tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/numsa-29804/articlesNumsa – The Conversation2020-08-28T06:21:36Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1445282020-08-28T06:21:36Z2020-08-28T06:21:36ZThe story of a working man who lived through apartheid – and his struggles after it ended<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353179/original/file-20200817-22-cidz4w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Black labourers extracting sludge
on a mine near Johannesburg at the height of apartheid in the 1980s. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Turnley/Corbis/VCG via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 25 June, Mandlenkosi Makhoba, one of the last of a generation of grassroots worker leaders of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (<a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/federation-south-african-trade-unions-fosatu">Fosatu</a>), was laid to rest above the majestic Mahlabathini plain in KwaZulu-Natal. He was 78.</p>
<p>Industrial workers such as Makhoba formed the basis of Fosatu, established in 1979 when democratic workers’ organisations forced the apartheid system to <a href="http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/docs/fosatu/fosatu.pdf">recognise their trade unions</a>. This federation went on to win rights for black workers, contributed to a new workplace order and the establishment of national collective bargaining, while challenging racism and inequality in the workplace. It laid the basis for the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) in 1985 with organised labour proving decisive in the transition to democracy. </p>
<p>Makhoba was, therefore, one of the “agents of change” who gave birth to South Africa’s modern labour movement. But he was not one of its beneficiaries. His death marks the passing of the era of the ‘labouring man’ – those industrial workers who were involved largely in manual labour, denied much formal education but stood for worker solidarity.</p>
<h2>A working man’s life under apartheid</h2>
<p>Makhoba’s life story illustrates the transition of established organised labour, from the voice of the dispossessed production worker struggling for recognition, to the relatively well protected suburban worker of today. He also represents the losers in the new South Africa, showing how inequality is consistently produced and reproduced. It tells the story of dreams lost and the need to recover the vision of a disappearing generation. </p>
<p>The stories of these working men and women has long been overshadowed by the big men and women of the successful struggle for democracy. Fortunately Makhoba lived to see the republication, in 2018, of his autobiography, <a href="https://www.nihss.ac.za/content/story-one-tells-struggle-all-metalworkers-under-apartheid"><em>The Story of One Tells the Struggle of All: Metalworkers under Apartheid</em></a>. His story prefigures what has happened both locally and globally, namely how organised factory- and mine-based manual labour became sidelined by both advances in technology and the rise of neoliberalism. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353357/original/file-20200818-20-1bvsihu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353357/original/file-20200818-20-1bvsihu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353357/original/file-20200818-20-1bvsihu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353357/original/file-20200818-20-1bvsihu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353357/original/file-20200818-20-1bvsihu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353357/original/file-20200818-20-1bvsihu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353357/original/file-20200818-20-1bvsihu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mandlenkosi Makhoba 40 years ago.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied by author</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We first met Makhoba, a foundry worker on the East Rand, now Ekhuruleni, nearly 40 years ago while researching the changing world of work in the metal industry. This archetypal, barrel-chested ‘labouring man’ poured molten metal to mould machine parts long before health and safety was taken seriously.</p>
<p>Alongside so many of his compatriots, he had migrated from his rural home in the “<a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/homelands">Bantustan</a>” of KwaZulu to perform the toughest jobs that demanded physical strength and industrial discipline. “Bantustans” were the then mainly rural, undeveloped areas were black people were required to live under apartheid. </p>
<p>Seen as an unskilled “cast boy” under apartheid, Makhoba was paid considerably less than the white “supervisors” he had trained. “That made me angry,” he said at the time. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I don’t get the money he is getting, but I am supposed to be his teacher! How can a clever man be taught by a stupid man like myself?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Throughout his working life Makhoba oscillated between town and countryside. He lived in the sprawling <a href="https://www.csvr.org.za/publications/1794--the-human-face-of-violence-hostel-dwellers-speak">single sex hostel complex</a> for black male migrant workers in Vosloorus, to the east of Johannesburg, a bus drive from his workplace. He was deeply dissatisfied with the filthy conditions in the hostel and the lack of privacy, with 16 men to a room and not much better than the mine compounds and concrete bunks these hostels had replaced. Men had to cook after a long day’s work and travel. Theft was rife and excessive drinking and violent assaults marked the weekends.</p>
<p>Accompanying this sense of deprivation was the resigned acceptance of being unable to live a normal social life. Of greatest concern for Makhoba was going home to Mahlabathini, only to find the decline of parental authority. This affected him deeply.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When a man comes home there is no respect for him anymore, because he has been away from home for such a long time. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The union</h2>
<p>It is not surprising then that in July 1979 Makhoba joined a fledgling metal union at the time, later to become the <a href="https://www.numsa.org.za/">National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa</a>. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I joined the union because workers are not treated like human beings by management, but like animals.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The men who joined the union came from similar districts in KwaZulu and elsewhere and shared the rigours of hostel life. They were, in other words, rooted in networks of mutual support.</p>
<p>Although Makhoba had been working in the city intermittently for 20 years when we first met him, his cultural world was shaped by his rural values: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I work here, but my spirit is in Mahlabathini. My spirit is there because I come from the countryside. I was born there and my father was born there.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 1983 he was dismissed from the foundry for participating in an illegal strike. Following episodic periods of temporary employment, he returned home permanently. </p>
<h2>Deprivations of rural life</h2>
<p>In 1991 we tracked him down to his homestead on a mountain top in Mahlabathini. He had acquired 15 head of cattle, ten from the <em>ilobolo</em> (bride price) of his two oldest daughters. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353163/original/file-20200817-20-nmgl1i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353163/original/file-20200817-20-nmgl1i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=854&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353163/original/file-20200817-20-nmgl1i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=854&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353163/original/file-20200817-20-nmgl1i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=854&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353163/original/file-20200817-20-nmgl1i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1073&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353163/original/file-20200817-20-nmgl1i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1073&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353163/original/file-20200817-20-nmgl1i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1073&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Fifteen people – his wife and 14 children – lived with him in the six rondavels of his neatly swept homestead where he had access to land on which he grew maize and some vegetables.</p>
<p>But a closer examination of this household revealed a sad reality: Mandlenkosi’s home was a picturesque version of a rural slum. The children spent their days doing household chores, chopping firewood and collecting water twice daily from the local stream half a kilometre away. Their diet, except on special occasions, was confined to mealie meal and they often faced hunger.</p>
<p>As the children matured and moved away, Makhoba suffered increasingly poor health. Unable to continue working at a local store, the lack of food intensified. As he drifted into the long autumn of his life, suffering with Parkinson’s disease, the family had become too poor to farm their land. The hopes of yesteryear, of a new start and a new, better society, had become “a dream”.</p>
