tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/niger-24235/articlesNiger – The Conversation2024-03-19T14:04:11Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2260272024-03-19T14:04:11Z2024-03-19T14:04:11ZNiger has cut military ties with the US: why this is bad for the Sahel’s security<p>Niger – a landlocked country of 25 million people in one of the most unstable parts of the world – recently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/17/niger-suspends-military-cooperation-with-us#:%7E:text=Niger%20has%20suspended%20its%20military,security%20interests%20in%20the%20region.">announced</a> it was suspending military cooperation with the United States. </p>
<p>For over a decade, Niger has been <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/07/29/with-niger-coup-the-west-loses-a-crucial-ally-in-the-sahel_6071295_4.html">one of America’s most reliable</a> allies in the Sahel. The Sahel region, which stretches across Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, is one of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">largest poorly governed regions in the world</a>. Terrorism, banditry, trafficking (humans, arms, drugs), cattle rustling and armed robbery have thrived in the region. </p>
<p>In the last few years, democracy has been threatened in the region. There have been <a href="https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/understanding-crisis-democracy-west-africa-and-sahel">seven coup d’états</a> there since 2020, four of which were successful. The <a href="https://www.iiss.org/sv/publications/strategic-comments/2023/the-coup-in-niger/">coup in Niger</a> in July 2023 was the most recent, following those in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58461971">Guinea</a>, <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup/">Burkina Faso</a> and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/mali-un-coup-dans-le-coup">Mali</a>. </p>
<p>The juntas in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso identified three main reasons for military takeover: increasing insecurity, economic stagnation and corruption.</p>
<p>Following the military takeover in Niger, the US did not initially label it a coup. This was in a bid to retain some elements of military cooperation with the country. Designating it a coup would <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-military-mission-niger-focus-after-coup-2023-08-10/">limit the security assistance</a> the US could provide the country. </p>
<p>In October 2023, the US eventually called the event a coup, thereby limiting security cooperation. The US had <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/17/niger-suspends-military-cooperation-with-us">650 military personnel</a> working in Niger as of December 2023. </p>
<p>I have studied the region through a security and political lens for over a decade. Based on the research I have done, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">including a paper written in 2018</a> on the US drone base in Agadez, I believe that Niger’s decision to end military cooperation with the US will have a dramatic impact on security in the region. Some of the consequences could be limited surveillance of insurgent groups, a reduction in intelligence sharing and a possible escalation of attacks by terrorist groups. </p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>The first deployment of US troops to Niger was in <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/10/politics/niger-american-troops-presence/index.html">2013 when 100 military personnel</a> were deployed and operated from a military base at Niamey airport which was shared with France. Washington later built one of its <a href="https://theintercept.com/2016/09/29/u-s-military-is-building-a-100-million-drone-base-in-africa/">largest</a> drone bases in Africa in Agadez-Niger. The base enabled it to carry out <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-niger-drone-base/">intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities</a>, which covered almost the entire Sahel region. </p>
<p>Since the “Air Base 201” drone base was <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_us-constructed-air-base-niger-begins-operations/6178666.html">commissioned</a> in 2019, it has been a major military asset to the US in the Sahel. Information gathered from the base has been essential in tracking and fighting insurgent groups operating in the region. </p>
<p>In addition to the drone base, the US also supported Niger with military aid before the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">military coup of 2023</a>.</p>
<h2>Why the rupture?</h2>
<p>The first reason for ending military cooperation is the discontinued financial support from the US. </p>
<p>Niger is one of the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/niger/">poorest countries</a> in the world and depends on foreign assistance. </p>
<p>Before the military coup in July 2023, the US was a significant contributor of aid to the country. In 2018, the <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-niger/">US committed US$437 million</a> to the country to strengthen Niger’s agricultural and livestock sectors. The US also supported the country’s fight against insurgency before the coup. </p>
<p>The coup dramatically changed the relationship. In October 2023 (three months after the coup), the US cut off more than <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231010-france-turns-a-page-as-troops-begin-leaving-coup-hit-niger">US$500 million</a> in assistance to Niger. This has affected the country’s security funding.</p>
<p>The second reason is that the Niger junta came to the view that the US was no longer willing to work with it. Shortly after the coup, the US drone operations in Niger were <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/25/west-africa-sahel-military-junta/">limited</a> to surveillance to protect US assets. The US stopped sharing intelligence with the junta in Niger, putting pressure on the junta to relinquish power.</p>
<p>This has hampered Niger’s counter-terrorism operations because intelligence sharing is essential in tracking and planning attacks against insurgent groups. </p>
<p>Tied to this has been the issue of the drone base. The base is a major source of surveillance and intelligence gathering. There is, however, a <a href="https://www.intellinews.com/us-in-danger-of-losing-control-of-its-extensive-drone-base-in-niger-289069/">10-year usage agreement</a> which expires this year (2024). The junta might think it is the right time to sever the military relationship with the US so as not to renew the usage of the base. It is unclear what will happen to the drone base now that Niger is cutting ties with the US.</p>
<p>The abrupt reduction in military cooperation has frustrated Nigerien authorities who <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240317-niger-revokes-military-cooperation-with-us">argue</a> that the US is now operating in the country illegally. </p>
<p>The US is now trying to establish new security cooperation agreements and considering countries such as Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Benin for American reconnaissance drones. </p>
<p>In addition, the deepening of ties between Niger and Russia has been a major source of concern to the US. In January 2024, Niger agreed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">strengthen</a> military ties with Russia. This has been worrying for the US and its allies. One reason Niger is shifting towards Russia, apart from the cut in funding, is the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-threatens-to-pull-all-aid-for-niger-/7203124.html">unwillingness of the US</a> to provide Niger with the required weapons needed to fight insurgency. </p>
<h2>Implications for security</h2>
<p>The Sahel region is a vast area and US surveillance drones have been useful in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">identifying terrorist locations</a>. If the relationship between the US and Niger is permanently severed, surveillance and intelligence gathering will be seriously affected even if the US moves to other countries. This is because Niger is strategically located and the drones flown from the country could cover large parts of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">Sahel and west Africa</a>.</p>
<p>The fact that there has been an increase in terrorist attacks in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel">Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso</a> since the coup in Niger in 2023 suggests these fears might be justified.</p>
<p>Terrorist groups could capitalise on the situation and become more daring. Surveillance drones offer a deterrence to terrorist groups. </p>
<p>I think it is in the interest of all the parties to engage in dialogue in a respectful manner. The Niger government accused the US of a “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/16/africa/niger-ends-us-military-agreement-intl-hnk/index.html">condescending attitude</a>” and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240317-niger-revokes-military-cooperation-with-us">trying to force</a> the junta to pick between the US and Russia. With Russia lurking around the corner, the US needs to change its approach not to lose this strategic partner.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226027/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Niger is cutting military ties with the US. This has implications for security in the Sahel region.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230352024-03-18T10:59:45Z2024-03-18T10:59:45Z2024 Senegal election crisis points to deeper issues with Macky Sall and his preferred successor<p>The botched attempt by Senegalese president <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Macky-Sall">Macky Sall</a> to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/3/senegals-macky-sall-postpones-presidential-election">postpone</a> the presidential election has stirred unnecessary tension in an already strained electoral process. The move reflected deeper governance problems in the country.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/3/senegals-macky-sall-postpones-presidential-election">Sall’s decree</a>, subsequently <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/02/16/constitutional-council-plunges-senegal-into-the-unknown-by-overturning-election-postponement_6531088_124.html">annulled by the Constitutional Council</a>, was the latest in a range of government interventions that exceeded the scope of the executive authority. These have included the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/22/sonko-wade-not-listed-among-official-candidates-of-feb25-presidential-election/">disqualification</a> of key opposition candidates, the manipulation of judicial procedures, and the arbitrary detention of dissenting figures.</p>
<p>Sall’s 12-year tenure has been marked by contradictions. His administration boosted investment in transport and urban infrastructure. Notably, he worked on the <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/319731593403262722/text/Senegal-Transport-and-Urban-Mobility-Project.txt">motorway network</a>, the new Diass international airport, the development of major roads and the completion of public transport projects.</p>
<p>But these investments have not translated into improvements in the lives of Senegalese. Thousands of young people still go on <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1072143/politique/tribune-whatshappeninginsenegal-quand-le-drame-des-migrants-passe-au-second-plan/">perilous journeys</a> to Europe having lost hope of fulfilling their potential in their own country.</p>
<p>This is the backdrop to his move to postpone the elections in a last bid to secure a winning strategy for his camp. His anointed successor, <a href="https://www.ecofinagency.com/public-management/1109-44836-senegals-macky-sall-endorses-pm-amadou-ba-as-2024-successor">Amadou Ba</a>, remains a contested figure within the ruling <a href="https://www.senegel.org/en/movements/political-parties/poldetails/2">Alliance for the Republic Party</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Amy-Niang">I have a research interest</a> in state formation in west Africa. As I <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781786606525/The-Postcolonial-African-State-in-Transition-Stateness-and-Modes-of-Sovereignty">have argued</a> in my work, states sustain themselves by producing and alienating internal “others”. This refers to a scenario where governments assert sovereignty not against outside forces but against internal cultural groups and existing logics of governance. Sall’s style of government follows this pattern closely. </p>
<h2>Crisis within his party</h2>
<p>Sall <a href="https://fr.africanews.com/2024/02/10/senegal-macky-sall-se-justifie-sur-le-report-de-la-presidentielle//">said</a> he was postponing elections because of an alleged conflict between parliament and the Constitutional Council. The parliament had approved the creation of a commission of inquiry into the process of validation of presidential candidacies by the Constitutional Council.</p>
<p>Sall in fact latched onto <a href="https://www.bbc.com/afrique/articles/c1vywrx3xx9o">an accusation</a> of corruption levelled by Karim Wade against two Constitutional Council judges following Karim’s disqualification from running in the election due to his dual citizenship.</p>
<p>But the most plausible reason was a crisis within the ruling camp. The Alliance for the Republic is a divided party that is going to the elections in disarray. Sall’s chosen successor, <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/world/senegal-pm-amadou-ba-named-ruling-party-candidate-for-president/">Ba</a>, has generated little enthusiasm among voters. He symbolises the status quo. An affluent candidate, Ba has the difficult task of convincing an impoverished electorate that he is up to the task. </p>
<p>Sall overstepped his constitutional powers. The Senegalese <a href="https://adsdatabase.ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/SENEGAL_Constitution.pdf">constitution’s limitation</a> of the president’s term duration can’t be amended. Further, according to the <a href="https://dge.sn/sites/default/files/2019-01/CODE%20ELECTORAL%202018_0.pdf">electoral code</a>, the decree setting a date for presidential elections must be published no later than 80 days before the scheduled ballot. Sall postponed the poll just 12 hours before the campaigning was due to start, and <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/02/14/senegal-authorities-restrict-internet-access-and-ban-march//">22 days before the ballot</a>.</p>
<p>Sall’s attempt at postponing the elections, which has fostered a climate of distrust in the integrity of the electoral process, has left Senegal embroiled in a serious constitutional crisis. His decree brought forth two important issues:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the government’s commitment to an orderly handover of power</p></li>
<li><p>the integrity of the democratic process.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Erosion of a democratic tradition</h2>
<p>Since 2021, a series of protests and riots have pitted Ousmane Sonko, a key opposition figure facing rape allegations, and his supporters against a government accused of manipulating the judiciary to thwart a serious candidate. As a result, the economy has been severely disrupted. Each day of protests causes an estimated <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/restaurants-water-towers-unrest-dents-senegals-economy-2023-06-09/">$33 million loss</a> in economic output. </p>
<p>Further, Sall has used security and defence forces to establish an order of fear. He has resorted to heavy-handed measures against opposition figures and dissenting voices within civil society through arbitrary detention and prosecution. His government has systematically <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/05/senegal-violent-crackdown-opposition-dissent">restricted</a> the freedom of assembly, banned protests, suppressed independent media and mobilised public resources to bolster the ruling party.</p>
<p>For all these reasons, Senegal has seen an erosion of institutions meant to uphold the rule of law, foster political participation and ensure public accountability.</p>
<p>Sall was elected in <a href="https://fr.allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00016260.html">2012</a> after a tumultuous period under the flamboyant government of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdoulaye-Wade">President Abdoulaye Wade</a>. Sall owes his entire political career to Wade’s patronage. Yet their relationship soured when it became evident that Sall harboured ambitions to challenge Wade’s son, <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/254/page/4">Karim</a>, who was being groomed to succeed his father. </p>
<p>Sall pledged to deliver virtuous and frugal governance. But public euphoria soon petered out as scandals involving cabinet ministers and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/06/25/senegal-soupconne-de-corruption-le-frere-du-president-macky-sall-demissionne_5481292_3212.html">close family members</a> laid bare the corruption within the administration.</p>
<p>In 2023, amid much brouhaha over the validity of a third term, Sall <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66093983">yielded</a> to public pressure after <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/senegalese-opposition-rally-against-president-sall-s-possible-third-term-ambition-/7091705.html">violent protests</a>. These resulted in the most serious political crisis since the 1960s, claiming over 60 lives and leading to the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/22/senegal-pre-election-crackdown">arrest</a> of over 1,000 people.</p>
<h2>Where to for Senegal?</h2>
<p>In compliance with the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/senegal-presidentsets-presidential-election-for-march-24-4547872">Constitutional Council ruling</a>, Sall has finally agreed to organise elections before his exit.</p>
<p>As the election day of 24 March draws near, the absence of key contenders, and uncertainties regarding the electoral procedures, inject an element of unpredictability. </p>
<p>Furthermore, the erosion of trust is such that the Senegalese public still doubts Sall’s commitment to fulfil his obligations and facilitate an orderly handover.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223035/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Niang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Attempts to postpone Senegal’s election indefinitely reflect deeper governance problems within Macky Sall’s administration, and the shortcomings of his chosen heir, Amadou Ba.Amy Niang, Head of Research Programme, Council for the Development of Social Science Research in AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2255172024-03-14T13:15:14Z2024-03-14T13:15:14ZBurkina Faso, Mali and Niger hint at a new west African currency: what it’ll take for it to succeed<p><em>On 11 February 2024, the head of Niger’s ruling military junta, General Abdourahmane Tiani, spoke of the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20240213-niger-hints-at-new-currency-in-step-out-of-colonialisation">possible creation of a common currency</a> with Burkina Faso and Mali. “The currency is a first step toward breaking free from the legacy of colonisation,” he said on national TV, referring to the CFA franc inherited from French colonisation.</em></p>
<p><em>Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, three former French colonies, have experienced military coups in recent years. They’re now all ruled by military regimes. They also formed a new defence alliance, known as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">Alliance of Sahel States</a> (AES).</em> </p>
<p><em>The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20240226-la-lev%C3%A9e-des-sanctions-contre-le-niger-un-net-changement-de-braquet-pour-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao">has condemned</a> these coups and imposed sanctions on the countries involved. In response, these countries decided to withdraw from Ecowas. However, they remain members of the <a href="https://www.umoatitres.org/en/commission-de-luemoa/">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a> (Uemoa). Uemoa has a common currency, the CFA franc, which is issued by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO).</em></p>
<p><em>The BCEAO and the Banque de France are bound by <a href="https://www.banque-france.fr/fr/banque-de-france/partenariats-afrique-france">cooperation agreements</a> that include the deposit of a portion of foreign exchange reserves at the Banque de France and France guaranteeing the CFA franc.</em></p>
<p><em>Thierno Thioune, an expert on <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352717047_Interdependance_entre_Politique_monetaire_et_politique_budgetaire_au_niveau_de_l4UEMOA?_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InByb2ZpbGUiLCJwYWdlIjoicHJvZmlsZSJ9fQ">monetary policies and unions between west African states</a>, analyses the potential implications and feasibility of launching a new currency for the AES member countries.</em></p>
<h2>What conditions must be met for a multilateral currency to work?</h2>
<p>To successfully launch and maintain a multilateral currency, several key factors must be considered.</p>
<p>First, macroeconomic and budgetary policies must be closely coordinated. Rigorous harmonisation of economic and budgetary policies between participating countries is imperative to guarantee the stability of the currency’s value and prevent trade imbalances. This will help maintain the confidence of economic players and promote regional growth.</p>
<p>Second, robust monetary management institutions must be established. Strong institutions responsible for currency management, like a common central bank, are essential. This central bank must have adequate authority to implement an independent and stable monetary policy. This will ensure the preservation of the currency’s value and address cyclical fluctuations. </p>
<p>Third, creating an integrated common market is vital. The unrestricted flow of goods, services, capital and labour is key to driving economic growth and enhancing regional cooperation. The current framework provided by the West African Economic and Monetary Union offers a significant advantage in this regard.</p>
<p>Finally, mechanisms to monitor and resolve crises need to be established. For instance, common reserve funds and <a href="https://www.abc-forex.net/contenu/swap-de-change/swap-devises.php">currency swap arrangements</a> could help address external and internal shocks that may affect the new currency. Currency swaps – when two parties exchange amounts in two different currencies for a certain period at a fixed rate – can be used to manage exchange rate risks and facilitate cross-border financing. </p>
<h2>Are these conditions met in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali?</h2>
<p>It’s difficult to say whether these conditions have been fully met in the three countries. It would mean having a firm understanding of whether these, among other, conditions have been met: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>harmonisation of government policies</p></li>
<li><p>macroeconomic stability through inflation control</p></li>
<li><p>limit on public debt</p></li>
<li><p>maintenance of a balanced current account.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>At this time, it’s hard to say whether these countries have done this. </p>
<h2>Does their monetary union membership make any difference?</h2>
<p>These three countries have been part of the West African Economic and Monetary Union since 1963. In theory, this should give them some experience in coordinating economic and monetary policies through the CFA franc. </p>
<p>They could have experience with infrastructure, like the Central Bank of West African States (which manages the single currency and monetary policy for member states), that would help them with the transition.</p>
<h2>What are the potential gains and risks of the initiative?</h2>
<p>Despite the risks involved, the initiative could bring several benefits. </p>
<p>Establishing a larger monetary zone can foster greater trade integration and improved resource allocation. </p>
<p>It could enhance the country’s “flexibility” in dealing with external partners. </p>
<p>By joining a new monetary union, these three countries could also benefit significantly from increased trade integration, independence from external partners, lower transaction costs and investor attractiveness. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, this initiative also entails risks, particularly with regard to their position within the West African Economic and Monetary Union and Ecowas. The latter could perceive the creation of a new currency as a threat to their regional influence. It could cause the fragmentation of existing economic blocs. In addition, the departure of the three countries could weaken the solidity of the West African Economic and Monetary Union and Ecowas in terms of economic and political influence. </p>
<p>There are also risks that the currency could quickly lose value. </p>
<p>The new currency could depreciate against the CFA franc. This could have substantial negative repercussions for exporters to other West African Economic and Monetary Union countries.</p>
<p>Second, without proper formal frameworks to control and manage the new currency, speculation and uncertainty regarding its value may emerge. This is why establishing robust institutions to support the management and supervision of the new currency is crucial.</p>
<h2>How will the new currency affect trade in the zone?</h2>
<p>The creation of a new currency by these three nations could, temporarily, have a negative impact on their trade with countries within the current bloc. It could even lead to some turbulence in trade with countries outside it.</p>
<p>The transition to a new currency typically introduces a level of uncertainty among economic actors and trading partners, as questions arise about the currency’s value, convertibility and stability. This adjustment phase can lead to a temporary slowdown in trade.</p>
<p>In addition, the introduction of a new currency often requires legislative and regulatory changes, especially regarding foreign exchange operations and customs duties. These can act as administrative and regulatory barriers and result in delays in commercial transactions.</p>
<p>During the transitional period, there may be fluctuations in exchange rates. This will lead to disparities between the old and new currencies. It can affect price competitiveness between exporters and importers and reduce the overall volume of trade.</p>
<p>The perceptions and attitudes of external partners matter when a new currency is announced. Some trading partners may exhibit reluctance or express doubts regarding its reliability and credibility. This could diminish their willingness to continue trading with member countries of the zone.</p>
<h2>Could the move isolate them?</h2>
<p>The creation of a new currency by these three countries may indeed raise questions about their potential isolation. However, such an initiative should not automatically lead to a diplomatic rupture or total marginalisation.</p>
<p>To avoid this, proactive communication, constructive cooperation and balanced, inclusive regional economic integration are key. This will help mitigate the risks of isolation for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in their monetary project.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thierno Thioune has received funding from the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF) and the Romanian Government for the "Eugen Ionescu" doctoral programme at the University "Dunarea De Jos" in Galati, Romania. CODESRIA also awarded him a prize as part of its thesis grant programme.</span></em></p>Several conditions must be met to ensure the successful launch and operation of a multilateral currency.Thierno Thioune, enseignant-chercheur, directeur du CREA, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de DakarLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238672024-02-22T12:01:17Z2024-02-22T12:01:17ZLearning in two languages: lessons from francophone Africa on what works best<p>Children living in multilingual communities often learn in a language at school that does not match the language they speak at home. This mismatch makes it challenging for them to participate in classroom discussions and learn to read. In turn, this contributes to poor learning outcomes, grade repetition, and dropping out of school.</p>
