tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/muhammadu-buhari-14364/articlesMuhammadu Buhari – The Conversation2023-03-01T09:43:26Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2002492023-03-01T09:43:26Z2023-03-01T09:43:26ZFrom Chinua Achebe to Toyin Falola – 5 essential books Nigeria’s new president should read<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511370/original/file-20230221-22-lymjhm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/nigerian-flag-with-pile-of-books-isolated-on-white-royalty-free-image/843290280?phrase=nigeria%20books&adppopup=true">Golden Brown/Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Not many African political leaders are known to have publicly declared their love of reading. US president Barack Obama popularised the idea of a recommended <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/entertainment/celebrities/2022/12/23/barack-obama-2022-favorites-books-movies-songs/10948842002/">reading list</a> and he still shares his annual choice. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/olayinka-oyegbile-1297384">a communications scholar</a> and a book reviewer, I made a short list of essential reads for Nigeria’s new president. My selection of books is based on what a new president needs to know when he takes the reins of <a href="https://businessday.ng/news/article/nigeria-more-divided-today-than-four-years-ago-report/">a deeply divided and disillusioned country</a>.</p>
<p>Nigeria has many problems. Disunity deepened under the Muhammadu Buhari government, and <a href="https://nairametrics.com/2022/07/29/controlling-nigerias-rising-population-could-reduce-long-term-inflation-report/">galloping inflation</a> has led to a <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/577603-nigerians-groan-as-fuel-scarcity-bites-harder.html">shortage of essential goods</a> and services. <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigeria-insecurity-2022-was-a-bad-year-and-points-to-need-for-major-reforms-194554">Insecurity</a> remains a challenge too. </p>
<h2>The Trouble with Nigeria, by Chinua Achebe</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Chinua-Achebe">Chinua Achebe</a>, Nigeria’s preeminent novelist, took a break from fiction <a href="https://africanbookaddict.com/2015/05/25/the-trouble-with-nigeria-by-chinua-achebe/#:%7E:text=Even%20though%20this%20book%20was,administrations%20in%20several%20African%20nations.">in 1983</a> to write <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Trouble-Nigeria-Chinua-Achebe/dp/9781561475">The Trouble with Nigeria</a>. I recommend it first because of its slim size. Many of our leaders have a well-known disdain for anything intellectual or rigorous. </p>
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<span class="caption">The Trouble With Nigeria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Amazon</span></span>
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<p>The incoming president should find time to sit down and pore over the 68 pages of this book and see what Achebe has said about our country. The writer says: “The trouble with Nigeria is leadership.” Simple. The president should then ask himself how he can make a difference. Perhaps after reading this small but powerful book, the incoming president might see where he fits into the “trouble” with Nigeria and how to fix it.</p>
<h2>From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000, by Lee Kuan Yew</h2>
<p>I know this is a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Third-World-First-Singapore-1965-2000/dp/0060197765">big book</a>. But it earns my recommendation because it is written from experience. Achebe was never a leader of a country. Lee Kuan Yew was. As prime minister of Singapore, he led a nation that was poor, scorned and derided. But through stern determination, he led it out of the dungeon. Nigeria needs a leader like Lee, without his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/23/lee-kuan-yews-legacy-of-authoritarian-pragmatism-will-serve-singapore-well">dictatorial tendencies</a>. Nigeria has long been a subject of scorn, even among its own citizens who have decided to vote with their feet in search of better fortunes in other countries. </p>
<p>How did Lee transform his small, decrepit country into an internet economy? There is no need to reinvent the wheel for Nigeria; this has been done in Singapore. All the president needs to do is adapt it to local needs. </p>
<h2>Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson</h2>
<p>I recommend <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Why-Nations-Fail-Origins-Prosperity/dp/0307719227">this book</a> because it is simple and straightforward without economic or political jargon that might bore or scare the incoming president. Daron Acemoglu is <a href="https://economics.mit.edu/people/faculty/daron-acemoglu">an economist at MIT</a> while James A. Robinson is <a href="https://harris.uchicago.edu/directory/james-robinson">an economist and political scientist at the University of Chicago</a>. </p>
<p>The authors did a great job of synthesising the reasons why nations fail – it’s an easy read. Many have argued that Nigeria is failing or has failed because of its culture, geography, climate or ethnic composition. These authors have punctured all that. </p>
<p>The new president will get a clear picture of how to move out of the bind Nigeria is in, 62 years after <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Independent-Nigeria">independence</a> and <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/5278c70012.html">24 years after a return to democracy</a>. To the authors, nations find themselves where they are because of the choices made by their leaders in setting up economic and political institutions. They conclude it’s possible to break out of the poverty cycle. This is what Nigeria needs now to restore citizens’ faith in the system. It is political and economic institutions that underlie economic success. </p>
<h2>Understanding Modern Nigeria: Ethnicity, Democracy, and Development, by Toyin Falola</h2>
<p>Abiodun Alao, a professor of African Studies at King’s College London, writing a blurb for <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Understanding-Modern-Nigeria-Ethnicity-Development/dp/1108837972">this book</a>, said: “Falola has brought together, under one cover, answers to all the questions anyone may want to ask about Nigeria.” </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511368/original/file-20230221-14-xabhxt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511368/original/file-20230221-14-xabhxt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511368/original/file-20230221-14-xabhxt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=910&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511368/original/file-20230221-14-xabhxt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=910&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511368/original/file-20230221-14-xabhxt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=910&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511368/original/file-20230221-14-xabhxt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1144&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511368/original/file-20230221-14-xabhxt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1144&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511368/original/file-20230221-14-xabhxt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1144&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Understanding Modern Nigeria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Amazon</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/history/faculty/falolaoo">Toyin Falola</a> is a Jacob and Frances Sanger Mossiker Chair in the Humanities and a distinguished teaching professor at the University of Texas at Austin in the US. </p>
<p>This is truly a magisterial book about Nigeria. In its 672 pages it covers everything about the country from colonialism to post-colonial and modern times, religious identities, fault lines, youth, popular culture and politics.</p>
<p>It is arguably one of the most detailed books about contemporary issues in the country. The new president can learn a lot from it. </p>
<h2>New York, My Village: A Novel, by Uwem Akpan</h2>
<p>Unlike the four other books, this is fiction. Why a novel? It earns its place because fiction has a way of telling some home truths that non-fiction may gloss over. In <a href="https://www.amazon.com/New-York-My-Village-Novel/dp/0393881423">this book</a> about <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Nigerian-civil-war">the Nigerian civil war (1967-70)</a>, Akpan has been able to give a voice to the minority. </p>
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<span class="caption">New York, My Village.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Goodreads</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Nigeria has been dogged by the issue of a majority accused of lording it over minority ethnic groups. Akpan’s short stories and autobiographical pieces have appeared in various magazines locally and abroad. He currently teaches at the University of Florida. </p>
<p>In this novel, Akpan gives minorities a voice. The majority have to listen instead of ramming their ideas down the throats of others. The incoming president would gain a lot from reading this book and understanding that we must always have the patience to listen to the minority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200249/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Oyegbile does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What a new president needs to know as he takes the reins of a deeply divided and disillusioned country.Olayinka Oyegbile, Journalist and Communications scholar, Trinity University, LagosLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1987342023-02-16T13:25:25Z2023-02-16T13:25:25ZEconomy and security on the ballot in Nigeria – 5 things to watch in presidential election<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509834/original/file-20230213-24-ghqcb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young Nigerians rallying to support Labour candidate Peter Obi consider themselves part of the 'Obi-dient' movement.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporter-sticks-a-party-flag-to-her-face-during-campaign-news-photo/1247043117">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Voters in Africa’s largest democracy will <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/nigerians-vote-soon-to-choose-next-president-lawmakers-/6952941.html">go to the polls on Feb. 25, 2023</a>, to pick a new president. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/231/40">voter turnout</a> has been on a steady decline in Nigeria for two decades, a recent surge of interest in politics and improvements to the election process have meant that <a href="https://www.inecnigeria.org/">93 million Nigerians</a> are now registered to vote. </p>
<p>I have observed four Nigerian elections as part of domestic and international missions, and I also worked in the National Assembly shortly after the military stepped down in 1999. As an academic both at the University of Ibadan and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=gw8HUpYAAAAJ&hl=en">now back in the U.S.</a>, I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=gw8HUpYAAAAJ&hl=en">researched</a> Nigeria’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139962872">development</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198804307.001.0001">political history</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2020.1734968">electoral politics</a> ever since. </p>
<p>Each of Nigeria’s elections since the military dictatorship ended has been important in its own way. For example, the 2015 vote held special importance when the newly formed opposition All Progressives Congress (APC) defeated the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). It was the first time in Nigeria’s history that one political party handed power over to another. Elections in 2019 overcame major logistical obstacles and security risks, and the swift passage of electoral reforms during Muhammadu Buhari’s second term <a href="https://www.ndi.org/publications/iri-ndi-conduct-second-pre-election-assessment-mission-ahead-nigeria-s-2023-general">increased public confidence</a> in electoral processes.</p>
<p>The presidential vote scheduled for this month will be consequential for Nigeria’s economy and national security. Here are five reasons the 2023 elections are unique and critical. </p>
<h2>1. Religion less of a mobilizing force</h2>
<p>Nigeria is roughly <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-exec/">evenly divided between Muslims and Christians</a>, and religion plays a big role in electoral politics. For example, using a large national survey, I showed that Muslims were <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2020.1734968">56% more likely</a> to vote for the Muslim candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, in 2015.</p>
<p>Religion is often a tool for political mobilization, since northerners are overwhelmingly Muslim and most southerners are Christian. This time around, the candidates from the two major parties are both Muslim, reducing the religious rhetoric on the campaign trail. Bola Tinubu of the APC and Atiku Abubakar of the PDP have therefore focused on other issues – such as <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/nigerias-presidential-hopefuls-make-vague-promises-on-security">insecurity</a> and <a href="https://theexchange.africa/countries/nigeria-elections-2023-tinubu-blockchain-taxation-oil/">the economy</a> – to mobilize voters and distinguish themselves from each other. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509837/original/file-20230213-18-np5o2b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Split photo of two Black men in ceremonial Nigerian robes and traditional fila hats" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509837/original/file-20230213-18-np5o2b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509837/original/file-20230213-18-np5o2b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509837/original/file-20230213-18-np5o2b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509837/original/file-20230213-18-np5o2b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509837/original/file-20230213-18-np5o2b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509837/original/file-20230213-18-np5o2b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509837/original/file-20230213-18-np5o2b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The two leading candidates are Bola Tinubu, left, of Nigeria’s ruling All Progressive Congress party, and former vice president Atiku Abubakar, of the opposition Peoples Democratic Party.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-combination-of-file-pictures-created-on-june-10-2022-news-photo/1241215339">Kola Sulaimon and Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>2. There’s no incumbent</h2>
<p>This is only the second time ever that Nigeria has had a presidential vote without an incumbent running for reelection. This is good for democracy, since it suggests that presidents are yielding to popular support for constitutional term limits. It is certainly an improvement over President Olusegun Obasanjo’s failed attempt in 2006 <a href="https://www.academia.edu/80182498/Nigeria_Confronts_Obasanjos_Legacy">to change the constitution</a> so he could run for a third term.</p>
<p>However, this situation also alters the dynamics of competition. One analysis of 22 years of African elections finds that ruling parties are only <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/african-history/democracy-africa-successes-failures-and-struggle-political-reform?format=PB">half as likely to win</a> when the incumbent president is not in the running. This improves the PDP’s odds. </p>
<h2>3. Labour candidate has energized young voters</h2>
<p>Peter Obi, who was Atiku Abubakar’s running mate in 2019, has emerged as a viable third-party candidate from the Labour Party. At 61, he is younger than the two leading candidates and hails from the overwhelming Christian southeast – where ethnic Igbos feel like they have been left out of presidential politics for decades.</p>
<p>Former president Obasanjo surprised the nation by <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202301060130.html">endorsing Obi</a> rather than the candidate from the PDP, his party during his two terms. </p>
<p>While some surveys targeting rural citizens show Obi <a href="https://thenextier.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Nigeria-2023-Elections_Poll-of-Rural-Voters_November-2022-Final.pdf">ahead at the polls</a>, conventional political science suggests he is unlikely to win. Nigeria’s electoral system, as in the U.S., makes it difficult for third-party candidates to succeed. </p>
<p>But Obi’s momentum has been no surprise to Nigerians under 35, who constitute a staggering <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-12/71-million-young-nigerians-have-registered-to-vote-in-next-month-s-election#xj4y7vzkg">40% of newly registered voters</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509838/original/file-20230213-20-7rhe0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Nigerian presidential candidate Peter Obi walks through crowd of supporters" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509838/original/file-20230213-20-7rhe0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509838/original/file-20230213-20-7rhe0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509838/original/file-20230213-20-7rhe0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509838/original/file-20230213-20-7rhe0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509838/original/file-20230213-20-7rhe0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509838/original/file-20230213-20-7rhe0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509838/original/file-20230213-20-7rhe0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Labour Party’s Peter Obi has emerged as a viable third-party candidate.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/labour-partys-presidential-candidate-peter-obi-arrives-at-a-news-photo/1245028792">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>4. Violence has spread across the country</h2>
<p>In 2015, a key question for voters was: Which candidate is better suited to end the militant group Boko Haram’s insurgency? Nigerians’ resounding answer then, and again at the 2019 polls, was Muhammadu Buhari. </p>
<p>But during Buhari’s two terms, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria">violence escalated and diversified</a>. Where Boko Haram overwhelmingly targeted the northeast, today the region also faces the militant group <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/islamic-state-africa-estimating-fighter-numbers-cells-across-continent/">Islamic State West Africa Provence</a>, the “middle belt” states contend with cattle <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/svnp-herder-farmer-food-security">herders clashing with farmers</a>, <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/cattle-rustling-instability-nigeria/">cattle bandits</a> plague the north-central and northwest states, and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/08/nigeria-at-least-115-people-killed-by-security-forces-in-four-months-in-countrys-southeast/">secessionists in the southeast</a> have attacked electoral offices and clashed with police.</p>
<p>According to the Council on Foreign Relations Security Tracker, Nigeria saw about <a href="https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483">7,000 violent deaths</a> last year, a decline from roughly 9,000 in 2021. Another credible source, the Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset, reports <a href="https://acleddata.com/africa/">10,600 violent deaths</a> in 2022. The techniques for counting are slightly different, but the message is the same: Violence in Nigeria is a dire risk to democracy, especially on the eve of elections.</p>
<p>Furthermore, both data sources confirm that state attacks on civilians have also increased. Thousands of unarmed young people demonstrating in Lagos for an end to the Special Anti-Robbery Squad SARS were shot at by security forces in October 2020. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/09/nigeria-prioritize-justice-abuses-against-protesters">At least 48 people died</a> in a single day at an #EndSARS protest in Lagos.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509840/original/file-20230213-20-352u9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Man in sunglasses holds protest sign while police in riot shields walk nearby" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509840/original/file-20230213-20-352u9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509840/original/file-20230213-20-352u9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509840/original/file-20230213-20-352u9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509840/original/file-20230213-20-352u9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509840/original/file-20230213-20-352u9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509840/original/file-20230213-20-352u9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509840/original/file-20230213-20-352u9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters commemorate the one-year anniversary of #EndSARS, a protest movement against police brutality.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/man-displays-a-placard-during-a-protest-to-commemorate-one-news-photo/1235999623">Kola Sulaimon/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>5. Electoral violence remains a threat</h2>
<p>In December, Nigeria’s Electoral Commissioner said there <a href="https://saharareporters.com/2022/12/16/nigerian-electoral-body-inec-offices-15-states-attacked-50-times-three-years-chairman">were 50 attacks</a> on their regional offices and other facilities since 2019. Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset <a href="https://acleddata.com/nigeria-election-violence-tracker/">data indicates</a> this is a gross underestimate, with the minimum being 134. </p>
<p>The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) recently admitted it is <a href="https://www.state.gov/imposing-visa-restrictions-on-individuals-involved-in-undermining-the-democratic-process-in-nigeria/">unable to hold elections</a> in at least 240 polling units because of violence.</p>
<p>Civil society groups in Nigeria such as <a href="https://eie.ng/">Enough Is Enough</a>, <a href="https://situationroomng.org/">Situation Room</a> and <a href="https://www.yiaga.org/">YIAGA Africa</a> are spreading messages to deter electoral violence. The U.S., for its part, announced <a href="https://www.state.gov/imposing-visa-restrictions-on-individuals-involved-in-undermining-the-democratic-process-in-nigeria/">visa bans on Nigerians</a> involved in undermining Nigeria’s elections. And former Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, who has deep knowledge of Nigeria, will lead the <a href="https://www.iri.org/news/ndi-and-iri-field-second-joint-delegation-to-assess-nigerias-pre-election-environment/">election observation mission</a> this month. </p>
<h2>Democracy at stake</h2>
<p>Nigeria’s political reformers have made progress over the past two decades. But more work needs to be done. Nigeria’s purchase of a billion dollars of <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2022/04/14/us-state-dept-approves-1-billion-sale-to-nigeria-delayed-over-human-rights-concerns/">American military assistance</a> in 2022 suggests that reducing insecurity – like efforts to advance democracy – requires international collaboration around shared goals of peace and democratic participation.</p>
<p>The Biden administration highlighted during its 2022 <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/15/u-s-africa-leaders-summit-strengthening-partnerships-to-meet-shared-priorities/">U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit</a> that partnership needs to be based on equality and respect. </p>
<p>A free and fair election in February 2023 would be an important step forward. Should there be any setbacks – especially during a potentially contentious runoff election – I believe friends of Nigeria will need to unite quickly to sustain its democratic progress.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198734/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carl LeVan is affiliated with the Centre for Democracy and Development. </span></em></p>An expert on Nigerian political history explains why the 2023 elections are unique and critical.Carl LeVan, Professor of Comparative and Regional studies, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1711332021-11-16T14:32:03Z2021-11-16T14:32:03ZNigeria is a federation in name only. Why Buhari isn’t the man to fix the problem<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431709/original/file-20211112-15357-a9d4iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Is President Muhammadu Buhari committed to the genuine federalisation of the Nigerian polity? </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The scenes and stories emerging from Nigeria are simply frightening. Nigeria, not a regional powerhouse but traditionally a veritable continental player, has been missing in action in most vital spheres of leadership because it’s saddled with a leader who has abdicated the duties and responsibilities of leading.</p>
<p>When the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/10/nigeria-the-lekki-toll-gate-massacre-new-investigative-timeline/">#EndSars protests engulfed Nigeria</a> in late 2020, General Muhammadu Buhari demonstrated an appalling lack of understanding, empathy and foresight. In desperately ill health and busy with frequent visits to hospitals abroad, he handed over his responsibilities to an array of sycophants and shady characters who have no business with leadership.</p>
<p>Buhari’s initial stint as head of state was as a military general <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muhammadu-Buhari">between 1983 and 1985</a> when he was deposed in a palace coup d'etat by General Ibrahim Babangida and his cabal. Given his military antecedents, can Buhari be truly committed to the genuine federalisation of the Nigerian polity? </p>
<p>I would argue not. The military establishment is generally strictly hierarchical in nature and concepts and practices relating to the devolution of power are often problematic to entrench.</p>
<p>The over-centralisation of power became doubly evident during the nefarious reign of General Sani Abacha whose regime hanged the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-50371699">Ogoni nine in 1995</a>. I conducted a series of studies on the Ogoni tragedy culminating in <a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/product/978-1-5275-6075-8">a book</a>, Ken Saro-Wiwa’s Shadow (expanded edition): Politics, Nationalism and the Ogoni Protest Movement.</p>
<p>Indeed, Nigeria’s current political problems are simply too daunting to embark on an honest journey to true federalism at this stage. Federalism entails the sharing of political power between the central seat of government and other federating units within a polity. In this way, power, responsibilities and obligations are not solely imposed on the central government but shared with other regions or states (as in the case of the United States) of a nation.</p>
<h2>Neither unitary nor federalist</h2>
<p>The Nigerian military has toyed with <a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/resources/pdfs/978-1-5275-6075-8-sample.pdf#page=23">the idea of federalism</a> since the first putsch that installed Major-General Johnson Aguyi-Ironsi as head of state in January 15, 1966. </p>
<p>Since then a rash of military adventurers have held the country in thrall. It continued to claim that was a federation when in fact there was a steady concentration of political power at the centre to the detriment of the federating units. These eventually rose to 36 states.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the federal seat of power became more arbitrary – distant, unresponsive and insufferably corrupt and inefficient.</p>
<p>The notions of nationhood and national interest are, at the best of times, inchoate and contentious. They have become more meaningless if not completely lost. </p>
<p>In June 2020, the US Council on Foreign Relations declared that Nigeria was <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202106010607.html">on verge of state collapse</a>. John Campbell and Robert Rotberg, both of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/27/nigeria-is-a-failed-state/">corroborate this view</a>.</p>
<p>Nigeria’s unpoliced borders have been usurped by well-armed mercenaries, cattle rustlers and a bewildering assortment of jihadists, bandits and terrorists. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/why-so-many-school-kidnappings-in-nigeria/?">the country bleeds</a>. School children by the hundreds are captured frequently by terrorists who demand and receive millions in ransom. Since January 2021, well over <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-57960544">1,000 students</a> have been kidnapped for ransom in Nigeria. </p>
<p>Ethnic tensions and agitations have reached fever pitch, lives are lost daily on the highways and farmlands at an alarming rate. Girls and women are routinely raped on the way to and from markets and farms by bandits. There is no security to be found anywhere.</p>
<p>Militants in the Niger Delta led by the Niger Delta Avengers have <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1165870/quarterly-oil-production-in-nigeria/">destroyed oil installations</a>. </p>
