tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/ideology-28012/articlesIdeology – The Conversation2024-03-19T19:42:52Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2213032024-03-19T19:42:52Z2024-03-19T19:42:52ZLiberalism is in crisis. A new book traces how we got here, but lets neoliberal ideologues off the hook<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582433/original/file-20240318-22-yg77o7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C0%2C4396%2C1855&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Haruki Yui/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What is post-liberalism? That is no simple question, though the simplest responses are given by those who identify with it as a movement. </p>
<p>Adrian Pabst, author of the <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-au/Postliberal+Politics%3A+The+Coming+Era+of+Renewal-p-9781509546817">most influential book</a> on the subject, proposes it as a way out of the impasse created by the excesses of hyper-capitalism on the right and identity politics on the left. He calls for a renewed focus on the collective identities of community, family and location. </p>
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<p><em>How We Became Post-Liberal – Russell Blackford (Bloomsbury)</em></p>
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<p>British journalist David Goodhart envisages an “<a href="https://demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/files/apostliberalfuture.pdf">embedded individualism</a>”, which acknowledges the messy realities of contemporary life, while insisting on traditional values of interdependence, mutual trust and social duty.</p>
<p>Both writers may be seen as part of a distinctly British mode of centrism, which combines left-wing commitments to economic justice and workers’ rights with principles of social conservatism. As advocates for consensus politics, they present their views with a reasoned account of the factors contributing to the crisis in liberalism, avoiding shrill statements and overly contentious assertions.</p>
<p>But the movement has less temperate adherents. In the United States, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/podcasts/opinion-free-expression/a-postliberal-future/6199298e-6b01-44aa-9e3a-d272ba2fcea3">Patrick Deneen</a> has made the title of his book <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/618154/regime-change-by-patrick-j-deneen/">Regime Change</a> a rallying cry, gaining him an enthusiastic audience among some Republicans in Washington. </p>
<p>The “regime” Deneen wants to change is the supposed cultural and institutional dominance of social liberalism – a longstanding shibboleth of the American right. He talks of a “distinct and pernicious” ruling class arisen from college campus liberals, who have created a new tyranny under which individual rights are the be-all and end-all. </p>
<p>The concept of post-liberalism, then, is ideologically ambiguous. It has the potential to embrace ideas from both left and right. Its one common assumption is that traditional liberalism – in its economic and social versions – is in trouble.</p>
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<p>Russell Blackford’s <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/how-we-became-postliberal-9781350322943/">How We Became Post-Liberal</a> purports to offer a detached, historical account of why liberalism is in trouble. As its proponents are keen to anchor their principles in deep tradition, the history matters.</p>
<p>There may be no simple answer to the question of what post-liberalism is, but Blackford shows how liberalism may be easier to define, at least in its origins. </p>
<p>His first three chapters chronicle the horrors of religious persecution, from late antiquity through to the early modern period, when liberalism began to mean something more than basic tolerance. Given the strong presence of Christian advocates in the post-liberal movement, it is interesting that Blackford places his emphasis on Christianity as a major player in the history of murderous intolerance. </p>
<p>If liberalism began as a bid to reverse some of the worst tendencies in Christian tradition, what has happened to cause a second u-turn in the movement?</p>
<h2>An impossible paradox</h2>
<p>This question underpins much of the argument in Blackford’s book, which pays sustained attention to the fuller realisation of liberalism in the long 19th century, when it became the subject of moral and philosophical treatises. </p>
<p>John Stuart Mill’s <a href="https://www.penguin.com.au/books/on-liberty-9780140432077">On Liberty</a> (1859) argued for the free expression of opinion as a prerequisite to intellectual progress. Perhaps the founding work of modern liberalism, Mill’s essay has been reinvented by current advocates as a primer of post-liberalism.</p>
<p>The expansion of industrial capitalism, population growth and political revolution subjected moral thinking to radically changed conditions. Mill made the case for a shift in values that placed the individual at the centre of the picture. He emphasised the dangers of a new form of tyranny in “the moral coercion of public opinion”. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578504/original/file-20240228-26-jx645r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578504/original/file-20240228-26-jx645r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578504/original/file-20240228-26-jx645r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578504/original/file-20240228-26-jx645r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578504/original/file-20240228-26-jx645r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578504/original/file-20240228-26-jx645r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=947&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578504/original/file-20240228-26-jx645r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=947&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578504/original/file-20240228-26-jx645r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=947&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">John Stuart Mill (c.1870).</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:John_Stuart_Mill_by_London_Stereoscopic_Company,_c1870.jpg">Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>In the 20th century, the longstanding dynamic of liberalism, which defined the free individual in opposition to church and state, shifted in Europe and America, as political innovators introduced notions of liberalism to government. With the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/New-Deal">New Deal</a>, Franklin D. Roosevelt succeed in redefining the word liberal by associating it with new kinds of government intervention to address social problems. </p>
<p>Free speech became core business in US politics as the Soviet Union moved in the opposite direction. Then came <a href="https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/educational-resources/age-of-eisenhower/mcarthyism-red-scare">McCarthyism</a>, described by Blackford as “one of the most severe episodes of repression in the universities that the United States experienced in the 20th century”. </p>
<p>The underlying rationales of liberalism, forged through the long 19th century, were threatened with an impossible paradox. What if freedom cannot be preserved without coercive measures? It only takes a significant minority of a democratised population to believe that for the ideals to become untenable. </p>
<p>The paradox played out through the 1960s. Countercultural movements and the rise of feminism introduced more widespread determinations to keep individual freedom paramount. There was never a golden age of liberalism, says Blackford, although for a time we seemed to be on the way. </p>
<p>The radical visions of the 1960s faded into disappointment and disillusionment. Neoliberal policies introduced another ideological twist, with their stringently economic interpretations of individual freedom. A strong element of backlash was in evidence.</p>
<p>Curiously, How We Became Post-Liberal does not really engage with this side of the story. By the time Blackford gets to the mid-20th century, his already sweeping historical canvas has stretched beyond what is really manageable. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-how-neoliberalism-became-an-insult-in-australian-politics-188291">Explainer: how neoliberalism became an insult in Australian politics</a>
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<h2>A Rorschach test</h2>
<p>Cultural history at this level of generality is something of a Rorschach test. Points are selected from an infinite network of hubs and intersections. A selective design is composed, becoming ever more subject to distortion as it approaches the present. </p>
<p>Blackford’s focus is on the growth of rights movements and identity politics. He spends time examining the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Satanic_Verses_controversy">controversy over Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses</a> as an Escher-like puzzle, in which contemporary notions of free speech came into conflict with stringent cultural definitions of blasphemy. Claims about rights and their infringement drive in both directions. </p>
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<span class="caption">Salman Rushdie at the Frontiers of Thought festival, Sao Paulo, May 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Salman_Rushdie_no_Fronteiras_do_Pensamento_S%C3%A3o_Paulo_2014_(14196012581).jpg">Greg Salibian/Fronteiras do Pensamento, via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-new-identity-focused-ideology-has-trapped-the-left-and-undermined-social-justice-217085">How a new identity-focused ideology has trapped the left and undermined social justice</a>
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<p>And so the atmosphere around liberalism heats up. Melbourne psychologist Nicholas Haslam has identified a trend he calls “<a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2016-08154-001">concept creep</a>”: an expansion in the use of terms related to the experience of harm – abuse, bullying, trauma, prejudice, vulnerability, being triggered, feeling unsafe.</p>
<p>As Blackford reminds us, harm is a central concern in Mill’s work. It is the philosopher’s guiding principle for where free speech should or should not be sanctioned. </p>
<p>But what happens when a society becomes so obsessed with the anticipation of and redress of harm that the obsession itself becomes a form of tyranny? We are finding out, Blackford suggests, as social justice movements move into a zone where permits for anger and indignation are handed out so keenly they lead to new modes of zealotry and intolerance. </p>
<p>Here lies the central problem with the post-liberal movement, and with the way it is explained in this book. There is too much animus and it is directed selectively. Why focus on social justice movements as the heart of the problem, rather than the culture of extreme individualism generated by neoliberal orthodoxies? </p>
<p>If people on college campuses are becoming prone to zealotry in their campaigns against racism, bullying and harassment, and in their determination to gain recognition for diverse sexualities, what about those in the corporate world who garner obscene levels of personal wealth at the expense of people working for <a href="https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/working-poverty/">below poverty wages</a>?</p>
<p>And where are campaigners like <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paine/">Thomas Paine</a> (1737-1809) and <a href="https://williammorrissociety.org/about-william-morris/">William Morris</a> (1834-96) in this history of liberalism? </p>
<p>Paine gets a passing mention as “pamphleteer, free thinker and political radical”. But there is no discussion of his commitment to the principles of social security and a version of basic income as means of redressing extremes of economic inequality. </p>
<p>Morris, who parted company with Mill’s doctrines on free-market capitalism, may be seen as an early example of post-liberalism, but one that moves explicitly towards socialism. Religious persecution may have been a primary cause of intolerance and oppression in the early modern period, but industrial capitalism rapidly took over as the most pervasive form of tyranny in Europe and America.</p>
<p>Here the secular liberalism of US philosopher <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/">John Rawls</a> (1921-2002) warrants more than the couple of paragraphs that allude to his work. Rawls’s vision of an economy based on social justice and the greater good has been an influential counterpoint to the orthodoxy of neoliberalism. His ideas, surely, may also be seen as an earlier version of post-liberalism.</p>
<p>The contemporary post-liberal movement is showing a distinct bias towards targeting identity politics and social justice campaigns. Pabst is one of the few to offer an evenhanded critique on this score. At their worst, the proponents of post-liberalism are starting to sound like Russian propagandist <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/23/who-is-russian-ultranationalist-alexander-dugin">Alexander Dugin</a>, who caricatures Western individualism as infantile indulgence, slurring the word “leeberaleezm” as if it were an obscenity.</p>
<p>Isn’t the problem that we get caught in one vituperative backlash after another? Beware of those who seek to herald new forms of sanity. They may be harbingers of the next wave of tyranny.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-george-orwell-is-everywhere-but-nineteen-eighty-four-is-not-a-reliable-guide-to-contemporary-politics-190909">Friday essay: George Orwell is everywhere, but Nineteen Eighty-Four is not a reliable guide to contemporary politics</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Goodall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russell Blackford’s How We Became Post-Liberal purports to offer a detached, historical account of why liberalism is in trouble.Jane Goodall, Emeritus Professor, Writing and Society Research Centre, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2170852023-11-15T19:04:35Z2023-11-15T19:04:35ZHow a new identity-focused ideology has trapped the left and undermined social justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559473/original/file-20231114-19-zpi3vf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C0%2C2986%2C1500&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fizkes/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Yascha Mounk’s new book, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/712961/the-identity-trap-by-yascha-mounk/">The Identity Trap: A Story of Ideas and Power in Our Time</a>, explores a radical progressive ideology that has been taking the world by storm. From its unlikely beginnings in esoteric scholarly theories and niche online communities, this new worldview is reshaping our lives, from the highest echelons of political power to the local school classroom. </p>
<p>Mounk argues that the new identity-focused ideology is not simply an extension of prior social justice philosophies and civil rights movements; on the contrary, it rejects both. He contends that those committed to social justice must resist this new ideology’s powerful temptations – its <em>trap</em>. </p>
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<p><em>Review: The Identity Trap: A Story of Ideas and Power in Our Time – Yascha Mounk (Allen Lane)</em></p>
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<p>While The Identity Trap focuses on the political left, Mounk’s two previous books – <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674237681">The People vs. Democracy</a> (2018) and <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/665275/the-great-experiment-by-yascha-mounk/">The Great Experiment</a> (2022) – considered the dangers of the illiberal right. </p>
<p>His critique of identity-focused progressivism thus comes from a place that shares many of its values. He aims to persuade readers who are naturally sympathetic to social justice causes that those causes demand a rejection, not an embrace, of identity-focused politics.</p>
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<p>A <em>tour de force</em> of intelligent argument, The Identity Trap covers a lot of ground. Mounk explores the intellectual history of the scholarly theories that support this new worldview. He interrogates its plausibility, explains the shifts in social media and news media that have amplified it, clarifies its key commitments and raises the alarm on its likely consequences.</p>
<p>To critique this perspective, Mounk must first name it. He settles on “identity synthesis”, in an attempt to avoid the more common but contentious term “identity politics”. His term refers to its synthesis of a range of intellectual traditions, including <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/postmodernism/">postmodernism</a>, <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/postcolonialism/v-1">postcolonialism</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/critical-race-theory">critical race theory</a>. These theories focus on ascriptive categories such as race, gender and sexual orientation. </p>
<p>One question that immediately arises is why the identity synthesis focuses heavily on some types of marginalised identities and not others. The lack of focus on <em>class</em> – that is, hierarchies built on wealth, income, education and closeness to elite institutions – is particularly surprising. After all, economic marginalisation has baked-in inequalities and power differentials. </p>
<p>As Mounk tells it, the Soviet Union’s moral and political collapse saw the concept of class struggle fall out of fashion on the scholarly left, empowering cultural concerns to take centre stage.</p>
<p>There is also a curiosity here that Mounk doesn’t dwell on, which is why this worldview requires naming at all. Most political ideologies – liberalism, socialism, libertarianism, conservatism – are reasonably well defined and understood. This is less true of the worldview that concerns Mounk. The vague term “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woke">woke</a>”, which has its origins in African American vernacular, was once used to refer to those who had woken up to their world’s systemic inequalities. But the term is now mainly used in a <a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/woke">pejorative sense</a>.</p>
<p>This has given rise to the perplexing phenomenon of an ideology that dares not speak its name. Perhaps those who think of contemporary progressivism as simply <em>the truth</em> are reluctant to name it as a specific position and turn it into an “ism”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/where-woke-came-from-and-why-marketers-should-think-twice-before-jumping-on-the-social-activism-bandwagon-122713">Where 'woke' came from and why marketers should think twice before jumping on the social activism bandwagon</a>
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<h2>Core themes</h2>
<p>Capturing a nestled group of moral commitments, political views, theoretical bases, activist strategies and online practices, Mounk distils the identity synthesis into seven core themes.</p>
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<li><p><em>Scepticism about objective truth</em>: a postmodern wariness about “grand narratives” that extends to scepticism about scientific claims and universal values.</p></li>
<li><p><em>Discourse analysis for political ends</em>: a critique of speech and language to overcome oppressive structures.</p></li>
<li><p><em>Doubling down on identity</em>: a strategy of embracing rather than dismantling identities.</p></li>
<li><p><em>Proud pessimism</em>: the view that no genuine civil rights progress has been made, and that oppressive structures will always exist.</p></li>
<li><p><em>Identity-sensitive legislation</em>: the failure of “equal treatment” requires policies that explicitly favour marginalised groups.</p></li>
<li><p><em>The imperative of intersectionality</em>: effectively acting against one form of oppression requires responding to all its forms.</p></li>
<li><p><em>Standpoint theory</em>: marginalised groups have access to truths that cannot be communicated to outsiders.</p></li>
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<p>There is always a worry when commentators take it upon themselves to outline an opposing view. There are dangers of misunderstanding and simplification, and of caricature and straw-man arguments. But Mounk does his best to document the prevalence of these themes. </p>
<p>Setting out core concepts might also prove useful in allowing progressives to clarify where they depart from his characterisation.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/do-universal-values-exist-a-philosopher-says-yes-and-takes-aim-at-identity-politics-but-not-all-of-his-arguments-are-convincing-208014">Do universal values exist? A philosopher says yes, and takes aim at identity politics – but not all of his arguments are convincing</a>
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<h2>The ‘Black’ classroom</h2>
<p>Many people are committed to the identity synthesis. Many of them wield considerable power. How did this happen?</p>
<p>Mounk explains how the identity synthesis grew out of scholarly theories taught at many US universities. Graduates of these elite institutions have carried their social justice commitments – and the determination to stand up for them – into the corporations, media, NGOs and public service organisations that hired them. The result has been the spread of a wide array of identity-focused practices and policies. </p>
<p>Mounk details many of these practices. His opening anecdote tells the story of a shocked Black mother in Atlanta being told her son must be placed in the “Black” classroom. He sees the incident as part of a wider trend, whereby “educators who believe themselves to be fighting for racial justice are separating children from each other on the basis of their skin color”. Universalism, he argues, is being rejected in the name of “progressive separatism”.</p>
<p>As an ethicist, to me the most shocking of Mounk’s stories was the <a href="https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/22193679/who-should-get-covid-19-vaccine-first-debate-explained">decision-making</a> at the US Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). A public health expert from the <a href="https://www.usa.gov/agencies/centers-for-disease-control-and-prevention">Centers for Disease Control</a> (CDC) argued <em>against</em> the life-saving policy of giving the elderly priority access to COVID vaccines. In the US, the aged are more likely to be white, meaning such prioritisation would disproportionately benefit whites.</p>
<p>The “ethics” of the policy protecting the elderly was therefore given the lowest score. This was despite the fact that the alternative (and initially selected) policy would not only cost more lives overall, but more <em>Black</em> lives. As the CDC knew, elderly Black people were vastly more likely to die from COVID than young Black essential workers.</p>
<p>These accounts provoke in the reader (or in this reader, at least) a sense that <em>this can’t be right. How could things possibly have come to this</em>?</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/-DB0SLTl-HQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
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<h2>Genuine insights</h2>
<p>Mounk provides a detailed and powerful critique of the identity synthesis. Yet his analysis is not entirely unsympathetic. A recurring theme is the way the identity synthesis stemmed from scholarly research that has delivered genuine insights. </p>
<p>For example, Harvard law professor <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/09/20/the-man-behind-critical-race-theory">Derrick Bell</a> was right to realise that legally enforced school integration had done little to improve Black educational outcomes. And he was insightful in drawing attention to structural racism. Institutions could continue and even exacerbate the effects of historical injustice, despite people’s good intentions. </p>
<p>Similarly, the legal scholar <a href="https://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/kimberle-w-crenshaw">Kimberlé Crenshaw</a>, who coined the term “critical race theory”, was correct to observe that Black women could be subject to discrimination that neither white women or Black men endured. She termed this phenomenon “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersectionality">intersectionality</a>”.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559215/original/file-20231114-17-sdwidj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559215/original/file-20231114-17-sdwidj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559215/original/file-20231114-17-sdwidj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559215/original/file-20231114-17-sdwidj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559215/original/file-20231114-17-sdwidj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559215/original/file-20231114-17-sdwidj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559215/original/file-20231114-17-sdwidj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559215/original/file-20231114-17-sdwidj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Black Lives Matter protest, Washington DC, June 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Clay Banks/Unsplash</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These important findings were, however, taken in worrying directions. Rather than concluding there were two types of racism – direct, intentional racism and structural racism – the latter became understood as the <em>only</em> type of racism. This implausibly tied racism exclusively to oppressive structures, making it impossible to make sense of (for example) hate crimes performed on one marginalised minority by another marginalised minority.</p>
<p>Rather than acknowledging that the law is a necessary but insufficient tool for social change, the conclusion drawn was that laws preferentially treating certain identity groups were necessary. Likewise, the concept of “intersectionality” has been used to justify many questionable claims, far removed from its initial meaning.</p>
<h2>Division and difference</h2>
<p>Mounk argues the identity synthesis is a “trap” because telling people to continually focus on their ascriptive identities prioritises difference, and unequal treatment only exacerbates divisions. </p>
<p>This is especially so when dominant groups, such as white people in the US, are encouraged to see themselves <em>as</em> white. Well established <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/great-experiment-9781526630155/">social science</a> <a href="https://www.penguin.com.au/books/the-righteous-mind-9780141039169">findings</a> suggest humans are powerfully motivated to favour their own in-group, and there is a chilling capacity for cruelty against designated out-groups.</p>
<p>Recent controversies in parts of the US – especially in elite universities – in the wake of the Hamas attack of October 7 seem to back up Mounk’s concern. </p>
<p>Many people harbour grave and longstanding moral concerns about <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/10/07/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-maps.html">Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians</a>. There is clear reason to fear the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-calling-the-israel-hamas-war-a-graveyard-of-children-in-an-adult-conflict-the-young-are-suffering-most-216633">harrowing civilian cost</a> of the Israeli response. </p>
<p>Basic ethics says there can never be an excuse to <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/pro-palestinian-protester-in-nyc-seen-brandishing-swastika-crowds-chant-f-the-jews-outside-sydney-opera-house/ar-AA1hVKDo">celebrate</a> an atrocity, to <a href="https://nypost.com/2023/10/10/blm-chicago-under-fire-for-pro-palestine-post-featuring-paragliding-terrorist/">applaud</a> the deliberate brutal murder of women and children, or to <a href="https://www.thefp.com/p/why-my-generation-hates-jews">blame</a> an entire ethnic or religious group for a government’s policy. Yet university students and professors have done all these things, invoking the language of postcolonialism and oppression. </p>
<p>Many Jewish progressives were shocked at universities’ reactions to the atrocity. University officials <a href="https://www.thefp.com/p/the-day-the-delusions-died-konstantin-kisin">failed to strongly condemn</a> the Hamas attack. An open letter from a coalition of student groups <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/18/us/harvard-students-israel-hamas-doxxing.html">claimed Israel was entirely responsible</a> for the violence, while other student organisations used a <a href="https://nypost.com/2023/10/10/california-student-groups-face-backlash-over-pro-palestine-rally-poster-featuring-paraglider/">picture of the Hamas paraglider</a> on their posters. One entry on the Sidechat app for Harvard read “<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-anguished-fallout-from-a-pro-palestinian-letter-at-harvard">LET EM COOK</a>” next to a Palestinian flag emoji.</p>
<p>Mounk’s analysis suggests these outcomes are all too predictable. According to the identity synthesis, everything must be viewed through the lens of oppressive structures. Once it is decided that Palestinian people are the <a href="https://www.thefp.com/p/john-mcwhorter-barbarism-recast-as-progress">oppressed party</a>, and Israelis the oppressors, even the deliberate murder of Jewish children can seem legitimate. Here, as elsewhere, ideology and in-group dynamics can so easily trump humanity.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-joanna-bourke-the-nsw-arts-minister-and-the-unruly-contradictions-of-cancel-culture-189377">Friday essay: Joanna Bourke, the NSW arts minister, and the unruly contradictions of cancel culture</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>Insight without ideology?</h2>
<p>Mounk does not explore the possibility of an identity-focused progressivism that is detached from scholarly theories and the ideological commitments underpinning them. </p>
<p>This detachment would not be an odd phenomenon. After all, most classical liberals would, like Mounk, endorse John Stuart Mill’s arguments for free speech in <a href="https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/mill/liberty.pdf">On Liberty</a>, but would not necessarily subscribe to Mill’s <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill-moral-political/#PerEle">particular version</a> of <a href="https://www.utilitarianism.com/mill1.htm">utilitarianism</a>, which focuses on maximising “higher” forms of happiness. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=781&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=781&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=781&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=982&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=982&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559495/original/file-20231115-23-v1p09a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=982&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">John Stuart Mill (1806-1873).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Public Domain</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In a similar way, a progressive reader of Mounk’s work might be alarmed at some of the stated themes of the identity synthesis. For example, they might accept scientific facts regarding climate change and vaccine efficacy. They might retain their commitments to universal values such as human rights. They might care about democracy and the rule of law. </p>
<p>Yet they might still harbour enough concern for marginalised groups to support some identity-based practices, such as censoring offensive speech, calling out “white privilege” and cultural appropriation, and demanding race-sensitive policies.</p>
