tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/land-reform-17355/articlesland reform – The Conversation2024-03-21T14:40:20Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2261352024-03-21T14:40:20Z2024-03-21T14:40:20ZThis is how President Ramaphosa got to the 25% figure of progress in land reform in South Africa<p>Nearly three decades into democracy, land reform remains central to South Africa’s transformation policies and agricultural policy. </p>
<p>We have over the years pointed out that the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/37171/chapter/323739043?login=true">progress on land reform has been incorrectly reported</a>. It’s been consistently understated.</p>
<p>We have argued that, if the statistics are treated carefully, the progress has been much better than politicians and activists often claim.</p>
<p>We were encouraged earlier this year when South African president Cyril Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q5d28EqZ-t8">acknowledged</a> in his <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/state-nation-address-president-cyril-ramaphosa-8-february-2024">State of the Nation address</a> that there had been better progress in land reform. The commonly cited argument is that land reform has been a failure and that only 8%-10% of farmland has been returned to black South Africans since apartheid ended in 1994.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa stated that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Through redistribution, around 25% of farmland in our country is now owned by black South Africans, bringing us closer to achieving our target of 30% by 2030.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This figure is based on an update of <a href="https://theconversation.com/land-reform-in-south-africa-5-myths-about-farming-debunked-195045">our work</a> at the Bureau of Economics Research and the Department of Agricultural Economics at Stellenbosch University.</p>
<p>Below we provide a detailed explanation of how we arrived at this figure. We also highlight policies the government can use to fast track the land reform programme to ensure that black farmers become central to a growing, and inclusive agricultural sector.</p>
<h2>Land reform data</h2>
<p>In reviewing the progress with land reform we should be mindful that the land reform programme consist of three elements (refer to <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">Section 25 of the constitution</a>: redistribution, restitution and tenure reform.</p>
<p>Substantive progress has only been made in the land redistribution space and through the process of land restitution managed by the <a href="https://nationalgovernment.co.za/units/view/62/commission-on-restitution-of-land-rights">Land Claims Commission</a>.</p>
<p>The progress of land reform can only be tracked where we have surveyed land, and land with title deeds registered. Even then it is tricky as the title deeds do not record the “race” of the registered owner.</p>
<p>To understand the progress with land reform it is important to start from the correct base. How much farm land is in question here? </p>
<p>In 1994, total farm land with title deeds (thus outside what the apartheid government set aside for black people) covered <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">77.58 million hectares of the total surface area of South Africa of 122 million hectares</a>. It is assumed, merely by the fact that black ownership of farm land in South Africa was not possible before 1991, that all <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/37171/chapter/323739043">77.58 million hectares were owned by white farmers when land reform was initiated in 1994</a>.</p>
<p>Let us now unpack the progress with land reform based on the various data sources.</p>
<h2>Land restitution</h2>
<p>The land restitution process involves the restoration of land rights to black communities who lost their (registered and legally owned) farm land as a result of various forms of dispossession introduced by the apartheid-era governments after 1913.</p>
<p>Through the process of land claims, the Land Claims Commission has transferred 4 million hectares back to communities who previously were dispossessed (Source: various annual reports of the Land Claims Commission). </p>
<p>What’s missing from this calculation is the fact that communities have also been able to elect to receive financial compensation instead of obtaining the formal rights to the land.</p>
<p>Over the years a total of R22 billion (about US$1.1 billion) was paid out in financial compensation (Source: various annual reports of the Land Claims Commission). The commission never reported the number of hectares for which financial compensation was paid out for. It took some work by us to get the number of hectares of farmland involved in financial compensation from the commission, and it has now been confirmed that a total of 2.68 million hectares have been restored in this way.</p>
<p>That means that, in total, the restitution programme managed to restore the land rights of black communities equivalent to 6.68 million hectares.</p>
<h2>Land redistribution</h2>
<p>For the first 10 years of the land reform programme the government applied a market assisted programme of land redistribution based on the <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/2537/Kirsten_Approaches(1999).pdf?sequence=1">willing-buyer-willing-seller principle</a>. Government grants assisted the purchase of the land by groups or individual beneficiaries. </p>
<p>These initiatives resulted in the transfer of 7.55 million hectares of farm land to black South Africans (Source: Various annual reports by Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development to parliament). This is probably where the stubbornness of the 10% figure came from. People have focused only on the one dimension of the land reform programme.</p>
<p>One element of redistributive land reform that is usually ignored is the private acquisition of farmland by Black South Africans outside the formal government assisted processes. Here individuals have used their own resources or financial arrangements with commercial banks or the <a href="https://landbank.co.za/Pages/Home.aspx">Land Bank</a> through which they fund the purchase farm land. </p>
<p>The only way you can find the exact number of these deals is to comb through every land transaction and, based on the surnames of the seller and buyer, confirm that the land was transferred from White to Black.</p>
<p>The Bureau of Economic Research at Stellenbosch University estimated that since 1994 a total of 1.9 million hectares of farm land were acquired by black South Africans without the assistance of the state. This might even be an undercount because some surnames such as Van Wyk, Van Rooyen, and even Schoeman do not necessary belong to white South Africans, and then there are many transactions to proprietary limited companies that are majority black owned but with typical names that would resemble an Afrikaans name such as Sandrift Boerdery. These are not picked-up in these searches.</p>
<h2>Government acquisition</h2>
<p>Our final source of the data is the farmland acquired by the state. The first is via the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-government-has-been-buying-land-and-leasing-it-to-black-farmers-why-its-gone-wrong-and-how-to-fix-it-211938#:%7E:text=By%20June%202023%2C%20the%20state,to%20the%20leasing%20of%20land.">PLAS</a>) that was introduced in 2006 after dissatisfaction with the earlier land reform efforts.</p>
<p>By August 2023, the state had acquired 2.54 million hectares of productive farmland through the programme and lease it out to beneficiaries. The <a href="https://www.gtac.gov.za/pepa/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/ALHA-Spending-Review-Report.pdf">State Land Holding Account Entity</a> is the custodian of this land.</p>
<p>Most of the roughly 2500 beneficiaries have a 30-year lease agreement with the state.</p>
<p>In addition, state owned enterprises and provincial governments have also acquired farmland which is now used for non-agricultural purposes. A total of 630 000 hectares have been acquired over the last 30 years.</p>
<h2>Getting to 25%</h2>
<p>If we now add all the numbers together:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Restitution: 6.68 million ha</p></li>
<li><p>Government Land redistribution: 7.55 million ha</p></li>
<li><p>Private transactions: 1.9 million ha</p></li>
<li><p>Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy programme: 2.54 million ha</p></li>
<li><p>Government acquisition for non-agricultural use: 0.63 million ha</p></li>
</ul>
<p>This gives a total of 19.3 million ha or 24.9% of the total of all freehold farmland in South Africa. The correct way to word the statement on the progress of with land reform since 1994 is therefore as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Almost 25% of all farm land previously owned by white land owners have been restored, redistributed to black South Africans or moved away to state ownership.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This does not say anything about the financial and commercial viability of the land that was transferred and doesn’t speak to the fast tracking of the land reform programme to bring about a just, equitable and inclusive commercial agricultural sector. Here we need more specific policy interventions.</p>
<h2>Policy considerations</h2>
<p>There are vast tracts of land within the government books that could be transferred to black South Africans for the benefit of agricultural progress and land reform success. The government should consider the following steps:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Establishing a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">Land Reform and Agricultural Development Agency</a>. It would primarily be responsible for land registration and transfer under the redistribution programme. It could operate under the <a href="https://landbank.co.za/About-Us/Key%20Policies/1.%20Land%20Bank%20Act.pdf">Land Bank Act</a>, effectively execute the government policy, and deal with beneficiary selection.</p></li>
<li><p>The government’s <a href="https://www.greenagri.org.za/blog/blended-finance-scheme/">Blended Finance programme</a>, in collaboration with the <a href="https://www.gcis.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/resourcecentre/newsletters/issues.pdf">development finance institutions</a> and other financial institutions, should provide financial support to the selected beneficiaries.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226135/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wandile Sihlobo is the Chief Economist of the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa (Agbiz) and a member of the Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johann Kirsten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Almost 25% of all farmland previously owned by white landowners has been restored, redistributed to black South Africans, or moved away to state ownership.Johann Kirsten, Director of the Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch UniversityWandile Sihlobo, Senior Fellow, Department of Agricultural Economics, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2119382023-09-04T13:10:14Z2023-09-04T13:10:14ZSouth Africa’s government has been buying land and leasing it to black farmers. Why it’s gone wrong and how to fix it<p>The progress with South Africa’s land reform programme has not been properly monitored. This has resulted in an incorrect understanding of the real progress made to correct the racial distribution of farm land ownership in South Africa. </p>
<p>In 2012 the <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030">National Development Plan</a> set a target to redistribute (or restore) 30% (or 23.7 million hectares) of all freehold agricultural land to black South Africans by 2030.</p>
<p>The general perception is that the land reform programme has failed to deliver a recognisable shift in ownership patterns. But the real situation is more nuanced. This is because land reform is made up of a number of initiatives. These include redistribution, restitution, financial compensation, private acquisition and state acquisition. </p>
<p>Some have progressed more than others. In this article I look at what’s happened to the state acquisition of farm land which is then, for the most part, leased to entrepreneurs wanting to become farmers. I identify the factors that stand in the way of its success. The list is drawn from reports as well as insights from farmers and based on my three decades of experience as an agricultural economist in the South African farming sector.</p>
<p>I have also identified steps that the government should take to fix the problems. These are informed partly by my view that the government should not be in the business of farming and should ideally simply be ensuring a conducive environment for businesses to thrive. The land should be in the hands and control of the entrepreneurs.</p>
<p>It is of the utmost importance that the government act on this ineffective and politics-ridden system of land leases and ensure that beneficiaries are getting secure rights to the land. If not, the question about why there are so few successful black commercial farmers (<a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/37171/chapter-abstract/323739043?redirectedFrom=fulltext">7% of all VAT registered farm businesses</a> in South Africa will continue to be asked. </p>
<h2>Land acquisition</h2>
<p>In 1994 when South Africa held its first democratic elections, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/37171/chapter-abstract/323739043?redirectedFrom=fulltext">the 77.58 million ha</a> of farmland in the country with registered tile deeds was mainly owned by white farmers.</p>
<p>Since then, by our calculations, the total area of land rights transferred away from white ownership – either to the state or black beneficiaries – or where financial compensation has been made, is equal to 19,165,891 ha. Our calculations will be published shortly by the <a href="https://www.ber.ac.za/home/">Bureau for Economic Research</a> in its update <a href="https://www.ber.ac.za/BER%20Documents/NDP-Assessment-Report/?doctypeid=1135">on the National Development Plan targets</a>.</p>
<p>This is equivalent to 24.7% of all freehold agricultural land.</p>
<p>Although the number may look heartening, given that it is close to the 30% target set out in the National Development Plan, the issue of concern is that the state is now a major owner of agricultural land (more than 2.5 million hectares). </p>
<p>This is a problem for a number of reasons.</p>
<h2>Flawed design</h2>
<p>The Agricultural Land Holding Account Trading Entity is responsible for the acquisition of land and other property (movable and immovable), in terms of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/impllandacquisition0.pdf">Proactive Land Acquisition Scheme</a> which was implemented in 2006. Through the scheme the land is then held by the state for the use by lessees of the programme.</p>
<p>By June 2023, the state had acquired 2.5 million hectares of productive farmland through the programme. Most of the roughly 2500 beneficiaries have a 30-year lease agreement with the state. There are several farms where no agreement has been signed.</p>
<p>The arrangement makes reference to the leasing of land. But there’s no mention of the transfer or sale of land to beneficiaries. </p>
<p>The acquisition strategy was a noble attempt at land reform. It had some clear objectives: acquire land of high agricultural potential; integrate black farmers into the commercial agricultural sector; improve beneficiary selection; improve land use planning; and ensure optimal productive land use.</p>
<p>But the programme has been disappointing. Virtually no land has been transferred to individuals. Most is leased to beneficiaries and in some cases the farms are illegally occupied. More than half of the current beneficiaries on the leased land have not shown any substantial <a href="https://www.arc.agric.za/Documents/Agrimetrics/National%20PLAS%20Report%20-%20August%202019.pdf">agricultural production</a>. This implies that valuable agricultural resources are not utilised and are lying fallow. </p>
<p>The factors behind this failure were set out in public in <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-south-african-government-has-been-buying-farmland-for-black-farmers-its-not-gone-well-197201">an article</a> we recently co-authored. The article was based on findings which were first collated in a research report compiled by the Agricultural Research Council for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform and released in 2019. However, its findings were never publicised.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-south-african-government-has-been-buying-farmland-for-black-farmers-its-not-gone-well-197201">The South African government has been buying farmland for black farmers. It's not gone well</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>I have gained further insights in conversations with farmers currently leasing land from the State. Their stories corroborate the report’s findings.</p>
<h2>Major obstacles</h2>
<p>Firstly, land tenure is insecure. This makes it difficult – or impossible – to invest in the land or secure loans for improvements and growth. Beneficiaries have to rely on government grants to do business. The grants are often not enough. And the process is often slow. </p>
<p>A second problem is bureaucratic red tape. There is clear evidence of excessive layers of approval with repetitive documentation. This causes significant delays. </p>
<p>Thirdly, there is a lack of access to finance. Farmers have limited credit history, collateral or access to formal financial institutions because of the nature of the lease arrangement.</p>
<p>Fourth, the arrangement of leasing of state land and the engagement of bureaucrats in the beneficiary selection process and management of decisions on the farms are setting beneficiaries up to fail.</p>
<h2>Action that needs to be taken</h2>
<p>Government has bought land on behalf of beneficiaries at market value. But the government doesn’t have the capacity and resources to manage the land assets and generate any return in the form of rents, improving the capital asset base or even performing general maintenance of the physical assets that may be on the land. </p>
<p>There are solutions.</p>
<p>Firstly, the government should transfer the asset to an institution with a vested interest and capacity to provide both oversight and finance. One such institution could be the Land Reform Agency announced by the president in his <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2021-state-nation-address-11-feb-2021-0000">State of the Nation address</a> of February 2021.</p>
<p>Secondly, beneficiaries who have managed to have commercially successful enterprises on these leased farms should get priority to acquire the land and finance.</p>
<p>Thirdly, lease amounts that are paid should get deducted from the purchase amount. And farmers who are up to date with their lease payments should be given preference.</p>
<p>Fourth, the purchase amount should be pegged at 50% of productive value (as opposed to the market value) – thus around 25% of initial purchase price by the state. Selling the farms at less than half the price they were bought for would allow farmers to grow quickly and avoid any challenges and give them the breathing space to catch up with their peers.</p>
<p>Fifth, the purchase price (pegged value minus lease amounts paid) should be financed over 25 years at a preferential interest rate.</p>
<p>Sixth, a financial institution (such as the Land Bank) should take title deeds as security and register a mortgage bond on the land.</p>
<p>Seventh, put a moratorium on the allowed window of reselling the farm to 10 years and let government have the first right of refusal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211938/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johann Kirsten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The South African government must act on the ineffective and politics-ridden system of land leases and ensure that beneficiaries are getting secure land rights.Johann Kirsten, Director of the Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1972012023-01-09T13:26:46Z2023-01-09T13:26:46ZThe South African government has been buying farmland for black farmers. It’s not gone well<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503265/original/file-20230105-1865-xupra0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Acquired land was used mostly for raising livestock rather than growing fruit, vegetables or field crops.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Titmuss/Education Images/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the African National Congress came to power in South Africa in 1994, <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/policy-documents-1994-agricultural-policy/">an expressed priority was land reform</a>. This was to address the fact that black farmers had been excluded from the agricultural economy for most of the 20th century. The aim of land reform was to provide agricultural land to disadvantaged people, raising their productivity, income and employment. </p>
<p>A plethora of policy initiatives were launched. The target was to distribute 30% of agricultural land to black farmers. In 2006 the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/impllandacquisition0.pdf">Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy</a> (PLAS) was adopted. This replaced the land redistribution programmes implemented between 1996 and 2006. The acquisition programme involved the government buying farmland previously owned by white farmers and redistributing it to black farmers. </p>
<p>But, overall, it’s become clear that the new approach to redistributing farmland has been mostly ineffective. Failure can be attributed to limited implementation, poor institutional capacity and corruption.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.arc.agric.za%2FPages%2FBiometry.aspx&data=05%7C01%7C%7C1584a1faa2094b38624508dae1a4a59d%7Ca6fa3b030a3c42588433a120dffcd348%7C0%7C0%7C638070394852634326%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C2000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=vlFhP%2FWhEaeVcuDfIOPXoFZembkylR7THuz5kDcNUPo%3D&reserved=0">research report</a> first released in 2019 shed fresh light on how the most recent strategy has unfolded. Compiled by the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, it provided a sober look at what happens when government bureaucrats get involved in land reform and farming decisions. </p>
<p>The main findings were that the performance on most farms bought under the acquisition scheme had been disappointing. More than half the current beneficiaries were not reporting any substantial production. The same percentage were evaluated as having a low capacity to achieve commercial status. </p>
<p>We argue that the data collected and interviews with stakeholders clearly indicate the reasons for failure. They include poor beneficiary selection, inadequate support and infrastructure, and rampant crime. Post settlement support was found to be inadequate, and stakeholders appointed to support the new farmers were poorly monitored and not working in an integrated manner. Agricultural infrastructure, both off farm and on farm, needed attention.</p>
<p>Based on our decades of experience in studying land policy, we believe that there is scope for the successful integration of farms acquired under the scheme into profitable value chains. But for this to happen, existing constraints need to be addressed.</p>
<h2>The plan</h2>
<p>The land acquisition programme was approved “in principle” in July 2003. It was officially implemented in 2006.</p>
<p>Between 2003 and August 2022, the state acquired 2.9 million hectares of farmland previously owned by white farmers through the Pro-active Land Acquisition Strategy. Around R12 billion (US$706 million) has been spent on the acquisition of these farms over the last 16 years. This land is made up of 2,921 farms and is under 30-year leases to beneficiaries. </p>
<p>The state also owns an additional 3,172 farms. It is unclear when and how these were acquired. Our best guess is that they were bought in the earlier iterations of the land redistribution programme. </p>
<p>The strategy was a noble attempt at land reform. It had some clear objectives:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>acquire land of high agricultural potential</p></li>
<li><p>integrate black farmers into the commercial agricultural sector</p></li>
<li><p>improve beneficiary selection</p></li>
<li><p>improve land use planning</p></li>
<li><p>ensure optimal productive land use.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>To establish the commercial potential and status of the farms, the Department of Rural Development and Land asked the Agricultural Research Council to conduct an analysis of all the land purchased under the scheme. Its remit was to:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>determine the agricultural potential of the land</p></li>
<li><p>establish the performance of the new farmers</p></li>
<li><p>define criteria for beneficiary selection</p></li>
<li><p>define criteria for contracting support agencies</p></li>
<li><p>establish interventions to help the scheme achieve its objectives.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>Most farms acquired under the initiative had high potential. It’s therefore possible to dismiss the myth that the land acquired for land reform was of poor quality.</p>
<p>The assessment showed that land acquired through the programme was generally of good or fair quality, and 98% of farms had fair to good natural resources. </p>
<p>Most farms (59%) were large enough in size and had a natural resource base sufficient to support viable enterprises. Some (7%) were doing well, despite limitations, indicating that it is possible for the programme to achieve its objectives.</p>
<p>The report noted that roughly 60% of all the farms had the potential to achieve commercial levels of production. Another 23% had the potential to reach significant (medium scale) levels of production. </p>
<p>Roughly 10% of the land had the capacity to support only livelihood level production. </p>
<p>According to the data, all the farms under review collectively employed 12,129 part-time and 7,045 full-time workers. Each farm on average employed six full-time and four part-time workers. Based on the potential of these farms, a total of 60,050 workers should be employed, suggesting that the growth and employment targets of the programme have been missed by a mile.</p>
<p>The report also looked at whether the farms were operational and in commercial production.</p>
<p>It found that performance on most was disappointing. More than half the current beneficiaries were not reporting any substantial production, and more than half the beneficiaries were evaluated as having a low capacity to achieve commercial status.</p>
<p>The report also addressed signs of degradation.</p>
<p>Nearly half (47%) of the farms that had been acquired were found to have some degree of degradation, while 13% were seriously or severely degraded. This was based on an evaluation of the land through satellite imagery and the data collected for the farm, compared to the potential based on land capability maps. Of concern was the high number of commercially viable farms (42%) and medium-scale farms (53%) that showed signs of degradation such as erosion and overgrazing.</p>
<p>The question of whether farmers were engaged in optimal farm enterprise mix was also addressed. It appears that most tended to avoid high value commodities (fruit, vegetables and field crops) in favour of livestock. This could be attributed to lack of skills, water constraints, insufficient suitable infrastructure and moveable assets, or limited access to capital. Of concern is the significant number (350) of farms that produced no commodities.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>The analysis showed that access to capital was one of the most critical resource limitations. To access capital from a commercial bank, the land bank or any private financial services outlet, farmers require collateral. Where farmers have title deed, this is facilitated. Lease agreements are not deemed collateral.</p>
<p>This points to the need to transfer the farm title deeds to farmers who have proven their capability. This would enable them to access finance via the Land Bank under its <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-didiza-launches-r32-billion-blended-finance-scheme-land-bank-assist-farmers%C2%A0-24">newly launched blended finance programme</a>.</p>
<p>Farms with better infrastructure – housing, fencing, water reticulation, fixed assets and equipment – performed better. This illustrates the importance of infrastructural investment. </p>
<p>For land reform success in the future, the importance of selecting beneficiaries based on the criteria of entrepreneurial aptitude, resilience and technical skills will also be vital. The criteria described in the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy stated that beneficiaries should be evaluated. But this appears not to have happened in practice. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/what-the-anc-decided-at-its-national-conference/">latest resolution</a> on land reform passed by the ANC argues for legislative instruments to manage the state acquisition of land. The failures set out above suggest that the state will always be a poor player in redistributing land as it will always hold onto it. </p>
<p>The point of identifying mistakes in policy is, surely, not to repeat them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197201/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aart-Jan Verschoor was part of the Agricultural Research Council team that conducted a study and wrote a report commissioned by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform on the South African government's land acquisition programme .</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Colleta Gandidzanwa was part of the Agricultural Research Council team that conducted a study and wrote a report commissioned by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform on the South African government's land acquisition programme .</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johann Kirsten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The government’s approach to redistributing farmland has been mostly ineffective. Failure can be attributed to limited implementation, poor institutional capacity and corruption.Johann Kirsten, Director of the Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch UniversityAart-Jan Verschoor, Senior Manager - Agrimetrics, Agricultural Research CouncilColleta Gandidzanwa, Researcher, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1959492022-12-07T14:39:13Z2022-12-07T14:39:13ZWhat is RET and what does it want? The Radical Economic Transformation faction in South Africa explained<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499500/original/file-20221207-3544-nqjswm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Loyalists of the ANC's Radical Economic Transformation (RET) at the Olive Convention Centre in Durban. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rajesh Jantilal/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It has been standard for some years, in any analysis of South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), to refer to the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-01-11-the-ret-faction-wants-total-control-of-everything-in-the-state-and-society-as-an-end-in-itself/">“radical economic transformation”</a> (RET) faction. Yet, there has been little serious analysis of what it is. </p>
<p>The RET is difficult to define. It has no clear shape, leadership, membership, rules or policies. It is rather an aggregation of the aggrieved and aspirant within the ANC, linked by a set of broadly shared attitudes towards the state and power. Nor, in conventional terms, is the faction particularly “radical”. The “economic transformation” it seeks is the displacement of white racial domination, rather than the overturn of capitalism.</p>