<p>The banned Indigenous People of Biafra movement has become <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-drives-the-indigenous-people-of-biafras-relentless-efforts-for-secession-163984">re-vitalised</a>. Largely inspired by the Biafran secessionist bid of 1967-70 it is led by the ex-fugitive <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/10/nigeria-trial-of-separatist-leader-nnamdi-kanu-adjourned">Nnamdi Kanu</a>. The Inspector General of Police, Usman Baba has <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/10/nigeria-the-lekki-toll-gate-massacre-new-investigative-timeline/">confirmed</a> that the Eastern Security Network, the militant arm of the movement, is responsible for the deaths of 187 soldiers, police and paramilitary operatives.</p>
<p><a href="https://guardian.ng/news/yoruba-groups-warn-against-move-to-silence-akintoye-igboho-kanu/">Sunday Adeyemo</a>, a currently exiled Yoruba freedom fighter, is fervently agitating for the creation of a Yoruba nation. He says there would be no elections in 2023. </p>
<p>None of this began under Buhari’s leadership. But things have got worse under his leadership.</p>
<h2>Why Buhari can’t deliver</h2>
<p>Buhari is the nominal leader of the Fulani, an ethnic group to be found in considerable numbers in virtually every West African country. He is <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence">alleged</a> to have invited his ethnic kinfolk from across West Africa in 2015 to aid his presidential ambitions.</p>
<p>Such a case of ethnic particularism deflects the purpose of Nigerian nationhood. It also undermines the concepts of sovereignty, territoriality and ultimately, modernity. </p>
<p>Buhari also has no understanding the notion of true federalism. </p>
<p>He is pursuing a grand agenda of Fulanisation. As the nominal leader of the Fulani in West Africa there has been an alarming influx of Fulanis from other West African nations. </p>
<p>The retreat into ethnic chauvinism has also meant an evisceration of the nation-state as a modernist project. Since it has become quite difficult to transform this dire state of affairs within Nigerian territory, there has been an expatriation of political struggles abroad as activists seek to pursue their causes outside the country. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-01/nigerian-president-announces-conditional-lifting-of-twitter-ban">ban on Twitter</a>, just as the brutal clampdown on anti-SARS protesters is an anti-people onslaught, a measure against digital democracy, an attack on the idea of freedom and finally, an act of feudalist terror. </p>
<p>Buhari’s desperation demonstrates him to be a Don Quixote. He is out-of-place, out-of-joint, irretrievably lost within a borderless technological universe that he does not understand. </p>
<p>With this sort of frame of mind, concepts such as federalism go out of the window. Indeed the immediate problems of political survival and dominance are far more pertinent than such highfalutin concepts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171133/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sanya Osha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nigeria’s current political problems are simply too daunting to embark on an honest journey to true federalism at this stage.Sanya Osha, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Humanities in Africa, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1709662021-11-04T15:52:10Z2021-11-04T15:52:10ZFuel subsidies in Nigeria: they’re bad for the economy, but the lifeblood of politicians<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/429566/original/file-20211101-21-1bvvygm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A January 2012 demonstration against the removal of petroleum subsidies in the northern Nigerian city of Kano
LPhoto credit should read </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pius Utomi E/kpeiAFP via Getty Images)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Nigeria, Africa’s biggest oil producer, has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigerias-renewed-use-fuel-subsidies-concern-imf-says-2021-06-17/">come under fire from the International Monetary Fund as well as World Bank</a> for the heavy financial burden it carries in providing subsidies for fuel and kerosene. The criticism is rooted in the belief that the money could be better spent on other essential services, such as healthcare and education. The Conversation Africa’s Wale Fatade asks Steve Onyeiwu about fuel subsidies in Nigeria.</em> </p>
<h2>How long have subsidies been in place?</h2>
<p>Fuel subsidies have been in place in Nigeria <a href="https://www.ictd.ac/publication/fuel-subsidy-social-contract-microeconomic-analysis-nigeria-rib/#:%7E:text=Subsidies%20exist%20because%20the%20government,oil%20price%20shock%20in%201973">since the 1970s</a>. It began with the government routinely selling petrol to Nigerians at below cost. But most Nigerians were unaware that this was being done. </p>
<p>Fuel subsidies became institutionalised in 1977, following the promulgation of the <a href="https://gazettes.africa/archive/ng/1977/ng-government-gazette-supplement-dated-1977-01-13-no-2-part-a.pdf">Price Control Act</a> which made it illegal for some products (including petrol) to be sold above the regulated price. This law was introduced by the General Olusegun Obasanjo regime in order to cushion the effects of the global <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/05/29/1001023637/think-inflation-is-bad-now-lets-take-a-step-back-to-the-1970s">“Great Inflation”</a> era of the 1970s, caused by a world-wide increase in energy prices. </p>
<p>Between 2006-2018 Nigeria spent about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-oil-gasoline/nigeria-pays-14-million-for-fuel-in-june-despite-subsidy-removal-nnpc-idUSKBN25R1DO">10 trillion Naira</a> (or US$24.5 billion at the current official exchange rate of 411 Naira = US$1) on petroleum subsidies. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/04/n1-5trn-spent-on-fuel-subsidy-in-2019-fg/">2019 and 2020</a> about 3 trillion Naira ($7 billion) was spent on subsidies. The number is expected to go up <a href="https://www.bloombergquint.com/markets/nigeria-s-annual-spending-on-subsidy-could-exceed-eurobond-raise">this year and next</a>. </p>
<p>It means that Nigeria has spent over $30 billion on fuel subsidies over the past 16 years or so. In 2018, it spent 722 billion ($2.4 billion at that year’s official exchange rate of $1 = 306 Naira), but spent only <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.PP.CD">$1.5 billion</a> on health. Nigeria’s growing fuel subsidy may have contributed to the country’s <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/sponsored/2-decades-on-nigeria-falls-short-of-landmark-health-pledge-99555">health-financing gap</a>. </p>
<p>Although the absolute amount spent on fuel subsidies has increased over time, the relative sum spent has decreased. </p>
<p>In 1970, about 72% of the cost of a litre of petrol was paid by the government, but that figure fell to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40761059">43%</a> in 2011. This means that Nigerians are increasingly bearing the burden of fuel price increases. This may explain why they vehemently oppose, through <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16390183">protests</a> and disruption of traffic, attempts at reducing or eliminating subsidies. </p>
<h2>Why are the subsidies there?</h2>
<p>The official reason for introducing oil subsidies was to minimise the impact of rising global oil prices on Nigerians. But other factors played an important role. </p>
<p>The period 1970-1979 was an era of subsidies in Nigeria. Virtually everything in Nigeria was heavily subsidised – education, health, electricity, water supply, air travel and even provisions or “essential commodities” such as milk, sugar, rice, wheat and beverages. </p>
<p>In the 1970s, Nigerians coined the phrase<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280131102_The_concept_of_national_cake_in_Nigerian_political_system_Implications_for_national_development"> “national cake,”</a> to depict a phenomenon whereby they felt entitled to government largesse. </p>
<p>Subsidies were sustained by the oil boom Nigeria enjoyed, thanks to the oil-shock caused by the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/05/the-1967-war-and-the-oil-weapon/">Arab-Israeli conflict </a> that saw global oil prices skyrocket. </p>
<p>As part of the subsidy jamboree, public-sector workers received a big boost in their wages in 1975, under the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1974/12/22/archives/nigerians-awaiting-a-payrise-decision.html">“Udoji awards.”</a> The country’s state-owned National Electric Power Authority did not even bother to collect electricity tariffs, while the national carrier, Nigeria Airways, sold tickets at below market-clearing prices. </p>
<p>But this jamboree was short lived, as the government was unable to sustain subsidies, following steep drops in oil price <a href="https://energyfuse.org/opecs-history-of-oil-market-management-its-complicated/">in the 1980s</a>. The scarcity of foreign exchange made it difficult for the government to finance imports of essential commodities, which led to shortages.</p>
<h2>Has the government tried to remove them?</h2>
<p>Various administrations have unsuccessfully tried to remove fuel subsidies since the transition to civilian rule in 1979. </p>
<p>President Shehu Shagari’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Shehu-Shagari">government</a> – from 1979 to 1983 – <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40761059">increased</a> the price of petrol in 1982, from 15.3 kobo a litre to 20 kobo. This happened without the government making reference to easing subsidies.</p>
<p>Then in 1986 President Ibrahim Babangida <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40761059">announced</a> a partial removal of oil subsidies, which saw petrol price rise from 20 kobo to 39 kobo per litre. This followed his implementation of the Structural Adjustment Program as set out by the International Monetary Fund. </p>
<p>There was a huge uproar against the decision, which reached a crescendo when workers, students and civil society groups embarked on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/04/world/economic-riots-are-spreading-in-nigeria.html">massive demonstrations</a> across the country. Massive and sustained protests against Babangida’s economic policies <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-08-27-mn-28537-story.html">played</a> a big role in his hurried exit from power. The administrations that followed left subsidies in place.</p>
<p>It wasn’t until 2012 that action was taken again. President Goodluck Jonathan <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2012/1/1/nigeria-ends-fuel-subsidies">parred down fuel subsides</a> and used the savings to invest in education and infrastructure. But he encountered <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-nigeria-strike-20120110-idAFJOE80900A20120110">virulent pushbacks</a> from labour unions, students, and civil society groups. He was subsequently forced to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-nigeria-strike-20120116-idAFJOE80F00A20120116">cut the fuel price</a> by 30%. </p>
<p>Last year in June, President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/060520-nigerias-president-confirms-removal-of-gasoline-subsidies">announced</a> it was eliminating fuel subsidies. It said it had <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/06/fg-removes-fuel-price-cap-gives-marketers-freedom-to-fix-price/">granted approval</a> to the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency to remove the price cap that was in place for petrol.</p>
<p>But by March of this year, the government <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-01/nigeria-s-nnpc-won-t-increase-fuel-prices-in-march">announced</a> it was keeping the pump price of petrol unchanged despite increasing crude costs. This effectively marked <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-01/nigeria-s-nnpc-won-t-increase-fuel-prices-in-march">a return to subsidies</a>. </p>
<h2>Why are the fuel subsidies difficult to remove?</h2>
<p>First, oil subsidies have survived when other subsidies have been removed because those benefiting from them are very powerful. They cut across a broad segment of the upper echelons of the government and political elites. </p>
<p>A host of players <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-fuel-scam/nigeria-investigates-4-billion-fuel-subsidy-fraud-idUSTRE80I1R220120119">benefit</a> from subsidies by inflating figures for oil imports, and over-invoicing the government for the cost of imports. They have used their political connections and influence to scuttle attempts to remove them. These include politicians, high-ranking government officials, business tycoons, officials at the state-owned <a href="https://nnpcgroup.com/Pages/Home.aspx">Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation</a>, the <a href="https://nigerianports.gov.ng/">Nigerian Ports Authority</a> and Customs. </p>
<p>A second reason is that Nigerians tend to use oil subsidy removal protests as a rallying point for many of their grouses against the government. This explains why the government prefers to borrow to finance the budget rather than scrap subsidies.</p>
<p>Third, some politicians deliberately miscommunicate the economics around subsidies. They <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/04/buharis-subsidy-regime-a-monumental-fraud-pdp/">tell</a> Nigerians that the government intends to divert funds meant for fuel subsidies to private coffers.</p>
<p>Nigerians have come to believe that the removal of fuel subsidies will inflict untold hardships. They have lost faith in government initiatives, no matter how well-intentioned.</p>
<p>Lastly, various administrations have not had the political will or courage to jettison the subsidies because of their failure to uplift Nigerians’ economic conditions. It would have been politically easier to remove fuel subsidies if the government had provided jobs, entrepreneurial opportunities, and other forms of economic empowerment. </p>
<h2>Why are oil subsidies bad economics?</h2>
<p>Every year, the Nigerian government runs huge <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-unveils-record-398-bln-budget-2022-spending-up-25-2021-10-07/">budget deficits</a> that could have been avoided if money budgeted for oil subsidies was allocated to other critical projects. </p>
<p>Subsidies should be used to spur investment in activities that raise the productive capacities of an economy (such as education, health, entrepreneurship, and infrastructure). They should be targeted at strategic sectors of the economy. They should not be used to finance non-durable consumption items like petrol. </p>
<p>Oil subsidies are inequitable, as they transfer the national wealth to those who own several cars and add little or no value to the national economy. </p>
<p>In lieu of subsidies, the government should invest massively in public transportation and boost the transport allowances of public-sector workers. </p>
<p>Removing fuel subsidies would also be good for the environment and safety on Nigerian roads. When motorists pay the full economic price for petrol, they will drive less, emit less pollution and reduce the incidence of road accidents.</p>
<p>There should be a clear communication to Nigerians that the removal of fuel subsidies favours the poor, and eliminates one of the several perks that the Nigerian elites undeservedly enjoy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170966/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Onyeiwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nigeria must remove fuel subsidies and channel the funds to critical sectors of its economy.Stephen Onyeiwu, Andrew Wells Robertson Professor of Economics, Allegheny CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1622332021-06-06T16:53:37Z2021-06-06T16:53:37ZNigeria’s Twitter ban could backfire, hurting the economy and democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404663/original/file-20210606-21-se6s5w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Taking a selfie during the #ENDSARS protest in Lagos in 2020. Social media was used extensively to mobilise demontrators.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Adekunle Ajayi/NurPhoto via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigeria’s decision to suspend Twitter indefinitely could backfire for the government and cost the country economically in terms of new investments into its technology sector. The Nigerian government <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/04/africa/nigeria-suspends-twitter-operations-intl/index.html">suspended</a> Twitter on June 4. The official <a href="https://twitter.com/FMICNigeria/status/1400843062641717249">press release</a> gave only a vague justification, citing threats to “Nigeria’s corporate existence”.</p>
<p>While only a minority of Nigerians use Twitter, they form part of the most vocal and politically active segment of the population. Many young people have used Twitter and other social media recently to organise anti-government protests. And <a href="https://www.techinafrica.com/africarena-releases-its-second-annual-state-of-tech-innovation-in-africa/">Nigeria</a> has been among the best-performing African countries in attracting investments for technology start-up business. The ban could threaten that status.</p>
<p>The government made little effort to hide the likely main reason for the ban: the social media giant’s <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/breaking-twitter-deletes-buharis-tweet-on-dealing-with-secessionists">decision</a> to delete a tweet by President Muhammadu Buhari just days before. In the tweet, Buhari seemed to threaten violent retaliation against a southeastern secessionist group’s <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/04/imo-jailbreak-ipob-esn-behind-attacks-igp-mohammed/">alleged recent attacks</a> on government facilities and personnel. Twitter claimed the message had violated its rules against “<a href="https://theweek.com/news/1001202/nigeria-banned-twitter-over-presidents-deleted-tweet">abusive behaviour</a>”. </p>
<p>The move angered many in the Nigerian government. Information and Culture Minister Lai Mohammed criticised <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/buhari-right-to-express-his-anger-lai-accuses-twitter-of-double-standards">“double standards”</a> and <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/fact-check-did-twitter-fund-endsars-protests-as-lai-claimed">complained</a> that Twitter had not deleted missives from a separatist leader. He also alleged that it supported the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54662986">2020 #EndSARS</a> movement against police brutality. The potential that social media could help mobilise such a large, <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/from-twitter-to-the-streets-how-nigerian-youths-won-endsars-war/">youth-driven protest movement</a> sent shudders throughout the ruling establishment. Officials might hope a ban squelches a <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/460534-insecurity-120-groups-activists-call-for-protests-boycott-of-democracy-day-activities.html">growing protest movement</a> against rising insecurity.</p>
<p>The deletion of Buhari’s tweet also came on the heels of Twitter’s <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/04/13/africa/twitter-hq-africa-ghana/index.html">April 2021 announcement</a> that it would be setting up its first African office in Accra, not Lagos. In its <a href="https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2021/establishing-twitter-s-presence-in-africa.html">justification</a>, Twitter cited Ghana’s support for “free speech, online freedom, and the open internet”. There’s no official data on the number of Nigeria’s Twitter users. <a href="https://noi-polls.com/social-media-poll-result-release/">One count</a> puts it at 24 million. <strong>{See note below.}</strong></p>
<p>The shutdown will be hard to enforce. It is also likely to be unpopular. And it could have dire consequences for Nigeria’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigeria-is-not-a-failed-state-but-it-has-not-delivered-democracy-for-its-people-149769">fragile democratic institutions</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/21/nigeria-slips-into-recession-blamed-on-covid-19-and-oil-prices">COVID-battered economy</a>.</p>
<h2>The shutdown challenge</h2>
<p>Shortly after the ban went into effect, traffic to the site was <a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/twitter-restricted-in-nigeria-after-deletion-of-presidents-tweet-aAwro08M">blocked</a> on leading local mobile networks like MTN, Globacom, Airtel and 9mobile, though access was still possible through some internet service providers. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s attorney general, Abubakar Malami, <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/twitter-ban-nigerias-attorney-general-to-prosecute-offenders/">promised to prosecute</a> those violating the ban.</p>
<p>But the extent to which the ban will stop Nigerians who want to use the platform from doing so is open to question. Targeting users for punishment would be a gargantuan and costly task.</p>
<p>It might also not be technologically feasible. Within hours, internet searches for “VPNs” – virtual private networks, which allow users to disguise their online identity and evade country-specific limits – <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/rush-for-vpns-in-nigeria-as-twitter-access-is-blocked/">surged</a> across the country. Multiple videos appeared on YouTube, explaining the ins and outs of VPNs to Twitter-hungry Nigerians. </p>
<p>Nigerians also have plenty of other digital options to share opinions and information, from the <a href="https://guardian.ng/technology/whatsapp-stays-strong-in-nigeria-despite-new-privacy-policy-headache/">popular WhatsApp </a> to the Indian microblogging service Koo, which quickly <a href="https://www.freepressjournal.in/india/indian-origin-koo-eyes-on-nigerian-market-after-twitter-ban">announced plans</a> to expand into the country. </p>
<h2>Not-so-hidden costs</h2>
<p>The widespread use of VPNs would come at significant costs. Poorer Nigerians are likely turn to free VPNs instead of fee-based ones that are more secure. This will expose them to <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/heads-up-nigerians-here-are-things-you-should-know-about-vpn/">data theft</a> and other forms of hacking. </p>
<p>And the use of VPNs can <a href="https://www.vpnmentor.com/blog/the-fastest-vpns-we-actually-tested-them/">slow</a> internet connectivity.</p>
<p>Beyond being an annoyance, this could significantly hamper economic productivity. Nigeria’s <a href="http://eiuperspectives-stage.economist.com/sites/default/files/BuildingadigitalNigeria.pdf">economy</a> and even government have become increasingly reliant on digital media. Some noted the <a href="https://twitter.com/MeduolaS/status/1400843676222472197?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1400843676222472197%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.aljazeera.com%2Fnews%2F2021%2F6%2F4%2Fnigerian-twitter-users-blast-govt-ban-of-social-media-giant">irony</a> that the government announced its ban on Twitter with a <a href="https://twitter.com/FMICNigeria/status/1400843062641717249">tweet</a>. NetBlocks, which tracks internet governance, <a href="https://twitter.com/ParadigmHQ/status/1401171874059624452">estimated</a> that each day of the Twitter shutdown will cost the Nigerian economy over 2 billion naira ($6 million US). </p>
<p>Digital media are essential for information exchange, marketing, customer service, and remote work, especially during public health and safety emergencies. <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/intenet-shutdowns-v-3.pdf">Shutdowns</a> can slow commerce, cut productivity and ultimately cost jobs. </p>
<p>In the longer term, the ban – even if only brief – could seriously harm Nigeria’s ability to attract investment to its <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32743?show=full">otherwise-promising digital economy</a>. Investors may turn to markets without the threat of sudden regulatory disruptions to the digital economy. In other words, Twitter’s choice of Ghana would only be the beginning.</p>
<h2>Public reaction</h2>
<p>Predictably, the ban generated <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/4/nigerian-twitter-users-blast-govt-ban-of-social-media-giant">widespread anger</a> on the platform. But Twitter users constitute a minority of the Nigerian population and they are not representative of the general public. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Summary%20of%20results/ab_nig_r8_summary_of_results-27jan21.pdf">2020 survey</a> by the independent, Africa-based research organisation Afrobarometer found that:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>35% of Nigerians reported using some social media service to get news at least a few times a week. </p></li>
<li><p>Men were marginally more likely to use it than women – 39% versus 31%.</p></li>
<li><p>More young people used it – 46% of 18-25 years old, versus 8% for those over 65.</p></li>
<li><p>Rates of weekly access were higher for Nigerians who lived in urban areas (54%, versus 18% for rural), had at least a secondary-level education (57%, versus 12% with a primary education or lower) and had the lowest levels of lived poverty (51%, versus 25% for those with the highest levels). </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Nevertheless, Nigerians more broadly are unlikely to take the ban quietly. Afrobarometer research also shows that Nigerians, like most Africans, <a href="https://theconversation.com/africans-are-concerned-about-ills-of-social-media-but-oppose-government-restrictions-137653">oppose government restrictions</a> on media generally. Those surveyed were roundly opposed to restrictions on digital media. More than <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Summary%20of%20results/ab_nig_r8_summary_of_results-27jan21.pdf">three-fifths</a> (61%) said that internet and social media should be “unrestricted” versus only 23% who agreed that “access should be regulated by the government”. </p>
<p>Nigerians were also particularly fond of social media. Nearly <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ad410-promise_and_peril-africas_changing_media_landscape-afrobarometer_dispatch-1dec20.pdf">two thirds </a>(65%) of those who had heard of social media said the technology’s impacts were more positive than negative. This rate is the highest among the 18 countries surveyed in 2019/20. </p>
<h2>Worrying trend</h2>
<p>Nigeria’s move is part of a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47734843">worrying trend</a> of governments in Africa throttling the use of social media. So far this year <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/niger-election-internet-blackout/">Niger</a>, <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/congo-keepiton-election/">the Republic of the Congo</a> and <a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/social-media-and-messaging-platforms-restricted-in-uganda-ahead-of-general-election-XB7aaO87">Uganda</a> have limited digital media around elections. <a href="https://iafrikan.com/2021/03/08/senegal-social-media-and-internet-shutdown/">Senegal</a> also did so around anti-government protests. </p>
<p>These shutdowns are typically justified as necessary to ensure national security around sensitive periods. But they transparently serve incumbent interests, by <a href="https://openinternet.global/news/internet-shutdowns-and-future-african-democracy-what-more-can-we-do">limiting democratic freedoms</a> around information, expression and assembly. </p>
<p>With its ban, the Buhari government has escalated a spat into something much more serious. The damage to <a href="https://qz.com/africa/2007087/africas-digital-economy-isnt-compatible-with-internet-shutdowns/">economic</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/internet-shutdowns-in-africa-threaten-democracy-and-development-142868">democratic development</a> from shutdowns can be significant, even with short blockages. Lost productivity and commerce threaten Nigeria’s economic recovery, and the reputational harm to its ability to attract investment to its digital economy could be long lasting. </p>
<p>On the political side, the government risks angering the most vocal and engaged segment of the population, with the likelihood that even most non-users will oppose the ban. </p>
<p>Given these costs, it is not even clear the government will come out ahead.</p>
<p>As one Nigerian programmer and web developer <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/rush-for-vpns-in-nigeria-as-twitter-access-is-blocked/">put it</a>: “In the long run, this might be a blow on the Nigerian government and not Twitter.”</p>
