tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/p5-7675/articlesP5 – The Conversation2023-09-21T02:00:04Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2139852023-09-21T02:00:04Z2023-09-21T02:00:04ZStripping Russia’s veto power on the Security Council is all but impossible. Perhaps we should expect less from the UN instead<p>Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/20/world/europe/zelensky-un-security-council.html">lambasted</a> the UN Security Council yet again, saying in a speech this week that as long as Russia has veto power on the body, it will remain powerless to do anything to stop the war in Ukraine – or any other conflict.</p>
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<p>Ukrainian soldiers are doing with their blood what the UN Security Council should do by its voting. […] Veto power in the hands of the aggressor is what has pushed the UN into deadlock.</p>
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<p>Every time a member of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – the US, Russia, France, the UK and China – engages in abhorrent actions, we see a wave of voices decrying the powerlessness and failure of the UN to stop conflict and atrocities. </p>
<p>Most recently, this has been focused on the Russian war in Ukraine. We also saw this criticism in relation to the US- and UK-led <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq">invasion of Iraq</a> in the early 2000s. </p>
<p>The central part of this criticism is that the five permanent members of the Security Council (commonly referred to as the “P5”) have a veto power, which can prevent UN action when they have engaged in wrongdoing. The other 10 rotating members of the Security Council do not.</p>
<p>This veto power is what has prevented Russia from being expelled from the UN, as Zelensky has repeatedly <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/3259390-zelensky-calls-for-russian-expulsion-from-un-security-council/">called for</a>, because suspension or expulsion of a member from the UN requires <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-2">action from the Security Council</a>.</p>
<p>This criticism is entirely reasonable – the P5 shouldn’t be able to prevent the UN from acting against them. However, this isn’t a failure of the UN itself, but rather a design feature baked in to the whole UN system. </p>
<p>And reform of the UN is functionally impossible, which is why we need to stop expecting so much from the global body.</p>
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<h2>Some are more equal than others</h2>
<p>Article 2(1) of the UN Charter <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-1">says</a> the UN is based on the principle of sovereign equality. This, in principle, should mean all nations are equal under international law. </p>
<p>In reality, even when just considering the rest of the UN Charter, it is clear this is not the case. Yes, all nations in the UN General Assembly have one vote and all those votes have equal weight, but this is somewhat insignificant because the work of the General Assembly isn’t legally binding. </p>
<p>The only UN body that has the power to make binding international law is the Security Council. And this only happens when it is acting under <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7">Chapter VII</a> of the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. </p>
<p>In order for a resolution to pass in the Security Council, it must have the support of at least nine members – and, critically, no opposing vote from a member of the P5. This is what is meant by the P5 veto power. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-international-law-powerless-against-russian-aggression-in-ukraine-no-but-its-complicated-177905">Is international law powerless against Russian aggression in Ukraine? No, but it's complicated</a>
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<p>When the UN Charter was being drafted at the end of the second world war, the allied powers and France agreed to enshrine themselves into the document as the P5.</p>
<p>Notably, the group included the “Republic of China”, the government led by Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, which held the Security Council seat until the General Assembly expelled Taiwan and gave the seat to the People’s Republic of China in 1971. And when the Soviet Union disbanded in the early 1990s, Russia inherited its seat on the Security Council through the <a href="https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(1994)054-e">Alma-Ata Protocol</a>. </p>
<p>The charter gave the P5 the ultimate responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, while also functionally removing them from scrutiny because they possess veto power. </p>
<p>This wasn’t a design oversight or failure, it was an intentional decision. This is clearly seen when you <a href="http://opiniojuris.org/2008/08/14/the-curious-article-273-of-the-un-charter/">examine</a> the wording of Article 27(3). This article requires a Security Council member to refrain from voting on a matter if they are party to a dispute – but it does not apply to resolutions invoking Chapter VII (that is, a legally binding resolution). </p>
<p>The fact the charter includes a restriction on the veto but only in relation to non-binding resolutions demonstrates an intention to place the P5 beyond scrutiny. </p>
<h2>So, what about veto reform?</h2>
<p>If the existence of the veto prevents any Security Council action from being taken against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine (or against any other P5 state when they engage in similar conduct), why don’t we just reform it? </p>
<p>Well, this can’t be done because the drafters of the UN Charter made reform incredibly difficult. Namely, the P5 ensured they have a right to veto any proposed reforms to the UN structure by <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-18">requiring</a> all charter amendments to be ratified by each of them, in addition to getting a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. </p>