<p>Mounk does not explicitly address this possibility. But his arguments suggest the progressive view sketched above – which wants to be both humanist and identity-focused – is incoherent. He shows that, without the rationales of the identity synthesis, cancellation, censorship, moral intolerance and cynicism about liberal-democratic institutions are far harder to justify ethically. </p>
<p>It is inconsistent to have science when it suits and to decry it as oppressive when it doesn’t. It is hypocritical to uphold democracy, free speech and the rule of law against right-wing authoritarianism and simultaneously believe these principles are merely tools of white supremacy. </p>
<p>Worse still, it is self-defeating to embrace the divisiveness of identity separatism and to somehow expect the age-old problems of in-group tribalism not to emerge – with predictably devastating impacts on vulnerable minorities.</p>
<p>Mounk builds a powerful case that the identity synthesis is indeed a trap. Genuine insights, important realisations and progressive values lure the sympathetic. But too often those insights are developed in extreme and implausible ways, ultimately betraying the very goals they claim to value.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hugh Breakey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Is social justice advanced by focusing on people’s different identities? Or is this worldview ultimately a trap?Hugh Breakey, Deputy Director, Institute for Ethics, Governance & Law. President, Australian Association for Professional & Applied Ethics., Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2139712023-10-03T12:34:09Z2023-10-03T12:34:09ZReagan wouldn’t recognize Trump-style ‘conservatism’ – a look at how the GOP has changed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550741/original/file-20230927-19-66bw79.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=32%2C8%2C5459%2C3648&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mitt Romney, left, represents an old-fashioned GOP conservatism. Donald Trump, right, doesn't − and Romney is leaving politics.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-elect-donald-trump-gives-a-thumbs-up-as-mitt-news-photo/624809914?adppopup=true">Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Mitt Romney announced his intended retirement from the U.S. Senate on Sept. 13, 2023, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2023/11/mitt-romney-retiring-senate-trump-mcconnell/675306/">the Atlantic</a> published an excerpt from his upcoming biography, in which the 2012 Republican presidential nominee told author McKay Coppins, “A very large portion of my party really doesn’t believe in the Constitution.” </p>
<p>This claim would have been startling 15 years ago. For decades, the Republican Party has been the party of conservatism and a champion for the Constitution.</p>
<p>Romney is clear that Donald Trump, who leads what he calls a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BujDsieHkZE">“populist” and “demagogic” portion of the party</a>, is to blame. And Romney is not the only concerned Republican. </p>
<p>Former Vice President Mike Pence, now running for the GOP presidential nomination, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/09/06/1197887694/mike-pence-donald-trump-populism-conservatism-free-market-republican-party">recently asked a crowd</a> at a campaign event, “Will we be the party of conservatism, or will we follow the siren song of populism unmoored to conservative principles?” </p>
<p>What are the conservative principles Romney and Pence spoke about? And what has happened to them since Trump’s rise?</p>
<p>As a political scientist, I spent the past five years researching <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12664">ideological identity</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221112395">Trump’s effect on conservatism</a> and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/abs/adversaries-or-allies-donald-trumps-republican-support-in-congress/1FA48BEAE419AD8348B3A2BB5A93CA5E">on the Republican Party</a>. </p>
<p>Defining “conservatism” is complicated. It has taken many forms over the course of U.S. history. It <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-reactionary-mind-9780190692001?cc=us&lang=en&">reinvents itself over time</a>. But a main tenet was summed up by President Ronald Reagan in his <a href="https://www.reaganfoundation.org/ronald-reagan/reagan-quotes-speeches/farewell-address-to-the-nation-1/">1989 farewell address to the nation</a>: “There’s a clear cause and effect here that is as neat and predictable as a law of physics: As government expands, liberty contracts.”</p>
<p>I focus here on features of what’s called “principled conservatism,” the cohesive belief system that emphasizes liberty and the status quo. </p>
<p>Here is a short inventory of these ideals and how they were violated in recent years. This is not an exhaustive list – but it captures much of Reagan’s style of conservatism, which has been the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/2023/09/26/reagan-gop-presidential-candidates/">touchstone for most Republican presidential candidates until recently</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550743/original/file-20230927-17-tqnr4e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man dressed in a blue suit, white shirt and red tie posing in front of three American flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550743/original/file-20230927-17-tqnr4e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550743/original/file-20230927-17-tqnr4e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550743/original/file-20230927-17-tqnr4e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550743/original/file-20230927-17-tqnr4e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550743/original/file-20230927-17-tqnr4e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550743/original/file-20230927-17-tqnr4e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550743/original/file-20230927-17-tqnr4e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Vice President Mike Pence, now a GOP presidential candidate, has asked, ‘Will we be the party of conservatism, or will we follow the siren song of populism?’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/republican-presidential-candidate-former-vice-president-news-photo/1683396110?adppopup=true">Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The Constitution and limited government protect liberty</h2>
<p>Outspoken conservatives <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/11/ronald-reagan-a-time-for-choosing-speech-defining-statement-modern-conservatism/">often emphasize the importance of the Constitution</a>, which established laws to protect the liberty of citizens. </p>
<p>First, the Constitution laid the groundwork for federalism, a system where <a href="https://theconversation.com/georgias-indictment-of-trump-is-a-confirmation-of-states-rights-a-favorite-cause-of-republicans-since-reagan-210610">local governments hold some level of power</a> to ensure the national government does not have absolute control. This is where the <a href="https://theconversation.com/georgias-indictment-of-trump-is-a-confirmation-of-states-rights-a-favorite-cause-of-republicans-since-reagan-210610">conservative phrase “states’ rights”</a> comes from. </p>
<p>Second, the Constitution <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/separation_of_powers_0">established checks and balances</a> between the three branches of government to prevent any one of them from abusing power. </p>
<p>These safeguards against tyranny are the beating heart of conservative thought.</p>
<p>But when Trump, <a href="https://projects.propublica.org/represent/members/trump-texas-amicus-house-members">backed by 126 Republican legislators</a> in Congress, tried to overturn election results of key states in 2020, it <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/10/politics/conservatives-states-rights/index.html">was seen as a violation of states’ rights</a> by conservative lawyers and a handful of Republican legislators. When only 17 Republicans <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/01/14/956621191/these-are-the-10-republicans-who-voted-to-impeach-trump">voted to impeach</a> <a href="https://rollcall.com/2021/02/13/trump-acquitted/">or convict Trump</a> for his role in the Jan. 6, 2021, insurrection, it gave the appearance that the abuse of power can go unchecked at the federal level. </p>
<h2>Government intervention should be restrained</h2>
<p>Since principled conservatism is averse to an overly active, centralized government, it typically opposes federal intervention in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pDaFwokiFF0">business, increased spending, higher taxes, public programs</a> and <a href="https://www.heritage.org/agriculture/commentary/it-not-conservative-support-farm-subsidies-heres-where-conservative-icons">subsidies</a>. </p>
<p>But using the bully pulpit and his presidential powers, Trump threatened retaliation against companies <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-threatens-consequences-for-us-firms-that-relocate-offshore/2016/12/01/a2429330-b7e4-11e6-959c-172c82123976_story.html">that moved jobs overseas</a>, <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/national-debt-trump">increased the national debt</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/us/politics/trump-china-tariffs-trade.html">instigated trade wars by raising tariffs</a> and gave <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/us/politics/trump-farmers-subsidies.html">subsidies to farmers</a> who were harmed in the trade war process. These behaviors and policies also fly in the face of conservative principles.</p>
<p>Though Republican Sen. Chuck Grassley still considers Republicans to be <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-money/2019/05/16/grassley-on-what-trump-really-believes-on-trade-437149">“a party of free trade,”</a> Trump’s trade war deviated from past GOP policies – with some exceptions – and was mostly met with <a href="https://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan-institute/publications/is-the-gop-still-the-party-of-free-trade/">“statements of discomfort</a>.”</p>
<h2>Institutions can support stable civic life</h2>
<p>In addition to protecting limited government and free markets, conservatism strives to preserve American institutions such as the military and the justice system, in the belief that they help organize and maintain the stability of civic life.</p>
<p>Yet Trump’s rhetoric persistently attacked <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/business/trump-calls-the-news-media-the-enemy-of-the-people.html">the free press</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/sep/11/trump-mar-a-lago-witch-hunt-fbi-doj-safety">the Department of Justice, the FBI</a> – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/18/opinion/trump-fbi-conservative.html">often considered a conservative organization</a> – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/us/politics/trump-military.html">military leadership</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/17/us/politics/trump-election-lies-fact-check.html">the integrity of the electoral system</a>. Some of these organizations enforce justice and hold government accountable through free speech, ideals that are embedded in the conservative principles <a href="https://mikejohnson.house.gov/7-core-principles-of-conservatism/">laid out by Republican Rep. Mike Johnson</a> for the Republican Study Committee in 2018.</p>
<h2>Conservatives in name only?</h2>
<p>Is Donald Trump solely to blame for the unraveling of American conservative ideals? </p>
<p>Yes and no. One the one hand, he is responsible for implementing anti-conservative policies like trade wars, eroding trust in institutions through his rhetoric and inspiring candidates to run for office in his image. </p>
<p>However, Trump is also a product of his voter base. He loses power without them and therefore often reflects what they want. What do they want, though? Here’s where it’s handy to know some political science.</p>
<p>One of the most <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/08913810608443650">cited findings in political psychology</a> is that the average American lacks “ideological sophistication.” Most people simply don’t structure their politics around an abstract attitude about the proper role of government. This includes many Americans <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/ideology-in-america/F22017ACF5F39C3739E7C0E8D89501F8">who call themselves “conservatives</a>.” </p>
<p>Instead, people often form preferences by asking, “How will this policy or person help me and people who are like me? How will this <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/white-identity-politics/5C330931FF4CF246FCA043AB14F5C626">protect the status of my group</a>?” Positive feelings toward one’s own group and positive – or negative – feelings toward other demographic groups <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/08913810608443657">hold real influence</a> over <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/715072">political orientations</a>. This is the stuff that motivates people politically – consequently, there has been a disconnect between the conservative ideals promoted by elites and the attitudes of their voter base. </p>
<p>You may hear conservative principles mentioned sporadically as the 2024 election nears. But until Republican voters reward politicians who embody them, it is unlikely actual conservative ideals do – or will – guide politics on the right.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213971/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karyn Amira does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Republicans Mike Pence and Mitt Romney both spoke recently about the conservative ideals that animate their politics − and which Donald Trump has violated. Do voters care?Karyn Amira, Associate Professor of Political Science, College of CharlestonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2114342023-09-25T12:22:52Z2023-09-25T12:22:52ZKwame Nkrumah: memorials to the man who led Ghana to independence have been built, erased and revived again<p>Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park lies at the centre of Ghana’s capital, Accra. <a href="https://citinewsroom.com/2023/07/akufo-addo-to-commission-redeveloped-kwame-nkrumah-memorial-park/">Recently renovated</a>, it is dedicated to the memory of <a href="https://theconversation.com/kwame-nkrumah-why-every-now-and-then-his-legacy-is-questioned-120790">Kwame Nkrumah</a>, the leader of Ghana’s independence struggle and its first president. Marking the spot of his final resting place at the park is a massive statue. </p>
<p>The statue has been continuously contested since its original commission in 1956 and its unveiling at the first anniversary of independence in 1958. As a <a href="https://www.blogs.uni-mainz.de/fb07-ifeas-eng/academic-staff-university-professors/prof-dr-carola-lentz/">social anthropologist</a> who has <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320148363_Ghanaian_Monument_Wars_The_Contested_History_of_the_Nkrumah_Statues">researched and written</a> about Kwame Nkrumah themed monuments, I have <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Remembering-Independence/Lentz-Lowe/p/book/9781138905733">explored</a> the contradiction that generally characterises monuments: built as lasting memories, they remain embedded in social and political conflict. </p>
<p>Nkrumah is heralded as one of the most influential African political leaders of the modern era. His vision of a liberated and united African continent influenced politics on the continent in the 1950s and 1960s. But that’s only one view of a man who was <a href="https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2018/2/23/february-24-1966-dr-kwame-nkrumah-overthrown-as-president-of-the-republic-of-ghana">deposed in a coup in 1966</a> and died in exile <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1972/04/28/archives/nkrumah-62-dead-ghanas-exleader-nkrumah-former-president-of-ghana.html">in 1972</a>. </p>
<p>In Ghana, there was vociferous criticism of “personality cult” and “hero worship”. Alongside presentations of him as the country’s “redeemer” were descriptions of him as a “dictator”. </p>
<p>The idolisation of Nkrumah began even before the country became independent. It had all the hallmarks of a new nation state trying to establish a charismatic national “founder” to stabilise its creation. But, as I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320148363_Ghanaian_Monument_Wars_The_Contested_History_of_the_Nkrumah_Statues">shown</a>, Nkrumah’s story shows both the limits and dangers of doing this. </p>
<p>These debates have been matched by unfolding dramas around various efforts to commemorate him – before and after his death. Attitudes have shifted from straightforward veneration to confrontation and destruction and, finally, to more subtle forms of remembrance.</p>
<h2>The birth of a monument</h2>
<p>With thoughts of Ghana soon celebrating 25 years of independence, then military ruler <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/features/opinion/remembering-general-kutu-acheampong-1.html">Ignatius Kutu Acheampong</a> intended to publicly honour the memory of Nkrumah. The deposed leader had <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1972/04/28/archives/nkrumah-62-dead-ghanas-exleader-nkrumah-former-president-of-ghana.html">passed away</a> in 1972, in exile. After his overthrow, several of his statues and images had been destroyed by the military government. His memory was taboo.</p>
<p>Acheampong discussed the possibility of creating a mausoleum, adorned with an imposing new statue, on the grounds where the ex-president had declared independence. The statue was commissioned in Italy but before it could be erected the Acheampong government was toppled by <a href="https://theconversation.com/saint-or-sinner-rawlings-was-pivotal-to-ghanas-political-and-economic-fortunes-150025">Flight Lieutenant Jerry J. Rawlings</a> in 1979.</p>
<p>In addition, the continued economic crisis militated against any large-scale investment in the monumental landscape.</p>
<p>The memorial project was finally realised in 1992 based on the design of Ghanaian architect <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/etudesafricaines/pdf/20822">Don Arthur</a>. The heart of the memorial is the mausoleum, surrounded by water basins, with fountains and figures of Asante elephant-horn blowers that traditionally accompany royal processions. </p>
<p>The mausoleum stands in a landscaped park that is successively greened by commemorative trees planted by important international visitors. It is complemented by a museum that exhibits a collection of Nkrumah memorabilia. These include the famous smock he wore to declare independence, his desk at the seat of government and numerous photographs. </p>
<p>The mausoleum itself, made of Italian marble, evokes a gigantic tree stump, but also draws on the imagery of Egyptian pyramids, the <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/252/">Taj Mahal</a> and the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Eiffel-Tower-Paris-France">Eiffel Tower</a>. The whole ensemble celebrates Nkrumah as a kind of chief. The shining large bronze statue erected in front of the mausoleum shows Nkrumah clad in royal kente cloth, not the humble smock of the original sculpture. </p>
<p>Opponents of Rawlings regarded the mausoleum project as an attempt to exploit the growing nostalgia for Nkrumah in his electoral campaign and to style himself and his party as worthy heirs of Nkrumah’s ideas. Another major motivation behind the project was to show the world that Ghanaians, after many years of neglect, respected Nkrumah as a great African leader. This was actually the first time since his overthrow that Nkrumah was publicly commemorated with such splendour. The memorial park conferred on Nkrumah an indisputable place in the national narrative. </p>
<p>This status, however, did not mean that his political legacy was now without contest. When the anti-Nkrumah New Patriotic Party won the elections in 2000, they, unlike the <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/232661566.pdf">1966 coup-makers</a> (who removed all images and monuments of Nkrumah), made no attempts to destroy the Nkrumah monument. However, the new government found other ways to correct, or at least complement, Nkrumah-centred nationalist narratives. </p>
<p>For instance, in the course of preparing for the golden jubilee of Ghana’s independence in 2007, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Kufuor">the John Kufuor</a> administration <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40175209">created a series of monuments</a> that commemorate the political heroes of his party, the New Patriotic Party. Most prominently, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/721348">J.B. Danquah</a>, Nkrumah’s most noted political opponent, was honoured by a renovated sculpture at a busy traffic roundabout in the capital.</p>
<p>This proliferation of historical monuments can be read as an attempt to neutralise the commemoration of Nkrumah. This was done not by eliminating existing statues of him, but rather by reducing Nkrumah’s status to being only one of several national founders. </p>
<h2>Strong memories remain</h2>
<p>For the masses of Ghanaian students and foreign tourists who come to the park, the statue of a triumphant Nkrumah has become the dominant icon of the national hero and of Ghana’s independence. It has been reproduced over and over again on thousands of private photographs, and is marketed on postcards, posters, calendars, T-shirts, bags, towels, tea cups and similar souvenirs. </p>
<p>However, there are still limits to the depoliticisation of Nkrumah’s memory. Heated debates over whether Nkrumah was a “democrat” or a “despot” flare up periodically. National heroes, as the case of Nkrumah shows, can divide people just as much as they can unite.</p>
<p>Developing the mausoleum into an attractive tourist site, as happened in the renovation and re-inauguration of the park in 2023, adds another intriguing twist to the long history of the commemoration of Kwame Nkrumah – another attempt at depoliticising and nationalising memory.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211434/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carola Lentz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Attitudes towards Kwame Nkrumah have shifted from veneration to confrontation and destruction and, finally, to more subtle forms of remembrance.Carola Lentz, Professor of Anthropology, Johannes Gutenberg University of MainzLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2006292023-02-26T19:06:11Z2023-02-26T19:06:11ZCan ideology-detecting algorithms catch online extremism before it takes hold?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512142/original/file-20230224-16-hxuklk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C11%2C3840%2C2144&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ideology has always been a critical element in understanding how we view the world, form opinions and make political decisions. </p>
<p>However, the internet has revolutionised the way opinions and ideologies spread, leading to new forms of online radicalisation. Far-right ideologies, which advocate for ultra-nationalism, racism and opposition to immigration and multiculturalism, have proliferated on social platforms.</p>
<p>These ideologies have strong links with violence and terrorism. In recent years, <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/sites/default/files/2022-02/ASIO_Annual_Report_2020-21.pdf">as much as 40%</a> of the caseload of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) was related to far-right extremism. This has <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-13/right-wing-terror-threat-declines-says-asio/101965964">declined</a>, though, with the easing of COVID restrictions.</p>
<p>Detecting online radicalisation early could help prevent far-right ideology-motivated (and potentially violent) activity. To this end, we have developed a <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.04097">completely automatic system</a> that can determine the ideology of social media users based on what they do online.</p>
<h2>How it works</h2>
<p>Our proposed pipeline is based on detecting the signals of ideology from people’s online behaviour. </p>
<p>There is no way to directly observe a person’s ideology. However, researchers can observe “ideological proxies” such as the use of political hashtags, retweeting politicians and following political parties. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-far-right-online-spaces-use-mainstream-media-to-spread-their-ideology-189066">How far-right online spaces use mainstream media to spread their ideology</a>
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<p>But using ideological proxies requires a lot of work: you need experts to understand and label the relationships between proxies and ideology. This can be expensive and time-consuming. </p>
<p>What’s more, online behaviour and contexts change between countries and social platforms. They also shift rapidly over time. This means even more work to keep your ideological proxies up to date and relevant.</p>
<h2>You are what you post</h2>
<p>Our pipeline simplifies this process and makes it automatic. It has two main components: a “media proxy”, which determines ideology via links to media, and an “inference architecture”, which helps us determine the ideology of people who don’t post links to media.</p>
<p>The media proxy measures the ideological leaning of an account by tracking which media sites it posts links to. Posting links to Fox News would indicate someone is more likely to lean right, for example, while linking to the Guardian indicates a leftward tendency. </p>
<p>To categorise the media sites users link to, we took the left-right ratings for a wide range of news sites from two datasets (though many are available). One was <a href="https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/our-research/digital-news-report-2018">based on a Reuters survey</a> and the other curated by experts at <a href="https://www.allsides.com/media-bias/ratings">Allsides.com</a>. </p>
<p>This works well for people who post links to media sites. However, most people don’t do that very often. So what do we do about them?</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-wasnt-a-bumper-campaign-for-right-wing-extremists-but-the-threat-from-terror-remains-199964">COVID wasn't a 'bumper campaign' for right-wing extremists. But the threat from terror remains</a>
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<p>That’s where the inference architecture comes in. In our pipeline, we determine how ideologically similar people are to one another with three measures: the kind of language they use, the hashtags they use, and the other users whose content they reshare.</p>
<p>Measuring similarity in hashtags and resharing is relatively straightforward, but such signals are not always available. Language use is the key: it is always present, and a known indicator of people’s latent psychological states. </p>
<p>Using machine-learning techniques we found that people with different ideologies use different kinds of language. </p>
<p>Right-leaning individuals tend to use moral language relating to vice (for example, harm, cheating, betrayal, subversion and degradation), as opposed to virtue (care, fairness, loyalty, authority and sanctity), more than left-leaning individuals. Far-right individuals use grievance language (involving violence, hate and paranoia) significantly more than moderates. </p>
<p>By detecting these signals of ideology, our pipeline can identify and understand the psychological and social characteristics of extreme individuals and communities.</p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>The ideology detection pipeline could be a crucial tool for understanding the spread of far-right ideologies and preventing violence and terrorism. By detecting signals of ideology from user behaviour online, the pipeline serves as an early warning systems for extreme ideology-motivated activity. It can provide law enforcement with methods to flag users for investigation and intervene before radicalisation takes hold.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200629/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rohit Ram receives funding from the Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG) and was supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP) Scholarship.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marian-Andrei Rizoiu receives funding from Meta (Facebook) Research, the Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG), The Department of Home Affairs and the Defence Innovation Network. </span></em></p>An automatic system to determine political ideology from online posts could be a powerful tool against online radicalisation.Rohit Ram, PhD Student, Social Data Science, University of Technology SydneyMarian-Andrei Rizoiu, Senior Lecturer in Behavioral Data Science, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956342023-01-18T13:38:02Z2023-01-18T13:38:02ZFictional newsman Ted Baxter was more invested in fame than in good journalism – but unlike today’s pundits, he didn’t corrupt the news<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504264/original/file-20230112-60681-z7fdw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C17%2C3906%2C2910&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Fictional anchorman Ted Baxter, center, flanked by newsroom boss Lou Grant and colleague Mary Richards, on 'The Mary Tyler Moore Show' in 1970.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/newsroom-boss-lou-grant-newscaster-ted-baxter-and-mary-news-photo/517428674?phrase=Ted%20Baxter&adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Pundits are commonplace in today’s cable news environment, with <a href="https://guides.lib.umich.edu/c.php?g=637508&p=4462444">politically tilted news coverage</a> coming from both left and right. Particularly dangerous are characters like Tucker Carlson and Laura Ingraham, who have stoked anger and polarization by promoting bigotry and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/11/business/media/vaccines-fox-news-hosts.html">spreading misinformation about COVID-19</a> <a href="https://www.poynter.org/newsletters/2020/the-damage-being-done-by-fox-news/">and the 2020 election</a>. </p>
<p>It’s sobering, then, to recall that during its first half-century of existence, from the 1950s until the ascendance of slanted channels such as Fox News and MSNBC, TV news strove for fairness and objectivity.</p>
<p>In the old days, analysis that provided a point of view was explicitly labeled as “commentary.” It was believed to be helpful to viewers, whom the news divisions understood not just as consumers – what advertisers cared about – but also as citizens. </p>
<p>Ed Klauber, who set CBS News standards in the 1930s, declared that “<a href="https://www.press.uillinois.edu/books/?id=p069413">in a democracy</a> it is important that people not only should know but should understand, and it is the analysts’ function to help the listener to understand, to weigh and to judge, but not to do the judging for him.” Fred Friendly, CBS News president from 1964 to 1966, distributed Klauber’s guidelines to his team on pocket-size cards. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504269/original/file-20230112-26-gzyrng.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man with glasses and wavy hair and a receding hairline, wearing a jacket and tie." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504269/original/file-20230112-26-gzyrng.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504269/original/file-20230112-26-gzyrng.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=911&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504269/original/file-20230112-26-gzyrng.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=911&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504269/original/file-20230112-26-gzyrng.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=911&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504269/original/file-20230112-26-gzyrng.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1145&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504269/original/file-20230112-26-gzyrng.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1145&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504269/original/file-20230112-26-gzyrng.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1145&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">CBS News President Fred Friendly.</span>
