tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/guinea-bissau-29100/articlesGuinea Bissau – The Conversation2022-11-09T14:12:58Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1922742022-11-09T14:12:58Z2022-11-09T14:12:58ZClimate change: West Africa’s oceans at risk because of a lack of monitoring<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492280/original/file-20221028-53244-can6ka.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The West African coastline is a source of livelihood for millions.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons/Paul Walter</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Canary-Current">West African Canary Current</a> extends along the north-west African coast, from the northern Atlantic coast of Morocco to Guinea-Bissau. It’s a hotspot for changes in the oceans driven by climate change. These include rising temperatures, <a href="https://www.nrdc.org/stories/what-you-need-know-about-ocean-acidification">ocean acidification</a> and <a href="https://scripps.ucsd.edu/research/climate-change-resources/faq-ocean-deoxygenation#:%7E:text=Deoxygenation%20is%20the%20overall%20decline,through%20photosynthesis%2C%20ventilation%2C%20mixing.">ocean deoxygenation</a>. All affect marine life on multiple levels. </p>
<p>The current is one of the world’s most productive ocean ecosystems, a consequence of the upwelling of cold and nutrient-rich waters. Ecosystems like this provide around <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590332221004115#:%7E:text=Expanding%20ocean%20observation%20and%20climate%20services%20to%20build%20resilience%20in%20West%20African%20fisheries,-Author%20links%20open&text=The%20Canary%20Current%20is%20a,for%20national%20economies%20and%20livelihoods">20% of global fish catches</a> and support livelihoods in coastal communities. </p>
<p>From 2016 -2019, we worked with an international team to draw attention to the impacts of climate change on the West African Canary Current. In a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590332221004115#:%7E:text=Expanding%20ocean%20observation%20and%20climate%20services%20to%20build%20resilience%20in%20West%20African%20fisheries,-Author%20links%20open&text=The%20Canary%20Current%20is%20a,for%20national%20economies%20and%20livelihoods.">recent publication</a>, we described the limited economic and institutional capacity to monitor and respond to climate variability and change in the countries bordering the West African Canary Current and the urgent need to build scientific capacity in the region in order address this shortcoming.</p>
<h2>What’s missing</h2>
<p>The waters of the West African Canary Current share a key characteristic with those of the coast of Oregon in the Pacific north west of America – namely ocean acidification. This happens when the large amounts of carbon dioxide being absorbed by the ocean dissolves in seawater as carbonic acid.</p>
<p>In 2007 shellfish growers in Oregon were nearly all wiped out economically due to increasing acidity of the ocean. The waters they grew their shellfish in had become corrosive to calcium carbonate – the building block for the skeletons and shells of shellfish and corals. The waters they farmed in had become corrosive to the shells of the sea butterfly, <em>Limacina helicina</em>, a delicate sea snail that is only 5mm across. The snail underpins key marine food webs that sustain herring, salmon, whales, seals, seabirds and other species. </p>
<p>But in California, people who depend on the ocean for their livelihood are in a position to understand, anticipate and to some degree adapt to the impacts of climate change on the region. This is thanks to an extensive network of state-of-the-art sensors and input from researchers from academia and the US government.</p>
<p>This is not the case in West Africa. There is only a single mooring – these are long anchored lines of scientific equipment and floats which are deployed to collect a range of ocean data over long periods – managed by French researchers to monitor the impacts of climate change on the West African Canary Current. </p>
<p>Communities are effectively left blind to the effects of climate change. So they can’t take informed measures to adapt.</p>
<p>For example, if a fishery or shellfish stock collapses, stakeholders won’t know what the cause is. It could be as a consequence of overharvesting, deoxygenation that causes fish to migrate to more oxygen-rich waters, or shellfish mortality brought on by acid waters. Or a combination of these factors – or others. </p>
<p>Scientists, managers and stakeholders who want to understand and address the management of fisheries in the Canary Current can’t build or use models because there isn’t data. </p>
<p>To be useful, models must take into account the changes, variations and interactions of the ocean in the region. They must also be supported by regional data.</p>
<p>Without this information, results of tests are incomplete at best and misleading at worst. They are thus unsuitable for guiding management, policy, or donor decisions.</p>
<h2>Solutions</h2>
<p>Scientists from Chile have shown how the rigorous monitoring of climate change, and assessing its impacts on local shellfish species, can inform adaptation efforts. Chile borders the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0079661109001049">Humboldt Current System</a>, an Eastern boundary upwelling ecosystem that extends along the west coast of South America. They have discovered shellfish strains that are relatively tolerant to ocean acidification and optimal habitats for their potential cultivation. This provides a potential means of adaptation to future, and likely more acidic, oceans. These findings are <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287360675_Shellfishing_and_shell_midden_construction_in_the_Saloum_Delta_Senegal">applicable to Senegal</a>, where shellfish have been for at least 5,000 years.</p>
<p>An essential step to building the capacity required to effectively anticipate and adapt to changing ocean chemistry in the Canary Current will the training of additional African Ph.D.-level scientists. This training could be in disciplines such as oceanography, ecology, and physiology. This could be accomplished through novel north-south or south-south partnerships among institutions of higher education or through the strengthening of existing international partnerships. West African scientists would be best suited to address context-specific adaptation measures and incorporate their findings into national policies and legislation. </p>
<p>Another benefit of understanding climate change impacts on West African oceans would be to add more voices to the global chorus calling for reductions in CO2 emissions. Greater representation for those that are most vulnerable, yet least responsible, for those emissions is also important. </p>
<p>Wealthy nations rely upon the data from programmes to monitor ocean acidification, deoxygenation and warming to develop reliable models and policies that provide guidance to industries and local stakeholders. The West African countries bordering the Canary Current, for whom climate change impacts on the oceans will impact livelihoods, food security, and development outcomes, deserve no less.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192274/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is only a single mooring managed by French researchers that monitors the impacts of climate change on West African Canary Current.Todd L Capson, Chercheur Associé, Institut de physique du globe de Paris (IPGP)Marie Boye, Research Director, CNRS, Institut de physique du globe de Paris (IPGP)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1772522022-02-16T15:13:57Z2022-02-16T15:13:57ZAfrica is beset with coups and conflicts: how the trend can be reversed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446741/original/file-20220216-27-wyyu7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Thousands of people have fled inter-ethnic clashes in northern Cameroon.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by DJIMET WICHE/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the evening of 15 February 2022, <a href="https://www.somalidispatch.com/latest-news/djibouti-guelleh-arrests-army-and-police-chief-over-a-coup-plot/">reports emerged</a> that key police and military officials in Djibouti were put under house arrest, reportedly amid fears of a coup d’état. </p>
<p>This was the latest in the string of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">successful and attempted coups</a> in Africa – from Mali to Madagascar and Guinea to the Central African Republic (CAR).</p>
<p>The popularity of some of the coups, combined with the perceived inability of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to stem the tide of democratic reversals and insecurity, has generated a crisis that calls for a fundamental rethinking of the values, role, mandate, capacity and resources of these institutions.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">Why West Africa has had so many coups and how to prevent more</a>
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<p>The Djibouti incident came barely 10 days after an <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-union-summit-tackles-coups-covid-tigray/a-60686782">AU Heads of State and Government Summit meeting</a>. In its <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-union-condemns-wave-of-military-coups/a-60678794">final communique</a> it lamented the “wave” of coups and pervasive insecurity across the continent.</p>
<p>Since its last in-person summit in early 2020 (they met virtually in 2021) there have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">successful military coups</a> in Mali <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/05/28/another-coup-mali-heres-what-you-need-know/">(twice)</a>, Chad, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Sudan, and attempted coups in Madagascar, CAR, Niger, Guinea Bissau, and possibly in Djibouti. </p>
<p>The continent also witnessed <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-faces-a-new-threat-to-democracy-the-constitutional-coup-72011">constitutional coups</a> where incumbents manipulated the constitutional framework to extend their terms. This happened in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-guinea-election-idUSKBN21E39O">Guinea</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/9/ivory-coast-president-ouattaras-disputed-third-term-confirmed">Cote d’Ivoire</a> (2020). In <a href="https://dawnmena.org/saieds-textbook-self-coup-in-tunisia/">Tunisia</a> the incumbent president governs through decrees, without any institutional checks on his power. </p>
<p>Africa has also seen new and expanding conflicts. Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous country, has been embroiled in a spiral of <a href="https://theconversation.com/eritrea-is-involved-in-tigray-to-boost-its-stature-why-the-strategy-could-backfire-175591">the largest and deadliest conflict in recent African memory</a>. The AU appointed a <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">special envoy for the Horn of Africa</a> and engaged in ‘quiet diplomacy’, but this is yet to bear any fruit.</p>
<p>In the Sahel, the zone of insecurity – arising from insurgencies and Islamic jihadists – has expanded. It has <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2022/1/61e137ac4/decade-sahel-conflict-leaves-25-million-people-displaced.html">entrapped and killed thousands, displaced millions, and caused tremendous suffering</a>. In the process the legitimacy and capacity of nascent democratic regimes has been undermined.</p>
<p>And in northern Mozambique, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/violence-ripples-in-islamist-hit-mozambique-as-insurgency-evolves-20211210">a rebellion</a> rooted in government neglect and sense of dispossession metamorphosed into an Islamist insurgency. Hundreds of thousands have been displaced and the country’s security forces have been overwhelmed.</p>
<p>Enduring instability in South Sudan, Libya and Somalia have made little progress. Here too the AU has largely been on the sidelines, despite its military presence in Somalia.</p>