<p>In essence, this means reforming the UN Charter is off the table because the P5 would be able to veto a reduction of their veto power. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-be-too-quick-to-condemn-the-un-security-council-power-of-veto-29980">Don't be too quick to condemn the UN Security Council power of veto</a>
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<p>The only avenue left for reform is to dissolve the UN Charter and reform the UN under a new treaty that limits or abolishes the power of the veto. </p>
<p>Given the state of global solidarity is very different today compared to the end of WWII when the UN was established, I’m loathe to test this approach. A P5 that is restrained by the Charter when it suits them is less dangerous than a P5 that opts out of international law entirely, leaving them completely unrestrained in their aggression. </p>
<h2>Tempering our expectations</h2>
<p>Yes, this means the UN is powerless to address Russian aggression in Ukraine, in the same way it was powerless to address US and UK aggression in Iraq. And yes, this seems to go against the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/preamble">initial purpose</a> of the global body, which was created to:</p>
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<p>to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.</p>
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<p>The Security Council, too, was given the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-5">mandate of maintaining international peace and security</a> when it was created, as Zelensky has <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115632">repeatedly pointed out</a>.</p>
<p>But in accepting that mandate, the P5 ensured they wouldn’t be subject to it. In creating the UN, they placed themselves above the law and above the power of the UN specifically so they could avoid scrutiny of their actions. They also ensured they could prevent any reform of the UN to limit their power. </p>
<p>As a result, maybe it is time we start treating the UN for what it is – a diplomatic congress aimed at making the world a little better through encouraging cooperation. Rather than what we hope it to be – a world government capable of effecting peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213985/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tamsin Phillipa Paige received funding from the federal government for her UN Security Council research. </span></em></p>Because reform of the current UN Charter is off the table, the only avenue left is to dissolve the charter and draw up a new treaty that limits or abolishes the power of the veto.Tamsin Phillipa Paige, Senior Lecturer, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/395282015-04-03T10:09:11Z2015-04-03T10:09:11ZIran celebrates historic nuclear deal – all eyes now on supreme leader<p>Finally, after years of diplomacy and brinkmanship, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-iran-nuclear-framework-deal-could-mean-for-the-region-and-the-world-39730">the long-awaited nuclear deal with Iran has been done</a>. There is jubilation in the streets as Iran’s people, who have struggled under the weight of western sanctions for decades, are waking up to the prospect of a brighter economic future. </p>
<p>It’s a big win for the US and a major foreign policy success for Barack Obama and John Kerry. But above all, this is a triumph for Iran’s president Hassan Rouhani. He has staked his political future on a deal that means economic salvation and paves the way for his policy of “engagement” bringing Iran in from the geopolitical cold. </p>
<p>So what happened? The US and its European allies, through sustained pressure as well as dialogue, got a series of Iranian concessions to put the framework in place. If the deal is completed and all the details settled in the next three months, Washington will have restricted Iran’s nuclear programme for at least 15 years, with a system of inspections and supervision to maintain the limits and renewed sanctions if Tehran tries to break out of the commitments.</p>
<p>How big a victory does this really represent? Last year, <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2014/07/iran-daily-supreme-leader-backs-rouhani-government-nuclear-talks/">Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, said</a> that Iran must have a capability in uranium production of 190,000 <a href="http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=Separative%20work%20unit">separative work units</a> by 2021. Last night, his negotiators accepted a ceiling of 5,000 SWUs until 2025.</p>
<h2>US pressure pays off</h2>
<p>Contrary to doom-mongering from some critics, Iran had already taken its programme far away from the work needed to produce a bomb. Since 2013, Tehran had either diluted most of its 20% uranium stock – which has to be enriched further to more than 90% for a nuclear weapon – to the 5% level or converted it to oxide powder and even fuel plates, which cannot be used in a military effort. The Islamic Republic had restricted itself to 40-year-old <a href="http://thebulletin.org/hitting-sweet-spot-how-many-iranian-centrifuges7763">IR-1 centrifuges</a>; the more advanced IR-2s, installed in early 2013, never went online.</p>
<p>Still, the US and Europeans pressed with a somewhat arbitrary technical line — arbitrary because it is not based on precise measurements, but a series of assumptions about capability — you must not have any prospect of “break-out” for a single nuclear bomb within a year.</p>
<p>Last night, after weeks of intense discussions, Iran’s negotiators gave way and <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2015/04/iran-feature-key-points-of-the-nuclear-framework/">agreed to the following terms</a>:</p>
