tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/political-instability-21520/articlesPolitical instability – The Conversation2023-03-01T05:45:22Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1993082023-03-01T05:45:22Z2023-03-01T05:45:22ZPolitical instability and damage to infrastructure: how climate change could undermine Australia’s national security<p>For many Australians, the impacts of climate change on wellbeing are distressingly clear.</p>
<p>Floods have recently caused massive damage in many parts of the country, while the 2019/2020 Black Summer bushfires are still seared in our memories.</p>
<p>Climate change will increase the frequency and intensity of such floods and fires, along with droughts, heatwaves and coastal erosion.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/farm-floods-will-hit-food-supplies-and-drive-up-prices-farmers-need-help-to-adapt-as-weather-extremes-worsen-192731">Farm floods will hit food supplies and drive up prices. Farmers need help to adapt as weather extremes worsen</a>
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<p>Climate change isn’t only a threat to our unique environment, but also a threat to Australia’s national security.</p>
<p>The federal government is already concerned about this issue. When coming into office last year, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said “The security implications of climate change are clear and cannot be ignored”. He subsequently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/jun/22/anthony-albanese-to-order-intelligence-chief-to-examine-security-threats-posed-by-climate-crisis">ordered</a> the Office of National Intelligence to analyse the security implications of climate change. However, the results of this assessment remain classified.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2023.2170978">latest study</a> provides the most comprehensive scientific (and publicly available) assessment of whether climate change affects national security in Australia. The answer to this question is a clear “yes”, even though some qualifications apply.</p>
<p>The biggest risks are damage to critical infrastructure, strained defence force capacity, and the possibility of increased political instability in our region.</p>
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<h2>Risks to infrastructure</h2>
<p>Climate change poses considerable risks to critical infrastructure. </p>
<p>Australia has long road, rail and grid networks, large parts of which are threatened by sea-level rise or located in disaster risk areas.</p>
<p>If you live in Western Australia, you may remember empty supermarket shelves in early 2022 when floods <a href="https://www.watoday.com.au/national/western-australia/supermarkets-bring-in-purchase-limits-as-floods-expose-vulnerability-of-wa-s-freight-network-20220202-p59ta4.html">washed away a major supply rail line</a>.</p>
<p>Likewise, climate change means more heatwaves. During hot days, demand for energy peaks to keep buildings cool. Simultaneously, high fire risks complicate repair works and bushfires may destroy energy infrastructure. As a result, the likelihood of power outages grows.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rising-seas-threaten-australias-major-airports-and-it-may-be-happening-faster-than-we-think-115374">Rising seas threaten Australia's major airports – and it may be happening faster than we think</a>
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<h2>Stretching the capacity of the defence force</h2>
<p>But climate change doesn’t only threaten civil infrastructure. It also affects the capabilities of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). When it comes to roads or power, the military often depends on the same infrastructure as civilians do, so is affected by similar risks.</p>
<p>The Tanami Road connecting Alice Springs to the Kimberley, for instance, is considered of high strategic importance in case of a larger international conflict. Yet it’s vulnerable to disruptions by floods and extreme heat.</p>
<p>Many military bases are also <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/exclusive-climate-change-warning-for-australias-military/iij8zlise">located close to the ocean</a> and hence threatened by rising sea levels.</p>
<p>The ADF also plays a key role as a provider of disaster relief, both domestically (such as after the Kimberley floods this year) and internationally (such as after Cyclone Winston in Fiji 2016).</p>
<p>The ADF is quite well resourced, but its capacities could be stretched thin if several relevant incidents occur at the same time.</p>
<p>Imagine, for example, several major disasters requiring military responses at a time when ADF infrastructure is affected by climate change, and geopolitical tensions with China are growing.</p>
<h2>Political instability</h2>
<p>Climate change will also increase the risk of political instability in the Asia-Pacific region.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102063">Research</a> has established that disasters like droughts, floods or storms make violent internal political conflict more likely, particularly in countries with pre-existing risk factors. This is because armed groups have an easier time recruiting impoverished and aggrieved disaster survivors.</p>
<p>Also, states are often weakened after disasters because their military is busy with the disaster response.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-poses-a-direct-threat-to-australias-national-security-it-must-be-a-political-priority-123264">Climate change poses a 'direct threat' to Australia's national security. It must be a political priority</a>
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<p>In the past, we have observed this link in several countries in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood. In Fiji, for instance, more and more residents are fleeing from coastal floods and storms to larger islands and urban areas. This frequently causes <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10402659.2022.2023424">tensions</a> between the newcomers and established residents.</p>
<p>Likewise, Maoist insurgents in India often <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262545556/catastrophes-confrontations-and-constraints/">recruit</a> desperate farmers. Droughts and tropical storms deepen poverty in these rural areas.</p>
<p>In the worst case, Australia’s foreign policy will need to deal with twin challenges: climate-related disasters causing political instability in the region and simultaneously undermining the capabilities of core regional partner countries like Indonesia, which are highly vulnerable to extreme climate events.</p>
<h2>Some risks exaggerated</h2>
<p>However, my study also finds some climate-related risks are exaggerated.</p>
<p>On the one hand, climate change isn’t a deterministic force of nature, but a result of human action (and inaction). Ambitious CO2-reduction policies and smart adaptation measures could go a long way in reducing the worst impacts of climate change. Decentralised solar energy projects, for instance, help to avoid greenhouse gas emissions and can act as a buffer against disruptions of the power grid.</p>
<p>On the other hand, depictions of climate change as a trigger of international wars and mass migration are misleading.</p>
<p>We have only seen a relatively small number of large-scale violent disputes between states since World War Two, and in none of them was the environment a major cause of contestation. As long as it’s many times cheaper to build a desalination plant than to invade a country, water wars remain unlikely.</p>
<p>What’s more, international migration is enormously costly for the majority of people living in poorer countries. If their livelihoods are further devastated by storms and droughts, they’re even less likely to be able to pay to move long distances.</p>
<p>Despite these qualifications, the message of recent research is unequivocal: climate change is not “just” an environmental concern. It’s an important national security issue for Australia. Efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change should, consequentially, remain high on the political agenda.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199308/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tobias Ide receives funding from the Australian Research Council for the project 'Disasters and Armed Conflict Dynamics'. </span></em></p>Our foreign policy may need to deal with twin challenges brought about by climate change.Tobias Ide, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Murdoch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1954882023-01-17T14:14:43Z2023-01-17T14:14:43Z7 million internally displaced people live in Central Africa – they need more support<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497944/original/file-20221129-12-irvzyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dozens of displaced people gather along the fence of the MONUSCO base in DRC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexis Huguet/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/7-million-internally-displaced-people-live-in-central-africa-they-need-more-support-195488&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Central Africa is host to the largest community of internally displaced persons in Africa. The countries in this region include Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda. </p>
<p>Just four of these account for <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1237268/number-of-internally-displaced-persons-in-africa/">more than</a> 7 million internally displaced people. At the top of the list, the DRC alone hosts more than <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-regional-refugee-response-plan-january-3">5.5 million</a>. </p>
<p>The main cause of these high numbers is conflict, both national and international. Conflicts have tormented the region for decades. </p>
<p>For example, the protracted armed conflicts and rebellions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic <a href="https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20Memo%205327">have contributed</a> to the instability of the region, with serious effects on their neighbours, some of which have been directly involved in the conflicts. </p>
<p>In addition, the militant Islamist group <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html">Boko Haram</a> has emerged as a major threat in Central Africa. And Burundi faces <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/09/burundi-must-engage-credible-and-inclusive-democratisation-process-says-un">persistent political tension and violence</a>.</p>
<p>The internal displacement crisis is further driven by <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2021/">natural disasters</a>, such as <a href="https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/dtm/lake_chad_basin_dtm_201903.pdf">flooding</a>. </p>
<p>Displaced people are a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14927.doc.htm">highly vulnerable group</a>. They’re forced to live in crowded and unsanitary camps. They’re also fleeing violence and are surrounded by active fighting situations. For example, in February 2022, in Plaine Savo camp (DRC), <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/01/17/drc-more-people-killed-in-two-militia-attacks-in-ituri/">a militia</a> group killed <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-statement-killing-dozens-displaced-people-plaine-savo-camp">more than 60 civilians</a>.</p>
<p>All over the world, the management of internally displaced people can be a challenge. It requires resources (for example, food and tents) and political will. </p>
<p>As a scholar with expertise in the legal promotion and protection of the rights of the people “on the move” in Africa, I argue that adopting a specific regional protocol could ease the management of displaced people in the region. A protocol is an instrument that creates legally binding obligations to international law. </p>
<p>In this case, the protocol would, among other things, legally bind countries to respect not only the new provisions contained in it but also the provisions of the <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-protection-and-assistance-internally-displaced-persons-africa">Kampala Convention</a>. This is
a continent-wide treaty which the African Union (AU) adopted in 2009 to protect and assist internally displaced people in Africa.</p>
<p>The mechanism of enforcement established in the protocol should complement and help to enforce the provisions of the Kampala Convention.</p>
<h2>The Kampala Convention</h2>
<p>The Kampala Convention provides solutions for the return, relocation or resettlement of the internally displaced. It also provides for displaced people to seek redress for housing, land and property losses. Physical, mental and other types of harms are included too. </p>
<p>But it’s not clear whether these services are accessible in practice. The problem is that the Kampala Convention is for the whole continent and lacks clear enforcement mechanisms. </p>
<p>The Central African region has a massive problem with displaced people. Currently, the <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/globalreport2021/west-central-africa#:%7E:text=In%20addition%20to%20strengthening%20its,close%20to%208%2C000%20protection%20incidents">main actor</a> to provide assistance in the region is the UN refugee agency - UNHCR. And its regional budget for 2023 <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/globalappeal/west-central-africa">already looked insufficient</a>
by late October 2022, repeating a pattern seen in the past three years.</p>
<p>A sub-regional treaty, or protocol, could focus on this specific situation and create a better management plan. There’s no subregional regime for internally displaced people anywhere in Africa. Countries are focusing on other problems or consider the plight of displaced people to be a domestic affair.</p>
<p>My proposal is an attempt to do something concrete to change this.</p>
<h2>What it should say</h2>
<p>The protocol must include a number of articles dedicated to stringent enforcement of the provisions of the Kampala Convention. To do this, it should create an institution that monitors and ensures the implementation of the Kampala Convention specifically for the Central African region. </p>
<p>For instance, the Kampala convention states that though states bear the primary duty and responsibility for providing assistance and protection to internally displaced people within their territory, they must cooperate with each other in doing so. The proposed institution should ensure that states in the subregion share the financial and material burden of managing displacement situations. </p>
<h2>Who should drive it</h2>
<p>Drafting such a protocol requires a big effort and the strong political will of the <a href="https://archive.uneca.org/oria/pages/eccas-economic-community-central-african-states#:%7E:text=The%20member%20States%20of%20ECCAS,and%20Sao%20Tome%20and%20Principe.">Economic Community of Central African States</a> (ECCAS), made up of 11 countries.</p>
<p>The regional community should lead on the protocol. It is easier for 11 actors of the region to reach agreement than to include 55 AU members in discussions. For example, at the continental level discussions on free movement of people which <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policy-brief111.pdf">started in 1991</a> are <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-sl-PROTOCOL%20TO%20THE%20TREATY%20ESTABLISHING%20THE%20AFRICAN%20ECONOMIC%20COMMUNITY%20RELAT....pdf">still going on</a>. Only four countries
have ratified the 2018 <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_free_movement_of_persons_in_africa_e.pdf">Free Movement Treaty</a>. By contrast, in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) area, a Protocol on Free Movement <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/492187502.html">has existed since</a> 1979, and it has been implemented for the most part. </p>
<p>The protocol could enter into force after ratification by a number of ECCAS members and a “committee” of politicians and magistrates could be created to enforce its provisions. </p>
<p>This committee would hold primary responsibility for the enforcement of the protocol. </p>
<p>Funding for the protocol’s activities should come from the ECCAS Commission, which is financed by its member countries. Member countries must turn conversations about regional solidarity into solid obligations. These include financial commitments and assistance. A special fund to assist internally displaced people could be created. </p>
<p>This isn’t a far-fetched suggestion. Recently, quests for solidarity and responsibility sharing have been high on political agendas, especially in the aftermath of emergencies triggered by political tension in several ECCAS countries. The DRC, for example, acceded to the Kampala Convention only on <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36846-sl-AFRICAN_UNION_CONVENTION_FOR_THE_PROTECTION_AND_ASSISTANCE_OF_INTERNALLY_DISPLACED_PERSONS_IN_AFRICA_KAMPALA_CONVENTION_1.pdf">3 February 2022</a> – the day after the killing in Plaine Savo.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195488/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cristiano d'Orsi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A specific regional protocol could ease the management of internally displaced persons in the region.Cristiano d'Orsi, Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at the South African Research Chair in International Law (SARCIL), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1965192022-12-13T16:53:57Z2022-12-13T16:53:57ZFive reasons why interest rates can’t go much higher<p>It’s decision time for central banks on interest rates again. The US Federal Reserve and European Central Bank (ECB) are set to announce their latest decisions on Wednesday 14, while the Bank of England (BoE) will go a day later. </p>
<p>After years of ultra-loose monetary policies, the Fed in particular has been aggressively raising interest rates during 2022 <a href="https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/11/30/record-inflation-which-country-in-europe-has-been-worst-hit-and-how-do-they-compare">to counteract</a> the <a href="https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2022/consumer-prices-up-9-1-percent-over-the-year-ended-june-2022-largest-increase-in-40-years.htm">inflation surge</a>. All three central banks increased their benchmark rates by 0.75 points at their meetings in late October/early November. </p>
<p><strong>Base rates in US, UK and eurozone</strong></p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500738/original/file-20221213-19390-oz0t5e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Chart showing interest rates in US, UK and eurozone" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500738/original/file-20221213-19390-oz0t5e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500738/original/file-20221213-19390-oz0t5e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500738/original/file-20221213-19390-oz0t5e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500738/original/file-20221213-19390-oz0t5e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500738/original/file-20221213-19390-oz0t5e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500738/original/file-20221213-19390-oz0t5e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500738/original/file-20221213-19390-oz0t5e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">US = blue; UK = orange; eurozone = turquoise.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.tradingview.com/">TradingView</a></span>
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<p><a href="https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/econ_focus/2022/q3_federal_reserve">The Fed</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/64e5dcdd-42a8-4013-a3bd-75a62cf8e6dc">BoE</a> have also been reducing the amount of money in the economy through what is known as quantitative tightening. This involves removing the money they “created” via quantitative easing, and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/ecb-start-offloading-debt-fight-inflation-2022-12-02/">ECB is likely</a> to follow suit. </p>
<p>It is widely expected that the central banks will further increase rates at their latest meetings, but potentially at a slower rate of 0.5 points. Fed Chair <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/feds-powell-rate-hike-slowdown-possible-next-month-inflation-fight-far-over-2022-11-30/">Jay Powell signalled</a> a probable slowdown a couple of weeks ago, causing markets to surge in response. On the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ea6edbc9-2ee6-4e8a-8289-4ee071260d60">other hand</a>, there is still pressure to stay aggressive to keep on top of inflation: UK wage growth is a worry, for instance. </p>
<p>It boils down to a question of how many rate rises the world economy can take. Here’s what the potential damage looks like: </p>
<h2>1. Consumption</h2>
<p>Higher interest rates force people to pay more to service their debts, including mortgages, car loans, credit cards and more. With many debts, the damage is staggered because of short-term fixed rates below today’s market rates. But to take UK mortgages as an example, it is <a href="https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/press-releases/britains-26-billion-mortgage-hike-five-million-households-set-for-average-mortgage-bill-increases-of-5100-by-end-of-2024/#:%7E:text=Over%20five%20million%20families%20are,Saturday)%20by%20the%20Resolution%20Foundation">estimated that</a> the average household will be forking out an extra £425 a month by the end of 2024. In London, the average increase will be closer to £700. </p>
<p>In a largely stagnant economy where wages are not keeping up with inflation, spending more on debts means cutting back on consumption – particularly on unessential spending such as holidays, luxury clothes or new cars. Companies will therefore produce less, sell less and earn less, causing two nasty chain reactions in the global economy: higher unemployment and slower growth. The silver lining is that it will probably reduce inflation faster.</p>
<h2>2. Falling house prices</h2>
<p>An oft-repeated mantra is that house prices cannot fall when there’s a limited supply of properties coming on the market. It’s not true, though. With mortgages getting more expensive, people can’t afford to pay as much for a house. Even if there are dozens of buyers competing for a property, each will bid lower than a year ago. The average buyer’s borrowing capacity is even more important than the number of buyers in the market. </p>
<p>Higher interest rates could make rentals unprofitable for buy-to-let landlords, particularly since they typically pay higher interest rates than ordinary homeowners. A percentage of these landlords will sell, creating a temporary spike in the supply of properties on the market. </p>