<p>Each of these occurrences has a unique context. Nevertheless, they are broadly linked to a democratic deficit and governments’ inability to deliver either freedom or peace and development. These failure of nominally elected governments has denied leaders – as well as the democratic system – a vanguard popular constituency.</p>
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<p>On top of this, the COVID-19 pandemic has decimated the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/economic-recovery-covid-19-prospects-sub-saharan-africa">economic gains of the last decade</a>. This has left behind an avalanche of unemployed youth, and worsened the public debt burden of virtually all countries. In turn this has deprived incumbents of economic rents they could deploy to appease the public and co-opt and silence key civilian and military officials.</p>
<p>The structural conditions that have made the coups and insecurity in the various countries possible obtain in a large majority of African countries. Moreover, the successes and apparent popularity of some of the coups have set a precedent that may inspire copycats.</p>
<p>But, an impoverished, insecure and coup-prone Africa is not inevitable. In fact, the continent continues to witness the resilience of democracy in Malawi and Zambia, among other countries. </p>
<p>Addressing the ailments and setting on a path to peace, freedom and sustainable development requires two key things. Firstly, a mental paradigm shift. Secondly, bold moves to accelerate the continent’s economic, security and political integration. </p>
<h2>From rejection to introspection</h2>
<p>Both the AU and ECOWAS have rejected the military coups. The AU has suspended four countries in a year, the highest since its formation in 2002. For its part ECOWAS is operating without 20% of its membership. Three of its 15 member states suspended. In addition it’s imposed crippling sanctions on Mali following a second coup and failure to agree an acceptable transition timeline.</p>
<p>But the AU hasn’t been wholly consistent. For example, it didn’t suspend Chad after an effective military takeover in the country. Instead, it put preconditions for a relatively quick transition, national dialogue and exclusion of transition leaders from standing for election.</p>
<p>It has remained largely silent on Tunisia too despite anti-democratic developments there.</p>
<p>ECOWAS has been acting according to the books on military coups. Nevertheless it failed to publicly criticise the constitutional coups in Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. </p>
<p>These inconsistencies have bred accusations of hypocrisy. Some have gone as far as accusing the two institutions of merely serving as <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/27/the-african-unions-hypocrisy-undermines-its-credibility/">protection for their club of incumbents</a>. </p>
<p>If the AU and ECOWAS want to be taken seriously, they must look inwards and stand up for constitutional democracy, regardless of the perpetrators – whether incumbents or men in military fatigue.</p>
<p>And here, they have an opportunity to redeem themselves through some quick wins. </p>
<p>Current presidents of Senegal (Macky Sall) and Benin (Patrice Salon) are serving their second and last terms. Nevertheless, there are concerns that they are resorting to democratically questionable manoeuvres. And that they may even be considering a constitutional manoeuvre to stay in power.</p>
<p>The AU and ECOWAS should proactively engage these leaders and secure public commitments that they will step down after the end of their terms, and continue the nascent legacy of their countries in peaceful alternation of power.</p>
<h2>From crisis to opportunity?</h2>
<p>The sense of crisis must spur the AU and ECOWAS into action. The ECOWAS Heads of State and Government have tasked the ECOWAS Commission to expedite the process of reviewing the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/CompilationDemocracy/Pages/ECOWASProtocol.aspx">Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance</a>. This is a chance to strengthen ECOWAS’ capacity to respond to incumbent constitutional and electoral manipulations. This could include re-tabling the region-wide two term limit on presidents that it abandoned in 2015.</p>
<p>The AU should similarly enhance its capabilities to check unconstitutional changes of government as well as the undemocratic exercise and retention of power.</p>
<p>And it should accelerate its institutional reform drive. Notably, it must work towards boosting the <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/peace-fund-lies-dormant-as-member-states-discuss-its-use">Peace Fund</a>. A well-supported fund would allow the AU to prevent political instability from degenerating into large scale conflict and insurgency.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africans-want-consensual-democracy-why-is-that-reality-so-hard-to-accept-164010">Africans want consensual democracy – why is that reality so hard to accept?</a>
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<p>The experiences of the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/b178-winning-peace-mozambiques-embattled-north">coordinated responses</a> to the insurgency in northern Mozambique, involving soldiers from the Southern African Development Community and Rwandan forces, could provide an important prototype. This must include measures to address the root causes of governance deficit, exclusion and wanton exploitation of natural resources.</p>
<p>In the long term, the AU, ECOWAS and other regional economic communities should strengthen security and economic integration. This would go some way to ensuring that nascent democracies deliver freedom as well as stability and a steady improvement of peoples’ economic fortunes.</p>
<p>Getting the <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2022/key-pillars-mostly%C2%A0-place-%C2%A0speed-%C2%A0africas%C2%A0free-trade-2022">African Continental Free Trade Area</a> into gear and the protocol on free movement of people implemented is critical.</p>
<p>Regional organisations should also boost their anti-corruption mechanisms and address problems of mismanagement of resources.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the primary responsibility for stability, prosperity and freedom lies at the national level. But if African leaders desire the protection of the AU, ECOWAS and other sub-regional communities, they must strengthen these institutions.</p>
<p>The ambitious mandate and expectations of these institutions must be matched with perquisite tools, power and resources. Incumbent safety may lie in sharing power: horizontally by addressing the curse of winner-takes-all politics at the domestic level through inclusion of the opposition in governance; and vertically by empowering regional and sub-regional organisations. </p>
<p>Africans must, of course, be the masters of their destiny. But external partners such as the United Nations, US and China should support efforts to enhance the continent’s stability and economic progress.</p>
<p><em>The views and opinions expressed in the article are the sole responsibility of the author and are not endorsed by any of the institutions he is affiliated with.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Advisor in the Constitution Building Programme of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, and Vice President (East Africa), African Network of Constitutional Lawyers.</span></em></p>The failures of nominally elected governments has denied leaders - as well as the democratic system - a vanguard popular constituency.Adem K Abebe, Extraordinary Lecturer, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1765772022-02-15T14:13:31Z2022-02-15T14:13:31ZWhy West Africa has had so many coups and how to prevent more<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446461/original/file-20220215-13-1u4lwtn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man with the Malian National flag joins a demonstration in Bamako after the military junta called for protests against sanctions imposed over delayed elections.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Florent Vergnes/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>West Africa’s latest <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/24/burkina-faso-government-denies-coup-after-army-mutiny-and-gunfire-near-presidents-home">successful coup</a>, in Burkina Faso on 24 January 2022, has renewed unease about coups “returning” and democracies “dying” in Africa. The recent <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60220701">attempt</a> in Guinea-Bissau, too, recalled the first decades after independence, when coups were rampant. </p>
<p>By 2012, there had been <a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Economic%20Brief%20-%20Political%20Fragility%20in%20Africa%20Are%20Military%20Coups%20d%E2%80%99Etat%20a%20Never%20Ending%20Phenomenon.pdf">over 200 coups</a> and attempted coups in Africa from their various times of independence. There was a coup attempt <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2781957?casa_token=ZVehwpVUvy0AAAAA:Drc6_hTUbRyfl88JzYSTo0Hzo2Sxkuxp2HPcqP9PJu1P1isOAyhRRPA8TKh2JFQPsUX0SKyhCrJcuD9lSeDDIkby5o_K3thjqd82gHeTkXrDaT0AWhY">every 55 days</a> in the 1960s and 1970s, and over 90% of African states had a coup experience. </p>
<p>After the Cold War, a neoliberal democratic programme was inaugurated in Africa. It promised to free the continent from authoritarianism and military seizures of power, in favour of political pluralism and the rule of law. Thus, many decades later, coups were supposed to be rare, if not a thing of the past, and dictatorships were supposed to be on the decline. </p>
<p>As one of us argued in <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2021/09/24/towards-a-better-understanding-of-the-underlying-conditions-of-coups-in-africa/">a recent article</a>, for this to be a “return” of coups, democracy in Africa must have made a forward move – enough to prevent or reduce coups. To say African democracies are dying is to accept that they were alive. </p>
<p>Either way, coups are rarely a solution to bad governance. The trend must be stopped in its tracks. Yet, it also invites a reassessment of the neoliberal democratic project in Africa. </p>
<p>Our studies of the region’s political history show that democracy in the region tends to be superficial. Despite some gains, democracy remains largely cosmetic, and the conditions that cause coups persist.</p>
<h2>Recent coups in West Africa</h2>
<p>A look at the history of coups in West Africa suggests some recurring themes as causes. These show how likely more coups are and what needs to change to prevent them.</p>
<p>In each decade between 1958 and 2008, according to one researcher, West Africa had the <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC167574">highest number</a> of coups on the continent, accounting for 44.4%. Since 2010, there have been over 40 coups and attempted coups in Africa; some 20 occurred in West Africa and the Sahel (including Chad). Since 2019 there have been 7 (five successful and two failed). </p>
<p>Between 1958 and 2008, most coups in Africa <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2009.9627543?journalCode=rasr20">occurred</a> in former French colonies, as did six of the 7 since 2019. Similarly, 12 of the 20 coups in the sub-region since 2010 happened there. The latest successful putsch in Burkina Faso came on the heels of two attempted ones, in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/world/africa/coup-in-burkina-faso-topples-government.html">2015</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/22/burkina-faso-coup-attempt-thwarted-says-government">2016</a>.</p>
<iframe title="Table: Coups in West Africa since 2019" aria-label="Table" id="datawrapper-chart-NNiWW" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/NNiWW/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="490" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>We can categorise the causes of coups in West Africa into inward-looking factors and outward-looking factors. Inward are those that emanate from challenges of national governance. Outward are those concerning global dynamics with significant impact on governance and security on the continent.</p>
