tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/greek-politics-14231/articlesGreek politics – The Conversation2022-11-08T14:02:26Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1925372022-11-08T14:02:26Z2022-11-08T14:02:26ZGreece’s ‘Watergate’ explained: why the European Parliament is investigating over a wiretapping scandal<p>After Greece and the European Central Bank <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2016.1154977?casa_token=nA5m981NE14AAAAA%3AvZsgVPwIH54QnboqbHweNklssbC6gIrdXWojSmH-Vlesr94IRns26RjeOgNgZ8lG1bqzYK1LSNE">agreed</a> post-economic-crash bailout terms in 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published a 146-page <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10110.pdf">report</a> outlining all the key state problems that were seen as having caused Greece’s fiscal crisis. </p>
<p>One of them was <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9780230294752">corruption</a>, which has eaten away at accountability in Greek politics since the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30036358#metadata_info_tab_contents">end of military dictatorship</a> in 1974. Sean Hagan, the former general counsel of the IMF described Greece as a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oe_MSTMFLGM">tough case</a>, as corruption appeared to be widespread on all levels of public administration.</p>
<p>On winning the 2019 general election, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis acknowledged those underlying issues. He <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gSZO4XVAMb4">promised</a> to be ruthless about the symptoms of corruption and fight off accusations of elitism. Far from achieving these goals, however, Mitsotakis’ government now stands accused of <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/733637/EPRS_ATA(2022)733637_EN.pdf">spying on journalists and opposition politicians</a>. </p>
<h2>‘Greek Watergate’</h2>
<p>Mitsotakis had to admit that the Greek National Intelligence Service (EYP) <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/733637/EPRS_ATA(2022)733637_EN.pdf">had been wiretapping</a> Nikos Androulakis, leader of centre-left opposition party Pasok and a member of the European parliament. However, he claimed not to have known about it and insisted all operations were legal.</p>
<p>This last point is crucial since several journalists have accused the Greek government of <a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2021/12/pegasus-vs-predator-dissidents-doubly-infected-iphone-reveals-cytrox-mercenary-spyware/">putting Predator spyware on their phones</a> – a type of software similar to the notorious <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/jul/18/what-is-pegasus-spyware-and-how-does-it-hack-phones">Pegasus</a> spyware – which is illegal in the European Union. </p>
<p>The EYP has admitted to monitoring journalist Thanasis Koukakis but denied deploying Predator. </p>
<p>The EYP has refused to provide records of the surveillance to prove that Predator was not used, however. And to the surprise of many, EYP director general Panagiotis Kontoleon <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/08/05/greek-intelligence-chief-resigns-over-alleged-spying-scandal">suddenly resigned</a> in August 2022 – although again denying Predator was involved in the wiretapping, admitting only that “incorrect actions” had taken place during “legal surveillance”. Grigoris Dimitriadis, the general secretary of the prime minister’s office (and nephew of Mitsotakis) stepped down within an hour of his departure. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Androulakis claims an independent analysis <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2022-09-12-INT-1-112-0000_EL.html">found Predator software on his phone</a> and is taking a case to Greece’s supreme court.</p>
<h2>A special inquiry goes nowhere</h2>
<p>Mitsotakis promised to shed “significant light” on what had happened in these cases and announced a special parliamentary inquiry. This was a huge risk since he had brought the EYP under his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/07/greek-pm-kyriakos-mitsotakis-under-pressure-over-tapping-of-opponents-phone">personal control</a> after winning the 2019 general election. It was an unusual move, heavily criticised by opposition parties at the time. Now Mitsotakis was leaving himself vulnerable to personal liability by ordering the inquiry. </p>
<p>Questions about how he could not have known about surveillance were bound to arise, as would questions about what prompted Kontoleon and Dimitriadis to resign if no wrongdoing had taken place. Mitsotakis insisted their departure was not an admission of guilt, but both resignations remain unexplained.</p>
<p>Anyone hoping that answers could be given through the inquiry were sorely disappointed when it <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/greek-spyware-inquiry-ends-in-stalemate/">wrapped up</a> without the various parties involved agreeing on any findings. According to Mitsotakis’s party, the allegations about phone hacking “collapsed like a house of cards” under scrutiny. According to opposition parties Syriza and Pasok, the government deliberately sped up the inquiry process to <a href="https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/134278/SYRIZA---PS:-Prwtofanhs-metapoliteytika-methodeysh-fimwshs-twn-boyleytwn-h-mystikh-Olomeleia-gia-tis-ypoklopes---Me-kathe-kinhsh-sygkalypshs-o-k.-Mhtsotakhs-epibebaiwnei-thn-enochh-toy.html">cover up</a> wrongdoing.</p>
<p>Mitsotakis claimed the inquiry proved no wrongdoing had taken place and declared the matter closed.</p>
<p>The fact that key witnesses, including Kontoleon and Dimitriadis, refused to cooperate or answer any questions, citing <a href="https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1192345/wiretapping-probe-veiled-in-confidentiality/">confidentiality</a>, has only added to the sense of injustice among the other parties. The “significant light” Mitsotakis promised to shed is currently missing. Instead, he <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ivFkoZVAWz8">blamed</a> “dark forces outside Greece” for destabilising the country – although did not make clear what these dark forces were. </p>
<h2>The EU steps in</h2>
<p>Nor is this scandal solely an internal matter anymore. The European Union has sent a <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/greek-pm-on-alert-as-eu-parliament-predator-mission-goes-to-athens/">fact finding delegation</a> to Greece to investigate further. This is part of wider work by the European Parliament to investigate the abuse of spyware among EU governments – a mission that Brussels takes seriously enough to have set up a <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022DP0071">dedicated committee</a>.</p>
<p>The committee has already expressed concern about evidence that the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LciskOzRD4Y">Polish government</a> was using spyware and has been investigating similar reports about the Hungarian government monitoring the press. </p>
<p>When Mitsotakis came to power in 2018, he pledged to take on <a href="https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/455961/mitsotakis-o-laikismos-stin-ellada-tha-nikithei-stis-eperhomenes-ekloges">populism</a>. Now he is under investigation alongside the populist leaders who have become notorious in the EU for straining democratic norms. </p>
<p><a href="https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreaming/press-conference-by-sophie-in-t-veld-rapporteur-on-pega-draft-report_20221108-1100-SPECIAL-PRESSER">Presenting the findings</a> of its draft report on the use of spyware by European governments the committee called on the Greek government to provide more information to enable the inquiry to draw accurate conclusions.</p>
