tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/golden-dawn-10178/articlesGolden Dawn – The Conversation2021-08-06T11:56:46Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1656392021-08-06T11:56:46Z2021-08-06T11:56:46ZCyprus: what is Elam, the far-right nationalist party seeking success after the demise of Golden Dawn?<p>A new shadow looms over Cypriot politics. Not much is known about the country’s far right, but Elam’s recent gains in the May 2021 general election put the party on the map for good. Elam originally started in 2008 as a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/30/far-right-cyprus-election-parliament">sub-division</a> of the Greek neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn but ended up splitting off and changing its name to National People’s Front (ELAM), apparently <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/3b7ng9/the-cypriot-golden-dawn-just-celebrated-their-fifth-anniversary">for legal reasons</a>.</p>
<p>Although the Cypriot context is different, the two parties have used <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13608746.2013.798893?casa_token=ptVYwoQTImoAAAAA%3AnP6LTkzvBiH0Zkldfl6LI32985VkanV8UShK4oe7M81_XM03qcHKVTlLQzEHkhfwq-z32pcSdGJ9">the same political recipe</a>. Like Golden Dawn, Elam’s identity is <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13608746.2018.1555957">extremist and populist</a>. The party’s leadership has focused on ethnocentrism to advance the narrative that migrants deprive Greek Cypriots of basic access to jobs and resources. </p>
<p>Elam favours welfare chauvinism: it has clearly stated benefits should be restricted to Greek Cypriots only. Elam opposes <a href="https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/eur/the-politics-of-fear/book237802">Islam</a>, multiculturalism and migration. It also stands against the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/cyprus-talks-on-the-rocks-over-school-history-rule/">Turkish presence</a> on Cyprus. During the height of Europe’s refugee crisis a few years ago, the party took an extreme stance.</p>
<p>After top Golden Dawn politicians were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-goldendawn-idUSBRE98R02Q20130928">arrested in 2013</a>, Elam and its leadership protested outside the Greek embassy in Cyprus against what they called “unfair and unconstitutional” proceedings. However, Golden Dawn’s leaders were recently convicted and imprisoned and the party has been completely outlawed from Greek politics, resulting in an abrupt end to the partnership between the two sister parties. Elam’s leader Christos Christou said the party is taking its own path and <a href="https://www.alphanews.live/politics/o-xristoy-exigei-giati-elam-diekopse-tis-sheseis-me-tin-hrysi-aygi-binteo">cannot be held responsible</a> for the actions of other parties in different countries.</p>
<h2>Greece, Turkey and Cyprus</h2>
<p>There is a close relationship between economic and political crises and the emergence of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17457289.2020.1778007?journalCode=fbep20">extreme-right groups</a>. And in Cyprus, the exceptionally long running political crisis has deepened in the past decade as a result of disagreements over the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/03/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-cyprus-bank-disaster/274096/">handling</a> of the economy. The financial crisis that followed the crash of 2008 and migration flows in the past decade might have favoured Elam’s rise, too. Its first run in the general election of 2011 was unsuccessful, but it went on to win two seats in the Cypriot parliament in 2016. Most recently, Elam secured 6.8% of the Cypriot vote in the elections of May 2021.</p>
<p>Elam has also come much closer than Golden Dawn to forming a government. After the May 2021 general election, Nicos Anastasiades, president of Cyprus, <a href="https://www.tovima.gr/2021/06/28/politics/i-kypros-sti-skia-tis-diafthoras-kai-tis-akrodeksias/">proposed</a> a coalition government with the Democratic Rally party and asked Elam to participate. Antoniou has rejected the offer. It’s unclear why a far-right party was being considered as a viable party of government by the president but the fact that he did approach Elam to play an active role suggests that the Cypriot parliament now recognises Elam as a considerable force in politics.</p>
<p>Since the beginning of the pandemic, Elam has <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering-radical-right/remnants-golden-dawn-are-winning-support-cyprus/">pushed</a> a highly xenophobic agenda. When Anastasiades announced his decision to fully <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/jul/17/no-mans-land-three-people-seeking-asylum-stuck-in-cypruss-buffer-zone">shut down</a> the Green Line (also known as the United Nations Buffer Zone) to block refugees from entering Cyprus, Elam supported the motion. The party asked for even tougher measures against migration.</p>
<p>Elam has also been scaremongering for months that Turkish expansionism is being <a href="https://elamcy.com/oute-i-pandimia-den-stamata-tis-epektatikes-vlepseis-tis-tourkias-stin-kypriaki-aoz/">accelerated</a> during the pandemic. The long-running <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/7/cyprus-reunification-is-the-un-process-is-dead">negotiations</a> between Cyprus and Turkey for the reunification of the island have been bumpy and although UN resolutions have called on the two sides to form a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, Turkish officials have rejected the UN process. Therefore, Antoniou has called on Anastasiades and the Cypriot parliament to call off any talks and negotiations, and take a more aggressive stance against the Turkish government. </p>
<h2>Rewriting history</h2>
<p>Elam has made sure in recent years to distance itself from Golden Dawn. You won’t find any old photos of its members posing next to members of the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/greece-neo-nazi-golden-dawn-leaders-guilty-of-running-criminal-gang/">now-illegal</a> Greek party or Nazi-saluting at shared events. And the approach has certainly worked. The successes in the 2021 election have been translated into four seats in the parliament.</p>
<p>It’s evident that Elam is in the process of becoming a lighter, less aggressive version of Golden Dawn. Antoniou seems to be emulating the approach taken by far-right politicians Matteo Salvini in Italy and Marine Le Pen in France – focusing on migration and anti-corruption to broaden support.</p>
<p>The party has started working cooperatively in the parliament too, voting recently in support of the government’s <a href="https://politis.com.cy/politis-news/kypros/to-elam-yperpsifizei-ton-kratiko-proypologismo-2021/">budget proposals</a> and providing <a href="https://en.famagusta.news/news/kypros/i-annita-dimitriou-i-nea-proedros-tis-voulis/">key support</a> in the vote for a speaker, helping the government avoid a fresh vote if its candidate did not get through.</p>
<p>This is a difficult line for Elam to tread. Parties of its kind thrive on anti-elitist rhetoric. Less anti-elitism and friendlier communication with rival political parties makes Elam a systemic entity in Cypriot politics. But Elam has clearly learned from Golden Dawn’s mistakes and is aiming to become a more mature version of its former sister party. Its recent disassociation from Golden Dawn could be the first step towards shaping a new political future. Far right politics may have suffered a blow in Greece, but its on a different trajectory in Cyprus. </p>
<p><em>This article has been updated to correct the name of Elam leader Christos Christou.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165639/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgios Samaras does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Greece has outlawed its most problematic far-right party, but its sister organisation is thriving in Cyprus.Georgios Samaras, Lecturer in Political Economy, Department of Political Economy, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1502392020-11-26T12:32:32Z2020-11-26T12:32:32ZThe end of Golden Dawn: has Greece shown us how to deal with neo-Nazis?<p>When a wave of right-wing extremism hit Greece in 2012, few would have predicted that Golden Dawn, one of the groups involved, would grow to become the third largest party in the Greek parliament. This was the beginning of a long period of <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/522081">turmoil</a> in Greek politics that saw a violent street movement become a viable political force.</p>
<p>But this neo-fascist “fairy tale” ended in what was considered the biggest Nazi trial since Nuremberg. Golden Dawn has been declared a <a href="https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/en/legislation/grc/penal_code/book_one/article_187/article_187.html">criminal organisation</a> and its leaders <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b2903dee-cd5f-403e-913e-f6d9ab5e9caa">jailed</a>, because of their involvement in unlawful activities – including murders, attacks on migrants, illegal possession of weapons and racketeering.</p>
<p>The leadership was also found guilty of ordering the <a href="https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-murder-of-pavlos-fyssas">murder</a> of leftist rapper Pavlos Fyssas.</p>
<p>Prior to that, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2012/08/12/158371570/migrants-targeted-amid-rise-of-greek-extremists">another murder attempt</a> on Egyptian fisherman Abuzid Embarak in 2012, showed that the party was deliberately trying to incite violence, something that has been previously described by a number <a href="https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/23655">academics</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/mar/03/golden-dawn-the-rise-and-fall-of-greece-neo-nazi-trial">journalists</a> as an attempt to target minorities.</p>
<p>The trial lasted more than five years due to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/21/world/europe/golden-dawn-trial-greece.html">numerous delays</a> and setbacks that turned the whole process into a never-ending chaos. In the meantime, the party was free to stand candidates in general and local elections without restrictions.</p>
<p>In total, 37 members of Golden Dawn were convicted – including leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos and 17 MPs – who have now been convicted and sentenced by the Greek court. Ioannis Lagos, Golden Dawn’s only remaining member of the European parliament, is likely to have his parliamentary immunity revoked any day now. Lagos is best known for <a href="https://www.ekathimerini.com/249452/article/ekathimerini/news/neo-nazi-mep-penalized-for-tearing-up-turkish-flag">ripping up</a> a Turkish flag during a debate.</p>
<h2>Why Golden Dawn was different</h2>
<p>Every European country has fringe groups like Golden Dawn. They are often part of larger <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26470450">right-wing extremist networks</a> with small but loyal bases.</p>
<p>Golden Dawn went mainstream soon after announcing its first major election campaign. Timing was crucial. The growing political instability in the country meant three general elections were held between 2009 and 2012. All major parties were losing public approval over their handling of the fiscal crisis.</p>
<p>On top of that, the only active far-right party in parliament back then (the Popular Orthodox Rally) had agreed to participate in a provisional coalition government organised by Lucas Papademos to get the country out of crisis. This move was seen as a betrayal by supporters. </p>
<p>The Greek far-right scene seemed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13608746.2013.782838?src=recsys">weak</a>, allowing Golden Dawn to step in and fill that gap without facing competition. Its monopoly allowed it to act in the most politically aggressive way. It embraced national purity, anticommunism, and promised mass migrant deportations. This rhetoric and an obsession with the refugee crisis started to pay off very quickly.</p>
<p>Calls for more aggressive migration policies <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d88eab00-5d30-11e5-a28b-50226830d644">became central</a> to its election campaigns. <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-analysis/article/waking-up-the-golden-dawn-does-exposure-to-the-refugee-crisis-increase-support-for-extremeright-parties/C50A127CC517968F2D0FA42A2A23FF85">Recent academic findings</a> showed that exposure to the refugee crisis in rural Greece increased support for Golden Dawn. </p>
<p>The party secured a shocking 9.4% of the vote in the European Parliament election of 2014, while in September 2015 it peaked nationally with 7%.</p>
<h2>Who fills the void?</h2>
