tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/human-development-index-20502/articlesHuman Development Index – The Conversation2023-12-04T22:49:02Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2143612023-12-04T22:49:02Z2023-12-04T22:49:02ZWhat happens after net zero? The impacts will play out for decades, with poorest countries still feeling the heat<p>Humanity’s emissions of greenhouse gases have caused rapid <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/resources/spm-headline-statements/">global warming</a> at a rate unprecedented in at least the past 2,000 years. Rapid global warming has been accompanied by increases in the frequency and intensity of heat extremes over most land regions in the past 70 years. </p>
<p>While human activities cause emissions of a number of greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide (CO₂) stands out as the leading culprit. This is because of its relatively long atmospheric lifetime and because human activities cause much <a href="https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data">higher emissions of CO₂</a> than other greenhouse gases. </p>
<p>To avoid reaching unsafe global temperatures, <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/spm/">climate scientists have concluded</a> we can’t prevent continued global warming without reaching a state of net zero CO₂ emissions.</p>
<p>But how might climate extremes change after net zero CO₂? There is limited research on this. Our new study, <a href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ad114a">published in Environmental Research Letters</a>, uses a collection of models to address this gap. We found temperatures would respond very differently in various parts of the world, and heat extremes might continue to disproportionately affect vulnerable populations.</p>
<h2>The greenhouse effect and net zero emissions</h2>
<p>The world’s land and oceans have taken up most of the carbon humanity has emitted over the past six decades. However, land and oceans are incapable of absorbing 100% of CO₂ emissions.</p>
<p>The remaining CO₂ emissions over the past 60 years have been absorbed by the atmosphere, leading to an enhanced <a href="https://climate.nasa.gov/faq/19/what-is-the-greenhouse-effect/">greenhouse effect</a>. This has caused the especially rapid warming we’ve observed in the recent past. </p>
<p>To stop the continued enhancement of the greenhouse effect, we need to reach <a href="https://netzeroclimate.org/what-is-net-zero-2/">net zero</a> CO₂ emissions. Achieving net zero means reaching an overall balance between the CO₂ emissions humans produce and the CO₂ humans remove from the atmosphere.</p>
<p>The urgency of reaching net zero CO₂ emissions has sparked the use of state-of-the-art climate modelling techniques to answer the question – how does our climate change after net zero?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-could-australia-actually-get-to-net-zero-heres-how-217778">How could Australia actually get to net zero? Here's how</a>
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<h2>What lies beyond net zero CO₂?</h2>
<p>To try and answer this question, we used climate simulation models with increasing carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Then, CO₂ emissions are “turned off” and simulations continue for 100 years more. This simple experimental setup allows us to compare the climate before net zero to climate patterns we might see after a transition to net zero.</p>
<p>There are regions where projected climate change patterns after net zero CO₂ are very uncertain. However, we saw several strong patterns:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>land cools after net zero CO₂ is achieved, while the ocean takes a bit more time to respond with some areas cooling and others warming;</p></li>
<li><p>the Southern Ocean continues to warm after net zero CO₂;</p></li>
<li><p>global temperature change (-0.23°C) is not always a good representation of regional temperature changes.</p></li>
</ol>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550256/original/file-20230926-19-9hsjoz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550256/original/file-20230926-19-9hsjoz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550256/original/file-20230926-19-9hsjoz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550256/original/file-20230926-19-9hsjoz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550256/original/file-20230926-19-9hsjoz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550256/original/file-20230926-19-9hsjoz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550256/original/file-20230926-19-9hsjoz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550256/original/file-20230926-19-9hsjoz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Change in regional temperature after net zero carbon dioxide emissions. Cross-hatching indicates areas where we are confident that regional temperatures increase (red hues) or decrease (blue hues).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
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<h2>Heat extreme patterns after net zero CO₂</h2>
<p>Currently, less economically developed regions experience <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/chapter/chapter-8/">disproportionate loss and damage</a> from climate extremes. Should we expect this to persist after net zero CO₂ emissions, or will the inequality of climate change be resolved by net zero? </p>
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<p>We explored this issue by investigating if there are any changes in how often local heat extremes occur 100 years after net zero compared to how often they occur before net zero.</p>
<p>We then compared our results to maps of the <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI">Human Development Index</a> – a measure of socioeconomic development where regions with a high rank have higher incomes, more access to education and longer life expectancy. Other similar development indicators include <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/content/2023-global-multidimensional-poverty-index-mpi#/indicies/MPI">the Multidimensional Poverty Index</a>.</p>
<p>Although there are widespread decreases in how often heat extremes occur after net zero CO₂ emissions, regions with a relatively higher human development index such as North America and western Europe experience larger reductions in heat extremes than regions with a lower rank, such as Sub-Saharan Africa and southeast Asia.</p>
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<span class="caption">Top: change in how often heat extremes occur regionally after net zero. Cross-hatching indicates areas where we are confident that heat extremes become more frequent (green hues) or less frequent (purple hues). Bottom: human development index in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
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<h2>Preparing for a post net zero world</h2>
<p>We need to reach and sustain net zero CO₂ emissions to halt continued global warming. Models that emulate the transition to net zero CO₂ project large-scale cooling over land, and widespread reduction in land-based heat extremes.</p>
<p>However, post-net zero reductions in heat extremes favour regions with a higher human development index over regions with a lower index. This means the inequality of climate change may persist even after net zero CO₂. </p>
<p>Our study represents a step toward understanding climate extremes after net zero CO₂ emissions are achieved. For now, it is imperative that humanity works without delay to achieve net zero emissions to avoid the most severe climate change impacts affecting future generations.</p>
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Read more:
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew King receives funding from the National Environmental Science Program. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Josephine Brown receives funding from the National Environmental Science Program.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tilo Ziehn receives funding from the Australian Government under the National Environmental Science Program.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liam Cassidy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We can’t prevent continued global warming without reaching net zero carbon dioxide emissions. New climate simulations show what might happen when we get there.Liam Cassidy, PhD Candidate, The University of MelbourneAndrew King, Senior Lecturer in Climate Science, The University of MelbourneJosephine Brown, Senior Lecturer, The University of MelbourneTilo Ziehn, Principal Research Scientist, CSIROLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2057882023-06-05T14:23:25Z2023-06-05T14:23:25ZCensus data in West Africa is badly out of date: 5 reasons fresh population statistics are crucial<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529068/original/file-20230530-21-bktyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Guineans living in Ivory Coast wait for their turn during a census on March 26, 2010 in Adjame, a popular district in Abidjan. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">SIA Kambou/AFP via Getty images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>West Africa, an area composed of 16 countries, is one of the fastest growing regions in the world. The region has a population of over <a href="https://www.oecd.org/swac-expo-milano/about/westafrica/#:%7E:text=%E2%80%8CHome%20to%20some%20350%20million,rapidly%20growing%20population%20are%20enormous.">350 million</a>, a five-fold increase since 1950 when 73 million people lived there. </p>
<p>More than half of the population is <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/adolescents-and-youth-report-west-and-central-africa">under the age of 25</a>.
The region’s urban population <a href="https://eros.usgs.gov/westafrica/population">rose</a> from 8.3% of the total in 1950 to almost 44% in 2015. </p>
<p>Population size, composition and distribution all have implications for what a society needs - including food, water, energy and infrastructure – and how to provide it. </p>
<p>Countries in West Africa have many pressing needs. Some of the reasons are insecurity, poor governance, high military spending and forgone investment. </p>
<p>Forces such as climate change may add pressure, causing food insecurity, economic disruption and extreme harms from floods and droughts. The region is also shifting towards renewable and green energy, creating new job opportunities. </p>
<p>With all these development challenges and opportunities, and limited resources, it’s vital to know what to focus on. Census data is useful for making effective policy plans and tracking progress to reach goals.</p>
<p>The census is a nationally representative survey, and a fundamental tool to collect information on each country’s population. A trained enumerator visits the home to collect information on each person living there, including their genders, ages, marital status, occupations, languages spoken, and other key pieces of basic information.</p>
<p>Without census data, countries are not able to measure or understand patterns of population growth or urbanisation.</p>
<p>The more detailed, up to date, and high quality the data, the better informed policies and programmes can be. Census data that can be disaggregated by key characteristics (broken down into more specific parts) can draw attention to disparities and inequalities. </p>
<p>And routine data allows countries to measure their success on key indicators such as the Sustainable Development Goals. </p>
<p>Many countries in west Africa, however, do not have up to date census surveys. For example the most recent census data for Benin, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal is over 10 years old. Normally these are done every 10 years.</p>
<p>Conducting a census is extremely challenging. It is costly and requires a large staff with training. It involves the participation of large numbers of people. There can be concerns about privacy or questions of a sensitive nature (such as ethnicity). Political instability and conflict can also make <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/census#readmore-expand">enumeration challenging</a>. </p>
<p>As a public health and demography <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/jessie-pinchoff-1216414">expert</a> at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/population-council-3531">Population Council</a>, which generates <a href="https://popcouncil.org/basic_page/adolescent-data-hub/">adolescent</a> and <a href="https://cdm.popcouncil.org/">demographic modelling</a> data across west Africa, I’ve listed five reasons why the region needs up to date censuses.</p>
<h2>Five ways a census helps a country</h2>
<p><strong>Allocation of resources and political power:</strong> With growing populations and economies, fresh census data helps governments allocate resources, target services, plan infrastructure projects, and direct investments. </p>
<p>To ensure that people have fair access to what they need, it’s useful to have information about their age, income and other characteristics. This information is also used to create geographic areas containing around the same number of people, so that all voters are represented.</p>
<p><strong>Economic development:</strong> The census asks households for information about their income, employment and demographic characteristics such as age or sex. This can help governments understand patterns of economic growth and how to stoke economic development. The private sector and governments need information like this for decisions about investment.</p>
<p><strong>Social welfare:</strong> Census data provides a better understanding of the needs of different groups in society, such as the elderly, children, and people with disabilities. It informs the design of social welfare programmes that target those who are most in need. </p>
<p>For example, only <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/inclusion-persons-disabilities-west-africa-ecowas-advocates-signature-and-ratification-african-union-protocol-persons-disabilities-all-its-member-states">three countries</a> out of 15 in the regional body ECOWAS have ratified the African Union’s protocol on disability inclusion. </p>
<p><strong>Disaster response and risk reduction:</strong> Census data is also used in disaster planning, response and risk reduction efforts. It provides information on population density, vulnerability and infrastructure, which is vital in identifying areas that are at risk during extreme events such as <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/warming-worsened-west-africa-floods-that-killed-800-people/">floods</a>. It can also indicate where vulnerable groups, such as the elderly or people with disabilities, may be harmed.</p>
<p><strong>Research to inform policies:</strong> High quality, up to date, and routine census data is critical for informing research to generate the evidence that policies and programmes are based on. </p>
<p>For example, the region could benefit from research on how to minimise schooling disruptions due to climate, target areas with low enrolment rates, and use technology to advance education outcomes. </p>
<p>Health research is another critical area, to protect children and their families and build hospitals and facilities where they are most needed. </p>
<p>The census can identify burden of disease, patterns of sickness and death and the distribution of risk factors. Census data can uncover disparities in health, education, social and economic programming.</p>
<h2>Challenging but worth it</h2>
<p>Accurate and timely census data is critical for west Africa to achieve its potential and mark progress. Conducting a census takes time, money and people, and it can be challenging to collect accurate data in certain settings. </p>
<p>However, the census is a critical tool to allow countries to make informed decisions about how best to allocate resources, plan for the future, and improve the lives of their citizens, including the rising generation of young people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205788/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessie Pinchoff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many countries in West Africa do not have up to date census surveys.Jessie Pinchoff, Associate researcher, Population CouncilLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1913572022-09-30T13:22:09Z2022-09-30T13:22:09ZNigeria ticks some boxes as a democracy. Why this hasn’t translated into a better life for most<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487338/original/file-20220929-21-2qcord.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Regular elections have not translated to development in Nigeria. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-electoral-official-holds-counted-ballot-papers-at-a-news-photo/1241939336?adppopup=true">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/nigeria-ticks-some-boxes-as-a-democracy-why-this-hasnt-translated-into-a-better-life-for-most-191357&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Since gaining independence <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Independent-Nigeria">on 1 October 1960</a>, Nigeria has struggled to maintain a democratic government.</p>
<p>The election of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/30/world/nigeria-s-military-turns-over-power-to-elected-leader.html">1999</a> offered renewed hope after <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308384412_Military_Coups_d'etat_in_Nigeria_Revisited_A_Political_and_Economic_Analysis">a series of military coups</a> and periods of generals in uniform running the country.</p>