<p><em>The number of 40 million Twitter users in Nigeria which was sourced from <a href="https://noi-polls.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Social-Media-Poll-Report.pdf">NoiPolls </a>has been disputed and the research company has since adjusted its estimates down to <a href="https://noi-polls.com/social-media-poll-result-release/">24 million users</a>. An official number is not available.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162233/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeff Conroy-Krutz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Muhammadu Buhari’s Twitter shutdown will be hard to enforce and could have dire consequences for Nigeria’s fragile democratic institutions and economy.Jeff Conroy-Krutz, Associate Professor of Political Science, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1538922021-02-17T14:45:17Z2021-02-17T14:45:17ZWhy being endowed with oil is not always a boon: the case of Nigeria and Angola<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382714/original/file-20210205-13-ilajqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young Angolans protest for bettter living conditions in the capital Luanda in 2020.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In countries with weak governance institutions, natural resource wealth <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01045.x">tends</a> to be a curse instead of a blessing. Where citizens are relatively powerless to hold ruling elites to account, resource wealth undermines development prospects. On the contrary, where citizens are able to exert constraints on executive power, resource wealth can generate development that benefits ordinary citizens.</p>
<p>Development scholar <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0305750X94901651">Richard Auty</a> first coined the term ‘resource curse’ in the early 1990s. He used the phrase to describe the puzzling phenomenon of resource wealthy countries failing to industrialise. Manifestations of the ‘curse’ now range from widespread corruption to civil war to deepening authoritarian rule. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382436/original/file-20210204-22-iwxypj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382436/original/file-20210204-22-iwxypj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382436/original/file-20210204-22-iwxypj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382436/original/file-20210204-22-iwxypj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382436/original/file-20210204-22-iwxypj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382436/original/file-20210204-22-iwxypj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382436/original/file-20210204-22-iwxypj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382436/original/file-20210204-22-iwxypj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Literature <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359">on the resource curse</a> has done an adequate job of describing the general nature of the relationship between resource dependence and underdevelopment. It now needs to focus on understanding specific manifestations. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/product/978-1-5275-6076-5">In my latest book</a>, I detail what these are in relation to oil in Nigeria and Angola, sub-Saharan Africa’s two largest oil producers.</p>
<p>My book shows that the resource curse manifests differently in different contexts. </p>
<p>Why does this matter?</p>
<p>If governance interventions are to be useful, it’s important to <a href="https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.27.2.173">understand the context</a>. Otherwise, policy interventions won’t gain traction. If political dynamics play a <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/700936?mobileUi=0&">determinative role</a> in long-run economic outcomes, we must understand them better. </p>
<h2>Two countries, two stories</h2>
<p>In 2018, Angola’s fuel exports constituted 92.4% of the country’s total exports. Oil rents – the <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/metadataglossary/adjusted-net-savings/series/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS">difference</a> between the price of oil and the average cost of producing – accounted for 25.6% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 2019 the country ranked <a href="http://www.hdr.undp.org/">148th</a> out of 189 countries in the UN’s Human Development Index. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s oil exports in 2018 were 94.1% of total exports, oil rents amounted to 9% of GDP. In 2019 it ranked <a href="http://www.hdr.undp.org/">161st on the human development index</a> . As is clear from the graph above, sub-Saharan Africa’s major oil producers are clustered around the lower end of the human development spectrum and are mostly autocratic.</p>
<p>Both Nigeria and Angola have been characterised by one form or another of autocratic rule for most of their post-independence histories. Autocracy invariably <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/700936?mobileUi=0&">undermines</a> a country’s development prospects.</p>
<p>Angola was plunged into a civil war shortly after independence in <a href="https://history.state.gov/countries/angola#:%7E:text=Portugal%20granted%20Angola%20independence%20on,over%20the%20newly%20liberated%20state.">November 1975</a>. It then suffered an unsuccessful coup attempt <a href="https://www.amazon.com/History-Modern-Angola-Birmingham-2015-12-17/dp/B01K91W048">in 1977</a>. </p>
<p>In Nigeria, the balance of power at independence in 1960 was just as precarious as Angola’s. Nigeria suffered two <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Max-Siollun-Politics-2009-03-30-Paperback/dp/B01GYOUQFY">military coups</a> in 1966, and a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Brothers-War-Biafra-Nigeria/dp/0571251919">civil war</a> from 1967-1970. </p>
<p>But why does oil fuel the consolidation of autocratic rule in one context, but not necessarily in another? </p>
<p>It all comes down to how the leader of the ruling coalition extracts and distributes the oil rents. In my book, I employ a game theory model <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/politics-of-authoritarian-rule/7F78A8828A5714F0BE74E44A90A44868">developed by Princeton political scientist Milan Svolik</a> to explain these divergent political outcomes.</p>
<h2>Angola</h2>
<p>Jose Eduardo dos Santos came to power in 1979 as served as president until 2017, grabbing power early and repeatedly. Svolik’s model predicts that rulers who can do this at the same time as limiting the probability of a coup being against them manage to entrench their rule. </p>
<p>Within six years, dos Santos had consolidated power. He eliminated internal threats by subverting power sharing institutions and purging key individuals. For instance, in 1984 the central committee of the ruling <em>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</em> (MPLA) – created a ‘defence and security council’, chaired by dos Santos. As I note in the <a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/product/978-1-5275-6076-5">book</a>, it became an inner cabinet, “effectively eclipsing the Political Bureau as the country’s top decision-making body”.</p>
<p>A year later, dos Santos dropped Lúcio Lara, the party’s stalwart intellectual, from the Political Bureau, thus removing the last potential threat to his rule. Simultaneously, he used the extensive oil rents at his disposal – and the cover of civil war – to either co-opt or eliminate opposition. </p>
<p>He did so by ensuring that the state oil firm, Sonangol, was proficiently run. It soon became Angola’s <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/magnificent-and-beggar-land/">shadow state</a> through its vast web of subsidiaries. After the civil war - 1975 to 2002 - Sonangol became the driver of (limited) development, but also the key distributor of patronage to cement dos Santos’s power. He not only bled it to enrich his family dynasty; he also used it to appease his inner circle. </p>
<p>Dos Santos ended up ruling for <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/26426/how-different-is-the-new-angola-under-lourenco">38 years</a>. But, his key strategic mistake was placing his children in plum Sonangol positions ahead of loyalists.</p>
<p>In 2017, <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-unlikely-to-herald-the-change-angolans-have-been-clamouring-for-82851">João Lourenço</a>, a former Defence Minister, became the new Angolan president. Dos Santos was to remain head of the MPLA until 2022. But, he was ousted through what was essentially a bloodless coup in 2018, engineered by his former loyalists like Manuel Vicente, the long-standing former head of Sonangol.</p>
<p>The Politburo appointed Lourenço president of the MPLA. He has since <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/angola-the-fall-of-the-dos-santos-clan/a-45646757">purged the dos Santos children</a> from plum positions. Angola is still heavily dominated by the ruling MPLA, though. Prospects for a more competitive political settlement appear limited.</p>
<h2>The case of Nigeria</h2>
<p>Within six years of independence from Britain on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54241944">1 October 1960</a>, the military launched a coup. This initiated a long period of military rule. Seven coups <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_coups_in_Nigeria">occurred</a> between 1966 and 1993. Military rule was largely uninterrupted from 1966 to 1999. </p>
<p>But neither the coups nor the civil war were driven by oil.</p>
<p>Oil wealth only became a major factor in Nigeria’s political economy in the early 1970s, when the price rocketed as a result of the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo">global supply crisis</a>. Windfall oil wealth exacerbated the preexisting fragility. The state run oil firm, the <a href="https://www.nnpcgroup.com/Pages/Home.aspx">Nigerian National Petroleum Company</a>, was inefficient compared to Sonangol. Nonetheless, it served as the country’s cash cow, milked to extend patronage. </p>
<p>But, unlike in Angola, no aspirant Nigerian autocrat was able to monopolise personal control over the national oil company. As I detail in <a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/product/978-1-5275-6076-5">the book</a>, oil exacerbated fragility in Nigeria. While Angola’s dos Santos maintained a stable bargain among elites, Nigeria’s balance of power remained precarious. </p>
<p>In 1975, another military coup toppled Yakubu Gowon who had ruled Nigeria through the civil war. Murtala Muhammed came to power but was assassinated in a coup attempt six months later, which brought <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/people/olusegun-obasanjo/">Olusegun Obasanjo</a> to power in 1976. Obasanjo guided a transition to civilian rule in 1979 but this only lasted four years.</p>
<p>A 1983 coup brought current president Muhammadu Buhari to power and another ousted him two years later. Ibrahim Babangida then ruled until 1993. After a brief attempt at civilian rule, Sani Abacha came to power through yet another coup that same year. He died in office in 1998. His successor, Abdulsalami Abubakar, returned the country to civilian rule a year later. </p>
<p>Former military ruler Obasanjo – who had been imprisoned by Abacha – won the 1999 elections but attempted to grab a third term as president in 2006. Despite <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/16/world/africa/16iht-lagos.html">alleged oil-funded bribery</a> to lobby party members to support his cause, they held fast to the constitution’s term limits. </p>
<p>The importance of that moment cannot be overstated. It has resulted in a more open and competitive political settlement in Nigeria. Maintaining constitutional term limits can stop autocratic entrenchment in its tracks. Unfortunately, this has not guaranteed stability in Nigeria. Post-2015 fragility has deepened considerably. </p>
<h2>Where to from here?</h2>
<p>As my book shows, oil rents grease the wheels of political dynamics very differently in Angola and Nigeria. </p>
<p>Existing explanations for different manifestations range from ethnic fragmentation, inherited colonial structures, the role of foreign actors and how <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ej/article/129/619/1425/5334637?login=true">lootable</a> the oil is.</p>
<p>More attention now needs to be paid to how aspirant autocrats use natural resource rents to accumulate power for themselves. This can lead to policy practitioners developing an early warning system that may help citizens to nip power-grabs in the bud. </p>
<p>This may serve, in conjunction with other policy interventions, to ultimately reverse the curse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153892/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ross Harvey is the Director of Research and Programmes at Good Governance Africa, a non-profit organisation. </span></em></p>A new book explains the manifestations of the oil curse in Nigeria and Angola since independence.Ross Harvey, Senior Research Associate, Institute for the Future of Knowledge, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1503552020-12-08T13:13:09Z2020-12-08T13:13:09ZNigerians got their abusive SARS police force abolished – but elation soon turned to frustration<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/373355/original/file-20201207-13-aw9ia3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=48%2C10%2C3546%2C2349&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A police officer in Lagos, Nigeria, Nov. 3. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/police-officer-stand-on-guard-while-the-inspector-general-news-photo/1229455671?adppopup=true">Olukayode Jaiyeola/NurPhoto via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For a brief moment in October, it seemed that youthful protesters calling to “abolish” a police force had succeeded. After weeks of mass demonstrations against police brutality, the government agreed to disband a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/22/sars-a-brief-history-of-a-rogue-unit">widely hated police unit</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/90566898/how-to-help-nigeria-what-you-can-do-for-the-end-sars-protest-movement-right-now">This was in Nigeria</a>, not the United States. But the lessons from Nigeria have broad relevance for protesters elsewhere calling for major reforms to policing.</p>
<p>In Nigeria, it took just three weeks of mass demonstrations for President Muhammadu Buhari to announce he would eliminate the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/11/nigeria-to-disband-sars-police-unit-accused-of-killings-and-brutality">Special Anti-Robbery Squad</a>, or SARS, the most reviled segment of the national Nigerian Police Force.</p>
<p>SARS officers were infamous for demanding bribes at checkpoints and for <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/10/photographer-behind-viral-sars-video-in-ughelli-tells-his-side-of-the-story/">violent confrontations with civilians</a> that could end in death. Though heavily armed, SARS officers seldom wore uniforms. Many Nigerians <a href="https://doi.org/10.1215/01636545-8092858">struggled to distinguish</a> the police from the criminals they ostensibly pursued.</p>
<p>Buhari explained his decision to dissolve SARS by stating his “<a href="https://twitter.com/MBuhari/status/1315631722604748804">commitment to extensive police reforms</a>… to ensure that the primary duty of the police and other law enforcement agencies remains the protection of lives.” </p>
<p>At first, <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/419963-breaking-endsars-buhari-bows-to-nigerians-dissolves-sars.html">Nigerians were elated</a>, if surprised: President Buhari, a former military dictator who in the 1980s imposed corporal punishment for <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigerias-war-against-indiscipline">minor infractions like jumping the line at bus stops</a>, had caved to public pressure over policing. </p>
<p>Their joy was to be short-lived.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Young men with face masks around their neck hold police reform signs" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/373349/original/file-20201207-19-1xmdk9o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C19%2C3213%2C2126&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/373349/original/file-20201207-19-1xmdk9o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/373349/original/file-20201207-19-1xmdk9o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/373349/original/file-20201207-19-1xmdk9o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/373349/original/file-20201207-19-1xmdk9o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/373349/original/file-20201207-19-1xmdk9o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/373349/original/file-20201207-19-1xmdk9o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Young protesters call for abolishing SARS at the Lagos State House of Assembly on Oct. 9.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/endsars-protesters-occupy-lagos-state-house-of-assembly-news-photo/1228989950?adppopup=true">Adekunle Ajayi/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>History of police violence</h2>
<p>In my research on the <a href="https://scholars.duke.edu/person/Samuel.Daly">history of law enforcement in Nigeria</a>, I’ve documented how durable its police institutions are, and how resistant to fundamental change.</p>
<p>The Nigeria Police Force <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2019.1576833">dates back to British colonialism</a>, which lasted until 1960. It is <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigerian-police-are-desperate-need-reform">notoriously ineffective</a>, and since it is a <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Police_in_a_Federal_State/BEoFAQAAIAAJ?hl=en">federal agency</a> its officers are usually not local to the places they patrol. Officers are poorly paid, which leads them to demand bribes and encourages other <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/604107">forms of corruption</a>. A lack of oversight means that police who abuse their power are seldom punished.</p>
<p>The Special Anti-Robbery Squad – the target of protesters’ recent ire – is a federal police force created during Nigeria’s long military dictatorship.</p>
<p>Military rule in Nigeria lasted from 1966 to 1999 with two brief interruptions, punctuated by the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417520000316">Nigerian Civil War</a> from 1967 to 1970. After the war, economic volatility and a glut of leftover firearms contributed to a spike in property crime. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s military rulers responded to a <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/703068">national crisis of armed robbery</a> by imposing martial law and making robbery a capital offense. SARS was established in 1992 as part of one such crackdown. But it endured after Nigeria returned to a civilian-led democracy in 1999. </p>
<p>Other law enforcement tools the military had used, like tribunals, continued after dictatorship, too, as did colonial-era punishments like <a href="https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822387930-007">corporal punishment by police</a>. </p>
<h2>#EndSARS</h2>
<p>The mandate of SARS went beyond patrolling and investigating. It also made judgments about guilt and meted out punishment, just as policemen and soldiers had done during military rule. That punishment could entail <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/nigeria-horrific-reign-of-impunity-by-sars-makes-mockery-of-anti-torture-law/">torture, and even death</a>, which human rights groups documented. </p>
<p>SARS officers also tormented Nigerians with more mundane harassment. They set up checkpoints to search cars and phones for “evidence” that they then used to demand bribes. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/373351/original/file-20201207-15-1s3tair.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Heavily armed men in camouflage and black vests walk toward a line of voters" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/373351/original/file-20201207-15-1s3tair.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/373351/original/file-20201207-15-1s3tair.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/373351/original/file-20201207-15-1s3tair.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/373351/original/file-20201207-15-1s3tair.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/373351/original/file-20201207-15-1s3tair.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/373351/original/file-20201207-15-1s3tair.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/373351/original/file-20201207-15-1s3tair.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">SARS officers patrol a polling station in Kano, in northern Nigeria, during Nigeria’s 2019 presidential election.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/federal-special-anti-robbery-squad-check-disturbances-by-news-photo/1126895716?adppopup=true">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In October 2020, a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-54396330">a video of the killing of a young man by SARS officers</a> in the town of Ughelli sparked long-standing opposition to SARS into a national cause. Online activism took <a href="https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/television/9472538/her-endsars-saturday-night-live-performance-videos/">#EndSARS international</a>, and an avalanche of Twitter posts exhorted the Nigerian government to dissolve the force. Nigerians <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/oct/16/black-lives-matter-everywhere-support-endsars-nigeria">living abroad led protests</a> in New York and in front of many Nigerian embassies, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/endsars-nigeria-police-brutality-sars-lekki-protest/2020/10/22/27e31e0c-143d-11eb-a258-614acf2b906d_story.html">garnering global media attention</a>.</p>
<p>#EndSARS built on a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/10/25/roots-endsars-protests-nigeria/">long history of discontent with the Nigerian police</a>. While the movement in some ways recalled Black Lives Matter in the United States – which <a href="https://blacklivesmatter.com/black-lives-matter-stands-in-solidarity-with-endsars-movement-against-police-brutality/">issued a statement in support of #EndSARS</a> – age rather than race was at its center. Its leaders argued that, as young people in a state run by elderly ex-soldiers, they were vulnerable to police harassment.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.pulse.ng/lifestyle/soro-soke-werey-the-origin-endsars-battle-cry/nz6fqmh">Soro soke werey</a>” – a slang phrase roughly meaning, “speak up, madman” – was one of its slogans, an indictment of past generations for having tolerated police violence.</p>
<h2>#EndSWAT</h2>
<p>Two days after President Buhari agreed to disband SARS, celebration turned to disillusionment. </p>
<p>On Oct. 14, the Nigerian Police Force unveiled a new police squad, the Special Weapons and Tactics Team, or SWAT. The police promised SWAT would be “<a href="https://twitter.com/PoliceNG/status/1316421071323701248">strictly intelligence-driven</a>,” and that “no personnel from the defunct SARS will be selected to be part of the new tactical team.”</p>
<p>Activists suspected SWAT was a new label for an old institution, not a meaningful reform. Rather than <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/endsars-nigeria-police-brutality-sars-lekki-protest/2020/10/22/27e31e0c-143d-11eb-a258-614acf2b906d_story.html">clearing the streets</a>, protests grew, in Nigeria and abroad. #EndSARS became #EndSWAT. On Oct. 20, soldiers <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/world/africa/nigeria-shooting-protesters-SARS-Lekki.html">opened fire</a> at an #EndSWAT protest in Lagos, killing at least 48. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Crowd holding #EndSARS signs with New York skyscrapers visible in the background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/373348/original/file-20201207-21-1xkefh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/373348/original/file-20201207-21-1xkefh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/373348/original/file-20201207-21-1xkefh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/373348/original/file-20201207-21-1xkefh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/373348/original/file-20201207-21-1xkefh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/373348/original/file-20201207-21-1xkefh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/373348/original/file-20201207-21-1xkefh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A protest against Nigeria’s SARS police force in New York City on Oct. 21.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-protest-against-recent-violence-at-demonstrations-in-news-photo/1281525266?adppopup=true">Spencer Platt/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Six police officers have been killed on the job <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/lagos-gives-n10m-each-to-families-of-policemen-killed-during-endsars-protests/">since the #EndSARS movement concluded</a>, and the Lagos State government has compensated their families. Nothing has been paid to the families of the protesters who died. The Lagos State government opened a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-54708009">judicial commission of inquiry</a> to investigate the Oct. 20 killings, but such inquiries, which are merely advisory, have come to little in the past.</p>
<p>[<em>Insight, in your inbox each day.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=insight">You can get it with The Conversation’s email newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Nigeria’s government has begun punishing the young organizers of #EndSARS, including by <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/13/nigeria-punitive-financial-moves-against-protesters">freezing their bank accounts and revoking their passports</a>. This, too, has echoes in the past. Financial penalties were imposed on the losing side of the Nigerian Civil War <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/history-of-the-republic-of-biafra/59377D443F078E195F366F5D1BCB31B9">in the early 1970s</a>, and military regimes regularly prevented their critics from leaving the country. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s story reveals a common pitfall of police reform movements that’s also been seen in the United States and beyond. Governments facing pressure to reform police may <a href="https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/GrunwaldRappaportArticle_geykjizk.pdf">shuffle around personnel or rebrand maligned units</a> – but cosmetic changes <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-disbanding-the-notorious-anti-robbery-squad-wont-stop-bad-policing-in-nigeria-147934">cannot fix root problems that date back decades</a>, even centuries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150355/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samuel Fury Childs Daly does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The story of Nigeria’s #EndSARS movement shows just how durable law enforcement institutions are – and why the road to reform goes straight uphill.Samuel Fury Childs Daly, Assistant Professor of African and African American Studies, Duke UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1442922020-08-11T14:25:23Z2020-08-11T14:25:23ZState of democracy in Africa: changing leaders doesn’t change politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352212/original/file-20200811-14-16wenam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>For the last few years the African political landscape has been dominated by high profile changes of leaders and governments. In Angola (2017), Ethiopia (2018), South Africa (2018), Sudan (2019) and Zimbabwe (2018), leadership change promised to bring about not only a new man at the top, but also a new political and economic direction. </p>
<p>But do changes of leaders and governments generate more democratic and responsive governments? The Bertelsmann Transformation Index Africa Report 2020 (BTI), <a href="https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/changing-guards-change-systems">A Changing of the Guards or A Change of Systems?</a>, suggests that we should be cautious about the prospects for rapid political improvements.</p>
<p>Reviewing developments in 44 countries from 2017 to the start of 2019, the report finds that leadership change results in an initial wave of optimism. But ongoing political challenges and constraints mean that it is often a case of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289660924_Kenya_since_2002_The_more_things_change_the_more_they_stay_the_same">“the more things change the more they stay the same”</a>. </p>
<p>Political change occurs gradually in the vast majority of African countries. </p>
<h2>More continuity than change</h2>
<p>From 2015 to 2019, the general pattern has been for the continent’s more authoritarian states – such as Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea and Rwanda – to make little progress towards democracy. In some cases countries became incrementally more repressive. </p>
<p>At the same time, many of the continent’s more democratic states – including Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal and South Africa – have remained “consolidating” or “defective” democracies. Very few of these dropped out of these categories to become “authoritarian” regimes.</p>
<p>A number of countries have seen more significant changes. But in most cases this did not fundamentally change the character of the political system. For example, Cameroon, Chad, Kenya and Tanzania moved further away from lasting political and economic transformation. Meanwhile Angola, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe initially made progress towards it, but these gains were limited – and only lasted for a short period in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>As this brief summary suggests, at a continental level the trajectories of different states have by and large cancelled each other out. Positive trends in some cases were wiped out by negative trends in others.</p>