<p>Despite its vagueness, the RET has become central to the contemporary ANC. It is destined to remain a powerful bloc within the party, and under President Cyril Ramaphosa, a constant constraint on his leadership and any effort to reform the economy and promote clean governance. For that reason, it needs to be understood.</p>
<h2>Growth and composition</h2>
<p>Its origins lie in the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/zuma-like-a-tsunami-wave-20050307">“tsunami wave”</a> which led to the defeat of Thabo Mbeki as ANC president <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president/">in 2007 by Jacob Zuma</a>, followed by Zuma’s elevation as state president in 2009. During Zuma’s presidency (<a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma-mr">9 May 2009 – 14 February 2018</a>), the RET faction overlapped heavily with his support base, which was drawn heavily from KwaZulu-Natal, his home province. Yet it was also closely aligned to ANC heavyweights in the other provinces, notably those dominated by the then <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/news/anc-suspensions-death-of-the-premier-league-9492a864-f3f0-4792-a94a-7c6a9080a0e6">“premier league”</a> – provincial premiers in three mainly rural provinces Mpumalanga, Free State and North West. Simultaneously it drew heavily on the support of black business lobbies doing business with the state, notably at provincial and local government levels. </p>
<p>By implication, the RET faction was often implicated in the corrupt practices referred to as <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/state-capture-report-public-protector-14-october-2016">“state capture”</a>. Yet there was more to it than that. While various “Indian” business people who were tied to Zuma, especially in KwaZulu-Natal, were on the periphery of the RET, the faction itself was largely Africanist politically, protesting a continuation of white power under a veil of democracy.</p>
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<p>The faction also drew energy from black professionals fighting against what they depicted as white domination of their professional spheres, and the radical black student lobbies which emerged during the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvmd84n8?turn_away=true">“RhodesMustFall”</a> and <a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/south-africa-student-protests-explained/">“Fees must fall”</a> protest waves of the late Zuma period. </p>
<p>By the time of the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc54-breaking-ramaphosa-elected-anc-president-12453127">December 2017 ANC elective conference</a>, the RET faction was strongly anti-Cyril Ramaphosa and <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-does-ramaphosas-victory-mean-for-south-africas-economy-89420">pro-Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a> in the race for the ANC presidency. The narrowness of Dlamini-Zuma’s defeat has provided it with a strong oppositional presence within the ANC during the Ramaphosa presidency, hampering his efforts at reform. </p>
<h2>Understanding the RET faction</h2>
<p>If it is difficult to pin down who belongs to the RET, it is equally difficult to define what they want. Nonetheless, four broad themes emerge.</p>
<p>First, the motive behind the faction seems to be black economic empowerment, but not the empowerment originally envisaged by Thabo Mbeki with its carefully regulated industrial charters <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40283176#metadata_info_tab_contents">and targets</a>. The RET version was a generalised insistence that the state machinery (government departments, provincial and local administrations, and state-owned enterprises) be leveraged to allocate contracts to black businesses. </p>
<p>This is justified by attacks upon <a href="https://theconversation.com/white-monopoly-capital-good-politics-bad-sociology-worse-economics-77338">“white monopoly capital”</a>, arguing that the South African economy has changed very little since democracy in 1994, and that white business is covertly determined upon maintaining white power. </p>
<p>The second thrust, closely related to the first, is a generalised attack on the constitutional settlement of 1994-96. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-its-wrong-to-blame-south-africas-woes-on-mandelas-compromises-96062">“Mandela compromise”</a> is criticised as having done little to ease the poverty and unemployment of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-policy-remains-hotly-contested-in-south-africa-this-detailed-history-shows-why-138378">black population</a>.</p>
<p>The RET is highly ambivalent about the constitution’s defence of property rights but has little respect for the other laws, rules and regulations which the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution</a> puts in place. By implication, the judiciary is regarded as suspect, as its function is to <a href="https://theconversation.com/rule-of-law-in-south-africa-protects-even-those-who-scorn-it-175533">see that the constitution is enforced</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-anc-survive-the-end-of-south-africas-heroic-epoch-57256">Can the ANC survive the end of South Africa's heroic epoch?</a>
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<p>Third, an overlap with the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which depicts itself as <a href="https://blackopinion.co.za/2019/12/30/the-effs-%EF%BB%BFmarxist-leninist-fanonist-thought-as-founded-by-mngxitama/">Marxist-Leninist-Fanonist</a>, sees the RET faction driving the call for the state to extend its right to the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-31-expropriation-without-compensation-anc-eff-toenadering-on-state-land-custodianship-its-all-about-the-politics/">compulsory expropriation of land</a>. The impetus comes from the fact that, despite the government’s programme of land reform, a hugely disproportionate amount of land suitable for agriculture remains in <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201802/landauditreport13feb2018.pdf">white hands</a>. The faction, like the EFF, appears to admire the Zimbabwean land reforms of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14725843.2022.2032591?journalCode=cafi20">early 2000s</a>, which saw mass expropriation of white farms, but rarely advocates this openly.</p>
<p>Fourth, the RET faction is a strong supporter of state enterprises. Although the faction would not object to the transfer of state enterprises into black hands, privatisation is feared as likely to result in acquisition of state businesses by white companies. </p>
<p>In any case, the RET faction is heavily embedded within the state owned enterprises. Their operatives allocate valuable contracts to black <a href="https://www.gov.za/tenderpreneurship-stuff-crooked-cadres-fighters">“tenderpreneurs”</a> – business people who feed on government contracts. By implication, it is opposed to all versions of “structural reform” touted by the Ramaphosa government and lobbies attached to “big business”.</p>
<h2>What the RET faction wants</h2>
<p>Trying to work out precisely what the RET faction wants is difficult because it has <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-ret-manifesto">no agreed manifesto</a>. However, three problems stand out:</p>
<p>First, it remains unclear what the RET faction would put in place of the existing constitution. </p>
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<p>Should the constitution be reworked, and if so, how? What are the specific flaws in the constitution as it stands? For the moment, all we are left with are generalised attacks on the judiciary for individual judgements the RET dislikes, demands for changes of the expropriation clause in the constitution, and so on.</p>
<p>Second, the RET faction has no general plan for land reform. Crucially, it ignores the increasing domination of agriculture by <a href="https://theconversation.com/land-reform-in-south-africa-is-failing-ignoring-the-realities-of-rural-life-plays-a-part-190452">huge agri-businesses</a>.</p>
<p>These mega-firms are hugely complex operations. It is one thing to expropriate small white farms; quite another to engage in a battle with huge corporations which probably incorporate foreign as well as local ownership. And what would happen to food production if the state were to take them over?</p>
<p>Third, it is common knowledge that South Africa’s parastatals are failing. <a href="https://mybroadband.co.za/news/investing/461772-eskoms-failure-in-four-charts.html">Eskom</a>, the power utility, can’t deliver enough electricity and is burdened by <a href="https://mg.co.za/business/2022-10-26-mtbs-government-to-take-a-chunk-of-eskoms-debt/">unpayable debt</a>. <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/transnet-decline-inside-business-big-battle-for-private-rail-20221129">Transnet</a>, the transport parastatal, is in chaos, unable to maintain infrastructure needed for business to operate efficiently. The public railway system is a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60202570">shambles</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-oldest-surviving-party-the-anc-has-an-achilles-heel-its-broken-branch-structure-150210">Africa's oldest surviving party – the ANC – has an Achilles heel: its broken branch structure</a>
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<p>South African Airways, the national airline, has collapsed financially and is being propped up by <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/the-days-of-bailouts-are-gone-saa-to-start-flying-ahead-of-takatso-deal-20210922">state funding</a>. The Post Office is <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2022-10-05-ag-highlights-sapo-mess-as-it-faces-collapse/">unable to deliver the post</a>. The reasons for these failures are many, ranging from the ANC’s systematic undervaluation of technical ability to run complex operations, its <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321223498_The_African_National_Congress_ANC_and_the_Cadre_Deployment_Policy_in_the_Postapartheid_South_Africa_A_Product_of_Democratic_Centralisation_or_a_Recipe_for_a_Constitutional_Crisis">political deployment strategy</a>, and the mass looting of state bodies that took place <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-state-capture-commission-nears-its-end-after-four-years-was-it-worth-it-182898">under Zuma</a>. </p>
<p>Turnaround strategies have failed. The difficult question for the RET (and the ANC at large) is: if not privatisation, then what?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195949/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite its vagueness, the RET has become central to the contemporary ANC. It is destined to remain a powerful bloc within the party, and a constant constraint on Ramaphosa leadership.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1950452022-11-26T11:36:52Z2022-11-26T11:36:52ZLand reform in South Africa: 5 myths about farming debunked<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496971/original/file-20221123-14-970hoe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Most farmers in South Africa run small-scale operations.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carl De Souza/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s land reform policy remains highly contested. But, in our view, a number of persistent myths about farmland statistics and the structure of commercial agriculture skew debates. This makes it difficult to reach some common understanding about the realities of land and agriculture in the country.</p>
<p>In 1994 when South Africa became a democracy, white farmers owned 77.580 million hectares of farmland out of the total <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/37171/chapter/323739043">surface area of 122 million hectares</a>. The new government set a target of <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/Commissioned_Report_land/Diagnostic_Report_on_Land_Reform_in_South_Africa.pdf">redistributing 30% of this within five years</a>. This target date has been moved several times and <a href="https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/assets/Documents/NDP_Chapters/devplan_ch6_0.pdf">is now 2030</a>.</p>
<p>According to popular belief between 8% and 10% has been redistributed so far. But as we show below this is incorrect as it omits a number of key statistics.</p>
<p>Only <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/37171/chapter/323739043">17%-20% of the 77,58 million ha</a> is suitable for field crop, irrigation and horticultural production. More than 55% of farmland is only ideal for extensive grazing (land that is poor and dry but animals can roam widely, the Karoo being an example), and another 20% for intensive pastures and animal production (land, the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands being an example, that receives good rains and has good pastures for grazing). </p>
<p>This shows that the potential of farm land being used to create full-time sustainable livelihoods is limited. This suggests that a careful and measured approach needs to be adopted in redistribution efforts. </p>
<p>These realities are the basis for our arguments against five standard myths about agriculture and land in South Africa. That’s not to say that there isn’t a great deal still to be done. But failure to recognise the gains that have been achieved means that policies can’t be developed based on what’s been achieved so far.</p>
<h2>Myth 1: 40,000 white farmers own 80% of all South Africa’s land</h2>
<p>First, let’s turn to the number that’s quoted about white farmers.</p>
<p>The number of 40,122 commercial farmers is widely quoted as the total number of farmers earning a commercial income from farming. The number comes from the <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-11-02-01/Report-11-02-012017.pdf">2017 census of commercial agriculture</a>.</p>
<p>But the number is flawed.</p>
<p>Firstly, the census only considers farmers who are registered for VAT (for which the the threshold is a turnover of R1 million a year (about US$59 000 today).</p>
<p>Adding in two other groups – the number of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/37171/chapter/323739043">households involved in commercial farming</a> as their main source of income and those that practice farming as a secondary source of income – the total number of households comes to 242,221.</p>
<p>It’s difficult to estimate the “race” of commercial farmers. But, using different data sources including the <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03014/P030142011.pdf">2011 population census</a>, the <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-11-02-01/Report-11-02-012017.pdf">2017 agricultural census</a> and the <a href="http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/NT-30-06-2016-RELEASE-for-CS-2016-_Statistical-releas_1-July-2016.pdf">2016 community survey</a> we estimated that most commercial farm enterprises are black owned. And that only 18% of these households are white. </p>
<p>Now to the 80% figure.</p>
<p>In 1994 white farmers owned 77.58 million ha of freehold land. We estimate that white farmers now <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">own 61 million ha of freehold farmland</a>. This follows the implementation of redistribution and restitution programmes and other transfers of land to the state and black farmers. It still represents 78% of freehold farmland but covers only 50% of the total surface area of South Africa. </p>
<p><strong>Fact:</strong> white commercial farmers (around 44,000 farming units) own 61 million ha – 78% of the farmland that comes with private title deeds or 50% of all land in South Africa.</p>
<h2>Myth 2: Commercial agriculture is characterised by large-scale white farmers</h2>
<p>This myth results from a misinterpretation of the concept of “commercial” and “scale”.</p>
<p>Commercial agricultural production indicates production beyond subsistence needs, with some (or a major share) of the total production sold to the market. This usually also involves the purchase of production inputs such as seeds and fertiliser.</p>
<p>But commercial production happens at various levels or “scales of production”.</p>
<p>The scale of farming is not determined by land size. Instead it refers to the <a href="https://wandilesihlobo.com/2019/03/16/the-perception-that-south-africas-agriculture-is-dominated-by-large-commercial-farms-is-incorrect/">gross farm income (or turnover) of the farming enterprise</a>.</p>
<p>Land size is not a good indication of the scale of the farming operation. For example, a small irrigation farm of 10 ha can deliver millions in turnover while a 10,000 ha extensive grazing farm is unlikely to exceed R1 million in turnover per annum.</p>
<p>If we unpack the census of commercial agriculture, commercial farming in South Africa consists largely of small-scale family-based operations. Almost <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/37171/chapter/323739043">90% of all VAT-registered commercial farming businesses</a> can be classified as micro - or small-scale enterprises (turnover below R13.5 million). While this is true, it’s also a fact that there are just over 2,600 large farms with turnover on average above R22.5 million per annum. These farms are responsible for 67% of all farm income and employ more than half the agricultural labour force. </p>
<p>If we take account of the farms that are not registered for VAT it is evident that 98% of all farming operations in South Africa are small-scale operations.</p>
<p>But, a mistaken leap is made to say that all white commercial farmers are “large-scale” operations, and all black farmers are “small-scale”. In the process, most writers on South African agriculture confuse the “scale of the operation” with the “race” of the operator.</p>
<p><strong>Fact:</strong> most white commercial farmers in South Africa are small-scale and family-based operations. Only a small minority (2 600) are large-scale operations. Most of these are owned by white farmers.</p>
<h2>Myth 3: Commercial farmers are hoarding land and not selling any farms</h2>
<p>It is often argued that white commercial farmers are holding on to their land and not offering it for sale to potential buyers. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.deeds.gov.za/">Deeds office records</a> provide insights into the activity in the farmland market. Between 2013 and 2021, the annual number of farm transactions recorded varied between 2,000 and 4,000. In 2021 2,585 farms were sold and registered to new owners. Most (58%) of these were farms smaller than 300 hectares. </p>
<p>Between 2003 and August 2022, the state acquired 2.8 million ha which brings the total area of farm land acquired by the state since 1994 to 3,12 million ha (or 4% of freehold farmland). This suggests that the state is also active in the market.</p>
<p><strong>Fact:</strong> The farmland market is active with around 2% of total farmland with private title deeds traded annually.</p>
<h2>Myth 4: All black farmers with private title deeds acquired their land through the land reform programme</h2>
<p>Deeds records show that since 1994 black South Africans have privately acquired a total of 1.78 million ha of farmland <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">through normal self-financed market transactions</a>. </p>
<p>Over the same period the government redistribution programme has assisted beneficiaries to acquire a total of 7.2 million ha of farmland. Thus, for every four hectares transferred by the State to black South Africans, private transactions contributed another one hectare to the process.</p>
<p><strong>Fact:</strong> Black farmers have acquired almost 2 million ha of farmland (2,3% of total freehold farmland) on their own without any assistance from the state sponsored land redistribution programme.</p>
<h2>Myth 5: South Africa has only redistributed 8% of farmland to black people</h2>
<p>The debate on the expropriation of land is largely driven by the myth that white farmers are hoarding land and are inflating prices, and therefore, it is impossible to remove the racially skewed land ownership patterns in South Africa.</p>
<p>These arguments typically ignore the statistics on the land market and the fact that black South Africans have been acquiring farmland on their own. These arguments also conveniently ignore other factors, such as bureaucratic inefficiences, patronage and corruption – that have slowed down land reform.</p>
<p>In addition, the incorrect presentation of the progress with the land reform process is also maliciously used to inflate the argument for expropriation. If South Africans are true to themselves and correctly report the statistics, then they will be much closer to the 30% target. We estimate, using various official datasets, that up to August 2022, the land statistics were as follows:</p>
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<p>Based on these numbers extracted from official sources it is evident that South Africa has made much more progress than what is been punted around. It is, therefore, disingenuous of analysts and commentators not to take account of the real progress made here.</p>
<p><strong>Fact:</strong> Taking account of all the pillars of the land reform programme, it is estimated that 24% of all farmland has been redistributed or land rights have been restored. This is close to the 30% target, which could be reached by 2030.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195045/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wandile Sihlobo is the Chief Economist of the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa (Agbiz) and a member of the Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johann Kirsten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Based on official statistics, we conclude that the country has made more progress towards land reform than is generally suggested.Johann Kirsten, Director of the Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch UniversityWandile Sihlobo, Senior Fellow, Department of Agricultural Economics, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1836882022-05-31T13:32:29Z2022-05-31T13:32:29ZANC policy papers touch on key issues facing agriculture and land reform in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465761/original/file-20220527-17-63tk59.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rural development is one of the priorities identified by South Africa's ruling party.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by: Galivel/Andia/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The latest <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/umrabulo-policy-conference-2022-2022-05-20">policy discussion document</a> published by the African National Congress (ANC) presents a positive change from the <a href="https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/73640_54th_national_conference_report.pdf">ambiguous agriculture policy</a> the South African governing party has maintained in the recent past. The latest document talks to the primary issues that, if implemented relentlessly, would drive the sector’s growth in ways that would benefit all.</p>
<p>The policy document is set for debate at the ANC’s policy conference in July, which is a precursor the party’s elective conference scheduled for December this year.</p>
<p>The previous policy documents were clouded by the <a href="https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/73640_54th_national_conference_report.pdf">proposals to amend the constitution</a> to allow for expropriation of land without compensation under specific circumstances. Beyond the push for radical land reform, there was inadequate reflection on the drivers of growth in the agricultural economy, and the importance of food security. The recently released document has a sharp focus on the key interventions to drive the agricultural and rural economy. It highlights the sector’s role in job creation and reducing poverty.</p>
<p>The ANC <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/umrabulo-policy-conference-2022-2022-05-20">acknowledges</a> that: </p>
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<p>agriculture remains an important sector of the South African economy. It holds the potential to uplift many poor South Africans out of poverty through increased food production, vibrant economic activity, and job creation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The policy discussion document draws from the insights of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X1830175X">a 2018 collection of studies</a> which found that, on average, growth in agriculture is more poverty-reducing than an equivalent amount of growth outside agriculture. This brings home the need to invest and expand agricultural production. That is if South Africa is to reduce poverty, raise its economic growth rate and the rate of development, specifically in the rural communities.</p>
<p>Overall, my assessment is that the idea presented by these discussion papers on agriculture, land reform and rural development are sound. They also speak to the core issues that have held back the growth of agriculture in South Africa.</p>
<p>That said, once these ideas have been adopted as the governing party’s policy positions, they still need to be translated into government policy. There’s a risk they may be diluted along the way. A lot also will depend on how well government is able to implement the proposals.</p>
<h2>The big issues</h2>
<p>The ANC <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/umrabulo-policy-conference-2022-2022-05-20">acknowledges</a> that the growth of the agricultural sector partly depends on effective land reform which includes bringing into production underutilised land. Such land is mainly in the state owned farmlands and the <a href="https://wandilesihlobo.com/2018/02/28/these-provinces-have-unused-land-suitable-for-agriculture/">former homelands</a> in the provinces of the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-narrow-the-big-divide-between-black-and-white-farmers-in-south-africa-172328">weak land governance, infrastructure and institutions</a> in these areas are amongst the key constraints to agricultural progress. </p>
<p>The ANC now places emphasis on the Land Reform and Agricultural Development Agency, first announced by President Cyril Ramaphosa in 2020 and more recently in the <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2022-state-nation-address-10-feb-2022-0000">State of the Nation Address in 2022</a>. The agency would ideally focus on the redistribution pillar of the land reform programme. The other pillars are land restitution and tenure. The agency would <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">bring about</a> national coordination, reduce red tape, and become a one-stop shop for issues related to a decentralised redistribution of agricultural land.</p>
<p>Details of how the agency will function haven’t yet been set out. The minister of agriculture, land reform and rural development, Thoko Didiza, is expected to announce these <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2022-state-nation-address-10-feb-2022-0000">before the end of June 2022</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/umrabulo-policy-conference-2022-2022-05-20">ANC policy papers</a> also emphasise the need to improve the functioning of municipality and the network industries – road, rail, water, electricity and ports. These are issues <a href="https://wandilesihlobo.com/2022/05/09/municipal-service-delivery-and-infrastructure-constraints-are-costly-for-south-african-farmers/">I have emphasised several times</a>. Some of the challenges the sector has faced in the recent past stem from the poor functioning of network industries and the failure of the municipalities.</p>
<p>Municipalities provide services such as water and sanitation, electricity, roads and technological infrastructure. These are fundamental for <a href="https://theconversation.com/small-towns-are-collapsing-across-south-africa-how-its-starting-to-affect-farming-162697">the functioning</a> of the agribusinesses and agriculture at large. Some agribusinesses have now resorted to <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2022-05-06-wandile-sihlobo-municipal-service-delivery-and-infrastructure-constraints-are-costly-for-farmers/">using their own funds</a> to provide these services. These are resources which would have ideally been used to support new entrant black farmers and agribusinesses.</p>
<p>If these challenges could be addressed, along with the release of state land to properly selected beneficiaries, South Africa could achieve improvements in <a href="https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/assets/Documents/NDP_Chapters/devplan_ch6_0.pdf">agricultural production and job creation</a>.</p>
<p>The discussion papers also focus on rural development, acknowledging its multi-dimensional nature. Rural development <a href="https://www.sun.ac.za/english/Lists/news/DispForm.aspx?ID=7514">encompasses</a> better infrastructure such as roads, water and electricity, and the building of schools and health facilities.</p>
<p>Here again, the challenge of deteriorating infrastructure remains a major hindrance. If improved, along with municipality governance and service delivery, South Africa would achieve a vibrant rural economy.</p>
<p>Agriculture, fishing, aquaculture, mining and tourism are among the key industries that would contribute more to economic growth and job creation with improved infrastructure. These industries contribute a decent share to the <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0441/GDP%202021%20Q4%20(Media%20presentation).pdf">economy and job creation</a>. </p>
<p>The one glaring omission in the documents is the idea on “land donations”, which was <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2022-04-24-anc-considers-land-donations-among-new-policy-proposals/">floated in the media</a> in April 2022. But it was first proposed by the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201907/panelreportlandreform_1.pdf">Presidential Advisory Panel Report on South Africa’s Land Reform and Agriculture</a>. Land donations would be an additional instrument to accelerate land reform.</p>
<p>The potential land donors would include churches, mining houses, and big farming businesses. The state would provide <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">incentives or nudges for such a programme</a>. This would help increase the land supply for the redistribution pillar of land reform.</p>
<p>Perhaps, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">Land Reform and Agricultural Development Agency</a> will incorporate land donations as one of its instruments.</p>
<h2>What’s to be avoided</h2>
<p>The discussion documents will no doubt be revised by the ANC’s policy conference. One hopes that their thoughtful approach to agriculture, land reform and rural development will not be diluted.</p>
<p>This is especially because the dilution of the policy proposals might affect existing government approaches to agriculture and agribusiness. The <a href="https://wandilesihlobo.com/2022/05/13/what-to-make-of-south-africas-agriculture-land-reform-and-rural-development-budget-vote-speech-and-master-plan-launch/">Agriculture and Agro-processing Master Plan and the budget vote speech</a> have acknowledged the sector’s contribution to economic growth, job creation, and the potential for its further expansion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183688/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wandile Sihlobo is the Chief Economist of the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa (Agbiz) and a member of the Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC).</span></em></p>Policies, if implemented, would drive the agricultural sector’s growth in ways that would benefit all.Wandile Sihlobo, Senior Fellow, Department of Agricultural Economics, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1822772022-05-16T12:07:37Z2022-05-16T12:07:37ZLand reform in South Africa: what the real debate should be about<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462968/original/file-20220513-19-23or2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Land ownership in South Africa remains skewed towards white farmers.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Silverman/via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Land reform in South Africa is an emotive and politically fraught subject. That’s because land was at the heart of the dispossession of Africans by colonial settlers. Successful land reform can help overcome this legacy, making it central to forging shared national bonds. It can also serve as a basis for a cohesive society through a properly managed redistribution programme.</p>