<p>Regardless of whether his government is guilty of using spyware against journalists and political opponents, Mitsotakis is behaving like a populist leader by making a sham of the inquiry set up to investigate the problem. Such a lack of commitment to accountability is never a welcome sign in a democratic system.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192537/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgios Samaras does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis admits his intelligence agency surveilled journalists but denies using illegal Predator software on them.Georgios Samaras, Lecturer in Political Economy, Department of Political Economy, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1200292019-07-09T16:33:24Z2019-07-09T16:33:24ZWhat victory for Kyriakos Mitsotakis means for Greece’s relationship with the EU<p>Victory for the centre-right New Democracy party in Greece’s July 7 elections brought to an end four years in power for the radical Syriza government of prime minister Alexis Tsipras, marked by turbulent relations with the EU. But what does the victory for New Democracy leader Kyriakos Mitsotakis mean for Greece’s relationship with the EU, and does it signal the country’s return to the European mainstream? </p>
<p>Since it came to power in Greece in 2015, Syriza maintained a steady path of austerity, despite promising the opposite. It signed <a href="https://fortune.com/2016/06/03/greece-eurozone/">an additional bailout agreement</a> with the EU and deepened cuts in welfare, pensions and the public sector. Nonetheless, it also insisted on shifting the blame for Greece’s predicament onto the EU. </p>
<p>In August 2018, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-bailout-tsipras/tsipras-declares-day-of-liberation-after-greece-exits-bailout-idUSKCN1L60PX">Tsipras declared Greece’s exit</a> from bailout supervision, but the country remains bound by an agreement to complete reforms and sustain a direction of fiscal discipline. Greek voters’ disappointment with Syriza continued, leading to a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-48420697">landslide victory</a> for the centre-right New Democracy party in the European parliamentary elections in May.</p>
<p>Tsipras called a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e9d234c6-8ba4-11e9-a24d-b42f641eca37">snap election</a> for July 7 as the ultimate political solution. The result brought the centre-right New Democracy back to power with an <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/242311/article/ekathimerini/news/tsipras-concedes-defeat-in-election">overall parliamentary majority</a>. But the road ahead is rocky for Mitsotakis. </p>
<p>The new government has a short grace period both domestically and with the EU. Despite Greek calls to postpone discussing the economy’s progress at a Eurogroup meeting of ministers on <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/07/08/remarks-by-mario-centeno-following-the-eurogroup-meeting-of-8-july-2019/">July 8</a> because of the elections, Greece remained on the agenda. Europe is clearly continuing to monitor the Greek economy’s performance closely. </p>
<p>At the same time, New Democracy promised to introduce a number of tax cuts, increase foreign investment flows and make further reforms to the public sector. Tax cuts require savings to be found elsewhere, and that means Mitsotakis is likely to follow an austerity agenda too. But he must remember that the Greek electorate punished Tsipras for doing just this, and voters have now placed significant hopes on new leadership and a new direction. Mitsotakis will have to perform a balancing act between delivering on his promises and satisfying the EU – but he has little time to act, as both the EU and the Greek electorate want quick results. </p>
<h2>Austerity repackaged</h2>
<p>Since 2010, Greece’s reputation within the EU has been heavily scarred by the financial crisis and the bailout agreements. Seen as a pariah state and a peripheral country, its negotiating capacity diminished alongside its ability to project its national interests within Europe. Brussels may see new opportunities for a strong centre-right government to push a fresh austerity agenda.</p>
<p>Mitsotakis certainly has allies at the European level. The newly configured European institutions means he is surrounded by friendly political actors, ideologically aligned with his centre-right policy platform of stability. </p>
<p>While the EU need not worry about a U-turn in public policy in Greece, a prolonged agenda of stability – essentially a codename with which to reframe austerity – could bear significant political cost to New Democracy. As minister of administrative reform between 2013-15, Mitsotakis was linked to a number of important public sector reforms included in the previous Greek bailout packages, and he will carry that legacy with him during his term as prime minister.</p>
<h2>Repositioning Greece within the EU</h2>
<p>Beyond the economy, Greece has three more burning issues to consider in the context of its European relationship.</p>
<p>The first surrounds migration flows and refugees. The rise of far-right party Golden Dawn in the past pushed New Democracy further to the right on some issues, such as migration. Some less hardcore Golden Dawn supporters may have also been attracted to New Democracy by its promise for stronger immigration control and border security. Delivering on that promise will require further cooperation with the EU, including financial help to accommodate refugees on Greek soil. Given the current views on immigration in Europe, including those of New Democracy’s <a href="https://www.eppgroup.eu/newsroom/publications/position-paper-on-migration">sister parties</a> at EU level, which have become increasingly conservative when it comes to border policy, this presents another challenge ahead.</p>
<p>The second issue is over North Macedonia. Tsipras was credited by Brussels with the successful completion of the 2018 Prespa agreement, in which Greece recognised its neighbouring country’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/north-macedonia-name-change-both-heals-and-divides/a-48194331-0">name as North Macedonia</a>. The deal was opposed by New Democracy and it cost Tsipras votes in the north of Greece. The normalisation of relations with North Macedonia, and the implementation of other aspects of the agreement, remain a challenge for a patriotically oriented party such as New Democracy, which may not attempt to stir matters further.</p>
<p>Third is the issue of Turkey and Cyprus. Tsipras left Greek-Turkish relations in a state of brinkmanship over the exploitation of gas and oil fields in the seabed south of Cyprus. While European companies were tasked with drilling in these fields, the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, questioned Greek sovereignty and international sea borders. Yet, he was the first foreign leader to <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkish-president-congratulates-greek-premier-elect/1525663">congratulate Mitsotakis</a> on his victory, which could signal a new period of rapprochement.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cyprus-dangerous-row-over-gas-exploration-dates-back-to-british-colonial-meddling-119331">Cyprus: dangerous row over gas exploration dates back to British colonial meddling</a>
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<p>Political analysts should not be quick to dismiss left-wing populism altogether in Greece. As <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jcms.12093">research</a> my colleagues and I have done has demonstrated, populism is widespread across the spectrum of Greek political parties. Syriza’s vote percentage will allow it to use its well-tested left-wing populist strategy in opposition to the new government, which could prompt New Democracy to respond with right-wing populism. </p>
<p>This strategy is likely to involve wooing political elements who are less prone to domestic reform, and could put New Democracy at odds with its own European agenda. So while Europe hopes for change in Greek politics, politics in Greece may not have changed after all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120029/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theofanis Exadaktylos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The road ahead remains rocky for Greece’s newly elected prime minister.Theofanis Exadaktylos, Senior Lecturer in European Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/477902015-09-21T12:01:27Z2015-09-21T12:01:27ZGreek election: Tsipras trounces his opponents, but at what cost?<p>In the latest episode of the seemingly never-ending Greek crisis, the election of September 20 marked another <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/20/greece-election-result-the-key-numbers">decisive victory for Syriza</a> – and especially for its leader, Alexis Tsipras. </p>