<p>During the early years of the Greek economic crisis, it looked as though the public was trying to punish the political system through the ballot box. It is widely believed that this age of anger had passed by 2017, which was when Golden Dawn’s downfall began. Greece rejected populism and abandoned fringe politics, allowing mainstream parties to become popular once again.</p>
<p>In the general election of 2019, Golden Dawn <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/07/greeks-choose-between-beach-and-ballot-in-first-post-debt-bailout-poll">lost all its parliamentary seats</a> and had to shut down most of its branches to survive financially.</p>
<p>However, the party casts a long shadow and continues to shape Greek politics. The more mainstream New Democracy, for example, has opened its doors to a number of far-right politicians, who ran successful campaigns in the recent election. Some of them had previously expressed strong <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/migration-divides-greek-government-refugees-antonis-samaras-kyriakos-mitsotakis-syriza/">xenophobic</a> and <a href="https://www.ekathimerini.com/215660/article/ekathimerini/news/nd-spokesman-georgiadis-apologizes-for-anti-semitic-comments-in-past">antisemitic</a> views.</p>
<p>Kyriakos Velopoulos’ ultranationalist party Greek Solution, meanwhile, won ten seats in the Greek parliament after a long period of <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/greek-solution-far-right-kyriakos-velopoulos-unorthodox-migration-votes/">campaigning against migrants</a>. Golden Dawn’s spokesperson Ilias Kasidiaris has formed a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/10/14/923605755/golden-dawn-leader-of-greek-neo-nazi-party-sentenced-to-13-years-in-prison">new movement</a> called Greeks for the Fatherland – even though he, too, is now in jail.</p>
<p>Kasidiaris has attempted to distance himself from neo-Nazi ideology in the wake of the Golden Dawn trial but his commitment to that change is yet to be tested. The same voters who embraced violence and legitimised Golden Dawn for its violent practices could support a similar movement. We might expect any such party to be less aggressive and neo-Nazi than Golden Dawn, but its values will be similar.</p>
<p>Greece has shown us how to deal with neo-Nazis. But when it comes to extremism, it is important to recognise the years of antifascist activism during Golden Dawn’s rise. It was a fight that, at times, seemed like <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/18/greek-prosecutor-urges-acquittal-of-neo-nazis-in-murder-trial">a lost cause</a>.</p>
<p>Democracy managed to pass an important test in the prosecution and sentencing of this criminal organisation. The court ruling was enough to eradicate Golden Dawn, but fascist remnants are still out there, reorganising and planning their next move.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150239/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgios Samaras does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Members of the far-right group have been found guilty of crimes including racketeering and murder.Georgios Samaras, PhD Research Associate, Department of European and International Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1228342019-10-16T17:00:48Z2019-10-16T17:00:48ZForms and outcomes of citizens’ mobilisations during Europe’s refugee reception crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292502/original/file-20190915-8678-1vquf13.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1790%2C1198&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mass mobilization of citizens and organizations around Brussels-North railway station.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=735478233328234&set=a.735474743328583&type=3&theater">FRANÇOIS DVORAK/fdvphotoreporter.wixsite.com/monsite</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The long summer of migration in 2015 had a profound impact on civil society throughout Europe. Whether countries were arrival points, on transit routes or were final destinations, and regardless of their geopolitical situations, a large and diversified set of attitudes and practices emerged.</p>
<p>The actions taken by citizens, whether they were negative or positive, intended to reject or welcome newcomers, made visible their dissatisfaction and criticism toward the way their political elites and institutions attempted to manage the situation. Over time they became systematic and structured, ultimately questioning the <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/socialinclusion/issue/view/107">relationship between citizens and political institutions</a>. They also give a sense of what political participation means today.</p>
<p>As shown in <a href="https://www.oapen.org/search?identifier=1005529">our research</a>, while public opinions remained relatively stable throughout from 2015 to 2018, civil-society mobilisation rose and became polarised in all European countries. The profiles of those involved differed, as did their relationships with institutions and the outcomes. The range of motivations themselves showed to be relatively stable, and determined by sociocultural and political motivations.</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Positive mobilisations</strong>: Humanitarian solidarity is the strongest catalyst and has an important impact on support activities. Donations and emergency help such as the distribution of food and clothes are the most common practices among individual volunteers and civil society groups. This is also true in those contexts where public opinion is more critical of migration, where institutions take a more restrictive approach, or where civil society is generally less proactive.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Negative mobilisations</strong>: These are inspired by tropes about the demographic threat from the Global South, including conspiracy theories on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_genocide_conspiracy_theory">“ethnic substitution”</a>, opposition to “foreignisation”, the conception of the national territory as “private property”, and the depiction of nations as victims of an <a href="https://www.leganord.org/component/tags/tag/stop-invasione">“invasion”</a>. During the reception crisis, perceived cultural threats revolving around national identity, cultural norms and values have significantly increased, especially in Eastern and Southern Europe.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Negative sociocultural beliefs are also embodied by political parties or movements. In Italy, far-right organisations as well as the anti-immigration mainstream party, the League and its leader Matteo Salvini, played this role. In Hungary, xenophobia is completely integrated into the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/21/hungary-accused-of-fuelling-xenophobia-human-rights-violations">rhetoric of the Orbán government</a>.</p>
<h2>From the social to the political</h2>
<p>In a second phase of the reception crisis, groups motivated by solidarity shifted to politically driven mobilisation, showing that sociocultural and the political forms of mobilisation are not exclusive or conflictual, but <a href="http://www.uninomade.org/the-gaze-of-autonomy-capitalism-migration-and-social-struggles/">overlapping</a>.</p>
<p>Only in rare instances did citizens’ reactions align with the governments’ stance. Instead, initiatives often aimed to correct – or more precisely, to suggest corrections to – state policies. When politically driven, positive mobilisation embraced the issue of formal access to rights, including questions of citizenship and <a href="https://sanspapiers.be/qui-sommes-nous/">recognition of undocumented people</a>. It aimed to have a direct impact on national politics, the policymaking process and field practices, as well as in those contexts where institutions show relative tolerance toward asylum seekers. Similarly, mobilisation against asylum seekers sought to integrate the government’s restrictive field practices such as <a href="https://euobserver.com/justice/142739">border and access control</a>. This happened especially when the reception systems in transit countries were overwhelmed and clearly no longer effective.</p>
<p>Interestingly, while positive mobilisation rarely sprang directly from political organisations or got backing from formal political parties, the most evident cases of negative mobilisation were structured around political groups that existed before 2015 – <a href="https://www.pegida.de">Pegida</a> in Germany, the Greek far-right party <a href="http://www.xrisiavgi.com">Golden Dawn</a> or Jobbik’s paramilitary wing, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/hungarys-future-antiimmigration-antimulticulturalism-and-antiro/">Hungarian Guard</a>. Italy is a case where the connection between negative mobilisation and formal politics is particularly evident: opposition to asylum seekers <a href="http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/sindaco-non-vuole-i-profughi-e-prefetto-deve-arrendersi-1150548.html">came directly from local governments</a>, and saw the spontaneous mobilisation of citizens only in rare cases.</p>
<p>The reception crisis also allowed far-right groups to portray asylum seekers as a national threat, and to gain space in the public debate. Golden Dawn had a strong impact, shaping the widespread impression that <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d88eab00-5d30-11e5-a28b-50226830d644">Greece was a xenophobic country</a>. In Italy, the reception crisis was an opportunity for different segments of the right-wing and far-right spectrum to <a href="https://www.open.online/2019/05/02/matteo-salvini-e-casapound-un-rapporto-lungo-cinque-anni/">work together</a>. Even in Germany, where the concept of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/06/germany-refugee-crisis-syrian"><em>Willkommenskultur</em></a> shaped the mainstream debate and inspired the humanitarian response at the international level, a strong representation of anti-migration views and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-222-refugee-homes-burned-or-attacked-arrests-a6763506.html">extreme violence</a> against immigrants emerged in 2015.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On December 17, 2015, German chancellor Angela Merkel and other European leaders sought to establish a new border and coast guard force to slow the influx of migrants across the EU’s external frontiers.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alain Jocard/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Mobilisation outcomes</h2>
<p>The long summer of migration in 2015 had an impact on the relationship between civil society and the state. This happened in the way the former represents claims and takes actions within the public affairs, and how the latter interacts with – and reacts to – citizens’ sentiments and engagement.</p>
<p>There was an unprecedented wave of solidarity from Europeans who hadn’t previously been active supporters of asylum seekers or migration-related issues. Mobilisation was primarily in urban settings, with the exception of areas such as the Serbian/Croatian border in Hungary and the Greek islands that experienced mass arrivals. The crisis of reception structures led to the creation, consolidation, interaction and evolution of heterogeneous organisations, citizen initiatives and networks at the <a href="http://www.bxlrefugees.be">national</a> and <a href="https://www.refugees-welcome.net">international level</a>.</p>
<p>Mobilisation also occurred when dormant organisations reactivated and existing ones embraced the issue of asylum seekers and refugees. The nature of their activities and their principles adapted to the situation, the needs of newcomers and the policy structures surrounding them. European civil society reacted more or less explicitly to the problems, gaps and failures of political institutions and institutional policy measures. In doing so, citizen organisations and NGOs made visible the <a href="https://books.google.be/books?id=JSlWDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT88&lpg=PT88&dq=organized+non-responsibility+pries&source=bl&ots=ji-emGEMoj&sig=ACfU3U13Zmyl6FAWnIR544gyhTlHK5runw&hl=it&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj628nI6bHkAhXKEVAKHU79DYAQ6AEwC3oECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=organiz&f=false">“organized non-responsibility”</a> that characterised the institutional approach of the European Union and the indifference of many countries during the emergency.</p>
<h2>The emergence of the local dimension</h2>
<p>As a consequence of the reception crisis, volunteer groups, citizen initiatives and civil-society organisations paved the way for inclusive approaches toward asylum seekers and migration in general. These approaches are specific to regions, municipalities and local areas. A new paradigm of integration established in these contexts, and marked a “local turn” in the management of the contemporary migration issue. Recent scientific articles published by <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1368371">Younes Ahouga</a> or <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0020852316688426">Zapata-Barrero, Caponio and Scholten</a> have observed this paradigm to be growing in Europe.</p>
