tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/joint-strike-fighter-10110/articlesJoint Strike Fighter – The Conversation2017-06-14T02:22:57Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/609052017-06-14T02:22:57Z2017-06-14T02:22:57ZWhat went wrong with the F-35, Lockheed Martin’s Joint Strike Fighter?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171516/original/file-20170530-23718-wvqgj1.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=175%2C462%2C2824%2C1805&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Everything to everyone – or is the F-35 a big expense for not much benefit?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/502787/hill-afb-in-midst-of-robust-f-35-preparation/">U.S. Air Force/Alex R. Lloyd</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The F-35 was billed as a fighter jet that could do almost everything the U.S. military desired, serving the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy – and even <a href="https://www.f35.com/global/participation/united-kingdom">Britain’s Royal Air Force and Royal Navy</a> – all in one aircraft design. It’s supposed to replace and improve upon several current – and aging – aircraft types with widely different missions. It’s <a href="https://www.f35.com/">marketed as a cost-effective, powerful multi-role fighter airplane</a> significantly better than anything potential adversaries could build in the next two decades. But it’s turned out to be none of those things.</p>
<p>Officially begun in 2001, with roots extending back to the late 1980s, the F-35 program is nearly a decade behind schedule, and has <a href="http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2015/pdf/dod/2015f35jsf.pdf">failed to meet many of its original design requirements</a>. It’s also become the <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2016/12/12/investing/donald-trump-lockheed-martin-f-35-tweet/index.html">most expensive defense program in world history</a>, at <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2014/07/31/how-dods-15-trillion-f-35-broke-the-air-force.html">around US$1.5 trillion</a> before the fighter is <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/2016/03/24/f-35-fly-until-2070-six-years-longer-than-planned/82224282/">phased out in 2070</a>.</p>
<p>The unit cost per airplane, above $100 million, is <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-donald-trump-was-right-the-f-35s-costs-are-out-control-18826">roughly twice what was promised early on</a>. Even after President Trump lambasted the cost of the program in February, the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/03/politics/f-35-lockheed-martin-cost-reduction/">price per plane dropped just $7 million</a> – less than 7 percent.</p>
<p>And yet, the U.S. is still throwing huge sums of money at the project. Essentially, the Pentagon has declared the F-35 “<a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/f-35-60-minutes-david-martin/">too big to fail</a>.” As a retired member of the U.S. Air Force and current university professor of finance who has been involved in and studied military aviation and acquisitions, I find the F-35 to be one of the greatest boondoggles in recent military purchasing history.</p>
<h2>Forget what’s already spent</h2>
<p>The Pentagon is trying to argue that just because taxpayers have flushed <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-18/f-35-s-grotesque-overruns-are-now-past-pentagon-s-chief-says">more than $100 billion down the proverbial toilet so far</a>, we must continue to throw billions more down that same toilet. That violates the most elementary financial principles of capital budgeting, which is the method companies and governments use to decide on investments. So-called sunk costs, the money already paid on a project, should never be a factor in investment decisions. Rather, spending should be based on <a href="http://leepublish.typepad.com/strategicthinking/2015/03/sunk-cost-fallacy.html">how it will add value in the future</a>.</p>
<p>Keeping the F-35 program alive is not only a gross waste in itself: Its funding could be spent on defense programs that are really useful and needed for national defense, such as <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/07/08/pentagon-needs-more-money-counter-islamic-state-drones/86867452/">anti-drone systems to defend U.S. troops</a>.</p>
<p>Part of the enormous cost has come as a result of an effort to share aircraft design and replacement parts across different branches of the military. In 2013, a study by the RAND Corporation found that it would have been cheaper if the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy had simply <a href="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/MG1200/MG1225/RAND_MG1225.pdf">designed and developed separate and more specialized aircraft</a> to meet their specific operational requirements.</p>
<h2>Not living up to top billing</h2>
<p>The company building the F-35 has made grand claims. Lockheed Martin said the plane would be <a href="http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/66855/lockheed-touts-f_22%2C-jsf-at-s%27pore-show-%28feb-22%29.html">far better than current aircraft</a> – “four times more effective” in air-to-air combat, “eight times more effective” in air-to-ground combat and “three times more effective” in recognizing and suppressing an enemy’s air defenses. It would, in fact, be “<a href="http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Lockheed_Martin_F22_and_F35_5th_Gen_Revolution_In_Military_Aviation.html">second only to the F-22 in air superiority</a>.” In addition, the F-35 was to have better range and require less logistics support than current military aircraft. The Pentagon is still calling the F-35 “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170530194416/http://www.jsf.mil/">the most affordable, lethal, supportable, and survivable aircraft ever to be used</a>.”</p>
<p>But that’s not how the plane has turned out. In January 2015, mock combat testing pitted the F-35 against an F-16, one of the fighters it is slated to replace. The F-35A was flown “clean” with empty weapon bays and without any drag-inducing and heavy externally mounted weapons or fuel tanks. The F-16D, a heavier and somewhat less capable training version of the mainstay F-16C, was further encumbered with two 370-gallon external wing-mounted fuel tanks. </p>
<p>In spite of its significant advantages, the F-35A’s test pilot noted that the F-35A was <a href="https://medium.com/war-is-boring/read-for-yourself-the-f-35-s-damning-dogfighting-report-719a4e66f3eb">less maneuverable and markedly inferior to the F-16D in a visual-range dogfight</a>.</p>
<h2>Stealth over power</h2>
<p>One key reason the F-35 doesn’t possess the world-beating air-to-air prowess promised, and is likely <a href="http://breakingdefense.com/2015/07/f-16-vs-f-35-in-a-dogfight-jpo-air-force-weigh-in-on-whos-best/">not even adequate when compared with its current potential adversaries</a>, is that it was designed first and foremost to be a stealthy airplane. This requirement has taken precedence over maneuverability, and likely above its overall air-to-air lethality. The Pentagon and especially the Air Force seem to be <a href="http://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/613385/us-marine-corps-moves-forward-with-f-35-transition/">relying almost exclusively</a> on the F-35’s stealth capabilities to succeed at its missions.</p>
<p>Like the F-117 and F-22, the F-35’s stealth capability <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/stealth-aircraft-rcs.htm">greatly reduces, but does not eliminate, its radar cross-section</a>, the signal that radar receivers see bouncing back off an airplane. The plane looks smaller on radar – perhaps like a bird rather than a plane – but is not invisible. The F-35 is designed to be stealthy primarily in the X-band, the radar frequency range most commonly used for targeting in air-to-air combat.</p>
<p>In other radar frequencies, the F-35 is not so stealthy, making it vulnerable to being tracked and shot down using current – and even obsolete – weapons. As far back as 1999 the same type of stealth technology was not able to prevent a U.S. Air Force F-117 flying over Kosovo from being located, tracked and <a href="http://www.defenceaviation.com/2007/02/how-was-f-117-shot-down-part-1.html">shot down using an out-of-date Soviet radar and surface-to-air missile system</a>. In the nearly two decades since, that incident has been studied in depth not only by the U.S., but also by potential adversaries seeking weaknesses in passive radar stealth aircraft.</p>
<p>Of course, radar is not the only way to locate and target an aircraft. One can also use an aircraft’s infrared emissions, which are created by friction-generated heat as it flies through the air, along with its hot engines. Several nations, particularly the Russians, have excellent passive <a href="http://aviationweek.com/technology/new-radars-irst-strengthen-stealth-detection-claims">infrared search and tracking systems</a>, that can locate and target enemy aircraft with great precision – sometimes using lasers to measure exact distances, but without needing radar.</p>
<p>It’s also very common in air-to-air battles for opposing planes to come close enough that their pilots can see each other. The F-35 is as visible as any other aircraft its size.</p>
<h2>Analysts weigh in</h2>
<p>Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon say the F-35’s superiority over its rivals lies in its ability to remain undetected, giving it “<a href="http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-f-35-tri-service-jet-must-outfly-critics-2012dec01-story.html">first look, first shot, first kill</a>.” Hugh Harkins, a highly respected author on military combat aircraft, called that claim “<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Sukhoi-Su-35S-Flanker-Generation-Super-Manoeuvrability/dp/1903630169/ref=asap_bc">a marketing and publicity gimmick</a>” in his book on Russia’s Sukhoi Su-35S, a potential opponent of the F-35. He also wrote, “In real terms an aircraft in the class of the F-35 cannot compete with the Su-35S for out and out performance such as speed, climb, altitude, and maneuverability.”</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Fighter plane expert Pierre Sprey is a harsh critic of the F-35.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Other critics have been even harsher. Pierre Sprey, a cofounding member of the so-called “<a href="http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/40-years-of-the-fighter-mafia/">fighter mafia</a>” at the Pentagon and a co-designer of the F-16, calls the F-35 an “<a href="http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/blog/extended-interview-pierre-sprey">inherently a terrible airplane</a>” that is the product of “an exceptionally dumb piece of Air Force PR spin.” He has said <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/blog/extended-interview-pierre-sprey">the F-35 would likely lose a close-in combat encounter to a well-flown MiG-21</a>, a 1950s Soviet fighter design. Robert Dorr, an Air Force veteran, career diplomat and military air combat historian, wrote in his book “Air Power Abandoned,” “The F-35 demonstrates repeatedly that it can’t live up to promises made for it. … <a href="https://robertfdorr.blogspot.com/2015/08/hitler-hillary-time-travel-and-f-22.html">It’s that bad</a>.”</p>
<h2>How did we get here?</h2>
<p>How did the F-35 go from its conception as the most technologically advanced, do-it-all military aircraft in the world to a virtual turkey? Over the decades-long effort to meet a real military need for better aircraft, the F-35 program is the result of the merging or combination of several other separate and diverse projects into a set of requirements for an airplane that is trying to be everything to everybody. </p>
<p>In combat the difference between winning and losing is often not very great. With second place all too often meaning death, the Pentagon seeks to provide warriors with the best possible equipment. The best tools are those that are tailor-made to address specific missions and types of combat. Seeking to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/08/28/defense-spending-in-the-u-s-in-four-charts/">accomplish more tasks with less money</a>, defense planners looked for ways to economize.</p>
<p>For a fighter airplane, funding decisions become a balancing act of procuring not just the best aircraft possible, but enough of them to make an effective force. This has lead to the creation of so-called “multi-role” fighter aircraft, capable both in air-to-air combat and against ground targets. Where trade-offs have to happen, designers of most multi-role fighters emphasize aerial combat strength, reducing air-to-ground capabilities. With the F-35, it appears designers created an airplane that doesn’t do either mission exceptionally well. They have made the plane an inelegant jack-of-all-trades, but master of none – at great expense, both in the past and, apparently, <a href="http://www.star-telegram.com/news/business/article151096902.html">well into the future</a>.</p>
