tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/mohammed-morsi-6359/articlesMohammed Morsi – The Conversation2023-11-07T17:29:05Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2167732023-11-07T17:29:05Z2023-11-07T17:29:05ZEgypt’s strongman president faces election amid economic slump and popular anger over inaction on Gaza<p>The bitter conflict between Israel and Hamas could not have come at a worse time for Egypt. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the former military strongman who <a href="https://theconversation.com/full-circle-in-egypt-as-failed-revolution-lets-the-military-strengthen-its-grip-22501">seized power in 2013</a> amid the turbulent fallout of the Arab Spring, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egyptian-president-sisi-confirms-candidacy-december-presidential-election-2023-10-02/">faces a general election in December</a>. </p>
<p>Beset by economic woes and with a political and humanitarian catastrophe unfolding on his country’s border, it will be an election fraught with risks.</p>
<p>Sisi effectively took power in July 2013, after decades of military dictatorship under Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak’s 30-year reign, which ended in April 2011 during the Arab Spring, was followed by a brief and turbulent interregnum in which a Muslim Brotherhood-backed government led by academic Mohamed Morsi struggled to maintain order. </p>
<p>In July 2013, Sisi removed Morsi from power and <a href="https://theconversation.com/egypts-counter-revolution-won-out-in-a-year-of-epochal-change-35799">won 96% of the vote</a> the following year in an election which drew <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/world/middleeast/international-observers-find-fault-with-egypt-vote.html">widespread international criticism</a>. He has not really faced significant political opposition since, but this can’t hide his deep unpopularity with many Egyptians.</p>
<p>At present, Sisi presides over what most experts would say is a contender for the region’s worst performing economy. Annual inflation hit a historic high of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypts-inflation-quickens-record-380-september-2023-10-10/#">38% in September</a> and the <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/EGY/egypt/youth-unemployment-rate#">youth unemployment rate is currently running at 17%</a>. </p>
<p>Compounding this economic crisis have been several rounds of currency devaluation and an incoming mandated International Monetary Fund bailout. A harsh <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/31/egypt-imf-bailout-highlights-risks-austerity-corruption">IMF-imposed austerity programme</a> will push struggling Egyptians to a level of destitution not seen since the Egyptian bread riots of 1977.</p>
<p>It’s against this unstable background that Sisi will have to fight for reelection. You could be excused for assuming it would be a mere box-ticking exercise, as Sisi has ruled Egypt with an iron fist since ousting the Muslim Brotherhood in July 2013’s brutal coup. </p>
<p>No election has been free and fair since then and Egypt’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/07/journalists-go-on-trial-in-egypt-for-offending-mps">independent media has been all but crushed</a> in the interceding years. Opposition parties have either been suppressed or co-opted, while civil society – previously a lively political sphere – now looks back at Mubarak’s dictatorship with a degree of nostalgia.</p>
<p>Initially – and for the first time since Sisi took power – it looked as if he would face a credible opposition. Former MP <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/67601/egypts-ahmed-tantawi-the-last-major-opposition-leader-standing-up-to-sisi/">Ahmed Tantawi</a>, a candidate for the Civil Democratic Movement, made a name for himself as an MP by openly criticising Sisi in parliament and not taking part in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypt-launches-national-dialogue-amid-ongoing-security-crackdown-2023-05-03/">National Dialogue</a>. </p>
<p>This was a Sisi-sponsored initiative which was launched in May 2023. It was presented by the government as an inclusive forum for addressing Egypt’s economic and political challenges – but has been dismissed by critics as merely a vehicle for Sisi’s own agenda.</p>
<p>Tantawi’s campaign gained momentum with support from prominent left-wingers, secularists and even some Muslim Brotherhood leaders in exile, attracted by Tantawi’s stance on releasing political prisoners. There are currently an estimated <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-brotherhood-prisons-specialrepo-idUSKCN0R30Y420150903">40,000 political prisoners in Egypt’s jails</a>, many of them Muslim Brotherhood members. </p>
<p>But Tantawi <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egyptian-opposition-candidate-ends-campaign-presidential-poll-2023-10-13/">withdrew his candidacy on October 13</a>, saying that pro-government “thugs” were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egyptian-opposition-candidate-ends-campaign-presidential-poll-2023-10-13/">preventing people from registering their support</a> for his candidacy. </p>
<p>If his abortive campaign wasn’t a direct threat to Sisi, Tantawi’s popularity represents a structural shift in Egyptian politics. Sisi has dealt so badly with Egypt’s economic problems in recent years it has left him vulnerable. </p>
<p>And his habit of <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220523-sisi-suggests-egyptians-eat-tree-leaves-as-prices-soar/">incautious statements</a> hasn’t helped – at one point when questioned about the soaring price of okra, an Egyptian staple, he suggested they emulate the followers of the prophet Muhammad and “eat leaves”.</p>
<h2>War on the doorstep</h2>
<p>With the war in Gaza on Sisi’s doorstep, the regime faces a difficult balancing act. Israel is bent on securing its border no matter the consequences for Egypt. Yet the fallout for Sisi at home could antagonise domestic vulnerabilities. The image of thousands of Gazans dying while Egypt’s Rafah border stays closed could be very harmful for the regime.</p>
<p>Sisi needs to be cautious, given his <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-israels-war-hamas-spells-trouble-egypts-sisi#:%7E:text=Indeed%2C%20ever%20since%20Sisi%20came,a%20decade%20of%20Sisi's%20tenure.">close relationship with the Israeli government</a>. Egypt has been <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/egypt-cauldron-gaza">party to the 16-year-long Israeli blockade</a> of Gaza, enforcing tight controls on the border crossing at Rafah. </p>
<p>But with an election looming he now needs to appease an Egyptian public who are far more sympathetic to the Gazan’s plight than the Israelis. He has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/21/exploiting-our-anger-egyptians-denounce-staged-pro-palestine-protests">attracted widespread criticism</a> from opponents who say his administration has been organising staged protests to piggyback on public sympathy for Palestinians as the death toll from Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip rises.</p>
<p>But the real risk to his administration lies at home with the ever-present threat of Egypt’s <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/30/egypt-sisi-muslim-brotherhood-history-repression-nationalism-democracy-opposition/">well-established Islamist movements</a>. It was a Muslim Brotherhood-sponsored popular uprising at Tahrir Square that toppled Mubarak and handed government to Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in 2011. </p>
<p>That history now acts as a serious warning for Egypt’s military to never be complacent about the potential threat of Islamist movements. Sisi’s regime has done its utmost to destroy the Brotherhood. </p>
<p>In the ten years since his security forces <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt">massacred more than 900 people</a> while violently breaking up mass anti-government sit-ins in Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda squares in August 2013, tens of thousands have been subject to arbitrary detention without trial or have been sentenced in military courts to lengthy prison terms for dissent. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most shameful exhibition of corrupt use of power was his regime’s treatment of Morsi. The former president died after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/17/mohamed-morsi-dead-ousted-president-egypt-collapses-after-court-session">collapsing inside the defendants “cage” in a Cairo courtroom</a> following six years in solitary confinement. </p>
<p>It is one thing for an incumbent to deal with the failings of a collapsing economy. It is quite another to accommodate an aggrieved public watching a human rights massacre right on its border. If the Sisi regime continues to let this happen on its watch, the opposition will have more ammunition than they have had for years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216773/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Gillian Kennedy received previously funding from the Leverhulme Foundation.</span></em></p>Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has held Egypt in an iron grip for a decade, but his regime’s close relations with Israel might prove a problem with voters.Gillian Kennedy, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1965432022-12-16T13:13:27Z2022-12-16T13:13:27ZMuslim Brotherhood at the crossroads: Where now for Egypt’s once-powerful group following leader’s death in exile, repression at home?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501383/original/file-20221215-22-5t8yv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C53%2C3994%2C2604&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the Muslim Brotherhood protest at a rally in 2013.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/members-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-and-supporters-of-ousted-news-photo/173509620?phrase=Muslim%20Brotherhood%20flag%20Egypt&adppopup=true">Carsten Koall/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ibrahim Munir, the leader of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-ibrahim-munir-muslim-brotherhood-acting-leader-dies">died on Nov. 4, 2022</a>, in exile in London. While the news generated few headlines around the world, Munir’s death marks a critical moment in the evolution of a group founded nearly 100 years ago, as a social and religious movement.</p>
<p>Over the years, the Brotherhood grew into the most significant social movement and political opposition in Egypt. Its Islamist ideology – which calls for public policies in line with its interpretation of Islam – <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-muslim-brotherhood-and-jamaat-i-islami/">became widely influential</a> around the world.</p>
<p>But since a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html">2013 military coup</a> that removed the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammed Morsi from power, the group has been all but destroyed, with most of its leaders either imprisoned, killed or in exile.</p>
<p>For now, the group has <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20221107-muslim-brotherhood-assigns-temporary-acting-guide/">a new temporary leader</a> in Muhyeddine al-Zayet, a 70-year-old senior figure in the movement.</p>
<p>But the stark reality is that the Brotherhood is at a turning point: The movement either will have to reinvent itself or face the prospect of gradually fading into irrelevance.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.wesleyan.edu/academics/faculty/imatesan/profile.html">scholar of social movements</a> who has <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-violence-pendulum-9780197510087?cc=us&lang=en&">studied the evolution of the Brotherhood</a> and interviewed both members and defectors, I believe its fate hangs on three issues: how it responds to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s repression of opposition groups including the Brotherhood; which leaders guide the movement during its crisis; and how the group rebuilds in exile. </p>
<h2>Has the Brotherhood run its course?</h2>
<p>The Muslim Brotherhood was <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/egypts-muslim-brotherhood">established in 1928</a> by Hassan al-Banna, a primary school teacher with a vision that piety and Islamic values can help transform the individual, reform society and ultimately bring about an Islamic state.</p>
<p>Appealing to Egyptians disillusioned with the country’s existing religious institutions, critical of its political system and angered by the Western interference in the Muslim world, the Brotherhood <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/africa/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-explainer/index.html">grew into a grassroots movement</a> with an intricate network of schools, newspapers and social services.</p>
<p>By the end of the 20th century, the Brotherhood dominated civil society in Egypt and became a prominent source of political opposition. It also established branches and affiliates throughout the Muslim world. </p>
<p>Following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/what-is-the-arab-spring-and-how-did-it-start">2011 Arab Spring</a>, which saw popular uprisings in a number of countries across the Middle East, the Brotherhood came to power in Egypt’s first free and fair elections. Its affiliated political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, won the largest parliamentary block, and its candidate, Mohammed Morsi, was elected president. By June 2013, however, disillusionment with the lack of political progress and the poor economic performance of the country led to widespread popular mobilization against the Brotherhood. A month later the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html">military ousted Morsi</a> from power. </p>
<h2>Emergence of two Brotherhoods</h2>
<p>When Brotherhood supporters took to the streets and demanded that the democratically elected president be reinstalled, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/08/egypt-clashes-morsi-muslim-brotherhood-military">police and army forces opened fire on demonstrators</a>. On Aug. 14, 2013, security forces brutally put down the sit-in in Rab’a Square in eastern Cairo, killing over 800 people, in what Human Rights Watch said <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt">likely amounted to crimes against humanity</a>.</p>
<p>For some Brotherhood members, the brutality of the security forces sparked a <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/13510347.2016.1273903?journalCode=fdem20">desire for revenge and justified a violent response</a>.</p>
<p>For the most senior Brotherhood leaders, however, violence was neither politically pragmatic nor ideologically justified. In the absence of a clear vision for how to respond to the political crisis, many young members became <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/13510347.2019.1630610">disillusioned with the organization</a>. </p>
<p>By 2014, the Brotherhood was not just losing members. Two additional fault lines emerged: the question of leadership and the question of exile. Mass arrests caused a leadership vacuum that led to a <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/13510347.2019.1630610">new cadres of midranking members</a> taking over activities inside Egypt. </p>
<p>These new leaders adopted a more revolutionary tone and started operating independently of the older leadership. The parallel claims to authority and divergent visions over how to respond to the political repression <a href="https://research.sharqforum.org/2018/09/07/iran-and-the-egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-heading-towards-development-or-simply-repair/">led to a split</a> between the so-called “historical leaders” and the new leadership.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Photo of an elderly man in a black blazer and blue shift." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former leader of the Muslim Brotherhood Ibrahim Munir in 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/secretary-general-of-the-international-organization-of-the-news-photo/173448728?phrase=Ibrahim%20Munir%20Muslim%20Brotherhood&adppopup=true">Ozan Kose/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By 2016 there were in effect two Muslim Brotherhoods: the original group, under the leadership of Ibrahim Munir as the deputy guide operating out of the U.K., and the <a href="https://research.sharqforum.org/2018/09/07/iran-and-the-egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-heading-towards-development-or-simply-repair/">so-called “General Office,” under the new leadership</a>. The General Office attracted many young revolutionaries, including women, but the group had significantly fewer resources, which led it eventually to dissipate.</p>
<p>I learned from interviews with Brotherhood members that with Munir operating as leader in exile, a deeply contested internal debate emerged over whether to restructure the movement and shift the strategic decision-making to the leaders abroad. Outside of Egypt, the organization established regional consultative councils in most host states with a significant Brotherhood presence, most notably in Turkey.</p>
<p>While this allowed for some semblance of organizational rebuilding, some leaders still insisted that all major decisions about the direction, tactics and strategies of the Brotherhood be made inside Egypt. </p>
<h2>Can the Brotherhood rise again?</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that the Muslim Brotherhood has been nearly destroyed by government repression. In 1954 a militant faction of the Brotherhood allegedly attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser, prompting <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-violence-pendulum-9780197510087?cc=us&lang=en&">a severe crackdown on the group</a>. The torture and abuse that Brotherhood members faced in prison inspired a new militant vision for activism and led a small group of Brotherhood members to start plotting attacks on government officials. The government discovered these cells before any plans came to fruition, leading to a <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691167886/making-the-arab-world">second major wave of repression in 1965</a>.</p>
<p>But the circumstances in which the Brotherhood finds itself today are different from these past periods of repression. It is more deeply divided than before. And importantly, the current repression comes after the movement came to power and had a chance to rule but ultimately failed.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABV_Egypt_Report_Public-Opinion_Arab-Barometer_2019.pdf">Arab Barometer</a>, a nonpartisan research network, shows that since 2013 Egyptians have been consistently skeptical of political Islam as expressed by the Brotherhood, even as the population remains largely religious. For for many of Egypt’s young people the Brotherhood cannot offer any solutions to the economic hardships facing the country, or the growing human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Faced with these internal divisions and challenging political circumstances, the road ahead will not be easy for the Brotherhood. As some of its former members have admitted, there is a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/rethinking-political-islam-9780190649197?cc=us&lang=en&">tension between being a social movement and being a political party</a>.</p>
<p>The Brotherhood knows that many Egyptians agree with the group’s religious values at the same time that they are deeply critical of its political ambitions.</p>
