisions to acquire nuclear-powered submarines and <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/hugely-significant-australia-to-manufacture-and-export-missiles-to-us-20230728-p5ds5e.html">manufacture US missiles</a>
have only entrenched Australia in America’s anti-China alliance.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-pact-born-in-secrecy-will-have-huge-implications-for-australia-and-the-region-168065">The AUKUS pact, born in secrecy, will have huge implications for Australia and the region</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Regionalism with American characteristics</h2>
<p>One of the most noteworthy and optimistic facts about the Asia-Pacific – or the more fashionable Indo-Pacific, for that matter – is that it has generally been peaceful. </p>
<p>This is more of a surprise than it seems, given that generations of US policymakers and strategic commentators have predicted chaos and mayhem in the region, especially in the absence of America’s supposedly benign, selfless and stabilising influence. Many still do, especially because of the “rise of China”.</p>
<p>A couple of points are worth making at the outset, however. China has not been an aggressive power hitherto, and it is far from certain it is going to be in the future. The US, by contrast, has been at war with someone somewhere for more than 90% of its history as an independent nation. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538898/original/file-20230724-29-i8g2uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538898/original/file-20230724-29-i8g2uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538898/original/file-20230724-29-i8g2uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=906&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538898/original/file-20230724-29-i8g2uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=906&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538898/original/file-20230724-29-i8g2uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=906&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538898/original/file-20230724-29-i8g2uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1139&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538898/original/file-20230724-29-i8g2uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1139&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538898/original/file-20230724-29-i8g2uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1139&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>When Asia’s peace has been upended, it has been because of American intervention. The Vietnam War remains the quintessential example of a catastrophic, unnecessary “war of choice”. Jackson describes this direct mode of US intervention in Asian affairs as the actions of an “imperious superpower”. </p>
<p>This is not the only way the US acts in Asia, however, nor is military intervention the sole determinant of peace or war in the region. At times, Jackson argues, America acts as an “aloof hegemon”, whose actions are “incidental to the course of events”.</p>
<p>At other times – and this is plainly the preferred narrative as far as US policymakers and allies are concerned – the US has acted as a “vital bulwark”, deterring intra-regional conflict, and fostering the development of Asian security.</p>
<p>These three contrasting faces of US foreign and strategic policy are at the heart of what Jackson calls the “Pacific power paradox”. It is possible to mount arguments in favour of all of these positions at times, which is what makes the US such a contradictory and protean presence in the region. Consequently, Jackson argues we have little to gain from separating the economic, institutional and localised rationales of US power.</p>
<p>To develop this argument, Jackson examines the impact of US power in Asia, considering the policies of each president since Richard Nixon’s rapprochement with China, which began in 1972. Jackson considers this development “the crucial founding moment for the Asian peace”. </p>
<p>As the so-called “Asian miracle” demonstrated, regional stability also paved the way for widespread, state-led economic development, which eventually included China. </p>
<p>Despite a good deal of talk about “Asian engagement”, Australia’s role in regional affairs has displayed a striking continuity. “In what amounted to strategic outsourcing,” writes Jackson, “US officials made clear that Australia was a valued ally not least because it could serve as a proxy for US interests in Oceania.”</p>
<p>Many of Australia’s neighbours, by contrast, have tried to make the best of growing strategic and economic competition between the US and China. They have done so through what Jackson calls a “dual hierarchy”. Individual Asian states have “hedged by heavily engaging China economically because US security commitments in the region alleviated the need to worry too much about China’s growing power”. </p>
<p>This response could be considered instructive, but Australian policymakers have generally remained wedded to a conception of the region that is predicated on the US as a “vital bulwark”. They still see China as more of a threat than an opportunity. The potentially egregious consequences of this judgement are increasingly clear.</p>
<h2>(Not) coming to terms with China</h2>
<p>The rather optimistic subtitle of Engaging China is “How Australia can lead the way again”. Sceptics may be forgiven for asking: when was the first time Australia played a leadership role in regional affairs? </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the editors are to be applauded for producing a much-needed “full-throated defence of engagement” and a “collective counter to the worrisome ‘China panic’ that has swept across Australia in recent years”. </p>
<p>To accomplish this task, a knowledgeable group of China-literate scholars has been assembled to analyse three key areas of Australia’s relationship with China: foreign and security relations; economy; and media, education and culture. </p>
<p>As a former ambassador to China, Geoff Raby, observes, what is needed – and what this book provides – is an explanation of </p>
<blockquote>
<p>how a failure of Australian diplomacy brought the relationship to its present nadir by not recognising that the changed world order necessitated different diplomatic responses and positioning than simply doubling down on the US alliance.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The potential risks of continuing to go “all the way with the USA” are spelled out in an essay by Brendon O'Connor, Lloyd Cox and Danny Cooper. The authors note that America’s growing domestic problems mean “we may be only one presidential election away from a return to and a deepening of the isolationism and ambivalence towards allies that marked the previous Trump presidency”.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538899/original/file-20230724-21-8cflib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538899/original/file-20230724-21-8cflib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538899/original/file-20230724-21-8cflib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=851&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538899/original/file-20230724-21-8cflib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=851&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538899/original/file-20230724-21-8cflib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=851&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538899/original/file-20230724-21-8cflib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1070&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538899/original/file-20230724-21-8cflib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1070&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538899/original/file-20230724-21-8cflib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1070&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>While the benefits of globalisation and trade interdependence may have been overstated at times, there is no doubt Australia has benefited from its economic relationship with China. Consequently, James Laurenceson and Weihuan Zhou argue that “deploying public policy to reduce trade exposure to China struggles as a coherent strategy”. Indeed, China’s supposedly bad international behaviour has largely been driven by “the actions taken by other key players, particularly the US abuse of economic sanctions on security grounds”.</p>
<p>Wei Li and Hans Hendrischke detail the similarly pernicious impact of geopolitics on Chinese investment in Australia, which has “transitioned from commercially driven investment cooperation to cooperation constrained by security concerns”. </p>
<p>Likewise, Glenda Korporaal points out that diplomacy and trade promotion “have the potential to create goodwill across a broad range of sectors and significantly reduce the chances of military conflict for a fraction of the cost of defence spending”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-southeast-asia-so-concerned-about-aukus-and-australias-plans-for-nuclear-submarines-168260">Why is southeast Asia so concerned about AUKUS and Australia's plans for nuclear submarines?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Cold War journalism 2.0</h2>
<p>Given the obvious economic costs, the consequences for the education sector, not to mention the adverse impact of the anti-China discourse on Australia’s growing Chinese community – all of which are detailed by other contributors – the counterproductive policies of both major political parties in this country take some explaining.</p>
<p>Part of that explanation is what Wanning Sun calls “Cold War journalism 2.0”. She argues that because China is seen as a hostile nation, “the ritual of reporting, which usually requires an attempt at balance and the provision of evidence, is no longer necessary”. </p>
<p>There has, indeed, been no shortage of irresponsible, evidence-free “red alerts” suggesting that a “direct attack on our mainland” could happen within three years. </p>
<p>And yet there is an even more alarming explanation for the complete absence of real debate amongst Australia’s policymaking elites. Stephen Fitzgerald, another former ambassador and one of the shrewdest observers of relations with China, points out that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has been</p>
<blockquote>
<p>totally sidelined in Canberra, losing out to the weight of advice and opinion from the intelligence and security agencies. These agencies, known to harbour nationalistic and xenophobic views, have been driving the policy[…]</p>
<p>[…]the deeper reason for the extremity and obduracy of the Australian anti-China stand, therefore, lies not so much in the behaviour of the PRC but here, in Australia, in the mindset and the attitudes and prejudices of those directing foreign policy and of the politicians they advised.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Leaders who are prepared to spend (at least) <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/what-a-368-billion-submarine-price-tag-means-for-the-budget-20230314-p5crtr.html">A$368 billion on nuclear submarines</a> to demonstrate their commitment to an international order that looks increasingly fragile and anachronistic are unlikely to be swayed by academic arguments from “outsiders”. </p>
<p>Australia’s distinctive “strategic culture” has been decades in the making. Its foundational assumptions are unchallengeable, self-evident truths – for those who believe them, at least. The fact that a growing number of people are not persuaded by the conventional strategic wisdom is unlikely to change the thinking within Canberra’s strategic bubble, no matter how much evidence accumulates about its perverse social and economic impacts. </p>
<p>Even plausible strategic counter-arguments are likely to remain unheeded, despite the widely noted opportunity costs that flow from proposed defence outlays and the prospect that they are unlikely to influence China’s behaviour. </p>
<p>By contrast, some of the proposals in Engaging China just might. </p>
<h2>Changing course and re-engaging?</h2>
<p>Ironically enough, it may take the return of Donald Trump to finally encourage some rethinking – even some genuinely independent thinking – that more accurately reflects Australia’s strategic and geographic circumstances. As Jackson, a former Pentagon insider, ruefully observes:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A world where American politics can yield far-right authoritarian demagogues is a world in which it makes no sense to simply count on America to keep things pacific, uphold pacifying international commitments indefinitely, or even remain pacific itself.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Quite so. And yet, in theory if not practice, the logic of “strategic outsourcing” cuts both ways. Australian policymakers still assume that the US is a reliable partner who will come to our aid in the unlikely event it is actually needed. Significantly, even some Canberra insiders now recognise the dangers of being strategically isolated as a consequence of our reflexive fealty to the US. </p>
<p>Compromising our independence and resolutely hitching our collective future to the frailties and pathologies of the US system is unwise at the best of times. When it occurs at the expense of our relationship with our principal trade partner, and in the midst of an intensifying great power competition we can do little to influence, it looks foolish and unthinking. </p>
<p>Surely, there is scope for a truly independent middle power to navigate a middle path. This might be facilitated, as Jamie Reilly and Jingdong Yuan argue, by “promoting an emerging new order based on multilateralism and regional institutions, with binding norms and rules on all players, including both the United States and the PRC”. </p>