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<p>The national news appeared on only three channels, and the networks strove for political neutrality. They were seeking a wide, mass audience but were also influenced by their own professional standards and the government-imposed <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Fairness-Doctrine">Fairness Doctrine</a> requiring balanced coverage of controversial issues. Within this context, celebrity <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Walter-Cronkite">anchormen like Walter Cronkite</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/David-Brinkley">David Brinkley</a> downplayed their own stardom.</p>
<p>Back then, the only TV newsman with an oversized personality who was familiar to a national audience was an entirely fictional one: <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-jul-16-et-kaltenbach16-story.html">Ted Baxter, of “The Mary Tyler Moore Show</a>,” a character who was funny precisely because he was so implausible. The sitcom, which ran from 1970 to 1977, centered on a single woman working in a TV newsroom in Minneapolis. Baxter was the station’s anchorman, and his incompetence doomed the “Six O'Clock News” to low ratings. </p>
<p>Notwithstanding the common perception that it was an unprofitable, strictly altruistic venture, the national news did make <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884910379707">significant revenue from their nightly broadcasts</a>. Still, the lofty objective of these operations was public service. There was a baseline understanding that <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/saving-the-news-9780190948412?cc=us&lang=en&">democracy demands a free press and an informed electorate</a>.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/33733/a-reporters-life-by-walter-cronkite/">Cronkite argued in his memoir</a>, encapsulating – and also mythologizing – the ideals of that era, “Newspapers and broadcasting, insofar as journalism goes, are public services essential to the successful working of our democracy. It is a travesty that they should be required to pay off like any other stock-market investment.” </p>
<p>Ted Baxter, played by actor Ted Knight, had no such concerns. Like many of today’s pundits – though without their ideological commitments – he was an anchorman more invested in fame than in good journalism.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Ted Baxter being Ted Baxter.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Alive in Minneapolis, dead in Tokyo</h2>
<p>Ted Baxter was a slow-witted egomaniac. </p>
<p>To pick up extra cash, he did <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhvNfg8Nw1E">undignified commercials</a> for sausage, dog food and even some kind of befuddling “woman’s product.” Impressed by the very existence of time zones, he once said, “It’s actually tomorrow in Tokyo. Do you realize that there are people alive here in Minneapolis who are already dead in Tokyo?”</p>
<p>His only professional assets were good looks and a fine baritone. In one episode, a blizzard made the <a href="https://youtu.be/U9A3-xvj_Y4">phones go down during local election coverage</a>. Unable to receive updates on the vote count, the news team was forced to pull an all-nighter until a winner could be accurately declared. </p>
<p>Baxter wanted to call the race prematurely so he could go home, a flagrant dereliction of duty. </p>
<p>Forced to stay, he displayed his typical incompetence, mistakenly reading the entirety of a cue card aloud on the air: “We’ll stay on the air until a winner is declared. Take off glasses, look concerned.” </p>
<p>Ted’s priority was stardom. When he was tempted to quit the news for a lucrative job as a game show host, his boss, Lou Grant, played by Ed Asner, talked him out of it by evoking the higher purpose embodied by newsmen like CBS’ acclaimed <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/06/books/always-on-the-side-of-the-heretics.html">Edward R. Murrow</a>. </p>
<p>Ted was nothing like Murrow, as confirmed in the next scene, when he reported about a fishing boat incident and then improvised a joke: a woman tells her sailor husband in bed, “not tonight, I have a haddock.” Ted Baxter revered Murrow as a celebrity, and his hero was Cronkite, but gravitas was simply impossible for him. </p>
<p>When Cronkite made a cameo appearance on the show in 1974, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=79A4vF2UsQM">Ted was positively giddy</a>. Cronkite was a bit wooden, underscoring the fact that he was not an actor, thereby implicitly upholding a more dignified standard than Ted. </p>
<p>In fact, Dick Salant, who succeeded Friendly at CBS, had <a href="https://txarchives.org/utcah/finding_aids/01267.xml">initially refused the invitation to Cronkite</a> from the show’s producers. He was anxious that Cronkite should not deliver “lines written for him in a fictitious role,” fearing it would undercut Cronkite’s trustworthy image.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Walter Cronkite appeared on ‘The Mary Tyler Moore Show’ on Feb. 9, 1974.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Cronkite was a fan of the show, declaring, “<a href="https://txarchives.org/utcah/finding_aids/01267.xml">The newsroom operation is realistic — even with Ted</a>.” </p>
<h2>Baxter couldn’t corrupt the news</h2>
<p>If there is anything “realistic” about the satirical, fictional Ted Baxter, though, it’s that he lived up to the norms of political neutrality that really did dominate national newscasts in the 1970s — notwithstanding President Richard Nixon and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lHuA5_yTok8">Vice President Spiro Agnew</a>’s ferocious accusations of “<a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/W/bo183630531.html">liberal bias</a>.”</p>
<p>Today’s grandstanding cable news pundits may provoke nostalgia for the Cronkite days – and the Baxter days – but nostalgia has a way of blurring over all the unpleasant details. </p>
<p>The news was already in trouble in the Nixon years. The president had planted the idea that the mainstream media suffered from liberal bias, a notion <a href="https://www.heritage.org/insider/fall-2019-insider/interview-carrie-lukas">which was then nurtured by</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/19/us/reed-irvine-82-the-founder-of-a-media-criticism-group-dies.html">right-wing groups</a> like Accuracy in Media and the Heritage Foundation. </p>
<p>Newscasters accustomed to reporting “both sides” were under constant attack in the 1970s. <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/226578">Nixon besieged the networks</a> with every dirty trick, from Federal Communications Commission pressure to IRS audits. He even dreamed that cable TV could solve his problems by <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.9783/9780812293746-011/pdf">breaking the network news monopoly</a>.</p>
<p>On this count, Nixon was right. Cable did end network dominance and enable the rise of <a href="https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/nicole-hemmer/partisans/9781541646872/">highly politicized, overtly biased, personality-driven news</a>. </p>
<p>But the triumph of Baxterism was never what “The Mary Tyler Moore Show” promoted. Just the opposite.</p>
<p>Ted Baxter was a cautionary figure who showed that real news could never succeed by depending on style over substance. Ted kept letting everyone down in order to teach viewers a lesson: Even a dolt who prized financial reward over integrity could not corrupt the news, as long as others held it to a higher standard. </p>
<p>In an episode called “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yw0k4o46Pcs">The Good-Time News</a>,” for example, the station manager demanded a “more entertaining” format to bring up the ratings. Lou Grant protested that “news is truth … I’m not going to make it into something fake.” </p>
<p>Lou was right. The new format was a disaster, with Ted’s offensive “good-time” banter provoking angry telegrams. </p>
<p>Fool that he was, Ted nonetheless represented a golden age of TV news. If he could have read cue cards without flubbing up, he might have even been a decent anchorman. But he never could have been a pundit. </p>
<p>Ted never boosted a favorite politician or a conspiracy theory. He was politically vacant. He once ran for office as a Democrat, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fmDtRMvJUww">even though he was a registered Republican</a>. He really didn’t care – he only wanted to increase his fan base.</p>
<p>Ted Baxter thus embodied the ego of the pundit, but without the opinions that often make such a person dangerous. For all his incompetence, it never occurred to him to air his own political views. By network news standards of the 1970s, this made him a friend of democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195634/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Heather Hendershot does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Today’s anchors on politically slanted news programs feed anger and polarization with their wild claims. Their ancestor is a character from ‘The Mary Tyler Moore Show’ – with one big difference.Heather Hendershot, Professor of Film and Media, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1922822022-10-31T12:34:21Z2022-10-31T12:34:21ZRepublicans and Democrats see news bias only in stories that clearly favor the other party<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492353/original/file-20221028-68119-lwyx09.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C26%2C5899%2C3903&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">If you detect news media bias, that perception may be a result of your own bias.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/sen-joe-manchin-speaks-to-reporters-outside-of-his-office-news-photo/1412537754?phrase=news%20reporters&adppopup=true">Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Charges of media bias – that “the media” are trying to brainwash Americans by feeding the public only one side of every issue – have become as common as campaign ads in the run-up to the midterm elections.</p>
<p>As a political scientist who has <a href="https://www.upress.virginia.edu/title/5621">examined media coverage of the Trump presidency and campaigns</a>, I can say that this is what social science research tells us about media bias.</p>
<p>First, media bias is in the eye of the beholder. </p>
<p>Communications scholars have found that if you ask people in any community, using scientific polling methods, whether their local media are biased, you’ll find that about half say yes. But of that half, typically a little more than a quarter say that their local media are biased against Republicans, and a little less than a quarter <a href="https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol35/iss1/2/">say the same local media are biased against Democrats</a>. </p>
<p>Research shows that Republicans and Democrats spot bias only in articles that clearly favor the other party. If an article tilts in favor of their own party, they tend to see it as unbiased.</p>
<p>Many people, then, define “bias” as “anything that doesn’t agree with me.” It’s not hard to see why.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/gmvpBZnve70?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">‘Liberal bias’ in the media is a constant topic on Fox News.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘Media’ is a plural word</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.pearson.com/us/higher-education/program/Abramowitz-Polarized-Public-The/PGM59757.html">American party politics has become increasingly polarized</a> in recent decades. Republicans have become more consistently conservative, and Democrats have become more consistently liberal to moderate. </p>
<p>As the lines have been drawn more clearly, many people have developed <a href="https://cookpolitical.com/analysis/national/national-politics/power-negative-partisanship">hostile feelings toward the opposition party</a>. </p>
<p>In a 2016 <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/22/key-facts-partisanship/">Pew Research Center poll</a>, 45% of Republicans said the Democratic Party’s policies are “so misguided that they threaten the nation’s well-being,” and 41% of Democrats said the same about Republicans. A <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/08/09/as-partisan-hostility-grows-signs-of-frustration-with-the-two-party-system/">poll conducted in midyear 2022 by Pew showed</a> that “72% of Republicans regard Democrats as more immoral, and 63% of Democrats say the same about Republicans.”</p>
<p>Not surprisingly, media outlets have arisen <a href="https://www.salon.com/2013/10/19/the_birth_of_fox_news/">to appeal primarily to people who share a conservative view</a>, or people who <a href="https://guides.lib.umich.edu/c.php?g=637508&p=4462444">share a liberal view</a>.</p>
<p>That doesn’t mean that “the media” are biased. There are hundreds of thousands of media outlets in the U.S. – newspapers, radio, network TV, cable TV, blogs, websites and social media. These news outlets don’t all take the same perspective on any given issue. </p>
<p>If you want a very conservative news site, it is not hard to find one, and the same with a very liberal news site.</p>
<h2>First Amendment rules</h2>
<p>“The media,” then, <a href="https://www.poynter.org/ethics-trust/2016/is-media-bias-really-rampant-ask-the-man-who-studies-it-for-a-living/">present a variety of different perspectives</a>. That’s the way a free press works. </p>
<p>The Constitution’s First Amendment says Congress shall make no law limiting the freedom of the press. It doesn’t say that Congress shall require all media sources to be “unbiased.” Rather, it implies that as long as Congress does not systematically suppress any particular point of view, <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/04/06/what-first-amendment-protects-and-what-doesnt/469920002/">then the free press can do its job</a> as one of the primary checks on a powerful government.</p>
<p>When the Constitution was written and for most of U.S. history, the major news sources – newspapers, for most of that time – <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691123677/all-the-news-thats-fit-to-sell">were explicitly biased</a>. Most were sponsored by a political party or a partisan individual. </p>
<p>The notion of objective journalism – that media must report both sides of every issue in every story – barely existed until the late 1800s. It reached full flower only in the few decades when broadcast television, limited to three major networks, was <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/postbroadcast-democracy/A0D17A3CD156A0D1BB4318EE5DBCC60B">the primary source of political information</a>.</p>
<p>Since that time, the media universe has expanded to include huge numbers of internet news sites, cable channels and social media posts. So if you feel that the media sources you’re reading or watching are biased, you can read a wider variety of media sources.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/362812/original/file-20201011-15-1gujjcx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Front page of the April 15, 1789 edition of the Gazette of the United States" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/362812/original/file-20201011-15-1gujjcx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/362812/original/file-20201011-15-1gujjcx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362812/original/file-20201011-15-1gujjcx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362812/original/file-20201011-15-1gujjcx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362812/original/file-20201011-15-1gujjcx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1185&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362812/original/file-20201011-15-1gujjcx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1185&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362812/original/file-20201011-15-1gujjcx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1185&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thomas Jefferson described this partisan newspaper, The Gazette of the United States, as ‘a paper of pure Toryism … disseminating the doctrines of monarchy, aristocracy, and the exclusion of the people.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030483/1789-04-15/ed-1/seq-1/">Library of Congress, Chronicling America collection</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>If it bleeds, it leads</h2>
<p>There is one form of actual media bias. Almost all media outlets need audiences in order to exist. Some can’t survive financially without an audience; others want the prestige that comes from attracting a big audience. </p>
<p>Thus, the media define as “news” the kinds of stories that will attract an audience: those that feature drama, conflict, engaging pictures and immediacy. That’s what <a href="https://nupress.northwestern.edu/content/deciding-whats-news">most people find interesting</a>. They don’t want to read a story headlined “Dog bites man.” They want “Man bites dog.”</p>
<p>The problem is that a focus on such stories crowds out what we need to know to protect our democracy, such as: How do the workings of American institutions benefit some groups and disadvantage others? In what ways do our major systems – education, health care, national defense and others – function effectively or less effectively? </p>
<p>These analyses are vital to citizens – if we fail to protect our democracy, our lives will be changed forever – but they aren’t always fun to read. So they get covered much less than celebrity scandals or murder cases – which, while compelling, don’t really affect the ability to sustain a democratic system.</p>
<p>Writer Dave Barry demonstrated this media bias in favor of dramatic stories <a href="https://www.miamiherald.com/living/liv-columns-blogs/dave-barry/article205604594.html">in a 1998 column</a>. </p>
<p>He wrote, “Let’s consider two headlines. FIRST HEADLINE: ‘Federal Reserve Board Ponders Reversal of Postponement of Deferral of Policy Reconsideration.’ SECOND HEADLINE: ‘Federal Reserve Board Caught in Motel with Underage Sheep.’ Be honest, now. Which of these two stories would you read?”</p>
<p>By focusing on the daily equivalent of the underage sheep, media can direct our attention away from the important systems that affect our lives. That isn’t the media’s fault; we are the audience whose attention media outlets want to attract. </p>
<p>But as long as we think of governance in terms of its entertainment value and media bias in terms of Republicans and Democrats, we’ll continue to be less informed than we need to be. That’s the real media bias.</p>
<p><em>This story is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/political-bias-in-media-doesnt-threaten-democracy-other-less-visible-biases-do-144844">an article that was originally published</a> on Oct. 15, 2020.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192282/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marjorie Hershey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many people define ‘bias’ as ‘anything that doesn’t agree with me.’ But are the news media really biased?Marjorie Hershey, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1833332022-07-18T12:27:13Z2022-07-18T12:27:13ZPolitical crowdfunding does more than raise money – it can also rile up opponents<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474371/original/file-20220715-16-3ibpqz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C16%2C3685%2C4898&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Crowdfunding can be a great way to raise money for political candidates and causes, but it can also have unintended consequences.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/hands-holding-out-money-one-hand-receiving-royalty-free-image/164836146">Joos Mind/The Image Bank via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The success of politicians in the U.S. largely depends on the amount of funding they receive from various sources. Although <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/">political action committees contribute considerably to elections</a>, a recent survey showed that <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/small-donor-public-financing-could-advance-race-and-gender-equity">grassroots contributions</a> – gifts under US$200 – are equally crucial and contribute a sizable amount. Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign raised <a href="http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/17-02-21/President_Trump_with_RNC_Help_Raised_More_Small_Donor_Money_than_President_Obama_As_Much_As_Clinton_and_Sanders_Combined.aspx">69% of its funding</a> from small donors.</p>
<p>Traditionally, volunteers went door to door to solicit donations from individuals. Today, politicians use social media to encourage their supporters to donate and eventually vote for them. Many politicians such as senators Bernie Sanders and Ted Cruz have turned to this sort of political crowdfunding.</p>
<p>The primary objective of political crowdfunding is to assist politicians in raising funds directly from individual donors. However, it’s also crucial for assessing the acceptance of politicians’ political agendas among potential supporters. Crowdfunding can reach and create loyalty from a much broader group than a party’s usual base, while minimizing the party’s and donors’ time and effort.</p>
<p>Although political crowdfunding is potentially becoming a way to build a strong sense of community, the impact of these campaigns may go far beyond that. These campaigns often focus on socially divisive partisan issues such as gun control and climate change. Discussions on these issues can influence potential supporters to develop highly polarized opinions on partisan issues.</p>
<p>As a computer scientist who <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=A0_KDngAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">researches social media and persuasion</a>, I’ve studied whether casual exposure to political crowdfunding campaigns might create a long-lasting sense of disapproval on partisan issues, even when those issues are not being discussed as part of a political fundraising campaign. </p>
<p>My colleagues and I found that casual exposure to these campaigns <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3491102.3502084">can influence people’s opinions</a> on politically sensitive issues such as climate change. These influences can stay active for many days and can influence people’s decisions on the same topic, even when it is not discussed by a politician in a political campaign.</p>
<h2>Lasting influence of political crowdfunding campaigns</h2>
<p>Our team recruited subjects from <a href="https://www.mturk.com/">Amazon Mechanical Turk</a>, an online platform for hiring people according to various criteria. We hired them in two groups: the first group supported the Democratic Party, and the other group supported the Republican Party. </p>
<p>We first showed all of our subjects a political crowdfunding campaign of a politician from the political party that they did not support. This process allowed us to present the argument about climate change from a particular perspective we believed the subjects would not naturally support because of their political ideology. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474370/original/file-20220715-20-j3x4u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A webpage showing a photograph of a young man holding a sign" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474370/original/file-20220715-20-j3x4u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474370/original/file-20220715-20-j3x4u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474370/original/file-20220715-20-j3x4u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474370/original/file-20220715-20-j3x4u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474370/original/file-20220715-20-j3x4u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474370/original/file-20220715-20-j3x4u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474370/original/file-20220715-20-j3x4u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Crowdfunding pages like this one can help raise money from people who support climate action, but they can also energize opponents.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">screenshot by Sanorita Dey</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After this casual exposure to a political crowdfunding campaign, we notified the subjects that the study was completed. In reality, we recruited the same group of people after 10 days as part of a new study, and this time they were asked to consider an online charitable event indirectly related to climate change. </p>
<p>Subjects who supported the Democratic Party were asked to guess a donation amount that they would be comfortable to pledge for a movement where organizers were trying to help people who lost their jobs in closed coal mines because of the climate action law. Supporters of the Republican Party were asked to do the same task of guessing the appropriate donation amount, but the movement was about planting trees in Central America to stop the effects of severe deforestation. </p>
<p>Both groups refused to donate any money to their assigned cause. Initially, we found this result disappointing but not surprising, considering that we were challenging their fundamental beliefs on climate change. However, we decided to take a second look at our findings when our team did the same experiment one more time with a new group of people. </p>
<p>This time we did not show a political crowdfunding campaign to any of the subjects. Instead, we showed them a news article about a politician, although the article did not show any information about the donation amount received by the politician from the supporters. All other details of these two experiments were the same. This time, to our surprise, subjects did not hesitate to donate a sizable amount to charitable movements irrespective of their political ideology.</p>
<p>This made us wonder whether and how the casual exposure to the political crowdfunding campaign influenced the first group of subjects who took a rather challenging decision of not donating anything to the charitable movements. After close observation, we concluded that it was not the content. Rather, it was the structure of the political crowdfunding campaigns that left a long-lasting influence on our subjects. </p>
<p>The political crowdfunding campaign not only presented the perspective of the politician on climate change but also showed how much money had been donated to that campaign. The clear signal of a significant amount of support for a politician from the supporters of the opposition party influenced their future actions, including decisions to donate, related to climate change movements. Although the news article presented the same arguments about climate change, it did not noticeably influence the second group of subjects because it did not show a direct signal of support in the form of monetary donations.</p>
<h2>Why it matters</h2>
<p>Political crowdfunding is widely considered a new and <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/online-political-crowdfunding.pdf">convenient medium for raising funding from grassroots supporters</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2531602.2531678">Most studies</a> on crowdfunding have focused on strategies that can raise more money from a diverse audience. Our study examined the impact of such campaigns on people’s opinions on partisan topics.</p>
<p>Our research suggests that people’s opinions can become polarized based on information they see in surprising places, and that impact can last for an extended period of time. The implications of our findings are critical because they suggest that people can double down on their views rather than considering the merits of a position when they are processing information from online platforms – especially on sensitive and divisive issues such as climate change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183333/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sanorita Dey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Crowdfunding has become a go-to means of raising money for political causes, but the monetary show of support can cause opponents to double down on their opposition.Sanorita Dey, Assistant Professor of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1844752022-06-08T13:58:18Z2022-06-08T13:58:18ZThe Fourth Industrial Revolution: a seductive idea requiring critical engagement<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467151/original/file-20220606-18-vw9r8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Technological innovation can indeed be beneficial for the working class.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by JNS/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Narrative frames are fundamental to unifying ideologies. They frame what is possible and impossible, which ideas can be accepted and which must be rejected. In her book, <a href="https://www.perlego.com/book/1990637/digital-democracy-analogue-politics-how-the-internet-era-is-transforming-politics-in-kenya-pdf?utm_source=google&utm_medium=cpc&campaignid=17287656381&adgroupid=134138494702&gclid=Cj0KCQjwnNyUBhCZARIsAI9AYlHhmee4nOr5YnvVZ2kTReK-wWuLVjoCzLrVSMUqsZt9v284egzcFvYaAhsvEALw_wcB">Digital Democracy, Analogue Politics</a>, storyteller and political analyst Nanjala Nyabola examines the framing of the Fourth Industrial Revolution narrative in this light. </p>
<p>She argues that it is being used by global elites to deflect from the drivers of inequality and enable ongoing processes of expropriation, exploitation and exclusion. During a recent <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GH-iD8rIdbU">policy dialogue</a> on the Future of Work(ers) she commented:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The real seduction of this idea is that it’s apolitical. We can talk about development and progress, without having to grapple with power.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Fourth Industrial Revolution’s chief ideologue is <a href="https://www.weforum.org/about/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-by-klaus-schwab">Karl Schwab</a>, chair of the World Economic Forum who published an influential book by the same name. In it he argues that digital innovations are transforming the ways in which people live, work and relate to one other. These include artificial intelligence and robotics, quantum cloud computing and block chain technology.</p>
<p>Compared to previous industrial revolutions, he maintains, the Fourth Industrial Revolution is evolving at an exponential pace, reorganising systems of production, management and governance in unprecedented ways.</p>
<p>But there is growing critique, particularly from the global South, of this capital-friendly framing of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Many are questioning whether it should be considered a revolution at all.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/the-fourth-industrial-revolution/">available evidence</a> suggests that the proliferation of digital technologies has been highly uneven, driven by an older generation of technological innovation, and used to reproduce rather than transform unequal social relations. </p>