<p>There’s also a self-fulfilling prophecy in that the more is written about falling prices, the more sellers will discount to sell quickly. Indeed, property prices have <a href="https://www.forbes.com/uk/advisor/personal-finance/2022/12/12/house-prices-updates/#:%7E:text=Price%20falls%20of%20up%20to,home%20now%20costs%20%C2%A3261%2C600">already started</a> to fall. UK house prices fell by <a href="https://www.fidelity.co.uk/markets-insights/markets/uk/why-are-houses-prices-falling/">more than 2%</a> in November, their third consecutive monthly fall and the sharpest since 2008. In the UK and also the US, analysts predict <a href="https://www.forbes.com/advisor/mortgages/real-estate/housing-market-predictions/">5% to 10% falls</a> within the next couple of years.</p>
<h2>3. Developing country defaults</h2>
<p>Most developing countries owe their debt in US dollars, not their local currency. Higher interest rates have strengthened the dollar – at least until it <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/index/dxy">eased off recently</a> – which has made their financial positions worse. This makes them seem like a riskier prospect to investors, making it more expensive for them to borrow on the international markets. </p>
<p>It doesn’t help that many developing countries already have weakened public finances due to the pandemic. And the prospect of falling global consumption, an impending recession and <a href="https://www.ey.com/en_cn/automotive-transportation/why-global-industrial-supply-chains-are-decoupling">reduced investment</a> is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/03/business/developing-countries-debt-defaults.html">not improving</a> their credentials. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-61505842">Sri Lanka</a> has already defaulted on its debts, and numerous other countries <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/are-we-ready-coming-spate-debt-crises">may soon follow</a>. Their citizens can expect hyperinflation, deep recessions and excessive taxes in the battle to get finances under control. It <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/argentinas-economic-crisis-whack-a-mole-goes-into-overdrive-2022-06-28/">can take years</a> or even decades to recover, causing severe hardship. </p>
<h2>4. Falling markets</h2>
<p>Just like property prices are affected by tighter monetary policies, the same is true of financial assets in general. Higher rates make it more lucrative to save money and invest in bonds, which makes it less tempting to invest in the stock market and other riskier assets. The prospect of reduced consumption and higher unemployment does not encourage investors to take risks either. </p>
<p><strong>S&P 500 chart</strong></p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500773/original/file-20221213-16226-ha011x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="S&P 500 chart" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500773/original/file-20221213-16226-ha011x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500773/original/file-20221213-16226-ha011x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500773/original/file-20221213-16226-ha011x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500773/original/file-20221213-16226-ha011x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500773/original/file-20221213-16226-ha011x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500773/original/file-20221213-16226-ha011x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500773/original/file-20221213-16226-ha011x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.tradingview.com/">TradingView</a></span>
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<p>This is why financial markets have <a href="https://investorplace.com/2022/10/stock-predictions-2022-when-will-stocks-go-back-up/">declined significantly</a> during 2022 – and why <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/global-markets-outlook-urgent-2022-11-28/">they rallied</a> on the news that rate hikes might decelerate. <a href="https://www.fitchratings.com/research/banks/major-european-banks-face-weaker-profits-after-strong-2021-31-03-2022">Banks have suffered</a> over the past year because of a decline in stock market returns, while those in Europe have also been exposed to the Russia sanctions. </p>
<h2>5. Political instability</h2>
<p>Economic developments tend to be followed by political ones. From the French revolution to the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-russia-bread-food-prices-civil-unrest-arab-spring-egypt-2022-3?r=US&IR=T#:%7E:text=Food%20scarcity%20also%20played%20a,with%20corrupt%20political%20systems%20peaked">Arab spring</a>, high food prices have stirred revolutions. Brexit in the UK and the election of Donald Trump were also arguably reactions to economic insecurity. </p>
<p>So the higher that interest rates rise, the greater the risk of political instability. Don’t be surprised if citizens ramp up their opposition to global elites and weak groups such as <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/10/sri-lanka-authorities-must-end-violence-and-discrimination-against-muslims/">minorities and migrants</a>. Also expect more populism and governments resorting to distractions such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/20/turkey-confirms-airstrikes-kurdish-groups-syria-iraq-bombing">nationalist wars</a>.</p>
<h2>The role of governments</h2>
<p>Central banks will only actually reduce interest rates once inflation comes back to low levels. In the meantime, the global economy needs steady and wise governments to minimise the damage. </p>
<p>Loan repayment holidays for struggling households and otherwise healthy businesses can certainly help. Food banks and free school meals are also essential, while governments need to have the courage to make <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/apr/13/wealthiest-americans-tax-income-propublica-investigation">billionaires</a>, <a href="https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/uk-tax-corporate-rate-amazon-facebook-zero-havens">multinationals</a> and <a href="https://www.landlordtoday.co.uk/breaking-news/2021/10/hmrc-discovers-huge-numbers-of-landlords-avoiding-paying-tax">even landlords</a> pay their fair share of tax. Without policies like these, the next couple of years will be harder than is necessary.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196519/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Central bankers are set to slow down their rate hikes.Alexander Tziamalis, Senior Lecturer in Economics, Sheffield Hallam UniversityJean-Philippe Serbera, Associate professor in Finance, ESC PauLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1917782022-10-05T13:47:05Z2022-10-05T13:47:05ZLesotho bungles political reforms, risking fresh bout of instability after 2022 poll<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488261/original/file-20221005-11-ac6y6n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lesotho citizens queue to vote in a previous national elections. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/ Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Kingdom of Lesotho – a small landlocked country in southern Africa with a population of 2.1 million people – has failed to introduce key political reforms needed to bring stability to the country. This setback is the latest of many false starts since the reform process started in earnest <a href="https://production-new-commonwealth-files.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/documents/Working%20Towards%20a%20Sustainable%20Democracy%20in%20Lesotho_0.pdf?VersionId=MfSrWj0t_CbJ8EFPyxOZbG11v1WT9QgA">after the 2012 elections</a>. </p>
<p>It had been hoped that <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/07/21/lesothos-general-elections-scheduled-on-october-7//">the 2022 national poll</a> would be held under a new constitutional framework that would help end conflicts in key areas such as the formation of government, coalitions and the electoral system. Lesotho’s history has been punctuated by spasms of political instability <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE14.2Weisfelder.pdf">since independence in 1966</a>.</p>
<p>The reform drive was supposed to have been completed by the end of the five-year term of the latest parliament, on 13 July 2022. Parliament tried, without success, to enact the reforms bill before its dissolution. Even frantic and chaotic efforts to pass it at midnight before the parliament dissolved <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2LVg0UI1AVs">failed</a>. </p>
<p>A chaotic process then followed which involved parliament being recalled and passing the <a href="https://www.maserumetro.com/news/politics/rakuoane-presents-10th-amendment-act-to-basotho/">flagship</a> reforms bills. But this decision was <a href="https://nationalassembly.parliament.ls/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/29th-Monday.pdf">struck down</a> by both the High Court and Court of Appeal. </p>
<p>This, in effect meant the collapse of the reform programme. </p>
<p>The net effect is that elections will be held on the basis of the old constitutional framework. This is the same framework that is to blame for recurrent political instability in the country.</p>
<p>Prime Minister Majoro’s government is the fourth on whose watch the reform process collapsed, despite enormous resources being invested in the initiative. The causes for the collapse are common in all four attempts. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/book-review-zakes-mdas-subversive-take-on-lesothos-traditions-174063">Book review: Zakes Mda's subversive take on Lesotho's traditions</a>
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<p>In my view, two key reasons lie behind the failure of political reforms in Lesotho. The first is lack of interest by successive governments. The second is the poor design of the reform processes. </p>
<h2>Chaotic collapse</h2>
<p>The way in which the latest reform attempts collapsed provides a good example of why Lesotho has struggled to get itself on a new political path. It reflects the deep tensions in the country grounded in the fact that political elites are driven by self-aggrandisement.</p>
<p>After parliament’s term ended without passing the “omnibus bill”, the government came under immense pressure from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which has been trying to facilitate the reforms, as well as donors and civil society to recall the dissolved parliament to finish the reforms process. </p>
<p>The prime minister, Moeketsi Majoro, then declared a “state of emergency” to create grounds for King Letsie III to recall the parliament. But the premise for the recall – that failure to pass the constitutional amendment bill and the National Assembly Electoral (Amendment) Act constituted a state of emergency – was wrong. </p>
<p>The recalled parliament purportedly passed the bill into law following a chaotic process on the 29 August 2022. But the recall of parliament was challenged in the courts by <a href="https://www.thepost.co.ls/comment/news-pst/a-massive-blow-to-government/">a journalist and a lawyer</a>. In a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9tchockhuMA">landmark decision</a>, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal in separate judgements rightly ruled that the recall of parliament was unconstitutional as there was no state of emergency justifying such recall. </p>
<p>Consequently, all the business it transacted after its lawful dissolution on 13 July 2022, including passing the reforms law, was declared null and void.</p>
<h2>Lack of interest in fundamental reforms</h2>
<p>Despite their pretensions to support reforms, it is clear that governments in Lesotho are not interested in the fundamental reforms to the structure of government. None wants to let go of the unfettered powers that the prime minister enjoys under the current dispensation.</p>
<p>The current design enables manipulation of other branches and institutions of government by the executive. For instance, the prime minister can prorogue and dissolve parliament based on a whim. This is reflective of the weak checks and balances on the use of executive powers.</p>
<p>The prime minister also enjoys unfettered powers to appoint all the other vital institutions - the judiciary, security agencies, oversight institutions and the civil service.</p>
<p>Successive prime ministers have not hesitated to use these powers to torment political opponents, and enhance their political prospects. The result has been recurring instability.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-monarch-in-lesotho-should-be-given-some-powers-but-not-extreme-powers-165914">The monarch in Lesotho should be given some powers: but not extreme powers</a>
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<p>To curb unfettered executive powers, the <a href="https://sundayexpress.co.ls/nra-challenges-dissolution/">now-defunct National Reforms Authority</a>, proposed amendments that provided for checks and balances. But even before the failure to pass the amendments, the government had removed proposals to ensure minimal changes to the status quo.</p>
<h2>Poor design</h2>
<p>Political reform processes are generally informed by <a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2871469/view">five principles of constitution-making</a>. These are proper agenda-setting (preparation), awareness and consultation, deliberation, adoption and implementation. </p>
<p>In Lesotho’s case, these phases were not clearly visible in the design of the reform process, hence it met incessant headwinds at every turn until it collapsed. </p>
<p>For instance, there was no proper agenda-setting. Consequently, the reform agenda was not clearly demarcated or agreed on. While there were five broad themes – <a href="https://lesotho.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Multi-stakeholder%20National%20Dialogue%20Plenary%20II%20Report%20A.pdf">judiciary, parliament, civil service, media, security and the constitution</a> – the extent to which the reform could go was unclear.</p>
<p>As result, competing political interests were often not moderated so that everyone could have a clear vision of what the new constitution should look like. The government view prevailed, as usual, causing discontent among other players.</p>
<p>Similarly, the role that would be played by citizens in the reforms process has been just as unclear. </p>
<p>Another fault line in the process was that the act that <a href="https://nra.org.ls/wp-content/uploads/filr/7272/Act%20No.%204%20of%202019.pdf">was passed</a> in 2019 to guide the reforms itself created more confusion.</p>
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<p>The new law saw the establishment of a multi-stakeholder constituent assembly called the <a href="https://nra.org.ls/">National Reform Authority</a>. But its relationship with parliament remained opaque. Most importantly, the parliament’s traditional legislative authority remained unaffected by it.</p>
<p>Another weakness of the process was the way in which it ran rough shod over the processes for changing the constitution in Lesotho: these are by an ordinary amendment by simple majority, two-thirds in both houses and a referendum. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>After the elections the new parliament must pass a new reforms law. Such a law must be based on the principles that have emerged following lessons in the many constitution-making exercises throughout the continent.</p>
<p>The most notable experiences are those in Kenya, South Africa, South Sudan and Zimbabwe. The law must carefully delineate the role of stakeholders such as government, other political players, civil society, experts, and, much more importantly, the public. </p>
<p>A careful design of the process and how various stakeholders participate in the process is the greatest lesson from many <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/aas/13/4/article-p429_3.xml">constitution-making experiences in Africa</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africans-want-consensual-democracy-why-is-that-reality-so-hard-to-accept-164010">Africans want consensual democracy – why is that reality so hard to accept?</a>
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<p>Inevitably, such a process is bound to reduce the classical powers of parliament. Parliament cannot regard a law passed through such a broad-based consultation, where agreements and compromises have been secured, as an ordinary piece of legislation with which it can do whatever it likes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191778/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hoolo 'Nyane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite their pretensions to support reforms, it is clear that successive governments are not interested in the reform.Hoolo 'Nyane, Head of Department, Public and Environmental Law Department, University of LimpopoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1855422022-07-04T13:28:13Z2022-07-04T13:28:13ZLesotho due to hold elections despite lack of progress on key political reforms<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471817/original/file-20220630-17-3f141a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman votes in Lesotho's 2017 national election. New elections are due in October. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gianluigi Guercia/AFP via Gettty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Lesotho is due to hold national elections in <a href="https://lestimes.com/polls-on-mid-october-iec/">mid-October</a>. The polls were expected to be held under a new constitutional regime resulting from a reform process that started in 2012. But, the process has not yielded much fruit. </p>
<p>There’s widespread consensus – locally and internationally – that the constitutional kingdom of about 2.2 million must reform its political system to overcome recurrent political instability. But successive governments have failed to bring about the necessary changes. </p>
<p>Now, with parliament legally required to dissolve by 14 July 2022 and elections held within three months, there is simply no time to undertake and complete the reforms. So, Basotho look set to vote without the much-needed political changes, at least the important ones. </p>
<p>The proposed reforms that have not been passed by parliament pertain to the excessive powers of the prime minister, unprofessional media, politicised security agencies and judiciary, parliament and the formation of government.</p>
<h2>The reasons for reforms</h2>
<p>The biggest deficiency of Lesotho’s political system is that the prime minister wields excessive powers.</p>
<p>These deficiencies became apparent with the advent of fragile coalition politics in 2012. In 2014 to 2015, the then prime minister, Thomas Thabane, capriciously replaced the chief justice, the president of the court of appeal as well as the leadership of the security agencies.</p>
<p>He also <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2014-06-19-parliament-suspended-amid-fears-of-a-coup-in-lesotho/">prorogued parliament</a> and changed most of the senior personnel of the civil service. Consequently, calls for reform grew louder while disagreements in the then tripartite coalition became pronounced. </p>
<p>The then deputy prime minister, Mothejoa Metsing’s party, <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/286041994.pdf">Lesotho Congress for Democracy</a>, withdrew its support for Thabane’s government. The government, which was formed through a hairbreadth majority in parliament – <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC183723">collapsed in 2015</a>.</p>
<p>A new government was elected, led by Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/cnews-us-lesotho-election-idCAKBN0MD1S220150317">in 2015</a>. It made the reforms its main agenda. But it didn’t have a clear process for executing the reform programme. Instead, it was consumed by the assassination of the then commander of the Lesotho Defence Force, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-06-29-killing-of-former-lesotho-army-chief-deepens-instability">Maaparankoe Mahao</a>, in June 2015 by rogue army operatives. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lesotho-cant-afford-incremental-changes-to-its-constitution-it-needs-a-complete-overhaul-140747">Lesotho can't afford incremental changes to its constitution: it needs a complete overhaul</a>
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<p>The country was thrown into instability, culminating in the Southern African Development Community establishing a <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2015/sadc0706.htm">commission of inquiry in July 2015</a> to investigate the death and related matters. A key recommendation of the commission was that the country undertake a comprehensive constitutional reform programme. </p>
<p>Mosisili’s government made reforms <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/sites/www.un.org.africarenewal/files/70_LS_en.pdf">one of its key objectives</a>. But the government failed to make any meaningful progress until it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/3/1/pakalitha-mosisili-loses-parliament-vote">collapsed in 2017</a>.</p>
<h2>Fresh attempts at reform</h2>
<p>A new government was elected in 2017, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/6/16/thomas-thabane-sworn-in-as-lesothos-prime-minister">led by Prime Minister Thabane</a> for the second time. There was renewed vigour to execute the reforms programme. The government proposed the National Reform Commission Bill of 2018 to parliament to establish an executive-based commission to <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/lesotho-commended-signing-reforms-agreement">implement the reforms</a>. </p>
<p>The bill never became law as it was greatly criticised by civil society and other stakeholders because government had <a href="http://www.lcn.org.ls/news/REFORM%20PROCESS.pdf">designed the process unilaterally</a>. A much more consultative approach was taken in 2018 when the first <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/5515/4384/2128/Multi-Stakeholders_National_Dialogue_Communique_pdf.pdf">muti-stakeholder dialogue</a> was organised. This resulted in the enactment of the <a href="https://www.ls.undp.org/content/lesotho/en/home/news-centre/articles/The-Lesotho-National-Reforms-Bill-to-safeguarding-and-insulate-Lesotho-Reforms-Process-passed.html">National Reforms Dialogue Act</a>.</p>
<p>The law established the National Leaders’ Forum and the National Dialogue Planning Committee to organise the second national dialogue on the <a href="http://www.lcn.org.ls/Resource/MSND%20Plenary%20II%20Report.pdf">content and process of the reforms</a>.