<p>After all, that is what the much invoked but seldom seen rules-based international order is supposed to be about, isn’t it?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209854/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Beeson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia’s decision to manufacture US missiles highlights tensions between our foreign policy stance and our trading interests. Two new books throw light the problem.Mark Beeson, Adjunct professor, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2094612023-07-21T13:54:00Z2023-07-21T13:54:00ZHere’s how China is responding to US sanctions – with blocking laws and other countermeasures<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538636/original/file-20230720-29-6r6648.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. sanctions have further strained relations between the two superpowers.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/cargo-containers-with-chinese-and-united-states-royalty-free-image/943639230">narvikk/iStock/Getty Images Plus</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After a recent meeting between U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and officials in Beijing, China released a statement <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china-urges-practical-us-action-sanctions-after-yellen-talks-2023-07-10/#:%7E:text=BEIJING%2C%20July%2010%20(Reuters),with%20senior%20officials%20in%20Beijing.">demanding “practical action”</a> over the issue of sanctions. The implication was that the punitive measures – imposed by the U.S. government on <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonytellez/2023/02/08/here-are-all-the-us-sanctions-against-china/?sh=37ae897115b4">hundreds of Chinese individuals and entities</a> over the past few years – impede any alleviation of the strained relations between the two economic giants.</p>
<p>The statement followed a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-rejects-meeting-defense-chiefs-lloyd-austin-li-shangfu-rcna86732">testy encounter in May 2023</a> in which Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu refused to meet his American counterpart because of sanctions. Clearly, the economic measures are hurting China – prompting not only tough words but also countermeasures to limit their impact.</p>
<p>As a professor of law and an <a href="https://scholar.google.ae/citations?user=PSk6YAUAAAAJ&hl=en">expert on international trade</a>, I study both how the U.S. sanctions China and how China attempts to counter these sanctions. I also analyze whether China’s countermeasures are working.</p>
<h2>How sanctions work</h2>
<p>Economic sanctions are considered an important <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-92-106.pdf">foreign policy tool</a> that can be used to influence and change the behavior of countries. </p>
<p>The sanctions on China have been imposed for a myriad of reasons, including as punishment for <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0070">human rights abuses</a>, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/10/us-sanctions-six-chinese-tech-companies-for-supporting-spy-balloon-programs.html">espionage activities</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-russia-us-ukraine-sanctions-59fa76b79b69b7489039b4d0ee5dd14b">supporting Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine</a>. Some sanctions are intended to restrict China’s technological capabilities by <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/27/biden-s-unprecedented-semiconductor-bet-pub-88270">limiting access to key tech suppliers</a>.</p>
<p>To be successful, the sanctioning country must have the economic clout to inflict economic damage on the other country and thus force change. </p>
<p>In the case of China, sanctions have harmed <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2019/05/23/blog-the-impact-of-us-china-trade-tensions">producers and consumers</a> in both countries. They have also benefited certain third countries – for example, through <a href="https://unctad.org/publication/trade-and-trade-diversion-effects-united-states-tariffs-china">trade diversion</a> that replaces Chinese exporters with suppliers from other countries.</p>
<p>Traditionally, sanctions have targeted entire countries. For example, since February 2022 the U.S. has imposed <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases">sweeping sanctions against Russia</a> for its invasion of Ukraine. In addition, the U.S. has imposed <a href="https://www.state.gov/cuba-sanctions/">multiple sanctions against Cuba</a> over the past 65 years in a failed attempt to force regime change.</p>
<p>Economic sanctions can be primary or secondary. With <a href="https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5792&context=flr">primary sanctions</a>, the U.S., for example, forbids imports of any product from the country being sanctioned. Primary sanctions also bar all U.S. companies from doing any business with the country or entities within it. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/sanctions-by-the-numbers-u-s-secondary-sanctions">secondary sanctions</a>, the U.S. refuses to engage in business with any company that has a business relationship with the country being sanctioned. In its most extreme form, <a href="https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2013%20NTE%20Arab%20League%20Final.pdf">these sanctions also prohibit</a> conducting business with a company that has a relationship with another company that in turn has a relationship with the sanctioned country.</p>
<h2>Targeting individuals and businesses</h2>
<p>In recent years, U.S. sanctions against China have become more targeted against specific individuals, products and companies. For example, the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury Department publishes a <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/specially-designated-nationals-and-blocked-persons-list-sdn-human-readable-lists">list of Specially Designated Nationals</a> against which sanctions apply. Individuals and businesses on the list have their assets blocked, and U.S. citizens are prohibited from dealing with them. There are <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/ctrylst.txt">hundreds of Chinese individuals and businesses</a> on the list, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-sanctions-seven-chinese-individuals-over-hong-kong-crackdown-2021-07-16/">officials in China’s Hong Kong liaison office</a> and major corporations such as <a href="https://www.steptoeinternationalcomplianceblog.com/2020/12/ofac-adds-chinese-tech-company-ceiec-to-sdn-list-issues-general-license-38-authorizing-wind-down-activities/">China National Electronic Import-Export Company</a>. </p>
<p>Also, the U.S. Commerce Department, through its Bureau of Industry, <a href="https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3158-2022-10-07-bis-press-release-advanced-computing-and-semiconductor-manufacturing-controls-final/file">implemented export controls</a> in October 2022 on certain exports to China, such as advanced computing equipment and semiconductor parts. These export controls were put in place because of concerns over <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/choking-chinas-access-future-ai">China’s defense modernization</a>.</p>
<p>In response to the secondary sanctions and the <a href="https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1151&context=jil">complex enforcement and compliance issues</a> they create for governments and businesses alike, the <a href="https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/open-strategic-autonomy/extraterritoriality-blocking-statute_en">European Union</a> and countries including <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/f-29/page-1.html">Canada</a> and the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/protection-of-trading-interests">U.K.</a> have enacted what are called blocking statutes. Blocking statutes typically allow an individual or business to not comply with U.S. laws and require individuals and businesses to notify authorities about any U.S. sanction enforcement measures.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Pedestrian walks past a Huawei store and billboard" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538565/original/file-20230720-19-nhjvk8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538565/original/file-20230720-19-nhjvk8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538565/original/file-20230720-19-nhjvk8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538565/original/file-20230720-19-nhjvk8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538565/original/file-20230720-19-nhjvk8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538565/original/file-20230720-19-nhjvk8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538565/original/file-20230720-19-nhjvk8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Chinese telecom giant Huawei reported a decline in revenue due to U.S. sanctions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/pedestrians-pass-a-sign-of-huawei-mobile-phone-in-yichang-news-photo/1246320157">CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>China’s countermeasures</h2>
<p>The Chinese government has taken several countermeasures to retaliate against U.S. sanctions in recent years. </p>
<p>In 2020, the Ministry of Commerce in China issued the <a href="http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/questions/202009/20200903002580.shtml">Unreliable Entity List</a>. A person or company is designated as “unreliable” if Chinese authorities deem them to be harming national security or development interests of China or applying discriminatory measures against a Chinese entity. Punitive measures – such as trade and investment restrictions and fines – may be imposed on them for conduct that is contrary to China’s national interests. So far, <a href="https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/china-added-two-us-companies-to-the-unreliable-entities-list/">two U.S. aerospace and defense companies</a> have been listed as unreliable entities.</p>
<p>In addition, in 2021 the Chinese Ministry of Commerce issued the <a href="http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/questions/202101/20210103029708.shtml">Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures</a>. A Chinese blocking statute, the rules require any Chinese citizen, business or other organization that is restricted or prohibited by U.S. sanctions from engaging in normal economic activities with a third nonsanctioning country to report such matters to the Chinese authorities. </p>
<p>China also enacted the <a href="https://oxfordpoliticalreview.com/2022/08/30/china-should-not-over-rely-on-its-anti-foreign-sanctions-law/">Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law</a> in 2021. This law authorizes China to take action – such as restrictions on visas and who can enter or exit the country – when a foreign country adopts what China sees as discriminatory measures against any Chinese citizen or organization. In addition, censured individuals or businesses can be slapped with a freezing of assets and prevented from doing business in China. Also, a Chinese individual or business can bring a case before Chinese courts and ask for an injunction from or damages for having to comply with foreign sanctions. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, the effectiveness of these countermeasures is unclear. There are no available statistics to determine whether they have mitigated the impact of U.S. sanctions. </p>
<h2>Caught in the middle</h2>
<p>The U.S. and China are <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/GreatEconomicRivalry_Final_2.pdf">economic superpowers</a>. Imposing sanctions and countersanctions can <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/coming-clash-over-hong-kong-sanctions">make it difficult</a> for any foreign country or company that wants to do business in both countries. It is, in effect, asking them to pick sides.</p>
<p>Some individuals and companies within both China and the U.S. may opt to adopt a pragmatic approach to the sanctions and continue to do business either directly or indirectly. But by doing so they risk being fined by U.S. authorities. </p>
<p>Or, they may try to circumvent these sanctions and countersanctions by working with businesses in other countries instead, or find different ways to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/21/china-united-states-semiconductor-chips-sanctions-evasion/">inoculate themselves from the effects of sanctions</a>. Both the U.S. and China are likely to not push sanctions too hard, so as not to engage in a full-blown trade war.</p>
<p>Workarounds for businesses that trade with both the U.S. and China are critical when the sanctioning country – typically the U.S. – has a monopoly over the particular goods or technology in question. For example, there is no short-term fix for Chinese telecom giant Huawei when the U.S. denies it access to critical semiconductors, since <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/bidens-uphill-battle-to-restructure-the-global-semiconductor-sector/">the U.S. has a monopoly on semiconductors</a>. Eventually, semiconductors will be produced in China, but not for several years. In the meantime, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/31/business/huawei-annual-earnings-2022.html">Huawei has seen a decline in revenue</a> and shifted money toward more research and development.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/26/huawei-focuses-on-software-as-us-sanctions-hurt-hardware-business.html">experience of Huawei</a> underscores why Beijing is eager to find a way to counter U.S. sanctions. It seems that at least for now China has settled on a policy of blocking tactics at home while upping rhetoric on the international stage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209461/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bashar Malkawi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China has responded to US sanctions with its own set of punitive measures. An expert on international trade explains the standoff and what it means for countries and companies caught in the middle.Bashar Malkawi, Professor of Law, University of ArizonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2093162023-07-12T01:53:47Z2023-07-12T01:53:47ZAfter being a ‘welcome guest’ at NATO, NZ now needs to consider what our partnership with the alliance really means<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536948/original/file-20230712-19-kok107.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C17%2C3817%2C2504&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mustafa Kamaci/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As a “<a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_217031.htm">welcomed guest</a>” at the latest NATO summit in Lithuania, New Zealand Prime Minister Chris Hipkins had a front-row seat for debates over Ukrainian membership, the role of countries outside NATO’s traditional geographic boundaries, the ongoing threat of China, military spending and an accelerating nuclear arms race. </p>