<p>If the Brotherhood seeks to become a force of change again and attract a new generation of Islamist activists, I believe it needs to develop a new vision and theory of political agency that inspires both the youth in exile, who speak the language of inclusion, diversity and revolution, and Egypt’s young people, who hunger for freedom and economic opportunities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196543/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ioana Emy Matesan has previously received funding from the National Science Foundation. </span></em></p>The Muslim Brotherhood once held the reins of power in Egypt. Now it faces internal splits, government repression and dwindling support.Ioana Emy Matesan, Associate Professor of Government, Wesleyan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1325652020-02-28T12:22:18Z2020-02-28T12:22:18ZMubarak: a man who built on his talent for self-promotion while stifling opposition<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317765/original/file-20200228-24668-5mn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hosni Mubarak, the late former President of Egypt.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Amel Pain</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The 21-gun salute fired in eastern Cairo during <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/364225/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-Sisi-attends-military-funeral-ceremony-for-.aspx">the burial</a> of the late president <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/hosni-mubarak-president-egypt-born">Hosni Mubarak</a> was an elegant end to the life of a man preoccupied with building his image and personality cult.</p>
<p>In my book, <a href="https://library.soas.ac.uk/Record/10043339">The Arab Split</a>, I emphasised how Mubarak was keen to build his reputation as a gentleman president, beloved by his people and respected by leaders the world over.</p>
<p>His desire to be smart, well-presented and always liked was an impediment, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z0mfCAcCKx4">according to</a> his Egyptian-British wife Suzanne. This desire for perfection led the modern <a href="https://www.israeltoday.co.il/read/israel-mourns-death-of-a-modern-pharaoh/">pharaoh</a> to become head of the military aviation academy when he was still in his 30s. A few years later he became the commander of the air force. </p>
<p>The role Mubarak played in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Yom-Kippur-War">the 1973 war with Israel</a> led president <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1978/al-sadat/facts/">Anwar el Sadat </a>to choose him as his vice-president. Mubarak was inches away from Sadat when the president was shot dead by army officers during a parade in 1981. At the time many analysts thought he would lead the country for an <a href="https://search.proquest.com/openview/a90e590240d1c3734e1dc131b43d74b5/1?cbl=31168&pq-origsite=gscholar">interim period</a> before a stronger leader could take over.</p>
<p>Instead, Mubarak became the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/egypt-president-hosni-mubarak-dies-91-200225105344417.html">longest-serving president of Egypt</a>, staying almost 30 years in power. He survived by building on his talents for self-promotion while controlling or stifling political opposition. Even his strongest critics have noted that it took some skill to die a “normal, natural death” while all the other presidents; <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2019/7/3/egypts-history-of-erasing-presidents-from-naguib-to-morsi">Mohamed Naguib</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2014/sep/29/egypt-president-nasser-dies-archive-1970">Gamal Abdel Nasser</a>, <a href="https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/the-assassination-of-anwar-sadat-1981/">Sadat</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-after-death-of-mohamed-morsi-119134">Mohamed Morsi</a> died in controversial circumstances. </p>
<p>My research on Mubarak’s personality in 2015 found that his long stay in power was founded upon building a personality cult. Professor of politics at the University of East Anglia <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2004.00149.x">John Street</a> has argued that politicians and celebrities share a common identity. To succeed in the new globalised celebrity culture, politicians – much like celebrities – have to rely on self-promotion, advertising, targeting and branding. </p>
<p>According to Street, modern politics has become more a matter of marketing than of science – challenging the concepts of traditional marketing and classical political leadership. Mubarak managed to do that very well. </p>
<h2>Image-making</h2>
<p>Mubarak hired a top journalist, Makram Mohamed Ahmed, to write his speeches. He was very keen to have extensive coverage in the media for all his activities. He also sponsored annual extravagant musicals to commemorate the <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/yom-kippur-war">6 October 1973 war</a>, pouring praise on the many singers who performed for him and who sang songs in his name. </p>
<p>Propaganda was one of his main tools in building his image, and the widespread brainwashing of the masses reverberates back to French psychologist Gustave le Bon’s notion of the <a href="https://exploringyourmind.com/gustave-le-bon-psychology-of-the-masses/">psychology of the masses</a>.</p>
<p>When he came into office Mubarak promised to <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ihcpCSjpzzIC&oi=fnd&pg=PP11&dq=Sullivan+egypt&ots=86cbnXDcR8&sig=g5V3sc4h-k3YyDcNwa48sBjQDw0&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=mubarak&f=false">defend democracy</a> in Egypt. Nevertheless, the political system he adopted in practice was authoritarian and very restrictive. Universal rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly were trampled upon. </p>
<p>An authoritarian system is the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hamdy_Hassan/publication/228628363_State_versus_society_in_Egypt_Consolidating_democracy_or_upgrading_autocracy/links/00b7d52626d844c1f2000000/State-versus-society-in-Egypt-Consolidating-democracy-or-upgrading-autocracy.pdf">basis</a> of a strong personality cult. </p>
<p>His international image was particularly important to Mubarak. </p>
<p>He became a leading voice in the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, promoting aggressively the idea of a <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Mubarak-Determine-Palestines-borders">two-state solution</a>. In 1989, Mubarak’s image was given a major boost when he raised the Egyptian flag on Taba, the resort that Israel kept under its authority even after Camp David. When Israel withdrew from Sinai it insisted that Taba, which borders the Israeli port of Eilat, was not part of Egypt and keeping it under the Israeli authority did not contradict the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2015/03/on-this-day-36-years-ago-the-signing-of-the-egyptisrael-peace-treaty/388781/">Camp David Egypt-Israeli peace treaty</a>. <a href="https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_xx/1-118.pdf">The arbitration</a> ruling on September 1988 proved that Israel was wrong.</p>
<p>Another moment of international limelight for Mubarak was Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Egyptians fought alongside the Americans to facilitate the Kuwait “liberation” and subsequent invasion of Iraq. On the back of this, Mubarak managed to return the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/12/world/arab-league-headquarters-to-return-to-cairo.html">Arab League headquarters</a> to Cairo after 10 years of boycott following the Camp David peace agreement with Israel in 1978. </p>
<p>Back at home, Mubarak did less well. His relationship with the opposition grew steadily worse, reaching its all-time low in 2010 when he decided to exclude all opposition from the parliament. The emergency laws were in effect for the almost three decades of his rule. Last but not least, Mubarak was grooming his son <a href="https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/egypts-mubarak-grooming-son-presidency">Gamal to succeed him as a president</a>. These efforts were silently opposed by the army but they had the chance to have their say during the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/01/egypt-revolution-160124191716737.html">January 2011 uprising</a>, when they refused to support Mubarak over the demonstrators. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Officers escort the flag-draped coffin former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Khaled Elfiqi</span></span>
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<p>When it came to the Muslim Brotherhood, Mubarak <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DjbpC5nqNlk">allowed</a> the organisation a level of freedom for activism. He allowed it to grow and control student unions and most of the professional organisations – such as those for doctors, engineers and teachers – and to build its wealth. But his regime made sure it was always under control. </p>
<h2>The military</h2>
<p>The fact that Mubarak’s military funeral with full honours was attended by the Egyptian president and former <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/201373112752442652.html">Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el Sisi</a> will keep future Egyptian generations in utter confusion for years to come. Was this the president who drove millions of Egyptians onto the streets for 18 days in January and February 2011, begging him to stand down, face justice and even face execution?</p>
<p>What were the feelings of thousands of Egyptian families who lost a loved one, or have a family member living with an injury or who were tortured during that “revolution”? Many have not yet heard an answer about who killed or injured their loved ones. </p>
<p>The highly formal full military funeral held one solid truth; those military men in Egypt, no matter what they do, are held in awe. The military is still in charge as it has been for the last 70 years. The image of the funeral was the image of the military and both the dead body of Mubarak in his coffin and the live body of Abdel Fattah el Sisi who was following the coffin grew from the same root: the “military institution” which has been ruling Egypt for decades. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-after-death-of-mohamed-morsi-119134">Where next for Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood after death of Mohamed Morsi</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132565/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed Taha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mubarak held power for three decades, on the foundation of a personality cult.Mohamed Taha, PhD Candidate, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1191342019-07-01T11:02:12Z2019-07-01T11:02:12ZWhere next for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood after death of Mohamed Morsi<p>The death of Egypt’s former president, Mohamed Morsi, in a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/17/mohamed-morsi-dead-ousted-president-egypt-collapses-after-court-session">Cairo court on June 17</a>, on the same day he was elected six years previously, closed a chapter in Egyptian history. Morsi was the first president of Egypt to be elected in popular, representative and multiparty elections. But his burial in a graveyard alongside previous leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood group is a symbolic indication that a different approach within the 90-year-old organisation has not yet happened. His family <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/06/18/mohammed-morsi-swiftly-buried-denied-public-funeral-hometown/">wasn’t allowed to bury</a> his body as he wished in his birthplace in the Delta village of Edwa.</p>
<p>Morsi led the Freedom and Justice Party, the Muslim Brotherhood’s first official political arm, and stood at the climax of its social, political and ideological struggle. His time as president only lasted one year and ended with the group plunged into its worse ever internal and external crisis. Six years on, the group still seems unable to find its way forward in a rapidly changing national, regional and international landscape.</p>
<p>The Muslim Brotherhood was <a href="https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-109268859/al-ikhwan-al-muslimeen-the-muslim-brotherhood">founded as a social movement by Hassan Al Banna</a> in the eastern Egyptian city of Ismailia in 1928, as a reaction to the fall of the Ottoman empire. The Brotherhood’s understanding is that Islam should encompass all aspects of life: political, social and personal. The early Brotherhood thought they could spread this concept by engaging in elections and by integrating into established social and political structures. </p>
<p>The group flourished under the Egyptian monarchy and managed to spread rapidly in Egypt and across the world until it faced its first crackdown under President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954. It started to rebuild its structure again from the 1970s onward under presidents Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. </p>
<p>After the revolution that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html">overthrew Mubarak in 2011</a>, the Brotherhood was initially undecided about whether the time was right for the group to put up a candidate for the presidential elections that followed. Its guidance office voted twice to reject running for the presidency but the group’s strong man, Khairat El Shater, managed to overturn this decision and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egypts-muslim-brotherhood-nominates-presidential-candidate/2012/03/31/gIQAnIZpnS_story.html?utm_term=.4ba6afc7775d">won the group’s approval</a> to run for president. However, he was among a group of candidates <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/04/2012414185229419379.html">discredited by the electoral commission</a> and Morsi replaced him. </p>
<p>Members who defected from the Brotherhood in 2013, who I’ve interviewed for my PhD research into the group’s political communications, maintain it should not have participated in the presidential elections. That remains the perspective of many of its current members.</p>
<h2>Factionalism</h2>
<p>During Morsi’s presidency there was no difference between the Brotherhood’s structure and that of its party political arm. All media, social and even religious activities of the members were combined.</p>
<p>During the Mubarak era, the Brotherhood had been a <a href="https://search.proquest.com/openview/7e542a35eba1798efa0aaa351b531d05/1?cbl=32013&pq-origsite=gscholar">key player</a> in the lives of Egyptians. It built hospitals and schools, established charities, helped the poor and dominated unions of both workers and students. None of this appeared to be helpful for running the country when the Freedom and Justice Party had full power. It was accused by critics of “Ikhawanisation” <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=B3orDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=morsi+and+the+ikhwanisation&ots=ZjQLf04W0Z&sig=NqujUSJYYVQ40eSWFUPpkcoD-U4#v=onepage&q=morsi%20and%20the%20ikhwanisation&f=false">of the country</a> – that they wanted Brotherhood members to occupy all the sensitive posts in the country. The liberals, leftists, Christians and other forces within Egyptian society were concerned about what effect the dominance of religion would have under the Brotherhood’s rule. </p>
<p>After the army <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-second-revolution">ousted Morsi from power in July 2013</a>, the group split into many factions. In the clampdown by the military that followed, it was designated as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-explosion-brotherhood/egypt-designates-muslim-brotherhood-as-terrorist-group-idUSBRE9BO08H20131225">a terrorist organisation in Egypt</a> later that year and the Freedom and Justice Party <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28722935">was banned</a>, accused of being linked to violence in the Sinai peninsula, which it denied.</p>
<p>Since then, its leaders – who are now mainly outside Egypt – have struggled to convince many of remaining young members to accept that the peaceful approach established by Al Banna 90 years ago remains the right one to reach the group’s goals. Al Banna planned for the group to build and develop the individual Muslim, then the Muslim family, then Muslim society, then the Muslim state, then unity between Muslim countries, finally reaching “mastery of the world”. </p>
<p>After 2013, the Broterhood’s youth members kept asking the group’s leaders that if they had been removed from power so easily once they had been given the opportunity to rule Egypt, what was the point of keeping to that path. Many young members believed that they would have to find other ways to make the “Islamic project” succeed.</p>
<p>Mass trials of members of the Brotherhood <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/08/egypt-sentences-75-to-death-in-rabaa-massacre-mass-trial">found them guilty</a> of a string of violent offences in late 2018, handing down death sentences to many. Many youth left the group after 2013, protesting about the dominance of the same leaders who they held responsible for the group’s crisis. </p>
<h2>Intransigence</h2>
<p>In my research, I’m finding that the Brotherhood is only prepared to tactically modify a few of its political strategies, no matter how big the change around them is. While its leaders in exile are using slightly more national language to address the whole Egyptian nation, it continues to use the same main themes of communication it was using before Morsi came to power. </p>
<p>Before they were banned in Egypt in 2013, the group’s affiliated media houses, the <a href="https://fj-p.com/">Freedom and Justice newspaper</a> and Misr 25 TV channel, used to attack their opponents with accusations of violence, claiming that they didn’t represent Islam, were financed by foreign sources and didn’t act in Egypt’s national interests. They asserted that they alone represented Islam as a political force in Egypt, that they had refined understanding of its teachings and that following them was a duty for every Muslim. The Brotherhood’s media in exile are still using the same ideological framework.</p>
<p>Morsi’s death provoked an outpouring of mourning in Egypt and in countries where the Brotherhood still has a presence, such <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-egypt-mursi-brotherhood/thousands-of-brotherhood-supporters-in-turkey-mourn-egypts-mursi-idUKKCN1TJ1CV">as Turkey</a>, Qatar and the UK. While much of Egypt looks ready to move on – particularly with many Egyptians focused on the African Cup of Nations which Egypt is hosting – it appears many of the Brotherhood’s supporters had still hoped that Morsi might have one day returned as president. But unless the group makes big changes to its political strategies and internal policies, it’s unlikely they will be playing a role in Egyptian politics any time soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119134/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed Taha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Muslim Brotherhood has been slow to adapt to its new reality.Mohamed Taha, PhD Candidate, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1190312019-06-18T20:58:14Z2019-06-18T20:58:14ZMohamed Morsi: death of Egypt’s former president shows deep state was always going to triumph<p>Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-48668941">died on June 17</a> in court in Cairo where he was on trial facing charges of espionage. He will be remembered for a short and divisive presidency and his failure to deliver the hopeful visions of Egypt’s “Arab Spring”. His legacy: the unprecedented consolidation of authoritarian rule by Egypt’s current military regime.</p>
<p>In the summer of 2012, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/06/201262412445190400.html">Morsi’s narrow victory</a> was hailed by the West in the wake of the uprising that saw the ouster of his predecessor Hosni Mubarak. But within a year, even Egyptians who had cast their votes for Morsi were clamouring for his removal, in what some described as the largest public protests in world history.</p>
<p>Morsi was not a popular president. His electoral triumph against Mubarak lackey Ahmad Shafik was so close that it aroused suspicions of a deal with the army. Neither of the two candidates represented Egypt’s liberal voice, whose votes were <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/egypt-final-presidential-elections-2012.pdf">split between a plethora of candidates</a> and who failed to consolidate as an effective “third way” during the first round of voting.</p>