<p>More elections followed over the years. Holding elections is a commonly <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/democracy/Features-of-ideal-democracy">accepted feature</a> of democracy, along with having an informed electorate and protecting basic human rights. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/handle/10413/14847">doctoral study</a> explored Nigeria’s (and Senegal’s) progress with consolidating democracy between 1999 and 2012. As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=vlllTzIAAAAJ&hl=en">a researcher on elections and democratisation</a> a key question that’s emerged for me is whether democracy has led to development in Nigeria. </p>
<h2>Democracy and development</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://gsdrc.org/document-library/analysing-the-relationship-between-democracy-and-development-defining-basic-concepts-and-assessing-key-linkages/">dominant perspective</a> in the literature is that there’s a strong correlation between democracy and development. In most developed democracies, it is assumed that <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/143061468741593788/between-democracy-and-development-in-africa-what-are-the-missing-links">democracy and economic development are linked</a>. </p>
<p>But in fact the impact of democracy on development is not linear. There is growing evidence that <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/5974/WDR+1991+-+English.pdf;jsessionid=AA84A9E7AD6D22DE0A788B8B6FA4A372?sequence=1">development can occur in both democratic and non-democratic states</a>.</p>
<p>There is therefore a need for caution in correlating democracy to development. The freedom of choice and political pluralism offered by democracy may not necessarily translate to improving material conditions. <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/143061468741593788/between-democracy-and-development-in-africa-what-are-the-missing-links">Empirical evidence</a> also suggests a weak link between democracy and economic growth. </p>
<p>There are conscious efforts by African countries to embrace democracy as a form of government that will strengthen development. Botswana and Mauritius are good examples. In both, <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/143061468741593788/between-democracy-and-development-in-africa-what-are-the-missing-links">democracy has been pinpointed as one of the main reasons for economic growth</a>. </p>
<p>Others on the list of countries that have advanced their democratic practices and achieved development outcomes are <a href="https://borgenproject.org/democracy-in-ghana/">Ghana</a>, the Seychelles and Cape Verde.</p>
<p>But democratic countries like Lesotho, Senegal and Madagascar <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/democracy-alone-is-no-guarantee-of-development">all score low on human development</a>. In 2019, 73.2% of Madagascar’s population lived on less than US$1.90 a day. For Lesotho it was 36.4% and Senegal 29.7%. </p>
<p>Countries such as <a href="https://www.intechopen.com/chapters/68719">Namibia</a>, <a href="https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1108473/FULLTEXT01.pdf">Tanzania</a> and <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/zambia/democracy-human-rights-and-governance">Zambia</a> conduct regular elections. Yet they are underdeveloped. And despite periodic elections Niger, Chad, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone and Burundi score low on development indices.</p>
<h2>Nigeria’s experience</h2>
<p>Nigeria has shown signs of consolidating its democracy. It has held elections in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019 without an interruption of the electoral cycle. The regularity of the electoral cycle led to the first electoral turnover in 2015, when the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/29/nigeria-buhari-takes-office-fractious-handover">handed over power</a> to Muhammadu Buhari after a peaceful electoral outcome. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-03-01/how-development-leads-democracy">Nigeria is yet to attain the desired economic development</a> despite its democratic practice since 1999.</p>
<p>Nigeria faces acute poverty, youth unemployment, institutional corruption and widespread insecurity. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/03/21/afw-deep-structural-reforms-guided-by-evidence-are-urgently-needed-to-lift-millions-of-nigerians-out-of-poverty">2022 World Bank report</a> stated that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>as many as 4 in 10 Nigerian live below the poverty line. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Tens of millions Nigerians cannot access education, basic infrastructure, safe drinking water and healthcare service as a result of poverty. Poverty has been further worsened by climate change variability and the recent COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p><a href="https://businessday.ng/news/article/nigerias-ranking-in-un-human-development-unchanged-in-2021/">Nigeria was ranked 163</a> in the Human Development Index for 2020 and 2021 out of 189 countries. <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1244496/human-development-index-of-africa-by-country/">It compares badly</a> with other countries like Mauritius, Seychelles, Egypt and Tunisia. </p>
<p>The low development index is related to the fact that <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Nigeria-Democracy-Without-Development-How/dp/9789800800">about 40% of the Nigerian population</a> (about 83 million people) still live on less than US$1 dollar a day. </p>
<h2>What’s gone wrong?</h2>
<p>In my view there are two issues that have stopped Nigeria translating its democratic dividend into better economic outcomes.</p>
<p>The first is poor quality leadership. The second is weak institutions. This has led to poor governance, corruption and insecurity. </p>
<p>Without strong and ethical leadership, institutions are weakened and the established culture of democracy frequently withers. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590291122000262">Democratic culture</a> is a set of values, attitudes, and practices shared by citizens and institutions, without which democracy cannot exist. </p>
<p>Democratic culture is missing because of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09718923.2012.11893106">enduring legacy of military and authoritarian rule</a>. Democratic institutions such as parliament, political parties and the judicial system are still affected by this legacy. They have become less reflective of citizens’ demands. And they have become corrupt. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/01/nigeria-ranks-154-on-corruption-perception-index-cislac-ti/">Nigeria has been ranked as one of the most corrupt countries</a> in the world. It is ranked 154 out of 180 in the Transparency International Perception Index. </p>
<p>The ruling elites frequently reserve government appointments and contracts for cronies without due process and merit. Some political leaders have been <a href="https://pmnewsnigeria.com/2019/12/11/meet-6-nigerian-ex-governors-who-have-been-to-prison/">convicted for corruption</a>. At the same time the rule of law and constitutionalism are at a low ebb.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483">Security has waned due to Boko Haram insurgency</a> and bandits. <a href="https://www.richtmann.org/journal/index.php/ajis/article/view/10573">Agitations by groups seeking self-determination</a> are also on the rise.</p>
<h2>How can democracy work better for Nigeria’s citizens?</h2>
<p>I <a href="https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/handle/10413/14847">discovered</a> that 23 years of democracy in Nigeria are an illusion of democracy and development. There are issues of leadership, weak institutions and governance, acute corruption and insecurity. </p>
<p>These should be tackled by electing developmental and transformational leadership whose vision is anchored on democratic culture and collective national interest rather than politics of self-enrichment. </p>
<p>Nigeria should strengthen democratic institutions and improve governance for economic development. I think if the security architecture is strengthened, democracy and development will thrive. </p>
<p>Similarly, the country needs an intense effort to transform and diversify the economy through human capital and infrastructural development. This will address the problem of corruption, poverty and unemployment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191357/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abiodun Fatai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nigeria must strengthen its democratic institutions and improve governance for economic development.Abiodun Fatai, Senior Lecturer, Lagos State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1868442022-08-01T13:55:11Z2022-08-01T13:55:11ZBurundi at 60 is the poorest country on the planet: a look at what went wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474611/original/file-20220718-72671-x6b330.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sorting newly picked coffee beans.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thierry BrŽsillon-GODONG/GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Burundi, which marked 60 years of independence on 1 July 2022, ranks as the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/256547/the-20-countries-with-the-lowest-gdp-per-capita/">poorest country on the planet</a> in terms of GDP per capita. This must be understood in the light of a <a href="https://recherche-afriquedesgrandslacs.pantheonsorbonne.fr/activites-et-programmes/burundi-recherche-son-histoire">history punctuated by political upheavals</a>. Until 1996, the country lived to the rhythm of <a href="https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/burundi-1962-present/">coups</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/burundi-killings-1972.html">massacres</a> and political <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundi-military-behind-1993-assassination-president">assassinations</a> – before plunging into a long civil war. </p>
<p>Peace was eventually restored in 2005. However, the country returned to authoritarian governance in 2015. Since then, the UN has noted progress but continues to <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100092">denounce</a> the political violence that plagues the country. </p>
<p>How did Burundi come to this? Why is change so slow to arrive?</p>
<p>I have studied the politics and economies around the Great Lakes region for more than 40 years – including the links between governance and poverty. The countries that form the region are Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. , Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. It’s my view that the end of the Belgian and British colonial empires <a href="https://www.persee.fr/issue/tiers_0040-7356_1986_num_27_106">upset</a> the political, economic and social frameworks of the two nations formed out of the former <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ruanda-Urundi">Ruanda-Urundi</a> colonial entity. </p>
<p>Present-day Rwanda and Burundi served as reservoirs of labour for the exploitation of the wealth of the vast agricultural and mining areas of the Belgian Congo to the west and the British colonies in the east. Refocused within their borders following independence in the 1962, they were reduced to small, overcrowded and landlocked micro-states.</p>
<p>Burundi is a country familiar with <a href="https://www.persee.fr/doc/tiers_0040-7356_1991_num_32_127_4651">various military regimes since independence</a>. These regimes have succeeded in appropriating state resources while ordinary citizens – mostly rural farmers – have borne the brunt of the civil war.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-whats-gone-wrong-in-burundis-search-for-stability-54014">Explainer: what’s gone wrong in Burundi’s search for stability</a>
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<p>The divide that has emerged between military elites and “people of the hills” – as rural farmers are commonly referred to – runs deeper than ethnic and regional differences. The peasantry still provides almost all the resources of the party-state. But most of the agrarian policy decisions are taken without consultation, including at the grassroots levels where party delegates, often peasants, do as directed. </p>
<p>The state has imposed itself as the exclusive economic operator. Civil servants and party cadres programme and direct investments. Ordinary people are for the most part powerless.</p>
<h2>Nkurunziza’s missed opportunity</h2>
<p>Following the gradual return of peace nearly 20 years ago, Pierre Nkurunziza was elected president in 2005. Drawn from the majority Hutu ethnic group, Nkurunziza ended 25 years of pro-Tutsi military regimes. The <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/422339#metadata_info_tab_contents">minority Tutsi make up 14% of the population and the Hutu 85%</a>. In the next five years, the president and his party – the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) – <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/post-nkurunziza-total-supremacy-cndd-fdd">went about consolidating power</a>.</p>
<p>Hopes for stability were stronger at the next election in 2010. For the first time in the country’s history, voters were called upon to vote at the normal end of an electoral cycle. CNDD-FDD secured another mandate thanks to a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/burundi-ruling-party-wins-parliamentary-elections-99322559/155447.html">divided opposition</a> and the charismatic personality of the incumbent president, who enjoyed massive support from rural populations. </p>
<p>A party that had managed to reconcile ethnic divisions and to <a href="https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/Burundi-CNDD-FDD-1994-2004.pdf">integrate</a> the armed forces with former rebels now had a resounding national mandate.</p>
<p>Unchallenged, Nkurunziza concentrated power in his hands under a de facto one-party state. A youth militia loyal to his party kept an eye on dissent among local populations and neutralised any organised opposition. But the mood soured quickly when Nkurunziza <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32588658">sought a “third term”</a> in the 2015 elections, contrary to the constitution.</p>
<p>A popular protest was immediate and strengthened despite the mobilisation of the police. Within weeks a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/14/burundi-violence-coup-protests-bujumbura-president-pierre-nkurunziza">failed military coup</a> laid bare the fractures within the armed forces. A <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/26/april-2015-june-2020-chronology-repression-media-and-civil-society-burundi">violent repression</a> followed in which freedom of expression and independent media were crushed. </p>
<p>In July 2015, after elections “<a href="https://news.un.org/fr/story/2015/07/315472-burundi-lonu-estime-que-lenvironnement-general-netait-pas-propice-des-elections">neither free nor credible</a>” according to the UN, the CNDD-FDD exceeded the two-thirds majority in the National Assembly.</p>
<p>Nkurunziza’s victory was Burundi’s loss. Amid the repression of opponents, the country’s economy slowed down, foreign capital took flight and infrastructure crumbled. There was looting of public resources and a sharp reduction in social benefits. </p>
<p>At the end of his third term, the leaders of the CNDD-FDD party were happy to see the back of the <a href="https://gl-news.com/news/burundi-to-pay-530-thousand-dollars-to-the-president-who-leaves-office/">“eternal supreme leader”</a> who had become a liability. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/nkurunziza-left-a-troubling-legacy-burundis-new-leader-has-much-to-mend-140972">Nkurunziza left a troubling legacy: Burundi's new leader has much to mend</a>
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<h2>The electoral rescue of 2020</h2>
<p>Burundi’s GDP had been <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Burundi-report-v2.pdf">battered badly</a> during the civil war, which ended in 2005. It was on the rise for ten years from 2005 to 2014. Following the Nkurunziza-instigated political crisis in 2015 the economy dipped sharply again. Ranked second poorest country in the world in 2013 and 2014, it fell to the poorest in 2015 and has remained there ever since. The UN <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI">Human Development Index</a>, which measures longevity, education and inequality, also attests to this deterioration. Burundi was ranked 180th in 2015, falling to 185th in 2019 and 2020.</p>
<p>Thus, in almost all socio-economic measures, Burundi’s performance is among the lowest on the planet thanks mainly to conflict and <a href="https://iwacu.global.ssl.fastly.net/une-annee-du-president-ndayishimiye-un-bilan-economique-indolent/">elite corruption</a>. </p>
<p>The failed coup of May 2015 upset a delicate balance in which the army – including former rebels – and the police were jointly managed. Pro-Nkurunziza <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/coup-d-etat-au-burundi-32942">elements</a> in the army who crushed the coup sensed an opportunity for <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/central-africa/burundi/au-coeur-de-la-crise-burundaise-iv-la-rente-du-maintien-de-la-paix-en-question">self-enrichment</a> to match the fortunes of their senior Tutsi colleagues and graduates of military schools. </p>
<p>Hitherto contained or concealed, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/central-africa/burundi/au-coeur-de-la-crise-burundaise-iv-la-rente-du-maintien-de-la-paix-en-question">this “financial catch-up”</a> was transformed into an open competition for personal enrichment commensurate with each person’s powers.</p>
<p>In May 2020, General Evariste Ndayishimiye, <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/burundi-qui-est-evariste-ndayishimiye-candidat-du-systeme-cndd-fdd-343510">a wise and withdrawn man</a>, became the new president. Nkurunziza died shortly afterwards officially from COVID-19, a disease whose danger he had always underestimated. Burundi, on the other hand, continues to suffer the effects of Nkurunziza’s political legacy. </p>
<h2>Struggle between elites</h2>