<p>I believe the F-35 program should be immediately cancelled; the technologies and systems developed for it should be used in more up-to-date and cost-effective aircraft designs. Specifically, the F-35 should be replaced with a series of new designs targeted toward the specific mission requirements of the individual branches of the armed forces, in lieu of a single aircraft design trying to be everything to everyone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60905/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael P. Hughes owns shares of an exchange traded fund that includes shares of Lockheed Martin along with many other aerospace and defense companies. </span></em></p>The most expensive defense program in world history has yielded a multi-role fighter plane that is an inelegant jack-of-all-trades, but master of none.Michael P. Hughes, Professor of Finance, Francis Marion UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/738322017-03-02T19:07:23Z2017-03-02T19:07:23ZAustralia gets its first public display of the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter<p>The Australian public will get its first chance to see the country’s new Joint Strike Fighter (<a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/joint-strike-fighter-10110">JSF</a>) when two Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II fighters <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-27/joint-strike-fighters-f35-land-in-australia/8308498">fly at Avalon air show</a> in Victoria this weekend.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.f35.com/news/detail/f-35s-to-make-australian-debut-at-the-avalon-airshow">AU-1 and AU-2 aircraft</a> were the first two Australian F-35s to roll off the Lockheed Martin assembly line in Fort Worth, Texas, in July 2014. In December that year, both aircraft were flown to Luke Air Force Base in Arizona to join an international pilot training pool. </p>
<p>The Australian government approved the purchase of 14 F-35A fighters in November 2009, and a second tranche of 58 aircraft in April 2014, equipping three squadrons. A further tranche of 28 aircraft, bringing the total up to 100 aircraft for a fourth squadron, has yet to be decided on.</p>
<p>But there have been several questions raised about the JSF’s effectiveness and readiness to be used operationally.</p>
<h2>Is the JSF ready yet?</h2>
<p>Lockheed Martin is developing <a href="https://www.f35.com/about/variants">three versions</a> of the Joint Strike Fighter: the F-35A for conventional takeoff and landing; the F-35B for short takeoff/vertical landing; and the F-35C for aircraft carriers.</p>
<p>The F-35B “jump jet” variant <a href="http://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/611657/us-marines%20-corps-declares-the-f-35b-operational/">achieved what is known as Initial Operational Capability</a> (IOC) on July 31, 2015. </p>
<p>For the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), IOC is the basic level of operational readiness, when “<a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Capability/?RAAF-/kFUpPVag5Pqj5gUIp0CxtwJlFabWz0O">one or more subsets of the capability</a>” can be deployed on operations. This means that it can go to war and perform some combat missions, but some things still need to be developed.</p>
<p>For the RAAF, Final Operational Capability (FOC) is when the “entire capability” can be deployed on operations and is fully ready for war.</p>
<p>However, the United States Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (<a href="http://www.dote.osd.mil/">DOT&E</a>), Michael Gilmore, was critical of the US test. He <a href="http://www.pogoarchives.org/straus/2015-9-1-DoD-FOIA-ocr.pdf">said in a 2015 memo</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The event was not an operational test, though, in either a formal or an informal sense of the term. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>With regard to the software “<a href="https://www.f35.com/about/life-cycle/software">block</a>”, an incremental approach to software development, Gilmore said in the memo:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] it did not – and could not – demonstrate that the Block 2B F-35B is operationally effective or suitable for use in any type of limited combat operation, or that it is ready for real-world operational deployments.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Additionally, it showed that a number of maintenance and reliability problems that he said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] are likely to present significant near-term challenges for the Marine Corps, given the present state of maturity of the F-35B aircraft.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Further details on the progress and deficiencies of the aircraft can be found in the <a href="http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2016/pdf/dod/2016f35jsf.pdf">DOT&E evaluation of the F-35 for the 2016 financial year</a>.</p>
<h2>The Australian aircraft</h2>
<p>The F-35A variant, which Australia is buying, <a href="http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/885496/air-force-declares-the-f-35a-combat-ready.aspx">achieved IOC with the US Air Force</a> (USAF) on August 2, 2016, but the aircraft was also <a href="http://www.pogo.org/straus/issues/weapons/2016/f-35-may-never-be-ready-for-combat.html">criticised for its deficiencies</a>.</p>
<p>The US-led F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) has been unfazed by the DOT&E reports, issuing <a href="https://www.f35.com/news/detail/jpo-public-response-statement-dote-2016-annual-report-on-the-f-35">a statement in January</a> this year that said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] F-35 flight test program, as well as the F-35 fleet users, made significant progress in maturing and proving the capability of the aircraft during 2016. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The JPO statement detailed a number of areas of such progress and noted that the development program was more than 90% complete. But it also recognised that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] there are known deficiencies that must be corrected and there remains the potential for future findings.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The RAAF hopes that the F-35A will begin entering service in July 2019 to <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/casg/AboutCASG/OurStructure/Air/JointStrikeFighterDivision/">achieve IOC in November 2020</a>, with <a href="http://www.janes.com/article/68300/avalon-2017-f-35-makes-australian-debut">FOC slated for 2023</a>. </p>
<h2>Seeing the stealth</h2>
<p>One of the key capabilities of the F-35A is its stealth, the ability to avoid enemy detection. But military technology is a dynamic process, and no advantage lasts for ever, as counter-measures are invariably developed, and stealth is no exception.</p>
<p>In September 2016 there were reports that a Chinese military company had announced it had developed <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2021235/end-stealth-new-chinese-radar-capable-detecting-invisible-targets-100km">a new form of radar</a> able to detect stealth planes 100km away. But this so-called “quantum radar” is far from being ready for operation, <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/did-china-just-make-all-stealth-fighters-think-the-f-22-f-35-19608">if it even exists outside a laboratory</a>.</p>
<p>As well as the Chinese, <a href="http://www.nextbigfuture.com/2017/02/more-technical-details-about-chinas.html">researchers in the US, UK and Canada</a> have been working on developing a “quantum radar” for a number of years, <a href="http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=7,375,802.PN.&OS=PN/7,375,802&RS=PN/7,375,802">including F-35 manufacturer Lockheed Martin</a>.</p>
<p>There are <a href="http://aviationweek.com/technology/new-radars-irst-strengthen-stealth-detection-claims">other ways of detecting stealth aircraft</a>, which are more technologically mature than quantum radar, such as low frequency radar and infrared search and track.</p>
<p>But the Sir Richard Williams Foundation, an independent research body on looking at Australia’s defence and security polices, <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/JointStikeFighter/%7E/media/Committees/fadt_ctte/JointStikeFighter/report.pdf">argues</a> that stealth is about more than a low radar cross section:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>LO (low observability) technology also means minimising the probability of intercept of its electronic emissions while at the same time enhancing networking capabilities and situational awareness to give a pilot decision superiority. Stealth is not about preventing detection; it’s about ensuring access. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A 5th generation air force</h2>
<p>The Australian defence force sees the F-35A as more than just a replacement older aircraft. According to Air Vice Marshal Chris Deeble, Australia’s JSF Program Manager, the “JSF is a catalyst for change” in the future of the air force.</p>
<p>The RAAF’s <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/plan-jericho/?RAAF-CrI57877JHUU/bo9YoJ64qWYIO7G/14Q">Plan Jericho</a> intends to use the introduction of the JSF to transform the Australian air force “into a fifth-generation air force”. By <a href="https://www.airforce.gov.au/Fifth-Generation-Explained/?RAAF-whY8eFJkE4+5GBF5e9dj+IO+IHd42mda">fifth-generation</a> the RAAF means one that is fully networked with aircraft just part of that network.</p>
<p>Lockheed Martin <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/JointStikeFighter/%7E/media/Committees/fadt_ctte/JointStikeFighter/report.pdf">told an Australian Senate committee</a> that the F-35 was designed to be a “key net-enabling node in a system of systems, gathering and transmitting data across the defence network”. </p>
<p>While Australia must still wait before its F-35 aircraft become operational, the USAF is looking to send small F-35A units to Europe and the Asia Pacific this year. It’s also hoping to deploy the <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/articles/air-force-anticipates-f-35-deployment-to-middle-east-in-not-too-distant-future">F-35A to fight the Islamic State group</a> in the Middle East in the not too distant future.</p>
<p>So if you want to take a look at the aircraft that’s at the centre of such attention then head to the Avalon airshow, between Melbourne and Geelong, this week, March 3 to 5. The two F-35As are <a href="https://www.airshow.com.au/airshow2017/PUBLIC/program/sunday-program.asp">due to fly out on Sunday</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article was amended at the request of the author to remove an incorrect reference to the cost of Australia’s first two F35s. A more accurate report on the initial costs is available <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-21/australias-joint-strike-fighter-purchase-unaffected-by-canada/6874660">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73832/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven L. Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The new Joint Strike Fighter will make its first appearance before an Australian crowd this weekend. But how close to being operational is the new fighter aircraft?Steven L. Jones, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/363542015-02-05T19:38:13Z2015-02-05T19:38:13ZShaping 2015: Andrews must show $30b defence budget is well spent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70418/original/image-20150129-22295-1s6xqhb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Defence’s year in 2015 will be defined primarily by its response to the forthcoming white paper.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Hugh Peterswald</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia has decisively responded to the strategic uncertainty of contemporary East Asia by forming committees and undertaking reviews. 2015 brings with it Australia’s third defence white paper in six years, along with a growing list of major <a href="http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2014/08/05/defence-minister-announces-first-principles-review-panel/">supporting reviews</a>. The challenge for the new minister, Kevin Andrews, will be to help the Department of Defence figure out how to implement it all.</p>
<p>As an organisation, Defence has come a long way in recent years, particularly under the guidance of <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/secretary/Biography.asp">Dennis Richardson</a>, perhaps Australia’s leading public servant. But even Richardson, who has stints as ambassador to the US and head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade under his belt, needs a strong minister to help him get the civilian and uniform sections of Defence moving in co-ordination. </p>
<p>Expect debate on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-joint-strike-fighter-is-it-the-right-aircraft-for-australia-25911">F-35 Joint Strike Fighter</a> and whether Australia should buy <a href="https://theconversation.com/government-in-a-rush-to-make-the-wrong-decision-on-submarines-33544">Japanese subs</a> to continue in 2015. Both speak to larger unresolvable issues, like Australia’s relationships with bigger countries and domestic manufacturing, with entrenched positions on either side.</p>
<h2>The upcoming white paper</h2>
<p>Defence’s year in 2015 will be defined primarily by its response to the <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/">white paper</a> expected some time mid-year. Andrews has come into the portfolio too late to significantly influence the document. Given his lack of expertise in military matters that is no bad thing.</p>