<p>The crisis created opportunities for citizens to transform spontaneous mobilisation – negative and positive – into forms of political action and advocacy. In several instances at the local level, groups of citizens and volunteers working alongside the state-designated reception actors took on a formal organisational structure and became involved in the decision-making process.</p>
<p>While strong civil-society mobilisation provided an alternative to anti-migrant rhetoric and violence, it did not always have positive political repercussions. This is reflected in the strategies of anti-migrant governments to challenge the leadership of non-institutional actors, as well as in the attempts to criminalise NGOs and obstruct their support activities. Examples of such institutional strategies are Hungary’s so-called <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/20/hungary-passes-anti-immigrant-stop-soros-laws">“Stop Soros” laws</a>, or Italy’s second <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/15/italy-adopts-decree-that-could-fine-migrant-rescue-ngo-aid-up-to-50000">“Security Decree”</a>.</p>
<p>A few years before than international migration was turned into a political problem and the EU sought to fortify its external borders, sociologist <a href="http://www.seuil.com/ouvrage/la-double-absence-des-illusions-de-l-emigre-aux-souffrances-de-l-immigre-abdelmalek-sayad/9782020385961">Abdelmalek Sayad</a> reminded us that contemporary migration has a mirror function. It makes visible how governmental trends in the treatment of immigrants anticipate the way forms of social control and legal measures are designed to be directed toward native citizens. The 2015-2018 refugee reception crisis is no exception.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122834/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The author does not work for, consults, owns shares in or receives funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond his academic appointment.</span></em></p>The 2015 reception crisis had a profound impact on civil society in Europe. A significant set of attitudes and practices emerged that give a sense of what political participation means today.Alessandro Mazzola, Post-doc Research Fellow, Sociologist, Université de LiègeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1200302019-07-09T12:14:25Z2019-07-09T12:14:25ZGreece: victory for New Democracy signals the beginning of the end of the crisis<p>As polls closed in Greece on July 7, with pollsters predicting a <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-greece-election/conservative-leader-mitsotakis-becomes-greek-pm-picks-cabinet-idUKKCN1U31AQ">convincing victory </a> for the centre-right New Democracy and a defeat for the left-wing Syriza government of Alexis Tsipras, an unusual sense of calm prevailed across the country. Rarely has a Greek election night been so quiet. </p>
<p>New Democracy’s incoming prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, went out of his way to unite and manage expectations. His supporters were just relieved to have ousted Tsipras. Tsipras himself looked relieved, having managed to reverse his party’s losses at the recent European Parliament elections, to win a respectable 31.5% of the vote, which will allow him to remain as a strong second pole in the system. With 39.9% of the vote, New Democracy <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/242324/article/ekathimerini/news/table-nd-wins-greek-election-official-results">will have 158 seats</a> in the Greek parliament, an outright majority.</p>
<p>Smaller parties all put on a happy face for their own internal reasons, with the exception of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn, which failed to pass the 3% threshold to elect MPs. It looked as if Greece had finally attained what it had been desperately seeking for one long decade: a sense of normalcy.</p>
<p>Exactly ten years ago, in the summer of 2009, the first signs that Greece was in economic trouble started to become apparent. As the markets’ confidence in Greek bonds collapsed, the government turned to the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Within weeks it had entered a vortex of excruciating negotiations, conditional bailouts and tough austerity measures that went on and on. To an extent these are still going on and, in different forms, are expected to go on for much of the 21st century. </p>
<p>It’s hard to overstate <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137369222">the impact of the crisis and austerity</a> on Greek society. Beyond the obvious effects – unemployment reaching 25%, hundreds of thousands of mostly young and well-educated people leaving the country to seek employment abroad, pensions and public services facing severe cuts – the political system was rattled. One of the two main pillars of the post-1974 system, the centre-left PASOK, collapsed. Far right parties such as Golden Dawn and the xenophobic, homophobic Independent Greeks – entered parliament. </p>
<p>The crisis has been the single biggest challenge to Greece’s survival since World War II. Its root causes, the way Greeks were stereotyped in the world’s media, and the way lenders and successive Greek governments designed and implemented austerity measures, all became sources of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0803706x.2018.1523558">collective shame and humiliation</a>. This in turn polarised a political culture that has been historically prone to bouts of instability and violence. </p>
<h2>Rise of violence</h2>
<p>Tsipras weaponised and normalised this populist narrative of victimhood, pitting the “innocent people” against “the corrupt elites”, including Greece’s EU partners and lenders. As I have shown in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9248.12079">my research</a>, this narrative was also used by far-left radical groups to justify revenge and aggression. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.lse.ac.uk/Hellenic-Observatory/Assets/Documents/Research/New-Research-Programme/Low-intensity-violence-in-crisis-ridden-Greece-Policy-Brief.pdf">Political violence tripled</a> between 2008 and 2018. Far-left violence was 3.5 times bigger in scale than far-right violence, which itself soared. Low-level incidents are a daily occurrence with thousands of them having taken place during the decade of the crisis, especially before Syriza got into power. Radicalisation and extremism have been particularly prominent among young people. While many are politically apathetic, those who do engage tend to do so in radical ways. Golden Dawn drew most of its supporters from the 18-25 age group, while Syriza has consistently topped the polls in that group. </p>
<p>The January and September 2015 victories of Syriza, which governed in alliance with the Independent Greeks, acted as pressure valves that allowed Greek society to vent a lot of its anger and frustration. That radicalism, which was such a prominent element of Greek political culture during the first period of the crisis, gradually ran out of steam.</p>
<p>From January to June 2015, Yanis Varoufakis, the flamboyant poster boy of the “Caviar left”, led <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Last-Bluff-Greece-financial-catastrophe-ebook/dp/B07SXCRNZB">catastrophic and slightly surreal negotiations</a> with EU and IMF lenders. These ended up costing Greece billions of euros, triggered a bank run and capital controls, caused it to default on its debts to the IMF and brought it within hours of exiting the Eurozone. Eventually, Tsipras did a U-turn and, in late 2015 began implementing all of the lenders’ requests, effectively showing that there really was no alternative to austerity.</p>
<h2>Mitsotakis’s moment</h2>
<p>Since being elected leader of New Democracy in 2016, Mitsotakis worked hard to renew his party. In the space of three years, he managed to turn an out of touch, old-school, conservative party into a modern, liberal, social media savvy electoral machine. While banking on his image as a well-educated and professionally successful technocrat who will cut taxes and facilitate foreign direct investment, he also placed strategic emphasis on the youth vote.</p>
<p>He voted in favour of civil partnerships for same-sex couples and spent time meeting with drug addicts in rough parts of Athens. He also carried out a radical renewal of New Democracy’s parliamentary candidates and party workers, promoting many people in their 20s, 30s and 40s. In doing so, he managed to build up support in the crucial 18-24 demographic, reaching <a href="https://www.thetoc.gr/politiki/article/pws-psifisan-neoi-suntaksiouxoi-dimosioi--idiwtikoi-upalliloi">27%-30%</a> in the recent elections, and so ending Syriza’s monopoly on the youth vote.</p>
<p>Whether Greece has really entered a new era of normalcy will become apparent fairly soon. One of the first moves Mitsotakis <a href="https://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/1405470/mitsotakis-current-asylum-law-for-greek-universities-will-be-scrapped">pledged to take</a> is to scrap the so-called “asylum” law, which forbids police from entering university premises. As a result of the law, urban university campuses <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/222966/article/ekathimerini/news/lawlessness-gripping-greek-university-campuses">have become hotspots</a> of crime, vandalism, drug-dealing and anarchist propaganda and public opinion has recently shifted in favour of taking action. However, far-left groups still carry street credit in universities and in the urban pocket of Exarchia in downtown Athens, where law-and-order has completely collapsed. </p>
<p>On election day in Greece, <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/242329/article/ekathimerini/news/anarchist-group-claims-responsibility-for-stolen-ballot-box">the only incident</a> that broke the peaceful hum of post-election dinner parties took place there: a previously unknown anarchist group stole and burnt a ballot box, threatened electoral clerks and threw tear gas. What happens at Exarchia over the next few months – whether and how the government decides to enforce the law and how young people and wider society react – will be the best indicator of whether Greece has truly turned the page.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120030/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roman Gerodimos has received funding from the Independent Social Research Foundation (ISRF) for a residential workshop on shame and political violence in Greece. He is founder and former convenor (2004-2017) of the Greek Politics Specialist Group of the UK's Political Studies Association, and has been a member of New Democracy in Greece since December 2015.</span></em></p>Ten years after the onset of Greece’s biggest crisis since World War II, radical populism is running out of steam.Roman Gerodimos, Associate Professor of Global Current Affairs, Bournemouth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1051562018-10-17T16:39:43Z2018-10-17T16:39:43ZAnthill 30: Extremes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241041/original/file-20181017-41135-11k7m9s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> </figcaption></figure><p>We’ve taken our cue for this episode of The Anthill podcast from the Cambridge Festival of Ideas – the theme for which in 2018 is extremes. As the organisers <a href="https://www.cam.ac.uk/news/cambridge-festival-of-ideas-2018-explores-extremes">point out</a>, it really does feel like we’re living in an age where the world is growing more and more extreme.</p>
<p>Far-right political extremism is on the rise around the world, with extreme, populist views gaining support everywhere from Brazil and the US to the Philippines. And Europe has not been immune, where elections have featured <a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-groups-may-be-diverse-but-heres-what-they-all-have-in-common-101919">far-right parties making plays for power</a>. How have these new parties managed to move into the mainstream of European politics? </p>
<p>In the first segment of this episode, we hear from Sofia Tipaldou, a research fellow at the University of Manchester, on the rise of <a href="https://theconversation.com/golden-dawn-how-the-greek-far-right-wrote-the-playbook-others-now-use-to-go-mainstream-100987">Golden Dawn</a> in Greece. Anna Bull, professor of Italian history and politics at the University of Bath, explains the context of the Lega’s ascent to the heart of government in Italy, and Stijn van Kessel, lecturer in European politics at Queen Mary University of London, talks about the effect these far-right forces are having on other political parties across Europe. </p>