<p>An engineer by training, Morsi in fact had little experience in politics before his rapid rise to power in 2012. Within months of his inauguration it seemed clear that he was unable to command the support of the Egyptian people. On the international stage, a series of embarrassing blunders intensified the wave of domestic criticism that culminated in his downfall in 2013.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/morsis-authority-ebbed-away-but-egypt-is-dangerously-divided-15774">Morsi's authority ebbed away, but Egypt is dangerously divided</a>
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<h2>The balance sheet</h2>
<p>Initially, Morsi showed promise. His first speech to the Egyptian people deployed the language of national unity and reform of the security state, clearly appealing to the sentiments expressed in the 2011 revolution of “bread, freedom and social justice.” In November 2012, he <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/22/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-conflict.html">brokered a ceasefire</a> between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, reassuring the international community that Egypt would continue to play the role of mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict.</p>
<p>Just one day after this success, however, Morsi announced a presidential decree that marked the beginning of the end of his rule. On November 22, 2012 he issued a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/23/protests-egypt-presidential-decree">constitutional declaration</a>, appointed a new public prosecutor, and gave himself what many saw as dictatorial powers – making presidential decrees immune to judicial oversight. While Morsi claimed that these measures were necessary to protect the revolution and transition to a constitutional democracy, he was accused of appointing himself as “Egypt’s new pharaoh”. </p>
<p>In response to widespread protests, Morsi annulled the declaration but insisted on proceeding with a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/16/world/middleeast/egypt-draft-constitution-vote.html?module=inline">snap referendum</a> on the new constitution which <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20829911">passed with a 63% majority</a> but a low voter turnout of only 33%.</p>
<p>The constitutional crisis was a critical turning point and provided the army with a window of opportunity to present itself as “the saviour” of the Egyptian people. In late April 2013, the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20130623-egypt-morsi-opposition-tamarod-revolt">Tamarod</a> (meaning “rebel”) campaign was officially launched with the goal of collecting 15m signatures by June 30 – the anniversary of Morsi’s presidential victory – to call for early elections. Evidence has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/03/how-egypts-generals-used-street-protests-to-stage-a-coup/?utm_term=.f233c3bf2828">since emerged</a> suggesting that the movement operated with the approval and support of the military and security agencies as well as supporters of the former Mubarak regime. Leaked <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/world/middleeast/recordings-suggest-emirates-and-egyptian-military-pushed-ousting-of-morsi.html">recordings of conversations</a> between Egyptian military figures revealed that the group drew funds from a bank account administered by the Ministry of Defence and replenished by the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>Millions of Egyptians heeded Tamarod’s call and on July 3, the defence minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi declared that the army had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2013/jul/03/egypt-countdown-army-deadline-live">suspended the constitution</a> and deposed the president in order to “end the state of conflict and division” that had marked Morsi’s presidency.</p>
<h2>Sisi clampdown</h2>
<p>In retrospect, Morsi’s brief time in power looks relatively benign when compared to the authoritarianism that followed Sisi’s military coup. The Muslim Brotherhood has long been demonised by the political elite since the founding of Egypt’s republic in 1952. In fact, Morsi’s brief presidency clearly demonstrated that the interests of the “deep state” would ultimately triumph. The Muslim Brotherhood could never have dominated Egypt in the way that many feared because they simply had too many enemies.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/egypt-hopes-for-democratic-future-die-as-al-sisi-marches-country-towards-dictatorship-with-parliaments-blessing-113491">Egypt: hopes for democratic future die as al-Sisi marches country towards dictatorship – with parliament's blessing</a>
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<p>Today, the Muslim Brotherhood is regarded as a terrorist group and an existential threat to the Egyptian people. Not only is it a crime to be associated with the organisation, but the Egyptian regime has made it clear that any dissent whatsoever will be crushed.</p>
<p>The Muslim Brotherhood no doubt sees Morsi as the latest martyr in an ongoing battle with the Sisi government. He was <a href="https://theconversation.com/morsi-death-penalty-completes-military-takeover-of-egypt-41948">sentenced to death</a> in 2015 in a ruling that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/15/mohamed-morsi-death-sentence-overturned">was subsequently overturned</a> in 2016. </p>
<p>The inhumanity of Morsi’s treatment in prison, where he was kept predominantly in solitary confinement, will evoke previous acts of brutality against the group, not least the public massacre of over 1,000 supporters of the Brotherhood in August 2013, described by <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt">Human Rights Watch</a> as the worst mass killing in Egypt’s history. The UN has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-48680603">called for an investigation</a> into Morsi’s death. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, while high profile, Morsi’s fate is by no means exceptional. He is simply the latest and most visible victim of a regime committed to imposing its will on the nation without concern for the human cost. Nonetheless, the vast majority of Egyptians will not be mourning the death of their first democratically elected president.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119031/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dina Rezk receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council for her research.</span></em></p>An obituary of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, who died in court in Cairo.Dina Rezk, Lecturer in Middle Eastern History, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1134912019-03-13T10:52:25Z2019-03-13T10:52:25ZEgypt: hopes for democratic future die as al-Sisi marches country towards dictatorship – with parliament’s blessing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263601/original/file-20190313-123522-f1g505.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Al-Sisi: more Mubarak than Mubarak.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.epa.eu/politics-photos/diplomacy-photos/egypt-s-president-abdel-fattah-al-sisi-in-paris-photos-53852502">EPA Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>During the 2013 coup which ousted Egypt’s elected president Mohammed Morsi, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23175529">military leader General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said</a>:</p>
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<p>The armed forces have realised that the Egyptian people, who are calling on us to come to their support, are not in fact calling on us to assume power. Rather, they have called on us to perform public service and to secure essential protection of the demands of their revolution.</p>
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<p>Six years on, Sisi is still president and the Egyptian parliament is <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-parliament-votes-favour-allowing-sisi-rule-until-2034">on the verge of</a> endorsing his rule until 2034, losing sight of the revolutionary demands which prompted millions of Egyptians to end the 29-year rule of Hosni Mubarak in January 2011.</p>
<p>Contrary to the hopes of 2011 and 2013, <a href="https://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/Ausland/Afrika/Infografik_Aegypten_2013-2018_A4-en.pdf">Egypt is sliding even further towards authoritarianism</a>. Tens of thousands of citizens are languishing in overcrowded prisons. Freedom of expression, media independence and opposition movements are curbed in the name of state stability. Torture, unjustified detentions, police assaults and <a href="https://afteegypt.org/wp-content/uploads/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%88%D9%8A-2017.pdf">death sentences are</a> the state’s strategic tools to silence protesters.</p>
<h2>A new phenomenon</h2>
<p>On February 14, <a href="https://madamasr.com/en/2019/02/14/feature/politics/parliament-advances-constitutional-amendments-by-overwhelming-majority-opposition-speaks-out/">485 of 596 Egyptian MPs</a> approved sweeping constitutional amendments to allow Sisi’s extension of power. The modifications to the national charter will lengthen the current four-year presidential term to six years, expand the role of the army as a state supervisory body, and give the president the constitutional right to appoint judges and the prosecutor general.</p>
<p>Although the new constitution still limits the president to two terms, Sisi – who was elected for a second term in March 2018 – will be granted a personal exception. The proposed amendments will now be reviewed by the parliament’s legislative and constitutional committee within 60 days before another House of Representatives vote, followed by a national referendum.</p>
<p>“This is totally a new phenomenon,” Ahmed Samih, the director of the Egyptian NGO Andalus Institute for Tolerance and Anti-Violence Studies, told me. “Neither Nasser nor the other presidents who followed him have been able to manipulate the state and the army to such a point as al-Sisi has done in the last five years.” He added:</p>
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<p>While Nasser, and in part Sadat [both former Egyptian leaders], addressed public opinion attention toward the fight against Israel, Sisi does not have an external enemy and his struggle is thoroughly focused on repressing the Egyptian people.</p>
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<h2>Rule through repression</h2>
<p>Throughout his time in power, <a href="https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/EuroMed-Rights-Report-on-Counter-terrorism-and-Human-Rights.pdf">Sisi has</a> <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/104697.aspx">endorsed</a> widespread draconian laws. He has trampled on human and civil rights by detaining thousands of activists, journalists, students and political opponents, including the former army chief of staff, Sami Anan. He has curbed the independence of the judiciary by stressing its pivotal role in fighting terrorists, Islamists and any hint of opposition. He has hindered academic autonomy by reintroducing the direct appointment of university heads.</p>
<p><a href="https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/EuroMed-Rights-Report-on-Counter-terrorism-and-Human-Rights.pdf">New legal dispositions</a>, such as the anti-protest law (2013), the counter-terrorism law (2015), the NGOs law (2017), and the cybercrime law (2018), have substantially increased the authorities’ power to surveil, repress, silence and detain political opponents. Amendments to the nationality law proposed in 2017 may revoke the Egyptian nationality of citizens living abroad and working with a foreign agency deemed to undermine the social or economic order of the state.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/egypt-and-amal-fathy-one-womans-story-highlights-national-wave-of-repression-and-sexual-violence-106890">Egypt and Amal Fathy: one woman's story highlights national wave of repression and sexual violence</a>
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<p>These laws have been harshly criticised for being excessively vague in defining what constitutes a danger for the Egyptian socioeconomic order. Moreover, legal and extra-legal measures – including torture, unfair trials and forced disappearances – have been actively implemented by Egyptian police, intelligence services and the military to ensure no one will obstruct Sisi from keeping his grip on power and militarising Egyptian life.</p>
<h2>Removing the judiciary</h2>
<p>Sisi’s power has been further enhanced by the approval of the recent constitutional amendments. <a href="https://cihrs.org/egypt-proposed-amendments-threaten-stability-and-sanction-lifelong-presidency/?lang=en">A statement</a> signed by at least 11 Egyptian civil society organisations explains:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The amendments eliminate all remnants of judicial independence by immunising exceptional legislation from judicial review while constitutionalising the president’s unilateral authority to appoint judicial leadership … and annul the judiciary’s financial independence.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Through these amendments, the constitutional separation of power will be destroyed, leading to an excessive concentration of authority in the president’s hands. Sisi has <a href="https://madamasr.com/en/2015/09/15/feature/politics/why-is-sisi-afraid-of-the-constitution-and-parliament/">proved several times</a> his reluctance to follow constitutional precepts – as in Egypt’s sale of the Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi Arabia without calling a popular referendum as required by the constitution. </p>
<p>The recent parliamentary vote crystallised this authoritarianism and repression in Egypt. Far from checking power, legislators gave away their responsibility as a democratic mechanism of the system. Only 16 MPs stood against the modifications.</p>
<p>Among them was Ahmed Tantawy, who emphasised how it dangerously concentrated power in one man’s hands and represented “a setback and a return to what is worse than the pre-25 January [2011] system”. Other opponents, such as Khaled Youssef and Haitham al-Hariri, were subjected to harsh defamatory media campaigns – in both cases, an alleged sexual affair was used as a pretext to whip up a public scandal over “moral indecency”.</p>
<p>Sisi still relies on the support of many Egyptians who see him as the last bastion against the spread of political and economic instability. But, according to Samih, even staunch Sisi supporters are fading away amid the repression and a stagnant economy. Samih said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Many Egyptian families involved in specific economic sectors, such as fishing, have been kicked out from the business, as the army has now gained an upper hand in their activities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But the likelihood that disillusionment will lead to Sisi’s departure – or even a check on his ambitions – is slim. Even the military, often seen as the repository of power, is neutered by one of its own. During the past three years, Sisi has implemented a series of reshuffles within the executive and a purge among army generals, buttressing his undisputed authority. </p>
<p>The detention of the former army chief of staff, Sami Anan; the replacement of the once-powerful head of the Egyptian intelligence service, Khaled Fawzi, with a Sisi ally, and the appointment of Sisi’s sons – Mahmoud and Hassan – to key positions within the general intelligence directorate are all clear signs of Sisi’s intention to out-Mubarak Mubarak, transforming his presidency into a full-blown dictatorship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113491/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As civil rights are trampled on, the Egyptian parliament is on the verge of endorsing his rule until 2034.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamGiovanni Piazzese, Doctoral Researcher, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/789062017-06-07T01:33:08Z2017-06-07T01:33:08ZWhy have other Gulf states cut ties with Qatar?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172568/original/file-20170606-3677-1533bvt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The skyline of Doha, Qatar.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AWest_Bay_Skyline%2C_Doha%2C_State_of_Qatar.jpg">Gregory Hawken Kramer</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Gulf Arab countries summon images of oil-fueled wealth, luxurious malls and strong Muslim identity. Nasty regional rivalry, diplomatic ruptures and panicked citizens <a href="https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/story/Qatar_residents_stockpile_food_as_Saudi_plans_to_close_land_border-ZAWYA20170605103702/">stockpiling groceries</a> don’t usually figure.</p>
<p>So why have Gulf states Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen, as well as non-Gulf Egypt, dramatically ruptured relations with tiny Qatar? What will this international crisis mean for the Middle East and the broader world?</p>
<h2>What is the dispute about?</h2>
<p>The Arab Gulf spans diverse countries. On one end of the scale is <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview">fractured, war-torn Yemen</a>. Then come the tourist destination and politically unassertive Oman, the small oil kingdoms of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, and regional powerhouse Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>As the largest country in the Arab Gulf, Saudi Arabia has long championed common regional policies under its leadership. However, in the past few decades, the rapid growth of massive oil wealth in smaller countries like Qatar and the UAE has allowed them excess capital to establish their own global influence.</p>
<p>The UAE has largely aligned its foreign policy with its larger neighbor. But Qatar has used its wealth to adopt policies different from, and sometimes rivaling, Saudi Arabia’s. Qatari positions have been propelled through the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/">Al-Jazeera</a> media network, based in Qatar’s capital, Doha, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/al-jazeera-block-article-slamming-saudi-arabian-human-rights-record-a6779596.html">partially funded</a> by Qatar’s ruling family, and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/al-jazeera-the-most-feared-news-network/">popular throughout the Middle East.</a></p>
<p>The Saudis have not appreciated Qatar’s foreign policy assertions, particularly its warmer relations with their archrival Iran. In Syria’s civil war, Qatar and Saudi Arabia both oppose ruler Bashar al Assad, but have supported competing Sunni militias. Qatar also had <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/qatar/inside-doha-at-the-heart-of-a-gcc-dispute">good relations with the freely elected Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt</a> and other anti-establishment Islamist organizations, again in contrast to Saudi positions.</p>
<p>The 2013 removal by the military of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood government under President Mohamed Morsi spearheaded a broader move among Arab governments to crack down on Sunni Islamist organizations that could threaten their authority. Some of these organizations <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/giorgio-cafiero/the-uae-and-qatar-wage-a-_b_8801602.html">had received Qatari support</a>. </p>
<p>In 2014, to pressure Qatar to fall in line with Saudi-led policies, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE suspended diplomatic ties with their neighbor. In response Qatar pulled back somewhat from open support for militant Sunni political groups and cooperation with Iran. It continued nonetheless to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/will-gcc-survive-qatar-saudi-rivalry-201431864034267256.html">assert a right to its own foreign policy.</a> </p>
<h2>What prompted the current crisis?</h2>
<p>Relations improved modestly since 2014. But Saudi and other commentators still complained that Qatar was <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/qatar-cannot-be-allowed-to-sabotage-the-region">“sabotaging the region</a>.”</p>