<p>Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has thus seen no significant changes to the overall level of democracy, economic management and governance. For example, the index shows that between 2018 and 2020, the overall level of democracy declined by just 0.09, a small shift on a 1-10 scale. This suggests continuity not change. </p>
<h2>Leadership changes often disappoint</h2>
<p>In almost all cases, positive trends were recorded in countries where leadership change generated hope for political renewal and economic reform. This includes Angola, after President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/world/africa/angola-dos-santos.html">José Eduardo dos Santos</a> stepped down in 2017, and Ethiopia, following the rise to power of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ethiopias-abiy-ahmed-wont-be-answering-any-questions-when-he-receives-his-nobel-prize/2019/12/09/5277fe12-1871-11ea-80d6-d0ca7007273f_story.html">Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed</a>. It also includes Zimbabwe, where the transfer of power from <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/118/472/580/5462513">Robert Mugabe to Emmerson Mnangagwa</a> was accompanied by promises that the Zanu-PF government would show greater respect for democratic norms and values in future.</p>
<p>Sierra Leone also recorded a significant improvement in performance following the victory of opposition candidate Julius Maada Bio in the presidential election of 2018. Nigeria has continued to make modest but significant gains in economic management since Muhammadu Buhari replaced Goodluck Jonathan as president in 2015. </p>
<p>The significance of leadership change in all of these processes is an important reminder of the extent to which power has been personalised. But it is important to note that events since the end of the period under review in 2019 have cast doubt on the significance of these transitions.</p>
<p>Most notably, continued and in some cases increasing human rights abuses in countries such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe suggest that we have seen “a changing of the guards” but not a change of political systems. </p>
<p>Nowhere is this more true than Zimbabwe, where the last few weeks have witnessed a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/zimbabwe-activists-decry-unprecedented-clampdown-arrests-200805144813725.html">brutal government crackdown</a>. Not only have journalists been arrested on flimsy charges, but the rule of law has been manipulated to keep them in jail. Following this sustained attack on democracy, it is now clear that the Mnangagwa government is no more committed to human rights and civil liberties than its predecessor was. </p>
<h2>There is no one ‘Africa’</h2>
<p>So what does the future hold? I often get asked what direction Africa is heading in. My answer is always the same: where democracy is concerned, there is no one “Africa”. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index report shows how true this is. </p>
<p>In addition to the well-known differences between leading lights like Botswana and entrenched laggards like Rwanda, there is also a profound regional variation that is less well recognised and understood. </p>
<p>From relatively similar starting points in the early 1990s, there has been a sharp divergence between West and Southern Africa – which have remained comparatively more open and democratic – and Central and Eastern Africa, which remained more closed and authoritarian. There is also some evidence that the average quality of democracy continued to decline in Eastern and Central Africa in the past few years. Because it continues to increase in West Africa, we have seen greater divergence between the two sets of regions.</p>
<p>Figure 1. Average Democracy scores for African regions, BTI 2006-2020*</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>These variations reflect the historical process through which governments came to power, the kinds of states over which they govern, and the disposition and influence of regional organisations. In particular, East Africa features a number of countries ruled by former rebel armies (Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda). Here political control is underpinned by coercion and a longstanding suspicion of opposition. </p>
<p>This is also a challenge in some Central African states. Here the added complication of long-running conflicts and political instability (Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo) has undermined government performance in many ways. </p>
<p>A number of former military leaders have also governed West African states, including Ghana, Nigeria and Togo. But the proportion has been lower and some countries, such as Senegal, have a long tradition of plural politics and civilian leadership. In a similar vein, southern Africa features a number of liberation movements. But in a number of cases these developed out of broad-based movements that valued political participation and civil liberties. Partly as a result, former military or rebel leaders have had a less damaging impact on the prospects for democracy in Southern and West Africa.</p>
<p>It is important not to exaggerate these regional differences. There is great variation within them as well as between them. But, this caveat notwithstanding, we should not expect to see any convergence around a common African democratic experience in the next few years. If anything, the gap between the continent’s most democratic and authoritarian regions is likely to become even wider.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144292/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman was paid for his work writing this report for the BTI.</span></em></p>The gap between the continent’s most democratic and authoritarian regions is likely to continue to grow.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1284732020-01-09T17:09:54Z2020-01-09T17:09:54ZHow the Nigerian and Kenyan media handled Cambridge Analytica<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307645/original/file-20191218-11909-qdrzct.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There's a growing awareness that Cambridge Analytica harnessed social media and personal data to influence elections. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta recently <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201911180439.html">signed</a> into law the Data Protection Bill. Passed after several years of debate and delay, the new law places restrictions on the collection and use of digital data by governments and private corporations. The restrictions are similar to those included in a new <a href="https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2019/04/05/nigeria-issues-new-data-protection-regulation/">data protection regulation</a> passed by Nigeria this year.</p>
<p>These protection laws are welcome advancements in the light of investigations that revealed that British political consulting firm <a href="https://twitter.com/camanalytica?lang=en">Cambridge Analytica</a>
had worked on presidential <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/03/africa/nigeria-kenya-cambridge-analytica-elections-intl/index.html">campaigns</a> in both countries. </p>
<p>It’s been widely known for some time that the firm <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/23/leaked-cambridge-analyticas-blueprint-for-trump-victory">helped elect</a> Donald Trump in the US and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jul/30/cambridge-analytica-did-work-for-leave-eu-emails-confirm">worked on</a> the Brexit referendum in the UK. But in March 2018 a number of startling exposés were published by The Guardian, The New York Times and Channel 4 showing the firm’s dubious campaign practices in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/21/cambridge-analyticas-ruthless-bid-to-sway-the-vote-in-nigeria">Nigeria</a> and <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/cambridge-analytica-revealed-trumps-election-consultants-filmed-saying-they-use-bribes-and-sex-workers-to-entrap-politicians-investigation">Kenya</a>. An <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jan/04/cambridge-analytica-data-leak-global-election-manipulation">ongoing leak</a> of tens of thousands of internal documents is set to show in great detail Cambridge Analytica’s work in 68 countries around the world.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">What is the Cambridge Analytica scandal?</span></figcaption>
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<p>The legal responses to the revelations suggest a growing awareness that social media and personal data are being harnessed by outside actors to influence elections around the world. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23743670.2019.1679208">recent article</a> we analysed press coverage of Cambridge Analytica in Nigeria and Kenya. We wanted to see if local coverage reflected international media coverage of the scandal. To do this we focused on three key themes: data privacy and protection, unethical political campaigning on social media, and foreign involvement in African elections.</p>
<p>We found that most newspaper articles focused on data privacy and social media campaigning. The Nigerian and Kenyan press focused on Facebook and data. But very few stories wrestled with the role of foreign actors in national elections. Important questions about campaigning and election interference received less attention.</p>
<p>This could mean that the door has been left open to ongoing foreign involvement in future elections, given that Cambridge Analytica used African elections as a testing ground for campaign tactics it later exported into more lucrative markets. It did this with little regard for the negative consequences on the emerging democracies. </p>
<h2>Cambridge Analytica in Africa</h2>
<p>It is easy to <a href="http://theconversation.com/claims-about-cambridge-analyticas-role-in-africa-should-be-taken-with-a-pinch-of-salt-93864">overstate the impact</a> of Cambridge Analytica in Nigeria and Kenya. So let’s review what the March 2018 exposés revealed.</p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/21/cambridge-analyticas-ruthless-bid-to-sway-the-vote-in-nigeria">detailed report</a>, Cambridge Analytica was hired by a wealthy Nigerian to support the 2015 reelection campaign of then-president Goodluck Jonathan. During the campaign, the firm worked with the Israeli intelligence firm Black Cube to acquire hacked medical and financial information about Jonathan’s opponent Muhammadu Buhari.</p>
<p>Cambridge Analytica also promoted a graphic anti-Buhari <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/apr/04/cambridge-analytica-used-violent-video-to-try-to-influence-nigerian-election">video</a>. It suggested Buhari would support the terrorist group Boko Haram and end women’s rights. </p>
<p>Jonathan eventually lost the 2015 election to Buhari. Earlier this year Buhari was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47380663">reelected</a> to a second term.</p>
<p>In Kenya, the firm worked on both Uhuru Kenyatta’s 2013 presidential campaign and his 2017 reelection campaign. To date, it is unclear exactly what it did during either campaign. One bit of evidence emerged in an undercover <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/cambridge-analytica-revealed-trumps-election-consultants-filmed-saying-they-use-bribes-and-sex-workers-to-entrap-politicians-investigation">video</a> of executive Mark Turnbull in which he made a number of claims. These included claims that the firm had rebranded Kenyatta’s party twice, had written their manifesto and had done two rounds of 50,000 surveys.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Cambridge Analytica Uncovered: Secret filming reveals election tricks.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Covering Cambridge Analytica</h2>
<p>To gather articles for our study, we searched the archives of two Nigerian newspapers — <a href="https://punchng.com/">Punch</a> and <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/">Vanguard</a> — and two Kenyan newspapers — <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/">Daily Nation</a> and <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/">East African Standard</a>. We looked for mentions of Cambridge Analytica in relation to Nigeria or Kenya. </p>
<p>We found 31 articles in the Nigerian newspapers and 74 articles in the Kenyan newspapers published prior to December 2018.</p>
<p>All 31 articles in Nigerian newspapers were published after March 2018. In the case of Kenya, 17 of the 74 articles were published prior to this. Cambridge Analytica was little known at the time of the 2015 elections in Nigeria. But the firm had garnered significant public attention in 2016 because of its connection to Trump and Brexit. As a result the Kenyan media was paying attention when the firm joined the Kenyatta campaign in 2017.</p>
<p>After March 2018, national newspapers in <a href="https://punchng.com/alleged-hacking-of-buharis-records-fg-investigates-cambridge-analytica-pdp/">Nigeria</a> and <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Cambridge-Analytica-and-Kenya-elections/1056-4349392-204vmx/index.html">Kenya</a> published several articles that summarised what Cambridge Analytica did in their respective countries.</p>
<p>But none of the articles we examined provided any further details on specific activities by Cambridge Analytica. They simply repeated what had already been reported in the international media.</p>
<p>Nigerian newspapers quickly framed the Cambridge Analytica scandal as a <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/03/961728/">partisan issue between two competing political parties</a>.</p>
<p>Kenyan newspaper coverage, on the other hand, was more comprehensive in quantity and quality. For one, the Kenyan press was covering Cambridge Analytica prior to March 2018; the first story appeared in <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Row-as-state-moves-to-cut-foreign-funds-for-Nasa-campaign/1064-3926074-4qbx87/index.html">May 2017</a>.</p>
<p>Because Cambridge Analytica had become known for its work with Trump and Brexit, Kenyan journalists and writers were discussing the <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001244727/cyber-warfare-as-politicians-turn-to-internet-propaganda-to-woo-voters">implications</a> of the firm working in their country early on. They <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/blogs/dot9/walubengo/2274560-4349730-ldnsrp/index.html">cautioned readers</a> that the firm might be involved in targeting sensational messages and misinformation on social media. They also considered the ramifications of foreign actors interfering in local political campaigns.</p>
<p>After the March 2018 revelations, Kenyan newspapers responded with more news and opinion pieces. These wrestled with the implications for data privacy, political campaigning on social media, and Kenya’s democratic institutions. For example, a <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Cambridge-Analytica-manipulate-elections/440808-4357302-qrmahuz/index.html">column</a> asked plainly whether the firm undermined democracy and made a mockery of elections by manipulating people’s emotions. The column also questioned whether the firm deepened ethnic division in society.</p>
<h2>Digital colonialism?</h2>
<p>Recently, the Kenyan writer, political analyst and activist <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/nanjala-nyabola-digital-colonialism-transforming-kenyas-political-discourse">Nanjala Nyabola</a> asked whether Africa was entering a new era of digital colonialism. By this she means a form of exploitation in which foreign actors use African nations for their own benefit without regard for the safety of citizens and the stability of institutions.</p>
<p>In the context of Cambridge Analytica’s work in Nigeria and Kenya, the answer may be yes. It’s important that African countries update their data privacy and protection laws. But as the ongoing document leak <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Mystery-men-behind-Uhuru-poll-strategy/1064-5407174-u76bnq/">demonstrates</a>, the Cambridge Analytic scandal runs deeper than access to Facebook data.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128473/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What role do foreign actors play in African elections? Cambridge Analytica’s case sheds some light.Brian Ekdale, Associate Professor of Journalism & Mass Communication, University of IowaMelissa Tully, Associate Professor Director of Undergraduate Studies School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of IowaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1249042019-10-08T14:27:07Z2019-10-08T14:27:07ZBuhari’s visit to South Africa eased tensions. But more needs to be done<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296020/original/file-20191008-128648-5a7rce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">One of the immediate outcomes of talks between Muhammadu Buhari (left) and Cyril Ramaphosa was the easing of tensions.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There were mixed feelings among Nigerians over President Muhammadu Buhari’s state visit to South Africa because of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-a-new-narrative-could-tackle-anti-migrant-crisis-123145">recent xenophobic attacks</a> in the country. While many Nigerians disapproved of the visit, Buhari’s government <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-10-04-nigeria-in-sa-mzansi-reacts-to-ramaphosas-meeting-with-buhari/">insisted</a> that it was imperative to go ahead. Their argument was that it was vital for the two countries to continue working together.</p>
<p>The recent attacks sparked angry reactions in Nigeria. Some Nigerians called for <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-09-03-nigeria-calls-for-sanctions-on-sa-as-relations-flounder/">severing relations</a> with South Africa or imposing additional taxes on South African companies in Nigeria. They claimed these actions would serve as an ample response to the xenophobia and also send a signal to South Africa that xenophobia is unacceptable. </p>
<p>But others argued that there was a need to <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201909070010.html">mend the relationship</a> so that the two countries could prevent further chaos. Buhari heeded these calls, clearly choosing to tread the path of reconciliation when he visited South Africa. </p>
<p>His visit is important for three main reasons. First, to protect the close economic ties between the countries, second, the Nigerian government wants to be seen as proactively protecting its citizens abroad and lastly because the South African government had to do something to mend fences with its important ally. </p>
<h2>The drivers</h2>
<p>One of the main drivers behind Ramaphosa’s invitation, and Buhari’s visit, was the need to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-nigeria/south-africa-nigeria-mend-relations-and-agree-trade-deals-idUSKBN1WI28I">ease tensions</a> between the two largest economies in Africa. </p>
<p>There are deep economic ties both ways. Over <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/120-south-african-companies-in-nigeria-risk-attacks/">120 South African companies</a> operate in Nigeria, ranging from mobile operators to retailers. </p>
<p>South Africa, on the other hand, is a significant buyer of Nigerian oil. There are also a <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201909070010.html">significant number</a> of Nigerian businesspeople, professionals and other migrants in South Africa.</p>
<p>Any further escalation would not only hurt the relationship but also threaten the economies of both countries. </p>
<p>Second, the Nigerian government has been <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2019/09/03/killings-nigerian-government-have-failed-citizens-in-south-africa-mgbo/">previously accused</a> by the Nigeria Union South Africa (NUSA) of not protecting its own citizens abroad. The visit could therefore be seen in context of addressing the displeasure of Nigerians at home and also to assure those living in South Africa that the government takes their welfare seriously. </p>
<p>For his part Ramaphosa certainly made all the right noises. He reiterated South Africa’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/nigerias-president-buhari-visits-south-africa-amid-tensions-over-xenophobia/a-50690234">“deep regret”</a> over the violence and assured Nigerians living in the country of adequate protection.</p>
<p>Third, the visit could also help South Africa address tensions with other aggrieved African countries. These include Rwanda, Malawi and <a href="https://time.com/5671003/what-the-xenophobic-violence-gripping-south-africa-means-for-future-of-country/">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>. All have threatened to cut ties with South Africa over the attacks.</p>
<h2>Bilateral ties</h2>
<p>Although Nigeria and South Africa are often cast as rivals, they have a strong bilateral relationship founded over the decades. This springs in part from Nigeria’s historical role in its support for the liberation struggle against apartheid. Nigeria provided support, as well as <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/south-africa-should-be-eternally-grateful-to-nigeria-7955145">financial backing</a> for the African National Congress (ANC) during its campaign against the apartheid regime. </p>
<p>For instance, after the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/sharpeville-massacre-21-march-1960">Sharpeville massacre</a> in 1960, Nigeria led calls for sanctions against the apartheid regime. Under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity, now the African Union, it championed the imposition of a trade embargo on the regime.</p>
<p>But relations haven’t always been cordial. For example, after the end of apartheid rule in 1994, South Africa put pressure on the international community to support the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/1995-11-17-the-crisis-in-nigeria">protests against military rule </a> in Nigeria especially after the execution of Ogoni activists. This enraged the ruling military government. </p>
<p>Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999. This laid the ground for a renewal of cordial relations which resulted in several bilateral arrangements. For example, in October 1999, a South Africa-Nigeria Bi-National Commission was <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26664032">established</a>. Several bilateral agreements on trade and investment followed.</p>
<p>The first major international partnership was in 2000, when president Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa both attended the <a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/nigeria/meet0007.html">G8 meeting</a> of the world’s richest states to argue for debt forgiveness for African countries. Both leaders also played a significant role in the creation of the <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/6453">New Partnership for African Development</a> (Nepad).</p>
<h2>What still needs to be done</h2>
<p>Buhari’s visit has already been judged successful by <a href="http://www.lagazzettadelsudafrica.net/index.php/current-news/6920-joint-communique-on-the-occasion-of-the-state-visit-to-south-africa-by-president-muhammadu-buhari-of-nigeria-and-the-inaugural-session-of-the-elevated-bnc-between-south-africa-and-nigeria">government</a> officials and media outlets in Nigeria. </p>
<p>But there are practical issues that must be addressed by both countries. </p>
<p>For the South African leader, there is need to act on attenuating the rhetoric that foreigners are responsible for the social ills in the country. For instance, the Mayor of Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba, has been accused of making “reckless” remarks against migrants which <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-09-01-mashaba-da-using-xenophobia-like-trump-says-rights-group/">“may incite more xenophobic violence”</a>.</p>
<p>For his part, Buhari needs to provide assurances of protection to South African businesses in Nigeria. He needs to reassure them that Nigeria will continue to protect them and their investments. </p>
<p>Both leaders also need to work together to reduce poverty, corruption and unemployment in their countries. These are some of the key issues stoking attacks and counter-attacks in both countries.</p>
<p>Although Nigeria and South Africa are the two largest economies on the continent, both face huge problems. When it comes to the <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/2018-update">human development index</a> Nigeria ranked 157 last year and South Africa 113 out of 189 . On corruption, <a href="https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018?gclid=CjwKCAjwxOvsBRAjEiwAuY7L8gTSkbKPUBpQ21QOG7WewFcH1QrSgr4kMJjtcBcn5saQvKpOyu65NBoC1pQQAvD_BwE">South-Africa was ranked 73 and Nigeria 144</a> out of 180 countries surveyed last year. </p>
<p>The ability of both to work together to address the issues holding back their development would go along way in determining their future together.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124904/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although Nigeria and South Africa are often cast as rivals they have a strong bilateral relationshipOlayinka Ajala, Associate Lecturer and Conflict Analyst, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1233812019-09-11T13:41:21Z2019-09-11T13:41:21ZPasha 35: How WhatsApp played a role in the Nigerian elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291920/original/file-20190911-190012-7cuw1l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>WhatsApp is one of the world’s most popular social media platforms. The messaging app is encrypted so it’s safer to share messages there than on platforms like Facebook and Twitter. It also notorious for the spread of fake news. But it’s also used for good. In the run-up to Nigeria’s 2019 election, for instance, the platform was used to spread fake news – but it was also used for campaigning and communicating with potential voters.</p>
<p>In this episode of Pasha Nic Cheeseman, a professor of democracy at the University of Birmingham, explores WhatsApp and its role in Nigeria’s elections. He also discusses how governments should embrace technologies like WhatsApp, promoting digital literacy so people can be more discerning readers. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whatsapp-played-a-big-role-in-the-nigerian-election-not-all-of-it-was-bad-121064">WhatsApp played a big role in the Nigerian election. Not all of it was bad</a>
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<p><strong>Photo:</strong>
Photo by Gregade
A man casting his vote at a polling unit in Idiko-Ile during the 23rd February, 2019 Presidential Election in Nigeria. <a href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/man-casting-his-vote-pooling-unit-1321582940?src=rI4PQNJAwRo6SdI-EB84eg-1-64">Shutterstock</a></p>
<p><strong>Music</strong>
“Happy African Village” by John Bartmann found on <a href="http://freemusicarchive.org/music/John_Bartmann/Public_Domain_Soundtrack_Music_Album_One/happy-african-village">FreeMusicArchive.org</a> licensed under <a href="https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/">CC0 1</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123381/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
WhatsApp can amplify and complement a candidate’s ground campaign. But it cannot replace it.Ozayr Patel, Digital EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1185722019-06-11T14:11:19Z2019-06-11T14:11:19ZJune 12 is now Democracy Day in Nigeria. Why it matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278871/original/file-20190611-32317-w5r6dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Muhammadu Buhari has endorsed June 12 as Nigeria's official
Democracy Day</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Esther Addy/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Democracy Day in Nigeria is being celebrated on the 12th of June this year. This is the first time the day has been marked on this date. And the change carries heavy symbolism for a country that’s known more years of being ruled by military men than by democratically elected leaders.</p>
<p>Until last year the date on which Nigeria commemorated <a href="https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/3310433">the restoration of democracy</a> was May 29. But last year President Muhammadu Buhari declared June 12 to be the new <a href="https://thenationonlineng.net/buhari-signs-june-12-democracy-day-bill-into-law/">Democracy Day</a>. </p>
<p>June 12 carries huge significance for older Nigerians. It was on this date in 1993 that presidential elections were held for the first time since the 1983 military coup. It was an event many observers have described as the <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/meaning-june-12">most significant</a> in Nigeria’s post-independence political history. It is still viewed as the freest, fairest and most peaceful election ever held in Nigeria. </p>
<p>On the day, an estimated 14 million Nigerians – irrespective of ethnic, religious, class, and regional affiliations, (in a period when religious acrimony and tension had reached its zenith) – <a href="https://www.academia.edu/2123541/_The_dawn_of_constitutionalism_in_Nigeria_in_Mbondenyi_M._K._and_Ojienda_T._eds._Constitutionalism_Constitution_Making_and_Constitutional_Reform_in_Africa_Contemporary_Perspectives_from_Sub-Saharan_Africa">defied</a> bad weather to elect their president with the hope of ending eight years of military dictatorships.</p>