<p>But nearly three decades since the first democratic elections in 1994, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-the-south-african-economy-9780192894199?facet_narrowbybinding_facet=Ebook&facet_narrowbyprice_facet=100to200&lang=en&cc=gb">South Africa has yet to crack land reform</a>. That’s not for a lack of initiatives. Some communities and individuals have indeed had their land restored. But for every one of these stories there’s another of a “failed” farming project or a small farmer stuck in a remote area without hope of gaining a livelihood. </p>
<p>Opinions vary on what <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Land-Matters-Africas-Failed-Reforms/dp/1776095960">has gone wrong with land reform</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">what should be done about it</a>.</p>
<p>The first problem is that the topic often rears its head close to election time. As the governing party, the African National Congress (<a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/anc-today-2022/">ANC</a>), gets closer to its national elective conference <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2022-01-20-nwc-proposes-december-16-for-start-of-anc-national-conference/">scheduled for December</a>, the country can expect another heated debate on land reform. The curtain raiser to this debate will be the ANC’s <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc-policy-conference-set-for-july-f383a0cf-df14-4052-a0b6-5b93fc0dfd39">policy conference in July </a> which precedes the elective conference.</p>
<p>But the debates in these charged environments tend to generate more heat than substance. Take the decision of the <a href="https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/73640_54th_national_conference_report.pdf">2017 ANC policy conference to amend Section 25 of the constitution</a>. The political rationale was that this would enable expropriation of land without compensation under specified conditions, which, in turn, <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/54th-national-conference-report-and-resolutions-2018-03-26">would accelerate land reform</a>.</p>
<p>But a prominent legal scholar on land reform, Tembeka Ngcukaitobi pointed out in 2018 and 2019 that land reform <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-06-08-00-how-land-expropriation-would-work/">had not been held back by the constitution</a> but by capacity constraints and the lack of political will on the part of government. </p>
<p>Ngcukaitobi went on to consolidate his views in a book, <em><a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/land-matters-south-africa%E2%80%99s-failed-land-reforms-and-road-ahead/9781776095964">Land Matters: South Africa’s Failed Land Reforms and the Road Ahead</a></em>, published in 2021.</p>
<p>His book should be part of the basis for the debates on land reform during the forthcoming ANC conferences. It offers insights on what an effective land reform programme – and the institutions to deliver it – might look like. </p>
<h2>Why land matters</h2>
<p>Ngcukaitobi reflects on the role of business in dispossession and apartheid, and therefore its potential contribution to land reform. In this he invokes the late Stellenbosch University economist Sampie Terreblanche <a href="https://www.amazon.com/History-Inequality-South-Africa-1652-2002/dp/1869140222">who also flagged the role of business in contributing to reparatory justice</a>. </p>
<p>Ngcukaitobi also argues that land reform shouldn’t be seen only as an agricultural industry problem. Rather, it should be viewed as a multi-industry challenge involving non-agricultural players. Underpinning this view is his analysis that white farmers weren’t the only beneficiaries of the colonial and apartheid regimes’ land policies. Most of those who profited from apartheid live in urban areas. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="Book cover showing the title 'Land Matters'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463304/original/file-20220516-20-ov300z.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463304/original/file-20220516-20-ov300z.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463304/original/file-20220516-20-ov300z.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463304/original/file-20220516-20-ov300z.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463304/original/file-20220516-20-ov300z.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1026&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463304/original/file-20220516-20-ov300z.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1026&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463304/original/file-20220516-20-ov300z.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1026&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>On this point, <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201907/panelreportlandreform_0.pdf">the proposals</a> of a Land Reform Fund that came out of the Expert Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture in 2018 could be a perfect vehicle for business to contribute through donations for land reform. Perhaps, Ngcukaitobi should have reflected on the panel’s proposal.</p>
<p>His research draws heavily on archival material. He casts a spotlight on the large-scale loss of black South African livestock during the years of dispossession, starting from the late 1600s through theft and killings and during the wars since the late 1600s. This insight brings home the point that black South Africans lost more than land. They lost their livelihoods and productive assets too in the form of livestock. </p>
<p>He writes</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the story of land dispossession will never be complete without an understanding of the loss of indigenous people’s cattle. Cattle, more than land, were a visible sign of wealth.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Unfinished work</h2>
<p>The book also brings home the reality of the slow progress of land reform in South Africa. In 1994 when the country became a democracy, white farmers owned 77.580 million hectares of farmland <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-the-south-african-economy-9780192894199?facet_narrowbybinding_facet=Ebook&facet_narrowbyprice_facet=100to200&lang=en&cc=gb">out of the total surface area of 122 million hectares</a>. </p>
<p>Ngcukaitobi writes that the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (<a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02120/06lv02126.htm">RDP</a>) set a target of redistributing 30% of agricultural land <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/Commissioned_Report_land/Diagnostic_Report_on_Land_Reform_in_South_Africa.pdf">in the first five years of the new democratic government</a>. The RDP was the socio-economic policy framework of the first ANC government in 1994.</p>
<p>Government has missed this goal and has been shifting the goal posts ever since. The aim now is to reach <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">the 30% goal by 2030</a>.</p>
<p>The achievements so far have been small. Exactly how far off the target the government is is the subject of heated debate. Some researchers <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/land-debate-in-south-africa-is-clouded-by-misrepresentation-and-lack-of-data-2/">argue that land reform has been painfully slow</a>. In my work with Stellenbosch University agricultural economist, Professor Johann Kirsten, we <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192894199.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780192894199-e-10">estimate</a> that a total of 13.2 million ha (or 17%) has already been transferred away from white landowners to the state (3.08 million ha) or black owners (10.135 million ha) through private and state supported transactions including land restitution. </p>
<p>These have included restitution, redistribution, private transactions and state procurement transactions.</p>
<p>If we add the hectares of land (2.339 million ha) that were successfully identified for restitution, but for which communities elected to receive financial compensation as the means for restitution, then the total area of land rights that were restored since 1994 is 15.56 million ha.</p>
<p>This is equivalent to 20% of formerly white-owned land – much closer to the 30% target (of 23.25 million ha) than commonly believed.</p>
<p>I don’t mention these statistics to justify the relatively slow pace of land reform but to highlight the challenge of the lack of credible land data in South Africa. For effective policy-making, accurate data is key and we have suggested on various occasions the methods of <a href="https://theconversation.com/small-towns-are-collapsing-across-south-africa-how-its-starting-to-affect-farming-162697">accelerating this process</a>.</p>
<p>Ngcukaitobi argues that the failure to faithfully implement the land reform policy and its three pillars of redistribution, restitution and tenure should be attributed to weaknesses in the state, including corruption. Thus, blaming the constitution for the slow pace of land reform – and calls for an amendment – are perhaps, misplaced.</p>
<p>Another critical aspect the book highlights is the role of women in land reform by offering both the historical part played by women in the South African society, and a mirror of how they have not benefited from redistribution in the recent past.</p>
<p>Finally, there are some success stories that might have been examined in more in depth. Example are joint venture approaches to land reform, specifically within agriculture. The success stories are important as they <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-narrow-the-big-divide-between-black-and-white-farmers-in-south-africa-172328">provide insight</a> into what can be done better going forward.</p>
<p>Overall, Land Matters is crucial work that should be read by all South Africans who care about the country’s future. The point about the weakness of institutions comes up several times in the book. This is a critical aspect that the government should prioritise. It should strengthen the land reform delivery instruments, and do more with the establishment of the Land Reform and Agricultural Development Agency <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">that has already been announced by the president</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182277/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wandile Sihlobo is the Chief Economist of the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa (Agbiz) and a member of the Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC).</span></em></p>Land reform had not been held back by the constitution but by capacity constraints and a lack of political will.Wandile Sihlobo, Senior Fellow, Department of Agricultural Economics, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1708862021-10-29T14:05:23Z2021-10-29T14:05:23ZSouth African local government elections: why a great deal hangs on the outcome<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/429362/original/file-20211029-21-1xi6v7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Economic Freedom Fighters's campaign emphasises national issues. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than 250 local elections will be held in each one of South Africa’s municipalities on <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-and-results/Municipal-Elections-2021">1 November</a>. More than 10,000 councillors have to be elected. For this reason, more than 95,000 candidates have been nominated, including more than <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/in-numbers-this-years-elections-sees-the-most-ever-number-of-participating-candidates-20211026">1,500 independent candidates</a>. </p>
<p>How they have communicated it to the public during their campaigns has been largely determined by their <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-10-01-political-party-manifestos-haul-out-the-promises-oops-its-now-commitments-to-woo-voters/">election manifestos</a>, the media debates between the parties, their election advertisements and their impromptu comments during the campaign.</p>
<p>The scale of the election makes it impossible to reduce it to a single answer of what is at stake and how the different parties articulate it. It would also be incorrect to assume that the parties’ presentation of the essence of the election is the same as that of the public.</p>
<p>The main parties – the <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">African National Congress</a> (ANC), <a href="https://www.da.org.za/">Democratic Alliance</a> (DA) and the <a href="https://effonline.org/">Economic Freedom Fighters</a> (EFF) – portrayed the election in different terms, which is in itself important to analyse. </p>
<p>Two approaches have dominated the election campaign. The African National Congress and Economic Freedom Fighters concentrated on national issues and used national campaigns to reach the voters. The Democratic Alliance also used a national campaign but concentrated much more on local issues of service delivery.</p>
<p>This interplay between the national and the local is an important contributor towards developing an understanding of what this election is about.</p>
<p>The election is not only about who will govern the municipalities. It will also show what is happening in party politics in South Africa, what the latest trends are, how the still relatively new leaders of some parties are performing, whether identity politics is emerging as a feature of South African politics, and whether coalition governments are a long-term feature or a transitional phenomenon. </p>
<h2>African National Congress</h2>
<p>The African National Congress is the governing party at national level, and in most of the provinces and majority of local councils. Its <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ANC-LGE-2021-Manifesto.pdf">election manifesto</a> and pronouncements by its main leaders concentrated very much on economic development and job creation. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-local-elections-new-entrants-likely-to-be-the-big-winners-170804">South Africa's local elections: new entrants likely to be the big winners</a>
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<p>Since 1994, its election slogan has been <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-ancs-1994-election-manifesto">“a better life for all”</a> and now it is; <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ANC-LGE-2021-Manifesto.pdf">“Building better communities together”</a>.</p>
<p>Its emphasis is, therefore, on socio-economic improvement, which depends on policies developed in the national and provincial spheres. </p>
<p>Local authorities have less capacity for economic development but can provide the local infrastructure and services to enable that development. The African National Congress’s electoral approach has been to avoid a focus on local service delivery and municipal infrastructural development. That’s because this is the governance sector in which mismanagement and lack of capacity are most visible. </p>
<p>Where it is unavoidable to address it, African National Congress President Ramaphosa has apologised for the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/elections-2021-ramaphosa-begs-voters-to-give-anc-a-second-chance-20211020">bad state of affairs</a> and distanced himself from the malpractices of the past.</p>
<p>A feature of this election was how most parties tried to concentrate on their own records of government in the past and their successes. The African National Congress and Ramaphosa, therefore, used the African National Congress government’s successes with the economic and social relief programme during the COVID-19 pandemic as a blueprint for its local recovery initiatives.</p>
<p>It, therefore, approached this election as a national scale and its local candidates did not feature much in the campaigns.</p>
<h2>Democratic Alliance</h2>
<p>The main thrust of the Democratic Alliance’s campaign has been that they can deliver the results at local level: </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-das-2021-local-government-election-manifesto">The DA gets things done</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These results are mainly in the form of local services and infrastructure. Their record of governance in the councils where they are the majority party has been their main reference point in the campaign. It is, therefore, meant to convince the voters that their track record should be expanded to councils controlled by the African National Congress and other parties.</p>
<p>The African National Congress and commentators challenged this approach by claiming that these successes only apply to the areas of higher-income residents and business areas, and not to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2021-09-21-what-have-you-done-for-me-lately-despite-its-outstanding-delivery-record-the-da-is-its-own-worst-enemy">informal settlements and townships</a>. The notion of a racial divide at local level is, therefore, the African National Congress’s rebuttal of the Democratic Alliance’s messaging.</p>
<p>Controversial in this election was the Democratic Alliance’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-inflammatory-election-posters-say-about-south-africas-democratic-alliance-169743">poster debacle at Phoenix </a> in KwaZulu-Natal. Though not part of its main campaign strategy, it exploited identity politics in an <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/phoenix-election-posters-steenhuisen-makes-about-turn-community-says-damage-already-done-20211008">Indian and African context</a>. It is per definition a divisive and high-risk approach, which exposed the problematic elements of nationalist politics.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-inflammatory-election-posters-say-about-south-africas-democratic-alliance-169743">What inflammatory election posters say about South Africa's Democratic Alliance</a>
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<p>The Democratic Alliance is one of the protagonists of coalition politics at local level, but its experiences – especially in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/marriages-of-inconvenience-the-fraught-politics-of-coalitions-in-south-africa-167517">Gauteng metropolitan councils</a> – motivated it to campaign for absolute majorities. Coalition negotiations after the elections will, however, become a major task for the DA. Its federal chairperson, Helen Zille’s earlier pronouncements on the African National Congress as a likely partner, lately attracted <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2021-10-27-helen-zille-addresses-viral-audio-clip-on-das-anc-coalition-plans/">quite some attention</a>. Zille indicated that the African National Congress do not share the Democratic Alliance’s values and therefore a coalition with them will be inconceivable. Other Democratic Alliance leaders, however, want to be more pragmatic and not foreclose any of the options.</p>
<h2>Economic Freedom Fighters</h2>
<p>The Economic Freedom Fighters staged a very visual campaign with prominent posters and billboards. Defining itself as a socialist party in its election manifesto of <a href="https://effonline.org/2021-lgemanifesto/">more than 570 pages</a>, it found it difficult to identify a niche area of itself left of the African National Congress.</p>
<p>Its focus on the past on land and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-31-expropriation-without-compensation-anc-eff-toenadering-on-state-land-custodianship-its-all-about-the-politics/">expropriation without compensation </a> could not evolve into a national campaign issue. Its lack of experience in local government also made it difficult to use the approach of the other parties of presenting their track records as a justification for their support.</p>
<p>The Economic Freedom Fighters followed the African National Congress in concentrating on national issues. Its campaign, however, did not develop a central theme. Because there were not really controversial political eruptions during the election campaigns, there were no real opportunities for the Economic Freedom Fighters capitalise on them.</p>
<p>The smaller parties like <a href="https://www.actionsa.org.za/manifesto/">ActionSA</a> and the <a href="https://www.vfplus.org.za/manifesto-2021">Freedom Front Plus</a> pursued local or provincial campaigns and concentrated on local issues. It presents a view of how these parties approach local government as part of the family of governments.</p>
<h2>What’s at stake</h2>
<p>The 2021 election will define for citizens important aspects of South Africa’s political future. What is the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/10/28/local-polls-a-test-for-the-future-for-south-africa-s-anc/">African National Congress’s future</a> and what was the impact of Ramaphosa on this election?</p>
<p>In which direction are <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-09-19-as-anc-and-da-face-obstacles-its-the-effs-elections-to-lose/">the Economic Freedom Fighters</a> and Democratic Alliance moving? Is there a future for independent candidates in South African politics, especially in the 2024 election?</p>
<p>Will the voter turn-out follow the decline in the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/">2016 elections</a>? Will the coalition dynamics of 2021 differ from those after the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/three-gauteng-metros-important-this-election-f148a2a6-dffc-4abd-a151-d3d0bae7c037">2016 elections?</a>.</p>
<p>This is what the 2021 election is actually about.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170886/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The 2021 election will define for citizens important aspects of South Africa’s political future. What is the governing ANC’s future, and what was the impact of President Ramaphosa on this election?Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1654502021-08-03T15:22:42Z2021-08-03T15:22:42ZHow a land reform agency could break South Africa’s land redistribution deadlock<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414137/original/file-20210802-14-1a1o5qb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The distribution of agricultural land in South Africa remains deeply unequal.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by David Turnley/Corbis/VCG via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa has <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/Columnists/CyrilRamaphosa/cyril-ramaphosa-land-reform-process-state-land-to-be-released-soon-to-black-farmers-20201005">conceded</a> that the country’s land reform programme is taking too long to address the challenge of land ownership inequality in South Africa. Bureaucratic delays, patronage and political influence, and opportunism among beneficiaries and landowners are among the challenges that have hindered South Africa’s land reform programme progress.</p>
<p>At the same time, the government’s farmer support programmes haven’t been agile and quick enough to provide the necessary support for beneficiaries.</p>
<p>In 1994 when South Africa became a democracy white farmers owned 77.580 million hectares of farmland out of the total surface area of 122 million hectares. The new government set a <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/Commissioned_Report_land/Diagnostic_Report_on_Land_Reform_in_South_Africa.pdf">target of redistributing 30% of the 77 million hectares within the first five years in government</a>. This target has been consistently moved over the years, and now the aim is to reach 30% by 2030, in line with the National Development Plan’s <a href="https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/assets/Documents/NDP_Chapters/devplan_ch6_0.pdf">agriculture and land reform objectives</a>. </p>
<p><a href="http://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10566/4653/wp_57_successful_farmland_redistribution_south_africa.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">Our estimates</a>, which include restitution, redistribution, private transactions and state procurement, suggest that 13.2 million hectares (or 17%) have already been transferred from white landowners to the state. An additional 3.08 million hectares have been transferred to black owners and 10.135 million hectares through private and state supported transactions including land restitution. </p>
<p>Adding 2.339 million hectares of land that was identified for restitution but for which communities elected to receive financial compensation as the means for restitution brings the total area of land rights that were restored since 1994 to 15.56 million hectares. This is equivalent to 20% of formerly white owned land. </p>
<p>We argue that things can happen much quicker if the arteries of land reform are unblocked.</p>
<p>One proposal is the creation of a Land Reform and Agricultural Development Agency. Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2021-state-nation-address-11-feb-2021-0000">announced</a> the creation of such a body in his state of the nation address in February 2021.</p>
<p>Here, we outline how the proposed agency could accelerate land reform by removing the process from political and bureaucratic control. The state’s only role would be to create an enabling environment. The heavy lifting would be the task of landowners, agribusinesses and large corporates. Their job would be to facilitate equitable and sustainable land reform. </p>
<p>We believe that the model set out below, with the agency as proposed by the president as the starting point, would give South Africa another chance to get a meaningful land reform programme under way. </p>
<p>The model could be the vehicle through which farmland can be returned to the majority of South Africans, with two notable differences to previous efforts. Firstly, it would ensure that beneficiaries weren’t being set up to fail, as has been the case in the past. Secondly, commercial farmers, who benefited from the past injustices, would have an opportunity – in a non-politicised way and with little red tape – to contribute meaningfully to land reform.</p>
<h2>How it would work</h2>
<p>The agency would ideally bring about national coordination, reduce red tape, and become a one-stop shop for issues related to a decentralised redistribution of agricultural land. This would not require additional fiscal outlays. It would, instead, use existing sources of material and other forms of support from the commercial agricultural sector.</p>
<p>The agency idea was developed out of proposals on decentralising land reform first set out in South Africa’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030">National Development Plan</a> released in 2012. The ideas in the plan were echoed in <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201907/panelreportlandreform_0.pdf">a 2019 report</a> by the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture.</p>
<p>The central principle is to locate the responsibility of redistributive land reform with district-level land committees. These would design locally based solutions created on the dominant farming enterprises while considering an area’s community and social dynamics.</p>
<p>The agency would take the job of land acquisition and redistribution out of the government sphere and put the responsibility on the shoulders of those who have benefited from the previous regime. </p>
<p>At the district level, farmers, communities, agribusinesses and other private sector role players would craft local solutions within a framework managed by the agency.</p>
<p>Local District Land and Agricultural Development committees would be established within a particular area. They could comprise ten voting members (all bona fide farmers: five black and five white). This structure could then elect a chairperson and invite six other members (agribusinesses, banks, community and so on) to join. </p>
<p>The local committee would have to consult with all stakeholders in the area and register as a non-profit company with a memorandum of incorporation, a budget, and a board of directors. </p>
<p>The functions of the committee would include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the listing of land, </p></li>
<li><p>the identification of potential beneficiaries in terms of objectively agreed criteria, </p></li>
<li><p>funding, training and support programmes, </p></li>
<li><p>monitoring of enterprises, and</p></li>
<li><p>liaison with government departments and the secretariat of the overarching national agency. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The mechanism would not require the state to provide funds for land acquisition since the land would be made available by farmers and transferred to beneficiaries without any funding flows. </p>
<p>What’s being proposed is a form of “self-expropriation without compensation” but on the terms of the existing land owner. This implies that there are no legal processes required to get land for free. It is done automatically by the current landowner and will transfer land to the beneficiary of their choice.</p>
<h2>Success factors</h2>
<p>A number of critical success factors would need to be in place before any transaction was set up. These would include: access to land, ownership or long-term lease, skills, access to markets for inputs and selling products, funding, the exit strategy, and a supportive environment.</p>
<p>Simply put, the new farm enterprise on redistributed land should immediately be linked to commercial value chains.</p>
<p>The district committee would be responsible for coordinating and facilitating implementation in line with the agreed principles. </p>
<p>The national agency would be established by the Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform, and Rural Development and supervised by a board of 12 members who would meet quarterly. A small secretariat would have funding and administrative capabilities to liaise with the local committees.</p>
<p>Its main functions would be to create enabling policies and smooth out bureaucratic logjams, set up a land reform fund, prescribe rules for the local committees and record and monitor progress with land transactions.</p>
<h2>Nudges</h2>
<p>To nudge current landowners to make land donations we propose:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Exemption on donation tax for land or finance donated for land reform purposes.</p></li>
<li><p>Exemption on capital gains tax when land is transferred to a beneficiary or new entity.</p></li>
<li><p>Registration of title deeds and the important notarial links on the deed signalling the land reform status of the deed. The speedy transfer of title deeds and tradable long-term leases to beneficiaries, including those who occupy land already procured for land reform purposes, will go a long way to support the land reform process.</p></li>
<li><p>Exemption of transfer fees.</p></li>
<li><p>Some recognition mechanisms to upscale voluntary donations. This could be in the form of water rights and access to a land reform fund at beneficial interest rates. The awarding of Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment scores could also be used. These were set up <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/29617s0.pdf">by government</a> to advance economic transformation and <a href="https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/fe87cd48/broad-based-black-economic-empowerment---basic-principles">increase the participation of black South Africans in the economy</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The empowerment recognition could also be provided to individuals or companies donating funds to a land reform fund.</p>