<p>As in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-polls-got-it-so-wrong-in-the-british-election-41530">UK elections</a>, opinion polls failed to predict the considerable gap between Syriza (35.5% of the vote) and centre-right opposition party New Democracy (28% of the vote), with most pre-election surveys indicating a very close battle. </p>
<p>In another surprise, no seats were won by Syriza’s splinter party <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-alexis-tsipras-has-called-a-snap-election-in-greece-46496">Popular Unity</a>, which accused Tsipras of treason for signing Greece up to a deal with the so-called “troika” (the European Commission, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank). </p>
<h2>Natural coalition</h2>
<p>Further confounding predictions was the popularity of Syriza’s populist right-wing coalition partner, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/26/greece-elections-who-are-independent-greeks">Independent Greeks</a> (ANEL). Contrary to the polls, the party managed to enter parliament with ten seats. Its leader, Panos Kammenos, announced that the Syriza-ANEL coalition government will be renewed, while Tsipras promised a four-year government.</p>
<p>It should be noted that ANEL was supported enthusiastically by Tsipras, who claimed numerous times that ANEL was the only party he was willing to collaborate with, and that any other coalition would be “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34249754">unnatural</a>”. Despite their differences, Syriza and ANEL have an ideological affinity over <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2015/02/05/greek-elections-2015-the-beginning-of-the-end-or-the-end-of-the-beginning/">anti-western populism</a>. This paradoxical coalition, however, is now expected to implement a western-led austerity package in order to satisfy the troika. </p>
<p>Shockingly, neo-Nazi party <a href="https://theconversation.com/for-the-sake-of-greece-they-must-get-the-golden-dawn-trial-right-41395">Golden Dawn</a> remains Greece’s third party, winning almost 7% of the vote (slightly higher than the January 2015 elections) even after its leader publicly accepted the “<a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/201623/article/ekathimerini/news/golden-dawn-chief-accepts-partys-political-responsibility-in-fyssas-murder">political responsibility</a>” for the assassination of a left wing musician Pavlos Fyssas. </p>
<p>Golden Dawn’s persistence shows that a part of the Greek electorate openly supports a neo-Nazi party which uses violence as political strategy and tool and remains loyal to its message of hate and nationalistic totalitarianism. </p>
<p>It should be noted that Golden Dawn (along with Syriza) is predominantly supported by <a href="http://greece.greekreporter.com/2014/10/20/why-do-young-greeks-vote-for-golden-dawn/">young voters</a>. Greeks have had many options to punish the establishment by voting for any of the country’s array of protest parties; voting Golden Dawn in this election shows there’s a cohort of voters doggedly loyalty to the party, potentially a considerable problem for Greece’s future political stability. </p>
<h2>Pyrrhic victory</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the biggest winner in the September election was Tsipras. </p>
<p>His <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-alexis-tsipras-has-called-a-snap-election-in-greece-46496">call to hold snap elections</a> turned out to be a masterstroke of Machiavellian political ingenuity. </p>
<p>On one hand, Tsipras managed a very efficient move to get rid of his internal opposition without even facing them in public. On the other hand, he saved face for his anti-austerity u-turn and now has legitimacy to implement three more years of harsh austerity which he agreed before the elections. That means Tsipras’s power is now more assured than ever, and his popularity clearly intact.</p>
<p>Still, one could argue that Tsipras’ victory was rather pyrrhic. The elections show the <a href="http://greece.greekreporter.com/?s=abstention+rate">highest abstention rate in Greece’s modern history</a> with almost half of eligible voters not turning out. This shows the disappointment of many voters as well as their silent acceptance that there is <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/07/greek-austerity-dead-long-live-austerity-150712083735451.html">no alternative to austerity</a>, and implies that almost half of Greeks do not feel that any of the existing parties represents them. </p>
<p>Greece is still coming off a prolonged period of reform inertia and political instability. That turbulence can be traced back to Syriza’s victory in the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/26/syriza-european-elections-greece">2014 European elections</a>, after which the Samaras government did little to implement much needed reforms for fear of unpopularity. Then the economy almost stalled after Syriza’s win in <a href="https://theconversation.com/syriza-sweeps-to-victory-in-greek-election-promising-an-end-to-humiliation-36680">January 2015</a>, while the imposition of capital controls dramatically undermined economic stability and confidence both within and outside Greece on economic recovery. </p>
<p>The worst is yet to come. The new government will have to implement a series of unpopular measures such as pension and labour market reforms, privatisations, liberalisation of professions and other structural reforms in healthcare and public administration that will alienate key parts of the Greek electorate. </p>
<p>Still, Tsipras has proven to be a remarkable political maverick. He is greatly skilled in electioneering, and his natural charisma keeps him very popular among Greeks (especially younger ones). It remains to be seen how his transformation from a hard-left radical to a pro-austerity premier will turn out, but so far, he has escaped punishment from the electorate despite reneging on almost all of his pre-2015 promises. </p>
<p>One may argue that Tsipras faces a considerable danger to turn into an unpopular leader as soon as austerity hits Greek voters. As Thomas Hobbes wrote in <a href="http://www.notable-quotes.com/h/hobbes_thomas_ii.html#TJFb0tbh61ljzcgg.99">Leviathan</a>, “where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruin”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47790/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sotirios Zartaloudis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Syriza lives to fight another day, but the omens for Greece’s future are as ominous as ever.Sotirios Zartaloudis, Lecturer in Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/443522015-07-07T02:12:47Z2015-07-07T02:12:47ZVaroufakis exit is not the game changer the EU needs<p>Many observers of the Greek debt crisis believed that after the referendum matters should return to the negotiating table in Brussels for a new round of painful arm-wrestling between Greece and the troika. Before the referendum, it was widely held that a yes vote would shift the balance towards the troika, while a no vote would increase Greece’s leverage in the negotiations. </p>
<p>The underlying assumption has been that it is perfectly rational for the troika and Greece to return to the negotiating table after the referendum. But within hours of the humiliating referendum outcome, the troika regrouped, stood up and delivered a <a href="http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/07/06/minister-no-more/">new blow</a>, resulting in the resignation of Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis.</p>
<p>It is tempting to believe the departure of Varoufakis is a paradigm changer. In reality it is a non sequitur. The eurozone is in real crisis and changing the finance minister of Greece is akin to shuffling the deckchairs on the Titanic. </p>