<p>Bilingual education programmes that include mother tongue languages have become increasingly popular for improving learning outcomes. Bilingual education is associated with better <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1366728908003386">language and literacy skills</a>, reduced grade repetition and school dropout rates across the <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/10986/10331">globe</a>. Including mother tongue languages in education also places value on children’s cultural identities, improving confidence, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09500789808666737">self-esteem</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-012-9308-2">learning</a>. </p>
<p>But simply providing bilingual education does not guarantee better learning results. This is the conclusion of a recent <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050.2023.2290482">paper</a> we published in which we reviewed bilingual programmes in six francophone west African countries: Niger, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon. </p>
<p>We found mixed results, across and within countries and programmes.</p>
<p>We identified two sets of factors that constrain or contribute to the quality of bilingual education. These were: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>implementation factors, such as teacher training and classroom resources</p></li>
<li><p>socio-cultural factors, such as perceptions of mother tongue languages in education.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Our findings emphasise the need to consider the local context when applying bilingual education programmes. </p>
<h2>Bilingual education in francophone west Africa</h2>
<p>Our research team conducted research in Côte d’Ivoire from 2016 to 2018. We measured children’s language and reading skills in both their mother tongue and in French, and compared outcomes between children attending French-only or bilingual Projet École Intégrée schools. </p>
<p>Children in French-only schools outperformed their peers from bilingual schools on the language and reading <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/edu0000723">assessments</a>. Teachers revealed they had better teaching resources and felt better prepared in French-only schools. </p>
<p>We were interested in whether bilingual education programmes in other francophone countries in the region had had similar experiences. In 2022, we searched academic databases for literature in English and French that discussed programme implementation and measured learning and schooling outcomes within bilingual education programmes. We reviewed nine programmes from six countries: Niger, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Cameroon. </p>
<p>These countries are former French colonies or territories. French is the official or working language and often the language of instruction in school. However, these countries are highly multilingual. About 23 living <a href="https://www.ethnologue.com/">languages</a> are spoken in Niger, <a href="https://www.languagesoftheworld.info/geolinguistics/linguistic-diversity-in-africa-and-europe.html">39</a> in Senegal, <a href="https://www.languagesoftheworld.info/geolinguistics/linguistic-diversity-in-africa-and-europe.html">68</a> in Mali, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1280625/number-of-living-languages-in-africa-by-country/">71</a> in Burkina Faso, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1280625/number-of-living-languages-in-africa-by-country/">78</a> in Côte d’Ivoire and <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1280625/number-of-living-languages-in-africa-by-country/">277</a> in Cameroon. </p>
<p>Our review showed that children can benefit from learning in two languages. This is true whether they are two official languages like in Cameroon’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10993-019-09510-7">Dual Curriculum Bilingual Education</a> (French and English) schools, or in a mother tongue and French, like in Mali’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/447544">Community Schools</a>. Children can also benefit regardless of whether they are gradually introduced to a language throughout primary school or whether both languages are introduced at the same time.</p>
<p>But a lack of resources, and a failure to take into account local conditions, affected the outcomes. The programmes that resulted in positive schooling and learning outcomes recognised and targeted common school-related and community-related challenges.</p>
<h2>Teacher training and resources</h2>
<p>One common school-related challenge was teachers not having teaching materials in all languages of instruction.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000161121">Pédagogie Convergente</a> programme in Mali, for example, ensured teachers had materials in both French and the mother tongue. Children had better French and maths scores. </p>
<p>But some teachers from the same programme did not always have teaching <a href="https://books.google.ca/books/about/Patterns_of_French_literacy_development.html?id=MoNnAAAAMAAJ&hl=en&redir_esc=y">materials</a> in mother tongue languages. And some children struggled with literacy and writing skills. </p>
<p>Another common challenge was teachers not feeling prepared to teach in all languages, as teacher training often occurred in an official language, like French. The <a href="https://www.adeanet.org/clearinghouse/sites/default/files/docs/interieur_11_burkina_fre.pdf">Programme d’éducation bilingue</a> in Burkina Faso, for example, made an effort to train teachers in the mother tongue language so they felt confident following the bilingual curriculum. </p>
<p>Children in bilingual Burkina Faso schools had higher than average <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050802149275">pass rates</a> on the primary certificate exam, <a href="https://www.memoireonline.com/06/22/12997/m_Le-rapport-des-enseignants-aux-langues-nationales-en-tant-que-mdiums-et-matires-den.html">repeated grades less</a>, and stayed in school more than children in traditional French schools. </p>
<p>Both examples are in contrast to the bilingual schools in Côte d’Ivoire, where teachers lacked materials and training in mother tongue languages. In turn, children demonstrated worse language and reading skills compared to their peers in French-only schools.</p>
<h2>Socio-cultural factors</h2>
<p>We identified common community-related challenges, particularly related to community buy-in and perceptions of mother tongue instruction. </p>
<p>For example, families with higher socioeconomic status were worried that Niger’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050208667760">Ecole Experimentale</a> schools would hinder children’s French proficiency and compromise their entry into secondary school. </p>
<p>Programmes such as the <a href="https://ared-edu.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/DC-Senegal-Workshop-Findings_04.2019-FINAL-ENG.pdf">Support Program for Quality Education in Mother Tongues for Primary Schools</a> in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050.2020.1765968">Senegal</a> worked to combat negative perceptions by educating families about the benefits of bilingual education. Children in the Senegalese programme outperformed their peers in traditional French schools in all school subjects.</p>
<p>The same programmes sometimes experienced different outcomes depending on the community. For example, although children in Burkina Faso’s bilingual schooling showed favourable outcomes, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-021-09885-y">parents</a> felt that French programmes were better suited for continuing to secondary school. </p>
<h2>What does this mean for bilingual education?</h2>
<p>Efforts to provide teachers with the resources they needed, and efforts to foster community support, were both consistently linked with positive schooling and learning outcomes in our review. </p>
<p>However, these efforts might work better in some communities compared to others, due to different resource constraints and socio-cultural differences. Studies that found poorer outcomes also found common challenges present. Therefore, bilingual education has the potential to facilitate positive learning outcomes if efforts are made to overcome common challenges based on communities’ needs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223867/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Bilingual education can improve learning outcomes but it’s important to consider local context.Kaja Jasinska, Assistant Professor, Applied Psychology and Human Development, University of TorontoMary-Claire Ball, PhD student, Developmental Psychology and Education, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2228262024-02-21T12:29:46Z2024-02-21T12:29:46ZFree movement in west Africa: three countries leaving Ecowas could face migration hurdles<p>For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, a recent decision to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">withdraw</a> from the <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (Ecowas) has thrown up questions about how they will navigate regional mobility in future. </p>
<p>Ecowas covers a variety of sectors, but migration is a major one. The bloc’s protocols since 1979 have long been seen as a <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97322-3_2">shining example</a> of free movement on the continent. They gave citizens the right to move between countries in the region without a visa, and a prospective right of residence and setting up businesses.</p>
<p>As multidisciplinary scholars we have previously researched <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/en/political-economy-west-african-migration-governance-wamig-2">migration governance in west Africa</a>, at the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2084452">regional level</a>, and in particular contexts like <a href="https://ecdpm.org/work/what-does-regime-change-niger-mean-migration-cooperation-eu">Niger</a>. </p>
<p>We argue that Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if their departure from Ecowas curtails mobility. But it is likely that informal mobility will continue anyway. </p>
<h2>Why free movement matters</h2>
<p>In September 2023, the three countries created a <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">mutual defence pact</a>, named <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sahel-coups-niger-tchiani-mali-burkina-faso-insecurity-e96627c700aa4fcf8d060dd9d2d16667">the Alliance of Sahel States</a>. This indicated their solidarity in dealing with insecurity. </p>
<p>Yet they also depend on neighbouring countries in the region, which puts these three countries in a difficult position.</p>
<p>The three countries that announced their withdrawal from Ecowas are connected in a web of mobility. Notably, Niger, seen as a key transit country for refugees and other migrants on their way to Europe, received <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/migration-and-society/3/1/arms030107.xml">major funds and support</a> from the European Union to prevent onward migration to Libya and beyond. </p>
<p>One central measure was <a href="https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/2015/fr/123771">Loi 2015-36</a>, a law which punished people transporting migrants with fines and prison sentences. The law was <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/european-dominance-of-migration-policy-in-niger-31383/">mostly developed</a> by external actors and had detrimental effects on the <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/multilateral-damage.pdf">local economy</a>. It also made migration journeys across the Sahara desert even <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc4138add1-visit-niger-report-special-rapporteur-human-rights-migrants">more dangerous</a>. </p>
<p>In November 2023, the law, which <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/sites/default/files/medam_niger_jegen.pdf">arguably violated</a> the principles of free movement under Ecowas, was repealed by the Nigerien coup leaders. </p>
<p>Mali is another major transit country in the region, as well as a country of origin for regional migration. It has a complicated history of <a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/72355">migration cooperation</a> with Europe. </p>
<p>Of less relevance to Europe, but more for regional dynamics, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-39814-8_11">Burkina Faso</a> is at the centre for <a href="https://www.mideq.org/en/migration-corridors/burkina-faso-cote-divoire/">regional migration</a>, often seasonal. Labour migration supports Côte d'Ivoire’s cocoa industry. After withdrawal from Ecowas, such labour migration may be difficult unless people resort more to informal migration. </p>
<p>As we have shown in our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2084452">previous research</a>, informal mobility has always existed along with formal mobility governance. Official border crossing points are often not used, despite the legal requirement to do so. </p>
<p>Hence, leaving Ecowas may increase corruption and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/imig.12766">problems of harassment</a> at formal border crossings as well as <a href="https://mixedmigration.org/resource/human-rights-migrants-smuggling-mali-niger/">increased use of mobility facilitators</a>, or “passeurs”. These are people who negotiate passage through formal border crossings and organise journeys through other routes. </p>
<p>The legal gaps that the current situation creates could be very expensive for businesses and individuals. People may in the near future require visas. And for those who have migrated regionally, the right to stay in a country of residency may soon be under threat. </p>
<h2>An immediate exit</h2>
<p>Days after they <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">announced</a> their withdrawal from <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/">Ecowas</a>, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.ewn.co.za/2024/02/08/burkina-mali-and-niger-reject-one-year-period-to-quit-ecowas">insisted</a> they were not bound by <a href="https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Revised-treaty-1.pdf#page=53">rules stipulating</a> a one year notice period before their final exit. </p>
<p>The announcement about leaving Ecowas outside the normal regulations was dramatic, but not unexpected. Military governments that took power in a series of coups in August 2020 and May 2021 in <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/mali-un-coup-dans-le-coup">Mali</a>, September 2022 in <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup/">Burkina Faso</a> and July 2023 in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">Niger</a> rule the three countries.</p>
<p>Ecowas has exerted political and economic pressure on the three countries to return to constitutional rule, through sanctions and the <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/policy-briefs/military-intervention-niger-imperatives-and-caveats">threat</a> of military intervention. </p>
<p>In Niger, for example, Ecowas <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-bazoum-coup-sanctions-ecowas-c7bdfd06559f1cfbfb856bea5b11a55f">closed</a> official border crossings, cut off more than <a href="https://punchng.com/niger-nigeria-cuts-power-supply-ecowas-vows-to-confront-junta/">70% </a> of electricity, and suspended financial transactions with other countries in the region. </p>
<p>International assets <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/31/nigers-planned-51-mln-bond-issuance-cancelled-due-to-sanctions">were frozen</a> and international aid halted. Even before the coup, <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/thousands-children-niger-risk-severe-nutritional-crisis-border-closures-leave-trucks-stranded#:%7E:text=Furthermore%2C%20prior%20to%20the%20political,least%20one%20form%20of%20malnutrition.">3.3 million people</a> in Niger experienced acute food insecurity. </p>
<p>The Ecowas sanctions made daily life even worse and in all likelihood added to the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate">popularity</a> of the coup leaders. </p>
<p>Similar sanctions were applied in Mali. The population has suffered as a result and the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-arent-sanctions-preventing-coups-in-africa">effectiveness</a> of the sanctions is questionable. </p>
<p>Sanctions in Burkina Faso included <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-arent-sanctions-preventing-coups-in-africa">travel bans</a> against members of the military government.</p>
<h2>Potential ways ahead</h2>
<p>For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, there are several considerations when it comes to regional mobility in their post-Ecowas era. These may include exploring the provisions of the <a href="https://www.uemoa.int/en">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a>; a return to bilateral agreements with individual neighbours; or relying on the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">African Union Protocol on Free Movement</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Monetary union:</strong> The three countries are still part of the <a href="https://www.uemoa.int/en">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a> (Waemu), a union around the common currency, the CFA franc.</p>
<p>The regional monetary union also has provisions for free movement of people and goods across its member countries. With this option, access to seaports, a major issue for all three landlocked countries, is ensured through other members of the monetary union, including, for example, Senegal. </p>
<p>On the downside is the fact that a major argument for leaving Ecowas was the perceived role of external influence over the regional bloc. The strong anti-imperialist discourse of the military governments does not bode well for the regional monetary union either. The union is the institutional framework for regional monetary policy over which France <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745341798/africas-last-colonial-currency/">continues</a> to exert significant influence. </p>
<p>Burkina Faso has already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-may-quit-west-african-currency-union-not-mali-2024-01-31/">announced</a> its intention to leave the monetary union too. </p>
<p>The West Africa Economic and Monetary Union also excludes major trading partners like Nigeria – of major importance to landlocked <a href="https://www.inter-reseaux.org/en/publication/51-special-issue-nigeria/nigerias-role-in-nigers-food-security/">Niger</a> for food supplies. Trade and commerce between Nigeria and Niger provides a lifeline and is among the most intense areas of cross-border activity in west Africa. </p>
<p>For these reasons, the regional monetary union option seems an unlikely alternative.</p>
<p><strong>Bilateral agreements:</strong> Another option for the three countries could be a return to bilateral agreements with individual countries to facilitate free movement. This can be likened to what former Ecowas member <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00083968.2014.936696">Mauritania</a>, which left in <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2000/12/28/mauritania-pulls-out-ecowas">2000</a>, did. </p>
<p>However, at the moment, given the sanctions, this option is off the cards, and could take many years to work out. </p>
<p><strong>African Union protocol:</strong> At a continental level the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">African Union Protocol on Free Movement</a> may offer a distant way forward. So far only <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-sl-PROTOCOL_TO_THE_TREATY_ESTABLISHING_THE_AFRICAN_ECONOMIC_COMMUNITY_RELATING_TO_FREE_MOVEMENT_OF_PERSONS-1.pdf">32 countries</a> have signed it and four have ratified it, among them Mali and Niger (Burkina Faso is a signatory). </p>
<p>One way to move forward would be for countries to ramp up ratifications of this document, to ensure that cooperation on free movement can continue whatever happens to Ecowas. </p>
<p>Of course, other countries within Ecowas could also unilaterally open up for visa-free entry like <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/03/rwanda-announces-visa-free-travel-for-all-africans//">Rwanda</a> or Kenya have done, though the process has had its <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/09/kenya-backlash-over-new-visa-free-entry-policy-many-describe-as-hectic//">hiccups</a>. </p>
<p>Such visa arrangements are also unlikely to include the rights of residence and establishment guaranteed under the Ecowas framework.</p>
<p>Given the current political context, an institutionalised option seems unlikely in the near future. The most likely option would be that migration will simply continue – informally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222826/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Franzisca Zanker received funding from the Mercator Stiftung for a research project "The Political Economy of West African Migration Governace" in 2019 which provided relevant background for this piece.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanda Bisong is a policy officer at the ECDPM, Maastricht, The Netherlands.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leonie Jegen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if they cannot migrate to and from neighbouring countries in Ecowas.Franzisca Zanker, Senior research fellow, Arnold Bergstraesser InstituteAmanda Bisong, PhD candidate, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLeonie Jegen, PhD Candidate, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227202024-02-07T13:27:05Z2024-02-07T13:27:05ZEcowas: why withdrawal of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso signals fresh trouble for the Sahel<p><em>On 27 January 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-mali-burkina-faso-say-they-are-leaving-ecowas-regional-block-2024-01-28/">announced</a> their plan to withdraw from membership of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), despite repeated efforts at reconciliation.</em></p>
<p><em>Diplomacy scholar Nicholas Westcott explains how the decision may be the latest symptom of a deepening crisis in the Sahel, the area south of the Sahara desert stretching from Mauritania in the west to Chad in the east.</em></p>
<h2>Why does their decision pose a threat to the region?</h2>
<p>The coastal states in Ecowas fear <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f9c0ca66-8c32-4906-9e22-f2d3fc0e8c67">contagion</a> from both jihadism and political disorder in the Sahel. If the three Sahelian countries leave Ecowas, that risk increases. So does the risk of potential hostility to Malian and Burkinabe migrants in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Stopping free movement between these three countries and the rest of west Africa would have serious economic consequences for all concerned.</p>
<p>Other governments in the region also fear damage to their own democracies – if not from coups, then from anti-western populists. </p>
<p>Guinea already has a military government. Others such as Cameroon, Togo and Sierra Leone may be vulnerable. </p>
<p>With elections ahead in <a href="https://ec.gov.gh/electoral-system/">Ghana</a>, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/6/senegal-parliament-delays-election-to-december-15-after-chaotic-vote">postponement</a> of the election in Senegal, this year will test democracy in the region.</p>
<p>This schism in Ecowas is also a risk for Africa’s partners in Europe and the US. Recent research in the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/advance-article/doi/10.1093/afraf/adad034/7564826?searchresult=1">African Affairs journal</a> showed that resentment of the increased French military presence was a key reason for the Nigerien military backing the coup led by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66430115">General Abdourahmane Tchiani</a> rather than elected <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-you-need-know-about-nigers-ousted-president-2023-08-14/">president Mohamed Bazoum</a>. </p>
<p>Other western countries risk being tarred with the same neocolonial brush unless they reform international institutions to reflect African concerns. They need to expedite the changes necessary to ensure that the multilateral system works for the benefit of small poor countries.</p>
<p>If this doesn’t happen, China’s narrative that the existing system works only to the benefit of “the west” will gain traction on the continent.</p>
<h2>What are the drivers?</h2>
<p>All countries in west Africa face a multilayered crisis. This has been brought on by years of sluggish growth following the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/great-recession.asp">2008 financial crisis</a>, <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1">COVID</a> and the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine">Ukraine war</a>, the impact of climate change and population growth. </p>
<p>Elected governments are finding it increasingly difficult to satisfy the expectations of their citizens. This is particularly true of the growing number of unemployed young people who have become disillusioned with democracy and are open to violent regime change, whether through jihad or a coup d’etat. </p>
<p>It is almost a re-run of the 1970s when drought, corruption and development failures led to a rash of coups in the region. People who cannot make a living legitimately will find other ways to do so.</p>
<p>Jihadism and banditry have <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-survey/2023/from-global-jihad-to-local-insurgencies/">increased</a> despite western efforts to combat them. Western support has thus lost credibility, even if the real failure is primarily political and economic. </p>
<h2>Why have regional bodies like Ecowas not been able to help?</h2>
<p>Faced with the juntas’ threat of secession, African regional organisations, in this case Ecowas and the African Union, face a dilemma. Do they to stick to their principles and exclude states that have experienced unconstitutional changes of government until they re-establish governments accountable to their citizens? Or do they compromise their principles to preserve at least nominal unity, and allow authoritarian governments back into the club? </p>
<p>Reconciliation efforts by Togo, through its <a href="https://lpsf.africa/lpsf-2023/">Peace and Security Forum</a> in Lomé last November, and by Nigerian Islamic leaders have not borne fruit. Nevertheless, it’s possible that the departure announcement is a bargaining chip to get more lenient terms for their reintegration into Ecowas. </p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-communique-on-burkina-faso-mali-niger/">responded</a> by saying that it had not yet received formal notification, which means, according to the regulations, that the countries can only leave in a year’s time. This provides all parties with negotiation time. The <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240130/communique-withdrawal-three-ecowas-member-states">AU</a> has also urged negotiation to keep Ecowas together. For its part, Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-notifies-west-african-bloc-ecowas-decision-leave-2024-01-29/">response</a> has been less accommodating.</p>
<h2>What lies behind the military regimes’ announcement?</h2>
<p>Regime survival has become their overriding objective. Their explicit intention seems to be to undermine the principle that African nations should apply standards to each other. The fact that African governments themselves signed up to these principles is as irrelevant to the insurrectionists, who want to retain power, as it is to the jihadists, who want to seize it. </p>