The second Multi-Stakeholder National Dialogue was held <a href="http://www.lcn.org.ls/Resource/MSND%20Plenary%20II%20Report.pdf">in November 2019</a>, after which the National Reforms Authority Act of 2019 was enacted.</p>
<p>The act established the <a href="https://nra.org.ls/">National Reforms Authority (NRA)</a>. The NRA was responsible for implementing the broad and often vague <a href="http://www.lcn.org.ls/Resource/MSND%20Plenary%20II%20Report.pdf">decisions of the Multi-Stakeholder National Dialogue</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lesotho-can-teach-eswatini-and-south-africa-about-key-political-reforms-184260">What Lesotho can teach Eswatini and South Africa about key political reforms</a>
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<p>The process suffered a setback in 2020 after Prime Minister Thabane resigned, following allegations that he was implicated in the murder of his ex-wife, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52707752">Lipolelo Thabane</a>. A new prime minister, Moeketsi Majoro, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/20/moeketsi-majoro-sworn-in-as-lesothos-new-prime-minister">was sworn in</a>. The reform programme continued under the stewardship of the National Reforms Authority.</p>
<p>However, the reforms authority exceeded its statutory lifespan without getting a single change to the constitution approved by parliament. Before its disbandment in <a href="https://sundayexpress.co.ls/nra-challenges-dissolution/">April 2022</a>, the reforms authority had completed proposed constitutional changes – the <a href="https://publiceyenews.com/parties-pledge-to-salvage-reforms-bills/">11th Amendment to the Constitution Bill 2022 </a>.</p>
<p>The so-called Omnibus Bill that is now before parliament is not perfect. But it promises to arrest some of the longstanding constitutional problems. These include the excessive powers of the prime minister, a judiciary that is controlled by the executive, politicised security agencies and a weak parliament.</p>
<h2>Implications of failure</h2>
<p>Despite the hype about passing the Omnibus Bill <a href="https://publiceyenews.com/parties-pledge-to-salvage-reforms-bills/">before the election</a>, it is almost certain that parliament will not have passed all the changes by its dissolution in mid-July. It is, therefore, expected that the country will hold election under the old political design.</p>
<p>The main hurdle is that the majority of critical provisions in the bill seek to amend the entrenched provisions of the constitution. These include changes on the judiciary, parliament and security. These provisions need a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament – Senate and the National Assembly. Some changes even require a referendum. </p>
<p>Given the improbability of especially the entrenched provisions being amended before parliament is dissolved, what then? </p>
<p>An option is to cherry-pick and pass the amendments that need a simple majority vote. But, that may not make any meaningful impact. Most of the problematic provisions of the constitution are entrenched. </p>
<p>The only viable option, albeit regrettable, is that parliament must avoid tampering with the Omnibus Bill, and wait for the new parliament after the elections to resuscitate the entire reform programme.</p>
<h2>Why reforms always fail in Lesotho</h2>
<p>This latest false start on reforms indicates that Lesotho is struggling to implement much-needed constitutional changes. The country has had five governments in 10 years. Every time a government collapses, the reform programme follows suit. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-efforts-to-stabilise-lesotho-have-failed-less-intervention-may-be-more-effective-137499">South Africa's efforts to stabilise Lesotho have failed. Less intervention may be more effective</a>
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<p>Another major cause of regular failure is the lack of clarity about the process of reforms. While there is some consensus about the broad areas for reform – parliament, the constitution, judiciary, civil service, security and media – there is a lack of clarity and consensus about the process of undertaking such thoroughgoing changes to the constitution.</p>
<p>The fact that the Omnibus Bill is now held up in parliament is emblematic of a lack of clear process. There was no plan about how different changes, including changes to the entrenched provisions of the constitution, would be undertaken.</p>
<h2>Where to from here?</h2>
<p>Now that the National Reforms Authority has been disbanded, and parliament has failed to pass the Omnibus Bill, it means the next election will be held under the old legal framework. Then after elections, yet another government will be expected to reinvigorate the reforms.</p>
<p>When the new programme starts after election, the country must pay particular attention to the process as previous attempts at reform were undermined by, among other factors, a poor process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185542/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hoolo 'Nyane was the consultant for the National Reforms Authority(NRA) during the drafting of the Omnibus Bill.</span></em></p>The country has had five governments in 10 years. Every time a government collapses, the reform programme follows suit.Hoolo 'Nyane, Head of Department, Public and Environmental Law Department, University of LimpopoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1808782022-04-13T13:51:51Z2022-04-13T13:51:51ZRussia-Ukraine conflict is driving up wheat prices: this could fuel instability in Sudan<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457128/original/file-20220408-42486-j3hdvh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Widespread protests have followed changes in the subsidised price of Baladi bread, a traditional Sudanese flatbread.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by MUJAHED SHARAF AL-DEEN SATI/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-ukraine-conflict-could-influence-africas-food-supplies-177843">has disrupted</a> agricultural production and trade from one of the world’s major food exporting regions. The war threatens to drive rising food prices still higher and create scarcity, especially for regions most dependent on wheat and other exports from Russia and Ukraine. </p>
<p>Particularly affected is the Middle East and North Africa region. These Arab countries <a href="https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/the-impact-of-the-ukraine-war-on-the-arab-region-food-insecurity-in-an-already-vulnerable-context/">consume</a> the highest wheat per capita, about 128 kg of wheat per capita, which is twice the world average. <a href="https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/storage.arab-reform.net/ari/2022/03/11145720/Wheat_En_FInal.pdf">More than half</a> of this comes from Russia and Ukraine.</p>
<p>Sudan, which is part of the Middle East and North Africa region, faces a uniquely difficult set of circumstances as these disruptions loom. As with other countries in the region, wheat is a key food item. It’s second only to sorghum as a source of calories, accounting for <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/cdmref/p15738coll2/id/134867/filename/135075.pdf">a fifth</a> of the total calories consumed daily. Demand for wheat has grown rapidly in the last 15 to 20 years driven mainly by population growth and changing consumer preferences for bread and other wheat products. </p>
<p>However, only <a href="https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/34103">about 15%</a> of the wheat consumed is grown in Sudan, and this share could shrink <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rising-hunger-looms-sudan-with-little-aid-sight-2022-04-01/">due to</a> rising fertiliser and energy <a href="https://www.one.org/africa/blog/rising-food-prices-africa-unrest/">prices</a>. The majority of imported wheat in Sudan is <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-conflict-likely-compound-sudans-existing-food-security-problems">sourced from</a> Russia and Ukraine, which together accounted for 59% of imports in 2020. </p>
<p>Moreover, because it is the staple food of the urban population, especially the urban poor, wheat is politically important. In recent years large-scale protests <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-easy-end-to-stand-off-between-al-bashir-and-sudans-protesters-112635">have followed</a> changes in the subsidised price of Baladi bread (traditional flatbread). </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-food-riots-show-that-the-transitional-government-still-has-much-to-achieve-155911">Sudan's food riots show that the transitional government still has much to achieve</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The situation in Sudan is already tense, for months there have been <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202204060733.html">widespread protests</a> against the current military government. The wheat crisis could escalate things further. </p>
<h2>Rising wheat prices</h2>
<p>Prices for wheat and fuel were <a href="https://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/134867/filename/135075.pdf">already spiking</a> before the war started. They began rising in 2019 as a result of a series of domestic problems in Sudan, including high inflation and political instability, with severe adverse consequences for the Sudanese economy. </p>
<iframe title="Sudan import of wheat" aria-label="Interactive area chart" id="datawrapper-chart-Ba0cb" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Ba0cb/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="400" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>Wheat prices continued to <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/cdmref/p15738coll2/id/134867/filename/135075.pdf">surge in 2021</a> due largely to overall domestic inflation, foreign exchange shortages that limited wheat imports, a rapid depreciation of the exchange rate and continued low productivity of domestic production. In addition, the removal of fuel subsidies in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/giews-country-brief-sudan-29-june-2021">June 2021</a> contributed to increased production costs for farmers and bakeries for non-subsidised inputs such as water, yeast, cooking gas, labour, and oil.</p>
<p>Many bakeries went out of business as production costs increased more than the official sales price of subsidised flat bread. </p>
<p>Inflationary pressures were compounded further by a cut in funding from international donors following the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/exclusive-sudan-cut-off-650-million-international-funding-after-coup-2021-12-08/">military coup</a> in October 2021. </p>
<p>These problems intensified in 2022. </p>
<p>On 1 January, the Sudan government abandoned all forms of subsidies on wheat (grain, flour and bread), <a href="https://www.fao.org/giews/food-prices/food-policies/detail/en/c/1096022/">forcing milling companies</a> to <a href="https://sudan.ifpri.info/2021/09/15/a-deeper-look-into-sudans-wheat-value-chains-and-wheat-policy-options/">obtain</a> grain in the higher-priced open market. Overall, between July 2021 and February 2022, the wholesale price of wheat in Khartoum rose by 112% (about 60% in real terms).</p>
<p>Then came Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>The resulting disruption of wheat exports has pushed imported wheat prices <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-war-exacerbating-international-food-price-volatility">still higher</a>. Bread prices are expected to rise further as well, both because of higher wheat prices and increased production costs due to higher oil and gas prices. </p>
<p>For example, the price of gas used as cooking fuel for most bakeries has <a href="https://al-ain.com/article/bread-prices-double-sudan">recently jumped</a> 56%; the price of a jerry can of oil <a href="https://al-ain.com/article/bread-prices-double-sudan">has jumped</a> 67%. </p>
<p>Higher wheat and petroleum prices also add to pressure on foreign exchange reserves, contributing to a recent government decision to sell gold to fund additional food imports in advance of the upcoming Ramadan months when household food consumption typically increases sharply. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457091/original/file-20220408-42951-d8eqbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457091/original/file-20220408-42951-d8eqbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457091/original/file-20220408-42951-d8eqbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457091/original/file-20220408-42951-d8eqbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457091/original/file-20220408-42951-d8eqbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457091/original/file-20220408-42951-d8eqbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457091/original/file-20220408-42951-d8eqbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sudan Wheat Model Simulations. Source: IFPRI.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To assess the impact of the surge in domestic prices in 2021 and what could happen to the market prices of imports and domestic wheat consumption due to the conflict in Ukraine in early 2022, we ran simulations using a partial equilibrium model of Sudan’s <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-conflict-likely-compound-sudans-existing-food-security-problems">wheat economy</a>. </p>
<p>The model used for our simulations is a simplified version of a <a href="http://www.ifpri.org/program/impact-model">partial equilibrium multi-market model</a> commonly used for agricultural trade policy analysis that takes into account agricultural production, household consumption, prices and trade. </p>
<p>Model simulations indicate that the 61% surge in the wholesale price of wheat in Sudan between August 2021 and February 2022 reduced the country’s wheat imports by 24% and total wheat consumption (including consumption of wheat products) <a href="https://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/134867/filename/135075.pdf">by 15%</a>. Simulations of a possible further 20% increase in real wheat prices, due to the Ukraine invasion, suggest this could lead to an additional decline in wheat imports and consumer demand for wheat products of 9 and 5 percentage points, respectively.</p>
<p>These wheat price shocks have serious consequences for Sudan’s food economy and especially for urban poor households. In the model simulations, wheat consumption dropped by 16%-19% between July 2021 and February 2022 because of domestic policy changes. And then by another 5% in March 2022. </p>
<p>The welfare of rural poor households, who constitute the majority of the Sudan’s population, is least affected by these wheat market shocks given their relatively low per capita consumption of wheat products in 2022 (about 12 kgs/person).</p>
<h2>What can be done</h2>
<p>Sudan needs to address the immediate impacts of the current crisis. It should then look to building its resilience to reduce the impacts of the next one. Here are several policy measures to consider:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Increased investments in roads, and other market infrastructure, such as physical markets and stalls. This would help reduce, transaction costs, raise producer prices and improve the functioning and efficiency of markets. </p></li>
<li><p>Additional research and extension efforts to increase production of alternatives to wheat production. This could include drought-tolerant sorghum and millet on non-irrigated land and high value export crops on irrigated land. </p></li>
<li><p>Introduce a cash transfer system targeting the poorest households as bread subsidies are removed. This could build on the experiences from the <a href="https://sudan.un.org/en/47747-sudan-government-and-wfp-sign-agreement-sudan-family-support-programme">Sudan Family Support Program (Samarat)</a> introduced in 2021 but then halted, as well as lessons from successful <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/11/15/the-story-of-takaful-and-karama-cash-transfer-program#:%7E:text=The%20Takaful%20and%20Karama%20conditional%20and%20unconditional%20cash,support%20of%20a%20US%24400%20million%20World%20Bank%20program.">cash transfer programs</a> in other countries, including Egypt’s Takaful and Karama programmes.</p></li>
<li><p>Address food security data gaps and improve monitoring. Accurate targeting of either cash or in-kind transfer programmes would require up-to-date household data. </p></li>
<li><p>Strengthen public sector capacity to address key problems. These include the effectiveness of standards agencies to enforce regulations for monitoring of wheat flour quality, ensuring competition in wheat milling, and effectively building and managing a cash transfer program. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Putting some – or all – of these in place can help build a more resilient wheat system in Sudan. This would give households the wherewithal to better withstand future economic shocks.</p>
<p><em>A version of this article was published <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-conflict-likely-compound-sudans-existing-food-security-problems">here</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180878/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clemens Breisinger receives funding from ONE CGIAR and the United States Agency for International Development. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Laborde Debucquet receives funding from United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to study the role of international trade in global and national food security.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Glauber receives funding from USAID. Glauber is also a visiting research scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oliver Kiptoo Kirui receives funding from United States Agency for International Development(USAID). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Dorosh receives funding from a USAID/Khartoum Sudan Strategy Support Program. </span></em></p>Wheat and bread play a central role for food security and political stability in Sudan.Clemens Breisinger, Senior Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) David Laborde Debucquet, Senior Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Joseph Glauber, Senior Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Oliver Kiptoo Kirui, Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Paul Dorosh, Director of Development Strategy and Governance Division, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1756422022-01-25T17:11:56Z2022-01-25T17:11:56ZBurkina Faso coup: latest sign of a rise in the ballot box being traded for bullets<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442442/original/file-20220125-19-idn6qt.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former President Roch Marc Christian Kabore has been detained</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Koch / MSC/Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When news broke that soldiers had mutinied in Burkina Faso, it was hardly surprising. Burkina Faso’s history has been plagued by both <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/4/17/soldiers-mutiny-in-burkina-faso">army mutinies</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/25/burkina-faso-foiled-military-coup">military coups d’état</a>. </p>
<p>Earlier this year an <a href="https://theconversation.com/another-coup-has-been-averted-in-burkina-faso-but-for-how-long-175074">attempt was foiled</a>. Even then it was clear that it was possibly only a matter of time before another was made.</p>
<p>And recent history in the region served a strong signal too. Over the last two years there have been coups in nearby <a href="https://theconversation.com/guinea-has-a-long-history-of-coups-here-are-5-things-to-know-about-the-country-167618">Guinea</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56830510">Chad</a> , multiple coups in <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/12/after-two-coups-mali-needs-regional-support-bolster-democracy">Mali</a> , and a failed attempt last year in neighbouring <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210331-attempted-coup-in-niger-france-24">Niger</a>.</p>
<p>As far as coup attempts go, Burkina Faso was the missing piece in coup puzzle stretching from the Atlantic to the Red Sea.</p>
<p>That this region would be plagued by coups might strike some as unsurprising. The average rating of this stretch of countries in the <a href="https://fragilestatesindex.org/">Fragile States Index</a> is 98, easily worse than recent coup cases like Myanmar, a so-called “failed state” such as Libya and placing the region far closer to bottom-ranked Yemen and Syria than countries like Senegal or Ghana. </p>
<p>Relative to other regions, the Sahel faces <a href="https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/sahel-emergency">extraordinary challenges</a>. It’s nevertheless surprising that there has been such a high number of coups in such a short period of time. </p>
<p>UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/an-epidemic-coups-un-chief-laments-urging-security-council-act-2021-10-26/">recently lamented</a> what he called an “epidemic of coups,” while acknowledging “effective deterrence is not in place.” In Guterres’s view, responses to coups have been handcuffed as potential anti-coup enforcers struggle with their own problems during the pandemic. The result, he argues, is</p>
<blockquote>
<p>an environment in which some military leaders feel that they have total impunity, they can do whatever they want because nothing will happen to them. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Decline in counterveiling forces against coups</h2>
<p>By <a href="https://militarycoups.org/">various accounts</a> , post-colonial Africa has seen over 200 coup attempts, with roughly half seeing the leader successfully removed. And though recent years have hardly seen the phenomenon completely retreat as a threat, the practice had <a href="https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2017/09/18/silent-guns-examining-the-two-year-absence-of-coups-in-africa/">greatly declined</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442433/original/file-20220125-27-51qnic.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442433/original/file-20220125-27-51qnic.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442433/original/file-20220125-27-51qnic.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442433/original/file-20220125-27-51qnic.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442433/original/file-20220125-27-51qnic.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442433/original/file-20220125-27-51qnic.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442433/original/file-20220125-27-51qnic.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Screenshot at AM.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Not since 1999 had so many successful coups occurred in a calendar year and not since 1980 had there been a year with more successful coups. Though 2021 appeared exceptional, the coup in Burkina Faso could suggest 2021 was no fluke. </p>
<p>Though many of these countries share fragile domestic political environments, many observers have commented on the weakening of a presumed <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/african-union-as-a-norm-entrepreneur-on-military-coups-detat-in-africa-19522012-an-empirical-assessment/34F81D3A221ABD0C1D4591412454C03C">anti-coup norm</a> that was argued to be at least <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12116-015-9210-6">partially responsible</a> for the decline in coups. </p>