<p>Governance deficits, non-fulfilment of the entitlements of citizenship, frustrated masses (most of whom are young) and growing insecurity are chief among the inward-looking causes. International factors, including external influence, are among the outward-looking. </p>
<p>These immediate factors, however, exist in a broader context that allows immediate causes to persist long enough to spark coups. Unimpressive democratic conditions in countries, and the consistency of foreign influence in African countries, make it unsurprising that there have been recent attempted and successful military takeovers of government. </p>
<h2>Looking inward at democracy and governance</h2>
<p>Despite modest democratic achievements, a more accurate picture of democracy in West Africa is that it is superficial. Elections are held periodically but without crucial ingredients of democracy like informed and active participation, respect for the rule of law, independence of the judiciary and civil liberties. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14662043.2012.642121?journalCode=fccp20">survey</a> of voting intentions in 16 African countries found that, in countries with few dominant parties, voters preferred certain parties not because they support the policies of the parties, but because the voters are afraid of being “punished” by elected officials after the election.</p>
<p>Another <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056244.2012.658717?casa_token=sXsXfxgaPwcAAAAA%3AXkV-wvcW3DGCYPg0WJGwzR_7IGx7-UehkuRw9TpSYliQOQEjtk4Ox4tU8Vvj7qW5NQV-towboLbk">study</a> found a trend in which political power is inherited rather than democratically contested. And people are appointed who answer to powerful political overlords. There are only a few instances of emerging liberal democratic governments. </p>
<p>Across the continent, several sitting presidents have tampered with <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/circumvention-of-term-limits-weakens-governance-in-africa/">constitutional terms</a> to stay longer in power, in just over a decade. Many others have attempted, but failed, to do so.</p>
<h2>Looking outward at external influence</h2>
<p>Foreign influence and strategic competition make coups more likely to occur. In the first four decades of independence, coups were set against Cold War politics as two global powers, the Soviet Union (now Russia) and the United States locked horns over the continent. </p>
<p>Like coups in the post-independence era, recent coups in West Africa also have foreign fingerprints. For instance, <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/09/why-russia-is-a-geopolitical-winner-in-malis-coup/">Russia</a> is cited in both the 2021 and 2020 coups in Mali, as well as the latest one in Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>Assimi Goïta, the leader of both coups in Mali, is also reported to have received <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/21/mali-coup-trump-administration-counterterrorism-efforts-sahel-west-africa-us-training/">US training</a> and assistance. The influence of France in political developments in the sub-region is almost a given, due to its colonial ties to West Africa. </p>
<p>Mahamat Déby’s covert coup in Chad, for example, received <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/456869-debys-death-france-declares-support-for-chad-coup-gives-reason.html">endorsement</a> from Paris. China, too, joined Russia in preventing France, which had the support of the US and the EU, to have the UN Security Council support a decision to impose economic and border sanctions on Mali. Indeed, whereas China <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-09-06/China-calls-for-restraint-dialogue-in-resolving-problems-in-Guinea-13kQyWPDINW/index.html">criticised</a> the putsch in Guinea, it has been quiet on Mali’s.</p>
<p>Thus, in the 21st century too, the quest for strategic influence and advantage by foreign powers in Africa has involved them in coups in the continent. They tolerate local politics and authoritarianism as long as their strategic advantage is served.</p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>The conditions under which coups occur are dynamic. To avert future coups and respond to current ones, there must be a radical change of direction. Countries, with the help of regional and global partners, must address governance deficits in the form of non-fulfilment of the entitlements of citizenship, socio-economic frustration, and growing insecurity. </p>
<p>Regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union must also be firm and unbiased in their show of contempt for all types of coups. International avenues for punishing coupists must be supported by global powers. Global intergovernmental bodies must equally check — and African regional organisations must resist - foreign interference in African countries that leads to political instability. </p>
<p>Democratisation in Africa also requires a re-orientation to suit local circumstances.</p>
<p>Finally, a more sustainable response to coups is to eliminate the adverse socio-economic and political conditions in national and international politics that allow immediate causes of political instability to hide behind a democratic façade.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176577/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hakeem Onapajo receives funding from the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Muhammad Dan Suleiman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Unimpressive democratic conditions and foreign influence in African countries make recent attempted and successful military takeovers unsurprising.Muhammad Dan Suleiman, Lecturer (Sessional) in International Relations, Curtin UniversityHakeem Onapajo, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Nile University of NigeriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1302142020-02-16T14:33:38Z2020-02-16T14:33:38ZGuinea Bissau election inspires optimism – but there are still big risks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311133/original/file-20200121-117911-yj7he4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Guinea-Bissau's presidential candidate Umaro Sissoco Embalo of MADEM G15 party during a campaign rally leading to his December 29 victory.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Andre Kosters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Late last year Bissau-Guineans went to the polls to decide who would replace José Mário Vaz as president of Guinea-Bissau.</p>
<p>It was viewed as a crucial poll. Decades of instability and military intervention came down to this one moment. Would Guinea-Bissau see a peaceful transfer of power following Vaz’s historic completion of his tenure as president?</p>
<p>The election was a run-off pitting Domingos Simões Pereira against Umaro Sissoco Embaló after Vaz failed to make the cut-off in the first round of voting.</p>
<p>Both Pereira and Embaló previously held the prime ministership. Emabló was also once a member of Pereira’s ruling party before leaving it to form another one.</p>
<p>Embaló’s tenure as prime minister was fragile. He formed a government <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/r-guinea-bissaus-dominant-party-to-boycott-new-government-2016-11?IR=T">without the help</a> of his own party at the time and he resigned less than two years later, after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bissau-politics/guinea-bissaus-dominant-party-to-boycott-new-government-idUSKBN13N1VR">coming into conflict</a> with President Vaz.</p>
<p>The election <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201912270013.html">was tense</a>. Given the history between the contestants, it is not surprising. With a <a href="https://theconversation.com/bissau-guineans-hold-their-breath-again-as-uncertainty-deepens-126212">constitutional crisis as the backdrop</a>, it would not have been far-fetched to expect the worst. Political rivalries have previously resulted in <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/guineabissau/4933580/Guinea-Bissau-president-beaten-before-assassination.html">assassinations</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/13/guinea-bissau-coup-suspected">military coups</a>, and even <a href="https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/866">civil war</a>, with <a href="https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2019/03/25/understanding-coup-risk-in-guinea-bissau/">elections</a> often serving as catalysts. </p>
<p>In the end, Embaló won with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/umaro-cissoko-embalo-wins-guinea-bissau-presidential-election-200101130856543.html">53% of the vote</a>. The election was ultimately peaceful, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1054631">earning praise from the United Nations</a>.</p>
<p>So what might this mean for coup risk and stability in future in Guinea-Bissau?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311541/original/file-20200123-162240-1k7yudk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311541/original/file-20200123-162240-1k7yudk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311541/original/file-20200123-162240-1k7yudk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311541/original/file-20200123-162240-1k7yudk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311541/original/file-20200123-162240-1k7yudk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311541/original/file-20200123-162240-1k7yudk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311541/original/file-20200123-162240-1k7yudk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">CoupCast: https://oefresearch.org/activities/coup-cast/methodology</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Using CoupCast, <a href="https://oefresearch.org/activities/coup-cast/methodology">a machine learning algorithm</a>, we can quantify structural coup risk at the country level and forecast future risk. CoupCast uses over 70 predictors of coup risk and country-month data going back to January 1950.</p>
<p>CoupCast is an open-source tool that combines substantive expertise on coups with modern machine learning forecasting methods. Publicly released in 2016, the tool has <a href="https://oefresearch.org/activities/coup-cast/accuracy">performed well</a> at identifying countries with a <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/2019/04/17/how-to-predict-when-a-despot-will-fall">high structural risk of a coup event</a>. </p>
<p>When forecasting Guinea-Bissau’s risk post-election, CoupCast suggests that the country’s risk remains higher than the average risk in sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>Embaló’s post-election coup risk remains higher than similar countries but CoupCast also suggests a slow decline in risk into the future. </p>
<h2>Cause for optimism</h2>
<p>Guinea-Bissau has had to navigate considerable political instability over the past two decades and risk is not likely to decrease quickly, but there are reasons to be optimistic.</p>
<p>It appears that Vaz’s military reforms have worked. The ongoing constitutional crisis might have pushed the military to intervene in the past, but <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bissau-politics/ex-bissau-military-chief-jailed-over-plot-against-president-idUSKCN0RN2H020150923">forced officer retirements and a high-profile punishment</a> of an attempted coup plotter may have been key to containing further military plots.</p>
<p>If Embaló can finish his term and hold elections, this will be the gold standard by which to strengthen Guinea-Bissau’s slow and steady trajectory towards political stability. </p>
<p>The country will also need to maintain its firm commitment to reforming the military and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bissau-politics/ex-bissau-military-chief-jailed-over-plot-against-president-idUSKCN0RN2H020150923">cracking down on organised crime</a> as first steps to continuing political stability.</p>