<p>The NATO meeting reaffirmed the alliance’s “iron-clad commitment to defend each other and every inch of allied territory at all times, protect our one billion citizens, and safeguard our freedom and democracy”.</p>
<p>But the meeting also highlighted an evolving alliance that recently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/3/finland-to-join-nato-on-tuesday-military-alliances-chief-says">expanded to include Finland</a>, with Sweden expected to join in the coming months. </p>
<p>It is worthwhile considering this direction, succinctly outlined by the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_217320.htm?selectedLocale=en">official communiqué</a> issued at the summit’s conclusion, and what it will mean for New Zealand. </p>
<h2>Ukraine told ‘not now’</h2>
<p>The war in Ukraine coloured everything at the NATO summit. </p>
<p>The unequivocal condemnation of Russia heard in Lithuania was not new. But the underlining argument, that Russia was clearly in the wrong, must fully withdraw from all of Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders and those responsible for crimes must face justice, was important. </p>
<p>These points show what NATO’s conditions for peace look like. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nato-vilnius-summit-will-reflect-fresh-sense-of-purpose-over-ukraine-war-but-hard-questions-remain-over-membership-issues-208293">Nato: Vilnius summit will reflect fresh sense of purpose over Ukraine war – but hard questions remain over membership issues</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>NATO’s decision <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/jul/11/russia-ukraine-war-live-russia-missile-attack-kyiv-before-nato-zelenskiy">not to give Ukraine a pathway to membership</a> was also key. </p>
<p>To invite Ukraine now would have created a direct route to global conflict. To be offered a pathway, where membership could be given when the war was over, would give Putin every justification to never end the conflict to prevent NATO expanding to Russia’s border. </p>
<p>Despite this disappointment for Ukraine, NATO will increase the cooperation and assistance given to the country. </p>
<p>And this is where New Zealand will need to do more. <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/increase-nz-support-ukraine#">Our support for Ukraine</a> in financial, military, diplomatic and humanitarian terms has been good. But it will need to be better to fall in line with NATO expectations of its partners.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1678822223530848274"}"></div></p>
<h2>Threads of connection winding us tighter to NATO</h2>
<p>Geographically, New Zealand can not be a full member of NATO. But New Zealand has become a “partner”, making up an Indo-Pacific cohort that includes Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea – known as IP4.</p>
<p>The communiqué from the summit emphasised the region’s impact on Euro-Atlantic security and our shared commitment to upholding international law and the rules-based international order. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-nato-expanding-its-reach-to-the-asia-pacific-region-209140">Why is NATO expanding its reach to the Asia-Pacific region?</a>
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<hr>
<p>It’s important to note the IP4 shared security obligations stem from bilateral treaties and not any one collective agreement. Bilateral relations tie the United States to Japan, South Korea and Australia. For New Zealand, we are tied to to this alliance via our neighbours across the Tasman. </p>
<p>An additional thread being woven through the group is the <a href="https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/explainer-what-is-the-aukus-partnership?gclid=CjwKCAjw-7OlBhB8EiwAnoOEkyZa0uZmVDOE4KMDeqEcBc1lExgkgH8NKfoJGw0Pr8OmGISyyCPMKxoCYngQAvD_BwE">AUKUS alliance</a>, which could ultimately include partnerships with Japan and South Korea. While full membership of AUKUS is ruled out by our long-standing nuclear-free policy, New Zealand has <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/131625701/new-zealand-interested-in-joining-second-tranche-of-aukus-deal-defence-minister-says">expressed interest</a> in joining the second tier of the alliance, which would give us access to a new generation of weaponry.</p>
<h2>China continues to loom large</h2>
<p>Since late 2020, the IP4 cohort has been galvanised around the shift in the global balance of power and the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). </p>
<p>While remaining “open to constructive engagement with the PRC”, NATO’s latest communiqué warned China against giving support to Russia and took aim at China’s efforts to undermine global stability. </p>
<p>Broadly, NATO members said the PRC’s ambitions challenged the alliance’s interests, security and values. In particular, the communiqué focused on China’s efforts to subvert the international order via its control of key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1678877864408539136"}"></div></p>
<h2>The 2% target</h2>
<p>The other thread that ties NATO and the partner countries together is military spending. The original goal was that each NATO country spend 2% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on the military. </p>
<p>At Lithuania, NATO emphasised the need for partners to invest “at least 2% of GDP on defence” and “that in many cases, expenditure beyond 2% of GDP will be needed in order to remedy existing shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order”. </p>
<p>This will be a challenge for New Zealand. Military spending makes up just 1.5% of our GDP. The other IP4 partners have all crossed this 2% threshold, or shall do soon.</p>
<h2>The nuclear umbrella</h2>
<p>For New Zealand, the hardening of the “nuclear umbrella” could also be a sticking point. </p>
<p>Via the communiqué, NATO said it was “ready and able to deter aggression and manage escalation risks in a crisis that has a nuclear dimension”. NATO also announced intentions to strengthen “training and exercises that simulate conventional and […] a nuclear dimension of a crisis or conflict”. </p>
<p>The alliance emphasised the importance of “the United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe” and reaffirmed “the imperative to ensure the broadest possible participation by allies concerned in NATO’s nuclear burden-sharing arrangements to demonstrate alliance unity and resolve”.</p>
<p>Although NATO remained committed to allies supporting existing disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation agreements and commitments, the exit of Russia from many agreements, and non-participation of other countries, have forced a rethink. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] the <a href="https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/#">Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</a> […] stands in opposition to and is inconsistent and incompatible with the alliance’s nuclear deterrence policy, is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, risks undermining the NPT, and does not take into account the current security environment.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>NATO called on its partners and all other countries to </p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] reflect realistically on the ban treaty’s impact on international peace and security […] and join us in working to improve collective security through tangible and verifiable measures that can reduce strategic risks and enable lasting progress on nuclear disarmament.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For a country like New Zealand, which made <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/nuclear-weapons-%E2%80%93-where-are-we-treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons-and-nuclear-non">conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</a> a priority, this is a powerful rebuke.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209316/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The latest NATO summit has put the spotlight on the global reach of the regional alliance.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2094832023-07-11T20:32:40Z2023-07-11T20:32:40ZUkraine is the hot topic at the NATO summit – the most important work is all in the details happening behind the scenes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536849/original/file-20230711-25-nrifv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Joe Biden and other world leaders are together at the 2023 NATO summit in Lithuania on July 11, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1523566545/photo/nato-holds-2023-summit-in-vilnius.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=zRKRMEn8R7Wsu9PT-jMZkZmfjWkmRJjSJM4xOKlPyxY=">Pauline Peleckis/Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A summit is literally the <a href="https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/summit">highest point on the mountain</a>. In diplomatic terms, summits like the NATO meeting, held on July 11 and 12, 2023, in Vilnius, Lithuania, mark important gatherings of world leaders.</p>
<p>The question of Sweden’s and Ukraine’s joining NATO, which is a political and military alliance of 31 countries from Europe and North America, was a central topic heading into this year’s summit. While <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/10/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-sweden-nato.html">Sweden is now set</a> to join the alliance, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/nato-summit-seeks-agreement-ukraine-bid-after-turkey-deal-sweden-2023-07-10/">there is no firm timeline</a> for when countries will determine whether Ukraine is admitted.</p>
<p>Having worked on and attended summits as a diplomat in both the Clinton and Obama administrations, <a href="https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/faculty/tara-sonenshine">I know how much</a> energy goes into planning the public and private diplomatic moments of these events. </p>
<p>NATO is convening this meeting as part of its regular work on major military and political concerns among its member countries. But make no mistake – the United States sees itself as pivotal in this summit. </p>
<p>For President Joe Biden, the meeting is a test of his personal commitment to help Ukraine win the battle against Russia. The <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/02/21/fact-sheet-one-year-of-supporting-ukraine/">U.S. has been leading</a> a coalition of countries helping Ukraine with <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts">military and humanitarian aid</a>. Biden has promised that the U.S. will help Ukraine “<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/biden-us-will-support-ukraine-as-long-as-it-takes-/6953138.html">as long as it takes</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People sit around a large circular table with a compass on it in a black and white photo." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">World leaders participate in a NATO summit in Paris in 1957.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/3295254/photo/nato-summit.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=3Y6Hgwx_3NNu4VlYK5ZbBYq7c-7Lhy_UG0IgjiHwxQ0=">Reg Birkett/Keystone/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>History of summits</h2>
<p>Political leaders <a href="https://www.gresham.ac.uk/watch-now/summit-diplomacy-some-lessons-history-21st-century-leaders">perfected the art of modern diplomacy</a> in routine face-to-face summits during the darkest days of the Cold War.</p>
<p>Winston Churchill, at the time the U.K. prime minister, helped form the concept of a political “summit” in 1950, when he suggested a “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/09/27/the-ideal-summit/5f621ade-2aa4-4369-8676-2d648250a9e5/">parley at the summit</a>.” That meant that the U.K., United States and the Soviet Union <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20030500_cli_paper_dip_issue86.pdf">should sit down</a> and figure out who had which sphere of influence after World War II ended. </p>
<p>But the history of summits stretches further back in time.</p>
<p>Another British politician, Lloyd George, first pushed for in-person political meetings in the early 1900s, <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20030500_cli_paper_dip_issue86.pdf">stating</a>, “If you want to settle a thing, you see your opponent and talk it over with him. The last thing to do is write him a letter.”</p>
<p>And it was the <a href="https://www.diplomacy.edu/histories/ancient-greek-diplomacy-politics-new-tools-and-negotiation/">Greeks who first elevated the idea of leaders talking</a> to leaders and debating issues as a form of building trust.</p>
<p>Since the Cold War, summits <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/diplomacy/Summit-diplomacy">have taken many different shapes</a> and sizes, ranging from regional to international meetings.</p>