<p>The inequality in life-chances that shaped Mandlenkosi’s life continues as his children are part of the growing millions of marginalised workers eking out an existence in the rural slums and informal settlements of our urban areas.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, today Cosatu is largely a home for relatively privileged public sector workers, a third of whom have post high school qualifications and <a href="https://witspress.co.za/catalogue/labour-beyond-cosatu/">40% have professional jobs</a>. Production in the foundry where Makhoba once worked is now largely robotised. </p>
<p>With many of the manual jobs disappearing, it is farewell to the traditional labouring man as the precarious worker of the digital age is ushered in.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144528/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Webster receives funding from the Ford Foundation and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. He is affiliated to the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Stewart does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The life story of Mandlenkosi Makhoba represents the losers in the new South Africa, showing how inequality is produced and reproduced generationally.Paul Stewart, Associate Professor in Sociology, University of ZululandEdward Webster, Distinguished Reserach Professor, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1345932020-04-06T14:18:37Z2020-04-06T14:18:37ZBook review: lessons from a township that resisted apartheid<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323612/original/file-20200327-146678-103wrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Oukasie residents protest over poor service delivery in 2010.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jaco Marais/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Can people on the wrong end of power change the world by working together? Or are the moments when the powerless take control of their own lives doomed to be snuffed out?</p>
<p>The question is raised by Kally Forrest’s <a href="https://jacana.co.za/our-books/bonds-of-justice-the-struggle-for-oukasie-hidden-voices-series/">book</a> Bonds of Justice: The Struggle for Oukasie. It is another in the <a href="https://jacana.co.za/our-books/?filter=Hidden%20Voices%20Series">Hidden Voices</a> series which aims to recover and preserve writings on society which would otherwise fall through publishers’ nets. The book is short and highly readable, and so is accessible to a non-academic audience. It has been some years in the making – it uses information gathered in 2011 and 2012. But the story it tells raises topical issues.</p>
<p>Forrest details the fight, in the last years of apartheid, of the people of Oukasie, a township near Brits in <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/north-west">North West</a> Province, against an attempt to force them to move to Lethlabile, 25 km from Brits, primarily because their presence offended white residents. While it was common under apartheid for black people to be <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/18/world/south-africa-orders-the-removal-of-10000-blacks-to-new-site.html">removed</a> to areas where they would be out of sight to whites, it was uncommon for those who faced this threat to resist it successfully. Oukasie did manage to defeat the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/archive-files/ChOct89.1024.8196.000.028.Oct1989.5.pdf">attempted removal</a>. </p>
<p>It organised to do this despite a sustained campaign by the apartheid authorities. This included the murder of anti-removal leaders and members of their family, but its chief strategy was to divide residents. So, resistance could only succeed if the resisters were <a href="https://learnandteachmagazine.wordpress.com/2014/11/12/oukasie-yes-letlhabile-no/">organised and united</a>. While thousands were induced to move, enough stayed to force the authorities to abandon the removal and agree that Oukasie be developed.</p>
<p>Unusual circumstances made Oukasie an ideal site for strong grassroots organisation in which people remain united because they share in decisions.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323285/original/file-20200326-133040-hlg1a3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323285/original/file-20200326-133040-hlg1a3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323285/original/file-20200326-133040-hlg1a3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323285/original/file-20200326-133040-hlg1a3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323285/original/file-20200326-133040-hlg1a3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1166&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323285/original/file-20200326-133040-hlg1a3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1166&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323285/original/file-20200326-133040-hlg1a3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1166&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hidden Voices/Fanele</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The resistance</h2>
<p>Brits was the site of strong worker organisation, largely the work of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Catholic-Action">Young Christian Workers</a> (YCW), founded by Roman Catholic priests as a vehicle for European workers to change exploitative conditions through organised efforts. YCW, which in Brits was open to non-Christians, stressed democratic grassroots organisation based on careful strategy summed up in its motto – “See, judge, act” – which encouraged members to reflect on what they saw before deciding what to do about it.</p>
<p>Young Christian Workers was political, since it challenged the effect of economic power on its members. But it was wary of the political movements which, it believed, wanted workers to act in ways which advanced the movements’ interests but not their own. It was able to maintain this stance because, in contrast to much of the rest of the country, the political organisations were not active in Oukasie.</p>
<p>Its attitude was identical to that of a section of the trade union movement which happened to be strongly represented in Brits. Its vehicle was the union which became the <a href="https://www.numsa.org.za/history/">National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa)</a>. Young Christian Workers’s members gravitated to it and it developed a strong presence in Oukasie. The resistance to removal relied on the same stress on grassroots participation and careful strategy which Young Christian Workers and Numsa adopted in the workplace.</p>
<p>The Oukasie resistance became, therefore, a test for an approach which relied on the efforts of grassroots people rather than high profile political leaders to change the world.</p>
<p>In one sense, this route to change worked. Oukasie was reprieved, and this was followed by a <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-08-31-wr-29871-story.html">period of development</a>. The Brits transitional local government which was elected in the mid-1990s was led by Levy Mamobolo, a unionist and anti-removal leader who, until his untimely death, led the area effectively and honestly. The first few years seemed to show that democratic local organisation could also produce political leadership which serves the people rather than itself.</p>
<p>But, as Forrest shows, the Oukasie story does <a href="https://ewn.co.za/Topic/Mothotlung-service-delivery-protests">not end happily</a>. Leaders committed to public service were forced out of the local government; public services declined and corruption increased.</p>
<p>Forrest therefore frames her book not as a story of the triumph of a particular way of fighting for change but as evidence of what is possible if people organise themselves in the way Oukasie did. The author of an important <a href="https://witspress.co.za/catalogue/metal-that-will-not-bend/">book</a> on Numsa, she is an advocate of the approach followed by Young Christian Workers, Numsa and the Oukasie resisters. She contrasts this with the selfish elitism which gained control of Brits. </p>
<p>But she leaves unanswered the key question: is the grassroots organisation which saved Oukasie a realistic route to change, or is it doomed to give way to the top-down leadership to which Brits <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-05-03-mayor-suspended-in-difficult-but-necessary-decision-by-anc/">succumbed</a>?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323609/original/file-20200327-146699-pc8td4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323609/original/file-20200327-146699-pc8td4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323609/original/file-20200327-146699-pc8td4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323609/original/file-20200327-146699-pc8td4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323609/original/file-20200327-146699-pc8td4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323609/original/file-20200327-146699-pc8td4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323609/original/file-20200327-146699-pc8td4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 2010 Oukasie rose again, in furious protests over poor service delivery. More than 100 were arrested.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Foto24/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What does the ultimate defeat mean?</h2>