<p>The white paper is unlikely to provide a major new organising strategic concept that easily identifies Defence’s priorities and force structures. Where the Cold War could offer multiple such ideas — notably <a href="http://vietnam-war.commemoration.gov.au/vietnam-war/australia-enters-1962.php">“forward defence”</a> and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_of_Australia_policy">“Defence of Australia”</a> – the modern era has no such clarity.</p>
<p>Instead, the 2015 Defence White Paper is likely to largely accept the mixed judgement about Australia’s strategic environment that guided the <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2009/">2009</a> and <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/">2013</a> papers. Rather than debating China as friend or foe, the document will most likely focus on the back end, identifying capabilities and command systems that are flexible yet effective enough to respond to a wide range of challenges.</p>
<p>Past defence white papers were proud to talk about the major assets the government should purchase and the idealistic environments they hoped to build. But how the former achieved the latter was often left unsaid – a matter for back-office bureaucrats to resolve long after the minister had moved on. </p>
<p>If Andrews can influence just one thing in the final drafting process it should be this relationship. The minister should be insisting the document is explicit in identifying the “strategic bridge” that links particular capabilities (ships, planes, troops) to the political outcomes Australia seeks. </p>
<p>In other words, how does the <a href="http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2014/05/13/minister-for-defence-budget-2014-15-defence-budget-overview/">nearly A$30 billion</a> the Australian public spends on defence directly achieve the type of world we want?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70423/original/image-20150129-22292-hqsn3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70423/original/image-20150129-22292-hqsn3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70423/original/image-20150129-22292-hqsn3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70423/original/image-20150129-22292-hqsn3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70423/original/image-20150129-22292-hqsn3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70423/original/image-20150129-22292-hqsn3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70423/original/image-20150129-22292-hqsn3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kevin Andrews has come into the defence portfolio too late to significantly influence this year’s white paper.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Lukas Coch</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Tackling funding questions</h2>
<p>Bereft of a grand organising concept, the Abbott government is likely to hedge its bets: closer co-operation with allies without needlessly antagonising potential opponents; a diversified, rather than focused, force. </p>
<p>But to make these flexible strategies work, the operational motor behind it all – the looming city on a hill that is the <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/id/_Master/docs/ncrp/act/1004,%20Russell%20Offices,%20ACT.pdf">Russell Defence offices</a> – has to be smooth and efficient.</p>
<p>In this regard, Andrews’ main task is one he has almost a decade’s worth of experience in: managing a major government department and keeping large-scale reforms – many already well underway – in train. There’s a reason Prime Minister Tony Abbott <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/kevin-andrews-faces-battles-on-multiple-fronts/story-fn59niix-1227163766880">chose</a> one of his most experienced colleagues for this portfolio. Defence has a nasty habit of ruling ministers, rather than the other way around, ensuring Andrews will need all his guile and authority as a minister to stay in charge.</p>
<p>In return, Andrews also needs to provide a vital service to Defence. While other areas are seeing budgets slashed and priorities questioned, the Abbott government has committed to substantially expanding Defence’s budget to reach <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/2-percent-can-we-should-we-will-we/">2% of Australia’s GDP</a>. </p>
<p>This largely passed without public comment last budget. But if there is another hostile reaction to Treasury’s axe swinging in May, the public will rightly ask why Defence has not only escaped the chopping block, but has seemingly been able to write its own cheque.</p>
<p>To protect Defence from another crippling round of start-stop funding promises, Andrews needs to convince the public of the merits of higher defence spending. This can’t just be through a fear campaign about foreign bogeymen. He needs to seriously engage the public, admit the limited basis upon which judgements have to be made, discuss the range of plausible threats and find a justification for perhaps the largest-ever peacetime expansion of national military spending.</p>
<p>If Andrews can perform these two acts of service – giving his senior bureaucrats the support to turn the incoming torrent of talk into the fuel for implementing their reforms, while crafting a public narrative that sustains Defence’s funding stream – he will have had a very successful 2015. But it is unlikely any of his colleagues will be envious of the task ahead.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is the final piece in The Conversation’s Shaping 2015 series. Catch up on the rest <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/shaping-2015">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36354/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Carr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia has decisively responded to the strategic uncertainty of contemporary East Asia by forming committees and undertaking reviews. 2015 brings with it Australia’s third defence white paper in six…Andrew Carr, Research Fellow in Strategic and Defence Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/364362015-01-20T19:24:27Z2015-01-20T19:24:27ZHacking the secrets of Australia’s Joint Strike Fighter<p>Design details of Australia’s new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (<a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/joint-strike-fighter">JSF</a>) have been stolen by Chinese spies, according to <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/china-stole-plans-for-a-new-fighter-plane-spy-documents-have-revealed-20150118-12sp1o.html">reports this week</a>, although it’s not clear whether the information was highly classified or not.</p>
<p>But this isn’t the first time information on the JSF has been stolen – it’s just one among a long history of security breaches over the aircraft and its manufacturer Lockheed Martin.</p>
<p>In May 2013, the Washington Post <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/confidential-report-lists-us-weapons-system-designs-compromised-by-chinese-cyberspies/2013/05/27/a42c3e1c-c2dd-11e2-8c3b-0b5e9247e8ca_story.html">reported</a> that information on more than two dozen weapon systems were compromised by Chinese hackers, including ballistic missile defence systems, the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor transport and the US Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship.</p>
<p>The list also <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/05/28/the-u-s-weapons-systems-that-experts-say-were-hacked-by-the-chinese">includes</a> aircraft which Australia does or will operate: the Black Hawk helicopter, the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, the F/A-18 fighter, EA-18 Growler electronic warfare aircraft, the C-17 Globemaster III heavy transport as well as the JSF.</p>
<p>This is vast range of stolen information and is not likely to be from a single incident, but a culmination of hacks and other thefts over a few years.</p>
<p>For example, in <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-07-15/pentagon-admits-stealing-from-defence-contractor-twt/2796340">March 2011</a> the Pentagon admitted that 24,000 files were stolen from a US defence contractor. In May 2011, Reuters <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/27/us-usa-defense-hackers-idUSTRE74Q6VY20110527">reported</a> that the security systems of JSF manufacturer Lockheed Martin and other military contractors were broken into by hackers using duplicate “SecurID” electronic keys, but it was not clear what, if any, information was stolen. </p>
<h2>Release going on for years</h2>
<p>The JSF has been the subject of the theft or unintentional release of confidential or classified information at various times over the past two decades. In 1996, while Lockheed Martin, McDonnell Douglas and Boeing were in the new fighter competition, the Pentagon’s JSF Program Office inadvertently released Lockheed’s confidential cost and pricing information to the other two competitors.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/feb/06/freedomofinformation.past">May 2001</a>, much to concern of the US, a petty thief stole a laptop from a British military officer in London. The laptop, which was eventually recovered by the British Ministry of Defence, contained details of progress on the development of the JSF.</p>
<p>In 2009, the Wall Street Journal <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124027491029837401">reported</a> that hackers had been breaking into the JSF project since 2007, and:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] appear to have been interested in data about the design of the plane, its performance statistics and its electronic systems.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The report continued:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The intruders compromised the system responsible for diagnosing a plane’s maintenance problems during flight […] [the] plane’s most vital systems – such as flight controls and sensors – are physically isolated from the publicly accessible internet.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>At the time, Lockheed and the US Department of Defense downplayed the seriousness of the report. A Lockheed official was <a href="http://awin.aviationweek.com/portals/awin/cmsfiles/media/pdf/as_pdf/2009/04/22/asd_04_22_2009.pdf">reported</a> to have said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Representation of successful cyber attacks on the F-35 [JSF] program [are] incorrect.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This was amended with the statement:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>To our knowledge there has never been any classified information breach [despite] attacks on our systems continually.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A Pentagon spokesperson said there was “no special concerns”. Similarly, the Australian Department of Defence was <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-04-22/adf-hoses-down-f-35-hacking-concerns/1659488">reported</a> to have said that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] it has spoken with US Defence officials and Lockheed Martin about the alleged breach, but says extra sensitive data is not kept on systems connected to the internet.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Investigating the thefts</h2>
<p>In the prologue to his 2014 book <a href="http://shaneharris.com/atwar/">@War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex</a>, Shane Harris <a href="http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-12-08/huge-intelligence-screw-turned-government-and-private-companies-cyberwarfare">provides</a> details on the investigation into the security breaches. Harris said that the hackers were operating for months before anyone had noticed.</p>
<p>The US Air Force worked out that the information wasn’t taken from a military computer, and investigators began to look at the computer systems of contractors. Harris writes that the US Air Force brought in its own hacker to investigate but when he arrived at the Lockheed office he was greeted not by officials overseeing the JSF construction, but by the company’s lawyers.</p>
<p>The US air force top generals demanded that Lockheed and other contractors cooperate with the investigation which eventually discovered that Lockheed’s network had been “breached repeatedly”.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>They couldn’t say precisely how many times, but they judged the damage as severe, given the amount of information stolen and the intruders’ unfettered access to the networks. In the entire campaign, which also targeted other companies, the spies had made off with several terabytes of information on the jet’s inner workings.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If events of the past year are any indication, electronic theft of JSF information has been much more successful than the physical theft of information. In <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140113/DEFREG02/301130030/">January 2014</a>, US citizen Mozaffar Khazaee was arrested after trying to send items to Iran including:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] numerous boxes of documents consisting of sensitive technical manuals, specification sheets, and other proprietary material for the F-35 [JSF].</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The shipment included:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] thousands of pages of documents, including diagrams and blueprints of the high-tech fighter jet’s engine.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-accuses-chinese-executive-of-hacking-to-find-military-data-1405105264">July 2014</a>, the US Justice Department charged Su Bin, a Chinese citizen who was living in Canada, with stealing sensitive information about Boeing’s C-17 and Lockheed’s F-22 and F-35 JSF. Working with two co-conspirators in China, Su was breaking into Boeing and Lockheed computers between 2009 and 2013.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/asia-pacific/2014/12/09/chinese-national-accused-of-transporting-usaf-program-information/20155571/">November 2014</a>, Chinese national Yu Long was arrested while carrying:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] sensitive proprietary information on titanium used in a US Air Force program, most likely the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Secret or sensitive information?</h2>