<p>While some of these meetings result in few tangible outcomes, others have helped pave the way for key policy changes, including <a href="https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/history/reagan-and-gorbachev-reykjavik-summit/">nuclear arms reductions</a> in the 1980s and a <a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement">treaty to limit the rise in global temperatures</a> in 2015.</p>
<p>From an American perspective, summits are key moments when leadership is on display. </p>
<p>U.S. presidents have hosted <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/summit-for-democracy-2023#">summits on everything</a> from democracy to trade since the Cold War. And <a href="https://time.com/6190443/nato-summit-2022/">NATO summits have taken place</a> almost every year since the alliance’s founding in 1949. </p>
<p>But there is a particular level of pressure and anticipation surrounding this meeting, with an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-launches-air-attack-kyiv-hours-before-nato-summit-2023-07-11/">active war in Europe</a> caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. </p>
<h2>Backstage details</h2>
<p>These mega-events require massive planning. Member countries can volunteer to host the summits, and the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50115.htm">offers are evaluated</a> and decided upon by the political branch of NATO.</p>
<p>From the logistical advance teams that prepare the groundwork for presidential travel to the protocol officers ensuring that handshakes or hugs are timed for photography, every detail matters both publicly and privately at these sorts of affairs. </p>
<p>Fashion is also a choice – from tie selection to pantsuits or dresses. Not a hair can be out of place. Women’s fashion choices tend to receive outsize scrutiny and attention – as when <a href="https://www.instyle.com/fashion/espadrille-wedges-jill-biden-queen-letizia">first lady Jill Biden wore espadrilles</a>, a popular kind of shoe in Spain, to the NATO meeting in Madrid in 2022. </p>
<p>Hundreds of U.S. government officials work across multiple agencies behind the scenes at political summits, both on site and back home, to generate pages and pages of briefing materials for every minute of every hour of the meeting. Depending on the timing and importance of the summit, a secretary of state might accompany the president on the trip. </p>
<p>U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is with Biden in Lithuania, as a delicate diplomatic dance is happening with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The Ukrainian leader <a href="https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor">has tweeted about</a> how his country is being discussed without his presence at the meeting.</p>
<p>There are secure documents to be written and read and private sessions to brief Biden.</p>
<p>Setting the table for a summit means the host country must make literal and figurative decisions around when <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/30/nato-summit-venue-madrid-serves-russian-salad">meals are served</a> and who attends the dinners. The host country of a summit can show off its local cuisine, considered a form of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/20/food-diplomacy-countries-identity-culture-marketing-gastrodiplomacy-gastronativism/">culinary diplomacy</a>. </p>
<p>Ambassadors of the other participating countries also send along menu guidelines or people’s particular dietary needs. </p>
<h2>Expecting the unexpected</h2>
<p>Despite all the scheduling and agenda-setting, there is an unpredictability to a political summit as people interact in real time.</p>
<p>Real-world events can also interfere in even a perfectly well-orchestrated summit. A terrorist incident or a natural disaster, for example, can turn a basic summit into an emergency meeting.</p>
<p>There are also human dynamics to summits. </p>
<p>It is one thing to read a briefing memo. It is quite another, as a leader, to look directly at people and see their expressions and body language. </p>
<p>This gives weight to closed-door meetings with just a few other people, as leaders often peel off from big group discussions to compare notes and plot strategies. </p>
<p>Throughout the summit, aides will pass notes to Biden, and there will be hallway huddles with diplomats and aides. Reporters will get bits and pieces of what is happening until the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/events_216418.htm">final press conference</a> on July 12, at which leaders will answer questions about any decisions made, the next steps and the overall question of whether the summit was a success or failure. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Volodymr Zelenskyy walks through a crowd with his wife, surrounded by men in suits." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy arrived at the NATO summit on July 11, 2023, to push for Ukraine’s entry into the alliance.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1523567553/photo/lithuania-nato-defence-diplomacy.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=i-2S22TgHp49NbghKIWLTB7zg9lqBEeYZU5nD8z4mzQ=">Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Elevating the event</h2>
<p>This meeting is happening in the middle of the summer. Many Europeans have flocked to beaches, as is their summer custom. Americans are off to national parks. Keeping the world’s attention on the NATO summit might be difficult. And, absent any major announcement, summits can be a humdrum affair. </p>
<p>But in this case, so much is riding on the NATO summit’s outcome. </p>
<p>Ukraine is at the center stage at this summit as countries debate extending a political invitation to Ukraine to join the alliance. Not only does NATO have to plot out its military response to an ongoing war, the U.S. and its allies have to plan for a future Ukraine once it emerges from the rubble. There is current division among NATO members <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/nato-summit-seeks-agreement-ukraine-bid-after-turkey-deal-sweden-2023-07-10/">whether they should admit</a> Ukraine. </p>
<p>The stakes are enormous: Letting Ukraine join NATO would force the <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-nato-and-why-does-ukraine-want-to-join-175821">military alliance to defend its new member</a> against Russia, which could then turn into a larger war across Europe. Hanging in the balance is the future of Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose aggression against Ukraine is really about a desire to stop the growth and power of NATO.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209483/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tara Sonenshine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The NATO summit is a chance for world leaders to hash out difficult topics, like the war in Ukraine – and for the US to show off its leadership, writes a former diplomat.Tara Sonenshine, Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice in Public Diplomacy, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2070782023-06-16T12:36:59Z2023-06-16T12:36:59ZThe Global South is forging a new foreign policy in the face of war in Ukraine, China-US tensions: Active nonalignment<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532264/original/file-20230615-16608-dw7p4b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=365%2C455%2C3502%2C2143&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lula and Modi walking a new diplomatic path.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/vietnams-prime-minister-pham-minh-chinh-japans-prime-news-photo/1256611319?adppopup=true">Takashi Aoyama/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>What does the Ukraine war have to do with Brazil? On the face of it, perhaps not much.</p>
<p>Yet, in his <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/01/01/1146518711/leftist-lula-brazil-sworn-in-president">first six months in office</a>, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva – now in his third nonconsecutive term – has expended much effort <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/24/americas/brazil-lula-ukraine-peace-coalition-intl-latam/index.html">trying to bring peace</a> to the conflict in Eastern Europe. This has included <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/02/10/joint-statement-following-the-meeting-between-president-biden-and-president-lula/">conversations with U.S. President Joe Biden</a> in Washington, <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202304/t20230414_11059515.html">Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing</a> and in a teleconference call with <a href="https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/lula-speaks-via-videoconference-with-the-president-of-ukraine-volodymyr-zelensky">Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy</a>. It has also seen “shuttle diplomacy” by Lula’s chief foreign policy adviser – and former foreign minister – Celso Amorim, who has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/brazil-envoy-met-putin-push-ukraine-peace-talks-cnn-brasil-2023-04-03/">visited Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/18/brazil-russia-ukraine-kirby-blowback-00092485">welcomed his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov</a>, in Brasília.</p>
<p>One reason Brazil has been in a position to meet with such an array of parties involved in the conflict is because the nation <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/brazil-wont-take-sides-over-russias-invasion-ukraine-foreign-minister-2022-03-08/">has made a point of not taking sides</a> in the war. In so doing, Brazil is engaging in what my colleagues <a href="https://www.ids.ac.uk/people/carlos-fortin/">Carlos Fortin</a> and <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/carlos-ominami">Carlos Ominami</a> <a href="https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/profile/jorge-heine/">and I</a> have called “<a href="https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/2022/08/15/heine-outlines-the-doctrine-of-active-non-alignment/">active nonalignment</a>.” By this we mean a foreign policy approach in which countries from the Global South – Africa, Asia and Latin America – refuse to take sides in conflicts between the great powers and focus strictly on their own interests. It is an approach that The Economist has <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/2023/04/11/how-to-survive-a-superpower-split">characterized as</a> “how to survive a superpower split.”</p>
<p>The difference between this new “nonalignment” and a similar approach <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-non-aligned-movement-in-the-21st-century-66057">adopted by nations in decades past</a> is that it is happening in an era in which developing nations are in a much stronger position than they once were, with rising powers emerging among them. For example, the gross domestic product in regard to purchasing power of the five BRICS countries - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – has <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2023/03/27/the-brics-has-overtaken-the-g7-in-global-gdp/">overtaken that of the G7</a> group of advanced economic nations. This growing economic power gives active nonaligned nations more international clout, allowing them to forge new initiatives and diplomatic coalition-building in a manner that would have been unthinkable before. Would, for example, João Goulart, who served as <a href="https://library.brown.edu/create/fivecenturiesofchange/chapters/chapter-6/presidents/joao-goulart/">Brazil’s president from 1961 to 1964</a>, have attempted to mediate in the Vietnam War, in the same way that Lula is doing with Ukraine? I believe to ask the question is to answer it.</p>
<h2>Neither neutral nor disinterested</h2>
<p>The growth of active nonalignment has been fueled by the increased competition and what I see as a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/16/u.s.-china-trade-war-has-become-cold-war-pub-85352">budding second Cold War</a> between the United States and China. For many countries in the Global South, maintaining good relations with both Washington and Beijing has been crucial for economic development, as well as trade and investment flows.</p>
<p>It is simply not in their interest to take sides in this growing conflict. At the same time, active nonalignment is not to be confused with neutrality – <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/law8_final.pdf">a legal position under international law</a> that entails certain duties and obligations. Being neutral means not taking a stance, which is not the case in active nonalignment.</p>
<p>Nor is active nonalignment about remaining equidistant, politically, from the great powers. On some issues – say, on democracy and human rights – it is perfectly possible for an active nonaligned policy to take a position closer to the United States. While on others – say, international trade – the country may side more with China.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Men in suits stand by the coast." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1142&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1142&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1142&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Yugoslavian President Marshal Tito at the Non-Aligned Movement conference in 1956.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/from-left-to-right-egyptian-president-gamal-abdel-nasser-news-photo/1365178535?adppopup=true">Archive Photos/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This form of nonalignment requires a highly fine-tuned diplomacy, one that examines each issue on its merits and makes choices steeped in statecraft. </p>
<h2>Opting out across the world</h2>
<p>As far as the war in Ukraine is concerned, it means not supporting either Russia or NATO. And Brazil isn’t the only country in the Global South taking that position, although it was the first to attempt to broker a peace agreement. </p>