<p>Having experienced since independence all forms of divisions that can be exploited by authoritarian regimes, the “people of the hills” now know that their lot is the result of struggles between elites for the capture of national resources.</p>
<p>Only the re-appropriation of the state, to make it legitimate once more in the eyes of the population, could free resources for their purposes. This implies that peasants emancipate themselves from <a href="https://iwacu42.global.ssl.fastly.net/quand-le-ministre-ndirakobuca-prend-la-grosse-seringue/">co-opted administrative and economic bureaucracies</a> which have appropriated power and wealth by force, first for the benefit of a Tutsi and then of a Hutu elite. Burundians need to impose themselves through free and credible elections as self-organised citizens responsible for the future of a democratic country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186844/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Guichaoua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The peasantry still provides almost all the resources of the party-state, yet most of the agrarian policy decisions are taken without consultation.André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1538922021-02-17T14:45:17Z2021-02-17T14:45:17ZWhy being endowed with oil is not always a boon: the case of Nigeria and Angola<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382714/original/file-20210205-13-ilajqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young Angolans protest for bettter living conditions in the capital Luanda in 2020.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In countries with weak governance institutions, natural resource wealth <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01045.x">tends</a> to be a curse instead of a blessing. Where citizens are relatively powerless to hold ruling elites to account, resource wealth undermines development prospects. On the contrary, where citizens are able to exert constraints on executive power, resource wealth can generate development that benefits ordinary citizens.</p>
<p>Development scholar <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0305750X94901651">Richard Auty</a> first coined the term ‘resource curse’ in the early 1990s. He used the phrase to describe the puzzling phenomenon of resource wealthy countries failing to industrialise. Manifestations of the ‘curse’ now range from widespread corruption to civil war to deepening authoritarian rule. </p>
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<p>Literature <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359">on the resource curse</a> has done an adequate job of describing the general nature of the relationship between resource dependence and underdevelopment. It now needs to focus on understanding specific manifestations. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/product/978-1-5275-6076-5">In my latest book</a>, I detail what these are in relation to oil in Nigeria and Angola, sub-Saharan Africa’s two largest oil producers.</p>
<p>My book shows that the resource curse manifests differently in different contexts. </p>
<p>Why does this matter?</p>
<p>If governance interventions are to be useful, it’s important to <a href="https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.27.2.173">understand the context</a>. Otherwise, policy interventions won’t gain traction. If political dynamics play a <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/700936?mobileUi=0&">determinative role</a> in long-run economic outcomes, we must understand them better. </p>
<h2>Two countries, two stories</h2>
<p>In 2018, Angola’s fuel exports constituted 92.4% of the country’s total exports. Oil rents – the <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/metadataglossary/adjusted-net-savings/series/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS">difference</a> between the price of oil and the average cost of producing – accounted for 25.6% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 2019 the country ranked <a href="http://www.hdr.undp.org/">148th</a> out of 189 countries in the UN’s Human Development Index. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s oil exports in 2018 were 94.1% of total exports, oil rents amounted to 9% of GDP. In 2019 it ranked <a href="http://www.hdr.undp.org/">161st on the human development index</a> . As is clear from the graph above, sub-Saharan Africa’s major oil producers are clustered around the lower end of the human development spectrum and are mostly autocratic.</p>
<p>Both Nigeria and Angola have been characterised by one form or another of autocratic rule for most of their post-independence histories. Autocracy invariably <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/700936?mobileUi=0&">undermines</a> a country’s development prospects.</p>
<p>Angola was plunged into a civil war shortly after independence in <a href="https://history.state.gov/countries/angola#:%7E:text=Portugal%20granted%20Angola%20independence%20on,over%20the%20newly%20liberated%20state.">November 1975</a>. It then suffered an unsuccessful coup attempt <a href="https://www.amazon.com/History-Modern-Angola-Birmingham-2015-12-17/dp/B01K91W048">in 1977</a>. </p>
<p>In Nigeria, the balance of power at independence in 1960 was just as precarious as Angola’s. Nigeria suffered two <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Max-Siollun-Politics-2009-03-30-Paperback/dp/B01GYOUQFY">military coups</a> in 1966, and a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Brothers-War-Biafra-Nigeria/dp/0571251919">civil war</a> from 1967-1970. </p>
<p>But why does oil fuel the consolidation of autocratic rule in one context, but not necessarily in another? </p>
<p>It all comes down to how the leader of the ruling coalition extracts and distributes the oil rents. In my book, I employ a game theory model <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/politics-of-authoritarian-rule/7F78A8828A5714F0BE74E44A90A44868">developed by Princeton political scientist Milan Svolik</a> to explain these divergent political outcomes.</p>
<h2>Angola</h2>
<p>Jose Eduardo dos Santos came to power in 1979 as served as president until 2017, grabbing power early and repeatedly. Svolik’s model predicts that rulers who can do this at the same time as limiting the probability of a coup being against them manage to entrench their rule. </p>
<p>Within six years, dos Santos had consolidated power. He eliminated internal threats by subverting power sharing institutions and purging key individuals. For instance, in 1984 the central committee of the ruling <em>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</em> (MPLA) – created a ‘defence and security council’, chaired by dos Santos. As I note in the <a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/product/978-1-5275-6076-5">book</a>, it became an inner cabinet, “effectively eclipsing the Political Bureau as the country’s top decision-making body”.</p>
<p>A year later, dos Santos dropped Lúcio Lara, the party’s stalwart intellectual, from the Political Bureau, thus removing the last potential threat to his rule. Simultaneously, he used the extensive oil rents at his disposal – and the cover of civil war – to either co-opt or eliminate opposition. </p>
<p>He did so by ensuring that the state oil firm, Sonangol, was proficiently run. It soon became Angola’s <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/magnificent-and-beggar-land/">shadow state</a> through its vast web of subsidiaries. After the civil war - 1975 to 2002 - Sonangol became the driver of (limited) development, but also the key distributor of patronage to cement dos Santos’s power. He not only bled it to enrich his family dynasty; he also used it to appease his inner circle. </p>
<p>Dos Santos ended up ruling for <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/26426/how-different-is-the-new-angola-under-lourenco">38 years</a>. But, his key strategic mistake was placing his children in plum Sonangol positions ahead of loyalists.</p>
<p>In 2017, <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-unlikely-to-herald-the-change-angolans-have-been-clamouring-for-82851">João Lourenço</a>, a former Defence Minister, became the new Angolan president. Dos Santos was to remain head of the MPLA until 2022. But, he was ousted through what was essentially a bloodless coup in 2018, engineered by his former loyalists like Manuel Vicente, the long-standing former head of Sonangol.</p>
<p>The Politburo appointed Lourenço president of the MPLA. He has since <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/angola-the-fall-of-the-dos-santos-clan/a-45646757">purged the dos Santos children</a> from plum positions. Angola is still heavily dominated by the ruling MPLA, though. Prospects for a more competitive political settlement appear limited.</p>
<h2>The case of Nigeria</h2>
<p>Within six years of independence from Britain on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54241944">1 October 1960</a>, the military launched a coup. This initiated a long period of military rule. Seven coups <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_coups_in_Nigeria">occurred</a> between 1966 and 1993. Military rule was largely uninterrupted from 1966 to 1999. </p>
<p>But neither the coups nor the civil war were driven by oil.</p>
<p>Oil wealth only became a major factor in Nigeria’s political economy in the early 1970s, when the price rocketed as a result of the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo">global supply crisis</a>. Windfall oil wealth exacerbated the preexisting fragility. The state run oil firm, the <a href="https://www.nnpcgroup.com/Pages/Home.aspx">Nigerian National Petroleum Company</a>, was inefficient compared to Sonangol. Nonetheless, it served as the country’s cash cow, milked to extend patronage. </p>
<p>But, unlike in Angola, no aspirant Nigerian autocrat was able to monopolise personal control over the national oil company. As I detail in <a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/product/978-1-5275-6076-5">the book</a>, oil exacerbated fragility in Nigeria. While Angola’s dos Santos maintained a stable bargain among elites, Nigeria’s balance of power remained precarious. </p>
<p>In 1975, another military coup toppled Yakubu Gowon who had ruled Nigeria through the civil war. Murtala Muhammed came to power but was assassinated in a coup attempt six months later, which brought <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/people/olusegun-obasanjo/">Olusegun Obasanjo</a> to power in 1976. Obasanjo guided a transition to civilian rule in 1979 but this only lasted four years.</p>
<p>A 1983 coup brought current president Muhammadu Buhari to power and another ousted him two years later. Ibrahim Babangida then ruled until 1993. After a brief attempt at civilian rule, Sani Abacha came to power through yet another coup that same year. He died in office in 1998. His successor, Abdulsalami Abubakar, returned the country to civilian rule a year later. </p>
<p>Former military ruler Obasanjo – who had been imprisoned by Abacha – won the 1999 elections but attempted to grab a third term as president in 2006. Despite <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/16/world/africa/16iht-lagos.html">alleged oil-funded bribery</a> to lobby party members to support his cause, they held fast to the constitution’s term limits. </p>
<p>The importance of that moment cannot be overstated. It has resulted in a more open and competitive political settlement in Nigeria. Maintaining constitutional term limits can stop autocratic entrenchment in its tracks. Unfortunately, this has not guaranteed stability in Nigeria. Post-2015 fragility has deepened considerably. </p>
<h2>Where to from here?</h2>
<p>As my book shows, oil rents grease the wheels of political dynamics very differently in Angola and Nigeria. </p>
<p>Existing explanations for different manifestations range from ethnic fragmentation, inherited colonial structures, the role of foreign actors and how <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ej/article/129/619/1425/5334637?login=true">lootable</a> the oil is.</p>
<p>More attention now needs to be paid to how aspirant autocrats use natural resource rents to accumulate power for themselves. This can lead to policy practitioners developing an early warning system that may help citizens to nip power-grabs in the bud. </p>
<p>This may serve, in conjunction with other policy interventions, to ultimately reverse the curse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153892/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ross Harvey is the Director of Research and Programmes at Good Governance Africa, a non-profit organisation. </span></em></p>A new book explains the manifestations of the oil curse in Nigeria and Angola since independence.Ross Harvey, Senior Research Associate, Institute for the Future of Knowledge, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/999212018-11-07T11:39:09Z2018-11-07T11:39:09ZWhich country is best to live in? Our calculations say it’s not Norway<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/237513/original/file-20180921-129850-e897k4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">It's not the U.S., either.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.pexels.com/photo/antique-antique-globe-antique-shop-antique-store-414916/">Pixabay</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Every year, the United Nations releases <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI">the Human Development Index</a>.</p>
<p>The HDI is like a country’s report card. In a single number, it tells policymakers and citizens how well a country is doing. This year, Norway was at the top of the class, while Niger finished last. </p>
<p>The index first appeared in 1990. Before then, a country’s level of development was measured solely by its economic growth. By taking non-economic dimensions of human well-being into account, the HDI revolutionized the idea of what was meant by countries becoming “more developed.” </p>
<p>The HDI has been wildly successful in <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/celebrating-human-development-success">changing the way people think</a> about the development process. However, it still <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2808029">suffers from</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2012.01.003">real flaws</a>. There have been numerous attempts to do its job better, including <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/padr.12205">one that we published on Nov. 6</a>.</p>
<p>Eliminating the flaws in the HDI make a substantial difference. For example, Denmark was ranked fifth in the world according to this year’s UN rankings, but our new index knocks it down to only 27th, switching places with Spain.</p>
<p><iframe id="2emkU" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/2emkU/5/" height="540px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Problems with the HDI</h2>
<p>Human development can be devilishly hard to measure. The HDI considers changes in three domains: economics, education and health. (One alternative to the HDI, <a href="https://www.socialprogress.org/">the Social Progress Index</a>, combines data on 54 domains.)</p>
<p>In our view, the HDI has three main problems. First, it implicitly assumes trade-offs between its components. For example, the HDI measures health using life expectancy at birth and measures economic conditions using GDP per capita. So the same HDI score can be achieved with different combinations of the two. </p>
<p>As a result, the HDI implies a value of an additional year of life in terms of economic output. This value differs according to a country’s level of GDP per capita. Dig into the HDI and you will find whether it assumes an additional year of life is worth more in the U.S. or Canada, more in Germany or France, and more in Norway or Niger. </p>
<p>The HDI also struggles with the accuracy and meaningfulness of the underlying data. Average income could be high in a country, but what if most of it goes to a small elite? The HDI does not distinguish between countries with the same GDP per capita, but different levels of income inequality or between countries based on the quality of education. By focusing on averages, the HDI can obscure important differences in human development. Incorporating inaccurate or incomplete data in an index reduces its usefulness.</p>
<p>Finally, data on different domains may be highly correlated. For example, the GDP per capita and the average level of education in countries are strongly related. Including two highly correlated indicators may provide little additional information compared to just using one.</p>
<h2>Our indicator</h2>
<p>We propose a new index: <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/padr.12205">the Human Life Indicator, or HLI</a>. </p>
<p>The HLI looks at life expectancy at birth, but also takes the inequality in longevity into account. If two countries had the same life expectancy, the country with the higher rate of infant and child deaths would have a lower HLI.</p>
<p><iframe id="r6a6J" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/r6a6J/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>This solves the problem of having contentious trade-offs among its components, because it has only a single component. It solves the problem of inaccurate data, because <a href="https://doi.org/10.3386/w16572">life expectancy is the most reliable component</a> of the UN’s index. Because GDP per capita, the level of education and life expectancy are closely related to one another, little information is lost by using a human development indicator based only on life expectancy. </p>
<p>Our index draws a different picture than the one made by the HDI. Based on data from 2010 to 2015, Norway is not on top of the list in terms of human development. That honor goes to Hong Kong, while Norway drops to ninth place. Norway ranks highly on the HDI in part because of the revenues that it receives from North Sea oil and gas, but even with that revenue, Norway’s inequality-adjusted life expectancy is not the highest in the world. </p>