<p>Guinea-Bissau has seen an increase in the population of <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/news/youth-forgotten-guinea-bissau-struggle-survival">young people</a> over the past two decades, and has one of the <a href="https://www.youthpolicy.org/factsheets/country/guinea-bissau/#situation-of-young-people">worst youth development index scores</a> in the world. </p>
<p>As the country improves one source of stability, it should not neglect the potential problems that come with an underserved youth demographic. Achieving growth and stability is a long-term process and Bissau-Guinean leaders should seek to take advantage of their gains by addressing pressing problems related to economic opportunity and youth employment.</p>
<h2>Coup risk remains</h2>
<p>Overall, the country’s coup risk trajectory looks optimistic. The country has made considerable political gains since the last coup event in 2012. And coup risk in Guinea-Bissau is likely to decline.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the coup risk remains significantly higher than in much of the region. </p>
<p>The continued relative risk is due to two main factors.</p>
<p>First, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022002713520531">economic</a> and socio-economic indicators <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guineabissau/overview">remain poor</a>. Second, according to CoupCast, coup risk can escalate around both elections and leadership change.</p>
<p>This trend is likely playing out in Guinea-Bissau.</p>
<p>Not taking into account the election, we estimated that Guinea-Bissau’s coup risk is higher than 75% of all other countries in 2020. Once the algorithm takes into account both the election event and Embaló’s tenure, the country’s risk percentile increases, making it the highest at-risk country in sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311543/original/file-20200123-162185-1chh0b4.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311543/original/file-20200123-162185-1chh0b4.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311543/original/file-20200123-162185-1chh0b4.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311543/original/file-20200123-162185-1chh0b4.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311543/original/file-20200123-162185-1chh0b4.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311543/original/file-20200123-162185-1chh0b4.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311543/original/file-20200123-162185-1chh0b4.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">CoupCast: https://oefresearch.org/activities/coup-cast/methodology</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This is not surprising.</p>
<p>Elections in which leadership changes occur are often flashpoints for coup events, especially if the ruling party loses out or the military decides that they do not support the opposition.</p>
<p>Comparing all sub-Saharan African countries that have experienced at least one coup event since 2000, countries such as Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe, we can see that coup risk percentile is highest after elections in which the leader changed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130214/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clayton Besaw is a research associate with the One Earth Future Foundation, a non-profit organization that promotes peace and security in post-conflict countries.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Coup risk in Guinea-Bissau is likely to decline, but changing leadership presents its own risks.Clayton Besaw, Political Science Researcher, University of Central FloridaJonathan Powell, Associate professor, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1048582018-10-16T09:32:50Z2018-10-16T09:32:50ZAfrican countries’ policies must shift to achieve zero hunger<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240563/original/file-20181015-165900-3tejc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hunger is a daily reality across large parts of Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jon Hrusa/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For the third year in a row <a href="http://www.fao.org/state-of-food-security-nutrition/en/">hunger is rising</a> across the world. And, as <a href="http://www.fao.org/state-of-food-security-nutrition/en/">a recent report</a> by the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organisation shows, the situation is worsening in most regions in Africa. Almost 21% of the continent’s population of 1,216 billion is undernourished.</p>
<p>Many factors drive this trend. Among these are rising population growth, conflict and poor governance. Severe weather conditions and climate change also play a role. This leads to food insecurity: a state of deprivation ranging from starvation through severe and constant hunger to deficiencies in vitamins and minerals. It’s rooted in poverty and inequalities that deprive people of the right to adequate food to meet their needs.</p>
<p>We <a href="https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/661/NAIP/1-s2.0-s0305750x18301232-main.zp150838.pdf">reviewed</a> whether the food security plans of 10 countries were aligned with the African Union’s Malabo <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/32377-doc-technical_guidelines_for_reporting_on_malabo_rev2_eng.pdf">Biennial Review technical guidelines</a> (which is related to agriculture and food security), the continent’s <a href="http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf">Agenda 2063</a> and the Sustainable Development Goal targets. The ten countries were Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria and Togo.</p>
<p>We found that the plans were generally compliant with the Sustainable Development Goal indicators directly related to agriculture and food security. However, they were not as closely aligned to Africa’s <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063">Agenda 2063</a> and the <a href="http://www.nepad.org/download/file/fid/6543">Malabo</a> commitments. They generally missed the opportunity to advance agricultural transformation to reduce poverty, inequality and unemployment. </p>
<p>Countries could benefit from more closely aligning these plans with their national visions, policies and strategies. A greater focus on core development goals could reduce competition for budget resources.</p>
<p>The plans can be strengthened and better aligned. This would offer opportunities to streamline monitoring and reporting on international, continental and national policies. It could also reduce the need for parallel reporting systems. </p>
<p>The African Union needs to provide clearer guidance and active oversight on these matters. The teams responsible for drafting countries’ plans related to food and agricultural investment should be regularly trained and their skills updated.</p>
<h2>A lack of coordination</h2>
<p>In 2014, most African governments signed the <a href="http://www.nepad.org/download/file/fid/6543">Malabo Declaration</a> on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihood. This reiterated commitments made in <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/31251-doc-the_country_caadp_implementation_guide_-_version_d_05_apr.pdf">Mozambique</a> more than a decade earlier, and in the continent’s <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063">Agenda 2063</a>.</p>
<p>Once the declaration was signed, governments were expected to design and implement <a href="http://www.resakss.org/sites/default/files/NAIP%20ToolBox%2016%2004%202018.pdf">agriculture and food security investment plans</a>. These are five-year integrated development strategies. They set out key priority programmes to achieve the Malabo Declaration’s goals related to advancing agricultural growth, improving food security and reducing malnutrition. </p>
<p>For example, when it comes to food security the plans need to prioritise crops that can increase household incomes. They must also make food more affordable and smooth the seasonal availability of nutritious foods. Through the plans and programmes, governments must directly increase people’s dietary diversity. </p>
<p>It’s one thing to come up with these plans. But implementing the programmes <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03031853.2018.1479974">is tough</a>. Integrated programmes require coordination and collaboration across multiple ministries. They involve the participation of a range of stakeholders with differing priorities. Yet, very few professionals are trained to work across disciplines. Also, budgets and performance management systems are typically associated with these siloed units. This makes collaboration tricky. </p>
<p>It’s important for African governments to align their plans with the <a href="http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html">UN’s Sustainable Development Goals</a>, Agenda 2063 and their own national development plans. Doing so improves the coherence and efficiency of planning. It saves resources, the costs of data collection and makes for a coherent system.</p>
<p>But African governments just aren’t doing this, as <a href="https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/661/NAIP/1-s2.0-s0305750x18301232-main.zp150838.pdf">our research shows</a>. </p>
<p>We found that, based on their plans, most countries didn’t understand what food security really means. They focused their actions and indicators narrowly on agricultural production and support services. This suggests that ministries are still working in silos rather than embracing a <a href="https://theconversation.com/search/result?sg=27cce709-22ed-4928-b150-bcc5ff6f967e&sp=1&sr=3&url=%2Fthe-missing-piece-in-fighting-africas-malnutrition-problems-94427">multisectoral approach to integrated planning</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.mamopanel.org/media/uploads/files/RPT_2017_MaMo_web_v01.pdf">Several countries</a> including Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal and Togo, have shown that coordinated effort can achieve real gains in dealing with hunger and related issues. Integration is crucial if these gains are to be replicated elsewhere on the continent.</p>
<h2>Better indicators</h2>
<p>Of course, increases in agricultural production – which featured prominently among most countries’ indicators – are necessary for achieving food security. But they’re not enough. </p>
<p>A comprehensive food security strategy needs to address the four dimensions of food insecurity. These are the availability of food, access to food (such as social protection programmes), nutrition and the resilience of food systems. These elements were largely missing from the plans. </p>
<p>Indicators related to social inclusion were also often absent despite instability, conflict and migration being significant challenges for agricultural growth and food security in Africa. </p>
<p>Similarly, despite the high levels of corruption in Africa, none of these countries included indicators for managing and mitigating corruption.</p>
<h2>Training and planning</h2>
<p>Our research suggests that countries in Africa should think more deeply about how to align their National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plans with other relevant frameworks.</p>