<p>Given the importance of this question, it is a pity that Forrest does not analyse the defeat of grassroots democracy in Oukasie. We are left wondering how and why control passed from the “good guys” to the “bad guys”.</p>
<p>One reason may well have been that the governing African National Congress’s (ANC’s) politics turned out to be more powerful than those who supported the Oukasie resistance hoped. Forrest records that key figures in the resistance to removal joined the ANC and served in its committees once it was unbanned. This suggests that Oukasie’s ability to maintain an independent path was purely a result of happenstance (the lack of a political presence in the area).</p>
<p>Despite these limitations, the book makes an important contribution. Forrest’s sympathy for the Oukasie campaign does not prevent her from highlighting weaknesses. She acknowledges that the campaign failed to prevent thousands leaving Oukasie, and she documents the defeat of the politics she champions as Oukasie moved from resistance to local governance. This makes the book a highly credible account of the events it describes.</p>
<p>The book should, therefore, be read by anyone concerned with democracy’s future in South Africa, but in other contexts too. It should also trigger a debate on whether the political approach it describes is feasible.</p>
<p><em><a href="https://jacana.co.za/our-books/bonds-of-justice-the-struggle-for-oukasie-hidden-voices-series/">Bonds of Justice</a>: The Struggle for Oukasie is <a href="https://www.loot.co.za/search?cat=b&terms=Bonds+of+Justice%3A+The+Struggle+for+Oukasie">available</a> <a href="https://www.exclusivebooks.co.za/search?expedite=&keyword=Bonds%20of%20Justice:%20The%20Struggle%20for%20Oukasie">online</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/134593/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A readable and important new book on the struggle for justice in South Africa’s Oukasie township does not go far enough to question the feasibility of grassroots resistance.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1120162019-02-27T13:53:51Z2019-02-27T13:53:51ZSouth Africa must end its coal habit. But it’s at odds about when and how<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/260417/original/file-20190222-195870-1dgv5ke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Over 90% of South Africa's electricity comes from coal-fired power stations.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s power utility Eskom is in <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-south-africas-energy-generator-is-in-so-much-trouble-111510">crisis</a>. In recent weeks, this has been brought home to South Africa’s 58 million citizens as major <a href="https://www.citypower.co.za/customers/Pages/Infographic.aspx">power cuts</a> hit the country. The blackouts have renewed focus on the power utility’s economic and technical problems. But Eskom’s problems point to the much bigger issue of a country struggling to map out a new energy regime – one that reduces its very high levels of dependency on coal in a way that doesn’t devastate people’s lives. </p>
<p>South Africa is highly dependent on coal – almost <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/electricity-production-from-coal-sources-percent-of-total-wb-data.html">90% of its energy</a> comes from coal-fired power stations. The urgency of change is clear on both global and local levels. Mining and burning coal is one of the most <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1878522015000533">destructive activities</a> on the planet. It represents an <a href="https://open.uct.ac.za/handle/11427/28127">immediate threat</a> to all forms of life and to scarce supplies of water, the degradation of arable land and toxic pollution of the air and water with extremely negative health impacts. </p>
<p>South Africa isn’t the only country in the world attempting to adjust its energy mix by moving away from fossil fuels to cleaner power sources. Dozens of countries such as Germany, Austria, Canada, Ghana and the Philippines are attempting to make the change. </p>
<p>But, despite policy commitments, South Africa isn’t doing enough to make these changes through what’s become known as a <a href="http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpPublications)/9B3F4F10301092C7C12583530035C2A5?OpenDocument">“just transition”</a>. This is a contested notion with different understandings of the depth and direction of the change involved. At the very minimum it means making provision for vulnerable workers in the energy sector, to make sure that the move towards a low-carbon economy is done in a way that protects jobs as well as the environment. </p>
<h2>Contradictions in policy</h2>
<p>Contradictions in the country’s approach to the transition away from coal are evident in the <a href="http://www.energy.gov.za/IRP/irp-update-draft-report2018/IRP-Update-2018-Draft-for-Comments.pdf">Draft Integrated Resource Plan</a> announced by the Minister of Energy in 2018. But it only mentions the partial decommissioning of Eskom’s 16 coal-fired power plants and of reducing South Africa’s reliance on coal for energy to less than 20% by 2050. The document appears oblivious to the immediate urgency of responding to climate change. Rather than being <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-10-31-blueprint-for-transition-from-coal-is-too-ambitious/">“too ambitious”</a>, the plan is not ambitious enough. </p>
<p>The country is also contradictory when it comes to the “just” elements of the transition. Mineral Resources Minister Gwede Mantashe has <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-01-31-mining-industry-must-act-to-get-rid-of-its-bad-reputation-gwede-mantashe-says/">referred</a> to “the government’s commitments to a just transition” but in the same speech he urges the mining industry to “take pride in itself and articulate a more positive image.” Specifically, he said coal producers must “wake up. You are under siege”. </p>
<p>In reality the people who are under siege are poor people who are the least responsible for climate change but who are carrying the heaviest costs. </p>
<p>Examples include the many communities living close to coal-fired power stations as well as people working in open-pit or abandoned mines. Others affected badly by mining include people dealing with dispossession, loss of land and livelihoods, threats to food security, limitations on access to water resources, health problems associated with air pollution and the desecration of ancestral graves. </p>
<p>There’s a desperate urgency for South Africa to take seriously its commitment to a just transition. The <a href="http://saftu.org.za/renewable-energy-is-necessary-but-not-at-expense-of-jobs-says-saftu/">South African Federation of Trade Unions</a> supports the move to renewable energy but has estimated that without a just transition that “protects the livelihoods of mining and energy workers, some 40,000 jobs will be lost.” </p>
<p>Powerful social forces such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the South African Federation of Trade Unions and the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa support a transition to renewable energy. But they insist that is shouldn’t be done at the expense of ordinary South Africans. That means that it there can’t be privatisation of state assets at the expense of jobs and higher electricity prices. This is understandable given the country’s <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate">high unemployment rate</a>. </p>
<h2>Eskom</h2>
<p>The restructuring of Eskom is obviously necessary. And there are strong economic and ecological arguments for shutting down inefficient coal-fired power stations and savings to the country would also be significant. </p>
<p>One <a href="http://meridianeconomics.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Eskoms-financial-crisis-and-the-viability-of-coalfired-power-in-SA_ME_20171115.pdf">study</a> on Eskom’s financial crisis claimed that to decommission the Eskom power stations at Grootvlei, Henrina and Komati power stations and avoid the completion of Kusile units 5 and 6 would give rise to savings of around R15 billion – R17 billon.</p>
<p>But none of this should happen at the expense of workers. Yet there are signs that it already is.</p>
<p>Decommissioning is already underway. For example two units at Hendrina – one of Eskom’s five coal-fired power stations to be closed by 2020 – have already been closed. The remaining eight will be closed by April this year. Yet there’s no protection for the bulk of the workforce, 2,300 of whom are contract workers hired by labour brokers. The power utility is taking no responsibility for what happens to them. </p>
<p>There have been calls by activist groups for a committee driven by the presidency to coordinate a just transition. But nothing has materialised. The current “solutions” to the Eskom crisis – a reliance on overseas experts, union bashing and backdoor privatisation – don’t bode well. All suggest a familiar panic on the part of the powerful. </p>
<h2>What’s needed</h2>
<p>There is no blueprint for a just transition; it has to be built in an inclusive process of democratic debate and participation including coal mining affected communities and workers. This needs to be grounded in the recognition that coal mining and burning is a driver of environmental inequality and injustice in South Africa. </p>