<p>Across <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/05/western-allies-pressure-african-countries-to-condemn-russia/">Africa</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/indonesia-jokowi-walks-tightrope-balancing-ties-with-russia-west/a-62396110">Asia</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fc8d51c8-5202-4862-a653-87d1603deded">Latin America</a>, several key countries have <a href="https://theconversation.com/when-two-elephants-fight-how-the-global-south-uses-non-alignment-to-avoid-great-power-rivalries-199418">refused to side with NATO</a>. Most prominent among them has been India, which despite its closer ties with the United States in recent years and its joining the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue">Quadrilateral Security Dialogue</a> – or the “Quad,” a group sometimes described as an “Asian NATO” – with the U.S., Japan and Australia, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/2023/03/16/explainer-why-india-walks-a-tightrope-between-us-and-russia/8bbe579c-c3fa-11ed-82a7-6a87555c1878_story.html">refused to condemn Russia’s invasion</a> of Ukraine and has significantly <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-16/india-now-buying-33-times-more-russian-oil-than-a-year-earlier">increased its imports of Russian oil</a>.</p>
<p>India’s nonalignment will presumably be on the agenda during <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-modi-india-state-visit-white-house-c969d6e4e9770c105ca7affe7c190714">Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s talks with Biden</a> in his upcoming visit to Washington.</p>
<p>Indeed, the position of India, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12557384">world’s largest democracy</a>, shows how the war in Ukraine, far from reflecting that the main geopolitical cleavage in the world today is between democracy and autocracy, <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/democracy-vs-autocracy-biden-s-inflection-point">as Biden has argued</a>, reveals that the real divide is between the Global North and the Global South.</p>
<p>Some of the most populous democracies in the world in addition to India – countries like <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/indonesia-jokowi-walks-tightrope-balancing-ties-with-russia-west/a-62396110">Indonesia</a>, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/pakistan-plays-on-both-sides-of-ukraine-war/articleshow/98496174.cms?from=mdr">Pakistan</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/6/2/a-russian-love-affair-why-south-africa-stays-neutral-on-war">South Africa</a>, Brazil, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/collection/blog-mexico-and-war-ukraine">Mexico</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/24/argentina-fernandez-russia-ukraine-war-brazil-lula-nonalignment/">Argentina</a> – have refused to side with NATO. Almost no country in Africa, Asia and Latin America has supported <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/countries-have-sanctioned-russia">the diplomatic and economic sanctions</a> against Russia. </p>
<p>Although many of these nations have voted to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the United Nations General Assembly, where <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/13/un-condemns-russias-annexations-in-ukraine-how-countries-voted">140-plus member states have repeatedly done so</a>, none wants to make what they consider to be a European war into a global one.</p>
<h2>How the ‘great powers’ are reacting</h2>
<p>Washington has seemingly been <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/10/nonalignment-superpowers-developing-world-us-west-russia-china-india-geopolitics-ukraine-war-sanctions/">caught by surprise</a> by this reaction, having portrayed the war in Ukraine as a choice between good and evil – one where the future of the “rules-based international order” is at stake. Similarly, during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/27/taking-nonalignment-seriously/">referred to nonalignment as “immoral</a>.”</p>
<p>Russia has seen the new nonaligned movement as an opening to bolster its own position, with Foreign Minister Lavrov <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/lavrov-returns-to-africa/">crisscrossing Africa, Asia and Latin America</a> to buttress Moscow’s opposition to sanctions. China, in turn, has ramped up its campaign to enhance the <a href="https://theconversation.com/war-in-ukraine-might-give-the-chinese-yuan-the-boost-it-needs-to-become-a-major-global-currency-and-be-a-serious-contender-against-the-us-dollar-205519">international role of the yuan</a>, arguing that the weaponization of the U.S. dollar against Russia only confirms the dangers of relying on it as the main world currency.</p>
<p>But I would argue that active nonalignment depends as much on regional multilateralism and cooperation as it does on these high-profile meetings. A recent <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/south-americas-presidents-meet-in-brazil-for-the-first-regional-summit-in-9-years">South American diplomatic summit</a> in Brasília called by Lula – the first such meeting held in 10 years – reflects Brazil’s awareness of the need to work with neighbors to deploy its international initiatives. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three men sit at a bench the one in the center has a plaque saying 'Brazil' on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brazil President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva speaks during a meeting with fellow South American leaders on May 30, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/brazils-president-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-speaks-during-a-news-photo/1258293847?adppopup=true">Mateus Bonomi/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Think local, act global</h2>
<p>This need to act jointly is also driven by the <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/latin-america-crisis-economy-castillo-peru-lula-brazil-chile-boric/">region’s economic crisis</a>. In 2020, Latin America was hit by its worst economic downturn in 120 years, with regional GDP <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---americas/---ro-lima/---sro-port_of_spain/documents/genericdocument/wcms_819029.pdf">falling by an average of 6.6%</a>. The region also suffered the highest COVID-19 death rate anywhere in the world, accounting <a href="https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/47923/1/S2200158_en.pdf">for close to 30% of global fatalities</a> from the pandemic despite comprising just over 8% of the world’s population. In this context, to be caught in the middle of a great power battle is unappealing, and active nonalignment has resonated.</p>
<p>Beyond the incipient U.S.-China Cold War and the war in Ukraine, the resurrection of nonalignment in its new “active” incarnation reflects a widespread disenchantment in the Global South with what has been <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/liberal-international-order-free-world-trump-authoritarianism/569881/">known as the “Liberal International Order”</a> in existence since World War II. </p>
<p>This order is seen as increasingly frayed and unresponsive to the needs of developing countries on issues ranging from <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/international-debt-time-global-restructuring-framework">international indebtedness</a> and <a href="https://time.com/6246278/david-beasley-global-hunger-interview/">food security</a> to <a href="https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/migration-myths-and-the-global-south/">migration</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/5/11/climate-change-is-devastating-the-global-south">and climate change</a>. To many nations in the Global South, calls to uphold the “rules-based order” appear to serve only the foreign policy interests of the great powers, rather than the global public good. In such a context, it is perhaps not surprising that so many nations are actively refusing to be caught in an “us versus them” dynamic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207078/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jorge Heine is a Wilson Center Global Fellow and a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for China and Globalization and a former Chilean ambassador to China, to India and to South Africa.</span></em></p>Brazil and India are among the countries pointedly not taking sides over the war in Ukraine. But this is not the nonaligned movement of yesteryear.Jorge Heine, Interim Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2076242023-06-14T20:11:01Z2023-06-14T20:11:01ZGareth Evans: the case for recognising Palestine<p>Since a United Nations General Assembly Resolution vote in November 2012, Palestine has had the status of a state within the UN system. It is not a full member state but, like the <a href="https://www.vatican.va/content/vatican/en.html">Holy See</a>, a non-member observer state. Australia – after a heady debate within the Gillard cabinet – abstained on that vote. </p>
<p>The State of Palestine has now been recognised as such by 138 of the UN’s 193 members, over 70% of the total. But Australia – along with the United States and most of its allies and partners – is not one of them.</p>
<p>Labor’s policy is now clearly that this should change. Initially passed in the form of a <a href="https://www.pennywong.com.au/media-hub/speeches/israeli-palestinian-resolution-alp-national-conference-adelaide-18-12-2018/">National Conference Resolution in 2018</a>, then elevated to formal incorporation in the <a href="https://alp.org.au/media/2594/2021-alp-national-platform-final-endorsed-platform.pdf">National Platform in 2021</a> on the motion of then shadow minister Penny Wong, the language is unequivocal: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Party supports the recognition and right of Israel and Palestine to exist as two states within secure and recognised borders; calls on the next Labor Government to recognise Palestine as a state; and expects that this issue will be an important priority for the next Labor government.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But unequivocal platform language, as most of us who have been in this business are acutely aware, has never stopped Labor governments equivocating. That has been the case whenever they – we – have had cost-benefit doubts about the practical, principled or political wisdom of some party policy position. There has been no sign yet that the Albanese government is giving the issue any priority at all.</p>
<p>So the question for us now is whether any further equivocation on this issue is in fact justified, or whether it is time for Australia to grasp the moment and explicitly recognise Palestinian statehood. </p>
<p>I believe we should, but the case has to be argued, not just asserted. The counter arguments need to be met head-on. There are three dimensions to the debate – moral, legal and political – and I will look at each in turn.</p>
<h2>The moral argument</h2>
<p>The moral argument is the easiest to make: the righting of a grievous wrong done to Jewish people does not justify a grievous wrong being done to Palestinian people. </p>
<p>For what it’s worth, it was that perception – which first struck home to me when I read, as a university student in the 1960s, the classic Penguin Special <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/892669.Israel_and_the_Arabs">Israel and the Arabs</a> by the French historian Maxime Rodinson, both of whose parents were murdered in Auschwitz – which triggered my understanding of the Palestinian cause. It has been key to my support for it ever since.</p>
<p>Everyone understands the nature and force of the Jewish people’s claim to a recognised homeland with safe and secure borders, suffering as they did centuries of persecution, culminating in the horror of the Holocaust. </p>
<p>But it is equally impossible to ignore the moral force of the Palestinian response: that the world’s conscience should not be satisfied at the expense of a people who bear no responsibility for that suffering.</p>
<p>Palestinians deserved a state of their own. They were promised a state of their own by the UN General Assembly in 1947 in <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/history/">its resolution</a> – which Australia’s <a href="https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/evatt-herbert-vere-bert-10131">H.V. Evatt</a> played a crucial role in crafting – to partition the then-British Mandate of Palestine into two states: one Arab and one Jewish, with Jerusalem to be placed under a special international regime. </p>
<p>The design and implementation of the Partition Plan was only defensible if it involved, as its terms clearly did, no dispossession of Palestinians living in the new Jewish state, and no subsequent discrimination against them, and the same for Jews in the new Palestinian state. </p>
<p>But we now know all too well that the birth of Israel, and its whole subsequent history, was accompanied by no such restraint.</p>
<p>In the first <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Israeli-wars">Arab-Israeli War of 1948</a>, triggered by Palestinian refusal to accept partition, the map was dramatically redrawn in Israel’s favour: 750,000 Palestinians became refugees. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Six-Day-War">Six-Day War of 1967</a>, initiated by Israel as a “pre-emptive strike” against its Arab neighbours, East Jerusalem was illegally annexed. The remaining 22% of the former Palestine was militarily occupied, and the foundations were laid for what it is hard now to describe as anything other than an apartheid state – certainly so in the occupied West Bank, and only marginally less so now in Israel itself. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.palquest.org/en/historictext/9673/palestinian-declaration-independence">Palestinian Declaration of Independence of November 1988</a>, which referenced the original Partition Plan and subsequent UN resolutions, effectively recognised Israel and supported a two-state solution. But all subsequent attempts to implement such a solution, based on Israel withdrawing to its pre-1967 borders, have run into the sand.</p>