<p>What we are proposing is a way forward that avoids top-heavy, bureaucratic focused processes. The agency would largely operate virtually. It would only report on progress and make sure politicians weren’t hindering the redistribution of land. It would facilitate the process of redistribution of land by ensuring that incentives for donation and transfer of land were in place. </p>
<p>This would ensure limited opportunity for political rent-seeking, jobs for friends, and corruption.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165450/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wandile Sihlobo is the Chief Economist of the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa (Agbiz), and also a member of the South African President's Economic Advisory Council (PEAC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johann Kirsten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An agency could accelerate land reform by removing the process from political and bureaucratic control.Johann Kirsten, Director of the Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch UniversityWandile Sihlobo, Visiting Research Fellow, Wits School of Governance, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1629692021-06-22T13:13:11Z2021-06-22T13:13:11ZWhat landmark Kwazulu-Natal court ruling means for land reform in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407432/original/file-20210621-30-10pn4h2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C47%2C528%2C342&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A rural homestead in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Collart Hervé/Sygma via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a landmark <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/media/uploads/documents/itb_judgment_11_june_2021.pdf">judgment</a> a South African high court has declared that people living on customary land in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, notionally held in trust by the Ingonyama (king) of the Zulu people, are the “true and beneficial owners” of that land. </p>
<p>It confirms that the <a href="https://nationalgovernment.co.za/units/view/110/ingonyama-trust-board">Ingonyama Trust Board</a> is not the real owner of this land. It, therefore, cannot convert the customary land rights of occupiers to rent-paying leases as it has been doing.</p>
<p>The Trust is in fact only a notional owner of this land. It is mandated to administer the land “for the benefit, material welfare and social well-being” of members of the affected rural communities. It administers around 2.8 million hectares, amounting to about one third of the whole of the province. </p>
<p>The court also found that the minister in charge of land reform has breached her duty to respect, protect and promote these informal land rights, as required by law. She is responsible for overseeing the operations of the Trust, and ensuring that the land rights of communities are not infringed upon.</p>
<p>The judgement has massive implications for the government’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/land-reform">land reform programme</a>. Tenure reform policy has yet to deliver legislation to secure the land rights of people in communal areas. The fact that the legislation required by the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">Constitution</a> is still absent, after 27 years of freedom, is a major blemish on the record of the governing African National Congress. </p>
<p>The reasons for the lacuna are primarily political, centred on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/unease-reigns-as-culture-and-the-constitution-collide-in-south-africa-41795">contested roles and powers of traditional leaders</a> in a democratic South Africa. In turn, this issue connects to the wider politics of <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">“state capture”</a> - the refashioning of state institutions during the presidency of Jacob Zuma, (<a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">May 2009-February 2018</a>), to serve the interests of politically-connected elites.</p>
<p>The judgment lends support to efforts by President Cyril Ramaphosa to turn the tide on both <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">state capture</a> in the narrow sense, and on <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2018-state-nation-address-16-feb-2018-0000">corruption</a> more generally.</p>
<p>The judgment also sheds light on the marginal role of parliament in overseeing land affairs, the lack of transparency and accountability of bodies such as land trusts, and the absence of state capacity to deal with questions of land administration. It also highlights the lack of interest by successive ministers in curtailing the self interested actions of rural elites.</p>
<p>All these problems have been in evidence over many years. This is clear from even a cursory review of <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-04-05-why-giving-sas-chiefs-more-power-adds-to-land-dispossession/">government support for corrupt traditional leaders</a> in areas with large deposits of platinum, coal or titanium.</p>
<h2>Ingonyama Trust Board</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ingonyamatrust.org.za/">Ingonyama Trust Board</a> was founded by the apartheid government <a href="http://www.cls.uct.ac.za/usr/lrg/downloads/FactsheetIngonyama_Final_Feb2015.pdf">in 1994</a>, just before the first democratic election. This is widely believed to have been a sop for the <a href="https://www.ifp.org.za/">Inkatha Freedom Party</a> to participate in that election, which it was <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/ifp-agrees-participate-1994-elections">threatening to boycott</a>.</p>
<p>The democratic government amended the Trust’s founding act <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/kitaa1997435.pdf">in 1997</a>, establishing a board for the Trust. It also made it subject to the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201505/act-57-1988_0.pdf">Trust Act of 1988</a>. As with other customary land held in trust by national government, “ownership” by the Trust is nominal. Administration of the land must be for the benefit of those occupiers.</p>
<p>In communal areas, most daily land administration tasks, such as approving applications for allocations of land, are carried out by traditional leaders (amakhosi) and village-based headmen (izinduna). Customary land rights derive from locally accepted membership of rural communities, mostly through descent but also of newcomers. They are protected by the Interim <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/act31of1996.pdf">Protection of Informal Land Rights Act</a>, 1996.</p>
<p>Some 12 years ago the Trust began to convert rights of customary ownership to rent-paying leases. It planned to escalate rental by 10% a year, to increase its own income. Residents who did not pay could in theory be evicted - although none have been to date. The court found that the land rights holders did not give consent to these “conversions”. It also <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/media/uploads/documents/itb_judgment_11_june_2021.pdf">provides details</a> of how they were intimidated and deceived into signing leases. Both Trust officials and local traditional leaders were involved in the dispossession.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cogta.gov.za/">portfolio committee of parliament for traditional affairs</a> and its panel on post-apartheid legislation, chaired by former president <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/former-president-kgalema-motlanthe">Kgalema Motlanthe</a>, have <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/HLP_Report/HLP_report.pdf">called attention to these problems</a>, but to no avail. Now, litigation against this abuse has succeeded, with the court ordering the Trust to repay the funds it extorted.</p>
<h2>Tenure reform and customary land rights</h2>
<p>What does this judgement mean for land rights in communal areas, home to the largest proportion of rural South Africans, who form <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/530481521735906534/pdf/124521-REV-OUO-South-Africa-Poverty-and-Inequality-Assessment-Report-2018-FINAL-WEB.pdf">one third of the population</a>?</p>
<p>These areas provide essential resources, services and livelihoods to the poorest sections of South African society. They are a crucial cushion against <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1856&PPN=P0211&SCH=72943">rampant unemployment</a> and the insecurities inherent in capitalist economies today.</p>
<p>The court characterises these land rights in the <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/media/uploads/documents/itb_judgment_11_june_2021.pdf">following terms</a>: land is allotted to a family head as residential and arable plots and access to communal pasture; no financial payments are involved, and land rights are inheritable. Land becomes the property of the family, and nothing may be done with such land without the involvement and consent of the owner.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Land rights are closely tied to social and cultural relationships, and tenure security is derived in large part from locally legitimate landholding.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The challenge for tenure reform policy is to express these principles in law in a way that provides certainty, and ensures the protection of land rights holders. This will lay a firm foundation for administrative systems focused on both support for rights holders (for example, in resolving disputes over land), and to facilitate development planning and service provision.</p>
<p>A further challenge is to clearly define and delimit the powers and functions of traditional leaders in relation to land. Policy has to promote full transparency and accountability in all aspects of land administration. This requirement can be met by the vesting of rights to land in families and not in institutions. Traditional leaders, trusts or other bodies with administrative roles would then have to be accountable to land rights holders.</p>
<p>The parameters suggested by the <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/media/uploads/documents/itb_judgment_11_june_2021.pdf">judgment</a> should frame tenure reform. Worryingly, current drafts of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201707/40965gen510.pdf">Communal Land Tenure Bill</a> are based on the same paradigm as the 2004 law that <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/Commissioned_Report_land/Commisioned_Report_on_Tenure_Reform_LARC.pdf">was struck down in 2010</a> by the Constitutional Court, in which traditional leaders were empowered to act as if they are owners of the land. Any law informed by this paradigm is sure to be challenged again.</p>
<h2>Need for pressure from below</h2>
<p>If land reform is to return to a strong focus on the rights, opportunities and needs of ordinary black South Africans, as was the case <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201411/whitepaperlandreform.pdf">in the 1990s</a>, building the capacity of institutions responsible for both implementation and oversight of policies is vital. But, national policies also need clear political direction. </p>
<p>Here the main obstacle is the lack of mobilisation of rural dwellers, as well as those living in informal settlements, to push for pro-poor, structural change within a democratic political framework.</p>
<p>Although litigation using human rights lawyers is essential for preventing abuse, it is expensive and time consuming. This constrains wider impact. Often only the bravest of rural people are willing to stand up and make their voices heard as applicants and witnesses, as in this case. </p>
<p>But their courage shows what is possible. In greater numbers, and applying more sustained pressure from below, ordinary South Africans can ensure that the state begins to deliver the promises enshrined in the Constitution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162969/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Cousins has in the past received funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>The judgment highlights the lack of interest by successive government ministers in curtailing the self-interested actions of rural elites.Ben Cousins, Emeritus Professor, Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1595612021-04-25T08:33:21Z2021-04-25T08:33:21ZSouth Africa remains a nation of insiders and outsiders, 27 years after democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396849/original/file-20210423-21-99d5c0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Skyscraper buildings in the Sandton area stand on the skyline beyond residential housing in the Alexandra township in Johannesburg.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photographer: Waldo Swiegers/Bloomberg via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Twenty seven years <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597239308460952?journalCode=tssu20">into democracy</a>, South African politics is still for the few. And those who complain the most have the least to grumble about. </p>
<p>Since South Africa is <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview">highly unequal</a> and remains divided into <a href="https://www.academia.edu/29610338/ARCHIPELAGOS_OF_DOMINANCE_Party_Fiefdoms_and_South_African_Democracy">insiders and outsiders</a> – those who benefit from the market economy and those who can’t – we might expect its politics to be a loud battle between those who have and those who don’t. Most commentators believe it is.</p>
<p>Within the governing African National Congress (ANC), <a href="https://theconversation.com/precarious-power-tilts-towards-ramaphosa-in-battle-inside-south-africas-governing-party-158251">a battle rages between</a> the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-03-14-carl-niehaus-tables-radical-economic-transformation-plan-ahead-of-ace-magashules-campaign-for-anc-president/">“radical economic transformation forces”</a>, who purport to champion the interests of the poor majority, and their <a href="https://theconversation.com/precarious-power-tilts-towards-ramaphosa-in-battle-inside-south-africas-governing-party-158251">market-friendly opponents</a>.</p>
<p>Outside it, the third biggest party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), some in the <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03161.htm">ANC alliance</a> and the advocates of <a href="https://socialsurveys.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/AZAPO-2019-Manifesto.pdf">black consciousness </a> and <a href="http://www.pac.org.za/wp-content/uploads/PAC-Manifesto-2019.pdf">pan-Africanism</a> are assumed to speak for those who live in poverty.</p>
<p>There is much radical talk which creates this impression. The left-wing tradition in South Africa goes back over a century – it was injected into the mainstream of anti-apartheid politics by the alliance between the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057079208708304?journalCode=cjss20">ANC and the Communist Party</a>. But, while it is common for political activists to use left language, all politics is still, as it was before 1994, <a href="https://www.academia.edu/29610338/ARCHIPELAGOS_OF_DOMINANCE_Party_Fiefdoms_and_South_African_Democracy">insider politics</a>. Then the insiders were whites – now they are the minority who receive an income from the formal economy each week or month.</p>
<p>In the country’s insider politics, the majority who try to survive outside the formal economy are talked about, but are never heard. The “radical economic transformation forces” are people trying to gain a bigger share of what the few enjoy, not to share it with the many. The EFF’s chief concern is to challenge white privilege in the insider economy, not to open it to the outsiders. According to one <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-12-12-as-its-ratings-fall-precipitously-the-eff-goes-post-truth-in-the-opinion-polls/">survey</a>, EFF members have, on average, higher incomes and qualifications than ANC members.</p>
<h2>Insiders and outsiders</h2>
<p>Over the past few years, the country has witnessed a furious debate over whether the government should be able to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-politics-behind-south-africas-property-clause-amendment-131575">expropriate land without compensation</a>. Only one group has been ignored – the millions of <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-02-02-land-activists-without-the-voices-of-communities-the-expropriation-bill-will-not-go-very-far/">landless people</a> who have the greatest stake in the outcome.</p>
<p>Since insider politics is often about insisting that you speak for the poor when you have consulted no-one who lives in poverty, both sides of the debate did their best to show that the landless were on their side. Those who wanted expropriation found a few landless people to take to official hearings. Their opponents in the media interviewed just as few landless people who were reported to not want expropriation. But no-one spoke for the people without land.</p>
<p>During the first year of COVID-19, a debate raged over whether lockdown measures were needed. The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance, echoed the global right-wing by demanding that <a href="https://www.capetownetc.com/news/da-opposes-curfews-and-lockdown-phasing/">all activity be allowed</a>. The EFF insisted that <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/malema-economy-is-secondary-hard-lockdown-should-continue-until-scientific-solution-found-48627807">nothing should be opened</a>. The ANC claimed to adopt a “scientific” <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/government-will-be-guided-by-scientific-evidence-before-easing-lockdown-ramaphosa/">approach</a> in which public health and the economy’s needs were balanced.</p>
<p>None of them spoke for – and to – the majority who were <a href="https://www.businessinsider.co.za/minibus-taxis-may-now-be-100-full-2020-7">forced to travel on taxis</a> which they knew might spread the virus, to earn incomes in ways which might infect them, and whose need was to find a way to feed their families without falling ill.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-2019-poll-showed-dangerous-signs-of-insiders-and-outsiders-121758">South Africa's 2019 poll showed dangerous signs of 'insiders' and 'outsiders'</a>
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<p>Insider politics also shapes another conflict which divides “left” and “right” – the demand for <a href="https://theconversation.com/fees-must-fall-but-not-at-the-expense-of-quality-higher-education-62520">free higher education</a>. This is a rallying cry of the left which is denounced by opponents as a Marxist assault on the market economy. But the “left” demand boils down to insisting that the children of the corporate and professional elite should be <a href="https://theconversation.com/history-explains-why-south-africans-on-the-left-argue-for-free-passes-for-the-rich-88345">educated at public expense</a>. This, would, of course, mean that less money would be available to address the needs of people living in poverty. </p>
<p>There are many other examples which underline a reality in which no-one speaks for the outsiders except some local organisations which are ignored by the mainstream debate. It is why policies aimed at ending the exclusion of the outsiders – or at least at helping them to survive – usually fail. They are products of what insider politics think the majority need, not what the outsiders want.</p>
<h2>Suburbs versus townships</h2>
<p>There is a perverse side of insider politics: it ensures that the government is routinely denounced by those whom democracy has benefited while those whom it has largely left out remain silent.</p>
<p>The gap between insiders and outsiders is also that between suburbs on the one hand, low-income <a href="https://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Bond%20Townships.pdf">townships</a> – the (almost) exclusively black urban residential areas – and shack settlements on the other. The suburbs are inhabited by the more affluent insiders. Not only does the ANC enjoy little support in these areas – it and the government are targets of deep contempt there. No-one wins respect in the suburbs by saying anything good about the government.</p>
<p>But suburban residents enjoy full economic and political freedom. They can also ensure that they receive much higher standards of public service than others: if the power or water supply is interrupted, suburbanites quickly begin demanding that the problem is fixed. They don’t always get what they want, but their problems are addressed more quickly than the rest of the country’s. And they can rely on privately provided services to make up the slack.</p>
<p>In the townships and shack settlements, the ANC, despite some setbacks, still tends to <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/results-of-the-municipal-byelections-held-on-21-ap">win elections handily</a>. It is often so dominant that the important conflicts happen within it. It is not uncommon for ANC activists to mobilise protest against an <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/umngeni-municipality-anc-members-protest-against-corruption">ANC mayor or councillor</a>.</p>
<p>But people aren’t free since local power holders don’t like competition and are often able, working at times with the police, <a href="https://theconversation.com/below-the-radar-south-africa-is-limiting-the-right-to-protest-60943">to suppress</a> people who speak and act independently. The best-known example is the shack dweller organisation <a href="https://abahlali.org/">Abahlali base mjondolo</a>, which has endured sustained violence because it threatens local power holders.</p>
<p>Outsiders must also make do with officials and politicians who ignore them. While suburbanites must sometimes make do without services for hours or a few days, outsiders must at times go without for weeks or months.</p>
<h2>Great irony</h2>
<p>The great irony, of course, is that the areas which denounce the government can better influence it than those which support it. This speaks to an important reality: that the majority does not yet rule, even though the constitution says it should.</p>
<p>This ensures that South African democracy is vigorous – but only for a minority of the population. The insiders use their freedoms to engage in heated contest while the majority is forced to accept whatever they decide. Until this changes, South Africa will not deal effectively with poverty and inequality because those who need change most will remain unheard.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159561/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the country’s insider politics, the majority who try to survive outside the formal economy are talked about, but are never heard.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1571512021-03-17T15:08:10Z2021-03-17T15:08:10ZWhy, 31 years after independence, Namibians aren’t in a festive mood<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390150/original/file-20210317-13-fqjs2b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hundreds of Namibians protested against growing gender-based violence in October 2020. The Afrikaans wording on the placard says 'We are tired'. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hildegard Titus/AFPvia Getty Images)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Namibia celebrates its 31st independence day <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/namibia-gains-independence">this month</a>. But Namibians are not in a festive mood. A <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/press/trust-political-institutions-decline-namibia-afrobarometer-survey-shows">2019 survey</a> by Afrobarometer, the independent African research network, showed a significant loss of trust in the country’s governance. </p>
<p>Worse: 2020 became <a href="https://ippr.org.na/publication/namibia-qer-quarter-4-2020/">“a year like no other”</a>
since independence in 1990, as the COVID-19 pandemic compounded the effects of a prolonged recession <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/159400/archive-read/Namibia-goes-into-technical-recession">which began in 2016</a>.</p>
<p>The legitimacy of the former liberation movement, the South West Africa People’s Organisation (<a href="http://www.swapoparty.org/history.html">SWAPO</a>), has steadily been eroded due to a combination of factors. These have included socioeconomic decline, SWAPO’s increasingly outdated populist narrative, financial scandals and elite self-enrichment. In addition, opposition has grown in the form of electoral support for new parties. </p>
<p>After independence from South Africa <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/434032">in 1990</a> it won elections by huge <a href="http://www.tfd.org.tw/export/sites/tfd/files/publication/journal/155-173-How-Democratic-Is-Namibias-Democracy.pdf">margins</a>, enabling it to entrench its power. Like other <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-liberators-turn-into-oppressors-a-study-of-southern-african-states-57213">former liberation movements</a>, its legitimacy centred on the idea that citizens owed the party unconditional loyalty in return for liberation. </p>
<p>But heroic narratives tend to have a sell by date. Since 2015 it’s become increasingly clear that SWAPO has lost appeal among the <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/60296/archive-read/Born-free-and-in-search-of-political-answers">younger generation</a> as the struggle for liberation passes into history. This generation expects good governance and measures it not in rhetoric but in delivery. After all, they were born into an independent state. Their number as voters is about to become a majority. </p>
<h2>Downward spiral</h2>
<p>The election results of 2019 and 2020 indicated the decline in support for the erstwhile liberation movement.</p>
<p>The National Assembly and presidential elections <a href="https://namibian-studies.com/index.php/JNS/article/view/8638">in November 2019</a> marked a turning point. SWAPO’s National Assembly votes dropped from 80% in 2014 to now 66%. For the first time since 1995, it no longer holds a two-thirds majority. Beneficiaries were the official opposition <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pg/OfficialOppositionNamibia/posts/">Popular Democratic Movement</a> and the new <a href="https://www.lpmparty.org/">Landless People’s Movement</a>, which came third. </p>
<p>President Hage Geingob was re-elected for a second (and last) term with only 57% of the vote (2014: 87%). His votes were snatched by <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DrItula/">Panduleni Itula</a>, a party rival posing as an independent candidate. He personified the internal party power struggles. After being expelled, he founded his own party, the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ipcpatriots/">Independent Patriots for Change</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/namibias-democracy-enters-new-era-as-ruling-swapo-continues-to-lose-its-lustre-151238">Namibia's democracy enters new era as ruling Swapo continues to lose its lustre</a>
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<p>The November 2020 <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/democracy-beyond-swapo-in-namibia/">elections</a> for the regional and local authorities shifted the ground further. In the <a href="https://ippr.org.na/blog/the-changing-political-landscape/">changing political landscape</a> only SWAPO’s traditional stronghold in the northern region suffered limited damage. The results everywhere else were disastrous.</p>
<p>On average, SWAPOs’ aggregate votes in all regions dropped from 83% in 2015 to 57%. In the 57 local authorities the party won only 40% of all votes (2015: 73%). It maintained control over just 20 of the 52 local councils it previously held.</p>
<p>Most urban centres, including the capital Windhoek, were seized by other parties or coalitions. Main winners were the Independent Patriots for Change and the Landless People’s Movement. Notably, the Popular Democratic Movement could not improve its scores significantly.</p>
<h1>Economy on the rocks</h1>
<p>Namibia recorded annual economic growth rates of up to <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/namibia">6% until 2015</a>. But the global economic crises and the ailing neighbouring economies of Angola and South Africa, in combination with a lasting drought, created severe setbacks. Since 2016 Namibia has been in <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/159400/archive-read/Namibia-goes-into-technical-recession">recession</a>. </p>
<p>The World Bank has Namibia classified as a <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/namibia/overview">upper middle-income</a> country. The annual <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/namibia/gdp-per-capita">average per capita income</a> peaked at US$ 6,274 in 2015 and dropped to US$ 5,766 in 2019. This contrasts – despite the crisis – favourably <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ZG">with US$ 1,596 in 2019 for sub-Saharan Africa in general</a>.</p>
<p>But the relative wealth is anything but fairly distributed. Inequality remains at staggering proportions. According to the latest United Nations Human Development Report, over half of employed Namibians earn <a href="https://www.namibiansun.com/news/over-half-of-namibians-earn-less-than-n1-400-report2021-03-01">less than US$95 (N$ 1,400) a month</a>. Even among those in paid employment this amounts to less than the average per capita income for sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>The full effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/207841/archive-read/Over-12-000-workers-retrenched-in-2020">rising unemployment</a> remains to be seen. Public debt has risen to over <a href="https://www.namibiansun.com/news/govt-debt-rises-to-n117bn2020-05-27/">two-thirds of GDP</a>. The economy contracted by an estimated 8% in 2020 and regressed to <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/94491/read/Economy-to-slump-back-to-2013-levels">2013 levels</a>. Economists assume that a <a href="https://www.republikein.com.na/nuus/tough-decades-ahead-for-nam2020-11-05">return to the 2015 level</a> won’t be achieved before 2024. </p>
<p>Credit rating agency Moody’s <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201708140763.html">downgraded</a> Namibia to “junk status” in August 2017. It has negatively <a href="https://www.namibiansun.com/news/more-junk-from-moodys2020-12-07">adjusted</a> Namibia’s status since then, most recently in December 2020, to three notches below junk. A further downgrade <a href="https://informante.web.na/?p=302250">looms</a>.</p>
<h1>Corruption</h1>
<p>Namibia was rocked by a <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/sidebar/the-spoils-of-fishrot-tracking-the-property-holdings-of-key-figures-in-namibias-biggest-bribery-scandal">bribery scandal</a> over fishing quotas in November 2019. The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/1/exclusive-corruption-in-namibias-fishing-industry-unveiled">#fishrot</a> scandal implicated two ministers and leading officials of state-owned enterprises. They are awaiting trial in prison. Evidence suggests that other leading party members are also implicated.</p>
<p>Instead of tackling the issue head on, President Geingob decided on an evasive approach. He declared 2020 a <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/196809/archive-read/The-Year-of-Introspection">“year of introspection”</a>. But an increasingly infuriated public witnessed further cover-ups and denialism. </p>
<p>The government commissioned an internal report into shady deals by the state-owned diamond trading company <a href="https://www.namdia.com/">Namdia</a>, but its contents have <a href="https://www.namibiansun.com/news/president-parks-namdia-report2021-01-22">not been disclosed</a> since it was submitted to Geingob in 2018. </p>
<p>Another state-owned enterprise, <a href="http://www.airnamibia.com/">Air Namibia</a>, became a showpiece of mismanagement, using up enormous state subsidies and bailouts while <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/99425/read/Scale-of-AirNams-debts-revealed-in-liquidation">amassing liabilities</a>. It was eventually <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/02/11/pressed-by-losses-and-debt-namibia-s-national-airline-folds//">liquidated</a> in February 2021.</p>