<p>What is required is militant, class –based activism to challenge existing power relations and to mobilise for a radical just transition. This involves changing – not just Eskom – but ways of producing, consuming and relating to nature to create a more just and sustainable world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112016/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacklyn Cock receives funding from Ford Foundation.</span></em></p>South Africa needs to wean itself off coal in a way that protects jobs and the environment.Jacklyn Cock, Professor Emerita in Sociology and Honorary Research Professor in SWOP, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/920512018-02-20T13:01:19Z2018-02-20T13:01:19ZSouth Africa must resist another captured president: this time by the markets<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207235/original/file-20180221-132680-1l9blwl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa addresses MPs after being elected president of South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African National Congress (ANC) has made a dangerous habit of bringing post-apartheid South Africa to the brink of instability and the common ruin of all. The <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-02-14-president-jacob-zuma-resigns/">resignation</a> of former President Jacob Zuma and his <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/live-goodbye-zuma-hello-president-cyril-20180215">replacement</a> by Cyril Ramaphosa was such a moment. It brought home the point that the over-concentration of power in the office of the president has clearly not worked. </p>
<p>A rethink on president-centred politics and the threats it poses to the democracy are crucial for the post-Zuma period. South Africa needs to re-imagine democratic practice, leadership and how power works. </p>
<p>Some sections of South African society have reduced the Zuma problem to a corruption problem. Dismantle Zuma’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-turned-sa-into-mafia-style-lawless-kleptocracy-saftu-20170805">kleptocratic network</a>, the argument goes, and all is solved. Zuma’s demise and a few high profile prosecutions will suffice. </p>
<p>But another view on the Zuma problem – and one with which I concur – suggests it is a problem of contending class projects inside the ANC. The <a href="http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/1789">neoliberal class project</a> under Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki saw South Africa integrated into global markets. It maintained stability through modest redistributive reforms. This project laid the basis for a new black middle class to <a href="https://monthlyreview.org/2003/01/01/neoliberalism-and-resistance-in-south-africa/">emerge</a> while systematically <a href="http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/14466/theresponsesoftradeunionstotheeffectsofneoliberalisminsouthafrica.pdf?sequence=1">weakening</a> labour and the left.</p>
<p>But it <a href="https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-neoliberal-squeeze-on-post-apartheid-democracy-reclaiming-the-south-african-dream/28453">surrendered</a> the state (including the presidency) to transnational capital and the power of finance. </p>
<p>The Zuma project, on the other hand, <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Opinion/zumas-radical-economic-transformation-is-state-looting-20170404">advanced looting</a> as the basis of accumulation and class formation. The <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/MaxduPreez/the-fatal-flaw-in-project-state-capture-20171205">extra-constitutional state</a> that emerged deepened the macroeconomic, institutional and legitimacy crisis of the ANC-led state. The left and labour, aligned with the ANC in the tripartite alliance, were <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-opinion/sa-workers-must-brace-for-a-dark-new-year/">co-opted</a> and divided. Both these projects are entrenched in the ANC.</p>
<p>Now what? Messiah-centred presidential politics is extremely dangerous. This is particularly true in a country of extreme inequality and with a formal concentration of power in the office of the president. If politics is not represented, thought and acted beyond this, South Africa is going to repeat historical mistakes.</p>
<p>Since the ANC’s December 2017 conference the media, the banks and international institutions have been talking up a narrative of the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/01/25/the-gaining-rand-and-the-cyril-effect-what-it-means-for-your-pocket_a_23343014/">“Cyril effect”</a>. Zuma’s removal is attributed to this. In fact the Cyril effect is a <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/02/12/will-sas-economy-really-benefit-from-the-cyril-effect_a_23359238/">narrative</a> of capture of South Africa’s new president by transnational and financial capital.</p>
<p>South Africa’s democracy cannot afford another captured president beholden to <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/ratings-agencies-note-ramaphosas-election-but-swift-upgrade-unlikely-20180215">credit rating agencies</a>, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/opinion-ramaphosa-isnt-the-only-winner-so-is-the-rand-12486405">currency fluctuations</a>, investment flows and business <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/safrica-economy/south-african-mining-seen-a-winner-as-ramaphosa-woos-investors-idUSL8N1PJ4EN">perceptions</a>. South Africa’s democracy has to be grounded in the needs of its citizens and the mandates given by its Constitution.</p>
<h2>The ‘Cyril effect’ is hyperbole</h2>
<p>The end of Zuma was in fact not because of the Cyril effect. In the main Zuma was removed by the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17450447">people’s effect</a> which connected the dots of corruption, a mismanaged state and rapacious capitalism. </p>
<p>This resistance was expressed over 15 years through various institutions and social forces. These included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Battles inside the South African Communist Party (SACP) against <a href="https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/south-africa-zumafication-left-politics-alliance">Zumafication</a> but which led to expulsions;</p></li>
<li><p>By feminists during Zuma’s rape trial and subsequently through <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-10-09-rememberkhwezi-zumas-rape-accuser-dies-never-having-known-freedom/#.Wovpsa6WbIU">#RememberKhwezi</a>;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.zapiro.com/120520st">Artists</a> and cartoonists lampooning Zuma, including with <a href="https://www.zapiro.com/">shower heads</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>The ongoing struggles in communities against <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-ancs-path-to-corruption-was-set-in-south-africas-1994-transition-64774">corrupt officials</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/marikana-shining-the-light-on-police-militarisation-and-brutality-in-south-africa-44162">Marikana massacre</a> in 2012. This produced rage among workers and major realignments away from Zuma’s ANC;</p></li>
<li><p>The <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2014/04/20/Numsa-calls-for-Zuma-to-resign">call</a> by trade unions like the metalworkers’ Numsa for Zuma’s removal;</p></li>
<li><p>The <a href="http://www.polity.org.za/article/sa-statement-by-the-sidikiwe-vukani-vote-no-campaign-calls-on-south-africans-to-endorse-campaign-16042014-2014-04-16">Vukani-Sidikiwe</a> campaign during the 2014 elections which opened up a national debate on how citizens should vote; </p></li>
<li><p>The rise of #ZumaMustGo Campaign. This was in response to the sacking of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-removal-of-south-africas-finance-minister-is-bad-news-for-the-country-52170">Nhlanhla Nene</a> as finance minister in December 2015. The NUMSA-led United Front played a crucial role in this;</p></li>
<li><p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-zumamustfall-and-feesmustfall-have-in-common-and-why-it-matters-53115">#FeesMustFall</a> movement. Students’ demands included labour insourcing as well as quality, decommodified and decolonised higher education;</p></li>
<li><p>The <a href="https://www.news24.com/elections/results/lge">2016 local government elections</a>. These were a harbinger of seismic political realignments against the ANC in key cities;</p></li>
<li><p>The role of <a href="http://amabhungane.co.za/">investigative and nonpartisan media</a> in probing corruption scandals. And the publication of the <a href="http://www.gupta-leaks.com/">Gupta-leaks</a> as well as <a href="http://www.jacana.co.za/book-categories/new-releases-65840/a-simple-man-kasrils-and-the-zuma-enigma-detail">“A Simple Man”</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/two-books-that-tell-the-unsettling-tale-of-south-africas-descent-87044">“The President’s Keepers”</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>The courageous role from 2010 onwards of then <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/thulisile-nomkhosi-madonsela">public protector Thuli Mandonsela</a> in drawing attention to ethics and legal violations by Zuma;</p></li>
<li><p>Court decisions affirming the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/display-judicial-independence-south-african-court-denies-zuma-again">judiciary’s independence</a> in relation to Zuma;</p></li>