<p>The minister’s fate was not a shock to everyone - he failed to create <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-next-card-yanis-varoufakis-will-play-37230">sufficient ambiguity</a>. Neither Varoufakis nor the troika has ever mastered the art of tightrope walking, so the negotiations between Greece and its creditors became fraught with deeper and deeper challenges as time wore on. </p>
<p>Just before the referendum took place, the IMF had started <a>recanting its position</a> on Greece, acknowledging Greece would need far more support, along with debt relief, to turn its economy around. This makes the negotiations in Brussels a wild goose chase and both parties know of their <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2015/jun/24/greek-crisis-eurogroup-meeting-tsipras-backlash-live">futility</a>. Would it be fair to ask whether the negotiations were a hoax?</p>
<h2>Rebuilding the flawed EU</h2>
<p>It is an open secret today that the IMF’s policy stance on Greece was a victim of Dominique Strauss-Kahn. In his usual style, he brushed aside professional advice from his economists and objections from many developed nations and put the rock of austerity around the neck of Greece, leading to economic stagnation.</p>
<p>The troika sought to make Greece compete in an international swimming championship when Greece couldn’t even float with that rock tied to its neck.</p>
<p>Deep down, the European Union has fundamental flaws. Any attempt to put a fix on the Greek crisis without rectifying these fundamental flaws will inevitably fail regardless of who is the finance minister of Greece or Germany. </p>
<p>The EU is nothing but a dualistic system with a north-south divide in productivity: most of the southern economies can’t compete with the northern ones, which inevitably leads to trade imbalances between them. Since the entry of Greece into the EU, the north has maintained a trade surplus while the south has suffered from a trade deficit. </p>
<p>The desire of southern governments to create investment booms for increasing productivity led to their indebtedness, with little impacts on their relative productivity vis-à-vis northern EU nations, but with a rising gap in their cost of production due to increasing wages. This begs a question of how the EU can overcome such long-run problems.</p>
<h2>More lessons from Germany</h2>
<p>One possible model can be found in Germany’s constitution.</p>
<p>The German Basic Law (Germany’s constitution) is founded on the philosophy of ensuring each tier of government has adequate access to financial resources. It is graphic about the allocation of revenues from the major taxes among the Federation, Länder (German states) and municipal governments. All three tiers of government share the personal income tax while the Federation and the Länder share corporate taxes and the proceeds from the German value-added tax (VAT). Beyond this agreement, even if there is no constitutional mandate, a business tax is also shared among these three tiers of government. This fiscal equalisation ensures that the poorer Länder are equalised to at least 95% of the average revenues of all Länder. </p>
<p>In the absence of fiscal equalisation and the divergence in productivity, the current Greek negotiations will fail to overcome economic dualism in the EU. </p>
<p>The EU will move from one crisis to another if it relies solely on negotiations of debts without real reforms in the fiscal arena.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44352/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Partha Gangopadhyay does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ongoing negotiations between Greece and the troika are likely to prove futile - what’s needed is a complete rethink of EU’s dualistic system.Partha Gangopadhyay, Associate Professor of Economics, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/413952015-05-06T17:12:12Z2015-05-06T17:12:12ZFor the sake of Greece they must get the Golden Dawn trial right<p>The <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/greece-far-right-golden-dawn-nikos-michaloliakos-trial-start">trial of 69 members of Golden Dawn</a>, Greece’s far-right party, has been a stop-start affair, with the emphasis on “stop”. And if the experience of day one of the trial on April 20 – which opened and then was quickly adjourned – is anything to go by, then you would have to be concerned about how long the trial will run, its complexity and the serious risk of social unrest that it might cause. </p>
<p>Inside the courtroom were dozens of lawyers, victims, press and defendants while outside were hundreds of people from anti-fascist groups and local organisations who had marched to the courthouse to witness the trial opening. There were also reports that <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32378578">Golden Dawn supporters attacked witnesses</a> arriving in court.</p>
<p>In the face of all this – and Greece’s much-publicised money troubles – getting the Golden Dawn trial right could not be more vital. The more Europe repeats the threat of “ostracising” Greece for failing to meet the demands of its lenders, the more convincing Golden Dawn’s nationalist and isolationist message will sound.</p>
<p>There is a risk that the trial and its attendant publicity could catapult Golden Dawn into unprecedented levels of public support, especially if the trial fails to demonstrate what the hundreds of pages of legal indictment clearly argue: that it is a criminal organisation posing as a political party.</p>
<p>The rhetoric of the party in relation to the trial is already one of political persecution. Their leader signs his memoranda as a <a href="http://www.xryshaygh.com/en/view/we-want-justice-and-the-truth-to-shine-article-by-n.-g.-michaloliakos">political prisoner</a>, and the party bluntly accuses the former “Conservative” government of having orchestrated these prosecutions.</p>
<h2>Justice must be seen to be done</h2>
<p>To avoid the pitfall of highly damaging Golden Dawn propaganda, there are pragmatic issues that must first be tackled head on. The constitution, the code of criminal procedure and Supreme Court jurisprudence all mandate that unrestricted access to criminal trials be provided to anyone who might wish to follow the proceedings.</p>
<p>At the very least, the court must therefore reserve a number of seats for the general public. But on the first day of the trial, access to court was severely restricted. If possible, national television should broadcast proceedings, but in any case, every effort must be made to facilitate the work of the media – there should be no scope for Golden Dawn to claim that the proceedings are in breach of the publicity principle.</p>
<p>The court then needs to ensure proceedings run smoothly so they don’t put too great a strain on its limited resources. A 17-day adjournment on the first day of the trial – as a result of one of the defendants appearing in court without legal representation – was not the best start and does not bode well for avoiding possible delaying tactics in the later stages of the process. There will be many more occasions where respecting the defendants’ right to a fair trial will – quite rightly – lengthen the proceedings. </p>
<h2>Why 69?</h2>
<p>So why opt for such a complex trial with 69 defendants? The answer lies in article 187 of the Greek criminal code, which provides the main basis for the Golden Dawn prosecution. This criminalises the act of setting up or joining an hierarchical criminal organisation of three or more members – which continuously sets out to commit a range of serious offences. This massive trial is the best way to hold Golden Dawn to account as a criminal organisation – rather than just punishing its individual members for the specific criminal acts that they are suspected of having committed.</p>
<p>But this approach brings its own problems – it is expected that in most cases the court’s inquiries as to membership in the criminal organisation will go hand-in-hand with establishing the liability of the defendants for the specific crimes the indictment is based upon. These include murder, attempted murder, criminal damage, assaults and other violent offences. But where this is not possible, there is the risk of deducing from mere membership in the political party – or from sharing its extremist ideology – a membership in the synonymous criminal organisation. So, while the trial sets out to show that Golden Dawn is a criminal organisation – it must not hold that every member is a criminal. </p>
