tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/military-training-27988/articlesMilitary training – The Conversation2024-03-07T12:22:10Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250232024-03-07T12:22:10Z2024-03-07T12:22:10ZSomalia-Turkey maritime deal is a win for both countries, and not a power play for the Horn of Africa<p>A recent <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/turkiye-somalia-sign-agreement-on-defense-economic-cooperation/3132095">defence deal</a> between Somalia and Turkey has great significance for Somalia and the region’s security. The agreement, which covers both land and sea, aims to enhance defence cooperation between Turkey and Somalia. It includes the possibility of Turkey providing both training and equipment for a Somali navy.</p>
<p>Its near-term impact should, however, not be exaggerated.</p>
<p>Instead, it should be understood as a good-faith agreement signed between asymmetric powers whose interests overlap a little, at present. My <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=Iuj4hHMAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">research</a> on the geopolitics and security agreements over the past few decades covering Turkey, Somalia and the wider east African region leads to my analysis that Mogadishu and Ankara entered into the agreement for different reasons. </p>
<p>Turkey, the more powerful partner, signed the agreement to bolster its <a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-politics-why-turkey-is-helping-somalia-defend-its-waters-224377">reputation</a> as a security partner and important actor in sub-Saharan Africa. It wants to cement its role as a critical player in Somalia’s future, and improve its international visibility and prestige domestically. </p>
<p>Turkey plans to expand its training role to the maritime realm in Somalia and complement its terrestrial <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26776053">military training facility</a> in Mogadishu. It may also provide – but is unlikely to sell (given Somalia’s <a href="https://mof.gov.so/sites/default/files/Publications/Budget%20strategy%20for%20fy2023%20V3%20PDF.pdf#page=3">severe budgetary constraints</a>) – arms to Somalia now that the arms embargo has been <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15511.doc.htm#:%7E:text=Recognizing%20the%20benchmarks%20reached%20on,the%20Federal%20Government%20of%20Somalia.">lifted</a>.</p>
<p>Somalia, as the less powerful partner, signed the agreement to build its defence capacities, particularly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-provide-maritime-security-support-somalia-official-2024-02-22/">offshore</a>. It entered into the deal eventually to gain the capabilities to project force throughout the territories it claims.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-politics-why-turkey-is-helping-somalia-defend-its-waters-224377">Red Sea politics: why Turkey is helping Somalia defend its waters</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Mogadishu’s means to project force in its territorial waters are currently <a href="https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-helps-increase-maritime-security-somalia-2022-04-06_en">limited</a>. Hence, the illegal, unreported and unregulated <a href="https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/Stories/tackling-illegal--unreported--and-unregulated-fishing-in-somalia.html#:%7E:text=In%20fact%2C%20reports%20suggest%20that,away%20from%20Somalia's%20economic%20development.">fishing</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872">piracy</a>.</p>
<p>Somalia’s leaders likely hope that Turkey will be able to train and equip Somali soldiers and sailors. This would give Mogadishu the capability to project limited <a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-politics-why-turkey-is-helping-somalia-defend-its-waters-224377">force</a> and thus better police its territories, both maritime and terrestrial. In doing so, it hopes to eventually gain a monopoly on the use of force within its borders, including semi-autonomous regions such as <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200614-somalia-recognizes-contested-leader-in-semi-autonomous-border-state">Jubaland</a> and the de facto independent state of <a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-has-been-pursuing-independence-for-33-years-expert-explains-the-impact-of-the-latest-deal-with-ethiopia-221502">Somaliland</a>.</p>
<h2>Limited scope</h2>
<p>In my view, there are limitations to what Turkey can achieve through this agreement in terms of its ambitions in the region. Even if the agreement were fully implemented, Ankara would not be involved in confronting Mogadishu’s rivals (including Ethiopia) within the region. </p>
<p>In short, the agreement is limited in scope and in terms of capabilities being offered. It will need to be long term to accomplish anything close to affecting political and military outcomes on the ground – inside and outside Somalia.</p>
<p>It does not, in my view, represent the beginning of a new system of <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/03/beyond-ethiopia-somaliland-turkey-somalia-defense-deal-fuels-uae-rivalry">regional alliances</a> that will pit Turkey and Somalia along with Egypt against Ethiopia, Somaliland and possibly other regional states such as the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<h2>The background</h2>
<p>The Turkey-Somalia agreement should be seen in the light of what the deal gives each signatory. Not as part of a new system of regional alliances that are adjusting to the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67858566">deal</a> signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland at the beginning of 2024.</p>
<p>Under this agreement, Ethiopia will get a 50-year lease on a strip of land on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast for naval and commercial maritime use, and access to the Berbera port. In return, Addis Ababa would <a href="https://interregional.com/article/Addis-Ababa-Ambitions/2221/en">recognise</a> Somaliland’s independence from Somalia.</p>
<p>This deal has set off a <a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-ethiopia-port-deal-international-opposition-flags-complex-red-sea-politics-221131">diplomatic storm</a> in the region. It has been opposed by Somalia and Turkey, as well as the US, China and Egypt. The agreement is certainly important. It has the potential to make an impact on the political and security fabric of the region as Ethiopia may eventually have a maritime security and commercial footprint in the Gulf of Aden.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-has-been-pursuing-independence-for-33-years-expert-explains-the-impact-of-the-latest-deal-with-ethiopia-221502">Somaliland has been pursuing independence for 33 years. Expert explains the impact of the latest deal with Ethiopia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These two recent deals in the Horn of Africa, however, are driven by the national interests of Somalia, Ethiopia and Somaliland. They speak to their primary interests – territory and sovereignty.</p>
<p>The genesis of engagement and agreements with external actors has come from one or more of these Horn of Africa states. This was similarly the case with the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3107475">2017 Berbera Port deal</a> between Ethiopia, Somaliland and Dubai’s DP World. It was the case with <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3355243">Qatar’s</a> engagement with Somalia on electoral politics, also in 2017.</p>
<p>It should come as little surprise that the region’s states – like others in the international state system – work to further their interests in their own back yard.</p>
<p>For its part, Turkey’s interests, like those of other foreign powers in the Horn of Africa, are generally opportunistic. Their intent is short-term gains. In my view, Turkey doesn’t have military interests in the Horn of Africa, and Ankara has limited capabilities even if it did.</p>