<p>And then came President Donald Trump’s May 21 visit to Riyadh, bolstering U.S. ties with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and promoting a common front against Iran and <a href="http://www.arabnews.com/node/1103136/saudi-arabia">Islamist “extremism,”</a> a vague term which for the Saudis can include political opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On his recent trip to Saudi Arabia, President Donald Trump, right, met with Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/US-Middle-East/5912b74b0fe3474d845b0ccb60dd1200/2/0">AP Photo/Evan Vucci</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Soon after, on May 24, Qatari news sites were blocked by Saudi Arabia and the UAE after alleged remarks by Qatar’s ruler <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/25/saudi-arabia-and-uae-block-qatari-media-over-incendiary-statements-iran-israel">that openly acknowledged Iran’s regional political role and Qatari ties to Israel.</a> Arab Gulf leaders would not normally take such positions publicly. Qatari sources insisted that the remarks were inaccurate, and that <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-05-23/qatar-says-its-official-state-news-agency-was-hacked">Doha’s media had been hacked</a>.</p>
<p>But Saudi Arabian and Emirati sources played up the alleged comments. They portrayed them as a renewed sign that Qatari policies remain deviant, despite the 2014 efforts to make Doha fall in line. The Trump administration’s <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/20/us-saudi-arabia-seal-weapons-deal-worth-nearly-110-billion-as-trump-begins-visit.html">announcement of a large military sale to Saudi Arabia</a> suggests new assurance in Riyadh that Washington will back confrontation against Iran. This likely bolstered Saudi confidence that it could move to rein in Qatar.</p>
<h2>What is Qatar’s perspective?</h2>
<p>Qatar’s ambitious growth has included opening its society to global <a href="http://qatarphilharmonicorchestra.org/">cultural</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/in-qatars-education-city-us-colleges-are-building-an-academic-oasis/2015/12/06/6b538702-8e01-11e5-ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html?utm_term=.0b78554f2a2a">educational</a> and business influences, as the country completes its plans to host <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/jun/05/2022-world-cup-qatar-under-threat-saudi-arabia-blockade-fifa-football">soccer’s 2022 World Cup</a>. As part of this ambition, Qatar has asserted its intention to <a href="https://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/INTA89_2_10_Khatib.pdf">work with a range of global partners</a>. </p>
<p>This foreign policy has included <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final-PDF-English.pdf">mediating between Islamist groups and Arab governments</a>, as well as <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/iran-qatar-rapprochement-middle-east.html">between Iran and other countries</a>. Although <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/22/qatar-needs-to-do-its-part/">some have critiqued</a> such an approach as two-faced, Qatari officials could argue that it is a rational strategy to resolve conflict in places where repressing Islamic political opposition <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/10/14/islamism-the-arab-spring-and-the-failure-of-americas-do-nothing-policy-in-the-middle-east/">has not worked</a>. </p>
<p>Whatever actually happened to trigger the crisis, <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-4535914/Qatars-state-news-agency-hacked-unknown-entity.html">Qatar’s concerns about hacking</a>, <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/2017/06/06/Qatar-s-ambition.html">recent Saudi and other critiques of the country</a>, and <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/leakers-share-new-email-dump-targeting-top-arab-diplomat-and-us-foreign-policy-elites_us_5934450be4b0c242ca252468">leaked emails from other Gulf governments</a> make Qataris feel victimized by what <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/01/whats-going-on-with-qatar/?utm_term=.4baf6d58fffe">could be a well-orchestrated campaign against them</a>. </p>
<h2>Why does this matter?</h2>
<p>Stability in the Arab Gulf region is <a href="https://gccstat.org/en/">critical to world trade</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_busiest_airports_by_international_passenger_traffic">global transportation</a> and regional military security. Dubai, for example, has been the world’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/middle-east/united-arab-emirates/dubai/articles/The-incredible-rise-of-Dubai-as-the-worlds-air-travel-hub/">busiest airport by international passenger traffic for several years</a>, with Qatar’s Hamad Airport not far behind. And, with 11,000 U.S. troops on site, Qatar hosts the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/05/middleeast/qatar-us-largest-base-in-mideast/index.html">Middle East’s major American military base</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The U.S. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/54/Al_Udeid_Air_Base.jpg">U.S. Government</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The bottom line is that the dramatic escalation of tensions in the Arab Gulf threatens regional stability, and makes it much harder to resolve graver conflicts in Syria, Libya, Islamic State-controlled Iraq and Yemen. Indeed, Qatar’s isolation from other Arab states could lead it closer to Turkey or even Iran. </p>
<p>More generally, the move against Qatar is part of a broad regional shift since the Arab uprisings of 2011. Many Arab governments now feel justified in <a href="https://www.ifex.org/middle_east_north_africa/2017/06/04/repression-crush-dissent/">acting strong to quash dissent</a>. They are now more likely to condone <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20170526-world-leaders-find-freedom-repress-era-trump">using force internally to maintain stability</a> and in <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/20/if-trump-doubles-down-on-the-saudi-war-in-yemen-millions-could-starve/">external conflicts like Yemen</a>. The Trump administration appears <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/world/middleeast/-egypt-sisi-trump-white-house.html?_r=0">comfortable with this</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"872077638042628096"}"></div></p>
<p>Indeed, the President has inserted himself directly into the growing conflict in several tweets, pointing a finger at Qatar as a funder of “radical ideology.” The U.S. may end up mediating the dispute out of its own interest in regional stability and its military base. At the same time, Trump has revealed his support for the Saudi position, and the trend to curb dissenting Arab voices around regional policy.</p>
<p>This trend goes against Qatar’s past autonomy and policies, leaving it little wiggle room. Qatar may have no choice but to conform its policies to Saudi ones, and to limit Al-Jazeera’s independence. Whether or not the crisis resolves soon, Riyadh’s new move against Doha has underscored its clear <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/qatar-may-have-pay-heavy-price-restore-links-its-gulf-neighbors-620948">determination to limit Qatari policy influence as much as possible</a>.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This article was updated to include President Trump’s statements – via Twitter – on Qatar.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78906/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mednicoff received a Fulbright US-government fellowship to be a visiting professor in Qatar in 2006-7, a fellowship at Harvard University funded in part through the Dubai School of Government in the UAE, and a research grant from 2013-16 from the Qatar National Research Fund. He currently receives no external funding from any government or government-funded entity.</span></em></p>Qatar has used its wealth to adopt policies sometimes rivaling Saudi Arabia’s. Think, for example, of the popular Al-Jazeera. Now the Saudis seem determined to limit Qatari influence as much as possible.David Mednicoff, Director, Middle Eastern Studies, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/735762017-03-10T04:18:57Z2017-03-10T04:18:57ZIs the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160012/original/image-20170308-24211-1grb91k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A member of the Muslim Brotherhood during Egypt's Freedom and Justice Party convention.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/lilianwagdy/6353083693/in/photolist-aFpdrK-fFZ6er-fGgQnQ-fzbW6u-dLak6r-avjwbb-dVjnd3-dVe5kn-4A5iFg-sg9NF7-fGgLhQ-3nbnzX-fFZ8Ue-fFZ9Bn-fFZ5pc-cgfKXh-9moxrU-ck3o9U-aK7mXD-otEhw1-fFZar4-a8PBfM-ck3oD3-dB3CSM-ck3hL1-dAjmMx-a8SkE9-bBCL9k-fGg2fQ-ck3p3h-dApNYA-fw8UVe-dAdHS2-dVjGLf-bygpJs-fGgfmy-fFYF5V-fGg1q9-fFYMvM-fFYvhZ-dAjnmx-fGgi87-a8PtXH-fFYz3t-gPupGq-fFYCgF-fFYKqD-fFYAc2-fFYsPx-fFYuvV">Lilian Wagdy</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-terrorism-trump.html?_r=0">Trump administration</a> as well as <a href="https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2953">Republican lawmakers</a> are seeking to introduce legislation that would designate the Muslim Brotherhood a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). </p>
<p>Many are <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/02/muslim-brotherhood-trump-terror-list-170201090317237.html">questioning</a> this move. The fact is that the Muslim Brotherhood has not been directly involved in any <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/01/30/should-the-muslim-brotherhood-be-designated-a-terrorist-organization/">violent terror attacks</a> in recent decades. </p>
<p>I have been studying Islam and politics over many years, and have learned that this is a highly complex phenomenon. Given its informal character and the diffuse nature of its organization, labeling the Muslim Brotherhood a foreign terrorist organization is not as simple as it seems.</p>
<p>To understand the Muslim Brotherhood, we need to first know how it is structured, and what it represents ideologically.</p>
<h2>The different groups</h2>
<p>The Muslim Brotherhood exists both in the form of local organizations (in Egypt, Jordan and so on) and in the form of an international organization. The international Muslim Brotherhood has, however, little <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/21/the-irrelevance-of-the-international-muslim-brotherhood/">influence</a> over any of the <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9780230100695">local organizations</a>. </p>
<p>The point is that the term “Muslim Brotherhood” represents a broader ideological trend. There are numerous organizations and groups across the Muslim world that to a varying degree associate themselves with this current. </p>
<p>Some of them use the name of the Muslim Brotherhood, while others operate under different labels. One example is the <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3115-one-against-all-the-national-islamic-front-nif.pdf">National Islamic Front</a> (NIF), that was established in the 1960 as the Sudanese Islamic Charter Front.</p>
<p>There are also a number of informal groups, <a href="http://noref.no/Regions/Africa/Publications/The-Intellectualist-movement-in-Ethiopia-the-Muslim-Brotherhood-and-the-issue-of-moderation-Report">such as the Ethiopian Intellectualist Movement</a>, that rather selectively find inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood’s thinkers without appropriating the entirety of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology. </p>
<p>None of these groups could be characterized as <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/21/the-irrelevance-of-the-international-muslim-brotherhood/">branches</a> of one unified Muslim Brotherhood. There does not exist any worldwide hierarchical structure. Nor are there any formal links between any of these organizations. </p>
<p>Most of them have produced independent thinkers and developed ideological profiles that <a href="http://www.sunypress.edu/p-3300-the-management-of-islamic-activ.aspx">focus more on local issues</a>. All this makes it difficult to speak about a coherent Muslim Brotherhood ideology.</p>
<h2>The origins and spread of the Brotherhood</h2>
<p>The original Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 by <a href="http://www.biography.com/people/hassan-al-banna-9198013">Hassan al-Banna</a>, an Egyptian schoolteacher. Its initial activities were concentrated in the town of Ismailiyah, in northeastern Egypt. However, due to al-Banna’s charismatic personality and skills as a community organizer, the group grew rapidly into a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-society-of-the-muslim-brothers-9780195084375?cc=us&lang=en&">mass organization</a> throughout Egypt. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160097/original/image-20170309-24226-b6zwz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160097/original/image-20170309-24226-b6zwz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160097/original/image-20170309-24226-b6zwz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160097/original/image-20170309-24226-b6zwz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160097/original/image-20170309-24226-b6zwz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160097/original/image-20170309-24226-b6zwz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160097/original/image-20170309-24226-b6zwz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brotherhood members and Salafists praying in Tahrir Square, Cairo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/alisdare/6377938093/in/photolist-quQp7-3nbnzX-biwQEz-EADW3-aHAAMT-amUj2u-bdNEei-oEzf8n-dH3gGK-ruZ24h">Alisdare Hickson</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is important to note that the Muslim Brotherhood was not a political movement in the beginning. Instead, it was devoted to education and social work. It was also focused on enhancing religious piety among Muslims and countering Western influences during the colonial period by <a href="http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/22131418-00101003">building an Islamic identity</a>. </p>
<p>Joining the opposition to the British colonizers, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership reluctantly decided to participate in Egypt’s parliamentary elections in the 1940s. Its anti-colonial attitudes also led the organization to support the coup in 1952 which eventually brought <a href="http://www.oupcanada.com/catalog/9780195069358.html">Gamal Abdel Nasser</a> to power as president.</p>
<p>However, the Muslim Brotherhood’s strong popular support soon led to an open conflict with Nasser, who responded by <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30069528?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">suppressing</a> it. In addition to filling up Egyptian prisons, Nasser’s policy produced thousands of refugees who became instrumental in spreading the movement’s ideas across the Muslim world.</p>
<h2>Ideological diversity</h2>
<p>While the Muslim Brotherhood’s initial political engagement was within a democratic framework, a more militant and anti-democratic substream gradually emerged within the movement. </p>
<p>The key figure here was <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/sayyid-qutb-and-the-origins-of-radical-islam-9780199333479?cc=us&lang=en&">Sayyid Qutb</a>, an Egyptian writer and thinker, who wrote the seminal book <a href="https://www.kalamullah.com/Books/Milestones%20Special%20Edition.pdf">“Milestones</a>.” He claimed that contemporary secular politics was reminiscent of the pre-Islamic “Jahiliyyah” (age of ignorance), and moreover, that “Hakmiyyah” (God’s sovereignty) could be restored only through armed struggle. </p>
<p>His teaching later inspired groups such as al-Qaida, and caused serious frictions within the Egyptian Brotherhood.</p>
<p>The main leadership made significant efforts to renounce the use of violence and to portray the Muslim Brotherhood <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Muslim-Brotherhood-Hasan-al-Hudaybi-and-ideology/Zollner/p/book/9780415664172%22%22">as a moderate reformist movement</a>. This was evident in the Muslim Brotherhood’s struggle to participate in Egypt’s electoral politics. The authoritarian Egyptian regimes, however, blocked it from gaining much influence. Not until Mohamed Morsi became president of Egypt in 2012 did the Muslim Brotherhood ascend to power. That victory proved, however, to be <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/523085/summary">short-lived</a>. </p>
<p>Globally too the Muslim Brotherhood has been similarly ideologically diverse. For example, some local Muslim Brotherhood-associated organizations, such as those in <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9780312238438">Kuwait</a> and <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9948.html">Morocco</a>, were initially influenced by Sayyid Qubt’s thinking. Later, however, they gradually abandoned such ideas. Others developed relatively pragmatic political programs. </p>
<p>The Muslim Brotherhood in <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329086?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">Jordan</a>, for example, did not challenge the local political authorities and developed rather cordial relationship with the Jordanian monarchy.</p>
<h2>Islam and democracy</h2>
<p>Ideologically, the Muslim Brotherhood as a current has commonly been categorized under the heading of “Islamism.” This ideology emphasizes <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Islam-and-Politics-2nd-Edition/Mandjjjkiaville/p/book/9780415782579">control over the state</a> as crucial for Islamization of state and society. There are <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Muslim-Brotherhood-Hasan-al-Hudaybi-and-ideology/Zollner/p/book/9780415664172">different opinions</a>, however, about what this means.</p>
<p>Various groups and individuals associated with the Muslim Brotherhood have over the last decades been engaged in elaborate discussions about their views on democracy and secularism. </p>
<p>However, there is still some ambiguity around certain issues. One part of this relates to the way the vast majority of Muslim Brotherhood organizations <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9948.html">embrace Shari’a</a>, or the Islamic law, as foundational for political and constitutional frameworks. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160015/original/image-20170308-24198-1rkjmex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160015/original/image-20170308-24198-1rkjmex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160015/original/image-20170308-24198-1rkjmex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160015/original/image-20170308-24198-1rkjmex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160015/original/image-20170308-24198-1rkjmex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160015/original/image-20170308-24198-1rkjmex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160015/original/image-20170308-24198-1rkjmex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Muslim Brotherhood women.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/7408004@N06/2354671081/in/photolist-4A5iFg-5ewgqF-fFZ7bK-aFpdrK-fFZ6er-fGgQnQ-fzbW6u-sg9NF7-fGgLhQ-3nbnzX-fFZ8Ue-fFZ9Bn-fFZ5pc-cgfKXh-9moxrU-ck3o9U-aK7mXD-otEhw1-fFZar4-fw8UVe-dAdHS2-a8PBfM-ck3oD3-dVjGLf-ck3hL1-dAjmMx-a8SkE9-bBCL9k-fGg2fQ-ck3p3h-dApNYA-dB3CSM-dAHNFN-fGgfmy-fFYF5V-bygpJs-fGg1q9-cvmexQ-fFYMvM-fFYvhZ-dVjxaQ-dAjnmx-fGgi87-a8PtXH-fFYz3t-gPupGq-otE2tr-fFYCgF-fFYKqD-fFYAc2">Gaynor Barton</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This relates to tensions between the belief in Shari’a as a divinely ordained authority and the acceptance of the popular will. Some tensions, for example, relate to the question whether Islamists would accept the outcome of a democratic election that does not necessarily correspond with their interpretation of Shari'a. Others are related to whether the Islamists would recognize the freedom of citizens to make individual choices in a state governed according to the Shari'a. Also, would they accommodate the rights of women and religious minorities? </p>
<h2>The current situation</h2>
<p>So what does this mean in assessing the current situation of the Muslim Brotherhood? </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12813859">Arab Spring</a>, a 2011 democratic uprising that quickly spread in the Arab world, was viewed by many Muslim Brotherhood-associated groups as a moment to put their ideological programs into political action.</p>
