tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/maritime-security-11650/articlesMaritime security – The Conversation2024-03-07T12:22:10Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250232024-03-07T12:22:10Z2024-03-07T12:22:10ZSomalia-Turkey maritime deal is a win for both countries, and not a power play for the Horn of Africa<p>A recent <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/turkiye-somalia-sign-agreement-on-defense-economic-cooperation/3132095">defence deal</a> between Somalia and Turkey has great significance for Somalia and the region’s security. The agreement, which covers both land and sea, aims to enhance defence cooperation between Turkey and Somalia. It includes the possibility of Turkey providing both training and equipment for a Somali navy.</p>
<p>Its near-term impact should, however, not be exaggerated.</p>
<p>Instead, it should be understood as a good-faith agreement signed between asymmetric powers whose interests overlap a little, at present. My <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=Iuj4hHMAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">research</a> on the geopolitics and security agreements over the past few decades covering Turkey, Somalia and the wider east African region leads to my analysis that Mogadishu and Ankara entered into the agreement for different reasons. </p>
<p>Turkey, the more powerful partner, signed the agreement to bolster its <a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-politics-why-turkey-is-helping-somalia-defend-its-waters-224377">reputation</a> as a security partner and important actor in sub-Saharan Africa. It wants to cement its role as a critical player in Somalia’s future, and improve its international visibility and prestige domestically. </p>
<p>Turkey plans to expand its training role to the maritime realm in Somalia and complement its terrestrial <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26776053">military training facility</a> in Mogadishu. It may also provide – but is unlikely to sell (given Somalia’s <a href="https://mof.gov.so/sites/default/files/Publications/Budget%20strategy%20for%20fy2023%20V3%20PDF.pdf#page=3">severe budgetary constraints</a>) – arms to Somalia now that the arms embargo has been <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15511.doc.htm#:%7E:text=Recognizing%20the%20benchmarks%20reached%20on,the%20Federal%20Government%20of%20Somalia.">lifted</a>.</p>
<p>Somalia, as the less powerful partner, signed the agreement to build its defence capacities, particularly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-provide-maritime-security-support-somalia-official-2024-02-22/">offshore</a>. It entered into the deal eventually to gain the capabilities to project force throughout the territories it claims.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-politics-why-turkey-is-helping-somalia-defend-its-waters-224377">Red Sea politics: why Turkey is helping Somalia defend its waters</a>
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<p>Mogadishu’s means to project force in its territorial waters are currently <a href="https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-helps-increase-maritime-security-somalia-2022-04-06_en">limited</a>. Hence, the illegal, unreported and unregulated <a href="https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/Stories/tackling-illegal--unreported--and-unregulated-fishing-in-somalia.html#:%7E:text=In%20fact%2C%20reports%20suggest%20that,away%20from%20Somalia's%20economic%20development.">fishing</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872">piracy</a>.</p>
<p>Somalia’s leaders likely hope that Turkey will be able to train and equip Somali soldiers and sailors. This would give Mogadishu the capability to project limited <a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-politics-why-turkey-is-helping-somalia-defend-its-waters-224377">force</a> and thus better police its territories, both maritime and terrestrial. In doing so, it hopes to eventually gain a monopoly on the use of force within its borders, including semi-autonomous regions such as <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200614-somalia-recognizes-contested-leader-in-semi-autonomous-border-state">Jubaland</a> and the de facto independent state of <a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-has-been-pursuing-independence-for-33-years-expert-explains-the-impact-of-the-latest-deal-with-ethiopia-221502">Somaliland</a>.</p>
<h2>Limited scope</h2>
<p>In my view, there are limitations to what Turkey can achieve through this agreement in terms of its ambitions in the region. Even if the agreement were fully implemented, Ankara would not be involved in confronting Mogadishu’s rivals (including Ethiopia) within the region. </p>
<p>In short, the agreement is limited in scope and in terms of capabilities being offered. It will need to be long term to accomplish anything close to affecting political and military outcomes on the ground – inside and outside Somalia.</p>
<p>It does not, in my view, represent the beginning of a new system of <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/03/beyond-ethiopia-somaliland-turkey-somalia-defense-deal-fuels-uae-rivalry">regional alliances</a> that will pit Turkey and Somalia along with Egypt against Ethiopia, Somaliland and possibly other regional states such as the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<h2>The background</h2>
<p>The Turkey-Somalia agreement should be seen in the light of what the deal gives each signatory. Not as part of a new system of regional alliances that are adjusting to the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67858566">deal</a> signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland at the beginning of 2024.</p>
<p>Under this agreement, Ethiopia will get a 50-year lease on a strip of land on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast for naval and commercial maritime use, and access to the Berbera port. In return, Addis Ababa would <a href="https://interregional.com/article/Addis-Ababa-Ambitions/2221/en">recognise</a> Somaliland’s independence from Somalia.</p>
<p>This deal has set off a <a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-ethiopia-port-deal-international-opposition-flags-complex-red-sea-politics-221131">diplomatic storm</a> in the region. It has been opposed by Somalia and Turkey, as well as the US, China and Egypt. The agreement is certainly important. It has the potential to make an impact on the political and security fabric of the region as Ethiopia may eventually have a maritime security and commercial footprint in the Gulf of Aden.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-has-been-pursuing-independence-for-33-years-expert-explains-the-impact-of-the-latest-deal-with-ethiopia-221502">Somaliland has been pursuing independence for 33 years. Expert explains the impact of the latest deal with Ethiopia</a>
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<p>These two recent deals in the Horn of Africa, however, are driven by the national interests of Somalia, Ethiopia and Somaliland. They speak to their primary interests – territory and sovereignty.</p>
<p>The genesis of engagement and agreements with external actors has come from one or more of these Horn of Africa states. This was similarly the case with the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3107475">2017 Berbera Port deal</a> between Ethiopia, Somaliland and Dubai’s DP World. It was the case with <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3355243">Qatar’s</a> engagement with Somalia on electoral politics, also in 2017.</p>
<p>It should come as little surprise that the region’s states – like others in the international state system – work to further their interests in their own back yard.</p>
<p>For its part, Turkey’s interests, like those of other foreign powers in the Horn of Africa, are generally opportunistic. Their intent is short-term gains. In my view, Turkey doesn’t have military interests in the Horn of Africa, and Ankara has limited capabilities even if it did.</p>
<p>This isn’t a criticism of Turkey. All states have limited capabilities and they generally prioritise them – especially when it comes to security architecture – <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2021.1976573">close</a> to home, where it matters. Turkey is no different.</p>
<h2>No gunboat diplomacy</h2>
<p>Turkey will be a good partner for Somalia and vice versa. They have a decade of history together and the agreement gives both Ankara and Mogadishu something of value. </p>
<p>In Turkey, Somalia has found a capable <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2872980">partner</a> that can offer training, expertise and some arms. And this means that the context was only partially about the recent Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. </p>
<p>Mogadishu’s leaders are under no illusion. </p>
<p>They know their own projection of limited power against what they see as encroachments on Somalia’s terrestrial and maritime territories is years in the future. But so is Ethiopia’s floating of a navy off the coast of Somaliland. </p>
<p>We should, therefore, not expect Turkish-trained and equipped Somali troops to be invading Somaliland, or Turkish ships crewed by Somali sailors to be skirmishing with Ethiopia in the Gulf of Aden any time soon. Instead, we should understand the agreement as one among many that may become embodied as something of strategic value only much later.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225023/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendon J. Cannon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>All states have limited security capabilities and they generally prioritise them close to home. where it matters.Brendon J. Cannon, Assistant Professor, Khalifa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216652024-01-31T12:37:10Z2024-01-31T12:37:10ZHouthi militant attacks in the Red Sea raise fears of Somali piracy resurgence<p>Renewed <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/29/somali-pirates-suspected-of-hijacking-a-sri-lankan-fishing-boat-with-6-crew">attacks</a> on ships by suspected Somali pirates since November 2023 <a href="https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/piracy/concerns-over-re-emergence-somali-piracy">have fuelled</a> fear of a new threat of piracy off the east coast of Africa. </p>
<p>The area at risk stretches from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. At least four ships have been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/return-of-piracy-on-somalia-waters-to-push-up-costs-4490794">hijacked</a> off the Somalia coast since November 2023. Concern has <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/12/17/bulk-carrier-hijacked-by-somali-pirates-houthi-alliance/">risen</a> amid the Iranian-backed Yemeni Houthi group’s militant campaign of support for <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hamas">Hamas</a>, the Palestinian political and military organisation governing Gaza and currently at war with Israel. Many observers <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/12/17/bulk-carrier-hijacked-by-somali-pirates-houthi-alliance/">suspect</a> a collaboration between Somali pirates and the Houthis. </p>
<p>I have researched piracy off the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09700161.2017.1377900">east coast of Africa</a>, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18366503.2016.1217377">counter piracy efforts</a> and the enduring relevance of <a href="https://seer.ufrgs.br//austral/article/view/113269">naval power</a>. I have no doubt that the Houthi attacks have emboldened the Somali pirates. Their collaboration or at least combination is undermining security off the east coast of Africa and may not be resolved solely by military means.</p>
<h2>The alarm</h2>
<p>The combination of Houthi maritime attacks and Somali piracy has disrupted traffic in the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Mediterranean. Most ships are taking the <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/business/kenya/2023-12-18-kenya-eac-stare-at-costly-imports-as-shipping-lines-shun-red-sea/">longer route</a> around Africa, and this is increasing shipping costs and lengthening shipping time, with negative implications for prices and the global economy.</p>
<p>The Suez Canal, which accounted for 12% to 15% of the total global trade in 2023, recorded a 42% decrease in ship traffic over December 2023 and January 2024, according to the <a href="https://unctad.org/news/red-sea-black-sea-and-panama-canal-unctad-raises-alarm-global-trade-disruptions">UN’s trade and development agency, Unctad</a>. The Suez Canal connects the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. For instance, shipping from the UK, east Africa’s key trading partner, <a href="https://www.containerlift.co.uk/shipping-routes-to-east-africa/">mostly passes</a> through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea.</p>
<p>These developments and others have <a href="https://unctad.org/press-material/unctad-raises-alarms-escalating-disruptions-global-trade-due-geopolitical-tensions">raised</a> the cost of shipping globally by more than 100%, and from Shanghai to Europe by 256%.</p>
<p>The global economy incurred a colossal loss at the peak of Somali piracy. The World Bank <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/408451468010486316/pdf/Pirate-trails-tracking-the-illicit-financial-flows-from-pirate-activities-off-the-Horn-of-Africa.pdf#page=99">estimates</a> that Somali pirates not only kidnapped seafarers but also received between US$339 million and US$413 million as ransom for hijacked ships between 2005 and 2012. </p>
<p>The threat raised the <a href="https://www.oceanuslive.org/main/DownloadAsset.aspx?uid=797">cost of shipping</a>, as shipping firms had to spend billions of dollars to install security equipment and hire guards aboard. They also had to pay more as compensation to endangered crew and insurance for goods. <a href="https://oneearthfuture.org/sites/default/files/documents/summaries/View%20Summary_4.pdf">One Earth Foundation</a>, a nonprofit organisation, estimated that US$7 billion was lost to Somali piracy at its peak in 2011. </p>
<h2>Preparedness of international shipping</h2>
<p>The threat of the Houthis and Somali pirates against maritime commerce has attracted international military responses. Prior to the latest crisis, the US, France and China maintained a significant <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/04597222.2023.2162721">military presence in Djibouti</a>. This has since been activated and, in some cases, reinforced, for maritime policing in the Gulf of Aden. In addition, India and Iran, among other nations, have deployed warships to the region. </p>
<p>The US and the UK have jointly launched airstrikes to undermine Houthi capabilities and motivations for maritime attacks in the region. But the group has <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/houthis-are-throttling-international-trade-but-uk-and-us-attacks-may-only-make-matters-worse-13057433">intensified</a> its attacks.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/us-thwarts-pirates-houthi-missile-attacks/">US forces</a> rescued a hijacked tanker and arrested five Somali pirates involved on 26 November 2023. The <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/return-of-piracy-on-somalia-waters-to-push-up-costs-4490794">Indian navy</a> also rescued a cargo vessel from pirates on 4 January 2024. </p>
<p>But the threats of maritime piracy and terrorism off the east coast of Africa have persisted. Without confidence in the current security situation in the region, many ships have rerouted around Africa to avoid the hotspot. </p>
<p>Previously, the threat of Somali piracy to global trade attracted a series of multinational initiatives. These included efforts to combat <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/al-Shabaab">Al Shabaab</a> and reconstruct Somalia state authority to govern its territory.</p>
<p>Many countries deployed their navy to the region. The EU naval operation Atlanta <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede030909factsheetatalanta_/sede030909factsheetatalanta_en.pdf">commenced</a> in the region in December 2008, and that of the US <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/199929.htm">in January 2009</a>. Similarly, Operation Ocean Shield by <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm">Nato</a>, the military alliance of EU and north American states, started in August 2009. Russia, China, India and Iran also deployed warships to the region. These forces joined the regional players in north and east Africa and the Arabian Peninsula to combat Somali piracy.</p>
<p>Many <a href="https://www.google.co.za/books/edition/Somali_Piracy/7WN9DAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=prosecution+of+piracy+somalia&printsec=frontcover">pirates from Somalia</a> were arrested, imprisoned and tried across the world or killed.</p>
<p>Consequently, Somali piracy eventually <a href="https://icc-ccs.org/news/904-somali-pirate-clampdown-caused-drop-in-global-piracy-imb-reveals">declined</a> from its peak in 2011 to <a href="https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/asia/no-somali-attacks-2015-no-room-complacency-industry-warns">zero</a> in 2015. Except for 2017, when attacks were recorded, Somali pirates have generally kept a <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/11/c_136888054.htm">low profile</a> from 2018 until November 2023.</p>
<p>The current counter piracy efforts mainly revolve around military power, coalition building and diplomatic engagements. Little effort is being made to resolve the root causes and trigger of the crisis. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>To address the emerging crisis off the east coast of Africa, there is a need to take a holistic approach to security in the region. </p>
<p>More concerted efforts are required to address the root causes of the crisis, starting with strengthening the Somali state to govern its territorial space. </p>
<p>Ending the Gaza war that attracted the solidarity of the Houthis, which in turn emboldened Somali pirates, is also important for the general stability of the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221665/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samuel Oyewole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Suez Canal ship traffic has dropped sharply due to frequent attacks at sea.Samuel Oyewole, Lecturer, Political Science, Federal University, Oye EkitiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2211442024-01-15T17:13:26Z2024-01-15T17:13:26ZRed Sea crisis: Suez Canal is not the only ‘choke point’ that threatens to disrupt global supply chains<p>The air strikes against targets in Yemen by the US and UK military have not been without <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/reactions-us-british-strikes-against-houthis-yemen-2024-01-12/">criticism</a>. They aim to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-67972796">keep the Houthis from attacking merchant vessels</a> in the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Less than 30 ships have been attacked by Houthis since they <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/13/have-the-houthi-red-sea-attacks-hurt-israels-economy#:%7E:text=So%20far%2C%20at%20least%2026,shot%20down%20missiles%20and%20drones.">seized the Israeli-linked Galaxy Leader</a> vessel in November. It’s a relatively small number, compared to the <a href="https://www.lloydslistintelligence.com/knowledge-hub/data-storytelling/the-yemen-conflict-and-risk-to-commercial-maritime-operations#:%7E:text=Over%2022%2C500%20transits%20were%20made,%2Del%2DMandeb%20Strait%20daily.">thousands of ships</a> that have passed through the area since. </p>
<p>Unlike the <a href="https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2021/0406/1208101-ever-given-suez-canal-blockage/">2021 Suez Canal blockage</a>, <a href="https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/MediaCenter/News/Pages/sca_12-01-2024.aspx">traffic is still moving</a> along the shortcut between Asia and Europe. While it adds one to two weeks of travel time and around US$1 million (£786,000) in cost, ships can also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/container-rates-soar-concerns-prolonged-red-sea-disruption-2024-01-12/">go around Africa</a>. </p>
<p>In response, <a href="https://www.drewry.co.uk/supply-chain-advisors/supply-chain-expertise/world-container-index-assessed-by-drewry#:%7E:text=The%20composite%20index%20increased%20by%2015%25%20to%20%243%2C072,more%20than%20average%202019%20%28pre-pandemic%29%20rates%20of%20%241%2C420.">container prices</a> have increased sharply, but are not at the levels reached at the <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2023/01/09/global-shipping-costs-are-returning-to-pre-pandemic-levels">height of the COVID-19 pandemic</a>. Even if the path through the Red Sea to the Suez Canal becomes unusable, this is hardly unprecedented. The <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387821000821">Suez Canal was closed</a> due to war from 1967 to 1975.</p>
<p>But the reasons for the strikes carried out to <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/biden-won-t-rule-out-further-strikes-on-yemeni-rebels-to-protect-trade-routes-20240112-p5ewvx.html">protect global trade</a> are likely to lie deeper than this. Global supply chains have become a lot more important for everyday life since the 1970s, so the impact of disruptions in the Red Sea is now much bigger. Also, crucially, Bab el-Mandeb is only one of several maritime <a href="https://www.rolandberger.com/en/Insights/Publications/Chokepoints-and-vulnerabilities-in-global-markets.html">choke points</a> that are vital for world trade. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the world's biggest trade routes and the various chokepoints that pose a risk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Global trade can be disrupted at various ‘chokepoints’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GIS/visualcapitalist.com</span></span>
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<h2>Transport choke points</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.ajot.com/premium/ajot-global-maritime-choke-points">Choke points</a> are narrow parts of main trade lanes, usually straits or canals. As the <a href="https://www.gartner.com/en/supply-chain/insights/beyond-supply-chain-blog/the-geopolitical-weaponization-of-supply-chain">geopolitical weaponisation of supply chains</a> increasingly becomes a part of <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/48/2/164/118107/Wars-without-Gun-Smoke-Global-Supply-Chains-Power">economic statecraft</a>, their vulnerability grows. As the Houthis have shown, disrupting global trade at one of these choke points, does not require huge military power. </p>
<p>Disabling the biggest choke points could have severe global consequences. While about <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/may/suez-canal-and-global-trade-routes">12% of global trade</a> passes the Suez Canal, more than twice as much goes through the <a href="https://porteconomicsmanagement.org/pemp/contents/part1/interoceanic-passages/capacity-key-strategic-passages/">Malacca Strait</a> between Indonesia and Malaysia. The <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/07/19/the-persistence-of-piracy-and-armed-robbery-against-ships-in-the-straits-of-malacca-and-singapore/">Malacca Strait</a> regularly has <a href="https://www.westpandi.com/news-and-resources/news/march-2023/malacca-and-singapore-straits-increase-of-piracy-i/">issues with piracy</a>.</p>
<p>Disruptions at choke points potentially have much larger effects around the world, as they affect traffic going to and from many countries. Alternative routes to them are difficult, if not impossible, to find. This was maybe most impressively demonstrated by the 2021 Suez blockage when a container ship was wedged across the canal and held up <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-56533250">US$9.6 billion in trade</a> per day for nearly a week.</p>
<p>Today is not 2021. Ships continue to use the Suez Canal and the Red Sea is not closed to shipping, the volume of shipping containers passing through Suez <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/news/cargo-volume-in-the-red-sea-collapses/">fell drastically</a> from 500,000 per day in November 2023 to 200,000 per day in December 2023. Demand is not <a href="https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1147914/Red-Sea-rerouting-is-not-a-rerun-of-supply-chain-crisis">nearly as high</a> as it was back then. Indeed, there has been <a href="https://www.container-xchange.com/analytical-pieces/blank-sailing-trends-will-persist-due-to-oversupply-and-import-demand-uncertainty-affecting-capacity-and-trade-routes/">over-capacity</a> on many shipping routes over the past year. This can now serve as a buffer when vessels spend more time on longer routes. </p>
<h2>Running out of routes</h2>
<p>But another of the main choke points is currently suffering severe disruptions. The Panama Canal, which connects the Atlantic and Pacific, is experiencing an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-67281776">intense drought</a>. Now <a href="https://www.waterdiplomat.org/story/2023/10/panama-canal-experiences-lowest-water-levels-history">water levels</a> in the Panama Canal are so low that shipping capacity is severely limited. Shipping giant Maersk recently <a href="https://www.maersk.com/news/articles/2024/01/12/changes-to-the-oc1-service">shifted cargo to the railway</a> line running in parallel to the canal. Before the current crisis, some ships took a ten-day detour on their journeys between Asia and the US east coast by going <a href="https://www.freightwaves.com/news/panama-canal-crisis-forces-us-farm-exports-to-detour-through-suez">through the Suez Canal</a>.</p>
<p>Alternatives for the route through the Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal are limited. The Panama Canal is not a viable option at the moment. The <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13437-022-00273-3">Northern Sea Route</a> is 40% shorter than the alternative via the Suez Canal for connecting Asia to Europe. But ice makes it navigable for no more than <a href="https://akerarctic.fi/en/arctic-passion/arctic-shipping-routes-open-for-the-season/">five months per year</a> and there are concerns about the impact of ships on the <a href="https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2017/2017-scholarly-papers/229-environmental-human-impact-of-the-northern-sea-route-industrial-development-in-russia-s-arctic-zone">fragile Arctic ecosystem</a>. </p>
<p>The railway line linking China to Europe has seen <a href="https://www.dhl.com/global-en/delivered/globalization/on-the-right-track-china-europe-rails-explosive-growth.html">significant growth</a> in freight transport in recent years. But both rail and <a href="https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/future-northern-sea-route-golden-waterway-niche/">Northern Sea Route</a> connection are affected by <a href="https://www.railtarget.eu/freight/eu-sanctions-impact-chinaeurope-train-traffic-via-russia-heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-detained-containers-in-maaszewicze-6568.html">sanctions on Russia</a>. What is left for most who are keen to avoid the Red Sea is the long detour around Africa.</p>
<h2>Strait of Hormuz</h2>
<p>The original military mission in the Red Sea was aptly called <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/">“Operation Prosperity Guardian”</a>. Countries involved in the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/11/joint-statement-from-the-governments-of-australia-bahrain-canada-denmark-germany-netherlands-new-zealand-republic-of-korea-united-kingdom-and-the-united-states/">White House’s announcement</a> regarding the strikes on Yemen include major exporters such as Germany and South Korea, Denmark, the home of affected shipping line Maersk and others, as well as countries such as Australia and Canada. This is an indication of the profound global effects this disruption is having. After Houthi attacks continued despite warnings, the military actions have sent a signal that free navigation will be protected despite the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/yemen-houthis-lord-cameron-nato-mod-b2478443.html">high cost</a>. </p>
<p>They can also be understood as a signal that countries are ready to defend other choke points. The most likely target for this is what a former chief economist of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/13/red-sea-crisis-could-shatter-hopes-of-economic-recovery">called</a> called “a horrible and inevitable progression that could see the situation in the Red Sea spread to the strait of Hormuz”. </p>
<p>At least <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61002">one-fifth of global oil and gas transports</a> is shipped through the 39km wide stretch of sea between Oman and Iran. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/26/1208456496/iran-hamas-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-israel">Iran backs the Houthis</a> in Yemen, as well as other groups in the Middle East. The Strait of Hormuz has a long <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/MIDEAST-ATTACKS-HORMUZ/0100B0B50N3/index.html">history of tensions</a>. By <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/120206-iran-strait-of-hormuz-oil-supply">blocking this choke point</a>, Iran could throw the global economy into serious disarray. </p>