<p>This isn’t a criticism of Turkey. All states have limited capabilities and they generally prioritise them – especially when it comes to security architecture – <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2021.1976573">close</a> to home, where it matters. Turkey is no different.</p>
<h2>No gunboat diplomacy</h2>
<p>Turkey will be a good partner for Somalia and vice versa. They have a decade of history together and the agreement gives both Ankara and Mogadishu something of value. </p>
<p>In Turkey, Somalia has found a capable <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2872980">partner</a> that can offer training, expertise and some arms. And this means that the context was only partially about the recent Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. </p>
<p>Mogadishu’s leaders are under no illusion. </p>
<p>They know their own projection of limited power against what they see as encroachments on Somalia’s terrestrial and maritime territories is years in the future. But so is Ethiopia’s floating of a navy off the coast of Somaliland. </p>
<p>We should, therefore, not expect Turkish-trained and equipped Somali troops to be invading Somaliland, or Turkish ships crewed by Somali sailors to be skirmishing with Ethiopia in the Gulf of Aden any time soon. Instead, we should understand the agreement as one among many that may become embodied as something of strategic value only much later.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225023/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendon J. Cannon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>All states have limited security capabilities and they generally prioritise them close to home. where it matters.Brendon J. Cannon, Assistant Professor, Khalifa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818632022-05-22T12:35:12Z2022-05-22T12:35:12ZMuseveni’s first son Muhoozi: clear signals of a succession plan in Uganda<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461233/original/file-20220504-13-flt98h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muhoozi Kainerugaba, commander of Uganda's land forces and President Yoweri Museveni's son.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Busomoke/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 8 March 2022, Ugandan politics was sent into a spin by 49 words tweeted by President Yoweri Museveni’s only son, Lt Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba.</p>
<p>The tweet announced Muhoozi’s retirement from the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), which he had formally served in since 1999. Since his most recent promotion in June 2021, he has served as the commander of the land forces. The position made him the third-highest ranking officer in the defence forces.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1501146903249141763"}"></div></p>
<p>Muhoozi’s resignation would clear his legal path to formally enter electoral politics. Serving members of the armed forces are banned from political activity under Uganda’s constitution. </p>
<p>The tweet seemed to catch everyone by surprise, including senior security officials. They later <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/updf-clears-the-air-on-muhoozi-status-3745690">put out a statement</a> saying Muhoozi had not resigned. </p>
<p>While Muhoozi clarified hours later that his retirement would not come for eight years, the post fits a recent pattern that has fuelled growing public perception that he is declaring his political intentions. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1501196861432074241"}"></div></p>
<p>The most stark example of this occurred weeks after the tweet. This was in the form of a nationwide series of public events to mark <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/muhoozi-s-birthday-launch-of-the-project--3800066">Muhoozi’s 48th birthday</a>. </p>
<p>These included sports tournaments, public rallies, a party for supporters, and a state dinner. Public roads were shut for the events, and state-owned broadcasters aired some of them live. Rwandan President Paul Kagame attended the State Dinner. </p>
<p>At one of the birthday rallies held in the south-western town of Masaka on <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/the-curious-case-of-muhoozi-national-event-3791614">April 20,</a> supporters wore T-shirts with slogans such as ‘Muhoozi K is our next president’ and ‘MK Project. Team Chairman. Secure Your Tomorrow.’ </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/we-will-take-power-says-muhoozi-3801732">subsequent tweets</a> in early May, Muhoozi dropped any remaining reticence. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1520754940502855680"}"></div></p>
<p>He later added:</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1520776987182260226"}"></div></p>
<p>At the state dinner, Museveni, who has <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/i-am-not-grooming-my-son-for-presidency-says-museveni-3544172">always denied</a> grooming his son to succeed him, <a href="https://www.observer.ug/news/headlines/73599-why-colonels-generals-support-gen-muhoozi">made comments </a> implying that Muhoozi would soon be in charge. </p>
<p>Whether or not Muhoozi makes it to State House – and a great deal still stands in the way of this happening – it is undoubtedly clear that the possibility of replacing Museveni with his son has dramatically shifted from rumour to reality in recent months.</p>
<h2>Heir apparent, apparently</h2>
<p>Muhoozi was 11 years old when his father’s National Resistance Army took Uganda’s capital Kampala in 1986. In 1999, he formally joined the Ugandan defence forces while a student at the city’s Makerere University. </p>
<p>He has been subsequently trained at elite military academies in the UK and US, and <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/muhoozi-kainerugaba-uganda-s-cagey-heir-apparent-3726692">continually promoted</a> ahead of more experienced peers.</p>
<p>After Muhoozi’s most recent promotion to commander of the land forces, he has featured in a number of Uganda’s military deployments. These include those in the <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/updf-sends-more-troops-armoured-vehicles-into-dr-congo-in-anti-adf-rebel-operation--3639838">Democratic Republic of Congo,</a> <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/the-rise-of-gen-muhoozi-kainerugaba-3742016">Somalia</a> where Uganda is part of the African Union peacekeeping force, and the <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/we-re-coming-with-hell-muhoozi-tells-rustlers-3757124">Karamoja region</a> in Uganda’s northeast. </p>
<p>Muhoozi’s fast-tracked rise into a position of power within the military has long produced <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/probe-assasination-claims-says-tinyefuza-1542336">accusations</a> that he is being groomed by Museveni for succession. Yet, despite this ‘heir apparent’ accusation, Muhoozi’s public profile had previously remained relatively small. He is still perceived as something of ‘an unknown quantity’ among broad swathes of the Ugandan public. </p>
<p>He has rarely given interviews to traditional media outlets. For most of his adult life, the average citizen would probably not have known very much about him. </p>
<p>The reasons for this relatively subdued profile were related to the inner workings of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2016.1279853">National Resistance Movement</a> (NRM) regime that Museveni has led since 1986. </p>
<h2>Museveni’s play book</h2>
<p>At every point in his now 36 years at the helm, the president has maintained a posture of impending retirement. Museveni consistently suggests that the next election will be his last and that he dreams of <a href="https://chimpreports.com/museveni-i-am-ready-to-retire-as-soon-as-we-get-east-africa-federation/">the simple life</a> of cattle keeping. </p>
<p>Being constantly about to step down in this way has allowed Museveni to play off the factions of the NRM against each other. He has dangled the possibility of succession before them. </p>