<p>To avoid this risk, the prosecution will have to demonstrate that “each member subjects her or his will to the group” and that “the intention to pursue serious crimes consists of a general manifest preparedness that the crimes be committed”. To explore this further, it is worth reading this analysis by <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/05/06/the-trial-of-golden-dawn-members-is-a-legitimate-criminal-case-not-political-persecution/">Emmanuel Melissaris</a>.</p>
<p>Crucially, to ensure a fair trial, the criminal liability of each of the 69 defendants must be investigated with sufficient specificity – and his or her role and participation in the activities of the criminal organisation fully established. In a mammoth trial like this, this is easier said than done, but the difficulty of the enterprise should not allow the court to lose sight of its vital importance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41395/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The prosecution of 69 members of Greece’s extreme right political party must be constitutional, fair and conducted in the full glare of public attention.Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, Senior lecturer, Brunel University LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/359382015-01-16T06:17:16Z2015-01-16T06:17:16ZGreece’s choice: vote for Germany or suffer the consequences<p>A joke that is often told among European leftists these days portrays the current situation between Germany and Greece quite accurately. An officer at the passport control at Athens airport asks a tourist: “What is your nationality?” He replies: “German.”</p>
<p>The officer then asks: “Occupation?”</p>
<p>Whereupon the tourist replies: “No, only visiting.”</p>
<p>The German tourist stands for the ambiguous position that the government in Berlin takes towards Greece: today the Germans might be just visiting, but Berlin’s intervention in Greece’s domestic politics might well have permanent effects.</p>
<h2>Your money or your life</h2>
<p>Only weeks before legislative elections in Athens, German politicians and press are confronting Greek voters with a choice that can more or less be rendered as “your money or your life”: vote for the status quo, or risk being kicked out of the eurozone. </p>
<p>Syriza, which is <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/07/us-greece-election-polls-idUSKBN0KG1OP20150107">performing well</a> in pre-election polls, demands a cancellation of a big part of the country’s crushing debts. In the run-up to the election, Der Spiegel <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/merkel-and-germany-open-to-possible-greek-euro-zone-exit-a-1011277.html#ref=plista">reported</a> that Angela Merkel was ready to accept the exit of Greece from the eurozone if a new Greek government would not hold tight to austerity measures; a German government official was quoted saying that “resourceful lawyers will find a way” to kick Greece out.</p>
<p>Greece was confronted with another non-choice three years ago. Former Greek prime minister George Papandreou suggested <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/caretaker-government-in-athens-greece-backs-away-from-referendum-plans-a-795746.html">holding a referendum</a> on the EU bailout package. Merkel and former French prime minister Nicolas Sarkozy reacted promptly and threatened to suspend their financial warrents for Greece. The humiliated Papandreou could not keep his promise to hold a referendum in the face of their opposition, and his tenure was soon over.</p>
<p>But Syriza’s leaders have made it absolutely clear they have no intention of leaving the euro. Their promises <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/augstein-kolumne-griechenland-und-seine-schulden-a-1010909.html">focus on the domestic realm</a>: improving the health care for those that suffered most in the crisis, introducing a minimum wage, and raising taxes on the rich. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the party’s demand for <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-syriza-election-win-would-be-a-serious-setback-for-greece-35576">debt cancellation</a> worries the German political elite less than it would have a couple of years ago. This time, rather than being bailed out, Greece could simply be asked to leave.</p>
<h2>Double standard</h2>
<p>A glance at history immediately clarifies the real difference between “good” and “bad” debts. The first countries to break the Maastricht Treaty, which bound all European signatories to keep their annual deficits below 3% of GDP, were Germany and France. At that stage in the early 2000s, and for those countries, rigid financial discipline was deemed narrow-minded. </p>
<p>As Der Spiegel <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-ticking-euro-bomb-how-the-euro-zone-ignored-its-own-rules-a-790333.html">recounts</a>, the Franco-German behaviour at the time was resolute: “Determined not to submit to sanctions, [they] managed to secure a majority in the EU’s Council of Economic and Finance Ministers to cancel the European Commission’s sanction procedure.”</p>
<p>Conversely, Greek political scientist Yannis Stavrakakis <a href="https://www.academia.edu/8727834/Debt_Society_Greece_and_the_future_of_Post-democracy">remembers</a> how his country became “overnight” the “sick man of Europe, a <em>bête noire</em> to be ridiculed, condemned and disciplined in the most severe way”. As he sees it, debt is being used as a tool in today’s Euro crisis “to threaten, subject, and control” countries that do not want to adhere to austerity politics made in Germany. </p>
<p>There are some voices in Germany taking a more circumspect line. The government’s chief economist, Marcel Fratzscher, recently <a href="http://greece.greekreporter.com/2015/01/10/diw-berlin-50-of-the-greek-debt-should-be-written-off/">floated</a> the idea that Germany “should probably reduce Greece’s public debt to half, which means €120 billion should be written off”. But he also acknowledged that this would harm Germany, and is highly unlikely ever to happen.</p>
<p>On January 25, the Greeks will decide who is going to become their next president, but the German government has already decided who it shouldn’t be. How sad that Germany’s contemporary politics are putting in jeopardy the very European democracy that they once helped build.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35938/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jasper Finkeldey receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).</span></em></p>A joke that is often told among European leftists these days portrays the current situation between Germany and Greece quite accurately. An officer at the passport control at Athens airport asks a tourist…Jasper Finkeldey, PhD student, Centre for Work, Organization, and Society, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/360342015-01-14T06:10:52Z2015-01-14T06:10:52ZMarkets threaten Greek democracy ahead of election<p>Greece faces a decisive moment on January 25 in a snap election that could see major gains for the extreme left and right. But anyone worried about how Syriza on one side, or Golden Dawn on the other, might handle power, should consider a far more sinister force that has conspired to keep Greece away from recovery for years – the international markets.</p>
<p>If <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/07/us-greece-election-polls-idUSKBN0KG1OP20150107">recent polls are accurate</a> Syriza, an alliance of left-wing parties firmly opposed to the country’s harsh bailout terms, will take office. To do that, it has to first overcome the relentless, and staunchly anti-democratic, warnings being issued by some upholders of capitalism’s vested interests. </p>