<p>What’s more, on our measure, Niger no longer is last. That dubious distinction goes to the Central African Republic.</p>
<p>The UN puts Canada and the U.S. as tied at 10th place, but Canada is ranked 17th in the world using our system, while the U.S. does poorly, ranking as 32nd. This relatively higher ranking of Canada reflects the higher longevity of its inhabitants and the lower inequality in their ages of death compared to people in the U.S.</p>
<p>In our view, the genius of the HDI is too important to give up, just because of problems with its implementation. In our new index, we have provided a simple approach that is free from the problems of the HDI. There is no need to have just one measure of human development, but it is useful to have at least one without contentious flaws.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99921/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Warren Sanderson receives funding from the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement No 323947. Project Name: Reassessing Aging from a Population Perspective, Re-Ageing. Warren Sanderson is a senior research scientist at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria and a Professor of Economics, emeritus at Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, New York, USA.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sergei Scherbov receives funding from European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement No 323947. Project Name: Reassessing Aging from a Population Perspective, Re-Ageing.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simone Ghislandi receives funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement No 323947. Project Name: Reassessing Aging from a Population Perspective, Re-Ageing.</span></em></p>Most researchers use the UN’s Human Development Index to measure each country’s progress, but that system has flaws. A new, simplified index aims to do it better.Warren Sanderson, Professor of Economics, Stony Brook University (The State University of New York)Sergei Scherbov, Deputy Director of World Population Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)Simone Ghislandi, Associate Professor of Social and Political Sciences, Bocconi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1004112018-08-06T15:01:53Z2018-08-06T15:01:53ZWhy the global survey on safety is deeply flawed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230208/original/file-20180801-136649-105dad8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A global survey claims South Africans don't trust their police.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There has been a rise in global statistical initiatives that measure and rank countries in terms of various aspects of the human condition. Some of the more prominent examples include the <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi">Human Development Index</a>, the World Governance <a href="http://info.worldbank.org/governance/WGI/#home">Indicators</a>, the Global Peace <a href="http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/06/Global-Peace-Index-2018-2.pdf">Index</a> and the Corruption Perceptions <a href="https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017">Index</a>. </p>
<p>Each ranks countries according to a series of indicators, or a composite indicator, and tracks their progress or decline over time. </p>
<p>One of the most recent global indicator projects is the <a href="https://news.gallup.com/reports/235310/gallup-global-law-order-report-2018.aspx">Gallup Law and Order Index</a>. It ranks 142 countries based on a perception survey relating to personal safety and policing, from a representative sample of 1000 people in each country. Knowing how secure, or insecure people feel is important because insecurity affects economic growth and undermines development. </p>
<p>According to the recently released 2018 <a href="https://news.gallup.com/reports/235310/gallup-global-law-order-report-2018.aspx">law and order index</a>, South Africa ranks high in the insecurity index – 137 out 142 countries. This means that South Africans would have expressed high levels of insecurity as well as fear that they were likely to, or had already, fallen victim to crime.</p>
<p>The ranking suggests that South Africans consider themselves to be more insecure, and having lower levels of confidence in the police, compared to people in Yemen, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya and Mali. These are all unstable states affected by violent conflict and high levels of instability.</p>
<p>This is surprising given that South Africa is not in state of armed conflict and is relatively stable. The possible reason for such a questionable ranking is that the survey, like many global perception surveys, doesn’t adequately account for the extent to which people will provide unreliable information about sensitive issues. To improve accuracy, surveys like this should factor in differences in context. </p>
<h2>The rankings</h2>
<p>The rankings are based on an index score derived from responses to the following questions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>In the city or area where you live, do you have confidence in the local police force?</p></li>
<li><p>Do you feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where you live?</p></li>
<li><p>Within the last 12 months, have you had money or property stolen from you or another household member?</p></li>
<li><p>Within the past 12 months, have you been assaulted or mugged?</p></li>
</ul>
<p>It’s undeniable that South Africa has high levels of insecurity and interpersonal crime. And, there’s a significant trust deficit between citizens and the police. </p>
<p>For example, the <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0341/P03412016.pdf">StatsSA 2016/17 Victims of Crime Survey</a> showed that only 30% of South African’s reported feeling safe walking at night in their neighbourhoods. Only 57% of households reported that they were “satisfied” with the police in their communities. And the country has very high <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/services/c_thumbnail.php?id=322">levels of crime</a>.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, it seems odd that South Africa is ranked below countries like <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/yemen">Yemen</a>, which has been in the throes of an intense civil war for several years, the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/central-african-republic">Central African Republic</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/libya">Libya</a>, which have been acutely affected by insurgency, criminality and weak law and order institutions. </p>
<p>Ranking South Africa below the DRC, Mali and Libya is also questionable given that the security forces and militias in those countries have been widely regarded as predatory and highly abusive.</p>
<p>So what’s missing?</p>
<h2>Context</h2>
<p>Firstly, context is key. </p>
<p>A key shortcoming of using survey data about crime and insecurity to construct indices and rankings is that people won’t always reply to questions honestly and accurately.</p>
<p>In stable democracies respondents will often give precise and truthful responses as there is little or no fear of reprisals from the state. Conversely, in unstable countries that have repressive governments, <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343311405698">research</a> shows that citizens are less willing to provide accurate information about personal experiences of crime and policing. This is because they fear there may be negative repercussions for them and their families.</p>
<p>Secondly, as research method experts have argued, survey responses can also be influenced by a variety of societal norms, particularly those related to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01621459.1986.10478282">privacy and dignity</a>, in which sensitive matters aren’t easily discussed with strangers. </p>
<p>In South Africa, citizens are generally willing to talk openly about crime and to criticise the police. But, this isn’t the case in many other African and Latin American countries that were rated as being safer. These include DRC, Libya, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/honduras">Honduras</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/mexico">Mexico</a>.</p>
<p>This is not to say that constructing indices about crime victimisation and policing on a country basis is irrelevant. But the danger of indicators like this, and adopting a ranking approach without careful consideration of the context in which the data is gathered, is that it could lead to wrong perceptions about crime and policing. That may even reinforce the use of militarised policing strategies, which will further undermine <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Policing-United-States-America/dp/0822321599">human security</a> over less aggressive and more integrated approaches to crime prevention. Examples of where this has happened include <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/27/brazil-military-police-crime-rio-de-janeiro-favelas">Brazil</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/world/americas/mexico-military-drug-war.html">Mexico</a> and <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0021909614541086">South Africa</a>. </p>
<p>To improve the accuracy of indices like this, it would be advisable to develop a quantifiable weighting for the reliability of crime and insecurity survey data for each country, and then apply the weighting to the overall index score. For example, in countries with more authoritarian governments, respondents are likely to under report their levels of trust in the police and sense of personal insecurity.</p>
<p>Applying a reliability weighting would adjust the overall insecurity index score to better reflect people’s lived reality. Such a weighting can be developed by including additional questions in the survey, for example about how willing respondents are to talk to strangers about sensitive information, including views about their governments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100411/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Guy Lamb does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Law and Order Index says South Africans feel less secure than people in Yemen, the DRC and Libya, countries all affected by violent conflict.Guy Lamb, Director, Safety and Violence Initiaitive, University of Cape Town, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/965592018-05-14T18:25:28Z2018-05-14T18:25:28ZForests are growing again where human well-being is increasing, finds new study<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218790/original/file-20180514-178740-1y263ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C0%2C3982%2C1994&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Swanepoel / shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Countries with high levels of human well-being are more likely to show increasing forest growth. That’s the finding of a new study by a group of Finnish scientists, published in <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0196248">PLOS ONE</a>. Their work shows that countries exhibiting annual increases in the amount of trees typically score highly on the UN’s <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi">Human Development Index</a> (HDI), a scoring system that uses measures of life expectancy, education, and income to assess development status. Meanwhile, countries with a net annual forest loss typically score lower on the HDI.</p>
<p>The logical leap of faith here is to think that a remedy for the ongoing loss and degradation of much of the world’s forests would be a massive push for development in deforested countries. But while such a noble undertaking would be desirable in many ways, these apparent environmental links warrant scrutiny.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218825/original/file-20180514-100713-17j6ui6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218825/original/file-20180514-100713-17j6ui6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218825/original/file-20180514-100713-17j6ui6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=273&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218825/original/file-20180514-100713-17j6ui6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=273&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218825/original/file-20180514-100713-17j6ui6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=273&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218825/original/file-20180514-100713-17j6ui6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218825/original/file-20180514-100713-17j6ui6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218825/original/file-20180514-100713-17j6ui6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Forests are generally growing back in more developed countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://bit.ly/2JNB3TD">Kauppi et al (2018)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>At what cost?</h2>
<p>The authors themselves discuss caveats to their findings, and these should not be ignored. For example, switching from net forest loss to net gain may simply involve sourcing things like wooden furniture or paper pulp from abroad, often from poorer nations with weaker environmental policies and safeguards. This process, known as “leakage”, was perhaps best described and documented by the geographer <a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/107/49/20917#ref-7">Patrick Meyfroidt and colleagues</a> in 2010. Among other examples, they illustrate leakage by looking at Vietnam, where national increases in forest cover were linked to sharp increases in imported wood, about half of which was illegal.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218827/original/file-20180514-100690-y9rvun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218827/original/file-20180514-100690-y9rvun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218827/original/file-20180514-100690-y9rvun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218827/original/file-20180514-100690-y9rvun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218827/original/file-20180514-100690-y9rvun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218827/original/file-20180514-100690-y9rvun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218827/original/file-20180514-100690-y9rvun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218827/original/file-20180514-100690-y9rvun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vietnam simply switched to using more wood from Malaysia, Indonesia and China instead.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rich Carey / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If such processes are occurring, then how far, and for how long, can the buck of exporting environmental impacts be passed?</p>
<p>In any case, those recovered forests often aren’t all they seem. Under some definitions they can include <a href="http://www.cts.cuni.cz/%7EStorch/publications/Tropek_et_al_2014_Science.pdf">plantations</a> of oil palm or rubber – technically “forests”, yet with few of the ecological benefits of the environment they replace. Even the supposedly naturally-recovered forests are rarely, if ever, as <a href="http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/06/when-forest-burned-what-comes-back-may-not-resemble-what-was-lost">biologically diverse and well-functioning</a> as their natural predecessors. </p>
<p>Things can be worsened by forest restoration schemes which may have human, rather than ecological, motives at heart. In Indonesia, for example, I have witnessed forest restoration work in national parks that favoured useful exotics over native forest species. In Tanzania, local NGOs such the as the <a href="http://www.tfcg.org/">Tanzania Forest Conservation Group</a> lobby for policies that promote forest conservation over (and in addition to) tree planting, citing both ecological and well-being benefits.</p>
<p>The clear message here is that it is far preferable to prevent damage in the first place, than to try and restore former conditions at a later point.</p>
<h2>Forests and development</h2>
<p>Modern concepts of sustainable development are typified by the UN’s 17 <a href="https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/">Sustainable Development Goals</a> (SDGs), which cover a variety of topics, including matters of well-being, infrastructure and environment. Studies of how these goals interact (whether for better or worse) are important if we are to achieve truly sustainable development.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218814/original/file-20180514-100687-1lejxe3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218814/original/file-20180514-100687-1lejxe3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218814/original/file-20180514-100687-1lejxe3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218814/original/file-20180514-100687-1lejxe3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218814/original/file-20180514-100687-1lejxe3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218814/original/file-20180514-100687-1lejxe3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218814/original/file-20180514-100687-1lejxe3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218814/original/file-20180514-100687-1lejxe3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The UN’s Sustainable Development Goals apply to all countries and were adopted in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sustainable_Development_Goals_text_only.png">UN</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The latest forest cover study uses a composite index to investigate forest trends, which may disguise a more complex picture. Past work has shown that <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/41448558/Demography_Development_and_Deforestation20160122-18760-1quz54e.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1526311738&Signature=FjcWJVowaLaYtB6%2Fo%2BXz0Rs%2BthI%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DDemography_Development_and_Deforestation.pdf">improved education</a> (SDG 4) is commonly associated with reducing deforestation, while the effect of increasing GDP (SDG 8) on forests is <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387898001102">far more complicated</a>. The authors use a metric that combines these components (along with life expectancy), which does not explain how they interact.</p>