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<li><p>They reduced their operating centrifuges by 50% – an even deeper cut than that reportedly in the draft document a month ago – and promised to hold that level for 10 years.</p></li>
<li><p>They promised no enrichment of uranium beyond 3.67% for 15 years.</p></li>
<li><p>They put the IR-2 models in storage, overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency.</p></li>
<li><p>They promised to halt all enrichment at their second plant at Fordoo, converting it to a “research facility” but accepting no research and development “associated with enrichment”.</p></li>
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<p>The commitments will be overseen by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of all nuclear facilities. Iran committed itself to the advanced provisions of the <a href="https://www.iaea.org/publications/factsheets/iaea-safeguards-overview">Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty</a>, bolstering the oversight of its programme. It confirmed the redesign of its Arak heavy-water reactor, to reduce plutonium by-product – and promised no other heavy-water reactors for 15 years.</p>
<p>Even on sanctions, the reddest of Iran’s “red lines” for a framework, the Iranians stepped back. In principle, Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, is holding up the <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2015/04/iran-daily-after-12-years-a-breakthrough-in-nuclear-talks/">image of suspension of all sanctions</a> as soon as a comprehensive deal is signed. In practice, the framework ties any removal to IAEA verification of Iran’s compliance, a process that could take weeks, or months, or even years.</p>
<p>Most importantly, the US and the Europeans embedded into the framework of the deal the warning of re-imposition of sanctions if Iran is found in violation of any provision. US, European Union and even UN sanctions will have a “snap-back” mechanism so they can be put back in place.</p>
<h2>What does Iran win?</h2>
<p>Put bluntly, Zarif and Rouhani restricted Iran’s nuclear programme to save the Iranian economy. It was the threat to the economy, presented by Rouhani to the supreme leader in a dossier in September 2013, that <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2014/02/iran-daily-supreme-leader-government-solve-economy/">brought Khamenei’s endorsement of renewed negotiations</a>. </p>
<p>It was that threat, even more menacing with the halving of oil prices since last June, that turned Iran’s declaration of an expanding nuclear programme into one with diminished output. And it was the prospect of ever-increasing unemployment, ever-decreasing production, ever-unstable currency, and a Government budget with a US$70 billion hole that brought the further concessions leading to Thursday’s announcement.</p>
<p>However, Rouhani may not just be thinking of survival. Instead — unseen by many outside Iran — a nuclear deal will be part of the president’s strategy to remake the Iranian economy.</p>
<p>Rouhani and his allies believe, with a great deal of justification, that the Islamic Republic’s economy has been crippled, not only by US-led sanctions, but by entrenched barriers to effective investment, production, infrastructure and trade. Much of this is controlled by interests linked to the Revolutionary Guards; efforts at “privatisation” have often been facades merely extending the power of those interests. The government’s budget and Iran’s economic fortunes are ratcheted to the state of the oil market, with non-oil production continuing to struggle. </p>
<p>The president’s hope is that he can take on those interests to open up Iran’s economy, not just to foreign investors but to those inside the country who have been unable to break the hold of more powerful factions. The Islamic Republic’s oft-proclaimed commitment to research, science, and technology will finally translate into completed projects.</p>
<p>Rouhani has indicated that he wants to take on this battle, notably in autumn 2013 as the nuclear talks were re-energised. But he is unable to act until the discussions are concluded. Finally, that prospect can be envisaged.</p>
<p>To make any headway against powerful constituencies such as the Revolutionary Guards – which means the consent of the supreme leader — the president has to show mass support for his economic initiatives. The celebrations in Tehran last night over the framework, despite Iran’s concessions, were a sign of that support: Iranians are putting the future of their jobs, homes, and families above any supposed goal of an Iranian flag on a bomb.</p>
<h2>What will the supreme leader do?</h2>
<p>However, amid these unexpected developments and prospects, there has been one notable silence. Khamenei has offered no comment on the framework or the ensuing talks about the details; indeed, his office has been silent for almost two weeks about the situation.</p>
<p>Khamenei does not have to make his ultimate choice until June, when the final agreement is presented to him. It will be a stark choice: accept the 95% cut in Iran’s nuclear programme, compared to the goals he set out last year, or face long-term economic decline and possibly worse.</p>
<p>With his distrust and even hatred of the US government, the supreme leader could wreck everything, rejecting the agreement and proclaiming a “resistance economy” – with all the sacrifices this will entail for Iranians – to defy his perceived enemies. </p>
<p>But Rouhani is gambling, as he did in September 2013, that a pragmatic Khamenei will accept the deal, even if this is <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-irans-supreme-leader-may-yet-swallow-a-bitter-nuclear-deal-38244">his version of the “cup of poison”</a> sipped by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, when he accepted a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War in 1988.</p>