<p>And what is it like to live in an extreme situation, particularly one of conflict and war? We hear from two academics from the University of Cambridge who also spoke at the Festival of Ideas about what happens to people who choose not to flee during war situations in the Middle East. Palestinian academic Mona Jebril talked about her school life and work as a university lecturer in Gaza, and Sophie Roborgh, talked about her research on the medics who stay on to treat those affected by conflict. </p>
<p>Finally, we turn to extremes of the climate. Australia has just had its driest September on record, and the second driest month ever: the only drier month was April 1902. In a clip from <a href="https://theconversation.com/trust-me-im-an-expert-cyclone-season-approacheth-but-this-year-theres-a-twist-104309">Trust Me I’m an Expert</a>, the monthly podcast from our colleagues at The Conversation Australia, we feature their interview with climate scientist Joelle Gergis from the University of Melbourne, whose latest book maps Australia’s climate over thousands of years. While is has always been a land of extremes, rapid warming since 1950 is starting to alter Australia’s weather patterns. </p>
<p><a href="https://itunes.apple.com/gb/podcast/the-anthill/id1114423002?mt=2"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233721/original/file-20180827-75984-1gfuvlr.png" alt="Listen on Apple Podcasts" width="268" height="68"></a> <a href="https://www.google.com/podcasts?feed=aHR0cHM6Ly90aGVjb252ZXJzYXRpb24uY29tL3VrL3BvZGNhc3RzL3RoZS1hbnRoaWxsLnJzcw%3D%3D"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233720/original/file-20180827-75978-3mdxcf.png" alt="" width="268" height="68"></a></p>
<p><a href="https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/the-conversation/the-anthill"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233716/original/file-20180827-75981-pdp50i.png" alt="Stitcher" width="300" height="88"></a> <a href="https://tunein.com/podcasts/Technology-Podcasts/The-Anthill-p877873/"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233723/original/file-20180827-75984-f0y2gb.png" alt="Listen on TuneIn" width="318" height="125"></a></p>
<p><a href="https://radiopublic.com/the-anthill-GOJ1vz"><img class="alignnone size-medium wp-image-152" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233717/original/file-20180827-75990-86y5tg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=268&fit=clip" alt="Listen on RadioPublic" width="268" height="87"></a> <a href="https://open.spotify.com/show/265Bnp4BgwaEmFv2QciIOC?si=-WMr1ecDTsO_6avrkxZu8g"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/237984/original/file-20180925-149976-1ks72uy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=268&fit=clip" width="268" height="82"></a> </p>
<hr>
<p><strong><em>Credits:</em></strong></p>
<p><em>Thank you to City, University of London’s Department of Journalism for letting us use their studios to record The Anthill.</em> </p>
<p><em>Picture source: <a href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/offroad-extreme-hand-drawn-grunge-lettering-717103177">Double Brain via Shutterstock</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The Anthill theme music is by Alex Grey for Melody Loops.</em> </p>
<p><em>MusOpen: Monica Alianello, <a href="https://musopen.org/music/662-twelve-spanish-dances-op-37/">Twelve Spanish Dances, Op.37 II Oriental</a></em></p>
<p><em>Free Music Archive: Podington Bear, <a href="https://freemusicarchive.org/music/Podington_Bear/">Clouds, Rain, Sun</a></em></p>
<p><em>EuroNews via YouTube: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-vrp_N2sBvo">Idlib Offensive: province targeted as rebels prepare for government attack</a></em></p>
<p><em>BBC News via YouTube: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zCS118rvWsM">How children are starving in Yemen’s war - BBC News</a></em></p>
<p><em>Clinton Library via YouTube: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8CFL6gHgxI">Signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles</a></em></p>
<p><em>Sky News via YouTube: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zli1JCqV-AE">Israel Close To Objective With Gaza</a></em> </p>
<p><em>AlJazeera via YouTube: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P1qlwgOSiu8">Security forces clear Cairo protest camp</a></em></p>
<p><em>Ruptly via YouTube: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KdvO8r9a25E&t=28s">Italy: “Italians first” – Lega Nord leader Salvini rallies in Milan</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105156/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A podcast on extremes: from far-right politics, to life in conflict zones and the extreme weather of Australia.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLaura Hood, Senior Politics Editor, Assistant Editor, The Conversation (UK edition)Annabel Bligh, Business & Economy Editor and Podcast Producer, The Conversation UKGemma Ware, Head of AudioMadeleine De Gabriele, Deputy Editor: Energy + EnvironmentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1019192018-09-27T12:13:39Z2018-09-27T12:13:39Z‘Far right’ groups may be diverse – but here’s what they all have in common<p>Far right parties and groups have been enjoying increasing support across Europe. Such parties have <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jcms.12769">performed well</a> in recent domestic elections, often occupying second or third place – and in some cases joining governing coalitions. Examples include the French Front National (FN, now Rassemblement National), the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), the Austrian Party for Freedom (FPÖ), the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP), the Italian Lega Nord (LN), the Sweden Democrats (SD) and Alternative for Germany (AfD). </p>
<p>Their shared focus on sovereignty, their scepticism of the EU, their emphasis on strict immigration policies and the placing of “native” inhabitants first in areas such as welfare and social services – policies that promote a “<a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2016/11/19/the-new-nationalism">new nationalism</a>” – have allowed researchers to compare these parties, often under the umbrella of the “far right”. </p>
<p>However, the term “far right” tends to subsume a broad range of parties and groups that differ significantly in agenda and policy – especially economic and welfare policies – as well as the extent to which they support and employ violence. This category includes both parties that have moderated their agendas, distancing themselves from fascism in order to appeal to broader electorates; and vigilante street groups and extreme parties which employ violence, such as the Greek Golden Dawn (GD), the English Defence League (EDL), Britain First and the Italian Casa Pound. </p>
<p>For this reason, the use of the term “far right” is often contested. So is it appropriate to group such different organisations under the same label?</p>
<h2>Terminology</h2>
<p>The short answer is “yes”. Given the significant variations that exist between these parties and groups, any term that groups them together and compares them will have limitations. But the term “far right” is the least problematic precisely because it can be used, on the one hand, to identify the overarching similarities that make them comparable, and on the other to distinguish between different variants, allowing researchers to take into account the idiosyncrasies of specific cases. </p>
<p>The “far right” umbrella includes parties and groups that share an important commonality: they all justify a broad range of policy positions on socioeconomic issues on the basis of nationalism. The point here is not simply that they are all, to a degree, nationalist; but rather, that they use nationalism to justify their positions on <em>all</em> socioeconomic issues. </p>
<p>The term “right-wing populism”, however, is less appropriate. Populism is an even broader umbrella that often includes disparate parties and groups. To narrow down this category, we often tend <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/07/cambridge-dictionary-nativism-populism-word-year">to conflate populism and nationalism</a>, identifying a party as populist, not on the basis of its populist attributes – what party doesn’t claim to speak on behalf of the people in a democracy? – but on the basis of its nationalist attributes. But despite the similarities between “populism” and “nationalism” – both emphasise conflict lines, focus on the collective, and put forward a vision of an ideal society – the two are conceptually different. While the former pits the people against the elites, the latter pits the in-group against the out-group. </p>
<p>And so herein lies the problem. If nationalism is always a feature of the far right, as most researchers agree, what is the added value of the term “populism”? To put it another way, what is the difference between a radical right-wing party and a populist radical right-wing party? While populism may or may not be an attribute of some far right parties, it is not their defining feature. Rather, nationalism is. </p>
<h2>Extreme vs radical</h2>
<p>Under the “far right” umbrella, we might distinguish between two sub-categories: extreme and radical right. </p>
<p>The extreme right includes both vigilante groups and political parties that are often openly racist, have clear ties to fascism and also employ violence and aggressive tactics. These groups may operate either outside or within the realm of electoral politics, or both. They tend to oppose procedural democracy. </p>
<p>The Greek Golden Dawn, for example, was formed as a violent grassroots movement by far right activists. Prior to its election to the Greek parliament in 2012, the party’s main activities were confined to the streets. Researchers often label this party as fascist or <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/daphne-halikiopoulou/golden-dawn_b_7643868.html">neo-Nazi</a>. Other examples include UK-based street movement <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-britain-first-the-far-right-group-retweeted-by-donald-trump-88407">Britain First</a>, the English Defence League and its former leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/tommy-robinson-the-martyr-how-the-far-right-builds-its-victim-narrative-98261">Tommy Robinson</a>. We might add various white supremacist organisations to this category, such as Stormfront in the US. It is notable that these groups often have ties between them – Stormfront, for example, often promotes Golden Dawn activities in its online materials.</p>
<p>The radical right tends to be the most widespread and electorally successful in Europe. These parties, which include the French FN (now Rassemblement National), Dutch PVV, Sweden Democrats, and the AfD, accept procedural democracy and have distanced themselves from fascism. They oppose the far right label. </p>
<p>These parties also use nationalism to justify all their policy positions. But instead of the ethnic nationalist narrative adopted by extreme right parties – which focuses on blood, creed and common descent – radical right parties utilise a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2012.00550.x">civic nationalist narrative</a> to promote anti-immigrant agendas, which allows them to appear <a href="https://networks.h-net.org/node/3911/discussions/1971598/brexit-and-rise-right-wing-populism-europe-why-and-how">legitimate</a> to a broad section of the population. </p>
<p>This civic nationalist rhetoric presents culture as a value issue, justifying exclusion on purported threats posed by those who do not share “our” liberal democratic values. This strengthens the ability of these parties to mobilise on issues such as terrorism by linking anti-Muslim narratives to immigration and security. The justification is that certain cultures and religions are intolerant and inherently antithetical to democracy. </p>
<p>It also focuses on social welfare as an important aspect of the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/government-and-opposition/article/breaching-the-social-contract-crises-of-democratic-representation-and-patterns-of-extreme-right-party-support/C8ECDE8C75B2CD406FE49B107E8B2307">social contract</a> between state and citizens. The positions of these parties are increasingly protectionist and welfare chauvinist, allowing them to mobilise the economically insecure by linking immigration, unemployment and (a purported) welfare scarcity. </p>
<p>This position is not incompatible with “far right” terminology. Extreme right variants have often been statist in their economic orientations – the classic example being fascism. Radical right variants, too, are increasingly departing from <a href="https://www.press.umich.edu/14497/radical_right_in_western_europe">the neo-liberal economic formula</a> of past years to adopt a more <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354068807075943">economically centrist</a> position.</p>