<p>This will require a greater consciousness at all levels of African governments about what commitments have been made on various international and continental platforms. The teams responsible for drafting these plans should be trained with alignment in mind – with a good understanding of what other frameworks matter.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104858/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sheryl L Hendriks receives funding from the USAID Feed the Future Innovation Lab for Food Security Policy. She is affiliated with the Malabo Montpellier Panel and the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System's National Agriculture and Fodo Security Investment Plan Task Team associated with the Africa Union. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elizabeth Mkandawire receives funding from receives funding from the USAID Feed the Future Innovation Lab for Food Security Policy.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nosipho Mabuza receives funding from the USAID Feed the Future Innovation Lab for Food Security Policy and is a member of the Agricultural Economics Association of Southern Africa.</span></em></p>It’s one thing to come up with food security plans. But implementing them is tough.Sheryl L Hendriks, Professor in Food Security; Head of the Department of Agricultural Economics, Extension and Rural Development, University of PretoriaElizabeth Mkandawire, Network and Research Manager: ARUA – UKRI GCRF FSNet Africa, University of PretoriaNosipho Mabuza, Research Assistant, University of Pretoria, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/816272017-08-15T14:01:17Z2017-08-15T14:01:17ZHeroin trafficking through South Africa: why here and why now?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181408/original/file-20170808-22982-1by1v5g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An addict prepares heroin in Lamu on the east coast of Kenya.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Goran Tomasevic</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A series of large <a href="http://mobserver.co.za/69733/middelburg-situated-popular-drug-route/">heroin seizures</a> have been made in South Africa since 2016, but the country is just one of the pitstops on Africa’s heroin highway.</p>
<p>The African continent is geographically situated between opium production and consumer states. </p>
<p>Heroin reaches South Africa via the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-06-21-from-afghanistan-to-africa-heroin-trafficking-in-east-africa-and-the-indian-ocean/#.WYHGVYTfqUk">southern heroin trafficking route</a> originating in Afghanistan, where the overwhelming majority of global opium is <a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/index.html">produced</a>. </p>
<p>The route goes through Pakistan and Iran to their coastlines, known as the Makran Coast. From there, the drug is loaded onto dhows which cross the Indian Ocean to transit states in either Africa or Asia, from where it is rerouted to its final destinations, mostly in Europe. The second phase of the journey can be by sea, land or air. </p>
<p>The dhows are large vessels often used for fishing explorations and able to undertake long journeys.</p>
<p>To avoid detection, the dhows either dock at island ports or remain out at sea. The heroin is then collected by smaller boats and taken ashore. The East and Southern African coastline has many inconspicuous islands to serve this purpose, which was also one of the factors luring cocaine traffickers to the cocaine plagued country of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/09/drugstrade">Guinea Bissau</a>.</p>
<p>The coastline from Kenya to South Africa is long, with porous borders, weak maritime surveillance, weak law enforcement capacity and corrupt officials willing to turn a blind eye. There is also a large diaspora connecting different regions to East and Southern Africa. </p>
<p>These factors attract traffickers and mean that managing the heroin trade in South Africa is fraught with challenges. Chief among them is the transnational nature of the heroin trade, the likely increase in local heroin use and the ability of the networks who run the trade to outsmart and outperform regional law enforcement entities and their limited resources.</p>
<h2>Changing circumstances, changing routes</h2>
<p>There are three primary heroin trafficking routes out of Afghanistan; the Balkan Route, the northern route and the southern route. The <a href="http://www.adriaticinstitute.org/?action=article&id=32">Balkan route</a>, stretching overland from Afghanistan to the Balkan countries and Western Europe, has experienced the bulk of heroin trafficking. </p>
<p>Research shows that <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21639560-east-african-states-are-being-undermined-heroin-smuggling-smack-track">law enforcement</a> efforts as well as conflicts have pushed some of the trade away from the Balkan route to the southern route and maritime trafficking, where law enforcement is mostly absent. Despite an increase in the southern route’s popularity with traffickers, it remains the least used of the three. </p>
<p>In 2010, a surge in large maritime heroin seizures in East Africa first highlighted Africa’s role in the southern route, especially the use of Kenya, Tanzania and Zanzibar as <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-06-21-from-afghanistan-to-africa-heroin-trafficking-in-east-africa-and-the-indian-ocean/#.WYHGVYTfqUk">transit zones</a>. </p>
<p>In 2014, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/australian-warship-seizes-a-tonne-of-heroin-worth-159-million-in-record-drug-bust-9291302.html">1,032 kg</a> of heroin was seized from a dhow off Mombasa. It was the largest ever seizure of the drug outside of Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries. </p>
<p>As seizures have continued, international attention and law enforcement efforts in and around East Africa have increased. This is probably what caused traffickers to increasingly turn to landing points in Southern Africa. </p>
<p>South Africa is attractive for other reasons too. Drug traffickers are able to exploit the country’s efficient financial and transport infrastructure.</p>
<h2>Indian Ocean heroin trafficking</h2>
<p>Law enforcement on the southern route is mainly concerned with disrupting maritime heroin shipments before they reach the shore. The biggest law enforcement effort has come from the <a href="https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-150-maritime-security/">Combined Maritime Forces Combined Task Force 150</a>. </p>
<p>It is a fleet of 31 international navies mandated to patrol the Western Indian Ocean to disrupt terrorist activities and financing. This includes disrupting heroin trafficking on the high seas. Between 2013 and 2016 the force seized <a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2016/November/indian-ocean_-colombo-declaration-adopted-to-coordinate-anti-drugs-efforts.html">9.3 tons</a> of heroin. </p>
<p>The task force patrols a vast <a href="https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-150-maritime-security/">area</a> – 2.5 million square miles across the high seas, extending as far as Mozambique. South Africa must, therefore, rely on its own navy and intelligence to detect shipments that outwit the Combined Task Force. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181385/original/file-20170808-21888-1h9cem1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181385/original/file-20170808-21888-1h9cem1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181385/original/file-20170808-21888-1h9cem1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181385/original/file-20170808-21888-1h9cem1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181385/original/file-20170808-21888-1h9cem1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181385/original/file-20170808-21888-1h9cem1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181385/original/file-20170808-21888-1h9cem1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A heroin trafficking dhow seized in Tanzanian waters, docked in Dar es Salaam next to the ferry to Zanzibar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carina Bruwer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the biggest obstacle to exposing the criminal networks running the southern route has been the Combined Task Force’s lack of jurisdiction to arrest heroin trafficking crews in international waters. This has resulted in the practice of the Combined Task Force throwing the heroin overboard and setting the crew and their vessel free. </p>
<p>If heroin can be seized in territorial waters, the national laws of the country apply and prosecutions can follow. </p>
<h2>Land based seizures in South Africa</h2>
<p>It is likely that dhows are only dropping off heroin as far as Mozambique because they would attract suspicion if they travelled as far as South Africa. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf">Land based seizures</a> in Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique have shown that heroin is broken up when it reaches the shore and then transported onward by road. This explains the seizure of smaller amounts of heroin being transported in cars and trucks from Mozambique to South Africa. </p>
<p>A recent heroin seizure in Overberg in the coastal province of the Western Cape has provided new insights into what researchers and law enforcement have only been able to speculate - that southern route heroin is also being transported to and from East and Southern Africa in containers. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/asia/sri-lanka-seizes-550-pounds-of-heroin.html">Containerised heroin seizures</a> have been made elsewhere along the southern route.</p>
<p>The heroin was found on a wine farm, hidden among boxes of wine intended for container shipment to <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-07-08-r292m-heroin-plot-collapsed-under-weight-of-cape-wine/">Europe</a>. This finally offers a more concrete link to container trafficking on the southern route, which would be harder to detect than dhows. </p>
<p>But lots of questions remain unanswered. These include: where did the shipment come from? Was it a single large shipment which entered at a harbour or smaller shipments that were consolidated on the wine farm? If so, which overland route was used? Was corruption involved? Is local heroin use increasing due to increased trafficking through the region? </p>
<h2>What needs to happen?</h2>
<p>Rooting out corruption and minimising the pool of potential small scale traffickers could be a good place to start. But the problem is much bigger than South Africa and encompasses many elements that increased law enforcement can’t address. One factor, for example, is increased local heroin consumption.</p>
<p>To understand, and respond to heroin trafficking networks there needs to be a coordinated effort that brings together production, transit and consumer states.</p>
<p>In the meantime, South Africa needs to increase its vigilance in local ports and along borders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81627/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carina Bruwer receives funding from the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime and the Social Science Research Council. </span></em></p>South Africa is only one piece in a larger puzzle of the heroin trade along the continents east coast.Carina Bruwer, PhD candidate, Institute for Safety Governance and Criminology, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/750082017-03-28T15:07:41Z2017-03-28T15:07:41ZHow to make an Internet of Intelligent Things work for Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162048/original/image-20170322-31219-1uhp22a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Internet of Things offers great opportunities for Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Late in 2016 Senegal’s Banque Regionale De Marches announced the launch of the <a href="https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/senegal-will-introduce-blockchain-based-national-digital-currency/">eCFA Franc</a>; a cryptocurrency for the countries of the <a href="http://www.uemoa.int/en">West African Monetary Union</a> – Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Togo and Guinea-Bissau. This and similar innovations mark the coming of age of a new generation of applications – an Internet of Intelligent Things – that could provide a new infrastructure for economic development across Africa.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/#648a7cae1d09">Internet of Things</a> is a network of physical devices, vehicles, buildings and other items. They are equipped with electronics, software, sensors and network connectivity so they can collect and exchange data. There’s wide enthusiasm about spectacular innovations such as <a href="http://www.theverge.com/2016/1/4/10707894/samsung-smart-refrigerator-connected-fridge-iot-ces-2016">Intelligent refrigerators</a>and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/15/driverless-cars-12-things-you-need-to-know">driverless cars</a>. But a quieter revolution is underway in everyday systems and facilities, such as <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/financial-services/articles/the-derivative-effect-how-financial-services-can-make-iot-technology-pay-off.html">financial services</a>.</p>