<p>However, experts also highlight the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/irans-harsh-revenge-blocking-strait-hormuz-really-plausible-option">likelihood of a severe global backlash</a> to any such action – doing more harm to Iran than good. The justification for the current military actions against the Houthis is likely to also contain a nod to this.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221144/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the Panama Canal in drought and the Strait of Hormuz also vulnerable to Iran, global trade routes are under severe pressure.Sarah Schiffling, Deputy Director of the HUMLOG (Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management Research) Institute, Hanken School of EconomicsMatthew Tickle, Lecturer in Operations Management Operations and Supply Chain Management, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2210062024-01-12T18:57:11Z2024-01-12T18:57:11ZUS-UK airstrikes risk strengthening Houthi rebels’ position in Yemen and the region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569063/original/file-20240112-29-67u6k4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C15%2C5276%2C3382&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Houthi supporters rally in Yemen following U.S.-U.K. airstrikes.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-handout-image-provided-by-the-uk-ministry-of-news-photo/1918198443?adppopup=true">Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The U.S.- and U.K.-led <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/11/us/politics/us-houthi-missile-strikes.html">strikes on the rebel Houthi group</a> in Yemen represent a dramatic new turn in the Middle East conflict – one that could have implications throughout the region.</p>
<p>The attacks of Jan. 11, 2024, hit around 60 targets at 16 sites, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthis-biden-retaliation-attacks-0804b93372cd5e874a0dd03513fe36a2">according to the U.S. Air Force’s Mideast command</a>, including in Yemen’s capital Sanaa, the main port of Hodeida and Saada, the birthplace of the Houthis in the country’s northwest.</p>
<p>The military action follows weeks of warning by the U.S. to the Houthis, ordering them to stop attacking commercial ships in the strategic strait of Bab el-Mandeb in the Red Sea. The Houthis – an armed militia backed by Iran that controls most of northern Yemen following a bitter <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen">near-decadelong civil war</a> – have also <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-houthi-attacks-affect-both-the-israel-hamas-conflict-and-yemens-own-civil-war-and-could-put-pressure-on-us-saudi-arabia-216852">launched missiles and drones toward Israel</a>. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.libarts.colostate.edu/people/mmahad/">expert on Yemeni politics</a>, I believe the U.S. attacks on the Houthis will have wide implications – not only for the Houthis and Yemen’s civil war, but also for the broader region where America maintains key allies. In short, the Houthis stand to gain politically from these U.S.-U.K. attacks as they support a narrative that the group has been cultivating: that they are freedom fighters fighting Western imperialism in the Muslim world.</p>
<h2>For Houthis, a new purpose</h2>
<p>The Israel-Gaza conflict has reinvigorated the Houthis – giving them a raison d'etre at a time when their status at home was diminishing.</p>
<p>By the time of the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data">Oct. 7 attack by Hamas militants</a> in Israel, the Houthis’ long conflict with Saudi Arabia, which backs the Yemeni <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-s-houthi-takeover">government ousted by the Houthis</a> at the start of Yemen’s civil war in 2014, had quieted after an April 2022 cease-fire drastically reduced fighting.</p>
<p>Houthi missile strikes on Saudi cities ceased, and there were hopes that a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15258.doc.htm">truce could bring about a permanent end</a> to Yemen’s brutal conflict.</p>
<p>With fewer external threats, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/yemens-civilians-besieged-on-all-sides/">domestic troubles</a> that <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/1925121/extreme-poverty-threatens-yemenis-living-under-houthi-rule">surfaced in Houthi-controlled areas</a> – poverty, unpaid government salaries, crumbling infrastructure – led to growing disquiet over Houthi governance. Public support for the Houthis slowly eroded without an outside aggressor to blame; Houthi leaders could no longer justify the hardships in Yemen as a required sacrifice to resist foreign powers, namely Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/israels-military-campaign-in-gaza-is-among-the-most-destructive-in-history-experts-say">Israel’s attacks in Gaza</a> have provided renewed purpose for Houthis. <a href="https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/houthis-involvement-in-gaza-war-a-tactical-move/">Aligning with the Palestinian cause</a> has allowed Houthis to reassert their relevance and has reenergized their fighters and leadership.</p>
<p>By <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/14/yemens-houthis-say-they-fired-ballistic-missiles-towards-israel">firing missiles toward Israel</a>, the Houthis have portrayed themselves as the lone force in the Arab Peninsula standing up to Israel, unlike regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The militia is presenting to Yemenis and others in the region a different face than Arab governments that have, to date, been unwilling to take strong action against Israel.</p>
<p>In particular, Houthis are contrasting their worldview with that of Saudi Arabia, which prior to the October Hamas attack had been <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-israel-normalization-still-table">looking to normalize ties</a> with Israel.</p>
<p><iframe id="P6Wxe" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/P6Wxe/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Houthi’s PR machine</h2>
<p>The U.S. and U.K. strikes were, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3644027/us-partners-forces-strike-houthi-military-targets-in-yemen/">the governments of both countries say</a>, in retaliation for persistent attacks by Houthis on international maritime vessels in the Red Sea and followed attempts at a diplomatic solution. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3643830/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-coalition-strikes-in-ho/">aim is to</a> “disrupt and degrade the Houthis’ capabilities,” according to U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A blurry picture shows an aircraft at night." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A U.K. military aircraft takes off en route to Yemen on Jan. 11, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-handout-image-provided-by-the-uk-ministry-of-news-photo/1918198443?adppopup=true">UK Ministry of Defence via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But regardless of the intent or the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/12/how-the-us-uk-bombing-of-yemen-might-help-the-houthis">damage caused to the Houthis militarily</a>, the Western strikes may play into the group’s narrative, reinforcing the claim that they are fighting oppressive foreign enemies attacking Yemen. And this will only bolster the Houthis’ image among supporters.</p>
<p>Already, the Houthis have managed to rally domestic public support in the part of Yemen they control behind their actions since October 2023. </p>
<p>Dramatic <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/how-houthi-rebel-attacks-in-the-red-sea-threaten-global-shipping">seaborne raids</a> and the taking hostage of ships’ crews have generated viral footage that taps into Northern Yemeni nationalism. Turning a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67632940">captured vessel into a public attraction</a> attracted more attention domestically. </p>
<p>Following the U.S.-U.K. strikes on Houthi targets, Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree has said the group would <a href="https://news.sky.com/video/yemen-houthi-general-says-attacks-will-not-pass-without-punishment-13046755">expand its attacks in the Red Sea</a>, saying any coalition attack on Yemen will prompt strikes on all shipping through the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects to the Arabian Sea at the southern end of the Red Sea.</p>
<h2>Weaponizing Palestinian sympathies</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, the Houthis have successfully managed to align the Palestinian cause with that of their own. Appeals through mosques in Yemen and cellphone text campaigns have raised donations for the Houthis by invoking Gaza’s plight. </p>
<p>The U.S.-U.K strikes may backfire for another reason, too: They evoke memories of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/30-years-after-our-endless-wars-in-the-middle-east-began-still-no-end-in-sight/">Western military interventions</a> in the Muslim and Arab world. </p>
<p>The Houthis will no doubt exploit this. </p>
<p>When U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin initially <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/19/us-announces-10-nation-force-to-counter-houthi-attacks-in-red-sea">announced the formation of a 10-country coalition</a> to counter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea on Dec. 18, 2023, there were concerns over the lack of regional representation. Among countries in the Middle East and Muslim world, only Bahrain – home to the <a href="https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/NSA-Bahrain/">U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the U.S. 5th Fleet</a> – joined.</p>
<p>The absence of key regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Djibouti – where the U.S. has its only military base in Africa – raised <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2023-12-17/ty-article-magazine/.premium/under-irans-auspices-houthis-turn-red-sea-to-an-independent-strategic-threat-zone/0000018c-7452-d48b-a5ec-745308440000">further doubts among observers</a> about the coalition’s ability to effectively counter the Houthis.</p>
<p>Muslim-majority countries were no doubt hesitant to support the coalition because of the sensitivity of the Palestinian cause, which by then the Houthis had successfully aligned themselves with.</p>
<p>But the lack of regional support leaves the U.S. and its coalition allies in a challenging position. Rather than being seen as protectors of maritime security, the U.S. – rather than the Houthis – are vulnerable to being framed in the region as the aggressor and escalating party. </p>
<p>This perception could damage U.S. credibility in the area and potentially serve as a recruitment tool for terrorist organizations like <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap">al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula</a> and similar groups.</p>
<p>The U.S.’s <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/history-us-support-israel-runs-deep-growing-chorus/story?id=104957109">military and diplomatic support for Israel</a> throughout the current conflict also plays into skepticism in the region over the true objectives of the anti-Houthi missile strikes.</p>
<h2>Reigniting civil war?</h2>
<p>The Houthis’ renewed vigor and Western strikes on the group also have implications for Yemen’s civil war itself.</p>
<p>Since <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/moment-truth-yemens-truce">the truce between</a> the two main protagonists in the conflict – Saudi Arabia and the Houthis – fighting between the Houthis and other groups in Yemen, such as the Southern Transitional Council, the Yemen Transitional Government and the National Resistance, has reached a deadlock. </p>
<p>Each group controls different parts of Yemen, and all seem to have accepted this deadlock. </p>
<p>But the U.S.-U.K. strikes put Houthi opponents in a difficult position. They will be hesitant to openly support Western intervention in Yemen or blame the Houthis for supporting Palestinans. There remains widespread sympathy for Gazans in Yemen – something that could give Houthis an opportunity to gain support in areas not under their control.</p>
<p>The Yemeni Transitional Government <a href="https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/25465/">issued a statement</a> following the U.S.-U.K. strikes that shows the predicament facing Houthi rivals. While blaming the Houthis’ “terrorist attacks” for “dragging the country into a military confrontation,” they also clearly reaffirmed support for Palestinians against “brutal Israeli aggression.”</p>
<p>While Houthi rivals will likely continue this balancing act, the Houthis face no such constraints – they can freely exploit the attacks to rally more support and gain a strategic advantage over their local rivals.</p>
<p>An emboldened Houthi group might also be less likely to accept the current status quo in Yemen and seize the moment to push for more control – potentially reigniting a civil war that had looked to be on the wane.</p>
<p>The Houthis thrive on foreign aggression to consolidate their power. Without this external conflict as a justification, the shortcomings of the Houthis’ political management become apparent, undermining their governance. During the civil war, Houthis were able to portray themselves as the defender of Yemen against Saudi influence. Now they can add U.S. and U.K. interference to the mix.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221006/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahad Darar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The raid follows warnings from Washington to cease attacks in the Red Sea − but it could serve to strengthen rebels and reignite civil war.Mahad Darar, Ph.D. Student of Political Science, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2207872024-01-10T14:43:45Z2024-01-10T14:43:45ZHouthi rebel Red Sea attacks and the threat of escalation and supply chain chaos are a major headache – and not just for the west<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568616/original/file-20240110-29-ygje5w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C1200%2C790&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Show of strength: an image released by the UK ministry of defence, of the Royal Navy responding to the Houthi attack.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Owen Cooban/Ministry of Defence</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>US and UK warships have repelled a mass drone attack launched by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/10/britain-warns-severe-consequences-houthi-attack-red-sea-repelled">Yemeni Houthis rebels</a> in the Red Sea. The incident, which reportedly involved a barrage of 20 rockets, drones and cruise missiles, was the largest concerted attack to be launched by the Iran-backed rebels. The UK defence secretary, Grant Shapps, called the attacks “unacceptable” and said that the consequences for the Houthis will be “severe”.</p>
<p>The UN security council will consider a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/09/un-yemen-houthis-shipping-red-sea-resolution-attacks/8972606a-af71-11ee-9a32-5c9e6aa28b3b_story.html">resolution</a> proposed by the US that condemns the Houthi attacks and demands they cease immediately.</p>
<p>The US has assembled a multinational naval task force to respond to the threat to Red Sea shipping. But, so far, these efforts have had limited effects and – in an <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/05/politics/middle-east-war-disaster-can-still-be-avoided/index.html">increasingly volatile Middle East</a> – options are running out.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/17/us-to-announce-expanded-protection-force-for-red-sea-shipping">Operation Prosperity Guardian</a>, as the task force is called, has not yet managed to deter Houthis nor to sufficiently limit the number of attacks to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/05/business/maersk-red-sea-shipping-suspended/index.html">restore confidence</a> in the Red Sea route within the shipping sector. The rebels have not hesitated to innovate and diversify their attack methods to continue putting pressure on trading nations. For instance, in addition to aerial drones and missiles they have recently used <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/01/05/red-sea-war-trade-disruption-drone-boat-explosion/">maritime drones</a>.</p>
<h2>Asymmetrical threat</h2>
<p>The threat posed by the Houthis is a classic case of <a href="https://www.rand.org/topics/asymmetric-warfare.html">asymmetrical warfare</a>. With limited means, they have enough leverage to disrupt the global economy. Freedom of navigation and the stability of global maritime supply chains are crucial for liberal economies that are highly dependent on the free flow of goods at sea.</p>
<p>This is in no way limited to western nations. The Red Sea accounts for <a href="https://www.navylookout.com/should-hms-queen-elizabeth-be-deployed-to-the-red-sea-region/">about 15%</a> of global sea traffic. Even landlocked countries and those located far away from the Red Sea depend on distant maritime supply chains for their imports and exports.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of the top of the Red Sea region with Bab al Mandab Strait in focus, December 3, 2023." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568623/original/file-20240110-15-etaznr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Strategic nightmare: Houthi rebels in Yemen can threaten the safety of shipping heading to or from the Suez canal, imperilling global supply chains.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/red-sea-region-bab-al-mandab-2399808119">Below the Sky/Shutterstock</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>This is why Houthi attacks have a disproportionate impact. The rising insurance premiums and the costs of rerouting ships via the Cape of Good Hope will slowly but steadily trickle down to businesses and consumers all over the world. This shift might have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/03/what-is-the-red-sea-crisis-and-what-does-it-mean-for-global-trade">enduring long-term impacts</a> on the global economy.</p>
<p>To counter such an asymmetric threat, defending commercial shipping rather than preventing and deterring attacks is not proving efficient. The naval response, meanwhile, is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-12-19/can-us-led-naval-force-protect-ships-oil-in-red-sea-persian-gulf?leadSource=uverify%20wall">costly</a> for participating nations. Given the cost of surface-to-air missiles used by western navies to destroy much cheaper Houthi drones, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/20/middleeast/us-destroyers-houthi-drones-red-sea-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">the cost-benefit ratio</a> is negative, although this does not account for the cost of a ship and its cargo.</p>
<p>But deterring Houthi attacks is equally arduous because <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-led-taskforce-deploys-in-red-sea-as-middle-east-crisis-threatens-to-escalate-beyond-gaza-220164">politically motivated combatants</a> are willing to engage in deadly combat and are not afraid of military or political escalation in the region.</p>
<h2>No good option on the table</h2>
<p>Recent efforts by the US secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, have been directed at <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/07/politics/blinken-israel-middle-east-tensions/index.html">containing the war</a> in Gaza and preventing it to spread to the whole region. But the patience of the US, the UK and others is running out, and there is a <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/saudi-arabia-ready-to-back-us-air-strikes-on-houthi-rebels-jmpj26mm0">growing consensus</a> around the need to strike Houthi positions on land.</p>
<p>The UK’s chancellor of the exchequer, <a href="https://twitter.com/BBCr4today/status/1743548099937636531">Jeremy Hunt</a>, acknowledged that these attacks “may have an impact”. He said the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-67900935">rebels have been warned</a> “that there will be consequences and we will not just sit back and accept that because it’s so vital for global trade”. This is no exaggeration.</p>
<p>His remarks followed a pledge from Shapps, that the UK “won’t hesitate <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/31/britain-considering-airstrikes-on-houthi-rebels-after-red-sea-attacks">to take further action</a> to deter threats to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea”.</p>
<p>Depending on their political mandate, the rules of engagement of navies operating in the Red Sea can be adapted, for instance, to include the targeting of hostile naval assets at sea or even ashore. But there is a big difference between shooting down incoming missiles or destroying small vessels that target civilian traffic at sea and striking Houthi positions on land. In the current geopolitical context, this is a decision to take with due consideration.</p>
<p>Indeed, airstrikes entail further risks of regional escalation, for instance, drawing other countries in the region, such as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/07/us/politics/iran-us-israel-conflict.html">Iran</a> and <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/saudi-arabia-ready-to-back-us-air-strikes-on-houthi-rebels-jmpj26mm0">Saudi Arabia</a>, into the conflict. Houthis and their backers might even be content for the war in Gaza to further escalate. Elsewhere, Putin’s Russia will <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-conflict-an-opportunity-for-putin-while-the-world-is-distracted-215479">also benefit</a> from any scenario in which western attention and resources would be drawn away from Ukraine.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-conflict-an-opportunity-for-putin-while-the-world-is-distracted-215479">Israel-Gaza conflict: an opportunity for Putin while the world is distracted</a>
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<p>Yet if the Houthi threat is not dealt with – and if commercial shipping must divert from the Red Sea for a prolonged period – then the cumulative impacts on the global economy will be detrimental to most nations, in the west and beyond.</p>
<p>Interestingly, instability in the Red Sea is <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/china-benefiting-middle-east-strife/32766139.html">neither in China’s interest</a> nor in the interests of any other non-western large trading nations because their economies are strongly and undeniably dependent on the global maritime supply chain.</p>
<p>In Washington, London and other major capitals, finding the right balance between defence and coercion will be key to securing peace in the Middle East while protecting the global maritime supply chain. Time is running out for both.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220787/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Basil Germond does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Iran-backed Houthi rebels have the power to significantly destabilise global trade by endangering maritime activity in the Red Sea.Basil Germond, Professor of International Security, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2196292023-12-12T14:42:23Z2023-12-12T14:42:23ZSomali pirates are back in action: but a full scale return isn’t likely. Here’s why<p>An Iranian fishing vessel, Almeraj 1, was reportedly hijacked by Somali pirates in <a href="https://splash247.com/somali-pirates-make-their-first-return-in-years/">November 2023</a>. According to <a href="https://x.com/MohamedDekAbdal/status/1727726532376825900?s=20">media reports</a>, the pirates demanded US$400,000 in ransom and threatened to use the Iranian ship for additional hijackings if the payment was not made.</p>
<p>Two days later, other Somali pirates <a href="https://apnews.com/article/yemen-somalia-houthi-pentagon-ship-bfa041bf410a40d4b79a086a6f88dd92">hijacked</a> a tanker, Central Park, off the Yemeni coast. The tanker sent a distress signal during the attack. Forces from a nearby American warship <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-yemen-ship-attack-526842504dc9f6bb7ca6e1d5104f77a3">captured the pirates</a> as they tried to flee in a small boat.</p>
<p>The two attacks have led the Somali government to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/somalia-piracy-houthis-yemen-israel-hamas-fa28cb2aa8fe7048fd60fd0f4ba05e26">call</a> for greater international support to deter a resurgence of piracy in the Horn of Africa. Similar <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/25/africa/piracy-resurgence-somalia/index.html">fears</a> that Somali piracy was on the <a href="https://eunavfor.eu/news/one-month-2019s-first-piracy-attack-somali-coast">rebound</a> surfaced after five previous attacks in 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020.</p>
<p>We have been <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=6ZYPGRsAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">studying</a> the rise and fall of <a href="https://scholar.google.dk/citations?hl=da&user=f4z0pC0AAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">Somali piracy</a>, and have tracked the problem for years. We do not regard a major rise in Somali piracy as likely. </p>
<h2>Addressing the threat</h2>
<p>Following previous threats, local authorities, experts and organisations tracking piracy globally warned that Somali pirates <a href="https://www.riskintelligence.eu/feature-articles/maritime-piracy-what-recent-developments-of-a-well-established-threat">retained the capacity</a> to launch attacks. This is also the <a href="https://www.steamshipmutual.com/sites/default/files/medialibrary/files/2023%20Jan%20-%20Sept%20IMB%20Piracy%20and%20Armed%20Robbery%20Report.pdf#page=2">current assessment</a> of the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre, which acts to suppress piracy and armed robbery at sea.</p>
<p>The concern is not surprising. </p>
<p>Somali piracy was a major threat to the region and the world economy at its height in 2011. That year alone, Somali pirates carried out <a href="https://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures">212 attacks</a>. The <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/6b9570fe-2f52-546f-af4b-605e4ebf04e6">World Bank</a> estimated that these cost the world economy US$18 billion.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872">Somali piracy, once an unsolvable security threat, has almost completely stopped. Here's why</a>
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</p>
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<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2023.2227356">recent analysis</a>, we concluded that a range of anti-piracy measures had put a stop to Somali piracy. The measures fall into four main categories:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>anti-piracy naval operations by the world’s most capable navies</p></li>
<li><p>costly self-protection measures, including the use of armed guards, by most flag states and shipping owners</p></li>
<li><p>a legal toolbox enabling pirate prosecution and imprisonment</p></li>
<li><p>capacity-building and the ability to imprison pirates regionally and in Somalia.</p></li>
</ol>
<h2>Anti-piracy measures</h2>
<p>These measures remain largely in place. </p>
<p><strong>Measure 1:</strong> The size of anti-piracy naval operations may have shrunk but some international forces remain active. Nato – an intergovernmental military alliance between 29 European and two North American member states – terminated its anti-piracy mission in <a href="https://mc.nato.int/missions/operation-ocean-shield">2016</a>. However, the European Union <a href="https://eunavfor.eu/">retains</a> its mission, as does a US-led coalition. <a href="https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/">Together</a> they seek to suppress piracy outside the territorial waters of Somalia and other coastal states in the region. In addition, independent deployers like China have warships on patrol.</p>
<p><strong>Measure 2:</strong> Most commercial ships sailing through the Gulf of Aden, the Somali basin and the Indian Ocean follow many of the <a href="https://www.steamshipmutual.com/sites/default/files/downloads/loss-prevention/BMP%25205.pdf#page=17">self-protection measures</a> recommended by flag states and the main maritime industry organisations. While the number of ships carrying armed guards has dropped considerably, most commercial ships report to the maritime security centres, follow the recommended transit corridor <a href="https://safety4sea.com/eu-extension-of-naval-operation-against-piracy-off-somalia-until-2024/">protected by international naval forces</a> and join group transits. </p>
<p><strong>Measure 3:</strong> The legal toolbox and the post-trial transfer system making it possible to prosecute pirates and imprison them in Somalia remains in place. This makes jail the most likely destination for the five pirates recently <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-yemen-ship-attack-526842504dc9f6bb7ca6e1d5104f77a3">apprehended by US forces</a> following their hijacking of Central Park. Successful prosecution and imprisonment would signal to other pirates that piracy remains an unprofitable undertaking off the Somali coast.</p>