<p>In Uganda, this ploy has been referred to as the succession <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/what-really-happened-to-the-succession-queue--1586740">‘queue’</a> within the ruling party.</p>
<p>In recent years, however, this act has worn thin. </p>
<p>This is mainly because Museveni has successfully marginalised several powerful National Resistance Movement figures who had developed partially autonomous political bases. They include former Vice President Gilbert Bukenya, former Parliamentary Speaker Rebecca Kadaga, former Inspector General of Police Kale Kayihura, and most spectacularly former Prime Minister and Party Secretary General Amama Mbabazi. </p>
<p>The decline of these figures – all rumoured to be in the metaphorical ‘queue’ for the top job – has made even the most naive party elites incredulous to the idea that Museveni will ever hand over power to one of them. </p>
<h2>Enter Muhoozi</h2>
<p>This change has coincided with the political emergence of Muhoozi in recent years. </p>
<p>His public profile has been growing both domestically and internationally. As a presidential advisor on special operations, a post he was appointed to in 2017 alongside his military roles, Muhoozi has <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/is-former-ldu-muhoozi-eyeing-seat-of-commander-in-chief--3800078">held summits</a> with the leaders of Egypt, Kenya and Somalia. </p>
<p>He has also held regional engagements with Rwanda’s Kagame, whom he refers to as his ‘uncle’. Following a meeting between the two men in Kigali in January, Rwanda finally agreed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-has-reopened-the-border-with-uganda-but-distrust-could-close-it-again-176861">reopen its border</a> with Uganda. It had been closed for three years following Kigali’s accusations that Uganda had been harbouring members of the opposition Rwandan National Congress. </p>
<p>The perception that Muhoozi’s intervention has been key in mending the frosty relationship between the two countries was reinforced by a further meeting, again in Kigali, in <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202203150194.html">March</a>. After this, Muhoozi and Kagame announced a broader bi-lateral agreement to stop supporting dissidents in each other’s countries. </p>
<p>Shortly afterwards, Rwandan opposition blogger, and former journalist, <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-deports-top-rwandan-rebel-robert-mukombozi-3771012">Robert Mukombozi</a>, who had been living in Kampala, was pictured boarding a plane at Uganda’s Entebbe International Airport. </p>
<p>Muhoozi confirmed on Twitter that Mukombozi had been expelled, describing him as an “enemy of Rwanda and Uganda”. It was not clear where Mukombozi was going, although it was <a href="https://taarifa.rw/robert-mukombozi-rncs-boss-in-australia-deported-to-rwanda/">possibly to Australia</a>, with which he has ties. </p>
<p>No longer a quiet figure in the background, the First Son has recently become vocal on social media about many aspects of Ugandan politics and its foreign affairs. </p>
<p>In many cases, his stances appear to have <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/72924-disregard-muhoozi-s-tweet-backing-russia-on-ukraine-minister-oryem">contradicted</a> some of the official positions of the Ugandan government. These include his tweets in support of Tigrayan rebels in Ethiopia’s civil war, and Russian President Vladimir Putin in his invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Alarming to many is not just the positions Muhoozi has taken, but the <a href="https://observer.ug/viewpoint/72907-what-s-beneath-muhoozi-s-ridiculous-and-outrageous-tweets">bombastic and egotistic tone</a> of his discourse. </p>
<p>He frequently states that he will destroy Uganda’s enemies, and likens himself to military and revolutionary figures throughout history. These are discursive traits that have long been components of his father’s rhetoric.</p>
<p>Yet, across the country and online, multiple ‘Team MK’ or ‘MK 2026’ <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/71516-muhoozi-army-campaigns-for-his-2026-presidential-bid">groups</a> are popping up to support his future presidential run.</p>
<h2>What’s coming?</h2>
<p>The most likely explanation for Muhoozi’s recent emergence is that his once low profile is being raised to position him to succeed his father. If this is indeed the regime’s wish, it would be unwise to bet against it. </p>
<p>However, the pathway for Muhoozi to reach State House is far from guaranteed. The Ugandan public would expect him to win an election to legitimise his leadership, and in so doing he would potentially face 2021 candidate <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/120/481/629/6406415">Bobi Wine</a> in fierce competition for the nation’s increasingly young electorate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181863/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Wilkins has received funding from the British Institute in Eastern Africa</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Vokes has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Royal Society of New Zealand, the European Union, the Economic and Social Research Council (UK), the British Institute in Eastern Africa, the British Library, and the Australia-Africa Universities Network.</span></em></p>The plan to replace Museveni with his son has dramatically shifted from rumour to reality in recent months.Sam Wilkins, Lecturer, RMIT UniversityRichard Vokes, Professor of Anthropology and International Development, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1281292019-12-03T18:36:34Z2019-12-03T18:36:34Z‘Life just went to crap’: why army veterans are twice as likely to end up in prison<p>The question of whether Australia does enough to support its ex-service personnel is growing in urgency, with Labor leader Anthony Albanese this week <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/we-must-do-better-labor-backs-royal-commission-into-veteran-deaths">adding his voice</a> to those calling for a royal commission into veteran suicides. </p>
<p>The numbers are alarming – between 2001 and 2017, <a href="https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/veterans/national-veteran-suicide-monitoring/contents/summary">419 serving and ex-serving</a> Australian Defence Force personnel died by suicide. But while the suicide rate for men still serving was 48% lower than in the equivalent general population, the rate is 18% higher for those who had left the military. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1201601917404827649"}"></div></p>
<p>For women it’s a similar story, where the suicide rate for ex-serving women is higher than Australian women generally. However, the small numbers of ex-service women who have been studied means the data are limited. </p>
<p>But there’s another issue afflicting ex-military men that’s not often discussed: they are imprisoned twice as often as men in the general Australian population. This is according to the first known Australian prison audit to identify incarcerated ex-service members, conducted in South Australia last year. </p>
<p>In fact, these findings support <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/342/bmj.d3898.extract">research from England</a>, which identifies ex-service men as the largest incarcerated occupational group. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/enough-inquiries-that-go-nowhere-its-time-for-a-royal-commission-into-veteran-suicide-119599">Enough inquiries that go nowhere – it's time for a royal commission into veteran suicide</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The high rate of imprisonment, along with the spike in the suicide rate of ex-members, reflects the challenges some service people face transitioning from military service back to civilian life, and the critical lack of available transition planning and support.</p>
<h2>Why do some veterans turn to crime?</h2>