<li><p>Zuma’s miscalculation in <a href="https://theconversation.com/stakes-for-south-africas-democracy-are-high-as-zuma-plunges-the-knife-75550">firing finance minister Pravin Gordhan</a>, the rallying of activists and the rise of <a href="http://www.savesouthafrica.org/">#SaveSouthAfrica</a>. What followed were some of the largest post-apartheid <a href="https://theconversation.com/rebellion-is-on-the-march-against-zuma-but-will-it-be-enough-to-oust-him-75862">protest marches</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>The powerful voice of liberation struggle veterans like <a href="https://theconversation.com/ahmed-kathrada-exhibit-a-of-the-values-imbued-in-south-africas-freedom-charter-75339">Ahmed Kathrada</a> and others who called for Zuma to resign.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The ANC’s legitimacy crisis</h2>
<p>As a result of all this activity the crisis of legitimacy in the ANC – and the ANC state – has deepened. This has placed immense pressure on the party to act. In this context, Ramaphosa is playing out his role out of necessity and to secure the ANC’s electoral fortunes.</p>
<p>For middle class and rich South Africans Ramaphosa’s <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/state-nation-address-president-republic-south-africa%2C-mr-cyril-ramaphosa">state of the nation</a> speech represented a return to normalcy – a democracy that works for a few. That’s not to say that the new president didn’t make some important announcements in his state of the nation address. This included his comments about state owned enterprises, redistributive state programmes and anti-corruption mechanisms. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the speech struck chords that resonated with the “return to normalcy” narrative.</p>
<p>But South Africans can’t repeat the mistake made in 1994 when progressive civil society <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2012.666011?scroll=top&needAccess=true">demobilised</a>. The people’s effect has to continue to shape a post-Zuma democracy in the interests of all. The ANC has abused majority support and cannot be trusted with the future of South Africa.</p>
<p>People’s power has to be strengthened and continuously mobilised around strengthening democratic institutions, ending corruption, fundamental economic transformation and advancing systemic alternatives to the climate crisis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92051/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vishwas Satgar receives funding from the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and the National Institute of the Humanities and Social Sciences. He has been engaged in various activist initiatives against the Zuma Regime. </span></em></p>Jacob Zuma was removed by the people’s effect, which connected the dots of corruption, a mismanaged state and rapacious capitalism.Vishwas Satgar, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/886472017-12-07T10:09:52Z2017-12-07T10:09:52ZSouth Africa’s communist party strips the ANC of its multi-class ruling party status<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197921/original/file-20171206-896-xftwg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There is a fallout between alliance partners the South African Communist Party and the governing ANC.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The South African Communist Party (SACP) has broken with history and challenged the governing African National Congress (ANC) in an election. The SACP’s decision to go it alone in the Metsimaholo municipality by-election marks a new low in relations within the tripartite alliance forged during the struggle against apartheid. The other alliance partner is the trade union federation Cosatu. The contest ended in a hung council, with the ANC taking 16 seats, the Democratic Alliance 11, the Economic Freedom Fighters eight and the SACP three. Politics and Society Editor Thabo Leshilo asked political scientist Professor Dirk Kotze about the development.</em></p>
<p><strong>What is the significance of this development?</strong></p>
<p>The decision to contest an election on its own clearly represents a watershed event for the SACP. It is the first tangible step towards implementation of a <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/12th_congress/resolutions.pdf">resolution</a> taken by the SACP in 2007. Then, unhappy with the ANC’s policies in government, the communists raised the issue of contesting elections themselves. It proposed doing this either within a “reconfigured alliance” or having its own candidates contest elections, after which it would come to an agreement with the ANC on how to cooperate in government.</p>
<p>The SACP’s decision to go it alone is the culmination of a fallout dating back to 1996. Then, the ANC government under President Thabo Mbeki announced a macro economic framework, known as Growth, Employment and Redistribution <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/gear/chapters.pdf">(Gear)</a>, without substantial consultations with the SACP and Cosatu. Both slammed the policy as being <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2957">anti-communist</a> and serving the interests of business at the expense of the poor working class.</p>
<p>The SACP, and Cosatu, thought that their fortunes had turned when, with their support, Jacob Zuma was elected president of the ANC in <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president">Polokwane in 2007</a>. But it wasn’t to be. Both groups have subsequently fallen out with <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/142598/how-zumas-faction-is-starting-to-unravel/">Zuma</a>. The relationship has deteriorated so badly that SACP members in KwaZulu-Natal are being assassinated over <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/Moerane-Commission-of-Inquiry">municipal council positions</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Why is this so unusual?</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2051">Tripartite Alliance</a> can be traced back to the late 1940s and the Communist Party’s subsequent underground involvement in the ANC-led <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/significance-congress-people-and-freedom-charter">Congress of the People in 1955</a>. The Congress Alliance adopted the <a href="http://scnc.ukzn.ac.za/doc/HIST/freedomchart/freedomch.html">Freedom Charter</a> as its blueprint for a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-legacy-of-south-africas-freedom-charter-60-years-later-43647">democratic and prosperous South Africa</a>.</p>
<p>In the 1960s the formation of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk">Umkhonto we Sizwe</a>, the armed wing formed by ANC and SACP members, was arguably the most concrete articulation of the ANC-SACP alliance. </p>
<p>In the decades that followed the SACP played a key role in facilitating the support of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc for the ANC and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/south-african-congress-trade-unions-sactu">South African Congress of Trade Unions</a>. The communists also shaped the ANC’s philosophy around national liberation as the <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=1850">“national democratic revolution”</a> and view of apartheid as <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/apartheid-south-africa-colonialism-special-type">“colonialism of a special type”</a>.</p>
<p>This influence on the ANC was personified by the likes of leading communists <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/moses-m-kotane">Moses Kotane</a>, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/moses-mabhida">Moses Mabhida</a> and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/dr-yusuf-mohamed-dadoo">Dr Yusuf Dadoo</a>. The SACP viewed the alliance as a <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=6249">popular front</a> uniting the working class and progressive forces in the struggle for freedom. </p>
<p>The SACP is unique in Africa because very few communist parties survived after independence. Most of them were either <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-communism-appears-to-be-gaining-favour-in-south-africa-45063">banned or integrated</a> into nationalist liberation movement governments. </p>
<p>The party’s independent participation in the Metsimaholo by-election takes it back to the period before 1950 when communists such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/09/southafrica.pressandpublishing">Brian Bunting</a> and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/sam-kahn">Sam Kahn</a> represented the then <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv03445/04lv03446/05lv03462.htm">Communist Party of South Africa</a> in Parliament. </p>
<p>But after that, and after the party was banned, the SACP’s revolutionary theory of <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=2638">armed struggle and insurrection</a> excluded an electoral approach. </p>
<p>Once the first inclusive elections were planned in South Africa, the SACP deferred to the ANC as the leader of the national democratic revolution to pursue an electoral approach. </p>
<p><strong>What is the significance for South Africa?</strong></p>
<p>Firstly, no one can continue to argue that the Tripartite Alliance is still a coherent political front bringing together a working class union movement (Cosatu), working class party (SACP) and a multi-class governing party (ANC). </p>