<p>The euphoria was short-lived. The results of the election were never released. But unofficial results gathered through the various polling stations by civil society groups across the country indicated <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abacha-regime-and-the-june-12-crisis-by-ebenezer-babatope-lagos-ebino-topsy-1995-available-from-beacons-books-london-pp-215-1295-paperback/AB05F1D76A8A5D3A6E45DBB40F5329E4">broad national support</a> for the presidential candidate of the Social Democratic Party, Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola.</p>
<p>Abiola was a businessman, publisher, politician and aristocrat of the Yoruba Egba clan. He made his fortune through various enterprises, including communication, oil and gas. He made his first, unsuccessful run at the presidency in 1983. By then, Nigeria had endured a great deal of political upheaval since its 1960 independence. It was a <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/ethnic-religious-crises-nigeria">deeply divided</a> nation, riven along ethnic, religious and regional lines. Political and military power was held by the north.</p>
<p>Then came Abiola, a man from the South. He brought a different perspective to the table and was able to <a href="https://www.nigerianinfopedia.com/biography-mko-abiola-nigerias-president-never-was/">connect with people across divides</a>. Come 12 June 1993, he tried for the presidency again.</p>
<p>Despite his popularity, and the turnout, the elections stalled. The then military head of state, General Ibrahim Babangida, decided to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4186945?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">annul the results of the election</a>. He <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/24/world/nigerian-military-rulers-annul-election.html">justified the annulment</a> on the grounds that it was necessary to save the nation. He alleged that political activities preceding the election were inimical to peace and stability in Nigeria.</p>
<p>Some people however believe that the military <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/06/the-military-underrated-abiolas-popularity-sen-zwingina-campaign-manager/">underrated Abiola’s popularity</a>. It also did not envisage the level of crisis after the annulment of the election result. </p>
<p>The June 12 election and subsequent annulment marked the beginning of a decades long struggle to see the election result restored and democracy rehabilitated.</p>
<h2>The fallout</h2>
<p>The annulment of the election result was not taken lightly in the south-Western part of the country. Civil violence in the South Western states provoked by electoral fraud and political exclusion previously contributed to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0975087814532585">the breakdown of the first and second republics</a>. These ran from 1993 to 1999 when Nigeria had its return to democratic rule.</p>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0975087814532585">According to</a> political scientist Professor Emmanuel Ojo, Southern resentment over Abiola’s rebuff also threatened to create fissures within the military. This in turn raised the spectre of wider civil conflicts and state collapse. In his official reaction to the annulment, Abiola was <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0975087814532585">quoted as saying</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I might embark on the programme of civil disobedience in the country. If those who make the law disobey the law, why (should) I obey it? There is a limit to the authenticity one could expect from a military ruler who is obviously anxious to hang on to power.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Abiola’s statement threw the country into unprecedented crisis. The Campaign for Democracy spearheaded mass protests by calling for a five-day non-violent protest. </p>
<p>Protests later <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/06/world/nigerian-protests-erupt-in-violence.html">turned violent</a>. At least 100 protesters were killed, shot by police. The violence prompted a mounting exodus from the major cities, as southern ethnic groups (most especially the Ibos), fearing a recurrence of the communal purges which had preceded the 1967 Civil War, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0975087814532585?journalCode=ioaa">fled to their home regions</a>. Author B.O Nwabueze lucidly and graphically described the crisis <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0975087814532585">like this</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The annulment of the June 12 presidential election plunged the country into what indisputably is the greatest political crisis in its 33-year life as an independent nation. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Never before, except during the <a href="https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Nigerian_Civil_War">murderous confrontation of 1966 to 1970</a>, had the survival of Nigeria as one political entity been in more serious danger. The impasse created was certainly unequalled in the country’s history.</p>
<h2>Push for change</h2>
<p>Civil society groups pushed for the re-democratisation of Nigeria. Their first call was that the mandate be returned to Abiola. During this period there was a great deal of fear and insecurity in the country. But, as Ebenezer Babatope, in his book “<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Abacha-regime-June-crisis-democracy/dp/B0006F671A">The Abacha Regime and the June 12 crisis</a>” notes, people mobilised to face the challenges of a military leadership that had reneged on its promise to hand over power to democratically elected leaders. </p>
<p>Under tremendous pressure, the Abubakar administration arranged for elections to be held. </p>
<p>These took place – for state governorships, the senate and local councils – over a few months from late 1998 to February 1999. </p>
<p>Finally, Abubakar’s transition reached the climax with the declaration of General Olusegun Obasanjo, who had retired from the military, as the president elect in late February 1999. He was duly sworn in on 29 May 1999.</p>
<p>This explains why May 29 became the official public holiday on which Nigerians celebrated the country’s return to civilian rule. </p>
<p>During most of this time, Abiola was in jail. In 1994 he declared himself Nigeria’s lawful president after returning from a trip to win the support of the international community for his mandate. After declaring himself president he was accused of treason and arrested on the orders of then military President General Sani Abacha, who sent 200 police vehicles to bring him into custody. </p>
<p>Abiola died in suspicious circumstances on the day that he was due to be released, 7 July 1998.</p>
<h2>Democracy today</h2>
<p>Buhari’s decision to mark 12 June as Democracy Day should be viewed as an attempt to placate the South Western Nigerian State, which has always set aside the day to remember Abiola’s stolen mandate and an annulled election that many still view as the country’s freest and fairest in the history of Nigeria and democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118572/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Damilola Agbalajobi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>June 12 is widely regarded as the most important day in Nigeria’s post-independence poltiical historyDamilola Agbalajobi, Lecturer, Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1128942019-03-26T14:04:46Z2019-03-26T14:04:46ZEducation in Nigeria is in a mess from top to bottom. Five things can fix it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264646/original/file-20190319-60956-zetlly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigeria’s education system is based on the (1)-6-3-3-4 formula: one year pre-primary education, six years primary, three years junior secondary, three years senior secondary, and a minimum of four years tertiary education. </p>
<p>The model had been used successfully in China, Germany and Ghana before Nigeria adopted it in 1989.</p>
<p>But it’s never been fully implemented in Nigeria. Although successive governments have theoretically upheld its objectives, none has successfully implemented the policy. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s educational system is in assorted crises of infrastructural decay, neglect, waste of resources and sordid conditions of service. The country has over 10 million <a href="https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/education">out-of-school children</a>. That’s the highest in the world. Another 27 million children in school are <a href="http://www.thecable.ng/goodbye-to-buhari-illusion">performing very poorly</a>. Millions of Nigerians are half-educated, and over 60 million – or 30% – are <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/250397-60-million-nigerians-are-illiterates-minister.html">illiterate</a>.</p>
<p>On top of this, many eligible young Nigerians can’t gain admission into public universities. At the same time prohibitive tuition fees, among other factors, are a barrier to the country’s private universities. </p>
<p>As the Buhari-Osinbajo government starts its second term it should focus on key areas that will dig Nigeria’s education system out of the deep hole it’s in. I have identified five priorities it should attend to first.</p>
<h2>Appointment</h2>
<p>The new government should appoint an expert Minister of Education, not a political party lackey. In the past, Nigeria’s educational system has fared better under expert education ministers who earned their stripes through the system.</p>
<p>Take Professor Jubril Aminu, who served in the portfolio from 1985 to 1990. The 6-3-3-4 system was inaugurated during his tenure. Aminu also introduced “<a href="https://www.ajouronline.com/index.php/AJHSS/article/view/2881">nomadic education</a>” in 1989 for nomadic Fulani and other migrant ethnic groups. </p>
<p>Aminu was followed by Professor Babs Fafunwa (1990 to 1992). He overhauled the national education policy. He also provided room for education in mother tongue, a universal practice which most African countries have not fully implemented. UNESCO recommends education in mother tongue because of its immense <a href="https://learningportal.iiep.unesco.org/en/issue-briefs/improve-learning/curriculum-and-materials/language-of-instruction">advantages</a>.</p>
<p>Lastly, under Professor Sam Egwu (2008 to 2010), a controversial agreement was signed between the government and the union <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/wp-content/files/2013/10/FGN.ASUU-INITIALED-AGREEMENT-JAN.-2009.pdf">representing the country’s academic staff</a>. The agreement – signed in 2009 after drawn-out negotiations – stipulated conditions of service and remuneration for lecturers, the autonomy of universities and how the government should fund tertiary education. </p>
<p>But successive governments have violated the terms of the pact, claiming that they didn’t have the money to meet some of its terms. Officials claimed that sections of the pact were difficult, and in some cases impossible, to implement. However, the union rejects these claims and has accused the government of using delay tactics and questionable criticisms to frustrate the deal.</p>
<h2>Funding</h2>
<p>Funding is the biggest problem confronting Nigeria’s education system. The percentage of the budget allocated to education annually is abysmally low. In 2018, only <a href="https://punchng.com/2018-budget-and-the-paltry-allocation-for-education/">7.04%</a> was allocated to education. This is far below UNESCO’s recommended <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/251927-fact-check-unesco-ever-recommend-26-per-cent-budgetary-allocation-education.html">15%-26%</a>.</p>
<p>Nigeria’s experience with the commercialisation and neglect of government secondary and primary school levels has led to poorer education outcomes. Nor is privatisation the answer: it’s only likely to widen the gap between the rich and the poor. It will deny many children affordable quality education, increase the rate of illiteracy and reduce academic performance at the tertiary level. </p>
<p>If the government continues to privatise government-owned universities, as is already the case with the proliferation of private universities with high fees, tertiary education will become the exclusive preserve of the rich upper class. This, in a country where more than 90% of the population is currently living in <a href="http://www.thecable.ng/goodbye-to-bujari-illusion">abject poverty</a>. </p>
<p>The government should also cut wasteful expenditure. For example, I would argue that the “school children feeding programme” is a massive drain on resources.</p>
<p>Government <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/08/fg-spends-n49bn-on-school-feeding-programme-2/">reported</a> earlier this year that it allocated 220 billion naira for the programme and of that, about 50 billion naira was wasted. This money could have be spent on more pressing problems such as building more classrooms and equipping them, supplying teaching and learning materials and improving staff welfare and remuneration. </p>
<h2>Money for research</h2>
<p>Research suffers in three ways in Nigeria. First, researchers work without sponsorship, particularly in the core sciences. The Tertiary Education Trust Fund is virtually the only source of money. The Trust funds and sponsors research projects, gives grants for research and sponsors lecturers for academic conferences, among other things. But its resources are limited and its operations are slow, highly selective and sometimes politicised.</p>
<p>Secondly, study findings are often abandoned on library shelves because the government isn’t committed to research-oriented development. Researchers don’t have the means to promote their work and research findings. </p>
<p>Third, research output is mediocre and repetitive because there are no effective measures in place to track research output nationwide. </p>
<h2>Stop incessant strikes</h2>
<p>In 1978, the Academic Staff Union of Universities was <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/asuu-strike-beginning-greater-suffering">established</a> to represent academic staff in Nigeria’s universities. <a href="http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=370195&rel_no=1">Since then</a>, there have been strikes almost every year, disrupting the academic calendar.</p>
<p>To stop these annual disruptions, the government must increase budgetary allocations to the sector and honour agreements that have been signed with the unions. </p>
<p>The only way that strikes will be stopped is if the welfare of all staff, from teachers to lecturers, is prioritised. </p>
<h2>In conclusion</h2>
<p>If these priorities are successfully implemented, Nigeria’s education system would be well on its way to realising government’s commitment to its own policies and the United Nations’ <a href="https://undocs.org/A/RES/70/1">Sustainable Development Goals</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112894/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr. Omowumi Olabode Steven Ekundayo is affiliated with with the Liberation Party and works with the party as an administrative consultant. </span></em></p>Nigeria has the world’s highest number of out-of-school children and over 60 million of its citizens are illiterate. Here’s what the country can do to improve its education sector.Omowumi Olabode Steven Ekundayo, University of BeninLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1130452019-03-07T13:36:54Z2019-03-07T13:36:54ZThe four key factors that determined the outcome of the Nigeria poll<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262404/original/file-20190306-100805-exdt3j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women waiting to vote in Nigeria's 2019 elections. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/George Esiri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mixed reactions greeted Nigeria’s 2019 presidential elections outcome. The 2019 presidential election was expected to be a close race because the two main candidates are from the northern part of the country. But, in the end, the final result showed Muhammadu Buhari polling <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/26/muhammadu-buhari-to-claim-victory-in-nigerias-presidential-election">56% of the total vote cast</a>.</p>
<p>The 2019 elections featured a total of 73 presidential candidates but the real contest was between the incumbent of the All Progressives Congress and the former vice-president, Atiku Abubakar of the platform of People’s Democratic Party.</p>
<p>Despite Atiku’s perceived popularity and Buhari’s lacklustre performance during his four years as president, four key issues shaped the outcome of the election. Some of these had more to do with Abubakar’s weaknesses – such as being tainted as corrupt and bad calculations about voting patterns in the south – than Buhari’s strengths. But factors such as high levels of tensions in some parts of the country combined with a low voter turnout also had an impact.</p>
<p>The People’s Democratic Party was quick to condemn the elections. Atiku described the presidential poll as the <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/02/28/atiku-this-is-the-worst-election-in-30-years/">“worst in 30 years”</a>. </p>
<p>While the 2019 presidential election wasn’t perfect, it showed that democracy is gradually being entrenched in Nigeria.</p>
<h2>The issues that mattered</h2>
<p>First, the privatisation agenda of the former vice-president was not well received by Nigerians. Atiku promised to create jobs and sell the country’s oil corporation - The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). While selling the highly inefficient corporation might be a good idea, the part privatisation of the country’s electricity sector has not been successful and another privatisation drive raised concerns in many quarters. It was quickly rumoured around the country that the former vice president would sell the country’s prized asset to his associates forcing him to <a href="https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/i-will-sell-nnpc-to-nigerians-not-to-my-friends-atiku.html">debunk the claim</a> during several campaigns and interviews.</p>
<p>Second, political calculations especially in the South-West region of the country worked against the former vice-president. In 1999, when Nigeria returned to democracy after 16 years of military rule, there was an unwritten agreement between the power brokers that the presidency will rotate between the north and south for eight years each time. Although this is not constitutional, power has rotated between the north and south. </p>
<p>Since incumbent president Buhari had already completed a first term being a northerner, most people in the south believed that voting for another northern candidate would imply the north being in power for 12 years since it is assumed every candidate would wish to complete two terms of four years. This assumption put off many voters from the South against Atiku, who is also from the north.</p>
<p>Third, Buhari’s anti-corruption stance, coupled with <a href="https://punchng.com/we-have-fresh-evidence-of-corruption-against-atiku-says-fg/">corruption allegations against Atiku</a> played a significant role. </p>
<p>In his book entitled, <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=5JWDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT45&lpg=PT45&dq=propensity+to+corruption,+his+tendency+to+disloyalty,+his+inability+to+say+and+stick+to+the+truth+all+the+time,a+propensity+for+poor+judgment,+his+belief+and+reliance+on+marabouts+,+his+lack+of+transparency,+his+trust+in+money+to+buy+his+way+out+on+all+issues+and+his+readiness+to+sacrifice+morality,+integrity,+propriety+truth+and+national+interest+for+self+and+selfish+interest&source=bl&ots=zBhyqQ_5bm&sig=ACfU3U2LrTBOQpbR8_wjBjJV47MWYHUUhQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjw7pTqqOjgAhXFPFAKHZpmCNYQ6AEwAHoECAAQAQ#v=onepage&q=propensity%20to%20corruption%2C%20his%20tendency%20to%20disloyalty%2C%20his%20inability%20to%20say%20and%20stick%20to%20the%20truth%20all%20the%20time%2Ca%20propensity%20for%20poor%20judgment%2C%20his%20belief%20and%20reliance%20on%20marabouts">‘My Watch’</a>, former President Olusegun Obasanjo made several corruption allegations against Atiku who was the vice-president under his tenure. Although Obasanjo eventually endorsed Atiku, his unflattering characterisation worked against his candidacy as excerpts from the book were circulated widely by the media. </p>
<p>Buhari, on the other hand, was seen by many Nigerians as willing to curtail corruption in the country. This worked in his favour and probably earned him a second term.</p>
<p>Fourth, the tense atmosphere around the country coupled with a heavy military presence in some parts limited voter’s turnout. This resulted in a record low of 35.6%. The numbers of registered voters rose from 57.9 million in 1999 to 84 million in 2019. But turnout continued a decline that’s been clear since 2003. In that year the turnout was 69.1%, four years later in 2007 it was 57.4%, <a href="https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/how-voter-turnout-shapes-nigerias-elections.html">in 2011 it was 53.7% and in 2015 43.6%</a>. </p>
<p>The record low numbers affected both parties. But it affected People’s Democratic Party disproportionately. For instance, the party garnered 1.4 million votes in Rivers state in 2015 but <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/02/2019-presidential-election-results-buhari-polled-over15m-votes/">only managed 473,971 votes</a> this time round, losing about a million votes in a single state. </p>
<p>The low turnouts, especially in the South-south and South-East regions which are believed to be Atiku’s strongholds, also worked in favour of Buhari.</p>
<h2>Free and fair?</h2>
<p>Although pockets of election-related violence around the country resulted in the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-25/dozens-killed-in-election-violence-as-nigeria-votes/10844842">deaths of at least 39 people</a>, the election has been described as free and fair in most <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/02/intl-observers-laud-inec-for-free-fair-election-in-kano/">usually volatile places</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, there are two major indications that the elections were largely credible. </p>
<p>First, the outcome for several key individuals, such as incumbent governors, former governors and astute politicians, points to the fact that the will of the people prevailed in a great number of places. For instance, in the senatorial elections, the current senate president Dr Bukola Saraki, <a href="https://punchng.com/how-the-mighty-fell-in-nass-election/">two sitting governors and six former</a> governors lost to relatively unknown candidates. Those who lost had previously been classified as ‘untouchables’ and supposedly had guaranteed senate seats.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262365/original/file-20190306-48438-brp83p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262365/original/file-20190306-48438-brp83p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262365/original/file-20190306-48438-brp83p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262365/original/file-20190306-48438-brp83p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262365/original/file-20190306-48438-brp83p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262365/original/file-20190306-48438-brp83p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262365/original/file-20190306-48438-brp83p.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1: Author supplied.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Second, the use of electronic card readers reduced the incidence of electoral manipulations that had characterised previous elections. Although the card readers were first used in the 2015 elections, the technology has been improved. This meant that there weren’t as many incidents of multiple and underage voting. (Figure 1 above shows the wide discrepancy between registered voters and actual voters.)</p>
<p>Prior to the use of card readers, the elections were fraught with irregularities and manipulations. This explains the fact that, despite lower numbers of registered voters, the number of votes cast were higher in the years prior to the use of electronic card readers. For example, this year 84 million voters registered, but only 29.3 million people were accredited to vote. This suggests that electronic voting has reduced electoral manipulation. </p>
<p>There’s another explanation – voter apathy. Nevertheless, the fact remains that it’s now more difficult to falsify <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14662040902857800?scroll=top&needAccess=true">election results</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113045/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While the 2019 presidential election wasn’t perfect, it showed that democracy is gradually being entrenched in Nigeria.Olayinka Ajala, Associate Lecturer and Conflict Analyst, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1130462019-03-06T14:37:48Z2019-03-06T14:37:48ZWhat Buhari has to do to take Nigeria’s economy to the next level<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262432/original/file-20190306-100772-jpc1as.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigerians celebrate the announcement of Muhammadu Buhari’s victory. But can he deliver jobs this time round?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the main reasons newly-elected Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari had been widely expected to lose his bid for a second term was the poor state of the country’s economy. Under his presidency, Nigeria’s <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/unemployment-rate">unemployment rate more than doubled</a>, from 10.4% in January 2016 to 23.1% in July 2018 </p>
<p>In his first four years, Buhari also failed to address poverty. Under his watch, Nigeria overtook India as the country with the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/26/africa/nigeria-overtakes-india-extreme-poverty-intl/index.html">largest number of people living in extreme poverty</a>. About 87 million Nigerians, or half the population, live on less than US$1.90 per day.</p>
<p>And economic growth has been lacklustre since his election in 2015. The country went into recession in 2016, with a negative 1.6% growth rate. There was a rebound in economic growth of about 2% in 2018. Nevertheless the IMF <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2015&ey=2023&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=19&pr1.y=10&c=694&s=NGDP_RPCH&grp=0&a">forecasts</a> that growth will remain anaemic at an annual average of about 1.9% from 2019 – 2023.</p>
<p>By reelecting Buhari despite his unimpressive economic performance, Nigerians are giving him a second chance. One of Buhari’s campaign catchphrases was “Next Level,” signalling his determination to build on programmes initiated in the first term. These include conditional cash transfers to vulnerable citizens, school feeding programmes, giving young people critical skills, and implementing a microcredit scheme for small traders and artisans. </p>
<p>But these initiatives, however noble, are not widespread and substantive enough to touch a majority of the Nigerian population. Buhari should be planning a massive stimulus package to jump start the economy. This is particularly important given the fact that economic growth is going to be so lacklustre.</p>
<h2>High unemployment</h2>
<p>Nigeria’s high unemployment rate has created a bloated and unproductive informal sector, replete with millions of underemployed youths. </p>
<p>Buhari’s response in the first term was to create jobs by providing credit to micro and small enterprises, especially in the agro-processing sector. But job creation by small enterprises usually takes time. And the number of jobs is never on the scale of large enterprises. The end result has been that most Nigerians feel economically marginalised in spite of Buhari’s best efforts. </p>
<p>The Buhari administration is well aware of the bleak economic conditions. In February 2017 it launched the ambitious <a href="https://yourbudgit.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Economic-Recovery-Growth-Plan-2017-2020.pdf">economic and growth plan</a>. Its overarching objective was to restore growth and build a competitive economy through investment in infrastructure and creation of an enabling business environment. </p>
<p>Laudable as the plan might have been, there’s a cynicism about whether Buhari will get any of it implemented given that he only has another four years in office. </p>
<p>I believe that he needs to be a great deal more bold, and to come up with a new set of interventions that truly take Nigeria to the “next level”.</p>
<h2>The next level</h2>
<p>Nigeria urgently needs a massive economic stimulus programme. If he can summon the energy, Buhari should significantly increase spending in sectors, projects and programmes that boost the economy, generate employment and promote inclusive growth. He should prioritise infrastructure, labour-intensive manufacturing such as textiles and footwear, agro-processing, youth entrepreneurship projects, health and education.</p>
<p>Nigeria has a very large stock of human and natural resources that aren’t being used optimally. Meanwhile, there is a huge infrastructural deficit. These range from dilapidated roads, epileptic electricity supply, acute water shortages, crumbling public buildings, grossly underfunded public tertiary institutions and so on. The gap can be closed through public works projects executed with direct labour. </p>