<p>However, regional instability across the Middle East, political violence (in Libya and Syria) and the return of an authoritative regime in Egypt shattered such hopes. The political takeover by <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/01/world/africa/abdel-fattah-el-sisi-fast-facts/">Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi</a> as the new president of Egypt in 2014 and the subsequent <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28722935">banning</a> of the Muslim Brotherhood seriously weakened the organization.</p>
<p>In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s increasingly <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-middle-east-studies/article/div-classtitlefrom-islamic-renaissance-to-neo-fascism-in-turkeydiv/3B9E527945D99DD5E575890A48134189">authoritarian rule</a> further blocked debates around Islam and politics. Developments in North Africa have added to the setbacks. The post-Islamist Tunisian Ennadha Party, for example, has been losing in national elections. </p>
<p>All this has exacerbated tensions over the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/islamism-after-the-arab-spring_english_web_final.pdf">future of the Muslim Brotherhood</a>. These developments have created a space for the emergence of more militant groups such as the Islamic State, although one should be careful not to draw explicit causal links. </p>
<p>Indeed, designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization could have the effect of limiting the opportunities for those Muslims who are attracted by the Muslim Brotherhood’s moderate agenda to engage in politics. </p>
<p>It could even accelerate recruitment to terrorist outfits – a possibility that the Trump administration might seek to take into account.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73576/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Terje Ostebo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Muslim Brotherhood exists in the form of many local organizations and well as an international organization. Research shows there isn’t a coherent Muslim Brotherhood ideology.Terje Ostebo, Director of the Center for Global Islamic Studies and associate professor in the Department of Religion and the Center for African Studies, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/460682015-08-14T05:01:18Z2015-08-14T05:01:18ZAs Morsi faces the gallows, where are the defenders of democracy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91843/original/image-20150813-21416-tpw2ht.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1396%2C463&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adaweya Square before and after the August 14 massacre of more than 800 peaceful protesters in 2013.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_2013_Rabaa_massacre#/media/File:Rabaa_Square_before_and_after.jpg">Wikimedia Commons/Mazidan</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In mid-June, an Egyptian court <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33147206">upheld the death sentence</a> against the country’s first freely elected president, Mohamed Morsi, whom the military <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Egyptian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat">deposed</a> in July 2013. Death sentences against Morsi and 105 others were confirmed after Egypt’s grand mufti gave his approval. Many Islamic scholars (ulema) in the past spoke truth to power, for which they were jailed or executed. The mufti and the general who ousted Morsi, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, are instead sending democracy, freedom, justice and truth to the gallows. </p>
<p>Amnesty International <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2015/05/egypt-court-recommends-death-sentences-for-morsi-more-than-100-others/">described the trials</a> as “grossly unfair” and “charades”. <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/death-sentence-egypt-emad-shahin/393590/">Emmad Shahin</a>, an academic of international repute, was among 101 others sentenced to death in absentia. I contributed a chapter to a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-islam-and-politics-9780195395891?cc=au&lang=en&">volume</a> co-edited by John Esposito and Shahin.</p>
<h2>Why are the world’s democrats so quiet?</h2>
<p>We have long heard about Islam’s presumed inability to separate religion and politics. Do we hear those same voices ask now: why is the Egyptian government mixing religion and politics, sham judicial trails and sharia? Did anyone object to el-Sisi seeking sanction for a political legal ruling from a religious authority?</p>
<p>Instead, this month, the US has <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/americas/20176-after-6-year-hiatus-egypt-us-resume-strategic-talks">openly embraced</a> el-Sisi’s regime. We have yet to hear democratic leaders unite in saying: we oppose the death penalty for Morsi. </p>
<p>Prime Minister Tony Abbott condemned the execution in Indonesia of two Australians, so will he denounce the death sentences imposed in Egypt? If not, is it unfair to conclude that the death penalty is wrong only when applied to “our” people?</p>
<p>Can Egypt really be said to be “restoring democracy”? That is the phrase US Secretary of State John Kerry <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23543744">used to justify</a> the 2013 coup, which was followed by a deadly military crackdown against peaceful protesters in Cairo. The then-Middle East “peace envoy”, Tony Blair, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/06/egypt-middle-east-tony-blair">hoped for</a> a “rapid return to democratic rule” as he lent his backing to the regime and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jul/02/tony-blair-advise-egypt-president-sisi-economic-reform">became its adviser</a> on “economic reforms”. </p>
<p>What notion of peace condones – directly or otherwise – the killing of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_2013_Rabaa_massacre">more than 800 peaceful protesters</a> within a few hours at Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adaweya square on August 14, 2013? As Egypt’s then-defence minister, el-Sisi had <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt">“overall responsibility for the army’s role”</a> in a slaughter <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/12/egypt-massacre-rabaa-intentional-human-rights-watch">comparable</a> to China’s 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. </p>
<p>Why are most of the world’s otherwise eloquent, even roaring, democrats largely mute about the death of Egyptian democracy and its symbol, Morsi? Why does the democratic conscience of the so-called globalised and connected world appear so disconnectedly unshaken by the brutal crackdown?</p>
<h2>The brutal business of killing politics</h2>
<p>According to media reports and the Brookings Centre for Middle East Policy, it is <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24772806">“unlikely”</a> the death sentence will be implemented. Regardless, the purpose is clear: to frighten Egyptians into submission so they dare not ask again for democracy. Under a regime such as el-Sisi’s, there is barely a space for politics, and certainly not for democratic politics; the only permissible politics is acquiescence to the dictatorial regime.</p>
<p>This killing of politics is evident in the sheer numbers of people the regime has arrested and imprisoned – <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-l-esposito/egypt-terror-in-the-name-of-state-security_b_7306486.html">around 40,000</a> by one estimate. Dissident media have been <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21305/we-completely-agree_egyptian-television-media-in-t">shut down</a> and disobedient journalists fired and jailed. The imprisoned include not only members of Morsi’s Freedom and Justice Party but anyone who defies el-Sisi’s dictatorship. In short, voices opposed to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/201232710543250236.html">de-democratisation</a> are treated as threatening.</p>
<p>Imprisoning people and passing death sentences on a virtual assembly line sends a message to Egyptians: abandon politics altogether. The increasing <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/theres-been-an-escalation-of-torture-and-a-maintenance-of-impunity-in-egypt-2015-8?IR=T">use of torture</a>, including sexual abuse, reinforces this message. </p>
<p>Seen from the perspective of American philosopher-activist <a href="http://thoreau.library.ucsb.edu/thoreau_life.html">Henry Thoreau</a>, the repeated branding of the imprisoned as terrorists, or terrorist sympathisers, or enemies of the nation-state – a line echoed in national, regional and global media – hides the reality that the regime is terrorising the people and is arguably their most lethal enemy. In his landmark essay <a href="https://machetegroup.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/resistance.pdf">Resistance to Civil Government</a>, Thoreau observed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Faith and freedom defy state violence</h2>
<p>The banning of political parties and sentencing to death of Morsi and others are, we are told, necessary to fight terrorism and threats to Egypt’s security. For more than a decade, security threats and terrorism have been mediatised as synonymous and both as Islamic. Whatever acceptability el-Sisi has to local and international elites is on account of his role as a “secular” warrior against what his spokesman has called <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/08/2013823142620812772.html">religious fascism</a> and terrorism. </p>
<p>This propaganda fits, as well as reproduces, the post-Cold War polarisation of international politics. The “evil” communist, according to anthropologist <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Terrorism-Self-Fulfilling-Prophecy-Joseba-Zulaika/dp/0226994163/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1432732473&sr=8-2&keywords=Joseba+Zulaika">Joseba Zulaika</a>, has been replaced with the new enemy baptised as terrorism (read Islamic). </p>
<p>We must puncture and resist, as Thoreau did, such a violent staging of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clash_of_Civilizations">“clash of civilisations”</a> thesis in the form of terrorism versus democracy, Islam versus the West and so on. What is at stake in Egypt and elsewhere is the freedom and democracy routinely denied and suppressed by invoking the bogeymen of religion and terrorism. </p>
<p>A different understanding of religion actually connects Christians in the West and Muslims, in fact people of all faiths across the world. This is not the religion of Egypt’s grand mufti, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shawki_Allam">Shawki Allam</a>, and his predecessor, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Gomaa">Ali Gomaa</a>, nor the likes of Florida pastor <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terry_Jones_(pastor)">Terry Jones</a>, nor the Buddhist monks <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/azeem-ibrahim/who-is-instigating-the-vi_b_7810972.html">inciting mass violence</a> against their fellow Burmese. It an understanding shared by thinkers such as Thoreau, his contemporary <a href="http://www.biography.com/people/ralph-waldo-emerson-9287153#american-transcendentalism">Ralph Waldo Emerson</a>, French Catholic philosopher <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/maritain/">Jacques Maritain</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khan_Abdul_Ghaffar_Khan">Abdul Ghaffar Khan</a>, an Indian figure of monumental significance but unfortunately not well known.</p>
<p>Khan’s philosophy of peace, dear to people of many faiths organised under the banner of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khudai_Khidmatgar">Khudaai Khidmatgaar</a> (God’s Servants), flourished in the same place where, ironically, the Pakistani Taliban come from. People such as Khan harnessed religion for peace, justice and equality and to fight slavery, colonialism and humiliation. Theirs was a vision that transcended sectarian divides.</p>
<h2>Ugly geopolitics and the beauty of sun-bright Mecca</h2>
<p>The bravery with which peaceful democracy protesters confronted death in Cairo resonates with Khan’s philosophy of peace. He challenged the brutality of the British Empire as well as the injustices – including patriarchal and feudal – within his own society as <a href="http://www.amazon.com/The-Pathan-Unarmed-Opposition-Anthropology/dp/0933452691">follows</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I warn the English that we also have God who watches over us … I admit that they have got machine guns, army, guns and police, but we have got God. We [Indians] have also got patience [ṣabr].</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The resolve of Egypt’s political prisoners recalls the spirit of Khan, who spent decades in prisons, and Emerson. Unlike <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_P._Huntington">Samuel Huntington</a>, who would separate the West and Islam, Emerson connected them to <a href="http://liberalarts.iupui.edu/mpsg/Essays/Emerson%20-%20Experience.pdf">assert</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I clap my hands in … joy and amazement, before the first opening to me of this august magnificence, old with the love and homage of innumerable ages, young with the life of life, the sun-bright Mecca of the desert. And what a future it opens! I feel a new heart beating with the love of the new beauty.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is this beauty Emerson spoke of that is concealed by merchants of the clash of civilisations – much of the mainstream media, thinktanks, policymakers, politicians, profiteering business conglomerates, the military-industrial complex – so as to sell the ugly shape of their geopolitics. The el-Sisi regime aims to block the way to the future that Emerson saw through cowardly devices such as death sentences and torture.</p>
<p>After the death sentence, Morsi <a href="http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/politics/2015/5/25/egypts-revolution-will-triumph-writes-morsi-from-jail-cell">declared</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I am not afraid … I promise the revolutionaries that I will not be less courageous and steadfast than they are, and I will stick to my principles and stances in confronting the coup … The coup leaders seek to break the will of the revolution. I call on everyone to complete the revolution without fear.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If Morsi is hanged, will there be a Thoreau to write about the “Martyrdom of Mohammed Morsi”? The verse Thoreau <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=gfnQrgx3Yn4C&pg=PA60&lpg=PA60&dq=Tell+men+of+high+condition/That+rule+affairs+of+state&source=bl&ots=CNcEQJdPL0&sig=JM_jmmD4uH243rSfcdtwEeF6uW0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCkQ6AEwBWoVChMIy5DIlqmlxwIVQn2mCh0mFAv5#v=onepage&q=Tell%20men%20of%20high%20condition%2FThat%20rule%20affairs%20of%20state&f=false">quotes</a> in “Remarks After the Hanging of John Brown” remains completely apt. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Tell men of high condition,</p>
<p>That rule affairs of state,</p>
<p>Their purpose is ambition,</p>
<p>Their practice only hate;</p>
<p>And if they once reply,</p>
<p>Then given them all the lie.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46068/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Irfan Ahmad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two years ago, on August 14, more than 800 protesters against a coup were massacred in Cairo. A court recently upheld the death sentence for Egypt’s ousted elected leader.Irfan Ahmad, Associate Professor of Political Anthropology, Institute for Religion, Politics & Society , Australian Catholic UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/435702015-06-30T12:38:59Z2015-06-30T12:38:59ZChief prosecutor killed by car bomb as Egypt marks two years of al-Sisi<p>Hisham Barakat, Egypt’s most senior prosecutor, has been <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/29/us-egypt-violence-idUSKCN0P90UA20150629">killed</a> by a car bomb that hit his motorcade in Cairo. The attack came just a month after Islamic State (IS) <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/uk-egypt-judges-militants-idUKKBN0O52NY20150520">urged</a> its followers to attack Egypt’s judges and its “<a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/egypt-in-crisis/the-deep-state-how-egypts-shadow-state-won-out/">deep state</a>” in revenge for their jailing <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-30532889">scores of Islamists</a>.</p>
<p>The attack, which also wounded six of Barakat’s security detail as well as two drivers and a passer-by, has been claimed by an obscure group calling itself the Popular Resistance Front of Giza. The Muslim Brotherhood condemned the killing – nonetheless accusing Barakat of “<a href="http://egyptianstreets.com/2015/06/29/muslim-brotherhood-says-without-justice-violence-will-continue/">legalising violence</a>”. The chief prosecutor was widely hated by Egypt’s disparate opposition groups as a figurehead for the savage crackdown on dissent which has marked the two-year rule of military strongman Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. </p>
<p>Barakat oversaw the jailing of thousands of opposition supporters – among them Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi, who has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/morsi-death-penalty-completes-military-takeover-of-egypt-41948">sentenced to death</a> along with hundreds of members of the Muslim Brotherhood.</p>
<p>Morsi’s death sentence was not just a red flag to jihadists and Islamic fundamentalists; it was proof that al-Sisi has fully abandoned the ideas animating the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf">2014 constitution</a>, which was expected to be firmly inclined towards the respect of human rights and freedom of thought.</p>
<p>Significantly, Barakat’s assassination comes almost exactly two years after the start of the June 30 coup that ousted Morsi and brought al-Sisi to power.</p>
<h2>Control freakery</h2>
<p>Al-Sisi’s rhetoric may be peppered with the language of “freedom”, but his style of rule is more indicative of a will to power – and there’s no better measure of that than his political sway over the country’s Islamic authorities.</p>
<p>The Sharia court system is not as dominant in Egypt as in Saudi Arabia, but it is clearly entwined with the state legal system, even though the two are supposedly constitutionally separate entities. The lack of proof or witnesses in Morsi’s trial was expected to technically and doctrinally stop the Grand Mufti from confirming his sentence. Instead, he apparently validated it without raising any questions – confirming al-Sisi’s genuine power over the Sharia court system. </p>
<p>Al-Sisi has long tried to present himself as a pious Muslim proponent of a moderate, mainstream Islam, to counter terrorism. But the Morsi verdict proved he has incorporated the juridical system into his pursuit of far more basic political goals: to get rid of the Muslim Brotherhood, and to placate Egypt’s vital foreign donor, the UAE, and strategic regional fellow, <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.545682">Israel</a>.</p>
<p>Al-Sisi increasingly depends on the Israelis for tactical support, and for now at least, Israel is looking to Egypt as its best hope for regional stability. The two countries’ leaders are singing from the same hymn sheet when it comes to dealing with radical Islamism. Even though both al-Sisi and Benjamin Netanyahu have worked hard to garner the support of some of the most conservative factions and lobbies in their respective countries, they are looking to each other as partners in the fight against Islamic terrorism. </p>
<p>Egypt also counts on support from Gulf Countries, as following the coup it started searching for new allies. In spite of this, the strategic role Israel plays remains crucial in light of the political interests al-Sisi and Benjamin Netanyahu share when referred both to the closure of Rafah border and the fight of jihadi groups Sinai peninsula. </p>