<p>Further complexities involve other areas of development, which have their own effects. For example, in countries with high levels of inequality (SDG 10), <a href="https://projects.ncsu.edu/project/amazonia/KoopTole2001.pdf">development can exacerbate deforestation rates</a>, rather than remedy them. In Brazil, for example, national efforts to raise people’s development status proved more damaging to forests in municipalities with <a href="https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43793/1/MPRA_paper_43793.pdf">high levels of land inequality</a> than in those where land was more fairly shared.</p>
<p>Some work suggests that improvements in <a href="http://www.binaagarwal.com/downloads/apapers/Rule-making%20in%20community%20forestry%20institutions.pdf">gender equality</a> (SDG 5) could have positive outcomes for forests, while forest-degrading activities witnessed <a href="http://langint.pri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ai/intra_data/JanetNackoney/NackoneyJ2014-BC.pdf">during times of conflict</a> suggest that peaceful relations (SDG 16) are also conducive to healthy forests. </p>
<p>On the flipside, achieving <a href="http://ucanr.edu/sites/Jackson_Lab/files/155937.pdf">global food security</a> (SDG 2), <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2af7/fba0fb70880c58ff00468a17b91d8b717519.pdf">meeting energy needs</a> (SDG 7), and developing <a href="https://repository.si.edu/bitstream/handle/10088/15918/stri_Laurance_TREE.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">sustainable infrastructure</a> (SDG 11) will all require careful planning and monitoring to ensure that their environmental impacts are minimised.</p>
<p>Ultimately, this paper gives reasons to feel positive about the inevitable development of humans and the fate of the world’s forests. It implies that, at a certain level of development, forests lost or degraded in the processes of developing will begin to regenerate or repair (whether naturally or with human assistance). I sincerely hope that the Finnish team’s work encourages nations across the world, developed or otherwise, to restore as much forest as they can.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, in an age of rapid climate change, biodiversity loss, and human population growth, we <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41559-018-0490-x">need our remaining forests</a> more than ever. The world must find sustainable ways to develop that do not involve destroying what forests are left. </p>
<p>Following in the footsteps of already developed nations, and simply replacing forests at a later point, should not be considered a viable course of action.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96559/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jamie Carr receives funding from the UK's Natural Environment Research Council and the United Bank of Carbon.</span></em></p>But often these new ‘forests’ have only grown thanks to increased deforestation abroad.Jamie Carr, PhD Researcher, Sustainability Research Institute, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/896992018-01-08T09:18:17Z2018-01-08T09:18:17ZWhy Rwanda’s development model wouldn’t work elsewhere in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200946/original/file-20180105-26142-cm4fig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Kagame has exercised firm personal control over Rwanda's politics since becoming president in 2000.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Phillip Guelland</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda is often touted as an example of what African states could achieve if only they were better governed. Out of the ashes of a horrific genocide, <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/rwandas-paul-kagame-saviour-or-dictator-bjdhp22nv">President Paul Kagame</a> has resuscitated the economy, curtailed corruption and maintained political stability.</p>
<p>This is a record that many other leaders can only dream of, and has led to Rwanda being cited as an economic success story that the rest of the continent would <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/1208900/rwanda-rising-new-model-economic-development">do well to follow</a>.</p>
<p>In countries like <a href="https://www.tuko.co.ke/253319-kenya-a-dictator-paul-kagame-uhuru-leader-jubilee-vice-chair.html#253319">Kenya</a> and <a href="https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2017/12/04/mnangagwa-zimbabwes-kagame/">Zimbabwe</a> some have argued that their leaders should operate more like Kagame. In other words, that job creation and poverty alleviation are more important than free and fair elections.</p>
<p>In response, critics have sought to puncture Kagame’s image by pointing to <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/rwanda-paul-kagame-americas-darling-tyrant-103963">human rights violations</a> committed under his leadership. This is an important concern. But the notion that the Rwandan model should be exported also suffers from a more fundamental flaw: it would not work almost anywhere else because the necessary conditions – political dominance and tight centralised control of patronage networks – do not apply.</p>
<h2>The Rwandan model</h2>
<p>Many of the achievements of Kagame and his governing <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-03.htm">Rwandan Patriotic Front</a> party are impressive. He took over a deeply divided nation in desperate need of economic and political reconstruction in 1994. Since then, Kagame has established firm personal control over Rwandan politics, generating the political stability needed for economic renewal.</p>
<p>Instead of sitting back and waiting for foreign investors and the “market” to inspire growth, the new administration intervened directly in a process of state directed development. Most notably, his government kick started economic activity in areas that had previously been stagnating by investing heavily in key sectors. It has done so through party-owned holding companies such as <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/business/21718000-crystal-ventures-has-investments-everything-furniture-finance-rwandan-patriotic">Tri-Star Investments</a>.</p>
<p>Combined with the careful management of agriculture, these policies generated <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview">economic growth of around 8%</a> between 2001 and 2013. Partly as a result, the percentage of people living below the poverty line fell from 57% in 2005 to <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/04/5-things-to-know-about-rwanda-s-economy/">45% in 2010</a>. Other indicators of human development, such as <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/RWA.pdf">life expectancy</a> and <a href="https://en.unesco.org/countries/rwanda">literacy</a>, have also improved.</p>
<h2>An example for Africa?</h2>
<p>Despite the impressive headline figures, a number of criticisms have been levelled at the Rwandan model.</p>
<p>Most obviously, it sacrifices basic human rights – such as <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/08/04/rwanda-kagame-efficient-repression/">freedom of expression and freedom of association</a> – to sustain the ruling party’s political hegemony. The Rwandan system therefore involves compromising democracy for the sake of development. That decision may be an easy one to make for those who enjoy political power, but is often rejected by the opposition.</p>
<p>Less obviously, the use of party-owned enterprises to kick start business activity places the ruling party at the heart of the economy. It also means that when the economy does well, the already dominant Rwandan Patriotic Front is strengthened. This empowers Kagame to determine who is allowed to <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/ruling-partys-business-arm-dominates-rwandan-economy-20170730">accumulate economic power</a>, which in turn undermines the ability of opposition leaders and critics to raise funds.</p>
<p>These arguments have been around for some time. But they have done little to dampen the allure of the Rwandan model for some <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-07-07-00-like-it-or-not-rwanda-is-africas-future">commentators</a> and <a href="http://en.igihe.com/news/kenya-s-kenyatta-congratulates-kagame.html">leaders</a>. </p>
<p>Given this, the strongest argument against exporting the Rwandan model is not that it is undemocratic and gives the ruling party tremendous economic power. It’s that it won’t actually work.</p>
<h2>Can’t work everywhere</h2>
<p>One of the most rigorous efforts to understand the political conditions that made the Rwandan model possible has emerged from the <a href="http://www.institutions-africa.org/">African Power and Politics</a> research project led by David Booth, Tim Kelsall and others. They argue that Kagame’s government is an example of <a href="http://www.institutions-africa.org/page/developmental-patrimonialism.html">“developmental patrimonialism”</a>. In this system, the potentially damaging aspects of patrimonial politics are held in check by a leader who enjoys tight control over patronage networks. These include jobs for the boys, waste and inefficiency.</p>
<p>This authority needs to be established both internally and externally. External political control is required because the threat of electoral defeat by a strong opposition party may force the government to prioritise short-term survival over long-term investments. Internal control is required because the absence of checks and balances on the ruling party is likely to exacerbate corruption.</p>
<p>When these conditions hold, elements of patrimonialism may be economically productive by generating resources that are channelled back into the system. In the Rwandan case, the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s economic and political dominance has not undermined development because the funds generated through party-owned enterprises have often been <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270777957_Developmental_Patrimonialism_The_Case_of_Rwanda">reinvested in the economy</a>.</p>
<h2>Unintended consequences</h2>
<p>The problem is that these conditions don’t hold in most African states. With a few exceptions such as Chad and Angola, the ruling party cannot aspire to the level of dominance witnessed in Rwanda because the opposition is too strong for this degree of political control to be sustained. In <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/06/13/why-do-opposition-coalitions-succeed-or-fail/">Kenya and Zimbabwe</a>, for example, the opposition has consistently won a large share of the legislative and presidential vote. </p>
<p>In addition, even some states that feature more dominant ruling parties have consistently failed to impose economic discipline on their governments. Instead, entrenched clientelism and internal factionalism have typically undermined anti-corruption efforts. This is true for both <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/08/14/angola-elections-ruling-family-dos-santos-worth-billions-what-happens-when-dad-steps-down/">Angola</a> and <a href="https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/overview_of_corruption_and_anti_corruption_in_chad">Chad</a>, hurting efforts to reduce poverty and boost economic growth.</p>
<p>Shorn of the internal and external political control required to make it work, the application of the Rwandan model elsewhere would generate very different results.</p>
<p>Extending the control of the ruling party over the economy is more likely to increase graft and waste than to spur economic activity. And efforts to neutralise opposition parties are likely to be strongly resisted, leading to political instability and economic uncertainty.</p>
<p>What this means is that if other countries on the continent try to implement the Rwandan model, the chances are that they will experience all of its costs while realising few of its benefits.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89699/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Rwandan model can’t be replicated easily given that it depends heavily on political dominance and tight, centralised control of patronage networks.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/763652017-04-23T10:20:43Z2017-04-23T10:20:43ZIt’s time to lift the ideological haze in debates about Africa’s middle class<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166142/original/file-20170420-20050-7nf56g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The middle classes in the Global South gained growing attention since the turn of the century, mainly through their rapid ascendancy in the Asian emerging economies. A side effect of the economic growth during these ‘fat years’ was a relative increase of monetary income for a growing number of <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/10/04/world-bank-forecasts-global-poverty-to-fall-below-10-for-first-time-major-hurdles-remain-in-goal-to-end-poverty-by-2030">households</a>.</p>
<p>This also benefited some lower income groups in resource-rich African economies. Many among these crossed the defined poverty levels, which were raised in late 2015 from US$ 1.25 a person a day to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/nov/01/global-poverty-is-worse-than-you-think-could-you-live-on-190-a-day">US$ 1.90</a>. As some economists had suggested, from as little as US$2 they were considered as entering the <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/4013/WPS4816.pdf">“middle class”</a>. </p>
<p>The ominous term was rising like a phoenix from the ashes to characterise this trend. It added another label to the packaging of a <a href="https://www.socialeurope.eu/2013/11/neoliberal-discourse-learning/">neo-liberal discourse</a>. By emphasising the free market paradigm as creating the best opportunities for all, it suggests that everyone benefits from a <a href="https://global.britannica.com/topic/neoliberalism">laissez-faire economy</a>.</p>
<p>But the middle class concept remained vague and limited to number crunching. The minimum threshold for entering a so-called middle class in monetary terms was critically vulnerable to a setback into impoverishment. After all, one sixth of the world’s population has to make a fragile living on US$ 2 to 3 a day.</p>
<p>The African Development Bank played a defining role in promoting the debate. Using the US$2 benchmark, it declared some 300 million Africans (about a third of the continent’s population) as <a href="http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid_The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid.pdf">being middle class</a> in 2011. A year later it expanded its guesstimates to 300 million to 500 million. It also set them up as being very important.</p>
<p>Such monetary acrobatics aside, the analytical deficit which characterises such classification is seriously problematic. The so-called middle class appears to be a “muddling class”. Rigorously explored differentiation remained largely absent – not to mention any substantial class analysis. Professional activities, social status, cultural, ethnic or religious affinities or lifestyle as well as political orientations were hardly (if at all) considered.</p>
<p>But lived experiences matter if one is in search of how to define a middle class as an array of collective identities. Such necessary debate has in the meantime arrived in <a href="https://globalmiddleclasses.wordpress.com/2017/01/11/the-middle-class-in-africa-comparative-perspectives-and-lived-experiences/#more-259">African studies</a>. And the claim to ownership is also reflected in a just published <a href="http://witspress.co.za/catalogue/the-rise-of-africas-middle-class/%20and%20https://www.zedbooks.net/shop/book/the-rise-of-africas-middle-class/">volume</a> that documents the need to deconstruct the mystification of the middle class being declared as the torchbearers of progress and development.</p>
<h2>Politics, economic growth and the middle class</h2>
<p>As alerted in a paper by <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2014-101.pdf">UNU-WIDER</a>, a new middle class as a meaningful social actor does require a collective identity in pursuance of common interests. Once upon a time this was called <a href="http://study.com/academy/lesson/karl-marx-theory-of-class-consciousness-and-false-consciousness.html">class-consciousness</a>, based on a “class in itself” while acting as a “class for itself”. After all, which “middle” is occupied by an African “middle class”, if this is not positioned also in terms of class awareness and behaviour?</p>
<p>Politically such middle classes seem not as democratic as many of those singing their praises assume. Middle classes have shown ambiguities - ranging from politically progressive engagement to a status-quo oriented, conservative approach to policies (if being political at all). African realities are not different.</p>
<p>In South Africa, the only consistency of the black middle class in historical perspective is its political inconsistency, as political scientist Roger Southall has <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0022278X14000445">suggested</a>. They are no more likely to hold democratic values than other black South Africans. In fact, they are more likely to want government to secure higher order needs such as proper service delivery, infrastructure and rule of law according to their <a href="https://theconversation.com/survey-sheds-light-on-who-marched-against-president-zuma-and-why-76271">living circumstances</a> rather than basic, survival needs.</p>