<p>The coalition that currently mis-governs Greece has done its best for two years to implement dutifully draconian austerity packages. With support now flagging, it hopes to receive a renewed mandate for this at the ballot box. Its austerity packages are designed by pseudo-technocrats at the European Commission in Brussels and enthusiastically backed by the German Bundesbank. </p>
<p>The proclaimed purpose of Greece’s austerity measures does not even end at deficit elimination. The Greek government has been tasked not merely with balancing the books, but with generating a surplus too. The surplus would go to reduce the country’s public debt, which currently stands at almost <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/publicdata/explore?ds=ds22a34krhq5p_&met_y=gd_pc_gdp&idim=country:el:it:es&hl=en&dl=en#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=gd_pc_gdp&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=country_group&idim=country:el&ifdim=country_group&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false">130% of GDP</a>.</p>
<h2>Ravaging of Greece</h2>
<p>The global financial crisis of 2008 resulted in fiscal deficits throughout the world, with EU member states hit particularly hard. In 2009, the Greek fiscal deficit stood at <a href="http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2013/9/cjv33n3-13.pdf">-15.6%</a> – the largest relative to GDP for any eurozone country. In absolute terms this 15.6 per cent represented about than €36 billion.</p>
<p>The deficit had dropped by a third by the end of 2010 to just under €24 billion. But this substantial decline failed to satisfy the austerity appetites of the European Commission, the German government or Bundesbank. By the end of 2014 the Greek fiscal balance was projected to drop to about -3% of GDP or €6.5 billion, as the chart below shows. The chart also shows one indicator of the enormous cost of that reduction in the public deficit; a drop in national income of 18% (26% lower than in 2008). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68484/original/image-20150108-23807-145560m.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68484/original/image-20150108-23807-145560m.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68484/original/image-20150108-23807-145560m.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68484/original/image-20150108-23807-145560m.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68484/original/image-20150108-23807-145560m.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68484/original/image-20150108-23807-145560m.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68484/original/image-20150108-23807-145560m.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Preliminary estimates for 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">http://www.oecd.org & http://www.statista.com/statistics/270398/budget-balance-in-greece/</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These policies brought a reduction of the fiscal deficit by €17.4 billion, at a cost in national income of more than double that figure. No western European country has suffered such a collapse of GDP since the end of World War II. We cannot find one example of a developed capitalist country with a lower national income than it had four years previously in any year between 1945 and 2010.</p>
<p>There have been no signs of respite, though, from Greece’s austerity enforcers. The ideologues in the European Commission and the Bundesbank apparently remain committed to destroying the Greek economy in order to save it.</p>
<p>This ravaging of the economy is evidenced by almost every measure of human welfare in Greece, to the extent that some now refer to a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/11/greece-humanitarian-crisis-eu">“humanitarian crisis”</a> in the country.</p>
<p>Total household consumption adjusted for inflation is now 20% lower than it was in 2010. And that measure includes rich households whose wealth could <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/capital-flight-southern-european-money-migrating-north-to-safety-a-818436.html">protect them</a> from the brunt of austerity. The decline for households below the average income was certainly in excess of 25% and perhaps over 30%. Four in ten children are being <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/oct/28/child-poverty-developed-world-unicef-report-global-recession">brought up in poverty</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68485/original/image-20150108-23812-abmt0d.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68485/original/image-20150108-23812-abmt0d.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68485/original/image-20150108-23812-abmt0d.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68485/original/image-20150108-23812-abmt0d.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68485/original/image-20150108-23812-abmt0d.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68485/original/image-20150108-23812-abmt0d.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68485/original/image-20150108-23812-abmt0d.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Preliminary estimates for 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.oecd.org</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Greece’s level of unemployment challenges the imagination. It has stood at 25% or more for two years – the same as the rate in the US in the 1930s during the great depression. Since the end of World War II <a href="http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/353/2iie3438.pdf">no European market economy</a> suffered unemployment of half the current Greek rate. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68487/original/image-20150108-23810-1182lgx.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68487/original/image-20150108-23810-1182lgx.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68487/original/image-20150108-23810-1182lgx.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68487/original/image-20150108-23810-1182lgx.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68487/original/image-20150108-23810-1182lgx.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68487/original/image-20150108-23810-1182lgx.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68487/original/image-20150108-23810-1182lgx.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.oecd.org</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Things are even worse for young people. Less than <a href="https://ycharts.com/indicators/sources/eurostat">50%</a> were in employment in 2014, and that statistic excludes those in education. These employment figures are but the tip of a human disaster iceberg; health and education are both steadily worsening below the waterline of publicity.</p>
<h2>Speculators vote with their money</h2>
<p>It is little wonder that the only major party opposed to austerity, Syriza, enjoys a lead in the opinion polls. The only surprise is that this anti-austerity party did not win the election in 2012, though it did have the second largest number of seats. </p>
<p>The primary reason for the failure of anti-austerity parties to win the election was the systematic scare campaign carried out by the European media, enthusiastically aided and abetted by the European Commission and every major EU government without exception.</p>
<p>The source of this putative reign of terror would be none other than the infamous “financial markets”, and the warning is <a href="http://time.com/3648338/greece-financial-crisis-election/">again pouring forth</a> at full volume, alongside more <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/world/europe/greeces-relationship-with-eurozone-is-tested-by-election.html?_r=0">threats from politicians</a> of the eurozone.</p>
<p>These warnings have a real basis. The blue bars in the chart below show the index of the Athens stock market and the red bars the interest rate on Greek government bonds. From the beginning of 2012 interest rates rose and the stock market plunged, as the lords and ladies of finance quivered with anxiety that a democratic election might bring an end to austerity in Greece.</p>