<p>They have set out the following <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">justifications</a> for their withdrawal:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Ecowas provided no support against the jihadists</p></li>
<li><p>Ecowas has imposed “illegal” sanctions that are harming the people </p></li>
<li><p>Ecowas has fallen under the influence of foreign governments.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These arguments are weak. They reflect an attempt to look like defenders of the poor and opponents of western influence.</p>
<p>It seems to be working. Populations are being <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/burkina-faso/313-armer-les-civils-au-prix-de-la-cohesion-sociale">mobilised and armed</a> to fight the jihadists.</p>
<p>The juntas appear to be donning the mantle of <a href="https://www.thomassankara.net/facts-about-thomas-sankara-in-burkina-faso/?lang=en">Thomas Sankara</a>. The revered former president of Burkina Faso, who seized power himself, is seen as a hero for his opposition to corrupt elites and French influence, his modesty and principles, and his concern for the ordinary Burkinabe. </p>
<p>It also plays conveniently into a narrative that both <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/09/21/china-wants-to-be-the-leader-of-the-global-south">China</a> and Russia are promoting: that current global institutions have been set up to defend neocolonial western interests, that adherence to “western values” (such as democracy and human rights) denies countries their right to develop in their own way; and that only China and Russia are true defenders of the interests of the global south.</p>
<p>Russia is putting its guns where its mouth is. There are an estimated <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/russian-mercenaries-behind-slaughter-in-mali-village-un-report-finds">1,000</a> Russian troops in Mali – formerly Wagner, now state-run and re-branded the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russian-troops-deploy-burkina-faso-2024-01-25/">Africa Corps</a> – and the first 100, with more to follow, have arrived in Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>Others are being recruited for Niger. Their official justification may be anti-terrorist duties, but their real purpose is to protect the regime from further threats of mutiny, coup or invasion. </p>
<p>The danger is that the Sahelian states could become unaccountable regimes, protected by Russia in return for gold, and living off the illicit trafficking of people and goods across the Sahara. </p>
<p>The migrant trade is already <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/54581/niger-migrants-return-to-the-route-towards-the-mediterranean">thriving again in Agadez</a>, the key transit point in northern Niger to the Mediterranean coast. And nothing worries European countries more than a dramatic increase in African migration. So they will be watching developments with concern.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Westcott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their intention to leave Ecowas. This may be a pointer to a deeper crisis in the Sahel region.Nicholas Westcott, Professor of Practice in Diplomacy, Dept of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223882024-02-05T09:27:55Z2024-02-05T09:27:55ZMali, Burkina Faso and Niger want to leave Ecowas. A political scientist explains the fallout<p><em>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have sent Ecowas, west Africa’s main political union of 15 countries, a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">formal notice</a> of their withdrawal from the bloc. The three countries are governed by military rulers who <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/coups-africa-even-ecowas">have overthrown</a> democratically elected leaders since 2021.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation Africa’s Godfred Akoto Boafo asked political scientist <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">Olayinka Ajala</a> about the implications of the withdrawal.</em></p>
<h2>Why are Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso withdrawing?</h2>
<p>The three countries have given <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240129-mali-and-burkina-faso-withdraw-from-ecowas">three main reasons</a>.</p>
<p>First is what they call the “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">illegal, illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible sanctions</a>” imposed on them for truncating their democracies. </p>
<p>Second is the failure of Ecowas to assist them in their “existential fight against terrorism and insecurity”. </p>
<p>The juntas have also argued that Ecowas has deviated from the founding principles of the organisation and is now <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68122947">controlled by foreign powers</a>. </p>
<p>In 2001, Ecowas adopted a protocol on democracy and good governance which included a mechanism for unconstitutional changes of government. <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/ecowas2001protocol.pdf">Article 1a</a> of the protocol maintains a “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”. </p>
<p>Ecowas cited this clause as its reason for suspending the three countries and for imposing sanctions against them.</p>
<p>Ecowas has made it clear that it won’t work with the regimes. Its statements make it clear that it has taken a strong stance because it wishes to deter military coups in other countries within the bloc. </p>
<p>The regional bloc is also clearly frustrated at the lack of interest the three countries have shown in returning to democratic rule. It has asked for a clear and definite transition timetable, especially for Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<h2>What impact will the withdrawal have on Ecowas?</h2>
<p>The main impact will be on trade and economic development. Ecowas is primarily an economic community and the loss of any member will affect trade and economic development.</p>
<p>The three countries collectively account for 8% of the <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/economic-community-west-african-states">US$761 billion</a> Ecowas gross domestic product (GDP). In 2022, the total trade volume from the Ecowas region totalled <a href="https://punchng.com/mali-b-faso-niger-exit-may-weaken-277bn-ecowas-trade-report/">US$277.22 billion</a>. </p>
<p>The concern is that the exit of these countries could affect the flow of goods and services in the bloc. </p>
<p>Leaving the bloc could have other knock-on effects too:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The economic collapse of the countries. These countries have strategic importance, especially in food security. Niger is a key source of onions while Burkina Faso exports tomatoes to the sub-region.</p></li>
<li><p>This would lead to an exodus of citizens to other Ecowas countries, further threatening the stability of the bloc. </p></li>
<li><p>Concerns that the three countries will enter into bilateral relationships with countries that might not be favourable to other Ecowas countries. For example, there are already concerns about Niger’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">alliance with Russia</a> after it severed ties with France. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What impact will it have on each of the countries?</h2>
<p>The main impact on the countries will be on the movement of people, goods and services. </p>
<p>Under Ecowas, members enjoy unrestricted movement of citizens within the bloc. Citizens of Ecowas countries can live and work in any country in the bloc. For instance, there are more than 5 million citizens of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger living and working in Côte d'Ivoire alone. Ghana, Togo and Republic of Benin also host large numbers of Nigeriens. </p>
<p>The citizens of all three landlocked countries would no longer be able to travel to other Ecowas states without impediments. Niger also shares a border of over 1,600km with seven states in Nigeria and <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-01-30/analysis-west-africas-brexit-moment-spells-trouble-for-the-region">80% of its trade</a> is done with Nigeria. </p>
<p>The sanctions imposed on Niger by Ecowas are <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate">already affecting</a> citizens of the country. Hardship is likely to increase after the exit if Nigeria decides to police its borders. </p>
<p>Also, depending on how Ecowas agrees to relate to the countries in future, there could be restrictions on goods and services which would further affect the economies of these countries. </p>
<h2>What impact will it have on security in the region?</h2>
<p>The security arrangement might not be affected in the short term. But it could be in the long term. There is already limited security cooperation between the three countries and other Ecowas members. For instance, they have all withdrawn from the G5 Sahel, resulting in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/6/chad-mauritania-pave-way-to-dissolve-g5-anti-rebel-alliance#:%7E:text=The%20G5%20was%20created%20in,major%20issue%20across%20the%20Sahel.&text=The%20two%20remaining%20members%20of,other%20three%20founding%20countries%20left.">collapse of the organisation</a>. </p>
<p>Although the lack of security support from Ecowas was stated as one of the reasons for exiting Ecowas, a total collapse of existing security infrastructure would affect not only the three countries but also other relatively stable states such as Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Benin. The three states have joined forces to form the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/military-led-sahel-states-rally-thousands-support-alliance-2023-12-30/">Alliance of Sahel States</a>, but without support from regional groups such as Ecowas, they will struggle to curtail insurgencies. </p>
<p>Currently, Mali has over 1,000 members of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner group), supported by Russia. There are <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-01-31/wagner-forces-under-a-new-flag-russias-africa-corps-burkina-faso">100 in Burkina Faso</a>. After months of Burkina Faso insisting it would not engage foreign mercenaries, the first contingent arrived in January 2024 and more are expected soon. Niger also recently agreed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">military cooperation</a> with Russia. </p>
<p>This indicates the three countries still require external assistance to combat insecurity. The problem is that Russia is fighting a huge war in Ukraine and might not be able to support the three countries as much as they would require. If the three countries fail to combat insurgence through the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States, the threat will spread to other countries in the bloc and beyond. </p>
<p>Ecowas leaders have indicated that they are willing to have a dialogue with the three countries. I think Ecowas granting some concessions to prevent them from exiting would be in the interest of the bloc and all the citizens of Ecowas countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The decision by the three countries could change the dynamics of Ecowas.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216962024-01-29T13:08:07Z2024-01-29T13:08:07ZNiger and Russia are forming military ties: 3 ways this could upset old allies<p>In July 2023, Niger’s military took over in <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">a coup</a> just two years after the country’s first transition to civilian power. The coup has brought into sharp focus the role of foreign countries in Niger’s politics.</p>
<p>Before the coup, France and the US were the <a href="https://www.gmfus.org/news/coup-niger">main security allies</a> of Niger. But the coup leaders, led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, were open about their antagonism to France, the country’s former colonial ruler, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/12/25/niger-suspends-cooperation-with-international-francophone-body">ordered the French military to leave</a>.</p>
<p>Now the attention of many people in Niger has shifted to Russia.</p>
<p>Since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">coup</a>, several analysts have <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/niger-russia-sahel/a-66494597">highlighted</a> the role of Russia. Some analysts and regional experts believe Russia might have played a role <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4135841-the-niger-coup-exposes-russias-grand-strategy-for-africa/">directly or indirectly</a> in the military takeover. </p>
<p>Others (including myself) <a href="https://theconversation.com/scramble-for-the-sahel-why-france-russia-china-and-the-united-states-are-interested-in-the-region-219130">argue</a> that Russia is increasing its grip on the country and actively seeking to benefit from the coup. This was evident when Russia and Niger recently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/">agreed</a> to develop military ties. </p>
<p>Although the details of this partnership are still sketchy, Russia promised to increase the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/">“combat readiness”</a> of Niger’s military. In addition, there are discussions to partner in the areas of agriculture and energy. </p>
<p>I have been <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">researching</a> the security dynamics of the region for over a decade. The Niger junta’s romance with Russia has potential implications for peace and security in the region and beyond. </p>
<p>I have identified three main potential implications for Niger and other allied countries:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>escalation of tensions between Niger and France</p></li>
<li><p>discontent between Niger and its regional allies</p></li>
<li><p>likely disruption of a <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/648851468123254494/pdf/957770PID0P1500Box391429B00PUBLIC0.pdf#page=3">US$13 billion</a> gas pipeline project from Nigeria to the European Union through Niger.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Russia in the region</h2>
<p>After the 2023 coup, France and the regional economic bloc Ecowas <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ecowas-threatens-use-of-force-against-niger-junta/a-66398008">threatened</a> to use force to reinstate the deposed president. </p>
<p>Russia <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warned</a> against such a move. </p>
<p>The military junta then expelled French soldiers. France responded by closing its embassy in Niger. </p>
<p>The US also reduced its military and economic cooperation. Washington cut aid to the country by more than <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231010-france-turns-a-page-as-troops-begin-leaving-coup-hit-niger">US$500 million</a> and removed the country from its <a href="https://credendo.com/en/knowledge-hub/usas-removal-uganda-niger-gabon-and-central-african-republic-agoa-has-only-limited">duty free export</a> programme. </p>
<p>The European Union also <a href="https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/eu-adopts-new-niger-sanctions-framework/">instituted sanctions</a>. Niger then cancelled its security and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231127-niger-junta-revokes-anti-migration-law-in-setback-to-eu-strategy">migration agreements</a> with the European bloc.</p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/west-african-bloc-maintains-sanctions-against-niger/3079035">sanctioned</a> Niger. Another major ally, Nigeria, <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2023/08/03/coup-nigeria-cuts-off-power-supply-to-niger-republic/">cut electricity</a> and instituted further sanctions. </p>
<p>The sanctions, coupled with an increase in insecurity, weakened and isolated Niger. </p>
<p>Rather than budge, the junta looked for alternative partners – like Russia and China. It also recently joined Mali and Burkina Faso to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">announce a withdrawal</a> from Ecowas. </p>
<p>For its part, Russia was positioning itself as a reliable ally. In December 2023, a <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/04/russian-officials-visit-niger-to-strengthen-military-ties/">Russian delegation visited Niger</a> and in January 2024, Niger’s Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/">visited Moscow</a> to discuss military and economic ties. </p>
<p>Russia is no stranger to the region. Over the last three years it has set up <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">security arrangements</a> with the juntas running Niger’s neighbours: Mali and Burkina Faso. This has been done through the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, a private security company supported by Russia, whose operations in Africa were renamed <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/12/17/africa-corps-russia-s-sahel-presence-rebranded_6352317_124.html">Africa Corps</a> in early 2024. </p>
<p>Russian military advisers have been operating in Mali since 2021. In addition, the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">Wagner group has 400 mercenaries</a> in the country. Russia also <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/08/10/mali-gets-more-military-equipment-from-russia/">delivered military hardware</a> to the country in 2022. </p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>There are three main potential implications for Niger and other allied countries. </p>
<p>First, a potential escalation of tensions between Niger and France. This will happen if Niger grants Russia uranium exploration rights that affect French companies with existing licences. Niger <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-24/top-uranium-producer-niger-launches-mining-sector-overhaul?leadSource=uverify%20wall&embedded-checkout=true">has suspended new mining licences</a> and is currently auditing existing ones. This could affect French companies. France has <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-emmanuel-macron-warn-attack-embassy-niger/">vowed</a> to protect its economic interests in Niger. </p>
<p>It depends on how the partnership between Russia and Niger develops, in particular how Niger intends to pay for its share of any military cooperation. If this involves the Wagner group, as is the case in security partnerships between Russia and Burkina Faso and Mali, the issue of <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/the-wagner-groups-playbook-in-africa-mali/">mining concessions</a> will come into play. Mali and Burkina Faso have paid for Wagner’s involvement by <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/03/a-heavy-price-to-pay-2/">offering</a> mining concessions in return for arms, ammunition and mercenaries. </p>
<p>Second, any security tie involving the Wagner group would create further discontent between Niger and its regional allies, especially Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon. </p>
<p>Following the coup, Niger announced it was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67605967">leaving</a> the G5 Sahel, which was set up to coordinate security operations in the Sahel. This has turned attention to the country’s participation in the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a>. </p>
<p>Both institutions were set up to fight insurgency in the region and Niger has been an active contributor. The other countries in the joint task force, such as Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Benin Republic, will be wary of working with Niger if it is in active partnership with Wagner, which is <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/massacres-executions-and-falsified-graves-wagner-groups-mounting-humanitarian-cost-mali">notorious</a> for human rights abuses.</p>
<p>The third likely major fallout from Russia’s involvement revolves around Niger’s relationship with the EU. The EU is currently constructing a <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/648851468123254494/pdf/957770PID0P1500Box391429B00PUBLIC0.pdf#page=3">US$13 billion</a> gas pipeline from Nigeria to the bloc through Niger. The pipeline project was designed to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian gas.</p>
<p>Based on Russia’s animosity with the EU, I believe Russia could use the security alliance to disrupt the project in order to secure its gas delivery to the EU. </p>
<p>The junta can use the pipeline project as leverage against the EU by demanding major financial concessions, putting the delivery of the project at risk and strengthening Russia’s position. </p>
<p>Migration is another area of contention when it comes to the EU. Niger now <a href="https://www.ewn.co.za/2024/01/24/nigers-gateway-to-the-desert-open-again-for-migrants-1">allows</a> mass illegal migration through its territory for onward journey to Europe. This will create more problems for the EU. </p>
<p>The active presence of Russia in Niger could change the security and economic landscape of the region and affect all parties. </p>
<p>I maintain my <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-ecowas-must-do-these-3-things-to-break-the-stalemate-212403">initial position</a> that rather than use force, the Niger junta should be encouraged to restore democracy as soon as possible. At the same time, some of the sanctions should be lifted to encourage dialogue and reduce the influence of Russia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221696/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Niger’s recent military romance with Russia could escalate tensions with France, regional allies and the European Union.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216162024-01-23T13:29:43Z2024-01-23T13:29:43ZEducation has a huge role to play in peace and development: 5 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570556/original/file-20240122-20-g5icoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children's education is frequently disrupted in conflict-fraught areas.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniel Beloumou Olomo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nelson Mandela was a famous advocate for the value of education. In 1990, the man who would become South Africa’s first democratically president four years later <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/24/us/the-mandela-visit-education-is-mighty-force-boston-teen-agers-are-told.html">told a high school in Boston</a>: “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.”</p>
<p>The United Nations agrees. In 2018 its General Assembly adopted a resolution that proclaimed 24 January as the <a href="https://www.unesco.org/en/days/education">International Day of Education</a>. It’s an annual opportunity to shine a spotlight on the role that education can and should play in promoting peace and development. This year the theme is “learning for lasting peace” – a critical focus in a world that, the UN points out, is “seeing a surge of violent conflicts paralleled by an alarming rise of discrimination, racism, xenophobia, and hate speech”.</p>
<p>To mark the occasion, we’re sharing some of the many articles our authors have contributed since we launched in 2015 that examine the intersection of education and conflict – and how to wield this powerful “weapon” for positive change.</p>
<h2>Education under attack</h2>
<p>Education systems in a number of African countries <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/GCPEA_NSAG_ScopingPaper.pdf">have been identified</a> by international advocacy groups as “very heavily affected” by conflict. These include Sudan, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Central Sahel, which includes Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, is another region of high concern. In 2020 alone (and before COVID lockdowns), 4,000 schools in the Central Sahel <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/Central-Sahel-Paper-English.pdf">closed because of insecurity</a>. </p>
<p>Craig Bailie <a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">explains</a> what drives armed groups to attack schools in the Central Sahel, leaving hundreds of thousands of students high and dry.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">Education is both the victim and the best weapon in Central Sahel conflict</a>
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<h2>Long-term effects</h2>
<p>Education systems, of course, do not exist in a vacuum. Where conflict meets long-term governance failures, poor resourcing and other societal issues, schooling comes under even more pressure. Ethiopia, for instance, has not only had to reckon with <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">internal conflict since 2020</a>; it’s also grappling with deeply rooted systemic crises.</p>
<p>Tebeje Molla and Dawit Tibebu Tiruneh <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">unpack</a> how these crises are colliding to leave Ethiopian children and teenagers floundering.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">Ethiopia’s education system is in crisis – now’s the time to fix it</a>
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<h2>Rebuilding is possible</h2>
<p>That’s not to say education systems can’t bounce back after conflict. During Somalia’s civil war in the late 1980s more than 90% of schools were destroyed. In the wake of the war the north of the country declared itself as the Republic of Somaliland. </p>
<p>Tobias Gandrup and Kristof Titeca <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">examine how</a>, together, the state, NGOs and the diaspora have succeeded in rebuilding the education system.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">How schools are kept afloat in Somaliland</a>
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<h2>Solutions exist</h2>
<p>Researchers also have a role to play in strengthening education systems. All over the continent, projects that aim to keep children learning even amid devastating conflicts are being developed, rolled out and tested.</p>
<p>One example comes from north-eastern Nigeria, which has been beset by Boko Haram attacks. Margee Ensign and Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob <a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">used</a> a combination of radio and tablet computers to improve the literacy and numeracy skills of 22,000 children forced out of school.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">Disasters interrupt schooling regularly in parts of Africa: here's a solution</a>
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<h2>In the classroom</h2>
<p>Conflicts seem inevitable in a world racked by many “wicked problems” like climate change, inequality and poverty. But what’s taught in Africa’s classrooms could play a role in solving them. The ability to think critically, and to engage with facts rather than fiction, is key. </p>
<p>To this end, Ayodeji Olukoju <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">explains</a> why it was so important that Nigeria reintroduced history as a school subject in 2019, a decade after scrapping it from the curriculum. Understanding history, he argues, helps to explode myths and stereotypes, leading to a more cohesive society.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">What studying history at school can do for Nigerians</a>
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</em>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221616/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Education can spur peace and development. Here are five essential reads on the topic.Natasha Joseph, Commissioning EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2191302024-01-08T13:58:09Z2024-01-08T13:58:09ZScramble for the Sahel – why France, Russia, China and the United States are interested in the region<p>The Sahel, a region <a href="https://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569">3,860km wide located south of the Sahara Desert</a> and stretching east-west across the African continent, has been a focus of attention around the world recently. </p>