<p>It remains dubious that middle classes in Africa by their sheer existence promote economic growth. Their increase was mainly a limited result of the trickle down effects of the resource based economic growth rates during the first decade of the 21st century since then in decline. This had hardly economic potential stimulating productive investment that contributes towards sustainable economic growth.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Doubt shrouds claims that a growing middle class benefits the poor.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There’s also little evidence of any correlation between economic growth and social progress, as a working paper of the IMF <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1353.pdf">concludes</a>. While during the “fat years” the poor partly became a little less poor, the rich got much richer. Even the African Development Bank admits that the income discrepancies as measured by the Gini-coefficient have increased, while six among the ten most unequal countries in the world <a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/ADER%202012%20(En).pdf">are in Africa</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cgdev.org/expert/nancy-birdsall">Nancy Birdsall</a>, president emeritus of the Centre for Global Development, is among the most prominent advocates and protagonists of the middle class. She argues in support of a middle class rather than a pro-poor developmental orientation. But even she concedes that a sensible political economy analysis needs to differentiate between the rich with political leverage and <a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/9a5242004ce34374a4d9bf271348019a/Africa%E2%80%99s-rising-middle-class:-time-to-sort-out-fact-from-fiction-20162505">the rest</a>.</p>
<p>She remains nevertheless adamant that the middle class is an ingredient for good governance. This is based on her assumption that continued economic growth reduces inequalities. She further hypothesises that a growing middle class has a greater interest in an accountable government and supports a social contract, which taxes it as an investment into collective public goods to the benefit of <a href="http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ejdr/journal/v27/n2/full/ejdr20153a.html">also the poor</a>. <a href="http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ejdr/journal/v27/n2/pdf/ejdr20153a.pdf">Dream on</a>!</p>
<h2>Time to lift the ideological haze</h2>
<p>It remains necessary to put the record straight and lift the ideological haze. Already the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report">2013 report</a>, which also promoted the <a href="http://d-nb.info/1045939153/34">middle class hype</a>, predicted that 80% of middle classes would come from the global South by 2030, but only 2% from Sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>Recent assessments claim that it’s not the middle of African societies which expands, but the lower and higher social groups.</p>
<p>According to a report by the <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/07/08/a-global-middle-class-is-more-promise-than-reality/">Pew Research Centre</a> only a few African countries had a meaningful increase of those in the middle-income category. </p>
<p>And the Economist, which earlier shifted its doomsday visions of a “Hopeless Continent” towards <a href="https://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/how-the-economist-changed-its-tune-on-africa/">“Africa Rising”</a> and the <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-greatly-improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-august">“Continent of Hope”</a>, now concludes that Africans are mainly <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21676774-africans-are-mainly-rich-or-poor-not-middle-class-should-worry">rich or poor but not middle class</a>.</p>
<p>Fortunately, the debate has created sufficient awareness among scholars to explore the fact and fiction of the assumed <a href="https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/africas-new-middle-class">transformative power</a> of a middle class. This also includes the need to be sensitive towards ideological smokescreens which try to make us believe that a middle class is the cure. In reality, little has changed when it comes to leverage and control over social and political affairs. </p>
<p>The current engagement with the African middle class phenomenon is nevertheless anything but obsolete. Independent of their numbers, middle class members signify modified social relations. These deserve attention and analysis with the emphasis on social relations. </p>
<p>Cambridge Economist <a href="https://newleftreview.org/II/78/goran-therborn-class-in-the-21st-century">Göran Therborn</a> stresses that discourse on class is always of social relevance. The boom of the middle class debate is therefore a remarkable symptom of our decade. Social class will remain a category of central importance, and bringing the class back in can do no harm.</p>
<p><em>Henning Melber is the author of <a href="https://www.zedbooks.net/shop/book/the-rise-of-africas-middle-class/">The Rise of Africa’s Middle Class</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76365/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The middle class concept in Africa has remained vague and limited to number crunching. The minimum threshold for entering it in monetary terms was critically vulnerable to a setback into poverty.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/745712017-03-16T17:47:47Z2017-03-16T17:47:47ZNamibia: grown up after a generation into independence, but not yet mature<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/161143/original/image-20170316-10918-5kmawv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Swapo supporters celebrated victory in the UN supervised November 1989 election.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Henning Melber</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Visitors to “the land of wide open spaces”, as Namibia is successfully promoted to tourists, will be <a href="https://vimeo.com/2388758">impressed by what they see</a>. Besides the beauty of the nature and abundant wildlife, the urban face of inner cities appeals to foreigners who treasure security and comfort amid the wilderness. </p>
<p>Namibia contributes a positive image to Africa. It ranks among the continent’s <a href="http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/03/08200254/Namibia-Insights-2016-IIAG.pdf?_ga=1.268531313.1851805696.1489660081">top five in governance</a> and other performance related surveys. But beyond the surface of the success story looms a different reality for most of the country’s 2.3 million people, as it marks 27 years of independence. </p>
<p>Independence was finally achieved on March 21, 1990 after a long and violent <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/namibia-gains-independence">anti-colonial struggle</a>. Since then, Namibia has shown remarkable signs of political stability. The former liberation movement <a href="http://www.swapoparty.org/">Swapo</a> governs with an ever-increasing majority.</p>
<p>It secured 80% of votes in the last <a href="http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2225_89.htm">parliamentary elections</a>. The directly elected party candidate for head of state, Hage Geingob, scored <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30285987">almost 87%</a>. Still representing the first generation of the liberation struggle, he personifies the smooth succession of three post-independence state presidents with far reaching executive powers. </p>
<p>Catchwords attributed to them by party propaganda include reconciliation (Sam Nujoma, 1990-2005), consolidation (Hifikepunye Pohamba, 2005-2015) and prosperity (Hage Geingob, <a href="http://namibian-studies.com/index.php/JNS/article/view/423">since 2015</a>. Geingob is the party’s vice-president and became acting president in April 2015.</p>
<p>But under his presidency the promised prosperity has remained the privilege of few. Namibia is a <a href="http://vivaworkers.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Inequality-in-Namibia-2009.pdf">rich country with poor people</a>. Redistribution of wealth is mainly limited to beneficiaries within a new black elite. These are office bearers, party stalwarts and those with close ties to the new inner circles of governance. They thrive through a policy of so-called affirmative action and <a href="http://www.opm.gov.na/neeef">black economic empowerment</a>. </p>
<p>A new terminology refers to <a href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/breeding-fat-cats">“fat cats”</a>, <a href="http://www.observer.com.na/index.php/business/7662-don-t-be-tenderpreneurs-gawaxab">“tenderpreneurs”</a> and <a href="http://amabhungane.co.za/article/2014-09-18-diamonds-are-swapos-best-friends">“sight holders”</a>. These labels reflect the continued exploitative nature of the economic realities.</p>
<h2>Namibia’s state-driven economy</h2>
<p>Namibia’s state-driven economy is a paradise for parasitic and rent-seeking self-enrichment schemes. The creation of state-owned enterprises as troughs for embezzlement has flourished. State tenders have dished out large sums for projects bordering on <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201601060035.html">megalomaniac elite symbolism</a>, often without creating any meaningful productive assets. Nepotism is a striking feature of a society with one of the <a href="https://borgenproject.org/inequality-and-poverty-in-namibia/">highest income discrepancies</a> in the world.</p>
<p>The UNDP’s <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/NAM">Human Development Report</a> documents the gross inequalities. A commonly referred to statistical figure is the country’s Gross National Income distribution per capita. This categorises Namibia as a <a href="https://www.newera.com.na/2016/02/16/namibia-copes-upper-middle-income-classification/">higher middle-income country</a>. But this number is misleading.</p>
<p>The inequality adjusted Human Development Index shows that Namibia has one of the highest inequalities in the world as measured by a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-31847943">Gini coefficient 0.613</a>.<br>
Also, 23.5% of the population was classified as living below the income poverty line <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/NAM.pdf">using 2013 data</a>.</p>
<p>Namibia’s government claims to have achieved considerable poverty alleviation. This contrasts sharply with the data. If tourists would end up in some of the overpopulated <a href="https://www.google.co.za/search?q=Namibia%27s+slums&rlz=1C1NHXL_enZA711ZA711&espv=2&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiH89HbvtrSAhXEA8AKHfC7BrsQsAQIHg&biw=1093&bih=530&dpr=1.25">shack settlements</a> at the outskirts of Namibian towns, they would see a different world from the lodges and Windhoek’s inner city.</p>
<h2>Economic mismanagement</h2>
<p>Namibia’s government is not shy of self-appraisals. It’s fond of blueprints, strategies and programmes, all claiming to solve the country’s problems. Under President Geingob, a new Ministry of Poverty Eradication and <a href="https://www.newera.com.na/2016/08/23/ministry-poverty-eradication-social-welfare/">Social Welfare</a> had been established. But so far little has been achieved.</p>
<p>The country’s fourth National Development <a href="http://www.npc.gov.na/?page_id=202">Plan</a> has been complemented by a Harambee Prosperity <a href="http://www.op.gov.na/4/-/document_library_display/PgQ38IFobsgf/view/263874">Plan</a>. It’s based on an annual economic growth rate of at least 7%. Given the (un)predictable insecurities such as global economic shocks, the effects of climate change, and the devastating consequences of the recent drought, this borders on wishful thinking similarly set out in <a href="https://www.google.co.za/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&rlz=1C1NHXL_enZA711ZA711&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Namibia,+Vision+2030&*">Vision 2030</a>. This claims that by then “Namibia will be a prosperous and industrialised nation”. </p>
<p>In reality, Namibia’s economy has been in <a href="http://www.namibian.com.na/159400/archive-read/Namibia-goes-into-technical-recession">recession since mid-2016</a>.</p>
<p>The discrepancy between promises and realities suggests that President Geingob’s rhetoric borders on <a href="http://www.namibian.com.na/160313/archive-read/Namibian-Populism-on-Display">populism</a>. The ritual of declaring the annual state budget as “pro-poor” has long lost any <a href="http://www.namibian.com.na/print.php?id=24729&type=2">convincing effect</a>. </p>
<p>Expenditure for army, police and security related portfolios have over the years proportionally increased more than other expenditure. So have debt services for local and foreign loans.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/161128/original/image-20170316-10895-xfw6x1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/161128/original/image-20170316-10895-xfw6x1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=727&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161128/original/image-20170316-10895-xfw6x1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=727&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161128/original/image-20170316-10895-xfw6x1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=727&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161128/original/image-20170316-10895-xfw6x1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=914&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161128/original/image-20170316-10895-xfw6x1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=914&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161128/original/image-20170316-10895-xfw6x1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=914&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Hage Geingob of Namibia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuter/Carlo Allegri</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The hope for an economic recovery in the near future is pinned on a <a href="https://www.newera.com.na/2017/01/10/mining-and-tourism-sectors-to-drive-growth-in-2017-sss/">booming tourism sector</a> and the full production of one of the biggest uranium mines in the world <a href="http://www.mining.com/namibias-new-uranium-mine-triple-countrys-output-2017/">owned by a Chinese company</a>. Such silver linings look rather bleak and faint. Sustainability would require other ingredients, not least a meaningful increase of employment.</p>
<p>But as of mid-2016, the state’s finances have faced a precarious shortage. The annual budget for <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/na/en/pages/tax/articles/namibia-budget-2017-2018.html">2017/2018</a> reflects the need to restore fiscal prudence and austerity to regain liquidity and some degree of credibility. Local trust and confidence in the state’s ability to deliver is at an all-time low.</p>
<p>A contentious issue is the bloated civil service. More than 20 years ago a wage and salary commission urged then Prime Minister Hage Geingob to stop recruitment in the public sector. But the expansion continued unabated. </p>
<p>The political elite continues to preach water and drink wine: a year ago President Geingob signed a <a href="http://www.namibian.com.na/52270/read/Politicians-salaries-hiked-in-2016">6% salary increase</a> with immediate effect for all political office holders. His cabinet is by far the biggest since independence.</p>
<h2>Grown up, but not mature</h2>
<p>Despite shifting grounds, the party still mobilises along the heroic narrative of the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/28649886_%27Namibia_land_of_the_brave%27_selective_memories_on_war_and_violence_within_nation_building">liberation struggle</a>, much to the frustration of a younger generation. But the number of born frees with voting rights will soon exceed the older generations. Inner-party rivalries and tensions, as well as ethnicity as a potential source of conflict are on the rise. An unresolved land issue, also manifested in urban and ancestral land claims, is adding <a href="https://weekend.newera.com.na/2017/02/27/land-reform-redistribution-and-ancestral-land-a-case-of-namibia/">fuel to the flames</a>.</p>
<p>Dissenting voices, mainly articulated by vocal younger activists provoke government to consider plans to <a href="https://www.namibiansun.com/news/vice-president-wants-to-censor-social-media/?">censor the social media</a>. A whistleblower bill before parliament includes provisions to heavily <a href="http://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IPPR_Comment_Whistleblower_Protection_Bill.pdf">punish “lies”</a> and to prohibit any criticism of state institutions. It restricts public opinion, including intimidation of the remarkably free and critical independent print media.</p>
<p>The authoritarian if not totalitarian tendency is also documented in Swapo’s current initiatives to take disciplinary action against members who dare to <a href="http://www.namibian.com.na/52263/read/Politburo-former-youth-leaders-meet">criticise party politics</a>. But this will not silence the growing frustration over the <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/research-data/view/858">limits to liberation</a>. </p>
<p>Nor does the close collaboration with North Korea add any <a href="http://www.namibian.com.na/160087/archive-read/North-Koreans-still-operating-in-Namibia">positive image</a>. A planned visit by the pariah state’s foreign minister was cancelled at the last minute after news about it <a href="https://www.republikein.com.na/nuus/ho-noord-koreaan-se-besoek-afgelas/">leaked in the media</a>. </p>
<p>A generation into independence, the country and its governance might be considered as grown up, but certainly not (yet) mature.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74571/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber is a member of SWAPO since 1974. He is the author of Understanding Namibia. The Trials of Independence and A Decade of Namibia – Politics, Economy and Society.