<p>In the past, post-coup regimes saw suspensions remain in place until prominent coupists fully retreated from power. In the case of Madagascar, it was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-madagascar-sanctions/african-union-welcomes-madagascar-back-after-power-handover-idUSBREA0Q0DN20140127">nearly five years</a>. Such responses have given way to seeing membership restored and sanctions dropped so long as coupists participate in an election. Not only are former coup leaders such as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/10/egypts-sisi-takes-over-as-new-head-of-african-union">Abdel Fattah el-Sisi</a> and and Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz welcomed back, they were even chosen to serve as the organization’s chairperson. </p>
<p>More recently, the organisation has simply chosen to ignore coups altogether <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/12/5/how-the-african-union-got-it-wrong-on-zimbabwe">in 2017 Zimbabwe</a> and <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/the-au-reneges-on-its-stance-against-coups-detat">2021 Chad</a>. </p>
<p>Nor has the behaviour of world powers acted as a deterrent. China, for example, has taken a “without conditions” approach to its loans and assistance, viewing the occasional coup as little more than <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adr022">“the cost of doing business”</a> in the region. Though the US has regularly suspended assistance after coups, as with the AU, they have been happy to end those suspensions so long as the coupists test the vote. </p>
<p>Sudan’s coup leaders, for example, were perhaps anticipating <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/12/3/america-and-china-opened-the-door-for-african-coups-to-return">an Egypt-like progression</a> in which any <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-africa-sudan-khartoum-96e7b33b6e1045fce01189e81b36814a">suspension of its $700 million aid package</a> would be temporary. In the case of military aid, even if the US or other Western actors response harshly, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/mali-russian-military-advisers-arrive-amid-western-pullback/a-60363317">alternatives are increasingly willing to step in</a>.</p>
<p>Put simply, the lesson learned from coups is that any costs are short-lived.</p>
<p>In addition to changing international dynamics, there seems to be a change in attitude on the part of people living in countries experiencing coups. Citizens in places like <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/25/burkina-faso-foiled-military-coup">in Burkina Faso</a> have in the past <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002716685611">rallied to thwart coups</a>. More recently, peoples’ willingness to tolerate coups seems to be increasing. </p>
<p>Neighbouring Mali has seen its people <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/14/malians-rally-after-army-calls-protests-over-ecowas-sanctions">protest against ECOWAS’s post-coup sanctions</a>, while a recent polling effort suggests over <a href="https://twitter.com/BridgesFromBKO/status/1483114244296130562?s=20">90% of respondents</a> in Bamako support military rule. The most recent data from <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a> – an independent research network that measures public attitudes on economic, political, and social matters in Africa – pegged nationwide support for military rule in<a href="https://afrobarometer.org/blogs/democracy-mali-dying-not-if-citizens-voices-are-heard"> Mali to be at around 31%</a>. </p>
<p>By comparison, <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r7_policypaperno54_africans_views_of_democracy1.pdf">50% Burkinabe respondents</a> approved or strongly approved of military rule in the same sample. This is up 10% from a decade earlier.</p>
<h2>Politics by the gun</h2>
<p>Tomorrow’s would-be coupists are emboldened by every case that lacks robust responses – from within and without. </p>
<p>The normalisation of coups does not simply mean an increase in “irregular” transfers of power. It means an increased acceptance of politics by the gun. The reported <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/burkina-faso-kabore-detained-coup-b1999317.html">attempt</a> on President Roch Kabore’s life could be a further indication of a throwback to an earlier coup era. An underappreciated trend accompanying the decline of coups is that though they still occasionally occur, they have become far less likely to be accompanied by political assassination. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442434/original/file-20220125-23-1mpfd4l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442434/original/file-20220125-23-1mpfd4l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442434/original/file-20220125-23-1mpfd4l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442434/original/file-20220125-23-1mpfd4l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442434/original/file-20220125-23-1mpfd4l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442434/original/file-20220125-23-1mpfd4l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442434/original/file-20220125-23-1mpfd4l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Screenshot at AM.</span>
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</figure>
<p>At the time<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/04/10/president-of-niger-assassinated/c8287bd2-32c8-42dc-92c4-d38c7218ea0c/"> President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara was killed</a> in an April 1999 coup in Niger, Africa had seen 14 of 82 ousted leaders killed during the attempt or as a direct consequence of it. </p>
<p>Following the April 1999 coup in Niger, a period which coincided with the continent’s establishment of an anti-coup norm, no leaders have been killed in the last 24 successful coups. Admittedly, this streak is at least in part due to a quirk of definitions, as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bissau-attack/guinea-bissaus-president-army-chief-killed-idUSTRE5210RR20090302">killing of Guinea-Bissauan President João Bernardo Vieira</a> is generally considered to be a mere “assassination.” </p>
<p>Compared to earlier eras, however, coups in the last 20 years have been comparatively tamer. It’s important to note that violence is a tool whose use all coup leaders accept. Nevertheless, the level of violence associated with them has dramatically decreased over time. This is not a coincidence . Leaders such as <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/142678/togo-who-killed-sylvanus-olympio-the-father-of-togolese-independence/">Sylvanus Olympio</a>in 1963 , and <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/in-depth/leading-up-to-thomas-sankaras-trial/">Thomas Sankara</a> in 1987 were not killed by accident. These were murder victims whose deaths were meant to facilitate a coup’s success and to eliminate a future political threat. </p>
<p>The normalisation of armies as political actors inevitably means the use of the military toolkit in politics. With growing support for army intervention and less interest in preventing coups these are trying times for those wary of returning trading the ballot box for bullets.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175642/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Africa saw more coup attempts in 2021 than the preceding five years combined.Jonathan Powell, Associate professor, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1622002021-06-16T16:08:01Z2021-06-16T16:08:01ZHow Israel’s missing constitution deepens divisions between Jews and with Arabs<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406180/original/file-20210614-125373-544ha5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C23%2C5130%2C3615&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Without a formal constitution, Israelis disagree on such basic issues as whether Israel is a Jewish state.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/right-wing-israeli-supporters-of-prime-minister-benjamin-news-photo/1233254116?adppopup=true">Jack Guez/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/world/middleeast/israel-coalition-hamas.html">Renewed fighting</a> has erupted again between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, endangering a ceasefire instituted after an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-57081848">11-day war in May</a>. </p>
<p>The conflict in Gaza is an early test of Israel’s <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/a-look-at-the-israeli-coalition-looking-to-strip-netanyahu-of-power">new coalition government</a>. Recently, parties across the political spectrum united to remove Israel’s scandal-plagued prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu from power, ending a two-year political crisis – though he may maneuver his way back into power. </p>
<p>While conducting dissertation research on the relationship between religion and state in Israel, I traced Israel’s chronic instability to what I believe is its core: Unlike most countries, <a href="https://m.knesset.gov.il/en/activity/pages/basiclaws.aspx">Israel does not have a constitution</a>. </p>
<h2>Why constitutions matter</h2>
<p>Constitutions <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/constitutional-origins-and-liberal-democracy-a-global-analysis-19002015/AD138F031B07119CBEF099B8879FB888">constrain the power of governments</a> by defining in precise terms who has what rights, what rights form the basis of legal decisions and how political power is dispersed among institutions.</p>
<p>Israel is governed by a changeable, ever-growing body of what are called “basic laws” – “Chukei Ha-Yesod” in Hebrew. The basic laws were passed individually over the past 73 years, beginning with one two-page law that described the makeup of Israel’s legislature, the Knesset, and citizens’ voting rights. </p>
<p>Today, Israel is governed by a 124-page collection of 13 laws. Although the basic laws outline a vision of democratic rights, they remain, to paraphrase the late legal scholar Ruth Gavison, “unanchored.” </p>
<p>This allows Israel to <a href="https://press.huc.edu/defining-israel-the-jewish-state-democracy-and-the-law-reviewed/">maintain an ambiguous stance</a> on key issues central to a nation’s identity. </p>
<p>First, Israel has never officially defined the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/middle-east-government-politics-and-policy/between-state-and-synagogue-secularization-contemporary-israel?format=PB">relationship between religion and state</a>. Is Israel founded on the Jewish religion? Or is it a secular state that is home to Jews, with non-Jewish minorities? That question remains unanswered.</p>
<p>Nor has the country fully determined whether Arab Israelis and other <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14650045.2011.562944">non-Jewish citizens</a> – who make up about a quarter of its 9 million people – enjoy the same rights as their Jewish counterparts.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406254/original/file-20210614-72954-5jemdl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406254/original/file-20210614-72954-5jemdl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406254/original/file-20210614-72954-5jemdl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406254/original/file-20210614-72954-5jemdl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406254/original/file-20210614-72954-5jemdl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406254/original/file-20210614-72954-5jemdl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406254/original/file-20210614-72954-5jemdl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406254/original/file-20210614-72954-5jemdl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">When David ben Gurion became the first prime minister of Israel in 1948, the country had no basic laws.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/david-ben-gurion-first-prime-minister-of-israel-1948-news-photo/566465999?adppopup=true">Universal History Archive/Universal Images Group via Getty Image</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Israel also <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/hascq39&div=15&g_sent=1&casa_token=aemNY4_AOrYAAAAA:YyZITcqo1btDCFbdITwR3s8feHnu6eI6V0_zmtzUF5pLI0QA_hY-EF4ggTaV11d6AqA9P58g&collection=journals">waffles on the relative</a> power of the legislature and judiciary. </p>
<p>The Israeli Supreme Court has used this constitutional ambiguity to retroactively subject new legislation to judicial review. Meanwhile, legislators in the Knesset have <a href="https://forward.com/news/breaking-news/308355/ayelet-shaked-plans-to-rein-in-israel-supreme-court/">tried to weaken</a> the court’s authority over their lawmaking. Incoming Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s Yamina party, for example, has previously attempted to pass legislation <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/court-override-bill-dead-in-the-water-as-haredim-liberman-rule-out-support/">allowing the Knesset to override</a> judicial decisions.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406188/original/file-20210614-126247-scn6xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A shouting man is pushed out of legislative chamber" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406188/original/file-20210614-126247-scn6xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406188/original/file-20210614-126247-scn6xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406188/original/file-20210614-126247-scn6xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406188/original/file-20210614-126247-scn6xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406188/original/file-20210614-126247-scn6xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406188/original/file-20210614-126247-scn6xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/406188/original/file-20210614-126247-scn6xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Angry Israeli lawmakers shout at incoming Prime Minister Naftali Bennett in the Knesset, Israel’s Parliament, June 13, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/man-is-led-away-after-holding-up-signs-and-shouting-at-news-photo/1233449333?adppopup=true">Marcus Yam / Los Angeles Times via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even Israel’s official borders aren’t defined. Israel maintains it has <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/08/netanyahu-annexation-palestinians-stop-calling-israel-a-jewish-democracy/">sovereignty over the West Bank</a> territory, but officially the West Bank is not part of Israel. So Palestinians living in the West Bank <a href="https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2019&context=jil">do not have rights</a> under Israeli law, because they are not Israeli citizens. </p>
<p>Palestinians there live under Israeli military rule, subject to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/17/israeli-military-law-stifles-palestinian-rights-watchdog-says">military law</a> that is unconstrained by any constitutional bounds, alongside Israeli settlers who are subject to Israeli law. </p>
<p>This ambiguity led Yuli Tamir, an Israeli politician and academic, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.HIGHLIGHT-forget-about-jewish-or-democratic-is-israel-even-an-actual-country-1.9224997">to quip</a>, “Is Israel even an actual country?”</p>
<h2>A young democracy</h2>
<p>Israel is not the only parliamentary democracy without a formal constitution. The United Kingdom doesn’t have one either.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/764688?casa_token=p1DnWvmVuJMAAAAA%3AvTIrqkIHAqbez7SXh19N7aNW2pcsa6BvVimHXbuy3BIt7cA195WwMu7nkggkBYsBWXs908bjVUK0H6wF5Ln2WeuenaDOLlQpQvzzvI3NG_Ta3blTSA&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">the United Kingdom has a large body of laws</a> accumulated over centuries of political conflict. This well-established common-law tradition, which served as one of the sources for the United States’ own Constitution, is the legal basis of governance in the U.K. </p>
<p>Israel, founded in 1948, does not have such a history to fall back on. And many of its problems are common to relatively young democracies. <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198826927.001.0001/oso-9780198826927">Weak, fractured party systems</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13510347.2011.619777?casa_token=0h2VEYPRN_QAAAAA:pxKnhO2vTyDq9r-JcBkISNFzZ-yuECa_lHWdBUE6n5gPnoY5-GtkuUKUmOYqjLG7rq6jPirA6CI">competition between ethnic and religious groups</a> are hallmarks of the democratization process. The early U.S., for example, grappled with many such problems, too. </p>
<p>But rule of law generally prevails in the U.S., and democracy progresses, because both the courts and legislators defer to a central document: the U.S. Constitution. </p>
<p>The Constitution outlines the powers of each branch of government, as well as procedures for amendment. The U.S. Bill of Rights – the first 10 amendments – guarantees specific rights of citizens.</p>
<h2>Let’s go logrolling</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/hlps.2019.0215">Netanyahu government</a> attempted to settle some long-running disagreements about Israel’s identity during his most recent term in office – though not necessarily with an eye toward strengthening liberal democracy.</p>
<p>In 2018, the Knesset passed a basic law naming Israel the “nation-state of the Jewish people.” <a href="https://en.idi.org.il/articles/24241">This effort</a> to settle a central identity question pleased almost nobody. Left-wing and Arab Israelis objected to the tacit downgrading of Arabs to second-class status, while religious Jewish groups found the law too secular. </p>
<p>Divisive political gambles like this became commonplace in the late stages of Netanyahu’s rule. As coalition politics became increasingly fragile, Netanyahu spiraled into what political scientists call “<a href="http://webhome.auburn.edu/%7Ejohnspm/gloss/logrolling.phtml">logrolling</a>”: using policy trade-offs among parties in exchange for political support. </p>
<p>This was especially the case in regard to religion, as Netanyahu bartered policies appeasing the Orthodox Jewish groups that kept him in power. In 2018, for example, Netanyahu’s coalition <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/israels-battle-between-religious-and-secular-jews-escalates-with-ban-on-saturday-shopping/2018/02/28/bb13f43c-164b-11e8-930c-45838ad0d77a_story.html">passed new legislation enforcing</a> previously symbolic laws such as restrictions on businesses operating on the sabbath. It was a punishing move for cities like Tel Aviv with large secular populations.</p>
<p>Similarly, Netanyahu’s policy of encouraging Jewish settlers to move to the West Bank and other occupied Palestinian territories and build cities was more political strategy than religious fervor. His aggressive support for Jewish nationalism <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/uprisings-palestinians-israeli-citizenship/story?id=77741627">increasingly alienated</a> Israel’s Arab population, who have few legal avenues to challenge their treatment.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 100,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>Minorities are mistreated and even subjugated in countries that have constitutions, too. But constitutions give them legal pathways to challenge that discrimination. </p>
<p>The Netanyahu era showed that strategic politicians can exploit Israel’s constitutional vacuum to maintain power well beyond their popular mandate. These destabilizing issues will continue to fester as a new government takes the reins in Israel.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162200/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendan Szendro does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Governed by a changeable body of ‘basic laws,’ Israel never settled basic questions like the rights of religious minorities. These destabilizing issues will continue to fester under a new government.Brendan Szendro, PhD Candidate, Binghamton University, State University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1538132021-01-29T17:15:43Z2021-01-29T17:15:43ZWhat those mourning the fragility of American democracy get wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380558/original/file-20210125-13-c01ock.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=26%2C26%2C2901%2C1967&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Armed demonstrators attend a rally in front of the Michigan Capitol in Lansing to protest the governor's stay-at-home order on May 14, 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/armed-demonstrators-attend-a-rally-in-front-of-the-michigan-news-photo/1224848091">Scott Olson/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For many people, the lesson from the assault on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021 – and more broadly from the experience of the last four years – is that American democracy has become newly and dangerously fragile. </p>
<p>That conclusion is overstated. In fact, American democracy has always been fragile. And it might be more precise to diagnose the United States as a fragile union rather than a fragile democracy. As President Joe Biden said in his <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/01/20/inaugural-address-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr/">inaugural address</a>, national unity is “that most elusive of things.”</p>
<p>Certainly, faith in American democracy has been battered over the last year. <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1H3uFRD7X0QttkZ26bccmlQVkbS-63uGj/view">Polls show that 1 in 4 Americans do not recognize Joe Biden as the legitimate winner of the 2020 election</a>. The turn to violence on Capitol Hill was a disturbing attack on an important symbol of U.S. democracy. </p>
<p>But there are four other factors that should be considered to evaluate the true state of the nation. Taking these into account, what emerges is a picture of a country that, despite its long tradition of presenting itself as exceptional, looks a lot like the other struggling democracies of the world.</p>
<h2>Democratic fragility is not new</h2>