<p>In the last decade, issues such as <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15365.doc.htm#:%7E:text=drivers%20of%20insecurity.-,From%201%20January%20to%2030%20June%202023%2C%20the%20region%20recorded,displaced%20persons%20exceeding%206%20million.">terrorism</a>, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1132332#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CIndeed%2C%20the%20central%20Sahel%20continues,in%20Ukraine%2C%E2%80%9D%20she%20added.">insecurity</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137072">trafficking</a> have characterised the region. </p>
<p>Military takeovers have been a major source of concern in the region and beyond in the last few years. Since 2020, the region has had <a href="https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/understanding-crisis-democracy-west-africa-and-sahel">four successful coup d’états</a> and three failed ones. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://acleddata.com/2023/08/03/fact-sheet-military-coup-in-niger/">coup in Niger</a> particularly attracted attention. This is because Niger was seen as a “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/west-africa/nigers-coup-and-americas-choice">darling of the west</a>” and a model for democratic governance in the region. </p>
<p>Despite the challenges facing the region, the scramble for the Sahel remains intense. </p>
<p>The main actors in this scramble are the <a href="https://european-union.europa.eu/index_en">European Union</a>, France, Russia, China and the United States.</p>
<p>The EU relies on Sahelian countries, especially Niger, to stop mass illegal immigration into the bloc. Niger is a major transit country in the region. Niger had security and defence partnerships with the EU until recently when the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/niger-ends-security-and-defence-partnerships-with-the-eu/">country unilaterally cancelled the deals</a>. This is a source of concern to the EU. </p>
<p>Why are these foreign powers interested in the Sahel?</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">scholar</a> in international relations and having <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/Olayinka-Ajala-2181806326">researched</a> the region for over a decade, I see the main reasons as follows: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>availability of natural resources</p></li>
<li><p>strategic location of the region in Africa</p></li>
<li><p>economic interests of the countries involved in the scramble</p></li>
<li><p>defence and security cooperation in the form of arms sales.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Foreign powers all have their reasons to be involved in the scramble for the Sahel.</p>
<h2>France</h2>
<p>Most of the countries in the Sahel region were colonised by France. Unlike Britain, France has maintained strong links with former colonies. They cooperate in the economy, defence and resource extraction, to mention a few areas. </p>
<p>France has the <a href="https://www.ieri.be/en/publications/wp/2019/f-vrier/france-still-exploiting-africa">first right</a> to buy any natural resources discovered in all its former colonies. Although the relationship between France and its former colonies appeared cordial, recent coups in Francophone countries and <a href="https://theconversation.com/france-in-africa-why-macrons-policies-increased-distrust-and-anger-212022">anti-France sentiments</a> across Africa have revealed the opposite. </p>
<p>The coups have been followed by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/huge-protests-niger-call-french-forces-leave-after-coup-2023-09-02/">large demonstrations</a> against France and in support of the putschists. </p>
<p>Despite these cracks, France is keen to maintain its grip on these countries, especially pertaining to military cooperation and resource extraction. France was reluctant to pull its military out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger despite the countries severing military partnerships. It continues to extract natural resources in these countries.</p>
<h2>Russia</h2>
<p>The relationships between Russia and many Sahelian countries were established during the cold war and colonial era. More recently, the emphasis by western countries on <a href="https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-72-the-impact-of-counter-terrorism-measures-on-muslim-communities.pdf">human rights</a>, especially during counterterrorism operations, has pushed Sahelian countries closer to Russia.</p>
<p>While western allies demand the rule of law, democracy, and human rights in return for security and economic support, Russia portrays itself differently. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/2022-Russian-invasion-of-Ukraine">invasion</a> of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 also increased Russia’s interest in the Sahel because it is keen to maintain allies in Africa. </p>
<p>Russia has <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">openly backed</a> military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warned</a> against any military intervention in Niger when the military took power. Furthermore, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, the controversial private military company which is controlled by Russia, cooperates with some countries in the Sahel. Niger has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231204-niger-s-junta-ends-key-security-agreements-with-eu-turns-to-russia-for-defence-deal">cancelled defence agreement with the EU</a> and switched to Russia. All of these factors explain Russia’s interest in the Sahel. </p>
<h2>China</h2>
<p>Like Russia, China portrays itself as an alternative to the traditional ally (France) of Sahelian countries. With a mantra of “<a href="https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=94683">non-interference</a>” and “<a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/praxis/files/2020/05/1.-Condon.pdf">respecting sovereignty</a>”, China has entrenched itself as a “partner” of countries in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The Sahel region is rich in natural resources such as oil, uranium, natural gas and lithium. Chinese state-owned enterprises <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">operate</a> in Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>For instance, Mali potentially has <a href="https://www.mining-technology.com/features/top-ten-biggest-lithium-mines/?cf-view">one of the largest</a> lithium reserves in the world and China’s Ganfeng Lithium has <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">invested</a> heavily in the country. In addition, despite China’s development in military hardware, most of the weapons are untested. China is keen to use the conflicts in the Sahel to <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/WF_93_Rajosefa_The_Future_of_Strategic_Competition_in_the_Sahel_Region.pdf">test</a> its arms products. </p>
<h2>The United States</h2>
<p>In 2019, the US opened its <a href="https://intellinews.com/us-in-danger-of-losing-control-of-its-extensive-drone-base-in-niger-289069/#:%7E:text=The%20Agadez%20drone%20base%2C%20officially,by%20the%20US%20Air%20Force.">largest drone base</a> in Africa in Agadez-Niger. A year before that, I had <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">written</a> about the security implications of the base for the region. </p>
<p>Unlike France and China, which both have extensive economic interests in the Sahel, the US has a strong military interest. Niger, in particular, is strategically located and the US can easily fly surveillance and reconnaissance drones from the country to cover the Sahel, west and central Africa. </p>
<p>As France is being militarily dislodged by its former colonies in the region, the US has been trying to fill the void to prevent Russia and China from establishing further military presence. </p>
<p>The US took several months to label the military takeover in Niger a coup so as not to lose strategic military cooperation and dominance. </p>
<p>The year 2023 has been particularly challenging for the countries in the Sahel. With issues ranging from economic instability to insecurity, the region remains fragile. Despite the instability and fragility, the scramble for the region remains intense with traditional allies such as France losing its grip and other powers stepping up. </p>
<p>The Sahel is one to keep an eye on in 2024 and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Foreign powers’ interest in the Sahel is driven by its natural resources and strategic location for security and illegal migration control.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2165552023-12-15T09:07:27Z2023-12-15T09:07:27ZThe Sahara Desert used to be a green savannah – new research explains why<p>Algeria’s <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/179/">Tassili N’Ajjer plateau</a> is Africa’s largest national park. Among its vast sandstone formations is perhaps the world’s largest art museum. Over 15,000 etchings and paintings are exhibited there, some as much as 11,000 years old according to scientific dating techniques, representing a unique ethnological and climatological record of the region. </p>
<p>Curiously, however, these images do not depict the arid, barren landscape that is present in the Tassili N'Ajjer today. Instead, they portray a vibrant savannah inhabited by elephants, giraffes, rhinos and hippos. This rock art is an important record of the past environmental conditions that prevailed in the Sahara, the world’s largest <a href="https://www.livescience.com/23140-sahara-desert.html">hot desert</a>. </p>
<p>These images depict a period approximately 6,000-11,000 years ago called the <a href="https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/green-sahara-african-humid-periods-paced-by-82884405/">Green Sahara or North African Humid Period</a>. There is widespread climatological <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590332220301007#bib31">evidence</a> that during this period the Sahara supported wooded savannah ecosystems and numerous rivers and lakes in what are now Libya, Niger, Chad and Mali. </p>
<p>This greening of the Sahara didn’t happen once. Using marine and lake sediments, scientists have <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0076514">identified</a> over 230 of these greenings occurring about every 21,000 years over the past eight million years. These greening events provided vegetated corridors which influenced species’ distribution and evolution, including the out-of-Africa migrations of ancient humans.</p>
<p>These dramatic greenings would have required a large-scale reorganisation of the atmospheric system to bring rains to this hyper arid region. But most climate models haven’t been able to simulate how dramatic these events were. </p>
<p>As a team of climate modellers and anthropologists, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-41219-4">we have overcome this obstacle</a>. We developed a climate model that more accurately simulates atmospheric circulation over the Sahara and the impacts of vegetation on rainfall. </p>
<p>We identified why north Africa greened approximately every 21,000 years over the past eight million years. It was caused by changes in the Earth’s orbital <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/precession-of-the-equinoxes">precession</a> - the slight wobbling of the planet while rotating. This moves the Northern Hemisphere closer to the sun during the summer months. </p>
<p>This caused warmer summers in the Northern Hemisphere, and warmer air is able to hold more moisture. This intensified the strength of the West African Monsoon system and shifted the African rainbelt northwards. This increased Saharan rainfall, resulting in the spread of savannah and wooded grassland across the desert from the tropics to the Mediterranean, providing a vast habitat for plants and animals. </p>
<p>Our results demonstrate the sensitivity of the Sahara Desert to changes in past climate. They explain how this sensitivity affects rainfall across north Africa. This is important for understanding the implications of present-day climate change (driven by human activities). Warmer temperatures in the future may also enhance monsoon strength, with both local and global impacts. </p>
<h2>Earth’s changing orbit</h2>
<p>The fact that the wetter periods in north Africa have recurred every 21,000 years or so is a big clue about what causes them: variations in Earth’s orbit. Due to gravitational influences from the moon and other planets in our solar system, the orbit of the Earth around the sun is not constant. It has cyclic variations on multi-thousand year timescales. These orbital cycles are termed <a href="https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_resources/211/orbital-cycles/">Milankovitch cycles</a>; they influence the amount of energy the Earth receives from the sun. </p>
<p>On 100,000-year cycles, the shape of Earth’s orbit (or <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/eccentricity-astronomy">eccentricity</a>) shifts between circular and oval, and on 41,000 year cycles the tilt of Earth’s axis varies (termed <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/obliquity">obliquity</a>). Eccentricity and obliquity cycles are responsible for driving the ice ages of the past 2.4 million years. </p>
<p>The third Milankovitch cycle is <a href="https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_resources/251/axial-precession-wobble/">precession</a>. This concerns Earth’s wobble on its axis, which varies on a 21,000 year timescale. The similarity between the precession cycle and the timing of the humid periods indicates that precession is their dominant driver. Precession influences seasonal contrasts, increasing them in one hemisphere and reducing them in another. During warmer Northern Hemisphere summers, a consequent increase in north African summer rainfall would have initiated a humid phase, resulting in the spread of vegetation across the region.</p>
<h2>Eccentricity and the ice sheets</h2>
<p>In our study we also identified that the humid periods did not occur during the ice ages, when large glacial ice sheets covered much of the polar regions. This is because these vast ice sheets cooled the atmosphere. The cooling countered the influence of precession and suppressed the expansion of the African monsoon system. </p>
<p>The ice ages are driven by the eccentricity cycle, which determines how circular Earth’s orbit is around the sun. So our findings show that eccentricity indirectly influences the magnitude of the humid periods via its influence on the ice sheets. This highlights, for the first time, a major connection between these distant high latitude and tropical regions.</p>
<p>The Sahara acts as a gate. It controls the dispersal of species between north and sub-Saharan Africa, and in and out of the continent. The gate was open when the Sahara was green and closed when deserts prevailed. Our results reveal the sensitivity of this gate to Earth’s orbit around the sun. They also show that high latitude ice sheets may have restricted the dispersal of species during the glacial periods of the last 800,000 years. </p>
<p>Our ability to model the African humid periods helps us understand the alternation of humid and arid phases. This had major consequences for the dispersal and evolution of species, including humans, within and out of Africa. Furthermore, it provides a tool for understanding future greening in response to climate change and its environmental impact. </p>
<p>Refined models may, in the future, be able to identify how climate warming will influence rainfall and vegetation in the Sahara region, and the wider implications for society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216555/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Sahara Desert is green and vegetated every 21,000 years. A climate model shows why.Edward Armstrong, Postdoctoral research fellow, University of HelsinkiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2144422023-10-03T14:42:00Z2023-10-03T14:42:00ZFrance’s decision to leave Niger was a bad move: three reasons why<p>After about two months of wrangling between France and the new military regime in Niger, President Emmanuel Macron finally <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/president-macron-says-france-will-pull-ambassador-and-troops-out-of-niger-by-end-of-the-year-12969438">decided</a>, on 24 September, to withdraw the French ambassador and pull out French military forces from Niger. </p>
<p>This was a U-turn. Only four weeks earlier, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230831-niger-junta-revokes-french-ambassador-s-diplomatic-immunity-orders-his-expulsion">Macron had refused to follow</a> the instructions of the putschists who’d ordered the ambassador and French forces to leave the country. He argued that he did not <a href="https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/Niger-France-does-not-recognize-any-legitimacy-to-the-declarations-of-the-military-junta-in-power/">recognise</a> the new junta, which took power on 26 July, and insisted that his forces would remain in the country. </p>
<p>As a scholar of <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">politics and international relations</a>, I have been exploring the security situation and the rise of insurgency in the Sahel for over a decade. In my view, France’s actions have created unnecessary uncertainty in a region already beset by insecurity from increasing jihadist activities, as well as six successful coups in the last three years. </p>
<p>In my opinion, France has made a strategic mistake. Though it did not recognise the junta, it should have maintained communication, especially after falling out with other former colonies such as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/5/how-malis-military-fell-out-with-its-french-ally">Mali</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-marks-official-end-french-military-operations-its-soil-2023-02-19/">Burkina Faso</a>. </p>
<p>The other prominent external actor in Niger was the US. The US decided to negotiate with the junta. Unlike France, it did not label the military takeover a coup d'etat. The US <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/u-s-resumes-counterterrorism-drone-operations-from-niger-68e8c903">resumed operations</a> in some of its bases in Niger, having secured agreement from the junta. </p>
<p>Macron’s actions could have three negative outcomes for the region. It will hurt the fight against terrorism. It also opens the door to greater influence of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60947877">Wagner</a>, the Russian-backed mercenary group. And finally it has implications for Europe’s migrant crisis.</p>
<h2>The fight against terrorism</h2>
<p>Niger plays a significant role in the security architecture of the Sahel. The country is actively involved in and contributes to security organisations such as the <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Counter-terrorism-projects/G5-Sahel">G5 Sahel</a> and the <a href="https://isij.eu/article/interorganizational-cooperation-and-fight-against-terrorism-west-africa-and-sahel">Multinational Joint Task Force</a>. </p>
<p>These organisations are involved in the fight against terrorism in the region. Apart from contributing funds to both organisations, especially the G5 Sahel, France is also involved in training Nigerien forces and flying reconnaissance and attack drones, actively combating terrorists in the region.</p>
<p>The decision by France to pull out of Niger will have an impact on counter terrorism operations in the region. France has been involved there for a long time and has soldiers who thoroughly understand the region. Losing these officers will create a gap that Niger might struggle to fill in the short term. </p>
<p>Like France, the US also has a large military presence in Niger, where it operates its largest drone base in Africa. I have previously analysed the <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-journal/us-drone-base-agadez-security-threat-niger">importance and security implications</a> of the drone base to the region. </p>
<p>For its part, the EU also contributes to the security of the region by providing <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_768">funding</a> for the G5 Sahel and Multinational Joint Task Force. This momentum must be sustained in order not to lose what has already been achieved in the form of an established security architecture. </p>
<p>The withdrawal of French forces will negatively affect the morale of the soldiers in the security alliance and embolden insurgent groups. An <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66922754">increase in terrorist attacks</a> has been recorded since the coup. </p>
<h2>Russia versus the US</h2>
<p>The terms of the agreement between the US and the military junta were not published. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to assume that one of Washington’s reasons for making sure it remained in Niger was the fear that it might lose the country to Russia. </p>
<p>In Mali, the military junta replaced French troops with Wagner forces. Since 2022, Russia <a href="https://www.unav.edu/en/web/global-affairs/a-change-in-mali-the-french-out-wagner-in">has gained influence through the Wagner Group</a> after the exit of France.</p>
<p>Washington would want to avoid losing further ground to Russian influence. With the Wagner group already present in Mali, there is suspicion that the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/09/17/mali-niger-burkina-faso-sign-mutual-defence-pact//">recently signed military pact</a> between the three countries (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) could expand the presence of the group. </p>
<p>In addition, the US has invested heavily in the Sahel, especially in Niger. In the last decade the US has invested hundreds of millions of dollars on security infrastructure, including a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">drone base in Agadez</a> (central Niger). </p>
<p>The US understands the role “ungoverned spaces” in the Sahel could play in breeding terrorism. Such was the case of the regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan where Al-Qaeda launched attacks against the US and its western allies. </p>
<h2>What it means for migration</h2>
<p>Other major players in Niger such as the European Union also cannot afford to follow the path of France. The EU needs stability in Niger to stem trafficking and avoid another humanitarian catastrophe as seen in 2015-16. Europe witnessed the highest number of migrants <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/asylum-seekers-refugees-and-migration-niger-may-2015">transiting through Niger</a> and Libya into Europe during this period.</p>
<p>There is no doubt that the civilian regimes of presidents <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mahamadou-Issoufou">Mahamadou Issoufou</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-you-need-know-about-nigers-ousted-president-2023-08-14/">Mohamed Bazoum</a> contributed to the reduction in the flow of migrants through Niger to Libya. While serving as interior minister, Bazoum was instrumental in passing a law against people smuggling through Niger. The law was championed by Bazoum but also believed to have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/23/niger-observers-link-coup-to-president-mohamed-bazoum-support-of-eu-migration-policies-people-smuggling">contributed to his ousting</a> by the military. The junta could threaten to cancel the agreement and look the other way as migrants again transition through Niger into the EU. </p>
<p>The EU needs to maintain a strong diplomatic channel with the junta to maintain stability, prevent an increase in smuggling and continue efforts towards the return of democratic order. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>While I understand that increased diplomacy with the junta cements its authority, I think foreign powers should accept that there is a government in Niger that has some degree of popularity among the citizens. Frozen channels of diplomacy must be reactivated to prevent a total collapse of the Sahel’s security architecture and in order to achieve a quick transition to democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214442/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>France’s withdrawal from Niger could hurt the regional fight against terrorism, create an opportunity for Wagner’s influence and increase Europe’s migrant crisis.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2136642023-09-21T13:27:45Z2023-09-21T13:27:45ZHow well you do at school depends on how much your teachers know: insights from 14 French-speaking countries in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548527/original/file-20230915-27043-8dgaeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Almost half of all sixth-grade students in Niger struggle to read a simple sentence.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Olympia De Maismont/AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Countries in sub-Saharan Africa have made remarkable progress towards reaching universal school enrolment in the past 25 years. Across the region, <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.TENR?locations=ZG">8 in 10 children</a> of primary school age are now enrolled in school, and in countries such as <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.TENR?locations=ZG-BJ">Benin</a> and <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.TENR?locations=ZG-MG">Madagascar</a> this figure stands at almost 10 in 10 children. </p>
<p>However, it is becoming increasingly clear that many children in the region are <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2018">learning very little in school</a>. This <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/09/26/world-bank-warns-of-learning-crisis-in-global-education">“learning crisis”</a> means that it will be difficult to reach the <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal4">United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal</a> of quality education for all by 2030.</p>
<p>Importantly, the learning crisis does not affect all countries equally. For example, a <a href="https://pasecconfemen.lmc-dev.fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/08/RapportPasec2019_Rev2022_WebOK.pdf">recent study</a> found that whereas almost half of all sixth-grade students (who are on average about 13 years old) in Niger have difficulties reading a simple sentence, only one in 10 sixth-grade students in neighbouring Burkina Faso has such problems. This raises the question of what explains these international learning gaps.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775723000845">recent study</a>, my co-authors Natalie Irmert, Mohammad H. Sepahvand and I tried to answer this question. We hypothesised that differences in teacher quality between countries play a role. Using comparable data from 14 countries in French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa, we found that differences in teachers’ subject knowledge – that is, teachers’ mastery of the material they are expected to teach in a given subject – explain more than a third of the international variation in student learning. </p>
<p>This implies that the very low levels of learning in some countries’ schools are to a large extent due to a lack of knowledgeable teachers.</p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>Our study was made possible by the recent release of data from the <a href="https://pasec.confemen.org/en/">PASEC 2019 assessment</a>. The assessment measured sixth-grade students’ reading and maths skills in 14 French-speaking African countries in a comparable way. Importantly for our purposes, it also measured the knowledge of these students’ teachers in the same two subjects. The assessment revealed very large differences in the average reading and maths skills of students between countries. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/collaboration-is-helping-teachers-in-rural-cameroon-fill-knowledge-gaps-101920">Collaboration is helping teachers in rural Cameroon fill knowledge gaps</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In our study, we examined whether these international differences in student skills were driven by gaps in teachers’ subject knowledge. We hypothesised that this might be the case based on <a href="https://economics.ucr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/4-15-22-Smith.pdf">previous research</a> from individual countries which shows that teacher quality is a key driver of learning.</p>