</span></em></p>Namibia contributes a positive image to Africa in governance and other indicators. But the reality for most of the country’s 2.3 million people isn’t quite as rosy.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/680212016-11-24T21:32:52Z2016-11-24T21:32:52ZHow the UN’s special rapporteur can make the right to development a reality<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/147174/original/image-20161123-19682-lxmnlz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">N'da Yao Messou is president of a cocoa farmers' association in Niable, eastern Ivory Coast. Women's right to development has a long way to go.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thierry Gouegnon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UN Human Rights Council recently adopted a <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/33/L.29">resolution</a> creating the position of a Special Rapporteur on the Right to Development. The decision was in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the <a href="http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/a41r128.htm">Declaration on the Right to Development</a> which, over the past three decades, has played a significant part in the advancement of a rights-based approach to development across the world.</p>
<p>The creation of a UN special rapporteur is a significant move in developing the norm on the right to development and addressing controversies such as the practical aspects of implementation by states.</p>
<p>While the decision of the Human Rights Council is good news, there are key issues that must still be addressed. This includes how specific groups should be protected, how co-operation between various global and regional organisations will be managed and how best practice around the world can be identified.</p>
<h2>How the right to development came about</h2>
<p>Prior to the adoption of the UN Declaration in 1986, ideas around the human right to development emanated from prominent Senegalese jurist <a href="http://prabook.com/web/person-view.html?profileId=1308343">Justice Kéba M’Baye</a>. </p>
<p>In 1972, M’Baye argued for a <a href="https://books.google.ca/books?id=rYLV0pbTepcC&pg=PA55&lpg=PA55&dq=Dieng+%E2%80%98Background+to+and+growth+of+the+right+to+development:+the+role+of+law+and+lawyers+in&source=bl&ots=EjEYSqKwsX&sig=QvvcMI3QvMJtyfId5BiVifjqzOk&hl=pcm&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiFpam_9JXQAhVq0oMKHYn3DToQ6AEIGjAA#v=onepage&q=Dieng%20%E2%80%98Background%20to%20and%20growth%20of%20the%20right%20to%20development%3A%20the%20role%20of%20law%20and%20lawyers%20in&f=false">distinction</a> between development as a field of study and development as a human right. His argument was that the effective realisation of freedom for all people requires that development must be viewed as a right, and not solely through the lens of economics and politics. </p>
<p>Around this time, developing countries had called for the recognition of development as a right of states. Seeking to assert economic self-determination, these countries argued for a New International Economic <a href="http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3201.htm">Order</a>. The aim was to advance development equitably with the rest of the world. They were concerned that the prevailing international economic order did not adequately respond to the needs of newly independent colonies. </p>
<p>Viewing development as a right was an affirmation of the need for the newly independent colonies to determine their economic trajectories and for the developed states to foster this goal through <a href="http://scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1143&context=twls">reforms</a> in the international economic order.</p>
<h2>An alternative view on development</h2>
<p>M'Baye’s proposition advanced a new angle for the conceptualisation of the subject of development. His thesis on development as a <a href="http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/books/b9789004293137_026">right of all men to live better</a> refocused the lens of development from state rights to human rights. </p>
<p>Over the next decade, discussions on development as a human right gained significant momentum. In 1977 the Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council) adopted a resolution calling for a <a href="http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/drd/drd_ph_e.pdf">study</a> on development as a human right. </p>
<p>In 1979, when the Assembly of the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) <a href="http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/history/">decided</a> to create a regional human rights treaty, there was a strong emphasis on incorporating a right to development. At the UN, deliberations on the right eventually culminated in the adoption of the Declaration on the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/events/righttodevelopment/declaration.shtml">Right to Development</a>. </p>
<p>In 1998, the Commission <a href="http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/e/chr/resolutions/e-cn_4-res-1998-72.doc">created</a> an Intergovernmental Working Group to monitor and review the implementation of the declaration. But the effectiveness of this Working Group <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/33/L.29">has been fraught</a>. </p>
<p>This highlights the need for independent perspectives on the promotion of the right to development. </p>
<h2>Making the special rapporteur work</h2>
<p>I believe that the special rapporteur’s mandate should address three key outstanding issues. </p>
<p>First, the special rapporteur needs to expound on how development can be realised for specific groups – such as vulnerable ones – within societies. The declaration emphasises the need for all individuals to engage in economic, social and cultural development. </p>
<p>But it is not clear how specific groups should be protected. For instance, how should development for persons with disabilities, women and children be achieved? What will constitute development for these categories? Against what standards must development be measured, and how? </p>
<p>Second, the special rapporteur should develop a road map for cooperation between the UN and regional institutions, such as the African Union, the European Union and the Organisation of American States for the realisation of this right within the context of the <a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld">2030 sustainable development goals</a>.</p>
<p>A crucial benefit of engaging regional institutions in protecting human rights lies in their proximity to the people within their regions. Synergy is important to prevent unnecessary duplication. It is also important to ensure that there is a common understanding of how the development goals should be met and, at the same time, how a rights-based approach should be advanced.</p>
<p>Third, the special rapporteur should compile a study on best practices. It should draw on legal, administrative, social and financial measures taken by states and institutions in realising the right to development. These best practices can guide other states wanting to initiate similar efforts. They can demonstrate what works and how to improve on existing efforts. Also, they can help in developing key indicators for evaluating effectiveness.</p>
<p>The establishment of a special rapporteur is a laudable initiative in the realisation of the right to development. But the buck stops with states. The Human Rights Council must therefore ensure that the recommendations of the special rapporteur are implemented by states. That way the right to development won’t remain an elusive aspiration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68021/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Romola Adeola does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The creation of a UN special rapporteurship on the right to development should help develop practical solutions on how the right could be realised.Romola Adeola, Steinberg Postdoctoral Fellow in International Migration Law, Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, Faculty of Law, McGill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/672432016-11-11T07:25:27Z2016-11-11T07:25:27ZJapan’s politics is opening up to women, but don’t expect a feminist revolution yet<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144568/original/image-20161104-27923-14138bm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The appointment of three women to politically powerful roles is symbolically significant for Japanese women.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/shibuya246/4101855251/">Shibuya246/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Three women have in recent months been appointed to politically powerful positions in Japan. But even as seeing women in positions of power becomes less unusual in the country, gender parity is a long way off.</p>
<p>Renho Murata (commonly known as Renho) is the new <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/15/national/politics-diplomacy/renho-elected-leader-of-main-opposition-democratic-party/">leader of the opposition Democratic Party</a>; Koike Yuriko beat her two male competitors to become <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/01/national/politics-diplomacy/tokyo-elects-former-environment-minister-yuriko-koike-as-citys-first-female-governor/#.WBhHi-F96qA">Tokyo’s first female governor</a>; and Japan’s Ministry of Defense is, for only the second time, being led by a woman — <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/03/national/politics-diplomacy/abes-defense-minister-pick-sparks-concern-relations-south-korea/#.WBhIAOF96qA">Inada Tomomi</a> (Koike Yuriko was defense minister from July to August 2007). </p>
<p>The appointment of the these women to leadership positions suggests a shift in the role and status of women in Japanese politics, and in society more generally. And <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/15/world/asia/japan-women-renho-murata.html?_r=0">some have wondered</a> if the surge means that a woman prime minister could be around the corner. But this is no revolution. </p>
<h2>National shame</h2>
<p>There’s an increasing sense of embarrassment among Japanese political leaders about the nation’s position in <a href="http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASDF25H07_V21C16A0EE8000/">global rankings of female political and economic empowerment</a>. </p>
<p>Women heads of state have emerged in several G8 countries and also in neighbouring countries, such as <a href="http://world.time.com/2012/12/19/strongmans-daugther-chosen-as-south-koreas-first-female-president/">South Korea</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36339276">Taiwan</a>. Japan, by contrast, has the lowest proportion of women in its national legislative assembly <a href="http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm">among OECD countries</a>; only <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21703286-yuriko-koike-combines-nationalism-and-steely-ambition-tokyo-gets-its-first-female-governor">9.3% of Lower House seats</a> are occupied by women. </p>
<p>The nation also has the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/gender/data/genderwagegap.htm">second largest gender pay gap</a>, after South Korea. Women comprise <a href="http://www.gender.go.jp/research/kenkyu/sankakujokyo/pdf/saishin.pdf">less than 2% of the nation’s mayors, less than 10% of company heads and only 18% of court judges</a>.</p>
<p>For a country that’s so advanced in other <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI">human development indices</a>, such as health and life expectancy, these statistics <a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2015/">paint a troubling picture of enduring gender inequality</a>. </p>
<p>The fact that Koike, Renho and Inada have reached positions of political leadership is a positive sign of change. It is also symbolically significant for Japanese women and representative democracy. But do they herald the beginning of a feminist political utopia in Japan? A glimpse of their backgrounds and motivations may give us a hint. </p>
<h2>The governor</h2>
<p>Tokyo’s first female governor Koike Yuriko’s <a href="http://politicoscope.com/2016/08/02/japan-yuriko-koike-biography-and-profile/">political background is in national politics</a>. Before throwing her hat in the ring for the office of Tokyo governor, she was a member of the long-ruling government party, the Liberal Democratic Party, and had a seat in the national legislative assembly. </p>
<p>She was influential in the preparation of policies to better utilise women’s labour largely as a strategy of improving the economy, so her commitment to “women’s empowerment” is unquestionable. She is interested in encouraging women to participate more in the workforce and <a href="http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Tokyo-must-reform-boost-role-of-women-to-attract-investment-Gov.-Koike-says?page=2">take an active part in the capitalist economy</a>.</p>
<p>Tokyoites can expect to see reform of working conditions at the metropolitan government. More specifically, they can expect an improvement in working hours and increased employment of women. </p>
<p>Koike has also expressed a commitment to the many <a href="http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Tokyo-must-reform-boost-role-of-women-to-attract-investment-Gov.-Koike-says">issues surrounding daycare for children</a> that have an adverse effect on working families, and especially on women. Specifically, she has spoken of her commitment to solving the problem of the long waiting lists for daycare in the city and to implementing measures to prevent accidents at daycare centres. </p>
<p>Tokyo women have great expectations of Koike but she is not necessarily an advocate of women’s rights for their sake. She’s certainly keen to see more women contribute to the economy and to help ensure employers can “utilise” women more effectively. </p>
<p>But there’s silence regarding ideas about alleviating poverty among women, or implementing expanded support to victims of sexual violence. Only time will tell whether Koike’s historic appointment as the first woman to govern Tokyo will have any effect on tackling the nation’s deeply embedded gender inequality.</p>
<h2>The defence minister</h2>
<p>Japan’s new defence minister, Inada Tomomi, is a close ally of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Both Abe and Inada are members of Japan’s powerful nationalist lobby group, Japan Conference, a vocal <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/03/national/politics-diplomacy/abes-defense-minister-pick-sparks-concern-relations-south-korea/#.WBxndOF94dU">denier of the validity and legitimacy</a> of “comfort women’s” claims to compensation. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/03/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-looks-retain-key-ministers-reshuffle-defense-chief-pick-may-irk-beijing-seoul/#.WCQRDOF94dV">Abe has faced criticism</a> from both outside and inside Japan for his decision to appoint Inada (who was elected to the House of Representatives in September 2005) to the post of defence minister. </p>