<p>We share the view that there is nothing predetermined or linear about what digital technology is developed, how it is used, and for what end. The challenge is how to harness digital innovations to improve the conditions of work and life, while holding capital accountable. </p>
<h2>Arguments against</h2>
<p>Historian <a href="https://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/1297">Ian Moll</a> questions whether the current myriad of digital technological innovations constitute an industrial revolution. After all, revolutions are not characterised by technological changes alone. Rather they’re driven by transformations in the labour process, fundamental changes in workplace relations, shifts in social relations and global socioeconomic restructuring. </p>
<p>The industrial revolution, for example, gave rise to factories that changed how people worked as well as where they lived. The centralisation of workplaces saw growing urbanisation, deepening class divides between the rich and the poor. It also saw the emergence of trade unions. </p>
<p>It is clear that digital technologies are reshaping the structure of the labour market and conditions of work. They are doing this through <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jlso/24/4/article-p525_525.xml">automation</a> and labour replacement, the informalisation or <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02692171.2020.1773647">Uberization</a> of work, the imposition of <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jlso/24/4/article-p525_525.xml">algorithmic management</a> and commodification of data.</p>
<p>But they seem to be deepening rather than transforming historic patterns of inequality along the lines of class, gender, race, citizenship and geographic location. </p>
<p>As Nyabola put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Data is the new oil … data points which can be extracted for profit.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite critiques, the <a href="https://au.int/fr/node/38163">African Union (AU)</a> has embraced the Fourth Industrial Revolution as a “watershed moment for Africa’s development”. The AU describes it as an opportunity to leapfrog into the digital era, increase global competitiveness and generate new sources of employment. </p>
<p>Scholar-activist Trevor Ngwane argues in the edited volume, <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/the-fourth-industrial-revolution/">the Fourth Industrial Revolution: a Sociological Critique</a>, that technological innovation can indeed be beneficial for the working class. It can reduce drudgery, improve working conditions and free up more time for people to engage in other meaningful activities. </p>
<p>The problem is that the fruits of technological innovation are being monopolised by a globalised capitalist class. Take the example of <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/weso/2021/lang--en/index.htm">digital labour platforms</a>. Financed primarily by venture capital funds in the global North, they have set up businesses in the global South without investing in assets, hiring employees or paying into state coffers. </p>
<p>This process is being buttressed by a framing that portrays the current terms of innovation as inevitable and thus uncontestable. </p>
<p>As Ngwane reflected during the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GH-iD8rIdbU">policy dialogue</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Who can question something which is moving along the laws of nature, of history, of technology?</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Setting parameters</h2>
<p>For community practitioner <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/authors/tessadooms/#google_vignette">Tessa Dooms</a>, there <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GH-iD8rIdbU">are two potential roads</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We can allow capital to do what it wants. Or we can start imagining a world where we set the parameters for what tech should be.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Dooms agrees that the narrative of the Fourth Industrial Revolution is more aspiration than reality. But it’s precisely because it is aspirational that its terms can be shaped. What is the place of Africans in an increasingly digitised world? How are technologies affecting people’s lives, identities and access to opportunities? How can innovations advance a more just society, where people are freed up to do meaningful work? How can states use regulations and other means to ensure the benefits of technological innovation are more equally shared?</p>
<p><em>The Future of Work(ers) Research Group at the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand is hosting <a href="https://wits-za.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_5UislRDVQPW1u4SdbBESHw">a six-part dialogue series</a>. The aim is to generate further debate on the relationship between digital technologies, the changing nature of work(ers) and the implications for inequality.</em></p>
<p><em>Seipati Mokhema, an Associate Researcher with the Future of Work(ers), contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184475/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The narrative of the Fourth Industrial Revolution is more aspiration than reality.Ruth Castel-Branco, Research Manager, University of the WitwatersrandHannah J. Dawson, Senior Researcher, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1826262022-05-23T13:20:27Z2022-05-23T13:20:27ZIdeology matters in unravelling Russia’s invasion of Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464249/original/file-20220519-21-cahh4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ukrainian soldiers unload their guns after fighting on the front line in eastern Ukraine.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In explaining the war on Ukraine, ideology matters as much as interests. This means that we need to factor ideology into our analysis if we want to gain a deeper understanding of interstate violent conflict. If we focus purely on the material interests of an aggressive state we land up with a lopsided picture of war. We view it simply as a continuation of politics – diplomacy has failed therefore the use of force is the only option.</p>
<p>But understanding and forecasting foreign policy behaviour requires understanding ideology and interests – equally. Ideology is important for a number of reasons. It highlights political actors’ consideration of what is right or wrong and how they see themselves. It also tells us who they associate with as well as their interpretation of the world.</p>
<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a rude awakening to the liberal world, raising the fear that liberalism’s ideological hegemony may have ended. This, after 30 years since the “The End of History?” as, advanced by political scientist <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d0331b51-5d0e-4132-9f97-c3f41c7d75b3">Francis Fukuyama</a>.</p>
<p>Are we seeing an antithesis, the beginning of history, along opposing ideological fault lines?</p>
<p>Weeks before the Russian invasion, liberal democracies such as the EU, Ukraine, the US, stood in opposition to Russia, Belarus, and the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. What is not clear is the ideology of the side opposing the liberal democratic grouping, other than to say that they are illiberal or autocratic.</p>
<p>Opposing ideologies were also evident in the United Nations Security Council. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/22/1082334172/kenya-security-council-russia">Kenya</a> expressed grave concern over Russia’s recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states and argued for the pursuit of peace through diplomatic channels. This placed it in the liberal democracy camp.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://theconversation.com/history-may-explain-south-africas-refusal-to-condemn-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-178657">South Africa together with Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique</a> abstained from a UN General Assembly vote opposing Russia’s invasion. This was interpreted as a tacit endorsement of Russia’s actions. Ideologically, Russia supported liberation movements such as South Africa’s African National Congress, Angola’s MPLA, Namibia’s Swapo, and Mozambique’s Frelimo.</p>
<p>The pursuit of liberal peace stood opposed to the tacit support of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2158379X.2022.2061128?src=">despotism</a>.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/publications/water-wars-enduring-myth-or-impending-reality/">research</a> on conflict and cooperation over water resources and as a lecturer in international politics teaching foreign policy analysis shows that ideologies and interests are important in understanding and forecasting foreign policy behaviour. </p>
<p>Ideas contained in ideology inform foreign policy practice. Behaviour that could – for better or worse – influence individual lives. </p>
<h2>Why ideology matters</h2>
<p>Ideologies are about our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2016.1201310">identities, moralities, how we perceive cause</a> and bring about change, and the interpretation of events and procedures. Through ideologies, political actors consider what is right or wrong, how they see themselves and with whom they associate. This goes along with their interpretation of the world.</p>
<p>Ideology resides within our cognitive and political lived experiences. </p>
<p>Ideology’s interpretation element comes to the fore when one considers that ideologies often claim that they have an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2016.1201310">opposite ideology to denounce, overpower and defeat</a>. These opposite ideologies often take a dehumanised form of an alien power. In Ukraine’s case, it is perceived Nazism. The remedy is the <a href="https://time.com/6154493/denazification-putin-ukraine-history-context/">denazification</a> of the Ukrainian state and leadership.</p>
<p>Russian President Vladimir Putin and his government have been referring to this <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2016.1201310">phenomenon</a> in Ukraine before and during Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014. This interpretation of Ukraine by Russia and its leaders is ideological propaganda.</p>
<p>Russia’s idea that Russians and Ukrainians are ethnically identical explains the rejection of Ukraine’s independent millennium-long history. Seen from Moscow, it is morally wrong to separate them into two sovereign states with a defined border in-between given that the identity of Russians and Ukrainians are similar. </p>
<p>Cause and effect play out in the ideological equation when the Russian leadership sees fit to react in such a way as to bring the Russians and Ukrainians together into one state since the powers in the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2016.1201310">Kremlin disbelieve that a separation between</a> the two peoples is not the preference of the Ukrainians.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s leadership and citizens resistance to the invasion indicates a general aversion to conquest and despotism. It also shows an ideological stance leaning heavily towards liberal democracy. This manifests particularly in the Ukrainian government’s calls to join the EU and NATO. It’s also been clear from the virtual addresses by President Volodymyr Zelensky to the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/inside-the-americas/20220317-zelensky-addresses-us-congress-ukrainian-president-invokes-9-11-in-virtual-speech">US Congress</a>, the Parliaments of <a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?518664-1/ukrainian-president-zelensky-calls-fly-zone-address-canadian-parliament">Canada</a>, <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/03/01/zelensky-video-european-parliament-address-ukraine">EU</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4E-XwBe9mRM">Japan</a> and a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zwdqhb0Ju_c">host</a> of other liberal democracies.</p>
<h2>Interests, power and security</h2>
<p>Considering interests, power, security, and wealth in the invasion have seen its fair share of explanations. Putin’s view of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) <a href="https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/explained-nato-and-its-role-in-russia-ukraine-crisis-2787399">encroachment ever closer to Russia’s border</a> over the past 30 years is often proclaimed as the main explanation for his decision to invade. Fearing an alliance that had been in the past the natural foe of the Soviet Union does not sit well with Russia and its leader. Within this interpretation, we see power and security manifesting at the state and individual levels.</p>
<p>The geopolitical proximity of the <a href="https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html">Nato</a> makes it difficult for Russia to keep its neighbours in its near abroad under its Soviet Union-style sphere of influence. The projection of Russia’s power is interlinked with its security concerns. Both are on the same side of the foreign policy coin. </p>
<p>With the prospect of Ukraine becoming a NATO member, Russia and its leader find it difficult to intervene and support unpopular regimes among NATO’s members. Belarus is a case in point.</p>
<p>Regarding the wealth aspect, Ukraine has for long been the breadbasket of Europe and many developing countries. Ukraine is also home to some of Europe’s largest <a href="https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/ukraine.aspx">nuclear</a> and <a href="https://www.netwerk24.com/netwerk24/stemme/aktueel/water-na-krim-opgedam-20220329">hydroelectric power</a> plants. </p>
<p>Before the invasion, there were plans to restructure the Ukrainian energy system and integrate it into a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-has-made-a-major-move-towards-integrating-with-europe-by-plugging-into-its-electricity-grid-180164">common energy area</a>. Germany and the US are leading players. In July 2021, they declared that Ukraine’s connection to the <a href="https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-united-states-and-germany-on-support-for-ukraine-european-energy-security-and-our-climate-goals/">European energy market</a> is high on Germany’s and the EU’s political agendas. </p>
<p>Natural gas is, therefore, not the only explanation for Russia’s powerful grip over Europe.</p>
<h2>Ideological cusp or funeral dirge?</h2>
<p>Is the world standing again at the beginning of history after the Second World War when two emerging ideologies stood opposite each other? On this, and to paraphrase Vladimir <a href="https://0-www-jstor-org.oasis.unisa.ac.za/stable/pdf/126000.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ac2b88f49d4a428733b9657f0441be7d6&ab_segments=&origin=">Lenin’s famous quote</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the end, one or the other will triumph – a funeral dirge will be sung over the Russian Federation or liberal democracy.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182626/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>ichard Meissner receives funding from the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and the National Research Foundation. He is also an Associate Professor at Unisa's Department of Political Sciences and an Honorary Research Fellow at the University of KwaZulu-Natal's Centre for Water Resources Research.</span></em></p>Ideology informs foreign policy practice. Behaviour that could – for better or worse – influence individual lives.Richard Meissner, Associate Professor, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1826602022-05-17T12:32:38Z2022-05-17T12:32:38ZOntario election: 4 ways Doug Ford has changed the province’s politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463388/original/file-20220516-17-3qpfdn.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3600%2C2091&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ontario Premier Doug Ford attends a photo opportunity on a construction site in Brampton as he kicks off his re-election campaign on May 4, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Chris Young</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The dismal environmental record of the Doug Ford government in Ontario <a href="https://theconversation.com/ontario-election-doug-fords-poor-record-on-the-environment-and-climate-change-182021">is well-documented</a>. Despite some <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ontario-climate-change-steel-co2-greenhouse-gas-emissions-1.6353814">recent moves on “greening”</a> the steel sector and <a href="https://www.nationalobserver.com/2022/03/16/news/ontario-invest-1316-million-electric-vehicle-manufacturing-vague-how">electric vehicle manufacturing initiatives</a>, the province is on track to see major increases in greenhouse gas emissions, particularly from the <a href="https://www.ieso.ca/en/Sector-Participants/Planning-and-Forecasting/Annual-Planning-Outlook">electricity sector</a>. </p>
<p>The government’s emphasis on <a href="https://thenarwhal.ca/highway-413-bradford-bypass-explainer/">highway expansion</a> in the Greater Toronto Area is further evidence of this trend.</p>
<p>The Ford government’s record on environmental issues is an extension of its wider approach to governance. It has broken from the <a href="https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2012/Malloy.pdf">traditional norms</a> of Ontario politics, which have emphasized moderation and administrative competence, <a href="https://www.tvo.org/article/how-the-big-blue-machine-dominated-ontario-politics-for-more-than-four-decades">as reflected through the long Progressive Conservative dynasty</a>.</p>
<p>Looking back on Ford’s four years in power reveals four themes about his approach to governance — and what the next four years might have in store if <a href="https://toronto.citynews.ca/2022/05/11/ontario-election-poll-doug-ford/">public opinion polls are correct and he wins again on June 2</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-doug-ford-will-once-again-win-the-ontario-election-180845">Why Doug Ford will once again win the Ontario election</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>1. Reactive governance</h2>
<p>The Ford government’s agenda seems driven by <a href="https://www.thestar.com/politics/provincial/2022/05/04/this-is-who-he-is-doug-ford-offers-ontario-another-four-years-of-what-he-promised.html">instinct more than ideology</a>. It came to power with scant vision for what a provincial government <a href="https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ontario-election-2018-party-platforms/">should do</a> other than cut taxes, red tape and hydro rates. It’s struggled when confronted with more complex problems that required the province to play a much more active role.</p>
<p>The resulting governance model has been fundamentally reactive, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-doug-ford-doctrine-short-term-gain-for-long-term-pain-116131">grounded in relatively short-term</a> perspectives. The government has tended to act once a situation reaches the crisis stage, rather than identifying potential problems and taking action to prevent them. </p>
<p>This pattern has been most evident in the government’s hesitant responses to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-ontario-can-recover-from-doug-fords-covid-19-governance-disaster-159783">COVID-19 pandemic</a>. It tended to <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-ontarios-covid-19-strategy-waiting-for-catastrophe-then-enacting/">react to</a> waves of COVID-19 infections rather than anticipating them and taking measures to minimize their impacts, even when given clear and consistent <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2022/03/17/ontario-science-table-to-publish-new-covid-19-projections-today.html">scientific advice</a> to do so.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man with grey-ish blonde slicked-back hair pulls his mask off." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463384/original/file-20220516-21-xbzouv.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463384/original/file-20220516-21-xbzouv.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463384/original/file-20220516-21-xbzouv.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463384/original/file-20220516-21-xbzouv.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463384/original/file-20220516-21-xbzouv.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463384/original/file-20220516-21-xbzouv.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463384/original/file-20220516-21-xbzouv.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ford arrives to a news conference at the Ontario legislature on the easing of restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic in Toronto in January 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Nathan Denette</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Issues like the environment and climate change are destined to do poorly under such a reactive governance model. They require taking action now to avoid problems in the future. </p>
<p>We are constantly reminded of this by the reports of the <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/">Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</a> and <a href="https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_cesd_202111_05_e_43898.html">federal</a> and <a href="https://www.auditor.on.ca/en/content/annualreports/arreports/en21/ENV_FU_ClimateChange_en21.pdf">provincial</a> environmental commissioners. Only responding when problems have become too obvious to ignore tends to mean it’s already too late.</p>
<h2>2. Creeping authoritarianism</h2>
<p>The government’s run-up to the election has placed a strong emphasis on “<a href="https://ontariopc.ca/">getting it done</a>” — it’s the Progressive Conservative party’s campaign slogan — in areas like housing and highway and transit construction, in particular. </p>
<p>The flip side of this emphasis has been increasingly aggressive exercises of provincial authority, particularly over local governments. One of the government’s first moves was to arbitrarily cut <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/doug-ford-supreme-court-ward-ruling-1.6194241">Toronto City Council</a> in half. The province threatened to invoke, for the first time in the province’s history, <a href="https://www.constitutionalstudies.ca/2019/07/notwithstanding-clause/">Sec. 33</a> of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, known as the notwithstanding clause, to get its way.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fords-fight-with-toronto-shows-legal-vulnerability-of-cities-103134">Ford's fight with Toronto shows legal vulnerability of cities</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Ontario’s <a href="https://urbantoronto.ca/news/2019/01/ontarios-growth-plan-changes-end-smart-growth">planning rules</a> have also been rewritten, not only at the provincial level, but down to the level of <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/city_hall/2019/06/05/province-to-change-development-rules-for-toronto.html">site-specific development plans</a> within individual municipalities, almost universally in favour of developers’ interests. <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2020/10/09/ontario-government-ramps-up-use-of-special-orders-to-rezone-land-without-appeals.html">Ministerial zoning orders</a> — which circumvent local planning processes and public consultations, designating land use without the possibility of appeals — are no longer the exceptions they once were.</p>
<p>Instead, they seem the new norm for planning in Ontario. Broad powers have been given to provincial agencies, most notably the <a href="https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/20b12">provincial transit agency Metrolinx</a>, to build what are often <a href="https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2021/08/25/there-is-still-time-to-stop-the-ontario-line.html">poorly conceived</a> and <a href="https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/96710/1/Perspectives-26-Siemiatycki-Fagan-Transit-GTA-October-2019.pdf">politically motivated</a> transit projects. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1524860372410318848"}"></div></p>
<p>The province’s <a href="https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/bills/parliament-42/session-2/bill-109">most recent legislative moves</a> have sought <a href="https://www.thespec.com/news/hamilton-region/2022/04/09/ontario-hamilton-housing-legislation.html">to further marginalize</a> the roles of local governments in planning matters and to eliminate public consultation requirements as red tape.</p>
<p>The notwithstanding clause was ultimately invoked by the government as it pertained to its <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-ford-government-recalls-legislature-to-push-through-election-finances/">election financing legislation</a> that seemed designed to silence potential critics. </p>
<p>Even local <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ontario-school-boards-masks-1.6381366">school boards</a> were forbidden to adopt COVID-19 containment measures more stringent that those put in place at the provincial level.</p>
<h2>3. Friends with benefits</h2>
<p>While the Ford government has gone to great lengths to silence voices of critical constituencies, it’s been extraordinarily open to the voices that support it.</p>
<p>The government has demonstrated a distinct tendency to uncritically accept whatever its favoured industry lobbyists tell it to do. This has been evident in its approaches to <a href="https://www.thestar.com/business/2021/07/15/did-lobbyists-influence-doug-fords-covid-19-decisions-read-the-exclusive-star-series.html">COVID-19</a>, <a href="https://www.thespec.com/opinion/contributors/2022/04/17/missing-the-mark-on-housing.html">housing and infrastructure</a>, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/thunder-bay/critical-minerals-strategy-first-nation-concerns-1.6389154">mining</a>, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/kitchener-waterloo/province-s-plans-to-change-gravel-pit-rules-could-harm-local-water-natural-areas-report-1.5338478">aggregate extraction sites like gravel pits and quarries</a>, <a href="https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2021/cleaning-up-ontarios-hydro-mess/">energy</a> and <a href="https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2022/04/25/too-many-dangers-in-promised-privatization-of-care-economy.html">long-term care</a>. </p>
<p>The overall decision-making model that has emerged is based <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/investigations/2021/04/03/ford-friends-with-benefits-an-inside-look-at-the-money-power-and-influence-behind-the-push-to-build-highway-413.html">on access, connections</a> and <a href="https://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorials/2021/03/08/fords-change-to-development-rules-is-a-massive-overreach.html">political whim</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Small white crosses are displayed in a field with people's names written on them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463389/original/file-20220516-25-1vlpcp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463389/original/file-20220516-25-1vlpcp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463389/original/file-20220516-25-1vlpcp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463389/original/file-20220516-25-1vlpcp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463389/original/file-20220516-25-1vlpcp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463389/original/file-20220516-25-1vlpcp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463389/original/file-20220516-25-1vlpcp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Crosses are displayed in memory of the elderly who died from COVID-19 at the Camilla Care Community facility during the COVID-19 pandemic in Mississauga, Ont.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Nathan Denette</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>4. Spend but don’t increase taxes</h2>
<p>A final defining feature of the Ford government has been a tendency to disregard the fiscal consequences of its decisions. The focus instead has been on short-term savings for consumers.</p>
<p>The cancellation of the previous Liberal government’s cap-and-trade system immediately following the 2018 election cost the provincial treasury <a href="https://www.fao-on.org/en/blog/publications/cap-and-trade-ending">billions in forgone revenues</a>. Hundreds of <a href="https://www.thestar.com/politics/provincial/2019/11/19/fords-cancellation-of-renewable-energy-projects-to-cost-at-least-231m.html">millions more</a> were spent cancelling renewable energy projects. </p>
<p>Hydro rates are being artificially lowered through an annual <a href="https://www.fao-on.org/en/Blog/publications/energy-and-electricity-2022">$7 billion</a> in subsidies from the provincial treasury, money that could otherwise be spent on schools and hospitals. The pre-election cancellation of tolls on Highways 412 and 418 will cost at least <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/highway-412-418-tolls-ending-1.6357066">$1 billion</a> over the next 25 years, while the cancellation of vehicle licensing fees will cost the province an estimated <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ontario-vehicle-licence-renewal-1.6359951">$1 billion</a> each year. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ontario-gas-tax-1.6407385">A proposed cut</a> to provincial gasoline taxes would cost nearly $650 million in annual revenues. And the projected deficit on the government’s <a href="https://budget.ontario.ca/2022/contents.html">pre-election budget</a> was almost $20 billion, a record.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man with blond-ish-grey hair in a navy suit speaks into a microphone, a large bulldozer in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463359/original/file-20220516-15-gs56h.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4500%2C2984&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463359/original/file-20220516-15-gs56h.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463359/original/file-20220516-15-gs56h.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463359/original/file-20220516-15-gs56h.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463359/original/file-20220516-15-gs56h.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463359/original/file-20220516-15-gs56h.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463359/original/file-20220516-15-gs56h.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ford makes an announcement about building transit and highways during an election campaign event in Bowmanville, Ont.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Aaron Vincent Elkaim</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>All of this is at odds with previous Progressive Conservative governments in Ontario, which were largely fiscally prudent.</p>