<p>That gamble will probably rest on the US and its allies refraining from any public gloating over their victory, glossing the detail of the nuclear agreement with the “win-win” favoured by the Rouhani and Zarif. It will rest on no further threat of sanctions, letting the current restrictions and the depressed oil price do their work. And it will rest on Iranians, in defiance of their country’s hardliners, continuing to display their desire for a final resolution so they can return a prospect of hope to their lives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/39528/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran is celebrating this historic deal – along with the rest of the world. But Iran’s religious leader can still throw a spanner in the works.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/388752015-03-26T14:54:00Z2015-03-26T14:54:00ZThe campaign to restrain the UN Security Council’s veto is wrongheaded and pointless<p>On <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russia-china-veto-un-draft-resolution-refer-syria-international-criminal-court">four occasions</a> since the crisis in Syria erupted, Russia and China have vetoed draft resolutions put to the Security Council. In response, the <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/">Global Centre for R2P</a> (GCR2P) has launched the “<a href="http://www.restraintheveto.com/">#restraintheveto</a>” campaign, declaring that “<a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/our_work/un_security_council_veto_reform">it is incumbent upon the P5 not to veto a draft Security Council resolution aimed at halting the perpetration of mass atrocity crimes</a>.”</p>
<p>Veto restraint was first proposed in the 2001 report <a href="http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf">The Responsibility to Protect</a>, but won little support. At the 2005 World Summit, <a href="http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/398-general-assembly-r2p-excerpt-from-outcome-document">two paragraphs of the Outcome Document</a> recognised a variant of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), but no references were made to veto restraint. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the idea has now been resurrected, and #restraintheveto is being retweeted, liked and shared – one of the most visible and fast-spreading social media campaigns in the UN’s history.</p>
<p>Of course, this does not mean the campaign makes any sense.</p>
<h2>Get real</h2>
<p>The notion that the Kremlin or the Chinese Communist party will be influenced by a multitude of tweets is laughable, and the actual influence of high-publicity social media campaigns on states is certainly chequered. </p>
<p>The cost-free engagement they attract has often proved to be highly superficial, most embarrassingly in the case of “<a href="http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/03/17/kony-2012-how-100-million-clicks-went-to-waste/">Kony 2012</a>”. But the problems go deeper than the questionable strategy: the campaign is also based on a misconception of why the veto is used in the first place. </p>
<p>Vetoes are used for one of two things: to block proposals in a draft resolution a power thinks are genuinely unsound, or for simply selfish reasons. Neither will be influenced by this proposal. </p>
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<p>Russia and China, for instance, claim their vetoes are a function of their principled position on what will best restore peace, and they have never cited purely geopolitical motives. But whether or not one believes or agrees with them, the idea that these two P5 powers have repeatedly and publicly stood in the way of crucial measures out of pure realpolitik is highly simplistic. </p>
<p>A blanket call for automatic restraint, therefore, misses the fact that draft resolutions may well be ill-conceived to the point where they need to be vetoed. The call that all proposals framed as “aimed at halting the perpetration of mass atrocity crimes” should be supported is specious and potentially reckless; righteous aims do not justify misconceived or foolhardy means, which may do more harm than good. </p>
<p>Genuinely selfish geopoliticking, meanwhile, is even less likely to be curbed by veto restraint. If Russia has cast its various vetoes on Syrian issues simply because it has key strategic interests in protecting Assad’s regime, it makes no sense to demand that it change tack because of some larger principle. There is surely little to be gained from asking Russia to set aside what it deems its vital national interests after it has repeatedly demonstrated its determination to pursue them no matter the humanitarian cost.</p>
<p>Vetoes are not cast gratuitously. <a href="http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto">An examination of their use</a> demonstrates they are employed when the vital national interests of the veto-wielding-power are deemed to be at stake. So by championing “restraint”, campaigners are actually calling for a revolution in the respective foreign policy priorities of the P5. That this can be realised is incredibly ambitious; that it can be impelled via Twitter and Facebook is arguably inconceivable. </p>
<h2>Responsibility to what?</h2>
<p>This campaign is also perpetuating a disturbingly pervasive misunderstanding of the P5’s position on R2P. </p>
<p>According to GCR2P Director <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/gcr2p-at-veto-event.pdf">Simon Adams</a>, “The Responsibility to Protect, adopted at the 2005 World Summit…means that the five Permanent Members of the Security Council have a responsibility not to veto in a mass atrocity situation.” </p>
<p>But this is simply not true, since veto restraint isn’t mentioned anywhere in the R2P Outcome Document. The wording merely commits the P5 to act on “a case-by-case basis”, and therefore simply enshrines their discretionary powers – including the veto. </p>