<p>When a United States ex-Marine fatally shot 12 people in California in 2018, President Donald Trump promoted a widespread, oversimplified connection between military service and criminal offending. He <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-rankles-veterans-with-comments-about-ptsd-and-california-shooter/2018/11/09/2c4ab5ba-e463-11e8-a1c9-6afe99dddd92_story.html">said</a> the shooter </p>
<blockquote>
<p>was in the war. He saw some pretty bad things […] they come back, they’re never the same.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>We have so far interviewed 13 former service men for our ongoing research, trying to explain the findings of the South Australia audit. And we found the connection between military service and criminal offending is more complex than Trump suggests.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/veterans-have-poorer-mental-health-than-australians-overall-we-could-be-serving-them-better-119525">Veterans have poorer mental health than Australians overall. We could be serving them better</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The combination of childhood trauma, military training, social exclusion and mental health issues on discharge created the perfect cocktail of risk factors leading to crime. </p>
<p>For many, joining the service was a way to find respect, discipline and camaraderie. In fact, most interviewees found military service effective at controlling the effects of childhood trauma. One man we interviewed said he</p>
<blockquote>
<p>could see me life going to the shit, that’s when I went and signed up for the army […] The discipline appealed to me. To me I was like yearning for it because I was going down the bad road real quick.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another explained that joining the military was the</p>
<blockquote>
<p>BEST thing I ever did. LOVED it. Well they gave me discipline, they showed me true friendships and it let me work my issues out […] I loved putting my uniform on and the respect that I could show other people, whereas before I’d rather hit them.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Leaving the military can aggravate past trauma</h2>
<p>However, all men complained military discharge was a complete, “sudden cut”. This sudden departure from the service, combined with the rigorous military training, can aggravate previous trauma. As one ex-service member put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the military is a fantastic thing […] but the moment that you’re not there […] it magnifies everything else and it’s just like a ticking time bomb.</p>
<p>I mean you’re trained to shoot people.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another reflected that when he left the army, he lost the routine that kept his past traumas at bay. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was working myself to the bone just to stop thinking about it. Then when I got out issues were coming back, coming back. I’ve lost my structure […] and life just went to crap.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Every man we interviewed had been diagnosed with some combination of post traumatic stress, multiple personality disorder, anti-social personality disorder, bipolar, depression, panic disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder or alcohol and other drug dependence. </p>
<p>They arose from various combinations of pre-service and service-related trauma. </p>
<p>All interviewees lacked support from the Australian Defence Force or government veteran services. One explained how he found it difficult to manage post traumatic stress since his usual strategies were “getting very thin”. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-shell-shock-to-ptsd-proof-of-wars-traumatic-history-37858">From shell shock to PTSD: proof of war's traumatic history</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>And the lack of support for their mental health issues worsened when they were incarcerated because they said the Department of Veterans Affairs cut ties, and “no-one inside the prison system is going to pay for psychological help”. </p>
<h2>Maintaining identity</h2>
<p>For some men, joining criminal organisations was a deliberate way to find a sense of belonging and the “brotherhood” they missed from the defence force. One man reflected:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I found a lot of Australian soldiers that are lost. You think you’re a civilian but you’re not, you never will be […] even three years’ service in the army will change you forever. And the Australian government doesn’t do enough. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Ex-service men in prison are a significant, vulnerable part of that community. The Australian Defence Force and government veteran agencies need to urgently reform transition support services because current discharge processes are costing lives.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/5-800-defence-veterans-homeless-in-australia-thats-more-than-we-thought-123695">5,800 defence veterans homeless in Australia – that's more than we thought</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09638237.2017.1370640">English research</a> has found peer support helps service men transition into civilian life, but the men we interviewed did not receive peer support until they were in prison. </p>
<p>Then, it was through a <a href="https://xmrc.com.au/">welfare organisation</a> and Correctional Services, not defence agencies.</p>
<p>One man told us that after his discharge </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I actually went back and asked if I could mow the lawns for free, just so I could be around them still. They wouldn’t allow it.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If ex-service men could maintain contact with the Australian Defence Force through peer support and informal networks, their identity and sense of purpose could be maintained to reduce the risk factors for offending and re-offending.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>If you or anyone you know needs help or is having suicidal thoughts, contact Lifeline on 131 114 or beyondblue on 1300 22 46 36.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128129/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s time veterans were given the support they need to transition back to civilian life.Kellie Toole, Lecturer in Law, University of AdelaideElaine Waddell, Dr of Public Health, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1148872019-05-29T08:58:11Z2019-05-29T08:58:11ZFemale military peacekeepers left feeling overwhelmed after inadequate training<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276798/original/file-20190528-42571-1rbblfo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwandan peacekeepers in Mali in 2014. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/14283028072/sizes/l">United Nations Photo</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Female military peacekeepers deployed to complex UN missions often feel overwhelmed and ill-prepared when providing assistance to local women and girls who’ve been the victims of violence. </p>
<p>The UN expects female peacekeepers around the world to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/report/increasing-female-participation-peacekeeping-operations">improve the effectiveness of missions</a> by gaining access to members of local communities that male peacekeepers cannot reach. But <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2018.1503934">my recent research</a> in Rwanda showed that women peacekeepers need more support. </p>
<p>I looked at whether the kind of training women from the Rwanda Defence Force received before their deployment in mixed-gender battalions to the <a href="https://unamid.unmissions.org/">UN Mission in Darfur</a> (UNAMID) and the <a href="https://unmiss.unmissions.org/">UN Mission in South Sudan</a> (UNMISS) was sufficient for the challenges they would face on their mission. I asked 24 Rwandan women from the military awaiting deployment and 22 who had returned from missions about their perceptions of the training they received, and how it related to the expectations and realities of working in UN and African Union (AU) peace operations.</p>