<p>First, fragility is not really new. It’s misleading to describe the United States as “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/01/06/donald-trumps-america-shithole-countries-455692">the world’s oldest democracy</a>,” as many observers have recently done. By modern definitions of the concept, the United States has only been a democracy for about 60 years. Despite constitutional guarantees, most <a href="https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/elections/right-to-vote/voting-rights-for-african-americans/">Black Americans could not vote in important elections before the 1960s</a>, nor did they have basic civil rights. Like many other countries, the United States is still working to consolidate democratic ideals.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380564/original/file-20210125-19-at2h5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of voters lining up outside a polling station, a Sugar Shack small store, in Peachtree, Alabama in 1966." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380564/original/file-20210125-19-at2h5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380564/original/file-20210125-19-at2h5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380564/original/file-20210125-19-at2h5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380564/original/file-20210125-19-at2h5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380564/original/file-20210125-19-at2h5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380564/original/file-20210125-19-at2h5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380564/original/file-20210125-19-at2h5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965, ensuring Blacks the right to vote, as people in Peachtree, Alabama, did at this polling place in May 1966.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/group-of-voters-lining-up-outside-the-polling-station-a-news-photo/3088626?adppopup=true">MPI/Getty images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Similarly, the struggle to contain political violence is not new. Washington has certainly seen its share of such violence. Since 1950, there have been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2021/01/07/us-capitol-violent-political-attacks/">multiple bombings and shootings at the U.S. Capitol</a> <a href="https://www.history.com/news/a-history-of-white-house-attacks">and the White House</a>. Troops have been deployed to keep order in Washington four times since World War I – <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/07/15/deadly-race-riot-aided-abetted-by-washington-post-century-ago/">during riots and unrest in 1919</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/local/dc-riots-1968/#:%7E:text=On%20April%204%2C%201968%2C%20the,before%20in%20Detroit%20and%20Newark.&text=His%20assassination%20ignited%20an%20explosion,in%20ruins%20for%2030%20years.">and 1968</a>, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/06/07/us-army-demonstrations-washington-305913">economic protests in 1932</a>, and again in 2021. The route from the Capitol to the White House passes near the spots where <a href="https://www.loc.gov/collections/abraham-lincoln-papers/articles-and-essays/assassination-of-president-abraham-lincoln/">Abraham Lincoln was assassinated in 1865</a>, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/dirty-painful-death-president-james-garfield">James Garfield was fatally shot in 1881</a>, and <a href="https://prologue.blogs.archives.gov/2015/11/01/the-plot-to-kill-president-truman/">Harry Truman was attacked in 1950</a>.</p>
<p>Political instability is also a familiar feature of economic downturns. There were <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1975/06/29/archives/the-crisis-of-democracy.html">similar fears about the end of democracy during the 1970s</a>, when the United States wrestled with inflation and unemployment, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/democracy-in-crisis-by-harold-j-laski-chapel-hill-the-university-of-north-carolina-press-1933-pp-267-the-state-in-theory-and-practice-by-harold-j-laski-new-york-the-viking-press-1935-pp-299/C295FBBABD2BB43006CF56336642202B">and during the Great Depression of the 1930s</a>. Of course, those fears had some justification. Many people wondered whether democratic governments could rise to new challenges. But there is evidence from historical episodes like this that democracies do eventually adapt – indeed, that they are better at adapting than non-democratic systems like the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union">Soviet Union, which collapsed in 1991</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, the debate about American democracy is <a href="https://penntoday.upenn.edu/news/researcher-penn-explores-why-voters-ignore-local-politics">fixated excessively on politics at the national level</a>. This fixation has been aggravated by the way that <a href="https://theconversation.com/when-newspapers-close-voters-become-more-partisan-108416">the media and internet have developed over the last 30 years</a>. Political debate focuses more and more heavily on Washington. But the American political system also includes 50 state governments and <a href="https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2013/econ/g12-cg-org.pdf">90,000 local governments</a>. More than <a href="https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/gus/tables/1995/gc92-1-2.pdf">half a million people</a> in the United States occupy a popularly elected office. Democratic practices may be imperfect, but they are extensive and not easily undone.</p>
<p>On balance, claims about the fragility of American democracy should be taken seriously, but with a sense of proportion. Events since the November 2020 election have been troubling, but they do not signal an impending collapse of America’s democratic experiment.</p>
<h2>A crisis of unity</h2>
<p>It might be more useful to think of the present crisis in other terms. The real difficulty confronting the country might be a fragile national union, rather than a fragile democracy. </p>
<p>Since the 1990s, the country has seen the emergence of <a href="https://theconversation.com/think-the-us-is-more-polarized-than-ever-you-dont-know-history-131600">deep fissures between what came to be called “red” and “blue” America</a> – two camps with very different views about national priorities and the role of federal government in particular. The result has been increasing <a href="https://theconversation.com/search/result?sg=231cca2a-cb7e-49a2-b6c6-0796ad9aba0f&sp=1&sr=1&url=%2Fcongress-used-to-pass-bipartisan-legislation-will-it-ever-again-107134">rancor and gridlock in Washington</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380561/original/file-20210125-19-pcati6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A supporter of President Donald Trump holds a Confederate battle flag outside the Senate chamber." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380561/original/file-20210125-19-pcati6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380561/original/file-20210125-19-pcati6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380561/original/file-20210125-19-pcati6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380561/original/file-20210125-19-pcati6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380561/original/file-20210125-19-pcati6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380561/original/file-20210125-19-pcati6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380561/original/file-20210125-19-pcati6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Old political divisions – exemplified by this Confederate battle flag held by a supporter of President Trump during the breach of the Capitol – are still at play in the U.S.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporter-of-us-president-donald-trump-holds-a-confederate-news-photo/1230505469?adppopup=true">Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Again, this sort of division is not new to American politics. “The United States” did not become established in American speech as a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/02/the-words-that-remade-america/308801/">singular rather than a plural noun</a> until after the Civil War. Until the 1950s, it was commonplace to describe the United States as a composite of sections – North, South and West – with distinctive interests and cultures. </p>
<p>[<em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>In 1932, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Frederick-Jackson-Turner">Frederick Jackson Turner compared the United States to Europe</a>, describing it as a “federation of nations” held together through careful diplomacy.</p>
<p>It was only in the 1960s that this view of the United States faded away. Advances in transportation and communications seemed to forge the country into a single economic and cultural unit. </p>
<p>But politicians overestimated this transformation. </p>
<h2>Return of old divisions</h2>
<p>Since the 1990s, old divisions have re-emerged.</p>
<p>America’s current political class has not fully absorbed this reality. Too often, it has taken unity for granted, forgetting the country’s long history of sectional conflict. Because they took unity for granted, many new presidents in the modern era were tempted to launch their administrations with <a href="https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/back-to-the-future/the-hundred-day-mistake/">ambitious programs that galvanized followers while antagonizing opponents</a>. However, this winner-take-all style may not be well suited to the needs of the present moment. It may aggravate divisions rather than rebuilding unity.</p>
<p>Only 20 years ago, many Americans – buoyed by an economic boom and the collapse of the Soviet Union – were convinced that their model of governance was on the brink of conquering the world. President George W. Bush declared American-style democracy to be the “<a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nssall.html">single sustainable model for national success</a>.” By contrast, many people today worry that this model is on the brink of collapse. </p>
<p>The hubris of the early 2000s was misguided, and so is the despair of 2021. Like many other countries, the United States is engaged in a never-ending effort to maintain unity, contain political violence and live up to democratic principles.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153813/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alasdair S. Roberts does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Everyone’s saying it: ‘Democracy is fragile’ in the United States. But a political science scholar says that has always been the case.Alasdair S. Roberts, Director, School of Public Policy, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1505022020-12-01T13:24:02Z2020-12-01T13:24:02ZPeru’s democracy faces greatest trial since Fujimori dictatorship after two presidents are ousted in one week<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372073/original/file-20201130-21-cfs1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=19%2C38%2C4268%2C2706&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Riot police face off against protesters in Lima, Peru, Nov. 12, 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-confront-riot-police-during-a-protest-against-news-photo/1229598013?adppopup=true">Ernesto Benavides/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Peru’s new interim president took office on Nov. 17 under <a href="https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/can-francisco-sagasti-hold-peru-together/">unenviable circumstances</a>. </p>
<p>Francisco Sagasti became the South American country’s third president in a week after President Martin Vizcarra was impeached for “<a href="https://www.dw.com/es/per%C3%BA-es-la-destituci%C3%B3n-de-vizcarra-inconstitucional/a-55598103">moral incapacity</a>” in what many Peruvians saw as a <a href="https://iep.org.pe/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Informe-IEP-OP-Noviembre-2020.pdf?fbclid=IwAR397myWtyweBXszD2T9X_HPqtdBCtZ3EtKcmJ5avhjyh-njOBLC1AOe4Ms">coup by Congress</a>. Then Vizcarra’s successor, congressional president Manuel Merino, was quickly forced to resign after furious public protest.</p>
<p>New president Sagasti must now steer a shaken nation not just toward elections, scheduled for April 2021, but also toward renewed faith in democracy. </p>
<p>It’s not an unprecedented mandate for a Peruvian leader. Exactly 20 years ago, Peru’s political leaders faced – and ultimately failed – a similar test, <a href="https://www.msn.com/es-pe/noticias/peru/hija-de-valent%C3%ADn-paniagua-toma-del-poder-por-el-congreso-significa-agravamiento-de-una-crisis/ar-BB1aUrES">after the fall of dictator Alberto Fujimori</a>. </p>
<p>And their failures explain why Peru, in the words of <a href="https://fb.watch/1XBff9WECg/">political scientist Alberto Vergara</a>, peered into the “abyss” of repressive authoritarianism for six days this November – with protesters facing <a href="http://derechoshumanos.pe/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Derechos_en_protesta_111120.pdf">indiscriminate and deadly violence,</a> even <a href="https://convoca.pe/agenda-propia/marcha-nacional-denuncian-que-policias-cometieron-secuestro-tortura-y-desaparicion?fbclid=IwAR0nFXVE_6eNB5uJqus3ArxCE6XlQRlbUNzZTVQs_BQu-jTDHs-5gcoditg">kidnapping, torture, illegal detention</a> and <a href="https://rpp.pe/peru/actualidad/marcha-nacional-ministerio-de-la-mujer-condena-el-abuso-de-autoridad-y-la-violencia-sexual-contra-las-manifestantes-detenidas-noticia-1304422">sexual abuse</a> by Peruvian police.</p>
<h2>Great expectations fall short</h2>
<p>During Fujimori’s corrupt military-backed rule between 1990 and 2000, Peru’s democratic institutions were dismantled and its democratic values subverted. Dissenters <a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/oxford-transitional-justice-research/past-debates/transitional-justice-and-0">faced death, disappearance and torture</a>. </p>
<p>Fujimori’s regime <a href="https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2000/09/peru-s21.html">came crumbling down</a> in November 2000 because of electoral fraud and a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/es/news/2000/07/28/la-marcha-de-los-cuatro-suyos">mass popular uprising</a>. Fujimori was <a href="http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/4ff2d288b48cf6e85d879a0edb04f391">removed from office by Congress</a> and replaced by congressional leader Valentín Paniagua. </p>
<p>As interim president, Paniagua had a mandate – as Sagasti does today – to lead a deeply scarred nation into a formal democratic transition and help society heal. In 2001, Paniagua <a href="https://www.cverdad.org.pe/pagina01.php">established a truth and reconciliation commission</a> to document Fujimori’s atrocities and created a constitutional commission tasked with identifying the structural changes required to safeguard Peruvian democracy in the future.</p>
<p>Paniagua’s successors did not see his initiatives through.</p>
<p>The truth commission meticulously documented state crimes, and in 2009 Fujimori was <a href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=auilr">convicted of mass human rights abuses</a>. But prosecutions of others and redress for victims – particularly poor, rural and Indigenous populations – have been <a href="https://idehpucp.pucp.edu.pe/opinion/11-anos-de-la-cvr/">excruciatingly slow and inadequate</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372043/original/file-20201130-23-1f56ya3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Peruvian police speak with a crying woman holding a baby" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372043/original/file-20201130-23-1f56ya3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372043/original/file-20201130-23-1f56ya3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372043/original/file-20201130-23-1f56ya3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372043/original/file-20201130-23-1f56ya3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372043/original/file-20201130-23-1f56ya3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372043/original/file-20201130-23-1f56ya3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372043/original/file-20201130-23-1f56ya3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Confrontations with security forces, like this 1992 encounter outside a Peruvian prison, were a feature of life under Fujimori.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/peruvian-police-deny-access-to-relatives-of-inmates-at-the-news-photo/51431933?adppopup=true">Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Peru’s leaders after Paniagua also <a href="https://www.elsevier.es/es-revista-cuestiones-constitucionales-revista-mexicana-derecho-113-articulo-reforma-constitucional-o-nueva-constitucion-S1405919318300428">discarded arguments that Peru needed a new constitution</a> with greater protections for democracy and the rule of law. Drafting a new constitution might have ensured, as the late Peruvian politician <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=sinverguenza+en+ingles&oq=sinverguenza&aqs=chrome.1.69i57j0l7.3161j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">Henry Pease</a> put it, that “scoundrels won’t feel free to dissolve the Congress” as Fujimori had. </p>
<p>Instead, Alejandro Toledo, the first democratically elected president after Fujimori, channeled reform demands into 2002’s “<a href="http://www.acuerdonacional.pe/politicas-de-estado-del-acuerdo-nacional/definicion/">National Agreement</a>.” This document, developed jointly by government, civil society and political parties, laid out the basis for Peru’s democratic transition and established a shared national vision. </p>
<p>But it did little to tackle Peru’s chronic governance problems. Social, environmental and accountability controls over public and private investment remained weak. So did Peruvian courts, which are vulnerable to special interests because of a politicized and often corrupt <a href="https://www.revistaideele.com/2020/10/24/corrupcion-y-reformas-judiciales-en-el-peru-del-bicentenariono-hay-mal-que-dure-quinientos-anos-ni-cuerpo-que-lo-resista/">judicial appointment process</a>. </p>
<h2>Uneven growth</h2>
<p>The consequences of Peru’s lack of reform were dramatically revealed in recent years in the <a href="https://nyujlpp.org/quorum/operation-car-wash-and-its-impact-in-peru/">Lava Jato</a> corruption scandal, in which construction companies bribed politicians across Latin America to snag big government contracts. </p>
<p>Since 2016, four Peruvian presidents and Fujimori’s own daughter have been criminally implicated in Lava Jato. Vizcarra, whose impeachment set off Peru’s current political crisis, became vice president because of this long-running scandal. He came to power in 2018 when then-president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/21/peru-president-pedro-pablo-kuczynski-resigns-amid-corruption-scandal">resigned after accusations of bribery</a>. </p>
<p>But when lawmakers ousted President Vizcarra with the same charges in November 2020, it caused immediate public condemnation. Protesters felt lawmakers’ interpretation of “moral incapacity” – a clause in the Peruvian constitution – <a href="https://www.dw.com/es/per%C3%BA-es-la-destituci%C3%B3n-de-vizcarra-inconstitucional/a-55598103">was dubious at best</a>. At worst, they feared, it was a cynical manipulation by congressional conservatives to seize Peru’s government.</p>
<p>When Vizcarra’s successor, Merino, appointed as his prime minister <a href="https://andina.pe/Ingles/noticia-meet-perus-new-prime-minister-antero-floresaraoz-821116.aspx">politician Antero Flores-Araoz</a> – an ally of congressional extreme right-wingers – those fears seemed to be confirmed. Some 2.7 million Peruvians – almost one-tenth of the population – <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/es-pe/la-crisis-politica-encuesta-de-opinion-noviembre-2020">took to the streets</a>. Merino resigned after six days, having failed to secure the military’s support.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Women in white, carrying pictures of the protest marches where two young men were killed" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372039/original/file-20201130-19-140yuga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=34%2C34%2C4566%2C3028&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372039/original/file-20201130-19-140yuga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372039/original/file-20201130-19-140yuga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372039/original/file-20201130-19-140yuga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372039/original/file-20201130-19-140yuga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372039/original/file-20201130-19-140yuga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372039/original/file-20201130-19-140yuga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Performance artists commemorate the victims of police killings during November’s protests.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/women-in-white-carrying-a-picture-of-the-marches-where-two-news-photo/1229845172?adppopup=true">Carlos Garcia Granthon/Fotoholica Press/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Today, 85% of Peruvians surveyed by the Vanderbilt University pollsters Latinobarometro agree that Peru “<a href="https://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp">is ruled by a handful of powerful groups for their own benefit</a>”. The country <a href="https://rpp.pe/peru/actualidad/contraloria-general-peru-pierde-anualmente-s-23-000-millones-por-corrupcion-e-inconducta-funcional-noticia-1273874">loses about US$6.5 billion to corruption every year</a>, according to the national comptroller.</p>
<p>Still, Peru’s economy has boomed since 2000, fueled primarily by mineral extraction, gas and <a href="https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/fresh-horizons-agricultural-exports-are-taking-place-traditional-foreign-currency-earners">crops like asparagus, grapes and avocados</a>. Mining accounts for about <a href="https://www.gob.pe/institucion/minem/noticias/66010-las-exportaciones-mineras-representan-casi-el-60-del-total-de-envios-del-pais">60% of exports</a>. </p>
<p>While these activities occur in rural areas, Peru’s <a href="https://peru.oxfam.org/sites/peru.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/Inequality%20in%20Peru.%20Reality%20and%20Risks.pdf">countryside remains extremely poor</a>. People in gold-rich Cajamarca are about five times more likely to live in poverty than those in metropolitan Lima. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372046/original/file-20201130-19-mlkmbd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Police officers in fatigues stand on pitted, sandy ground" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372046/original/file-20201130-19-mlkmbd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372046/original/file-20201130-19-mlkmbd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372046/original/file-20201130-19-mlkmbd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372046/original/file-20201130-19-mlkmbd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372046/original/file-20201130-19-mlkmbd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372046/original/file-20201130-19-mlkmbd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372046/original/file-20201130-19-mlkmbd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Peruvian National Police at an illegal gold mine near Puerto Maldonado, June 11, 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ligynnek/21760262523/in/photostream/">Lig Ynnek/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Peruvians who protest against the <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781315226576/chapters/10.4324/9781315226576-9">environmental damage</a> and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X08002404">disruption of livelihoods</a> caused by mining – both legal and illegal – are often met with <a href="https://perusupportgroup.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Mining-and-Development-in-Peru-with-special-reference-to-the-Rio.pdf">police and security force violence</a>. </p>
<p>Protests and legal battles over mining in Peru have earned little political response. Oversight of mining operations is so weak that police and military forces sometimes <a href="https://earthrights.org/wp-content/uploads/Informe-Convenios-entre-PNP-y-empresas-extractivas.pdf">sign agreements with companies to protect mines</a> from protests.</p>