<h2>Battle for legitimacy</h2>
<p>As the election results of 2019 and 2020 show, even a dominant party regime needs to use its authority and space to show that it serves the interest of the people. If people feel <a href="https://theconversation.com/southern-africas-former-liberators-offer-rich-lessons-in-political-populism-70490">neglected</a>, their loyalty will decline. </p>
<p>Other parties also have to earn legitimacy and show that they are not more of the same. </p>
<p>The Popular Democratic Movement as the official parliamentary opposition party has not gained from SWAPO’s decline in the November 2020 elections. Instead, two new parties – the Landless People’s Movement and the Independent Patriots for Change – are setting the tune. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/southern-africas-former-liberators-offer-rich-lessons-in-political-populism-70490">Southern Africa's former liberators offer rich lessons in political populism</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.namibiansun.com/news/intra-party-cracks-widen-in-opposition2021-03-12/">In-fighting</a> rages in all parties of political influence. Whether it’s a sign of decline among the established parties or one of ascendancy among the new kids ones, the fight over their future seems in full swing. </p>
<p>New dynamics suggest that the political culture is damaged. Parliament has seen <a href="https://futuremedia.com.na/chaos-in-national-assembly/">physical contests</a>, insults and <a href="https://twitter.com/KalondoMonica/status/1370295633748373505">sexist remarks</a>.</p>
<h2>Lingering question</h2>
<p>Days before Namibia’s independence on 21 March 1990, a poem on a wall in what used to be a compound for contract labour asked: </p>
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<p>Now that the Namib sings</p>
<p>And the tear of the Katatura child washed away</p>
<p>Who will keep the fire burning?</p>
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<p>After 31 years of independence, the answer remains pending.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157151/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber has been a member of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) since 1974. </span></em></p>The legitimacy of SWAPO, the former liberation movement that has governed since 1990, has been eroded amid growing corruption and a deepening economic crisis.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1547562021-02-08T08:18:58Z2021-02-08T08:18:58ZSimeon Nyachae: the larger-than-life civil servant who made his mark on Kenya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382869/original/file-20210207-15-z743ze.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Simeon Nyachae (right) welcomes President Uhuru Kenyatta to his alma mater, Kisii School in western Kenya, during the institution's 80th anniversary in 2014.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/120898464@N04/14995103431/in/photolist-8dfzcw-oR4PQ4/lightbox/">State House Kenya/Courtesy</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Simeon Nyachae, who <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2021-02-02-nyachae-wealthy-politician-who-controlled-gusii-politics/">passed away</a> in early February at the age of 88, was among the men who shaped Kenya and made it one of Africa’s leading economies. For Kenya’s first 40 years of independence he was highly visible in government and helped to craft an economy oriented to the private sector that also was favourable to both large and small-scale agriculture.</p>
<p>Nyachae held senior leadership positions under all three of Kenya’s first presidents – Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki – from 1963 to 2007. </p>
<p>Nyachae was among the favourite sons of <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/biography-of-chief-musa-nyandusi/oclc/32825246&referer=brief_results">Musa Nyandusi</a>, who was the senior chief in Kisii District in western Kenya and supervisor of its other chiefs. This was the highest government post an African could hold in the colonial government. As independence approached Nyandusi was able to influence an appointment for Nyachae as district assistant (or officer) – which had been the entry grade for British colonial officers – in Kisii. He then moved to Machakos district bordering the capital Nairobi. </p>
<p>After independence President Kenyatta made Nyachae district commissioner for Nyandarua. He was then promoted to provincial commissioner for the Rift Valley, the largest of the country’s eight provinces. Subsequently, he was moved to Central Province, the president’s home province outside Nairobi. </p>
<p>As Kenyatta was a strong centraliser and ruled through the civil service, these positions were equivalent to a governor or prefect. He was effectively in charge of the local activities of other government officials. The places where Nyachae served gave him considerable authority over the transformation of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1792632?seq=1">“White Highlands”</a> estates from European hands into African-held small and large farms. This meant that his position was highly political. </p>
<p>Under President arap Moi, Nyachae rose in 1979 to the office of chief secretary and cabinet secretary, from which he retired in 1987. </p>
<p>Moi was much less of a centraliser than Kenyatta had been. He was interested in seeing a better distribution of resources among Kenya’s ethnic (or tribal) regions. To this end, Nyachae formed an alliance with Harris Mule, then the permanent secretary in the ministry of planning, and together they shepherded the “<a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/9018">District Focus for Rural Development</a>” into policy in the mid-1980s. </p>
<p>This involved devolving significant financial authority and responsibility to district county councils. In turn this presaged the <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/138-chapter-eleven-devolved-government">decentralised structure</a> provided by the current Kenyan constitution promulgated in 2010. </p>
<p>The purpose of both changes was to give Kenya’s multiple “tribes” greater control over the local distribution of government resources. In this way Kenya sought to mitigate the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/from-divided-pasts-to-cohesive-futures/kenyas-four-ages-of-ethnicity/47BB799B6C95D3E2659C1EE1B8B148BE">intensity of “tribal” competition</a> for national political office which had been building up over the years. Indeed, it boiled over into considerable violence after the 2007 elections. </p>
<p>After retirement from the civil service, in 1992, Nyachae was elected a member of parliament from his home in Kisii and was re-elected in 1997. As an MP, Nyachae served in Moi’s cabinet, first as agriculture minister from 1992, and then as water minister. After the 1997 election, he served in finance before moving to industry. </p>
<p>He broke with Moi and <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/ken2002results.htm">contested</a> the presidency in 2002, but lost to Mwai Kibaki. Nonetheless, President Kibaki appointed Nyachae as minister of energy in a government of national unity. In 2005 Nyachae chose to retire from public life for health reasons.</p>
<h2>Wealth and interests</h2>
<p>With financial support from his father, Nyachae had begun a very small bakery even before he joined the civil service. At Kenya’s independence, most African leaders of the independence generation were given opportunities by Kenyatta to take over previously European parts of the economy. </p>
<p>They had <a href="https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft8p3008fh;query=;brand=ucpress">privileged access</a> to farms in the ‘White Highlands’, loans, government permits, contracts, and the like and became instantly wealthy. Nyachae was no exception. His bakery expanded, he acquired at least two large farms, and other businesses he established did well.</p>
<p>As was true for other members of the new African elite, the agricultural commodities they produced were largely the same as those of small farmers. By pursuing public policies that profited their farms, they were helping a large number of poorer Kenyan farmers as well. This Kenyan coincidence of large and small-holder agricultural interests was very unusual in Africa and a part of the key to its economic success. </p>
<p>Nyachae shared those interests and thus joined in promoting business, agricultural and rural development policies with long-term, broad benefits that reached widely in the economy. Furthermore, unlike many others he was a <a href="https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft8p3008fh;query=;brand=ucpress">‘nationalist’</a>, in that he was concerned with the welfare of all parts of the country and much less focused on immediate personal gain or in advancing sectional (that is, ‘tribal’) advantage.</p>
<p>Nyachae’s wealth also gave him the economic independence to risk government displeasure when he wanted to quietly oppose political measures he found unwise. He believed strongly in supporting the interests of the presidents he served, but when others with political influence tried to gain unseemly advantage at government expense, Nyachae was willing to interfere. Several times he <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110527054529/http://mvuleafricapublishers.com/walking-through-the-corridor-of-services-hard-cover/">blocked conspiracies</a> to remove dedicated civil servants who were in the way.</p>
<p>He <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110527054529/http://mvuleafricapublishers.com/walking-through-the-corridor-of-services-hard-cover/">believed</a> the efforts he made to stop corruption were behind Moi’s decisions to transfer him to minor cabinet portfolios from being minister of agriculture and later of finance. </p>
<p>Ultimately, particularly around the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/Report-of-the-Judicial-Commission-of-Inquiry-into-the-Goldenberg-Affair.pdf">Goldenberg corruption scandal</a> in which senior government officials were implicated, he lost influence with President Moi and broke with him in 1999. </p>
<h2>Round the clock manager</h2>
<p>Nyachae always served at the intersection of politics and administration. Nevertheless, he was more of a firm manager than a politician. In addition to being a ‘nationalist’ he was known for his exceptional drive, long hours, self-discipline and the speed with which he wrote memos. </p>
<p>More important, his success as a manager came from the support he provided gifted civil service professionals in gaining links to presidential support and in his willingness to take risks in opposing misguided endeavours of lesser politicians.</p>
<p>Nyachae is survived by numerous children and their offspring, but he insisted when I last spoke to him that it was contrary to Gusii tradition to enumerate them. He had four wives and was very proud of the effort he put into keeping their children united under his leadership. In this he was successful, as witnessed by the many occasions until the very end in which they were there to support him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154756/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David K. Leonard received funding from the US National Science Foundation and the US Fulbright programme in the mid-1980s. to research a 1990 book on Nyachae and others.</span></em></p>Nyachae always served at the intersection of politics and administration. Nevertheless, he was more of a firm manager than a politician.David K. Leonard, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of California, BerkeleyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1483792020-11-01T07:57:35Z2020-11-01T07:57:35ZSouth Africa has another go at an expropriation law. What it’s all about<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/366387/original/file-20201029-17-xy1661.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young Sandi Sile on an abandoned structure in Makhanda, South Africa, in 2013. Questions remain about how the new law will treat abandoned land. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When South Africa officially became a constitutional democracy in South Africa on <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1">4 February 1997</a> it heralded profound change in the way the country is governed. Once a racially oppressive pariah state, it became one based on freedom, human rights and the rule of law. </p>
<p>All laws that were not in keeping with the new constitution had to be changed to give effect to the rights enshrined in the new supreme law. One such law is the Expropriation Act, which governs how the government can acquire land owned by private citizens for public purposes such as building roads and railways. </p>
<p>The constitution changed the compensation standard from requiring the government to pay “market value” for such land to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321670076_What_is_just_and_equitable_compensation_for_land_reform">“just and equitable”</a> compensation. The requirement that expropriation be in the public interest (which includes a commitment to land reform and other reforms) was included. The requirement that a fair procedure be followed when expropriating was included in section 33 of the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng-02.pdf">bill of rights</a>. </p>
<p>The constitution laid down a framework in which expropriation must happen, but did not provide the details of how. This is the role of legislation. Such legislation is necessary to bring the process in line with the constitution.</p>
<h2>Long, arduous process</h2>
<p>The first attempt at an Expropriation Bill was 12 years ago, in <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjk_fL937jsAhWQx4UKHaT3As0QFjAAegQIAhAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fpmg.org.za%2Ffiles%2Fbills%2F080416b16-08.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2E61_FpIKOugF8btpYSAGm">2008</a>, but it was shelved because of the concern that it obscured the role of the courts in expropriation and would therefore be declared unconstitutional. </p>
<p>Another attempt was made in <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjiw5Tn37jsAhWBqqQKHXj-A4wQFjAAegQIAhAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gov.za%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fgcis_document%2F201409%2F36269gen234.pdf&usg=AOvVaw08hwxR5n2yTB8RbEdyd3gM">2013</a>. The 2013 bill was refined and became the 2015 bill, which made it onto the table of the president the same year, to be signed into law. But it was officially <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26932/">withdrawn</a> in 2018 because the process of amending section 25 of the constitution was still not completed. Communities living on land in terms of customary law also had <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-12-24-draft-expropriation-bill-a-disappointment-for-land-rights-organisation/">reservations</a> about its constitutionality, including the public participation process. </p>
<p>The country is having another attempt at passing an expropriation law that is in keeping with the constitution. The 2015 version, with slight amendments and the addition of clauses 12(3) dealing with “nil compensation”, was published again in December 2018.</p>
<p>This new bill, the <a href="https://www.dalrrd.gov.za/docs/media/2020%2010%2011%20JOINT%20STATEMENT%20BY%20IMC%20ON%20LAND%20REFORM%20EXPROPRIATION%20BILL.pdf">2020 Expropriation Bill</a>, was recently published in the government gazette. Importantly, this bill is not a result of the process to amend section 25 of the constitution to enable expropriation at nil compensation.</p>
<h2>Section 25 amendment</h2>
<p>Section 25 sets down the requirements that the state has to comply with if it wants to expropriate property: it must be done in terms of a law of general application; it must be for a public purpose or in the public interest; and lastly, “just and equitable” compensation must be paid. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/29530/">proposed section 25 amendment</a> makes it explicit that it might be “just and equitable” in some instances to pay nil compensation. But the state must still justify why not paying compensation is “just and equitable”. All other requirements must still be complied with. </p>
<p>Section 25 of the constitution provides the framework in which the 2020 Expropriation Bill will operate, once it becomes law. </p>
<h2>Why expropriation?</h2>
<p>Expropriation is a mechanism for the state to acquire property for public projects, such as the building of the railways, mass housing and roads. It is not only used in land reform instances, and is not only restricted to land.</p>
<p>Because expropriation is an administrative action by the government, the procedure must be just and give affected people an avenue for recourse in the case of abuse.</p>
<p>The 2020 Expropriation Bill sets out the procedure that the authorities must follow when expropriating property, how compensation must be calculated and paid, and where and when decisions can be challenged. </p>
<p>It includes a comprehensive mediation process, and guarantees access to the courts as the final form of oversight.</p>
<h2>Some contentious issues</h2>
<p>The bill has gone through consultative processes at the <a href="https://nedlac.org.za/">National Economic Development and Labour Council</a>, which facilitates consensus and cooperation between government, labour, business and the community in dealing with South Africa’s socio-economic challenges.</p>
<p>Still, there are a few unclear provisions that will most probably be focused on during the parliamentary public participation process. These are the definitions of “expropriation”, the provision for nil compensation and expropriating land from communities.</p>
<p><strong>Definition</strong></p>
<p>The definition of “expropriation” provides that an act will only be an expropriation if the state <em>acquires</em> the property. The concern is whether, if the property is expropriated for land reform purposes and transferred to a private beneficiary, it will be deemed an “acquisition by the state”. The bill obscures this a bit in clause 9(1)(a) where it seems to suggest that a private beneficiary can also “acquire” the property.</p>
<p>The legally correct route would be for the state to first acquire the property and then transfer it to the beneficiary. These actions can happen simultaneously in the Deeds Office and should not delay the transfer. The bill must reflect this.</p>
<p><strong>Nil compensation</strong></p>
<p>Clause 12(3) and (4) provides that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>it may be just and equitable for nil compensation to be paid where land is expropriated in the public interest, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including but not limited to …</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It then lists the instances where the state possibly foresees nil compensation to be applicable. The bill clarifies that this is, for example, land that is </p>
<blockquote>
<p>not being used and the owner’s main purpose is … to benefit from appreciation of market value. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This might still be vague, but it does give a more precise indication that it is not property earmarked for development.</p>
<p>Similarly, it’s not clear how “abandoned land” will be handled. Will this bear the technical legal meaning that the owner abandoned the land with the intention of no longer being owner? Or will it also include land that the owner left because it was no longer safe to stay on? </p>
<p><strong>Communities</strong></p>
<p>Owners of land earmarked for expropriation have specific time-frames in which they must respond. It seems as if the time-frames in the bill were written with a single owner of land in mind, and not for situations where whole communities living on land in terms of customary law are concerned. </p>
<h2>The next steps</h2>
<p>What is desperately needed in the land reform context for expropriation to be a useful tool is redistribution legislation that authorises the expropriation, and sets out what must happen after the state has acquired the land. </p>
<p>In the meantime, the bill will now go to the committee of the National Assembly that will hopefully start the public participation process. The bill will also have to go to the National Council of Provinces, the house of parliament that ensures that provincial interests are taken into account on the national level. </p>
<p>Considering all that, the bill will probably only be finalised some time next year, if all goes well.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148379/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elmien du Plessis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The proposed new law has a long history. The country has been trying for almost 12 years now to come up with expropriation legislation that is in line with the constitution.Elmien du Plessis, Associate Professor of Law, North-West UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1486652020-10-26T15:17:54Z2020-10-26T15:17:54ZProblematic assumptions raise questions about South Africa’s new land reform plan<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365238/original/file-20201023-16-1fzjk95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Small-scale farming creates more jobs in South Africa.This one is in Soweto, Johannesburg.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sharon Seretlo/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African government recently announced a plan to allocate 700,000 hectares of state land to black farmers. Exactly how many farms and beneficiaries this will involve is unclear. </p>
<p>But there’s a huge amount wrong with the idea.</p>
<p>First, it reproduces the core weaknesses of post-apartheid land and agricultural policies, which do little to reduce unemployment or enhance rural livelihoods.</p>
<p>Public response has been mostly <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2020-10-01-hefty-push-to-redistribute-land-to-black-farmers/">positive in character</a>. But land researchers on the left of the political spectrum are asking searching questions about the origins of this land. Also about the status of its current occupiers, and whether the procedures announced provide sufficient safeguards against the process being <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/700-000-ha-of-state-land-redistributed/">captured by elites</a>.</p>
<p>From the right, the Institute of Race Relations think-tank asked why property rights on the allocated farms will continue to take the form of leases, rather than private title. It also asked how beneficiaries will <a href="https://irr.org.za/media/government2019s-new-land-plan-needs-to-do-better-iol">secure bank loans without collateral</a>.</p>
<p>The policy announcement does have some positive aspects. If achieved, the redistribution of 700,000ha in one year would indeed represent an acceleration of <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/land-reform">land reform</a>. The minister also acknowledged that the administration of state land had been deficient to date, and admitted that corruption was a problem. This is refreshingly frank talk from a department that has mostly been in denial about these problems.</p>
<p>But below the radar of public debate are other aspects of this initiative which are highly problematic. These include crippling assumptions in relation to farming systems and scale. </p>
<p>I argue that these reproduce the core weaknesses of post-apartheid state land and agricultural policy, which have done little to reduce unemployment or enhance the livelihoods of the rural poor.</p>
<h2>Key features</h2>
<p>The state will allocate farmland to successful applicants who must <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2020-10-01-hefty-push-to-redistribute-land-to-black-farmers/">show evidence of farming experience</a> or a willingness to learn. Allocations will be biased in favour of women, young people and the disabled. A compulsory training programme will focus on “entry level” knowledge, record keeping and financial management.</p>
<p>Rent will be paid to the state at rates aligned with local land values, and an option to purchase will be offered after 30 years. Beneficiaries must maintain state-owned infrastructure on farms, and regular inspections will take place. Investments in infrastructure must be recorded, valued and reported.</p>
<p>Given that some (unspecified) proportion of these farms is already occupied and used, a land enquiry process will investigate how such occupation came about. It will also look at whether the land is being used “in accordance with the agricultural practices of the area”, and whether occupiers can become beneficiaries.</p>
<h2>Worrying silences</h2>
<p>There’s a lot of detail that’s worryingly missing. For example, official statements neglect to specify how and when this land came to be acquired by the state, and how it has been managed to date. </p>
<p>Secondly, it is positive that weaknesses in land administration are acknowledged, but no details have been offered. It is also not at all clear that the root causes of the failures of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/impllandacquisition0.pdf">Pro-Active Land Acquisition policy</a> to date are being addressed. These include the absence of area-based planning, inadequate and poorly targeted financial support and a lack of effective extension advice. And the allocation procedures seem similar to those adopted during the presidency of Jacob Zuma, when corruption was rife and <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/farai-mtero-elite-capture-in-land-redistribution-winners-and-losers/">elites were favoured</a>.</p>
<p>Nor are the criteria to be used in assessing the performance and productivity of beneficiaries specified, mirroring the lack of clarity on exactly how the suitability of applicants will be assessed.</p>
<p>The lack of clarity speaks to a much deeper problem – the adherence to a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03066150903498739">particular paradigm of agriculture</a> that I don’t believe is suited to what’s needed in South Africa in the 21st century. </p>
<h2>The wrong model</h2>
<p>The model of “farming” that underlies government’s policies for land and agricultural reform is one of modern, high-tech, large-scale commercial production of agricultural commodities by skilled business managers, in which economies of scale are paramount.</p>
<p>This largely unexamined choice has consequences. From within the paradigm, it is “common sense” that land reform beneficiaries should be “business-oriented”, with the potential to succeed in a highly competitive South African agricultural sector. Lip service is paid to the need to provide land to smallholder and “semi-commercial” farmers. But, in practice, the hegemonic model sidelines farmers operating small-scale farming systems, often successfully, despite inadequate support in a hostile economic environment.</p>
<p>Small-scale farming systems in South Africa tend to be labour rather than capital intensive, and have potential to create jobs <a href="https://theconversation.com/study-shows-land-redistribution-can-create-new-jobs-in-agriculture-in-south-africa-139333">on a significant scale</a>. </p>
<p>They tend to focus on high-value horticultural crops, such as fresh vegetables, rather than mechanised dryland cropping systems in which economies of scale are pervasive. They also focus on extensive livestock production, including small stock such as sheep and goats. </p>
<p>Land reform’s current focus on promoting black, “emerging” commercial farmers means that relatively few people – likely to be either middle class already or aspiring entrepreneurs – gain access to a <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/farai-mtero-elite-capture-in-land-redistribution-winners-and-losers/">small number of medium-scale farms</a>. Problems with this include high rates of failure, partly due to over-gearing of the new farm enterprises and crippling debt. This is partly due to lack of appropriate planning and support.</p>
<p>These issues need to be understood in the context of a changing agrarian structure. A 2017 <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-11-02-01/Report-11-02-012017.pdf">census</a> of commercial farming revealed that 67% of income in South African agriculture is earned by only 2,610 farms, 6.5% of the total. They have annual turnover of over R22.5 million (about US$1.3 million) and employ 51% of all workers. Farms earning around R1 million annually or below number 25,000, or 62% of the total, but earn only 2% of total income.</p>
<p>It would seem that black land reform beneficiaries on under-capitalised medium-scale farms are being set up to join the ranks of these marginal commercial producers. Why?</p>
<p>Aspirant black commercial farmers should benefit from land redistribution. But a narrow focus on only this category of beneficiary is likely to end in tears. And the potential of redistribution to create a large number of new jobs is being missed. In the context of massive and <a href="https://cramsurvey.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/1.-Spaull-et-al.-NIDS-CRAM-Wave-2-Synthesis-Findings..pdf">growing unemployment</a>, a middle class land reform agenda is an affront to the transformative promise of post-apartheid democracy.</p>
<p>Detailed recommendations on an alternative approach are available. A recent study for the Treasury Department provided detailed empirical evidence of the potential for employment growth through land redistribution aimed primarily at smallholders and <a href="https://theconversation.com/study-shows-land-redistribution-can-create-new-jobs-in-agriculture-in-south-africa-139333">small-scale commercial black farmers</a>. It has received little attention from policymakers, including those managing the development of government’s draft <a href="http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/phocadownload/Agri-parks/Cammisa/BOJANALA-Agri-Park-MBP-April2016.pdf">Agricultural Master Plan</a>.</p>
<h2>Urgent need to rethink land redistribution</h2>
<p>The social and economic crisis that has followed the COVID-19 pandemic is already shaking the foundations of South Africa’s democracy. Questions of unequal land ownership, always profoundly political, are unlikely to fade away. </p>
<p>Unless addressed, they will contribute to further dissatisfaction with the status quo, creating fertile ground for authoritarian forms of populism.</p>
<p>It is urgent that land policies provide real opportunities to create jobs, increase the incomes of the poor and enhance livelihoods. A focus on small-scale farmers is the most practical way to do so. But once again, the Agriculture Minister and her department appear to have their heads in the sand.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148665/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Cousins has received funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa, and from the European Union</span></em></p>The new initiative reproduces the core weaknesses of post-apartheid state land and agricultural policy. These have done little to improve the livelihoods of the poor.Ben Cousins, Emeritus Professor, Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1437532020-08-05T14:40:15Z2020-08-05T14:40:15ZZimbabwe wants to raise money through a sovereign bond. Why this is ill-advised<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351048/original/file-20200804-16-1igb83g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Central bank (in the background) can no longer perform its function of being the lender of last resort</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Zimbabwean government recently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2020/07/zimbabwe-pay-white-farmer-35bn-land-compensation-deal-200729135752062.html">signed an agreement</a> to pay 4,500 white farmers US$3.5 billion for infrastructure improvements on the land expropriated by the government during the chaotic land <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/zimbabwe/ZimLand0302-02.htm">reform programme</a> of 1997/8. </p>