<h2>Insufficiently prepared</h2>
<p>Women waiting to deploy felt confident that the training equipped them for all <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/protection-of-civilians-mandate">protection of civilian tasks</a> they would be assigned. But women who’d returned from dangerous peace operations felt the pre-deployment training didn’t adequately equip them. They found it especially challenging to handle complex cases where women and girls had experienced sexual violence related to conflict, were extremely traumatised, or required urgent assistance. These challenges were exacerbated by the difficulty of communicating with local woman through an interpreter – a skill that had to be learnt on the job in difficult circumstances.</p>
<p>A 27-year-old liaison officer, who was critical of the military training’s emphasis on processes and procedures, suggested that “more information on the psychological impact violence has on survivors” was required. She said encountering gender-based violence in camps for internally displaced people (IDP) “was not easy” and the training hadn’t prepared her for sustained engagement with survivors. She added:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When I was on the ground and reached the [IDP] camp, you find this person who was raped for two or three hours and the people around her don’t want to communicate, they don’t care about what happened. You get this person, you put her in touch with the NGOs, you take her to hospital, but you need to spend three or four hours with her.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The women I interviewed also felt overwhelmed by the sheer scale of the assistance local communities required in Darfur and South Sudan. One 30-year-old major who deployed as a mechanic in UNAMID said there weren’t enough female peacekeepers to make a real impact.</p>
<h2>Gender biased training</h2>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276799/original/file-20190528-42546-5qgeeb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276799/original/file-20190528-42546-5qgeeb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=898&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276799/original/file-20190528-42546-5qgeeb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=898&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276799/original/file-20190528-42546-5qgeeb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=898&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276799/original/file-20190528-42546-5qgeeb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1129&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276799/original/file-20190528-42546-5qgeeb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1129&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276799/original/file-20190528-42546-5qgeeb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1129&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Peacekeepers from the UN Mission in Sudan in 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/6127493530/sizes/l">United Nations Photo</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While gender advisers and military observers receive specialist community engagement training, most tactical-level female peacekeepers, like their male colleagues, receive military-led training two to three months prior to deployment. Typically, the programme comprises a mixture of training sessions in the classroom and field exercises designed by both the UN and local military. </p>
<p>These sessions introduce theoretical concepts but don’t provide practical knowledge about how people behave directly after experiencing violence, forms of trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder, and what to do during contact with survivors. Nor does the training desensitise peacekeepers in preparation for the distressing situations they’re likely to witness. One 32-year-old second lieutenant reflected on what was missing:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We study gender issues theoretically, but in the mission area, when we start putting theory into practice, there are challenges. In training, my mate acts as a refugee and I act as I’m going to help her. But that is like theatre – you can’t grasp the reality well.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Gender biases also play a role. In Rwanda, senior leaders and trainers told me that female peacekeepers naturally knew how to respond to local women’s needs by dint of being the same sex. They believed women inherently possessed the required skill set, incorporating the traditional feminine traits of empathy, compassion, communication and the ability to care for vulnerable people. </p>
<p>There was also an assumption circulating that Rwandan women were good at providing victim assistance because of the country’s own history of conflict, where some <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/06/11/rwandas-children-of-rape-are-coming-of-age-against-the-odds/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.22a411aa8fcb">350,000 to 500,000 women were raped</a> during the civil war and genocide in 1994. Women awaiting deployment on peackeeping missions appeared to have internalised this stereotype, even though more than half of those I interviewed were between 18- and 23-years-old and born after 1994. This self-stereotyping resulted in a false confidence among the trainee peacekeepers that they were equipped to counsel and support traumatised women and girls.</p>
<h2>Training partnerships</h2>
<p>Rwandan female police peacekeepers I spoke to who had worked in UN missions in Darfur, South Sudan and Haiti, hadn’t felt as ill-prepared as their military colleagues. According to one senior female police peacekeeper, community engagement was a big part of their day-to-day job in Rwanda and they had significant experience helping those affected by violence. Yet currently, the Rwanda National Police and the Rwanda Defence Force run separate training programmes.</p>
<p>To help mitigate some of the issues I’ve found in my research, the police and military could share good practice and develop joint pre-deployment training sessions on the implementation of the UN’s protection of civilians mandate, including providing assistance to victims. At the same time, the UN, regional organisations and those countries that contribute troops to peacekeeping missions <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2019-05/peacekeeping-2.php">should continue to work together</a> to strengthen their training.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114887/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgina Holmes receives funding from the Leverhulme Trust.</span></em></p>Interviews with Rwandan women from the military who had served on peacekeeping missions found many felt ill-equipped for what they had to deal with. Georgina Holmes, Leverhulme Early Career Research Fellow, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/724902017-02-07T19:13:10Z2017-02-07T19:13:10ZWe need to be clear-headed when offering land for Singapore to train its soldiers<p>Deputy Prime Minister Barnaby Joyce has said the Australian government <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-03/barnaby-joyce-stop-defence-adf-land-acquisition-showalwater-bay/8238200">has “no intention”</a> to forcibly acquire farmland north of Rockhampton in Queensland for military purposes. While this may come as a relief to landowners fighting against the acquisition, the Australian Defence Force is still in agreement with Singapore to provide land for military exercises.</p>
<p>The existing defence training areas in <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-06/singapore-to-expand-queensland-defence-bases/7389168">Shoalwater Bay and near Townsville</a> were earmarked for expansion to honour the deal, under which the number of Singapore’s troops on rotation in Australia will increase from 6,000 to 14,000. </p>