<p>In the 2014 cases outlined above, it is important to note the term “sensitive” as opposed to classified or secret. The information may be commercially confidential, but not classified at a national security level.</p>
<p>And so too, it is not clear from the reports this week if classified information has been stolen on the JSF. The <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-35687.pdf">slide</a> in question, published by the German newspaper Der Speigel, is marked “Secret”, the whole presentation “Top Secret”, but the (U) for each piece of information indicates “Unclassified”.</p>
<p>What is not known is the security classification of the information stolen, as opposed to classification of the slide itself. Lockheed and Pentagon officials who stated in 2009 that no “classified” information was stolen may be technically correct, but it is still problematic.</p>
<p>In 2013, US Defence acquisitions chief Frank Kendall <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/19/usa-fighter-hacking-idUSL2N0EV0T320130619">admitted</a> to a Senate hearing that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A lot of [unclassified information] is being stolen right now and it’s a major problem for us.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Kendall was not primarily concerned that the loss of information would make the JSF vulnerable to attack, but rather that it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] reduces the costs and lead time of our adversaries to doing their own designs, so it gives away a substantial advantage.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>What now for Australia’s JSF plan?</h2>
<p>So what does all this mean for Australia’s commitment to the JSF? The federal government has <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Future-Acquisitions/F-35A-Lightning-II/?RAAF-ZRnYQhJUh1u0e44uR32olOT1rt+Ym4K3">committed to buying 72</a> of the F-35A version of the JSF at a total cost of A$12.4-billion, with the first to be operational by 2021.</p>
<p>For decades, a pillar of Australia’s defence policy has been possessing a technological edge over other nations in the region. It’s paid a significant premium to maintain that edge with the JSF but the theft of information, even unclassified information, erodes the technological edge in terms of quality and timeframes.</p>
<p>That being said, the JSF is much more than a weapons system. It is an enabler of networked information warfare, and it is the information’s technological edge which is critically important. <a href="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1314/MR1314.ch6.pdf">Information warfare</a> is the process of protecting one’s own sources of battlefield information and, at the same time, seeking to deny, degrade, corrupt, or destroy the enemy’s sources of battlefield information.</p>
<p>It is not clear if the electronic and information warfare capabilities of the JSF have been compromised. But China has demonstrated its adeptness in cyberespionage, and it would be concerning if this was indicative of China’s capabilities for electronic and information warfare.</p>
<p>Apart from increasing security measures, the theft of data of the past decade does not have significant short-term consequences for the US or Australia. But the long-term consequences remain unknown, at least until the capabilities of the JSF are fully developed, and we learn more about the Chinese fighters under development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36436/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven L. Jones receives government scholarship funding for his PhD.</span></em></p>Design details of Australia’s new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) have been stolen by Chinese spies, according to reports this week, although it’s not clear whether the information was highly classified…Steven L. Jones, PhD candidate in International Relations, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/281072014-07-07T20:12:32Z2014-07-07T20:12:32ZTake out the pilot from Australia’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter<p>Prime Minister Tony Abbott sat in the pilot seat of a F-35 <a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/joint-strike-fighter">Joint Strike Fighter</a> at the time he announced his government will buy an <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-23/australia-to-buy-58-more-joint-strike-fighters/5405236">additional 58 planes</a> at a cost of at least A$12.4 billion. But imagine if there was no need for a pilot to fly inside the so-called fifth generation aircraft.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.f35.com/">F-35</a> is said to be the smartest and most complex fighter jet on the planet, designed to conduct lethal strikes on air and ground targets without being detected by radar.</p>
<p>But its development has been beset by delays and cost overruns and it is not clear whether this aircraft is best <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-joint-strike-fighter-is-it-the-right-aircraft-for-australia-25911">suited to the task</a>.</p>
<p>Indeed, it’s not even obvious that we need a human in the loop.</p>
<h2>Do we really need a pilot?</h2>
<p>What we need is analysis to consider whether we have the right balance between piloted, optionally piloted and remotely or even automatically (autonomous) piloted systems planned for the future defence and air force structure.</p>
<p>Optionally piloted is where there is still a pilot on board but they can leave some of the aircraft’s operations to its computer systems. A preference for the latter remote or autonomous options might lead to cost savings or strategic benefits.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Does the F-35 need a pilot?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usairforce/8682921635">Flickr/US Air Force</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While Lockheed Martin has not yet officially confirmed the development of a pilotless or optionally piloted version of the F-35, Boeing has already converted several <a href="http://www.gizmag.com/boeing-f16-jet-unmanned-drone/29203/">F-16 fighter jets into drones</a>.</p>
<p>Bob Rubino, Lockheed’s director of Washington operations for the JSF program, <a href="http://news.usni.org/2012/07/12/unmanned-joint-strike-fighter">has also let on</a> that the company’s <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/aeronautics/skunkworks.html">Skunk Works</a> research and development lab is “constantly looking at all kinds of things”.</p>
<p>The US Naval Institute has <a href="http://news.usni.org/2012/07/12/unmanned-joint-strike-fighter">already pointed</a> out that an optionally piloted F-35 would hold many advantages.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>With a pilot in its seat, the aircraft can concentrate on the task of flying while the pilot gathers intelligence or operates the aircraft’s extensive command and control suite.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This has the potential to enhance decision-making and reduce casualties in armed conflict.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pilots still in training for the F-35.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/39955793@N07/8812929354">Flickr/US Department of Defense</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Without a human in the cockpit in the remotely or automatically piloted version, the potential benefits are magnified, as the aircraft would be able to perform riskier missions in support of international security.</p>
<p>Without the need for an ejector seat and other life support systems, the F-35 would also be able to significantly increase its weapon or sensor payload, or fly higher for an extended duration.</p>
<p>Over time, pilotless systems may also prove cheaper to buy and operate with reduced <a href="http://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/transportation-and-aviation/unmanned-aerial-vehicle-operator.html">training</a> and maintenance requirements, and the option for a multi-system control interface through which one operator can simultaneously oversee several drones.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.baesystems.com/enhancedarticle/BAES_157659/taranis-unmanned?_afrLoop=49001152028000&_afrWindowMode=2&_afrWindowId=null">BAE Systems</a> has already revealed that it has successfully test-flown the <a href="http://www.baesystems.com/enhancedarticle/BAES_157659/taranis-unmanned">Taranis</a>, a highly autonomous prototype drone.</p>
<p>But the best indication of what is to come for the JSF has been provided to me by industry insiders who have suggested that a pilotless conversion is inevitable (if not already underway).</p>
<p>The F-35 is a prime candidate as a fifth generation fighter aircraft with reports of up to <a href="http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2013/10/software-code-f-35.html">10 million lines of computer code</a> controlling its flight surfaces, engine and weapons systems. That’s more than six times the amount of the 1.7 million lines of code in its piloted cousin, the <a href="http://www.f22fighter.com/avionics.htm">F-22 Raptor</a>.</p>
<p>In essence, the computer already does much of the tough flying and the F-35 aircraft could serve as bridge to test other dedicated combat aircraft, with any lessons learned being applied to other unmanned combat aircraft of the future Australian Defence Force.</p>
<h2>The machines taking over</h2>
<p>Of course, beyond the technical survey and typical cost-benefit analysis, the government also needs to consider the higher level moral, political and strategic costs of employing such novel technologies.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The US already flies remotely piloted aircraft such as the MQ-9 Reaper.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usairforce/13991119140">Flickr/US Air Force/Staff Sgt John Bainter</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A host of questions go largely unanswered: are pilotless systems capable of discriminating between a fisherman displaying his catch and an angry Somali pirate holding a rocket propelled grenade, or between an Iraqi child playing in the street with a toy gun and a child soldier wielding an AK-47 assault rifle?</p>
<p>Do drone operators benefit from improved situational awareness or is it more like trying to conduct a sword fight in a telephone booth while looking through a toilet paper tube?</p>
<p>Will there be psychological consequences for the operators of these systems if they can see events unfold in real time but are unable to intervene? That is, how mentally and morally disturbed will an operator be when he or she has no option other than to watch an innocent person walk into the ‘kill zone’ of a missile strike?</p>
<p>Some psychologists have proposed that we develop a <a href="http://io9.com/psychologists-propose-horrifying-solution-to-ptsd-in-dr-1453349900">Siri-like like user interface or virtual co-pilot</a> to allow operators to shirk the blame for any collateral damage.</p>
<p>Australia surely has a right to minimise harm to its troops and reduce other costs, but if war and combat can be reduced to saying “Siri, go kill those people”, will this dehumanise and possibly aggravate our enemies?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28107/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jai Galliott a former Royal Australian Navy officer and works for DefenceTech Consulting, but the views expressed here are solely those of the author in his private capacity and do not in any way represent the views of the Australian Government or the Australian Defence Force.</span></em></p>Prime Minister Tony Abbott sat in the pilot seat of a F-35 Joint Strike Fighter at the time he announced his government will buy an additional 58 planes at a cost of at least A$12.4 billion. But imagine…Jai Galliott, Tutor in Applied Ethics, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/280572014-06-18T20:43:38Z2014-06-18T20:43:38ZAustralia’s jump jet strike fighter option: lessons from the UK<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51285/original/7g35br22-1402977303.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The F-35B short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the Joint Strike Fighter.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/lockheedmartin/9602152526/in/set-72157635146786820">Flickr/Lockheed Martin </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>If Australia is serious about buying the jump jet version of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/joint-strike-fighter">Joint Strike Fighter</a> it would be wise to look at why the UK is the only country to change its mind on which version of the aircraft to buy. </p>