<p><strong>Measure 4:</strong> International efforts continue to increase the capacity of Somalia and other regional states to patrol their national waters. The <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eucap-som_en?s=332">EU’s capacity building mission in Somalia</a>, for instance, still supports Somalia’s maritime security sector. It seeks to strengthen the sector’s capacity to <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eucap-som/about-eucap-somalia_en?s=332">deter, capture and prosecute pirates</a>. The successful operations undertaken by the Puntland Maritime Police Force – including <a href="https://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/asset/U121/U121231a/">securing the release of hostages</a> – indicate that these efforts are paying off.</p>
<p>These anti-piracy measures continue to be implemented by a broad coalition of state and private actors. They include states from outside the region, regional nations, Somali authorities and the international shipping industry. As long as these actors continue to invest in maintaining these measures, Somali piracy will remain unprofitable.</p>
<h2>High risks, few rewards</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen if the ransom demand for the Iranian fishing vessel Almeraj 1 will succeed. However, pirates don’t appear to have made any money from any of the other five attacks launched in the 2017-2023 period. We haven’t been able to ascertain if any ransom was paid to secure the release of a Panama-flagged ship captured in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/somali-pirates-hijack-panama-flagged-ship/a-54637865">August 2020</a>. In the other four instances, the attacks either failed or <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/16/somali-pirates-release-oil-tanker-and-crew-after-first-hijack-for-five-years">didn’t result in ransom payments</a>. </p>
<p>Even if the US$400,000 ransom demand succeeds, it doesn’t alter the overall conclusion that piracy off the Somali coast remains a high-risk undertaking with a low probability of success. This suggests that a major increase in Somali piracy is highly unlikely. </p>
<p>If it did happen, though, it would be easy for international naval forces and the shipping industry to reduce the prospects of success by stepping up naval patrols and reintroducing armed guards.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219629/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Piracy off the Somali coast remains a high-risk undertaking with a low probability of success.Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Associate professor, Royal Danish Defence CollegeTroels Burchall Henningsen, Associate Professor, Royal Danish Defence CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2042052023-04-20T13:43:45Z2023-04-20T13:43:45ZRussian ‘spy ship’ in North Sea raises concerns about the vulnerability of key maritime infrastructure<p>A <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3QFW3kLDo_M">new documentary</a> produced by a consortium of public broadcasters in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway has revealed what appears to be a profound threat to maritime and undersea energy and data infrastructure in the North Sea and the Baltic region. <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russian-ghost-ships-prepare-sabotage-of-britain-in-the-north-sea-t2gll75t6">The Shadow War</a> includes footage of a Russian research vessel called Admiral Vladimirsky allegedly collecting data on windfarms, gas pipelines, power and internet cables.</p>
<p>The film, which has been widely <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/04/19/russia-ukraine-war-spy-ships-europe-energy-infrastructure/">reported in the UK press this week</a>, asserts that Russia is systematically mapping the vulnerabilities of maritime infrastructure in the North Sea. This would enable Russia to learn of any weak spots – for instance, the locations where underwater energy and data cables intersect, making it easier to mount a sabotage attack if the Kremlin deemed it necessary.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1648676082244284418"}"></div></p>
<p>These reports don’t tell maritime security experts anything they don’t already know. We have known for a long time that Russian forces are mapping maritime infrastructures, including wind farms, communication cables and pipelines. Indeed, back in the 1990s and 2000s, when Nato and Russia were cooperating on some security issues, Russian spying activities in Nordic waters never stopped. In 2013, I was taken on a Royal Navy vessel to the North Sea where part of its mission was to look out for Russian spy ships.</p>
<p>But since the occupation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 these activities <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1907129">have intensified</a>. Across European waters, including in Irish and Portuguese waters and the Mediterranean, <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_IDA(2022)702557">Russian vessels have been spotted</a> conducting intelligence operations.</p>
<h2>Nord Stream sabotage</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/nord-stream-pipeline-sabotage-how-an-attack-could-have-been-carried-out-and-why-europe-was-defenceless-191895">sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipeline</a> in September 2022, in which a core energy pipeline was destroyed in the Baltic Sea, raised significant concerns in the west about the damage a hostile power could do by destroying or disrupting this important energy or information infrastructure.</p>
<p>The culprit behind the Nord Stream sabotage has not yet been identified. But the latest reports show that these worries are justified.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nord-stream-pipeline-sabotage-how-an-attack-could-have-been-carried-out-and-why-europe-was-defenceless-191895">Nord Stream pipeline sabotage: how an attack could have been carried out and why Europe was defenceless</a>
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</p>
<hr>
<p>Nato and the EU have rolled out ambitious plans for improving the resilience of maritime infrastructure. Nato and the EU created new <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_212887.htm">working groups</a> and <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_211919.htm?selectedLocale=en">coordination bodies</a> to develop better protection strategies and coordinate between civil and military agencies. In March of this year, the European Commission published an ambitious action plan as part of the updated <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_1483">EU maritime security strategy</a>. It foresees studies to identify the most severe vulnerabilities and better surveillance. But do these plans go far enough?</p>
<h2>Why the North Sea is so significant</h2>
<p>The gas and oil supplies of the North Sea are an important resource for the entire European energy market. The increasing focus on the production of green energy makes this strategic importance even greater. More than <a href="https://map.4coffshore.com/offshorewind/">40 windfarms</a> are based in the region, and with ideal conditions for wind energy, installations are continuously and rapidly expanding. The North Sea is hence vital to reduce dependency on fossil fuels and lower CO₂ emissions.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522115/original/file-20230420-26-lqt44u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the movements of a Russian ship in the Baltic and North Sea." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522115/original/file-20230420-26-lqt44u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522115/original/file-20230420-26-lqt44u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522115/original/file-20230420-26-lqt44u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522115/original/file-20230420-26-lqt44u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522115/original/file-20230420-26-lqt44u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522115/original/file-20230420-26-lqt44u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522115/original/file-20230420-26-lqt44u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The documentary tracks the movements of Russia’s ‘spy ship’ the Admiral Vladimirsky.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Shadow War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But given what we now suspect about Russian intelligence and possible sabotage activities, the North Sea now needs to be seen as a vulnerable and critical strategic security space. A concerted act of sabotage, damaging underwater electricity cables, for instance, can do significant harm to energy markets. Cutting underwater data cables can limit internet connectivity including across the Atlantic, since important data cable connect for instance Denmark and the US. Repair at sea is costly as it requires specialised ships, which can only operate if the weather conditions allow. After all the North Sea is a harsh environment. </p>
<p>Recent Nato and EU initiatives centre on <a href="https://euobserver.com/opinion/156255">improving surveillance</a>. They aim at getting better at detecting suspicious activities, such as those reported by the Nordic documentary film. Satellites, radar and patrols – including by unmanned vehicles – CCTV on all infrastructure and contributions by maritime users, such as fishermen who report suspicious activity, can do much to <a href="https://www.safeseas.net/themes/mda/">improve the overall awareness</a>.</p>
<p>This can assist in rapid responses and can also be a deterrent. Information sharing between states and with the industry is important. Nato, the EU, the UK and Norway need to work closely together, as none of them can handle this on their own. Putting different sources of information together to identify suspicious patterns is needed.</p>
<h2>Importance of rapid repair</h2>
<p>What often gets too little attention is the question of repair. If an attack occurs, it is vital to be able to fix any damage as quickly as possible in order to return to normal. Not only that, but if there is a demonstrable repair capacity in the region it reduces the strategic value – and hence the likelihood – of such an attack. </p>
<p>But as of now, these key repair capacities – such as specialised repair vessels and cable depots are <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_IDA(2022)702557">severely limited in Europe</a>.</p>
<p>New models of how security policy and the industry can work together to develop strategic repair capacities are required. These might be public-private partnerships that operate repair ships and provide contingency for crisis situations. This would have the dual benefit of enhancing repair capacity and, perhaps, at the same time will give an opportunity to enhance the efficiency of infrastructure by reducing repair times in the North Sea and elsewhere more generally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christian Bueger receives funding from the Velux Foundation to carry out research on maritime infrastructures. </span></em></p>A new documentary has tracked a Russian vessel apparently collecting data on energy and communications infrastructure in the North Sea and Baltic.Christian Bueger, Professor of International Relations, University of CopenhagenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2000232023-02-23T06:27:46Z2023-02-23T06:27:46ZUkraine: Russia’s inability to dominate the sea has changed the course of the war<p>Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a year ago, most of the fighting has been on land. However, there has also been a less visible – but nonetheless crucial – maritime dimension to the war across the full spectrum of tactical, strategic, economic and diplomatic considerations.</p>
<p>After land troops crossed the Ukraine border on February 24 2022, the Russian navy quickly secured control of the northwestern Black Sea. This meant it could contribute to the air campaign against Ukraine by launching cruise missiles from the sea. This diversified Russia’s attack vectors, thus increasing the chance of penetration by overwhelming Ukraine’s air defence systems. </p>
<p>This operational control gave the invaders the ability to threaten the important port city of Odesa with an amphibious assault. The prospect initially required Ukraine’s war planners to divert resources away from the main fronts in the east and north around Kyiv. It also enabled Russia to deny Ukraine access to and from its own ports, which resulted in a <em>de facto</em> maritime blockade of Ukraine.</p>
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our weekly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>But Russia failed to translate this early dominance into strategic effects by opening up a new front in Odesa. This has been attributed to the <a href="https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf">navy’s subordination</a> to the objectives of Russia’s land forces, whose focus was elsewhere.</p>
<p>For its part, Ukraine was without an operational navy able to directly engage the Russian navy at sea. Its position was made all the more insecure due to the inability of its western allies to intervene at sea – because of the <a href="https://lieber.westpoint.edu/closing-turkish-straits-war/">closure of the Turkish Straits</a> and the risk of escalation in the case of any direct involvement of Nato ships.</p>
<p>But despite all this, Kyiv managed to undermine Russia’s naval dominance by demonstrating innovation and initiative.</p>
<h2>Sinking the Moskva</h2>
<p>Its first major victory was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/15/sinking-moskva-what-we-know-russia-ship-sunk-missile-ukraine">sinking the cruiser Moskva</a> on April 14. In addition to the prestige of sinking the flagship of the Black Sea fleet, this exposed the shortcomings of Russia’s air defence onboard its surface ships.</p>
<p>The sinking of the Moskva demonstrated that the Russian navy could not operate safely in the vicinity of Ukraine’s coast, due to the threat from anti-ship missiles – both the Ukrainian-developed Neptune and western-supplied Harpoon missiles.</p>
<p>The Black Sea fleet surface ships have needed the protection of Russia’s naval air force, mainly land-based in Crimea. This limited their operational range to about <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/08/18/russian-navy-crews-are-under-orders-to-avoid-the-ukrainian-coast/?sh=42055b269463">20 miles</a> in order to benefit from full air support. </p>
<p>Another notable success was when Ukraine regained <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-reclaiming-snake-island-is-kyivs-biggest-strategic-victory-so-far-heres-why-186317">control over Snake Island</a>, a small but strategically important outpost in the Black Sea (about 70 nautical miles south of Odesa) that had been <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/25/europe/ukraine-russia-snake-island-attack-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">taken by Russian forces</a> in the opening days of the conflict. </p>
<h2>Ukraine’s creative opportunism</h2>
<p>Things began to move faster in August as Kyiv launched counterattacks, especially in the south. As part of this shift in momentum, Ukraine adopted a bold strategy of harassing Russian naval assets. This included an attack on the Black Sea fleet’s air arm at the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-62821044">Saky airbase</a> in Crimea on August 9, followed on August 20 by a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/20/ukraine-launches-fresh-strike-on-russias-black-sea-fleet-headquarters">drone attack</a> on the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol.</p>
<p>Maritime drones were then used on October 29 to target Russian warships in Sevastopol, highlighting the constant state of insecurity of the Russian navy, which was put in full “<a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/11/why-ukraines-remarkable-attack-on-sevastopol-will-go-down-in-history/">defence mode</a>”.</p>
<p>In practice, with its surface fleet “<a href="https://www.forces.net/russia/russian-black-fleet-hiding-ukrainian-navy-doesnt-exist">hiding</a>”, this reduced Moscow’s ability to plan for an amphibious assault on Odesa. It also limited its <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1559411321581572098">ability to strike from the sea</a>, and restricted its initial geostrategic objective to control the southern coast of Ukraine from <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-invasion-stage-two-of-russias-war-is-ringing-alarm-bells-in-nearby-moldova-heres-why-181813">Crimea to Transnistria</a>. </p>
<p>Importantly, it also affected the overall conduct of the war by enabling Ukraine to move its counter-offensive closer to Crimea.</p>
<h2>The maritime supply chain</h2>
<p>But with its limited navy, Ukraine has not been able to secure control of the sea. Moscow remains able to prohibit civilian traffic to and from Ukrainian ports, by making it too risky for shipping companies to operate outside the remit of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative">maritime corridor for grain exports</a> – a deal brokered by the UN and Turkey, and agreed on July 22.</p>
<p>Russia’s denial of the northwestern Black Sea has been enough to prevent the shipment of grain and other agricultural products. This has led to increased food prices, hurting many developing nations. But Russia’s own lack of control over global supply chains has also contributed to the effectiveness of sanctions targeting its <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-impact-of-sanctions-and-export-controls-on-the-russian-federation/#:%7E:text=Sanctioned%20Russian%20oligarchs%20and%20financial,with%20the%20Russian%20financial%20sector.">military-industrial base</a>. </p>
<p>All major shipping companies bar the Chinese have suspended their operations to and from Russia. But this significant collective effort has come at a <a href="https://investor.maersk.com/static-files/40368aa8-980c-4a47-8535-6f9e91ac08b1">cost to shipping companies</a>. Declining trade with Russia and the ban on Russian flagged, owned or operated ships has also <a href="https://investor.maersk.com/static-files/40368aa8-980c-4a47-8535-6f9e91ac08b1">affected business in western ports</a>.</p>
<h2>Seapower and global leadership</h2>
<p>Despite reports that a new Russian offensive is impending, naval power is not expected to play a major role as it is unlikely that the Russian navy will consider opening a new front around Odesa. But the longer a war lasts, the more likely it is to be won by a coalition of maritime nations that can control the global supply chain.</p>
<p>Well aware of this, Russia stressed in its <a href="https://cimsec.org/the-2022-maritime-doctrine-of-the-russian-federation-mobilization-maritime-law-and-socio-economic-warfare/">July 2022 maritime doctrine</a> the need to consolidate its sea power. But it’s <a href="https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2022/09/russias-new-maritime-doctrine-adrift-from-reality">not clear how</a> it can do this, given the current difficulties facing Russia’s naval-industrial base.</p>
<p>So while the war’s maritime dimension is limited, it still demonstrates that Kyiv has the capacity to seize opportunities created by Russia’s weakness at sea. And in a lengthy war – as in other lengthy conflicts – this could eventually tip the scales in Ukraine’s favour.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200023/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Basil Germond does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most of the fighting has been on land, but key developments at sea have put Russia at a disadvantage.Basil Germond, Professor, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1918952022-10-05T09:51:03Z2022-10-05T09:51:03ZNord Stream pipeline sabotage: how an attack could have been carried out and why Europe was defenceless<p>Whatever caused the damage to the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea, it appears to be the first major attack on critical “subsea” (underwater) infrastructure in Europe. It’s now <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88062">widely thought</a> – <a href="https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/nato-statement-on-the-damage-to-gas-pipelines/">not least by Nato</a> – that the explosions that led to major leaks in the two pipelines were not caused by accidents. The alliance says they were a deliberate act of sabotage. </p>
<p>The attacks occurred in the exclusive economic zones of Denmark and Sweden and demonstrate the risks that Europe’s subsea infrastructures are facing. This raises the question of the vulnerabilities of European pipelines, electricity and internet cables, and other maritime infrastructure. Europe will have to revisit its policies for protecting them. </p>
<p>But it is still unclear how the attacks were carried out. The investigations will probably take months to complete, but there are two likely scenarios. A first option is that the attacks could have been carried out as an underwater operation using advanced submarine technology. </p>
<p>This implies that we are looking at a state and its navy. Although the attacks took place <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nord-stream-sabotage-not-an-attack-sweden-foreign-minister-says-2022-09-28/">outside the territorial waters</a> of the Nato members Denmark and Sweden, they could be interpreted as an act of war. </p>
<p>The second scenario is an operation launched from a privately owned surface vessel, such as a fishing boat being used as a platform for divers or submersibles to place explosives. In this case, the attack vessel was hiding in everyday maritime traffic. </p>
<p>This scenario points us to so called <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14751798.2017.1310702">“grey-zone” tactics</a>: an attack by a group acting indirectly on behalf of state interests. The involvement of any government will then be very difficult to verify. This scenario implies that the Nord Stream attack was likely to have been the first ever recorded grey-zone activity in the European subsea.</p>
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<p>Grey-zone tactics are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2022.2053556">increasingly common at sea</a>, and have been associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-seizes-greek-oil-tankers/31871990.html">seizing ships</a>, or the Chinese fishing fleet <a href="https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/china-s-civilian-fishing-fleets-are-still-weapons-of-territorial-control">advancing territorial claims</a>. </p>
<p>Grey-zone tactics at sea have not been extensively studied, but similar tactics are well understood in the cyber domain. In that domain it is usually a hacker group operating formally “independent” from governmental agencies that carry out an attack. </p>
<p>The comparison to the cyber world is useful as it gives us insights into why the maritime domain is very vulnerable. The sea is more similar to cyberspace than first meets the eye. </p>
<p>Like cyberspace, <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix174">the sea is crowded</a> with a highly complex set of state and non-state actors and multiple overlapping jurisdictions. That makes it easier to hide, and more difficult to trace and identify responsible actors. The legal ambiguities also raise the question of how to prosecute any perpetrators.</p>
<h2>Unregulated space</h2>
<p>As our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1907129">research shows,</a> the subsea is an ocean space that is often forgotten, yet increasingly vital. Pipelines ensure the flow of gas and oil. Electricity cables across Europe and the Mediterranean are key to the green energy revolution. Underwater data cables <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/invisible-and-vital-undersea-cables-and-transatlantic-security#:%7E:text=Sometimes%20described%20as%20the%20%E2%80%9Cworld's,critical%20for%20our%20daily%20lives.">transport 95% of data</a> and ensure digital connectivity. </p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_IDA(2022)702557">Europe has no policy in place</a> that would provide for the surveillance and protection of this underwater infrastructure. Europe is effectively subsea blind. </p>
<p>Three European Union agencies – the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), the European Fishery Control Agency (EFCA) and the European Border and Coastguard Agency (Frontex) – address ocean surfaces. But none of them has a mandate to look underwater.</p>
<p>These three agencies, however, run a tight surveillance scheme to monitor maritime activities, known as the <a href="https://emsa.europa.eu/cise.html#:%7E:text=The%20Common%20Information%20Sharing%20Environment,to%20conduct%20missions%20at%20sea.">Common Information Sharing Environment</a>. </p>
<p>A first step to increase the protection of subsea infrastructure is to draw upon this platform to systematically provide surveillance of suspicious activities on the surface in vicinity to infrastructures and to coordinate patrols. This will help to deter perpetrators and prevent a future grey-zone scenario.</p>
<h2>Eye in the sea</h2>
<p>Monitoring underwater activities is a more difficult and costly affair. The seabed is a vast space – and cables and pipelines cover thousands of kilometres. The <a href="https://eda.europa.eu/">European Defence Agency</a> runs a number of projects to improve under water surveillance.</p>
<p>However, as we have shown <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_IDA(2022)702557">in a recent report to the European Parliament</a>, not only technological advancement is the route to better resilience. Navies and coastguards need to develop better collaboration with the private industry that operates and maintains underwater infrastructure. </p>
<p>Industry holds important data, and is needed to ensure swift responses for any future attack. The EU has a major role to play in enabling this collaboration through its agencies. It must also ensure that industry holds sufficient repair capabilities for cables and pipelines. </p>
<p>All of this calls for an explicit underwater policy for the EU and mandating its agencies to contribute to critical maritime infrastructure protection. The ongoing drafting of the new <a href="https://eda.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/2022/06/24/public-consultation-on-eu-maritime-security-strategy">European Union Maritime Security Strategy</a> is a window of opportunity. </p>
<p>Initiated in 2022, the purpose of the strategy is to provide direction and ensure coordination between EU institutions and the member state agencies that deal with the maritime. The strategy is expected for 2023. It must address the subsea and outline how underwater infrastructure can be better protected.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191895/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christian Bueger receives funding from the Velux Foundation for a research group on Ocean Infrastructures.</span></em></p>Europe needs to coordinate surveillance of its underwater infrastructure to safeguard vital gas power and data supplies.Christian Bueger, Professor of International Relations, University of CopenhagenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1917642022-10-05T02:09:05Z2022-10-05T02:09:05Z‘Hybrid warfare’: Nord Stream attacks show how war is evolving<p>It’s not yet clear who carried out the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/qa-nord-stream-gas-sabotage-whos-being-blamed-why-2022-09-30/">attacks on the Nord Stream gas pipelines</a> in the Baltic Sea last week, although many Western nations are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/oct/01/truss-nord-stream-gas-pipeline-russia-damage-sabotage">suspicious</a> it was an act of sabotage by Russia.</p>
<p>What is clear is that the ruptures have added to already heightened tensions and an impending energy crisis in the region.</p>
<p>While further investigations are required, if Russia was behind such sabotage, we can view it as an evolution of “hybrid warfare”, because it would highlight how the energy sector and critical infrastructure can be strategically targeted as an unconventional warfare method.</p>
<p>If the damage to Nord Stream is deemed to be a deliberate act of sabotage, there will likely be an escalation in the regional conflict.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nord-stream-leaks-where-will-europe-get-its-gas-from-now-191529">Nord Stream leaks: where will Europe get its gas from now?</a>
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<h2>What is hybrid warfare?</h2>
<p><a href="https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irc_97_900-1.pdf">Traditionally</a>, war was conducted on a battlefield, between two states in a defined territory. This is no longer the case. As technology has become more advanced, and the enemy more sophisticated, states have moved further away from this traditional warfare style. </p>
<p>Now warfare is conducted across multiple battle domains: air, land, sea, space and through cyberspace, and often simultaneously. </p>
<p><a href="https://jmss.org/article/view/73754">Hybrid warfare</a> refers to newer and more unconventional methods of fighting a war. It can occur across the political, economic and civil spheres, often blending several warfare tactics.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-hybrid-warfare-and-what-is-meant-by-the-grey-zone-118841">Explainer: what is 'hybrid warfare' and what is meant by the 'grey zone'?</a>
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<p>Hybrid warfare blurs the lines between conventional and unconventional warfare, as well as the <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ihls/7/1/article-p63_4.xml?language=en">distinction</a> between times of peace and war. As stated by <a href="https://ung.edu/institute-leadership-strategic-studies/_uploads/files/bachmann-gunneriusson-hybrid-wars-16-sep-2016-scientia-militaria.pdf">NATO</a>, hybrid warfare can include a variety of tactics such as terrorism, migration, piracy, corruption and ethnic conflict.</p>