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<p>The GCR2P has heralded the fact that many states have endorsed the idea of voluntary restraint, yet the last sentence of the document detailing this support is the most telling: “<a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/veto-restraint-references-1.pdf">Four additional states have spoken on the veto, but did not express support…China, Russia, United Kingdom and United States</a>”. In other words, four of the P5 have expressly rejected the idea.</p>
<p>Syria has once again highlighted the influence of politics on law enforcement at the heart of the international system. This should surprise no-one. R2P, once vaunted as revolutionary, has simply affirmed the centrality of the Security Council and <a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-be-too-quick-to-condemn-the-un-security-council-power-of-veto-29980">overlooked the idea of reforming it</a>; the inertia over Syria is the result. </p>
<p>Yes, <a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-who-uses-veto-in-the-un-security-council-most-often-and-for-what-29907">the veto is a problem</a> – but to solve it we need to stop affirming the very system within which it exists. The purveyors of R2P must accept that it’s their own poorly articulated policy that has allowed the P5 to shore up their power. They also need to stop sponsoring distracting, hopeless campaigns and get behind actual reform.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/38875/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aidan Hehir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Does anyone seriously expect Beijing or Moscow to change their behaviour because of a hail of hopeful retweets?Aidan Hehir, Reader in International Relations, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/196282013-10-29T15:03:16Z2013-10-29T15:03:16ZSyria peace talks will be fault line for post-US Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34018/original/g5p5zdvy-1383041007.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">'Win or die': Free Syrian Army rebels.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">VOA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Syrian rebels have dealt another blow to the prospects of a peace summit in Geneva in November. On Sunday, 22 of the armed groups fighting on the ground, <a href="http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/27/21194191-main-syrian-rebel-groups-declare-opposition-to-geneva-peace-talks?lite">including four of the most powerful</a>, issued an announcement that unless the Syrian president, Bashar Assad, steps down, they would consider it a “betrayal” to participate.</p>
<p>Their stance is not new – and perhaps the only point on which Syrian rebels can agree is that Assad must go. A peace summit that does not provide for his departure has no appeal for them. What has changed is the position of the international players currently trying to agree the composition and agenda for Geneva.</p>
<p>The United States and Russia are now at one in wanting to see through the UN-backed initiative to locate and destroy Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal, with the cooperation of the Assad regime. Russia instigated that initiative in the face of the US threat to launch a military strike on Syrian government targets following the chemical weapons attack in Damascus on August 21. And the Russians persuaded Assad to go along.</p>
<p>Exactly how chemical weapons stockpiles could have been safely decommissioned without Assad’s cooperation is difficult to imagine. Even with his acquiescence the task is daunting – though the Syrians <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-syria-chemical-deadline-20131028,0,7141214.story#axzz2j6S3rJeC">have delivered their first formal inventory</a> and plan for the destruction of such arms slightly ahead of the UN deadline.</p>
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<p>In light of this development it would make little sense for the US and its Western allies to block the opportunity presented by the Russian initiative, which has even been backed by Assad’s other main ally Iran. Added to which the Iranians are now engaged in <a href="https://theconversation.com/trust-crucial-in-high-stakes-nuclear-talks-with-iran-19170">new diplomatic talks</a> with the UN Permanent Five and Germany (the P5 + 1) about Tehran’s nuclear programme. And under the presidency of Hassan Rouhani the Iranian negotiating team appear more serious about reaching a deal than was the case under Mahmoud Ahmedinejad.</p>
<h2>Saudi rift</h2>
<p>All fine and good, except the spectre of an American-Iranian rapprochement, coupled with a reprieve for Assad has caused consternation in Saudi Arabia – Washington’s key ally in the Gulf and wider Middle East. The Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, says the kingdom <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/10/saudi-reassess-relations-with-us-20131022213218439646.html">will review its relationship with the US</a> and chart a more independent path in future.</p>
<p>Israel, the Americans’ closest ally is <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/10/israel-us-differ-iran-nuclear-file-20131023133939371927.html">none too pleased</a> either – for fear Iran will do a deal that permits it to retain its nuclear programme and thence the potential to develop a bomb at a later date. The Israelis can take some comfort from the fact that Syria’s chemical arsenal will likely be demolished. Yet the Israeli government does not want to be pressed into making concessions to the Palestinians to accommodate US secretary of state John Kerry’s new peace initiative on the Israeli-Palestinian front.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34022/original/g44fkcjr-1383042443.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34022/original/g44fkcjr-1383042443.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34022/original/g44fkcjr-1383042443.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=707&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34022/original/g44fkcjr-1383042443.