<p>Did Palestinians, and the Arab states supporting them, forfeit their moral claim to a state of their own by refusing for so long to accept the Partition Plan and initiating the violent resistance to the creation of Israel that ended so catastrophically in 1948? </p>
<p>That is an argument still heard from time to time – and it may seem to have some prima facie plausibility. </p>
<p>But if one is going to claim that, how could one not also accept that the moral claim to a new state of Israel was not tarnished by the violent extremism perpetrated by Irgun and the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Stern-Gang">Stern Gang</a> (or Lehi) in the pre-partition period, not least with the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/stories-44862029">bombing of the King David Hotel</a> in 1946 and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/9/the-deir-yassin-massacre-why-it-still-matters-75-years-later">massacre at Deir Yassin</a> in April 1948?</p>
<p>History teaches us it has forever been the unhappy reality that, in the pursuit of national self-determination, some of those most passionate for their causes have sometimes done things that have been misguided and counterproductive, and sometimes indefensibly terrible. </p>
<p>But the means chosen cannot in itself destroy the moral force, such as it is, of the end being fought for.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531827/original/file-20230613-23-wuuy96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531827/original/file-20230613-23-wuuy96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531827/original/file-20230613-23-wuuy96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531827/original/file-20230613-23-wuuy96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531827/original/file-20230613-23-wuuy96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531827/original/file-20230613-23-wuuy96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531827/original/file-20230613-23-wuuy96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531827/original/file-20230613-23-wuuy96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Refugees on the road from Jerusalem to Lebanon, November 9, 1948.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jim Pringle/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/i-can-live-with-either-one-palestine-israel-and-the-two-state-solution-73436">'I can live with either one': Palestine, Israel and the two-state solution</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The legal argument</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/038/88/PDF/NR003888.pdf?OpenElement">UN Partition Resolution 181(II)</a> of 1947 determined there was to be a Palestinian state alongside the Jewish one. Multiple resolutions since have reaffirmed the UN’s position. While general assembly – unlike security council – resolutions are not formally binding on member states, they are certainly persuasive: both politically and legally.</p>
<p>The boundaries of what that Palestinian state might be were effectively redrawn in 1948. They will necessarily require further renegotiation after the new facts on the ground created by the 1967 war and – illegal under international law as they may be – by Israel’s relentless subsequent program of settlement building in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.</p>
<p>But the UN has never resiled from declaring the necessity of a two-state solution, in which Palestine would have its own viable, recognised state. </p>
<p>Resolutions <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SCRes242%281967%29.pdf">242</a> (after the 1967 War) and <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/middleeast-resolution338">338</a> (after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War) – constantly reaffirmed since – make clear what the parameters of that solution should involve. They would include Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and “a just settlement of the refugee problem”.</p>
<p>But what is necessary in international law for a state to be recognised as such? And to what extent, if at all, is Australia constrained by that law in making its own recognition decision? </p>
<p>The issue is more complicated than it is sometimes claimed to be: there is in fact no single, universally accepted definition in international law as to what constitutes a state. </p>
<p>The definition in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Montevideo-Convention">1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States</a> (ratified by 17 states in the Americas) is the familiar starting point. But it is by no means the finishing point.</p>
<p>Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention provides that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other states. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Palestine does have, arguably, an identifiable population and its own government – albeit divided between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, with neither in complete effective control of the territory they notionally govern. It does have theoretically defined territory – in the sense of the pre-1967 borders recognised by the UN – but those boundaries now are hardly recognisable in reality. They will be immensely difficult to recreate.</p>
<p>And while there remains far from universal acceptance by others of its sovereign equality, Palestine has demonstrated its capacity to enter into relations with other states. </p>
<p>It has done this by being accepted (as the State of Palestine, or the Palestine National Authority, or in some cases the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Palestine-Liberation-Organization">PLO</a>) as a full member of a number of international organisations: from the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/arab-league">Arab League</a> and <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/organisation-islamic-cooperation-oic_en">Organisation of Islamic Cooperation</a> to the <a href="https://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx">International Telecommunication Union</a> and <a href="https://www.who.int/">World Health Organization</a>. And it is accepted as an observer state in others, including the UN itself. It is also a state party to the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf">Rome Statute</a>, which constitutes the International Criminal Court.</p>
<p>Not everyone will be persuaded that all the Montevideo criteria are fully satisfied in the case of Palestine. This is obviously the case with organisations here like the <a href="https://www.zfa.com.au/">Zionist Federation</a>, which has made this a major objection, arguing that claims Palestine meets the minimum criteria for statehood is a “virtue-signalling” pretence. </p>
<p>But that is not the end of the story. The view that satisfying these criteria is both necessary and sufficient for a state to be regarded as such is just one school of thought in international law: the “declaratory” school. The other school – described as the “constitutive” school – takes the view that it is the act of recognition by others that leads to the creation of a state.</p>
<p>The argument here is partly that the Montevideo criteria cannot be regarded as the sole determinant of statehood: without the additional element of recognition, would-be states would lack international personality and would be unable to benefit from their international rights. </p>
<p>But the “constitutive” position goes further: it is recognition itself which really matters. And in the case of Palestine, while its recognition as a state by others is not yet universal, the fact that 138 UN member states (with Mexico reported as likely to be the 139th) now explicitly recognise its statehood is in itself a compelling legal – not just political – argument for others to do the same.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531857/original/file-20230614-15-sipiun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531857/original/file-20230614-15-sipiun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531857/original/file-20230614-15-sipiun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531857/original/file-20230614-15-sipiun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531857/original/file-20230614-15-sipiun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531857/original/file-20230614-15-sipiun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531857/original/file-20230614-15-sipiun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531857/original/file-20230614-15-sipiun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu chairs a cabinet meeting in Jerusalem, June 11, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Menahem Kahana/AP</span></span>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-admitting-palestine-to-the-international-criminal-court-means-36140">What admitting Palestine to the International Criminal Court means</a>
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<h2>The political argument</h2>
<p>If the moral arguments for Australian recognition are compelling, and the legal arguments against it anything but decisive, the argument – no surprise – comes down to politics: both international and domestic. </p>
<p>There are three international political arguments against our recognition that need to be countered: that recognition by anyone will destroy the peace process; that it is now useless; and that for Australia it would be damaging to our international reputation. Domestically, the argument is that it would be political folly for any party to go down this path.</p>
<p>The argument that recognition would destroy the peace process – undermining the capacity for a settlement to be negotiated, and completely premature to even contemplate until such a settlement is achieved – has been around forever. </p>
<p>If it ever had any objective credibility with anyone, it certainly has none at all now in the face of Israel’s breathtaking intransigence, being taken to ever more alarming new heights by the Netanyahu government. If the two-state solution is in fact dead, it is the Israeli settlement program that has killed it.</p>
<p>There will still be those who lay all the blame for the effective collapse of peace negotiations on a Palestinian regime that former Labor MP Michael Danby, with his usual flair for constructive diplomacy, <a href="https://www.australianjewishnews.com/alp-recognises-state-of-palestine/">described earlier this year</a> as “homophobic, fundamentally undemocratic, kleptocratic, misogynist” and “scumbag”. </p>
<p>No one doubts that the quality of Palestinian Authority leadership has been less than ideal, nor that Hamas’s formal (if not practical) position on Israel’s right to exist has been manifestly unhelpful. </p>
<p>But the evidence is clear – and my own years of direct talking with all parties, particularly as president of the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/">International Crisis Group</a>, strongly confirms it. The threat and reality of violence, whether by Hamas or anyone else, diminishes rapidly when Palestinians see a path ahead of genuine hope for a just and dignified settlement. And it escalates equally rapidly when they do not.</p>
<p>The argument that recognition is useless has gained more traction as hopes for a viable two-state solution continue to crumble – above all, as a result of the territorial fragmentation created by Israel’s indefensible West Bank settlement-building program.</p>
<p>What is the point, opponents say, of wasting time and energy – and, perhaps, political capital – on supporting a totally quixotic enterprise, never likely to bear fruit?</p>
<p>With all that acknowledged, it is important to keep the dream of a two-state solution alive. Not just because it remains overwhelmingly the preferred policy internationally, but because it is so obviously in Israel’s own long-term interest. </p>
<p>As many commentators over the years have pointed out, with compelling logic, Israel can be a Jewish state, a democratic state, and one occupying the whole of historical <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Judaea">Judea</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Samaria-historical-region-Palestine">Samaria</a>. But it cannot be all three.</p>
<p>The argument in this context for recognising Palestinian statehood is that it is crucially necessary to restore a balance that has in recent years tipped overwhelmingly in favour of Israel. </p>
<p>No peace negotiation has much prospect of succeeding if the parties at the table are completely mismatched. And the best – possibly the only – way to counter that for the foreseeable future will be for Palestine to show it has ever-increasing legitimacy internationally, not only in the Islamic world and global south, but among traditional pillars of the global north, like Australia and other allies and partners of the United States. </p>
<p>For Australia to climb off the fence on this issue would make a significant contribution to changing this dynamic. Giving Palestine some extra leverage and bargaining power is important and useful, whether or not the two-state solution proves to have any life left in it at all. </p>
<p>If it does, as we must all hope it does, this will be crucial in producing genuinely just and viable solutions to all the crucial outstanding issues, including boundaries, credible security guarantees for both sides, protection of the holy sites, and a formula that will credibly address the incredibly difficult issue of refugee rights.</p>