<p>To the relief of speculators throughout Europe, Greek voters returned the right-of-centre government to carry on the lowering of living standards. The relief of speculators at escaping democratic accountability is shown in falling interest rates and a recovering Athens stock market over the next two years. But now the spectre of a citizen’s revolt again stirs anxiety. Interest rates have crept up over the past three months and <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/snap-election-fears-are-tanking-the-greek-stock-market-2014-12">stock prices declined</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68488/original/image-20150108-23792-kz0unw.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68488/original/image-20150108-23792-kz0unw.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68488/original/image-20150108-23792-kz0unw.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68488/original/image-20150108-23792-kz0unw.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68488/original/image-20150108-23792-kz0unw.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68488/original/image-20150108-23792-kz0unw.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68488/original/image-20150108-23792-kz0unw.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.bankofgreece.gr & www.investing.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Democracy or dictatorship?</h2>
<p>In the same election that anti-austerity Syriza won 71 seats, the overtly fascist <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_Dawn_%28political_party%29">Golden Dawn party</a> won 18. Among the far-right parties that have thrived on a diet of austerity-depressed countries, Golden Dawn is perhaps the most dangerous. In October of last year the Greek public prosecutor ordered all Golden Dawn members of parliament to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/16/greece-golden-dawn-mps-tried-criminal-offences">stand trial</a> for inciting, supporting and carrying out acts of political violence.</p>
<p>Without doubt Golden Dawn and all parties like it, such as the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-eu-27571116">Jobbik party</a> in Hungary, are clear and immediate threats to democracy. But they do not present the biggest threat to the democratic process. Considerably more dangerous and infinitely more powerful are the eponymous financial markets. Always alert to any democratic revolt against their privilege to loot and plunder, speculators and the more superficially respectable international bankers have the power to bring down governments and pervert election results. </p>
<p>Europe and most countries of the world need radical measures to restrict – or better still eliminate – the power of finance. The choice is democracy, however flawed it might be, or the dictatorship of finance. It really is that simple.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Weeks does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Greece faces a decisive moment on January 25 in a snap election that could see major gains for the extreme left and right. But anyone worried about how Syriza on one side, or Golden Dawn on the other…John Weeks, Professor Emeritus, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/359652015-01-09T11:44:47Z2015-01-09T11:44:47ZWhy are European leaders so afraid of Greece’s Syriza party?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68354/original/image-20150107-1985-1sd48vw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Alexis Tsipras is on track to win the Greek election.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/home_of_chaos/14274791564/in/photolist-nKq3cW-nsY83t-oZix82-4fw4C9-aBA6JJ-5BvCxF-5BzSJb-5BvBkM-5BvAjn-bWGoiy-dCYY8Y-dCYYbh">thierry ehrmann</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The calling of a snap election in Greece for January 25 has been met with great <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30623421">concern in political circles</a>, prompted direct interventions by <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/14/greece-election-eu-finance-chief-athens-grexit-fears">top European officials</a> and alarmed markets and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/30/fitch-snap-greek-elections-add-to-credit-idUSFit88538020141230">credit rating agencies</a>.</p>
<p>This is all because Syriza, the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left, is being tipped to win the election. It is currently the largest opposition party in the Greek parliament and consistently leads the polls as the vote approaches. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="http://www.ft.com/fastft/257212/syriza-set-decisive-victory-report">latest polls</a> Syriza’s vote share could stretch anywhere between 36% to 40%, with the centre-right New Democracy trailing by at least three percentage points. Anything above 36% gives Syriza not only an electoral victory but an outright governing majority in the Greek parliament because the winning party is automatically handed a <a href="http://metapolls.net/country-facts-2/greece/greek-electoral-system/">50-seat bonus</a> in the 300-seat parliament.</p>
<p>Opponents claim that Syriza would renege on Greece’s international obligations if it came to power and that efforts to reform the country would be halted. <a href="https://theconversation.com/january-poll-puts-syriza-in-driving-seat-and-greece-on-course-for-economic-turmoil-35824">Political instability</a> would ensue and the eurozone would again be plunged into crisis. Talk of Greece leaving the euro has been particularly prominent of late.</p>
<h2>Syriza’s roots</h2>
<p>Syriza emerged as a unified party just before the elections of June 2012 but it brings together political groups with long histories. It can be seen as the accomplished product of an effort to unite the Greek left that spans nearly 50 years. </p>
<p>Syriza’s political strategy draws heavily on the principles of the Euro-communist <a href="http://www.transform-network.net/cs/casopis/vytisk-132013/news/detail/Journal/what-syriza-will-propose-to-europe.html">“democratic road to socialism”</a>. Its values, organisation and mobilisation are influenced by the global justice movement. </p>
<p>The party advocates an eclectic egalitarian economic programme that draws on Marxism, Keynesianism and more recent Latin American economic experiments. It goes hand-in-hand with claims for the expansion of social and political rights, pacifism and environmentalism, as articulated by European and global social movements since the 1960s. This also ties in with a staunch, albeit critical, Europeanism that aims to build alliances with other progressive political and social forces in Europe in order to achieve radical root-and-branch reform of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/13608746.2012.757455#.VKvxkiusXTo">European integration</a>.</p>
<h2>The manifesto</h2>
<p>According to the <a href="http://www.businessinsider.sg/what-syriza-stands-for-2014-12/">Thessaloniki programme</a> that lies at the heart of Syriza’s election pledges, the party is committed to renegotiating Greece’s colossal debt. Despite five years of extreme austerity, this still exceeds 170% of GDP. Syriza wants a 50% debt write-off as part of a wider European Debt Conference along the lines of the German debt <a href="http://www.dw.de/german-economic-miracle-thanks-to-debt-relief/a-16630511/">write-off of 1953</a>. </p>
<p>The programme also includes a promise to replace the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/mou/2012-03-01-greece-mou_en.pdf">2010 bail-out agreement</a> signed with the Europe with a long-term national plan aimed at the reconstruction of the Greek economy.</p>
<p>Syriza will also put in place a set of emergency measures meant to alleviate what it calls the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-18/what-syriza-says-about-greece-s-economy-its-debt-and-the-euro.html">“humanitarian crisis”</a> caused by austerity. Minimum wages and public investments will be increased to trigger consumer demand, create jobs and kickstart growth. Only then, Syriza argues, will the country be able to repay its debt. Exhaustive negotiations will be conducted with creditors and European partners but Greece will remain in the eurozone.</p>
<p>The reforms envisaged involve the democratic refoundation of the Greek state. This means unsettling decades of collusion between big business, media groups and political parties. Syriza may indeed be well placed to make such a radical change work since it has not been a party of government and has not been involved in such practices.</p>