<p>So, comparable does not mean identical. The BNP is not the same as UKIP. Similarly, Golden Dawn is not the same as the FN or the PVV or the AfD. But these groups are comparable; they all justify their policies on some form of exclusion of an out-group. Comparing them allows us not only to understand their different levels of success across Europe, but also the different forms they take depending on context and circumstance. </p>
<p>In northwest Europe, for example, the most successful far right parties are radical right variants that emphasise immigration and a cultural backlash, such as the PVV, the FN and the SVP; while in crisis-ridden southern Europe, successful far right parties, such as Golden Dawn, tend to be extreme variants which propose statist economic agendas. </p>
<p>But while these parties differ in many ways, their progressive entrenchment in their national political systems raises similar questions about out-group exclusion, anti-immigration narratives and mainstream responses. And this progressive entrenchment has comparable – and significant – implications for the nature of democracy and policymaking in Europe.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101919/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daphne Halikiopoulou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From welfare chauvinism to value-based nationalism – a breakdown of what constitutes a ‘far right’ group.Daphne Halikiopoulou, Associate Professor in Comparative Politics, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1009872018-08-17T13:17:30Z2018-08-17T13:17:30ZGolden Dawn: how the Greek far right wrote the playbook others now use to go mainstream<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231663/original/file-20180813-2903-5rn1fw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Around the world it seems far-right groups can infiltrate the mainstream regardless of a given country’s political present or past. The question is, then, how do they do it? </p>
<p>The far-right movement Golden Dawn, based in Greece, is a prime example of how fringe groups can become major political forces. Since it first emerged in the early nineties, the group has adapted to change, seized political opportunities, and diversified and expanded its base. Golden Dawn first came to public attention in 1992, as Greeks were demonstrating in their thousands against a proposal to give the name <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/17/world/for-the-name-of-macedonia-a-burst-of-greek-pride.html">Macedonia</a> to the neighbouring former Yugoslav Republic. Golden Dawn’s hardline position was that Macedonia belongs to the cultural heritage of modern Greece, and that naming an independent nation after it would provoke territorial claims against Greek territories. </p>
<p>Throughout the 1990s, Golden Dawn began deradicalising its discourse in order to run for election. But the deep financial crisis that shook the foundations of the nation in the late 2000s provided the group with <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9781137487124">new opportunities</a>. Greece entered a spiral of high fiscal deficits, recession, unemployment, bail-out loans and austerity. The consequences were unevenly distributed between classes. Resentment rose, and economic issues spilt over into the political realm. A major realignment of the party system followed.</p>
<p>Greece’s main populist far-right party Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) was formed in 2000 by George Karatzaferis, a former member of Greece’s major centre-right party New Democracy. As the crisis unfolded, LAOS began to emerge as a political force on a nationalist, xenophobic platform. The party associated immigration with Greece’s domestic problems and found its winning formula. By 2007, it had entered parliament and by 2011 it was part of an interim three-party coalition government. </p>
<p>Whilst Golden Dawn’s position remained the most nationalist, anti-immigrant and coherent throughout the crisis, LAOS’s successes worked to Golden Dawn’s advantage. Golden Dawn’s toned-down rhetoric brought it directly into the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13608746.2013.782838?scroll=top&needAccess=true">programmatic territory of this main competitor</a> and various links were forged between the two. For instance, two Golden Dawn members were listed as LAOS representatives in the 2002 local elections, giving Golden Dawn an experience in institutionalised politics. As the crisis developed and LAOS set about introducing its anti-immigration agenda at the government level, it helped legitimise Golden Dawn’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494294">xenophobic discourse</a>.</p>
<p>This process continued as centre-right party New Democracy under Antonis Samaras gradually started to absorb LAOS’ <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494294">anti-immigration agenda</a>. LAOS itself was weakened as a result of its stint in coalition government. Many of its supporters had voted for its anti-establishment agenda and were turned off by its participation in establishment parties’ economic policies. This opened up new opportunities for Golden Dawn. </p>
<h2>Winning the ground war</h2>
<p>Learning from other social movements, Golden Dawn set up a football hooligan team, the Azure Army, and a youth branch, Counterattack. These side projects have enabled Golden Dawn to keep its most radical followers happy while attracting new members from among radical youth groups. The <a href="http://www.iospress.gr/ios2008/ios20080210.htm">Azure Army</a> incited the first pogrom against foreigners in modern Greek history in Athens, after Greece won the UEFA Euro 2004.</p>
<p>But Golden Dawn’s most powerful play was securing a local <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354068813511381">stronghold in Athens</a> by taking control of a city-centre neighborhood with one of the highest non-Greek populations. This was achieved through pogroms and individual violent attacks but also door-to-door canvassing. It also engaged in grassroots activism. Golden Dawn set up “people’s committees”, which complained in the media about immigrant criminality. It distributed a journal called “The Voice of the Residents of Agios Panteleimonas”. </p>
<p>Later on, Golden Dawn enriched its repertoire with a series of “social policies”. It started distributing food to natives in need (after ID control), clothes and toys to orphans, and even started a blood donation campaign “only for Greeks”.</p>
<p>By 2012 it had consolidated its position in the Greek parliament. By 2015 it had become the third opposition party. Even as it takes its place in the mainstream, it remains one of the most extreme formations in Europe. It is inspired by National Socialist ideological and organisational principles and opposes democracy, communism and liberalism. </p>
<p>In 2016, Golden Dawn proposed strict legislation to crack down on “illegal migration”. Since 2015, many of the party’s high and low-ranking members have been <a href="https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2018/04/19/3-years-on-what-the-trial-against-golden-dawn-tells-us-about-greek-society/">on trial</a> for a series of offences, including manslaughter and gun possession. But, rather than denting Golden Dawn’s popularity, the party has been active in confronting the PR surrounding these trials. It has used its own alternative media channels – a newspaper, radio station and online TV station – to distribute its own alternative information. </p>
<p>The trials provide Golden Dawn with the perfect opportunity to present itself as victim of state repression – an image that has long resonated with its anti-establishment base.</p>
<p>By adapting its narrative, developing mobilisation strategies and striking political alliances with right-wing parties already in the mainstream, Golden Dawn made its way to a position of great influence in Greece. Its story shows how important adaptability is to fringe groups. It helps them to become sustainable, even when threatened. By adapting, far-right fringe groups can advance within a democratic system, like left-wing movements do.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100987/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sofia Tipaldou currently receives funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 752387.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katrin Uba does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As we try to understand how extreme groups win mass appeal, this organisation offers valuable lessons.Sofia Tipaldou, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow, University of ManchesterKatrin Uba, Associate Professor, Uppsala UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/943092018-04-04T19:13:28Z2018-04-04T19:13:28ZItaly’s Five Star Movement: Looking at an ‘unclassifiable’ political force from a marketing perspective<p>The March 4 Italian elections were marked by the breakthrough of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/05/five-star-leader-open-to-coalition-talks-despite-founders-warning">Five Star Movement</a>, which was the leading party with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/mar/05/italian-elections-2018-full-results-renzi-berlusconi">32% of the vote</a>. Known as “M5S”, after its name in Italian, the Movimento 5 Stelle, the
party was founded in 2009 by the comedian Beppe Grillo and his fans. For many national and international observers, it’s unclassifiable in terms of the traditional left-right conception of political parties. For this reason, it is simultaneously defined as anti-party, anti-system and populist. </p>
<p>However, the M5S is a result of a general feeling coming from Western societies, which are less centred than they were in the past on work and the culture of production, on which the traditional political consensus is based, and are more focused on the culture of consumerism – thus the now-common expression “consumer societies” used by sociologists and marketers. In this regard, the M5S stands apart from many European populist movements because it is above all a fandom, a movement of activists who are mobilised by the messages of a brand-name celebrity from the culture industry: Beppe Grillo.</p>
<h2>Origins and achievements</h2>
<p>The M5S is rooted in Grillo’s blog, <a href="http://www.beppegrillo.it/">beppegrillo.it</a>, which he launched in 2004. In the blog he discussed economic and social issues, but also denounces the failings of the Italian political class. By 2008 the blog had become, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2008/mar/09/blogs">according to <em>The Guardian</em></a>, one of the most influential in the world. </p>
<p>From a marketing point of view, Grillo is a celebrity operating as a commercial brand, with his texts and public following. Since 2004, the comedian’s fans have organised themselves into groups of local activists, “Friends of Beppe Grillo”, who participate in local debates. In 2007 Grillo used the blog to launch a political program. The discussions concerned issues of public interest intended for presentation to the then prime minister, Romano Prodi, so that he would integrate them into the governmental agenda. This did not happen. </p>
<p>During the period 2007–2008, Grillo organized in Bologna and Turin, and streamed live for other Italian cities, two “V-Day” protest rallies. Signatures were collected for peoples’ bills to reform the political class, intended to be presented to public institutions, but once again this was not followed up. The year 2008 saw for the first time the inclusion of civic lists in local elections for Beppe Grillo. On October 4, 2009, M5S was officially established. In 2010, the parties’ activists participated in regional elections – Campania, Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy, Piedmont and Veneto – with promising results.</p>
<p>In the 2013 national elections, and against all the odds, the M5S achieved the same scores as the traditional left-wing and right-wing parties, gaining about 25% of the vote. From 2013 to 2018, the M5S took a position within the opposition in the Italian Parliament, where it denounced acts it claimed were carried out against the interests of the Italian people and in favour of the groups holding power. In 2016, the party won local elections in major cities such as Rome and Turin. In 2018, in the March 4 elections, the M5S became the leading party <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/05/five-star-leader-open-to-coalition-talks-despite-founders-warning">with 32% of the vote</a>, followed by the Partito Democratico, with just 18%.</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Helena Norberg-Hodge of Local Futures speaks with Beppe Grillo, founder Five-Star Movement (subtitled).</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A populist movement… in a consumer society</h2>