<p>In 2010, the British government decided against buying the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35b-stovl-variant.html">F-35B</a> jump jet as previously planned because of the limitations of the aircraft. It later changed its mind as the costs converting the aircraft carrier for the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35c-carrier-variant.html">F-35C</a> carrier variant were too expensive.</p>
<p>In the lead up to a new Australian Defence White Paper and Force Structure Review, Prime Minister Tony Abbott this year ordered Defence to assess the <a href="https://theconversation.com/jump-jet-strike-fighters-for-australia-would-come-at-a-cost-27595">benefits of F-35B jump jets</a> and converting the Canberra class Landing Helicopter Docks (<a href="http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/lhd">LHD</a>) to accommodate them.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/gWBUwq4Qu9o?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The F-35A originally planned for Australia.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Previously, the RAAF was committed to buying only the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-joint-strike-fighter-is-it-the-right-aircraft-for-australia-25911">F-35A version</a> of the Joint Strike Fighter.</p>
<h2>Change can be costly</h2>
<p>While the British example is not directly comparable to Australia’s potential decision, it offers a warning on the costs and risks of changing plans and hasty policy decision making.</p>
<p>Additionally, the reasons behind the UK’s 2010 decision to buy the F-35C instead of the F-35B provides some insights on the limitations of the F-35B short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft.</p>
<p>The UK’s 2010 <a href="http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf">Strategic Defence and Security Review</a> said its Queen Elizabeth class <a href="http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/the-equipment/ships/future-ships/aircraft-carrier">aircraft carriers</a> would provide it with the long term political flexibility to act without the need to depend on other countries to use of their bases. They also provided options for a response to crises as a “complement or alternative” to ground engagements.</p>
<p>A key element of this capability is the fixed wing aircraft (as opposed to helicopters) which would fly from these carriers. </p>
<h2>The first of plan in the UK</h2>
<p>While the UK had originally signed on the JSF project to buy F-35B jump-jet fighters to replace their Harriers, the <a href="http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf">2010 Review</a> announced the decision to buy the F-35C naval carrier variant instead.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=221&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=221&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=221&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Three variants of the F-35 at three very different costs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/lockheedmartin/12835132324">Flickr/Lockheed Martin</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The reason given for the change in policy was that the F-35C carrier variant has a “longer range and greater payload” which was the critical requirement for precision strike operations in the future. The carrier-variant was also cheaper, reducing through-life costs by “around 25%”.</p>
<p>The savings would result from a cheaper acquisition cost, as well as the efficiencies from maintaining only one type of aircraft, instead of two versions.</p>
<p>A US Department of Defense <a href="http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30563.pdf">report on the F-35</a> states that the estimated basic costs per aircraft (the airframe, engines and avionics) are:</p>
<ul>
<li>US$77.7 million – F-35A CTOL variant</li>
<li>US$105.5 million – F-35B STOVL variant </li>
<li>US$89.7 million – F-35C carrier version.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Concerns about the jump jet</h2>
<p>In 2012 Britain’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/9217918/Fighter-jets-about-turn-will-harm-capability.html">The Telegraph newspaper reported</a> it had seen a highly classified Operational Analysis Supporting Paper which indicated that “planners have grave doubts about the capabilities of the jump jets”.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vertical landing capability of the F-35B comes at a cost.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/lockheedmartin/9617383748/in/set-72157635146786820">Flickr/Lockheed Martin </a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>According to the newspaper, the conventional variant was “more effective than the jump jet in almost all cases”. For potential missions the British military may have to conduct, the document stated that the F-35B was less useful that the other variants. </p>
<p>The key issue identified was that the F-35B STOVL version carried less fuel than other the other versions, reducing weapons payloads and reducing the amount of time the aircraft could spend over a target area.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a target 300 nautical miles away from the aircraft carrier, the jump jet can spend only 20 minutes over its target before turning back, compared with 80 minutes for the conventional jet. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 2010, there were also concerns that with the development of the F-35B and the possibility that the STOVL version could be cancelled. This influenced the British decision to acquire a different version of the F-35.</p>
<p>In January 2011 the then US Defense Secretary Robert Gates put the F-35B on a <a href="http://australianaviation.com.au/2011/01/f-35b-stovl-%E2%80%9Con-probation%E2%80%9D-%E2%80%93-gates/">two-year probation</a>, saying that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If we cannot fix this variant during this time frame and get it back on track in terms of performance, cost and schedule, then I believe it should be cancelled.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But twelve months later the new Defense Secretary Leon Panetta <a href="http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66879">lifted the probation</a> on the F-35B variant citing efforts that had been made to bring the STOVL aircraft up to the standards of the other two variants.</p>
<h2>A change of plan again in the UK</h2>
<p>In May 2012 the UK’s Defence Secretary Philip Hammond announced a U-turn on the 2010 decision, changing policy back to buying the F-35B jump jet fighters and cancelling modifications to the ship. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-18008171">He argued</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When the facts change, the responsible thing to do is to examine the decision made and be willing to change, however inconvenient that may be. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The problem was that the estimated cost of converting the carrier HMS Prince of Wales for the F-35C carrier version had blown out from £950 million to £2 billion “with no guarantee that it will not rise further”.</p>
<p>The UK government already had spent between £40 million and £50 million on design and assessment work for modifying the carrier. </p>
<p>In January 2013, the House of Commons <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/9/9.pdf">Defence Committee</a> provided a scathing assessment of the “rushed and flawed decision” of 2010. The Defence Acquisition report stated the decision to choose a different aircraft and modify the ship was:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] based upon incomplete and inaccurate policy development [and] was taken without the MoD [Ministry of Defence] understanding how the change could be implemented.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/oYy0XR6ESkM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The UK takes flight in a jump jet variant of the JSF.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The challenge for Australia</h2>
<p>While converting the Royal Australian Navy’s LHDs would not be anywhere near as expensive as it was for the British carrier, it would certainly be an expensive exercise.</p>
<p>While the Canberra class LHDs retain the ski jump for STOVL aircraft, the decision to keep them was based on the evaluation that it was cheaper than removing them.</p>
<p>Otherwise, the infrastructure necessary to support aircraft, such as fuel lines and storage, had deliberately not been incorporated as it would have added unnecessary costs to support a capability that they were not intended to have.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/estimate/c5d61275-a1aa-4194-b861-cfe08f848ab3/toc_pdf/Foreign%20Affairs,%20Defence%20and%20Trade%20Legislation%20Committee_2014_06_02_2526.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22committees/estimate/c5d61275-a1aa-4194-b861-cfe08f848ab3/0001%22">Senate Estimates hearings</a> recently, senior Defence officials admitted that <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/jump-jets-on-navys-agenda-as-tony-abbott-orders-air-strike-rethink-20140603-39gl0.html">little work</a> had so far been done on the possibility of buying a STOVL variant.</p>
<p>They said a “fairly superficial examination” had been done up until now because there had not been a “serious consideration” of the aircraft flying from the LHDs.</p>
<p>Chief of the Defence Force General David Hurley noted that Defence was in a situation with a new government and a prime minister with a view about a particular capability.</p>
<p>As well as requiring an assessment of the option of acquiring the F-35B and converting the LHDs, the issue raises questions about Australian defence planning and policy broadly.</p>
<p>There are still questions to be asked as to how appropriate were the previous decisions regarding the LHDs and F-35As, and to what extent is Defence flexible enough to change policies with changes in the Australia’s strategic environment.</p>
<p>Alternatively, there are questions as to how independent is defence policy and planning from politics, and to what extent is Defence able to make long term decisions without political interference.</p>
<p>Lastly, assuming the Australian Defence Force had not previously given the suggested capability “serious consideration”, who has the Prime Minister’s ear on strategic and defence policy?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28057/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven L. Jones receives PhD scholarship funding from the University of New South Wales.</span></em></p>If Australia is serious about buying the jump jet version of the Joint Strike Fighter it would be wise to look at why the UK is the only country to change its mind on which version of the aircraft to buy…Steven L. Jones, PhD candidate, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/275952014-06-05T04:39:52Z2014-06-05T04:39:52ZJump jet strike fighters for Australia would come at a cost<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50297/original/hcrb72nj-1401927081.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Could the jump version of the Joint Strike Fighter be heading for Australia?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/lockheedmartin/6310298566/in/set-72157625859980836#">Flickr/Lockheed Martin</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Senior Australian Defence Force (ADF) <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/jump-jets-on-navys-agenda-as-tony-abbott-orders-air-strike-rethink-20140603-39gl0.html">officers confirmed</a> during <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/estimate/c5d61275-a1aa-4194-b861-cfe08f848ab3/toc_pdf/Foreign%20Affairs,%20Defence%20and%20Trade%20Legislation%20Committee_2014_06_02_2526.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22committees/estimate/c5d61275-a1aa-4194-b861-cfe08f848ab3/0000%22">Senate estimates</a> this week that Prime Minister Tony Abbott had ordered Defence to examine options for Australia to acquire the jump jet version of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft.</p>
<p>To accommodate the jump jet’s short take-off and vertical landing ability. Defence was also asked to look at options to convert the Navy’s two amphibious assault ships, the <a href="http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/lhd">Canberra-class</a> Landing Helicopter Docks (LHD), into “aircraft carriers”.</p>
<p>Were it to go ahead, the decision is much more than acquiring a slightly different version of the JSF aircraft. It would represent a major change in Australia’s power projection capabilities, force structure and the nation’s defence posture.</p>
<p>It would allow Australia to project force in a new way with the aircraft able to operate far from Australia’s shores on Australian or allied ships or forward bases. It would require a change in the ADF structure to be able to use and protect the new capabilities, and it would change the way Australia – and our neighbours – think we would use the new capabilities in pursuit of national interests.</p>
<p>But it would also be more expense on top of what is already a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-joint-strike-fighter-is-it-the-right-aircraft-for-australia-25911">very expensive project</a>, and represent a trade-off in capabilities.</p>