<p>What this means is that the ANC’s social democratic character in terms of a partnership with working class organisations has come to an end. The ANC will now have to reconfigure its own identity as a social democratic party, similar to former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s reconfiguration of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-10518842">“New Labour”</a>. </p>
<p>Secondly, the SACP’s decision serves as an official recording of the radical changes the ANC’s identity has undergone in terms of how it defines its own interests or constituencies. It’s finally stating that its core interests and those of the ANC’s are in the process of parting ways. In socialist parlance, the ANC’s and SACP’s class interests have reached a crossroads. </p>
<p>This follows on the earlier decision by Cosatu’s largest affiliate the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa to part ways with the federation and to establish the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/01/19/Numsa-United-Front-structures-registered-to-contest-local-elections">United Front</a> as its own political vehicle. It’s still unclear whether this this will result in a new left political movement. But, all the socio-economic conditions - <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/economics-governance-and-instability-in-south-africa">such as high inequality, unemployment</a>, <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10334">poverty </a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-protesters-echo-a-global-cry-democracy-isnt-making-peoples-lives-better-77639">social discontent</a> - provide fertile ground for just such a movement.</p>
<p><strong>What are the electoral prospects of the SACP?</strong></p>
<p>The SACP is not in a position to mobilise substantial support in the near future. The left is contested terrain and prone to fragmentation. This is partly the result of personality clashes and ideological hair-splitting. </p>
<p>It could possibly join forces with the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa which, for the last 30 years, has debated the ideal of a workers’ party. This would only be viable if the SACP combined its party programme with the social democratic (social welfare) needs of a rural, non-socialist populace. This would imply making ideological compromises, which is not uncommon for the SACP. It would also require it to establish a real party political infrastructure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88647/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The South African Communist Party’s decision to compete in an election against its alliance partner the ANC is a watershed moment for them, with important implications for the country.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/826292017-08-23T15:36:15Z2017-08-23T15:36:15ZHas South Africa’s labour movement become a middle class movement?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182948/original/file-20170822-31963-1yg2867.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Congress of South African Trade Unions, the country's largest trade union federation, has been losing members.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Rogan Ward</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Do South African trade unions still represent the working class?</p>
<p>The South African labour landscape has undergone <a href="http://witspress.co.za/catalogue/labour-beyond-cosatu/">massive changes</a> in the past few years that have left the country’s trade union movement almost unrecognisable from yesteryear. </p>
<p>The Congress of South African Trade Unions, still the country’s largest trade union federation, has been bleeding members for a while and has been shaken to the core by the exit of the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa. This exit has led to a new formation, the South African Federation of Trade Unions. Both labour federations still claim to represent the interests of the working class.</p>
<p>Something else, perhaps more fundamental has been changing within South Africa’s trade union movement. The membership base has shifted significantly from one dominated by unskilled and semiskilled workers to one that shows bias towards skilled and professional workers. This is captured in a series of surveys undertaken between 1994 and 2014, before the National Union of Metal Workers’s exit.</p>
<p>The data shows that less than 1% of members within the trade union movement classified themselves as professional in early years of democracy. The picture had changed radically by 2008 with 20% of the respondents classifying themselves as professional. It would therefore seem that South Africa’s trade union federation had become a home for middle class civil servants, rather than a working class federation.</p>
<h2>The evolution</h2>
<p>A group of labour scholars has been conducting surveys of Congress of South African Trade Unions members before every parliamentary election since 1994. The intention of the survey, titled Taking Democracy Seriously, was to study the impact of union democracy on parliamentary democracy.</p>
<p>The data set (drawn from five surveys, with the last conducted in 2014 just before National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa was expelled) tell us much more than just what union members’ attitudes towards democracy is. It paints a complex picture of who trade unions actually represent.</p>
<p>At its high point, the federation had a membership of 2.2 million. This was the result of three waves of unionisation. </p>
<p>The first wave of members comprised of workers who were organised into the initial manufacturing unions that resulted from the militancy of the 1973 strikes.</p>
<p>The second wave started in 1985 with the National Union of Mineworkers – the first to organise black miners and what was to become the largest union in the country – joining the Federation of South African Trade Unions in 1985. </p>
<p>The third wave came with the public sector unions that emerged after 1990. This wave benefited from the Labour Relations Act of 1995 which brought public sector employees under the same dispensation as the private sector in terms of collective bargaining and organisational rights.</p>
<p>In the early years of democracy public sector unions were so marginal to the federation and debates in labour studies that the researchers did not even include any unions from the public sector.</p>
<h2>The professional factor</h2>
<p>From 1994 union members were asked to classify themselves as being professional, clerical, supervisors, skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. Less than 1% classified themselves as professional in 1994, 1998 and 2004.</p>
<p>The data reflects a major shift in the last two surveys conducted after the inclusion of public sector unions in the sample. 20% of respondents classified themselves as professional in 2008, and 19% in 2014. This constituted a fifth of federation membership base, certainly a massive shift from the early 1990s.</p>
<p>Those members who classified themselves as clerical remained more or less constant, with those classifying themselves as supervisors increasing slightly from 4% in 1994 to 6% in 2014.</p>
<p>What is interesting though, is an increase of those who classify themselves as skilled increasing from 21% in 1994 to 37% in 2014. Those who classify themselves as unskilled declined from 30% in 1994 to a mere 8% in 2014, almost equal to the members who are supervisors.</p>
<p>This means that while 60% of the federation was made of semi-skilled and unskilled workers in 1994, by 2014 roughly 60% classified themselves as either skilled or professional, a complete inversion.</p>
<h2>Loss of unskilled members</h2>
<p>What explains this major transformation in the federation’s membership composition? We explored three possible explanations.</p>
<p>The entry of public sector unions, representing civil servants like teachers and nurses, into the federation is a major factor. This is confirmed when one breaks down the levels of skill by whether members belong to private sector or public sector unions for the 2014 survey. </p>
<p>The data shows that 78% of union members who classify themselves as professionals is from public sector unions. The unskilled and semiskilled members tend to come from private sector unions.</p>
<p>Its clear that the increase in the number of professionals within the federation was mainly a result of the entry of public sector unions. But this factor does not provide enough of an explanation for the decline in the percentage of unskilled members. We have to look elsewhere for this.</p>
<p>The data suggests that the post-apartheid era facilitated upgrading of skills within the federation. The proportion of members who had Grades 5-7 declined from 15% in 1994 to a mere 2% in 2014. Those with Grades 8-10 declined from 44% in 1994 to 11% in 2014.</p>
<p>Members with Grades 11-12 increased from 31% in 1994 to 45% in 2014 and members with technical diplomas increased from 3% in 1994 to 20% in 2014. Those with university degrees rose from less than 1% in 1994 to 17% in 2014.</p>
<p>Almost 40% of the trade union members in our sample have tertiary qualifications in the form of technical diplomas or university degrees. But the skills upgrade explanation also leaves a bit of a puzzle. </p>
<p>Does the fact that these trade union members now have higher levels of formal qualifications mean that a much smaller proportion of the work in South Africa’s economy is now done by skilled rather than unskilled workers?