<p>The initiative shows commitment to constitutionalism and respect for property rights and restoring the rule of law. The agreement is also a noble attempt at bringing closure to a questionable episode of the country’s land history. </p>
<p>But the proposal to fund the exercise by issuing a sovereign bond is highly ambitious. With <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/17/zimbabwe-could-be-headed-for-political-upheaval-as-economic-health-crises-spiral.html">an ailing economy</a>, the country simply doesn’t have the resources to meet its commitment to white farmers. In his <a href="https://zimbabwe.shafaqna.com/EN/AL/734195">letter dated 2 April 2020</a> to the heads of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), Paris Club and European Investment Bank, Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube clearly outlined that the country does not have the medical and financial resources to fight the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the government cleared its US$107.9 million arrears with the IMF in 2016, it is still <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/why-zim-didnt-get-imf-covid-19-debt-relief/">struggling to settle its US$2.2 billion debt</a> to other international financial institutions, including the World Bank and African Development Bank.</p>
<p>The government has proposed issuing <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-30/zimbabwe-sees-bond-sale-as-answer-to-two-decade-land-dispute">a long-term sovereign bond</a>, a process where the government sells bonds to investors on either domestic or international financial markets to raise funds. This year, only Ghana, Gabon and Egypt have managed to do so.</p>
<p>It has also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/zimbabwe-pay-white-farmer-35bn-land-compensation-deal-200729135752062.html">called on international donors</a> to help it raise the needed funding. If these options do not raise sufficient funds, another proposal is to sell municipal land around the nation’s biggest cities. </p>
<p>In my view issuing a sovereign bond would be ill-advised. The main reasons for this are that the economic and political conditions are not conducive to an issuance of such a bond. For a country to successfully issue a sovereign bond, it needs some basics in place. It needs an international sovereign credit rating, stable domestic economic fundamentals and investor confidence. None of these are currently present in Zimbabwe.</p>
<h2>Why it’s a bad idea</h2>
<p>Most of the factors relate to internal political and economic fundamentals.</p>
<p>Firstly, Zimbabwe does not have a sovereign credit rating from the three international credit rating agencies – Fitch, Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s. Without a rating, it is impossible to successfully issue a sovereign bond on international markets because it’s a <a href="https://theconversation.com/qanda-why-credit-rating-agencies-matter-for-developing-countries-51964">key input in determining</a> yield and coupon payment on a bond. The government has not yet solicited a rating from the big three rating agencies. It is among the 23 African countries that are yet to request an international sovereign rating.</p>
<p>Secondly, the country has no domestic debt market. If it did, it could try to mobilise local investors who understand the associated risk exposures and could perform their own due diligence. Domestic institutional investors would have to subscribe for the government’s bond issuance to be successful.</p>
<p>Thirdly, the country has changed its currency more than 10 times since 2000. In 2019, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48757080">the Central Bank banned</a> the use of foreign currency for trading and reintroduced the Zimbabwe dollar quasi-currency that had been abandoned in 2009. The local currency <a href="https://www.mycurrencytransfer.com/currency-converter/ZWL-to-USD">depreciated</a> by more than 320% in less than a year. This eroded savings and pensions, and saw a further loss of confidence in the entire financial system. Strength of a country’s currency determines the attractiveness of its bond issues. A weak currency compounds the risk of default and debt sustainability as repayments will still have to be made in foreign currency. </p>
<p>Fourthly, the increasing economic crisis in the country has eroded the goodwill that the current government accrued post-Mugabe era. President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/zimbabwe-president-vows-flush-opponents-200804141615075.html">actions</a> have failed to tally with his “open for business” mantra. His trips to Davos have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/eyes-zimbabwes-mnangagwa-wef-davos-180124125748504.html">failed to yield</a> any significant foreign direct investment as investors question his credibility.</p>
<p>The government is also in bad favour with institutions such as the <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/Economy/Africa/locked-out-of-aid-zimbabwe-begs-imf-and-world-bank-for-help-20200504">IMF and World Bank</a>. It has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/zimbabwe-among-african-nations-defaulting-imf-loans">defaulted</a> on IMF loans and failed to implement reforms agreed with the organisations.</p>
<p>Fifth, the government has been hostile to the private sector. It ordered the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-06/for-zimbabwe-investors-stock-exchange-closing-is-the-last-straw">closure of the stock exchange</a> on 29 June 2020 and accused businesses of fuelling <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/zimbabwe-president-currency-attack-prices-spiral-200610173443771.html">currency devaluation</a>. State security agencies attempted to stop certain business operations of <a href="https://www.developingtelecoms.com/telecom-technology/mobile-financial-services/9799-zimbabwe-issues-econet-warrant-over-alleged-money-laundering.html">Econet</a> and <a href="https://www.biznews.com/global-investing/2020/07/12/old-mutual-zimbabwe">Old Mutual</a>, the two largest companies listed on the stock exchange. They were accused of fuelling hostilities against the government. It is these companies and their multinational networks that would support the bond issuance by purchasing the government bonds.</p>
<p>Sixth, the government’s brand has been damaged by a number of government officials being targeted for sanctions. Some are <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-07-29-peter-hain-calls-for-stronger-sanctions-against-zimbabwe-for-human-rights-abuses/">calling for stronger sanctions</a> for human rights abuses. Investors perceive a country that does not respect its rule of law as unlikely to respect its sovereign bond covenants nor honour its obligations on time.</p>
<p>In addition, the government’s commitment to transparency and integrity has been called into question on the back of accusations of <a href="https://anticorruptiondigest.com/2020/06/08/zimbabwes-mnangagwa-govt-engulfed-in-corruption-scandals/#axzz6TjHsXutV">mass corruption</a>. Despite promises, there has been little to no action against government officials embroiled in <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2020-07-07-mnangagwa-fires-zimbabwes-health-minister-after-corruption-charge/">corruption scandals</a>. </p>
<p>Seventh, Zimbabwe’s economy has failed to pick up in the post-Mugabe era. Instead, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ecae3702-bde1-11e9-89e2-41e555e96722">it has become worse</a>. Food production is at its all time low, the health sector has been paralysed by constant protests and inflation has been <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/trending/408053/zimbabwes-inflation-rate-hits-785-55/">estimated at more than 800%</a>.</p>
<p>The last internal factor to consider is that the country’s central bank <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2020/06/19/inefficient-foreign-exchange-market-costing-zim-billions/">can no longer perform</a> its functions as the lender of last resort and facilitating cross-border transactions, because of the lack of foreign exchange reserves. Forex access has been restricted to government agencies, departments and selected individuals. Local banks technically have the liberty to make their own forex transaction arrangements with other international corresponding banks.</p>
<p>There are also some external factors that make raising capital this way a bad idea right now. The international debt market has been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-26/coronavirus-chaos-brings-corporate-debt-market-to-its-knees">depressed</a> as a result of COVID-19 and is likely to remain so for the next two years as investors wait to see how countries emerge from the crisis. And the cost of issuing a bond has doubled, which has priced most African countries out of the market. Zimbabwe is no exception.</p>
<p>All these factors are not favourable for Zimbabwe to issue a sovereign bond.</p>
<h2>Solutions</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe has many pressing issues. Given that the economy is at its lowest, compensating farmers is a luxury the country cannot afford. It will not yield the implied results of increasing foreign direct investment. </p>
<p>Instead, Zimbabwe should focus on demonstrating the political will to restore business confidence. Evidence of this will include the removal from public office and prosecution of people involved in corruption. </p>
<p>It should also acknowledge the challenges it faces and commit to genuine political dialogue. International partners and investors interpret the denial of the challenges faced by the country as being dishonest and untrustworthy.</p>
<p>Lastly, the government should implement the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-imf/zimbabwe-reaches-agreement-with-imf-on-economic-reform-program-idUSKCN1RN0PZ">economic reforms previously agreed</a> with multilateral lenders. Under the agreement, policies should focus on eliminating the government’s double-digit fiscal deficit and adopting reforms to allow market forces to drive the functioning of foreign exchange and other financial markets. These will help stabilise the currency and monetary policy. Without fully implementing these reforms agreed with multilateral agencies, mobilising foreign direct investment will remain a dream.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143753/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Misheck Mutize is the Lead Expert consultant with the African Union - African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) on supporting countries on their engagements with international credit rating agencies.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe wants to issue a sovereign bond to raise $3.5 billion it has agreed to pay as compensation to white farmers, but the economic and political conditions aren’t conducive to such an issuance.Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1393332020-06-03T13:37:31Z2020-06-03T13:37:31ZStudy shows land redistribution can create new jobs in agriculture in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/338004/original/file-20200527-20255-w319yb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Land reform can assist in creating more employment-intensive farming systems
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gunter Fischer/-Universal Images Group via Getty Images)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The COVID-19 crisis has clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the livelihoods of many South Africans, and highlighted <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/food-in-the-time-of-the-coronavirus-why-we-should-be-very-very-afraid/">food insecurity as one key aspect</a>. Many now argue that reducing the vulnerability of the livelihoods of the poor, and associated food insecurity, must become <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/Voices/covid-19-food-security-and-wellness-are-likely-to-be-compromised-20200403">a key focus of policy</a>.</p>
<p>Some assert that structural reform, tackling these problems at their root, is required <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-03-23-sweeping-economic-interventions-called-for-in-sa-amid-coronavirus-pandemic/">more urgently than before</a>. Land reform has this potential. It is, in any case, a political necessity. If successful, it could play a significant role in reducing the vulnerability and food insecurity of the rural population, who are one third of the population, as well as some urban residents. Enhancing employment and thus incomes is one key thrust of pro-poor land reform.</p>
<p>Land reform is necessary in post-apartheid South Africa to help address inherited historical injustices, especially those resulting from <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/natives-land-act-1913">land dispossession</a> of the black majority. It involves the restitution of land to individuals and communities who lost their homes and land due to forced removals. It also creates secure rights to land held by the black majority. In addition, the process aims to create a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-02-01-land-reform-is-at-a-crossroads/">more equitable pattern of land ownership</a>.</p>
<p>Land reform since the end of apartheid in 1994 has encountered many difficulties, and progress has been slow. One problem is that elites have <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/farai-mtero-elite-capture-in-land-redistribution-winners-and-losers/">captured many of the benefits</a>. Another is the limited impact thus far on poverty and unemployment.</p>
<p>A recent study commissioned by the government and funded by the European Union, and conducted by experts from different institutions, with me as the leader, focused on the <a href="https://assets.website-files.com/5e540242678f9f3ccb231a54/5ed1275e31b120a9c6b38c48_2020527%20GTAC%20FINAL%20LILR%20policy%20brief%20branded.pdf">potential contribution of redistributive land reform to employment creation</a>. </p>
<p>The key questions addressed in the study were: can land redistribution be undertaken in a manner that creates jobs? If so, through which commodity mix and and what kinds of farming systems, operating at what scales? And what is the potential of small-scale farming in particular?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/urban-spread-is-turning-the-lives-of-ghanaian-farmers-upside-down-139057">Urban spread is turning the lives of Ghanaian farmers upside down</a>
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<p>Despite its many limitations – such as the lack of a quantitative survey due to time constraints – the study breaks new ground by investigating the potential for employment creation in specific locations, focused on specific commodities and building on local knowledge. </p>
<p>The study revealed a considerable, unmet demand for land by both smallholders and small-scale commercial farmers.</p>
<h2>Findings</h2>
<p>The study found that land reform can assist in creating more employment-intensive farming systems by: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>reducing the size of farming units, while increasing their total numbers; </p></li>
<li><p>changing the mix and scale of farm commodities produced; and </p></li>
<li><p>changing farming systems so that they become more employment-intensive.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>A number of assumptions informed the study. “Employment” included both employment by others and self-employment. Potential gains are calculated in terms of net jobs – the total new jobs created after deducting the number of jobs “displaced” through redistribution of the land on which existing farms are located. These are estimated as “full time equivalents” – a job was assumed to involve working a 40 hour week.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/small-scale-farmers-should-be-at-the-centre-of-land-reform-in-south-africa-94546">Small-scale farmers should be at the centre of land reform in South Africa</a>
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<p>In estimating net job gains, the study assumes that 50% of the land under large-scale farming at present will be redistributed to small-scale black farmers. This illustrates the order of magnitude of potential impacts on employment. Costs to the state involve both land acquisition (at market prices) and set-up costs.</p>
<p>In the four municipalities in which the study took place, net job creation amounted to the equivalent of <a href="https://assets.website-files.com/5e540242678f9f3ccb231a54/5ed611838b992c39dd00bc6d_20200527%20GTAC%20FINAL_%20Research%20Summary%20branded.pdf">23 691 permanent jobs</a>. The commodities which land redistribution beneficiaries could begin to farm included subtropical fruit and nuts in Limpopo, grapes and lucerne in the Western Cape, maize and wool in the Eastern Cape, and extensive livestock (goats and cattle) in KwaZulu-Natal. Vegetables with high levels of labour intensity are key in all four municipalities. </p>
<p>The cost per net job varies from R325 425 in KwaZulu-Natal to R685 311 in the Western Cape. </p>
<p>The findings have major implications for the targeting and selection of beneficiaries, commodities and farming systems. </p>
<p>It shows that that extensive livestock production, including wool, offers key opportunities. The bulk of the land surface of South Africa is not suitable for cropping, and livestock production is likely be the dominant land use on redistributed farms. Net gains in its employment intensity are thus significant at the national scale, if modest at farm level. This can be enhanced if new and more employment-intensive value chains are created (as shown clearly in the KwaZulu-Natal case).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337982/original/file-20200527-20241-14031t7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337982/original/file-20200527-20241-14031t7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337982/original/file-20200527-20241-14031t7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337982/original/file-20200527-20241-14031t7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337982/original/file-20200527-20241-14031t7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337982/original/file-20200527-20241-14031t7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337982/original/file-20200527-20241-14031t7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Small scale farmers struggle to find markets for their products.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Halden Krog</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Given expanding market demand for fresh vegetables, these crops offer important opportunities for small-scale black producers. Their potential for employment creation is particularly significant.</p>
<h2>Challenges and recommendations</h2>
<p>Key challenges for land reform projects include improved access to irrigation water, formal and informal markets, and effective extension and advisory services. High-value subtropical fruit, nuts and grapes by small-scale producers have great potential, but this must be balanced against their high capital and running costs, and technically demanding character.</p>
<p>A key consideration is how to enhance access to markets and value chains (including agro-processing). Climate change is also likely to have highly negative impacts on all scales and forms of agriculture, even though its precise nature and timing remain uncertain.</p>
<p>The study also considers a number of policy issues, such as the allocation of farm production units of appropriate sizes, land tenure options, and the <a href="https://assets.website-files.com/5e540242678f9f3ccb231a54/5ed1275e31b120a9c6b38c48_2020527%20GTAC%20FINAL%20LILR%20policy%20brief%20branded.pdf">design of effective support services</a>.</p>
<p>It recommends the decentralised implementation of land reform and discusses the need for complementary policies in relation to support for informal agricultural markets, water allocation reform, environmental management and climate change, state procurement, and improved data collection.</p>
<h2>Trade-offs</h2>
<p>Land policy always involves difficult trade-offs, in this case between capital intensity and employment intensity, and between creating more jobs and paying decent wages. These have to be carefully weighed up and steered in a practical manner.</p>
<p>Clearly, finding the funds for land reform will not be easy. But if significant reductions in unemployment through land reform focused on small-scale farming are indeed feasible, as argued in this study, then it might well be worth the effort to find the requisite funds.</p>
<p>When South Africa eventually emerges from the fog of the COVID-19 crisis, structural reform, including land reform, will be high on the political agenda as never before. A key question is: will policy makers be ready to grasp the nettle of farm scale, and promote the large-scale redistribution of land to small-scale producers?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139333/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Cousins has received funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>When South Africa eventually emerges from the fog of the COVID-19 crisis, structural reform, including land reform, will be high on the political agenda as never before.Ben Cousins, Emeritus Professor, Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1350662020-04-12T14:04:15Z2020-04-12T14:04:15ZZimbabwe’s shattered economy poses a serious challenge to fighting COVID-19<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326155/original/file-20200407-85423-12r0p9p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hawkers' stalls in Harare, Zimbabwe, lie deserted following lockdown in a bid to slow down the spread of the coronavirus.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The COVID-19 pandemic has left Zimbabwe in an extremely difficult situation. As of early April, the number of infections and deaths from the pandemic <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/zim-records-3rd-coronavirus-death/">appeared low</a>, although the available data isn’t necessarily reliable. </p>
<p>President Emmerson Mnangagwa <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/breaking-mnangagwa-decrees-21-day-covid-19-lockdown-starting-monday/">announced</a> a 21-day lockdown which began on 30 March, in a bid to contain the spread of the coronavirus. The decree ordered all citizens to stay at home, “except in respect of essential movements related to seeking health services, the purchase of food”, or carrying out responsibilities that are in the critical services sectors. </p>
<p>Other measures include the shutting down of public markets in the informal sector, except those that sell food. </p>
<p>None of this will be easy to implement in Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>The country has an economic profile similar to that of many developing countries. The difference is that its informal sector makes up a much higher percentage of the overall economy. According to a 2018 International Monetary Fund report, Zimbabwe’s informal economy is <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/01/25/Shadow-Economies-Around-the-World-What-Did-We-Learn-Over-the-Last-20-Years-45583">the largest in Africa</a>, and second only to Bolivia in the world. The sector accounts for at least 60% of all of Zimbabwe’s economic activity. </p>
<p>In addition to the usual problems faced by countries with large informal economies, including poor governance and low tax revenues, Zimbabwe has an added set of problems: its economy is broken.</p>
<p>To implement the nationwide <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/breaking-mnangagwa-decrees-21-day-covid-19-lockdown-starting-monday/">lockdown</a> Mnangagwa is likely to have to inflict further damage to an already extremely fragile economy. </p>
<p>The president did not announce a stimulus financial package to cushion business from the impact of the lockdown. This might result in the total collapse of some businesses. </p>
<h2>Fragile economy</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s economy has been shrinking since <a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/3.%20Zimbabwe%20Report_Chapter%201.pdf">2000</a>, triggered by the government’s controversial land <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Opinion/5-lessons-sa-can-learn-from-zim-land-grabs-20180305-2">re-distribution programme</a> of that year. The violent programme wreaked havoc on agriculture, which was then the mainstay of the Zimbabwean economy. </p>
<p>This was compounded by subsequent sanctions imposed by the West in response to the <a href="http://www.thethinker.co.za/resources/Thinker_81/81%20chagonda.pdf">seizures of white-owned farms and land</a>. </p>
<p>Around <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/03/zimbabwe-in-economic-and-humanitarian-crisis-as-imf-sounds-alarm.html">6 million Zimbabweans</a> – about 34% of the population – live in extreme poverty.</p>
<p>The IMF recently gave a very bleak <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/02/26/pr2072-zimbabwe-imf-executive-board-concludes-2020-article-iv-consultation">assessment</a>, saying that the country’s economy had contracted by 7.5% in 2019. It put the inflation rate at over 500%, meaning that the country was heading back to the traumatic hyper-inflation era of <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/03/zimbabwe-in-economic-and-humanitarian-crisis-as-imf-sounds-alarm.html">2007/8</a>, when inflation peaked at an official <a href="https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/390/inflation/hyper-inflation-in-zimbabwe/">231 million percent</a>.</p>
<p>The IMF report shows that Zimbabwe’s economy performed the worst in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019. Its prognosis is disheartening, showing that if </p>
<blockquote>
<p>…governance, and corruption challenges, entrenched vested interests, and enforcement of the rule of law, (were not observed) then…there is little prospect of a major improvement to Zimbabwe’s economic and financial challenges in the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/03/zimbabwe-in-economic-and-humanitarian-crisis-as-imf-sounds-alarm.html">short to medium term …</a>. </p>
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<p>The dire economic situation is further worsened by the fact that the country is suffering its <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/03/zimbabwe-in-economic-and-humanitarian-crisis-as-imf-sounds-alarm.html">worst hunger crisis in a decade</a>, largely due to an ongoing drought that started last year. The shortage of essential foods, such as the staple maize meal, often results in stampedes at the few <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/millers-avail-40-000t-maize-for-roller-meal/">markets</a> where they can still be found. </p>
<h2>Zimbabwe’s informal sector</h2>
<p>Two decades of economic turmoil have seen Zimbabwe’s formal economic sector shrinking significantly. For example, manufacturing, clothing and textile industries have almost totally collapsed, with factories reduced to <a href="https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/SET-Outlook-for-Zimbabwe-Economy_Sep2017.pdf">dilapidated shells</a>.</p>
<p>The consequence is that the informal sector has grown exponentially. It’s estimated that a staggering 90% of Zimbabwe’s working population is <a href="https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/SET-Outlook-for-Zimbabwe-Economy_Sep2017.pdf">employed in this sector</a>. </p>
<p>I have been doing <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?user=sQSjKP0AAAAJ&hl=en">research</a> on Zimbabwe’s informal sector for the last 12 years. I have found that it sustains many families’ livelihoods, even though the majority of participants in the sector live from hand to mouth as petty traders. This reality that confronts Zimbabwe’s informal economy is corroborated by <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/simbabwe/13714.pdf">research</a> by the Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>In addition, almost everyone who is employed in the formal economy augments their income through informal sector activities such as <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?user=sQSjKP0AAAAJ&hl=en">cross-border trading</a>.</p>
<p>Reliable numbers are hard to come by, but a very high number of Zimbabweans <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/zimbabwe-economy-founders-millennials-eke-living-190910134415766.html">eke out a living in this sector</a>, or rely on it for food, clothing, fuel, local currency and forex. </p>
<h2>Stern test</h2>
<p>The lockdown in Zimbabwe is going to provide a stern test for its informal economy, which is the country’s dominant economy. Most traders are subsistence traders and are already mired in extreme poverty. The jury is out on the extent to which they will observe the lockdown. </p>
<p>The government should immediately put in place a stimulus package that can cushion the informal economy. </p>
<p>Otherwise, a lot of livelihoods are going to be destroyed. The ramifications for the country and the whole region, especially neighbouring South Africa, will be grim.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-deepening-crisis-time-for-second-government-of-national-unity-122726">Zimbabwe’s deepening crisis: time for second government of national unity?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/135066/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>The current lockdown in Zimbabwe is going to provide a stern test for its informal economy, which is the country’s dominant economy and employs 90% of people.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1297622020-01-12T13:57:17Z2020-01-12T13:57:17ZRamaphosa fails to show leadership as difficult and decisive year looms<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309547/original/file-20200112-103974-14erqv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Cyril Ramaphosa's speech failed to inspire confidence.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/ANC handout</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the eve of the statement marking the 108th birthday of the governing African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s finance minister Tito Mboweni <a href="https://twitter.com/tito_mboweni/status/1215441642892746752?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1215441642892746752&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.iol.co.za%2Fbusiness-report%2Feconomy%2Ffinance-minister-tweets-warnings-about-sas-structural-economic-reforms-40357595">tweeted</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you cannot effect deep structural economic reforms, then game over! Stay as you are and you are downgraded to Junk Status! The consequences are dire. Your choice… </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similar sentiments have been voiced by many well respected commentators concerned about the state of South Africa’s economy as well as its politics – and the ability of the ANC to provide effective leadership to <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/the-anc-at-108-the-sick-man-of-south-african-politics-20200109">address the major challenges it faces</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa faces perhaps many more challenges than it did in the build up to the new constitution of 1994. These include a <a href="https://theconversation.com/tough-times-and-bad-advice-are-holding-back-south-africas-economy-125990">moribund economy</a> and a governing party that is faction-ridden and ideologically disorientated. This is blamed for enabling much of the massive corruption and nepotism in the country best described as <a href="https://beta.mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-definition-of-state-capture/">“state capture”</a>.</p>
<p>What South Africa needs is a reformer who can redirect its politics to address issues related to economic growth and development, political stability, social cohesion, service delivery and several issues related to governance, management and administration. </p>
<p>It should all start with President Cyril Ramaphosa and the ANC, which he leads.