<p>If it does not – if the two-state solution is indeed permanently dead – and the only game left in town is the negotiation of a new, democratic, non-apartheid-cursed single state (into which the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza is merged with fully equal rights to citizenship with Israel’s own Jewish population) then again anything that gives the Palestinians some more balanced power at the negotiating table is a consummation devoutly to be wished.</p>
<p>The argument that recognition would be reputationally damaging for Australia internationally has little to commend it. It is true it would place us outside our usual North America-Western Europe comfort zone (our fellow middle power and good international citizen role model Sweden excepted). But not in a way that could be expected to have any adverse impact on our diplomatic, defence, trade, investment or other national interests. </p>
<p>Supporting Palestinian statehood would put us in very good company with most of our global partners in the middle-power <a href="http://mikta.org/">MIKTA</a> group, comprising Mexico, Indonesia, Korea and Turkey, as well as ourselves. And more importantly, it will align us with not just Indonesia, but nearly all of our Southeast and South Asian neighbours, and key Pacific partners like Papua New Guinea. </p>
<p>If Australia’s future does indeed lie much more with our geography than our Anglospheric history – as I for one have long believed it does – recognition would be no bad call.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-labor-party-has-long-struggled-over-a-position-on-israel-and-palestine-heres-why-162611">The Labor Party has long struggled over a position on Israel and Palestine. Here's why</a>
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<h2>Domestic politics</h2>
<p>Which leaves us, last but by no means least, with the domestic politics. None of us in any party – not least my own – is oblivious to the formidable lobbying power of the Israeli support organisations in this country, nor of their ability to characterise even the most cautiously expressed critiques of Israel as savouring of unconscionable anti-semitism.</p>
<p>But times are changing. Israel’s brand – long gradually diminishing, as its practices in the West Bank have been ever more credibly labelled as apartheid by internationally credible observers, from <a href="https://www.npr.org/2007/01/25/7004473/jimmy-carter-defends-peace-not-apartheid">Jimmy Carter</a> to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution">Human Rights Watch</a> – has been badly tarnished in recent times, here as elsewhere, by the extreme, overtly racist, right-wing extremism of the Netanyahu government. </p>
<p>There have been massive community demonstrations in Israel against some of its proposed measures – in particular to bring the judiciary to heel. But the democracy being campaigned for does not extend (some brave dissenting voices notwithstanding) to Palestinians living in Israel or under its control.</p>
<p>Within the Jewish community here, as in the US, new and more balanced voices are emerging – like the <a href="https://www.nif.org/">New Israel Fund</a>. And the voices in Australian politics that have been most visibly arguing for recognition, such as former New South Wales premier and foreign minister Bob Carr, are hardly fringe dwellers outside the respectable mainstream. </p>
<p>Bob Hawke, an early very passionate friend of Israel, made abundantly clear as prime minister that it should accept the reality of Palestine’s aspirations to statehood. And, in his later years, he made equally clear his view that Australia should not hold back on recognition.</p>
<p>I myself have always supported Israel’s right to exist. And in fact as foreign minister, I resisted international efforts through the UN to characterise any support for Zionism as inherently and irretrievably racist. I have a plaque signed by Mark Leibler of the <a href="https://www.zfa.com.au/">Zionist Federation of Australia</a> to prove it! </p>
<p>What unites me and Hawke and Carr, and a legion of other Labor figures going back to Evatt, is not a belief that Israel should not exist, but that it should fully respect the rights of Palestinians to live alongside it in peace and dignity in a state of their own, and with the rights of dispossessed Palestinians appropriately acknowledged.</p>
<p>Maybe recognising Palestine statehood will put at risk some of our strongest traditional sources of party fundraising. But sometimes those considerations just have to take second place to decency. It is not a bad principle in politics – when in doubt – to do the right thing simply because it’s the right thing to do.</p>
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<p><em>This article was delivered as an address to Parliamentary Friends of Palestine, Parliament House, Canberra, June 13 2023.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207624/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gareth Evans does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia should recognise the state of Palestine. The legal, moral and political arguments are compelling.Gareth Evans, Distinguished Honorary Professor, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2008612023-05-14T06:11:57Z2023-05-14T06:11:57ZMost east African refugees are hosted close to borders – it’s a deliberate war strategy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523812/original/file-20230502-20-ymiyh3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Burundian flag flies at the head of a convoy of buses moving refugees back home from Tanzania in 2019.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tchandrou Nitanga/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There are close to <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/">4 million</a> people living in refugee camps across Africa. Of the more than 300 camps, nearly 70% are situated within 30km-50km of an international border. They include some of the largest camps in the continent, such as Kakuma in northern Kenya, Nyarugusu in western Tanzania and Bidibidi in north-western Uganda. </p>
<p>The closer the camp is to an international border, the easier it is for people on both sides of the border to interact. </p>
<p>What this means is that healthy refugees in Kakuma, for example, can walk across the Kenyan border and get to Uganda or South Sudan within a day or two. It also means that rebel groups operating in any of these countries can access the refugee camp. This easy access to refugees benefits rebel groups across the border. And asylum countries like Tanzania and Kenya may choose refugee policies that help rebel groups in this fashion. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/99.397.601">Exploitation by armed groups</a> is one of the many threats refugees in border camps face. Often refugees are not allowed to <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/472896f50.pdf">leave camps to seek work</a>, making them dependent on aid. Young refugees, particularly men, are vulnerable to armed rebel groups that recruit people to their causes. These groups also informally tax refugees by taking a share of the aid they receive or demanding contributions. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt7z6bx">Researchers</a> and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-anatomy-phantom-state">aid groups</a> have suggested that rebel groups take advantage of refugees because host countries <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501700392/dangerous-sanctuaries">cannot or will not stop them</a>. This logic focuses on the lack of will or capacity of such host countries as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chad-sudan-displaced/chad-failing-to-protect-civilians-refugee-group-idUSL1269730520070712">Chad</a> or the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-anatomy-phantom-state">Central African Republic</a>. But this ignores their strategy. </p>
<p>Even governments of <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/205014/why-nations-fail-by-daron-acemoglu-and-james-a-robinson/">poor countries choose where to allocate resources</a>. For example, rather than being inept or incapable of protection, <a href="https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/2008/02/12/chad-demands-removal-sudanese-refugees/23619034007/">Chad’s approach to refugees has been consistent</a> with a broader approach to its <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2008/02/making-sense-of-chad/">relations with Sudan</a>. </p>
<p>I set out on my <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/kara_ross_camarena/files/krc_camplocation.pdf">research</a> project in east Africa to develop an <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691001296/analytic-narratives">analytic narrative</a> of refugee policy selection in the region. Using in-depth case studies and formal theory, I expected to find that foreign policy informed refugee policy in some ways, including interactions with humanitarian aid and donor countries. I sought to investigate the extent to which these tempered the domestic drivers of refugee policy. </p>
<p>What I found is that countries’ policies for hosting refugees are more strategic than expected. Host countries choose their refugee policy to influence the war from which the refugees fled. When <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC111780">Tanzania</a> and Kenya chose the <a href="https://www.fmreview.org/fmr-3/crisp-jacobsen">location</a> of camps and the restrictions on work and movement, influencing war informed their policies. Camp location and restrictions, along with maintaining dense refugee settlements, give rebel groups valuable access to refugee camps for exploitation.</p>
<p>My study demonstrates that east African host countries can follow a foreign policy logic for setting refugees up to be exploited. Domestic considerations can matter as well. </p>
<p>My research can help aid organisations identify whether domestic or foreign policy interests drive border camps in east Africa and elsewhere. When domestic rather than foreign policy considerations drive border camp location, humanitarian agencies can negotiate alternatives that make camps less crowded, move refugees further from the border or provide options for integrating elsewhere. </p>
<p>Each of these make refugee camps safer for refugees but less valuable to a rebel group. However, aid agencies will be less successful in negotiating alternatives when foreign policy drives the border camps because the alternatives undermine the goal of helping the rebel group.</p>
<h2>Proxy intervention aims</h2>
<p>Tanzania’s refugee policy in the 1990s is a good example of how geopolitics can inform refugee policy. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/united-republic-tanzania/tanzania-refugee-situation-report">Tanzania hosted hundreds of thousands of Burundian refugees</a>. They began arriving in 1993 because of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/10/30/tribal-massacres-ravage-burundi/2ce12135-2139-4b78-a89b-f9bcf19b0992/">political violence</a> and then a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/burundian-refugees-tanzania-key-factor-burundi-peace-process">civil war</a>. Densely populated camps were set up for arriving Burundian refugees as close as 15km to the common border. </p>
<p>The location, dense population and movement restrictions ensured that aid groups could serve the refugees. But the refugees were also ideal targets for recruitment and taxation, unable to work and with aid that could be taken away as efficiently as it was distributed. </p>
<p>Tanzania need not have established crowded camps on the border but this favoured its goals. Tanzania’s aim was to create pressure to return Burundi to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x15000324">a government consistent with the 1993 constitution</a>. Tanzania hoped that by Burundi holding multiparty elections and selecting a government backed by the majority of its citizens, Burundi would gain some stability. </p>
<p>At the same time, Tanzania sought to avoid a domestic backlash from the host population in the north-west who were <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/21.1_and_2.12">growing weary</a> of hosting refugees. </p>
<p>For Burundian rebel groups, the policy created a constant flow of resources and people from the camps to the front lines, which put the rebel groups in a better position to fight. Tanzania, which also hosted the peace accords, used a variety of tools of statecraft to end the war, and refugee policy was one of them. The better position to fight gave the rebel group more bargaining power. Since the rebel group also supported the 1993 constitution, a negotiated settlement where the rebel group had a pathway to elections would achieve this goal. </p>
<p>East Africa offers another example of the foreign policy logic. Following the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6b414.html">fall of the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime</a> in Ethiopia in 1990, refugees from southern Sudan left Ethiopia for Kenya. Kenya established camps for the Sudanese at Kakuma near the border with Sudan. This was in line with Kenya’s support for the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army’s fight for autonomy. Like Tanzania, Kenya used multiple tools to sway the civil war outcome in their northern neighbour. Its combined efforts were instrumental in securing a pathway to independence for South Sudan. </p>
<h2>Non-intervention as a policy goal</h2>
<p>Tanzania and Kenya also offer a lesson in advancing foreign policy aims by not intervening. </p>
<p>At roughly the same time as Burundian refugees were being placed into crowded camps, Tanzania was also <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/research/evalreports/3ae6bcf90/evaluation-unhcrs-repatriation-operation-mozambique.html">hosting</a> between 70,000 and 300,000 Mozambicans. Many of them fled or could not return home because of civil war in Mozambique.</p>