<p>While hybrid warfare isn’t a new concept, advances in technology have allowed hybrid strategies to be executed in new ways, such as <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2670527">cyber attacks</a> and information warfare.</p>
<p>Many commentators are concerned Russia or other states with similar military capabilities could <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-threat-to-undersea-internet-cables/">attack underwater internet cables</a>.</p>
<p>It’s therefore understandable why some European politicians are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/28/nord-stream-blasts-hybrid-war-eu-russia-sabotage">claiming</a> that if such critical energy infrastructure has been sabotaged, this would herald a new stage of hybrid warfare.</p>
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<p>The recent development of new underwater technology, such as autonomous underwater drones, could also feasibly be utilised to achieve military goals. Such hybrid warfare strategies being employed in maritime zones will likely lead to further discussion on the applicability of the international law of the sea.</p>
<p>It’s important to note we’re not saying who we think caused the Nord Stream damage. We simply want to highlight that if a state or non-state actor were to be found responsible, such an incident could be considered an act of hybrid warfare.</p>
<h2>Energy as a weapon</h2>
<p>The extent of the damage to the Nord Stream pipelines, which carry natural gas from Russia to Europe, could exacerbate the already vulnerable situation of Europe’s energy crisis.</p>
<p>Controlling and targeting natural resources for military gain has occurred in several past conflicts. For example in Syria, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2018.1433469">Islamic State controlled an oil refinery</a> and surrounding territory, thereby <a href="https://jmss.org/article/view/73754/55220">sustaining</a> their financial model.</p>
<p>Also, the resultant ecological impact of the damaged Nord Stream’s gas emissions is reminiscent of an incident in the first Gulf War when <a href="https://magazin.nzz.ch/nzz-am-sonntag/international/der-krieg-in-der-grauzone-ld.1705413">Saddam Hussain deliberately</a> destroyed oil fields and platforms to create an ecological hazard.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-vladimir-putin-uses-natural-gas-to-exert-russian-influence-and-punish-his-enemies-162413">How Vladimir Putin uses natural gas to exert Russian influence and punish his enemies</a>
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<h2>A false flag operation?</h2>
<p>But the damage caused to Nord Stream isn’t within the boundaries of a territory where a conflict is occurring. It has happened in the international waters of the Baltic Sea, just outside the boundaries of the exclusive economic zones of Germany, Denmark, Poland and Sweden. It’s this feature of the incident that shows how hybrid warfare strategies have evolved – specifically how such tactics don’t need to remain in the conflict zone itself.</p>
<p>Indeed, the Nord Stream incident wasn’t an attack on Western or NATO states’ territories directly. As such, these are hallmarks of a “<a href="https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/09/nord-stream-leaks-underline-gray-zone-risks/377701/">grey zone</a>” act – coercive tactics which don’t meet the threshold of conventional military warfare.</p>
<p>If Russia is responsible, it could also be understood as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-false-flag-attacks-and-could-russia-make-one-work-in-the-information-age-177128">false flag operation</a>. A false flag attack is one in which the actor aims to <a href="https://magazin.nzz.ch/nzz-am-sonntag/international/der-krieg-in-der-grauzone-ld.1705413#back-register">pin blame for the incident on an adversary</a>, and to distort and weaken the opponent’s military cohesion. Such an operation would result in disinformation and could be used to trigger further military action. </p>
<p>It’s interesting to note that Putin has blamed the Nord Stream attacks <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-spy-chief-says-moscow-has-evidence-west-behind-sabotage-nord-stream-2022-09-30/">on the United States</a>, and the Russian ambassador to the United Nations said last week the US has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-has-much-gain-nord-stream-damage-russia-says-un-2022-09-30/">much to gain</a> from the explosions.</p>
<p>Such an approach would likely aim to weaken the West’s <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/09/15/vladimir-putins-war-is-failing-the-west-should-help-it-fail-faster">cohesion</a> and willingness to continue supporting humanitarian and military efforts in the region.</p>
<p>Whoever the perpetrator is, such actions send a clear signal to the rest of the world as to the power, reach and willingness to cause disruption beyond the traditional boundaries of a conflict zone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191764/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann received funding from the Australian Department of Defence for research regarding grey zone and information operations targeting Australia. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Primrose Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If the Nord Stream attacks were an act of sabotage, this shows how energy infrastructure can be strategically targeted as an act of ‘hybrid warfare’.Meredith Primrose Jones, Researcher - Oceania Cyber Security Centre; Researcher - Centre for Cyber Security Research and Innovation, RMIT UniversitySascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann, Professor in Law and Co-Convener National Security Hub (University of Canberra) and Research Fellow (adjunct) - The Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University- NATO Fellow Asia-Pacific, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1906782022-09-20T13:09:02Z2022-09-20T13:09:02ZSouth Africa is surrounded by sea but doesn’t have a plan to protect it: three steps to get one<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484551/original/file-20220914-13-kerp1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kalk Bay, Western Cape, South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Education Images/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa is surrounded by 2,798km of coastline. Yet, oddly, the country doesn’t have a coherent maritime strategy underpinned by a related national strategy to safeguard its maritime interests.</p>
<p>This omission was underscored again recently by an evolving <a href="https://www.westerncape.gov.za/assets/departments/economic-development-tourism/draft_discussion_document_towards_an_oceans_economy_master_plan__0.pdf">master plan for South Africa’s oceans</a>. The document is significant as it puts the importance of South Africa’s oceans into sharper focus. But this shouldn’t obscure the fact that government’s commitment to comprehensively harness the ocean to help arrest economic decline has been disappointing.</p>
<p>The document also underscores the absence of a coherent and comprehensive policy. In countries where this has been done well – such as <a href="https://www.transport.govt.nz/area-of-interest/resilience-and-security/maritime-security-strategy/#:%7E:text=The%20Maritime%20Security%20Strategy%20ensures%20New%20Zealand%20has,more%20efficient%20and%20effective%20maritime%20security%20sector%20that%3A%20%22%22">New Zealand</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ghana-has-developed-a-maritime-policy-here-is-what-it-means-188381">Ghana</a> – policies have been developed that encompass the economic value of a country’s oceans, as well as the vulnerability they present from a security point of view.</p>
<p>There are solutions. </p>
<p>A three step process would put South Africa’s maritime security house in order. The first would be to create a well-designed government-led process that includes a high-office body and core stakeholders. This would lead directly into the second step – the mapping of the country’s national maritime interests as well as the threats it faces. The third step would be creation of an integrated national maritime strategy.</p>
<p>The growing trend internationally is for countries to be explicit about their maritime interests and back this with dedicated institutional commitments to promote, develop and defend them if required. It’s time South Africa followed suit.</p>
<h2>What’s missing</h2>
<p>Some efforts have been made at getting a policy framework in place. The most recent is the <a href="http://www.governmentpublications.lib.uct.ac.za/news/framework-document-south-africa%E2%80%99s-national-interest-and-its-advancement-global-environment">Draft Framework on South Africa’s National Interest</a>.</p>
<p>The evolving master plan and <a href="https://www.operationphakisa.gov.za/Pages/Home.aspx">Operation Phakisa</a> – launched by the country’s presidency in July 2014 to hasten solutions to “critical development issues” – stress the critical importance of the oceans economy to South Africa’s overall economic interests. </p>
<p>The master plan also outlines good statistics on the potential contribution the oceans economy holds for the country.</p>
<p>But neither of these adds up to an integrated and credible maritime security plan for the country. The overall picture is one of working in silos, seemingly without coordination.</p>
<p>A recent communiqué from the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/speeches-communiques">Southern African Development Community Heads of State meeting</a> in the DR Congo noted that maritime security of Southern Africa is not what it should be and that a regional maritime strategy must be implemented. </p>
<p>There are examples South Africa could learn form. There are sound strategies on maritime security emerging among Gulf of Guinea countries, <a href="https://www.kenyanews.go.ke/govt-develops-comprehensive-maritime-security-strategy/">Kenya</a> in the Horn region, and the emphasis by <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/maritime-security-the-seychelles-way/#:%7E:text=The%20Seychelles%20has%20committed%20to%20protecting%20up%20to,and%20preserve%20economic%20opportunities%20in%20tourism%20and%20fishing">Seychelles</a> on security to harness the economic potential of its maritime territories.</p>
<p>Countries like <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sea/sea-sea/ghana-has-developed-a-maritime-policy-here-is-what-it-means/">Ghana</a>, <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/nigeria-launches-deep-blue-maritime-security-project/">Nigeria</a>, Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius have made strides.</p>
<p>Beyond Africa, the UK recently launched its <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-maritime-security-strategy">national maritime security strategy</a>. For its part, China has turned its attention to the importance of the oceans <a href="https://www.stripes.com/theaters/africa/2021-12-06/china-military-guinea-djibouti-africom-3875711.html">in pursuit of its national interests</a>. This ambition features alongside the <a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-background-papers/foreign-military-presence-horn-africa-region">military buildup in the western Indian Ocean</a> with a focus on the Horn region and southern strands to Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Maldives.</p>
<p>The naval profile unfolds alongside a much larger oceans agenda made up of security, safety, climate change, functional connectivity, and a thriving blue economy.</p>
<h2>Prioritising South Africa’s maritime interests</h2>
<p>A first step is to appoint a high-level entity to oversee maritime affairs in South Africa. A Department of Maritime Affairs is an attractive idea. But a powerful steering committee reporting to the presidency is probably a more attainable start. </p>
<p>This practice is growing. <a href="https://www.transport.govt.nz/area-of-interest/resilience-and-security/maritime-security-strategy/#:%7E:text=The%20Maritime%20Security%20Strategy%20ensures%20New%20Zealand%20has,more%20efficient%20and%20effective%20maritime%20security%20sector%20that%3A">New Zealand</a> and Ghana have taken this approach. </p>
<p>Next there needs to be a detailed mapping of interests on existing and new domains. An example is the security of underwater cable infrastructure – locally and regionally. </p>
<p>The maritime domain has essentially become too important to leave within a vague and broad set of statements like South Africa’s <a href="http://www.governmentpublications.lib.uct.ac.za/news/framework-document-south-africa%E2%80%99s-national-interest-and-its-advancement-global-environment">recent framework document</a>. Clearly articulated national interests with a maritime underpinning should inform an integrated national maritime security strategy. </p>
<p>In my view this is imperative for three reasons.</p>
<p>First, existing plans and documents are too vague about a credible security foundation for South Africa’s dependence on, and use of, the oceans. This leaves too much room for ambiguity about what must be secured.</p>
<p>Second, the absence of a strategy inherently forfeits the value in planning for shifts in maritime interests as well as the dynamic modern strategic maritime environment.</p>
<p>A third aspect stems from the value of a maritime security strategy to inform collaboration with regional and international partners (other African countries). Having a maritime strategy presents opportunities for maritime diplomacy – whether coercive, cooperative or more persuasive in kind.</p>
<p>South Africa is also very explicit in its foreign policy about commitment to the Southern African Development Community and Africa. The African Union’s <a href="https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fau.int%2Fweb%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fdocuments%2F30928-doc-2050_aim_strategy_eng.doc">AIMS-2050</a> and <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-maritime-security-and-safety-and-development-africa-lome-charter">Lomé Charter</a> as well as <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063">Agenda 2063</a> alongside the <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals">UN Sustainable Development Goals</a> have explicit maritime objectives that call for cooperation. Collectively, these framework documents guide and expect South Africa to be in step with its own strategies.</p>
<p>The question is: what does South Africa bring to the maritime table?</p>
<p>Not a great deal, is the answer. This means it can’t support and cooperate with higher order African maritime architectures. It seemingly remains up to academia, NGOs, individual state departments and agencies to play many of the constructive maritime roles on the international stage.</p>
<p>South Africa comes across as being out of touch with maritime security developments on the continent and beyond. There is no doubt that encouraging work is being done on South Africa’s ocean landscapes. This work unfortunately stems more from collections of actors in national departments, agencies, NGOs, and academia shining the light on the country’s critical maritime interests. </p>
<p>But this hasn’t been translated into a coherent strategy. The ultimate responsibility rests with the higher echelons of government. It is national government that must orchestrate the opportunities, actors and beneficiaries that will give expression to Operation Phakisa’s extensive oceans agenda.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190678/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francois Vreÿ receives funding from Stellenbosch University. He is affiliated with Stellenbosch University. </span></em></p>The trend globally is for countries to be explicit about their maritime interests, underpinned by a sound security strategy.Francois Vreÿ, Research Coordinator, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1856402022-06-23T11:18:10Z2022-06-23T11:18:10ZUkraine war: as the conflict at sea intensifies, Russia’s prospects of victory look further off than ever<p>The Ukraine war is at a strategic turning point. As the Russian offensive intensifies in the Donbas without resulting in any substantial gains, western leaders warn that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/19/russia-ukraine-war-could-last-for-years-nato-jens-stoltenberg">the war will be long</a>, and supporting Ukraine must be sustained in the long term. At the same time, a less perceptible change is happening. The war at sea is intensifying.</p>
<p>From the blockade in the Black Sea, to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yZH3PFSZkXo">growing tensions</a> in the Baltic Sea, Ukraine’s assertiveness in destroying Russian naval assets and the role played by civilian shipping sector in sanctioning Russia, the war’s maritime aspects are now emerging and are likely to be more influential in the outcome of the conflict. Consequently, Russia, which is a continental power, is now more likely to be strategically defeated.</p>
<p>The longer a war, the more likely it is to be won by a sea power. As the maritime dimension of the conflict intensifies, the west’s mastery of the sea, its dominance of relevant maritime forums (such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO)) and its influence over big insurance brokers and shipping companies, will eventually be fatal to Putin’s war.</p>
<p>Russia, like its predecessor, the Soviet Union, lacks a maritime outlook – which prevents Moscow from grasping the strategic importance of sea power beyond its short-term naval preponderance in the Black Sea.</p>
<p>Ukraine is a land power as much as Russia. But Putin is also confronted by a coalition of maritime (mainly western) nations, which champion freedom of navigation, have superior naval capabilities and a strong influence on the world’s maritime affairs. This grants the west with the capacity to gradually suffocate Putin’s regime by exercising strategic sea power.</p>
<p>The blockade of Ukraine, which prevents the shipment of grain and other agricultural products to the global south, is responsible for a worldwide food crisis. This has drawn attention to the importance of freedom of navigation. </p>
<h2>Moves and strategies</h2>
<p>At first sight, Russia seems to be in a dominant position. It can blockade Ukraine and use the resulting food crisis as a bargaining chip (or blackmailing tool) to negotiate the lifting of western sanctions. But this is also offering the west an opportunity to take the upper hand where they have a comparative advantage: upholding freedom of the sea and rallying partners under the banner of humanitarianism.</p>
<p>Technical, legal, operational and strategic difficulties make it arduous to establish a safe corridor to and from Ukraine. In particular, agreeing on procedures and safeguards with Russia, clearing the corridor of mines to an acceptable standard for maritime insurances and operators, and managing Turkey’s interpretation of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-montreux-convention-is-and-what-it-means-for-the-ukraine-war-178136">Montreux Convention</a>, which gives Ankara control over the access routes between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and beyond.</p>
<p>It is also crucial to prevent the approach to the port city of Odesa from becoming vulnerable to a Russian attack following its de-mining and avoiding potential escalation between Russian forces and escort vessels. Nevertheless, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/turkish-team-discuss-black-sea-grain-corridor-russia-this-week-media-2022-06-21/">this option is still on the table</a>.</p>
<p>Ukraine itself is proactively targeting Russian assets in the Black Sea. Since the <a href="https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2022/04/the-moskva-incident-and-its-wider-implications">sinking of the cruiser Moskva</a> in April, the Russian navy is <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220502-russia-struggles-to-turn-black-sea-rule-into-amphibious-attack">not safe</a> when operating too close to the shore.</p>
<p>The pressure exercised by Ukraine in the Black Sea has further increased in June. Using <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-it-hit-russian-naval-tugboat-with-missiles-2022-06-17/">harpoon missiles</a> supplied by the west, Ukraine successfully attacked a Russian tugboat supplying Snake Island, which is strategically vital for Russia’s control over the area. Ukraine also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/20/ukrainian-missiles-hit-black-sea-gas-platforms-russian-officials">targeted oil rigs</a> located in the Crimean waters (occupied since 2014) and launched air strikes against Russian installations on Snake Island. </p>
<p>These tactical victories will <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1539118311409176576/photo/1">challenge Russia’s ability</a> to deny Ukraine access to the north-western Black Sea – with long-term strategic consequences. Also, a weakened Russia in the Black Sea might open the door to the establishment of a safe corridor.</p>
<p>At a diplomatic level, freedom of navigation – especially when its disruption causes food shortages – is a core norm of the global maritime order that seafaring nations, led by the west, are committed to upholding. The high representative of the EU for foreign affairs and security policy, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-blockade-ukrainian-grain-exports-is-war-crime-eus-top-diplomat-2022-06-20/">Josep Borrell</a>, said that the blockade of Ukraine that disrupts grain shipments is “a real war crime”.</p>
<p>The blockade might contribute to further diplomatically isolate Russia by making the global south, until now reluctant to condemn Russia’s aggression, revise its stance and side with the west in pointing at Russia’s wrongdoings. But there is still <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-61802498">a long way to go</a>.</p>
<h2>Beyond the Black Sea</h2>
<p>There is also a strong <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2022/05/10/ukraine-war-the-limits-of-traditional-naval-power-and-the-rise-of-collective-and-civilian-seapower/">civilian maritime dimension</a> to the war. All major shipping companies but the Chinese have stopped operations to and from Russia. Ships that are either owned or operated by Russia or sail under the Russian flag are banned from EU, UK, US and most others ports. This is gradually putting a great deal of <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_22_2823">pressure on the Russian economy</a> and – down the line – on its war machine.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Russian Navy sailors stand in front of a naval ship in Kronstadt, near St. Petersburg, Russia, 14 April 2022." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470340/original/file-20220622-34601-k6m80x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C7%2C5009%2C3589&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470340/original/file-20220622-34601-k6m80x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470340/original/file-20220622-34601-k6m80x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470340/original/file-20220622-34601-k6m80x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470340/original/file-20220622-34601-k6m80x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470340/original/file-20220622-34601-k6m80x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470340/original/file-20220622-34601-k6m80x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian navy: impressive in port, faltering on the ocean wave.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Anatoly Maltsev</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Baltic Sea is also becoming a theatre of tensions between Russia and the west. Finland and Sweden’s potential accession to Nato will further transform the Baltic Sea into a “lake” controlled by the EU and Nato, whereas it has always been an important sea lane of communication for Russia. Both Nato and Russia have recently conducted <a href="https://metro.co.uk/2022/06/09/russia-putin-dispatches-navy-to-baltic-sea-in-defiance-of-nato-16799955/">naval exercises</a> in the Baltic Sea. </p>
<p>Additionally, to apply EU sanctions, Lithuania has now blocked the transit of prohibited goods (notably metal ore) from Russia to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/21/kaliningrad-lithuania-eu-blockade-russia-nato/">Kaliningrad</a>, which is the headquarters of the Baltic Sea Fleet. As a result, freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea becomes even more crucial for Russia in order to ensure supplies to the Russian “<a href="https://theconversation.com/kaliningrad-russias-unsinkable-aircraft-carrier-deep-in-nato-territory-182541">exclave</a>”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kaliningrad-russias-unsinkable-aircraft-carrier-deep-in-nato-territory-182541">Kaliningrad: Russia's 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' deep in Nato territory</a>
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<p>At the same time, recent incursions by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/17/unacceptable-russian-warship-accused-of-violating-danish-waters">Russian warships</a> in the territorial waters of Denmark (which incidentally supplied Ukraine with harpoon missiles) highlight Russia’s willingness to assert its status as a Baltic Sea power, but also demonstrates its nervousness as it faces the determination of maritime nations.</p>
<h2>Advantages of sea power</h2>
<p>The consensus among sea power scholars (for instance see books by US maritime expert <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Leverage_of_Sea_Power.html?id=0DkSAAAAYAAJ">Colin S Gray</a> and British maritime strategist <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Seapower.html?id=vQVQ_dTVVzwC&redir_esc=y">Geoffrey Till</a>) is that the possession of powerful naval forces is not sufficient to win a war. But command of the sea grants strategic advantages – from the ability to control the global supply chain to carrying out projection operations, such as targeted air strikes and amphibious assaults.</p>
<p>But for sea power to exert its influence on a continental enemy requires time and perseverance. Thus, the longer the war the more likely it will be won by a coalition of maritime nations.</p>
<p>Beyond its naval dominance, the west – as a collective of maritime nations – has been in a position to shape the international order at sea, from IMO procedures to the <a href="https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Legal/Pages/UnitedNationsConventionOnTheLawOfTheSea.aspx#:%7E:text=The%20United%20Nations%20Convention%20on,the%20oceans%20and%20their%20resources.">UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)</a>, to naval war laws. Similarly, major civilian stakeholders, especially <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-ukraine-war-is-benefiting-russian-insurers-and-pushing-up-insurance-premiums-everywhere-184965">maritime insurers</a>, are closely associated with western interests. </p>
<p>The preponderance of sea power in war, peace and hybrid contexts (such as the current confrontation between Russia and the west) derives from maritime nations’ ability to use their dominance to produce strategic effects via their control of the global supply chain and their ability to deny such control to continental states. These effects can only be felt in the longer term.</p>
<p>Russia is able to exercise some pressure on Europe via its control of the energy supply in the mid-term. It has also managed to operate naval units in the Black Sea in a way that – currently – prevents the free flow of goods to and from Ukraine.</p>
<p>But as a traditional continental power, Russia lacks the ability to oppose the coalition of maritime nations in the longer term and at global level. Sea power will eventually contribute to Moscow’s strategic failure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185640/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Basil Germond does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the war drags on and its maritime dimension intensifies, Russia is more likely to be strategically defeated in the long term.Basil Germond, Senior Lecturer and Director of Research Training, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1781362022-03-01T19:26:26Z2022-03-01T19:26:26ZWhat the Montreux Convention is, and what it means for the Ukraine war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449225/original/file-20220301-3997-ebh58x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C0%2C3547%2C1840&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Russian warship, the Patrol Ship Dmitry Rogachev, travels through the Dardanelles on Feb. 15, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/patrol-ship-dmitry-rogachev-of-russian-navy-passes-through-news-photo/1238500374">Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As bad as the Ukraine war is so far, an international agreement signed in 1936 is preventing it from getting even worse.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280166981">Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits</a> gives Turkey control over the water route between the Black Sea – home to a <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/02/russia-ukraine-conflict-what-happened-in-the-black-sea-so-far/">major Russian naval force</a> – and the Mediterranean Sea and beyond.</p>