<p>Our results showed student skills and teachers’ subject knowledge were indeed positively correlated: better teacher knowledge tended to go hand in hand with better student skills. </p>
<p>However, this did not necessarily mean that teachers’ subject knowledge caused learning. For example, countries with more knowledgeable teachers might also invest more into school buildings. In this case, the positive correlation between teacher knowledge and student skills could simply reflect the better learning conditions due to improved school buildings.</p>
<h2>Explaining the differences</h2>
<p>To be sure that our correlation reflected a causal effect of teacher knowledge, we used a statistical trick: we compared each country’s student skills and teacher knowledge in reading to its student skills and teacher knowledge in maths. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/girls-thrive-with-women-teachers-a-study-in-francophone-africa-95297">Girls thrive with women teachers: a study in Francophone Africa</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This meant that we could keep all factors that did not differ between the two subjects, such as the quality of school buildings, constant. If better teachers’ knowledge in reading relative to maths tended to go hand in hand with better student skills in reading relative to maths, we could be certain that the effect of teacher knowledge was causal.</p>
<p>The figure below shows that this was indeed the case: for example, Burundi’s teachers scored relatively low on the reading test relative to the maths test, and consequently its students did worse in the reading assessment than in the maths assessment. In contrast, Gabon’s teachers were relatively more knowledgeable in reading, and therefore its students also performed better in the reading test. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Teachers’ subject knowledge boosts student skills.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775723000845">Authors supplied</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Overall, differences in teachers’ subject knowledge could explain a third of the differences in student learning between the 14 countries. Our data did not allow us to conclude which factors explain the remaining two thirds of these differences.</p>
<h2>Implications for policy</h2>
<p>Our results show that teacher quality, and especially teacher subject knowledge, is a crucial driver of cross-country differences in learning. This is an important insight for policymakers in sub-Saharan Africa who are trying to solve the “learning crisis”: it shows that there is a large payoff to recruiting more knowledgeable teachers.</p>
<p>Additionally, in-service training that improves the knowledge of already employed teachers could lead to large gains in student learning.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213664/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jan Bietenbeck receives funding from Jan Wallanders och Tom Hedelius stiftelse samt Tore Browaldhs stiftelse. </span></em></p>Overall, differences in teachers’ subject knowledge could explain a third of the differences in student learning between the 14 countries.Jan Bietenbeck, Associate Professor of Economics, Lund UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122772023-09-12T14:15:03Z2023-09-12T14:15:03ZJihadist groups threaten the conservation of a key west African world heritage site - new study<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547012/original/file-20230907-19-qmm5ol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C16%2C5367%2C4177&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An African antelope at the Mekrou river in the W National Park, Niger.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kob-bovidae-w-national-park-mekrou-river-niger-africa-news-photo/492759701?adppopup=true">DeAgostini/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Burkina Faso, Benin and Niger share a biosphere reserve known as the <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/fr/list/749">WAP complex (W-Arly-Pendjari)</a>, which spreads across the borders of the three countries. The first part of this 3 million hectare <a href="https://en.unesco.org/mab">Unesco</a> world heritage site was declared in 1996 and it was extended in 2002. It’s intended to protect species that are highly threatened in the region, including elephants and cheetahs, as well as important <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/fr/ramsar/">wetlands</a>.</p>
<p>The three states signed an agreement in 2008 to manage the reserve’s natural resources together, for the purposes of local, national and regional development. </p>
<p>The territory has been afflicted by violence and insecurity for some ten years. This trouble has spilled over from the “three borders” area shared by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, where armed Islamist groups have been operating. </p>
<p>Due to the steady encroachment of non-state armed groups, the conflict is threatening to engulf the reserve. Forest resources are being <a href="https://www.afrik21.africa/en/benin-impact-of-the-massacre-of-5-rangers-in-the-w-national-park-in-northern-benin/">plundered</a> and people who live near the protected areas are being displaced.</p>
<p>As part of a study of causes of migration in and from the region, I <a href="https://nai.uu.se/news-and-events/news/2022-10-14-counter-terrorism-has-to-be-transborder-and-address-root-causes.html">investigated</a> the local impact of armed groups, focusing on <a href="https://en.unesco.org/biosphere/africa/w-transboundary">W Park</a>, part of the WAP complex. I interviewed local people about the implications of poaching activities and the use of violence in forest reserves.</p>
<p>My opinion is that an “economy of armed groups”, which can be called a “jihadism of protected areas”, is being set up. It is dangerously disrupting environmental protection.</p>
<p>The armed groups have opened trafficking routes and launched attacks on local communities. They have taken over activities such as gold panning, hunting and fishing and targeted forest eco-guards. All this has had a direct impact on people and led to deteriorating social conditions. Authorities need to coordinate national responses to safeguard the reserve and restore social cohesion among local communities.</p>
<h2>Serious threat to protected forest areas</h2>
<p>The transboundary area came under multiple pressures decades ago, such as harvesting wood, hunting, poaching, fishing, collecting medicinal plants and illegal mining. The level of exploitation was threatening the ecosystems. In response, the countries adopted a regional approach to coordinate national policies. Local people were to participate in the common management of resources. This approach was outlined in the 2000 <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/TAPOA.pdf">Tapoa Declaration</a> and again in 2008.</p>
<p>But another form of pressure has also grown. Today, armed groups seriously <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/2222">threaten</a> the future of the reserve, its conservation and the sustainability of its activities and development. They have “colonised” this natural geographical area, living inside the remote uncontrolled protected areas and exploiting resources. <a href="https://apanews.net/2023/06/10/benin-deploys-3000-troops-in-the-north-to-fight-terrorism/">They often commit abuses on unprotected populations</a>. </p>
<p>The armed groups are not the sole causes of this current situation. Based on my field research in the region over the years, I argue that it is also the result of the political management by the three states.</p>
<p>Contributing to the political and social instability are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>land grabs in the areas surrounding protected forest areas</p></li>
<li><p>a pastoralism crisis which increases competition with crop farmers</p></li>
<li><p>inconsistency in the distribution and regulation of forest resources between local residents and state representatives </p></li>
<li><p>a poorly integrated approach to the biosphere. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>War entrepreneurship</h2>
<p>Since 2018, the Katiba Ansar-ul Islam and the Katiba Serma have been the two <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/National-Parks.pdf">armed groups most visible in northern Benin, south-eastern Burkina Faso and western Niger</a>. A kind of “war entrepreneurship” is being set up. It <a href="https://www.afrik21.africa/en/benin-impact-of-the-massacre-of-5-rangers-in-the-w-national-park-in-northern-benin/">draws</a> on natural resources (wood, rare plants, illegal fishing, gold panning), but also causes forced migration in already vulnerable populations. Protected areas have become sanctuaries for recruiting local fighters and planning attacks. According to most of the people I interviewed, the armed groups also consider the forest eco-guards as predators who have oppressed the local populations since the colonial era. Some guards have been killed, others recruited into the armed groups.</p>
<p>The armed groups rely on income from forest products exploitation, illegally extracted gold and <em>zakat</em> – taxes demanded from locals. They also force local people to pledge allegiance to their cause and make them move from their places to remote areas such as the protected reserves. There, migrants also exploit the natural resources. </p>
<p>What has developed is a parallel political economy in areas controlled by armed groups. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Among the initiatives to combat non-state armed groups, our policy report suggested the following solutions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>make forest villages inaccessible to two-wheeled motorcycles, the main means of transport for armed groups</p></li>
<li><p>set up forest tunnels or corridors where people can hide when under threat </p></li>
<li><p>re-adopt an integrated and inclusive approach to forest ecology, animal protection and cross-border security </p></li>
<li><p>strengthen social cohesion between communities in Burkina Faso, Benin and Niger by defusing the driving factors of insurgency and restoring mutual trust.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212277/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Papa Sow receives funding from the Nordic Africa institute, Uppsala, Sweden. </span></em></p>Trans-border collaboration is required to recover protected areas that transverse Niger, Burkina Faso and Benin Republic from armed groups.Papa Sow, Senior Researcher, The Nordic Africa InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2130482023-09-12T12:27:00Z2023-09-12T12:27:00ZUS response to Gabon and Niger coups suggests need for a new West Africa policy in Washington<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547570/original/file-20230911-8175-ma4a9g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C56%2C2524%2C1673&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Niger's pro-coup National Council for Safeguard of the Homeland celebrate</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-nigers-national-concil-for-safeguard-of-the-news-photo/1657635765?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent coups in the West African nations of Gabon and Niger <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/blindsided-hours-coup-niger-us-diplomats-said-country-was-stable-rcna99708">caught U.S. diplomats a little off guard</a>. They also indicate Washington may need to reassess its policy in the region or risk becoming increasingly irrelevant to the new governments.</p>
<p>Despite following similar overthrows of governments <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62037317">in Mali</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/5/coup-in-burkina-faso-what-you-need-to-know">Burkina Faso</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/chads-covert-coup-and-the-implications-for-democratic-governance-in-africa-159725">and Chad</a> in recent years, the U.S official reaction to the coups in Gabon and Niger has come across to <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/us-africa/">some observers as makeshift and uncertain</a>.</p>
<p>In Niger, U.S. diplomats have resisted referring to the overthrowing of President Mohamed Bazoum in July as a coup. Doing so would <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/06/us/politics/biden-niger-coup-aid.html">mandate the cutting off of military and economic assistance</a> to the country, in which America has sizable military bases. Nonetheless, Washington <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/niger-us-seeks-hang-best-counterterrorist-outpost-west-102008004">later threatened to cut millions of dollars in aid</a>. In Gabon, America acknowledged the coup, which brought down President Ali Bongo Ondimba, and called for the restoration of a democratic process.</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://udayton.edu/directory/artssciences/history/amin_julius_a.php">scholar of U.S—Africa relations</a>, and my forthcoming book, “<a href="https://www.routledge.com/Sixty-Years-of-Service-in-Africa-The-US-Peace-Corps-in-Cameroon/Amin/p/book/9781032584836">Sixty Years of Service in Africa: The U.S Peace Corps in Cameroon</a>,” examines the nature of U.S.-Africa relations. From my position, Washington’s reaction to coups suggests U.S. policy is out of step with the needs of the region. It is reactive rather than proactive, and based on notions that prioritize Washington’s security needs over the aspirations of the countries of West Africa. It also risks <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/china-russia-cooperation-in-africa-and-the-middle-east/">diminishing U.S. influence in West Africa</a> at a time when rivals – Russia and China – are expanding links.</p>
<p>Such signs are already evident. When U.S Acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland met with the military junta in the Nigerien capital of Niamey in early August 2023, she was <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/08/07/niger-coup-leaders-refuse-to-let-senior-u-s-diplomat-meet-with-deposed-president-00110207">denied access to the deposed leader</a>. </p>
<h2>The contours of US policy in Africa</h2>
<p>U.S. policy toward Africa was shaped – and is still scarred – by <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2001/03/01/rethinking-u.s.-policy-in-africa-pub-834">Cold War considerations</a> and European colonial ideologies. </p>
<p>From nationalist struggles to earning their independence, African people were often <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195396096.001.0001">dismissed by U.S. diplomats</a> as backward, incapable and inferior. Washington’s policy often treated African nations as junior partners to Europe and often <a href="https://archive.org/details/jfk-ordeal-in-africa">deferred to former colonial powers on issues concerning the former colonies</a>. </p>
<p>These perceptions of Africa and its people have endured, so it was not surprising when former President Donald Trump <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/11/politics/immigrants-shithole-countries-trump/index.html">dismissed African nations as “shithole”</a> places dominated by chaos, violence and poverty.</p>
<p>Such thinking and American policy have largely failed to understand the rapid changes taking place on the continent, I believe. African people are <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/19/us-africa-leaders-summit-china-russia-competition-scramble/">no longer prepared to be lectured</a> to about who to engage with in their development. Yet American officials <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-09-08/niger-gabon-coups-the-us-must-tread-more-carefully-in-africa?embedded-checkout=true">stand accused of being too slow</a> to recognize this shift.</p>
<h2>Openings for China and Russia</h2>
<p>Such sluggishness has created avenues for China and Russia to move into the Sahel region and East Africa. </p>
<p>China’s serious advancement in the continent <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf">began at the Bandung Conference</a> in 1955, where its leaders aligned themselves with African nationalists, emphasizing dogmas of “win-win partnership,” “equality and mutual benefit” and “<a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitpse/2015-04/22/content_20509374.htm">mutual respect for sovereignty</a>.” Today, China’s premier makes frequent visits to Africa, while the country invests <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/02/chinese-firms-african-labor-are-building-africas-infrastructure/">billions of dollars in the region</a> on infrastructure and other projects. </p>
<p>Like China, Russia engaged Africa gradually. In 1958, Russia’s ignorance of the continent was revealed <a href="https://www-sup.stanford.edu/books/title/?id=20981">when it included snow plows</a> among its aid package to Guinea, a country located in tropical Africa. But today, African leaders <a href="https://summitafrica.ru/en/">overwhelmingly participate in the Russia-Africa Summits</a> that have taken place in 2019 and 2023, during which Moscow has aid and trade deals and pledged to become an alternative to Western influence.</p>
<p>And Russia has <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-still-progressing-africa-whats-limit">surpassed China in arms sales to Africa</a>, accounting for 40% of its major weapon shipments. It supplies about 30% of the continent’s grain, and African leaders are increasingly seeing Russia as a counter to the action of other powers, such as France.</p>
<p>Russia and China can easily flatter African leaders with gifts, money, support and state visits, making them feel respected. Both nations have a <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/03/16/south-africas-love-affair-with-russia">long history of siding with African nationalists</a> on anti-colonial struggles and in opposing South Africa’s Apartheid.</p>
<p>More recently, at the U.N. vote to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many African nations <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/figure-of-the-week-african-countries-votes-on-the-un-resolution-condemning-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/">either remained neutral or abstained or opposed the U.S. position</a>.</p>
<p>Already, there have been suggestions that the coups may be <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66562999">exploited to serve the interests of Russia</a> <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/niger-chinas-path-stability-may-093000342.html">and China</a>. The Wagner Group, a pro-Russian mercenary group, was supportive of the coup in Niger, seeing it as an opportunity to enhance Russia’s involvement there <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66436797">as it did in Mali</a>. Officially, China has said it remains <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/niger-coup-can-blight-chinese-investments-in-africas-sahel-region/articleshow/102688818.cms">concerned about the impact of the coups</a> but stuck to its position of not interfering in other nations’ internal affairs. </p>
<h2>Where does the US go from here?</h2>
<p>Africa’s shifting allegiance to Moscow and Beijing comes at the expense of Washington’s influence – and that could hurt U.S. economic and strategic interests.</p>
<p>The Sahel region and the rest of Africa is <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/32091/chapter/268011948">home to immense and valuable resources</a>, most notably cocoa, coffee, timber, cotton, diamond, gold, manganese, cobalt, uranium, titanium and coltan.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in a suit stands in front of a map of Africa." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Barack Obama was the last U.S. president to make an official state visit to Africa, in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-barack-obama-delivers-a-speech-at-the-african-news-photo/482183512?adppopup=true">Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Sahel region is also of huge strategic importance in the battle against Boko Haram and other extremist organizations. The continent, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/africa-can-play-a-leading-role-in-the-fight-against-climate-change/">is crucial in the struggle</a> to safeguard the environment and addressing climate change. It also contains some of the the fastest-growing nations in the world. Nigeria is set to <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf">double its population to 375 million by 2050</a> – and in the process potentially overtake the U.S.</p>
<p>It is for good reason, therefore, that U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://editorials.voa.gov/a/secretary-blinken-visits-kenya-nigeria-senegal/6343059.html">noted in 2021 that</a> “Africa will shape the future … of the world.”</p>
<p>But for too long, America has fallen back on discarded notions to shape its African policy rather than look to the continent’s future. By focusing on its own security needs, America has, in my view, failed to understand that alleviating the political, economic and social conditions of locals remains a vital part of the struggle. In Niger, for example, America spent millions of dollars via the government and the U.S. military’s Africa Command, yet 43% of its people <a href="https://concernusa.org/news/poverty-in-niger/">still live in poverty</a>. And to them, resolving problems including chronic unemployment, poor governance and weak democratic institutions is more important than military spending. </p>
<p>U.S. policy risks becoming increasingly ineffectual if it fails to better focus on alleviating conditions that create political unrest, rather than just reacting when it happens. For example, America <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/10/the-u-s-should-bid-biya-goodbye-cameroon-security-foreign-policy-yaounde/">can better pressure the continent’s autocrats</a>, such as Paul Biya of Cameroon and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, to institute genuine democratic reforms and make way for new leadership. </p>
<p>The Biden administration pledged at 2022’s U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/15/u-s-africa-leaders-summit-strengthening-partnerships-to-meet-shared-priorities/">invest US$55 billion</a> in the continent over a three-year period.</p>
<p>But while Secretary Blinken has endorsed an equal partnership with African nations, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/us-africa-policy-biden-administration/2021/11/19/cc11c95c-4933-11ec-95dc-5f2a96e00fa3_story.html">past practices of marginalizing the continent continue</a>. Joe Biden has not visited sub-Saharan Africa as president – nor did his predecessor. You have to go <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/07/26/president-obama-travels-kenya-and-ethiopia">back to 2015</a> for the last time a U.S. president – Barack Obama – set foot on sub-Saharan Africa as part of an official state visit. </p>
<p>To many on the continent, that speaks volumes about Washington’s priorities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213048/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julius A. Amin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>No US president has set foot on sub-Saharan Africa since 2015 – and it hasn’t gone unnoticed.Julius A. Amin, Professor of History, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2120222023-09-05T15:07:08Z2023-09-05T15:07:08ZFrance in Africa: why Macron’s policies increased distrust and anger<p>French west Africa has experienced <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">five coups</a> in the past three years. Underpinning most of these coups is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66406137">hostility</a> towards France, a former colonial authority. Mohamed Bazoum of Niger’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-underlies-the-coup-in-niger/">downfall</a> in July 2023 comes after coups in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/7/mali-military-promises-return-to-civilian-rule-in-march-2024">Mali</a> in August 2020, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/06/chad-deby-coup-leader-democracy/">Chad</a> in April 2021, <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup/">Burkina Faso</a> in September 2022 and Gabon in September 2023.</p>
<p>The perpetrators of these coups have, among their <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/coups-in-west-africa-is-france-to-blame/">justifications</a>, mentioned the overbearing influence of France and its president, <a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-in-africa-a-cynical-twist-to-repair-the-colonial-past-while-keeping-a-tight-grip-189175">Emmanuel Macron</a>, in their affairs. The influence of France in military affairs and maintenance of dominance in business has been a key cog of the Macron agenda. Unlike other former colonial powers, France still has military <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/06/06/france-will-further-cut-back-military-presence-in-africa_6029304_7.html">bases</a> in Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Gabon. </p>
<p>At the same time, Macron has put forward <a href="https://www.nation.sc/archive/259549/macron-embraces-african-entrepreneurship">entrepreneurship</a> as the best form of development assistance. This strategic pivot away from personal relationships with African leaders is rooted in Macron’s <a href="https://jacobin.com/2021/03/emmanuel-macron-neoliberalism">neoliberal beliefs</a>. This is a political approach that favours free-market capitalism, deregulation and a reduction in government spending. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://www.uu.nl/staff/fplgerits">historian</a> who has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2019.1576170">researched</a> the relationship between France and its former colonies.</p>
<p>In Africa, Macron’s neoliberal turn has stripped France of the long-standing myth that it was somehow a more benevolent coloniser because of the cultural links it established with African elites. Macron’s approach has only increased distrust and anger because a large military presence has not been replaced by a <a href="https://www.president.go.ke/new-financial-order-will-help-the-world-overcome-poverty-and-climate-change/#:%7E:text=President%20William%20Ruto%20has%20said,the%20hands%20of%20the%20few.%E2%80%9D">new international economic order</a>, but with <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-emmanuel-macron-africa-reset-strategy-francafrique/">small-scale business deals and start-ups</a>. This is not what Africans <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/43?ln=en">wanted</a>, but it is what they got.</p>
<h2>Neoliberal values are French values</h2>
<p>Rather than a remaking of the economic and financial infrastructure, Macron has pushed entrepreneurship as development assistance: promoting start-ups and training Africa’s youth. <a href="https://www.afd.fr/fr">Agence Française de Dévelopment</a> (France’s main institution for policy implementation) is still investing in education, agriculture and infrastructure. But what Macron wants observers to notice is that increasingly, French development aid in Africa has to be run by French businesses. </p>
<p>French corporations are no longer making money in secret, as in the era of <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/macron-and-the-future-of-francafrique-6781/">Françafrique</a>. This was a period when French presidents supported African dictators to maintain influence. Rather, Macron’s speeches put forward business activities and neoliberal values as French values that benefit the continent. </p>