<p>This all begs the questions: why do we need to provide land to Singapore at all and what do we stand to gain from the arrangement? The answers lie in our historical relationship with Singapore and our strategic place in the region.</p>
<h2>Australia’s relationship with Singapore</h2>
<p>Ties between Australia and Singapore go back to the days of the British Empire. Australians were based there in the second world war, fighting alongside British forces against the Japanese. Thousands were detained as prisoners of war following the British surrender to the Japanese in February 1942. </p>
<p>The connection between the two countries is epitomised at <a href="http://www.cwgc.org/find-a-cemetery/cemetery/2004200/KRANJI%20WAR%20CEMETERY">Kranji War Cemetery</a> in Singapore, overlooking the Straits of Johore, where the remains of Australians who died there are interred. In the years following the war, Australia remained engaged with Singapore. Since Singaporean independence in 1965, the two have been close partners. </p>
<p>For Australia, Singapore has been an easy access point into South-East Asia. It is strategically located at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, through which <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/05/world-most-important-trade-route/">about half of the world’s seaborne trade passes</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155785/original/image-20170207-27202-y0hsoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155785/original/image-20170207-27202-y0hsoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155785/original/image-20170207-27202-y0hsoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155785/original/image-20170207-27202-y0hsoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155785/original/image-20170207-27202-y0hsoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155785/original/image-20170207-27202-y0hsoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155785/original/image-20170207-27202-y0hsoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155785/original/image-20170207-27202-y0hsoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The connection between Singapore and Australia is episomised at Kranji War Cemetery.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/geoffwhalan/16732291052/in/photolist-ruznbL-cGU7d3-86gwNK-8R1hVL-86Heyd-Yjnt-7CE3de-9BKNnQ-YjnF-YjnY-ruESqk-rbkaUD-Yjo4-CRX62-89PG6B-Yjoc-8cTPbq-ruyF2X-9BGSqz-7CEqmP-aEebRv-a6ueAP-3Veuwr-7CE52Z-g5qE-hiAmPS-ruzntj-7CE8xj-7CE4Wi-vUTQW-rrtSbK-7CJe5w-aEeaV8-aEebKe-qRn1S-3ViZPj-rdsnV9-s5wuvV-aEebPt-nY7Sac-9pixQn-aEebig-aEebLZ-aEebq2-rz6VeU-ofqN6J-aEeb1n-aEeaNH-ruDayH-aEeboB">Geoff Whalan/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Australian economic interests in Singapore have been matched by security ties. Today Australian ships and aircraft transit through Singapore, often under provisions associated with the <a href="https://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/vol3no1Thayer.pdf">Five Power Defence Arrangements</a> which link the armed forces of Singapore, the UK, New Zealand, Australia and Malaysia. </p>
<p>Commonwealth ties remain palpable too, with a shared English language and British-derived laws. Bilateral ties have broadened and deepened. An <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/geo/singapore/Pages/joint-announcement-australia-singapore-comprehensive-strategic-partnership.aspx">Australia-Singapore Comprehensive Strategic Partnership</a> was signed in mid-2015. This further expanded the trade ties formalised through the 2003 <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/safta/Pages/singapore-australia-fta.aspx">Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement</a> . </p>
<p>As a result of all this, Singapore is about as close to Australia legally, diplomatically and economically as Australia’s oldest regional ally, New Zealand.</p>
<h2>But why do they need our land?</h2>
<p>Singapore is a small city-state with virtually no spare land on which to conduct military training. By way of example, <a href="http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Geography/Area/Land/Per-capita">New Zealand has about 64.22 square km</a> per 1,000 people, while Singapore has 0.148 square km per 1,000 people. </p>
<p>The Shoalwater Bay training area encompasses 4,545 square km – more than six times the size of Singapore (719.1 square km). Acquired by the Commonwealth Government in 1965, it has been one of the most important military training areas in Australia, frequently used by Australian, US, New Zealand and Singaporean troops. </p>
<p>Over time, the level of use increased, with greater frequency and scale of exercises involving larger numbers of Australian troops and US marines conducting amphibious war games. This involves troops being sent ashore from nearby ships.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155810/original/image-20170207-27194-9g9icg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155810/original/image-20170207-27194-9g9icg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155810/original/image-20170207-27194-9g9icg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=687&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155810/original/image-20170207-27194-9g9icg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=687&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155810/original/image-20170207-27194-9g9icg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=687&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155810/original/image-20170207-27194-9g9icg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=863&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155810/original/image-20170207-27194-9g9icg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=863&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155810/original/image-20170207-27194-9g9icg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=863&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Singapore is a very small city-state that has long felt uneasy about its neighbourhood.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fc/Southeast_asia.svg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Singapore has long felt uneasy about its neighbourhood. It is surrounded by two much larger and predominantly Muslim nations, Malaysia and Indonesia, with whom it has not always been on best terms. That unease has grown with China’s increasing assertiveness and extraordinary island-building nearby in the South China Sea.</p>
<p>Singapore has invested in modernising and expanding its defence force. But with limited options to use for training, it <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-06/singapore-to-expand-queensland-defence-bases/7389168">signed a A$2.25 billion deal</a> with Australia in 2015 to allow for an increase in troop training rotations. To accommodate this, and avoid environmental degradation, additional land has to be found.</p>
<h2>Shoalwater Bay</h2>
<p>The most obvious location to host Singaporean troops is alongside the existing training area in Shoalwater Bay. Singapore and Australia have already invested in military infrastructure there, and much of the money will be spent through local industries in nearby towns.</p>
<p>The coastal land allows for a wide variety of training activities or “war games” involving land, sea and air forces (including the amphibious activities where forces practise getting across the shoreline).</p>
<p>Australia has signed a deal with Singapore and has an obligation to follow through. And it is in Australia’s interests to further bolster ties with a long-standing and trusted regional security partner. We should be clear-headed about the importance of ensuring this training area expansion proceeds relatively smoothly.</p>