<p>It sets limits on the passage of civilian vessels and military warships through the Dardanelles and the Bosporus straits, which with the Sea of Marmara between them form the seagoing link between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.</p>
<p>The international agreement was signed by Australia, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Japan, Romania, Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Turkey and has been in effect since November 1936. </p>
<p><iframe id="lbrD7" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/lbrD7/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Now the Montreux Convention is serving an important role in the Ukraine conflict. Ukraine has asked Turkey to close the straits to Russian warships, highlighting the Turkish role in keeping regional peace. The <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/02/turkey-closes-the-dardanelles-and-bosphorus-to-warships/">Turkish government agreed</a> on Feb. 28, 2022. However, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-warships-black-sea-ukraine/31692995.html">several Russian warships</a> entered the Black Sea in early February. And Turkey has said it <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%20173/v173.pdf#page=227">would not prevent Russian warships from entering the Black Sea</a> if Russia claimed they were <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/02/russia-ukraine-conflict-what-happened-in-the-black-sea-so-far/">returning to their home port</a>.</p>
<p>Four key elements in the Montreux Convention regulate which vessels may enter the Black Sea in wartime:</p>
<ol>
<li><p><a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%20173/v173.pdf#page=225">Turkey can close the straits to warships</a> of belligerent parties in wartime or when Turkey itself is a party to the war or threatened by aggression from another nation. </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%20173/v173.pdf#page=219">Turkey can close the straits to merchant ships</a> belonging to countries at war with Turkey.</p></li>
<li><p>Any country with coastline on the Black Sea – Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia or Ukraine – must <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%20173/v173.pdf#page=223">notify Turkey eight days in advance</a> of its intention to send vessels of war through the straits. Other countries, the ones that don’t border the Black Sea, must give Turkey 15 days’ advance notice. Only Black Sea nations may <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%20173/v173.pdf#page=221">send submarines through the straits</a>, only with prior notice and only if the vessels are constructed or purchased outside the Black Sea.</p></li>
<li><p>Only nine warships are allowed to pass through the straits at any one time, and there are limits on how big the ships can be, both individually and as a group. No group of ships may <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%20173/v173.pdf#page=223">exceed 15,000 metric tons</a>. Modern warships are heavy, with <a href="https://www.cnet.com/pictures/americas-fighting-ships-from-smallest-to-largest/18/">frigates</a> around 3,000 metric tons and <a href="https://www.cnet.com/pictures/americas-fighting-ships-from-smallest-to-largest/20/">destroyers</a> and <a href="https://www.cnet.com/pictures/americas-fighting-ships-from-smallest-to-largest/26/">cruisers</a> around 10,000 metric tons. <a href="https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a38696676/every-single-aircraft-carrier-in-the-world/">Modern aircraft carriers</a> are too big to go through, and <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.tr/implementation-of-the-montreux-convention.en.mfa">aren’t allowed anyway</a> under Turkish rules.</p></li>
</ol>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449226/original/file-20220301-19-1ibz60c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A cargo ship travels under a bridge" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449226/original/file-20220301-19-1ibz60c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449226/original/file-20220301-19-1ibz60c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449226/original/file-20220301-19-1ibz60c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449226/original/file-20220301-19-1ibz60c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449226/original/file-20220301-19-1ibz60c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449226/original/file-20220301-19-1ibz60c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449226/original/file-20220301-19-1ibz60c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A merchant ship travels through the Bosporus on Feb. 23, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/cargo-ship-passes-through-the-bosphorus-strait-in-istanbul-news-photo/1238823862">shadati/Xinhua via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Turkey has used the convention’s powers before. During World War II, Turkey <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283302">closed the straits to warships</a> belonging to combatant nations. That prevented the Axis powers from sending their warships to attack the Soviet Union – and blocked the Soviet navy from participating in <a href="https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/worldwar2/theatres-of-war/mediterranean/1939/">combat in the Mediterranean</a>.</p>
<p>In the current situation, the Turkish government finds itself in a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/28/middleeast/mideast-summary-02-28-2022-intl/index.html">difficult position</a>, as both Ukraine and Russia are important partners in critical energy and military trade agreements. Turkey, a NATO member since 1952, wants to <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/middle-east-north-africa/539730-turkeys-erdogan-says-the-country-has-more">strengthen its ties with the West</a> while <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/28/erdogans-straits-of-indecision-in-the-russia-ukraine-war/">not upsetting Russia</a>. Its control over these key straits may test its balancing act.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alpaslan Ozerdem does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits gives Turkey control over the water route between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.Alpaslan Ozerdem, Dean of Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution, George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1780852022-03-01T15:58:18Z2022-03-01T15:58:18ZUkraine invasion: what can be done at sea – without risking war<p>The closure of the Turkish straits <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-urges-respect-black-sea-straits-pact-after-closing-access-2022-03-01/">to all warships</a> has drawn attention to the maritime dimension of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>From a tactical and operational perspective, Russian naval forces have already contributed, albeit in a limited way, to the current invasion of Ukraine, notably with <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/02/russia-ukraine-conflict-what-happened-in-the-black-sea-so-far/">missile strikes</a> and <a href="https://news.usni.org/2022/02/25/russian-navy-launches-amphibious-assault-on-ukraine">amphibious assaults</a>. But from a strategic and political perspective, there are other important maritime elements to the conflict, for both Russia and Nato.</p>
<p>Russia is not, and has never been, a maritime power, but it would be a mistake to assume that Russia does not have maritime objectives. Since the late 17th century, securing access to global sea lanes of communication (the primary maritime routes between international ports) has been a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/navy-base-syria-crimea-putin/408694/">recurring driver</a> of Russian foreign policy. </p>
<p>In particular, the country has striven for access to the Turkish straits between the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. This route connects Russia to other global sea lanes and provides the sole access for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. In the past 15 years, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, securing naval facilities in Syria, and attempts to warm up relationships with Turkey have all contributed to this long-term objective.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-warns-countries-not-pass-warships-through-straits-2022-02-28/">1936 Montreux Convention</a> that regulates control of the straits, Turkey can <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/can-turkey-close-the-turkish-straits-to-russian-warships/">decide to limit the transit of military vessels</a> in case of war, although ships returning to base are permitted to pass through. The closure of the straits to warships will not make a substantial difference to the war in coming weeks, although it might hinder Russia’s efforts if the conflict continues for months by preventing reinforcements travelling by sea.</p>
<p>However, the political impact of closing the straits is immediately significant. It adds further weight to the various sanctions and acts of diplomatic opposition to Russia’s invasion, such as banning Russian banks from the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-60521822">Swift banking payment system</a>, and closing EU airspace to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60539303">Russian aircraft</a>, reinforcing Russia’s status as an outcast on the world stage. </p>
<h2>Helping Ukraine</h2>
<p>There are other maritime actions that western countries can take as part of their efforts to support Ukraine. While they want to avoid an open confrontation with Russia, they are also keen to demonstrate support to allies and to deter Russia from aggression towards eastern European Nato members.</p>
<p>The US and EU could ban Russian ships from docking at their ports (<a href="https://www.cityam.com/grant-shapps-asks-uk-ports-deny-access-russian-ships/">as the UK has already done</a>). And they can enforce sanctions at sea. For instance, on Saturday 26 February, the French authorities seized a cargo ship “suspected of being <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-seizes-ship-suspected-violating-russia-sanctions-official-2022-02-26/">linked to Russian interests</a> targeted by the sanctions” in the English Channel.</p>
<p>There is a risk that Russia will consider restrictions imposed on Russian assets, such as commercial ships, as a hostile act. This could lead to potential escalation between Nato and EU member states and Russia. But as demonstrated by France’s rapid action, it is possible to implement sanctions so long as risks are measured.</p>
<p>Similarly, Nato is surely going to avoid any naval skirmish that could degenerate into open hostilities. Nato’s priority is to support Ukraine’s defence and enduring independence and sovereignty without risking a war with Russia.</p>
<p>Sealift – the use of ships to deliver assistance and material such as defensive weaponry to Ukraine – is unlikely because of the status of the Turkish straits. Also, there is a large possibility of encountering Russian warships, which are strategically positioned along the access routes to Ukrainian ports, with a risk of an open confrontation.</p>
<p>Third party commercial ships in the Black Sea have <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/02/two-civilian-vessels-hit-by-russian-missiles-off-odessa-ukraine-mod/">already been hit</a> by Russian weapons. What action Nato countries will take if their civilian ships are attacked is a crucial question. Indeed, even if provocations and collateral damages originate from the Russian side, any armed response to them could risk an open war with Russia.</p>
<p>However, naval diplomacy can be part of <a href="https://en.kims.or.kr/issubrief/kims-periscope/peri264/">Nato’s toolkit</a>. Deploying warships, and in particular <a href="https://www.navylookout.com/situation-report-the-naval-aspects-of-the-war-in-ukraine/">aircraft carriers</a>, for example in the eastern Mediterranean, would have a substantial symbolic and political effect. This would give a strong message on Nato’s resolve to oppose the invasion to both Russia and eastern European Nato members.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Basil Germond does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are important strategic and political maritime dimensions to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.Basil Germond, Senior Lecturer and Director of Research Training, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1689522021-09-29T15:04:14Z2021-09-29T15:04:14ZHow illegal fishing off Cameroon’s coast worsens maritime security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423823/original/file-20210929-18783-1mw0gog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man removes water from a fishing boat in Idenau, Cameroon. Illegal activity by foreign fishing companies has depleted fishing stocks. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ann Johansson/Corbis via Getty Images)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Cameroon there is growing awareness that there’s a direct relationship between illegal and unregulated activity in the fisheries sector, and maritime security in the waters off the country’s coast.</p>
<p>Like most countries along Africa’s Atlantic coast, addressing illegal fishing and fisheries crimes is challenging for Cameroon. Earlier this year the European Commission <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_621">called out</a> the country for failing to control vessels engaged in illegal fishing under the country’s flag. It also pointed to weak governance, including poor knowledge of the scale of illegal fishing.</p>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2021.1982241?journalCode=uafs20#.YUxa6m1ZGHg.twitter">research paper</a> I looked at how Cameroon’s fisheries sector allows for unscrupulous actors to use fishing activities and fishing assets to engage in criminal activities.</p>
<p>I also sought to assess the implications for Cameroon’s maritime security. I analysed existing research and media reports, talked to military officers and other state agents, representatives of fishing community organisations and civil society actors.</p>
<p>My study shows both artisanal and industrial fishing vessels being intercepted and used for smuggling fuel, arms, other contraband and illegal migrants. </p>
<p>This affects national security greatly. The Cameroon navy is increasingly wary that fishing vessels are being used to smuggle weapons into Cameroon from neighbouring countries, particularly Nigeria. In addition, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/cameroon-equatorial-idINLC51095420090112">confrontations</a> between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea’s Navy officers over fishing rights in the Campo border settlement – and continuous tension between Cameroon and Nigerian authorities over illicit fishing activities in Bakassi peninsula – are important national security concerns. </p>
<p>Efforts to combat fishing and fisheries crime must recognise the relationship between the sector and maritime security. And there must be efforts to ensure cooperation with locals as well as non-state actors. These include fisheries-based community groups and civil society organisations.</p>
<h2>Cameroon’s dependency on fishing</h2>
<p>Millions of Cameroonians depend on fisheries for their livelihoods. </p>
<p>In a report, the Ministry of Finance says that the fisheries sector <a href="https://www.cabri-sbo.org/uploads/bia/cameroon_2017_approval_external_enacted_budget_ministry_of_finance_eccas_french_1_2.pdf">contributed</a> 3% of Cameroon’s US$39 billion gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019. It is projected to stay the same in coming years. Marine capture fishing <a href="http://www.minfi.gov.cm/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2021_FINANCE_LAW_REPORT_ON_THE_NATION_S_ECONOMIC_SOCIAL_AND_FINANCIAL_SITUATION_AND_OUTLOOK.pdf">operations account</a> for 83% of fish production in the country. Nearly 80% is from <a href="http://www.minfi.gov.cm/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2021_FINANCE_LAW_REPORT_ON_THE_NATION_S_ECONOMIC_SOCIAL_AND_FINANCIAL_SITUATION_AND_OUTLOOK.pdf">marine small-scale fisheries</a>. This supports the livelihoods of millions of Cameroonians especially women who mostly depend on fish trade for their livelihood. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cameroon-cant-afford-to-continue-ignoring-crime-in-fisheries-sector-124519">Cameroon can't afford to continue ignoring crime in fisheries sector</a>
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<p>Fishing equally constitutes an important part of the socio-cultural system in coastal communities building social cohesion. </p>
<p>But the fishery sector faces numerous challenges. One is illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and fisheries crimes. </p>
<p>In my paper I map the extent of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing and fisheries crimes off the country’s coast. I noted that these activities are a threat to Cameroon’s blue economy development, marine safety, ocean health and human resilience, and by extension national security. </p>
<h2>My research</h2>
<p>I found that in both industrial and artisanal sectors, illegal and unregulated fishing issues include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>violation of fishing zones,</p></li>
<li><p>use of prohibited chemicals,</p></li>
<li><p>fishing in breeding grounds,</p></li>
<li><p>non-declaration of catch data,</p></li>
<li><p>landing of catch in foreign ports and poor regulations and ineffective enforcement of existing laws.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Alongside these are criminal practices that are directly related to fishing such as corruption and document fraud. Some actors use the fisheries sector and its assets for crime. This includes drug and arms trafficking, illegal immigration and human rights abuses. </p>
<p>I also found that both industrial and artisanal fishing is dominated by foreign vessels and crew. An estimated 70 industrial fishing vessels that operate in Cameroonian maritime area come from mainly China and Nigeria. Some operate in partnership with Cameroonian entrepreneurs though details of such alliances are murky. </p>
<p>Meanwhile over 80% of artisanal fishers come from Nigeria, Ghana, Benin and Togo. Fisheries officers are concerned that this foreign dominance exacerbates illegal fishing and fisheries crime practices. This is because they explore their transnational social and economic networks to enhance illicit activities. For instance, small-scale fishing entrepreneurs bring in workers from their countries of origin, sometimes illegally. They are sometimes subjected to poor working and living conditions and have no labour protection. </p>
<p>Illegal fishing and fisheries crime leads to depleting fish stocks. Illegal catches by foreign industrial vessels alone <a href="http://www.seaaroundus.org/doc/publications/wp/2015/Belhabib-et-al-Cameroon.pdf">rose</a> from 2,300 tons in the 1980s to 95,000 tons in the 2000s. These estimates mask the true scale of the problem especially as the number of industrial vessels fishing illegally has <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0308597X19303264">increased</a> in recent years. </p>
<p>The same is true for the economic cost of illegal fishing and fisheries crime. A recent <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7043925/">study</a> estimated that illegal fishing leads to a tax revenue loss of between US$9000 to US$14000 per year. According to a <a href="https://www.businessincameroon.com/fish/1006-7192-cameroon-a-new-fishing-boat-boarded-and-search-on-wouri-river-for-illegal-fishing">government estimate</a>, the overall cost of illegal fishing alone is about US$33 million a year. </p>
<p>Depleting fisheries means small scale fishers struggle to access enough fish. The lack of fish and dwindling fishing activities means small-scale fisherfolks have to seek alternative livelihoods. A lack of opportunities in fishing communities also breeds discontent. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>To address illegal and unregulated fishing, endemic governance challenges, that have plagued the sector for decades, must be resolved. There must also be recognition of the link between illegal fishing and fisheries crime. </p>
<p>I identify a number of steps that need to be taken.</p>
<p>There needs to be effective regulation of who fishes, where and when in Cameroon’s maritime area. </p>
<p>Regulation of how fish is processed either for local consumption or export is equally important.</p>
<p>Ensuring transparency along the Cameroon fisheries value chain – from vessel registration to market – is also essential. To achieve this the Ministry of Fisheries and Animal Industries must ensure transparency in matriculating licensing fishing vessels and in monitoring control and surveillance of fishing operations. </p>
<p>All industrial fishing partnership agreements must be transparent. To this end a national open registry system must be set up. And the government must do more to involve Cameroonians in the sector. It took a step in the right direction by promoting and <a href="https://www.ifad.org/en/web/latest/-/news/cameroon-receives-us-1-million-grant-from-united-nations-agency-to-promote-aquaculture-entrepreneurship">facilitating</a> the greater involvement of local people in fishing activities. </p>
<p>The transnational nature of fisheries crime practices requires inter-agency cooperation both within Cameroon and other countries. Understanding the social networks and economic partnerships of the various agencies will help focus resources to tackle actors and their illegal proceeds.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168952/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maurice Beseng received funding from Coventry University Research Studentship Awards to conduct this research.</span></em></p>Efforts to combat illegal fishing and fisheries crime must recognise the relationship between the sector and maritime security.Maurice Beseng, Research associate, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1661382021-08-29T07:49:22Z2021-08-29T07:49:22ZMozambique insurgency: focus needs to shift to preventing criminality at sea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418068/original/file-20210826-6524-fyv73z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mozambican soldiers on patrol in Palma,
Cabo Delgado, following the terrorist attack in March.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Joas Relvas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The insurgency in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique has been placed firmly in the international spotlight since radicals linked to Islamic State launched their audacious attack on the town of Palma <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mozambique-insurgency-pemba-idUSKBN2BS0R4">in March</a>, killing over 50 people.</p>
<p>A large <a href="https://www.africa-press.net/mozambique/all-news/mozambique-nyusi-confirms-arrival-of-rwandan-forces-in-cabo-delgado-watch">Rwandan military and police contingent</a> and <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/tanzania-air-force-freighter-unloads-military-logistics-at-pemba-airport-noticias-198278/">troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC)</a> have entered the theatre. These are helping Mozambique’s army and police to stem the tide and step up their act over the longer term.</p>
<p>There is also support from the <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/us-military-providing-additional-training-to-mozambican-armed-forces">US and the European Union</a>, largely in the form of training assistance. This adds to training support promised by Angola and Zimbabwe as part of the <a href="https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/64130-latest-on-deployment-of-zimbabwean-special-soldiers-in-mozambique-story-fresh-details-emerge.html">SADC contingent arriving in Cabo Delgado</a>. </p>
<p>But there’s a problem. </p>
<p>The combined military response against the insurgents is primarily on land, with very limited maritime response capabilities. But the insurgent threat is not limited to the interior. Insurgents stormed and held the port of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2020 and attacked communities on nearby <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-terrorists-attack-island-off-palma-coast-aim-report-171133/">islands off Palma, halting its tourism flows</a>.</p>
<p>The fixation on landward efforts ignores the fact that the insurgency also poses a maritime threat. Significantly, the insurgency has hobbled the energy sector. This was set to make Mozambique an important global energy player following the discovery of <a href="https://www.africanglobe.net/business/oil-gas-discoveries-mozambique">large offshore gas fields</a>. The discoveries hold regional and global implications. Mozambique could well become a gas emirate in southern Africa, and bringing the industry on line could propel Mozambique into the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/03/africa/mozambique-oil-and-gas-hub/index.html">top seven global gas producing countries</a>. </p>
<p>These optimistic outlooks all depend on whether Mozambique can contain the impact of the ongoing violent insurgency in Cabo Delgado. This precondition extends offshore.</p>
<h2>Maritime security</h2>
<p>Mozambique’s future economy relies heavily on maintaining a safe offshore domain. To this end the government must make use of every opportunity to build the required <a href="https://africabriefing.org/2019/08/an-analysis-of-mozambiques-maritime-security/">capacity and partnerships</a> to maintain the rule of law at sea.</p>
<p>Bringing gas production on line has been severely disrupted because of the insurgency. Much of the landward activity and construction of infrastructure has come to a standstill.</p>
<p>In April, <a href="https://totalenergies.com/media/news/press-releases/total-declares-force-majeure-mozambique-lng-project">Totalenergies</a>, the French energy multinational, declared a force majeure. This was after the insurgents occupied and held the port of Mocímboa da Praia in 2020 and attacked Palma early in 2021. </p>
<p>The port is of significance for the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53756692">delivery of goods by sea and air</a> for the construction projects under way to develop onshore infrastructure in support of the gas industry. It has since been reclaimed by the <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/africa/mozambican-rwandan-forces-retake-port-town-from-insurgents/">Mozambique and Rwandan forces</a>. But given how risk perception unfolds, construction remains stalled. </p>
<p>In my view Mozambique’s ocean territories must receive due attention for three reasons. These are: events on land spilling offshore, perceptions of dangerous seas off Mozambique, and criminality at sea left unchecked.</p>
<h2>Cost of insecurity at sea</h2>
<p>First, insecurity on land has maritime repercussions. This is the reality in the waters off Somalia, Nigeria, Libya and Yemen. Weak security governance on land affects the maritime economy, with shipping and resource extraction particularly vulnerable. </p>
<p>This land and sea interplay is a potential risk facing Mozambique’s decision-makers.</p>
<p>Second, perceptions of dangers in the waters off Mozambique hold negative repercussions. This is even more so if international measures are implemented to mitigate a threat to shipping. A <a href="https://maritimecyprus.com/2015/12/18/anti-piracy-update-updated-chart-for-hra-available-to-download/">high risk area</a> at sea akin to those off Somalia and Nigeria directs shipping to take preventive actions. This has multiple knock-on effects.</p>
<p>Higher insurance costs are incured; shipping must follow longer routes, increasing the cost of doing business; private security personnel are often taken on; and the safety and livelihoods of crews are at higher risk. All this is evident in the demarcated danger zone now operational off Nigeria. </p>
<p>Third, the waters off Cabo Delgado must not be allowed to become a playground for criminals to enter and exploit. If ungoverned, this sea space offers the potential for criminal syndicates and insurgents to prosper side by side. </p>
<h2>Connecting the dots: five risks to mitigate</h2>
<p>The insurgency has resulted in or compounded the following problems: </p>
<p><strong>Transnational criminal syndicates:</strong> These already operate into Cabo Delgado. If weak governance on land is mirrored at sea, syndicates become dangerous competitors, and even more so if allied with insurgent elements as in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.</p>
<p><strong>Illegal oil trafficking:</strong> Energy infrastructure for gas and oil are difficult to take over. Nevertheless illegal oil trafficking from <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/6/26/libya-calls-on-un-to-block-illegal-oil-sale">rebel-held territories in the east of Libya</a> shows how brazen non-state actors can take over or infiltrate energy infrastructure and port facilities and use this to join an illegal industry.</p>
<p><strong>Attacks on infrastructure and shipping at sea:</strong> Sri Lanka provides a good example. The Sea Tiger wing of the insurgent movement <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/6/11/sri-lanka-battles-tigers-at-sea">Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/6/11/sri-lanka-battles-tigers-at-sea">attacked</a> Sri Lanka’s navy with suicide vessels for several years. </p>