<p>There are particular possibilities here for Africa. <a href="https://theconversation.com/development-in-africa-is-on-a-firm-footing-heres-how-to-take-it-to-the-next-level-70665">The potential for the continent’s economic growth is well established</a>. There’s also an abundance of opportunity for digital innovation. This was clear from a recent continent wide <a href="http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/mtnecbyjumia/">entrepreneurship competition</a> organised by the University of Cape Town’s Graduate School of Business. </p>
<p>More broadly, the new Internet of Things has the potential to compensate for Africa’s legacies of underdevelopment. The key here is the development of the blockchain from a fringe concept into a mainstream digital innovation.</p>
<h2>The blockchain and Africa</h2>
<p>The blockchain, mostly known as the technology that underpins digital currency <a href="https://www.bitcoin.com/">Bitcoin</a>, is an almost incorruptible digital ledger of transactions, agreements and contracts that is distributed across thousands of computers, worldwide. </p>
<p>It has <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35370304">the potential</a> to be both foundation and springboard for a new developmental infrastructure.</p>
<p>New blockchain platforms such as <a href="https://www.ethereum.org">Ethereum</a> are supporting the development of distributed applications. These “DApps” can provide accessible ways to use the blockchain. They act like “autonomous agents” – little brains that receive and process information, make decisions and take actions. These new capabilities will have widespread implications when linked to cryptocurrencies through “smart contacts” that are also securely recorded in the blockchain. </p>
<p>DApps provide a practical and affordable means of making Things intelligent and able to interact directly with other Things. They can be programmed to take data-informed actions without human intervention. </p>
<p>These innovations will have particular benefits across Africa. Economic growth is underpinned and enabled by appropriate financial services. Early internet-based innovations such as Kenya’s <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-18">M-PESA</a> have clearly demonstrated the appetite for accessible, Internet-financial services. But many small and medium businesses are still restricted. Their owners usually can’t access standard loan financing. Banks will not extend credit facilities without traditional title deeds to land and buildings, or a conventional payslip. </p>
<p>Don and Alex Tapscott have shown in their <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Blockchain-Revolution-Technology-Changing-Business-ebook/dp/B01EGYYNF8/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1489994046&sr=1-1&keywords=blockchain+revolution+tapscott">recent book</a> that the new blockchain can be “the ledger of everything”. A house can become an intelligent entity registered on a secure, distributed database once it’s tagged with a geospatial reference and sensors that monitor its continuing existence. </p>
<p>The owner of the asset can, through an Ethereum-based smart contract, secure a loan to expand a start-up enterprise. Intermediary arrangements become unnecessary. Economist Hernando de Soto has suggested this could create “<a href="https://twitter.com/ReadingSignals">a revolution in property rights</a>”.</p>
<h2>Water and energy</h2>
<p>Property and financing aren’t the only areas where the new Internet of Intelligent Things has the potential to compensate for Africa’s legacies of underdevelopment.</p>
<p>Economic growth also depends on affordable and reliable services like water and energy. <a href="http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/africa.shtml">Water</a> is an increasingly scarce resource in many parts of Africa. This is particularly true in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jun/07/africa-urbanisation-megatrend-needs-to-deliver-growth-says-report">cities</a>. Rapid population increases are making old precepts of urban planning redundant.</p>
<p>Technology can help. Autonomous agents positioned across all aspects of water reticulation systems can monitor supplies of potable, storm and waste water. These “little brains” can take appropriate actions to detect and report damage and leakage and close off supply lines. Smart devices can also monitor water quality to detect health hazards. They can regulate and charge for water consumption.</p>
<p>Similarly, for the supply of energy, smart devices are already being deployed across conventional and ageing power grids in other parts of the world. In <a href="https://powerledger.io/">Australia</a>, for instance, intelligent monitors detect when an individual pole is in trouble. They then report the fault and call out a repair crew. They can also communicate with other poles to redirect the supply and preserve the grid’s integrity. </p>
<p>In parallel with conventional supply systems, new digital technologies can enable full integration with renewable sources of energy and the intelligent management of supply at the household level. The new blockchain is designed for secure peer-to-peer transactions combined with incorruptible contracts between multiple parties. Individual households can manage their own supply and demand to incorporate self-generated energy. A house equipped with a simple windmill and a roof made up of photovoltaic tiles could sell surplus power to a neighbour in need. They could also buy from another house to meet a shortfall.<br>
Such microgrids are <a href="http://www.siemens.com/press/en/pressrelease/?press=/en/pressrelease/2016/energymanagement/pr2016110080emen.htm&content%5B%5D=EM">already in development</a>. The combination of ubiquitous and affordable bandwidth and low cost autonomous agents could bring affordable energy to communities that have never enjoyed reliable electricity supply.</p>
<p>A new infrastructure built up in this way could be a springboard for economic development – from small enterprises that would have the resources to take innovations to scale, to significant household efficiencies and increases in consumer purchasing power. As has been the pattern with previous digital technologies, costs of production will fall dramatically as the global market for intelligent things explodes. That which seems extraordinary today will be everyday tomorrow.</p>
<p>So what’s standing in the way? </p>
<h2>Established interests</h2>
<p>It’s not the technology that’s holding Africa back from embracing the Internet of Things. Rather, it’s the established interests in play. These include state enterprises and near-monopolies that are heavily invested in conventional systems, local patronage networks and conventional banks, and the failure of political vision.</p>
<p>What’s needed is effective public policy and business to ensure that the potential of this next wave of digital innovation is realised. Government and civil society innovators need to be directing much of their attention here.</p>
<p>This is why the West African Monetary Union’s cryptocurrency initiative is encouraging. It’s a step towards the future that Don and Alex Tapscott <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Blockchain-Revolution-Technology-Changing-Business-ebook/dp/B01EGYYNF8/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1489994046&sr=1-1&keywords=blockchain+revolution+tapscott">envision</a>; a move towards an Internet that’s driven by the falling costs of bargaining, policing, and enforcing social and commercial agreements. </p>
<p>In this new space integrity, security, collaboration, the privacy of all transactions will be the name of the game. So too will the creation and distribution of value. And that’s great news for Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75008/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The new Internet of Things has the potential to compensate for Africa’s legacies of underdevelopment.Martin Hall, Emeritus Professor, MTN Solution Space Graduate School of Business, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/711062017-02-15T13:44:54Z2017-02-15T13:44:54ZPropaganda in Portugal’s colonies: lessons for the West today<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/156631/original/image-20170213-15806-16ecpl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The official Angolan broadcaster, or Emissora Oficial de Angola, under construction between 1963-67.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fernão Simões de Carvalho</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>“Revolt begins where the road ends.” This sums up the thoughts of a Portuguese general on the counterinsurgency strategy in the 1960s against nationalist movements in the country’s former African colonies of Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique. </p>
<p>When most other African countries had liberated themselves from Europe’s colonial yoke, Portugal, one of the earliest colonisers and the poor man of Europe, insisted on retaining its empire. Drawing on research for my <a href="https://history.indiana.edu/news-events/news/news_2016_11_04.html">upcoming book</a> “Powerful Frequencies: Radio, State, and the Cold War in Angola, 1931-2002”, this article looks at the relationship between military radio propaganda of counterinsurgency to draw some lessons for today’s wars.</p>
<p>Counterinsurgency has garnered renewed attention in the wake of ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Invading Western powers desperately need the cooperation of local populations to fight Iraqi guerrilla insurgents resisting US occupation and Afghani Taliban (along with a congeries of tribal allies and opium traders). </p>
<p>Western military brass and policy wonks repeatedly appeal to the historical, anti-colonial struggles and the counterinsurgency strategies European and US imperialists deployed against local populations as relevant case studies for contemporary wars. Recall, for example, that <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/07/weekinreview/the-world-film-studies-what-does-the-pentagon-see-in-battle-of-algiers.html">the Pentagon screened</a> Gillo Pontecorvo’s “The Battle of Algiers” in 2003 to raise the issues of infiltration, interrogation and torture of insurrectionary forces in Iraq. </p>
<p>At the core of all these strategies, old and new, is the blurring of civilian and military practices. Put differently, under these circumstances development is just another word for counterinsurgency. Reform (for civilians) and repression (for rebels), the twin prongs of this strategy, are more intertwined than they are parallel tines. </p>
<p>Bromides about the future are aimed at dulling the violence of forced removals, spying on one’s neighbours and family, and the militarisation of everyday life. Indeed the vaunted progress – roads constructed, homes built, fields tilled – are built on and through big and small acts of violence. The <a href="http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/U/bo5748917.html">US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual</a>, (2006), the first to be published in 20 years, offers a tidy dyad in its foreword: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Soldiers and marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Anti-colonial radio and the state</h2>
<p>In late colonial Angola, radio (the object and the institution), blared the contradictions of this kind of counterinsurgency programme and sounded out the fragmented nature of the colonial state. </p>
<p>One plank of counterinsurgency was what the Portuguese military referred to as <a href="http://www.guerracolonial.org/index.php?content=234">“psychological action”</a>. Crafted in the information trenches, psychological action had three targets:</p>
<ol>
<li>Civilians – win their hearts and minds;</li>
<li>Rebel combatants – demoralise them and encourage desertion; and</li>
<li>Colonial soldiers – maintain their morale and loyalty. </li>
</ol>