<p>M5S is part of the wave of “populist” parties that have emerged in Europe recently. They range widely across the political spectrum, including the left-wing, anti-austerity <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/12/podemos-pablo-iglesias-spain-re-election-inigo-errejon">Podemos</a> in Spain, the Europhobe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/09/ukip-group-fails-bid-restore-eu-funding-amid-inquiry">UK Independence Party</a> (UKIP), the extreme-right <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/29/germanys-far-right-afd-leader-margaret-thatcher-is-my-role-model">Alternative for Germany</a> (AfD) and the overtly neo-fascist <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/donald-trump-muslim-ban-greece-neo-nazi-golden-dawn-athens-march-protest-a7555706.html">Golden Dawn</a> in Greece. All these movements appeared in response to crises within the traditional parties.</p>
<p>Yet M5S also has characteristics in common with the party of current French president Emmanuel Macron, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/18/emmanuel-macron-marches-on-majority-french-parliament">La République en Marche</a>, in particular its transversality between left and right. M5S also distinguishes itself through its origins: it was created by the comedian Beppe Grillo, with the support of a digital entrepreneur, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/03/italy-five-star-movement-internet">Gianroberto Casaleggio</a>, and the movement’s fans. </p>
<p>What seems unclassifiable in terms of traditional political alignments has proved to be reasonably consistent with current general feeling within Western society, which is, above all, a consumer society. Moreover, it is not simply by chance while the M5S found it difficult to gain ground among those over 50, it found its support among the young.</p>
<h2>Fandom’s power</h2>
<p>The relationship of Beppe Grillo to his fansin this case – known as “grillini” – and they to each other often plays out through the Internet. Fandoms are the result of mass or popular consumer culture, where media texts, and celebrities in particular play a central role. The fans claim ownership of media content, used in turn for the creation of new content, with the aim of challenging the establishment’s political, economic and financial powers. In this scenario, a large part of the media and news programming acts as a defending wall for the dominant elites, while the Internet is the weapon with which supporters wage their guerrilla war against the system, as they spread counter-information and an alternative vision of life within society. </p>
<p>As a fandom, the M5S has come up against the status quo and the mechanisms that govern it. The M5S subverts the traditional classifications of left and right, while at the same time proposes a universal income for all citizens living below the poverty line and support for small and medium-sized businesses. The Internet – including Grillo’s blog as well as its <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/world/europe/italy-election-davide-casaleggio-five-star.html">Rousseau platform</a> – is not only a means of communication, but is also an infrastructure for the movement’s operations, the selection of its candidates, the proposal and discussion of its ideas and the development of its programs. The Internet is the means by which the M5S aims to replace one of the fundamental institutions of modern democracies, representative democracy. Instead, it will be direct democracy, enabled by the Internet.</p>
<p>Therein lies the difference between the M5S and other European “populist” movements. While they may have acquired more fluid forms adapted to contemporary society, they remain linked to political categories and/or the history of the traditional parties. The M5S is pure expression of the power that consumer culture – the brand and its fans – exerts on Western societies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94309/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregorio Fuschillo is a member of the Five Star Movement.</span></em></p>While often lumped with other European populist parties, Beppe Grillo’s M5S is a movement of activist fans mobilized by the messages of his “celebrity brand”.Gregorio Fuschillo, Professeur assistant de marketing et de consumer culture « theory », Kedge Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/615412016-06-24T05:33:45Z2016-06-24T05:33:45ZBrexit: Europe’s new nationalism is here to stay<p>It is something of a tragic irony that the European Union – originally constructed to lay to rest the atavistic nationalist impulses of the 20th century – is today behind the resurgence of such feelings across much of Europe. The British referendum that has delivered a vote for “Brexit” is the latest, dramatic indication that this nationalism is here to stay.</p>
<p>This nationalism has brewed largely in reaction to how the EU has evolved over the past few decades. What started as a common market grew to embrace a single currency, the Schengen area and integration in justice and home affairs. All this has diluted core aspects of national sovereignty: states have less control over macro-economic policy, borders and people.</p>
<p>The EU also enlarged to embrace Central and Eastern Europe. The inclusion of 12 new member-states with distinct histories, economic structures and democratic traditions has rendered the decision-making process at the EU level all the more cumbersome. At the same time, it has made EU policy all the less responsive to public opinion. These transformations have been very disquieting for voters in certain countries – like the UK.</p>
<p>But what we have witnessed in the UK is part of a much broader shift in public attitudes towards the EU from what analysts have called a “permissive consensus” to a “constraining dissensus”. In the past, European leaders quietly pursued integration in such areas as agriculture and the public paid little attention. More recently though, leaders have sought to take collective decisions in areas such as trade in services, banking or asylum. But they have to bear in mind that the voters back home are more likely to pay more attention and to be sceptical. </p>
<h2>Nationalists of all stripes</h2>
<p>This scepticism draws strength from the perception that the EU is responsible for the sundry ills that underlie the malaise felt by many European voters. Economic dislocation and industrial restructuring, austerity and privatisation, unemployment and job insecurity, fear of immigration, and a more general sense of vanishing influence over the decisions that affect their daily lives. All feed into the negative feelings people have about the EU. </p>
<p>Euroscepticism is found on the extremes of the political spectrum. On the left, voters and parties see the EU as a neoliberal plot. It exists only to serve the big businesses that lobby in Brussels for favourable legislation. For the right, the EU is a bureaucratic behemoth that imposes excessive regulation and threatens ancient national identities by encouraging labour migration. When these two viewpoints merge, as they have in UKIP’s political base, they are powerfully toxic.</p>
<p>And UKIP is only one of many such parties. Similar rhetoric and patterns of political support underpin the success of others, too. The Front National in France, the New Democrats in Sweden and the Finns Party in Finland have all been watching events in the UK closely. Some have even called for their own referendums, hoping for a Frexit or a Swexit after Brexit. Some others tailor their euroscepticism to suit local idiosyncracies. Take the <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/dutch-anti-islam-politician-geert-wilders-surges-polls-419080">Dutch Freedom Party’s</a> virulently anti-islamic platform for example, or <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24363776">violent action</a> promoted by Greece’s Golden Dawn.</p>
<h2>Rejecting the mainstream</h2>
<p>But in all cases, what we have witnessed with the rise of euroscepticism is the recrudescence of a robust form of populist nationalism. It will endure because it maps onto and reinforces existing social fault-lines.</p>
<p>Most importantly, it depends on the existence of divisions between the winners and losers of globalisation in the 21st century. It thrives on the different experiences of the educated, well-travelled polyglots working in highly-skilled professions and the immobile and stunted individuals left behind by global economic transformations.</p>
<p>Whether they work in low-paid jobs in the port towns of Essex or claim unemployment benefits in Lille, those left behind share a common feeling of despair and frustration that has yielded a visceral rejection of foreign bodies.</p>
<p>In certain countries, such as Poland or the Nordics, social and ideological divisions also map onto geographical ones. Patriotic countryside dwellers view their effete metropolitan neighbours – and their liberal values – with suspicion.</p>
<p>And, in the absence of a credible socialist alternative to protect them, many have turned to the more basic instinct of solidarity with the native and dominant ethnic kin: the English, the French, the Germans. In all countries, what underlies this nationalism is the clustering of individuals with left-wing economic interests and culturally conservative values that diverge tremendously from the mainstream.</p>
<h2>Not backing down</h2>
<p>So, when these sentiments are bundled together by entrepreneurial political actors such as UKIP, they become endowed with a political flavour that is reminiscent of the nationalisms of the past. It holds a view of the country’s history that glorifies national democratic control and it espouses a reactionary return to this past, no matter the economic costs.</p>
<p>It is sincerely anti-intellectual, offers facile solutions to complex problems, prefers what it calls “plain-speaking” over a well-articulated elocution and is utterly unapologetic in its disdain for the establishment.</p>
<p>The main difference is that, in contrast with the past, democracy is now the only game in town. The systems in which these nationalist parties operate are (fairly) stable, and generational turnover should lead to the predominance of liberal values, suggesting that there is a ceiling on the pool of support from which they can draw.</p>
<p>However, even if democratic institutions themselves are not in question, democracy currently offers the mechanism through which these nationalist parties’ can contaminate the platforms of other mainstream parties. They can exert competitive pressures during local, national and European elections, forcing the bigger parties to shift their political offerings as they attempt to avoid losing voters.</p>
<p>So, unless significant domestic economic and social reforms can tackle the sharpening divisions upon which this populist nationalism is founded, it will persist for the foreseeable future.</p>
<p>And unless the EU can infuse its institutions with greater democratic legitimacy, it will continue to draw populist ire. Voters need to be able to identify with the people who make decisions on their behalf. </p>
<p>The UK may be the first country to leave the EU but it may not be the last. Europe’s new nationalism is here to stay.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61541/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Toubeau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>All across the continent, euroscepticism is offering a new outlet for old feelings.Simon Toubeau, Assistant Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/447452015-07-15T18:27:16Z2015-07-15T18:27:16ZGreece’s ‘aGreekment’ isn’t Versailles: why the bailout won’t lead to sudden rise of Golden Dawn<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/88524/original/image-20150715-26319-1xb0mxy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Grecians have made it clear how they feel about Golden Dawn: get out. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Greece protest via www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is not uncommon that a compromise is made that leaves practically everyone disappointed, but the aGreekment, as the recent agreement between the EU and the Greek government has been so coyly dubbed, takes it to a whole new level. </p>
<p>An avalanche of (<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/13/greek-supporters-social-media-backlash-germany">orchestrated</a>) tweets tells us that #ThisIsACoup and <a href="http://www.euractiv.com/sections/euro-finance/12-july-agreement-puts-greece-slippery-slope-towards-right-wing-extremism">pundits</a> warn that “the 12 July agreement puts Greece on a slippery slope towards right-wing extremism.” </p>
<p>The hero of continuous resistance, former Greek Minister of Finance <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/latenightlive/greek-bailout-deal-a-new-versailles-treaty-yanis-varoufakis/6616532">Yanis Varoufakis</a>, also weighed in on this, comparing the aGreekment with the Treaty of Versailles – putting contemporary Greece on par with Weimar Germany – and proclaimed with his usual level of certainty that the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn will be strengthened by more austerity.</p>