<p><strong>Drone attacks:</strong> The <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/gulf-shipping-attacks-leave-global-economy-vulnerable-trade/">recent drone attack</a> on a commercial vessel passing through the Gulf of Oman, with Yemen and Iranian connections, must also serve as a warning. There have been allegations of the presence of <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/unmanned-aerial-vehicles/iss-drones-in-the-hands-of-insurgents-how-africa-can-prepare/#:%7E:text=In%20the%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20the%20Congo%2C%20insurgents,drones%20for%20precision%20targeting%20in%20Cabo%20Delgado%20province">drones in Cabo Delgado</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Drug smuggling:</strong> Insecurity at sea off Cabo Delgado carries the risk of compounding the problem posed by <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202006080902.html">drug smuggling networks</a> operating in the area. No effort should be spared to prevent the insurgents and the smugglers cooperating.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Children attend a class sitting on the ground under a tree." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Displaced children in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, learn under a tree.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Joao Relvas</span></span>
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<p>Overall, the tactics I’ve outlined call for a comprehensive response, one most probably beyond anything the Mozambique authorities can mobilise on their own. </p>
<p>Some small steps with a maritime focus have taken place.</p>
<p>Two small, lightly armed <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-equipment-spotted-in-mozambique/#:%7E:text=In%20addition%20to%20vehicles%20on%20land%2C%20naval%20vessels,Development%20Community%E2%80%99s%20intervention%20brigade%20%28SADC%20Mission%20in%20Mozambique%29.">South African naval patrol vessels</a> arrived in Pemba harbour for patrols off Cabo Delgado.</p>
<p>A training team from the <a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2021/August/unodc-and-mozambique-cooperate-to-promote-maritime-security.html">United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</a> recently arrived to help train maritime personnel from Mozambique to increase maritime security governance.</p>
<p>The Rwandan military contingent includes a <a href="https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Rwandan-Mozambican-forces-retake-port-from-16374076.php">limited small boat capability</a> to extend their presence off the coast, albeit only near harbour patrols. </p>
<p>Fourth – in recapturing Mocímboa da Praia from the insurgents in early August 2021, the operation included a <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-most-important-mission-yet-to-come-says-army-commander-aim-198891/">surprise attack by a small contingent of Mozambique soldiers from the sea</a>. </p>
<h2>Looking forward: what needs to happen</h2>
<p>The maritime situation in Mozambique must not be allowed to emulate the maritime threats found off Nigeria, Somalia and the rebel-held territories in Libya. Allowing this would hold dire implications for international shipping and subsequently for Mozambique and the landlocked countries in the region. </p>
<p>It is precisely this threat that underscored <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-question/14632/">the need for cooperation</a> between South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania to prevent piracy from gaining a foothold in Mozambique. Ongoing maritime operations between South Africa and Mozambique also need to be maintained.</p>
<p>Cooperation with a wide array of partners to promote maritime security governance over the longer term must remain a priority. This is a long term objective to be addressed in the context of the current armed insurgency, and sustained beyond the present volatility. </p>
<p>Stability on land and at sea must be addressed simultaneously.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://news.africa.com/south-african-military-deploys-troops-to-pemba-northern-mozambique-1635.html">South African Navy</a> and UN Office on Drugs and Crime are the first naval and capacity building respondents to arrive. But the SADC should seriously consider using its Standing Maritime Committee to assist Mozambique. The aim would be to bring about a formal regional arrangement for cooperation to secure regional economic and security interests in the southwestern Indian Ocean over the longer term.</p>
<p>Mozambique is in no position to contribute significantly to the broader array of maritime security endeavours. That’s why international partners need to play a role. </p>
<p>The SADC must now pass the acid test of stemming the insurgent threats from spilling over and threatening the region’s wider landward and maritime interests.</p>
<p>The intervention forces currently fighting the insurgents should extend their role offshore to prevent a collapse of security at sea off Mozambique or at the minimum, any such perception among the international maritime community.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166138/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francois Vreÿ receives funding from Stellenbosch University and the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>The maritime situation in Mozambique must not be allowed to emulate the maritime threats found off Nigeria, Somalia, and the rebel-held territories in Libya.Francois Vreÿ, Research Coordinator, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1616382021-06-03T10:23:11Z2021-06-03T10:23:11ZThe ocean economy is booming: who is making money, who is paying the price? Podcast<p>In this week’s episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a>, we ask a question – who is trying to make money from our oceans and is it sustainable? Also, why Brazilian women who lived through Zika are avoiding getting pregnant during the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
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<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-561" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/561/4fbbd099d631750693d02bac632430b71b37cd5f/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>From deep-sea mining, to fishing, to oil and gas exploration, the ocean economy is booming. This is one of the themes that’s emerged from a series The Conversation has been running over the past few months called <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/oceans-21-96784">Oceans 21</a>, examining the history and future of the world’s oceans. </p>
<p>A key question here is what the economic exploitation of our oceans is doing to the ocean environment. It’s important to balance economic growth with preservation of ocean habitats. But researchers – and to some extent, governments – are increasingly focusing on a third consideration: the people who’ve depended on the ocean for generations. In this episode, we speak to three experts about the tension between economic growth, environmental protection and the people that rely on oceans – and what’s being done to make the exploitation of the oceans more sustainable. </p>
<p>Jean-Baptiste Jouffray, post-doctoral researcher at the Stockholm Resilience Centre at Stockholm University, Sweden, has come up with a new term to describe what’s been happening to the oceans over the past two decades: <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590332219302751">the blue acceleration</a>. “Humanity has used the ocean for millennia as a source of food, as a means of transportation,” he says, but today’s use of the ocean is “unprecedented” for its diversity and intensity. </p>
<p>One of the prospects for further development that’s exciting some is mining the floor of the ocean for minerals including manganese, nickel and cobalt. There’s a lot of this activity in the middle of the Pacific, where mining companies are working on ways to collect potato-sized nodules rich in these precious metals. </p>
<p>But Anna Metaxas, professor of oceanography at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, Canada, says lots of unique animals including deep water corals and sponges live no where else on earth except on and around these rocks and the sediment they sit on top of. This sediment stores a lot of the carbon that gets absorbed by the ocean and if you disturb it – through mining, for example – “all of a sudden you’re affecting how much carbon has been sequestered, how much carbon is sitting within that sediment.”</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the effects of ocean exploitation on coastal communities in west Africa can be devastating. Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, lecturer in sustainable development at St Andrew’s University in Scotland, tells us that fisher communities are being left deeply vulnerable. Some of those whose livelihoods have been destroyed by pollution or over-fishing, or who have been displaced by large development projects, are left with few options but to turn to piracy or other illegal activities. “This is unfortunately the cyclical relationship between the pressure on marine resources, primarily fisheries, and how it is affecting the people,” she tells us. </p>
<p>In our second story this week, we’re heading to Brazil, which remains a global epicentre of the coronavirus pandemic – just a few years after another devastating epidemic, Zika. </p>
<p>Zika, you may remember, caused some children whose mothers were infected during pregnancy to be born with microcephaly, or abnormally small heads. Our colleague Catesby Holmes, international editor at The Conversation US, wondered how Brazilian women who’d already lived through Zika were feeling about another novel disease outbreak, COVID-19. </p>
<p>She spoke with Letícia Marteleto, professor of sociology at the University of Texas at Austin College of Liberal Arts, about <a href="https://theconversation.com/scarred-by-zika-and-fearing-new-covid-19-variants-brazilian-women-say-no-to-another-pandemic-pregnancy-158366">her research project</a> in Pernambuco, Brazil - an epicenter of Zika that’s also been hit hard by the coronavirus. Marteleto and her team have been surveying women in the area about their attitudes toward having children. They found that Zika left an emotional scar on women. Many plan to avoid getting pregnant during this pandemic – even though the coronavirus does not appear to cause birth defects. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/scarred-by-zika-and-fearing-new-covid-19-variants-brazilian-women-say-no-to-another-pandemic-pregnancy-158366">Scarred by Zika and fearing new COVID-19 variants, Brazilian women say no to another pandemic pregnancy</a>
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<p>And Françoise Marmouyet, membership editor for The Conversation in Paris, tells us about a new podcast series about the state of democracy in France, the US and China. </p>
<p>The Conversation Weekly is produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware, with sound design by Eloise Stevens. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a>. or via email on podcast@theconversation.com. You can also sign up to <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">The Conversation’s free daily email here</a>.</p>
<p>A transcript of this episode will be available soon. </p>
<p>News clips in this episode are from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0uRkmtC36tY">CBS</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rYRreX3aIrw">News</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jgw8kw6caR4">UOL</a>.</p>
<p><em>You can listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a>, or find out how else to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">listen here</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>This story was updated to more accurately reflect that seafloor sediments store carbon.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161638/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Plus, why Brazilian women who lived through Zika are avoiding getting pregnant during the COVID-19 pandemic. Listen to episode 18 of The Conversation Weekly podcast.Gemma Ware, Head of AudioCatesby Holmes, International Editor | Politics Editor, The Conversation USDaniel Merino, Associate Breaking News Editor and Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly PodcastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1580342021-03-29T14:00:54Z2021-03-29T14:00:54ZTop three take-away lessons from the Suez Canal blockage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392216/original/file-20210329-17-1epk7ds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Suez Canal on a normal day. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Camille Delbos/Art In All of Us/Corbis via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>For a week the world was gripped by the extraordinary sight of a massive container ship that had run aground in the Suez Canal in Egypt. The Ever Given is 400m long (1,312ft) and weighs 200,000 tonnes, with a maximum capacity of 20,000 containers. It was carrying 18,300 containers when it became wedged in the canal, blocking all shipping traffic. Efforts to free it <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56559073">finally paid off when it was partially dislodged in the early hours of Monday 29 March</a>. Adejuwon Soyinka asked maritime security expert Dirk Siebels to unpack lessons learnt from the incident.</em></p>
<h2>What maritime lessons can be learnt from this incident?</h2>
<p><strong>Choke points:</strong> The shipping industry provides an extremely efficient link to ensure just-in-time deliveries. This link, however, is largely invisible, underlined by the time it took most countries to classify seafarers as <a href="https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/Pages/WhatsNew-1573.aspx">key workers</a> during the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>When choke points are blocked, trade doesn’t necessarily come to a standstill. Under normal circumstances, it is <a href="https://www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-fact/shipping-and-world-trade-driving-prosperity/">extremely cheap</a> to transport all types of cargo over long distances on ships. Freight rates are barely noticeable in the price of most goods, so higher freight rates are unlikely to be a significant issue for economies as a whole. Nevertheless, the implications of a blockage as we’ve seen in the Suez Canal will have been felt in many sectors. For example, refineries need crude oil, factories need raw materials, shops need goods to sell. </p>
<p><strong>Security threats:</strong> These are easy to exaggerate, but complicated to understand. Concerns about additional piracy threats on the route around Africa are, in my view exaggerated. In addition, there have been alarming headlines about ships waiting at the southern end of the Suez Canal, describing them as <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/suez-canal-security-ever-given-b1822825.html">“sitting ducks”</a> in a volatile region. </p>
<p>While there are certain threats for operations in the Red Sea, these have not changed overnight. Ships always have to wait in the area as Suez Canal transits are conducted in convoys. Moreover, the threat level is the same for all ships but the resulting risk is different for individual vessels, depending on factors such as ship type, cargo or even the owner’s nationality. </p>
<p>Situational awareness is therefore important to ensure appropriate preparations and to avoid unwarranted alarmism.</p>
<p><strong>Security and safety:</strong> These threats should receive similar attention. <a href="https://www.stableseas.org/publications/maritime-terrorism/soft-targets-black-markets-maritime-terrorism">Potential security</a> threats are often highlighted as worst-case scenarios, namely terrorist attacks which could cause high levels of economic disruption. These have often been identified as a <a href="https://cimsec.org/breaking-the-bottleneck-maritime-terrorism-and-economic-chokepoints-part-1/">particular threat</a> for choke points such as the <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/attacks-in-the-suez-security-of-the-canal-at-risk/">Suez Canal</a>. Safety threats, on the other hand, are not as headline-grabbing. <a href="https://theloadstar.com/cscl-indian-ocean-finally-refloated-running-aground-elbe/">Accidents</a> are much more likely to occur but are much less discussed. </p>
<p>In many cases, however, the actual implications of safety and security incidents are very similar. Countermeasures that are designed to increase resilience should therefore receive more attention. Better awareness of all types of threats is vital in this area as well because safety threats are largely static while security threats are much more dynamic.</p>
<h2>Were there any maritime security implications from the incident?</h2>
<p>This <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/24/world/middleeast/suez-canal-blocked-ship.html">was a rare</a> accident that has highlighted how much the world’s economy relies on shipping. This has been the case for many years. But the global shipping industry is almost invisible most of the time. </p>
<p>While the Ever Given’s grounding was not a security-related incident, the <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32292">critical nature</a> of certain choke points around the world has been discussed for many years.</p>
<p>These narrow channels – including man-made ones like the Suez Canal, but also natural ones like the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Strait-of-Hormuz">Strait of Hormuz</a> in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman or the <a href="https://worldoceanreview.com/en/wor-5/living-with-the-coasts/coastal-functions/the-strait-of-malacca-a-historical-shipping-metropolis/">Strait of Malacca</a> between the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra – are part of the most important global sea routes. When merchant ships can no longer navigate through such a choke point, it may lead to supply delays and higher freight rates. These effects are already visible in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-suezcanal-ship/suez-blockage-sets-shipping-rates-racing-oil-and-gas-tankers-diverted-away-idUKKBN2BI0GZ">tanker market</a>. </p>
<p>For container ships, the impact could exacerbate an already <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/06/business/global-shipping.html">chaotic situation</a> in the wake of COVID 19-related disruptions of long-established trading patterns.</p>
<p>Overall, direct implications on maritime security are unlikely. The commercial implications for the shipping industry – and, by extension, for global trade – are already significant and the ripple effects will be felt in many sectors beyond shipping.</p>
<h2>What does the incident tell us about other sea routes around Africa?</h2>
<p>The only alternative to a transit through the Suez Canal is the much longer passage around the African continent. Piracy in particular has been a significant concern for operators of merchant ships in recent years, first off the Somali coastline and more recently in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/attacks-at-sea-arent-all-linked-to-piracy-why-its-important-to-unpick-whats-what-153591">Gulf of Guinea</a>.</p>
<p>Some shipping companies have already voiced <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2021/03/26/shipping-companies-stuck-near-suez-are-reportedly-alerting-us-navy-over-piracy-risks/?sh=12f23bb13e36">concerns</a> over piracy threats on the alternative route, even prompting inquiries to the US Navy. One of the largest industry organisations, <a href="https://www.bimco.org/news/security/20210326-security-guidance-on-diverting-around-the-cape-of-good-hope-to-avoid-suez.aspx">BIMCO</a>, recently published a related security guidance. </p>
<p>In recent years shipping industry associations as well as international navies have often pointed out that Somalia-based piracy has merely been suppressed, not defeated. In December, the European Union’s naval mission in the western Indian Ocean was extended until <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/23/operation-atalanta-eutm-somalia-and-eucap-somalia-mandates-extended-for-two-more-years/">31 December 2022</a>.</p>
<p>At the same time, it should be noted that the threat of piracy for a transit through the Gulf of Aden towards the Suez Canal is not significantly different from a voyage through the Indian Ocean towards South Africa. After passing the Cape of Good Hope, a ship with a destination in Europe is very likely to steam on a straight course and pass between Senegal and Cabo Verde. Any such transit will not be affected by the piracy threat in West Africa, which is significant in the inner Gulf of Guinea, but limited to an area around 250 nautical miles from the Nigerian coastline. Taking the shortest route around Africa means that ships will be almost 1,000 nautical miles away from Nigeria.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Siebels does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Direct implications for maritime security are unlikely. But there will be ripple effects in the shipping industry and in many commercial sectors.Dirk Siebels, PhD (Maritime Security), University of GreenwichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1535912021-01-26T14:17:44Z2021-01-26T14:17:44ZAttacks at sea aren’t all linked to piracy. Why it’s important to unpick what’s what<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379951/original/file-20210121-13-187c0s6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigerian Navy Special forces pretend to arrest pirates during a joint military exercise with the French navy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/four-attacks-in-one-week-show-the-rising-risk-of-west-african-piracy">Pirate attacks</a> against merchant ships off the African coast have been reported regularly over the past decade. And despite measures to suppress it, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259425417_Piracy_in_Somalia_A_Challenge_to_The_International_Community">Somalia-based piracy</a> remains a concern. On the other side of the continent, the <a href="https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/imb-piracy-report-2020/">Gulf of Guinea</a> is now viewed as presenting a much more serious piracy problem. </p>
<p>Last year a record 130 crew members were kidnapped in 22 separate incidents, according to the <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1301-gulf-of-guinea-records-highest-ever-number-of-crew-kidnapped-in-2020-according-to-imb-s-annual-piracy-report">International Maritime Bureau</a>. The cluster of attacks in November and December has once again led to alarming headlines about the <a href="http://portfolio.cpl.co.uk/BIMCO/202012/cover/">Gulf of Guinea</a> being the world’s <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/gulf-of-guinea-confirmed-as-world-piracy-hotspot/">piracy hotspot</a>.</p>
<p>But an increase in officially reported attacks does not necessarily mean that the actual number of attacks has increased. And individual cases must be <a href="https://www.dirksiebels.eu/publications/2021/01/04/gulf-of-guinea-piracy-in-2020/">analysed</a> carefully. Attacks against small cargo ships trading solely in the Gulf of Guinea, for example, are often linked to criminal disputes or other illicit activities at sea. These incidents are very different from random attacks targeting merchant ships in international trade which are solely aimed at kidnapping seafarers to collect a large ransom and are, therefore, a profit-driven crime.</p>
<p>Similarly, <a href="https://safety4sea.com/two-suspicious-approaches-in-gulf-of-aden-in-24-hours/">reports</a> about suspicious approaches against merchant ships off Somalia are still frequent. Most are related to smuggling operations between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian peninsula or simply to everyday fishing activities.</p>
<p>Pirate attacks may grab most headlines, but maritime security is important for wider reasons. Illicit activities at sea limit the potential benefits of economic activities linked to the sea – what’s referred to as the “blue economy”. This includes maritime trade, fishing activities, offshore oil and gas production or coastal tourism. Also, criminality at sea and on land are closely linked. Government agencies need to recognise this if security is to be improved.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gulf-of-guinea-fighting-criminal-groups-in-the-niger-delta-is-key-to-defeating-piracy-130480">Gulf of Guinea: fighting criminal groups in the Niger Delta is key to defeating piracy</a>
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<h2>Many problems, few resources</h2>
<p>Piracy remains arguably the most visible symptom of <a href="https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/the-challenge-of-governance-in-the-gulf-of-guinea">insecurity at sea</a>. But coastal states also have other reasons to be concerned about it.</p>
<p>Illegal fishing, for example, has a direct impact on coastal communities where artisanal fishing is one of the few opportunities to earn a living. Smuggling on maritime routes even affects government income directly. Virtually all African countries rely heavily on customs revenues. When fuel, cigarettes or agricultural goods are smuggled, no import or export duties are paid. Less money can then be spent on schools, roads or hospitals, as <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030226879">my research</a> has shown.</p>
<p>Governments are also concerned about drug trafficking or weapons smuggling at sea, underlined by <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/africa-new-regional-anti-piracy-agreement/">international agreements</a> which have been adopted by the majority of African coastal states. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030226879">Limited monitoring</a> of maritime trade allows for a steady flow of pharmaceutical products – including fake drugs – into Africa as well as lucrative exports of unlicensed timber or illegal wildlife products.</p>
<p>Despite the widespread impacts, maritime security has only come into the political focus over the past decade. African countries have <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/promising-signs-of-africas-global-leadership-on-maritime-security">initiated</a> international meetings about it. The African Union adopted a maritime <a href="https://au.int/en/maritime">strategy</a> in 2014 and held a follow-up summit in Togo’s capital Lomé in 2016. But progress has been <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/features/maritime-security-implementing-aus-aim-strategy/">limited</a>. National governments have largely failed to take concrete actions. Strategies aren’t supported by financial and human resources.</p>
<p>Even Ghana, where a comprehensive <a href="https://996227d1-de16-4875-a76e-7ece4d3917bc.filesusr.com/ugd/a5e83a_ffc206114be34849b92d89655812abd7.pdf">maritime strategy</a> has been under development for years, is still unable to provide reliable <a href="https://safety4sea.com/ghana-wants-more-investment-to-improve-maritime-security/">funding</a> for patrol boat operations. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Some examples highlight that it is possible to provide more security at sea. In West Africa, Nigeria is leading the way with its $195 million <a href="http://www.apanews.net/en/news/nigerian-press-focuses-on-plans-to-commence-195m-deep-blue-project-in-2021-others">Deep Blue project</a>, scheduled to be fully operational in the coming months. This project is primarily aimed at better surveillance and enforcement across the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone, an area that stretches out up to 200 nautical miles (around 360 kilometres) from the coastline.</p>
<p>Benin, Gabon and Tanzania have partnered with environmental organisations like <a href="https://www.seashepherdglobal.org/our-campaigns/iuu-fishing/">Sea Shepherd</a> to combat illegal fishing in their waters. Such non-traditional partnerships may help overcome short-term challenges and focus on urgent problems.</p>
<p>But it’s necessary to build capacity for the long term.</p>
<p>In many African countries, the blue economy could help to increase economic growth and development, although it should not be limited to <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2020.00586/full">economic gains</a>. Acknowledging the needs of local communities and environmental sustainability are equally important. Investments can yield direct benefits which are five times higher than the initial outlay, according to a <a href="https://oceanpanel.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/Ocean%20Panel_Economic%20Analysis_FINAL.pdf">recent study</a>. And the inclusion of <a href="https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/covid-19-four-sustainable-development-goals-help-future-proof-global">Sustainable Development Goal 14</a> on ocean resources could strengthen efforts to recover from the economic impacts of COVID-19.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lift-for-maritime-sector-in-kenya-and-djibouti-after-fall-in-piracy-128073">Lift for maritime sector in Kenya and Djibouti after fall in piracy</a>