He had the opportunity to set the tone this weekend when he <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_NqtWFqmOH0">delivered</a> the ANC national executive committee’s January 8 statement to mark the party’s birthday. Such <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/anc-january-8th-statements">statements</a> are viewed as being important because they provide direction for cabinet discussions ahead of the new legislative sitting of parliament as well as the <a href="https://www.gov.za/state-nation-address">state of the nation address</a> delivered in February every year by the President. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa was expected to lay out the political direction for South Africa during 2020. Unfortunately, his speech failed to hit the mark. It didn’t offer any radical new ideas on the structural reforms hinted at by Mboweni. Ramaphosa showed a complete lack of party as well as political leadership. His inability to be bold and decisive about what needs to be done suggests that he is increasingly becoming a victim of his own party’s inability to deal with the difficult circumstances of the current negative state of affairs in the country.</p>
<h2>What was missing</h2>
<p>There was nothing new in the speech outside of the existing policy and strategy of the ANC. The core of his presentation were the usual talking points about rebuilding the state, reinforcing the state-owned enterprises, the battle against corruption and state capture, social cohesion, and economic growth and development. </p>
<p>Despite an emphasis on making state companies, specifically the power utility Eskom work, and making progress with land reform, no fresh proposals were made. More rhetoric, a lack of strategic vision and political survival at all costs seems to be the name of the game. </p>
<p>This is a far cry from what’s needed.</p>
<p>Even more difficult times lie ahead for Ramaphosa. His <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2020/01/11/january-8-statement-the-anc-s-priorities-for-2020">promise</a> that this year will see decisive action against those implicated in widespread corruption – among them influential party leaders – will no doubt add to his precarious position in the party. </p>
<p>The ANC’s 108th birthday bash provided fresh evidence that Ramaphosa faces a very difficult political environment in the party. There were expectations that about 35 000 people would turn up. In the event only 11 500 arrived to hear him deliver his speech. Some party leaders bemoaned the <a href="https://twitter.com/niehaus_carl/status/1215963887935291394">poor attendance</a>. </p>
<p>This shows that, beyond any doubt, 2020 is going to be dominated by the battle for control of the ANC. That battle will gain a lot of momentum towards the party’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/no-ngc-can-remove-ramaphosa-mantashe-20190510">national general council</a> which is due to be held in the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/no-ngc-can-remove-ramaphosa-mantashe-20190510">middle of this year</a>. The national general conference is held midway between party conferences, to debate the <a href="http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/understanding-the-ancs-national-general-council-ngc/">“strategic organisational and political issues facing the movement”</a>. </p>
<p>There are already those who are already beginning to shows signs of mounting a challenge against him. These include those implicated in <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">state capture</a>, among them <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-08-28-state-capture-inquiry-hears-about-ace-magashule-and-the-asbestos-heist/">ANC secretary-general Ace Magashule</a>, as well as other disgruntled members of the ANC presenting themselves as a “coalition of the wounded”. </p>
<p>The outcome of this battle will have far reaching implications for the future for South Africa, and its ability to deal with its numerous challenges.</p>
<h2>Decisive year ahead</h2>
<p>The year ahead promises to be a very difficult but also a very decisive year for South Africa. Is Ramaphosa the man to take the country into a new dawn, or is he going to be the victim of a well-organised campaign to disrupt his intended initiatives? </p>
<p>This year will provide the perspective on the way forward. If strong forces within the ANC get their way, someone other than Ramaphosa will present the January 8 statement in 2021. </p>
<p>For ordinary South Africans, this presents a very difficult scenario, with the strong possibility that the economy will slide into recession.</p>
<p>This, plus amending article 25 of the constitution to enable the expropriation of land without compensation, will result in even lower investment levels, higher levels of political instability and bigger challenges in terms of food security. </p>
<p>This does does not augur well for the future of the country and the well-being of its citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129762/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andre Duvenhage does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The year ahead promises to be a very difficult but also a very decisive year for South Africa. Is President Ramaphosa equal to the challenge?Andre Duvenhage, Research Director, North-West UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1276272019-12-08T07:14:49Z2019-12-08T07:14:49ZGlobal and historical lessons on how land reforms have unfolded<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304883/original/file-20191203-67002-4br5uv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Large estates in Vietnam were collectivised.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What can South Africa learn about land reforms from wider global and historical experiences in the 20th century? Most land reforms have involved transferring rights of ownership from wealthy landlords to poor, small-scale farmers working the land under various kinds of tenancy arrangements. These are often described as “land to the tiller” reforms. </p>
<p>Much less common are redistributive reforms that resettle small farmers on large estates subdivided into smaller plots. Southern Africa, the Africa of “settler states”, is something of an outlier in this respect.</p>
<p>Changes in the distribution, character and legal status of rights to land and natural resources, as well as in the class character and productivity of the agrarian economy, have powerfully shaped the modern world. Land reform has played a central role in the transition from pre-capitalist forms of economy to capitalism. Before capitalism, classes of unproductive landed property dominated the countryside.</p>
<h2>Reform and revolution</h2>
<p>Two revolutionary convulsions, in Mexico in 1910 and in Russia in 1917, saw peasants play key roles in the overthrow of autocratic states. They were replaced by popular democracy in Mexico and socialism in Russia. In both cases the mass of the population was engaged in small-scale peasant farming.</p>
<p>Power and wealth in the countryside were concentrated in the hands of a small landowning elite. Radical redistributive land reforms were driven “from below” and large areas of land were transferred to the rural poor. Subsequent developments in Mexico, however, saw the takeover of the agrarian economy by large-scale capital. The fate of the Russian peasantry was even more tragic.</p>
<p>After the second world war, pressures for decolonisation and national liberation increased dramatically. European colonial powers had to give up their direct control of large areas of the world. Tensions between the capitalist West and the communist bloc led by the Soviet Union heightened – the Cold War period.</p>
<p>In the former colonies, most people were still engaged in small-scale farming. Land reform featured strongly in many national liberation struggles, described by the anthropologist Eric Wolf as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-asian-studies/article/peasant-wars-of-the-twentieth-century-by-eric-r-wolf-new-york-harper-row-1969-xv-328-pp-bibliography-index-paperback-np/85F7B814F932B58BB58F1624DCD503B1">“peasant wars”</a>. It also formed a focus of post-independence policy. In most cases these were “land to the tiller”-type reforms. Large estates in Vietnam, Algeria and Cuba were collectivised by socialist governments.</p>
<p>In China, land reform initially involved “land to the tiller”. Collectivisation followed, and from 1978, in the <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/features/60years/2009-09/16/content_18534697.htm">Household Responsibility System</a>, land ownership remained with the collective. Currently, of course, China is encouraging capitalist farming.</p>
<p>In Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, agrarian reform helped to consolidate capitalism. It underwrote rapid industrialisation, with reforms driven from above by authoritarian states, backed by occupying United States forces. This was designed to pre-empt a turn to communism. Powerful landlords were expropriated and their land redistributed to tenants. Technological innovation raised productivity. </p>
<p>But the capitalists ended up appropriating the agricultural surplus. This process was made possible by administered prices, taxation and supplies of cheap rural labour to emerging industries.</p>
<h2>The 1980s</h2>
<p>The 1980s saw something of a hiatus. The “developmental state” gave way to neoliberal, market-oriented reforms. But in a few countries openings were created for radical reform. These included Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, the Philippines and Zimbabwe. In the 1990s, large-scale peasant mobilisations took place in Indonesia and Honduras.</p>
<p>From 1990, after the collapse of Soviet-style communism, the US and the World Bank promoted a “new wave” of land reform. This was a way to consolidate capitalist property relations.</p>
<p>In southern Africa, for example, where redistributive land reform was necessary because of historical legacies, the advocates of “new wave” reform sought to avoid expropriation. They argued instead for policies based on “willing sellers and willing buyers”. This influenced negotiated transitions and land reform policies in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.</p>
<p>Since the 1980s and the rise of neoliberalism, many developing countries have strongly promoted large-scale, commercial and export-oriented farming. With capitalism now hegemonic, the terrain on which land reform takes place has been dramatically altered. </p>
<p>But these shifts haven’t been uncontested. Global social movements such as <a href="https://viacampesina.org/en/">Via Campesina</a>, the “way of the peasant”, have emerged to resist neoliberal-style reform. They urge redistribution of land to the poor.</p>
<p>At the same time, new issues loom large within debates on land reform. Gender equity and claims to resources by indigenous peoples are two. They also include the unequal and often unhealthy character of global agro-food systems, and environmental sustainability.</p>
<p>Comparing these experiences, what can we conclude?</p>
<p>It seems to me that South Africa’s land reform is pre-eminently driven by the state. But the state has been captured by elite interests.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, in some cases land reform has been followed by significant reductions of rural poverty. Land reform has also resulted in increased productivity, output and income. These changes have made a significant contribution to development more generally. </p>
<p>There have also been many disappointing outcomes. These include little or no reduction in rural poverty. And the benefits of reform have in some cases been captured by the relatively wealthy.</p>
<h2>Class bias and elite capture</h2>
<p>Land reform in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Mozambique is quite distinctive in some ways, and typical in others. It is distinctive in its focus on breaking up large and productive farms. It is somewhat muted in rural struggles and hence its state-driven character, with Zimbabwe as a partial exception. It is also muted in its ambitions to undertake both redistribution and tenure reform on a large scale. South Africa has the added complication of restitution.</p>
<p>Land reform in southern Africa is not at all distinctive in the fate of land reform being closely tied to shifts in wider political economy. Hence the class bias and elite capture. Neither is it distinctive in its turn away from small-scale farmers towards large-scale capitalist agriculture. Again, in this Zimbabwe is unique.</p>
<p>The bigger unresolved issue of land reform in the 21st century is the need to confront the overwhelming threat of ecological collapse. South Africa’s rural reforms have not yet done so. Asking questions about how to address this challenge is an urgent task.</p>
<p><strong>This is an extract from a recent <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/land-reform-accumulation-and-social-reproduction-public-lecture-by-prof-ben-cousins/">lecture </a> delivered by Professor Cousins at the University of the Western Cape.</strong></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127627/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Cousins receives funding from the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>Land reform has always been closely tied to shifts in the wider political economy of countries.Ben Cousins, Professor, Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1247912019-10-10T14:42:32Z2019-10-10T14:42:32ZEconomic chaos is causing a food security and humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/295966/original/file-20191008-128705-1src4ws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C138%2C3109%2C2546&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's food insecurity is more complex than the headline figures suggest.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since Zimbabwe’s land reform of 2000 – when around 8 million hectares of formerly large-scale commercial farmland was distributed to about 175,000 households – debates about the <a href="https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com/2013/09/23/zimbabwes-agricultural-sector-goes-from-bread-basket-to-basket-case-or-is-it-again-a-bit-more-complicated/">consequences for food security</a> have raged.</p>
<p>A standard narrative has been that Zimbabwe has turned from “food basket” to “basket case”. This year, following the devastating <a href="https://www.climate.gov/enso">El Niño</a> drought combined with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/cyclone-idai-destroys-zimbabwe-farms-deepening-food-crisis-190329142611666.html">Cyclone Idai</a>, some <a href="http://fnc.org.zw/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ZimVAC-2019-Rural-Livelihoods-Assessment-report.pdf">5.5 million people</a> are estimated to be at risk of hunger, with international agencies issuing <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ROSEA_Zimbabwe_HumanitarianAppealRevision_06082019.pdf">crisis and emergency alerts</a>.</p>
<p>It is unquestionable that this season was disastrous – only 776,635 tonnes of maize was produced, more than a third below the five-year average. Nevertheless, the story of food insecurity is more complex than the headline figures suggest.</p>
<p>It’s true that Zimbabwe’s food economy has been transformed over the past 19 years. Aggregate <a href="https://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=zw&commodity=corn&graph=production">production</a> of maize has certainly declined, and <a href="https://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=zw&commodity=corn&graph=imports">imports</a> have become more frequent. </p>
<p>But Zimbabwe suffered food shortages, often precipiated by El Niño events, before land reform. These too led to the need for more imports. And surpluses have also been produced since land reform. For example, in 2017, there was a <a href="https://theconversation.com/land-reform-is-a-zimbabwe-success-story-it-will-be-the-basis-for-economic-recovery-under-mnangagwa-88205">bumper crop</a>. Some of it was stored and has been used to keep people going. </p>
<p>Getting behind the headline figures and understanding an increasingly complex food economy is essential. <a href="https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com/">Our on-going research</a> shows just how complicated the picture is.</p>
<h2>Farming and food</h2>
<p>Since land reform, we have been <a href="https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com/">tracking livelihood change</a> in resettlement areas in a number of sites across the country. Our research is exploring how people have fared since getting land, asking who is doing well and not so well, and why. Some of our key findings include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Crop production is higher in the land reform areas compared to the communal lands. Larger land areas allows new settlers to produce, invest and accumulate.</p></li>
<li><p>There are substantial hidden flows of food between land reform areas and poor rural and urban areas, as successful resettlement farmers provide food for relatives, or sell food informally.</p></li>
<li><p>There is a significant growth of small-scale, <a href="https://theconversation.com/irrigating-africa-can-small-scale-farmers-lead-the-way-113692">farmer-led irrigation</a> in resettlement areas. This is often not recognised, as production occurs on disparate small plots, frequently farmed by younger people without independent homes.</p></li>
<li><p>Trade in food across regions and borders, facilitated by networks of traders, often women, is significant, but unrecorded.</p></li>
<li><p>Market networks following land reform are complex and informal, linking producers to traders and <a href="https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com/2016/05/01/small-towns-in-zimbabwe-are-booming-thanks-to-land-reform/">small urban centres</a> in new ways. Outside formal channels, the volume and flows of food through the system is difficult to trace.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Simple aggregate analyses of food deficits, estimating the numbers of people at risk of food insecurity, do not capture these new dynamics. National surveys are important, but <a href="https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com/2013/09/16/food-crisis-in-zimbabwe-2-2-million-a-risk-but-where-do-the-figures-come-from-and-what-do-they-mean/">may be misleading</a>, and local studies, such as ours, often do not match the national, aggregate picture. </p>
<p>So, what is going on?</p>
<h2>Access to food: complex relationships</h2>
<p>Food insecurity is not just about production, it is also about access. This is affected by the value of assets when sold, the ease with which things can be bought and sold in markets, the value of cash as influenced by currency fluctuations and inflation, local and cross-border trade opportunities, and all the social, institutional and cultural dimensions that go into exchange. </p>
<p>When these dimensions change, so does food security. And this is particularly true for certain groups.</p>
<p>Take the case of Zvishavane district, in Midlands province of Zimbabwe. In the communal area of Mazvihwa, there was effectively no production this season. Some got a little if they had access to wetlands, and a few had stores. But compared to 30 years ago, production is focused on maize, which stores poorly, rather than small grains that can be kept for years. </p>
<p>How are people surviving? Some seek piecework in the nearby resettlement areas; others have taken up seasonal gold panning; others migrate to town, or further afield; others get help from relatives through remittances; while others are in receipt of cash transfers or food hand-outs from NGOs. </p>
<p>With small amounts of cash, people must buy food. It’s available in shops, but expensive. So a vibrant trade has emerged, with exchanges of maize grain for sugar or other products. And it’s especially people from the land reform areas who are selling their surpluses. Many have relatives who got land, and some travel there to get food, but there is also a network of women traders who come and sell in the communal areas.</p>
<p>Aggregate surveys almost always <a href="https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com/2016/09/19/food-security-in-zimbabwe-why-a-more-sophisticated-response-is-needed/">miss this complexity</a>. There are sampling biases, as the importance of the resettlements as sites of production and exchange are missed. </p>
<p>There are data problems too, as it is difficult to pick up informal exchanges, and income-earning activities on the margins. The result is that each year there are big food insecurity figures proclaimed, fund-raising campaigns launched, but meanwhile people get on with surviving. </p>
<p>This is not to say that there is not a problem this year. Far from it. But it may be a different one to that diagnosed.</p>
<h2>Economic collapse is causing a humanitarian crisis</h2>
<p>As the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2019-09-26-zimbabwes-economy-in-steep-contraction-as-inflation-hits-300/">Zimbabwean economy</a> continues to deteriorate, with rapidly-rising inflation, parallel currency rates, and declining service provision, whether electricity, fuel or water, the challenges of market exchange and trade become more acute. Barter trade is more common, as prices fluctuate wildly and the value of physical and electronic money diverge. With poor mobile phone networks due to electricity outages, electronic exchange becomes more difficult too.</p>
<p>Collapsing infrastructure has an effect on production also. Fuel price hikes make transport prohibitive and irrigation pumps expensive to run. Desperate measures by government often make matters worse. The <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/private-grain-imports-now-legal-govt/">now-rescinded</a> edict that all grain must be supplied to the state grain marketing board undermined vital informal trade. Meanwhile, the notoriously corrupt <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2019/07/26/missing-us3bn-an-indictment-on-mnangagwas-government/">“command agriculture”</a> subsidy scheme directs support to some, while excluding others from the provision of favourable loans for government-supplied seed, fertiliser, fuel or equipment. </p>
<p>Economic and infrastructural collapse is threatening food security in Zimbabwe. Even if there is good rainfall this season, the crisis will persist. Farmers will plant, produce and market less this year. While food imports are needed for targeted areas and population groups for sure, this may not be the biggest challenge. </p>
<p>Stabilising Zimbabwe’s economy is the top priority, as economic chaos is causing a humanitarian crisis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124791/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Scoones receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council through the STEPS Centre (steps-centre.org) and the UK Department for International Development through the Agricultural Policy Research in Africa programme (<a href="http://www.future-agricultures.org">www.future-agricultures.org</a>).</span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s food insecurity is not just about food production, but access too. It is affected by, among others, the value of assets when sold and social and cultural dimensions that go into exchange.Ian Scoones, Professorial Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1227262019-09-05T09:02:06Z2019-09-05T09:02:06ZZimbabwe’s deepening crisis: time for second government of national unity?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290911/original/file-20190904-175686-v3skdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many Zimbabweans have turned to hawking to keep the wolf from the door as the economic crisis in the country deepens. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe is going through its worst socio-economic and political crisis in two decades. Crippling daily power outages of <a href="https://www.biznews.com/africa/2019/08/05/zimbabwe-tipping-point-economic-crisis">up to 18 hours</a> and erratic supply of clean water are just some of the most obvious signs. Meanwhile, an inflation rate of over 500% has put the prices of basic goods beyond the reach of most people.</p>
<p>Hopes that the end of President Robert Mugabe’s ruinous rule in November 2017 would help put the country on a new path of peace and prosperity have long <a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">dissipated</a>. Efforts by his successor President Emmerson Mnangagwa to <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwe-is-open-for-business-says-mnangagwa-12913367">attract foreign investors</a>, who are critical in reviving Zimbabwe’s ailing economy, have also largely failed.</p>
<p>The situation has not been helped by the rejection of the 2018 presidential election results by the main opposition party. The Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) claims the governing Zanu-PF stole the elections even though the results were <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Regional-observers-Zimbabwe-election-free-and-fair/4552902-4692254-e75fje/index.html">endorsed</a> as free and fair by the African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC). Only the European Union observers were somewhat circumspect <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/eu-observers-say-zimbabwe-election-fell-short-on-fairness-20181010">in their assessment</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">Fantasy that Mnangagwa would fix Zimbabwe now fully exposed</a>
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<p>The opposition alliance has been calling for Mnangagwa’s government to relinquish power, and a <a href="https://www.openparly.co.zw/chamisa-calls-for-national-trasitional-authority/">national transitional authority</a> appointed to run the country for at least two years, or until the 2023 general elections.</p>
<p>How individuals who will sit on the national transitional authority will be chosen and by whom, is not clear. But the party and <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2019/03/01/towards-the-national-transitional-authority/">some academics</a> believe such a transitional authority would normalise Zimbabwe’s highly polarised political situation and help it revive its relations with the West.</p>
<p>The opposition may have a point on re-engagement with the West. This is key to helping end the investment drought that started in earnest <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.908.3003&rep=rep1&type=pdf">between 2000 and 2003</a> under sanctions imposed by Western countries for human rights violations linked to Zanu-PF’s violent land reform seizures and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/03/zimbabwe.andrewmeldrum">election rigging</a>.</p>
<p>But the transitional authority idea is doomed to fail because of lack of buy-in by Zanu-PF. So, it’s time to consider a more viable alternative path to peace for Zimbabwe.</p>
<h2>Clamping down</h2>
<p>For now, the government has dismissed talk of a transitional authority as unconstitutional. Instead, in May it launched its own platform, called the <a href="https://www.panafricanvisions.com/2019/zimbabwe-mnangagwa-launches-the-political-actors-dialogue-to-address-long-term-economic-challenges/">Political Actors Dialogue</a>. The forum comprises 17 small political parties that participated in the 2018 elections. </p>
<p>The main opposition party is boycotting the process on grounds that Mnangagwa is an illegitimate president. Recently, it attempted to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi-gdPunLfkAhXfSBUIHdWZCeIQFjAEegQIBBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-africa-49366224&usg=AOvVaw0fkr2f1y4BV0-4W2SlJHGY">embark on public protests</a> in the hope of bringing the government to its knees. The protests fell flat after being blocked by the courts and the police.</p>
<p>It boggles the mind why the MDC-A, led by Nelson Chamisa, insists on marches when previous attempts were crushed with brute force. These led to deaths in <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=21&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwingbiQ87TkAhVsZhUIHWexAsIQFjAUegQICBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.news24.com%2FAfrica%2FZimbabwe%2Fzimbabwean-generals-deny-troops-shot-and-killed-6-protesters-20181113&usg=AOvVaw02nyk1uLwat64nJso2EImF">August 2018</a> and <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwicyIfl87TkAhV9SBUIHXzrAC4QFjAAegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmg.co.za%2Farticle%2F2019-01-30-zim-army-responsible-for-murders-rapes-report&usg=AOvVaw1fiTJ2kraC9xNiMyQ4TBM6">January 2019</a>. </p>
<p>The Zanu-PF regime has always clamped down heavily on perceived threats to its rule since 1980. Why then does the MDC-A continue to endanger people’s lives through this deadly route as a way of resolving Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political crises?</p>
<p>I firmly believe that the opposition needs to change tack and focus on entering into dialogue with the government. </p>
<h2>Dialogue and unity government</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s ongoing crisis requires the two leading political protagonists - Mnangagwa and Chamisa - to enter into serious dialogue. Both leaders need to soften their hard-line stances towards each other and put the people of Zimbabwe first.</p>
<p>There’s a precedent for this. Ten years ago, then South African President Thabo Mbeki managed to bring then President Mugabe and Movement for Democratic Change opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai to the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiMheeVnrfkAhVXShUIHeBIDw04ChAWMAB6BAgAEAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.france24.com%2Fen%2F20080721-mbeki-harare-mediate-talks-zimbabwe-political-crisis&usg=AOvVaw2pLPeTVwBEVrH2TSAcW5e3">negotiation table</a>. </p>
<p>The talks culminated in the formation of the government of national unity that ran Zimbabwe from February 2009 to July 2013, with Mugabe as the President and Tsvangirai as the Prime Minister. The unity government was fairly successful and managed to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiv9PjanrfkAhUUTBUIHQR0D0cQFjAJegQIABAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theindependent.co.zw%2F2013%2F07%2F11%2Freflecting-on-positive-zimbabwe-gnu-moments%2F&usg=AOvVaw25plQQHFWt-5PTjI9_Fi6J">stabilise the economy</a>.</p>
<p>Two decades of suffering have shown that it is not the threat of protests or sanctions from the West that can move Zanu-PF to change, but neighbouring countries under the aegis of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwia1fucj7HkAhWnRhUIHcY8Dvc4ChAWMAB6BAgAEAI&url=https%3A%2F%2Flibrary.fes.de%2Fpdf-files%2Fbueros%2Fmosambik%2F07874.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2PSzn2eTrgI53Cnw2yrI2t">SADC</a>. South Africa is pivotal in this regard as the region’s strongest economic and military power. </p>
<p>It’s time to experiment with a second government of national unity for Zimbabwe. But for this to happen, SADC and South Africa must have the appetite to intervene in Zimbabwe. This is currently lacking. </p>