<p>I am not going to focus on the irony that the <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/cas-mudde/european-elites-politics-of-fear">European Union elite</a> has used the same cynical and misguided fear-mongering tactic again and again against both the far right and the far left, including Varoufakis’s Syriza Party itself. </p>
<p>I am also not going to dwell on the fact that Weimar Germany was literally destroyed by a (real) war, while contemporary Greece has seen no armed conflict since its own civil war, more than 50 years ago. </p>
<p>Nor will I develop further the meaningless comparison of the aGreekment, which is essentially a loan of billions of euros to Greece in exchange for binding reforms, to the <a href="http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005425">Versailles Treaty</a>, which meant a payment of billions by Germany in the form of reparations.</p>
<p>I am even going to ignore the fact that the whole leadership of Golden Dawn is currently in jail or <a href="http://www.thenation.com/article/rejoice-caution-golden-dawn-under-arrest/">under house arrest</a> and the party can hardly organize in a normal fashion.</p>
<p>Instead, let’s just look at the empirical facts. Is Golden Dawn really on the rise? </p>
<p>There is little doubt that Golden Dawn did profit from the crisis, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/01/world/europe/amid-greeces-worries-the-rise-of-right-wing-extremists.html?_r=0">growing</a> from an irrelevant party of less than 1% before 2010 to a moderately successful party with roughly 7% in 2012. </p>
<p>Perhaps high, but hardly a threat to Greek democracy. While no polls have been held since Monday morning following the bailout, a <a href="http://www.electograph.com/2015/07/greece-july-2015-metron-analysis-poll.html">Metron Analysis</a> poll taken between the Greferendum and the aGreekment shows remarkable stability in Greek party preferences since the January 2015 elections. </p>
<p>Only one shift was outside of the margins of error of plus or minus 3.1%: New Democracy (one of Greece’s two major parties) lost almost 9%, which is undoubtedly in part a temporary response to the fresh news of the <a href="http://greece.greekreporter.com/2015/07/05/antonis-samaras-resigns-from-nd-party-leadership-after-no-win-in-greek-refrendum/">resignation</a> of party leader Antonis Samaras after the No vote in the Greferendum. Golden Dawn was down 2%, from 6.3% in January elections to 4.3%. Again, this is within the margin of error, but at the very least shows that there is absolutely no evidence for a rise.</p>
<p>If Varoufakis and others <a href="http://alphahistory.com/weimarrepublic/why-the-weimar-republic-failed/">really want</a> to learn lessons from Weimar Germany, they should remember that the rise of the Nazi Party was at least as much caused by the material economic effects of the Versailles Treaty and the Great Depression as by the psychological consequences of the framing of the two. </p>
<p>As <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cas-mudde/weimar-greece-and-the-future-of-europe_b_6876944.html">Weimar Germany</a> was largely a democracy without democrats, contemporary Greece is largely a liberal democracy without liberal democrats. Just like in Greece today, anti-Semitism was <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-features/1.591841">rampant</a> in Weimar Germany. However, while anti-Semitic conspiracies were highly popular in other countries in the 1930s too, including Austria and France, Weimar Germany had an even more toxic conspiracy theory.</p>
<p>The “<a href="http://www.bl.uk/world-war-one/articles/the-legacy-of-world-war-one-propaganda">Dolchstoβlegende</a>” (Stab-in-the-Back Myth) emerged already at the end of the First World War and was spoon-fed to ordinary Germans by a broad range of elites. The accusation was that the capitulation of Germany and the consequent Treaty of Versailles were the result of a stab in the back by a “fifth column” and a “traitorous elite” who did the bidding of hostile international forces. </p>
<p>Sound familiar?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44745/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cas Mudde has received funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, British Academy, Dutch Scientific Organization (NWO), Flemish Scientific Organization (FWO), Israeli Institute, and Volkswagen Foundation. He is affiliated with the Center for Right-Wing Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and consults/ed for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR), and European Policy Center (EPC).
</span></em></p>Some, including Greece’s ex-Finance Minister Varoufakis, have warned that the bailout’s austerity will strengthen extremist parties like Golden Dawn. They’re wrong.Cas Mudde, Associate Professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, University of GeorgiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/441932015-07-02T14:57:48Z2015-07-02T14:57:48ZHow Greece crisis sparked a new era of extremist politics<p>Societal crises breed extremism. As political theorist <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ASarAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA195&lpg=PA195&dq=%22alleviate+political,+social,+or+economic+misery+in+a+manner+worthy+of+man%22&source=bl&ots=Uf06jmaDmG&sig=DqMrV279E2PG_afw1TDNQHfCbsg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=_y-VVZ2lMovsUt_KoEg&ved=0CC0Q6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=%22alleviate%20political%2C%20social%2C%20or%20economic%20misery%20in%20a%20manner%20worthy%20of%20man%22&f=false">Hannah Arendt</a> has claimed, extreme groups gain momentum by offering solutions when other alternatives appear unable to “alleviate political, social, or economic misery in a manner worthy of man”.</p>
<p>Both the far right and the far left can be understood as the product of external triggers, such as economic crises. Parties at both extremes of the political spectrum capitalise on the insecurities of downward social mobility. They <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Political-Man-Social-Bases-Politics/dp/0801825229/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1435843738&sr=8-1&keywords=Political+Man:+The+Social+Bases+of+Politics">appeal</a> to the dispossessed, the socially isolated, the economically insecure, and authoritarian persons at every level of society.</p>
<p>The Greek crisis is a perfect example of this phenomenon. As the country spirals towards disaster, the extreme left and extreme right find themselves singing from the same hymn sheet. But while their eurosceptic nationalism is being celebrated by many in Greece, it also poses a threat.</p>
<h2>Rise of the extremes</h2>
<p>Radical left coalition Syriza made a significant electoral breakthrough in 2012, coming second in the election with 26.89% of the <a href="http://www.stanlib.com/EconomicFocus/Pages/GreeceelectionwonbyNewDemocracywith297ofvote.aspx">vote</a>. On the far right, the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party moved from the fringes into the mainstream after winning 6.92% of the votes, giving it 18 seats in the Greek parliament.</p>
<p>This trend continued into the 2015 election, when Syriza and ANEL, a far-right party formed by defectors from New Democracy, formed a coalition government. Syriza had secured 36.34% of the vote and secured 149 parliamentary seats – just two seats short of what it needed to form a majority government.</p>
<p>Golden Dawn lost a little ground since 2012 but still managed to come third, with 6.28% of the vote. This despite the fact that the party did little campaigning and its leading members were in prison at the time of the election, facing <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-31139658">charges of indictment</a>.</p>
<p>All three parties were elected on an anti-austerity platform that emphasised the independence, dignity and sovereignty of the Greek nation. The crisis altered the cleavages of Greek society from left versus right to centre versus extreme. These three parties are now converging in their support for the campaign to <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-01/greece-s-tsipras-calls-for-no-vote-in-july-5-referendum">reject</a> the bailout deal being proposed by Greece’s international creditors in the referendum being held on July 5. Rejection in this vote may be interpreted as a call for Greece to leave the eurozone and even the EU.</p>
<h2>Strange bedfellows</h2>
<p>It may seem counter-intuitive that both the far left and the far right belong to the same camp and put forward similar ideas and solutions to the crisis but it actually makes sense.</p>
<p>Societal crises breed extremism when economic woes meet political turmoil – particularly when severe issues of governability limit the ability of the state to fulfil its social contract obligations.</p>
<p>This breach of the social contract is accompanied by declining levels of trust in state institutions, resulting in the collapse of the party system. This is what happened in Greece. The people lost faith in the ability of the state to mediate the effects of the crisis. They stopped trusting institutions, political parties and democracy more broadly. Citizens questioned the existing mechanisms of democratic representation, which gave anti-systemic parties space to offer an alternative vision.</p>
<p>This vision is <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.02050.x/abstract">premised</a> on national pride, defiance and an antagonism against the status quo – which explains the convergence of the extremes. The far right and left both take an anti-establishment stance and reject the European Union on the basis that it is an exploitative power seeking to undermine the unity, autonomy and identity of the Greek nation. </p>
<p>Paradoxically then, nationalism is the underlying feature that unites the far right and the far left in Greece, cross-cutting traditional alignments and mobilising support across the political spectrum.</p>
<p>Since the eruption of the crisis, left-right polarisation has been superseded by polarisation over the demands being placed on Greece by its creditors.</p>
<p>The extreme versus mainstream cleavage is based around the question of whether the Greek crisis can be resolved within the confines of the eurozone or whether the people should reject European membership in order to maintain their national pride.</p>
<h2>Decision time</h2>
<p>The impending referendum is yet another indicator of the state’s failure to manage the crisis and implement solutions based on democratic practices. The timing of the referendum, the ballot paper itself, and the question posed, all fail <a href="mailto:http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/council-of-europe-conditions-of-greek-referendum-fall-short-of-international-standards/2015/07/01/2485b560-1fe9-11e5-a135-935065bc30d0_story.html">international standards</a>. The people are being pushed into answering a complicated question at very short notice, while the government has openly supported the No camp. </p>
<p>The most important effect of the referendum has been to further polarise an already deeply divided society. The tension between the Yes and No voters provides an opportunity for extremist parties and there is grave danger that Golden Dawn will be able to harness even further support.</p>
<p>History should act as a warning here. When societies have opted for extreme measures in response to crises, they have found themselves plunged into economic disaster, isolation, dictatorships and totalitarianism.</p>
<p>This is because for the dispossessed, the socially isolated and economically insecure who vote on the basis of anger and emotion, the extreme becomes acceptable and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/29/hannah-arendt-adolf-eichmann-banality-of-evil">banal</a>.</p>
<p>But their choice is often the product of a lack of reflection, information and clarity about the severity of the implications. Expecting Greek voters to provide a simple answer to an extremely complex question, within a very short period of time and without a clear plan of what comes next, deepens societal polarisation and undermines the very democratic practices a referendum is purported to promote.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44193/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The extreme right and extreme left have found themselves united against Europe.Daphne Halikiopoulou, Associate Professor in Comparative Politics, University of ReadingSofia Vasilopoulou, Lecturer, Department of Politics, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/413952015-05-06T17:12:12Z2015-05-06T17:12:12ZFor the sake of Greece they must get the Golden Dawn trial right<p>The <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/greece-far-right-golden-dawn-nikos-michaloliakos-trial-start">trial of 69 members of Golden Dawn</a>, Greece’s far-right party, has been a stop-start affair, with the emphasis on “stop”. And if the experience of day one of the trial on April 20 – which opened and then was quickly adjourned – is anything to go by, then you would have to be concerned about how long the trial will run, its complexity and the serious risk of social unrest that it might cause. </p>