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<p>Despite some alarming <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/05/global-sea-piracy-coronavirus-covid19/">headlines</a>, there is no evidence to suggest that the coronavirus pandemic has had an immediate <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5f3f8460cb3933732c1b3650/t/5f984316e606836d108ed586/1603814171548/Whitepaper+Maritime+Security+Post+Covid+Sep+2020_sml.pdf">impact</a> on security threats at sea. But growth forecasts have been <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2020/12/30/covid-19-takes-its-toll-on-african-economy/">slashed</a> and governments are unlikely to prioritise spending on navies and other maritime agencies. </p>
<p>Security concerns <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/elections-and-instability-as-africa-enters-2021">on land</a> are much more immediate threats, and even relatively limited <a href="https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/The-evolving-fiscal-and-liquidity-stimulus-packages-in-response-to-COVID-19-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa.pdf">stimulus packages</a> are another burden for government budgets.</p>
<p>A closer analysis of sea piracy is important for law enforcement and longer-term prevention whether these are solely aimed at pirates or at organised criminal groups. It is also important for shipping companies because it affects the threat assessment when attacks are linked to criminal activities and aimed at specific ships rather than random targets.</p>
<p>Short-term solutions for long-standing problems are impossible. Even small steps, however, are important to improve maritime security in the medium to long term. That would be in line with the <a href="https://au.int/en/maritime">AU’s maritime strategy</a> which highlights the blue economy’s potential contribution to economic growth and development across the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153591/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Siebels does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sea piracy often grabs the headlines, but it is just one of many symptoms of insecurity at sea.Dirk Siebels, PhD (Maritime Security), University of GreenwichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1464232020-09-29T14:50:17Z2020-09-29T14:50:17ZSouth Africa mulls future of its military to make it fit-for-purpose<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360281/original/file-20200928-16-1sw18de.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some hard decisions need to be taken about the future of the South African National Defence Force</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nic Bothma/EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa’s parliament has opened discussions about how to redesign the country’s lumbering military to make it fit-for-purpose for the 21st Century. To kick-start the process, a parliamentary committee charged with <a href="https://aejonline.org/index.php/aej/article/view/424/678">oversight</a> over the military hosted a mini-symposium addressed by military leaders and experts, academics, political parties as well as civil society. Politics Editor Thabo Leshilo asked Lindy Heinecken, a military sociologist, for her insights.</em></p>
<p><strong>Historically, a review of the country’s defence has been informed by a white paper or a defence review produced by the Ministry of Defence. What informs the parliamentary process?</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-defence-white-paper">1996 White Paper on Defence</a> established a broad policy framework for defence in the country’s new democracy from 1994, while <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-defence-review-1998">the 1998 Defence Review</a> outlined the appropriate size, structure, force design and tasks of the South African National Defence Force. </p>
<p>But, as the force became increasingly drawn into <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-army-is-in-steady-decline-and-nothings-being-done-to-fix-it-74712">peacekeeping</a> and internal roles - such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-army-is-being-used-to-fight-cape-towns-gangs-why-its-a-bad-idea-120455">fighting crime</a>, the balance between what it is trained, funded and equipped for became misaligned. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/170512review.pdf">2015 a new Defence Review</a> was produced given the changes in the strategic environment, and the forces’s <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/a-new-plan-to-halt-the-downward-spiral-of-the-sa-defence-force">state of critical decline</a>, resulting mainly from operational overstretch. </p>
<p>While comprehensive, the 2015 review did not specify what the design and structure of the force should look like. This was left to the politicians, military leadership and ultimately society to decide upon. Five years later, there is still no clear direction and the military continues to muddle along.</p>
<p><strong>What is wrong with the military that needs fixing?</strong></p>
<p>Some hard decisions need to be taken on the future of the defence force. Besides the misalignment of its resources, design, equipment and its additional roles, the military has also been hobbled by <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/general/2353257/sandf-blows-r51-million-in-irregular-expenditure/">misappropriation of funds</a>. </p>
<p>The National Treasury highlighted in a briefing to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence that <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/dod-salaries-highlighted-as-problem-area-by-national-treasury/">growing personnel expenditure</a> was the main issue incapacitating the defence force, leaving little money for capital and operational expenditure. This has left the military with ageing equipment, and hardly any funds for maintenance. Meanwhile, the deployment of the military has <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-south-africas-neglected-military-faces-mission-impossible-133250">increased substantially</a>, both internal and externally.</p>
<p>The over expenditure on personnel stems from imbalances in the force design and structure. Over time, instead of having 40% personnel in the short term service (2-5yrs), 40 % in the medium term service (up to age 45yrs), an only 20% in the long term service (until 60yrs), 87% of the regular force personnel ended up serving <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/docs/2004/appendices/040810dodstrategy.htm">on medium to extended long-term tenures</a>. </p>
<p>This, together with the failure to implement effective personnel exit mechanisms, has led to deviation from the ideal situation of expenditure being 40% on personnel, 30% on capital, and 30% on operations. Personnel costs are now reportedly almost <a href="https://theconversation.com/money-has-little-to-do-with-why-south-africas-military-is-failing-to-do-its-job-81216">80% of the defence budget</a>.</p>
<p>Added to this, personnel expenditure has been driven up to unsustainable levels by increases in pay and benefits that have not been budgeted for, rank inflation and the stagnation of junior and middle ranking personnel. This means that people sit in posts for long periods at the top of their scale, or end up being promoted to a higher rank, beyond the post profile. Other anomalies are a high ratio of general officers and a failure to rightsize the forces in accordance with mission demands. These problems are eroding the defence force’s <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/170512review.pdf">capital and operating budget</a>. </p>
<p>There is a pressing need for the military to address its human resource management systems.</p>
<p>Going forward, this means accelerating the exit of unfit, overage, unhealthy and supernumerary personnel over the short to medium term. The longer term should see the military shedding all overage personnel, reversing rank inflation and rebalancing the force. This means looking at the ratio of officers to other ranks, and the ratio of support to combat personnel.</p>
<p>This is a difficult political decision. It entails putting former soldiers out onto the streets, with little other than military skills, making it hard for them <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2015.1028417">to get jobs</a>. </p>
<p>More attention needs to be paid to exit mechanisms for the short and medium terms in order to prepare them for a second career. Another problem is that there are not enough young people transferring from the full-time forces into part-time and reserve forces. This affects both the numerical and functional flexibility of the military in times of crises, when it suddenly needs extra personnel, such as during the Covid-19 crisis. </p>
<p><strong>Why is there need for national consensus on the military?</strong></p>
<p>Before the military can address these challenges, there is a need to reach national consensus on what type of defence force the country wants. At present there is a chasm between what the military leadership believes it should be doing, according to the constitution, what the government and politicians demand, and what the <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/parliament-shines-spotlight-on-civil-military-relationship/">public considers important</a>. </p>
<p>Transformation cannot happen without a clear understanding of the military’s future role. Without this, military leadership cannot design, plan, or train personnel for their future roles and missions.</p>
<p>The defence force cannot fulfil its obligations within the current organisational and budgetary <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/downloads/2011-07-south-african-defence-brenthurst-paper-.pdf">constraints</a>. </p>
<p><strong>What should the future military look like?</strong></p>
<p>The defence force is caught in a time warp. It still operates with a mindset and equipment geared for the 20th Century. It has not made the transition into the 21st Century in terms of how to combat future threats, and the use of technology as a <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sa-defence/sa-defence-sa-defence/feature-sandf-outlines-threats-priorities/">force enabler and multiplier</a>. Many tasks, like intelligence gathering and surveillance, can now be done by unmanned aerial vehicles, which are cost effective. But, there is no money for these.</p>
<p>Any restructuring should consider what the future military should look like. But right now, some pressing decisions need to be taken on whether to shut down the military, or channel it towards more pressing issues that affect the safety and security of the country’s citizens.</p>
<p>Given the current budgetary constraints, scaling down to playing only a developmental role is possibly the way to go. This means focusing only on border and maritime security, disaster relief and public order functions.</p>
<p>At the same time, there must be capacity to respond to other pressing geo-strategic security concerns unfolding on the country’s borders, and beyond, that may <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-serious-is-the-islamic-state-threat-to-attack-south-africa">require a military response</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Does the country have the money to afford the military it needs?</strong></p>
<p>The simple answer is “no”. But, the reality is that there needs to be a balance between the agreed mandate and budget. Within the current context, the mandate is budget driven, not the other way round, unless the security dynamics change dramatically. It is like taking a risk with an insurance policy, what to secure and what not. </p>
<p>Another way to cut costs is to reduce personnel expenditure to fit sustainably into a smaller funding allocation. This is a difficult political decision, but preferable to the military sliding into <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/time-for-a-long-hard-look-at-the-sandf/">further decline</a>.</p>
<p>The current impasse makes it the perfect time to march the defence force in a new direction in accordance with what the country needs, can afford, and deliver. Now, more than ever before, robust debate is needed on the future of South Africa’s military.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146423/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lindy Heinecken does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Besides the misalignment of its resources, design, equipment and its additional roles, the military has also been hobbled by misappropriation of funds.Lindy Heinecken, Chair of the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1375862020-05-05T12:19:31Z2020-05-05T12:19:31ZGlobal sea piracy ticks upward, and the coronavirus may make it worse<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332466/original/file-20200504-83725-j37t37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C3%2C1019%2C541&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Suspected pirates surrender to the U.S. Coast Guard off the coast of Somalia in 2009.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2010/03/history-the-piracy-mission-then-and-now/">LCDR Tyson Weinert/U.S. Coast Guard</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In early April, eight armed raiders boarded the container ship Fouma as it entered the port of Guayaquil, Ecuador. They fired warning shots toward the ship’s bridge, boarded the ship and <a href="https://www.maritimebulletin.net/2020/04/16/unusual-piracy-attack-on-container-ship/">opened several shipping containers</a>, removing unknown items before escaping in two speedboats. Nobody was harmed. </p>
<p>Ecuador isn’t exactly a hot spot of global piracy, but <a href="https://www.intelligencefusion.co.uk/blog/maritime-threats-in-south-america-piracy-and-drug-trafficking">armed robbers regularly attack ships</a> in and around the port of Guayaquil. It’s the <a href="https://www.cepal.org/en/notes/port-activity-report-latin-america-and-caribbean-2018">seventh-busiest port</a> in Latin America, handling most of Ecuador’s agricultural and industrial imports and exports. Ships moored along the port’s quays or, like the Fouma, transiting its narrow river passages are easy prey for local criminal gangs.</p>
<p>Only a few short years ago the international community was <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2015.1092281">celebrating the end</a> of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/23/the-world-beat-somali-pirates-why-cant-it-stop-west-african-piracy/">maritime piracy</a>. Worldwide in 2019, there were fewer attacks and attempted attacks on ships than there had been in 25 years.</p>
<p>But as the Guayaquil attack hints, pirates may be getting more active. Already, the first three months of 2020 have seen a <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map">24% increase in pirate attacks and attempted attacks</a>, over the same period in 2019. As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=R-qc3U8AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=sra">scholar of sea piracy</a>, I worry that the coronavirus pandemic may make piracy even more of a problem in the coming months and years. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332449/original/file-20200504-83779-13qxir8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332449/original/file-20200504-83779-13qxir8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332449/original/file-20200504-83779-13qxir8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332449/original/file-20200504-83779-13qxir8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332449/original/file-20200504-83779-13qxir8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332449/original/file-20200504-83779-13qxir8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332449/original/file-20200504-83779-13qxir8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332449/original/file-20200504-83779-13qxir8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In a photo from 2012, masked Somali pirate Hassan stands near a Taiwanese fishing vessel that washed up on a Somali shore after the pirates were paid a ransom and released the crew.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/AP-Piracy/a68502733d1447abbe538313ec65b331/38/0">AP Photo/Farah Abdi Warsameh</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Counter-piracy successes</h2>
<p>Modern sea piracy often involves pirates in small fast boats approaching and boarding larger, slower-moving ships to rob them of cargo – such as car parts, oil, crew valuables, communication equipment – or to seize the ship and crew for ransom.</p>
<p>Beginning in 2008, the greater Gulf of Aden area off the coast of East Africa became the most dangerous waters in the world for pirate attacks. Somali pirates like those portrayed in the 2013 Tom Hanks movie “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1535109/">Captain Phillips</a>” spent five years regularly hijacking large commercial vessels. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/june/end-piracy-gulf-aden">Three international naval efforts</a>, and industry-wide efforts to <a href="https://www.ocimf.org/media/92018/Guidelines-to-Harden-Vessels.pdf">make ships harder to attack and easier to defend</a>, helped reduce the threat – as did <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/12/09/world-bank-approves-112-million-to-strengthen-local-government-capacity-and-provide-urban-infrastructure-for-somalis">improved local government on land</a>, such as <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Public_Strategy_USAID.Somalia_03.29.2017_3.pdf">enhanced security and better health and education services</a>. By 2019, the International Maritime Bureau reported <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre">no successful hijackings</a> in the Greater Gulf of Aden.</p>
<p>In Southeast Asia, better aerial and naval surveillance has curbed pirate threats, with the help of improved <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/indonesia-malaysia-and-philippines-launch-joint-operations-in-sulu-sea-to-tackle-terrorism">coordination between national governments</a> that <a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/21042016-the-malacca-strait-patrols-finding-common-ground-analysis/">share jurisdiction</a> of the region’s busy shipping lanes.</p>
<p>As a result of these efforts, the global number of attacks and attempted attacks dropped significantly over the past decade, from a high of nearly 450 incidents in 2010 to fewer than 165 incidents in 2019 – the lowest number of <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre">actual and attempted pirate attacks</a> since 1994. Ship hijackings, the most severe and visible manifestation of sea piracy, also <a href="http://brandonprins.weebly.com/minervaresearch.html">have declined since 2010</a>.</p>
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<h2>A return of pirates?</h2>
<p>However, the Fouma attack is a troubling sign. The sea robbers seem to have had detailed advance knowledge of the ship’s cargo, as well as its course and the personnel on board. Those are clues that the pirates planned the attack, likely with help from the crew or others with specific information about the ship.</p>
<p>That sort of insider information is relatively rare in pirate attacks in general, but is <a href="https://time.com/piracy-southeast-asia-malacca-strait">common when pirates go after large cargo vessels</a> and tanker ships, as happens in <a href="http://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.522">about one-third of pirate attacks</a>.</p>
<p>Piracy in the waters off of South America – and off West Africa – has been increasing somewhat in recent years. Some of the conditions in those regions are similar to the ones that drove the Somali spike a decade ago: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002712453709">weak governments embroiled in political violence</a>, <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300180749/pirates">widespread economic hardship and easy access to weapons</a>. </p>
<p>Most piracy ultimately affects poor countries with weak governments. That’s because criminals, insurgents and other groups <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022343316683436">see opportunities</a> to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/25/what-do-pirates-want-to-steal-riches-at-sea-so-they-can-pay-for-wars-on-land/">raise money for their land-based battles</a> by <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2233865919833975">stealing from passing ships</a>. For instance, militant groups in Nigeria, particularly in the Niger River Delta region and the Gulf of Guinea, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2018/03/20/amnesty-and-new-violence-in-the-niger-delta/#53bf70a6263f">siphon oil off tanker ships</a> and resell it on the black market.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36319877">economic hardship</a> striking <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48386415">Venezuela and Brazil</a>, poor and jobless citizens may see opportunities offshore. <a href="https://voices.transparency.org/the-home-visit-people-dread-a545e84a75d8">Weak police</a> and <a href="https://voices.transparency.org/threats-against-anti-corruption-framework-in-brazil-multiply-d6c4acfbfd4c">corrupt officials</a> only exacerbate the economic problems.</p>
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<h2>The coronavirus weakens nations – and ships</h2>
<p>The medical and economic fallout from the coronavirus pandemic seems likely to pose severe challenges for countries with few resources and weak governments. West African and South American countries already struggle to police their territorial waters. Those regions have <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/total-covid-cases-region">not yet been severely affected by the coronavirus</a>, though infections are growing on both continents. </p>
<p>As hospitals fill with COVID-19 patients, the regions’ governments will almost certainly shift their public safety efforts away from sea piracy and toward <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/03/ticking-time-bomb-scientists-worry-about-coronavirus-spread-africa">more immediate concerns on land</a>. That will create opportunities for pirates.</p>
<p>The disease may make it harder for crews to protect ships as well. Most merchant vessel crews are already <a href="https://www.rosegeorge.com/ninety-percent-of-everything">stretched thin</a>. If crew members get sick, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/ships-are-moving-but-exhausted-sailors-are-stuck-at-sea-under-coronavirus-restrictions-11586084402">restrictions on international travel</a> prevent their replacements from meeting the ship in whatever port it’s in.</p>
<p>Slowing consumer spending around the globe means less trade, which brings less revenue for shipping companies to spend on armed guards or <a href="https://safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Intercargo-Best-Management-Practices-to-Deter-Piracy-and-Enhance-Maritime-Security-in-the-Red-Sea-Gulf-of-Aden-Indian-Ocean-and-Arabian-Sea-2018_06.pdf">other methods of protecting ships against pirates</a>. As a result, ships will likely become easier targets for pirates.</p>
<p>Even with the <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map">early numbers suggesting an increase for 2020</a>, global piracy still isn’t as high as it was during the Somali peak from 2009 to 2012. But if economic conditions worsen around the globe and ships look like easy targets, more desperate people may turn to piracy, or ramp up their existing efforts in an attempt to survive.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brandon Prins received funding for this research project from the U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Naval Research, through the Minerva Initiative.</span></em></p>In 2019, there were fewer attacks and attempted attacks on ships than there had been in 25 years. The coronavirus may bring economic and political changes that make piracy worse in the coming years.Brandon Prins, Professor of Political Science & Global Security Fellow at the Howard Baker Center, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1335482020-04-16T09:53:26Z2020-04-16T09:53:26ZBrexit: how the UK is preparing to secure its seas outside the EU<p>Four dinghies carrying 53 migrants who tried to cross the English Channel from France were intercepted by British and French authorities <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-kent-52207869">in early April</a>. The crossings are a reminder of the importance of maritime security and safety to the UK.</p>
<p>Brexit has led to many uncertainties, including over the governance of the UK’s seas in the future. Withdrawal from EU regulations at the end of the Brexit transition period on December 31 2020 raises questions over how to face the difficult task of managing maritime risks which are currently managed alongside the EU. </p>
<p>Uncertainty has also spurred new government efforts by shining a light on the need to secure UK waters, something we’ve written about in <a href="http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/policybristol/briefings-and-reports-pdfs/SafeSeas%20report_v5.pdf">a new report</a>.</p>
<p>The UK faces <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/322813/20140623-40221_national-maritime-strat-Cm_8829_accessible.pdf">rapidly evolving risks</a> to its shipping lanes, fishing grounds and marine infrastructure. These risks include <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/722074/fisheries-wp-consult-document.pdf">illegal fishing</a>, human trafficking, <a href="https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/173-national-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-organised-crime-2018/file">organised crime such as smuggling</a>, <a href="https://rm.coe.int/the-united-kingdom-s-strategy-for-countering-terrorism-june-2018/16808b05f3">terrorism</a>, and the potential for protests <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/dec/04/greenpeace-banned-from-protesting-on-shell-north-sea-oil-rigs">at sea</a>. </p>
<p>Terrorist attacks could cause significant loss of life if targeted against ferries and cruise liners. Illegal fishing could affect <a href="https://www.seafish.org/media/Publications/SeafishGuidetoIUU07-2016.pdf">the livelihoods of fishers and marine biodiversity</a>, while other risks could have an impact on the wider economy in a context where <a href="https://www.ukchamberofshipping.com/latest/why-ports-are-crucial-britains-future/">95% of Britain’s trade</a> flows via the ocean.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1247935866326200320"}"></div></p>
<p>These risks tend to interlink with each other in ways that are increasingly well documented in other regions of the world. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016578361400143X">In Somalia</a>, for example, local fishers losing their stock as a result of illegal fishing have <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2442.pdf">turned to piracy</a>. What unintended consequences of new risks might appear in UK waters is still not fully understood. </p>
<p>Maritime security threats can also take place simultaneously. Without greater understanding of these risks, it’s difficult to know which should be prioritised. </p>
<h2>Added complication of Brexit</h2>
<p>These issues have been complicated by the <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2019/10/brexits-challenge-maritime-security/">UK’s withdrawal from the EU</a>. During the current transition period the UK manages its waters within a wider EU maritime governance framework and under EU regulations, as it did while it was an EU member. While the UK isn’t expected to cease all cooperation with the EU when this comes to an end, it will be required to depend more on national enforcement and regulations.</p>
<p>This shift is most visible in the fisheries sector. As part of the EU, British fisheries were managed under the Common Fisheries Policy meaning both UK and EU fishing boats had access to quotas in UK waters. Such arrangements are <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X17307376">likely to come to an end</a> with the UK choosing to regulate its own waters. </p>
<p>UK ports are also a hotspot for change as they seem likely to withdraw from EU port legislation. This could lead to <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/308/pdfs/uksiem_20190308_en.pdf">new national regulatory</a> challenges such as a need to balance harmonisation with the EU with the pursual of British priorities like the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/freeports-consultation">creation of freeports</a>, aimed to give British trade a competitive edge.</p>
<p>Taking sole responsibility is made difficult by other complicating factors. In the UK, different risks are managed by <a href="https://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2018-02-23.HL5857.h">different government agencies</a>, with problems of jurisdictional overlap. </p>
<p>Depending where it takes place, multiple agencies could be involved in illegal fishing, for example. This could include the Marine Management Organisation, Marine Scotland, and the Royal Navy’s Fishery Protection Squadron. Other agencies may contribute boats or intelligence, such as the National Maritime Information Centre, Border Force and the National Crime Agency. </p>
<p>Yet, a common understanding of the threats and consistent communication between departments <a href="http://www.safeseas.net/a-moment-of-opportunity-britain-and-the-maritime-security-challenge/">is lacking in some areas</a>. This is more of a problem for devolved issues such as fisheries, which add even more authorities, departments and agencies to the picture. The relationships between these different organisations are likely to be further tested by the <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2019/10/brexits-challenge-maritime-security/">challenges posed by Brexit</a>.</p>