<p>It isn’t clear yet to what extent the potential political success of a governance model organized around these four themes represents a fundamental break from the traditional norms of Ontario politics. If Ford wins again, is it due to <a href="https://www.thespec.com/opinion/contributors/2021/08/16/ford-still-in-the-lead-heading-into-election-year-despite-failures.html">the weaknesses</a> of the alternatives being offered to Ontario voters, or does it signal a permanent realignment in the province’s politics? </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-doug-fords-shift-to-the-centre-says-about-the-longevity-of-populism-182371">What Doug Ford's shift to the centre says about the longevity of populism</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Either way, June 2 could be a watershed moment in the province’s history, defining a “new normal” for politics in Ontario.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182660/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Winfield receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada </span></em></p>Looking back on Ford’s four years in power reveals four themes in his approach to governance — and what the next four years might have in store if he wins again.Mark Winfield, Professor, Environmental and Urban Change, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1779812022-03-31T12:44:06Z2022-03-31T12:44:06ZBehind the crypto hype is an ideology of social change<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455113/original/file-20220329-21-5ds15m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C25%2C5706%2C2737&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">For some, promoting cryptocurrencies is political activism.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/young-man-with-a-face-mask-and-a-poster-in-his-royalty-free-image/1296675280">Vasil Dimitrov/E+ via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ads for <a href="https://gizmodo.com/super-bowl-crypto-ads-feature-larry-david-lebron-james-1848531978">blockchain, NFTs and cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin</a> seem to be everywhere. Crypto technologies are being promoted as <a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2594288">a replacement for banks</a>; a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/11/arts/design/what-is-an-nft.html">new way to buy art</a>; the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BH5-rSxilxo">next big investment opportunity</a>, and an essential part of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-metaverse-is-money-and-crypto-is-king-why-youll-be-on-a-blockchain-when-youre-virtual-world-hopping-171659">the metaverse</a>. </p>
<p>To many, these technologies are <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2022/02/crypto-nft-web3-internet-future/621479/">confusing or risky</a>. But enthusiasts <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/88gb75/at-sxsw-a-pathetic-tech-future-struggles-to-be-born">ardently promote them</a>.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ef0ApTwAAAAJ">cybersecurity and social media researcher</a>, I’ve found that behind the hype is an ideology about social change: Hardcore enthusiasts argue that <a href="https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3359138">crypto will get people to trust in technology rather than government</a>, which they see as inherently untrustworthy. This ideology leads people to encourage its use while downplaying its risks. </p>
<h2>The true believers</h2>
<p>My colleagues and I studied almost three months of discussions on Reddit forums about cryptocurrencies to try to understand <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3359138">how people talk about crypto and Bitcoin</a>. The loudest voices on the forum were a group of crypto enthusiasts who called themselves “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3290607.3312969">True Bitcoiners</a>.” Unlike technology enthusiasts or crypto marketers, “true bitcoiners” didn’t talk about technology, or about their own use of crypto. Instead, they talked about <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3359138">trust and corruption</a>. </p>
<p>These crypto enthusiasts often <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3359138">cite examples</a> of what they see as government corruption and corporate corruption. They recognize that society depends on governments and corporations setting and enforcing rules, and they complain that people are stuck with these “corrupt” institutions. Corruption, they say, is an inevitable flaw in humanity and leads to trying to control and mistreat others.</p>
<p>The enthusiasts see Bitcoin, blockchain and other crypto technologies as providing an alternative to the corruption. They argue that these new technologies are “<a href="https://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr/vol25/iss1/2/">trustless</a>” and don’t depend on institutions. You can buy and sell things using bitcoin without checking with a bank or using government-issued cash. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/3xGLc-zz9cA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Blockchain, the technology underlying cryptocurrencies, keeps records of ownership and transactions without requiring trust in anyone or any institution.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These two beliefs – that governments are corrupt and that crypto avoids that corruption – are common among the crypto enthusiasts we studied. But enthusiasts go one step further. They seek change. They want to change who has power and who doesn’t. </p>
<p>They argue that crypto is how that change will happen. For crypto enthusiasts, using crypto isn’t just a way to buy and sell things. By using crypto technologies, they argue, society will become less dependent on governments and corporations. That is, using crypto – and getting as many people as possible to use it as much as possible – is a way to change the world and <a href="https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3359138">take power away from governments</a>.</p>
<h2>Pushing an ideology</h2>
<p>These beliefs about who should and should not have power in society embody <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203702444-11/media-makes-ignites-breaks-ideology-david-livingstone-smith">an ideology</a>. An important part of the crypto ideology is that this change can’t happen unless people use crypto. The technology and the ideology are tied together. </p>
<p>For many of these enthusiasts, recommending crypto to other people is not just a technology recommendation. To them, buying and selling crypto is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3359138">a form of political and social activism</a>. They argue that buying crypto will remove corruption and change society to trust technology over government. </p>
<p>This ideology is a <a href="https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.13051/7831/01_3YaleJL_Tech1_2000_2001_.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y">more extreme version of technolibertarianism</a>, which seeks to replace government with technology. Like technolibertarians, true bitcoiners want technology to control society. But they focus on financial and economic control more than civil liberties. And because promoting crypto is part of this ideology, crypto has often been compared with <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-are-people-calling-bitcoin-a-religion-175717">a religion</a>.</p>
<h2>Crypto dangers</h2>
<p>An important aspect of any ideology is the way it emphasizes some dangers and downplays others. True bitcoiners emphasize the problems with government corruption. But they downplay the <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/data-spotlight/2021/05/cryptocurrency-buzz-drives-record-investment-scam-losses">financial risks of crypto</a>. The price of Bitcoin fluctuates wildly, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54970-4_33">many people have lost money</a> buying crypto. Crypto wallets are <a href="https://www.usenix.org/system/files/soups2020-mai.pdf">difficult to understand and use</a>, and fraudulent transactions are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2015.14">difficult to reverse</a>. </p>
<p>Crypto enthusiasts frequently downplay the technology’s risks to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2015.14">people</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.29.2.213">society</a>. They also dismiss the valuable role that governments and corporations play in <a href="https://pluralistic.net/2022/03/02/shadow-banking-2-point-oh/#leverage">protecting people’s money</a>, <a href="https://www.fdic.gov">providing insurance for bank accounts</a> and <a href="https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2022-02-09/bitfinex-who-will-get-crypto-back-after-arrests-in-3-6-billion-bitcoin-hack">returning money that’s been stolen</a>. </p>
<p>Beliefs in crypto’s ability to create social change are also overstated. Crypto technologies don’t necessarily eliminate corporations or avoid government control. There are <a href="https://www.ibm.com/blockchain">private, corporate blockchains</a> and many <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett/2021/12/27/in-2021-congress-has-introduced-35-bills-focused-on-us-crypto-policy/?sh=65388ccac9e8">government</a> <a href="https://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/cryptocurrency-2021-legislation.aspx">regulations</a> <a href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llglrd/2021687419/2021687419.pdf">about cryptocurrencies</a>. As I see it, simply using the technology doesn’t necessarily lead to the social change these enthusiasts seek.</p>
<p>[<em>Science, politics, religion or just plain interesting articles:</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-checkoutweekly">Check out The Conversation’s weekly newsletters</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177981/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rick Wash receives funding from the National Science Foundation and from Google. He is affiliated with Association for Computing Machinery and the USENIX Association.</span></em></p>Many people promoting cryptocurrencies are looking for something bigger than the future of financial transactions. They’re aiming to break free of governments and corporations.Rick Wash, Associate Professor of Information Science and Cybersecurity, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1751542022-01-31T17:25:53Z2022-01-31T17:25:53ZTwitter’s algorithm favours the political right, a recent study finds<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443507/original/file-20220131-118102-4ucd3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=13%2C0%2C4479%2C2997&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/london-uk-april-25th-2017-official-628061660">Ink Drop/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>If you’re a Twitter user, you’ll know that when scrolling through your home feed, in between posts from accounts you follow, you’ll sometimes see tweets tagged “you might like”. In other words, Twitter is recommending content to you that it deems may appeal to you.</p>
<p>This is done using an algorithm based on your past <a href="https://blog.hootsuite.com/twitter-algorithm/">activity on the platform</a>, such as the tweets that you have liked or engaged with. It may also be based on your preferences on your profile, where you have indicated topics you would like to see in your Twitter feed. “Machine learning” is used to automatically learn from user preferences and apply this to data the system hasn’t seen before.</p>
<p>As more and more technologies come to use machine learning, an associated challenge is <a href="https://theconversation.com/facial-analysis-ai-is-being-used-in-job-interviews-it-will-probably-reinforce-inequality-124790">bias</a>, where an algorithm produces results that favour one set of outcomes or users over another, often reinforcing human prejudices. Twitter has on various occasions been accused of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/technology/lawmakers-facebook-twitter-foreign-influence-hearing.html">political bias</a>, with politicians or commentators alleging Twitter’s algorithm amplifies their opponents’ voices, or silences their own.</p>
<p>In this climate, Twitter commissioned a study to understand whether their algorithm may be biased towards a certain political ideology. While <a href="https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2021/rml-politicalcontent">Twitter</a> publicised the findings of the research in 2021, the <a href="https://www.pnas.org/content/119/1/e2025334119">study</a> has now been published in the peer-reviewed journal PNAS.</p>
<p>The study looked at a sample of 4% of all Twitter users who had been exposed to the algorithm (46,470,596 unique users). It also included a control group of 11,617,373 users who had never received any automatically recommended tweets in their feeds.</p>
<p>This wasn’t a manual study, whereby, say, the researchers recruited volunteers and asked them questions about their experiences. It wouldn’t have been possible to study such a large number of users that way. Instead, a computer model allowed the researchers to generate their findings.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/twitters-ban-on-political-ads-does-change-the-game-in-one-way-126255">Twitter's ban on political ads does change the game in one way</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The authors analysed the “algorithmic amplification” effect on tweets from 3,634 elected politicians from major political parties in seven countries with a large user base on Twitter: the US, Japan, the UK, France, Spain, Canada and Germany. </p>
<p>Algorithmic amplification refers to the extent to which a tweet is more likely to be seen on a regular Twitter feed (where the algorithm is operating) compared to a feed without automated recommendations. </p>
<p>So for example, if the algorithmic amplification of a particular political group’s tweets was 100%, this means that in feeds using the algorithm, that party’s tweets were seen by twice as many users than among users scrolling without the automated recommendations (the control group).</p>
<p>The researchers computed amplification based on counting events called “linger impressions”. These events are registered every time at least 50% of the area of a tweet is visible for at least 0.5 seconds, and provide a good indication that a user has been exposed to a tweet.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman drinking a cup of coffee looks at her smartphone." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443454/original/file-20220131-13-sw2yvv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443454/original/file-20220131-13-sw2yvv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443454/original/file-20220131-13-sw2yvv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443454/original/file-20220131-13-sw2yvv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443454/original/file-20220131-13-sw2yvv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443454/original/file-20220131-13-sw2yvv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443454/original/file-20220131-13-sw2yvv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Twitter uses an algorithm to automatically recommend personalised content to users.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/young-woman-cafe-drinking-coffee-using-425107399">astarot/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The researchers found that in six out of the seven countries (Germany was the exception), the algorithm significantly favoured the amplification of tweets from politically right-leaning sources.</p>
<p>Overall, the amplification trend wasn’t significant among individual politicians from specific parties, but was when they were taken together as a group. The starkest contrasts were seen in Canada (the Liberals’ tweets were amplified 43%, versus those of the Conservatives at 167%) and the UK (Labour’s tweets were amplified 112%, while the Conservatives’ were amplified at 176%).</p>
<h2>Amplification of right-leaning news</h2>
<p>In acknowledgement of the fact that tweets from elected officials represent only a small portion of political content on Twitter, the researchers also looked at whether the algorithm disproportionately amplifies news content from any particular point on the ideological spectrum.</p>
<p>To this end, they measured the algorithmic amplification of 6.2 million political news articles shared in the US. To determine the political leaning of the news source, they used two independently curated media bias-rating datasets.</p>
<p>Similar to the results in the first part of the study, the authors found that content from right-wing media outlets is amplified more than that from outlets at other points on the ideological spectrum.</p>
<p>This part of the study also found far-left-leaning and far-right-leaning outlets were not significantly amplified compared with politically moderate outlets.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/six-ways-twitter-has-changed-the-world-56234">Six ways Twitter has changed the world</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>While this is a very large study which draws pertinent conclusions, there are some things we need to be aware of when interpreting the results. As the authors point out, the algorithms might be influenced by the way different political groups operate. So for example, some political groups might be deploying better tactics and strategies to amplify their content on Twitter.</p>
<p>It is pleasing to see <a href="https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2021/rml-politicalcontent">Twitter</a> taking the initiative to carry out this kind of research, and reviewing the findings. The next steps will be to gather more detailed data to understand why their algorithm might be favouring the political right, and what they can do to mitigate this issue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175154/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shoaib Jameel receives funding from Innovate UK.</span></em></p>Research shows Twitter tends to amplify the tweets of politically right-wing sources over left-leaning sources.Shoaib Jameel, Lecturer in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1744002022-01-09T17:34:12Z2022-01-09T17:34:12ZHow extremists have used the COVID pandemic to further their own ends, often with chaotic results<p>Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, extremists have sought to exploit the pandemic environment to their own ends. Where most of the population sees an enduring health catastrophe, extremists tend to see opportunity. </p>
<p>Over the past two years, we have seen <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/mar/26/hospital-bomb-attack-man-killed-fbi-agents-missouri">hospitals targeted by extremists</a>, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27040260.pdf">infrastructure attacked</a>, and extremist narratives go viral. This has been most marked in western democracies, including Australia. </p>
<p>Funded by a Charles Sturt University COVID-19 Research Grant, <a href="https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2021/issue-6/campion-et-al.pdf">we examined the Australian security context</a> to better understand how extremists were understanding and responding to the pandemic. Our key consideration was what extremist responses would mean for the security of Australians both now and into the future. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-covids-shadow-global-terrorism-goes-quiet-but-we-have-seen-this-before-and-should-be-wary-144286">In COVID's shadow, global terrorism goes quiet. But we have seen this before, and should be wary</a>
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<p>Our focus quickly became extreme ideologies. Ideologies were important to our study because they helped us make sense of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/201978">the link between knowing and doing, between thought and action</a>. By observing extremist statements and behaviours, we were able to identify and map ideology in action.</p>
<p>Ideology can be divided into three parts:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>it provides an explanation of the current state of affairs. That is, why the world is as it is</p></li>
<li><p>it imagines an alternative and preferred order. </p></li>
<li><p>it proposes a method of political action to achieve that alternative. For extremists, that method of political action is through severe, lethal violence that meets the threshold for terrorism.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>This is important, because ideology shapes strategy. It is a significant factor in who extremists determine are valid targets of their violence. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/17/survey-of-covid-19-racism-against-asian-australians-records-178-incidents-in-two-weeks">With reports of attacks against Australians of Asian descent</a> early in the pandemic, we believed it was important to investigate these ideologically motivated behaviours. </p>
<p>To understand this better, we mapped narratives and activities of three primary extremist threats over 2020. These included violent Salafi jihadists, the extreme right, and the extreme left in Australia.</p>
<p>While we found little data on the extreme left, we had four key outcomes from the data collected on the extreme right and violent Salafi jihadists with respect to Australia. They were active in using the emerging pandemic to support their own beliefs.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hundreds-of-westerners-are-taking-up-arms-in-global-jihad-28302">Why hundreds of westerners are taking up arms in global jihad</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>First, and most significantly, we identified ideological buttressing. This meant extremists were integrating the pandemic environment into their existing beliefs. For example, extremists incorporated COVID-19 to decry globalism, immigration, and modern society in general. This strengthened their existing narratives, which in turn positively influenced their ability to recruit. </p>
<p>This comes with national security implications. Extremists were able to cement beliefs and positions, thereby deepening the divide and distrust between fringe elements and their government. Buttressing ensures that the threat of lone actor and group terrorism will endure. It will also challenge future deradicalisation practices.</p>
<p>Second, we identified changes in existing ideologies – what we called diversification. That is, we found extremists adopting new or contradictory beliefs in addition to their former positions. Often, this occurred where extremists who were diverse in ideological affiliation gathered in the same space (albeit with differing goals). For example, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-20/experts-insight-into-covid-vaccine-mandate-protests/100707434">traditional White supremacists adopted some of the sovereign citizen movement ideas on government oppression</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/living-people-who-are-the-sovereign-citizens-or-sovcits-and-why-do-they-believe-they-have-immunity-from-the-law-143438">'Living people': who are the sovereign citizens, or SovCits, and why do they believe they have immunity from the law?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>What this means is that extremists were exposed to different ideas, goals, and people. Their ideology was shifted by having a more diverse range of people in their networks, but often with chaotic results: supporters held seemingly contradictory positions simultaneously. </p>
<p>This shifting will challenge the efficient identification and categorisation of an extremist or group of extremists: the pandemic has made everything messier. There could be, as a result, flow-on effects, both to the community in reporting suspected extremists and the authorities investigating extremists.</p>
<p>The third outcomes was what we call “idiosyncratisation”. This is where extremists integrated specific conspiracies into their narratives. Conspiracies are not usually ideologies in a technical sense, because they rarely provide a alternative order. Nonetheless, we saw the adoption of objectionable and disconnected beliefs, <a href="https://theconversation.com/four-experts-investigate-how-the-5g-coronavirus-conspiracy-theory-began-139137">such as 5G causing COVID-19</a> across both extreme left and extreme right movements. </p>
<p>Finally, our fourth outcome was that – despite COVID-19 countermeasures – the sharing of ideologically motivated ideas did not solely occur online, as might have been expected in a pandemic environment. Instead, misinformation and ideological content was shared offline, and in some cases, in person. While the internet was a highway for COVID-19 narratives around the world, it was not the only one.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-groups-have-used-covid-to-expand-their-footprint-in-australia-here-are-the-ones-you-need-to-know-about-151203">Far-right groups have used COVID to expand their footprint in Australia. Here are the ones you need to know about</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The context created by COVID-19 has complicated Australia’s national security environment. We have seen new leaders emerging and new ideas being adopted. At the same time, old movements are transforming and old ideologies being reinforced. </p>
<p>As we move into 2022 and the pandemic continues, there will be critical considerations for the national security landscape. Those include the increasing complexities associated with extremists and how they are using COVID to further their own means. The four key outcomes identified in our study shed light on this ever-evolving threat to our national security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174400/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Funded by a CSU COVID-19 Research Grant</span></em></p>The pandemic has changed the nature of the national security threat to Australia: here’s what our research uncovered.Kristy Campion, Lecturer in Terrorism Studies, Charles Sturt UniversityJamie Ferrill, Lecturer in Financial Crime Studies, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1516702020-12-29T14:19:57Z2020-12-29T14:19:57ZSeat belts and smoking rates show people eventually adopt healthy behaviors – but it can take time we don’t have during a pandemic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376416/original/file-20201222-15-1l2l98c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C0%2C4683%2C3713&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Once upon a time, buckling up was new behavior.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/young-woman-fastening-seat-belt-news-photo/931844278">Harold M. Lambert/Archive Photos via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Why do we do things that are bad for us – or not do things that are good for us – even in light of overwhelming evidence? </p>
<p>As someone with a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C39&q=author%3A%22Juhl+rp%22&btnG=">long career in pharmacy</a>, I have witnessed some pretty dramatic shifts in public health behavior. But I won’t sugarcoat it. It generally takes years – or even decades – of dragging people, kicking and screaming, to finally achieve new and improved societal norms.</p>
<p>This plodding time course seems to be an innate human defect that existed long before the current-day pandemic mask and social distancing conundrums. Historically, people aren’t fond of being told what to do.</p>
<h2>Notable victories</h2>
<p>Attitudes toward smoking have undergone dramatic changes over the past 50 years. Although there has been a gradual decline in smoking, from 42% of the American population in 1965 to the low teens today, there still are <a href="https://www.lung.org/research/trends-in-lung-disease/tobacco-trends-brief/overall-tobacco-trends">a lot of smokers in the U.S.</a> – and premature deaths due to smoking. Even <a href="https://www.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220168">health care workers fall prey</a> to this unhealthy and highly addictive habit.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376421/original/file-20201222-17-1a4gzuq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two 1970s era older male politicians posting a sign that reads 'For your health and safety and the comfort of others, no smoking.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376421/original/file-20201222-17-1a4gzuq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376421/original/file-20201222-17-1a4gzuq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376421/original/file-20201222-17-1a4gzuq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376421/original/file-20201222-17-1a4gzuq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376421/original/file-20201222-17-1a4gzuq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=598&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376421/original/file-20201222-17-1a4gzuq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=598&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376421/original/file-20201222-17-1a4gzuq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=598&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Colorado Health Department Headquarters begins a ban on smoking in 1972.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ban-on-smoking-begun-at-state-health-department-news-photo/161903567">David Cupp/Denver Post via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There was a strongly held view that smoking was a personal decision that do-gooders and the government should keep their noses out of – until the issue was framed differently by studies showing harm caused by secondhand smoke. You are welcome to do what you want to yourself, but it becomes a horse of a different color when it affects others. </p>
<p>Today, public smoking restrictions have become commonplace. But this change in societal behavior didn’t happen overnight or without painful discourse. The journey from the initial 1964 <a href="https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/consequences-smoking-exec-summary.pdf">surgeon general’s report on smoking and health</a> to the 2006 <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3576627/">surgeon general’s report on secondhand smoke</a> to today was a fractious one.</p>
<p>Another about-face has been the adoption of seat belts. <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/transportationsafety/seatbeltbrief/index.html">Seat belts save lives.</a> And most people now use them as a result of the <a href="https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/belt-reminders-can-be-just-as-effective-as-interlocks">nagging warning alarm</a>, the marketing of automobile safety, the law and the data. </p>
<p>This change in behavior, however, <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/calculator/factsheet/seatbelt.html">followed a rocky road</a> over many years. In my earlier days, I can remember more than one occasion when I hopped into a friend’s car, put on my seat belt and was then chastised for having so little faith in my friend’s driving ability.</p>
<p>Seat belts were <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/calculator/factsheet/seatbelt.html">required to be installed</a> in new cars starting in 1964 and New York enacted the first seat belt use law in 1984. In the U.S., <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seat_belt_use_rates_in_the_United_States">seat belt use rose</a> from 14% in 1983 to 90% in 2016. </p>
<h2>Continuing challenges</h2>
<p>In the medical arena, much effort has been expended in promoting healthy behaviors – diet, exercise, sleep hygiene, adherence to prescribed drugs and immunizations. Frankly, the success has been mixed. </p>
<p>Studies have suggested <a href="https://www.uspharmacist.com/article/overcoming-barriers-to-statin-adherence">many possible variables</a> associated with not following accepted medical advice: age, gender, race, education, literacy, income, insurance copays, level of physician and pharmacist care – and plain old stubbornness. But there is no single, easily addressable cause of nonadherence to healthy behaviors. </p>
<p>For example, properly prescribed cholesterol-lowering drugs called statins literally add years to patients’ lives <a href="https://www.acc.org/latest-in-cardiology/articles/2016/11/17/09/03/summarizing-the-current-state-and-evidence-on-efficacy-and-safety-of-statin-therapy">by reducing heart attacks and strokes</a>. Even in people with insurance coverage and minimal side effects, <a href="https://www.uspharmacist.com/article/overcoming-barriers-to-statin-adherence">50% of patients discontinue statin therapy</a> within one year of receiving their first prescription. </p>