<p>The Egypt-Israel relationship is built around a common fight against Islamic terrorism – above all against Hamas, the historic right wing of the Muslim Brotherhood – and through energetic trade.</p>
<p>However, in spite of ambitious <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2015/03/egypt-international-investment-150313190909962.html">summits</a> in Sharm El-Sheikh meant to attract foreign investments, doing business in Egypt is still considered difficult, and the Egyptian economy is still shaky. The country’s public debt hit record levels in 2014, and it is expected to keep increasing. </p>
<p>Unless Egypt readdresses its security situation, the investments it needs will never materialise. And the terrorists targeting the regime know that all too well.</p>
<h2>Gear shift</h2>
<p>The attack that killed Bakarat was just the latest attempt to shatter the stability al-Sisi is desperately trying to maintain. These attempts are coming not from the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been subject to a crackdown and hundreds of whose members have been jailed; instead, they are the work of minor Islamist groups and individual fighters. </p>
<p>That much was made clear on June 19, when the Muslim Brotherhood was expected to gather in Tahrir square for a mass protest in spite of the 2013 <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/egypt-interim-president-anti-protest-law">anti-protest law</a>. Violent rallies were expected, but Brotherhood members instead kept a low profile, perhaps fearing jail. </p>
<p>It seems unlikely the Brotherhood will directly stage any violent protests in the months to come; instead, it will keep campaigning through its main online presence, <a href="http://www.ikhwanweb.com/">Ikhwanweb</a>, while Egypt’s Islamist youths fall ever more into the orbit of more radical groups. </p>
<p>Instead, the random attacks to come will be the work of isolated “jihadi” cells, some officially affiliated to IS (such as Wilaya Sinai,<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25882504">formerly Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis</a>), or individuals from Egypt or nearby countries such as Tunisia and Libya. These groups are not especially co-ordinated, but their aim is the same: to exploit Egypt’s social and political disorder and target the economic apparatus on which al-Sisi’s regime depends. They are trying to unpick Egypt’s social fabric by violently challenging its political elites.</p>
<p>If al-Sisi continues to rely solely on authoritarianism to keep Egypt together, he will fail. The resulting backlash will worsen Egypt’s security crisis, both preventing its growth and and antagonising its Islamist discontents. And the murder of the country’s top prosecutor shows this process is already underway.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43570/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maria Gloria Polimeno does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Egypt’s Islamist discontents are incensed at the abuse of the judicial system – and hellbent on sabotaging the country’s stability.Maria Gloria Polimeno, Doctoral Researcher , City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/419482015-05-18T13:46:22Z2015-05-18T13:46:22ZMorsi death penalty completes military takeover of Egypt<p>In shocking but not exactly surprising news, Mohammed Morsi, the first democratically elected president of Egypt has been sentenced to death for his role in a 2011 prison break, which occurred during the protests that ultimately led to the toppling of Hosni Mubarak.</p>
<p>While it is rare for Amnesty International, the US and Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to agree on anything, all quickly expressed outrage at Morsi’s sentence. The US expressed “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/expresses-deep-concern-morsi-death-sentence-150517064527019.html">deep concern</a>”, Erdogan <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/expresses-deep-concern-morsi-death-sentence-150517064527019.html">decried the use of the death penalty</a> and Amnesty called the trial a “<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/press-releases/2015/05/egypt-court-recommends-death-sentences-for-morsi-more-than-100-others/">charade</a>”. </p>
<p>On the night of January 28 2011, two days after their arrest, 34 members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Mohammed Morsi, <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptMarketNews/idAFLDE70T06S20110130">fled the Wadi Natrum prison</a>, along with several thousand other prisoners. While some accounts suggest that the guards at the prison fled their posts in the face of chaos on the streets, the official Sisi regime line is that Hamas and Hezbollah were involved in facilitating the prison break. </p>
<p>Morsi was not the only person to be sentenced to death for these crimes – 104 others were also sentenced for the same crime (a large number of them in absentia, as allowed under the newly reformed Penal Code). In the courtroom, Morsi and his fellow defendants were defiant as charges were read out, chanting “down with military rule”. </p>
<p>The verdict comes less than a month after <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/21/egypts-ex-president-mohamed-morsi-jailed-protest-deaths-muslim-brotherhood">Morsi was sentenced to 20 years in prison</a> after being found guilty of inciting violence and the illegal detention and torture of protesters while occupying the office of the president. </p>
<p>Senior Brotherhood officials are rejecting the legitimacy of the judicial process, a sentiment <a href="http://www.afp.com/en/news/us-deeply-concerned-morsi-death-sentence-egypt">echoed by senior figures in the US State Department</a>, who suggest that this decision is “inconsistent with Egypt’s international obligations and the rule of law”. </p>
<h2>Crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood</h2>
<p>This appears to be the latest step in the almost two-year long crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which began with the coup d’etat against the Morsi government in July 2013. </p>
<p>The sentence now has to be confirmed by the Egyptian grand mufti, whose decision will likely be instrumental in determining whether chaos is to envelop Egypt once again. Coming from Egypt’s highest religious figure, the mufti’s pronouncement is not legally binding but nevertheless necessary to carry out a death sentence, as the final verdict cannot be issued until that is known. The mufti’s decision will also be indicative of the real state of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian politics, as the religious figure has sided with the Islamist organisation in the past. </p>
<p>In August 2014, Egypt’s highest legal official in fact <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/07/uk-egypt-courts-badie-idUKKBN0G70Y620140807">refused to approve the death sentence of Mohamed Badie</a> (the Brotherhood’s general guide) and of another 13 Brotherhood members – which is seen in some quarters as setting a precedent for what might happen next. </p>
<p>Whatever the mufti’s final decision, chaos is likely to break out in the country once again, from either “betrayed” Brotherhood supporters or angered governmental officials, depending on which side the religious authority chooses to support. Only hours after the verdict, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/three-egyptian-judges-shot-dead-in-sinai-hours-after-mohamed-morsi-sentenced-to-death-10255067.html">three Egyptian judges were killed in Sinai</a>, a reflection of the levels of discontent and growing unrest within Egypt.</p>
<p>Regardless of the final verdict, the increasing number of death sentences is indicative of the deteriorating state of what little democracy was established after the 2011 uprisings. The <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/01/egypt-parliamentary-elections-to-be-postponed-by-new-legal-setback">endless postponement of the parliamentary elections</a> is a clear sign of al-Sisi’s unwillingness to be held accountable by anyone outside of his circle of supporters. </p>
<p>Sisi’s administration is characterised by a steady decrease of democratic practices and civil liberties, as the president attempts to reinforce its authority by propagating levels of brutality and repression that are unmatched in the country’s history. </p>
<p>Another element that is indicative of the current state of affairs in Egypt is the decision to <a href="http://www.democracynow.org/2014/12/1/a_dark_moment_in_egypts_history">drop all criminal charges against previous dictator Hosni Mubarak and his sons</a>, which further underlines the continuation of the military’s deep state despite the events of 2011. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, daily human rights abuses are quickly leading the country to breaking point once again. The <a href="http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/egypt">steady deterioration of human rights and democratic practices</a> in Egypt can be directly traced to al-Sisi’s <a href="http://www.madamasr.com/news/president-amends-law-include-life-sentence-receiving-funds-arms">amendments to the Penal Code</a>, which allow civilians to be tried in absentia in military courts without the right of even consulting with a lawyer. </p>
<p>Morsi’s sentence will not only be another blow to Egypt’s already fragile democracy, but is also further diminishing al-Sisi’s volatile international credibility.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/full-circle-in-egypt-as-failed-revolution-lets-the-military-strengthen-its-grip-22501">As we argued previously</a>, Morsi’s trial can be seen as the culmination of the military’s quest to regain its ruling power and to reinstate the status quo that was interrupted by the 2011 uprisings. Similarly, such events are also a continuation of the previous Egyptian governments’ decades long practice of branding Islamists as scapegoats. </p>
<p>Morsi’s sentence can still be appealed – as a second court date has been set for June 2 – meanwhile Egypt awaits the grand mufti’s decision. But until then, the country remains on the verge of explosive popular discontent and chaos, which al-Sisi’s unprecedented security measures are failing to contain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41948/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucia Ardovini receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two years after the ousting of Egypt’s first democratically elected president, military rule is now firmly entrenched.Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLucia Ardovini, ESRC PhD candidate, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/271442014-05-27T05:14:22Z2014-05-27T05:14:22ZEgypt prepares to hail former army chief as president – once the election is out of the way<p>In May 2012, Egypt’s <a href="http://www.european-centre.org/ecia-briefings/egypts-preside-elections/">first democratic presidential election</a> set an important precedent in a troubled transition process. At the time, there was no constitution, no clarity on the president’s powers, no process of transitional justice, no security sector reform, and no economic reform. Key demands of the revolution such as inclusive economic growth and social justice were a chimera. </p>
<p>There was, however, plenty of political participation: for all its flaws, with the presidential election the transitions process finally gave signs of life in the free election of the land’s most powerful office.</p>
<p>The election itself was a surprisingly close-run affair: the top four candidates in the first round were all within 7% of each other, and the first two candidates separated by a mere 3.5% in the run-off. While the victor, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Muhammad Morsi, could only <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/24/us-egypt-election-idUSBRE85G01U20120624">claim a slender margin of victory</a>, Egyptians hopeful of a transition towards democracy could take heart from the process itself.</p>
<p>However, instead of a full transitional process, what ordinary Egyptians got was a return of the ancien regime. Core elements of the old order – particularly the armed forces and businessmen – regrouped, and focused on stalling transition and undermining the opposition.</p>
<h2>Bread, freedom and social justice</h2>
<p>The Brotherhood was no exception to this process. Like all post-Mubarak governments, it failed to tackle Egypt’s core problems: the economy is <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/22/world/meast/egypt-presidential-candidates-economy/">still in dire straits</a>, inequality is increasing, and ordinary people are increasingly frustrated. Bread, freedom and social justice are still a distant dream.</p>
<p>Instead of confronting Egypt’s deep-seated economic, social and political problems, successive governments responded with a toxic mix of hyper-nationalism and repression of any political dissent, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s turn in power was no exception. This combination of political disenfranchisement and economic impoverishment led to increased instability.</p>
<p>Tension reached a peak when the <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/andrea-teti-gennaro-gervasio/army%E2%80%99s-coup-in-egypt-for-people-or-against-people">army</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/tears-and-terror-as-egypt-slides-towards-civil-war-17077">removed Morsi in July 2013</a>. The <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/andrea-teti-vivienne-matthies-boon-gennaro-gervasio/revolution-continues-morsi%E2%80%99s-miscalculations-and">Brotherhood’s miscalculation of popular discontent</a> with its rule brought about a groundswell of mobilisation against Morsi, which the army took advantage of, stepping in and removing him. What has followed since then is a concerted effort by the army and other sections of the “old guard” to effectively <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-muslim-brotherhood-failed-in-egypt-because-it-was-inept-incompetent-and-out-of-touch-23738">eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood</a> as a political actor. </p>
<p>Under the banner of “Egypt’s war on terror”, thousands of <a href="https://theconversation.com/mass-death-sentences-for-muslim-brotherhood-complete-the-counter-revolution-in-egypt-24742">Brotherhood activists have been arrested and often tortured</a>, its leadership is in prison or in exile, and hundreds of anti-coup demonstrators – many but not all Brotherhood supporters – have been killed by the security forces. Security has become a political mantra and authorities view dissent as akin to treason.</p>
<p>Nor has the assault been limited to the Brotherhood. Riding – and stoking – a wave of hyper-nationalism rivalled only during the Suez Crisis of 1956, the 1967 defeat to Israel, or the “October War” of 1973, this assault has aimed at pro-democracy groups such as <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/egypt-outlaws-anti-mubarak-april-6-movement-20144281135421761.html">April 6th</a>. Activists and even iconic opposition figures like <a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/05/18/alaa-abdel-fattah-fined-request-bench-recusal-denied/">Alaa Abdel Fattah</a> and April 6th co-founder Ahmed Maher have been arrested under draconian new anti-protest legislation, and often tortured. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the new regime struck back. <a href="http://www.madamasr.com/content/mubarak-mansions">Mubarak and his cronies</a> received lighter sentences for corruption than pro-democracy activists on trumped-up charges received for dissenting, and General al-Sisi, paladin of <a href="http://www.dw.de/egypts-army-expands-economic-power/a-17611602">the Army’s financial and political interests</a> and already head of Intelligence, was promoted Field Marshal and “responded” to “popular demands” that he run for office. Al-Sisi has also become the object of a spasmodic <a href="http://www.juancole.com/2014/04/egypts-personality-beatification.html">cult of personality</a> by his admirers, producing a baffling range of “Sisi” (or “CC”) items, <a href="http://sisifetish.tumblr.com">from chocolate cakes to underwear</a>.</p>
<p>In this sense, the context for the coming presidential elections couldn’t contrast more with 2012: for all the faults of those elections, they were conducted in a markedly more open political landscape. There is no doubt in anyone’s mind that al-Sisi will “win” these elections – the only doubt is by how much. Nor is there any doubt what an al-Sisi presidency will mean both politically and economically: like his military, Islamist, and “civilian” predecessors, he has given no sign of tolerating dissent, nor has he formulated any economic policies that might have a chance of addressing Egypt’s deep structural problems. Al-Sisi might be preparing to celebrate, but Egypt is unlikely to have much to cheer about in the long run.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27144/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Teti is Senior Fellow at the European Centre for International Affairs.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Hynek does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In May 2012, Egypt’s first democratic presidential election set an important precedent in a troubled transition process. At the time, there was no constitution, no clarity on the president’s powers, no…Andrea Teti, Director, Centre for Global Security and Governance, University of AberdeenSarah Hynek, Postgraduate researcher, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/170772013-08-14T13:19:55Z2013-08-14T13:19:55ZTears and terror as Egypt slides towards civil war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/29253/original/qd7k9wbn-1376480265.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The pain of conflict.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Egypt is waking up to a <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/article3843604.ece">death toll</a> of more than 460 people after yesterday’s massacres. After factoring in the death toll of weeks of unrest, that’s close on <a href="https://docs.google.com/a/theconversation.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0At6CC4x_yBnMdGZ4LWR4WllKUWNNM3VqSG43ZGY1LWc#gid=0">800 dead</a> and many thousands more injured since June. An elected president in custody. Army units <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23691401">using deadly force</a> to clear protesters off the streets. Egypt appears to be spiralling out of control.</p>
<p>The question the international community must now face is whether the situation will further deteriorate and escalate into a full-blown civil war. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23691571">Reports</a> from Cairo where the confrontation between the supporters of ousted president Mohammed Morsi and the army is in full swing have been harrowing. Today’s butcher’s bill is at least 100 and will surely rise.</p>
<p>The already yawning gulf between supporters and opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, may now be even more difficult to bridge than a week ago. Then European and US mediators appeared hopeful that they could broker a peaceful end to the stand-off in Egypt caused as a result the army coup which removed Morsi. </p>
<p>With the benefit of hindsight, this hope was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23601349">misplaced</a>. And now any political solution is that much harder to imagine.</p>
<h2>The road to conflict</h2>
<p>There is certainly no lack of motivation for further violence. Morsi’s supporters, inside and outside the Muslim Brotherhood, rightly feel betrayed by events. The president was democratically elected, and while he and his inner circle grossly <a href="https://theconversation.com/egypt-where-turmoil-comes-with-the-constitution-15816">mismanaged</a> Egypt’s transition, the military coup and its aftermath were anything but progress for Egypt’s Arab Spring. </p>
<p>One of the obvious but misleading conclusions for the Brotherhood may simply be that the democratic process will not help them advance their goals, and that violence instead may be more justifiable. </p>
<p>What is misleading about such a simplistic “lesson” is that democracy is not simply the rule of the majority, but a form of government that protects minorities as well. Especially in diverse, and even more so in deeply divided societies, majorities ignore the need for inclusiveness at their peril.</p>