<p>Inside the courtroom were dozens of lawyers, victims, press and defendants while outside were hundreds of people from anti-fascist groups and local organisations who had marched to the courthouse to witness the trial opening. There were also reports that <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32378578">Golden Dawn supporters attacked witnesses</a> arriving in court.</p>
<p>In the face of all this – and Greece’s much-publicised money troubles – getting the Golden Dawn trial right could not be more vital. The more Europe repeats the threat of “ostracising” Greece for failing to meet the demands of its lenders, the more convincing Golden Dawn’s nationalist and isolationist message will sound.</p>
<p>There is a risk that the trial and its attendant publicity could catapult Golden Dawn into unprecedented levels of public support, especially if the trial fails to demonstrate what the hundreds of pages of legal indictment clearly argue: that it is a criminal organisation posing as a political party.</p>
<p>The rhetoric of the party in relation to the trial is already one of political persecution. Their leader signs his memoranda as a <a href="http://www.xryshaygh.com/en/view/we-want-justice-and-the-truth-to-shine-article-by-n.-g.-michaloliakos">political prisoner</a>, and the party bluntly accuses the former “Conservative” government of having orchestrated these prosecutions.</p>
<h2>Justice must be seen to be done</h2>
<p>To avoid the pitfall of highly damaging Golden Dawn propaganda, there are pragmatic issues that must first be tackled head on. The constitution, the code of criminal procedure and Supreme Court jurisprudence all mandate that unrestricted access to criminal trials be provided to anyone who might wish to follow the proceedings.</p>
<p>At the very least, the court must therefore reserve a number of seats for the general public. But on the first day of the trial, access to court was severely restricted. If possible, national television should broadcast proceedings, but in any case, every effort must be made to facilitate the work of the media – there should be no scope for Golden Dawn to claim that the proceedings are in breach of the publicity principle.</p>
<p>The court then needs to ensure proceedings run smoothly so they don’t put too great a strain on its limited resources. A 17-day adjournment on the first day of the trial – as a result of one of the defendants appearing in court without legal representation – was not the best start and does not bode well for avoiding possible delaying tactics in the later stages of the process. There will be many more occasions where respecting the defendants’ right to a fair trial will – quite rightly – lengthen the proceedings. </p>
<h2>Why 69?</h2>
<p>So why opt for such a complex trial with 69 defendants? The answer lies in article 187 of the Greek criminal code, which provides the main basis for the Golden Dawn prosecution. This criminalises the act of setting up or joining an hierarchical criminal organisation of three or more members – which continuously sets out to commit a range of serious offences. This massive trial is the best way to hold Golden Dawn to account as a criminal organisation – rather than just punishing its individual members for the specific criminal acts that they are suspected of having committed.</p>
<p>But this approach brings its own problems – it is expected that in most cases the court’s inquiries as to membership in the criminal organisation will go hand-in-hand with establishing the liability of the defendants for the specific crimes the indictment is based upon. These include murder, attempted murder, criminal damage, assaults and other violent offences. But where this is not possible, there is the risk of deducing from mere membership in the political party – or from sharing its extremist ideology – a membership in the synonymous criminal organisation. So, while the trial sets out to show that Golden Dawn is a criminal organisation – it must not hold that every member is a criminal. </p>
<p>To avoid this risk, the prosecution will have to demonstrate that “each member subjects her or his will to the group” and that “the intention to pursue serious crimes consists of a general manifest preparedness that the crimes be committed”. To explore this further, it is worth reading this analysis by <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/05/06/the-trial-of-golden-dawn-members-is-a-legitimate-criminal-case-not-political-persecution/">Emmanuel Melissaris</a>.</p>
<p>Crucially, to ensure a fair trial, the criminal liability of each of the 69 defendants must be investigated with sufficient specificity – and his or her role and participation in the activities of the criminal organisation fully established. In a mammoth trial like this, this is easier said than done, but the difficulty of the enterprise should not allow the court to lose sight of its vital importance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41395/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The prosecution of 69 members of Greece’s extreme right political party must be constitutional, fair and conducted in the full glare of public attention.Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, Senior lecturer, Brunel University LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/257872014-05-09T15:38:15Z2014-05-09T15:38:15ZEU election: austerity will make for lively contest in Greece<p>The Greek public will <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/takis-s-pappas/greece-and-european-elections-preview">go to the polls on May 25</a> as a massively divided electorate. The obvious factor which shapes public opinion is the continuation of an economic crisis which has resulted in a six-year recession and ongoing austerity programme which has led to a massive contraction in the Greek economy and dramatic falls in levels of income and standards of living. </p>
<p>The divide which stems from this is between those who support the continuing austerity and reform drive within an EU/Euro context – who will mainly vote for the centre-right New Democracy party (ND) – and those opposed, and wish to see a more expansive, growth agenda based on public spending and an end to “foreign-imposed” austerity packages – who will mainly support the radical populism of the left-wing Syriza party.</p>
<p>This is an obvious cleavage in time of a harsh economic climate which has seen <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/10/greece-unemployment-idUSEMS1O3SN120140410">unemployment soar</a> (especially among the youth), wages and pensions cut, and no let-up in the call for further culls and sacrifices. </p>
<p>But it is only one way of portraying a series of divides which characterise the Greek political agenda today and which will be evident in the final election outcome next month. This pro/anti-austerity representation of the electorate divide is also a traditional right-left divide. Supporters of the government’s adherence to the austerity/reform packages “negotiated” with the EU/IMF/ECB troika are also the traditional core voters of New Democracy and of an enduring centre-right tradition. The radical left sees Syriza as its champion, pursuing a socialist, anti-capitalist agenda, highly populist and based on a big State and big spending.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47446/original/gxhr7rky-1398873692.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47446/original/gxhr7rky-1398873692.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47446/original/gxhr7rky-1398873692.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=306&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47446/original/gxhr7rky-1398873692.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=306&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47446/original/gxhr7rky-1398873692.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=306&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47446/original/gxhr7rky-1398873692.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47446/original/gxhr7rky-1398873692.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47446/original/gxhr7rky-1398873692.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Europa.eu</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Eurosceptics to the Left</h2>
<p>This also brings into the picture a different dimension in the race between these two parties which lead the polls which estimate that Syriza has anything up to a 2% lead over New Democracy (a remarkably small lead considering the supposed unpopularity of the government which New Democracy heads): the question of Europe. Indeed, almost paradoxically, Europe forms a big part of the political debate in the run up to the European elections of 2014. </p>
<p>While New Democracy adheres to Greece’s European future and membership of the Eurozone, and has acceded to the German-led agenda of cuts and restructuring in return for substantial bail-outs. Syriza – and other parties significant to the electoral outcome – <a href="http://euobserver.com/eu-elections/123586">diverge from this view</a>. Syriza, sees Europe as anathema to the extent that it is imposing a foreign agenda on Greece. The party pursues rhetoric and promotes policies which are incompatible with continuing membership of the Eurozone and potentially the EU as a whole (even though its official line is that to save Greece we need to reform the EU). There is a xenophobia here which is mirrored by others such as <a href="http://www.enetenglish.gr/?i=news.en.article&id=1856">Independent Greeks</a> and the <a href="http://inter.kke.gr/">Communist Party (KKE)</a>, but far distant from the overt rascism of the neo-fascist Golden Dawn which has had such an impact both in Greece and across Europe in general.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47447/original/4xgkqz5n-1398873718.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47447/original/4xgkqz5n-1398873718.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47447/original/4xgkqz5n-1398873718.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47447/original/4xgkqz5n-1398873718.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47447/original/4xgkqz5n-1398873718.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47447/original/4xgkqz5n-1398873718.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47447/original/4xgkqz5n-1398873718.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47447/original/4xgkqz5n-1398873718.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Based on polls conducted from 3 to 9 April by Kapa Research, University of Macedonia, GPO and Pulse RC.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">metapoll.net</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But what these parties do share is an anti-establishment agenda, targeting the “old parties” of New Democracy and PASOK (electioneering under the <a href="http://greece.greekreporter.com/2014/03/09/political-rift-uproots-olive-tree-movement/">Olive Tree’ – Elia – platform</a>), and holding them responsible for the maintenance of a clientilistic, nepotistic political system which they manipulated for personal gain, and mismanaged so horrendously, that the crisis was a direct result.</p>
<p>This is the last split in electoral term, between “old” and “new” parties/politics. And perhaps the most significant development stemming from this in the current Euroelection context is the emergence of <a href="http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-elections-2014/new-party-shakes-greek-political-scene-301531">To Potami</a> (The River): a political movement, headed by a journalist, which is polling at up to 10% and campaigning on an anti-“old party” agenda. At the heart of the message is the idea of forging a new kind of trust between the electorate and its government based not on left-right, pro-anti ideologies but on real issues and real people.</p>
<p>The divisions are complex and span a wide range. It is a close race between New Democracy and Syriza with the surprising emergence of a new political force playing a significant role – and Europe actually figures quite high on the political agenda in a Euroelection!</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/25787/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Spyros Economides does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Greek public will go to the polls on May 25 as a massively divided electorate. The obvious factor which shapes public opinion is the continuation of an economic crisis which has resulted in a six-year…Spyros Economides, Associate Professor of International Relations and European Politics, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.