<p>Singapore is paying for the benefits of accessing Australian land and a considerable budget has been allocated to secure the deal. There is little doubt, however, that the matter could have been handled better. Even if it has withdrawn plans to compulsorily acquire some land, the government needs to better argue the case for this agreement with our important regional partner.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72490/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Blaxland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The small city-state is an important regional ally, and we should work hard to maintain that strong relationship.John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/609042016-07-20T08:54:02Z2016-07-20T08:54:02ZHow Sweden is using virtual reality to help the military work with civilians<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128328/original/image-20160627-28391-odzq9r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">What would you do?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Our white Land Rover comes to a stop a few metres in front of the checkpoint, and a man approaches the window. He asks us what we are doing in the area, and we inform him that we’ve just had a meeting with the mayor of the town. To this he responds: “The mayor is a war criminal. You have to talk to Tony.” As we drive slowly away, we can hear him mutter: “There is no need for the UN here, we provide security.” </p>
<p>The lights come on in the training room, and the action on the screen is paused. “How do you think that went?” our instructor asks. </p>
<p>Military applications have long been at the vanguard of virtual reality (VR) technology, though the civilian commercial market is quickly <a href="http://www.roadtovr.com/the-gulf-between-high-end-military-vr-and-consumer-vr-is-rapidly-shrinking/">catching up</a>. While the prospect of fighting the enemy on a <a href="http://www.defensetech.org/2016/04/21/navy-conducts-virtual-reality-demo-aboard-destroyer/">destroyer at sea</a> or in a <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/us-military-urban-combat-training-virtual-reality-could-be-used-prepare-fighting-2241054">megacity skyscraper</a> has consistently excited militaries and gamers alike, the use of VR to train soldiers in softer skills has flown under the radar. </p>
<p>But its importance shouldn’t be understated. These proficiencies are in serious demand today, as international military forces play an increasingly prominent role in crisis response and peace support operations the world over.</p>
<p>Whether deployed under the aegis of the UN, NATO, the EU or some other organisation, these forces are now routinely placed under civilian leadership in the field. They also have to be adept at interacting with their international civilian counterparts, as well as local populations in conflict zones.</p>
<p>Faced with the imperative to adapt to this new reality, the Swedish Armed Forces have taken a particularly innovative approach. </p>
<h2>Check yourself</h2>
<p>At its two-week training in <a href="http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/swedint/courses-at-swedint-and-how-to-apply/cmr/">Civil-Military Relations</a>, the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre, <a href="http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/swedint/">SWEDINT</a>, employs VR technology to teach military, police, and civilian trainees to work together.</p>
<p>The “<a href="http://theconversation.com/military-needs-a-more-realistic-approach-to-virtual-reality-58552">mixed reality</a>” session I attended began in SWEDINT’s VR exercise room, where trainees embarked on a joint assessment mission in a fictional conflict zone. As part of the exercise, the UN vehicle travelled to the headquarters of a local NGO named HELP. </p>
<p>After the team encountered the representative for the NGO virtually, they were guided to a separate training room where a live actor awaited them. As someone who researches humanitarian-military relations in international missions (which I’ve discussed <a href="https://ilg2.org/2016/04/19/it-is-a-cold-liaison-military-perceptions-of-humanitarian-distinction/#more-9828">here</a> and <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2016/02/03/conference-seeks-to-improve-relations-and-understanding-between-civilians-and-military/">here</a>), I was especially curious to see how the trainees engage with this local NGO. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131122/original/image-20160719-7913-1d75of4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131122/original/image-20160719-7913-1d75of4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131122/original/image-20160719-7913-1d75of4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131122/original/image-20160719-7913-1d75of4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131122/original/image-20160719-7913-1d75of4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131122/original/image-20160719-7913-1d75of4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131122/original/image-20160719-7913-1d75of4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Swedish military drilling in the real world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ASwedish_military_rescue_operation_-_exercise_-_1.jpg">Szilas via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the simulated meeting, a UN civilian was put in charge of speaking for the mission. He joked to the NGO representative while pointing to his military colleagues: “I am with the civilian UN, so we can work together … but I know you are allergic to the uniforms beside me.” The NGO representative replied that she must indeed keep her independence, and that in her view the entire UN is actually “a military of sorts”. To reassure her, the UN civilian told her that next time, he would come to the meeting without the military and police. </p>
<p>This attracted the ire of one of his Finnish colleagues, who interjected: “Don’t apologise for the military, we are part of the team!” A Swedish soldier added: “If we continue to put up the boundaries between us, we are never going to function together.”</p>
<p>Similarly, the virtual checkpoint encounter exposed how different people can experience the same situation very differently. After the UN vehicle had driven away, the instructor asked us how many armed men were at the checkpoint. </p>
<p>As a civilian, I realised I hadn’t even tried to count the men – and it seemed none of my civilian counterparts had either. The military participants, though, made fairly accurate guesses; a policeman got it right, with seven.</p>
<p>As these two brief vignettes attest, these sorts of exercises might not resolve tensions or dispel stereotypes so much as bring them to light. Given the seriousness of the situations in which civilians and military forces find themselves, this is a vital priority. </p>
<p>As one of the course leaders explained to me, VR training is at its best when it holds up a mirror. It reveals to different actors how they are perceived, and alerts them to discrepancies between the way they see themselves and the impressions they make on others. This an opportunity to navigate, if not transcend, fraught territory together.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60904/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Sutton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The author sat in on one of the Swedish military’s virtual reality training exercises. Here’s what they saw.Rebecca Sutton, Lawyer & PhD Candidate, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/585522016-06-01T14:38:19Z2016-06-01T14:38:19ZMilitary needs a more realistic approach to virtual reality<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124789/original/image-20160601-26863-1eo65zo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Virtual military</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The worlds of warfare and virtual reality are an appealing combination. Millions of fans of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/11/call-of-duty-infinite-warfare">Call of Duty</a> would no doubt jump from their sofas at the chance to immerse themselves in a 3D version of the game, given the right kit.</p>