<h2>Sagasti’s task</h2>
<p>Improving political and economic inclusion and reforming the police are now high on Peruvian protesters’ list of demands. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372041/original/file-20201130-19-12o42r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Sagasti, wearing a face mask and a presidential sash, waves at the camera" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372041/original/file-20201130-19-12o42r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372041/original/file-20201130-19-12o42r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372041/original/file-20201130-19-12o42r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372041/original/file-20201130-19-12o42r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372041/original/file-20201130-19-12o42r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372041/original/file-20201130-19-12o42r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372041/original/file-20201130-19-12o42r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Francisco Sagasti after taking his oath of office Nov. 17.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/newly-appointed-interim-president-francisco-sagasti-waves-news-photo/1286231078?adppopup=true">Hugo Curotto/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As in 2000, some protesters and politicians are again <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ULZSfimQvxk">calling for a new constitution</a> that will <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2020-11-23/la-crisis-politica-en-peru-abre-el-debate-sobre-la-pertinencia-de-una-nueva-constitucion.html">strengthen the separation of powers in Peru</a> and hold elected officials more accountable for their actions. </p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Back in the 2000s, Congress neglected <a href="http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/Sicr/Prensa/heraldo.nsf/CNtitulares2/919E0B964139CD5305256EDF007688E8/?OpenDocument">such structural changes</a>, allowing the problems that gave rise to Fujimori’s regime to continue after his overthrow. </p>
<p>Today <a href="https://www.pagina12.com.ar/307396-los-jovenes-en-peru-protagonistas-de-un-giro-historico">Peru’s vigilant young protesters expect</a> Sagasti to do more. To succeed as a post-crisis leader, he’ll need to restore Peruvians’ trust in government and lay the foundation for a more democratic future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150502/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Bebbington is also a Board member of Oxfam America.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gisselle Vila Benites does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After becoming Peru’s third president in six days, Francisco Sagasti must both lead the country into elections and build a better democracy. It’s a test Peruvian leaders largely failed 20 years ago.Gisselle Vila Benites, Adjunct Researcher at the Center for Mining and Sustainability Studies at the Universidad del Pacífico (Peru) and PhD Candidate in Geography, The University of MelbourneAnthony Bebbington, Milton P. and Alice C. Higgins Professor of Environment and Society, Professor of Geography, Clark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1437152020-09-22T12:21:06Z2020-09-22T12:21:06ZPandemic crushes Guyana’s dreams of big oil profits as ‘resource curse’ looms over oil-producing nations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359120/original/file-20200921-14-13no7u6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C9%2C6666%2C4420&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Secretary of State Mike Pompeo with Guyana's president, Mohamed Irfaan Ali, Sept. 18. Pompeo is the first U.S. secretary of state to visit the tiny South American country. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/secretary-of-state-mike-pompeo-speaks-with-guyanas-news-photo/1228580460?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>This year was supposed to bring <a href="https://theconversation.com/guyana-hopes-oil-will-bring-wealth-not-corruption-and-crisis-108958">great things for Guyana</a>. </p>
<p>ExxonMobil discovered massive oil deposits off the South American country’s Caribbean coast in 2015, and Guyana sold its first cargo of crude oil this February. As production ramps up, its first stage offshore wells were projected to produce 750,000 barrels a day by 2025, <a href="https://theconversation.com/guyana-hopes-oil-will-bring-wealth-not-corruption-and-crisis-108958">tripling the size of Guyana’s economy</a>, from <a href="https://theconversation.com/guyana-hopes-oil-will-bring-wealth-not-corruption-and-crisis-108958">US$3.4 billion to $13 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Guyana also received its first U.S. secretary of state when <a href="https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article245760395.html">Mike Pompeo visited on Sept. 17</a>, reflecting both its rising international status as a major oil exporter and U.S. hopes that it will be an American partner in dealing with its troubled neighbor Venezuela. </p>
<p>But Guyana’s dreams of fabulous wealth this year have been dashed by COVID-19, which has delayed production and slashed oil demand. Compounding its coronavirus troubles, Guyana shows warning signs of the so-called “<a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359">resource curse</a>,” in which a country’s new oil wealth crowds out other productive economic sectors, breeds corruption and triggers political conflict. </p>
<p>If oil prices stay low, more countries could join the list of troubled petro-nations. My work on <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/national-institute-economic-review/article/stranded-assets-and-sovereign-states/5379F112676DF91F18349E5C7B8AB624">the link between the COVID-19 crisis, climate change risk, sovereign debt and oil</a> suggests a looming crisis.</p>
<h2>Burst hopes</h2>
<p>Guyana, a former British colony with a population of 786,000, already struggles with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/10/world/americas/killings-guyana-racial-tension.html">political instability and ethnic tensions</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359409/original/file-20200922-18-1b9sxu9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of South America" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359409/original/file-20200922-18-1b9sxu9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359409/original/file-20200922-18-1b9sxu9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=781&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359409/original/file-20200922-18-1b9sxu9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=781&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359409/original/file-20200922-18-1b9sxu9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=781&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359409/original/file-20200922-18-1b9sxu9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=982&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359409/original/file-20200922-18-1b9sxu9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=982&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359409/original/file-20200922-18-1b9sxu9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=982&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Guyana neighbors Venezuela on the northern coast of South America.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d9/Guyana_in_South_America.png">Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Earlier this year, in the first national election held since oil was discovered, accusations of corruption prompted a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-53637085">recount</a> and an unclear presidential result. The transfer of power <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/07/07/why-guyanas-political-stalemate-matters/">dragged on for five months</a>, leading to deep uncertainty, violence and eventually <a href="https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article244241167.html">U.S. sanctions</a>. </p>
<p>Guyana’s new president, Mohamed Irfaan Ali, finally took office in August. </p>
<p>Ali campaigned on the issue of oil governance. Asserting that his predecessor David Granger had agreed to overly generous contracts with foreign oil investors, he promised to get Guyana its fair share of oil revenues. </p>
<p>So far, Ali has stopped short of saying his administration will retroactively change existing oil contracts, but calls for a review of terms have already delayed government approval for <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/guyana-oil-politics-and-great-expectations">the next phase of offshore oil development</a>, a holdup that <a href="https://www.rystadenergy.com/newsevents/news/press-releases/how-further-delays-could-hit-the-value-and-output-of-guyanas-payara-pacora-offshore-project/">is estimated to potentially cost Guyana over $1.6 billion</a> in lost oil revenue.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the coronavirus pandemic has delayed the ramp-up of oil production, as <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/071520-decision-delays-at-exxonmobil-led-guyana-project-may-cut-revenues-to-partners-country-consultants">safety concerns</a> prevented crews from going to work last spring. </p>
<p>The pandemic has also sapped oil demand worldwide, causing a glut of supply and ushering in stubbornly lower prices. That means new oil-producing countries like Guyana <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2020-01-20/striking-oil-aint-what-it-used-be">won’t likely see the economic windfalls</a> that other petrostates experienced in past decades. </p>
<h2>Looming crisis</h2>
<p>Guyana is not the only oil-production nation facing an unexpectedly harsh political and economic reality. </p>
<p>Iraq, which experienced massive unrest in 2019 that led to a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/06/world/middleeast/iraq-prime-minister-mustafa-khadimi.html">change in government</a>, is expected to become a <a href="https://www.bloombergquint.com/global-economics/iraq-seeks-imf-loan-saudi-investments-to-boost-battered-economy">debtor nation</a> this year, as low oil prices and high budgetary needs are forcing it to deplete its entire $62 billion nest egg. Nigeria’s looming debt – which it needs high oil prices to service – will make it harder for the government to fight <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/boko-haram-arms-stockpiling-indicates-long-term-threat">the terror group Boko Haram</a>. </p>
<p>In the Middle East and Eurasia, $35 billion in maturing external sovereign debt is due this year. Meanwhile, Mexico’s national oil company, Pemex, has <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-04-02/emerging-market-petrostates-are-about-melt-down">$30 billion in debt coming due by 2024</a> and no prospects of profits this year or even in 2021. Brazil’s Petrobras has a staggering <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-04-02/emerging-market-petrostates-are-about-melt-down">debt load of $78.9 billion and a similarly dismal forecast</a>.</p>
<p>The coronavirus didn’t cause these problems – <a href="https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF082/26206-9781498324021/26206-9781498324021/26206-9781498324021.xml?redirect=true&redirect=true">government debt in oil-exporting countries has been on the rise since 2016</a> – but it could make them worse. </p>
<p>The pandemic has essentially created a self-fulfilling economic prophecy for some oil nations. Low oil prices mean governments must cut the budget of their national oil company to meet other more pressing fiscal, social and health needs. That will translate into less future oil production, which, in turn, further lowers the oil revenues these places depend on. </p>
<p>The longer the pandemic recession lasts, the more oil producers will face this grim fate.</p>
<h2>Betting on Guyana’s future</h2>
<p>Though its crude has barely left the ground, Guyana was counting on oil revenues to plug its <a href="https://www.stabroeknews.com/2020/09/12/news/guyana/private-sector-budget-has-eroded-revenue-base-pumped-up-deficit-jordan/">budget deficit this year</a>. That may now prove impossible given the damage <a href="https://www.stabroeknews.com/2020/09/10/news/guyana/govt-projecting-gdp-growth-of-48-to-51/">COVID-19 has done to its economy</a>. But if Guyana can resist the urge to pay today’s costs by borrowing against future oil receipts, it could yet ride out this crisis. </p>
<p>President Ali has promised to create a petroleum commission to ensure transparency for how Guyana’s oil revenues are spent and to prevent undue political interference in the oil and gas sector. Guyana, which has received refugees from crisis-stricken Venezuela, is well aware of what happens when oil wealth is not properly stewarded. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359114/original/file-20200921-24-qwu8tr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Line of people standing outside a colorfully painted school" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359114/original/file-20200921-24-qwu8tr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359114/original/file-20200921-24-qwu8tr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359114/original/file-20200921-24-qwu8tr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359114/original/file-20200921-24-qwu8tr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359114/original/file-20200921-24-qwu8tr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359114/original/file-20200921-24-qwu8tr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359114/original/file-20200921-24-qwu8tr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People line up to vote in Leonora, Guyana, on March 2 to decide which president will control its oil boom.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/guyanese-citizens-line-up-to-vote-in-leonora-guyana-on-news-photo/1204736573?adppopup=true">Luis Acosta/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>But surviving this year’s low oil prices is only the beginning. To thrive in the long term, Guyana will need to sink much of its oil earnings into building other sectors to avoid overdependence on one volatile source of revenue. This is especially key in a world that’s moving away from oil as its main energy source. </p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>The World Bank finds that very few petrostates have adequately <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/national-institute-economic-review/article/stranded-assets-and-sovereign-states/5379F112676DF91F18349E5C7B8AB624">diversified their economies</a>. Exceptions include Malaysia and Dubai, which have both used oil wealth successfully to build a broader economic foundation and have avoided the dreaded “resource curse.”</p>
<p>Those countries will be models for Guyana, if can just get through 2020 first.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143715/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tufts University Climate Policy Lab receives funding from BP, The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Energy Foundation and Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Amy Myers Jaffe is President of the US Association of Energy Economics and co-chair of the Steering committee of the Women in Energy Program at Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy. </span></em></p>Tiny Guyana hoped to see unprecedented wealth this year as ExxonMobil’s offshore wells began pumping out crude. Instead, it got a pandemic and political strife. Other oil states are struggling, too.Amy Myers Jaffe, Research professor, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1374992020-05-05T13:51:38Z2020-05-05T13:51:38ZSouth Africa’s efforts to stabilise Lesotho have failed. Less intervention may be more effective<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332360/original/file-20200504-83721-1pxbc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lesotho's embattled prime minister deployed troops onto the streets in April, ostensibly to 'restore order'.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Molise Molise/AFP-GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Lesotho has been plagued by political <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-lesothos-in-such-a-mess-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-79678">instability</a> since its return to democracy in 1993. </p>
<p>Throughout this period, South Africa, often under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), has intervened on numerous occasions to steady the political situation in its small, landlocked neighbour. Unfortunately, its frequent involvement in Lesotho’s politics has not helped the mountain kingdom achieve lasting peace. Instead, it has had the unintended consequence of encouraging Basotho politicians to act in intransigent and inflammatory ways.</p>
<p>During the most recent South African attempt to calm conflict in the kingdom, President Cyril Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/sa-brokers-deal-for-lesotho-prime-minister-tom-thabanes-dignified-retirement-46942711">dispatched a delegation</a> headed by former minister Jeff Radebe to Maseru, the capital. Radebe’s visit came in response to the decision by the embattled prime minister, Tom Thabane, to send the army onto the streets of the capital.</p>
<p>While Thabane claimed the deployment was to restore law and order, his actions are widely seen as an attempt to cling to power and avoid prosecution for his alleged role in the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2020-02-24-thabane-finally-in-court-in-connection-with-murder-of-his-wife/">murder of his estranged wife</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa’s intervention seems to have temporarily quieted this recent crisis. But it will do nothing to alleviate the long-term problems that cause instability in the country. In fact, it may worsen them. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lesothos-constitution-says-about-immunity-for-a-sitting-prime-minister-133089">What Lesotho's constitution says about immunity for a sitting prime minister</a>
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<p>There are a number of reasons for Lesotho’s <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/lesotho-in-2019-looking-back-to-find-a-way-forward/">chronic instability</a>, including unhealthy civil-military relations, parliamentary rules that encourage the formation of factions, a small and moribund economy that makes holding political office one of the most profitable positions in the country, and a culture of combative politics. </p>
<p>Another factor that aggravates political tensions in Lesotho is the role recurring South African interventions have come to play in the political calculations of competing Basotho actors. While well-intentioned and stabilising in the short term, repeated South African interventions have encouraged the country’s political actors – the government, opposition parties and the monarchy – to spurn compromise and seek conflict.</p>
<h2>Brinkmanship and belligerence</h2>
<p>Over the years Basotho political actors have been willing to risk instability, even violence, to achieve their maximum positions. This is in part because they have come to expect that if political confrontation in Lesotho skids toward violent confrontation, or reform efforts grind to a halt, South Africa will step in. </p>
<p>Over the past 27 years all of Lesotho’s political actors have at one point or another either requested or engaged in provocative behaviour that induces their larger neighbour’s involvement in the hope that the power of Pretoria will help them prevail over domestic rivals.</p>
<p>The result is continued brinkmanship and belligerence. Political scientists Timothy Crawford and Alan Kuperman <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=jdO3AwAAQBAJ&pg=PR10&lpg=PR10&dq=long-term+history+of+intervention+in+a+state+perpetuates+its+instability.&source=bl&ots=E_EvhqreWC&sig=ACfU3U0pVPaZIGM5ydhc24dxd2ArBnKnhg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjEu971npzpAhV3ShUIHUrYB9QQ6AEwAHoECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=long-term%20history%20of%20intervention%20in%20a%20state%20perpetuates%20its%20instability.&f=false">describe this as</a> “chronic moral hazard”, a situation in which a</p>
<blockquote>
<p>long-term history of intervention in a state perpetuates its instability.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>History of conflict</h2>
<p>There is a long history of South Africa intervening in Lesotho’s politics. In the early 1990s democratic transitions in both Lesotho and South Africa held out promise for greater peace both within and between these two countries. </p>
<p>In Lesotho, that hope was immediately undercut. Early in 1994 a conflict within the country’s military broke out. Fighting between two factions of the defence force escalated and gun fire was exchanged across Maseru. </p>
<p>Desperate for help, prime minister Ntsu Mokhehle wrote to the South African president, FW de Klerk, asking that he dispatch</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a peacekeeping force to Maseru, in order to separate the two sides in the army who are definitely on a bloody collision course…</p>
</blockquote>
<p>After discussions with South Africa’s presumptive future president, Nelson Mandela, De Klerk demurred. Instead, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/king-of-lesotho-told-he-must-reverse-coup-1378683.html">intense diplomatic intervention by Southern African Development Community</a> helped to temporarily steady Lesotho’s precarious politics.</p>
<p>But a pernicious precedent was set. When confronted with domestic problems Lesotho’s political actors would look for assistance beyond their borders, rather than seek to compromise with their compatriots. This dynamic has manifested itself many times since. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332364/original/file-20200504-83730-8ww4mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332364/original/file-20200504-83730-8ww4mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332364/original/file-20200504-83730-8ww4mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332364/original/file-20200504-83730-8ww4mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332364/original/file-20200504-83730-8ww4mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332364/original/file-20200504-83730-8ww4mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332364/original/file-20200504-83730-8ww4mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lesotho’s prime minister, Tom Thabane.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gianluigi Guercia/AFP-GettyImages</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In August 1998, with protests over a contested election in Lesotho mounting, King Letsie III asked Mandela, who was by then president of South Africa, to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2019.1585282?src=recsys&journalCode=rsaj20">help resolve the situation</a>. South Africa’s attempted solution, a Southern African Development Community commission to look into the elections, was inconclusive. A mutiny in Lesotho’s military compounded the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-19-mandela-and-military-force-its-use-is-determined-by-the-situation/">crisis</a>. </p>