<p>Yet, this not only applies to numerical majorities but it also extends to otherwise dominant groups. The army in Egypt may still enjoy support among secularists and feel emboldened to crack down hard on its Muslim Brotherhood challengers, but it too cannot forever rule by force alone and eventually risks losing the popular support it still enjoys among secularists. </p>
<p>The army may see a unique opportunity now to crush the pro-Morsi camp, and thus be motivated to escalate violence further, but this is not a long-term strategy for stability. </p>
<h2>Violent resistance</h2>
<p>Even if we were to accept that one or even both sides are motivated for further violent escalation, this would in itself not be enough to lead to a full-blown civil war in the absence of two further crucial ingredients: means and opportunity. </p>
<p>To fight a civil war, regime opponents need the weapons, or the resources to acquire them. They need the expertise in how to fight, and sustain, an asymmetric campaign. The Muslim Brotherhood may well be able to acquire both over time, but any escalation to civil war would at best be gradual. </p>
<p>More likely, the situation would resemble an uneven race between the army and its opponents: one side trying to crush the other before it can build up necessary capabilities, the other to survive until it is more evenly matched.</p>
<p>But decades of repression and persecution did not destroy the Muslim Brotherhood, so in light of recent events it is possible to imagine small bands of guerrilla fighters being able to command sufficient popular support to maintain a low-level campaign of violent resistance. </p>
<p>Considering the <a href="http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egypts-muslim-brotherhood/p23991">wider network</a> the Brotherhood has in the region and beyond, external support is likely to create opportunities in the form of resources, expertise - and fighters. Events in Egypt fit in very well with an al-Qaeda narrative of suppression of Islam by corrupt local governments supported by Western powers. Moreover, there is a significant danger that turmoil in Egypt will <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/article/conflicts-without-borders-2066">spread</a> and further destabilise an already volatile region.</p>
<h2>What the West should do</h2>
<p>Yet opportunity cuts both ways, and in a double sense. On the one hand, opportunities for the Muslim Brotherhood to build up capabilities to fight an all-out civil war can be denied, or at least constrained, by controlling and intercepting flows of weapons, money and people, challenging though that might be. </p>
<p>Similarly, opportunities for the army to further escalate violence can, and must, also be constrained. What is needed is a much more clearly and publicly articulated policy by Egypt’s international partners in the West and in the Muslim world of what is unacceptable. This needs to be backed by credible threats of sanctions and offers of incentives if certain conditions are met. </p>
<p>Chief among these needs to be an immediate de-escalation of violence. Both the US and the EU are in a <a href="http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/eu-mediator-remain-egypt-talks-c-news-529754">position</a> to do so — the US because of its long-standing links with the Egyptian military, the EU because it has played an important, if so far unsuccessful, mediation role between the Brotherhood and the army.</p>
<p>Denying means and constraining opportunities for a full-blown civil war, however, are stop-gap measures. They can at best be effective for a period of time only and create a window of opportunity for cooler and more rational heads to prevail and prevent the currently extremely volatile situation in Egypt from spinning out of control. </p>
<p>The key challenge for the rival factions in Egypt is to learn the right lessons from its so-far disastrous post-Mubarak transition and find the courage to right the wrongs committed by both sides.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/17077/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council of the United Kingdom. In the past, his research has also been funded by the British Academy and the European Commission.</span></em></p>Egypt is waking up to a death toll of more than 460 people after yesterday’s massacres. After factoring in the death toll of weeks of unrest, that’s close on 800 dead and many thousands more injured since…Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/165952013-08-06T05:41:19Z2013-08-06T05:41:19ZMixed messages from the EU won’t help solve Egypt’s crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/28443/original/73mkcbvn-1375271627.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Happier times: Catherine Ashton meets Mohamed Morsi after his election as Egypt's president.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">European External Action Service</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The stand-off in Egypt continues. A sit in by supporters of deposed president Mohamed Morsi has been put on notice that they will be cleared out by force if necessary.</p>
<p>The protesters for their part have vowed they will remain until Morsi is reinstated. The government has dropped leaflets explaining that anyone who leaves the sit-in will be deemed not to have committed a crime.</p>
<p>And while the stalemate drags on, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23563210">envoys have poured</a> into Cairo from the US, the European Union and the Gulf States in an attempt to stave off a descent into large-scale bloodshed.</p>
<p>Meanwhile the whereabouts of Morsi himself remains a closely guarded secret. Not even the EU’s foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, who met with Morsi last week, was allowed to know where he is being kept - she was flown to the location after dark.</p>
<p>Baroness Ashton reported Morsi to be safe and well - and reported a “strong desire” on all sides to resolve the crisis that has paralysed Egypt since the end of June.</p>
<h2>EU shaky on Egypt</h2>
<p>But the EU’s track record on Egypt has up to now been fairly equivocal, to say the least. When Morsi was elected Ashton <a href="http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_12375_en.htm">proclaimed his inauguration</a> “a moment to celebrate the first democratically elected president in Egypt’s history” and also committed the EU to “work with him and his future government as he leads the country into the next crucial stage of its transition”. </p>
<p>Despite this initial enthusiasm, the EU was quick to change its mind when protesters went en masse into Tahrir Square to challenge Morsi’s government and the headline in the EU Observer on July 4, the day after Mohamed Morsi was removed from office by an army coup <a href="http://euobserver.com/foreign/120758">ran thus</a>: “EU sheds no tears over Morsi’s departure”. </p>
<p>The same day Ashton <a href="http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/20130704_en.htm">stated that</a> the EU “remains unequivocally committed to supporting the Egyptian people in their aspirations to democracy and inclusive governance”.</p>
<p>We need reminding that Morsi was democratically elected and although his short-lived government was not as inclusive as many Egyptians wanted, and his ousting followed massive popular protests, this was not the way in which a serious international actor is expected to respond to such a grave situation in the most populous country in the Arab world. </p>
<h2>Stability trumps democracy</h2>
<p>The EU has always preferred stability over democracy in the Middle East, conscious that any political change towards democratic reforms in this region would produce instability in the short to medium term. </p>
<p>Thus, despite professing a commitment to democratisation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region) in its <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf">2003 European Security Strategy</a> and <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf">2004 European Neighbourhood Policy</a>, the EU continued to support autocratic regimes, such as that of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, in the region. </p>
<p>This was mainly because the alternative – the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood – was not expected to be as co-operative with the EU on various EU security interests including Egypt’s willingness (under Hosni Mubarak) to deal with Israel, to act as trading and economic partner of the EU, to “control” illegal migration and counter-“terrorism”.</p>
<h2>Shades of Palestine 2006?</h2>
<p>The EU’s reaction reminds us of how the <a href="http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22659.pdf">EU isolated Hamas</a>, Palestine’s Islamist party, following its democratic victory in Palestinian elections in 2006. The upheaval that followed in Palestine after the 2006 elections should have acted as an important lesson for the EU in its proclaimed role in the southern neighbourhood and more broadly in the world.</p>
<p>If the EU wanted to be taken seriously as a mediator in the deepening internal divisions in Egypt it had a golden opportunity to encourage political reconciliation between the two main rival camps before the coup actually took place. </p>
<p>The EU <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45339#.Ufkao43ryvw">deems dialogue</a> to be one of its core foreign policy tools. So it is even more surprising that it did not initiate or at least encourage the building of a free space for the contestation of ideas, a climate of open discussion and exchange of alternative view points between the two main rival parties in Egypt. Instead its reaction has only deepened the divisions in this crucial Arab state.</p>
<p>But just as it did not play a timely role in encouraging reconciliation between the two main rival groups in Palestine (Fatah and Hamas), the EU did not encourage reconciliation between the two rival camps in Egypt. The result has been escalating violence and bloodshed with no party showing any willingness to compromise for the best of the country as a whole. </p>
<p>For their part, the Muslim Brotherhood stipulate that their protests will continue until Morsi is reinstated in office. The army on the other hand is increasing its pressure on the MB by arresting key party figures and pursuing tough measures against its opponents including violence - thus further accentuating the divisions in Egypt by alienating all Morsi’s supporters.</p>
<p>Ashton says that relationships built up over a dozen or more visits have given her an advantage in her efforts to find a “middle ground and to identify confidence-building measures” between the two rival Egyptian camps. She could do well in making it clear to the Egyptian army that the use of force is no way forward towards a peaceful political solution to this crisis. </p>
<p>Her message to the MB should be that the reinstatement of an unpopular president may have to be shelved in favour of fresh elections. Her emphasis should be on a healthy, rational debate between all opposing views as the only possible way that Egypt could avoid descending into social and economic collapse with serious repercussions for the whole region as well as for Europe and the wider world.</p>
<p>There have been <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/05/egyptian-government-offers-muslim-brotherhood-ministerial-posts">reports of possible concessions</a> to the MB - talk of the offer of ministerial posts, unfreezing of assets and an amnesty for those members held in prison, but these have been denied today. This is the most serious aspect of the crisis - the marginalisation of non-violent Islam as a political force. </p>
<p>For many Muslims in Egypt, Morsi’s government had represented an opportunity for an Islamist group (the Muslim Brotherhood) to access political power through legitimate means. That it was cut off before it had a chance to prove itself may have catastrophic consequences. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/16595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Pace receives funding from ESRC</span></em></p>The stand-off in Egypt continues. A sit in by supporters of deposed president Mohamed Morsi has been put on notice that they will be cleared out by force if necessary. The protesters for their part have…Michelle Pace, Chair in Politics and International Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/163802013-07-26T05:32:56Z2013-07-26T05:32:56ZRaising the stakes on the streets of Egypt<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/28081/original/fgp353tr-1374751513.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Morsi still commands considerable support.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jonathan Rashad</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the world holds its breath, hundreds of thousands - maybe millions - of protestors will take to the streets of Egypt’s big cities today in what has been <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/10200495/Egypts-military-chief-accused-of-declaring-civil-war-against-Muslim-Brotherhood.html">widely billed in the international media</a> as a deliberate step towards civil war recklessly taken by the commander of the country’s armed forces, Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.</p>
<p>On Tuesday al-Sisi, the defence minister and deputy prime minister - and the central player in the removal of the government of Mohamed Morsi - <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=02QZNE0UE4o">called on</a> “all honest and trustworthy Egyptians” to come out to the streets in large numbers to show the world the determination of the Egyptian people while giving him and the army a “mandate to confront violence and potential terrorism”. </p>
<p>At the very least this is seen as a signal that the army is preparing for a <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/24/egypt-army-chief-support-citizens">“violent crackdown”</a> against Morsi’s supporters in the Muslim Brotherhood. </p>
<h2>Coup or uprising?</h2>
<p>Despite the impressive manifestation of popular will on June 30, the reassertion of the military over political life in Egypt was almost unanimously seen as a “coup” internationally. Anticipating the military takeover of civil authority, this narrative of events had in fact been pushed by the Brotherhood’s English-speaking social media platforms and website <a href="http://ikhwanweb.com/">ikhwanweb.com</a> even before July 3. </p>
<p>Once the army intervened, the “coup” narrative was broadcast by the Qatari-owned and Brotherhood-leaning station al-Jazeera, from where it was adopted by CNN and into the global media loop to the extent that it has become the accepted truth. The same reading of events, that of an authoritarian army bent on killing the democratic baby, breast-fed by the peace-loving Muslim Brotherhood, continues today. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Brotherhood <a href="draws%20the%20spectre">continues to invoke the spectre</a> of a looming “civil war”. And though it is crucial to read al-Sisi’s statement and motives with the greatest of care, it seems that it has been already interpreted <em>ante post facto</em> as a carte blanche for the military to commit yet another crime.</p>
<p>But an examination of the facts gives us another picture. Following the removal of Morsi from power on July 3, bloody clashes erupted in Cairo and across cities in Egypt. The next day Muslim Botherhood leader, Mohammed Badie, and Mohamed Beltagy, a member of the Brotherhood’s top executive body, appeared in front of packed crowds at Rabaa al-Adawiyya in Nasir City, the Muslim Brotherhood stronghold. </p>
<h2>Words of peace as prelude to violence</h2>
<p>Their speeches reiterated the Brotherhood’s commitment to “peaceful methods” while raising the banner of jihad in the name of Islam. <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4dFarB0CGRo">Badie’s speech</a>, in particular, was a good example of this: appearing to appeal to global public opinion by promoting peaceful protests while energising the rank and file and through the activation of the image of an external enemy bent on destroying Islam, using charged terminologies such as takfir (“apostasy” – a mortal sin according to a widely rejected interpretation of Islam).</p>
<p>The following night, supporters and opponents of the deposed president clashed at the Kobri el-Gamaa and the 6th of October bridge. From the hundreds of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dHzhGnTZzhY">videos uploaded to the web</a>, as well as from interviews I have conducted myself at Cairo University in the aftermath of the clashes, a pattern emerges that might give an indication on the Brotherhood’s ideology and methods. </p>
<p>During the weekend, armed Morsi supporters <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=6V2YRc4bg48">clashed with opponents</a> in Sidi Gabir, a neighborhood in Alexandria, and other cities in Egypt. One <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ApWByfkhuGs">particularly brutal scene</a> shows pro-Morsi people throwing a couple of youngsters off a roof top in the same Alexandrian neighborhood. Meanwhile <a href="http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/369768.aspx">in the Sinai</a>, armed commandoes exploded a gasoline-line.</p>
<p>The main accounts of the events of July 8 come from two sources: a video uploaded on YouTube which can be <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2013/jul/18/cairo-republican-guard-shooting-full-story#part-one">found here</a> and an <a href="http://www.facebook.com/notes/mirna-el-helbawi/my-eye-witness-on-the-republican-guard-clashes/507036462702957">eyewitness account</a> by a young journalist called Mirna el-Helbawy, who lived right above the scene of the shoot-out. </p>
<p>The exact truth of the sequence of events will probably remain unknown. But what seems to be clear is that among the supporters of Morsi, there is a minority of people armed and ready to commit acts of violence. Recruited at least in <a href="http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/219627.aspx">some instances</a> from abroad, they seem for the most part organised through the Brotherhood’s secretive paramilitary commando structure (historically called the <em>tanzim al-khass</em> or “special apparatus”, but today organized under the <em>qism al-askari</em> or “military section” of the group, which is directly attached to the Guidance Bureau). </p>
<p>It is these armed elements who contributed to the escalation of violence following July 3 and, in light of recent developments, it now seems legitimate to speculate if the Brotherhood has ever truly stopped its romance with political violence, despite of all the assertions of having “renounced” it over the past decades.</p>
<h2>Pawns in a darker game</h2>
<p>The tragic part of the story is that the greatest part of what is usually called the “Islamists” or “Morsi supporters” continues to be misled by a leadership that sees itself as being locked in a mortal combat against a powerful enemy bent on the destruction of Islam. </p>
<p>The majority of these people, still holding out at Rabaa al-Adawiyya and Cairo University, are decent and respectful citizens who feel duped in their democratic rights, feel that they have an obligation to support what they perceive as the “rule of law” and oppose an illegal intervention by the army to depose a democratically elected president. </p>
<p>While the Brotherhood propaganda machine continues to feed the global media with continued iterations of their peacefulness, it continues at the same time (through its Arabic channels) to mislead its rank and file by invoking Islam in the crudest fashion. </p>
<p>It remains to be seen how large the numbers will be who will follow the commander’s call and whether Sisi indeed commands the authority to mobilise large numbers of Egyptians. It is a risky strategy. And while we can and should speculate about the ulterior motives of Sisi and the army, it should be clear that there are some tangible reasons for him to raise the stakes. </p>
<p>Given the apocalyptic worldview of the Brotherhood and the fact that they are engaged in the financing and arming elements among their own ranks, such a step seems necessary.