The labour market data more generally does not support this assumption. We have to look elsewhere for additional explanations.</p>
<p>A significant portion of South Africa’s unskilled manual labour is no longer performed by trade union members. This is due to the rise of non-permanent employment through subcontracting, casual labour, or informal forms of employment.</p>
<p>This means that as the trade union movement was gaining skilled and professional members it was bleeding unskilled manual workers. This leaves the question: has South Africa’s labour movement become a middle class movement, rather than one that primarily represents the working class?</p>
<p><em>This article is based on an extract from a chapter by Andries Bezuidenhout, Christine Bischoff and Ntsehiseng Nthejane in the newly published volume Labour Beyond Cosatu: <a href="http://witspress.co.za/catalogue/labour-beyond-cosatu/">Mapping the Rupture in South Africa’s Labour Landscape</a> published by Wits University Press.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82629/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This project received funding from the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung (RLS), with funds from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of the Federal Republic of Germany. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the funder.</span></em></p>The membership base of South Africa’s trade union movement has undergone significant changes which begs the question: has it moved away from its working class roots to become a middle class movement.Andries Bezuidenhout, Associate Professor, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/766092017-04-25T19:41:21Z2017-04-25T19:41:21ZSouth Africa has a new trade union federation. Can it break the mould?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166582/original/file-20170425-12468-17hcapr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Delegates at the launch of the South African Federation of Trade Unions.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Star/Nokuthula Mbatha</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The newly launched trade union grouping in South Africa – the South African Federation of Trade Unions <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/21/saftu-launch-marks-end-of-long-journey-since-numsa-left-cosatu">(Saftu)</a> – promises to be a voice for the growing numbers of unorganised and marginalised workers in the country. But, as the secretary of the South African Informal Traders Alliance warned delegates, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Don’t break our hearts with false promises.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Historically, trade unions in South Africa have played a significant role in shaping the political landscape, especially during the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43157717">struggle against apartheid</a>. But the union movement has declined globally in influence as the growing informalistion of work has eroded its power and unions are seen as protecting the special interests of those in regular employment.</p>
<p>With increasing numbers of people outside the formal employment net, unions have had a tough time defining their role. Yet the rights won by South African workers in the struggle for democracy continues to give them a degree of influence unsurpassed in post-colonial Africa.</p>
<p>The new federation was conceived over two years ago in the wake of the <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Labour/News/Cosatu-to-lose-millions-over-Numsa-split-20141112">expulsion</a> of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa from trade union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). The expulsion signified growing political realignment in the country given that Cosatu is in an alliance with the governing African National Congress. The union’s expulsion <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-03-30-cosatu-fires-zwelinzima-vavi">was followed by</a> that of the Cosatu general secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi. </p>
<p>So what difference is the new federation likely to make to the lives of workers in South Africa, as well as the very large number of unemployed people and those in the informal economy?</p>
<p>Significantly, the new federation is not the outcome of a surge in worker militancy. Instead, it’s a response to the perceived failure of existing unions to provide an adequate voice and service to their members. The new federation is in fact the product of the crisis facing traditional trade unions across the globe.</p>
<p>A strength of the federation will be its ability to combine the experiences of long standing union leaders with a new generation of unionists disillusioned with the governing party and its two <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2051">alliance partners</a> – Cosatu and the South African Communist Party. </p>
<p>With nearly 700 000 members, it’s the second largest federation in South Africa after Cosatu. But the challenges facing an attempt to “cross the divide” between organised workers and the growing <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/11/precariat-global-class-rise-of-populism/">precariat</a> – those in casual, outsourced and informal jobs – will require strategic leadership willing to move out of the comfort zone of traditional unionism, recruit unfamiliar constituencies and experiment with new ways of organising.</p>
<h2>Challenges facing the new federation</h2>
<p>The first challenge will be to break with the bureaucratic practices that have seen many union leaders gradually distanced from their members. If the practices of “business unionism” – where unions come to mirror the values and practices of business – are to be challenged, two big issues will need to be revisited. These are union investment companies and the gap between the salaries of some union leaders and their members. </p>
<p>The new federation could make its mark within the labour movement by taking lifestyle issues seriously and, in particular, the wage gap within its own ranks.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=646&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=646&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=646&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=812&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=812&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=812&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zwelinzima Vavi, secretary general of the new trade union federation Saftu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/John Hrusa</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The second challenge is around political diversity. What was striking at the launch was the wide range of political and ideological views. An illustration was the lively debate over the <a href="http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2017/04/24/new-union-federation-anti-politics-pro-workers/">relationship</a> between pan-Africanism and Marxist-Leninism. </p>
<p>But there was consensus that there should be no party political affiliation. Saftu, it was agreed, should be politically independent. The challenge will be for the new federation to be a genuine forum for political debate, respecting different views, and even allowing different ideological factions to be institutionalised.</p>
<p>The most difficult challenge arises from the shift from industrial unions to general unions. The National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa led the way when it extended its scope to include a variety of economic activities beyond metalworkers. This included, for example, university cleaners and bus drivers. Furthermore, many of the Saftu affiliates are general unions. </p>
<p>How to deal with the danger of internal “poaching” of members was extensively discussed at the launch. Will the protocols proposed in the report of the steering committee prevent divisive conflict in the future? </p>
<p>Another major challenge facing Saftu is the need for innovative strategies on new ways of organising. It’s not clear how the federation intends to recruit the new constituencies of women, immigrants, low paid service workers, outsourced workers and the growing numbers of workers in the informal economy. Experiments in organising precarious workers, such as the <a href="http://www.cwao.org.za/contact.asp">Casual Workers Advice Office</a> in Germiston, need to be examined as they could provide ways of crossing the divide between the old and the new.</p>
<p>Another difficult challenge will be defining the federation’s position on economic policy. Harsh criticisms were made of the proposed national minimum wage of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-search-for-a-national-minimum-wage-laid-bare-south-africas-faultlines-69382">R20 an hour</a>. But maybe it is time to confront the dilemma that for many workers a bad job is better than no job. Has the time not arrived to go beyond the demand for decent work to explore what kind of role trade unions have in a developing country such as South Africa, in the context of a uni-polar world, dominated by neo-liberal capitalism? </p>
<h2>New ways of organising</h2>
<p>The leaders of the new federation are confident that a number of Cosatu affiliated unions will join, or if the unions don’t, their member will come across. But will the federation be able to break out of the old organising straight jacket? </p>
<p>To organise the low paid and the precarious is an ambitious task. There’s growing evidence that innovative strategies to bridge the informal-formal “divide” are emerging in the Global South with successful attempts emerging in <a href="http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:291569/FULLTEXT01.pdf">other parts of Africa </a>. For example, in Ghana an alliance of informal port workers with national trade unions has been formed and is proving to be effective.</p>
<p>Labour scholar, <a href="http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3755&context=jssw">Rina Agarwala</a>, has challenged the conventional view that informalisation is the “final nail in the labour movement’s coffin”. Informal workers in India, she demonstrates, are creating new institutions and forging a new social contract between the state and labour. New informal worker organisations are not attached to a particular party, nor do they espouse a specific political or economic ideology.</p>
<p>It’s too soon to pronounce on the future of the new federation. But it’s clear that workers are increasingly rejecting traditional trade unions and forming new types of organisations that bring workers together to promote their rights and interests. The future lies with unions that are forward looking and see the global economy as an opportunity for a new kind of unionism. </p>
<p>Saftu needs to draw on these experiences if it’s to fulfil the promise of its launch.</p>