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=707&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34022/original/g44fkcjr-1383042443.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=707&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34022/original/g44fkcjr-1383042443.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34022/original/g44fkcjr-1383042443.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34022/original/g44fkcjr-1383042443.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Independent path: Bandar bin Sultan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kremlin Archive</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Washington is thus proceeding along a trajectory that places it at odds, for now at least, with both the Israelis and the Saudis. And its longstanding relationship with Egypt, another linchpin state in the region, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/16/us-egypt-usa-idUSBRE99F07220131016">has faltered</a> following the ousting of the former president, Mohammed Morsi, by the Egyptian armed forces leader General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.</p>
<p>In Cairo the US government is accused by Sisi supporters of having supported Morsi, and thence the Muslim Brotherhood – which is now the object of suppression by the Egyptian establishment – in the name of protecting Egyptian national interests and regional stature. The Saudis agree with them, having long regarded the Brotherhood as their rivals for power in the region.</p>
<p>The Al Saud were aghast when the Americans stood aside as Hosni Mubarak was ousted in 2011, and now that Washington has cut some of its aid to Egypt to demonstrate disapproval at the military intervention against Morsi, the Saudis have promised to make up any shortfall in US financial assistance.</p>
<h2>New Middle East course for US</h2>
<p>The prospect of the US charting a new path in the Middle East that ignores or conflicts with the agendas of its closest Arab allies was actually foreshadowed in <a href="http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-09-24/politics/42340329_1_challenges-war-u-n-general-assembly">Barack Obama’s UN speech in September</a>. He appears determined not to let the region absorb his attention to the detriment of his broader economic (and social) agendas.</p>
<p>What is taking a while to sink in, among America’s allies, however, are the consequences of Washington’s return to foreign policy pragmatism. They seem not to have grasped yet that the US took such a toll from its engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq that it no longer has the capacity to shape the future of the Middle East – even if it wished to.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34023/original/gky4b9zy-1383042693.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34023/original/gky4b9zy-1383042693.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34023/original/gky4b9zy-1383042693.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34023/original/gky4b9zy-1383042693.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34023/original/gky4b9zy-1383042693.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34023/original/gky4b9zy-1383042693.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34023/original/gky4b9zy-1383042693.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34023/original/gky4b9zy-1383042693.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Obama: no more good cop in the Middle East.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">White House</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What the preparations for the Geneva summit on Syria demonstrate is that the Americans really do not intend to take a lead on sorting that country out. They may indeed regret now that they called for Assad to go and thereby raised expectations among the rebels and others that they could somehow see him off. Yet, not only can there be no going back now, but also it is highly debatable that early intervention by the US, with or without allies, could have saved the situation without dragging the US into a broader war.</p>
<p>The prospects are not auspicious for Geneva and thence for an early end to the fighting in Syria. Not only is much of Syria in ruins, it increasingly looks like the cockpit of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-egypt-to-syria-this-could-be-the-start-of-the-arab-winter-17335">much wider struggle</a>, with the regional powers backing different factions and sectarian animosities poisoning the mix.</p>
<p>Yet even if they have their wish and Assad is ousted, that in itself is unlikely to end the power struggle now unfolding. In the circumstances it could be wiser to keep Assad in the mix for now, including at Geneva, with a view to using that opportunity to oblige Assad to cooperate on a humanitarian agenda to rescue at least some of the civilians trapped and besieged in their neighbourhoods or else displaced around the country. US military intervention cannot automatically deliver that, even if that were on the cards.</p>
<p>Therefore, let necessity be the mother of invention and let the bargaining take its course, with the various parties seeing what they can extract ahead of the summit. But to cancel Geneva altogether is to assume there is a military solution – which there is not.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/19628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rosemary Hollis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Syrian rebels have dealt another blow to the prospects of a peace summit in Geneva in November. On Sunday, 22 of the armed groups fighting on the ground, including four of the most powerful, issued an…Rosemary Hollis, Professor of Middle East Policy Studies and Director of the Olive Tree Scholarship Programme, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.