<p>The benefits of this are clear. These projects would provide temporary employment for unskilled workers in government-funded projects, which would enable these workers to gain experience needed for permanent jobs. In addition, the targeted stimulus spending on productive and value-creating projects would spur growth, while also addressing inclusivity. The beneficiaries of economic growth in Nigeria have typically been politicians, workers in the oil and gas sector, high-level public officials, and executives of financial institutions. A vast majority of Nigerians are usually left out.</p>
<p>Some may wonder how the Buhari administration could possibly finance a massive stimulus spending, given <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201811280074.html">dwindling oil revenues</a> and a volatile global oil market. </p>
<p>There’s an answer to this conundrum: Nigeria could follow the example of Asian countries that financed their <a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSDNETWORK/Resources/3167518-1247856570643/3.7_Infrastructure_and_the_financial_crisis_in_EAP_July2009.pdf">stimulus programmes</a> through domestic borrowing mainly by issuing government bonds. Borrowing money domestically in a <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/are-south-asian-countries-sinking-debt-trap">local currency</a> isn’t nearly as problematic as external borrowing. </p>
<p>Of course, financing stimulus spending via domestic borrowing comes at a price: it may crowd-out domestic private investment by raising interest rates. But this would be a temporary hiccup, as the increase in aggregate demand generated by stimulus spending would subsequently crowd-in investment in the production of goods and services. This ultimately will generate employment opportunities.</p>
<p>One of the usual concerns about stimulus spending is the risk of inflation. But unemployment, economic disempowerment and youth restiveness are bigger threats to the stability of the Nigerian economy in the short to medium term. </p>
<p>A big chunk of Buhari’s stimulus spending should be directed toward manufacturing and agro-processing. The <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263752096_The_Performance_of_the_Nigerian_Manufacturing_Sector_A_52-Year_Analysis_of_Growth_and_Retrogression_1960-2012">manufacturing sector</a> accounts for only 12% of employment in the country, down from a high of over 30% in the 1980s. During its heydays in the 1970s-1980s, the Nigerian textile industry alone employed almost 1 million workers. Today it employs about <a href="https://opinion.premiumtimesng.com/2017/02/06/nigeria-exports-two-million-jobs-to-china-as-textile-industry-is-dysfunctional-by-paul-alaje/">30,000 workers</a>. </p>
<p>According to the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria, the contribution of manufacturing to the country’s GDP has been flat at 4%. This is well below the 12% targeted by the government. </p>
<h2>Taking charge</h2>
<p>In this first term, Buhari ceded too much economic policymaking responsibility to Vice President Yemi Osinbajo. Though a brilliant lawyer and professor, Osinbajo has no experience in economic management. </p>
<p>To move the economy to the next level, and thus regain the trust of Nigerians who have given him a second chance, the president must surround himself with a more talented team of economists.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113046/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Onyeiwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nigeria’s high unemployment rate has created a bloated and unproductive informal sector.Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor and Chair of the Economics Department, Allegheny CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1129652019-03-05T14:24:32Z2019-03-05T14:24:32ZWhy Buhari won even though he had little to show for first term<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262129/original/file-20190305-48429-t5lhj0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Muhammadu Buhari (left) and Vice President Yemi Osinbajo during a campaign rally in Akure, Ondo State.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A close race was predicted between Muhammadu Buhari and his main rival Atiku Abubakar. In the end the incumbent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-election-announcement/nigerias-electoral-commission-declares-buhari-winner-of-presidential-election-idUSKCN1QG0C1">won</a> the Nigerian presidential election with almost four million votes. </p>
<p>After the results were declared, <a href="https://twitter.com/atiku/status/1100682572181504000">Atiku cried foul</a>, pointing out numerous flaws and manipulations of the electoral process. He also threatened legal action although it remains to be seen if the Peoples Democratic Party candidate will file suit within 21 days of the vote as required. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, international leaders have already <a href="https://punchng.com/us-france-congratulate-buhari/">congratulated Buhari</a> and his All Progressives’ Congress. This is to be expected. External actors have often tended to prefer stability over denunciation when it comes to incredulous election results. </p>
<p>Hence this still begs the question: did Buhari actually win? Several problems marked the electoral process itself. But, in my view, while the election results were prone to manipulation, the result indicates that Buhari’s party did in fact win. </p>
<p>The question is: how did he do it given his poor track record in his first term? Several factors stand out from the election results: Buhari’s continued popularity in the north, combined with voter apathy in the south. And the fact that Atiku was an uninspiring contestant.</p>
<h2>Buhari’s failures</h2>
<p>Buhari came to power in 2015 after defeating incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan with around 2.5 million votes. His victory at the time can be attributed to his tough stance on corruption, his <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056244.2018.1456415">poverty alleviation promises</a>, and the Jonathan administration’s failure to curb the Boko Haram crisis.</p>
<p>In addition, Jonathan’s decision to run again as a Southern candidate had caused rifts in the Peoples Democratic Party with many, especially northern, political stalwarts defecting to the All Progressives’ Congress during his presidency. Buhari’s candidacy had already been strengthened by his coalition with the south-western Action Congress of Nigeria.</p>
<p>Buhari’s first term in office can be rated rather poorly. </p>
<p>His administration was struck with the double whammy of a severe recession and a drop in revenues from oil due to <a href="https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/pause-thought-pace-growth-has-slowed-drop-oil-prices">falling oil prices</a>. The government’s responses were slow and mostly inadequate. This was partly due to Buhari’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/after-long-absence-due-to-ill-health-nigerias-president-muhammadu-buhari-slams-divisions-terror/a-40175197">long absence from home</a> undergoing treatment for an undisclosed illness.</p>
<p>The Buhari government also didn’t perform very well on the security. While the Boko Haram crisis was pushed back during his first year in office, it resurfaced as the group <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-potentially-more-sinister-threat-in-boko-harams-split">split into several deadly factions</a>. <a href="https://theconversation.com/growing-herdsmen-militancy-is-adding-to-west-africas-security-threats-81966">Farmer-herder conflict</a> in the Middle Belt has also spun out of control. And the roots of new violent crises may have been laid with the brutal repression of the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra movement as well as the arrest of Muslim clerk El-Zakzaky and violence against his followers.</p>
<p>Finally, while Buhari has indeed taken <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-banks/nigeria-central-bank-suspends-nine-banks-from-fx-market-sources-say-idUSKCN10Y282">actions against corruption</a>, the battle against graft has often appeared to be a battle against political enemies. And little has been achieved at the policy level due to severe legislative-executive <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/nigeria-oil/update-1-nigerias-presidency-rebuffs-landmark-oil-reform-bill-in-current-form-idUKL3N1VJ55M">gridlock</a> during his first term. </p>
<h2>So why the win?</h2>
<p>In the end <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47385552">the electoral map of 2019</a> closely resembles <a href="https://www.nigerianmuse.com/20150411041722zg/elections-2015/monday-quarter-backing-preliminary-analysis-of-the-2015-presidential-elections-in-nigeria-just-the-numbers-please/">that of 2015</a> with most northern and south-western states going to the All Progressives’ Congress. In Lagos, the All Progressives’ Congress won a slight majority in the face of economic decline, but campaigned primarily to get voters to go to the polls. This only partly succeeded. </p>
<p>In the north, the All Progressives’ Congress’s vote share generally dropped on a <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/data-nigerian-election-results-analysis/">state-by-state level</a>, but turnout was high enough vis-à-vis the south to win the elections overall. </p>
<p>The Peoples Democratic Party did not substantially increase its leverage in the Middle Belt states, which are most affected by the herdsmen-farmer conflict. Particularly noteworthy is Atiku’s poor performance in the North in general. His home state of Adamawa was only won with a slim majority. </p>
<p>Buhari’s continued popularity in the North can partly be explained by the fact that the region is more insulated from international market dynamics. This means that the effects of the recession were less severe. While poverty remains more entrenched in the region, this was to some extent alleviated by <a href="https://www.efficiencyview.com/fg-farmer-moni-loan-geep-initiative/">the government’s subsidy programmes</a>. These also extended patronage to localities which had before largely been excluded from such networks. </p>
<p>Besides this, and from a more emotional perspective, many of Buhari’s supporters still continue to view him as their political messiah. </p>
<h2>Atiku had his weaknesses</h2>
<p>After its loss to the All Progressives’ Congress in 2015, the Peoples Democratic Party itself remained for a long time mired in internal conflict. In the middle of a <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2016/11/17/pdp-leadership-crisis-makarfi-and-sheriff-renew-hostilities">leadership crisis</a>, the party lost political elites and followers, also due to the sudden cut-off from patronage resources. </p>
<p>The party came together again <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/12/pdp-chairmanship-final-battle/">near the end of 2017</a>, but had to rebuild its grassroots structures in many areas. This could have led to the lack of mobilisation in the south. While the All Progressives’ Congress lost important political figures, the party also convinced some powerful Peoples Democratic Party politicians in the South to <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2018/11/28/pdp-senator-defects-to-apc/">defect</a> in the run-up to the elections. </p>
<p>Another factor was that, while <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00358539608454292">rotational politics</a> necessitated a northern candidate, Atiku’s candidacy may not have resonated particularly strongly in the south.</p>
<p>Besides his regional origin, Atiku as a candidate also had his weaknesses, including a credibility problem due to the riches he collected during his time in office as vice-president and his old age. For many voters in both the north and the south, Atiku represented a return to the past rather than a break from traditional Nigerian politics. </p>
<p>Buhari’s first term record has little to show for it, but it is in the end still possible that he did win the elections, simply because the Peoples Democratic Party could not provide any viable alternative.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112965/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leila Demarest does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the end, Buhari possibly won simply because the Peoples Democratic Party wasn’t offering a viable alternative.Leila Demarest, Assistant Professor of African Politics, Institute of Political Science, Leiden UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1128062019-03-05T14:15:13Z2019-03-05T14:15:13ZNigeria: what Muhammadu Buhari’s re-election means for Africa’s biggest economy<p>Muhammadu Buhari was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/26/muhammadu-buhari-to-claim-victory-in-nigerias-presidential-election">re-elected as president</a> of Nigeria in late February, winning 56% of the vote share in a poll shrouded in controversy. After polling day was <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-election-delay-why-and-what-next-111962">delayed by a week</a> on the eve of the election, the result was met with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/buhari-reelected-nigeria-president-electoral-commission-190227033031779.html">allegations of election irregularities</a>. Turnout was low, and only <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-47381382">35% of those registered voted</a>, compared to 44% when Buhari was elected in 2015. </p>
<p>The competition was fierce. The race for the presidency was between the incumbent, Buhari, and a pro-market multimillionaire, Atiku Abubakar, the opposition leader. Before the poll, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-12/election-may-mark-turning-point-for-nigeria-s-battered-stocks">investors predicted</a> victory for Abubakar could have boosted Nigeria’s medium-term economic growth, though there were concerns over historic <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-08/nigeria-s-tough-decision-former-dictator-or-alleged-kleptocrat">allegations of corruption</a> surrounding him. He denies any wrongdoing.</p>
<p>Buhari, a former military general, focused his first term in office on tackling <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigeria-sees-more-high-level-corruption-convictions-under-buhari">corruption</a> and security issues but was <a href="https://theconversation.com/buhari-failed-to-fix-nigerias-economy-but-he-may-still-have-the-edge-110196">widely criticised</a> for neglecting the economy. Some of his economic policies drove investors away and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-19/nigeria-s-half-measures-on-currency-regime-are-only-half-working">were detrimental to growth</a>. </p>
<p>In 2015, Nigeria introduced <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-10/oil-fell-unemployment-soared-and-now-nigeria-votes-quicktake">capital controls</a>, measures to limit the flow of foreign capital in and out of the domestic economy. This was of concern to investors who feared they may not be able to repatriate funds out of the country. In the same year, the government pegged Nigeria’s currency, the naira, to the US dollar, which <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-currency/nigerian-naira-tumbles-30-percent-after-peg-removed-idUSKCN0Z61F7">significantly reduced foreign currency reserves</a>. The peg was eventually removed in 2016 – a decision welcomed by investors, though it <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b0753e96-36cd-11e6-a780-b48ed7b6126f">sharply devalued the naira</a> against the dollar.</p>
<p>Since Buhari was first elected in May 2015, Nigeria’s stock market has been the world’s worst performer, losing <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-27/nigeria-s-vote-the-numbers-the-surprises-the-market-reaction">almost half its value</a> in dollar terms, according to Bloomberg. And stocks <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-28/bank-stocks-in-nigeria-fall-most-since-2016-after-buhari-victory">fell immediately</a> after Buhari’s re-election was announced. This came after the Nigerian stock exchange suffered a <a href="http://businesselitesafrica.com/trending/nse-loses-540-6-million-after-election-delays/">$540.6m loss</a> in one day after the elections were postponed by a week. </p>
<p>Still, international bond markets <a href="https://www.nasdaq.com/article/nigerian-bonds-rally-after-buhari-wins-reelection-20190227-00695">reacted positively</a> to the election result, and there was a rise in dollar-denominated bonds, often favoured by international investors. Naira bonds <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-27/nigeria-s-vote-the-numbers-the-surprises-the-market-reaction">also rose</a> after the results were announced, indicating bond traders are more focused on the currency and bond yields on offer. </p>
<h2>Buhari’s priorities</h2>
<p>In his first term, Buhari focused a great deal on Nigeria’s security challenges. Knowing he faces a strong political opposition and that people are desperate for economic growth and its benefits, he now needs to turn his attention more squarely on the economy. This requires a shift in the government’s economic policy to embrace much more market-driven policies, such as the decision his government took in 2016 to remove the naira peg against the dollar. </p>
<p>To boost domestic business and investment, the government also needs to encourage private sector investment in infrastructure. So far, the government has permitted the private sector to invest in some infrastructure projects, particularly <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/02/dangote-5-others-partner-fg-on-road-construction-across-states/">road building</a>, but this needs to be expanded to others, including rail.</p>
<h2>Finance and industry</h2>
<p>Buhari’s victory is likely to mean stability for the financial sector, particularly if the Central Bank of Nigeria governor, Godwin Emefiele, retains his position. Abubakar had <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-16/abubakar-will-change-nigeria-s-central-bank-governor-if-elected">threatened</a> to remove the governor if he won. If Emefiele stays and his term, which comes to an end in June, is renewed, this would support stability in the financial markets. It would mean no radical changes to monetary and exchange rate policies, which can affect the price and value of financial assets, are likely to occur. Also, no major changes are expected to occur in the industrial sector, although there is continuing urgency to develop Nigeria’s manufacturing base to boost employment. </p>
<p>The country’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-budget-idUSL5N16V360">high fiscal deficit, debt levels</a> and <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/corruption-rank">corruption levels</a> could no doubt dampen investor confidence in Nigeria. Buhari also faces <a href="https://theconversation.com/buhari-failed-to-fix-nigerias-economy-but-he-may-still-have-the-edge-110196">criticism</a> over his inexperienced policy advisers, which could diminish the credibility of new policy announcements in the future. It’s also unclear whether there is going to be a cabinet reshuffle, or if key ministers, such as the finance minister, will remain in post. </p>
<p>Still, major changes in the policy environment are not expected under Buhari’s second term in office. As investors like predictability, policy continuity could help improve investor sentiment.</p>
<p>Nigeria’s governance also needs to be underpinned by principles built around the rule of law, which are critical for building any viable market economy. The six dimensions of governance, coined by the World Bank’s <a href="http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home">World Governance Indicators Project</a>, speak to the heart of the challenges Nigeria faces. These are: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Strengthening these six dimensions could help set Nigeria along the path of recovery and then growth again.</p>
<p>With all its woes, Nigeria still remains the largest economy in Africa and the largest oil producer on the continent. With a huge market and a huge potential for foreign investment, every wise investor should have their eyes on this country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112806/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Iwa Salami does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Investors favoured Muhammadu Buhari’s opponent, Atiku Abubakar. So what are the Nigerian president’s economic priorities?Iwa Salami, Senior Lecturer in Financial Law and Regulation, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1124212019-02-25T11:57:45Z2019-02-25T11:57:45ZWhy Nigeria’s election was an improvement on previous polls<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/260678/original/file-20190225-26162-lcms4w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Voters in the presidential elections in Abuja, Nigeria. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The close-run election contest between incumbent Muhammadu Buhari and former vice-president Atiku Abubakar was largely peaceful. But it was not a perfect performance given that there were some pockets of violence that led to the death of at least 16 people. Olayinka Ajala gives his views on the poll.</em></p>
<p><strong>How well did the country’s Independent National Electoral Commission’s manage the vote?</strong></p>
<p>Although the election can’t be described as a perfect performance, it was a noticeable improvement on previous elections conducted since the country returned to democracy in 1999.</p>
<p>The commission understandably received a lot of stick for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/16/nigeria-postpones-election-just-hours-before-polls-due-to-open">pushing back the election by a week</a>. But it has acquitted itself well <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/02/resign-now-pdp-tells-inec-chairman/">by resisting intimidation</a> from the political parties to conduct a fairly credible election. </p>
<p>Although there were pockets of violence – in one incident in River State <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/scores-killed-in-nigeria-poll-violence-say-election-observers-19477310">16 people died</a> – the process was peaceful in most of the states. There was <a href="https://www.sunnewsonline.com/presidential-nass-polls-inec-admits-challenges-extends-voting-in-some-polling-units/">delayed voting</a> in some polling units but the commission was able to douse the tension by extending the voting hours in the affected areas. </p>
<p>Faulty voter card readers were a key source of complaints by several political parties during the 2015 elections. This time around, issues relating to malfunctioning of electronic card readers were <a href="https://www.naijanews.com/2019/02/23/nigeriadecides2019-inec-replaces-faulty-card-reader-in-ekiti-state/">promptly addressed</a> by the electoral commission’s mobile team. </p>
<p>The postponement of the elections by a week also allowed the electoral commission to <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2019/02/15/inec-replaces-burnt-card-readers-14-lgas-anambra">replace the card readers destroyed in arson attacks</a> on three of its state offices.</p>
<p>The electoral commission’s work has been commended by a number of organisation’s. Two notable ones were the All Progressives Congress whose chairman Adams Oshiomhole <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/02/oshiomhole-commends-inec-over-conduct-of-polls/">commended</a> it’s work as did the Centre for Transparency Advocacy.</p>
<p>Despite the challenges faced by the electoral commission in the run-up to the poll, the commission was able to conduct a credible election in a very challenging atmosphere.</p>
<p><strong>What other factors affected the election?</strong></p>
<p>One of the key threats prior to the elections was insecurity in the already volatile regions of the country as well as in several electoral hotspots. Frequent <a href="https://theconversation.com/buhari-hasnt-solved-nigerias-security-threats-will-voters-punish-him-110038">attacks by Boko Haram</a> and a <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-conflict-is-a-result-of-environmental-devastation-across-west-africa-91694">cycle of clashes between farmers and herdsmen</a> north of the country had created apprehensions before the elections. </p>
<p>True to these fears, there were multiple blasts and gun shots around the North-Eastern region of the country on the morning of the elections. Boko Haram factions <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/02/boko-haram-iswap-claims-attack-on-maiduguri-during-election/">fired rockets</a> in Borno State capital Maiduguri to dissuade residents from participating in the elections. The military, however, was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/23/africa/nigeria-elections-blasts-intl/index.html">able to take charge of the situation</a> and allow the residents to vote in the elections.</p>
<p>Although the Boko Haram ambush was quickly foiled, there were pockets of violence around the country that could affect on the outcome of the elections. This is especially at the national assembly levels in the regions affected.</p>
<p>In a repeat of the 2015 elections, Rivers State – which is the largest oil producing state – experienced the highest number of election related fatalities. This resulted in the cancellation of some local government elections. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/02/23/soldier-five-others-killed-in-election-violence-in-rivers/">At least six people were killed</a> in Rivers State including an army officer in clashes between political party hirelings and security operatives. Rivers State is considered a major hotspot in the country during elections not only because of its position as the largest oil producing state but also because it is home to several militant groups agitating for the control of oil resources in the Niger Delta region. </p>
<p>There were also <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1494734/killed-nigeria-election-violence">clashes</a> in areas that include Lagos, Ibadan and Bayelsa.</p>
<p>Although these pockets of violence would affect the regions where the violence took place, it’s unlikely to affect the overall outcome of the elections as electoral commission insisted it would cancel elections where there are outbreaks of violence. Elections in the affected areas in <a href="https://www.pulse.ng/news/politics/inec-cancels-elections-in-lagos-rivers-anambra/p6hkfn7">Rivers have already been cancelled</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Can the elections be described as free and fair?</strong></p>
<p>To a large extent the conduct of the elections can be described as free and fair. The electoral commission, security forces and most candidates have conducted themselves reasonably well. </p>
<p>As for the electorate, there is evidence that Nigerians were more willing to play their part. The electorate monitored political parties very closely, an indication in my view that democracy in Nigeria is maturing</p>
<p>It also seems that people were prepared to take action (sometimes by taking the law in their hands) to ensure that there wasn’t any interference in the election process. For example, in Lagos <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/02/24/ballot-box-snatcher-burnt-to-death-in-lagos/">irate voters</a> attacked and killed a one member of a vigilante group who attempted to destroy ballot papers. Although the police force has warned the electorates from engaging in “jungle justice” the willingness of voters to confront political thugs is a new development in Nigeria’s democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112421/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The electorate monitored political parties very closely, an indication that democracy in Nigeria is taking root.Olayinka Ajala, Associate Lecturer and Conflict Analyst, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1119622019-02-16T17:01:05Z2019-02-16T17:01:05ZNigeria’s election delay: why, and what next?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259361/original/file-20190216-56215-bnk7zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Newspaper headlines following the decision by Nigeria's National Electoral Commission to delay the country's poll.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Jayden Joshua</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Nigeria <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/16/nigeria-postpones-election-just-hours-before-polls-due-to-open">abruptly postponed</a> its presidential election hours before polling was due to begin. The presidential and parliamentary votes have been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47263122">rescheduled</a> for 23 February while the governorship, state assembly and federal area council elections have been rescheduled to 9 March. The electoral commission cited logistical challenges for the decision. Olayinka Ajala examines the shock announcement and its implications on the final outcome.</em></p>
<p><strong>What is your reaction to the pushing back of Nigeria’s presidential vote?</strong></p>
<p>The postponement isn’t a new phenomenon in Nigeria. The 2015 elections were also postponed for six weeks to allow the government to intensify the fight against Boko Haram and for the general security of the electoral commission’s staff <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/176445-full-inec-official-statement-on-postponement-of-2015-elections.html">in volatile areas</a>. The postponement however, was eventually in favour of the opposition party which eventually won the 2015 polls. </p>