<p>In September 1998 prime minister Pakalitha Mosisili <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2019.1585282?src=recsys&journalCode=rsaj20">asked that Southern African Development Community leaders</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>put together quickly a strong military intervention to help Lesotho return to normalcy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The ensuing regional intervention force did restore stability, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/23/world/tiny-neighbor-gives-south-african-army-rude-surprise.html">but at a high cost</a>. About 90 lives were lost and Maseru, Mohale’s Hoek and Mafeteng incurred heavy damage. </p>
<p>In August 2014, after an attempted coup against Thabane, he fled to South Africa. He then called on Pretoria to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/01/lesotho-tom-thabane-south-africa">send troops</a> to stabilise Lesotho. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lesothos-prime-minister-plays-for-time-but-the-end-beckons-137410">Lesotho's prime minister plays for time. But the end beckons</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These are only the most dramatic examples of how South Africa – and the Southern African Development Community – have been sucked into Lesotho’s politics.</p>
<p>A more mundane but no less important example is <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-ramaphosas-new-reform-timetable-save-thabanes-skin">the much-delayed Roadmap for Reforms and National Dialogue</a>. South Africa’s former deputy chief justice, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/moseneke-outlines-lesotho-peace-plans-16159383">Dikgang Moseneke</a>, is doing his best to shepherd this toward completion. </p>
<h2>The alternative</h2>
<p>It will be difficult for South Africa to alter this damaging dynamic because it has an important national interest in preserving stability in Lesotho. </p>
<p>The Lesotho Highlands Water Project provides Gauteng, South Africa’s economic hub, with much of its <a href="http://www.lhda.org.ls/lhdaweb">water</a>. For this supply to continue, there needs to be relative stability in Lesotho. </p>
<p>What’s more, insecurity in Lesotho would spill into South Africa. It could lead to problems like the diffusion of weapons and an increase in criminality.</p>
<p>One strategy South Africa can adopt is to limit its interventions to situations that truly threaten to escalate into violence. This approach runs contrary to the <a href="https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ISS_Africa-policybrief103.pdf">African Union’s emphasis on conflict prevention</a>. But it has the virtue of forcing the country’s leaders to find compromise themselves or deal with the consequences if they don’t. </p>
<p>The key to this strategy is good intelligence. South African officials must have the necessary information to discern when a political crisis in Lesotho will burst into violent conflict. </p>
<p>Stepping back in all but the most extreme cases would be a major departure from past South African policies. It has potential downsides if a political crisis in the kingdom unexpectedly spins out of control. But it might be worth a try – more than a quarter century of close South African involvement has brought Lesotho no closer to stability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137499/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa’s numerous interventions in Lesotho contribute to the acrimonious nature of its political culture.Christopher Williams, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/926322018-03-02T11:44:46Z2018-03-02T11:44:46ZIt’s a turbulent world. Stop stressing and adapt<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208529/original/file-20180301-152575-di0ut0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Instability is the norm in politics</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The American people have been roughed up over the last decade. A sense of vulnerability and danger tinges their view of public affairs. </p>
<p>The 2008 crash made them wary of markets. The last two years exposed the weakness of political institutions. And international politics has turned ugly.</p>
<p>The main question in politics today is how to deal with this fragility.</p>
<p>Some people are escapists, engaged in a futile effort to make fragility go away. </p>
<p>And some are realists. They accept fragility as an unavoidable aspect of political and social life. They see an open society as the only way to manage fragility well.</p>
<p>Some political scientists will say that I am misusing the concept of realism. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/#RootRealTrad">In their view</a>, realism is strictly about foreign affairs, and realists are people who see global politics as a brawl among power-hungry countries.</p>
<p>These academics identify the ancient scholar Thucydides as a father of realism. Thucydides wrote a <a href="http://classics.mit.edu/Thucydides/pelopwar.html">history of the war</a> between Sparta and Athens in the fifth century B.C. – a ruthless decades-long struggle for survival. One scholar says that Thucydides wanted to reveal the “<a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/204816">unalterable nature</a>” of international relations.</p>
<h2>Order is fragile</h2>
<p>But Thucydides did more than this. He described an idea that dominated politics within the Greek city-states: that political and social order is fragile. </p>
<p>Thucydides gives us a history of worried peoples. They know that they live in a world suffused with perils.</p>
<p>In the epoch described by Thucydides, the main peril confronting Greek city-states was posed by other states. But people had other worries too. In some places, people lived in “constant fear” of revolution and lawlessness. Elsewhere, they feared drought, famine and disease. Some felt an “undefined fear of the unknown future.”</p>
<p>These were Thucydides’ realists – people who understood that the world was a turbulent and dangerous place.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208538/original/file-20180301-152572-vcc2gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208538/original/file-20180301-152572-vcc2gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208538/original/file-20180301-152572-vcc2gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208538/original/file-20180301-152572-vcc2gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208538/original/file-20180301-152572-vcc2gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208538/original/file-20180301-152572-vcc2gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208538/original/file-20180301-152572-vcc2gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thucydides described a turbulent and dangerous world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Concern about fragility was shared by later writers in the realist tradition. Machiavelli feared that Florence would be attacked by other city-states but also fretted about <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1232/1232-h/1232-h.htm#link2HCH0019">unrest within its own walls</a>. The French jurist <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bodin/">Jean Bodin</a> also fixated on internal disorders as well as external enemies. The English statesman Francis Bacon offered a list of conditions – including inequality, religious disputes and immigration – that could produce <a href="http://www.literaturepage.com/read/francis-bacon-essays-27.html">“tempests” within the state</a>. A good leader, Bacon said, looked for signs of coming storms.</p>
<p>Early American leaders were realists too. They were not just worried about threats from Europe. They agonized about <a href="http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp">“domestic factions”</a> and the “<a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=9HQSAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA168&dq=%22fluctuations+of+trade%22&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiNptftzMnZAhUQWq0KHXFLCtoQ6AEIWjAJ#v=onepage&q=%22fluctuations%20of%20trade%22&f=false">vicissitudes of trade</a>” as well.</p>
<p>And they worried about the future. </p>
<p>“To say that there is no danger,” a Maine newspaper editor warned as he appraised the country’s prospects in 1824, “would betray a gross ignorance of the history of nations.”</p>
<p>The feeling of fragility has oscillated throughout American history. In the 20th century, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/four-crises-of-american-democracy-9780190459895?cc=us&lang=en&">the mood has shifted many times</a> – from confidence in the 1920s to anxiety in the 1930s, to confidence in the 1950s and anxiety in the 1970s.</p>
<p>By 2000, the country was confident again. President Bill Clinton boasted that it had never enjoyed <a href="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58708">“so much prosperity and social progress with so little internal crisis and so few external threats.”</a></p>
<p>So much for that. Since 2000, Americans have faced terrorist attacks, wars and threats of war, frayed alliances, market busts, technological and climatic shocks, protests and polarization. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/inspired-life/wp/2017/02/15/americans-are-seriously-stressed-out-about-the-future-of-the-country-survey-finds/?utm_term=.1ada9913f4bf">Polls</a> show that Americans are stressed by uncertainty about the nation’s future. Pundits have encouraged despair, speculating about <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n23/david-runciman/is-this-how-democracy-ends">the end of democracy</a> and even <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/end-of-west-western-establishment-wolfgang-ischinger-munich-security-conference-blame-a7582081.html">the end of the West</a>. </p>
<p>This is hyperbole. Our times are difficult but not unusual. History shows that fragility is the norm. What is unusual are moments of calm in which politicians like Clinton succumb to complacency.</p>
<h2>Realist credo: Adapt in the face of change</h2>
<p>The central question today is how Americans should deal with fragility. </p>
<p>One response is isolationism. This is the politics of gated communities and Fortress America. The theory is that the country can separate itself from foreign perils. </p>
<p>More often, though, retreat allows those perils to fester. And it forgets the warning of classical writers: There are dangers within city walls, too.</p>
<p>Another response, aimed at internal perils, is authoritarianism. The search is for a strong leader who can purge society of threats and uncertainties. </p>
<p>But the <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300078152/seeing-state">sorry record of state planning</a> shows the folly of this. Society is too complex to be completely disciplined. And big government has its own internal weaknesses. Societal fragility is simply replaced by state fragility. </p>
<p>A more constructive response is to recognize that fragility cannot be avoided. <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1232/1232-h/1232-h.htm#link2HCH0025">As Machiavelli said</a>, fortune cannot be entirely tamed. The key to survival is adaptability in the face of change. This is the realist credo.</p>
<p>Adaptable societies have three capabilities. First, they are vigilant for dangers. Second, they are open to new ideas. And third, they are ready to abandon outmoded practices and experiment with new ones.</p>
<p>Adaptable societies reject both authoritarianism and isolationism. They prize openness, not just because it promotes freedom, but also because it improves resilience.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.ohioswallow.com/book/The+Public+and+Its+Problems">The philosopher John Dewey</a> articulated this idea almost a century ago. The state, he said, must be remade constantly to deal with changing conditions. This can only be done through patience, dialogue and experimentation.</p>
<p>John Dewey was a realist too. He was concerned with survival in a turbulent world. His prescription still works today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92632/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alasdair S. Roberts does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Our current politically turbulent times in the US are difficult – but not unusual. History shows that fragility is the norm. Get used to it. What is unusual are moments of calm.Alasdair S. Roberts, Director, School of Public Policy, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/908032018-01-29T11:30:21Z2018-01-29T11:30:21ZWhy it’s too soon for Davos billionaires to toast Trump’s ‘pro-business’ policies<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203670/original/file-20180128-100929-1dvdiu9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">SAP CEO Bill McDermott and Siemens chief Joe Kaeser flank Trump as they praise him for his tax cut.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Evan Vucci</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The moguls of global business, who met recently in Davos for the World Economic Forum, may not like Donald Trump’s style. But, if a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/business/trump-davos-speech-response.html">series</a> of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/22/business/davos-world-economic-forum-populism.html">reports</a> by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/us/politics/trump-davos-elites.html">The New York Times</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-wins-over-global-elites-at-davos-all-it-took-was-a-15-trillion-tax-cut/2018/01/25/3c688624-0201-11e8-8acf-ad2991367d9d_story.html7">other</a> <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2018/01/23/news/economy/ceos-love-us-trump-tax-cut-davos/index.html">outlets</a> are to be believed, Trump’s pro-business policies are making it easier for them to forgive his foibles. </p>
<p>Klaus Schwab, the head of the forum, put it <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/business/trump-davos-speech-response.html?ribbon-ad-idx=7&rref=homepage&module=Ribbon&version=origin&region=Header&action=click&contentCollection=Home%20Page&pgtype=article">this way</a> as he introduced President Trump before his Jan. 26 speech: “On behalf of the business leaders here in this room, let me particularly congratulate you for the historic tax reform [that is] fostering job creation while providing a tremendous boost to the world economy.”</p>
<p>Many attendees <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/business/trump-davos-speech-response.html">praised</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-trumps-every-country-for-itself-rhetoric-gets-wrong-about-davos-90792">Trump’s speech itself</a> – bolstered by the impression members of his administration gave at the forum – for pragmatism and a “very constructive mind-set.”</p>
<p>Such wonky gushing is shortsighted, however, and ignores the long-term risks of Trumpism for the economic prosperity of the U.S. and the world. Research into the politics of economic growth – one of my areas of expertise – explains why. </p>
<h2>Don’t pop the champagne corks yet</h2>
<p>Since becoming president, Trump has overseen significant <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2018/0105/Trump-s-deregulation-drive-is-epic-in-scale-and-scope.-And-yet">deregulation</a> in several industries, and his signature economic initiative is a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-tax-cuts-delivering-hardworking-americans-manufacturers/">major tax cut</a> focused on businesses. The <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/05/politics/trump-dow-jones-interactive/index.html">strong performance</a> of the U.S. stock market suggests investors, at least, are quite smitten with his policies.</p>
<p>It is true that tax cuts and deregulation can provide a fiscal stimulus and, when done correctly, can even <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20180123-imf-global-growth-boost-trump-tax-cuts">spur growth</a> by encouraging investment. It is also true that many in the business community are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/business/trump-davos-follow-the-money.html">relieved</a> that Trump seems <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-brand-of-economic-populism-gets-a-makeover-in-first-100-days-76077">uninterested</a> in following through on his populist rhetoric.</p>
<p>But it is important to remember that the long-term business costs of Trump’s destabilizing influence are likely to be much greater than any short-term policy benefits. This is because businesses must operate within a social and political context, one that influences their success at every step.</p>
<p>Trump’s behavior since taking office – his <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor">willingness to ignore</a> the norms of civil discourse, his <a href="http://billmoyers.com/story/trump-russia-timeline/">possible links</a> to the authoritarian regime in Russia, his <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38069298">problematic business interests</a> and, especially, his contempt for the <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/his-own-words-presidents-attacks-courts">judiciary</a> and the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/how-to-work-for-a-president-who-hates-the-civil-service/2018/01/26/34dbe95c-0204-11e8-bb03-722769454f82_story.html">professional civil service</a> – has eroded global <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/01/17/578422668/heres-just-how-little-confidence-americans-have-in-political-institutions">confidence</a> in American institutions. </p>
<p>This is a serious problem for business. Research has confirmed <a href="http://whynationsfail.com/summary/">over</a> and <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/political-economy/institutions-institutional-change-and-economic-performance">over</a> the link between open and stable political institutions and economic growth. We now know that <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2340943615000195">entrepreneurship</a>, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2342668">natural resource wealth</a> and even <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/8494.html">the right economic policies</a> are not enough to bring prosperity, when people are unable to trust the integrity of a country’s political and legal system. Instability <a href="https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4553024/alesina_instabilitygrowth.pdf?s">deters investment</a>, both foreign and domestic, and raises fears that the benefits of hard work will not be rewarded.</p>
<h2>The China exception?</h2>
<p>At first glance, the phenomenal growth experienced by autocracies such as China and Singapore may seem to be exceptions to this rule. But a comparative view shows that stability is critical for growth even among authoritarian regimes. </p>
<p><a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00753.x/abstract">My own research</a> (co-authored with political scientist Daniel Kuthy) suggests that more institutionalized and stable dictatorships are more inclined to choose economic policies that promote growth. And <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Institutions-Dictatorship-Jennifer-Gandhi/dp/0521155711/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=">research by Emory University’s Jennifer Gandhi</a> has made the link between authoritarian stability and growth even more directly.</p>
<p>Even so, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Globalizing-Innovation-Institutions-Investment-Economies-ebook/dp/B078X54VRC/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1517192617&sr=1-1&keywords=politics+fdi">stable</a> <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Nation-States-Multinational-Corporation-Political-Investment-ebook/dp/B003NUSAP6/ref=sr_1_4?s=digital-text&ie=UTF8&qid=1517192929&sr=1-4">democracy</a>, with its transparency and its rule of law, is the best sort of government for business. Such countries as <a href="http://natoassociation.ca/exploring-the-effects-of-economic-instability-in-venezuela/">Venezuela</a> and <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/turkish-economy-struggling-political-volatility">Turkey</a> have experienced negative economic consequences after backsliding from democracy.</p>
<h2>Business and society</h2>
<p>Economic growth is also <a href="http://www.seh.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/DP15.pdf">tightly linked</a> to <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/5105.html">social</a> cooperation and peace. </p>
<p>When there is a high level of antagonism in society, whether by class, race, ethnicity, gender, geography or something else, businesses must operate in a much more complicated environment. There is a greater threat of strikes, reduced public support for liberal markets, and more challenges in the workplace and in product marketing.</p>
<p>It is here that Trump’s statements and behavior, from his <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/146683/trump-fox-news-mainstreaming-white-nationalism">failure to condemn</a> white nationalists to his well established <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/politics/donald-trump-sexism-tracker-every-offensive-comment-in-one-place/">sexism</a>, can be so harmful. The highly <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/polarized-america">polarized</a> climate of today, quite apart from the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/opinion/sunday/democracy-polarization.html">inherent problems</a> it creates, is <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecin.12070/abstract">bad</a> for business.</p>
<p>Moreover, social peace is <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/economics/industrial-economics/inequality-and-industrial-change-global-view?format=PB&isbn=9780521009935#S3Y3gDuBLrcfG1hz.97">connected</a> to levels of economic inequality. This is where even the policies that many businesses support can have seriously <a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/05/economist-explains">negative repercussions</a> in the long term. Analysts agree that Trump’s tax cuts will have the effect of <a href="http://fortune.com/2017/11/03/trump-gop-tax-plan-cuts-2017/">concentrating wealth</a> even more fully in the hands of the few. For businesses, the short-term benefits of a tax concession should not outweigh the risks posed by increased inequality and polarization.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203709/original/file-20180129-100908-ntfxyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203709/original/file-20180129-100908-ntfxyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203709/original/file-20180129-100908-ntfxyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203709/original/file-20180129-100908-ntfxyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203709/original/file-20180129-100908-ntfxyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203709/original/file-20180129-100908-ntfxyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203709/original/file-20180129-100908-ntfxyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Most of those who attend the meeting in Davos, including CEOs, have a more internationalist bent than Trump. From left to right, Christine Lagarde, managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Erna Solberg, prime minister of Norway, Virginia Rometty, CEO of IBM, Chetna Sinha, president of the Mann Deshi Foundation, Fabiola Gianotti, director of the European Organization for Nuclear Research, Sharan Burrow, general secretary of the International Trade Union Confederation, and Isabelle Kocher, CEO of ENGIE.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Markus Schreiber</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Trumpism abroad</h2>