<p>Plainly put, this was propaganda. Both sides used it. The Portuguese almost always played catch up. Military <a href="http://psimg.jstor.org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.ufbmp1004_final.pdf">reports</a> from a Counterinsurgency Commission held in 1968-1969 point to the effective histories and radio broadcasts of guerrilla movements. They refer in particular to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) based in Brazzaville and the need to counteract their transmissions.</p>
<p>The MPLA had been broadcasting guerrilla radio from the mid-1960s via the state radios of the Congo Republic in Brazzaville. Brazzaville, once the site of Charles DeGaulle’s <a href="https://global.britannica.com/topic/Free-French">Free French</a> government-in-exile during the Second World War, had the largest transmitter on the continent. The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) did much less from their Kinshasa base in Zaire.</p>
<p>MPLA cadres received some training in Algeria. This, with their already Marxist and anti-colonial orientation, meant the programming on Angola Combatente (Fighting Angola) broadcast critiques of colonial occupation and its capitalist ends. It also sent secret messages to movement militants working clandestinely and appealed to Portuguese soldiers to desert. </p>
<p>The FNLA’s Voz Livre de Angola (The Free Voice of Angola) served primarily as a community station for the many African exiles from Angola in the area. The Portuguese secret police (PIDE) faithfully listened and transcribed. Only later, after the Counterinsurgency Commission, did the military develop its own radio propaganda. </p>
<p>The colonial state played a reactive game. They employed various media: radio, newspapers, pamphlets and posters. In Mozambique for example, loudspeakers mounted in aeroplanes as part of Operation Gordian Knot, was the largest and most successful Portuguese counterinsurgency effort. It was based on US counterinsurgency in Vietnam. </p>
<p>The Military Information Secretariat produced news that local papers printed. It was also relayed on civilian radio stations and was loosely coordinated through the official Angolan broadcaster, the EOA or Emissora Oficial de Angola. </p>
<h2>Broadcasting in Angola - the longer view</h2>
<p>A vast network of radio broadcasters, largely member based radio clubs, developed in Angola from the 1930s. By the 1950s each region of Angola had a least one radio club. This meant a total of 10 broadcasters for a white settler population that reached nearly half a million by the early 1970s. They were also served by a commercial station, another belonging to the diamond mining company Diamang, and the EOA.</p>
<p>Member based groups drew from radio enthusiasts, the local business elite, and, increasingly, young folks. Every club was different in structure and size. While they broadcast in Portuguese, their main focus was local events: football games, car races and radio plays. Many also organised live musical events. </p>
<p>They often implored the colonial state for financial support and strategically lauded Portuguese Prime Minister António Salazar and the work of empire. Yet, radio club broadcasters were largely (though not entirely) deaf to the nationalist cause. Still, these young men and women created a dynamic network and vibrant modernity. If clubs found their broadcasters pressed into broadcasting counterinsurgency messages, it seemed a small price to pay. </p>
<p>The official EOA opened in the early 1950s (then too a settler initiative). But <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Portuguese_Colonial_War">the war</a> made it more of a priority. The Plan for Radio Broadcasting in Angola, established in 1961 a few short months after the war erupted, attempted to fortify broadcasting structures. The plan was a long term, shifting set of goals. It was grounded in infrastructure and targeted at increasing the state’s broadcasting range. </p>
<p>It put broadcasting in the hands of the Centre for Information and Tourism and the Post Office. But archival files show a jumble of voices and interests. Broadcasters, military and secret police varied in their ideas about how and what radio should do.</p>
<h2>We’re jamming</h2>
<p>Despite the largely discredited practice of jamming, some military and police figures continued to advocate it well into the late 1960s. Blocking the signal of the guerrilla radios was inefficient and expensive. </p>
<p>But broadcasters from the national broadcaster – Emissora Nacional – in Lisbon, rich in expertise but poor in structural authority, argued for propaganda produced by an autonomous body, not the EOA. Propaganda required nimble structures, free of the state’s imprimatur and staid sound.</p>
<p>In the end, broadcasting policy came down on the side of technological solutions to political problems. Even as the military and secret police argued for responsive forms of counterinsurgency, state policy around broadcasting opted for concrete solutions.</p>
<h2>Fast forward to today</h2>
<p>The lesson for today is the obvious one. But the one still not learned. No matter how slick the Field Manuals sound and how well they shill the idea that occupying militaries can purvey both violence and the building of a state, the contradictions and complications ultimately undo the best of intentions. You cannot introduce development surrounded by concertina wire or democracy with drones buzzing overhead. And neither will technology fix political problems, which are essentially human.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71106/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marissa J. Moorman receives funding from Fulbright Hayes Faculty Fellowship and the American Council of Learned Societies Fellowship in 2010-2011 for research.</span></em></p>Portugal used radio propaganda in its colonies in the 1960s against local liberation movements. Decades later there are still lessons to be learned for occupying armies from their failed strategies.Marissa J. Moorman, Associate Professor of History, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/716882017-02-01T15:58:43Z2017-02-01T15:58:43ZHow West Africa built the muscle to rout dictators and keep the peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154021/original/image-20170124-8088-rrj4lu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the Ecowas force at the Denton Bridge check point in Banjul, The Gambia, following Yahya Jammeh's departure.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thierry Gouegnon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Following the resolution of the political impasse in The Gambia, a great deal of attention has focused on the role played by the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas). The regional body brought a <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/22/gambias-defeated-leader-yahya-jammeh-goes-exile/">swift end</a> to the potentially explosive crisis sparked by the refusal of former President Yahya Jammeh to hand over to the newly elected Adama Barrow.</p>
<p>Jammeh’s flight to exile was preceded by weeks of diplomacy to persuade him to hand over power peacefully. When this failed regional troops and military assets were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/19/new-gambian-leader-adama-barrow-sworn-in-at-ceremony-in-senegal">mobilised</a> to install Barrow forcibly. The rest is history. Barrow is now officially in the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/gambia-president-adama-barrow-pledges-reforms-170128194124520.html">presidential seat</a>. </p>
<p>This resounding success, unrivalled by any African regional organisation, has taken decades to craft. It is remarkable to think that <a href="http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/economic-community-of-west-african-states-">at its inception in 1975</a>, joint military action was not even on the cards.</p>
<h2>The fractious 1960s</h2>
<p>By the close of the early 1960s most countries in the West African sub-region had gained political freedom from colonial powers. They adopted a variety of political systems including multiparty democracy, one-party civilian administrations and military autocracies. The region developed quite a reputation for <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/why-are-there-so-many-coups-west-africa/329209/">military coups</a>. There were more in the region than anywhere else on the continent. </p>
<p>Initial attempts to form Ecowas floundered in the early 1960s. This was due largely to the differences between Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, and Nigeria’s first prime minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, on the kind of integration necessary for the states in the region. </p>
<p>The fall of these two personalities from power in 1966 did not end the political rivalries in the region. Attempts at integration were further delayed by the civil war in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970. Its aftermath further affected any chances at integration due to the struggle over the supremacy of the West African region between Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire along Anglo-Francophone lines. </p>
<p>Eventually two influential military leaders – Generals Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo – formed the nucleus of Ecowas in the 1970s. They succeeded in bringing on board the other military leaders of Dahomey (now Benin), Ghana and Niger among others. This explains the dominant role of the military in the life of the organisation. </p>
<p>Ecowas was eventually formed on May 28 1975, in Nigeria as a regional economic grouping of 15 states. Membership went up to 16 when Cape Verde joined in 1976. But it declined again to 15 when Mauritania withdrew in December 2000. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/351_ecowas%20treaty%20of%201975.pdf">Ecowas Treaty of 1975</a> envisaged the group as an economic community with the aim of promoting</p>
<blockquote>
<p>cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The grouping saw its role as raising the living standards of people in the region, increasing and maintaining economic stability, fostering closer relations among its members and contributing to the progress and development of the continent. </p>
<p>It is significant that no reference was made to defence or security in any of the treaty’s 65 articles. </p>
<p>How did the economic bloc blossom into a dominant sub-regional peace and security organisation in Africa? </p>
<h2>The need for a security organisation</h2>
<p>When Ecowas was formed in 1975 only Nigeria had experienced a <a href="https://oldnaija.wordpress.com/2015/07/26/the-nigerian-civil-war/">civil war</a>. But there was an increase in the number of violent conflicts after the late 1980s. </p>
<p>Several factors contributed to the intractability and complexity of violent conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Côte d'Ivoire. These included the effects of the Cold War, economic malaise, human rights abuses and political rivalries and interests of states in the region. The conflicts had deleterious implications for peace and security of the region. </p>
<p>The effect of the civil wars was that some states became places for recruiting disenchanted unemployed youth into various armed banditry groups. They pillaged the region for natural resources and committed heinous war related crimes. </p>
<p>Ecowas was formed at a time when power vacillated between civilian and military rulers in the region. The period was characterised by governments accusing one another of supporting dissidents. There were also accusations of domestic problems being instigated externally. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, the treaty was revised in 1993. The “Revised Treaty” allowed the promulgation of protocols to regulate the peace and security architecture of member states. </p>
<h2>The peace and security architecture of Ecowas</h2>
<p>The first protocol promulgated was a nonaggression pact signed on April 28 1978 in Lagos, Nigeria. The region’s leaders present noted that the community</p>
<blockquote>