<p>This reliance on French culture and values can be seen as a continuation of a strategy that started with the French colonial project. Macron’s values, however, are the values of neoliberalism. At home he has pushed through a pension plan to limit French state debt. Abroad, he wants French development policy to be driven by private initiatives. </p>
<p>In light of that strategy, it becomes clear that sentiments among Africans have not become more anti-French. Rather, by elevating economics to a core value of his relationship to Africa, Macron has played into a widely accepted African worldview in which underdevelopment is the product of dependency on Europe and neocolonial exploitation.</p>
<p>Every visitor who talks to cab drivers or vendors in Dakar figures out quite quickly that the French are seen as colonisers first, possible friends second. What has changed is that Macron has unknowingly confirmed African suspicions about his intentions: he never wanted to change economic structures. Instead Africans get bread crumbs in the form of start-up money. </p>
<h2>The free market as the dividing line in west Africa</h2>
<p>Entrepreneurship is not universally loved on the continent. The belief in the free market as an engine for development has redrawn the battle lines in west Africa. Countries within the regional body Ecowas like Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal – which have had high economic growth in the past decade – are clashing with Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso – which have experienced deepening poverty. </p>
<p>While other African countries like Kenya are confronted with similar debates about how to stimulate development – Kenyan president William Ruto famously believes in the “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220913-william-ruto-kenya-s-hustler-in-chief-president">hustler nation</a>” – climate change and terrorism have led to a more combustible mix in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The juntas that have come to power therefore do not only present themselves as caretakers who are trying to do the job politicians will not do. They are also claiming they want a new ideological direction for their countries. <a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/insight/ibrahim-traore-why-burkina-fasos-leader-attracts-attention-14479334">Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso</a> has styled himself to be the successor to Thomas Sankara, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66282417">Assimi Goïta</a> has cast himself as a reformer not a revolutionary. </p>
<p>In the past, the fires of African instability and anti-French sentiment were fanned by the French underdelivering on their – sometimes cynical – promises of big structural change. Today, instability is being fed by the opposite. It is African leaders who demand big structural change, but are met with small business efforts to maintain French influence on the cheap.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212022/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Gerits does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The French president has struggled to maintain the influence his country gained in Africa through colonialism.Frank Gerits, Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, South Africa and Assistant Professor in the History of International Relations, Utrecht UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122022023-08-28T14:43:16Z2023-08-28T14:43:16ZNiger’s coup weakens regional fight against Boko Haram: four reasons why<p>Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">detained and deposed</a> on 26 July by his military guard under the command of General Abdourahamane Tchiani. </p>
<p>The unconstitutional change of government has been widely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-president-says-democracy-will-be-saved-following-coup-2023-07-27/">condemned</a> internationally. Ecowas, the regional group, also issued sanctions and <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/08/11/coup-review-your-military-threat-sanctions-against-niger-%E2%80%90-fulani-group-tells-ecowas/">threatened</a> military intervention. </p>
<p>However, other military juntas in the region have been <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/613369-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-declare-support-for-niger-coup-as-soldiers-arrest-politicians.html">sympathetic</a> to the cause of the coup leaders. </p>
<p>The Niger coup has changed the security priority of key actors in the Lake Chad region, from fighting Boko Haram to addressing the political crisis.</p>
<p>Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency emerged in Nigeria in 2009 and spread across the Lake Chad region: Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The group has directly or indirectly killed more than <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2021/09/23/boko-haram-war-over-300000-children-killed-in-northeast-unicef/">300,000 children</a> and displaced <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/boko-haram-five-million-displaced-in-lake-chad-buhari/">five million</a> people in the region.</p>
<p>At its peak in early 2015, the insurgents <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003211525-1/boko-haram-lake-chad-basin-temitope-oriola-freedom-onuoha-samuel-oyewole">controlled</a> about 20,000 square miles (over 50,000km²) of Nigerian territory. </p>
<p>Early in the fight against Boko Haram, especially between 2010 and 2013, neighbouring states in the Lake Chad region displayed inadequate interest in cooperating with Nigeria. </p>
<p>Regional discord allowed the terrorists to attack targets in Nigeria and escape to neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>From around 2013, the region showed growing interest in the fight against Boko Haram, as terrorist attacks spread beyond Nigeria. The 2014 Paris and London <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047227">conferences</a> further encouraged common frontline and international support against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region.</p>
<p>Cameroon opened the second front against Boko Haram, deploying over <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html">3,000 troops</a> to its northern region in July 2014. Around the same time, Niger Republic <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047227">granted</a> the Nigerian military the right to pursue terrorists across the border. </p>
<p>Niger later declared a state of emergency and deployed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">3,000 troops</a> to the Differ region, threatened by Boko Haram, in February 2015. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">Chad</a> deployed 4,500 troops against the insurgents in early 2015. At the same time, Nigeria and Cameroon <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">raised</a> their forces to 25,000 and 7,000 respectively. </p>
<p>In July 2015, the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/about/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> became operational against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. With headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad, the force established sectors in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The force is made up of 10,000 troops drawn from the four frontline countries and Benin Republic.</p>
<p>To support them, France, the US, Belgium, Italy and Germany maintain varying degrees of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868798">military presence</a> in Niger. </p>
<p>This coordinated response is now threatened by the shift in focus from fighting Boko Haram to removing the coup leaders in Niger. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=vU7aPGIAAAAJ&citation_for_view=vU7aPGIAAAAJ:43bX7VzcjpAC">researched</a> Boko Haram and its operations in the Lake Chad region for the last 13 years. Based on my <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Boko-Harams-Terrorist-Campaign-in-Nigeria-Contexts-Dimensions-and-Emerging/Oriola-Onuoha-Oyewole/p/book/9781032077840">research</a> and <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html">understanding</a> of the region, I see four ways in which the events in Niger will make the regional fight against Boko Haram more difficult:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Ecowas’s attention is divided</p></li>
<li><p>Niger’s attention is diverted</p></li>
<li><p>the gaps in security may give Boko Haram the opportunity to regroup and restrategise</p></li>
<li><p>suspension of western aid to Niger could fuel poverty and drive recruitment into Boko Haram.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Niger’s coup and its benefits to Boko Haram</h2>
<p>The member states of the Lake Chad security arrangement and their western partners have condemned the Niger coup, and become hostile to the junta. </p>
<p>Ecowas, led by Nigeria, has <a href="https://ecowas.int/final-communique-fifty-first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">sanctioned</a> Niger. Ecowas suspended financial and commercial relations, closed land borders and restricted flights to and from Niger. The regional bloc also threatened military intervention to restore constitutional order in the country. </p>
<p>This means the Nigerian military has been preoccupied with possible Ecowas intervention in Niger. Data extracted from the <a href="https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/">Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project</a> as of 23 August shows that the last offensive operation against Boko Haram by the Nigerian military was on 25 July. Since then, four insurgent attacks have been recorded, where 12 civilians were killed and 15 were kidnapped in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The military priority of Niger has also shifted from fighting against Boko Haram and other violent extremist groups. Now it is regime security. Niger’s military is preoccupied with a potential Nigeria-led Ecowas military intervention. </p>
<p>The junta has thus <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/07/africa/niger-coup-deadline-intl/index.html">prioritised</a> defence of the national capital and south-western borders. This is to the detriment of south-eastern borders, where Boko Haram is a threat. </p>
<p>Boko Haram is already taking advantage of this shift. On 15 August, <a href="https://punchng.com/17-niger-soldiers-killed-in-attack-near-mali-ministry/#google_vignette">17 Niger soldiers</a> were killed in an attack by suspected jihadists near the country’s border with Mali. The attack was described as the first in over a year. </p>
<p>Many western countries have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-loses-aid-western-countries-condemn-coup-2023-07-29/#:%7E:text=NIAMEY%2C%20July%2029%20">suspended</a> critical development and security aid to Niger. This is to the detriment of the country’s counter-insurgency capacity. </p>
<p>Niger’s military junta is mobilising anti-colonial and anti-imperial sentiment. It has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66365376">severed</a> defence cooperation with France and is aligning with pro-Russian forces. </p>
<p>Boko Haram can exploit the Niger crisis to regroup and re-strategise. Terrorist movement from Sahel to the Lake Chad region was recently <a href="https://dailytrust.com/niger-coup-iswap-migrating-from-sahel-to-lake-chad-north-west/#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20top%20ISWAP%20fighters%20and,of%20the%20Lake%20Chad%20region">reported</a>.</p>
<p>The humanitarian effects of Ecowas sanctions and suspension of western aid may also fuel terrorist recruitment and a new wave of insecurity in the region. </p>
<p>The anti-western mobilisation of the junta can advance Boko Haram’s agenda to end western influence and establish Islamic State in the Lake Chad region and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212202/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samuel Oyewole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Boko Haram may be the unintended beneficiary of the crisis created by the recent coup in Niger.Samuel Oyewole, Lecturer, Political Science, Federal University, Oye EkitiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122092023-08-25T11:17:05Z2023-08-25T11:17:05ZNiger’s resource paradox: what should make the country rich has made it a target for predators<p>A month after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">coup in Niger</a> that toppled the democratically elected civilian government of Mohamed Bazoum, the country’s neighbours are still debating the possibility of <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">military intervention</a>. </p>
<p>The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) – a coalition of west African countries, which includes Niger – has said it intends to send in a taskforce to topple the military junta led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, which ousted Bazoum on July 26.</p>
<p>But the plan to intervene is not without controversy. Niger, a landlocked nation, shares borders with Mali, Algeria, Libya, Chad, Benin and Burkina Faso. These countries <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/6/niger-coup-divisions-as-ecowas-military-threat-fails-to-play-out">have expressed solidarity with the military junta</a> and have committed to oppose any potential Ecowas intervention. </p>
<p>France, which <a href="https://capstone.ndu.edu/Portals/83/20-2%20Africa%20Field%20Study%20Book%20II%20Final%20reduced%20Part%20II.pdf">occupied Niger</a> from 1890 until independence in 1960, has also considered intervention – it has a small contingent of troops in the country ostensibly to combat jihadi insurgency in the Sahel region – which the junta has given them <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/08/23/niger-group-calls-for-withdrawal-of-french-troops//#:%7E:text=Some%201%2C500%20French%20soldiers%20have,its%20Sahel%20operation%20last%20year.&text=On%20August%203%2C%20Niamey's%20ruling,a%20one%2Dmonth%20notice%20period.">notice to withdraw</a>. Algeria has also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/22/african-union-issues-ambiguous-view-on-possible-niger-military-intervention#:%7E:text=While%20the%20AU%20issued%20a,diplomatic%20efforts%20to%20restore%20democracy">denied France permission</a> to fly over the country.</p>
<p>For now, the situation remains fluid and uncertain. But beneath the surface of daily news headlines is an intricate web of geopolitical competition and strategic agendas that have profound consequences for the Nigerien people. </p>
<p>The recent coup underscores <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/niger-and-the-collapse-of-frances-empire/">a geopolitical rivalry</a> deeply rooted in colonial and neo-colonial legacies and intensified by some western nations’ drive for the control of Niger’s resources.</p>
<p>Although Niger <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/niger-and-the-collapse-of-frances-empire/">grapples with extreme poverty</a>, leading to widespread malnutrition and hunger among its citizens, it is the world’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/01/uranium-niger-france-coup/">seventh-biggest producer of uranium</a>. This juxtaposition of mineral wealth and societal poverty underscores the irony of a nation abundant in resources yet plagued by profound economic hardships.</p>
<p>First <a href="https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/niger.aspx#:%7E:text=Uranium%20was%20discovered%20at%20Azelik,(CEA)%20initiated%20further%20studies.">discovered in 1957 at Azelik</a> by a French colonial expedition looking for copper deposits, Uranium now ranks as Niger’s second-largest export in monetary value – <a href="https://www.powerengineeringint.com/nuclear/coup-in-niger-brings-countrys-uranium-resources-into-sharper-focus/">surpassed only by gold</a>. The country is a <a href="https://www.powerengineeringint.com/nuclear/coup-in-niger-brings-countrys-uranium-resources-into-sharper-focus/">principal supplier of uranium to the European Union (EU)</a> and contributes between 15% and 17% of the uranium fuelling France’s electricity generation. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the country <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20230814-power-cuts-worsen-in-niger-following-sanctions-from-ecowas">struggles to produce its own electricity</a> because Nigeria <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">recently terminated</a> its power supply to the nation as a sanction against the military junta, leaving much of the country in darkness.</p>
<h2>Western exploitation</h2>
<p>Given its abundant natural resources, it seems counterintuitive for Niger to rank among the world’s poorest nations. Yet its economic and political struggles have deep roots in historical <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/africa/niger-coup-france-west-africa.html">foreign interventions, exploitation and resource extraction</a>. This situation has, for decades, been further compounded by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/27/timeline-a-history-of-coups-in-niger">misguided and ineffective leadership</a>, often conniving in exploitation by foreign interests.</p>
<p>While some Ecowas members oppose the coup in Niger and have threatened <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/18/africa/niger-ecowas-d-day-military-intervention-intl-hnk/index.html">military intervention against the coup leaders</a>, some western countries are manoeuvring to uphold their interests. The Nigerian senate <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/nigeria-senate-cautions-against-niger-military-intervention/a-66450388">opposes military intervention</a>, with one of its <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/niger-coup-dont-allow-us-france-push-you-to-unnecessary-war-orji-kalu-tells-tinubu/">members alleging</a> that Ecowas would merely be doing France and America’s bidding. Senator Orji Uzor Kalu suggested that if there is to be military action, it should be carried out by French and US troops.</p>
<p>Colonial powers and other major geopolitical actors have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ee6fb170-3284-46fa-9eb7-da64212c4989">profoundly influenced</a> Niger’s contemporary situation. France, referred to by the New York Times recently as the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/africa/niger-coup-france-west-africa.html">Former Coloniser that Stayed</a>”, has already warned that any attack on its interests in Niger will be <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/07/30/france-warns-attacks-on-its-interests-in-niger-will-not-be-tolerated">met with retaliation</a>. Meanwhile the reported presence of Wagner Group mercenaries in the country, after a request from the coup leaders, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/08/05/niger-junta-wagner-group-mali-mohamed-bazoum-ecowas/">is a proxy for Russian interests in Niger</a>. </p>
<p>But following the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66599733">reported death of Wagner Group boss, Yevgeny Progozhin</a>, after his private jet is understood to have crashed on a trip from St Petersburg to Moscow on August 23, the status of the Wagner Group activities in Niger – and Africa generally – is uncertain. However, their operations may come under the direct control of Russia’s military. </p>
<h2>African resources, western interests</h2>
<p>Another important resource issue threatened by instability in Niger is the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-countries-seek-to-revive-trans-saharan-gas-pipeline-dream/a-62778681">trans-Saharan gas pipeline (TSGP)</a>, designed to transport natural gas from Nigeria through Niger and on to Algeria and then to Europe. One of the drivers of this project in the past two years has been the European need to wean itself off Russian gas supplies in light of the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Yet again, western resource needs are dictating events in supposedly independent and sovereign African countries.</p>
<p>The dominant narrative in west Africa frequently presents foreign interventions as benevolent efforts to stabilise the Sahel region, in particular, against the threat of jihadi insurgency. Yet a deeper examination <a href="https://journal.iag.ir/article_118383_en.html">uncovers a more intricate reality</a>. As western powers strive to shape political dynamics in Niger – driven not just by a desire for stability but also to preserve their dominance and <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/niger-and-the-collapse-of-frances-empire/">control over resource allocation</a> – they portray Niger, and by extension, Africa, as mere markets within the global economy. This ignores the potential <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/niger-coup-could-exacerbate-humanitarian-crisis">humanitarian consequences</a> of such interventions for the people of Niger and west Africa in general.</p>
<p>As Niger faces political instability and possible violent conflict, there’s a pressing need to critically evaluate the motives and repercussions of foreign intervention. </p>
<p>Beyond the veneer of the quest for democracy and stability, the various players’ deeper strategic intentions must be scrutinised. This is the key to understanding the multifaceted dynamics in the Sahel region and their broader global implications.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A geopolitical struggle for valuable resources such as uranium is behind the wrangling over Niger.Francis Okpaleke, PhD Candidate, Politics and International Security, University of WaikatoOlumba E. Ezenwa, Doctoral Research Fellow, Conflict, Violence, & Terrorism Research Centre, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122192023-08-24T20:19:37Z2023-08-24T20:19:37ZRegardless of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s fate, Vladimir Putin benefits<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544640/original/file-20230824-18379-6nqbwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C5%2C3936%2C2667&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Face masks depicting Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin displayed at a souvenir shop in St. Petersburg, Russia. Prigozhin reportedly died in a plane crash on Aug. 23.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo, File)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/regardless-of-wagner-group-leader-yevgeny-prigozhins-fate-vladimir-putin-benefits" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>On Aug. 23, Russian media reported that Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/moscow-plane-crash-yevgeny-prigozhin-1.6945096%22">was listed among the passengers of a plane that crashed, leaving no survivors</a>. Speculation has <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/2023/08/24/Prigozhin-death-is-likely-Putin-s-payback-for-mutiny-warning-to-opposition-Analysts">already begun about Putin’s potential involvement in the crash</a>. This speculation is likely to continue unabated well into the future. </p>
<p>Some have even argued that due to <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/business-jet-crash-russia-kills-10-officials-wagner-102499339">many individuals changing their names to Yevgeny Prigozhin in an attempt to thwart surveillance of the Wagner leader</a>, it might not have been him on the flight.</p>
<p>Regardless of whether Putin was responsible or even if Prigozhin is still alive, the latter’s position has been undermined in Russia; Putin will benefit from this development.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="men in uniform stand around the remains of a plane in a field" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian servicemen inspect a part of a crashed private jet that may have been carrying Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Domestic advantages</h2>
<p>Prigozhin’s death will stabilize Putin’s domestic position. Putin has been at his <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-wagner-group-revolt-in-russia-could-mean-for-the-war-in-ukraine-208428">weakest point</a>, politically speaking, since the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wagner-groups-rebellion-putin-unfolded/story?id=100373557">Wagner Group’s insurrection in June</a>.</p>
<p>Not only did domestic elites <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-the-fallout-of-russias-wagner-rebellion/">not immediately support Putin</a>, but the insurrection demonstrated to the Russian people that Putin’s position was not unassailable. Prigozhin’s revolt challenged the Russian political establishment in a way not done since Putin <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vladimir-Putin">assumed power over two decades ago</a>.</p>
<p>Many Russians will see Prigozhin’s death as emanating from the Kremlin. Although some people <a href="https://news.sky.com/video/russians-bring-flowers-to-wagner-hq-for-wagner-leader-yevgeny-prigozhin-12946437">laid flowers</a> outside of Wagner headquarters in honour of Prigozhin, this gesture does not appear to represent the majority. Instead, Prigozhin’s alleged demise will reinforce Putin’s domestic position, whether through his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/may/09/putin-may-have-high-ratings-but-russians-are-terrified-too">genuine popularity or fear of opposing him</a>.</p>
<h2>Russia and sanctions</h2>
<p>The economic sanctions against Russia have been simultaneously controversial and effective. The controversy stems from the fact that the sanctions at their outset had minimal effect on the Russian economy. The Russian economy <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/21/russias-economy-contracted-2-1-in-2022">did not contract to the extent hoped for</a> by those implementing the sanctions. </p>
<p>This development should not have been shocking, as Russia knew sanctions were likely after Western countries made a similar move after its annexation of Crimea. The Russian state, therefore, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/03/world/europe/putin-sanctions-proofing.html">made moves</a> to fortify its economy against the effects of economic sanctions.</p>
<p>Crucial to Russia’s ongoing efforts to avoid the worst effects of the sanctions has been finding non-Western countries with which to conduct trade. Outlets for Russian resources, such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/asia-crude-imports-hit-high-china-india-gorge-russian-oil-russell-2023-08-03/">China and India</a>, have kept the Russian economy functioning, if not in an ideal manner. These markets have helped the Russian economy weather the worst impacts of the sanctions.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-russias-economy-proved-resilient-last-year-now-the-pain-is-setting-in/">collapsing ruble</a> however, suggests that while sanctions were ineffective in the short term, the long-term costs are being felt. </p>
<p>For Russia to surmount this problem, additional markets and means of overcoming the sanctions are needed.</p>
<h2>Wagner operations</h2>
<p>The Wagner Group’s involvement in Ukraine represented an aberration in its standard operations. In Ukraine, the Wagner Group operated as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/bakhmut-is-increasingly-a-quagmire-that-works-to-russias-advantage-203524">direct appendage of the Russian state</a>. This was in contrast to how the group often acted in relationship to the state — it was much more common for Wagner to pursue Russian interests in campaigns where the Russian government <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state">wished to downplay its active involvement</a>.</p>
<p>Syria was a textbook example of how Russia used the Wagner Group to pursue its interests while minimizing its direct involvement. In Syria, Wagner Group soldiers took an <a href="https://apnews.com/general-news-7f9e63cb14a54dfa9148b6430d89e873">active role in not only defending the regime of Bashar al-Assad</a>, but also conducting offensive operations that allowed the Syrian president to retake control of much of the country. </p>