<p>The Abbott government <a href="http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2014/04/23/prime-minister-and-minister-for-defence-joint-media-release-f-35-joint-strike-fighters-to-transform-australias-air-combat-capability/">recently committed</a> A$12.4 billion for an extra 58 JSF to add to the 14 already ordered.</p>
<p>The task for Defence is to weigh the complicated costs and benefits of acquiring jump jets, not just in terms of strategic value and capabilities, but additional acquisition and sustainment costs.</p>
<h2>Three choices</h2>
<p>There are three main variants of the F-35:</p>
<ol>
<li>the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35a-ctol-variant.html">F-35A</a> Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL) variant will be used by air forces, including the US Air Force, and is the version intended for the <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Future-Acquisitions/F-35A-Lightning-II/?RAAF-ZRnYQhJUh1u0e44uR32olOT1rt+Ym4K3">RAAF</a></li>
<li>the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35b-stovl-variant.html">F-35B</a> is the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) or jump jet variant, which will be used by the US Marines and the Royal Navy</li>
<li>the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35c-carrier-variant.html">F-35C</a>, designated a CV variant (a US Navy designation for fixed wing carrier aviation) or Catapult Assisted Take Off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) variant, is the naval variant for use on aircraft carriers.</li>
</ol>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">F-35A, F-35B and F-35C.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lockheed Martin</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some of the broad strategic issues involved involved with the F-35B proposal have been outlined by Bond University’s expert in international relations, Malcom Davis, in a <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/f-35b-jsf-for-the-adf-a-viable-option-in-the-2015-white-paper-part-1/">couple</a> of <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/f-35b-jsf-for-the-adf-a-viable-option-in-the-2015-white-paper-part-2/">posts</a> on the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s blog.</p>
<p>But there a range of other issues which greatly complicate the issue and will need to be considered.</p>
<h2>Reduced weapons capacity</h2>
<p>The F-35B STOVL variant has a <a href="http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/jsf/">reduced range and payload</a> because the jump jet propulsion system takes up space that would otherwise be used for fuel. </p>
<p>All three F-35 variants have two internal weapons bays, each of which can carry two air-to-air missiles, or one air-to-air missile and one air-to-surface missile or bomb. It can also carry weapons on pylons under its wings, but this greatly reduces its stealth characteristics. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">F-35B Lightning II weapons stations.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While the F-35B will still be able to carry the same air-to-air missiles as the F-35A in the internal bays, the capacity for air-to-surface missiles is reduced from 2,500lbs to 1,500lbs (1,130kg to 680kg).</p>
<p>This would be a problem for Australia as the AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (<a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/jassm.html">JASSM</a>), which reached Final Operational Capability (FOC) with the RAAF <a href="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australia-chooses-jassm-missiles-on-f18s-for-longrange-strike-updated-01966/">last week</a>, weighs around 2,250lbs (1,020kg).</p>
<p>While new stand-off missiles Australia is interesting in purchasing such as the Joint Strike Missile (<a href="http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/Selected-topics/kampfly-til-forsvaret/Joint-Strike-Missile-JSM---A-Considerably-Strengtened-Norwegian-Threshold-Against-War-and-Conflict.html?id=760245">JSM</a>) Norway is developing for its F-35As weigh only around 900lbs (408kg), it still <a href="http://breakingdefense.com/2014/07/norway-joint-strike-missile/">cannot fit</a> in the F-35Bs internal weapons bays.</p>
<h2>Where to take off and land a jump jet?</h2>
<p>Another issue requiring serious consideration is that the temperature and force of the STOVL propulsion system limits where the F-35B can take off and land.</p>
<p>The ADF would require additional resources to support the STOVL variant beyond that of the CTOL version. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ZD-J1KksHUQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">F-35B – taking STOVL to a new level.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2011, defence writer Bill Sweetman highlighted the “basing flexibility” issue, <a href="http://aviationweek.com/awin/new-threat-f-35-joint-strike-fighter">noting</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[US] Navy construction specifications continue to warn that the F-35B will impose temperatures as high as 1700F (926C) (several hundred degrees higher than a Harrier exhaust) on vertical-landing pads, with a transonic exhaust velocity.</p>
<p>This is enough to cause standard concrete to “spall” – that is, shed surface flakes in a near-explosive manner – with a 50% chance of damage on the first landing.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In addition, Sweetman writes that the US Office of Naval Research had a program to:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] develop a cooling system for the decks of LHD- and LHA-class ships that will carry F-35Bs, reflecting concerns that thermal expansion and contraction and consequent buckling will cause fatigue and premature failure.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For the UK at least, these issues are still under consideration and yet to be finalised. Writing last week, Sweetman <a href="http://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-f-35b-vertical-landings-doubt-uk">noted</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] there are no plans for the F-35B to perform [vertical landings] in the UK, because the program staff has not finished testing the matting that is needed to protect the runway from exhaust heat. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Issues for Australia</h2>
<p>These are just two of the myriad of issues the ADF will have to consider but they are indicative of the complexity of defence procurement decision making.</p>
<p>The danger is, that like the <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/06/27/1023864632200.html">2002 decision</a> to acquire the F-35 and effectively cancel the competition, political imperatives will short-circuit a rigorous assessment process.</p>
<p>Rather than simply representing a simple purchase of additional capabilities, acquiring F-35Bs represents a trade-off in capabilities and certainly additional costs. Defence will be calculating an estimate of the extra costs in the coming months, and will depend on precisely what Defence wants to do with the aircraft and ships.</p>
<p>The key question is whether the balance of the capability trade-off offer is of strategic benefit to Australia, and whether this benefit is worth the additional financial costs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven L. Jones receives PhD scholarship funding from the University of New South Wales.</span></em></p>Senior Australian Defence Force (ADF) officers confirmed during Senate estimates this week that Prime Minister Tony Abbott had ordered Defence to examine options for Australia to acquire the jump jet version…Steven L. Jones, PhD candidate, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/260882014-04-30T06:12:19Z2014-04-30T06:12:19ZThe F-35 JSF: what is a fifth-generation fighter aircraft?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47352/original/pwv8rqf8-1398829568.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The three variants of the F-35 Joinst Strike Fighter described as fifth-generation aircraft</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.jsf.mil/downloads/">Joint Strike Fighter</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Any conversation about <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-joint-strike-fighter-is-it-the-right-aircraft-for-australia-25911">Australia’s commitment</a> to the <a href="https://www.f35.com/">F-35 Joint Strike Fighter</a> refers to it as a fifth-generation fighter aircraft. But what exactly is a fifth-generation aircraft, and why is it important?</p>
<p>Both the Prime Minister <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-04-23/f-35-joint-strike-fighters-transform-australias-air-combat-capability">Tony Abbott</a> and Defence Minister <a href="https://www.f35.com/news/detail/delivery-of-the-first-australian-made-f-35-jsf-vertical-tail">David Johnston</a> spoke of the JSF’s “fifth-generation” capability as Australia now plans to buy a further 58 aircraft.</p>
<p>The political mantra of the importance of a fifth-generation aircraft begs the question: What does it mean?</p>
<h2>Is there a definition?</h2>
<p>Despite its common usage, the definition of fifth-generation is not clear and is contested but it can serve a political purpose as defence writer Giovanni de Briganti [pointed out](http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/feature/5/135080/f_35-reality-check-10-years-on-(part-1%29.html):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Politicians know next to nothing about defense, so being able to pepper their sentences with expressions like “the only fifth-generation aircraft” gives them instant credibility in the eyes of the trusting public, and leaves other politicos with no come-backs, especially if it is followed up with references to the moral obligation of “buying the best equipment for our military”.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>One <a href="http://aviationweek.com/awin/saab-s-new-gripen-future-fighters">report</a> says Lockheed Martin labelled the F-35 a “fifth-generation” fighter in 2005, borrowing the Russian term to describe the <a href="http://www.f22-raptor.com/">F-22 Raptor</a>. Previously, and even up to 2009, the JSF was <a href="http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30563_20090217.pdf">referred to</a> as a new or next-generation aircraft.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/y44lftPGWvM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">How long before fifth generation is mentioned in this Lockheed Martin video?</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As well as a political tool the term fifth-generation is also a powerful marketing tool, at least according to critics such as representatives from Eurofighter whose <a href="http://www.eurofighter.com/">Typhoon</a> fighter has <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/business-10726346">lost many procurement battles</a> with the JSF.</p>
<p>It is a distinct advantage for Lockheed Martin to define the characteristics of fifth-generation aircraft as it shapes the requirements for countries who may purchase it. In this way, the manufacturer produces suit the fifth-generation requirements of the countries who wish to buy them.</p>
<p>The marketing argument is implicitly supported by the Office of the Auditor General of Canada, who <a href="http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_oag_201204_02_e.pdf">used a critical definition</a> of fifth generation aircraft:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Fighter jets that, according to manufacturers, incorporate the most modern technologies, such as stealth, advanced radar, and integrated avionics. There is no accepted or objective definition of fifth-generation capability.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The fourth-generation</h2>
<p>Even defining fourth-generation aircraft as a starting point is difficult and the terms fourth-plus or 4.5 generation have been used to encompass fourth-generation aircraft with fifth-generation capabilities.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The JSF in still in production.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.f35.com/assets/uploads/downloads/13377/8452977387_4fe1e918f7_o__high.jpg">Lockheed Martin</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Generally, fourth-generation aircraft are those developed in the 1970s and 1980s, with more advanced radars and avionics (aerospace electronics), including fly-by-wire (computer interfaced) controls, improved manoeuvrability, and multi-role capabilities.</p>
<p>The US <a href="http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/military_act_2009.pdf">FY2010 Defense Authorization Act</a> defined 4.5 generation as current aircraft, including the <a href="http://www.boeing.com/boeing/defense-space/military/f15/index.page">F-15</a>, <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/f16.html">F-16</a> and <a href="http://www.boeing.com/boeing/defense-space/military/fa18ef/">F/A-18</a>, that have advanced capabilities, including active electronically scanned array radar, high capacity data-links and enhanced avionics, and have the ability to deploy current and reasonably foreseeable advanced armaments.</p>
<p>Currently, Australia has 71 fourth-generation F/A-18 Hornets, and 24 4.5 generation F/A-18F Super Hornets.</p>