<p>But the serious side of this combination is appealing too. Using virtual reality to train soldiers and other military personnel is a much safer (and cheaper) option for governments and their defence organisations. So <a href="http://forces.tv/77866430">what does the future hold</a> for virtual reality technologies and their military applications? </p>
<p>Every year, the world’s defence simulation industries come together at international events to show off their latest products, each vying for the attention of the browsing military supremos. <a href="http://www.itec.co.uk/">ITEC</a> and <a href="http://www.dsei.co.uk/">DSEI</a> are huge exhibitions where defence procurers queue side by side with developers and high-tech enthusiasts, hopeful of experiencing the latest (alleged) advances in virtual reality military simulation. </p>
<p>It is hard not to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-virtual-reality-hype-train-is-starting-to-make-me-queasy-30113">carried away by the marketing hype</a> produced by defence simulation companies. But standing back and reviewing exactly what is on show, I often find myself questioning how much of this high-tech pizzazz will ever deliver real benefit to members of our armed forces. I suspect that in the unforgiving world of the military, the stark answer is very little.</p>
<p>The vast majority of products on show are, in truth, unsuited to the realities of military training or live missions. The one essential ingredient that always seems to be missing from these so-called advanced simulations is clear evidence that real human factors have played a significant role in their development. Instead it soon becomes clear that human elements have been ignored in favour of staging visually appealing demonstrations that do little more than show off the latest “must-have” hardware and software.</p>
<p>But not all the reality can be virtual. I was directly involved in two projects which demonstrated how the blending of the virtual with the real – “mixed reality” – could deliver a far more believable training setup than one relying on virtual reality technology alone. </p>
<p>The applications in these two projects involved a new close-range weapons trainer for the Royal Navy, and the development of aircraft situational awareness and communication skills for helicopter marshals in the RAF. </p>
<p>Both projects exploited significant real or physical objects in the quest to make the virtual features of the simulation more believable. Inert but real weapons were used in the naval project and a wooden helicopter door frame mock-up for the RAF one. Both demonstrated improvements in trainee performance, as well as significant financial savings for the defence sponsors in estate costs, ammunition and the need to tie up real vessel or aircraft assets.</p>
<p>A more recent example was the development of a low-cost simulator supporting the training of remote operation of the UK’s latest unmanned bomb disposal robot, the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/6309515/Northrop-Grumman-to-supply-British-Army-with-bomb-disposal-robot-as-part-of-60m-Ministry-of-Defence-contract.html">Cutlass</a>. The need for a simulation-based trainer for Cutlass was obvious, especially since the prohibitive expense of repair meant that real robots could only be made available to trainees on limited occasions under strict supervision. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124782/original/image-20160601-3253-1773c9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124782/original/image-20160601-3253-1773c9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124782/original/image-20160601-3253-1773c9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124782/original/image-20160601-3253-1773c9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124782/original/image-20160601-3253-1773c9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=577&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124782/original/image-20160601-3253-1773c9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=577&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124782/original/image-20160601-3253-1773c9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=577&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Cutlass and its virtual training console.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There were many, myself included, who felt that the Cutlass operator’s console – in particular, the cluttered, multi-menu, screen-based interface which featured small windows relaying images from the vehicle’s cameras, was overly complex and could cause problems. Ditto the six joysticks governing vehicle driving and multi-axis control.</p>
<p>Initially, it was believed the complex skills necessary to control the Cutlass vehicle could be delivered using a simple, software-only virtual environment. One US organisation even produced such a simulation using <a href="https://www.secondlife.com/">Second Life</a>, the online virtual world. However, from a human perspective, it became very clear that such a low-fidelity solution would be doomed to failure, as there was no way of guaranteeing transfer of system specific knowledge and skills from the virtual to the real. </p>
<h2>Let’s get real</h2>
<p>So the decision was taken to use a mixed reality solution and produce a low-cost physical replica of the operator’s console to accompany the high-fidelity graphical environment in which the virtual Cutlass could be deployed.</p>
<p>The fundamental human-centric lessons learned during these projects today form the basis of the latest virtual, augmented and mixed reality demonstrators under development by the <a href="http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/activity/eese/ise/hit-team/index.aspx">Human Interface Technologies Team</a> at the University of Birmingham, including an advanced command-and-control station, and a brand new mixed reality training system for future defence medics which will benefit from the interplay between real-world objects and virtual reality reconstructions of the interior of a Chinook helicopter.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124790/original/image-20160601-1951-2n4il0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124790/original/image-20160601-1951-2n4il0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=216&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124790/original/image-20160601-1951-2n4il0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=216&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124790/original/image-20160601-1951-2n4il0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=216&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124790/original/image-20160601-1951-2n4il0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=272&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124790/original/image-20160601-1951-2n4il0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=272&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124790/original/image-20160601-1951-2n4il0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=272&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mixed reality training.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Without such an approach they stand very little chance of being successfully exploited in actual armed conflicts. And with today’s emergence of highly speculative interactive technologies, those same principles must be applied rigorously in all projects seeking to exploit virtual, augmented and mixed reality. Especially in matters of war, when life and death situations are all too real.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58552/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Stone receives funding from BAE Systems, Defence Science & Technology Laboratory (Dstl/MoD), Royal Centre for Defence Medicine.</span></em></p>Human experience must remain at the heart of technological advances.Robert Stone, Chair in Interactive Multimedia Systems, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.