<h2>Dialogue in Zimbabwe’s history</h2>
<p>Historically, dialogue has moved Zimbabwe forward as a nation during its darkest hours. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>A year before independence in 1980, battle-hardened guerrilla commanders agreed to talk to the then Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, to end Zimbabwe’s liberation war even though they were convinced that they were winning. </p></li>
<li><p>In 1987 Joshua Nkomo, who was the leader of the main opposition party, the Zimbabwean African People’s Union, agreed to talk to his political nemesis, then Prime Minister Mugabe. Yet before this, he had been hounded out of the country by Mugabe in the mid-80s, and <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">thousands of his supporters killed</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>More recently in 2009, Morgan Tsvangirai agreed to enter into a unity government with Mugabe, despite winning the first round of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-10-00-zim-2008-election-taken-by-a-gun-not-a-pen">2008 elections</a>. The unity government briefly resuscitated and stabilised Zimbabwe’s fragile economy. Hyperinflation was tamed, basic commodities became available again and people regained purchasing power.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Given the MDC-A’s positive contribution during its brief stint in the 2009-2013 unity government, the party should be expending its energies on dialogue. The main opposition party can enter into a second government of national unity, but continue building and strengthening its own support.</p>
<p>In the same vein, Zanu-PF also needs to realise that without the involvement of the MDC-A, its attempts to revive the economy and end the strife in the country, on its own terms, are destined to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122726/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>It’s time for a new approach as it becomes increasingly clear that protests won’t topple the Zanu-PF government.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1217712019-08-20T13:04:43Z2019-08-20T13:04:43ZHow a chief defied apartheid and upheld democracy for the good of his people<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288184/original/file-20190815-136222-34o1j9.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Inkosi Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, right, with Dali Mpofu and Winnie Mandela in 1989. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thobekile Maphumulo Family Papers, Author provided (No reuse)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recently released report of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/president-ramaphosa-appoints-advisory-panel-land-reform">advisory panel</a> on land reform, and the latest efforts to force through <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-still-has-a-long-way-to-go-to-settle-traditional-leadership-challenges-119009">two controversial traditional authority bills</a>, point to the continued legacies of changes to the relationship between traditional leaders, their followers, and land in South Africa’s history. </p>
<p>The panel calls for a resolution to the “<a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/final-report-presidential-advisory-panel-land-reform-and-agriculture-28-jul-2019-0000">contending philosophies around land tenure</a>” — those of individual rights and those of communalism. But as traditional leaders <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/contralesa-back-zulu-king-ingonyama-issue">fight to continue their control</a> over communally held land, there also needs to be a recognition that there are contending philosophies of traditional leadership. At times, these overlap.</p>
<p>This was evident at the meeting between a delegation from the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa) and the then exiled African National Congress (ANC) in Lusaka, Zambia 30 years ago – on 18 August 1989.</p>
<p>The meeting released a joint memorandum. In it the parties called upon traditional leaders in South Africa to refuse to implement apartheid. The <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110427125959/http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=3843">document</a> recognised the profound effects of apartheid on South Africa’s traditional leaders: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>From leaders responsible and responsive to the people, you are being forced by the regime to become its paid agents. From being a force for unity and prosperity you are turned into perpetrators of division, poverty and want among the oppressed. The so-called <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/homelands">homeland system</a>, land deprivation, forced removals and the denial of basic political rights – all these and more are the anti-people policies that the white ruling clique forces the chiefs to implement on its behalf.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Contending views of chieftancy</h2>
<p>The ANC and the Contralesa delegation called on a historical understanding of traditional authority in which a leader’s authority came from their followers. This understanding is embodied by the isiZulu proverb <em>inkosi yinkosi ngabantu</em> (a chief is a chief by the people who <em>khonza</em> him, or pay allegiance to him). <em>Ukukhonza</em> is a practice of political affiliation. It is one that binds chiefs and their subjects and allows for accountability.</p>
<p>Colonialism and apartheid sought to make traditional leaders accountable to white officials by tying them to land. Historian Percy Ngonyama called this <em>inkosi yinkosi ngendawo</em> (a chief is a chief by territory). Doing so effected territorial segregation. It also allowed white officials to govern through a mimicry of pre-existing political structures.</p>
<p>Colonial officials came to interpret <em>ukukhonza</em> as a practice of subservience. But in fact, historically, this was a reciprocal practice. Paying allegiance to a chief came with expectations of physical and social security.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287997/original/file-20190814-136176-ywjj73.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287997/original/file-20190814-136176-ywjj73.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=797&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/287997/original/file-20190814-136176-ywjj73.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=797&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/287997/original/file-20190814-136176-ywjj73.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=797&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/287997/original/file-20190814-136176-ywjj73.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1002&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/287997/original/file-20190814-136176-ywjj73.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1002&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/287997/original/file-20190814-136176-ywjj73.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1002&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>My recent <a href="http://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=552">book</a>, To Swim with Crocodiles: Land, Violence and Belonging in South Africa, 1800 - 1996, is a history of <em>ukukhonza</em>. It shows how even as colonialism and apartheid sought to break down personal bonds of <em>ukukhonza</em>, people used knowledge about the practice to make claims on land and on their leaders. </p>
<p>In the case of Inkosi Maphumulo, the claims were for physical security in times of violence.</p>
<h2>Inkosi Mhlabunzima Maphumulo</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/mhlabunzima-joseph-maphumulo">Inkosi (Chief) Mhlabunzima Maphumulo</a> (1949-1991) led the Contralesa delegation to Lusaka. He governed in the Table Mountain region, an area just outside of Pietermaritzburg, in KwaZulu-Natal. His life, tragically cut short by an apartheid hit squad, provides insight on these overlapping concepts of chiefly authority – <em>inkosi yinkosi ngabantu</em> and <em>inkosi yinkosi ngendawo</em>. </p>
<p>Inkosi Maphumulo was the fourth chief of a colonially created chiefdom that from its genesis in 1905 was tied to land south of the <a href="http://www.dwaf.gov.za/iwqs/rhp/state_of_rivers/state_of_umngeni_02/history.html">Umngeni River</a> at <a href="https://www.google.com/search?rlz=1C1NHXL_enZA711ZA711&q=table+mountain+pietermaritzburg&tbm=isch&source=univ&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiNz9T18f_jAhVKJVAKHbBzCQUQsAR6BAgGEAE&biw=1261&bih=636">Table Mountain</a>. The existence of two types of chiefdoms served to “divide and rule”. It pitted leaders who saw themselves as having historical authority against those with new authority from the colonial regime. </p>
<p>From his installation in 1973, he carried out the duties of the chieftaincy within the structures of the nascent KwaZulu bantustan. The so-called <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/homelands">“bantustans” or “homelands”</a> were the ultimate level of the three tiered system of governance designed to ensure segregation in South Africa – not only on racial, but also ethnic lines. The bantustans built on so-called <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/24222/02chapter2.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y">tribal authorities</a> such as that of the region Maphumulo governed. </p>
<p>One of Inkosi Maphumulo’s priorities was to provide land to his subjects during a time when territorial segregation constrained black South Africans’ access to land. He tirelessly pursued a contested strip of land that bisected his territory but, according to apartheid-defined boundaries, fell neither under his control nor that of a neighbouring chief.</p>
<p>The government gazette that outlined the boundaries of the Inkosi Maphumulo Tribal Authority in 1957 made its leaders chiefs by land. Colonial officials had been putting down boundaries in Natal for over 100 years. But apartheid’s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/bantu-authorities-act%2C-act-no-68-of-1951">Bantu Authorities</a> finalised this process and fully bounded chiefdoms. </p>
<p>But Inkosi Maphumulo was a leader who did not forget the responsibilities of chief by the people, even as he pursued land to allocate to his followers. By the time he flew to Lusaka, he had become known as the “peace chief”. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287938/original/file-20190813-9389-k5lnqo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287938/original/file-20190813-9389-k5lnqo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/287938/original/file-20190813-9389-k5lnqo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/287938/original/file-20190813-9389-k5lnqo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/287938/original/file-20190813-9389-k5lnqo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/287938/original/file-20190813-9389-k5lnqo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/287938/original/file-20190813-9389-k5lnqo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Maphumulo the peace maker.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">New African, April 17, 1989</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As violence spread across the Natal Midlands from 1985 in a state-sponsored civil war, Inkosi Maphumulo organised peace initiatives. And, through Contralesa, he set up a commission of inquiry into the causes of the conflict. </p>
<p>He spoke out against police partiality and cooperation with Inkatha, which was engaged in a deadly conflict with the ANC and the broader liberation movement. He also welcomed refugees of all political affiliations from war torn townships onto land at Table Mountain. He described the process by which this happened to the press:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>People are not made to pay money to live in the area, but in our tradition they are expected to pay ‘khonza’—a tribute to the chief… A goat is sufficient for ‘khonza’ but if a person does not have one, then a small amount of money, depending on the person’s circumstances, is expected.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Land and belonging</h2>
<p>Inkosi Maphumulo spoke of rights to land as tied to belonging in a chiefdom, a process facilitated by <em>ukukhonza</em>. There was a slight hitch. The neighbouring Nyavu chiefdom, who claimed precedence in the region – to the time of King Shaka, if not before – believed the land onto which Maphumulo located refugees belonged to them. </p>
<p>While Inkosi Maphumulo sought to provide expected security to his followers, both old and those who newly paid allegiance to him, his neighbours and some among his followers who contested his chieftaincy saw the newcomers as interlopers. Peace would <a href="http://disa.ukzn.ac.za/sites/default/files/pdf_files/aff00000000.043.027.pdf">not remain</a> at Table Mountain.</p>
<p>As the violence spread to the area, people used the cultural inheritance of <em>ukukhonza</em> to define who had access to the contested land, and who could expect security from their chief. Inkosi Maphumulo believed himself responsible for the new residents because they had paid allegiance to him. As the conflict raged, he reflected:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I had done all I could to ensure peaceful coexistence in my area. What had I done wrong?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He sought to expand his territory, but respected the demands of <em>ukukhonza</em> with his attempts to promote political tolerance, provide a safe haven, and end the violence.</p>
<h2>Chiefaincy and land reform</h2>
<p>Inkosi Maphumulo did not live to see the dawning of democracy in South Africa. But these overlapping concepts of chief by the people and chief by land embodied in his leadership need to be brought to the forefront in current discussions about traditional authority and land reform. </p>
<p>Even after the territorial rule of colonialism and apartheid took hold among chiefs, Inkosi Maphumulo’s belief in the concept of <em>inkosi yinkosi ngabantu</em> spurred him to pursue peace and promote political tolerance.</p>
<p>Enshrining the control of land by traditional leaders in <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-08-07-secret-details-of-the-land-deal-that-brought-the-ifp-into-the-94-poll?fbclid=IwAR1crtWUQX3RseTPGSua0-0FRZhRv7niLms6KJQBe0tv5bIg8tcNF4TWCkc">recent</a> and newly proposed laws gives precedence to the <em>inkosi yinkosi ngendawo</em> of colonial and apartheid rule at the expense of the people of <em>inkosi yinkosi ngabantu</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121771/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jill E. Kelly's research has been supported by the American Council of Learned Societies (2015) and Fulbright (2010-2011, 2018-2019). </span></em></p>Colonialism and apartheid sought to make traditional leaders accountable to white officials by tying them to land.Jill E. Kelly, Associate Professor of History, Southern Methodist UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1184642019-07-14T10:51:54Z2019-07-14T10:51:54ZHow South Africa’s rural communities are getting a raw deal from mining<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283507/original/file-20190710-44448-x7vm1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mining activities in South Africa's rural areas tend to occur at the expense of local communities and the environment.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Some of the most profitable South African mines are situated in the <a href="https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/mining-land-and-community-in-communal-areas-ii-mineral-rights-and-land-rights">areas of the country</a> that are home to traditional communities and are governed in terms of customary law. </p>
<p>Many of these developments have led to the <a href="https://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/558/76519.html">destruction</a> of the natural environment. And mining activities have also disrupted local ways of life. For example, residential homes have been <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-07-27-00-scramble-for-minerals-leaves-rural-families-homeless">destroyed</a>. In others, violence has erupted within communities leading to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/04/16/we-know-our-lives-are-danger/environment-fear-south-africas-mining-affected">the deaths</a> of people opposed to mining. </p>
<p>On top of this communities rarely <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-02-05-mining-brings-no-benefit-say-79-of-community-members-in-audit/">benefit</a> from mining. Instead, they’re exposed to pollution and health risks as well as disruptions to their livelihoods. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, communities are often let down by traditional leaders who are meant to represent their interests. Some have acted as barriers to local community participation and decision making. And some have entered into deals with the mining companies for personal profit, without local community consent.</p>
<p>There have been <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/6547/HSRC%20Review%20Nov%20to%20Dec%202015.pdf">legal cases</a>. For example, over a decade ago the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela traditional community <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/sacq/article/view/109085">attempted</a> to hold their traditional leader to account over assets and revenue derived from mining operations. The traditional leader sought an <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2015/25.html">interdict</a> against villagers from holding public meetings to discuss community concerns about mining and corruption. In the end the traditional leader was convicted of <a href="https://www.judgesmatter.co.za/opinions/judge-hendricks-in-the-hot-seat/">theft and corruption</a>.</p>
<p>I conducted a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264837718308664?dgcid=author">study</a> in the community of Fuleni located in Northern KwaZulu-Natal near the Great St Lucia Wetland Park, where a coal mining company is attempting to develop an anthracite open cast coal mine. </p>
<p>My fieldwork centred on the role of traditional leaders in the area. I conducted research spread over a year in Fuleni and neighbouring Somkele, and as part of a larger study on mining in South Africa. My findings included the fact that corruption played a role in blocking the local community’s concerns being taken on board when mining licences were considered. I also found that mining conglomerates exercise more control over the government and traditional chiefs than local communities.</p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>I interviewed key social actors. These included local community residents fighting mining, youth groups and civil society organisations that were providing support to the local community. </p>
<p>I found that there was a lack of transparency on how decisions were made about mining developments within the Fuleni traditional council. And that decisions weren’t in the interest of the community. The support for mining development within the traditional council was due to benefits received from <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/news/community-vs-coal-mining-giants-in-court-today-16691046">mining development</a>. </p>
<p>I also found that South Africa’s laws weren’t being enforced. </p>
<p>Firstly, the <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf">South African Constitution</a> protects peoples’ right to transparency, accountability and justice. These conditions were not being met. </p>
<p>In addition, specific laws – such as the <a href="https://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/107-of-1998-National-Environmental-Management-Act_18-Dec-2014-to-date.pdf">1998 National Waste Management</a> Strategy and the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-environmental-management-act">1998 National Environmental Management Act</a> – designed to protect the environment were also being flouted. </p>
<p>These laws all point to the fact that the state has a duty to ensure that communities’ interests are genuinely taken into account during decision making processes over mining developments. </p>
<p>In addition, mining companies need to ensure that they’re operating within the law and to ensure that proper rehabilitation of the environment is done post-mining operations. </p>
<p>Another big challenge is monitoring the impact of mining once a licence is granted. A lack of human resources at all government levels means that this is done unevenly. As a result mining companies take advantage of enforcement loopholes. </p>
<h2>Traditional leaders</h2>
<p>Another major challenge is that the government is <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/joac.12179">proposing</a> new regulations that would strengthen the powers of traditional leaders. Traditional leaders often purport to be the only community representatives in negotiation processes with mining companies. </p>
<p>But reasserting the proprietary powers of chiefs in the name of “custom” would create a situation in which land could be indirectly transferred to mining corporations. </p>
<p>Even as things stand, communities are left vulnerable to exploitation by traditional leaders, mining companies and government. This is because of a lack of transparency – nobody knows what deals traditional leaders have done – is compounded by weaknesses in the regulatory framework. A sound framework would ensure genuine consultation, consent, and <a href="http://www.larc.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/347/NewsStories/In%20Good%20Company.pdf">downward accountability in mining communities</a>. </p>
<p>So far government has distanced itself from the challenges faced by mining affected communities. It needs to adopt a co-ordinated and integrated environmental management approach when it considers mining development and applications. And effective governance won’t happen unless the government and industry are transparent and employ credible participatory processes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118464/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Llewellyn Leonard does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa’s rural communities where mining licenses have been granted are often excluded from consultations and bear the brunt having their environment and livelihoods destroyed.Llewellyn Leonard, Professor Environmental Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1193332019-07-03T14:06:34Z2019-07-03T14:06:34ZSmallholder crop farming is on the decline in South Africa. Why it matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281171/original/file-20190625-81745-gfxsdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children play in a cabbage patch near their home in Modderspruit, near Rustenburg, South Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Halden Krog</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over half a million households in South Africa’s former homelands disengaged from farming between <a href="http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/NT-30-06-2016-RELEASE-for-CS-2016-_Statistical-releas_1-July-2016.pdf">2011 and 2016</a>, according to <a href="https://nationalgovernment.co.za/units/view/43/statistics-south-africa-stats-sa">Statistics South Africa</a>. This represents a loss of one in five crop farming households. </p>
<p>The former homelands were the ten areas demarcated under the previous apartheid system as places where indigenous, black South Africans were required to live, along <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/homelands">ethnic group lines</a>. With little economic base and no government investment, underdevelopment and poverty were rife (and still are). Arable agriculture was thus an important livelihood activity of most households.</p>
<p>The high number of households abandoning crop farming is disquieting given the high levels of food insecurity and hunger in the country: one in five people are vulnerable to hunger, and about one-third of children in some provinces suffer <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/rising-poverty-levels-threaten-food-security-and-childrens-futures-15194638">chronic malnutrition</a>. Why would households disengage from field cropping in the face of such high levels of hunger and malnutrition? </p>
<p>We corroborated the picture painted by Statistics South Africa data in our recent <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.01.009">synthesis</a> of several studies over the last two decades. The synthesis covers 37 sites spread throughout six of the former homelands and used a wide range of different approaches. These included repeat ground, aerial or satellite images, household surveys, repeat visits to specific villages and oral narratives about farming and cultivation.</p>
<p>We focused on the former homelands because that is where most of the millions of smallholders live. They have experienced very little change in access to land or tenure security since the demise of apartheid. </p>
<p>Regardless of methods used and locations studied, results from most of the sites showed that the planting and cultivation of fields, typically areas larger than 0.5 hectares, has been abandoned on a large-scale. In some instances this has been partially compensated for by the intensification of smaller scale home-gardening. </p>
<p>Such a decline in cropping makes rural households, most of whom are poor, more reliant on food purchases, and at the mercy of price hikes. Such food is often of a lower diversity and nutritional quality. Additionally, the decline undermines the household and national food security and self-sufficiency. While this dynamic is not unique to South Africa, it has received little attention in the national debates around land and about agriculture. </p>
<h2>Why people abandon crop farming</h2>
<p>The abandonment of crop farming fields isn’t new. But some researchers have argued that it’s accelerated in the last two decades. Irrespective, one wonders what might be the causes of such a loss of skills, knowledge, labour and land out of cropping. </p>
<p>The answer is that there is unlikely to be a single cause. The interplay of specific drivers behind the change varies from place to place, and from household to household, even in the same village. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, there are several, often interrelated, causes mentioned more often than others by rural villagers themselves. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>insufficient funds to buy inputs; </p></li>
<li><p>increasing incomes from other sources (mostly social grants), making it possible to buy food from shops; </p></li>
<li><p>environmental change such as climate change or declining soil fertility; </p></li>
<li><p>recurring damage to crops by livestock that are not herded because children are in school; </p></li>
<li><p>socio-cultural change, such as a decline in patriarchy, with many female-headed households, and youth who do not wish to follow in their father’s footsteps. </p></li>
<li><p>aspirations for urban livelihoods leading to some young people not seeing a future in farming; and </p></li>
<li><p>inadequate direct and policy support from the government. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Understanding the relative contributions of these different causes can contribute towards more informed decision-making, at local and national levels. </p>
<h2>Effects and implications</h2>
<p>The effects and implications of the change are also worth examining. These span social, economic and ecological spheres.</p>
<p>Socially, there is loss of identity as farming communities. That’s because more young people increasingly aspire to a future in less physically demanding, and more financially rewarding jobs. The decline of field cropping means that the people who used to work the fields (including household labour) are either now unemployed or have moved to other sectors. </p>
<p>Another consequence is that food security may be compromised. For example, Dr Gamuchirai Chakona, an environmental science researcher at Rhodes University, has found that farming households have <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2072-6643/9/8/812/htm">higher dietary diversity</a>. And, Mike Rogan, a professor of labour studies at Rhodes University, has reported that farming households experience less hunger, even though they may be <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0376835X.2017.1358602">poorer in terms of income</a>. </p>
<p>Economically, idle arable land in the context of a growing national population jeopardises national food security and requires increases in food imports. </p>
<p>Ecologically, there may be both pros and cons. Abandoned fields provide other products, such as firewood, that are useful to local communities or general society. Increased biodiversity in deactivated fields increases carbon absorption, and helps mitigate the effects of climate change. But such changes will also alter fire regimes and make some old fields susceptible to invasive species.</p>
<h2>Intervention</h2>
<p>Only a small proportion of households in the former homelands are <a href="https://www.mandelainitiative.org.za/images/docs/Small-scale-Agriculture-Action-Dialogue.pdf">full-time farmers</a>. This number is declining, as is the area of land being cultivated. Government support for cultivators in the communal areas is quite limited, and focused on the small fraction that is capable of selling surplus produce to the formal market. </p>
<p>Policies and interventions that promote the value and image of agriculture, and which strive for food security for all are limited. On the other hand, having unused land means it could be reactivated as a safety net during adverse times, such as the loss of a job or loss of a breadwinner. </p>
<p>There is a clear need to understand this ongoing decline in crop farming. There is also a need to debate the implications for the use of the abandoned land. To find appropriate policy responses, such debates should take place across sectors and involve households, the villages, districts and country. </p>
<p><em>Penny Mograbi (Rhodes), Scott Drimie and Kristi Maciejewski (Stellenbosch), Timm Hoffman (Cape Town), Wayne Twine (Witwatersrand), Derick Fay (California, USA) and Paul Hebinck (Wageningen, The Netherlands) collaborated on the research for this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119333/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charlie Shackleton receives funding from National Research Organisation of South Africa under the SARChI Chairs programme (grant 84379).</span></em></p>The abandonment of crop farming fields isn’t new. But some researchers say it’s accelerated in the last two decades.Charlie Shackleton, Professor & Research Chair in Interdisciplinary Science in Land and Natural Resource Use for Sustainable Livelihoods, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.