<p>But this postponement is different for three main reasons. First, just a day earlier the Independent National Electoral Commission had <a href="https://tvcnews.tv/nigeriavotes-inec-expresses-readiness-to-conduct-polls/">insisted</a> it was ready to conduct free and fair elections. So the fact that it changed its mind so abruptly has raised questions about the real reason for the delay.</p>
<p>Second, even the two leading parties were not privy to the shock announcement before hand. Agents of both parties as well as local and foreign observers were all invited to a briefing on the eve of the elections where all the options available were discussed. Postponement wasn’t mentioned. </p>
<p>Lastly, the elections were postponed less than six hours before they were due to commence. In the 2015 elections the postponement was announced about a week to the commencement of the polls. </p>
<p>One of the strongest rumours doing the rounds in the hours following the announcement was that the electoral commission had identified serious security threats in the last 24 hours. This might be connected to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/gunmen-kill-66-nigeria-kaduna-state-vote-190215192550760.html">killing of 66 people</a> in Kaduna on Friday and the four people caught with <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2019/02/15/breaking-two-people-caught-four-ak-47-rifles-set-ablaze-zamfara">AK47s in Zamafara</a>. </p>
<p>Not surprisingly, the announcement fuelled suspicions in a tight contest. The main opposition Peoples Democratic Party kicked off protests against the decision labelling it a <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/02/16/pdp-kicks-says-postponement-of-polls-ploy-by-buhari-to-cling-to-power/">“deliberate pre-determined agenda”</a> by the ruling party to thwart the will of the people. President Muhammadu Buhari also expressed <a href="https://punchng.com/president-buharis-statement-on-postponement-of-elections-by-inec/">disappointment</a>. He added that his administration remained committed to conducting free and fair elections. </p>
<p><strong>To what extent is the postponement justified?</strong></p>
<p>The electoral commission has cited a number of logistical challenges. Apart from issues related to the distribution of electoral materials, it also cited poor weather and the <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/02/13/fire-hits-nigerian-election-office-days-before-vote">destruction of materials in fires</a>. In the last two weeks, arson attacks have been reported at the electoral commission’s offices in three states (Anambra, Abia and Plateau) which led to the destruction of thousands of card readers, voters cards and other vital <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201902140755.html">electoral materials.</a></p>
<p>On top of this, the Central Bank of Nigeria, which stores sensitive electoral equipment and material, is said to have been overwhelmed. In the run up to the poll, ballot papers and electoral registers are normally kept in the vaults of the central bank and distributed within days of the elections. <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-to-expect-as-84-million-nigerians-go-to-the-polls-111457">With 15 million new voters </a> since the 2015 elections it would seem that the electoral commission and the central bank underestimated the scale of the task. On the eve of the elections, vital materials hadn’t been delivered in some states. </p>
<p>All these issues could have affected the results. The electoral commission was therefore justified in postponing the elections. The question is why they delayed the postponement until the last minute.</p>
<p><strong>What do you make of the allegations of rigging?</strong></p>
<p>There have been allegations of <a href="https://punchng.com/apc-pdp-accuse-each-other-of-planning-to-rig-election/">rigging by both main parties</a> since the campaign started. Any postponement was bound to lead to more speculation. Although the electoral commission maintained that the postponement was done in good faith, political parties could see the move as an effort to disenfranchise them. This is because every presidential election result in Nigeria since 1999 have been questioned by the losing side regardless of the approach of the electoral commission. </p>
<p>The opposition People’s Democratic Party also sees the move as an <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/pdp-asks-inec-chairman-to-resign-accuses-apc-of-grand-conspiracy">attempt to weaken its position further</a> The party’s national chairman, Uche Secondus, <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/pdp-asks-inec-chairman-to-resign-accuses-apc-of-grand-conspiracy">called the postponement</a> a:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>deliberate, pre-determined agenda of President Muhammadu Buhari to cling on to power even when it’s obvious to him that Nigerians want him out.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Tensions were running high in the run up to the poll after the governing All Progressive’s Congress showed signs of gaining momentum following <a href="http://dailypost.ng/2019/02/16/nigeria-decides-2019-15-pdp-wards-chairmen-dump-party-ruling-apc/">mass defections</a> from the main opposition party to the governing party.</p>
<p>But the All Progressive’s Congress party also <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/313208-elections-buhari-campaign-blames-pdp-for-postponement.html">feels aggrieved</a>, questioning whether the electoral commission is colluding with the opposition People’s Democratic Party which they claim was not <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/02/breaking-we-condemn-inecs-postponement-of-nigerias-election-apc/">ready for the election.</a></p>
<p><strong>What are the implications?</strong></p>
<p>Regardless of how the elections are conducted on the new dates announced, the losing parties will blame the postponement for their defeat. This has happened on previous occasions when <a href="https://www.cogentoa.com/article/10.1080/23311886.2019.1565615.pdf">elections have been postponed</a>. </p>
<p>A serious challenge facing the electoral commission is how it can safeguard election materials that have already been distributed from getting into the wrong hands. Since some of the sensitive materials have arrived in most states, all eyes will be on the electoral commission and security operatives until the new election dates. </p>
<p>Finally, it is not exactly clear how, within a week, the electoral commission will overcome the logistical challenges it cited. How, for example, will it be able to replace equipment and material destroyed in the fires. In addition, how will it guarantee that the decision was entirely based on logistics and not coercion? The postponement of the elections will definitely generate further criticisms which the electoral commission must manage in an unbiased way.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111962/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Regardless of how the elections are conducted on the new dates announced, losing parties will blame the postponement for their defeat.Olayinka Ajala, Associate Lecturer and Conflict Analyst, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1115742019-02-15T11:09:19Z2019-02-15T11:09:19ZNigerian elections: why poor economic performance is front and centre<p>On February 16, more than 84m eligible voters in Nigeria go to the polls to elect the next president of the country and members of the national assembly. There are nearly 80 candidates competing for the country’s top job but the contest can be viewed to be mainly between the incumbent president, Muhammadu Buhari, aged 76, of the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC) and the former vice president, Atiku Abubakar, aged 72, of the People’s Democratic Party. </p>
<p>Buhari, a former military head of state from 1983 to 1985, was re-elected as a civilian president in 2015 and is campaigning for another four years at the helm. He has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/nigeria-president-muhammadu-buhari-honoured-promises-190211144124045.html">vowed</a> to expunge the country of corruption, while Abubakar, who was the vice president from 1999 to 2007, is campaigning on the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/working-nigeria-abubakar-launches-poll-campaign-181119141314962.html">promise</a> to get Nigeria “working again”. </p>
<p>Indeed, Nigeria is in dire need of all that has been promised. But given the past records of the two main candidates, it would be near delusional to hope for meaningful change if they are re-elected. </p>
<p>Buhari’s handling of the economy has been somewhere between poor and appalling. The same could be said of past administrations, including when Atiku was vice president from 1999 to 2007. </p>
<p>Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, with more than 198m people. It is also the continent’s largest economy, with a GDP in 2017 of <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html">US$376 billion</a>. It holds the world’s tenth-largest gas reserves and eleventh-largest <a href="https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2018-full-report.pdf">oil reserves</a> – some 37 billion barrels, as of 2017.</p>
<p>Despite this abundance of natural and human resources, the country’s development indicators are nothing to write home about. As I document in my book, Nigeria’s economy <a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/financialisation-capital-accumulation-and-economic-development-in-nigeria">faces a number of challenges</a>. </p>
<h2>Serious under-performer</h2>
<p>Over 75% of Nigeria’s population lives below the US$3.20-a-day poverty line and more than half of the population is multi-dimensionally poor – they are deprived of access to basic health, education and standards of <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/MPI">living</a>. What’s more, the inequality gap in the country has widened over recent years, with the top 10% sharing more than 40% of the national income and the bottom 20% living on less than 5% of the national <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/world-development-indicators">income</a>. According to Oxfam, Nigeria has the unenviable distinction of being at the bottom of the commitment to reducing inequality index (CRI) since <a href="http://www.inequalityindex.com">2017</a>. </p>
<p>Its record on social spending (on health, education and social protection) is also <a href="https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620553/rr-commitment-reducing-inequality-index-2018-091018-en.pdf">abysmal</a>. One in 10 children in the country does not reach their fifth birthday, and more than 10m children do not go to school. Of these, 60% are girls. Average life expectancy at birth in Nigeria is around 52 years, which is significantly lower than the sub-Saharan African region’s average of 62 years. </p>
<p>The country’s infrastructures are in a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/064f9730-c8bc-11e8-86e6-19f5b7134d1c">very sorry state</a>. More than two thirds of the population does not have access to constant electricity, safe water and good sanitation. The roads and transport facilities are in poor condition despite the billions of dollars budgeted for their construction and maintenance. </p>
<p>The implications of this infrastructural inadequacy and insecurity is the decline of investment in the economy, which then results in high unemployment and underemployment. The inadequate provision of basic infrastructure means that private companies have to take on these costs, making it more expensive for them to do business in Nigeria. Plus, weak institutions, in the form of weak rule of law and poor quality regulations, also contribute to the increase in the cost of production. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259031/original/file-20190214-1733-1tmb6e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259031/original/file-20190214-1733-1tmb6e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259031/original/file-20190214-1733-1tmb6e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259031/original/file-20190214-1733-1tmb6e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259031/original/file-20190214-1733-1tmb6e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259031/original/file-20190214-1733-1tmb6e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259031/original/file-20190214-1733-1tmb6e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259031/original/file-20190214-1733-1tmb6e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nigeria’s unemployment rate.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ejike Udeogu</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These inadequacies, together with fierce competition from low-cost production from abroad (China especially) and low domestic-demand for locally manufactured goods (due to the high poverty rate), all contribute to undermining the viability of any productive process in the country. The result is an under-performing economy that is overly-reliant on its oil and mineral wealth to prop up its GDP – but this does not benefit a large proportion of the population.</p>
<h2>Road to recovery?</h2>
<p>To solve this, whoever wins the Nigerian elections desperately needs an ambitious industrial policy. The country has huge economic potential that can be met if governed well. The state needs to play a strategic role in the development process, beyond just providing the right infrastructure and a conducive environment. Right now the economy is far too dependent on exporting oil and other minerals. Emphasis needs to shift to fostering knowledge-based, high-tech economy.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259033/original/file-20190214-1742-cfaqhu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259033/original/file-20190214-1742-cfaqhu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259033/original/file-20190214-1742-cfaqhu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259033/original/file-20190214-1742-cfaqhu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259033/original/file-20190214-1742-cfaqhu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259033/original/file-20190214-1742-cfaqhu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=640&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259033/original/file-20190214-1742-cfaqhu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=640&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259033/original/file-20190214-1742-cfaqhu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=640&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nigeria’s exports in 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/data#use-permissions">"The Atlas of Economic Complexity," Center for International Development at Harvard University</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Indonesia, for example, is at a similar level of development to Nigeria and is similarly rich in natural resources. But, as the graph below shows, it has a much more diverse economy.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259034/original/file-20190214-1758-1u7v96a.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259034/original/file-20190214-1758-1u7v96a.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259034/original/file-20190214-1758-1u7v96a.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259034/original/file-20190214-1758-1u7v96a.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259034/original/file-20190214-1758-1u7v96a.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259034/original/file-20190214-1758-1u7v96a.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259034/original/file-20190214-1758-1u7v96a.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259034/original/file-20190214-1758-1u7v96a.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Indonesia’s exports 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/data#use-permissions">"The Atlas of Economic Complexity," Center for International Development at Harvard University</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The next Nigerian government must follow the lead of many developed and emerging countries in funding research and development (R&D) activities that drive innovation. The current lack of R&D and innovation is one of the main reasons the country is still struggling to achieve any meaningful development. Lastly, the state also needs to create an environment that attracts, grows and retains talent. This means developing its dilapidated education and health infrastructure and creating institutions that recognise and reward talent. </p>
<p>And, amid all this, corruption must be tackled. Like a cankerworm, it has gnawed at Nigeria for so long and has also contributed significantly to its persistent underdevelopment. If Nigeria is to make any meaningful inroad towards development, more also needs to be done in the fight against graft. Buhari’s efforts on this front have been seen by his critics as selective. And Atiku, on the other hand, has been accused by his detractors as a ruthless businessman-politician who has milked the system for <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1e9e9d52-2e0d-11e9-ba00-0251022932c8">decades</a>. So, Nigeria’s voters face two uninspiring choices in the coming election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111574/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ejike Bob Udeogu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Buhari’s handling of the economy has been somewhere between poor and appalling. But the same could be said of past administrations.Ejike Bob Udeogu, Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1101962019-01-27T09:13:28Z2019-01-27T09:13:28ZBuhari failed to fix Nigeria’s economy. But he may still have the edge<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254934/original/file-20190122-100273-1ao0mbl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A hawker sells clocks on a roadside in Nigeria's oil rich Bayelsa state.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Tife Owolabi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Muhammadu Buhari’s election four years ago as Nigerian president was greeted with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32141703">great enthusiasm, and expectation</a>. US President Barack Obama invited him to the White House less than two months after his inauguration, an honour rarely accorded to newly elected African leaders. Many Nigerians saw Buhari as a messiah rescuing them from years of economic disempowerment, institutionalised corruption and insecurity.</p>
<p>These high hopes were unsurprising. The Nigerian economy, though growing at a robust rate, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/toward-inclusive-growth-in-nigeria/">wasn’t benefiting most Nigerians</a>. Unemployment, especially among young people, was <a href="https://qz.com/africa/999641/the-unemployment-rate-in-nigeria-has-climbed-for-nine-consecutive-quarters/">widespread and growing</a>. The World Bank estimated Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/middle-east-and-africa/nigerias-renewal-delivering-inclusive-growth">poverty rate to be as high as 70%</a>, an embarrassing number given that the country is ranked as the eighth largest oil exporter in the world. </p>
<p>The result of the toxic combination of high joblessness and poverty rates, is a life expectancy of 55 years, one of the <a href="https://www.who.int/countries/nga/en/">lowest in developing countries</a>.</p>
<p>As Buhari prepares to go to the polls, pundits have been analysing his scorecard and asking whether he deserves another four years in office. </p>
<p>What is clear is that, this time around, his re-election campaign has not been greeted with the same level of enthusiasm. Some analysts, including the London-based Economist Intelligence Unit, have gone as far as to <a href="https://www.pulse.ng/news/politics/economist-magazine-says-buhari-will-lose-2019-election/ncm7eg4">predict</a> that he will lose the election. </p>
<p>Why the change of fortunes? The answer seems to lie in the fact that most of the things Nigerians complained about in 2015 are still unresolved. In particular, unemployment, poverty and economic disempowerment remain firmly in place. </p>
<p>Since Buhari came to power, Nigeria’s unemployment rate has <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/unemployment-rate">more than doubled</a> from 10.4% in January 2016 to 23.1% in July 2018. In June last year CNN <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/26/africa/nigeria-overtakes-india-extreme-poverty-intl/index.html">reported</a> that Nigeria had overtaken India as the country with the largest number of people living in extreme poverty. About 87 million Nigerians, or half the population, live on less than $1.90 per day.</p>
<p>The big question is: can Buhari win reelection amid his disappointing economic performance? I believe that he will, in fact, win the election. But this will be for reasons to do with the weakness of other candidates, rather than his own strengths.</p>
<h2>Economic performance</h2>
<p>When he came to power in 2015, Buhari promised to tackle three interrelated problems: corruption, insecurity and the economy. Of the three, Nigerians regarded <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32905067">economic problems as paramount</a>. But the administration appears to have focused on corruption and security issues and paid less attention to the economy. </p>
<p>For example, Buhari failed to prevent an impending <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-37228741">recession</a> that followed the collapse of oil prices in 2015. This was because he didn’t prioritise the economy and took too long to articulate an economic transformation strategy. </p>
<p>Another example of lack of focus on the economy was his meeting with US President Donald Trump in April 2018. Buhari asked for <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/world/trump-gives-buhari-banned-military-aircraft-14724854">fighter jets</a>, not economic support. </p>
<p>Critics also point to the fact that Buhari ceded the management of the economy to his vice president Yemi Osinbajo. Though a brilliant lawyer, Osinbajo had no background or experience in economics. To make matters worse, Osinbajo surrounded himself with incompetent and inexperienced advisers.</p>
<p>Buhari claimed he was unable to jump-start the economy because of falling oil prices and dwindling government revenue. Before he came to power the oil price was <a href="https://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/6188.pdf">as high as $108 per barrel</a>. It <a href="https://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/6188.pdf">plummeted precipitously to $63</a> the month he was sworn in as president. The oil price continued to slide during the early stages of his administration, reaching an all-time low of $35 per barrel in February 2016.</p>
<p>The collapse affected Buhari’s ability to put together a coherent budget. For instance, his 2016 budget had a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-budget-idUSL5N16V360">deficit of over 2.2 trillion Naira</a>. His attempt to borrow $30 billion to finance the deficit was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-budget/update-1-nigerian-senate-rejects-buharis-plan-to-borrow-30-billion-abroad-idUSL8N1D2450">vehemently opposed by the country’s lawmakers</a>. Nor was public opinion favourable about an external loan. This forced the administration to pare down the number of projects it intended to undertake. </p>
<p>Because of the administration’s inability to implement an expansionary fiscal policy, the economy has been grappling with anaemic growth since Buhari’s election. The country went into recession in 2016 followed by a rebound to about 2% in 2018. But the IMF <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2015&ey=2023&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=19&pr1.y=10&c=694&s=NGDP_RPCH&grp=0&a">projects</a> that growth will remain weak at an annual average of about 1.9% from 2019 to 2023.</p>
<h2>Anti-corruption scorecard</h2>
<p>Buhari’s scorecard in fighting corruption has been mixed. On the one hand, he has prosecuted high-profile politicians, civil servants and retired military officers for corruption and secured convictions in a handful of cases. His administration has also recovered billions of Naira in stolen assets from corrupt Nigerians. </p>
<p>Scores of corrupt politicians and government officials, including the Chief Justice of the country’s Supreme Court, are currently undergoing trials for various forms of financial impropriety. </p>
<p>But Buhari’s anti-corruption efforts have been marred by the perception that they have been selective and targeted mostly at members of the main opposition party, the People’s Democratic party. </p>
<p>And his failure to prosecute a prominent state governor who is one of his close political allies, after the governor was shown on video collecting several thousand dollars in bribes, has accentuated the perception that he is only interested in prosecuting his political enemies. </p>
<p>Another political ally, a former Secretary to the Government of the Federation, also got a pass from Buhari after being credibly accused of corrupt practices.</p>
<p>Despite these shortcomings, Buhari’s campaign against corruption is regarded by many Nigerians as the most intense the country has ever seen.</p>
<h2>Hobbesian choice</h2>
<p>Buhari is likely to win not because he has fulfilled the expectations of Nigerians, but because his main opponent, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, is a weak candidate who carries a lot of baggage. </p>
<p>Abubakar is a very prominent and wealthy businessman. But his business credentials and <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/atiku-abubakar-nigerias-perennial-presidential-hopeful-20181008">the source of his wealth are controversial</a>. Many believe he made his money through cronyism and questionable activities rather than through genuine entrepreneurship. </p>
<p>Nigerians will be faced with a Hobbesian choice between two problematic candidates. In that choice, Buhari seems to have an edge over Abubakar.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110196/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Onyeiwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most of the things Nigerians complained about in 2015 are still unresolved – unemployment, poverty and economic disempowerment.Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor and Chair of the Economics Department, Allegheny CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1100382019-01-21T13:41:50Z2019-01-21T13:41:50ZBuhari hasn’t solved Nigeria’s security threats. Will voters punish him?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254486/original/file-20190118-100279-19nobyi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigerian soldiers clearing a Boko Haram camp in Borno State in 2015.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Weeks away from another democratic transition in Nigeria, electoral campaigns are in full gear for the dozens of candidates vying for the <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201901160343.html">presidency in the country</a>. Four years from the historic 2015 elections – the first democratic transition <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-03-31/goodnight-goodluck-nigerias-president-concedes-election-defeat">not marred by post-election violence</a> – there is palpable tension due to insecurity in some parts of the country.</p>
<p>The 2015 election was won, partly, on a promise by incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari that he would end the Boko Haram insurgency in the country and guarantee security across the country. But the surge in terrorism in the North-East is evidence that Buhari has failed to keep one of his major campaign promises. The security situation in the country remains volatile. </p>
<p>In addition to the Boko Haram insurgency, there have been several pockets of violence in other parts of the country. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-clashes-are-on-the-rise-between-farmers-and-herdsmen-in-the-sahel-95554">conflict between herdsmen and farmers</a> has resulted in the loss of thousands of lives. And it’s deepened ethnic tensions in the North Central region of Nigeria. </p>
<p>Several attempts have been made to end the violence. But the killings have continued unabated. This, in turn, has led to the president losing key political allies. Several states in the region have also <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/277737-breaking-benue-governor-ortom-defects-to-pdp.html">threatened not to vote for Buhari</a> in the 2019 elections.</p>
<p>Other regions also remain deeply insecure, including the south, south east and the Niger Delta.</p>
<p>The catalogue of security failures shows the extent to which the Buhari government has failed to address the country’s security challenges. The main opponent in next month’s election <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-46897051/nigeria-election-atiku-abubakar-says-his-age-is-not-an-issue">Atiku Abubakar</a> has also promised to address the country’s security challenges. But it remains to be seen if the electorate will give the incumbent government a chance to continue its promised “change” agenda, or whether they will change the president himself and opt for someone else that could do a better job. </p>
<h2>Recurring issues</h2>