<p>Vaccines and immunization offer another window into the puzzle of human behavior. <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1040079/life-expectancy-united-states-all-time/">Life expectancy in the U.S. rose</a> from 40 years in 1860 to 70 years in 1960. These gains resulted largely from decreased infant and child mortality due to infectious diseases. A better understanding of infectious diseases along with scientific advances, vaccines and antibacterial drugs were the primary factors for this <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/2019/08/cannot-forget-world-before-vaccines/">profound increase in life expectancy</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="Ak64w" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Ak64w/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Common sense alone makes the value of vaccines abundantly clear; how many people do you know who are suffering from polio or smallpox? Yet some intelligent, thoughtful friends, family and neighbors are convinced <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/22/health/anti-vaxxers-old-arguments-covid-19-wellness-partner/index.html">vaccines are not helpful and are even harmful</a>. Some believe wearing a mask is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/18/us/coronavirus-mask-mandate-iowa-reynolds.html">nothing more than a “feel good” placebo</a>. I believe these contrarian beliefs make better press and are therefore more frequently reported than mainstream ones, but clearly there is reason for concern.</p>
<h2>The current crisis</h2>
<p>Historically, changes in societal behavior that benefit public health occur in fits and starts – and never fast enough for the individuals who fall victim before society comes around. </p>
<p>The urgency imposed by the coronavirus has actually resulted in comparatively swift behavioral changes (<a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-mask-retail-sales-gap-etsy/">masks</a>, <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/hand-sanitizer-disinfectant-demands-hit-biblical-proportions">hand-washing</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2020.00608">distancing</a>) in the U.S. – as scientists learned how the coronavirus is spread, how dangerous it can be and which groups are more susceptible. But these behavioral changes were not as complete or as fast as they should – or could – have been when judged by far better outcomes in <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/finland-and-norway-avoid-covid-19-lockdowns-but-keep-the-virus-at-bay-11605704407">other countries</a>. </p>
<p>I am discouraged by the battle between the scientific method and political ideology when it comes to public health. Ideology never seems to change and is therefore more comforting to some – while science evolves as new findings debunk old ideas or confirm new ones. It is clear to all who want to listen: controlling the virus and maintaining the economy is not an either/or choice – they are interdependent.</p>
<p>At the same time, I am buoyed that the tide seems to be turning. As a better understanding of treating COVID-19 has emerged and with more than one highly effective vaccine on the horizon, the “<a href="https://www.motherjones.com/2020-elections/2020/10/trump-sticks-by-his-losing-message-fauci-and-the-scientists-are-idiots/">idiot scientists</a>” are gaining ground, both in the lab and at the bedside. Even the most prominent ideologues run to the hospital to get <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/health/trump-antibody-treatment.html">the best treatments science can offer</a> when the effect of their maskless behavior rears up to bite them. </p>
<p>But as history suggests, the science, no matter how great, is only the beginning of implementation in a divided population. Ultimately, both the citizenry and the economy will benefit from a shot in the arm.</p>
<p>[<em>Understand new developments in science, health and technology, each week.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/science-editors-picks-71/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=science-understand">Subscribe to The Conversation’s science newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151670/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Randy P. Juhl's wife is a retiree of Pfizer Inc., which developed one of the COVID-19 vaccines authorized in the U.S.</span></em></p>Public health recommendations have always been a hard sell. Resistance to new behaviors – like the mask-wearing and social distancing advised during the COVID-19 pandemic – is part of human nature.Randy P. Juhl, Dean Emeritus and Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of Pharmacy, University of PittsburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1413352020-06-25T12:18:56Z2020-06-25T12:18:56ZCoronavirus responses highlight how humans are hardwired to dismiss facts that don’t fit their worldview<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343846/original/file-20200624-132961-fwo33u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=165%2C285%2C4547%2C3051&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The more politicized an issue, the harder it is for people to absorb contradictory evidence.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/flanked-by-white-house-coronavirus-response-coordinator-dr-news-photo/1213154746">Drew Angerer/Getty Images News via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Bemoaning uneven individual and state compliance with public health recommendations, top U.S. COVID-19 adviser Anthony Fauci <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/18/politics/anthony-fauci-coronavirus-anti-science-bias/index.html">recently blamed</a> the country’s ineffective pandemic response on an American “anti-science bias.” He called this bias “inconceivable,” because “science is truth.” Fauci compared those discounting the importance of masks and social distancing to “anti-vaxxers” in their “amazing” refusal to listen to science. </p>
<p>It is Fauci’s profession of amazement that amazes me. As well-versed as he is in the science of the coronavirus, he’s overlooking the <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/04/denial-science-chris-mooney/">well-established science</a> of “anti-science bias,” or science denial.</p>
<p>Americans increasingly exist in highly polarized, informationally insulated ideological communities occupying their own <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/11/16/20964281/impeachment-hearings-trump-america-epistemic-crisis">information universes</a>. </p>
<p>Within segments of the political blogosphere, <a href="https://www.desmogblog.com/heartland-institute">global warming</a> is dismissed as either a hoax or so uncertain as to be unworthy of response. Within other geographic or online communities, the science of <a href="https://www.npr.org/tags/399145964/anti-vaccination-movement">vaccine safety</a>, <a href="https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/but-not-simpler/why-portland-is-wrong-about-water-fluoridation/">fluoridated drinking water</a> and <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/food/the-plate/2016/05/17/scientists-say-gmo-foods-are-safe-public-skepticism-remains/">genetically modified foods</a> is distorted or ignored. There is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-new-survey-shows-how-republicans-and-democrats-are-responding-differently-138394">marked gap in expressed concern</a> over the coronavirus depending on political party affiliation, apparently based in part on partisan disagreements over factual issues like the <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/06/03/partisan-differences-over-the-pandemic-response-are-growing/ps_2020-06-03_sci-am-trust_00-3/">effectiveness of social distancing</a> or <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/311408/republicans-skeptical-covid-lethality.aspx">the actual COVID-19 death rate</a>.</p>
<p>In theory, resolving factual disputes should be relatively easy: Just present strong evidence, or evidence of a strong expert consensus. This approach succeeds most of the time, when the issue is, say, the atomic weight of hydrogen.</p>
<p>But things don’t work that way when scientific advice presents a picture that threatens someone’s perceived interests or ideological worldview. In practice, it turns out that one’s political, religious or ethnic identity quite effectively predicts one’s willingness to accept expertise on any given politicized issue.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/motivated-reasoning">Motivated reasoning</a>” is what social scientists call the process of deciding what evidence to accept based on the conclusion one prefers. As I explain in my book, “<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Truth-About-Denial-Self-Deception-Politics/dp/0190062274">The Truth About Denial</a>,” this very human tendency applies to all kinds of facts about the physical world, economic history and current events.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The same facts will sound different to people depending on what they already believe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Nightclub-Shooting-Florida/4d33732e41f34ce89a416c03d669a0b0/1/0">AP Photo/John Raoux</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Denial doesn’t stem from ignorance</h2>
<p>The interdisciplinary study of this phenomenon has made one thing clear: The failure of various groups to acknowledge the truth about, say, climate change, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/facts-versus-feelings-isnt-the-way-to-think-about-communicating-science-80255">not explained by a lack of information</a> about the scientific consensus on the subject.</p>
<p>Instead, what strongly predicts denial of expertise on many controversial topics is simply one’s political persuasion.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214558393">2015 metastudy</a> showed that ideological polarization over the reality of climate change actually increases with respondents’ knowledge of politics, science and/or energy policy. The chances that a conservative is a climate science denier is <a href="http://www.people-press.org/2008/05/08/a-deeper-partisan-divide-over-global-warming/">significantly higher</a> if he or she is college educated. Conservatives scoring highest on tests for <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2182588">cognitive sophistication</a> or <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2319992">quantitative reasoning skills</a> are most susceptible to motivated reasoning about climate science. </p>
<p>Denialism is not just a problem for conservatives. Studies have found <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2010.511246">liberals are less likely to accept</a> a hypothetical expert consensus on the possibility of safe storage of nuclear waste, or on the effects of concealed-carry gun laws.</p>
<h2>Denial is natural</h2>
<p>The human talent for rationalization is a product of many hundreds of thousands of years of adaptation. Our ancestors evolved in small groups, where <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X10000968">cooperation and persuasion</a> had at least as much to do with reproductive success as holding accurate factual beliefs about the world. Assimilation into one’s tribe required assimilation into the group’s ideological belief system – regardless of whether it was grounded in science or superstition. An instinctive bias in favor of one’s “<a href="https://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html">in-group</a>” and its worldview is deeply ingrained in human psychology. </p>
<p>A human being’s very sense of self <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280701592070">is intimately tied up with</a> his or her identity group’s status and beliefs. Unsurprisingly, then, people respond automatically and defensively to information that threatens the worldview of groups with which they identify. We respond with rationalization and selective assessment of evidence – that is, we engage in “<a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/science-choice/201504/what-is-confirmation-bias">confirmation bias</a>,” giving credit to expert testimony we like while finding reasons to reject the rest.</p>
<p>Unwelcome information can also threaten in other ways. “<a href="https://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2017/06/system-justification">System justification</a>” theorists like psychologist <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Zh1vTeMAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">John Jost</a> have shown how situations that represent a perceived threat to established systems trigger inflexible thinking. For example, populations experiencing economic distress or an external threat have often turned to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/tps0000122">authoritarian leaders</a> who <a href="https://medium.com/@bardona/varieties-of-bullsh-t-6fd1cfeb102f?source=friends_link&sk=b6096254e8c3873da683a9dbbc165ac1">promise security and stability</a>.</p>
<p>In ideologically charged situations, one’s prejudices end up affecting one’s factual beliefs. Insofar as you define yourself in terms of your <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2010.511246">cultural affiliations</a>, your attachment to the social or economic status quo, or a combination, information that threatens your belief system – say, about the negative effects of industrial production on the environment – can threaten your sense of identity itself. If trusted political leaders or partisan media are telling you that the COVID-19 crisis is overblown, factual information about a scientific consensus to the contrary can feel like a personal attack. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Everyone sees the world through one partisan lens or another, based on their identity and beliefs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/3d-cinema-glasses-isolated-on-white-62373739">Vladyslav Starozhylov/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Denial is everywhere</h2>
<p>This kind of affect-laden, motivated thinking explains a wide range of examples of an extreme, evidence-resistant rejection of historical fact and scientific consensus.</p>
<p>Have tax cuts been shown to pay for themselves in terms of economic growth? Do communities with high numbers of immigrants have higher rates of violent crime? Did Russia interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election? Predictably, expert opinion regarding such matters is treated by partisan media as though evidence is itself <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2014/04/28/george_will_global_warming_is_socialism_by_the_back_door.html">inherently partisan</a>.</p>
<p>Denialist phenomena are many and varied, but the story behind them is, ultimately, quite simple. Human cognition is inseparable from the unconscious emotional responses that go with it. Under the right conditions, universal human traits like in-group favoritism, existential anxiety and a desire for stability and control combine into a toxic, system-justifying identity politics. </p>
<p>Science denial is notoriously resistant to facts because it isn’t about facts in the first place. Science denial is an expression of identity – usually in the face of perceived threats to the social and economic status quo – and it typically manifests in response to elite messaging.</p>
<p>I’d be very surprised if Anthony Fauci is, in fact, actually unaware of the significant impact of politics on COVID-19 attitudes, or of what signals are being sent by <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2020/04/21/texas-dan-patrick-economy-coronavirus/">Republican state government officials’ statements</a>, <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/06/pelosi-enforce-new-mask-rule-congress-republicans-committee-hearings.html">partisan mask refusal in Congress</a>, or the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-rally-in-tulsa-a-day-after-juneteenth-awakens-memories-of-1921-racist-massacre-140915">Trump rally in Tulsa</a>. Effective science communication is critically important because of the profound effects partisan messaging can have on public attitudes. Vaccination, resource depletion, climate and COVID-19 are life-and-death matters. To successfully tackle them, we must not ignore what the science tells us about science denial. </p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/humans-are-hardwired-to-dismiss-facts-that-dont-fit-their-worldview-127168">an article originally published</a> on Jan. 31, 2020.</em></p>
<p>[<em>Get our best science, health and technology stories.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/science-editors-picks-71/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=science-best">Sign up for The Conversation’s science newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141335/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Bardon received funding from the Humility and Conviction in Public Life project at the University of Connecticut.</span></em></p>Whether in situations relating to scientific consensus, economic history or current political events, denialism has its roots in what psychologists call ‘motivated reasoning.’Adrian Bardon, Professor of Philosophy, Wake Forest UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1334782020-03-11T18:14:10Z2020-03-11T18:14:10ZBiden’s win shows the power of Democratic moderates<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319904/original/file-20200311-116240-15uq64l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Joe and Jill Biden address the press the evening of the Idaho, Missouri, Michigan, Washington, Mississippi and North Dakota primaries.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Election-2020-Joe-Biden/34387e81c9074d8cbe71805079642649/33/0">AP Photo/Matt Rourke</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Super Tuesday II marked <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/March_10_presidential_primaries,_2020">Democratic primary elections</a> in six states: Idaho, Missouri, Michigan, Washington, Mississippi and North Dakota.</p>
<p>The candidates entered the races on level fields, with Biden enjoying a slight delegate edge over Sanders. Biden’s lead is now decisive, and there is a <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2020-primary-forecast/">high probability</a> he will emerge as the Democratic nominee.</p>
<p>Despite his victory, Biden continues to struggle with young voters. He faces difficulties in appealing to the most ideologically extreme wing of the party, which also tends to be younger. Sanders would have required <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/2/25/21152538/bernie-sanders-electability-president-moderates-data">unprecedented youth turnout to beat Trump</a> in November. By some estimates, youth turnout would need to increase some 30 percentage points over 2016. </p>
<p>Still, youth turnout in the general election has historically slightly exceeded 40 percentage points. Biden will need to appeal to this demographic, if he is to stay competitive against Trump. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/exit-polls-2020-michigan-march-10-primary/">Exit polling in Michigan</a> further clarified the ideological lane the party is likely to occupy this fall. It is becoming clear the party will adopt a center-left agenda. </p>
<p>The 2020 Democratic primaries are frequently cast as referenda on ideological extremism versus moderation.</p>
<p>“I was told at the beginning of this whole undertaking that there are two lanes, a progressive lane that Bernie Sanders is the incumbent for and a moderate lane that Joe Biden is the incumbent for, and there’s no room for anyone else in this,” <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/05/warrens-right-she-was-stuck-lane-couldnt-pass-sanders/">Elizabeth Warren told the Washington Post</a>. “I thought that wasn’t right, but evidently it was.”</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319878/original/file-20200311-168563-ei8739.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319878/original/file-20200311-168563-ei8739.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319878/original/file-20200311-168563-ei8739.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319878/original/file-20200311-168563-ei8739.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319878/original/file-20200311-168563-ei8739.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319878/original/file-20200311-168563-ei8739.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319878/original/file-20200311-168563-ei8739.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319878/original/file-20200311-168563-ei8739.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A voter fills in a ballot at the the Summit View Church of the Nazarene in Kansas City, Missouri.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Election-2020-Voting-Virus-Outbreak/7a9ebcbbc7d94741b95aaa51371ff2ab/2/0">AP Photo/Charlie Riedel</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Sanders enjoyed a 34 percentage point edge among strong liberals. Biden enjoyed an almost equal lead among moderates and conservatives. But even more revealing was Biden’s 18 percentage point lead in Michigan or all over in Michigan among people who described themselves as “somewhat liberal.”</p>
<p>In the Michigan <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/exit-polls-2020-michigan-march-10-primary/">exit poll</a>, 40% described themselves as “somewhat liberal,” also known as center-left voters. The fact that Biden is drawing strong support from center-left voters is important for a simple reason: They constitute a large share of the Democratic coalition. </p>
<p>Data from the <a href="https://www.voterstudygroup.org/">2016 Democracy Fund’s Voter’s Study</a> survey reveals a similar dynamic. At 27%, center-left is the second most popular choice among Democrats, behind “moderate or conservative.”</p>
<p>Thirty-three percent of non-Hispanic white Democrats describe themselves as somewhat liberal. Among African American Democratic identifiers, 34% identify as somewhat liberal, and so do 33% of Latinx Democrats. </p>
<p>Biden’s lead among this group shows he is making clear inroads with a large share of the party.</p>
<p>[<em>You’re too busy to read everything. We get it. That’s why we’ve got a weekly newsletter.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybusy">Sign up for good Sunday reading.</a> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/133478/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Weber does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It is becoming clear that this election season, the Democratic Party will likely adopt a center-left agenda.Chris Weber, Associate Professor in the School of Government and Public Policy, University of ArizonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1321322020-02-27T11:13:26Z2020-02-27T11:13:26ZWhat it will take to build a capable state in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316471/original/file-20200220-92493-psnobm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African National Congress top six leaders. The governing party's wishes are sometimes out of kilter with the dictates of statecraft. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP-GettyImages/Mujahid Safodien</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A major factor that undermines South Africa’s social and economic progress is the deficit in the capabilities of the state. This gap was identified long ago by the National Planning Commission, first in its diagnostic report in 2011, and again when it issued its final <a href="https://nationalplanningcommission.wordpress.com/the-work-of-the-commission-2/">National Development Plan</a> in 2012. The plan is the country’s blueprint for fixing its problems.</p>
<p>I define a capable state as a system of government that functions with relative autonomy from narrow ideological interests. Its parts work in a coordinated fashion to achieve clearly defined goals. It conducts its work efficiently and is effective in delivering services and critical economic infrastructure. </p>
<p>The core function of a state is to mobilise resources to meet its developmental challenges and manage long-term social and economic change. A capable state, with autonomy from political factions, is best placed to respond to changes and harness opportunities for development. Such states value innovation, human capital and merit. They emphasise economic performance, education, health care and infrastructure.</p>
<p>Currently, the South African state works in a fragmented manner and with no shared vision. </p>
<p>The reason it can’t deliver on its social and economic obligations lies in poor political choices and defective political management. Part of the problem is the relationship between the political machinery of the governing African National Congress (ANC) and the bureaucratic machinery of the state.</p>
<p>Adding to the challenge is that the ANC governs through a <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03161.htm">tripartite alliance</a> with the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions. These seek to influence government policy and decisions. </p>
<p>It is impossible to build state capabilities in a sustained manner without overcoming these many tensions. This requires a solid nerve centre – essentially the presidency. President Cyril Ramaphosa has massive political capital that he is under-using.</p>
<p>He needs to mobilise resources across the state towards achieving a defined set of strategic objectives and priorities. And he needs to stare down factional and ideological interests that circle the state and its agencies. He should then use his executive authority to translate his strategic objectives into measurable outcomes that make a noticeable difference in the economy and society. </p>
<p>The process currently under way to <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/ramaphosa-to-sign-performance-agreements-with-ministers">sign performance agreements</a> with government ministers is a step in the right direction. But, without any system for cracking the whip, this may fall apart as it did under Ramaphosa’s predecessor Jacob Zuma.</p>
<h2>Capacity constraints</h2>
<p>The severity of capacity and resource constraints varies across different levels of government. Some of these relate to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321223498_The_African_National_Congress_ANC_and_the_Cadre_Deployment_Policy_in_the_Postapartheid_South_Africa_A_Product_of_Democratic_Centralisation_or_a_Recipe_for_a_Constitutional_Crisis">substandard political appointees</a>. As is clear from the Auditor General’s reports over the years, at the local government level capacity deficiencies are largely due to the <a href="https://www.agsa.co.za/Portals/0/Reports/MFMA/2019.06.25/MFMA2017-18%20-%20Section%201%20-%20Executive%20summary.pdf">absence of technical skills and execution failures</a>. And municipalities routinely <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-06-26-financial-state-of-municipalities-has-worsened-ag/">disregard recommendations</a>.</p>
<p>Skills shortages are found in key areas such as project management, procurement and contract management as well as financial management. The ability to execute mandates and deliver services to communities is weak too. </p>
<p>Political management also matters when it comes to building great institutions – the other half of the equation of a capable state. Weak political management is clear from the parlous situation of state-owned enterprises, such as the power utility <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-energy-crisis-has-triggered-lots-of-ideas-why-most-are-wrong-130298">Eskom</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-in-unfamiliar-terrain-as-national-carrier-goes-into-business-rescue-128868">South African Airways</a>. </p>
<p>It’s also evident in defects in the institutions responsible for maintaining rule of law. It contributes to the tortuously slow grind of the <a href="https://sastatecapture.org.za/">Zondo Commission</a> into grand corruption, which has yet to result in any prosecutions. There are also ambiguities in policy decisions in key economic sectors such as information and communications technology, energy and <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Companies/Mining/junior-miners-feel-undermined-by-regulation-policy-uncertainty-minerals-council-20200205">mining</a>.</p>
<p>The calibre of politicians who preside over the state determines the norms and standards by which the bureaucratic machinery of the state functions. As the founding father of modern Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/16248652-lee-kuan-yew">pointed out</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>To get good government, you must have good people in charge of government. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>A country can have institutions and policies that look good. But if there are no capable and ethical politicians who protect them, they are doomed to be ineffectual and not reach their full potential. It is impossible to build a capable state outside an acceptable ethical framework, and the necessary range of human capabilities at a country’s disposal. At the moment South Africa suffers capability deficiencies and institutional stasis due to poor political management.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>For President Ramaphosa, the important lever of statecraft for creating results in a democratic society is to act decisively in getting things done. This requires awareness of his power and authority, skills to read the political mood, and a strong urge to act decisively.</p>
<p>As the nerve centre of the state, he needs to signify acceptable norms and be hard on errant public officials. This should start with members of the executive who are underperforming. At the municipal and provincial levels, the centre needs to use fiscal tools to stop wastage and poor performance. </p>
<p>Effective leaders in government who lead through moments of crisis should immediately grasp the purposes and uses of power. They can achieve a great deal more through astute political management and centralised decision-making. They should focus on getting results rather than fixating on long processes of consultation as is the case in South Africa.</p>
<p>Finally, there are areas where government can achieve quick wins through well-structured partnerships to fix capacity deficiencies. </p>
<p>It can tap into the resources in the private sector. A number of mining companies, for example, could help build capabilities at the local government level. This could help address constraints in areas where their workers live. Such shared value may help improve the reputation of those companies.</p>
<p>We should, however, be careful of private sector firms and business leaders that are only interested in pursuing their narrow interests through proximity to political leadership. Partnerships with the private sector should be based on resolving clearly defined and specific challenges.</p>
<p>Building capabilities is key to retooling the state for higher performance. The starting point should be to fix political management at the centre.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132132/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mzukisi Qobo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa suffers capability deficiencies and institutional stasis due to poor political management.Mzukisi Qobo, Head: Wits School of Governance (Designate), University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1271682020-01-31T13:00:32Z2020-01-31T13:00:32ZHumans are hardwired to dismiss facts that don’t fit their worldview<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312933/original/file-20200130-41554-166h57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=160%2C25%2C3928%2C2818&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">What's behind this natural tendency?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/three-wise-monkeys-mystic-apes-sacred-281368427">Zhou Eka/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>An updated version of this article was published on June 25, 2020. <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-responses-highlight-how-humans-are-hardwired-to-dismiss-facts-that-dont-fit-their-worldview-141335">Read it here</a>.</em></p>