<p>Syriza also believes that Europe as a whole must be reformed. German-inspired austerity politics, the party argues, are leading the whole enterprise to ruin. The party wants a new deal for the EU involving public investment, financed by the European Investment Bank. It supports a shift towards quantitative easing by the European Central Bank that involves direct purchases of sovereign bonds. This is, in many ways, Syriza’s most ambitious goal and probably the hardest to achieve.</p>
<p>How far Syriza gets will depend on the magnitude of political support it can muster at home but also on the alliances it builds beyond the limited forces of Europe’s radical left, even counting <a href="https://theconversation.com/meet-podemos-the-party-revolutionising-spanish-politics-33802">an emergent Podemos</a> in Spain and the German <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30342441">Die Linke</a>.</p>
<p>The party’s success in the forthcoming election may mark a turning point in Europe. It would be a step away from austerity and towards a resurgence of the left. But this is not the social democratic left. It is a radical new experiment. It is perhaps this, and not the potential for economic turmoil under a Syriza government that scares European leaders the most.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35965/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Myrto Tsakatika is a member of Syriza</span></em></p>The calling of a snap election in Greece for January 25 has been met with great concern in political circles, prompted direct interventions by top European officials and alarmed markets and credit rating…Myrto Tsakatika, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/358292014-12-31T17:30:01Z2014-12-31T17:30:01ZSyriza surges ahead of January election as Greek voters reject austerity<p>The snap election called in Greece for January 25 has <a href="https://theconversation.com/january-poll-puts-syriza-in-driving-seat-and-greece-on-course-for-economic-turmoil-35824">renewed speculation about the country’s uncertain future</a> as left-of-centre Syriza looks likely to capitalise on the unprecedented unpopularity of the ruling coalition of conservative New Democracy and socialists PASOK to snatch power – perhaps with an absolute majority. </p>
<p>Syriza, which has come from virtually nowhere (3% in the polls in 2009 to 28% at the end of 2014) has little experience in national politics and its commitment to renegotiating the terms of Greece’s bailout could represent a serious concern for the country’s creditors. The impact this could have for the Eurozone is even more worrying – the potential knock-on effects of an unprecedented exit from the Euro for the global financial system should the Greek government decide, or be forced, to abandon the common currency, are difficult to predict. </p>
<p>Domestically, the immediate consequences of a disorderly departure for Greece’s economy and its people are all-too predictable: a run on the banks and ensuing social disorder are the first to spring to mind. Greece’s overall unemployment rate has topped 20% for four consecutive years now (and reached almost 27% in 2013) with youth unemployment above 50%, many people in Greece have reached breaking point. <a href="https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000338137/The+dynamics+of+migration+in+the+euro+area.PDF">Emigration among educated young people is at record high levels</a>.</p>
<p>The human cost of austerity policies has been immense. <a href="https://damomac.wordpress.com/2014/10/29/unicef-greece-suffers-great-leap-backwards-in-child-poverty/">According to UNICEF</a>, childhood poverty increased by 20% between 2008 and 2012 as well as a four-fold increase in the number of families with two or more unemployed members during the same period – it is not uncommon to see people searching for food in garbage cans in Athens. But with the level of debt reaching <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/greece/government-debt-to-gdp">175% of Greek GDP in 2013</a> from 120% in 2010 when Greece entered the bailout, it is virtually impossible for an incoming government to either reduce the deficit or to tackle poverty. </p>
<p>Greece’s <a href="http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/30/the-question-hanging-over-greek-debt/?_r=0">total debt</a>, which presently stands at €360 billion, is not only unsustainable but also politically unacceptable – and a substantial debt reduction, though unpopular with many European parliaments, is the only possible and right decision that the European Union must seriously consider.</p>
<p>The EU governments’ decision to rescue their private lenders from their bad investments by underwriting banks’ debts and squeezing their own citizens to pay these back has led to an impasse. Bondholders and lenders need to realise that maintaining the existing course of action in Greece and elsewhere could result in the loss of all of their money. Meanwhile apportioning blame and punishing the Greek population collectively for the parlous state of the national economy has bred resentment rather than bringing the country nearer to any productive solutions.</p>
<h2>Voters reject austerity</h2>
<p>It may be a fact that many ordinary Greeks do all they can to evade taxes – and the lack of outrage at some of the more nefarious practises of successive governments has enabled widespread corruption, but the fact remains that <a href="https://theconversation.com/snap-election-and-market-collapse-show-greece-is-still-crippled-by-crisis-35347">more austerity will not get the country out of an impossibly bad situation</a>. And here is the problem – the coalition of socialist and conservative governments have asked Greek people to do just that: they have called on ordinary people to make continuous “sacrifices” by accepting ever greater cuts in salaries and pensions to pay down the debt.</p>
<p>The Greek population’s anger at this state of affairs has until now been successfully diverted towards lenders and the troika (IMF, EU, ECB) who are being held responsible for Greece’s woes.</p>
<p>So it should come as no surprise that voters <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/29/syriza-leading-polls-future-begun-alexis-tsipras-greece">are turning to Syriza</a> which promises to restore the minimum wage and create a safety net for those who are hardest hit by the crisis – offer free access to health care for those who need it and electricity to those whose supply has been cut since they could not pay their income tax (which is attached to the electricity bill). </p>
<p>Whether Syriza is able to deliver on these promises remains to be seen. But the EU has little to lose and much to gain from supporting a democratically elected government of Greece, especially if it has a mandate to address the social costs of European integration. After all, the European Union was never meant as an economic, custom or monetary union only. Right from the outset, it had a social dimension. </p>
<p>The cost of neglecting this dimension through austerity policies and the democratic deficit in the EU, has led to the rise of the far right in Europe. Without seeing a better future for themselves and without having a say over the direction of the European project, citizens in many countries will continue to discuss rejecting union. The possibility of an anti-austerity government being elected in Greece might open up a space for re-imagining the European project</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35829/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marianna Fotaki does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The snap election called in Greece for January 25 has renewed speculation about the country’s uncertain future as left-of-centre Syriza looks likely to capitalise on the unprecedented unpopularity of the…Marianna Fotaki, Network Fellow, Edmond J Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University and Professor of Business Ethics, Warwick Business School, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.