<p>Abe’s decision might reflect a possible desire to appease the female voting public. Japanese women are generally <a href="http://www.shinfujin.gr.jp/english/newsletter/nl_no36.pdf">opposed to national involvement in war</a> and therefore the Abe administration’s moves to revise Japan’s pacifist constitution. They were <a href="https://www.facebook.com/mothers.no.war/?hc_ref=PAGES_TIMELINE&fref=nf">particularly opposed to the decision</a> this year to send Self Defence Forces to South Sudan. </p>
<p>When women reach politically powerful positions, especially if they are in the early stage of their careers, they run the <a href="http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201610290019.html">risk of not being taken as seriously</a> as their male counterparts, and of being open to attack. This has been <a href="http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/news-opinion/senior-women-politics-vs-men-9002804">noted in other countries as well</a>, and women in Japan are no strangers to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/02/japan-women-sexually-harassed-at-work-report-finds">harassment and abuse at the hands of their male colleagues</a>. </p>
<p>But Inada seems to be protected by her friend Abe to the point of being coached by him from the sidelines, so to speak, during fierce questioning from the opposition. </p>
<h2>The party leader</h2>
<p>Renho, the new leader of the Democratic Party, follows in the footsteps of the political path-breaker of Doi Takako, who <a href="http://countrystudies.us/japan/125.htm">led the Japan Socialist Party</a> (JSP) when it was the main political opposition from 1986 to 1991, and again from 1996 to 2003. </p>
<p>Renho has capitalised on being a woman in her political campaigns by <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/16/world/asia/japan-renho-murata-democratic-party.html?_r=1">referring to her experience as a mother</a> of twins. Her powerful oratory skills and direct humour endear her to the public. </p>
<p>Her main challenge is arguably to unify her party and transform it into one that’s regarded by voters as a viable alternative to the Liberal Democratic Party. Renho’s decision to <a href="http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160916/p2g/00m/0dm/059000c">appoint former prime minister Noda Yoshihiko</a> as her party’s secretary general, second only in power to her, perhaps indicates her desire to pay it safe. </p>
<p>Many in the party were <a href="http://asia.nikkei.com/print/article/202441">highly critical of the appointment</a> because they partially blame him for the party’s loss of its brief hold on government in the 2012 general election.</p>
<h2>The road ahead</h2>
<p>So, can Japanese women expect improvement in their lives with Koike, Inada and Renho in charge? </p>
<p>When it comes to parity in the workplace, they can certainly expect reforms, and it’s important to have women in visible leadership positions. But it’s also important to acknowledge that <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21703286-yuriko-koike-combines-nationalism-and-steely-ambition-tokyo-gets-its-first-female-governor">Japanese women are ambivalent</a> towards these three leaders. </p>
<p>Neither Koike, Inada or Renho represent the majority of women – or the majority of Japanese people more generally – when it comes to pacifism and nuclear energy. These are <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/20/opinions/japan-military-opinion-berger/">two of the most politically significant issues</a> in Japan today. </p>
<p>The majority support the pacifist constitution, which was promulgated in 1947, and are opposed to nuclear energy — a topic that has become increasingly important since the triple disaster at Fukushima on March 11 2011. </p>
<p>Until women who are more in tune with the majority of Japan’s voting public are elected to power, we shouldn’t expect too many significant changes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67243/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Even though three women have recently been appointed to powerful positions in Japanese politics, gender parity in the country is a long way off.Emma Dalton, Lecturer in Japanese, La Trobe UniversityMari Miura, Professor of Politics, Sophia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/477142015-09-18T04:35:15Z2015-09-18T04:35:15ZBeyond political violence in Burundi: an economy in crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95209/original/image-20150917-7530-1xkg6vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vendors sell bananas in an open market in a village near Bujumbura. Burundians are being driven deeper into poverty.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Goran Tomasevic</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Burundi may have slipped off the world’s attention, but the crisis that <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundi-teeters-on-the-brink-of-civil-war-following-coup-attempt-41869">erupted</a> in May when President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would seek a third term is far from being resolved. </p>
<p>Most commentators have, rightfully so, discussed the political aspects of the crisis. This includes whether Nkurunziza’s third mandate is <a href="http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/08/17/afraf.adv045.full">constitutional</a> and the lack of coherence of the political <a href="https://storify.com/Emayi2011/le-burundi-dans-le-piege-des-obstinations-politiqu">opposition</a>. They also discussed the alarming <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/08/burundi-opposition-spokesman-patrice-gahungu-shot-dead-as-violence-escalates">political violence</a> and <a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/16624/burundi-rwanda-spat-stokes-fear-of-revived-ethnic-tensions">mounting tension</a> with Rwanda.</p>
<p>Often overlooked is the economy, which is central to understanding the backdrop to the most severe crisis Burundi has had since the end of the <a href="http://www.columbia.edu/%7Eenm2105/docs/onub/Taylor_Samii_Mvukiyehe_Burundi_apsa06_061003.pdf">1993-2005 civil war</a>. While acknowledging the crucial political dimension of the crisis, this article focuses on the economic situation and its consequences.</p>
<h2>Hungriest nation on earth</h2>
<p>With a GDP per capita of US$267, the country’s 10.16 million people are among the poorest in the world. Burundi ranked 180 out of 186 in the last <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/BDI.pdf">Human Development Index</a>.</p>
<p>89% of the active population depends on farming a territory as densely populated as Belgium. Coffee, once the proud main export of Burundi, was controversially <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13246&LangID=E">privatised</a> in 2008 and has been declining for 20 years. Tea and cotton, the other traditional exports, are also in poor shape.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">source: http://www.indexmundi.com.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The country has few mineral resources. It has been expecting a lot, so far in vain, from a potentially important <a href="http://www.miningweekly.com/article/significant-pgm-prospects-at-burundi-project-2014-08-22">nickel</a> <a href="http://www.miningweekly.com/article/significant-pgm-prospects-at-burundi-project-2014-08-22">deposit</a>. The hopes in gold, which is artisanally mined and had become Burundi’s <a href="https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/bdi/">first export</a> by 2012, collapsed with the recent crash of international prices. Part of Burundian gold has also reportedly been <a href="http://enoughproject.org/reports/congo%E2%80%99s-conflict-gold-rush">smuggled</a> from the DR Congo.</p>
<p>The apparently decent 4% to 4.5% <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/burundi">growth</a> of Burundi’s GDP in the past years is dwarfed by a population growth above <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW/countries/BI?display=graph">3%</a>. The number of mouths to feed keeps growing very fast and the GDP per capita has not grown by more than <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG">1.5%</a> in the best of the past years. </p>
<p>Even before the crisis, <a href="http://www.gallup.com/poll/183047/burundi-faces-challenges-beyond-elections.aspx">reports</a> indicated that the living conditions were deteriorating for most people. Burundi was, and still is, the <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/topic/global-hunger-index">hungriest nation</a> on earth. With the political crisis, things have deteriorated even further.</p>
<p>When violent unrests exploded in Bujumbura, the city was paralysed for months. It concentrates 70% of the <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2015/07/20/the-political-crisis-leaves-burundi-on-the-brink-of-economic-collapse-by-lorraine-nkengurutse/">economic activity</a> of the country. </p>
<p>Trade with regional and local markets was heavily disrupted and is still not back to normal as security forces control displacements of people in and out the capital city. The government recently estimated that the insurrection cost at least US$ 32.7 million in <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20150910-soulevement-burundi-rapport-autorites-accable-opposition">material damage</a>.</p>
<p>At least <a href="http://data.unhcr.org/burundi/regional.php">190,000 people</a> have left the country since April, and among them investors, business people, and part of the middle class. Most of them still have not returned. </p>
<p>The Burundian diaspora, mostly from Canada, the US, France, and Belgium, are a habitual and most-welcomed source of cash in the summer. But they did not spent their holidays on the beaches of Bujumbura this year.</p>
<p>Perhaps more important for the economy, Western donors are in the process of <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201509071997.html">cutting</a> their support to Burundi, whose budget relies <a href="http://finances.gov.bi/index.php/budgets">49% on aid</a>. </p>
<p>The government already had to use its own money to organise the elections, reportedly diverting <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-27/burundi-to-fund-election-by-cutting-education-malaria-budgets">funds</a> earmarked for malaria and education. And it seems clear that the 2015 budget is now totally offtrack. Hypothetical fresh support from <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/28/how-the-west-lost-burundi/">Russia or China</a> is unlikely to be enough to balance the budget. Inflation only rose by a bit less than a percentage point <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Burundi-inflation-hits-8-in-July-as-political-unrest-persists-20150828">since May</a>. But official tax revenues for May-August are about 30% lower than expected, and 23% less than <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFKCN0RB1MX20150911">last year</a>.</p>
<h2>Pressure points</h2>
<p>Nkurunziza, who was controversially re-elected in August, is now facing an economic crisis that could destabilise him in at least three different ways:</p>
<ul>
<li>First, the first long-serving Hutu president has built his popularity on generous social policies including the abolition of healthcare user fees for children below five and pregnant women, free primary education, and a national fertiliser subsidy program. These social services depend on foreign and are now in grave danger.</li>
</ul>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=290&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=290&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=290&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Source: Ministry of Finance of Burundi.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<ul>
<li><p>Second, if the reported current disruption of wage payment continues, Nkurunziza may alienate a small but influential middle-class of civil servants as well as the police and military still mostly loyal to him.</p></li>
<li><p>Third, benefits from politically appointed positions are becoming potentially less interesting as the economy contracts. This makes it harder to buy off loyalty and opponents, and potentially exacerbates corruption, which is already a key reason for discontent with the regime.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Nkurunziza’s current strategy, in a fashion not dissimilar to his predecessor president <a href="http://global.britannica.com/biography/Pierre-Buyoya">Pierre Buyoya</a>, is to <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/burundi-president-announces-early-inauguration/2925131.html">blame</a> the insurgents and Western countries for the economic difficulties. This may reinforce him, but probably only for a short while.</p>
<p>In the meantime, Burundians are being pushed towards even more intolerable levels of poverty. The locking of the political space and the volatility of the situation is likely continue to scare off economic actors and international partners and fuel the mismanagement of public services. </p>
<p>In the current context, few have any interest or incentive to look beyond the very short term. The economic and social costs of protracted fragility are <a href="http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Working_Paper_197_-_Estimating_the_Economic_Cost_of_Fragility_in_Africa.pdf">huge</a>, even in an already impoverished nation.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.voxeu.org/article/democracy-and-growth-new-evidence">safest route</a> to restoring stability and developing the Burundian economy is to rebuild strong and inclusive institutions that citizens and international partners – including the diaspora that has an important potential for economic development – can trust. </p>
<p>In the past years, the boundaries between the state and party apparatus have <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/192-burundi-bye-bye-arusha.aspx">blurred</a> at the expense of ordinary citizens. Abuses used to be vocally denounced by the local independent media, but most of them were shut down after the failed May coup attempt.</p>
<p>Calls for a national unity government, which the president says he has responded to by including a few not-too-virulent opposition parties to his government, are missing the point if they only lead to <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/185-burundi-la-crise-de-corruption.aspx">redistributing rents</a> between a slightly larger or different elite group. </p>
<p>Burundi needs a social and economic vision that rests on economic and political institutions that are genuinely accountable and directed to the people, and that everybody, including the poorest and non-party members, can rely on.</p>
<p><em>This article is based on a blog that appears on the <a href="http://blog.qeh.ox.ac.uk">Oxford Department of International Development</a> site.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47714/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jean-Benoit Falisse does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Whenever the crisis in Burundi is discussed, the economy is often overlooked, even though it is central to understanding the backdrop to the most severe crisis since the end of the civil war.Jean-Benoit Falisse, DPhil candidate, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.