<h2>Opportunity for reform</h2>
<p>But Brexit also offers the UK an opportunity to improve its maritime security. The leak of <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/831199/20190802_Latest_Yellowhammer_Planning_assumptions_CDL.pdf">Operation Yellowhammer</a> in 2019 raised the public profile of maritime issues such as delayed freight in ports, the illegal entry of EU fishing boats into UK waters and potential clashes between fishing vessels. This came at a time where there were high profile landings of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-kent-46358700">illegal migrants along the south coast of the UK</a>, while Operation Yellowhammer warned of stretched maritime enforcement capabilities.</p>
<p>The UK has started off well. In 2019, the UK government created the <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2019-09-05/debates/CAD11F2C-9E6C-4092-9417-C34D68330187/MaritimeSecurity">Joint Maritime Security Centre</a> (JMSC) to coordinate all the different agencies involved and foster interaction between them. The JMSC conducted a joint UK maritime security exercise at the end of 2019, highlighting how coordination can improve enforcement. It is also preparing a new UK maritime security strategy. </p>
<p>Interactions between the different government agencies involved in managing the risks to the UK seas need to become more frequent and overcome existing divides to create habits of cooperation and communication. Other groups such as fishing communities need to be included in deliberations. Transparency and information sharing in the process of drafting a new maritime security strategy can help to identify common goals, encourage involvement, and establish a shared basis for action.</p>
<p>A review of resources would also be worthwhile to identify the means the UK has to secure its waters, what gaps exist, and how these means can best be shared.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/133548/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy Edmunds receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). Grant no. ES/S008810/1: Transnational Organised Crime at Sea: New Evidence for Better Responses. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Edwards does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Brexit could make it make the UK’s maritime security more complicated.Scott Edwards, Research Associate, University of BristolTimothy Edmunds, Professor of International Security at University of Bristol and Director of the Centre for Global Insecurity, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1304802020-02-03T13:51:44Z2020-02-03T13:51:44ZGulf of Guinea: fighting criminal groups in the Niger Delta is key to defeating piracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313087/original/file-20200131-41490-3adlyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo: Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Different reports have recently highlighted security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. One was published by the <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1286-unprecedented-number-of-crew-kidnappings-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-despite-drop-in-overall-global-numbers">International Maritime Bureau</a>, another by the French Navy’s <a href="https://www.mica-center.org/download/bilan.pdf">Mica centre</a> and another by the <a href="https://www.maritime.dot.gov/content/2020-002-gulf-guinea-piracyarmed-robberykidnapping-ransom">US Maritime Administration</a>. </p>
<p>These reports come against a backdrop of pirate attacks against merchant ships in West Africa, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea between Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon. They have also led to attention-grabbing headlines about a <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/piracy-surges-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-with-spate-of-deadly-attacks/">“piracy surge”</a> or even <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/waves-terror">“waves of terror”</a>. </p>
<p>In 2019, kidnappings of seafarers in the Gulf of Guinea reached an unprecedented number. Attacks against merchant ships were recorded off Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. The area is often described as “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48581197">the world’s most dangerous seas</a>”. </p>
<p>Piracy is a significant threat for shipping companies operating in the region. Industry organisations have pointed out that urgent action is required and that seafarers should not be <a href="https://www.bimco.org/news/priority-news/20190610-gulf-of-guinea-piracy-continues-to-threaten-seafarers">“exposed to such appalling dangers”</a>.</p>
<p>The human cost is significant and hostages aren’t the only victims. Representatives from seafarers’ unions <a href="https://www.nautilusint.org/en/news-insight/news/latest-gulf-of-guinea-kidnapping-prompts-union-call-for-international-action-on-piracy/">have pointed out</a> that their members are at considerable risk for just doing their jobs, and even crews on ships that are merely transiting are on edge.</p>
<p>Based on a thorough analysis of attack patterns and overall maritime activities in the region, I am convinced that it will be impossible for navies and other security agencies to improve maritime security as long as root causes are not addressed. Many security incidents at sea, and notably kidnappings of seafarers, are merely an extension of land-based issues.</p>
<p>At the heart of the problem are activities by criminal groups based in the Niger Delta where kidnappings on land have long been a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-nigeria-must-do-to-deal-with-its-ransom-driven-kidnapping-crisis-116547">security challenge</a>. Unless the massive security problems in the Delta are resolved, no significant headway will be made at sea.</p>
<h2>The numbers</h2>
<p>Beyond attention-grabbing headlines there’s no consensus on figures. Not even the reports mentioned above include the same numbers. That matters because shipping companies make commercial decisions based on official statistics, and budgets for security agencies are allocated depending on the scope and scale of the problem. </p>
<p>For example, the International Maritime Bureau reported that <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1286-unprecedented-number-of-crew-kidnappings-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-despite-drop-in-overall-global-numbers">121 seafarers</a> were taken as hostages during attacks in the Gulf of Guinea in 2019. This represented more than 90% of global kidnappings at sea recorded by the centre.</p>
<p>At the same time, the organisation only reported 64 attacks in the Gulf of Guinea last year. This was a decrease of 19% compared with 2018. </p>
<p>The US Maritime Administration highlighted a similar trend in a <a href="https://www.maritime.dot.gov/content/2020-002-gulf-guinea-piracyarmed-robberykidnapping-ransom">recent advisory</a> even though the overall numbers are much higher. It reported that there were 129 attacks in 2019 after 145 attacks in 2018, representing an 11% drop. </p>
<p>The French Navy’s <a href="https://www.mica-center.org/download/bilan.pdf">Mica centre</a>, on the other hand, reported a 20% increase in attacks against ships across the Gulf of Guinea between 2018 and 2019 (from 90 to 111 incidents).</p>
<p>Overall, numbers differ due to reporting standards and categorisations aren’t comparable. Similar events are often classified in different ways. For example, the IMB recorded four hijacked ships in 2019, the US Maritime Administration noted six, and the MICA centre classified 26 incidents as hijackings. </p>
<p>Annual statistics are further complicated by increased awareness. Incidents that would not have been reported a few years ago are now included in publicly available data, even though they may be linked to other criminal activities at sea.</p>
<p>During my <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030226879">own research</a>, I have come across many cases where such activities were linked to incidents broadly described as “pirate attacks”, without a detailed analysis of individual circumstances.</p>
<p>Such differences <a href="https://www.dirksiebels.eu/publications/2020/01/16/piracy-in-west-africa-annual-reports/">underline</a> that annual statistics are not necessarily a valuable tool for understanding issues in the Gulf of Guinea. Rather, security agencies have to gain a broad understanding of all maritime security challenges. Based on such knowledge, a transparent analysis of incidents is possible, providing the necessary background for commercial decisions or law enforcement operations. </p>
<h2>Extension of a land problem</h2>
<p>Attacks at sea are generally conducted by criminal groups based in the Niger Delta. Throughout the region, there is an ample supply of foot soldiers and <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/mumbai-pirates-forced-18-indian-seafarers-to-camp-near-crocodile-infested-swamp-in-nigeria/articleshow/73239638.cms">camps</a> in remote locations where hostages can be held during negotiations, the prerequisites for a lucrative business model.</p>
<p>Violent attacks <a href="https://splash247.com/abducted-jj-ugland-bulker-crew-released-by-pirates">affected various countries in 2019</a>. These are almost exclusively linked to Nigerian perpetrators.</p>
<p>Highlighting the direct link with Nigeria is important. On the one hand, neighbouring countries are unable to solve the problem unless security on land in the Niger Delta improves. On the other hand, spikes in attacks are possible at any time. For operators of merchant ships, the threat level can change within weeks, depending on factors such as weather, changes in traffic patterns or naval operations as well as the general situation on land in certain areas in the Niger Delta.</p>
<p>Furthermore, insecurity at sea is an overarching problem for regional governments. Pirate attacks may be particularly visible. But other concerns, such as <a href="https://www.fairplanet.org/story/illegal-smuggling-for-oil-in-ghana/">fuel smuggling</a>, <a href="https://www.icsf.net/images/samudra/pdf/english/issue_77/4319_art_Sam77_e_art06.pdf">illegal fishing</a> or <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2019/08/west-africa-opioid-crisis-190827135612104.html">unregulated shipments</a> of pharmaceuticals like Tramadol, are usually more pressing for government agencies. </p>
<h2>Solutions</h2>
<p>The West and Central African region has made significant progress in fighting all types of illicit activities at sea. Various types of maritime security issues are mentioned in the <a href="http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Documents/code_of_conduct%20signed%20from%20ECOWAS%20site.pdf">Yaoundé Code</a> of Conduct, adopted in 2013 and aimed at improving maritime security in West and Central Africa. </p>
<p>However, human and financial resources are scarce and maritime security is generally regarded as less important than land-based security challenges which directly affect domestic populations. </p>
<p>But insecurity at sea has a significant economic impact by hurting activities related to the maritime environment. Maritime business plans therefore must include security-related expenditures for navies, coastguards and other government agencies. These are needed to maximise the potential of the maritime environment. This, in turn, would show that better maritime security has direct benefits for economic growth and development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Siebels works as a Senior Analyst for Risk Intelligence, specialising in maritime security issues in sub-Saharan Africa, primarily in West and Central Africa.</span></em></p>Navies, and other security agencies, won’t be able to improve maritime security as long as root causes on land are not addressed.Dirk Siebels, PhD (Maritime Security), University of GreenwichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1280732019-12-15T08:03:56Z2019-12-15T08:03:56ZLift for maritime sector in Kenya and Djibouti after fall in piracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305214/original/file-20191204-70133-m8zij.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US service members practising water rescue techniques during a routine training exercise off the coast of Djibouti in 2007.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/US NAVY/MC1 MICHAEL R. MCCORMICK</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The upsurge of Somali piracy <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/1_0.pdf">after 2005</a> led to significant international activity in the Horn of Africa. Naval missions, training programmes, capital investment and capacity building projects were among the responses to the threat. States in the region also started to focus on the dangers and opportunities associated with the sea.</p>
<p>Kenya and Djibouti, two states directly affected by piracy, achieved widespread reform of their domestic maritime sectors through new national initiatives and assistance from external partners. Djibouti’s President Ismail Guelleh recently <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/09/c_137167464.htm">commented</a> during talks with Kenya on security and trade links that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>What happens in Somalia has an immediate impact on all of us.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>At its height, between 2008 and 2012, it is estimated that Somali piracy cost the Kenyan shipping industry between <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SitRep2012_22Feb.pdf">US$300 million and $400 million</a> every year. This was as a result of increased costs (including insurance) and a decline in coastal tourism. It also damaged Djibouti’s maritime industry, financial sector and international trade. </p>
<p>The upsurge of piracy after 2005 had a number of causes. It grew from poverty and lawlessness in Somalia alongside opportunity and a low risk of getting caught. By 2013 the threat had been <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/ten-years-on-is-somali-piracy-still-a-threat">reduced</a>. This was due to a combination of naval patrols, private armed guards, self defence measures on board ships and capacity building efforts ashore.</p>
<p>Historically, most states in the Horn of Africa have struggled with limited capacity to address maritime insecurity. Their naval assets, training, human resources, institutional and judicial structures, monitoring and surveillance have all been critically underfunded.</p>
<p>But the international response to piracy – and the investments and partnerships that emerged – have helped some states to improve in these areas. </p>
<p>More importantly perhaps, since the decline in piracy attacks, Kenya and Djibouti have been paying more attention to policies around maritime governance and “blue” economic development. This relates to <a href="https://www.unenvironment.org/nairobiconvention/kenya-promoting-blue-economy-home-and-abroad">sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, job creation and ocean ecosystem health</a>. The refocus marks a shift from traditional investments related to land based conflict and land borders.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19392206.2019.1667053">recent article</a>, I examine how Kenya and Djibouti reformed their domestic maritime sectors following a decline in acts of piracy. The study sheds new light on the limitations and challenges facing domestic maritime sectors in Africa as well as some of the innovative approaches taken. </p>
<p>A key point is that blue economic growth is not possible without addressing security threats at sea. This includes building a robust maritime security sector, improving ocean health and regulating human activity at sea in a more sustainable way.</p>
<h2>International partnerships</h2>
<p>Many of the new developments in the region have been supported by international partners. The Djibouti Navy and Coastguard <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1162342/us-uk-france-complete-exercise-alligator-dagger-17/">work closely with the US Navy</a>. Together, for example, they are developing capacity for stopping and searching suspicious vessels. This is important in countering the illicit trafficking in people and smuggling of migrants through Djiboutian waters. </p>
<p>Djibouti has also benefited from Chinese direct investment, which accounts for nearly <a href="http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038215.pdf">40% of the funding for its major investment projects</a>. Chinese state-owned firms have built some of Djibouti’s largest maritime related infrastructure projects. These include the Doraleh Multipurpose Port, a new railway connection between Djibouti and Addis Ababa, and the opening of China’s first foreign military facility. </p>
<p>This is a clear example of Beijing prioritising its growing economic and security interests in Africa. And advancing its “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13567888.2018.1436801">massive and geopolitically ambitious</a>” Belt and Road Initiative.</p>
<p>Kenya, too, has received international assistance and investment. This includes support to set up the Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Mombasa. Organisations like the International Maritime Organisation have led training for staff from the centre and for the Kenyan Navy. </p>
<p>The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has provided law enforcement training for the Kenyan Maritime Police Unit. It also opened a new high-security courtroom in Shimo La Tewa, Mombasa, for cases of maritime piracy and other serious criminal offences.</p>
<h2>National refocus</h2>
<p>At a national level, there is evidence of a fundamental shift towards building a more secure and sustainable domestic maritime sector. </p>
<p>For example, Kenya has created a new coastguard service. Its job is to police the country’s ocean territory and to ensure that Kenya <a href="http://www.president.go.ke/2018/11/26/president-kenyatta-leads-the-world-in-pledging-support-for-sustainable-blue-economy/">benefits from its water resources</a>. The country has new naval training partnerships, maritime capacity building projects and an <a href="https://kippra.or.ke/kenyas-agenda-in-developing-the-blue-economy/">implementation committee</a> to coordinate “blue economic” activities. These include fisheries, shipping, port infrastructure, tourism and environmental protection.</p>
<p>For its part, Djibouti has rapidly developed its maritime sector and recognised the financial benefits of leasing coastal real estate. The country has an ambitious development plan titled “Djibouti Vision 2035”. This sets out its aspiration to become a maritime hub and the “<a href="https://www.gulf-times.com/story/415602/Djibouti-wants-to-become-the-Singapore-of-Africa">Singapore of Africa</a>”. It’s trading on the fact that it has a similar strategic position along one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. </p>
<p>All of these approaches require robust laws and regulations governing human activities at sea. They also call for a capable and flexible coastguard and navy to enforce these regulations and secure coastal waters against threats such as piracy, fisheries crime and the illicit smuggling of drugs, weapons and people.</p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>There are lessons in the Horn of Africa experience for other regions of Africa facing similar maritime insecurities. One example is <a href="https://icc-ccs.org/index.php/1268-maritime-piracy-incidents-down-in-q1-2019-but-kidnapping-risk-in-gulf-of-guinea-persists">the Gulf of Guinea</a>. </p>
<p>The first lesson is that there’s a need to convince coastal states with weak maritime capacities of the untapped potential of the blue economy. Even reputational damage can harm tourism, development and investment in coastal regions. This was clearly illustrated in the <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SitRep2012_22Feb.pdf">case of Kenya</a>.</p>
<p>Blue economic growth needs a safe and secure maritime environment for merchant shipping in particular. It can also help alleviate poverty in coastal regions, provide alternatives to criminal livelihoods, and allow local communities more ownership of issues that affect them.</p>
<p>Ultimately, maritime security and blue economic growth need to be considered as a unified policy issue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128073/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert McCabe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya and Djibouti are building a more secure and sustainable domestic maritime sector.Robert McCabe, Assistant Professor, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1270322019-11-18T14:28:00Z2019-11-18T14:28:00ZFighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea needs a radical rethink<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301921/original/file-20191115-66945-1tojfeo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ivorian sailors participate in an anti-piracy hostage rescue scenario with the Ghanaian Navy during Exercise Obangame Express. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Bonita had been anchored off Benin for several days, waiting for a berth in the port of Cotonou. On November 2, 2019 the crew had a traumatic awakening. Armed men boarded the vessel and <a href="https://beninwebtv.com/en/2019/11/benin-09-persons-kidnapped-in-a-ship-attack-at-cotonou-port/">kidnapped nine crew members</a>. Only two days later, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pirates-attack-greek-oil-tanker-off-togo/a-51108398">four seafarers were kidnapped</a> from the Elka Aristotle, which was anchored off Lomé in neighbouring Togo.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, these were not the only attacks off the coast of West Africa in which seafarers were kidnapped. Nevertheless, the patterns are changing, with <a href="https://riskintelligence.eu/articles/long-term-perspective-west-africa-and-gulf-guinea-piracy">gradual signs of improvement</a>. In addition, attacker success rates in the region have declined from <a href="https://riskintelligence.eu/articles/long-term-perspective-west-africa-and-gulf-guinea-piracy">80% over ten years ago to just under 50% in 2018</a>.</p>
<p>Another change has been the fact that attacks have become more visible. This is at least partly due to increased cooperation among countries in West and Central Africa. They adopted the <a href="http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Documents/code_of_conduct%20signed%20from%20ECOWAS%20site.pdf">Yaoundé Code of Conduct</a> in 2013, aimed at fighting illicit activities at sea. Implementation has been slow, yet navies and maritime agencies in the region have become much more active in collecting relevant information.</p>
<p>Based on my research into maritime security in the region, I have become increasingly convinced that sustainable improvements are impossible when the focus is solely on piracy. In many cases, kidnappings of seafarers are an extension of land-based problems – such as fuel smuggling and illegal migration – and have to be tackled as such.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/african-states-dont-prioritise-maritime-security-heres-why-they-should-77685">African states don't prioritise maritime security – here's why they should</a>
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<p>In my view, <a href="https://www.bimco.org/news/priority-news/20190108-call-for-gog-counter-piracy">demands by the shipping industry</a> for international navies to become more involved in counter-piracy operations won’t lead to lasting solutions. These can only be successful if they are designed based on regional requirements and take on board regional initiatives aimed at tackling a multiplicity of social problems, rather than just one.</p>
<h2>Links to crime on land</h2>
<p>High-profile attacks – such as the recent kidnappings – are generally carried out by criminal groups based in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-nigeria-must-do-to-deal-with-its-ransom-driven-kidnapping-crisis-116547">Kidnappings on land have been a long-standing problem</a> for security forces there. Collecting ransoms has become a lucrative business model which requires foot soldiers, access to camps for holding hostages, and negotiators with the necessary skills. All these things can be found in the Niger Delta, where the lines between armed insurgents and organised criminals are often fluid. </p>
<p>For countries like Benin, Togo and Cameroon where Nigeria-based criminals have taken hostages from merchant ships this year, the situation is a concern. Ports in these countries are crucial for economic growth and development in terms of customs revenues. For example, <a href="https://www.mcc.gov/resources/story/story-story-kin-apr-2015-unlocking-a-regional-trade-bottleneck-in-benin">more than 40%</a> of Benin’s government revenues are collected in Cotonou’s port. Ensuring adequate security for maritime trade is therefore a strategic concern in Benin. Hence the government’s <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/07/c_138536961.htm">quick announcement</a> of improved security measures for ships anchoring off Cotonou.</p>
<p>Most kidnappings still take place off the Nigerian coastline. The established pattern is one of hostages being taken and then released several weeks later for a ransom payment. This is according <a href="https://riskintelligence.eu/articles/long-term-perspective-west-africa-and-gulf-guinea-piracy">to analysis done</a> by the Danish security intelligence company Risk Intelligence.</p>
<p>The fact that there are more cases off the Nigerian coastline points to my contention that this criminal behaviour is closely linked to land-based criminal activities – such as fuel smuggling – which is <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tracing-the-flow-of-nigerias-stolen-oil-to-cameroon/a-45918707">widespread in the area</a>.</p>
<p>When such incidents are analysed through a narrow piracy lens, efforts of navies and law enforcement agencies -– which are already suffering from a lack of resources –- are likely to be misguided. The narrow view might mistakenly focus, for example, on the capacity to respond at sea.</p>
<p>The problem of wrong analyses is made worse by international actors, for example the US and European governments, the European Union or international organisations. They often put a strong emphasis on combating piracy and provide financial or technical assistance to partners in West and Central Africa. But they rarely focus on illegal fishing, fuel smuggling or illegal migration. All these activities have been linked to attacks against merchant ships or fishing vessels. </p>
<h2>Broader understanding needed</h2>
<p>Fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea requires a broad understanding of maritime security. Acknowledging links between, for example, piracy and illegal fishing is vital for regional governments and external partners. On the most basic level, illegal fishing destroys fishers’ livelihoods, forcing some into piracy simply to earn an income. </p>
<p>A good example is the EU’s contradictory stance. On the one hand, it provides <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/52490/eu-maritime-security-factsheet-gulf-guinea_en">€29 million</a> to support West Africa’s Integrated Maritime Security project. On the other hand, EU countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/eu-targets-fragile-west-african-fish-stocks-despite-protection-laws-125679">contribute to the depletion of fish stocks across West Africa</a>. </p>
<p>Countries around the Gulf of Guinea also have to <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-states-dont-prioritise-maritime-security-heres-why-they-should-77685">increase their efforts</a>. Laws regulating maritime operations are often deliberately opaque, disguising a lack of enforcement capacity and enabling corruption. Increasing transparency would highlight shortcomings and problems caused by insecurity at sea –- somewhat embarrassing for any government, but necessary to address these issues.</p>
<p>Recent efforts in Nigeria, including a large conference in October that led <a href="https://globalmaritimesecurityconf.com/2019/10/11/communique-for-the-global-maritime-security-conference-2019/">to the Abuja Declaration</a>, are a step in the right direction. The declaration highlighted shortcomings of countries around the Gulf of Guinea related to ocean governance and law enforcement at sea. Concrete actions have to follow.</p>
<p>More transparency could also help to improve relationships between the maritime industry and security agencies in the region. Lack of trust and limited cooperation have often hindered thorough investigations, feeding a simple narrative of piracy without a broader look at other maritime security challenges.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127032/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Siebels works as a Senior Analyst for Risk Intelligence, specialising in maritime security issues in sub-Saharan Africa, primarily in West and Central Africa.</span></em></p>Feeding a simple narrative of piracy without a broader look at other maritime security challenges hinders progress in dealing with it.Dirk Siebels, PhD (Maritime Security), University of GreenwichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.