<p>One of the key campaign issues leading to the 2015 election was the high level of insecurity in several parts of the country. Prior to the election, Boko Haram held sway in several local governments across three states (Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states). Buhari ran a “change” mantra and <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/05/what-buhari-promised-nigerians/">campaigned vigorously promising</a> to end the menace of Boko Haram “permanently”. </p>
<p>Prior to the elections in 2015, he stated </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I will bring permanent peace and solution to the insurgency issues in the North-East; the Niger Delta; and other conflict prone states and areas such as Plateau, Benue, Bauchi, Borno, Abia, Taraba, Yobe and Kaduna in order to engender national unity and social harmony. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Soon after his inauguration in 2015, Buhari charged the military chiefs <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/188316-buhari-charges-nigerias-military-chiefs-to-defeat-boko-haram-in-3-months.html">to end Boko Haram within three months</a>.</p>
<p>Almost four years later, Boko Haram seems to have been more invigorated and in 2018 the military suffered its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/23/nigerian-islamists-kill-scores-of-soldiers-in-military-base-attack">highest fatalities against the group</a>.</p>
<p>Boko Haram split in 2016, leading to a splinter group called Islamic State- West Africa (ISIS-WA) emerging. The new group became prominent in 2018 after a <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-potentially-more-sinister-threat-in-boko-harams-split">series of attacks on military bases</a>. ISIS-WA led by the son of the former leader (Mohammed Yusuf)- Abu Musab al-Barnawi, <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2019/01/15/nigeria-military-struggles-islamic-state-iswa-part-1-upsurge-in-attacks/">claimed 23 attacks</a> in West Africa between August and November 2018. </p>
<p>The group captured a large cache of military hardware. It was also responsible for the <a href="https://www.sbmintel.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/201809_Road-to-Maiduguri.pdf">death of at least 600 Nigerian soldiers</a> in 2018.</p>
<p>Towards the end of 2018, the group seemed to be emboldened with several attacks on communities and military bases. Between July and October 2018, Boko Haram <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/boko-haram-jihadists-attack-military-base-in-ne-nigeria-20181028">attacked nine military bases</a>. It also overran the Multinational Joint Task Force <a href="https://punchng.com/breaking-boko-haram-sacks-two-military-bases-in-baga/">(MNJTF) base in Baga, Borno state</a>. The numbers and intensity of attacks show that the battle against the group is far from over. </p>
<h2>Unrest and tension in the south</h2>
<p>Apart from the unrest in the North-Eastern and North-Central regions of the country, agitation for secession in the <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1077801/biafra-and-nnamdi-kanu-nigerias-army-siege-to-crush-biafra-calls-isnt-winning-much-support/">South-East region has also been rife</a>. Violent protests resulting in fierce crackdown by the military and police have added to the security challenges faced by the country. </p>
<p>Groups such as Movement for the Actualisation of Sovereign State of Biafra and Indigenous People of Biafra have led several protests which have threatened the peace and security of the region. The government has reached out to the groups on occasion. But the ability of the groups to stage large protests and the <a href="https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/massob-2019-election-will-be-bloody-group-says/ev5xvyb">threat to disrupt the 2019 elections</a> is already causing further anxiety in the region.</p>
<p>The government has also not been able to find a permanent solution to the unrest in the Niger Delta. Thousands of youths are on the government amnesty payroll and any disruption in the payments has the potential to destabilise the nation. A delay in monthly stipends in 2016 led to a renewal of hostilities and the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2018/03/20/amnesty-and-new-violence-in-the-niger-delta/#4eb78024263f">formation of new groups </a> such as the Niger Delta Avengers, Red Scorpions and the Niger Delta Greenland Justice Movement. </p>
<p>In addition, new groups emerge almost on an annual basis demanding for enrolment in the amnesty programme. This situation results in what could be termed an “amnesty cycle” where groups of young men engage in sporadic violence in order to be integrated into the <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/07/3000-ex-militants-demand-inclusion-in-amnesty-programme/">amnesty programme</a>.</p>
<p>Considering the inability of Buhari to stem the tide of insecurity in the country in his first term in office, winning a reelection will be a difficult task.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110038/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari is hoping to be reelected but he’s fallen short on the country’s security challenges.Olayinka Ajala, Associate Lecturer and Conflict Analyst, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1076112018-12-04T12:47:11Z2018-12-04T12:47:11ZHow Nigeria can attract and keep the right kind of foreign direct investment<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247927/original/file-20181129-170238-v28vln.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari at the US-Africa Business Forum in New York in 2016. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Drew Angerer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two of the largest banking and financial services institutions in the world, HSBC and UBS, have <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-03/hsbc-ubs-shut-nigeria-offices-as-foreign-investment-declines">recently closed their local representative offices</a> in Nigeria. </p>
<p>There’s also trouble brewing elsewhere in Nigeria’s business world that’s prompted fears about the climate for foreign direct investment in the country. Foreign direct investment is an investment made by a firm or individual in one country into business interests located in another country.</p>
<p>For instance, Nigeria’s government in September <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-17/nigeria-fires-back-at-hsbc-after-bank-criticizes-president">accused HSBC of money laundering</a> after an analyst working for the lender said a second term for President Muhammadu Buhari <a href="http://dailypost.ng/2018/09/11/2019-second-term-buhari-will-nigerias-economy-hsbc/">may stall economic recovery </a> in Africa’s biggest oil producer.</p>
<p>There are also tensions between Nigeria’s central bank and the South African telecom company MTN. In 2015, MTN was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-45424537">fined about $5bn</a> for failing to cut off unregistered SIM cards. This was later reduced to $1.7 billion after a long legal dispute and the intervention of South Africa’s then President Jacob Zuma.</p>
<p>Recently, the central bank has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-29/nigeria-orders-mtn-banks-to-refund-8-billion-exported-funds">ordered MTN to repatriate $8 billion</a> it said has been taken out of the country illegally. </p>
<p>Analysts are <a href="https://nextedition.com.ng/2018/11/09/analysis-hsbc-ubs-left-nigeria/">concerned</a> that the Nigerian government’s attitude towards MTN and the two banks may erode the confidence of foreign direct investors. Their fears seem to be well founded: foreign direct investment in Nigeria <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/foreign-direct-investment">fell to</a> <a href="https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/nigeria/foreign-direct-investment">$1 billion in the first half of 2018, from $1.48 billion in the first half of 2017</a>. </p>
<p>Foreign direct investment is crucial for any economy. So how can Nigeria attract and keep the right kind of investment from global companies? Compromise will be key, both for the government and foreign firms.</p>
<h2>Why foreign direct investment?</h2>
<p>Foreign direct investment is often preferred to exporting. That’s because while exports merely involve moving goods from one country to another, foreign direct investment actually involves an investor establishing foreign business operations or acquiring foreign business assets. </p>
<p>This often includes establishing ownership or controlling interest in a foreign country (for instance an American business establishing a physical business presence in Nigeria). Many emerging economies like China, Brazil, Vietnam and India have <a href="https://www.industryweek.com/leadership/top-10-countries-receiving-foreign-direct-investment/gallery?slide=1">built their growth on FDI flows</a>.</p>
<p>The trick is to attract “quality foreign direct investment” that links foreign investors into the local host country economy. The International Growth Centre, a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-development">British-funded</a> research centre that aims to promote sustainable growth in developing countries, <a href="https://www.theigc.org/blog/attracting-quality-foreign-direct-investment-developing-countries/">characterises</a> “quality” here as contributing to:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>decent and value-adding jobs and enhancing the skill base of host economies;</p></li>
<li><p>transfer of technology, knowledge and know-how;</p></li>
<li><p>boosting competitiveness of domestic firms and enabling their access to markets.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What Nigeria can do</h2>
<p>There are a few things Nigeria can do to boost foreign direct investment. For starters, it must play fair. Foreign and domestic businesses should be treated equally. They should be open, transparent and dependable conditions for all kinds of firms. </p>
<p>Another area that needs attention is infrastructure. Businesses need easy access to ports, an adequate and reliable supply of energy and relative certainty that the country will be good to invest in. Good institutions <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00758.x">also promote FDI</a>. </p>
<p>The government should encourage partnerships between foreign and local businesses. Foreign firms might be familiar with global good business practices, but local firms will be more familiar with the indigenous context. This synergy could be very beneficial.</p>
<p>It’s also critical that Nigeria gets its regional governments involved: there are many regions in Nigeria, and these regions all have unique opportunities and challenges. <a href="https://journals.aom.org/doi/abs/10.5465/AMBPP.2018.11006abstract">Our latest research</a> shows that when the central government of Nigeria ran out of ideas and foreigners wanted to exit the agricultural sector, the regional government of Kwara state stepped in to create a positive business climate based on the cooperation of local banks, community members, and the foreigners themselves culminating in the <a href="https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/learning-commercial-farming-through-shonga-farmss-approach.html">Shonga farms</a> public-private venture. </p>
<p>This has kept the firm in Nigeria. It’s also brought private investors to the table, bolstering the firm and the local economy.</p>
<p>Nigeria should also tap into its huge <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/business-37727761/how-can-investors-tap-in-to-nigeria-s-diaspora">diaspora</a>. There are many Nigerians living outside the country who understand its challenges. They should be encouraged to help, or asked to work with their networks to invest in the country.</p>
<h2>What foreign firms can do</h2>
<p>Foreign firms also have a role to play. They can enhance their success in Nigeria (and elsewhere on the African continent) in several ways.</p>
<p>First, they need a long term strategic plan. This means thinking carefully about what sectors or activities to target. Many foreign firms come to developing countries when things are rosy but leave when conditions change. They don’t properly consider that solving such problems will gain them a competitive advantage in the long run. </p>
<p>If they stay and follow a learning curve, foreign firms will better understand the local business context. They’ll also gain credibility among ordinary people and possibly get more customers and support that way.</p>
<p>In the same vein, foreign businesses should create local solutions that meet ordinary people’s needs. The banks leaving Nigeria have <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/11/breaking-hsbc-ubs-close-their-offices-in-nigeria/">been accused</a> of only catering to the needs of wealthy Nigerians, who are <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/business/2010/10/201010116251929702.html">perceived as corrupt</a>. A more diverse portfolio that catered to the needs of ordinary Nigerians would have nullified this claim.</p>
<p>Foreign firms must also work closely with credible and strategic local firms, and be willing to enter into dialogue with the Nigerian government where necessary. This is crucial especially as administrations may change or government policy may evolve. Dialogue could ensure that all parties are on the same page.</p>
<h2>Act local, think global</h2>
<p>It’s unfortunate that these banking institutions have decided to leave Nigeria. Hopefully both the Nigerian government and other foreign investors can learn from this. </p>
<p>The main takeaway for both foreign investors and governments involved in foreign direct investment is that it would be prudent for all parties to act locally but think globally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107611/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tolu Olarewaju does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is concern that Nigeria’s attitude towards foreign direct investors may erode inward capital flows.Tolu Olarewaju, Lecturer in Economics, Staffordshire UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1067892018-11-25T09:19:51Z2018-11-25T09:19:51ZNigeria’s 2019 election: a two-horse race with uninspiring candidates<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246677/original/file-20181121-161627-kfal47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=515%2C0%2C1575%2C1068&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Atiku Abubakar and incumbent Muhammadu Buhari (right) are the two frontrunners in Nigeria's presidential race.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/STR</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Almost all of Nigeria’s 68 political parties have wrapped up their primaries and chosen candidates to stand in the country’s February 2019 general election. The poll is likely to be yet another two-horse race: a contest between the All Progressives Congress (APC) and People’s Democratic Party (PDP). These are the only two parties to win the presidency since the end of military rule in 1999. The Conversation Africa’s Julius Maina spoke to Olayinka Ajala about the emerging campaign issues and the surprises so far.</em></p>
<p><strong>Who are the main candidates for the February election?</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/10/the-31-presidential-candidates-for-2019/">Thirty one aspirants</a> have emerged to contest the presidential election. That number will probably be reduced before the elections, as several smaller parties are in talks to form coalitions. </p>
<p>But there are only two leading contenders – the incumbent, President Muhammadu Buhari, and Atiku Abubakar, who was vice-president under President Olusegun Obasanjo from 1999 to 2007.</p>
<p>Both are contesting on the platforms of the two largest parties in Nigeria. </p>
<p>Apart from the two main contenders, other popular names on the list are former governors <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/10/the-31-presidential-candidates-for-2019/">Donald Duke and Olusegun Mimiko</a>, alongside <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-ezekwesili-minister-turned-activist-who-wants-to-be-president-104975">Obi Ezekwesili</a>. She’s the former minister of education and co-founder of Transparency International.</p>
<p><strong>What are the emerging campaign issues?</strong></p>
<p>The campaign issues are similar to those that featured in the 2015 presidential elections. These included political violence, particularly an end to the Boko Haram insurgency and the recent conflict between herdsmen and farmers which has claimed thousands of lives.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-clashes-are-on-the-rise-between-farmers-and-herdsmen-in-the-sahel-95554">Why clashes are on the rise between farmers and herdsmen in the Sahel</a>
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<p>Corruption will also loom large. Buhari claims to have curtailed corruption, particularly since the introduction of the single treasury account that has <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323584046_The_Impact_of_Treasury_Single_Account_on_the_Liquidity_of_Banks_in_Nigeria">reduced “leakages” in the country’s finances</a>. But the state of the economy and the increase in youth unemployment has negatively affected the current government’s image. The Atiku campaign has capitalised on this. </p>
<p>Other issues that have emerged include a lack of infrastructure, lopsided political appointments - as the president is often accused of neglecting federal character when making political appointments as well as the president’s health. These are likely to dominate the campaign when it <a href="http://dailypost.ng/2018/05/03/2019-no-political-campaign-december-2018-inec-warns/">officially kicks off in December</a>. </p>
<p>Buhari’s health is likely to feature extensively given that he spent about 15% of his first term in office receiving <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/buharis-health-reemerging-factor-2019-nigerian-elections">medical treatment abroad</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Have there been any surprises ahead of the 2019 ballot?</strong></p>
<p>The first major surprise was the emergence of Atiku as the People’s Democratic Party candidate. Atiku, one of the founding members of the PDP, emerged as the flag bearer for the party despite being relatively quiet politically in the last few years following his movement from PDP to APC and then back to PDP.</p>
<p>The second surprise was former president Olusegun Obasanjo’s endorsement of Atiku. Earlier in the year Obasanjo wrote an <a href="https://punchng.com/full-letter-obasanjo-writes-buhari-asks-president-to-halt-2019-ambition/">open letter to Buhari</a> advising the president not to seek a second term. He argued that Buhari had under-performed and was incapable of understanding the problems the country faces. Subsequently, Obasanjo formed a movement to unseat the incumbent president. </p>
<p>Obasanjo’s endorsement of Atiku came as a shock to most Nigerians because of his frosty relationship with the former vice-president. Obasanjo <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/278869-exclusive-god-will-never-forgive-me-if-i-support-atiku-for-president-obasanjo.html">famously stated in August 2018</a> </p>
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<p>If I support Atiku for anything, God will not forgive me. If I do not know, yes. But once I know, Atiku can never enjoy my support. </p>
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<p>The sudden turn around by the former president just two months later to <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/289774-breaking-2019-obasanjo-forgives-atiku-endorses-him-for-president.html">“forgive and endorse”</a> Atiku came as a surprise to most Nigerians.</p>
<p><strong>What do the primaries tell us about women’s participation?</strong></p>
<p>Despite the large number of aspirants for the 2019 elections, women and young people remain underrepresented. Although <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/09/2019-why-we-want-buharis-job-by-6-female-aspirants/">six women emerged before the presidential primaries</a>, the number dropped to three immediately after the primaries. Also, several young people were unable to contest in the primaries because of the cost of nomination forms. </p>
<p>Elections are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45450399">costly affairs</a> in Nigeria. The ruling party charges candidates $125,000 (£97,000) to be able to stand for nominations. The People’s Democratic Party also charged $33,000 (£26,000) for its nomination forms. This is in a country where the minimum wage is <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/11/minimum-wage-increasewill-make-no-difference-if-ali-baba/">less than USD$100 a month</a>. </p>
<p>The government’s insincerity in supporting women and young people was laid bare in June 2018 when the president passed a bill titled <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2018/06/04/not-too-young-run-or-too-old-rule-erasmus-ikhide">“Not too young to Rule”</a>. The bill was designed to support the political aspiration of young people interested in pursuing a political career. Minutes after signing the legislation, the president commended the national assembly for passing the bill – but warned that young people would still <a href="http://sunnewsonline.com/2019-presidency-we-wont-wait-for-you-youths-tell-buhari/">have to wait till 2023</a> before they would actually be given the opportunity.</p>
<p>With just a few months to the polls, most Nigerians remain frustrated and concerned because neither of the two leading presidential aspirants offer any real hope. </p>
<p>The president has been accused of being too slow and too ill to handle the rigours of the position. The multiple <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/289930-2019-atiku-must-face-corruption-integrity-test-apc.html">allegations of corruption and fraud</a> levelled against Atiku, meanwhile, continue to taint his image and hopes of gaining power from the Buhari administration. </p>
<p>Unless a credible consensus candidate emerges, the 2019 presidential elections remains a two-horse race with none of the contenders really appealing to the populace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106789/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite the large number of aspirants for Nigeria’s 2019 elections, women and young people remain underrepresented.Olayinka Ajala, Associate Lecturer and Conflict Analyst, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1066222018-11-13T14:38:26Z2018-11-13T14:38:26ZBroken government promises to blame for Nigeria university strike<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/245025/original/file-20181112-83599-1i7a2go.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muhammadu Buhari's administration has not fulfilled agreements it made with academic staff in Nigeria's public universities. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/ Felipe Trueba</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>All 37,504 academic staff of Nigeria’s public universities have been on an <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201811120072.html">indefinite strike</a> since early November. This followed a meeting of the union’s national executive council which ruled that no substantial progress had been made on a range of past agreements between the Academic Staff Union of Universities, which represents academic staff, and the federal government. </p>
<p>Nigeria has 43 federal universities and 47 state universities which all fall under public universities. All academic activities at public universities – teaching, supervision, examination – are on hold, affecting about 1.3 million students. The admission of new students is also being affected. </p>
<p>The vast majority of Nigerians attend a public university. This year, of the 1.6 million students who wrote the final <a href="https://www.jamb.gov.ng/home.aspx">high school exams</a>, 94% picked public universities. This suggests that it would be wise for the Nigerian government to <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/asuu-chides-fg-over-poor-allocation-to-education-sector/">invest</a> in this critical sector, where the interest of the country’s future lies. </p>
<p>Students in most public universities pay less than N50,000 a year. This means that the institutions get very little fee income. As a result, government remains the major funder of universities. But it hasn’t met its obligations even though many institutions face serious infrastructure decay. Most of the public universities generate funds from business ventures. But this isn’t enough to cover costs. </p>
<p>It’s not the first time academic staff have gone on strike. In 2013 they held a <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/12/asuu-calls-6-month-old-strike/">six-month strike</a> and in 2017 they had a five-week <a href="http://sunnewsonline.com/asuu-suspends-strike-for-6-weeks/">strike</a>. After the 2017 strike a <a href="https://punchng.com/inside-asuu-fgs-memorandum-of-action/">memorandum of action</a> was signed with Muhammadu Buhari’s administration. The agreement set out what steps would be taken to implement outstanding agreements.</p>
<p>The union called the latest strike because the government still hasn’t met the commitments it made. These include shortfalls in salary payments as well as academic allowances. For its part, the government argues that it can’t meet the demands of striking lecturers to the detriment of the country’s <a href="http://thenationonlineng.net/asuu-negotiating-team-okays-student-loan/">infrastructure, health, and security</a>. </p>
<p>Other outstanding issues are government’s promise to provide funding to revitalise public universities and changes to the University Pension Fund that would enable staff to manage the pension funds themselves. </p>
<p>So what’s behind the recurrent strikes in Nigeria’s <a href="https://punchng.com/asuu-strike-and-the-imperatives-of-change-begins-with-me/">educational system</a>? The answer is the seeming lack of the political will by the federal government to honour agreements. What’s also irking academics is that the government isn’t ensuring the environment at universities is conducive to teaching and learning. And that conditions aren’t good enough to attract foreign scholars.</p>
<p>The main factor is that the federal government can’t be trusted to deliver on its promises. For example, the Academic Staff Union of Universities suspended its strike in 2017 on the promise of federal government action within six months. Almost a year later, Buhari’s government continues to drag its feet on fully implementing the agreements.</p>
<h2>Issues in revitalisation fund</h2>
<p>The issue of insufficient funding of Nigeria’s public universities goes back a long way. In 2012, the federal government constituted a panel to undertake a needs assessment of public universities. The report indicated that universities need N1.3 trillion for a <a href="https://www.nigerianmuse.com/20130924094415zg/sections/general-articles/universities-needs-assessment-report-presentation-to-nec-november-2012/">modest revitalisation</a>. The fund was to be paid in tranches over the next five years. But only the Goodluck Jonathan government <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/02/fg-distributes-letters-n200bn-allocation-public-universities/">released N200 billion</a> in 2013. </p>
<p>This underfunding has serious consequences. Infrastructure is decaying. State universities struggle to attract foreign scholars. And Nigerian universities perform poorly in global rankings.</p>
<p>When it comes to salaries, the union has acknowledged that some progress has been made in payment of shortfalls. But in a <a href="https://punchng.com/inside-asuu-fgs-memorandum-of-action/">letter</a> to the Minister of Education a month ago, the union asked the government to pay the outstanding balances. </p>
<p>Other issues are the failure to release an operational license to the Nigerian University Employees Pension Company. The union has only been given approval in principle but cannot hit the ground running without an operational license. It feels the federal government is frustrating it because operating pension fund administrators are friends of government. </p>
<p>Another reason for the strike is the government’s planned re-introduction of the Education Bank which was scrapped in 2001. It was designed to help indigent students access loans to attend universities. The union believes that re-introducing the bank is an attempt to re-introduce tuition fees to public universities. </p>
<p>The government denies this. It argues the Education Bank would only provide loans to students. </p>
<h2>Strategic moment</h2>
<p>The strike is happening at a strategic time. Nigerians will be going to the <a href="http://www.inecnigeria.org/">polls</a> in February 2019; the incumbent Buhari is seeking re-election. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s public officials tend to pay attention to issues affecting the general populace only during election periods. The hope is that government officials will see education as a vital investment in the future – and commit funds to institutions of higher learning.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106622/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oludayo Tade does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Government remains the major funder of universities. But it hasn’t met its obligations even though many institutions face serious infrastructure decay.Oludayo Tade, Lecturer of Criminology, Victimology, Deviance and Social Problems, University of IbadanLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.