<p>In exchange, the Wagner Group received <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/wagner-group-syria-profiting-failed-states">25 per cent of the gas, oil and phosphate production</a> in the areas it recaptured for the Syrian government.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group’s actions in Africa are even more explicit from an economic standpoint. While the Wagner Group’s operations in Libya were nominally in support of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whos-who-libyas-war">Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army</a>, it simultaneously <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/08/wagner-group-libya-oil-russia-war/">took control of key oil fields and natural gas facilities</a>. </p>
<p>This development has occurred against the backdrop of the European Union looking to <a href="https://globaleurope.eu/globalization/the-eu-and-the-middle-east-exploring-alternatives-to-russian-energy/">Libya and other countries</a> to reduce their reliance on Russian oil and natural gas.</p>
<p>Libya is not alone in this regard. The Wagner Group has been actively involved in supporting numerous governments in Africa. In some countries, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-accuses-russias-wagner-group-mercenaries-fueling-war-sudan-rcna86492">such as Sudan</a>, this involved the Wagner Group establishing companies in order to directly exploit the natural resources of the country.</p>
<p>In other African countries, a Wagner Group presence allows for <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/whats-ahead-for-the-wagner-group-in-africa-and-the-middle-east/">smuggling and money laundering operations</a>. For many governments, such as the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-coup-niger-military-force-e0e1108b58a9e955af465a3efe6605c0">recently established junta in Niger</a>, this is a cost they are willing to pay.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-mercenaries-in-africa-why-there-hasnt-been-any-effective-opposition-to-drive-them-out-207318">Wagner group mercenaries in Africa: why there hasn't been any effective opposition to drive them out</a>
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<h2>Wagner’s loyalty</h2>
<p>For Russia, all these activities by the Wagner Group provide a way of overcoming the sanctions regime. The problem Putin faced was that while Wagner Group provided him and the Russian state with vast political and economic resources, Prigozhin’s June revolt made him unreliable. </p>
<p>As the effects of the sanctions become more pronounced, the Russian state is exploring <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/putin-urges-govt-to-propose-reforms-for-overcoming-sanctions/2863665">all avenues available to overcome these economic challenges</a>. Whether Prigozhin truly is dead is irrelevant; Putin, in the underlying confusion, will be able to replace him with individuals <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/putin-is-dismantling-and-rebadging-the-wagner-group-after-prigozhin-plane-crash-experts-say/ar-AA1fJbcY">loyal to him to take charge of Wagner’s vast economic empire</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212219/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russian mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of the Wagner Group, reportedly died when a private jet he was said to be on crashed on Aug. 23, 2023, killing all 10 people on board.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854482023-08-20T09:27:05Z2023-08-20T09:27:05ZCivilian support for military coups is rising in parts of Africa: why the reasons matter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543212/original/file-20230817-25-4iakmh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The clamour for coups among citizens is rising</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the night of <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/142678/togo-who-killed-sylvanus-olympio-the-father-of-togolese-independence/">13 January 1963</a>, Togo’s President Sylvanus Olympio was shot dead by rebels in the first military coup staged in Africa. A long list, as shown below, was to come. From the 1960s to the end of the millennium, there were an average of four military coups a year on the continent. By the end of the 1990s this phenomenon seemed to have faded away. </p>
<p>But since August 2020 six African nations have suffered seven coups or attempted coups. </p>
<p>First came <a href="https://theconversation.com/malis-predictable-coup-leaves-an-unclear-path-to-civilian-rule-144774">Mali</a>, in August 2020. The military took advantage of social unrest and insecurity caused by the activities of violent extremists. Mali had two coups or attempts in a nine-month span. </p>
<p>In April 2021, <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-signs-of-a-true-transition-in-chad-a-year-after-idriss-debys-death-181203">Chad</a> followed the same path. In March 2021, there was a coup attempt in Niger, and in September 2021 it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/guinea-coup-highlights-the-weaknesses-of-west-africas-regional-body-167650">Guinea’s</a> turn. A month later, it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">Sudan</a>. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/jihadism-and-military-takeovers-in-west-africa-burkina-faso-coup-highlights-the-links-193972">Burkina Faso</a>, an attack in November 2021 led to the coup in January 2022. </p>
<p>More recently, a coup was <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">launched in Niger</a>, deposing President Mohamed Bazoum. Two days later, General Abdourahamane Tchiani declared himself the leader of Niger. </p>
<p>All together, that’s more than <a href="https://defishumanitaires.com/en/2019/11/27/the-sahel-is-a-demographic-bomb/">100 million people</a> being ruled by the military after power was seized violently. All are in the Sahel. This has alerted governments in the region.</p>
<p>Researchers, analysts and journalists have pointed to mismanagement, incompetence, corruption, economic crisis and state weakness as the main factors propelling military coups all over the world and, of course, in Africa. State weakness is a factor in the recent instances in Africa. They have happened partly because of governments’ failure to stem the spread of groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State all over the Sahel. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">Niger coup: why an Ecowas-led military intervention is unlikely</a>
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<p>But there are two intertwined characteristics that differentiate Africa from the rest of the world. One is the public support of many citizens on the streets when there is a coup. The other is the society’s rising support for military rule as a form of government. Popular support for military rule has grown in the last 20 years.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589346.2022.2072582">research</a> explored the reasons for this. I used survey data to examine whether support for nondemocratic rule was mainly due to poor institutional and economic performance or to an existing so-called authoritarian personality and culture in the region. This type of personality refers to values existing in certain societies that make them more prone to embrace authoritarian forms of government. </p>
<p>This distinction is relevant because if the reason for military rule support is cultural, then societies will continue to endorse authoritarian regimes. If the reason is institutional performance, then as long as incumbent governments perform efficiently, both politically and economically, democratic support will overcome authoritarian support.</p>
<h2>Citizen discontent</h2>
<p>I carried out a quantitative analysis using <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a> survey data gathered from 37 African countries, both from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis looked for underlying factors propelling the rise in support for military rule. </p>
<p>Respondents were asked about the extent of their support for military rule as a form of government plus a number of other potential explanatory questions such as perception of corruption, governing and opposition parties performance, economy evaluation and socio-demographic issues like their level of education.</p>
<p>The data shows that from 2000 to the present, the level of support for military rule as a form of government has doubled, from 11.6% of people supporting “much” or “very much” military rule as a form of government to 22.3%. Of the 37 countries <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">analysed</a>, there were 11 where support for military dictatorship was decreasing and 26 where this figure was on the rise. The latest <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/young-africans-show-tolerance-for-military-intervention-a-wake-up-call-afrobarometer-ceo-tells-german-leaders/#:%7E:text=Afrobarometer%20findings%20from%2028%20African,if%20elected%20leaders%20abuse%20power.">Afrobarometer data</a> shows that support for democracy has fallen in the last year. Out of 38 countries, only four show decreasing support for military rule since 2000, whereas 34 show higher support for higher military rule than in 2000.</p>
<p><a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">Support</a> for military rule was higher in “partly free” and “not free” countries than in “free” countries. (They were categorised according to the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world">Freedom House</a> index.) </p>
<p>But there were some exceptions. In <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">South Africa</a>, which is a constitutional democracy with regular elections, one in three South Africans supported military rule as a form of government. In democratic Namibia the level of support showed that one in four Namibians supported military rule.</p>
<h2>Reasons to support military rule</h2>
<p>The analysis points to three conclusions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>In sub-Saharan Africa, the legitimacy of military rule is mainly based on institutional performance and economic management. These are weakened by jihadist organisations rapidly expanding throughout the region. State institutions are not able to tackle their expansion throughout the region.</p></li>
<li><p>In North Africa, institutional performance plays a role but authoritarian personality plays a larger role in the support for military rule.</p></li>
<li><p>Education seems to be an antidote against authoritarianism. Those with higher level of education, according to survey data, show higher level of democratic endorsement.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The study’s findings suggest that people in sub-Saharan Africa are fed up with their governments for many reasons, including security threats, humanitarian disasters and lack of prospects. Waiting for the next elections to take place to change government does not seem to them to be a good option. Opposition parties do not seem to enjoy a better image. For the survey respondents, the solution appears to be to welcome the military to intervene.</p>
<p>If citizens perceive that politicians don’t care about them, this will invite the military to continue overthrowing civil governments, with society publicly legitimising their intervention in politics. </p>
<p>If military, political and economic solutions are not found, military coups in the region will increase and people will continue gathering on the streets to welcome them. Niger’s recent coup may not be the last one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185448/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlos García Rivero is Research Fellow at the Centre for International and Comparative Politics, at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. </span></em></p>Citizen expectations of governments are not being met by most elected leaders.Carlos García Rivero, Associate Professor, Universitat de ValènciaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2115492023-08-17T10:20:48Z2023-08-17T10:20:48ZNiger: Ecowas military intervention could trigger 3 bad outcomes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542849/original/file-20230815-21-ogk7ja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigeria-led Ecowas artillerymen land by helicopter on 10 January, 1999 in Freetown. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jean-Philippe Ksiazek/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66465146">threat</a> of military force to end the coup in Niger has led to significant divisions in the region.</p>
<p>It has heightened tensions in Niger itself, as well as among its neighbours. </p>
<p>There are more and more signs that any military intervention is likely to be met with stiff opposition. <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/niger-coup-supporters-rally-as-regional-force-mulls-intervention-/7222246.html">Growing support</a> for the junta has emboldened the coup plotters to stay in power and call the bluff of the <a href="https://ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a>, Ecowas. </p>
<p>In reaction to the threat of force, more Nigeriens took to the streets to show their opposition, with one <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/08/military-junta-thousands-of-coup-supporters-gather-near-french-military-base-in-niger/">protest</a> held close to a French military base in Niamey. </p>
<p>The option of military force has divided countries in west Africa and the Sahel. Ecowas members are fully aware that an all-out war would increase the fragility of the region. A meeting of Ecowas military chiefs in Ghana on <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230817-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-ecowas-military-chiefs-to-meet-over-niger-coup">17 and 18 August</a> will discuss intervention options. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Ecowas parliament is <a href="https://punchng.com/ecowas-parliament-divided-over-planned-military-action-in-niger/">divided</a> over a military intervention. Member countries such as Nigeria, which currently holds the rotating chair, are also being put under internal pressure. <a href="https://punchng.com/niger-kano-residents-protest-planned-standby-force/">Protesters</a> took to the streets in Kano, the biggest city in northern Nigeria, against a possible invasion of Niger. </p>
<p>For their part, countries that neighbour Niger but do not belong to Ecowas, such as Chad and Algeria, have <a href="https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/niger-chad-and-algeria-opposed-to-military-intervention-would-aggravate-the-situation/">opposed</a> the use of force. </p>
<p>As a scholar of <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">politics and international relations</a>, I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329456894_US_Drone_Base_in_Agadez_A_Security_Threat_to_Niger">researched</a> the implications of foreign military bases in Niger. My view remains as I have <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">previously argued</a> that a military intervention in Niger is unlikely. </p>
<p>However, the threat of force means tensions remain high. This is understandable as a great deal is at stake. I have identified three major implications of a full-blown war. </p>
<p>The first casualty would be the ongoing regional war against terrorism because countries currently committed to this fight would have their armies and resources diverted. </p>
<p>The second is that there would be a mass influx of refugees into the seven countries bordering Niger. This would have a knock-on effect as more refugees seek to find their way to Europe. </p>
<p>The third is that the conflict would heighten tensions between Niger and France. The junta blames France for the country’s insecurity and economic woes. </p>
<h2>Counting the cost of war</h2>
<p>Nigerien soldiers, through the <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Counter-terrorism-projects/G5-Sahel">G5-Sahel</a> and <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a>, are involved in the fight against <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html">Boko Haram</a>, <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/islamic-state-west-africa-province">Islamic State West Africa Province</a> (ISWAP) and other terrorist groups around the Lake Chad Basin and other regions of the country. An attack led by Ecowas on Niger would distract the soldiers and divert critical resources. </p>
<p>Terrorist groups could then take advantage of borders weakened by conflict. They could also benefit from a situation where armies which previously fought side by side against insurgents such as Boko Haram and ISWAP were now fighting one another.</p>
<p>The example of Syria and how ISIS <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets/">quickly emerged</a> in the region gives a glimpse of what could happen. </p>
<p>Most of the Nigerien population lives in the southern part of the country next to the borders with Nigeria, Republic of Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali. These countries would suffer an influx of refugees, further destabilising what are already fragile states.</p>
<p>A war between the Nigerien military and Ecowas would embolden human traffickers and lead to more Africans taking advantage of the chaos to travel north towards Europe. </p>
<p>Niger has several bilateral and multilateral arrangements with the European Union and other countries in Europe to <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_4536">curb mass migration</a> through Libya and the Mediterranean sea.</p>
<p>Agadez in central Niger used to be a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20171213-focus-niger-agadez-desert-migrant-hub-people-smuggling-sahel-hotspots-route-libya">major hub for illegal migration</a> but this has changed as a result of the concerted effort between Niger and its European allies. </p>
<p>Military intervention would lead to a total collapse of the relationship between France and Niger’s people. There is already anger among a large part of the Nigerien public against the former colonial master and its activities in the country. </p>
<p>Niger was a French colony from 1922 till independence in 1960 and Paris has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230803-niger-coup-brings-france-s-complicated-relationship-with-its-former-colonies-into-the-spotlight">continued</a> to play a critical role in the domestic political and economic affairs of the country.</p>
<p>If people believe that Ecowas is being pushed to take military action by France and its allies, Nigeriens could look to Russia which has issued its own <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warning</a> against military intervention.</p>
<p>While Russia might not have the capacity and resources to fully mobilise in support of the junta, it might engage the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60947877">Wagner Group</a>, the Russia-backed private military contractor, which already has a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali">presence</a> in neighbouring Mali. </p>
<p>Russia has been careful not to support the coup plotters so as not to upset its allies in Africa, such as South Africa and Namibia, who both oppose the coup. But a full-scale military intervention would provide Moscow with an opportunity to get involved and “gain another ally”. The military leaders in Burkina Faso for instance have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/5/interim-burkina-faso-president-hails-russia-as-strategic-ally">strengthening </a> their relationship with Russia.</p>
<h2>Limited options</h2>
<p>Ecowas is desperate to “do something” after the junta defied its <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/ecowas-threatens-force-gives-7-day-ultimatum-for-return-to-democracy-in-niger">seven-day ultimatum</a> to step down.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the junta is not showing any signs of backing down. </p>
<p>I think the best option is to rule out military action and to negotiate a short transition period to restore democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211549/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The use of force to end the coup in Niger would come at great cost and cripple the regional fight against terrorism.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2113532023-08-11T15:39:27Z2023-08-11T15:39:27ZMilitary coups in Africa: here’s what determines a return to civilian rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542141/original/file-20230810-25-hyb3hk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Niger's July 2023 coup celebrate in the capital, Niamey. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Balima Boureima/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Slightly more than two years after Niger’s first peaceful handover of power from one civilian president to another, the military seized power in July 2023. The coup – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13943662">the fourth in Nigerien history</a> – follows on the heels of recent military interventions in Africa. Mali (August 2020 and May 2021), Chad (April 2021), Guinea (September 2021), Sudan (October 2021) and Burkina Faso (January and September 2022). </p>
<p>Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the number of military coups has <a href="https://arresteddictatorship.com/coups/">declined sharply</a>. However, francophone west Africa now accounts for <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">approximately two-thirds of all military coups</a> that have occurred since then. </p>
<p>As a political scientist analysing African politics, I have <a href="https://people.clas.ufl.edu/selischer/">studied</a> military coups and their outcomes for the last decade and a half. In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">recent article</a>, Justin Hoyle, a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Florida, and I demonstrate that since 1989, military coups across the world have resulted in two outcomes. </p>
<p>First is the withdrawal of the junta from executive power. This means the junta doesn’t participate or interfere in post-coup elections. While it is necessary for the transition to democracy, it isn’t sufficient in itself. This scenario played out in the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/110/439/295/164122">Nigerien coup of 2010</a> and the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00472330701651929">Thailand coup of 2006</a>. </p>
<p>Second is electoral rigging by the junta in favour of its own candidate. This scenario establishes a regime in which coup leaders entrench themselves in executive power.</p>
<p>Examining how military coups unfold is crucial to understanding a country’s path back to democracy. It also provides insights into the effect of coups on the <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691217000/shock-to-the-system">quality of democracy</a>.</p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>We <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">studied</a> five countries and 12 post-coup transitions: Egypt (coups in 2011 and 2013), Mauritania (coups in 2005 and 2008), Niger (1996, 1999 and 2010), Fiji (2000 and 2006) and Thailand (1991, 2006 and 2014). </p>
<p>Overall, we examined slightly more than a third of all military coups between 1989 and 2017.</p>
<p>Out of a total of 32 post-coup environments, we found that in half of all cases, juntas withdrew from executive power in the coup’s aftermath.</p>
<p>However, even with the military’s withdrawal from power, the transition period to civilian rule was highly volatile. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, counter-coup attempts by a rival faction within the armed forces intending to remain in power occurred rather frequently. This was the case most recently in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2015/09/17/441222504/presidential-guard-announces-takeover-of-burkina-faso">Burkina Faso in 2015</a>. </p>
<p>Although many coups result in the withdrawal of juntas from executive power, many of the cases from our study were near-misses – the country could’ve ended up under <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/military-coups-are-key-to-understanding-contemporary-autocracies/">military authoritarian rule</a>.</p>
<p>We examined four key variables and their influence on coup outcomes. These are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the internal coherence of the armed forces</p></li>
<li><p>the ability of civil society organisations and political parties to mobilise against the junta</p></li>
<li><p>the deployment of donor leverage </p></li>
<li><p>trade dependency on regional and western partners. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Of these, we argue that the two that matter the most are: the internal cohesion of the military and the vibrancy of civil society groups. </p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>In our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">analysis</a>, we found that the single most important variable that accounts for different coup outcomes is the internal coherence of the military.</p>
<p>When there’s internal coherence, militaries generally feel <a href="https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article-abstract/12/2/192/2367607">inclined</a> to <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691217000/shock-to-the-system">withdraw</a> from executive power. This is because holding on to power <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-213418">challenges</a> their internal cohesion.</p>
<p>Internal cohesion <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">is based on</a> the factors that triggered the coup. If a coup occurs in response to threats to the country’s territorial integrity, to the preservation of public order, or to the military’s material or reputational benefits, the junta will have the backing of the military at large. This is because the benefits of seeking power outweigh the risks of not being in power. </p>
<p>If a coup occurs for reasons outside these, the junta either won’t seek power or will face resistance from within the military and withdraw. We found this confirmed in all the coups that we analysed.</p>
<p>Another relevant yet less significant variable is the positioning of civil society toward the junta. </p>
<p>Where civil society groups manage to rally the population to demand a return to democratic civilian rule, juntas depart from power. The most prominent example of this was in <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=de&lr=&id=xSZwAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=egypt+2011+nepsted&ots=r-G56kRRmg&sig=YmiQioJNNM-ECTabvUcrsIT2w_c#v=onepage&q=egypt%202011%20nepsted&f=false">Egypt after the 2011 coup</a>. </p>
<p>Interestingly, we didn’t find that aid dependency or membership in an international organisation with anti-coup rules exerted any discernible influence on juntas. This means that domestic variables – and in particular the drivers of the coup – influence political aftermaths.</p>
<h2>What it all means</h2>
<p>For the current transitions in parts of Africa, these findings are troubling. </p>
<p>In Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad, militaries overthrew their governments because of threats to their countries’ territorial integrity or to the military’s material benefits. The juntas in these countries can rely on the backing of the military at large. This decreases the likelihood of a return to civilian rule. </p>
<p>The implications of our findings for Niger and Guinea are less straightforward, however. Here, coups were staged by a sub-section of the military, even though such a move wasn’t in line with the interests of the armed forces at large. Our research findings suggest a more volatile dynamic for these two post-coup states.</p>
<p>At this stage, no one can predict how the motives of Niger’s presidential guard will shape future action. Much will depend on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66430115">coup leader Abdourahmane Tchiani’s</a> ability to convince the military that a coup was the right thing to do politically. </p>