C</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/16380/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Victor Willi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the world holds its breath, hundreds of thousands - maybe millions - of protestors will take to the streets of Egypt’s big cities today in what has been widely billed in the international media as a…Victor Willi, PhD Candidate, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/157922013-07-04T14:11:26Z2013-07-04T14:11:26ZEgyptians soldier on as Cairo wakes to a post-coup world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/26899/original/26kbjczp-1372921805.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some Egyptians protest, some just hope for a better life.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">TiTaN Jad</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When I took a walk past Cairo University this morning, the tanks were still there, while the Islamist camp were continuing their sit-in, though with strongly reduced numbers. At around 5.30pm the night before, the armed forces had closed in on the campus and at the Raba’a al-Adawiyya mosque in Nasr City, the two main sites of the pro-Morsi camp. Clashes erupted throughout the night, <a>leaving 10 dead</a>, according to news agencies, but thankfully the escalation of violence that everyone expected has not materialised (yet).</p>
<p>As these developments took place, millions of opponents of Mohammed Morsi cheered and partied throughout the night. Their demands had been fulfilled. “<em>Irhal</em>” – “Get Out!” was their battle cry. Morsi has failed on every front in during his short-lived presidency, not only because of the food, water, electricity and gas shortages across the country, but because of the complete mismanagement of the country he was supposed to lead. His race to the bottom started in November 22, 2012, with the <a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/morsy-issues-new-constitutional-declaration">Constitutional Declaration</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, Morsi systematically imprisoned opposition figures; his flacks repeatedly tried to put a ban on any sort of freedom of speech, such as in the <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/28/world/africa/bassem-youssef-sarcasm-weapon-egypt/">Bassam Yousef case</a>; he and his clan of Muslim Brothers pushed a constitution through the Shura Council that made the president immune from any sort of criticism. He exerted repeated efforts to undermine the judiciary system. He even included Hamas, a Palestinian national organisation, into the Egyptian governmental system. And he tried to undermine the state by replacing national and provincial leaders with Muslim Brotherhood apparatchiks. In doing so, he didn’t act independently, but as an executor of the orders coming out of the Guidance Office, (<em>maktab al-irsahd</em>), where the real power brokers run the affairs of the state.</p>
<p>The clearest indication of the president’s failure was his <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypts-morsi-under-increasing-pressure-as-deadline-looms/2013/07/02/fcb11aa0-e315-11e2-a11e-c2ea876a8f30_story.html">speech</a> two days ago, which once again showed the Brotherhood’s limited understanding of democracy, which is restricted to the mechanics of democracy (voting, elections, ballot boxes) while showing precious little appreciation for the values that make up the essence of a democracy – values such as the rule of law, citizenship, equality and human rights. The same faint comprehension also prevails at the base. When I talked to Morsi supporters today at Cairo University, asking them what democracy means to them, the only thing they could say was: <em>shara’iyya</em> (legitimacy). Morsi and the Brothers believe that winning an election gives them a carte blanche to run the state as if it was their feudality.</p>
<p>Morsi’s speech revealed another point that is crucial to understanding the psychology of the Brotherhood leadership and their crass miscalculation about the June 30 demonstrations: the complete disconnection with the people, especially the poor. While Morsi had uttered the word “legitimacy” about 40 times during his speech, the poor were not mentioned one single time. What else can you expect of a pyramidal, top-down run organisation whose leaders have been imprisoned and exiled most part of their lives, and whose core values are strict obedience to a leadership, most of whom are aged over 80 years old?</p>
<p>The ensuing shock vis-à-vis the huge numbers who took to the streets over the last few days led the army to start implementing a plan that has been in the making for quite some time. This was not a coup d’état. Rather, this was a concentrated grassroots effort, a campaign called <em>Tamarrod</em> (“rebel”) that had been going on for the past eight months, and to which many members of the Egyptian political and civil society scene subscribed, including prominent opposition figures, al-Azhar, the Coptic Pope, the police, the national guard – and the people of Egypt. The campaign called for peaceful protests and, for the first time since the first revolution of 2011, had a message and clearly defined goals: the deposition of Morsi, a six-month transitional government while a new constitution would be written, followed by parliamentary elections. </p>
<p>After having pushed for a national reconciliation dialogue, which the president refused, the military took up the demands of the people. Shortly before the ultimatum expired, a travel ban was issued against the president and the top leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. Nearly 300 members of the Freedom and Justice Party and the Muslim Brotherhood <a href="http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/03/egypt-live-blog/comment-page-29/">were arrested</a>, and Morsi, the Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie, Kharita al-Shater and 30 other top Brotherhood leaders are either in prison or under house arrest. A statement was read by the minister of defence and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19256730">Abdel Fattah al-Sisi</a>, declaring the army had taken control, that they would found a technocratic government, and that the head of the High Constitutional Court, Adly Mohamed Mansour, would take over the business of running the state until a new constitution was written that would make early presidential elections possible. For the military, everything went according to plan, which was ready-made, and they executed it swiftly and professionally.</p>
<p>What happened is phenomenal and unprecedented in Egyptian history. And while millions of Egyptians cheered and partied until in the early morning on June 30, and then again yesterday, following the sacking of Morsi, there is a flip side to the coin.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/26901/original/tpr8y28x-1372922331.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/26901/original/tpr8y28x-1372922331.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/26901/original/tpr8y28x-1372922331.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/26901/original/tpr8y28x-1372922331.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/26901/original/tpr8y28x-1372922331.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/26901/original/tpr8y28x-1372922331.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/26901/original/tpr8y28x-1372922331.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/26901/original/tpr8y28x-1372922331.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Scenes of jubilation in Cairo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">TripleMs</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Just one year ago, millions of Egyptians had supported Morsi, many of these same people – the large masses of average men and women, who are not politically active and desire peace and stability – have turned against him in wide swing of the pendulum, <em>à l’égyptienne</em>. While the demands of the opponents are clear, the move by the army weakens the institution of the presidency and could be the beginning of a new era of military-security cohabitation. Of course, the Egyptian people assume that al-Sisi is a man of his word, but in politics one has to assume that he has another agenda and it would be naïve to assume that the military is just a neutral power-broker in the name of the people.</p>
<p>As Hazem Kandil shows in a <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Soldiers-Spies-Statesmen-Egypts-Revolt/dp/1844679616">brilliant new study</a> on Egyptian history, there exist three traditional power centres in Egypt: the army, state security and the presidency. Under president Gamel Abdul Nasser, and following the July 1952 revolution, the military emerged as the strongest political force. When Anwar al-Sadat came to power, the first thing he had to do was to assert himself against his Nassirist rivals on the left, thus shifting alliances away from the army and towards the state security, represented through the ministry of interior. Finally, under Hosni Mubarak, Egypt developed into a fully-fledged police state, with the minister of interior exerting huge influence against their traditional rival, the armed forces. The state has now been toppled twice in three years, first with the fall of Mubarak and now with Morsi’s ousting. At the same time, we have witnessed the emergence of a fourth force in the Egyptian political scene – the millions of protesters who once again took to the street. </p>
<p>Almost two-and-a-half years after the revolution of January 25, 2011, and after a transition that was moving at least partially in a democratic manner (let’s not forget that there were two referenda held, as well a presidential election – all which were accepted by the Egyptian people and there were few claims of electoral fraud), the military, together with other institutions of state and civil society and with the enormous support of millions of Egyptians staged a counter-revolution of which the end is yet unknown. Whatever you might think of the Islamists, within their limited understanding of democracy their argument around constitutional legitimacy (<em>shara’iyya</em>) and the (formal) illegality of what happened yesterday stands on solid grounds.</p>
<p>For the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, their short romance with power is over. We can only hope they will not activate their paramilitary wing and resort to violent tactics over the coming days. According to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, laid out by its founder Hassan al-Bannah in one of his letters (<em>risala al-Ta’lim</em>), the next stage (after educating the Muslim individual, family and community, then taking over the government) would have been the establishment of an Islamic state ruled by sharia – a prelude to the unification of all Muslim countries into a “caliphate”.</p>
<p>But the brothers have failed miserably. They became infected by the arrogance of power and if they hadn’t been so incompetent in running state affairs, they could have actually made it. Thus, the saga of the Muslim Brotherhood – the story of prions, exile, torture, arrests – continues. It is likely that they will go back underground, pondering their mistakes and working out new plans to take the government back. </p>
<p>It’s clear that they will never give up their ideology. As is typical for strongly ideological parties and movements, ideology is existential. Without it, they are nothing. The theory is right according to the brothers and if reality doesn’t fit the theory, it is because of an error in strategy and tactics, not an error in the theory. This is a crucial point, and it is quite possible that the latent potential for violence erupts.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/26903/original/q898dr7n-1372922628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/26903/original/q898dr7n-1372922628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/26903/original/q898dr7n-1372922628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/26903/original/q898dr7n-1372922628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/26903/original/q898dr7n-1372922628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/26903/original/q898dr7n-1372922628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/26903/original/q898dr7n-1372922628.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">There is a new force in Egypt - the power of protest.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Imjleft</span></span>
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<p>Beyond the army, the state security, the presidency and the brothers, the tragic part in the second act of the Egyptian revolutionary drama is the millions of poor people in this country. They have joined both camps, the opposition as well as the Morsi supporters, hoping for a better future. </p>
<p>Over the course of past year, I have met and talked to hundreds of Egyptians, cab and microbus drivers, shop owners, shoe makers, vegetable sellers, guards, bawaabs and so on. They are all very kind and good-hearted people, and have quite humble expectations of life. “We don’t want to travel or live in luxury, we just want bread, freedom and social justice – we are a very simple people,” Ahmed, a former engineer who was forced to take up a job as a cab driver following the revolution, told me two days ago. </p>
<p>It is important to understand that both sides think of themselves as defending legitimate goals. According to the worldview of the Islamists, the <em>sharia</em> represents the best system of governance, both in this life and the next one. They are deeply religious, sticking to an ethical framework that doesn’t permit them to act in a manner against Islam. It is a system that regulates the behaviour of the individual believer on the level of ethics and morals, where an external force, the state with its monopoly of power, has not been necessary for the biggest part of Muslim history. Islam gives these people meaning and a direction and, most importantly hope. Who can blame them for this?</p>
<p>Ultimately, what we find in the Muslim Brotherhood is a deeply divided organisation, where the mass of followers are systematically deceived and duped. While at the top echelons of power the next move is already in the making, these people will go about their lives, struggling every day in this sticky, noisy, polluted city of Cairo, holding on to their faith. In the absence of any hope for improving their living standards, all they have is the hope to be salvaged in the afterlife, where their hard work and suffering will be rewarded by God Almighty. They are the losers – again – in this chapter of Egyptian history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/15792/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Victor Willi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When I took a walk past Cairo University this morning, the tanks were still there, while the Islamist camp were continuing their sit-in, though with strongly reduced numbers. At around 5.30pm the night…Victor Willi, PhD Candidate, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.