<p>Something is rotten in the state of American political life. The U.S. (among other nations) is increasingly characterized by highly polarized, informationally insulated ideological communities occupying their own <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/11/16/20964281/impeachment-hearings-trump-america-epistemic-crisis">factual universes</a>. </p>
<p>Within the conservative political blogosphere, <a href="https://www.desmogblog.com/heartland-institute">global warming</a> is either a hoax or so uncertain as to be unworthy of response. Within other geographic or online communities, <a href="https://www.npr.org/tags/399145964/anti-vaccination-movement">vaccines</a>, <a href="https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/but-not-simpler/why-portland-is-wrong-about-water-fluoridation/">fluoridated water</a> and <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/food/the-plate/2016/05/17/scientists-say-gmo-foods-are-safe-public-skepticism-remains/">genetically modified foods</a> are known to be dangerous. Right-wing <a href="https://dailycaller.com/">media outlets</a> paint a detailed picture of how Donald Trump is the victim of a fabricated conspiracy.</p>
<p>None of that is correct, though. The reality of human-caused global warming is <a href="https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/">settled science</a>. The alleged link between vaccines and autism has been <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/concerns/autism.html">debunked</a> as conclusively as anything in the history of epidemiology. It’s easy to find <a href="https://apnews.com/893415ed7acb069604566149630abdb8">authoritative refutations</a> of Donald Trump’s self-exculpatory claims regarding Ukraine and many other issues.</p>
<p>Yet many well-educated people sincerely deny evidence-based conclusions on these matters.</p>
<p>In theory, resolving factual disputes should be relatively easy: Just present evidence of a strong expert consensus. This approach succeeds most of the time, when the issue is, say, the atomic weight of hydrogen.</p>
<p>But things don’t work that way when the scientific consensus presents a picture that threatens someone’s ideological worldview. In practice, it turns out that one’s political, religious or ethnic identity quite effectively predicts one’s willingness to accept expertise on any given politicized issue.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/motivated-reasoning">Motivated reasoning</a>” is what social scientists call the process of deciding what evidence to accept based on the conclusion one prefers. As I explain in my book, “<a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-truth-about-denial-9780190062279?lang=en&cc=us">The Truth About Denial</a>,” this very human tendency applies to all kinds of facts about the physical world, economic history and current events.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The same facts will sound different to people depending on what they already believe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Nightclub-Shooting-Florida/4d33732e41f34ce89a416c03d669a0b0/1/0">AP Photo/John Raoux</a></span>
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<h2>Denial doesn’t stem from ignorance</h2>
<p>The interdisciplinary study of this phenomenon has exploded over just the last six or seven years. One thing has become clear: The failure of various groups to acknowledge the truth about, say, climate change, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/facts-versus-feelings-isnt-the-way-to-think-about-communicating-science-80255">not explained by a lack of information</a> about the scientific consensus on the subject.</p>
<p>Instead, what strongly predicts denial of expertise on many controversial topics is simply one’s political persuasion.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214558393">2015 metastudy</a> showed that ideological polarization over the reality of climate change actually increases with respondents’ knowledge of politics, science and/or energy policy. The chances that a conservative is a climate change denier is <a href="http://www.people-press.org/2008/05/08/a-deeper-partisan-divide-over-global-warming/">significantly higher</a> if he or she is college-educated. Conservatives scoring highest on tests for <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2182588">cognitive sophistication</a> or <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2319992">quantitative reasoning skills</a> are most susceptible to motivated reasoning about climate science. </p>
<p>This is not just a problem for conservatives. As researcher <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=8P7tOMAAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Dan Kahan</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2010.511246">has demonstrated</a>, liberals are less likely to accept expert consensus on the possibility of safe storage of nuclear waste, or on the effects of concealed-carry gun laws.</p>
<h2>Denial is natural</h2>
<p>Our ancestors evolved in small groups, where <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X10000968">cooperation and persuasion</a> had at least as much to do with reproductive success as holding accurate factual beliefs about the world. Assimilation into one’s tribe required assimilation into the group’s ideological belief system. An instinctive bias in favor of one’s “<a href="https://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html">in-group</a>” and its worldview is deeply ingrained in human psychology.</p>
<p>A human being’s very sense of self <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280701592070">is intimately tied up with</a> his or her identity group’s status and beliefs. Unsurprisingly, then, people respond automatically and defensively to information that threatens their ideological worldview. We respond with rationalization and selective assessment of evidence – that is, we engage in “<a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/science-choice/201504/what-is-confirmation-bias">confirmation bias</a>,” giving credit to expert testimony we like and find reasons to reject the rest.</p>
<p>Political scientists <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=9VwvxRIAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Charles Taber</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=NyoRiXkAAAAJ&hl=en">Milton Lodge</a> experimentally confirmed the existence of this <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214554758">automatic response</a>. They found that partisan subjects, when presented with photos of politicians, produce an affective “like/dislike” response that precedes any sort of conscious, factual assessment as to who is pictured. </p>
<p>In ideologically charged situations, one’s prejudices end up affecting one’s factual beliefs. Insofar as you define yourself in terms of your <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2010.511246">cultural affiliations</a>, information that threatens your belief system – say, information about the negative effects of industrial production on the environment – can threaten your sense of identity itself. If it’s part of your ideological community’s worldview that unnatural things are unhealthful, factual information about a scientific consensus on vaccine or GM food safety feels like a personal attack. </p>
<p>Unwelcome information can also threaten in other ways. “<a href="https://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2017/06/system-justification">System justification</a>” theorists like psychologist <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Zh1vTeMAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">John Jost</a> have shown how situations that represent a threat to established systems trigger inflexible thinking and a desire for closure. For example, as Jost and colleagues extensively review, populations experiencing economic distress or external threat have often turned to <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Ftps0000122">authoritarian, hierarchicalist leaders</a> promising security and stability.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Everyone sees the world through one partisan lens or another, based on their identity and beliefs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/3d-cinema-glasses-isolated-on-white-62373739">Vladyslav Starozhylov/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
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<h2>Denial is everywhere</h2>
<p>This kind of affect-laden, motivated thinking explains a wide range of examples of an extreme, evidence-resistant rejection of historical fact and scientific consensus.</p>
<p>Have tax cuts been shown to pay for themselves in terms of economic growth? Do communities with high numbers of immigrants have higher rates of violent crime? Did Russia interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election? Predictably, expert opinion regarding such matters is treated by partisan media as though evidence is itself <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2014/04/28/george_will_global_warming_is_socialism_by_the_back_door.html">inherently partisan</a>.</p>
<p>Denialist phenomena are many and varied, but the story behind them is, ultimately, quite simple. Human cognition is inseparable from the unconscious emotional responses that go with it. Under the right conditions, universal human traits like in-group favoritism, existential anxiety and a desire for stability and control combine into a toxic, system-justifying identity politics.</p>
<p>When group interests, creeds, or dogmas are threatened by unwelcome factual information, biased thinking becomes denial. And unfortunately these facts about human nature <a href="https://www.merchantsofdoubt.org/">can be manipulated for political ends</a>. </p>
<p>This picture is a bit grim, because it suggests that facts alone have limited power to resolve politicized issues like climate change or immigration policy. But properly understanding the phenomenon of denial is surely a crucial first step to addressing it.</p>
<p>[ <em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127168/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Bardon received funding from the Humility and Conviction in Public Life project at the University of Connecticut. </span></em></p>Whether in situations relating to scientific consensus, economic history or current political events, denialism has its roots in what psychologists call ‘motivated reasoning.’Adrian Bardon, Professor of Philosophy, Wake Forest UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1171842019-05-19T04:53:59Z2019-05-19T04:53:59ZMorrison has led the Coalition to a ‘miracle’ win, but how do they govern from here?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275268/original/file-20190519-69178-1u46kgd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Scott Morrison has pulled off an unexpected victory, and will forever be a Liberal hero.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Bianca de Marchi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The man that has “always believed in miracles” has just delivered one for the Liberal party. It’s not clear at the time of writing if the government will have minority or a narrow majority. But it is deafening defeat for Labor.</p>
<p>This election result is an extraordinary achievement by a man that has doggedly presented himself as the ordinary, suburban dad. Morrison — a man we are <a href="https://theconversation.com/against-the-odds-scott-morrison-wants-to-be-returned-as-prime-minister-but-who-the-bloody-hell-is-he-116732">still just getting to know</a> — was triumphant as he addressed a rapturous crowd. It was an uncomplicated victory speech. He told us that Australia was a great country, thanked his family and — finally — his party for their roles in running a ruthlessly disciplined campaign and, promised to get back to work for the “quiet Australians”. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/against-the-odds-scott-morrison-wants-to-be-returned-as-prime-minister-but-who-the-bloody-hell-is-he-116732">Against the odds, Scott Morrison wants to be returned as prime minister. But who the bloody hell is he?</a>
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<p>This is the most presidential campaign run by a single party in Australian history, pitted against the biggest policy target since John Hewson’s <em>Fightback!</em>. What really made this election singular was the impact of a quarter of voters preferring minor parties as their first preference.</p>
<p>At the beginning of the campaign, the task of defending so many safe seats from an insurgence of would-be liberal independents seemed overwhelmingly difficult. It would leave too many marginal seats under resourced to defend what has been an unpopular government, riven by infighting.</p>
<p>Voters always say that they hate negative campaigns. But they work. Morrison deftly crafted his negative message around the unpopularity of Bill Shorten and the risk he posed to the “promise of Australia”. </p>
<p>Morrison has a gift for easy simplification. To give just one example, he framed the complex franking credits issue into the “retirement tax” scare. At the same time, Morrison smoothed out this overwhelmingly negative campaign, and rounded out his previous public image as aggressive and shouty, by showing himself to be just another dad in the suburbs. </p>
<p>This is Morrison’s victory, and he will forever be a Liberal hero.</p>
<h2>But what next?</h2>
<p>What do the Liberals want to do with three more years of power? By the campaign’s end, it remained a question without a detailed answer. And it is still the most important question.</p>
<p>By delivering a result most thought improbable, Morrison’s personal authority will be titanic within the Liberal party. It is not clear what the government’s agenda is beyond their tax plan. There remain several pressing policy questions particularly around climate and energy. The government does not have a mandate to act in these policy domains and these are issues that are difficult internally for the Coalition.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/coalition-wins-election-but-abbott-loses-warringah-plus-how-the-polls-got-it-so-wrong-116804">Coalition wins election but Abbott loses Warringah, plus how the polls got it so wrong</a>
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<p>Much is made of ideology within the Liberal Party. It is often presented as <em>the</em> factor that explains the party’s internal woes — and for good reason. The fusion of Australia’s Liberal and Conservative forces in 1909 mashed together what were previously two competing political traditions. They’ve had to co-exist ever since.</p>
<p>But ideological conflict within the liberal party is the symptom. The cause is that the party lacks effective institutional mechanisms to safely and semi-publicly debate ideas.</p>
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<h2>Institutional design matters</h2>
<p>This also applies to how debates are undertaken. What are the formal rules about who, where and when party members can speak? Just as important are the informal norms around what can be said and in what context.</p>
<p>The Liberal party has traditionally relied on strong leaders to embody and articulate what it stands for. Successful leaders in the Liberal Party (like other conservative parties in Westminster systems) are dominant, but also deft enough to allow sufficient breathing room for their factional rivals. More importantly, being a proven winner counts for a lot. With this victory, Morrison now has the opportunity to transform himself into precisely this kind of leader.</p>
<p>Liberal leaders’ dominance is reinforced by the way the party machine (but less so its members) has contented itself with setting out broad policy principles. This leaves the parliamentary Liberal party plenty of scope to interpret the political landscape and best position the party for electoral victory.</p>
<p>In the past, the Liberal Party’s links with civil society were strong. It had a healthy branch structure and was embedded in the lives of its core constituents. Today, the average age of its members is around 70, and the decline in party membership means that parties are no longer a key democratic link between representatives and voters. This ultimately makes leaders more independent of their parties. We’ve seen this trend borne out in Australian parties over many decades, and particularly in Morrison’s campaign.</p>
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<p>Finally, the Liberals have famously rejected formally recognised and organised factions. But in doing so, the party has also given up a tool for organising ideological interests and debates.</p>
<p>It’s hard to have both open and robust debate, and a dominant leader. Open debate is very quickly interpreted as dissent or “open revolt” by outside observers. It is even more challenging in government when discipline matters more and dissent is reported by the media as a failure of leadership.</p>
<p>As the party room has declined as a site of robust debate, the Liberal party’s primary mechanism for dealing with difficult ideological debates is leadership change. It is no accident that this party has been unable to resolve its internal debate on climate change, and has had six leaders in 12 years. </p>
<p>Climate change is so potent a debate within the coalition because it is really about changing the relationship between government, economy and citizens. How this ought – whether it ought – to be accomplished calls into question core assumptions about the role of the state and Australia’s sources of prosperity that have traditionally bound together the “broad church” of the Liberal party.</p>
<p>To be clear, the Liberal party has governed successfully under multiple leaders over decades by putting their faith in the leader to listen, but to ultimately set the course. This formula works when leaders’ authority is high. We should also never underestimate that simply keeping Labor out is sufficient reason for government for the conservative side of politics. At its simplest, their politics is one of incremental change, sound finance and fending off the “radicalism” of Labor.</p>
<p>Morrison is a proven winner and now has the chance to exercise his personal authority. He will need to address climate policy, because business wants a price signal for carbon emissions. He may follow in the footsteps of another giant of the Liberal Party, Robert Menzies, and poach some of Labor’s more compelling ideas, refashioning them through a Liberal lens. </p>
<p>While questions of the party’s ideology are important, the truth is, the party has always had to navigate tensions between its Liberal and Conservative traditions. This debate has never been settled and it is foolish to suggest that it ever would be. </p>
<p>The more pressing questions relate to how it will govern and win the next election. Over the long term, the party should really be asking how it will seek to renew itself, both in terms of ideas and candidates. </p>
<p>This win should not be an excuse for ongoing organisational drift and complacency.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117184/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marija Taflaga does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Coalition should not use this unexpected win to allow itself to be complacent and drift. It needs to work out its agenda for the next three years and how it allows internal debate.Marija Taflaga, Lecturer, School of Political Science and International Relations, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1108872019-03-07T23:49:30Z2019-03-07T23:49:30ZAfter years of vicious culture wars, hope may yet triumph over hate in Australian politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261156/original/file-20190227-150724-41h5qv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=383%2C5%2C3173%2C1988&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wes Mountain/The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This is part of a major series called Advancing Australia, in which leading academics examine the key issues facing Australia in the lead-up to the 2019 federal election and beyond. Read the other pieces in the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/advancing-australia-66135">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>For a generation, politics has been wearying for those of good heart and outright damaging to those targeted in the culture wars unleashed in the 1990s. How this happened, and whether it will continue, are questions pressing hard upon us. </p>
<p>The traditional post-war political struggle pitted class and concerns about inequality, opportunity and redistribution against capital and concerns about profits, property rights and the shoring up of traditional social structures. </p>
<p>Over the past two decades, the moorings of this “left” versus “right” paradigm of political competition have morphed somewhat – in the latter case, drastically. </p>
<p>The “left”, traditionally organised around better pay and conditions for working people, has incorporated post-materialist political concerns around identity (most recently, for example, marriage equality rights) and the environment. The Australian Labor Party has continued to straddle the tensions to which this occasionally gives rise, first evident in the 1970s and increasingly significant in the new millennium. The proposed Adani coal mine provides the latest example of this.</p>
<p>The founding of the Australian Greens in 1992 was a structural expression of this development. The party provided a political home for progressives unwilling to practise a politics involving the trade-offs and compromises necessary to achieve government in its own right. The downside is that the Greens mostly acquire influence but not power.</p>
<p>These two main parties on the “left” mirror the existence of the two main parties – the Liberal Party and National Party – on the “right”. But, unlike the Liberals, who rely on the Nationals to form coalition governments, Labor generally returns enough members at elections to govern without needing another party’s support. The exceptions to this are the ACT and Tasmania, where proportional representation systems deliver more minor party MPs than elsewhere.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-morrison-governments-biggest-economic-problem-climate-change-denial-105125">The Morrison government's biggest economic problem? Climate change denial</a>
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<h2>Two decades of race-baiting politics</h2>
<p>The “right” over the last two decades in Australia has imported the US Republican Party playbook. President Richard Nixon’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/01/10/how-donald-trump-put-an-end-to-the-gops-southern-strategy/?utm_term=.7a32f3baeb70">“Southern Strategy”</a> exploited race in the late 1960s to realign white working-class Democratic Party supporters in the American south with the Republican Party.</p>
<p>In the mid-1990s, the Liberal prime minister, John Howard, followed suit. “Dogwhistling” on race recruited traditional white working-class Labor voters to the Liberal-and-National-Party-voting <a href="http://insidestory.org.au/howards-victories-which-voters-switched-which-issues-mattered-and-why/">“Howard’s battlers”</a> camp.</p>
<p>From 2001 Howard used the so-called “war on terror” to heighten racial tensions for political gain more explicitly. His government broke from previously bipartisan migration policies to harness migration to national security concerns well beyond what was necessary to actually address those concerns. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-politics-explainer-the-mv-tampa-and-the-transformation-of-asylum-seeker-policy-74078">Tampa and the “children overboard” scandal</a> were prominent examples. Recent manifestations include the whipping up of unfounded fears about ethnic gang violence in Melbourne and <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/doctors-reject-claims-of-flood-of-asylum-seeker-transfers-20190214-p50xwg.html">flagrant accusations about the likely consequences of the “Medevac” bill</a> passed by parliament against the government’s will in February 2019. </p>
<p>Australian politics has been hostage for a generation to the divisive, racialised politics practised by Howard and his Liberal and National Party (LNP) successors, wedging Labor, which struggled to refocus the agenda beyond it.</p>
<h2>Right’s strategy looks to be losing its sting</h2>
<p>However, 2019 may well be the year this long cycle of race-baiting politics from the “right” in Australia exhausts itself. The Morrison government’s oversight of inhumane practises in offshore immigration detention centres, and the <a href="https://www.afr.com/news/policy/foreign-affairs/bad-debts-failed-contracts-across-asia-trail-manus-contractor-paladin-20190211-h1b4kh">“no bid” tendering of responsibility for some of these to dubious corporate entities</a>, are becoming perceived proxies for incompetent government.</p>
<p>Despite recent efforts to recharge it, the fear factor inculcated by the LNP around migration seems to have dissipated. Several <a href="https://theconversation.com/liberals-trounced-in-huge-wentworth-swing-bringing-a-hung-parliament-105351">moderate conservatives have been elected to the crossbench</a> who in the pre-Howard era would have stood as Liberal candidates rather than as independents. They are living proof that even many on the “right” have little stomach for playing Nixon-style politics in Australia any more, even as it flourishes anew in the US through President Donald J. Trump. </p>
<p>This shift occurs in the context of the LNP recently being seen to be wrong-footed on several totemic policy issues: the environment, gender equity and gay rights. With saturation support from Rupert Murdoch-owned News Corporation media outlets and several commercial radio shock jocks, climate change denial, the trivialisation of gender equity issues and refusal of marriage equality for the LGBTQI community were consistent political winners for the LNP – until the moment they were not. </p>
<p>Along with the diminishing dividends of the LNP’s race-baiting for political gain, this hints at the renewal of Australian voters’ better instincts. The LNP tropes of the last two decades seem exhausted. </p>
<h2>Are we at a turning point?</h2>
<p>The successful plebiscite vote for <a href="https://theconversation.com/grattan-on-friday-in-2017-australia-has-delivered-to-the-lgbti-community-but-failed-its-first-peoples-87633">marriage equality in 2017</a> may well have been a turning point. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-woman-problem-no-the-liberals-have-a-man-problem-and-they-need-to-fix-it-102339">revolt of female Liberal MPs</a> over their treatment at the hands of male colleagues may be another.</p>
<p>Increasingly vocal dissidents within the wider LNP urging action on climate change is a further hopeful sign. Prime-age cabinet ministers like Kelly O’Dwyer, who <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/minister-kelly-o-dwyer-lashes-homophobic-anti-women-liberals-in-her-party">lamented last year to Liberal colleagues</a> that they were widely seen as “homophobic, anti-women climate deniers”, are voting with their feet and <a href="https://theconversation.com/view-from-the-hill-odwyers-decision-turns-the-spotlight-onto-bishop-110159">departing parliament at the next election</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-woman-problem-no-the-liberals-have-a-man-problem-and-they-need-to-fix-it-102339">A 'woman problem'? No, the Liberals have a 'man problem', and they need to fix it</a>
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<p>Together, this points to a possible sea change – a welcome one – in Australian politics after a long, acrid 20-plus years of disrespect, division and denial.</p>
<p>A Labor Party strengthened by rules reinforcing, rather than allowing the undermining of, the leader has arguably been central in this shift. Internecine warfare has been replaced by steady attention to policy issues rather than questions of leadership personnel. </p>
<p>Secure in his position, Opposition Leader Bill Shorten goes to the election confidently advancing some politically risky policies on negative gearing, dividend imputation and humane treatment of refugees. The quality of the Labor frontbench is as strong as at any time since the Hawke-Keating era. </p>
<p>The nascent appetite in the electorate for hope over hate, for forward momentum over susceptibility to artificially stoked fear, favours a change to government capable of decisive action on the big neglected issues, of which climate action is second to none.</p>
<p>The successful reframing of Australian politics from fear to hope is a mighty challenge, one undertaken against the massive dead weight of Australian media influence reinforcing our baser instincts over the past 20 years. It seems to be under way. One can only hope it succeeds.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110887/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Wallace receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>On racist dog-whistling and on climate change, the “right” now finds itself on the wrong side of public opinion – so the acrimonious public debates on ideological lines may be coming to an end.Chris Wallace, ARC DECRA Fellow, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1094952019-01-29T11:45:46Z2019-01-29T11:45:46ZHow to have productive disagreements about politics and religion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255049/original/file-20190122-100288-yhbmr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=164%2C14%2C4244%2C2791&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Psychology research suggests a new tool for your ‘disagreement toolbox.’ </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/two-pretty-africaamerican-women-drinking-cocktails-1056856253">Dragon Images/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the current polarized climate, it’s easy to find yourself in the midst of a political disagreement that morphs into a religious argument. People’s religious affiliation <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/22/american-religious-groups-vary-widely-in-their-views-of-abortion/">predicts their stances on abortion</a>, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-5906.2009.01449.x">immigration</a> and other controversial topics, and disagreements about these issues can seem intractable. </p>
<p>The seeming futility in arguing about politics and religion may arise partly because people misunderstand the nature of these beliefs. Many people approach an ideological disagreement the same way they would a disagreement about facts. If you disagree with someone about when water freezes, facts are convincing. It’s easy to think that if you disagree with someone about immigration, facts will be similarly persuasive.</p>
<p>This might work if people’s ideological beliefs worked the same way as their factual beliefs – but they don’t. As psychologists who focus on religious and moral cognition, <a href="https://columbiasamclab.weebly.com">my colleagues and I</a> are investigating how people understand that these are two separate classes of belief. Our work suggests that an effective strategy for disagreement involves approaching ideological beliefs as a combination of fact and opinion.</p>
<h2>Identifying a difference</h2>
<p>To investigate whether people distinguish between facts and religious beliefs, my colleagues and I <a href="https://columbiasamclab.weebly.com/uploads/5/9/0/6/59061709/heiphetz_landers_vanleeuwen_in_press_prs.pdf">examined</a> a <a href="https://corpus.byu.edu/coca/">database containing more than 520 million words</a> from speeches, novels, newspapers and other sources. </p>
<p>Religious statements were typically preceded by the phrase “believe that” rather than “think that.” Phrases like “I believe that Jesus turned water into wine” were relatively common, whereas phrases like “I think that Jesus turned water into wine” were nearly nonexistent.</p>