<p>Generally, military coups bode ill for democratic processes. In instances where juntas withdraw from power, democracies don’t emerge. When juntas rig post-coup elections, they <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/military-coups-are-key-to-understanding-contemporary-autocracies/">become entrenched in power</a> in the medium to long-term. This has devastating consequences for the political and civil rights of their populations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211353/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sebastian Elischer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Examining how military coups unfold is crucial to understanding a country’s path back to democracy.Sebastian Elischer, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111362023-08-08T12:28:33Z2023-08-08T12:28:33ZNiger coup: why an Ecowas-led military intervention is unlikely<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541537/original/file-20230807-34367-f6znll.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Niger's coup leaders waving at a crowd of supporters in Niamey on August 6, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Balima Boureima/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hopes are fading for a quick resolution of Niger’s coup or the potential use of force by the <a href="https://ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (Ecowas) to free Nigerien president Mohammed Bazoum and restore him to power.</p>
<p>Ecowas leaders gave the Nigerien military junta <a href="https://ecowas.int/final-communique-fifty-first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">an ultimatum</a> to cede power within seven days of 30 July or face a military intervention.</p>
<p>The deadline of 6 August came and went, and the putschists remained. Ecowas meets again on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/7/ecowas-calls-for-second-emergency-summit-to-discuss-niger-coup">10 August</a> to discuss the situation in Niger. However, hopes of a Nigeria-led Ecowas military intervention in Niger now appears dim. </p>
<p>The first indication that it would be difficult to immediately restore democracy in the country surfaced when <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/6/thousands-in-niger-rally-in-support-of-coup-leaders">demonstrations</a> in support of the coup started. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-coup-mohamed-bazoum-military-junta-sahel-88ccaa2f004db44601e59475199c5fbe">attack</a> on the French embassy in Niamey was followed by a daily protest in support of the coup. The size of the protest increased daily. </p>
<p><a href="https://indepthnews.net/niger-coup-reflects-anti-french-sentiment-in-the-region/">Anti-France sentiments</a> also increased, with more people supporting the junta. </p>
<p>Niger shares a border with <a href="https://www.worlddata.info/africa/niger/index.php">seven countries</a> in the region, four of which are members of Ecowas. Of those four, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230801-burkina-faso-and-mali-say-intervention-in-niger-would-be-declaration-of-war">Mali and Burkina Faso</a> have been suspended due to similar coups d'etat. </p>
<p>Both countries have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/1/burkina-faso-and-mali-warn-against-foreign-intervention-after-niger-coup">threatened</a> to support Niger if Ecowas tries to use force. The remaining two countries in the bloc bordering Niger are Nigeria and Benin. Outside Ecowas, Chad and Algeria have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230806-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-pressure-mounts-on-niger-coup-leaders-as-ecowas-deadline-approaches">both ruled out</a> participating in any military action and Libya has its own challenges. </p>
<p>The likelihood of a military intervention further diminished when Nigerian legislators <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/318122/nigerias-senate-rejects-military-intervention-in-niger-as-ultimatum-to-coup-leaders-expires/">rejected</a> the idea. They argued for the use of “other means” than force. Nigeria is the largest country in the Ecowas bloc and <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/118585-nigeria-ecowas-largest-donor-continually-outsmarted-by-smaller-west-african-countries.html">principal financier</a> of the bloc. </p>
<p>It will be difficult for Ecowas to carry out military intervention without the full support of Nigeria. As a scholar of <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">politics and international relations</a> I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329456894_US_Drone_Base_in_Agadez_A_Security_Threat_to_Niger">researched</a> the implications of foreign military bases in Niger. I have also previously <a href="https://isij.eu/article/interorganizational-cooperation-and-fight-against-terrorism-west-africa-and-sahel">analysed the role Nigeria plays</a> in regional organisations such as Ecowas and the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Taskforce</a> in the region. </p>
<p>My view is that the unwillingness of Nigeria’s politicians to support military intervention, coupled with growing local support for the junta in Niger, will make the use of force almost impossible. This leaves Ecowas with little or no option than to pursue a diplomatic resolution. </p>
<h2>Why military intervention is unlikely</h2>
<p>There are three main reasons why the use of force is becoming more unlikely.</p>
<p>First, the increasing popularity of the putschists in the country is a cause for concern. The growth of protests in support of the coup is an indication of a wider acceptance than previously envisaged.</p>
<p>Hundreds of youths <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/deadline-arrived-nigers-junta-reinstate-president-residents-brace-102053037">joined</a> military personnel to stand guard at the entrance to Niamey. Some of these youths vowed to join the military to fight any incursion.</p>
<p>Second, politicians in Nigeria and Ghana fear that any military intervention would result in human catastrophe, which would further destabilise the region. Politicians from Nigeria <a href="https://north-africa.com/nigerian-president-tinubu-under-pressure-to-avoid-war-with-northern-neighbor-niger/">argue</a> that any war in Niger will have a serious impact on northern Nigeria, a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2020.1811662">region that is already strained</a> by insurgency. </p>
<p>Apart from Islamist terror organisation, <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html">Boko Haram</a>, which has ravaged the north-eastern part of the country, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2020.1811662">clashes</a> between farmers and pastoralists have also destabilised other parts of northern Nigeria. </p>
<p>Seven Nigerian states share borders with Niger. An attack on Niger would lead to a large influx of refugees into Nigeria. This has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66420693">created anxiety</a> in northern Nigeria. President Bola Tinubu, who took office only recently, will find it difficult to ignore the senators from the region who <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/614494-niger-coup-nigerian-senators-reject-tinubus-request-for-troops-deployment.html">rejected</a> any military intervention.</p>
<p>Third, Niger has fought terrorism in the region and has been a reliable partner. The country is a member of the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> and the <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Counter-terrorism-projects/G5-Sahel">G5 Sahel</a>, two key organisations tasked with countering terrorism and fighting trafficking in the region. </p>
<p>A military intervention in Niger which could result in a full blown war would embolden terrorist groups. It will also result in soldiers previously fighting side by side against terrorist groups now fighting against each other.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/islamic-state-west-africa-province">Islamic State West Africa Province</a>, an Isis affiliate, already operating in the region, an attack on Niger could create a situation similar to what happened in Syria. Isis took advantage of the fighting in Syria to establish a caliphate in 2014.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Since military intervention to restore democracy in Niger is unlikely, diplomacy remains the only solution. </p>
<p>The de facto leader General Abdourahamane Tiani was on the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/318026/10-things-to-know-about-niger-coup-leader-general-abdourahamane-tiani/">verge of being removed</a> as leader of the presidential guard before the coup d'etat. Many high-ranking military officers in the country are involved in the mutiny and it is almost impossible they will be able to work with Bazoum again. They could be <a href="https://www.pgaction.org/ilhr/adp/ner.html">tried for treason</a>, which is punishable by death in Niger.</p>
<p>As I have <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721#:%7E:text=In%20addition%20to%20insecurity%20and,labelled%20as%20having%20foreign%20origins.">explained</a> elsewhere, the mutiny was partly a result of the large presence of foreign military troops in the country. It has further weakened the relationship between the Nigerien military and France. </p>
<p>The military junta has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/niger-coup-leaders-end-military-cooperation-with-france-deepening-concerns-over-anti-western-turn-e7fae57e">cancelled</a> military cooperation with France. </p>
<p>If Bazoum is released and restored as president, he will have to remove several military leaders who participated in the coup or renegotiate Niger’s military alliance with France. Both options are fraught with difficulties. </p>
<p>The most likely diplomatic option is for Ecowas to negotiate a short transition window with the military junta. This will include a quick return to democratic rule. </p>
<p>This will calm the tension and give some assurance to partners within and outside the region. With the level of support the junta has received from the Nigerien public and outside the country, Ecowas negotiators must be open to making concessions. </p>
<p>Third party countries with lower stakes in Niger must lead these negotiations and France must be willing to change its relationship with the country to one of mutual benefit. At the moment, Nigeriens see France as an exploiter and are keen to end their long-held relationship. </p>
<p>In all, there’s no easy solution to the impasse in Niger.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211136/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A combination of Nigerian and Nigerien factors dim prospects of Ecowas military intervention in Niger.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111392023-08-07T15:30:39Z2023-08-07T15:30:39ZNiger: with a key deadline passed, Nigeria must take decisive steps to prevent a civil war in its neighborhood<p>The deadline set by the <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/economic-community-west-african-states#:%7E:text=The%2015%20members%20of%20the,%2C%20Sierra%20Leone%2C%20and%20Togo.">Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas)</a> for the elected president of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum – who was deposed in a coup on July 26 – to be reinstated to office <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/niger-coup-junta-closes-airspace-as-deadline-to-reinstate-ousted-president-passes-12935276">has passed</a>. West Africa is now bracing to see how Ecowas, which has threatened to take all steps, including military intervention, will react.</p>
<p>The situation is complicated by the fact that several member states of Ecowas, including Mali and Burkina Faso, both of which have also had recent military coups, have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230807-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-niger-junta-closes-airspace-as-ecowas-deadline-expires">publicly supported the coup plotters</a>.</p>
<p>The military junta, led by the former leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tiani, is understood to have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-coup-niger-military-force-e0e1108b58a9e955af465a3efe6605c0">asked for assistance</a> from the Russian-owned mercenary Wagner Group.</p>
<p>Niger’s coup bears serious consequences for regional peace, security, and stability in west Africa, especially as it affects Nigeria and the already <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66322914">troubled Sahel region</a>. Niger, which has been described as the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/how-military-coup-niger-threatens-stability-west-africa-2023-07-27/">only hope</a>” for stability in the Sahel, is struggling to contain two insurgencies in the south of the country involving jihadi groups which have spilled over from Mali and Nigeria.</p>
<p>In its response to the coup, a <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/news/first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">summit held in Nigeria by Ecowas</a> issued a seven-day ultimatum to the coup leaders calling on them to relinquish political power. But thus far the military junta has shown no signs of backing down and is supported by a significant number of Niger’s population. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ecowas countries" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Strife-torn neighbourhood: the Ecowas group of west African countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ecowas.png">Scantyzer1/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The options now before Ecowas are to extend the deadline to give mediation and diplomatic efforts a chance, or to proceed with the threatened military intervention. The Nigerian Senate <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/08/06/coup-nigerian-senate-rejects-tinubus-proposal-for-military-intervention-in-niger-republic/">voted against military action</a> on August 5 and public opinion appears to favour further mediation.</p>
<p>Having called on the Wagner Group for assistance in the event of an Ecowas military intervention, it appears likely that Niger’s coup leaders will look to Moscow to fill the gaps resulting from the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-loses-aid-western-countries-condemn-coup-2023-07-29/">suspension of humanitarian and security aid</a> by western powers. This would further entrench Russia’s influence in the region. </p>
<h2>Jihadi insurgency threats</h2>
<p>Despite Niger being seen in the west as a “poster-child” for stability in the region following the peaceful transition of power in elections in 2021, parts of the country are afflicted by ongoing violence. In the southwestern Tillabéri region, which borders Mali and Burkina Faso, more than 2,500 people have been killed and 100,000 displaced by fighting involving a number of armed insurgent groups.</p>
<p>Elsewhere in southern Niger there is overspill from violence in northern Nigeria involving jihadist groups, including Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel">Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP)</a>.</p>
<p>As with elsewhere in the Sahel, Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries are keen to <a href="https://theconversation.com/mapping-the-contours-of-jihadist-groups-in-the-sahel-168539">exploit the turmoil</a> to help Moscow increase its influence in the region at the expense of the former colonial power, France, as well as the US. Both have had peacekeeping troops in the region. </p>
<p>To add to the instability, there are estimated to be as many <a href="https://dailytrust.com/matawalle-there-are-30000-armed-bandits-across-the-north/">30,000 “bandits”</a>, mainly operating in and around northern Nigeria. While described as “terrorists” by the Nigerian government, these are generally driven by economic and criminal, enterprises. There is already a <a href="https://unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs//the-complex-dynamics-of-small-arms-in-west-africa-en-329.pdf">flourishing trade</a> in illegal small arms and light weapons in the region, made easier by the porous border between Niger and its neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>The net result of this violence is an explosion in the number of refugees and displaced people, which would only increase were civil war to break out in Niger. This would put intense pressure on Nigeria’s already strained social and medical infrastructure. Niger is already hosting an estimated <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/ner">influx of 30,000 refugees</a> from the conflict in Mali who would be likely to flee into Nigeria were violence to spread in Niger.</p>
<h2>All eyes on Nigeria’s response</h2>
<p>Nigeria, which currently holds the chair of Ecowas, has taken some decisive steps intended at reversing the coup in Niger, such as backing the Chadian leader who is acting as a mediator. </p>
<p>It has also <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230801-coup-d-%C3%A9tat-au-niger-une-d%C3%A9l%C3%A9gation-de-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao-avec-le-sultan-de-sokoto-leader-religieux-influent-attendue-%C3%A0-niamey">dispatched a team of mediators</a> which includes the former military leader of Nigeria, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdusalam-Abubakar">General Abdulsamali Abubakar</a>, and the Sultan of Sokoto, <a href="https://themuslim500.com/profiles/muhammadu-saadu-abubakar-iii/">Sa'adu Abubakar</a>, who leads the Sokoto Caliphate, a Sunni Muslim community of West Africa.</p>
<p>Military action from Ecowas would come at a heavy cost to Nigeria, whose economy is in the process of a <a href="https://businessday.ng/news/article/world-bank-imf-others-back-tinubus-economic-reforms/">long-overdue programme of economic reform</a> and cannot afford to fund such a military intervention. The cost of previous Ecowas interventions, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone, has largely been borne by Nigeria. Ecowas must ensure that all options for a negotiated peace settlement are fully explored and at most should deploy a contingent of special operations forces on high alert to Nigeria’s border with Niger.</p>
<p>So despite the passing of the Ecowas deadline, member states must take great care not to allow the situation to descend into a civil war which could draw in the rest of the Sahel on either side. That would have calamitous consequences for the region and major implications for global security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>All eyes are on Nigeria where west African countries are discussing the possibility of military intervention to reverse the coup.Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2109902023-08-03T15:15:11Z2023-08-03T15:15:11ZNiger coup: west African union has pledged to intervene – but some members support the plotters<p>When the Nigerian president, <a href="https://businessday.ng/columnist/article/questionable-mandate-tinubu-lacks-legitimacy-to-govern-nigeria/">Bola Tinubu</a>, was elected as chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) on July 10, he asserted that the organisation would no longer be a “<a href="https://pmnewsnigeria.com/2023/07/10/tinubu-asks-ecowas-leaders-to-stop-being-toothless-bulldogs-against-coup-plotters/">toothless bulldog</a>”. Tinubu insisted that Ecowas would work collectively to <a href="https://leadership.ng/ecowas-must-rise-against-coup-detat-tinubu/">combat terrorism and promote democracy</a> in west Africa, explaining:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We must stand firm on democracy. There is no governance, freedom and rule of law without democracy. We will not accept coup after coup in west Africa again. Democracy is very difficult to manage but it is the best form of government.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Within a month, however, the democratically elected leader of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/26/africa/niger-presidency-attempted-coup-intl/index.html">overthrown by his own palace guard</a>.</p>
<p>As Tinubu noted when taking on the leadership of Ecowas, <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/01/a-deeper-look-into-the-west-african-coup-wave/">coups and counter-coups</a> have become commonplace within the region in recent years. Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso (twice in eight months) have all experienced military takeovers that have ousted their elected governments. Now the same fate has befallen Niger, where the election of Bazoum in April 2021 was considered to be a rare case of successful and democratic transition of power in west Africa. </p>
<p>The coup – which installed the former leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, as leader – has been roundly condemned by the US, France, the EU and the United Nations. The US, which has has had troops in Niger for more than a decade advising the country’s military on counter-terrorism, said it would “take measures” to restore democratic government in the country. </p>
<p>On July 30, Ecowas issued a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ecowas-threatens-use-of-force-against-niger-junta/a-66398008">seven-day ultimatum</a> vowing to use force to dislodge the junta should they not restore Bazoum to the presidency. </p>
<p>Ecowas has also <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/7/29/23812389/niger-coup-africa-ecowas-tchiani-bazoum">closed its countries’ borders</a> with Niger, instituted a no-fly zone, and frozen the country’s assets and those of those involved in the coup and their families. In addition, Nigeria has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66383119">discontinued electricity supplies to Niger</a>, leading to blackouts in its major cities. But the junta has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-reopens-borders-with-several-neighbours-week-after-coup-2023-08-02/">pledged not to back down</a> despite these “inhumane sanctions”.</p>
<h2>What is Ecowas?</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/002190961557095">Ecowas</a>, a 15-member regional group formed in 1975 and comprising mainly former British and French colonies, aims to “<a href="https://ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">promote cooperation and integration</a>” among members in the form of an economic union. Over the years, it has expanded its remit to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">include a security role</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ecowas nations" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ecowas: a community of west African nations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Scantyzer1 via Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1990, the group’s military wing, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog), was deployed in a peacekeeping role in the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13533319408413509">civil war in Liberia</a>, enjoying initial success but ultimately failing to prevent the outbreak of further hostilities that lasted through most of the 1990s – only ending with the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2005.</p>
<p>In neighbouring Sierra Leone, Johnny Paul Koroma, an army major, led a military coup on May 25 1997, overthrowing the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Ecomog troops stationed in Liberia were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45194480">deployed to restore peace and democracy there</a>, but were unable to prevent a bitter civil war <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094419">breaking out</a>, requiring intervention from UN peacekeepers and British troops.</p>
<p>In both Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire, Ecowas has again intervened to ensure the democratic transition of power when it appeared that the incumbent leaders would not respect election results.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">How The Gambia is testing West Africa's resolve to protect democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Stretching military capacity</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen whether Ecowas will follow through with its pledge to intervene if Bazoum is not restored to office in Niger. But conditions are very different in the region now from when the organisation successfully led the interventions described above.</p>
<p>West Africa is riddled with violence associated with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2021.1888082?casa_token=cDR2sgiLEKoAAAAA%3ASTrfRYVK_ZnNjGov4jaEa82EoITfidvU_FtyHW-zZfPFxLZDo-6oJ_-_oEBSBR-V1RhMeA6lFg">jihadi terrorism</a> involving Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram. There are also regular <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2022.2129015">outbreaks of violence</a> between herders and farmers over land in the face of droughts and scarcity of resources. These issues have <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-islamic-state-affiliate-attempts-to-assassinate-nigerian-president">stretched the military capacity</a> of Ecowas member states, many of whom have their own problems to deal with.</p>
<p>And then there’s the prospect of the involvement of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">the Wagner Group</a>. The coup junta is reported <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/02/africa/niger-coup-mali-wagner-intl-afr/index.html">to be engaged in discussions</a> with this Russia-backed mercenary army, which has been active across the region. Several countries where the Wagner Group is involved <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/613369-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-declare-support-for-niger-coup-as-soldiers-arrest-politicians.html">have declared their backing</a> for the coup, rejected the Ecowas sanctions, and pledged support for the coup leaders if Ecowas intervenes militarily.</p>
<p>As in Burkina Faso and Mali, there is also growing <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/africa/protesters-attack-french-embassy-niger-west-african-governments-threat-rcna97181">anti-French sentiment</a> on the streets of Niger. This is being fuelled by the Wagner Group’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who has hailed the coup as a blow against colonialism – a message which resonates with many in Niger, where France maintains a 1,500-strong peacekeeping force to combat jihadist terrorism. </p>
<h2>Unpopular leader</h2>
<p>Much has been made by Bazoum’s opponents of his membership <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/02/19/who-is-nigerien-presidential-candidate-mohamed-bazoum/">of a minority ethnic Arab group</a>, which led to him being dubbed as “foreign” during Niger’s election campaign. His election was also condemned in some quarters as cronyism, as he was the handpicked successor of the outgoing president Mahamadou Issoufou. Bazoum’s decision to ban members of his government from <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202206160312.html">having more than one wife</a> has also ruffled powerful feathers.</p>
<p>All these factors will complicate any decision by Ecowas to use force to restore Bazoum to power. But Nigeria, under the leadership of Tinubu, appears determined to take this opportunity to prove that Ecowas still wields muscle in the region.</p>
<p>His chief of staff, General Christopher Musa, has assembled Ecowas defence ministers for a <a href="https://leadership.ng/just-in-ecowas-defence-chiefs-meet-in-abuja-over-niger-coup/">two-day summit in Abuja</a>. Representatives from Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, The Gambia, Cote D’Ivoire, Cabo Verde, and Senegal attended, while Niger, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau were not represented.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia and the west – which harbours fears about Moscow’s intentions in the region – are both watching closely to see whether yet another west African country will descend into the pit of instability and violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olumba E. Ezenwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The coup in Niger has the potential to further destabilise the whole of west Africa.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.