<p>The Tanzanian and Mozambican governments have a long <a href="https://www.mz.tzembassy.go.tz/resources/view/mozambique-tanzania-relations">history of cooperation</a>. Tanzania was also strongly opposed to the apartheid-backed rebel group, Mozambican National Resistance, or Renamo, which was battling the government. </p>
<p>Unlike refugees from Burundi, Mozambican arrivals were not housed in camps. Most Mozambicans <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/research/evalreports/3ae6bcf90/evaluation-unhcrs-repatriation-operation-mozambique.html">were allowed to settle across the southern regions of Tanzania</a>, where they integrated with their co-ethnics in rural villages. Their shared way of life made the experience more like the regular cross-border migration that has occurred for generations.</p>
<p>By dispersing refugees throughout the countryside, refusing aid and allowing Mozambicans to integrate, Tanzania’s strategy followed a logic of non-intervention. This ensured that the migrant population was not easily targeted by Renamo in keeping with its political backing of the Mozambique administration.</p>
<p>In Kenya’s case with Somalia, the tide turned from indifference to non-intervention within a span of six years. </p>
<p>After the United Nations pulled out of Somalia in <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/somalia-fall-of-siad-barre-civil-war/">1995</a>, Kenya shifted the policy for Somalis away from intervention while building a relationship with what would became the transitional government in Somalia. Kenya <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/12.1.54">consolidated existing refugee camps</a> and eliminated camps that were close to the border with Somalia and along the coast. Somali refugees were subsequently moved <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/12.1.54">across the country</a> to Kakuma in the north. Settlements in Nairobi were allowed to expand, which reinforced an informal pathway to make Dadaab – the remaining camp near the Somali border – less attractive for recruiting.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Most wars end in negotiated settlements. Rebel groups need to extract sufficient assurances to negotiate. If not, <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/24/1/127/11637/Designing-Transitions-from-Civil-War">they are unwilling to take the risk of giving up the fight</a>. Providing a rebel group with a stronger bargaining position could help along negotiations and bring about a peace agreement. </p>
<p>Giving a rebel group bargaining power by helping it fight a war can inform refugee policy. Alternatively, host countries might avoid camps specifically to prevent helping a rebel group.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200861/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kara Ross Camarena received funding from the Harvard University Committee on African Studies and
the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs for this project. She is also a faculty affiliate of the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts. </span></em></p>Tanzania’s refugee policy in the 1990s is a good example of how geopolitics affects ordinary refugees.Kara Ross Camarena, Assistant Professor, Loyola University ChicagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2047682023-05-11T12:13:37Z2023-05-11T12:13:37Z‘The Diplomat’ negotiates expectations – and myths – about gender, power and politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525469/original/file-20230510-14022-f4qqq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3594%2C1988&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Keri Russell plays a a nonpolitical straight shooter in a political role that she grudgingly accepts.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/billboard-for-a-netflix-streaming-show-the-diplomat-on-a-news-photo/1252546268?adppopup=true"> Brian van der Brug / Contributor/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Few people would have predicted that a loquacious drama about a woman foreign service professional would have been Netflix’s next big hit. But <a href="https://variety.com/2023/tv/news/the-diplomat-season-2-netflix-keri-russell-1235599216/">everyone is talking</a> about “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt17491088/?ref_=nv_sr_srsg_0_tt_8_nm_0_q_the%2520diplomat">The Diplomat</a>” – for good reason.</p>
<p>The series, starring Keri Russell as the U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom, <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/diplomat-lands-top-streaming-most-213223969.html">debuted at No. 1 on the streaming charts</a>. Critics commend the <a href="https://latinamedia.co/the-diplomat/">stellar performances</a>, <a href="https://www.stylist.co.uk/entertainment/tv/the-diplomat-netflix-cast-release-date-plot/779125">twisty plot</a> and “<a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/tv-movies/tv-movie-reviews/the-diplomat-review-netflix-keri-russell-the-americans-tv-political-thriller-feminism-vp-rufus-sewell-1234715683/">wryly funny</a>” writing that comprise this “<a href="https://variety.com/2023/tv/news/the-diplomat-season-2-netflix-keri-russell-1235599216/">gripping and propulsive drama</a>.” Even the official Twitter account of the U.S. Embassy in London <a href="https://twitter.com/USAinUK/status/1653336857789313024">tweeted</a> a playful and mostly laudatory video fact-checking the first episode.</p>
<p>With so many eyes on the latest TV iteration of a woman in a high-profile political position, its depiction of women’s leadership is significant. As a communication scholar who researches media <a href="https://www.tamupress.com/book/9781623495558/woman-president/">framing of real</a> <a href="https://www.peterlang.com/document/1056671">and fictional</a> women politicians, I am interested in how television and film shape our views of women politicians in the real world. </p>
<p>Although “The Diplomat” initially perpetuates a popular stereotype that the only women who can be trusted in high office are those who don’t want to be there, it thoughtfully portrays the ubiquity of everyday sexism in political culture.</p>
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<h2>Women and political ambition</h2>
<p>“The Diplomat” follows Russell’s character, Kate Wyler, the newly appointed ambassador to the U.K., and her husband, Hal, a former ambassador and the duo’s more politically ambitious half, played by Rufus Sewell. </p>
<p>The president needs to replace his vice president due to an impending scandal, and Hal has maneuvered Kate onto the VP short list – without her knowledge – by convincing the president’s chief of staff, Billie Appia, played by Nana Mensah, that Kate’s supreme competence and lack of political ambition is what qualifies her for the job. </p>
<p>Hal insists that “no one with the temperament to win a campaign should be in charge of anything.”</p>
<p>The assumption at the center of “The Diplomat” is that politicians make lousy leaders. There’s no doubt that for many viewers, that’s <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2023/04/07/poll-biden-congress-democrats-republicans-unfavorable/11622285002/">part of its appeal</a>. </p>
<p>Like “The West Wing,” – the series on which the <a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/showrunner">showrunner</a> of the “The Diplomat,” Debora Cahn, got her start – the show is part political fairy tale, envisioning a world in which people who can solve problems are actually empowered to do so. As she tries to convince Kate to consider the VP gig, Billie asks, “Can you imagine hiring someone for a key governing position just because you think they’d be good at it?”</p>
<p>This is tricky terrain to negotiate, however, and “The Diplomat” initially reinforces one of the most pernicious stereotypes about women politicians on screen and in real life: Women who have political ambition can’t be trusted. In series like “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1759761/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">Veep</a>,” “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/list/ls085193267/">24</a>” and “<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/culture/on-television/borgen-s-bleak-view-of-women-in-power">Borgen: Power and Glory</a>,” ambitious women politicians turn out to be incompetent or corrupt.</p>
<p>Conversely, ethical and successful women politicians such as those in “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0429455/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">Commander in Chief</a>,” “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt3501074/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">Madam Secretary</a>” and, now, “The Diplomat” are public servants who have to be cajoled into participating in campaigning and partisan politics.</p>
<p>After Kate discovers that people have been scheming behind her back to install her as the vice president during a foreign policy crisis, she cements her status as a nonpolitical straight shooter by marching up to the president and announcing, “I am not cut out for this. I’m stepping down. The good news is, that makes me the one person in the world who isn’t trying to kiss your ass, but still knows a lot about Iran.” </p>
<p>Then, after schooling the commander in chief on the finer points of foreign policy, Kate asserts that his willingness to cooperate with the British prime minister’s request for a show of force is because “you’re scared your enemies think you’re too old and frail to put Americans in the line of fire.” </p>
<p>Because this is a political fairy tale, the president, played by Michael McKean, shakes her hand, tells her she’s doing great, and says, “Just knock off that ‘I resign’ shit. It really pisses me off. I don’t have that kind of time.”</p>
<p>The vision of a candid, nonpolitical woman who wins powerful men’s respect by exposing flaws in their logic and highlighting their weaknesses makes good TV. </p>
<p>But it complicates things when viewers become voters and are asked to support real women candidates who put themselves forward for public office and get punished for speaking their minds and asserting authority. Women politicians who express ambition are often <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07491409.2017.1302257">evaluated more negatively</a> by voters than their men counterparts, from whom political ambition is not just tolerated, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/03/why-ambitious-men-are-celebrated-and-ambitious-women-are-criticized/">but expected</a>.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/pmRJiZ4mFQU?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">‘Borgen: Power and Glory’ is one of a number of series in which ambitious women politicians, even those who began their careers as successful idealists, devolve into cynical political operators whose priorities harm their families, their parties and their nations.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Gender and power</h2>
<p>“The Diplomat” recognizes that likable women protagonists, like their political counterparts, can’t appear to be be power hungry. But it also resists the notion that the vice presidency is a powerless office. </p>
<p>As Billie and the U.S. embassy’s deputy chief of mission, Stuart Heyford, played by Ato Essandoh, try to persuade Kate to agree to be vice president, Billie emphasizes that the position would come with substantial influence. </p>
<p>“The VP spends more time in the Oval Office than anyone who doesn’t have a desk there,” she says, then promising, “We’d put you in the lead on foreign policy.” Stuart appeals to Kate’s sense of mission with a line that also reminds viewers that Kate isn’t inappropriately ambitious: “You’d be doing it for the country, not the power.”</p>
<p>The elaborate, and preposterous, chain of events that produces this conversation – in which the president’s chief of staff tries to persuade a rank-and-file foreign service officer to agree to be the vice president in the middle of a term – allows the show to remark on the absurd corrosiveness of political campaigns. After reminding Kate that she wouldn’t “have to survive a campaign,” there is the following exchange between Billie and Stuart:</p>
<p>Billie: “I mean, it’s bad for the guys, but for the women – f–k me. Is she pretty, but not too pretty? Appealing, but not hot? Confident, but not bitchy? Decisive, but not bitchy?”</p>
<p>Stuart: “Cute bitchy, but not bitchy bitchy.”</p>
<h2>Dressing the part</h2>
<p>Cahn explores this double standard visually as well. Although Kate prefers black suits, minimal makeup, undisciplined hair and shoes that allow her to power walk through her day, her impeccably coiffed staff urges her to adopt a more appealing, feminine and camera-friendly look.</p>
<p>Rather than presenting Kate as dowdy or oblivious and giving her a midseason glow-up, however, the show demonstrates that she is <a href="https://www.indiewire.com/features/craft/the-diplomat-keri-russell-costumes-netflix-1234831239/">well aware of the image she is creating</a>. During a photo shoot for British Vogue, Kate tells the photographer, “I don’t want to make your job any harder than it already is, but it would be great if there weren’t any shots of me looking wistfully into the distance as I caress my own neck.” </p>
<p>“The Diplomat” wraps insights about sexism in politics in the packaging of a political thriller. Its popularity is a good thing. As the 2024 campaign season ramps up, voters need compelling reminders of the effect sexism can have on democracy – because patriarchal political culture is something we all have to negotiate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204768/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karrin Vasby Anderson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although the series perpetuates the stereotype that politically ambitious women can’t be trusted in high office, it thoughtfully portrays the ubiquity of everyday sexism in political culture.Karrin Vasby Anderson, Professor of Communication Studies, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.