<p>In four subsequent experiments, we asked adults to complete sentences like “Zane __ that Jesus turned water into wine.” Participants were more likely to use “believes” for religious and political claims and “thinks” for factual claims. </p>
<p><iframe id="Qgbts" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Qgbts/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Taken together, these results suggest that people distinguish between factual beliefs, on the one hand, and religious and political claims, on the other.</p>
<p>Rather than equating ideologies and facts, people appear to view ideologies as a combination of fact and opinion. In two earlier studies, 5- to 10-year-old children and adults learned about pairs of characters who <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.09.005">disagreed about religious, factual and opinion-based statements</a>. For example, we told participants that one person thought that God could hear prayers while the other didn’t, or that two other people disagreed about whether or not blue is the prettiest color. Participants said that only one person could be right nearly every time they heard a factual disagreement, but they gave this answer less often when they heard a religious disagreement and less often still when they heard an opinion-based disagreement.</p>
<p>This result may occur because children and adults think that different types of beliefs provide different information. <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2013.12.002">Participants told us</a> that factual claims reveal information about the world, whereas opinions reveal information about the speaker. They also reported that religious claims reveal a moderate amount of information about both the world and the speaker. People who say that God exists are ostensibly making a claim about what kinds of beings exist in the world – but not everyone would agree with that claim, so they are also revealing information about themselves. </p>
<h2>Recognizing the difference in everyday life</h2>
<p>So how can you use our results when a contentious topic arises outside the lab?</p>
<p>When you find yourself in the midst of an ideological disagreement, it can be tempting to correct the other person’s facts. “Actually, scientific evidence shows that the earth is <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-science-figured-out-the-age-of-the-earth/">more than 4 billion years old</a> and that <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/evolution/humans/humankind/index.html">humans did indeed evolve</a> from <a href="http://humanorigins.si.edu">other primates</a>.” “Actually, recent data show that immigrants <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-immigration-bad-for-the-economy-4-essential-reads-99001">contribute to the economy</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/19/two-charts-demolish-the-notion-that-immigrants-here-illegally-commit-more-crime/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bbdd23b1132b">commit fewer crimes</a> than native-born Americans.” </p>
<p>Yet this type of information alone is often insufficient to resolve disagreements. It’s addressing the part of ideological beliefs that is like a fact, the part where someone is trying to communicate information about the world. But it’s missing the part where ideological beliefs are also like an opinion. Without this part, saying, “Actually, evidence shows that X” sounds a lot like saying, “Actually, evidence proves that blue is not the prettiest color.” To be convincing, you need tools that address both the fact part and the opinion part of an ideology.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255014/original/file-20190122-100282-3kcjfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255014/original/file-20190122-100282-3kcjfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255014/original/file-20190122-100282-3kcjfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255014/original/file-20190122-100282-3kcjfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255014/original/file-20190122-100282-3kcjfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255014/original/file-20190122-100282-3kcjfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255014/original/file-20190122-100282-3kcjfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255014/original/file-20190122-100282-3kcjfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">There’s a better way than arguing as if over facts.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/nBMNu-SBRXk">Andrea Tummons/Unsplash</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>People rarely change their opinions because someone out-argued them. Rather, opinion-based change can come from exposure. <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0025848">People like</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2008.26.3.259">the familiar</a>, even when that familiarity comes from the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00289">briefest of prior exposures</a>. The same could occur for viewpoints that they’ve heard before. </p>
<p>What does exposure look like when talking about ideological disagreements? “Hmm. I actually think something different.” “I really appreciated the way my science tutor was patient with me when I didn’t understand evolution. The way she explained things made a lot of sense to me after a while.” “I’m going to donate money to groups helping asylum seekers. Do you want to join me?”</p>
<p>Maybe you say just one of these sentences, but others pick up where you left off. By walking around in the world, someone might encounter numerous counterpoints to their opinions, perhaps leading to gradual change as other views become more familiar. </p>
<p>It’s not anyone’s responsibility to say these sentences, least of all people who are being harmed by the disagreement. But for those in a position to change minds via repeated exposure, this strategy can be a helpful addition to the “managing disagreement” toolboxes everyone carries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109495/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Larisa Heiphetz receives funding from the John Templeton Foundation. She has also received funding from American Psychological Association, American Psychological Foundation/Council of Graduate Departments of Psychology, Harvard University, National Academy of Education/Spencer Foundation, and National Science Foundation to conduct the work described here.</span></em></p>Research suggests people intuitively draw a distinction between what is known and what is believed. Recognizing the difference can help in ideological disagreements.Larisa Heiphetz, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Columbia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1015142018-08-14T20:27:12Z2018-08-14T20:27:12ZFractured Liberals need a new brand – ‘broad church’ is no longer working<p>Political parties wishing to win majority support in the pursuit of gaining control of government cannot afford to be tied too closely to a rigid ideology or set of views. They must accommodate a range of viewpoints and approaches to matters of public policy, even as they decide which policy to pursue.</p>
<p>In the case of the Liberal Party, former Prime Minister John Howard summed up this reality of political life with his description of the party as a <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/federal-election-2016-howard-calls-for-calm-under-broad-church/news-story/299957cc57ba967d43a821636a72a96d">“broad church”</a> that married the conservative tradition exemplified by the Irish writer Edmund Burke with the liberalism of John Stuart Mill. </p>
<p>This formulation was vague enough to encompass a range of political positions, even if they were at odds with one another. The “broad church” ideal had a simple goal – ensure that all Liberals were inside the tent and shared a common outlook. </p>
<h2>The left-right divide</h2>
<p>In earlier days, the Liberal Party could define itself in terms of being “anti-Labor”. Labor sought an Australia based on national planning, abolishing the federal system and nationalising institutions such as the banks. The Liberals summed this up in one word: socialism.</p>
<p>The ALP increasingly adopted liberal principles, not just in economic terms as exemplified by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/14/the-hawke-keating-agenda-was-laborism-not-neoliberalism-and-is-still-a-guiding-light">Hawke/Keating reforms</a>, but also in social matters. The party also dropped its traditional social conservatism; its last exponent was 1960s leader <a href="https://www.moadoph.gov.au/blog/the-day-the-alp-changed/">Arthur Calwell.</a></p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-liberal-party-hold-its-broad-church-of-liberals-and-conservatives-together-93575">Can the Liberal Party hold its 'broad church' of liberals and conservatives together?</a>
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<p>As the ALP “modernised” and jettisoned much of its earlier ideological baggage, the Liberal Party needed to find what is described these days as a new “brand”, and Howard’s “broad church” was a response to these changing circumstances. </p>
<p>In many ways, the “broad church” formulation of the Liberal brand is much weaker than “anti-socialism”. This may reflect the fact that the old left vs. right division, with its clear-cut understanding of politics in material terms, has largely ceased to be relevant.</p>
<p>In these circumstances, the possibility of conflict within the Liberal Party based on both values and interests becomes greater. For example, the issue of the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/drive/coalition-mps-divided-over-neg/9912318">National Energy Guarantee</a> cannot be conceptualised in traditional left/right terms.</p>
<p>The same is true of climate change in general. One of the biggest international critics of anthropogenic global warming is <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/is-jeremy-corbyn-a-climate-change-sceptic-his-brother-suggests-he-could-be-a6760346.html">Piers Corbyn,</a> the brother of UK Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, who considers “climate change” an attack by globalists on the working class.</p>
<p>The advocates of coal-fired power stations in the Coalition would seem to have more in common with Piers Corbyn and the values of Calwell’s Labor Party than with contemporary progressive liberalism. And from an old-style Labor perspective,
the focus in that party would be on prioritising cheap energy for the ordinary working person.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/christianity-does-not-play-a-significant-role-in-australian-politics-but-cultural-conservatism-does-78345">Christianity does not play a significant role in Australian politics, but cultural conservatism does</a>
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<p>What this suggests is that divisions about contemporary political issues are becoming increasingly difficult to comprehend with the ideological tools handed down to us from the past, and to do so is to paint a false picture. Of course, there are intellectual differences between those advocating for the increased use of renewable energy sources and those who wish to build new coal-fired power stations. There are also other interests involved of a more material kind.</p>
<p>Another issue currently being debated in parliament – whether to allow the territory governments to legalise euthanasia – is again not so much a left/right issue as a liberal/conservative one. I think it would be true to say that such a bill would have horrified the Labor party of the 1950s, especially given the significant number of Catholics in its ranks.</p>
<p>The Coalition is now the home of social conservatism in the Australian parliament. Given the success of the same-sex referendum last year, one can only wonder if the tide is <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/john-howard-joins-tony-abbott-in-campaigning-against-samesex-marriage/news-story/d7cae3da2446598abb26b5ee4fe7596e">flowing against them</a> also on euthanasia.</p>
<h2>Evolving for the modern political age</h2>
<p>It may be possible to conclude that the Liberal reformulation of its brand in terms of the “broad church” model is limited by the way in which Australian politics in the 21st century has been evolving. The reason: the “broad church” model paints politics in what are largely 19th century terms.</p>
<p>The ALP has claimed at least some of the heritage of <a href="https://mises.org/library/john-stuart-mill-and-new-liberalism">John Stuart Mill</a> as expressed in contemporary liberal progressivism. The party has left the conservative working class behind. In so doing, they seem to have created a much stronger brand.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-liberalism-old-and-new-15692">Australian liberalism old and new</a>
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<p>The Liberals, on the other hand, have perhaps created a rod for their own backs. They have a liberal progressive wing, exemplified by Malcolm Turnbull, and a conservative wing, exemplified by Tony Abbott. On matters where the ALP are unified, the Liberals are divided. </p>
<p>One reason for this division is the heterogeneity of the current Liberal Party and its support base. It can longer define itself as being “anti-socialist”. The “broad church” brand was an attempt to turn that heterogeneity into unity, but it may have only papered over the cracks. This reflects the ideological muddle of 21st century politics.</p>
<p>Modern-day Australia imposes certain realities on political parties. The most important one is that the important public policy issues of the day go beyond old-fashioned left/right characterisations. </p>
<p>Political parties need to be nimble and agile if they are to escape from the labels of a past age. Otherwise, they will continue to repeat the errors of recent years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101514/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory Melleuish receives funding from the Australian research Council. He is a member of the Academic Advisory Board of the Menzies Research Centre.</span></em></p>The Liberals once tried to build a big tent to include a range of political positions. Recent conflicts over energy, same-sex marriage and euthanasia show this is no longer sustainable.Gregory Melleuish, Professor, School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/786172017-06-08T16:31:58Z2017-06-08T16:31:58ZThe perversion of paleontology by apartheid’s advocates still lingers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172678/original/file-20170607-11297-11rdzfw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children gather around a fossil skull at a South African museum.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Jon Hrusa </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 1925, <a href="http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/people.php?id=65-251-19">Jan Smuts</a> was both a prominent politician and an advocate for science. Just after the first of his two terms as prime minister of the Union of South Africa, Smuts served as president of the South African Association for the Advancement of Science. It was in this capacity that he spoke out about <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/raymond-arthur-dart">Raymond Dart’s</a> discovery of <em>Australopithecus africanus</em> and his theories about the <a href="http://humanorigins.si.edu/evidence/human-fossils/fossils/taung-child">Taung skull</a>, saying these ideas meant that</p>
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<p>South Africa may yet figure as the cradle of mankind, or shall I rather, say, one of the cradles?</p>
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<p>He remained in government at the time and actively supported the emerging discipline of paleontology – not just in speeches but in personalised contacts with the scientists who were birthing it. And so, as Christa Kuljan points out in her new book <a href="http://www.jacana.co.za/book-categories/natural-history-a-travel/darwins-hunch-detail">Darwin’s Hunch: Science, Race, and the Search for Human Origins</a>, from the beginning of the search for the “cradle” the role of state support – or lack thereof – was essential to how scientific research was conducted in South Africa. </p>
<p>In the book, Kuljan examines the history of South African palaeoanthropology and genetics research as she tries to make sense of science, race and their links to the hunt for human origins. The “hunch” she refers to was Darwin’s idea, from 1871, that humans evolved in Africa. He was later proved right. But for a long time European scientists rejected his thesis.</p>
<p>As an intellectual history of the disciplines of paleontology and paleoanthropology, Kuljan’s book is especially adept at narrating the interwoven connections between science and power. There are shortcomings, too; she doesn’t really grapple with ideas around identity, and could have explored some scientists’ bizarre preoccupation with Spiritualism in more depth.</p>
<p>The victory of the National Party (NP) in 1948’s elections, as Kuljan shows, threw paleontology into a crisis. This wasn’t only because the effusive support shown by Smuts was lost, but also because the meaning of the word “race” changed to suit the ideological ambitions of apartheid’s advocates. </p>
<h2>The fate of race</h2>
<p>Suspicion and complicity were united under the NP’s rule. Religion rather than science was used as the foundation of race thinking. But at the same time individual scientists – paleoanthropologist <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/professor-emeritus-phillip-tobias">Phillip Tobias</a> being the most prominent – were repeatedly asked to endorse the existence of “race” and “races”. </p>
<p>Tobias’ behaviour when it came to race was ambiguous.</p>
<p>In 1961 he published a paper titled “<a href="http://www.indiana.edu/%7Eafrcol/items/show/16485">The Meaning of Race</a>” in which he questioned the academic usefulness of the category of race. But at the same time he was leading the “Campbell Griqua Expedition” which exhumed 35 skeletons of people identified as <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/griqua">Griqua</a>. This was one instance of blatant and criminal “grave digging” by anatomists and paleoanthropologists.</p>
<p>The exhumations reveal a blind spot of the era’s paleontologists, like Tobias – one that even Kuljan does not observe. As far as we know the word “Griqua” is an invention. The people identified by the name are the epitome of hybridity in South Africa. Tobias and his team were looking for “pure Koranna” and “pure Bushman”. They were looking at the “Bushman” once again as the “missing link” – but that’s exactly the opposite of what the Griqua were: from their first appearance on the frontier, they were understood to be a cultural melange of indigenous and enslaved forefathers. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172681/original/file-20170607-11301-wz2oas.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172681/original/file-20170607-11301-wz2oas.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172681/original/file-20170607-11301-wz2oas.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=911&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172681/original/file-20170607-11301-wz2oas.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=911&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172681/original/file-20170607-11301-wz2oas.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=911&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172681/original/file-20170607-11301-wz2oas.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1145&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172681/original/file-20170607-11301-wz2oas.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1145&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172681/original/file-20170607-11301-wz2oas.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1145&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jacana Media</span></span>
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<p>The failure to really dig into the question of “Griqua” identity is, I think, one of the glaring absences in Kuljan’s account. She could have simply asked the question: what does it mean to erase “hybridity” and replace it with “purity”? By missing this step, the apartheid mania for <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-myth-of-white-purity-and-narratives-that-fed-racism-in-south-africa-59330">racial purity</a> is once again left untouched. </p>
<p>Without this acknowledgement of the irrational, “science” remains “rational” – even while “race” seems to derail its assumptions and unhinge even the most talented minds. </p>
<h2>The metaphysics of science</h2>
<p>This derangement is also evident in the frequency with which believers in the “science of Man” – author J.M. Coetzee’s term for the ethnological disciplines – resorted to Spiritualism. </p>
<p>So, Kuljan writes, both <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/evan.10024/epdf">John Robinson</a> and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/dr-robert-broom-discoverer-mrs-ples-born">Robert Broom</a> – two of South Africa’s most prominent paleontologists – were members or attended the meetings of the mystically-focused <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/theosophy">Theosophical Society</a>.</p>
<p>The collision of science and religion caused Robinson to cleave them apart, Kuljan explains, since he saw</p>
<blockquote>
<p>science as explaining the material world, but he looked to his spiritual side to explore non-material aspects of the universe (page 127). </p>
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<p>He went even further by inviting a clairvoyant from New Zealand, Geoffrey Hodson, to Sterkfontein near Johannesburg to channel the life of the “ape-man” via fossils. The <a href="http://www.maropeng.co.za/content/page/explore-the-caves">Sterkfontein caves</a> were quickly becoming the most attractive site for finding fossils. Colloquially, even scientists referred to these fossils as a confirmation of an ancestor who was an “ape-man”. </p>
<p>Robinson invited Hodson to conjure the life of an “ape-man” since this was presumed to be the main characteristic of the human ancestor who became known as <em>Australopithecus africanus</em>. </p>
<p>These and other resorts to metaphysics are not as well explored in the book as they could have been. </p>
<p>It’s not surprising that as human beings scientists can entertain crystal ball visions and table-tapping seances even while claiming to be materialists. The most enduring legacy of these vacillations is that it has bequeathed to us a rather conflicted image of our hominid ancestors.</p>
<h2>African Genesis goes viral</h2>
<p>In Kuljan’s book this conflict revolves around the place of violence in the emergence of homo sapiens. The scientists are not entirely at fault here since it was the sensationalism of Robert Ardrey’s <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/African_genesis.html?id=9Yg1AAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">book</a> <em>African Genesis: A Personal Investigation into the Animal Origins and Nature of Man</em> (1961) that catapulted the fragmentary bones and skulls of southern Africa into a full-blown technicolour picture of a hominid ancestor who was a “killer ape”. </p>
<p>This reimagined violent ancestor is still with us not only in the continuing endeavour to “humanise” hominids – the liberal reaction – but also in the visceral <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2015/09/24/Stop-divisive-attacks-over-Homo-naledi-Makhura">attack</a> on the recently discovered <em>Homo naledi</em> by those who think of hominids as “apes”. </p>
<p>Somewhere in between lies the truth of our ancestors. Kuljan’s book is a brave attempt to make this search for our ancestry a recuperable enterprise even while the “killer ape” keeps escaping her scientific confines and invading the imagination of the popular “scientist” and naysayer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78617/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hlonipha Mokoena does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As an intellectual history of the disciplines of paleontology and paleoanthropology, Kuljan’s book is especially adept at narrating the interwoven connections between science and power.Hlonipha Mokoena, Associate Professor at the Wits Institute for Social & Economic Research, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/775882017-05-12T12:18:49Z2017-05-12T12:18:49Z‘Horseshoe theory’ is nonsense – the far right and far left have little in common<p>After the first round of the French presidential elections, several <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/24/10-things-learned-french-election-macron-le-pen">liberal commentators</a> condemned the defeated leftist candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon for refusing to endorse the centrist Emmanuel Macron. His decision was portrayed as a failure to oppose the far-right Front National, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/world/europe/france-melenchon-macron-le-pen.html?_r=0">it was argued</a> that many of his supporters were likely to vote for Marine Le Pen in the second round. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/25/le-pen-far-right-holocaust-revisionist-macron-left">Comparisons were drawn</a> with the US presidential elections and the alleged failure of Bernie Sanders supporters to back Hilary Clinton over Donald Trump.</p>
<p><a href="https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/05/could-the-french-far-left-propel-marine-le-pen-to-victory/">Underlying these claims</a> is a broader and increasingly popular notion that the far left and the far right have more in common than either would like to admit. This is known as the “horseshoe theory”, so called because rather than envisaging the political spectrum as a straight line from communism to fascism, it pictures the spectrum as a horseshoe in which the far left and far right have more in common with each other than they do with the political centre. The theory also underlies many of the attacks on the leader of the UK Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, who is accused of cosying up to authoritarian and theocratic regimes and fostering antisemitism within his party.</p>
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<p>Taken one by one, these claims do not withstand scrutiny. Did Mélenchon give succour to Le Pen? No: he explicitly ruled out supporting Le Pen, and most of his supporters <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/62d782d6-31a7-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a">voted for Macron</a> in the second round. Are there antisemites in the Labour Party? Yes: but there are antisemites in every British political party; the difference is that <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/27-times-tory-party-racism-7904018">repeated incidents of racism</a> in other parties go unremarked (as does Corbyn’s longstanding record of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/29/jeremy-corbyn-arrest-protesting-apartheid-shows-ready-lead-britain/">anti-racist activism</a>).</p>
<p>Fans of the horseshoe theory like to lend their views weight and credibility by pointing to the alleged history of collusion between fascists and communists: the favoured example is the Nazi-Soviet Pact. But – aside from the fact that the Soviet Union played a vital role in defeating the Nazis – it is patently absurd to compare Stalin to present-day leftists like Mélenchon or Corbyn.</p>
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<p>Can we instead find convergence between far left and far right at the level of policy? It is true that both attack neoliberal globalisation and its elites. But there is no agreement between far left and far right over who counts as the “elite”, why they are a problem, and how to respond to them. When the billionaire real-estate mogul Donald Trump decries global elites, for example, he is either simply giving his audience what he thinks they want to hear or he is indulging in <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/11/06/is_donald_trump_s_closing_campaign_ad_anti_semitic.html">antisemitic dog-whistling</a>.</p>
<p>For the left, the problem with globalisation is that it has given free rein to capital and entrenched economic and political inequality. The solution is therefore to place constraints on capital and/or to allow <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-100-trillion-case-for-open-borders-72595">people to have the same freedom of movement</a> currently given to capital, goods, and services. They want an <em>alternative</em> globalisation. For the right, the problem with globalisation is that it has corroded supposedly traditional and homogeneous cultural and ethnic communities – their solution is therefore to <em>reverse</em> globalisation, protecting national capital and placing <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-marine-le-pens-144-point-presidential-plan-for-france-actually-says-72910">further restrictions on the movement of people</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trump and Sanders both attacked globalisation – for different reasons.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/80038275@N00/31642423416/in/album-72157674058907543/">Michael Vadon</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Is there a more fundamental, ideological resonance between far left and far right? Again, only in the vaguest sense that both challenge the liberal-democratic status quo. But they do so for very different reasons and with very different aims. When fascists reject liberal individualism, it is in the name of a vision of national unity and ethnic purity rooted in a romanticised past; when communists and socialists do so, it is in the name of international solidarity and the redistribution of wealth.</p>
<p>Given the basic implausibility of the horseshoe theory, why do so many centrist commentators insist on perpetuating it? The likely answer is that it allows those in the centre to discredit the left while disavowing their own complicity with the far right. Historically, it has been “centrist” liberals – in Spain, Chile, Brazil, and in many other countries – who have helped the far right to power, usually because they would rather have had a fascist in power than a socialist.</p>
<p>Today’s fascists have also been facilitated by centrists – and not just, for example, <a href="http://theweek.com/articles/694928/why-not-le-pen?utm_source=links&utm_medium=website&utm_campaign=twitter">those</a> on the <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/2017/05/is-marine-le-pen-really-far-right/">centre-right</a> who have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/29/opinion/sunday/is-there-a-case-for-le-pen.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fross-douthat&action=click&contentCollection=opinion&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=4&pgtype=collection">explicitly defended Le Pen</a>. When centrists ape the Islamophobia and immigrant-bashing of the far right, many people begin to think that fascism is legitimate; when they pursue policies which exacerbate <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/03/daily-chart-1">economic inequality</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-french-election-shows-the-democratic-limits-of-the-countrys-presidential-system-77114">hollow out democracy</a>, many begin to think that fascism looks desirable.</p>
<p>If liberals genuinely want to understand and confront the rise of the far right, then rather than smearing the left they should perhaps reflect on their own faults.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77588/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Choat is a member of the Labour party.</span></em></p>Both attack the status-quo, but for entirely different reasons.Simon Choat, Senior Lecturer in Political Theory, Kingston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.