<p>To examine the concept of fifth-generation aircraft, the <a href="http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30563_20091127.pdf">definition provided by</a> the US Congressional Research Service is useful, although it lacks precision:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Fifth-generation fighters combine new developments such as thrust vectoring, composite materials, supercruise (the ability to cruise at supersonic speeds without using engine afterburners), stealth technology, advanced radar and sensors, and integrated avionics to greatly improve pilot situational awareness.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Many fourth-generation aircraft have some of these features but it is generally considered that for an aircraft to truly be fifth-generation it must include all of these characteristics.</p>
<p>For example, the American <a href="http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/B2SpiritBomber/Pages/default.aspx">B-2 Spirit</a> strategic bomber and <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/100years/stories/f-117.html">F-117 Nighthawk</a> strike fighter are both stealth aircraft but they are not fifth-generation aircraft as they lack advanced radars and other avionics.</p>
<p>Some <a href="http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/November%202012/1112fighter.aspx">reports say</a> the JSF is “not technically a supercruising aircraft” but it can “maintain Mach 1.2 for a dash of 150 miles without using fuel-gulping afterburners”.</p>
<p>Only the short take-off and vertical landing version of the aircraft (the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/f35/f-35b-stovl-variant.html">F-35B</a>, which Australia is not acquiring) will have thrust vectoring, which can greatly improve manoeuvrability for dogfighting.</p>
<p>The JSF is less manoeuvrable than some fourth-generation aircraft, particularly the Russian <a href="http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/planes/military/">Sukhoi</a> fighters, but this deficiency is negated through stealth.</p>
<h2>What about stealth?</h2>
<p>Stealth allows a pilot to shoot at another aircraft without the enemy having the ability to shoot back because they cannot see them. To make definitions even more complex, stealth is not an absolute term as it too can be contested.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A low profile from the front helps the JSF stealth.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.jsf.mil/downloads/">Joint Strike Fighter</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Stealth refers to the inability of the enemy to detect the aircraft, commonly by radar. The smaller the radar cross section of an aircraft, the more difficult it is to detect and the more stealthy it is considered to be.</p>
<p>This level of radar stealthiness is determined by the outside of the aircraft, the design of the body and what it is made of or covered with.</p>
<p>All modern combat aircraft are designed with a low radar cross section in mind and for this reason competitors of the JSF describe their aircraft as stealthy but they are not as stealthy as the JSF.</p>
<p>The F-22 Raptor is probably the only operational aircraft stealthier than the JSF. But the radar cross section of the JSF is at its lowest when directly facing a radar. It then increases as the aircraft turns away from the radar presenting more of its side rather than front.</p>
<p>Internal weapons bays ensure stealth is not compromised when carrying weapons internally but it would be comprised when the JSF carries weapons on its wings.</p>
<p>The US has kept the details of the electronic weapon capabilities a closely guarded secret but there is a question as why Australia is investing in Boeing <a href="http://www.boeing.com/boeing/defense-space/military/ea18g/index.page">EA-18G Growler</a> which is 4.5-generation electronic warfare aircraft with the JSF soon to enter Australian service.</p>
<h2>Look around for the enemy</h2>
<p>The JSF will provide parallelled situation awareness, <a href="http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/UploadedFiles/General/Defining_a_5th_Generation_Fighter_-_Dubai_Air_Chiefs_Conference_-_12_Nov_11.pdf">allowing the pilot to virtually</a> “look through the floor of the fighter or behind the aircraft”. Networking will also allow the pilot to see information provided by other aircraft, ships or ground units.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Look around - The JSF includes a 360-degree visual display system.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/lockheedmartin/5631844597">Flickr/Lockheed Martin</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The JSF has an electro-optical distributed aperture system which, when coupled with the advanced helmet, provides the pilot with <a href="http://www.northropgrumman.com/capabilities/anaaq37f35/pages/default.aspx">360 degree spherical situational awareness</a>.</p>
<p>As well as collecting information from onboard and remote sources – and fusing it gives the pilot broad battlespace awareness – the JSF can automatically <a href="http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/November%202012/1112fighter.aspx">collect vast amounts of data</a> on enemy forces, including targeting information, and transmit it to other friendly forces in the air and on the ground.</p>
<h2>Is it the next generation?</h2>
<p>So using the term fifth-generation offers the benefits of simplicity and authority where the characteristics of modern combat aircraft are broad ranging and complex.</p>
<p>But it is not a useful term when trying to analyse how well suited the JSF is to Australia’s strategic needs. The term denotes an improvement over older technology, inferring improved capability, but does not describe the technology’s usefulness in strategic environments, or cost effectiveness.</p>
<p>An effective public debate is made difficult when a catch-all slogan is commonly used, but where a technically informed analysis is needed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/26088/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven L. Jones receives PhD scholarship funding from UNSW.</span></em></p>Any conversation about Australia’s commitment to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter refers to it as a fifth-generation fighter aircraft. But what exactly is a fifth-generation aircraft, and why is it important…Steven L. Jones, PhD candidate, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/259072014-04-29T06:37:55Z2014-04-29T06:37:55ZWhat do we need of a military fighter aircraft?<p>Now the Australian Government has committed to a <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-23/australia-to-buy-58-more-joint-strike-fighters/5405236">further 58</a> F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (<a href="http://www.jsf.mil/">JSF</a>) aircraft it is time to ask whether this is a good idea, will we be getting value for money – and will the JSF carry out the roles Australia needs them for?</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf">Defence White Paper 2009</a> stated that our military strategic aim is to achieve and maintain air superiority and sea control in places of our choosing.</p>
<p>This is particularly important for Australia since it is an island continent with vast areas of ocean, a very long coastline and a ring of land-sea borders to worry about.</p>
<p>To control “places of our choosing”, as the white paper recommends, the marine and air services need to “enable the manoeuvre and employment of joint ADF [Australian Defence Force] elements” in the operational environment.</p>
<p>More specifically Australia’s defence aircraft need to meet a range of future air and surface threats:</p>
<ul>
<li>it would be nice if it was able to win air-to-air combat</li>
<li>it should be capable of having first strike capability, so it can hit bad guys before they hit us</li>
<li>it should be able to support ground troops, air and sea forces, and future coalition forces, and do a multitude of tasks all within one mission</li>
<li>it needs to be affordable to acquire and maintain and upgrade throughout its life</li>
<li>it needs to fit our intended schedule of new acquisitions and retirements of current air platforms.</li>
</ul>
<h2>A big ask</h2>
<p>The intention of the US was to leverage the same technologies as those developed for the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/f22.html">F-22</a> to construct a single air-frame that could be modified to carry out the specific functions of the US Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/aWji8AcOYGA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">F-35 Flight Test Intentional Departure.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If you were ever inspired to modify a house you may have found that the cost is equivalent to buying a whole new house, and you end up with … well … a modified house, not a new one.</p>
<p>So how does this impact Australia, I hear you ask. After all, we have opted for just one variant of the JSF – the basic conventional take-off and landing <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/f35/f-35a-ctol-variant.html">F-35A</a> bargain basement version. None of this <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/f35/f-35b-stovl-variant.html">F-35B</a> vertical take-off nonsense for us.</p>
<p>The problem is that the issues involved in getting the multiple variants to work in the first place impact on the cost and schedule – we pay more, and we wait longer. The first aircraft are not expected in Australia until 2018 with 72 to be operational by 2023. But this is not a problem if performance is sufficiently quantum-leap-ish. So is it?</p>
<p>The A$12.4 billion JSF program is intended to replace the Australian fighter fleet of <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Aircraft/FA-18F_Super_Hornet/?RAAF-4dRvdvKuGAokY31UEml0P+KGoMiO8n/o">F/A-18F Super Hornets</a>, termed <a href="http://www.fighterworld.com.au/az-of-fighter-aircraft/five-generations-of-jets">fourth-generation fighters</a>. This new aircraft with increased technology is <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Future_Acquisitions/F-35A_Lightning_II/?RAAF-ZRnYQhJUh1u0e44uR32olOT1rt+Ym4K3">a fifth-generation fighter</a> with all sorts of good stuff such as stealth, comprehensive situation awareness, network-centricity, stand-off capability and so on.</p>
<h2>The bad guys</h2>
<p>The intention is to give us a “<a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/strategic-insights-9-is-the-jsf-good-enough/SI_JSF.pdf">decisive combat edge</a>” over the bad guys, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston said in 2004 when he was Air Force chief. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Russian Sukhoi Su-35 – is it better than the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.sukhoi.org/img/gallery/wallpaper/su35/13_11_08_27_sm.jpg">Sukhoi</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Who, you would like to know, are the bad guys? It had better not be the Russians because their latest Sukhoi Flanker variants, such as the <a href="http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/planes/military/Su-35/">Su-35BM or Su-35-1</a>, would <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com.au/sukhoi-su-35-competes-with-the-f-35-2013-4#military-jets-are-divided-into-generations-and-the-aircraft-of-the-immediate-future-is-the-5th-but-none-have-yet-made-it-into-combat-despite-years-in-development-1">outclass the JSF</a>, all else being equal – despite of <a href="http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/in-focus-lockheed-claims-f-35-kinematics-better-than-or-equal-to-typhoon-or-super-382078/">claims to the contrary</a> by people involved in the F-35 program.</p>
<p>Our F-35A variants may have better luck against typical fighter aircraft employed by regional forces in South East Asia or Africa where older variety fighters are in use or being purchased. India, Algeria, Malaysia and Indonesia operate fourth-generation fighters as well as older models.</p>
<p>But Indonesia is <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140210/DEFREG/302100030/Indonesia-May-Replace-F-5s-Su-35s">considering purchasing</a> a more advanced SU-35 among other possible options. As long as our potential foes opt for fourth-generation fighters with outdated technologies (and not too many of them at one time) we should have a chance of competing against them with some advantage. But why should they hold back?</p>
<h2>The F-35 JSF in action</h2>
<p>Where can the JSF operate? The range of just over 1,000km (2,000km return) doesn’t get us very far around Australia. This has been addressed by purchasing a fleet of five <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Aircraft/KC-30A/?RAAF-mqVOdY4RK4Yc3QG06xtPhhp7asTRVUyC">air-to-air refuelling tankers</a>, so the JSF can go a fair bit further, remembering that Australia has no access to aircraft carriers to provide floating airports.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Does the F-35 JSF have what is needed?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.jsf.mil/downloads/">Joint Strike Fighter</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There is also a fleet of six airborne <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/DMO/aewc/index.cfm">early warning and control</a> aircraft designed to provide external situational awareness data. This combined with satellite communications, all-around sensors and a heads-up display to provide the pilot with information in an easily digestible form, means they will have a fair idea of what’s going on.</p>