<p><em>Edward Webster will soon be launching a collection of research based essays on precarious work in India, Ghana and South Africa. <a href="http://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=518">Crossing the Divide: Precarious Work and the Future of Labour</a>, together with Akua O. Britwum and the late Sharit Bhowmik.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76609/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Webster does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa’s newest trade union federation, Saftu, comes at a time of declining political influence by unions, compared to during the struggle against apartheid. They are also seen as elitist.Edward Webster, Professor Emeritus, Society, Work and Development Institute, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/630632016-07-26T20:53:02Z2016-07-26T20:53:02ZWhy the battle for Nelson Mandela Bay has captured South Africa’s attention<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132022/original/image-20160726-7028-1smc3ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mmusi Maimane, leader of the opposition Democratic Alliance, woos voters in hotly-contested Nelson Mandela Bay.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied by the DA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/party-big-guns-city-last-shot-wooing-voters/">Political heavyweights</a> from South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) and the country’s leading opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) have descended on Nelson Mandela Bay in a bid to woo voters ahead of local government elections. </p>
<p>The Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality, set in the Eastern Cape, the heartland of the ANC, is a <a href="http://theconversation.com/how-south-africas-nelson-mandela-bay-may-be-the-ancs-mini-waterloo-58010">strategic battleground</a> for both parties. A loss to the main opposition party would suggest that people are losing faith in the ANC as a governing party. A victory for the DA would indicate that it is breaking through a protected core of voters and that it could become a formidable challenger for power in future.</p>
<p>The ANC has suffered significant losses in the area due to <a href="https://www.academia.edu/8197409/Bitter_battles_for_survival_Assessing_the_impact_of_the_political_factionalism_in_Nelson_Mandela_Bay_Municipality_s_post-Polokwane_landscape">factional political battles</a> that have had a direct effect on service delivery. Governance has been undermined by <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/02/09/Auditor-General-report-flags-wasteful-expenditure-in-EC">maladministration</a>, <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-19-former-mandela-metro-manager-wins-r31-in-damages">political interference</a>, and alleged corruption in the <a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/assets/Documents/KabusoLegalInterpretation.pdf">Kabuso</a> and <a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/new-delays-in-pikoli-report/">Pikoli</a> reports.</p>
<p>These events may have a direct effect on the electoral performance of the ANC. For the first time the party faces the real possibility of losing one of its strongholds. Voter support for the ANC is no longer unconditional as communities have become more vocal about its failure to deliver on its promise of “a better life for all”.</p>
<h2>The promise of a better life</h2>
<p>The ANC’s election <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2016/07/23/DA-the-offspring-of-the-National-Party-Zuma">campaign rhetoric</a> has focused on the dangers of the past, a <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/da-is-apartheid-snake-zuma-tells-crowd-of-voters-20160723">return to apartheid</a> if the DA wins, and its continued commitment to advancing human dignity and freedom. The DA has focused on debunking the <a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/apartheid-return/">myth of a return to apartheid</a>, saying that life would be better under rule by the opposition party.</p>
<p>Both parties claim their policies and governance strategies will make for a better life for the electorate.</p>
<p>Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, the <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1021&id=nelson-mandela-bay-municipality">sixth largest</a> municipality in South Africa, tells the story of both the advancing of a better life, but also of disappointment that a better life has not materialised.</p>
<p>Manufacturing, community services, transport and finance industries are the foundation of the metro’s economy. But unemployment among the 1.2 million people who live in the municipality is estimated to stand at <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02111stQuarter2016.pdf">33.2%</a> compared with the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/05/09/SA-unemployment-rate-rises">26.7% national unemployment</a> rate. </p>
<p>Most households have access to electricity and other basic services. But about 6% of the population, predominantly in informal settlements, still use the <a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/3c6aa6004d21849fa0f6e293fd523eaa/Bucket-toilet-system-still-a-challenge-in-EC-20161406">bucket system</a> as they don’t have access to proper sanitation. This is despite promises that the problem would be addressed. It is estimated that <a href="http://mype.co.za/new/bucket-toilet-crisis-mokonyane-and-jordaan-both-turn-a-blind-eye/61388/2016/02">35% of all bucket systems</a> nationally are located in Nelson Mandela Bay. </p>
<p>The illusion of a better life finds expression in dissatisfaction with poorly built government-supplied houses, the basis of human security. In Khayamnandi, a number of ablution facilities have been built, but no houses have materialised. This is colloquially referred to as “<a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/toilet-outcry-leads-plans-homes/">toilet city</a>”. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/f85022804bc720f289638d96fb2bb898/Police-ministry-intervenes-to-curb-PE-gang-violence">Gang violence</a> has also increased. And, for many, basic education provision remains critical as classes are overcrowded and limited teachers have been appointed to schools. Education is, of course, a vehicle for social mobility.</p>
<h2>Changing political landscape</h2>
<p>Support for the DA has grown significantly, most notably during the 2011 local government election when it got <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2014-05-11-the-partys-over-anc-sees-decline-in-support">40% of the vote</a>. This went up marginally in the 2014 general election from 40.13% to 40.16%. </p>
<p>The party is running an aggressive electoral campaign that capitalises on its governance successes in Cape Town, which it controls, and the Western Cape region, where it holds power in a number of local municipalities.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132001/original/image-20160726-7028-1bnd2ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132001/original/image-20160726-7028-1bnd2ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=815&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132001/original/image-20160726-7028-1bnd2ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=815&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132001/original/image-20160726-7028-1bnd2ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=815&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132001/original/image-20160726-7028-1bnd2ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1024&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132001/original/image-20160726-7028-1bnd2ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1024&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132001/original/image-20160726-7028-1bnd2ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1024&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A man collects fallen election posters for recycling in South Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To take over the metro council the party would need to make significant gains in ANC strongholds within the metro. But to do this it would need to work on losing the label that it is a “white party”. The DA is in fact one of the most racially diverse parties in South Africa. </p>
<h2>Framing ‘the better life’</h2>
<p>In contesting the elections, both parties have addressed critical issues like job creation, governance, basic service delivery, gangsterism and delivering on the promise of a better life. </p>
<p>The DA has also focused on the delivery failures of the ANC. Here it has capitalised on creating a new political agenda: dealing with key priorities like poverty alleviation, unemployment, and clean and accountable governance, while also emphasising social cohesion, diversity and nation-building. </p>
<p>In turn, the ANC has focused on regaining the trust of voters. With the deployment of former South African Football Association President <a href="https://www.uwc.ac.za/News/Pages/-UWC-alumnus-Danny-Jordaan-as-mayor.aspx">Danny Jordaan</a> as the mayor, the first priority has been to clean up the administration. The party has sought to counter the perception that council posts serve as a road to riches for “<a href="http://www.gov.za/tenderpreneurship-stuff-crooked-cadres-fighters">tenderperneurs</a>” – reference to businesspeople who enrich themselves, often in underhanded ways, through government tenders.</p>
<p>The Jordaan administration has rolled out free Wi-Fi, is attempting to address botched housing delivery and has set out a clear five-year strategic plan.</p>
<h2>Bets are off</h2>
<p>It is difficult to predict the outcome of the election in Nelson Mandela Bay. <a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/polls-eff-drops-in-nelson-mandela-bay">Recent polls</a> show that the DA is leading the race. But a number of factors could swing the result either way. </p>
<p>One of these is how other opposition parties – the United Democratic Movement, the United Front and the Economic Freedom Fighters – perform. </p>
<p>We also do not know to what extent the divisive politics of the ANC will resonate with voters, especially in its strongholds. </p>
<p>Voter turn-out will also be a crucial factor. Will ANC voters stay away from the polls? Will the DA get its voters out on the day?</p>
<p>The uncertainty around the outcome has captured South Africa’s imagination. In previous elections speculation has focused on the size of the ANC’s majority. This time the question on people’s minds is: will the ANC win in Nelson Mandela Bay?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63063/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joleen Steyn Kotze receives funding from the NRF and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. </span></em></p>In previous elections speculation in South Africa focused on the likely size of the ruling ANC’s majority. This time the question on people’s minds is: will the ANC win or lose Nelson Mandela Bay?Joleen Steyn Kotze, Associate Professor of Political Science, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.