<p>cannot attain its objective save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among Community members.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This marked the beginning of future steps by member states to address security matters in the region. But the protocol proved inadequate against either external attacks or intrastate conflicts which were becoming more frequent. This led to the mutual assistance in defence protocol being passed.</p>
<p>This was signed in May 1981 despite fervent opposition from Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. It did not create a standing army but provisions were made for joint action in the event of any security threat to a member state through a voluntary contribution of troops. These were referred to as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community.</p>
<p>But the reliance on troop contributions from member states was a major challenge. This was because by the time troops were assembled the violence would have escalated. </p>
<p>These and many other bottlenecks, in particular, the harrowing experiences of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, led to the next big step. Which is why in 1999 a <a href="http://www.wanep.org/wanep/attachments/article/101/tp_ecowas_subregional_peacekeeping.pdf">mechanism</a> for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security was agreed.</p>
<h2>Current peace and security framework</h2>
<p>The 1999 protocol put in place comprehensive structures and processes that have to be followed in the event of conflict breaking out. </p>
<p>The mechanism makes provision for diplomatic and military interventions. It empowers regional leaders to decide on the deployment of political and military missions.</p>
<p>Ecowas has a standby force in member countries which can be deployed rapidly to prevent conflicts from escalating. The rapid deployment of troops from Nigeria and The Gambia’s neighbour Senegal in the recent deadlock is a case in point. </p>
<p>Other protocols relating to the prevention, management and resolution of conflict make up a significant part of the regional peace and security architecture. These include a supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance adopted in 2001. </p>
<p>There are a number of other security related structures. These include an early warning system and a mediation and security council which advises the authority of heads of state and government. In addition, there are offices of the special representatives, a council of elders and special mediators.</p>
<p>But the challenge of preventing conflicts from escalating remained. To meet this challenge, a conflict prevention framework was agreed in 2008. This enabled the regional powers to harness <a href="http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/womenandjustice/upload/ECOWAS-Conflict-Prevention-Framework.pdf">human and financial resources</a> from other important players such as private and civil society organisations. </p>
<p>A major challenge that now remains is the financial burden associated with political and military missions. But with its long history of meeting its challenges full square, there is every chance Ecowas will make a success of that, too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71688/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdul-Jalilu Ateku receives funding from the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the United Kingdom. </span></em></p>Regional power Ecowas, which has just seen off yet another dictator in Yahya Jammeh, started off with a tame agenda 42 years ago. But it was soon shaped by civil wars, military coups and despotsAbdul-Jalilu Ateku, PhD Candidate in International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/621182016-07-10T16:45:20Z2016-07-10T16:45:20ZNarco-state or failed state? Guinea-Bissau and the framing of Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129712/original/image-20160707-30690-b64qmr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of presidential candidate José Mário Vaz cheer at a campaign rally in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, in 2014.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Joe Penney </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For the vast majority, knowledge and understanding of the African political landscape is gained not from personal experience but from mass media. Those with a global reach and appeal often have the most influence. </p>
<p>Media has the ability to create frames through which people and even governments view countries and regions. These in turn influence policy on aid, international security and trade. Countries can be represented in ways that can be hugely simplistic and overwhelmingly negative.</p>
<p>The importance of framing and representation of African states was brought home forcefully when I started reading the new book “<a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/guinea-bissau/">Guinea-Bissau: Micro-State to ‘Narco-State’</a>.” This much-needed, detailed and minutely-researched collection of chapters is edited by Toby Green and the late Patrick Chabal. The book will be welcomed by those with a specific interest in the West African state of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13443186">Guinea-Bissau</a>. But it is also of great value for those interested in the dynamics of the so-called micro and fragile states.</p>
<h2>A shining example of media framing</h2>
<p>Guinea-Bissau has exemplified media framing and been given a particular image of failure and criminality to that country. It is worth briefly explaining what I mean by framing and representation. Framing involves the basic selection of which stories are reported by the media and which are not. It involves which countries are regularly in the news and which rarely figure but, when they do, are presented in simplified ways. </p>
<p>Framing is also in the telling of sensational stories that do not represent the reality or the country they are portraying. This leads to the establishment and periodic reinforcement of negative and <a href="http://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/en/contents/framing-conflict-and-war-the-cold-war-and-after">misleading images</a> of states, particularly those only reported when something appalling or novel has happened in them.</p>
<p>The new book provides a timely antidote to the potentially poisonous and certainly misleading portrayal of Guinea-Bissau as a failed state – that and the implication that it has become a narco-state that exists only in some sort of criminal underworld among states. This representation of a whole state and its people in the international criminal frame sits alongside other frames used to <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2013/02/26/framing-news-in-africa-%E2%80%93-how-journalists-approach-stories-and-reinforce-stereotypes-%E2%80%93-by-keith-somerville/">categorise Africa</a>. The others include war on terror, humanitarian crisis, basket case and general failed state frames. </p>
<p>There are endless examples of how Guinea-Bissau is presented as a narco-state in the world media. A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jan/07/guinea-bissau-global-drugs-trade">detailed piece</a> in the <em>Guardian</em> is instructive. The newspaper’s reporting on Africa has generally been more thoughtful. But in this article the paper reported that despite its surface appearance as a potential tourist paradise the country was fighting to end its position as the world’s first narco-state. </p>
<p>A picture emerges of a poor, violence-wracked state with empty beaches and guesthouses. The only trade that is of importance is the drugs trade. The crux of the article is that attempts are being made internally with crucial external support to fight the trade but are not making progress. The trade in narcotics is also treated as something that has caused conflict and poverty rather than as a symptom of it. </p>
<h2>Changing from within</h2>
<p>The Green and Chabal volume turns that simplistic view on its head. It looks at deep-seated, historical problems of political legitimacy, and of economic subordination within a global trading system. It also examines the use of force and informal networks of power by competing political and military elites. The contributors don’t pull their punches about the recurrent political and economic crises. They note the development of the drug trade as a means of providing rents for the elites when other income sources either declined or dried up. They also examine the weakness of the state institutions and the porosity of the country’s borders. </p>
<p>The modern failures to establish legitimacy and accountability and the use of ethnicity as a weapon in political struggles are clearly located by the authors in history. They are pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial.</p>
<p>In this, Green’s contributions stand out as the most lucid and well-argued. He agrees that Guinea-Bissau meets the criteria of the Western-imposed narratives of failed state. But he points out the failings of the narco-state approach, with its implicit belief “that successful change can only come from outside the country”. </p>
<p>He goes on to press the convincing case that “the realities are more complex”. These relate to internal factors and indicate the need for indigenous solutions and the building of a nation from within and below, rather than from above and outside. He points out that despite the role of elites in the drug trade, and the recent history of coups and political violence, “day-to-day life in the country remains peaceful, in contrast to the stereotyped image.”</p>
<p>What makes the book particularly enlightening is the way it places the history and narrative of Guinea-Bissau as a state in context. It should be emphasised that it is a very nuanced approach to sub-Saharan African political and economic development. Power is very personalised and dependent on transactions between political patrons and their clients. This is within the context of unequal trade between African economies and the outside world. </p>
<p>These patterns developed before colonialism, and were entrenched and deepened during colonial rule. They have remained in place because of the interest of gatekeeping elites and their patronage networks. Power and wealth are accumulated through being the conduits for income from trade, aid and foreign finance. When income from trade in peanuts and then cashews fell in Guinea-Bissau, a new form of local gatekeeping emerged.</p>
<h2>Guinea-Bissau is not a criminal state</h2>
<p>The overall analysis and the concepts deployed are used as analytical tools in the context of Guinea-Bissau and its own history. This is not some overall and hugely simplified, one-size-fits-all African frame. Guinea-Bissau’s problems are common to much of Africa. But the manner in which these have developed are individual to each country. </p>
<p>Hassoum Ceesay, in his analysis of the narco-state discourse, makes very clear that Guinea-Bissau is not a criminal state. He points out that the drugs trade does not explain the political and societal challenges facing the country, but is a product of them.</p>
<p>Ethnicity is another common and misleading frame used by the media to describe the root of African conflict or political instability. But in Christoph Kohl’s chapter, it is something manipulated by political and military leaders for their own ends rather than a causal factor in itself.</p>
<p>The main conclusion of the work is that despite the evident weakness of state institutions and accountability of elites, Guinea-Bissau “is still a country that ‘works’.” As such, labels such as failed state, so glibly applied to Africa, are a hindrance to understanding the dynamics of development and change across Africa.</p>
<p><em>“<a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/guinea-bissau/">Guinea-Bissau: Micro-State to ‘Narco-State’</a>,” edited by Patrick Chabal and Toby Green, is published by Hurst.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62118/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Somerville does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite the evident weakness of state institutions and accountability of elites, Guinea-Bissau is still a country that ‘works’.Keith Somerville, Visiting Professor, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.