<p>All good so long as the enemy isn’t sneaky, overpowering in numbers, or overpowering with more advanced technologies.</p>
<p>In considering the land-support side of the equation, for instance, the enemy could be sneaky by using man-transportable infrared rocket launchers. These are now much more sophisticated than they used to be - and hard to defeat - especially as the JSF tends to glow in the infrared.</p>
<p>Radio frequency–targeting from the ground isn’t so dangerous, since such systems are expensive, stationary and vulnerable to radio frequency-seeker missiles.</p>
<h2>Consider the alternatives</h2>
<p>Was there a choice? Australia could have opted for larger numbers of cheaper fourth-generation aircraft, as has been done by our regional neighbours, or it could have gone for a top-flight machine, such as the US F-22 Raptor.</p>
<p>The thinking goes that a step-advantage could not be gleaned over neighbours by resorting to fourth-generation aircraft, while for the same budget as forecast for the 100 JSF aircraft initially recommended by the white paper, only 30 F-22 could be purchased.</p>
<p>As a couple of squadrons of F-22 cannot achieve the strategic aims of fighting in two separated geographic locations, it looks like we are stuck with the JSF.</p>
<p>The JSF is a good aircraft, not necessarily the best – nor is it the worst. Whether it meets our demands depends on what it comes up against in a hostile situation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/25907/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Russell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Now the Australian Government has committed to a further 58 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft it is time to ask whether this is a good idea, will we be getting value for money – and will the JSF…Stephen Russell, Lectures in systems engineering , University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/259112014-04-28T06:56:27Z2014-04-28T06:56:27ZThe Joint Strike Fighter: is it the right aircraft for Australia?<p>The Australian Government’s <a href="https://www.liberal.org.au/latest-news/2013/09/02/coalitions-policy-stronger-defence">mission</a> to upgrade the defence force fleet of ageing aircraft with the <a href="http://www.jsf.mil/">F-35 Joint Strike Fighter</a> has been controversial since it began more than a decade ago.</p>
<p>Australia formally began looking for options to replace its <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Aircraft/FA-18AB_Hornet/?RAAF-9SSttIt/E93/3lV4LgVxgxc0y4P09YW2">F/A-18</a> and <a href="http://www.raafamberleyheritage.gov.au/f-111.aspx">F-111</a> aircraft in May 1999 with the creation of project AIR 6000 – <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/about/domains/nacc.cfm">New Air Combat Capability</a>.</p>
<p>Phase 2, a Project Definition Study, was to commence in the 2002/03 financial year with a final decision expected around 2005/06.</p>
<p>But when Australia signed up to the System Development and Demonstration phase of the JSF program in June 2002, then-Defence Minister Robert Hill effectively <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/06/27/1023864632200.html">ended the selection process</a> for Australia’s new combat aircraft.</p>
<p>At that stage the primary contenders included the European Eurofighter <a href="http://www.eurofighter.com/">Typhoon</a>, the French Dassault <a href="http://www.dassault-aviation.com/en/defense/rafale/introduction/">Rafale</a> and the Swedish Saab <a href="http://www.saabgroup.com/en/Air/Gripen-Fighter-System/">Gripen</a>.</p>
<p>The government’s decision was a surprise to nearly everyone, including JSF manufacturer Lockheed Martin, rival manufacturers and the Pentagon. While many other nations had joined the JSF program in 2002, Australia was the only one to end their selection process at that time. </p>
<p>Now Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s pledged to spend <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-23/australia-to-buy-58-more-joint-strike-fighters/5405236">A$12 billion</a> on a further 58 aircraft to bring the total to to 72.</p>
<p>The JSF has an impressive list of capabilities and weapons including:</p>
<ul>
<li>low observable stealth</li>
<li>integrated sensors, information and weapons systems</li>
<li>powerful and comprehensive integrated sensor package for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions</li>
<li>advanced electronic warfare capabilities</li>
<li>a 25mm GAU-22 internal gun</li>
<li>four internal and six external weapon stations which can carry a combination of air-to-air, air-to-surface and anti-ship missiles, and precision guided bombs.</li>
</ul>
<p>But whether the JSF is the right aircraft for Australia has been continuously questioned. The government and Australian Defence Force maintain it is the right aircraft because it provides Australia with a <a href="https://www.f35.com/news/detail/delivery-of-the-first-australian-made-f-35-jsf-vertical-tail">technological edge</a> in our region. But this only raises further questions.</p>
<h2>An edge over whom?</h2>
<p>Two defence white papers from 2000 and 2009 recognised that the conventional military threat to Australia is relatively low, with the <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf">2009 white paper</a> stating:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is a broad consensus that the present strategic environment is relatively benign.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Of the countries in our region, Indonesia has a growing military capability, and has had serious political tensions with Australia over many decades.</p>
<p>Over the past decade Indonesia has acquired advanced Russian Sukhoi <a href="http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/planes/military/su27sk/">Su-27</a> and <a href="http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/planes/military/su30mk/">Su-30</a> fighters. Its plans to acquire more have led to concerns regarding Australia’s air superiority capabilities.</p>
<p>While these aircraft are superior to Australia’s F/A-18 Hornets in many ways they have not been considered a major threat to Australia because of the standards of training and doctrine for Indonesian pilots, and levels of aircraft readiness.</p>
<p>Indonesia is currently in the process of significantly <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/moving-beyond-ambitions-indonesias-military-modernisation/Strategy_Moving_beyond_ambitions.pdf%20its%20military">expanding and modernising</a>, but it remains largely ill-equipped and ill-prepared for modern military operations.</p>
<p>Analysts such as <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-a-stronger-indonesian-military-is-good-for-australia-but-is-still-a-long-way-off/">Ben Schreer</a> and <a href="http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au/node/34">Alan Stephens</a> have suggested that Indonesia’s military modernisation offers opportunities for increasing Australia’s security.</p>
<h2>A technological edge in what timeframe?</h2>
<p>The JSF does offer significant technological advantages at the moment and probably out to at least 2020. But Australia and the US plan on operating the JSF until 2050 and it is here that a capability edge becomes more uncertain.</p>
<p>While the JSF was designed to be upgradeable – and regular software upgrades are a major part of the ongoing sustainment of the aircraft – future improvements will be limited by the hardware and the physical characteristics of the aircraft.</p>
<p>Although some broad technological developments fundamentally change the nature of warfare (such as with the invention of gunpowder or the aircraft) smaller incremental changes generally only provide short-term advantages with counter-measures developed over time, and developing increasing quickly in the 21st century.</p>
<p>Also, technology itself does not always provide advantages. During the Vietnam War, early US F-4 Phantoms lacked guns as air-to-air missiles were considered the best way of destroying enemy aircraft, limiting their dominance over technologically inferior, but more agile and gun armed North Vietnamese MiG fighters.</p>
<p>The argument here is not that the days of dogfighting are back, but rather to point out that there are historical precedents that illustrate the limitations to technological advantages.</p>
<p>While the JSF is less manoeuvrable than less advanced aircraft, probably making it less capable within visual range, it’s argued that this is not relevant as stealth and advanced missiles will allow JSFs to take down enemy aircraft well before they enter visual range.</p>
<p>Australia has paid a large premium for <a href="http://www.news.com.au/national/tony-abbott-to-approve-australias-biggest-ever-military-purchase-of-stealth-fighter-jets/story-fncynjr2-1226851684344">radar stealth</a> in the JSF but it is not a permanent solution. A US F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter was <a href="http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-10-26-serb-stealth_x.htm">shot down</a> in 1999 by an innovative Serbian commander who modified his obsolescent anti-aircraft missile battery.</p>
<p>In 2012 the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathon Greenert, explored the <a href="http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-07/payloads-over-platforms-charting-new-course">limitations of stealth</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The rapid expansion of computing power also ushers in new sensors and methods that will make stealth and its advantages increasingly difficult to maintain […] It is time to consider shifting our focus from platforms that rely solely on stealth.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Israel’s air force also believes any stealth protection of the JSF will be good for only <a href="http://aviationweek.com/awin/israel-us-agree-450-million-f-35-ew-work">five to 10 years</a>.</p>
<h2>For what purpose?</h2>
<p>In defending the JSF against Russian and Chinese competitors, Prime Minister Abbott <a href="http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-04-23/joint-press-conference-canberra">said</a> that in the judgement of the US and the other Western powers it was a “very, very effective aircraft”.</p>
<p>How the US plans to use the latest <a href="http://www.fighterworld.com.au/az-of-fighter-aircraft/five-generations-of-jets">fifth-generation fighters</a> such as the JSF sheds light on Australia’s strategic thinking in acquiring them.</p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR871.pdf">Rand report</a> noted the importance of any fifth-generation aircraft to operate in hostile environments featuring integrated air defence system that include advanced surface to air missile systems, jamming and other electronic attack modes.</p>
<p>Senior US generals have also <a href="http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66911">indicated</a> the importance of allowing the US to strike any target in the world at any time.</p>
<p>To operate successfully in a contemporary hostile environment, older technology strike aircraft would need the support of a range of defensive and offensive electronic warfare aircraft, as well as other aircraft to suppress enemy air defences.</p>
<p>But the JSF can perform <a href="http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/November%202012/1112fighter.aspx">all of these roles</a> in the one aircraft. </p>
<p>China’s military modernisation and strategic developments are designed to deter a US attack, and the JSF is a key component in overcoming Chinese defences.</p>
<h2>What other options are there?</h2>
<p>The suitability of other options depends on evaluating and prioritising a range of factors, including price and cost effectiveness, timeframes, the strategic environment, operational needs and capabilities available.</p>
<p>As well as the European aircraft mentioned previously, Australia’s current F/A-18F Super Hornets possess many advanced technologies. There is also a range of aircraft that would fit in the fifth-generation category currently being developed in China, Russia, Japan, India and Turkey.</p>
<p>While not all of these will ultimately be produced, the future is likely to see a range of technologically advanced aircraft made available to customers in Australia’s region. The suitability of the JSF for Australia in the long term will, to some degree, be dependent on the capability of these aircraft.</p>
<p>The JSF may well be a safe bet for Australia. It has its problems and does not meet the expectations of a decade ago, but it provides some certainty, at least in the short term.</p>
<p>Predicting Australia’s strategic needs for the next 35 years is a daunting exercise, but the financial cost burden of acquiring and sustaining the JSF may reduce Australia’s strategic flexibility to change its force structure in the coming decades.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/25911/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven L. Jones receives PhD scholarship funding from UNSW.</span></em></p>The Australian Government’s mission to upgrade the defence force fleet of ageing aircraft with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has been controversial since it began more than a decade ago. Australia formally…Steven L. Jones, PhD candidate, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.