<p>Most of the corporate CEOs who gathered in Davos <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-at-davos-can-america-first-lead-to-shared-prosperity-across-the-world-90792">have a distinctly international orientation</a>. President Trump’s “<a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/america-first-34020">America First</a>” policies are likely to harm their interests much more than those of domestic business leaders. </p>
<p>For international businesses to function, a network of global agreements and understandings is necessary. The countries of the world have built this network over decades, largely under the leadership of the United States. </p>
<p>If the primary architect of this system no longer supports it, there is a risk that new impediments to trade and capital flows will make economic interdependence <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-america-first-trade-policy-ignores-key-lesson-from-great-depression-87477">harder to sustain</a>. While supporters of globalization are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/us/politics/trump-trade-america-first-davos.html">moving forward</a> without the Trump administration, the world should not be sanguine about the future of the liberal economic order without active American support.</p>
<p>Just as seriously, an international conflict could have a severely <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2478.00042/full">detrimental</a> impact on <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-shank/economic-consequences-of-_b_1294430.html">economic activity</a>. Loose talk from the Trump administration, to the extent that it <a href="http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/347783-poll-68-percent-think-trump-could-accidentally-get-us-in">increases the risk of war</a>, is a serious threat to business success.</p>
<p>For all of these reasons, the optimism that many seemed to be feeling at Davos is misplaced. Businesses operate within a social and political context, and when that context is destabilized, they cannot escape the consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90803/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Hankla does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The billionaires, business leaders and other elites who gathered in Davos praised the president’s policies, yet research on the politics of economic growth suggests it’s too soon to celebrate.Charles Hankla, Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgia State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/796782017-06-19T20:12:51Z2017-06-19T20:12:51ZWhy Lesotho’s in such a mess and what can be done about it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174469/original/file-20170619-12433-qhlvep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lesotho voters wait patiently to cast their ballot.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In an interview following his recent return as Prime Minister of Lesotho, Tom Thabane has blamed the army for the country’s chronic political instability. Stating that his previous administration (after an election in 2012) was “scuttled” by the army, he went on to say that he now intended to neutralise the Lesotho Defence Force, even if it means <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-15-who-is-thomas-thabane-and-why-is-lesothos-army-so-scared-of-him">getting rid of it entirely</a>.</p>
<p>That certainly sounds a good idea. After all, what real use is a <em>pondokkie</em> (ramshackle) army? Okay, it gave a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/1998-09-25-sandfs-chaotic-invasion">good account of itself</a> when the South African National Defence Force entered the country to restore order when opposition parties disputed the result of the general election in 1998. But then that was one of the most ham-fisted operations in the annals of military history. </p>
<p>Anyway, despite its incompetence on that occasion, the South African army did impose control. Given that Lesotho is surrounded by South Africa, who is the 3000-strong military intended to defend the country from? </p>
<p>But whether Thabane’s latest government has the political capital to tame the army, let alone get rid of it, is questionable.</p>
<p>From the outside, politics in Lesotho looks inordinately complicated, with a mish-mash of competing <a href="https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-lesotho-goes-to-the-polls/">political parties</a>, fractious governing coalitions, and repeated interventions by the military. It’s a mess, but basically, it’s not that hard to unravel. </p>
<h2>History of political instability</h2>
<p>After a South African backed <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/lesoverview6.htm">coup in 1986</a>, Lesotho was returned to civilian rule in 1993, when an election returned the Basutoland Congress Party to power with a <a href="http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2181_93.htm">landslide victory </a> and no opposition party representation in parliament. </p>
<p>This was a fault of the British style <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/first-past-post-voting-system/">first-past-the-post</a> electoral system, which produced hugely disproportionate results. A similar outcome was recorded in another election in 1998, although this time, the victor was the <a href="http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2181_98.htm">Lesotho Congress for Democracy</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174464/original/file-20170619-12450-ynswrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174464/original/file-20170619-12450-ynswrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=805&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174464/original/file-20170619-12450-ynswrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=805&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174464/original/file-20170619-12450-ynswrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=805&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174464/original/file-20170619-12450-ynswrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1012&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174464/original/file-20170619-12450-ynswrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1012&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174464/original/file-20170619-12450-ynswrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1012&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tom Thabane, Prime Minister of Lesotho.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Michael Reynolds</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This was the creation of the sitting Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, who had walked out of his own ruling party in 1997 after he had lost control of its party machinery. All this was too much for the opposition to stomach, and they poured their protesters on to the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/demonstrators-close-down-businesses-and-government-offices-lesotho">streets of Maseru</a>, the capital. Mosisili called for help, and in shambled the South African National Defence Force.</p>
<p>The South Africans, acting for the Southern African Development Community oversaw inter-party negotiations which resulted in a new and fairer electoral system which combined the first past the post system with <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/proportional-representation">proportional representation</a>.</p>
<p>It worked well at first, ensuring proportionate representation of opposition parties in parliament. It should have led to greater accountability, but it didn’t because Lesotho didn’t have the political culture of give and take to go with it.</p>
<p>In a country with little prospect of employment unless one can access government largesse, politics is about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2009/mar/14/politics">who can eat </a>. In the political sphere, this means that politicians scramble desperately for position. If they lose out, they undermine those who win.</p>
<p>Since 2002 there has been a steady fragmentation of the once dominant Congress tradition, as party malcontents have hived off to form new parties, and to search out new alliances. Indeed, such was the threat to his position that Mosisili pulled his previous trick once again in 2012, walking out of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy to form the Democratic Congress. </p>
<p>But this proved his undoing, as in an election that year he <a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/048f63004b70ed2c915199a9f8f2aadf/Lesotho-election-leads-to-coalition-battle-20120531">lost out to a multi-party coalition</a> formed by the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lesothos-interparty-talks-more-turbulence-ahead">All Basotho Convention</a> led by Thabane, a former Lesotho Congress for Democracy minister. But Thabane’s coalition didn’t last long either, its disarray forcing the country into another crisis, and under SADC prompting, another election in <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Lesotho-elections-free-and-fair-20150302">2015</a>.</p>
<h2>Politics and the military</h2>
<p>Mosisili had sought to shore up his increasingly fragile political position through the support of the army. Thabane had sought to counter this by replacing Mosisili’s appointment of Lieutenant-General Tlali Kamoli as Commander by Brigadier-General Maaparankoe Mahao. This was when the serious trouble started. </p>
<p>Elements loyal to Kamoli staged an attempted coup in 2014 which led to Thabane and his fellow coalition leaders <a href="http://www.enca.com/lesothos-prime-minister-thomas-thabane-south-africa">fleeing to South Africa</a>. Although the coup was thwarted by the Southern African Development Community, which told the army to return to barracks, South Africa insisted that the latest crisis be resolved by the holding of yet another election. </p>
<p>This time round it was Mosisili who scraped home, displacing Thabane as prime minister by forming an unwieldy coalition of seven parties. It was unlikely that this would last for long, so Mosisili turned to the army. A temporary commander had been appointed to head the Lesotho Defence Force during the election campaign, when SADC sent both Kamoli and Mahao into exile .</p>
<p>When they returned after the election, Kamoli clearly expected to be reappointed to his position – and was. Meanwhile, prosecutions of soldiers involved in the attempted coup were winding their way <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/lesotho-quash-mutiny-charges-against-freed-soldiers/">through the courts</a>, making Kamoli nervous. Amid this drama, soldiers were sent to detain Mahao, <a href="http://amabhungane.co.za/article/2015-09-23-army-and-state-threaten-lesotho-inquiry">who was shot dead in cold blood</a> (supposedly for “resisting arrest”).</p>
<p>Yet more crisis. Mosisili’s coalition began to unravel. He lost a <a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/a0dd578040400fd09d64ddb29663e5e6/Lesothos-Prime-Minister-loses-confidence-vote-20170103">vote of no-confidence</a> in parliament. With SADC ensuring that he could not use the army to prop himself up in power, he had to face (yes, you’ve got it) <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/07/ramaphosa-welcomes-african-union-s-declaring-that-lesotho-polls-were-free-and-fair">another election</a>, just a few weeks ago. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174462/original/file-20170619-12450-1rhhzfj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174462/original/file-20170619-12450-1rhhzfj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174462/original/file-20170619-12450-1rhhzfj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174462/original/file-20170619-12450-1rhhzfj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174462/original/file-20170619-12450-1rhhzfj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174462/original/file-20170619-12450-1rhhzfj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174462/original/file-20170619-12450-1rhhzfj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pakalitha Mosisili lost a no-confidence vote.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By this time, Mosisili’s political credit was running on empty. But although Thabane’s ABC <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/07/ramaphosa-welcomes-african-union-s-declaring-that-lesotho-polls-were-free-and-fair">won 48 out of the 60 constituency seats</a>, it was not enough to form another government, so along came another coalition. How long this one will last, remains to be seen.</p>
<p>What is certain is that the dominant faction in the army remains hostile to Thabane (even if it is loyal to Kamoli rather than Mosisili). Thabane’s estranged wife was <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/15/tom-thabane-s-wife-killed-in-random-shooting-ahead-of-inauguration-in-lesotho">assassinated</a> even before he had been sworn in as prime minister, some saying that this was the army warning him to watch his step. This may give him sound domestic reason for wanting to do to the army what should have been done a long time ago: reining them in. But does he have the power to do it?</p>
<h2>Demilitarising Lesotho’s politics</h2>
<p>The best hope lies with decisive action by Southern African Development Community, for whom the troubled situation in Lesotho is a running sore. (South Africa’s deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa, the regional body’s points man for Lesotho, must have a room permanently booked for him at the Maseru Sun). </p>
<p>But does the Southern African Development Community have the guts and the unity to do anything about it? Will they be prepared to impugn Lesotho’s “sovereignty”? </p>
<p>Anyway, quite how would they do it? </p>
<p>Demilitarising Lesotho’s politics won’t be easy. But if it doesn’t happen, there will be a constant replay of military intervention and changing political coalitions. There would be no shortage of donor assistance, perhaps to retrain foot soldiers as police. But the officer corps needs to be pensioned off. <em>In toto</em>. Full stop.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79678/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>Politics in Lesotho can look incredibly complicated, with a mish-mash of competing political parties and repeated military interventions. It’s a mess, but it’s not that hard to unravel.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/637992016-08-23T01:16:26Z2016-08-23T01:16:26ZHow Dostoevsky predicted Trump’s America<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134806/original/image-20160819-30370-kdhnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Portrait of Fyodor Dostoyevsky, by Vasily Perov (1872).</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/78/Vasily_Perov_-_Портрет_Ф.М.Достоевского_-_Google_Art_Project.jpg">Vasily Perov/Wikimedia Commons</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As a professor of Russian literature, I’ve come to realize that it’s never a good sign when real life resembles a Fyodor Dostoevsky novel. </p>
<p>Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, with its riotous rhetoric and steady stream of scandals, calls to mind Dostoevsky’s most political novel, “<a href="http://bit.ly/2b58dwB">Demons</a>,” written in 1872. In it, the writer wanted to warn readers about the destructive force of demagoguery and unchecked rhetoric, and his cautionary messages – largely influenced by 19th-century Russian political chaos – resonate in our present political climate. </p>
<p>To show his readers just how bad things could get if they didn’t pay attention, Dostoevsky linked his political nightmare to unhinged impulses and the breakdown of civility. </p>
<h2>A passion for destruction</h2>
<p>Dostoevsky was as addicted to newspapers as some of us are to social media, and he often plucked crises and violence right from the headlines, refashioning them for his fiction. </p>
<p>Russia during the 1860s and 1870s – the heyday of the author’s career – was experiencing massive socioeconomic instability. Tsar Alexander II’s <a href="http://historyofrussia.org/emancipation-of-the-serfs/">Emancipation of the Serfs</a> freed Russian peasants from a form of class bondage, while the subsequent <a href="http://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/reform-and-reaction-in-russia/">Great Reforms</a> aimed to restructure the executive and judidical branches, as well as the military, tax code and education system. The reforms were supposed to modernize the country by dragging it out of the caste-like system of estates and legal privilege. But it didn’t do much to improve the economic lot of the peasant. </p>
<p>It was a reversal of America’s present political landscape. While today there’s simmering discontent from the right, in 19th-century Russia it was leftists who were enraged. They were angered by the reforms for not going far enough and had lost hope in the government’s ability to produce meaningful change. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134808/original/image-20160819-30366-8cn837.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134808/original/image-20160819-30366-8cn837.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134808/original/image-20160819-30366-8cn837.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134808/original/image-20160819-30366-8cn837.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134808/original/image-20160819-30366-8cn837.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134808/original/image-20160819-30366-8cn837.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134808/original/image-20160819-30366-8cn837.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sergei Nechaev influenced Dostoevsky’s Pyotr Verkhovensky.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/79/Nechayev.png">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One of the only unifying ideas among the more radical left-wing political factions of the period was the belief that the tsarist regime must be eliminated. Important public figures, like Russian anarchist <a href="https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/bio/">Mikhail Bakunin</a>, advocated for destruction of the status quo as an end greater than all ideologies. As Bakunin famously <a href="https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/works/1842/reaction-germany.htm">exhorted</a>: “The passion for destruction is a creative passion, too.” </p>
<p>Bakunin’s conviction that a new world could rise only from the ashes of tsarism was actually put into practice by his one-time disciple, <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Sergey_Nechayev">Sergei Nechaev</a>, who was the inspiration for Dostoevsky’s protagonist in “Demons,” Pyotr Verkhovensky. </p>
<h2>A slippery slope from incivility to violence</h2>
<p>In 1869, Nechaev <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Sergey_Nechayev">orchestrated the murder</a> of a young student, an event that so shocked and angered Dostoevsky that it became the basis for “Demons.”</p>
<p>The novel begins in a boring provincial backwater inhabited by middle-aged people and ineffectual young liberals, all engrossed in their romantic lives. Pyotr Verkhovensky arrives and persuades many of these same characters to join his underground revolutionary society. Passions are stirred and the local order destabilized as the town enters a downward spiral that concludes with arson and several murders.</p>
<p>What’s most relevant to our time in “Demons” is not its ideologues but the anti-intellectual and impulse-driven nature of Pyotr’s rebellion. In Pyotr, Dostoevsky created a demagogue and pure nihilist, a political figure who appeals to people’s baser desires. Under his influence, the townspeople lose all impulse control and grow reckless, rebelling against all conventions of decency for a good laugh. At one point they desecrate a sacred icon; at another, they gleefully gather around the body of someone who has committed suicide and eat the food he’s left behind.</p>
<p>If their pranks, insults and disorder seem harmless, the decline in the level of public discourse act as a precursor to the violent and destructive acts at the novel’s conclusion. A skilled psychological writer, Dostoevsky never saw violence as divorced from normal human behavior. What’s most haunting about his works is just how close otherwise ordinary people are from doing extraordinarily awful things. </p>
<p>In “Demons,” narrative tensions escalate in a deliberately gradual way. What begins as minor impoliteness becomes scandal, arson, murder and suicide. Dostoevsky is essentially saying that criminal acts are rooted in social transgression; uncivil behavior facilitates scapegoating, dehumanization and, eventually, violence. </p>
<h2>‘Make America Great Again!’</h2>
<p>Donald Trump’s unconventional campaign for president powerfully evokes Dostoevsky’s novel. Aside from his pro-gun and anti-immigration positions, Trump doesn’t offer many concrete political plans. As we evaluate what motivated 14 million Americans to vote for him in the primaries, we might consider <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/08/12/a-massive-new-study-debunks-a-widespread-theory-for-donald-trumps-success/">new research showing</a> that his candidacy has a primarily emotion-based – rather than ideological or economical – appeal. There are notable anti-establishment sentiments among his supporters; many are disaffected, middle-aged white people who believe that American institutions aren’t working on their behalf. </p>
<p>And while his notorious campaign motto “Make America Great Again” is framed in a positive way, it actually advances a version of Bakunin’s creative destruction. It stands for purging the establishment, for recreating a nostalgia-tinged version of some lost, past America. We’ve already seen this destructive drive in its more Nechaevist, low-brow form at Trump rallies, where several people have been <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/03/02/a_list_of_violent_incidents_at_donald_trump_rallies_and_events.html">attacked</a>. </p>
<p>There’s another aspect of Trump’s popularity that ties him to Dostoevsky’s “Demons.” Trump, in the way he carries himself, embodies the complete disavowal of impulse control we see in the novel. Unlike most political candidates, he speaks off the cuff, simultaneously reflecting and stoking the anger and pessimism of his supporters. </p>
<p>For instance, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/28/politics/donald-trump-dnc-response/">he said he wanted to “hit”</a> some of the speakers who criticized him at the Democratic National Convention; in his words, there’s anger, a need to provoke and deep-seated irreverence. His supporters <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-advertising-research-explains-donald-trumps-profound-appeal-47059">feel empowered by this</a>. Without weighing his policies, they’re viscerally drawn to the spectacle of his candidacy, like the townspeople following Pyotr Verkhovensky in “Demons” who delight in the gossip and scandals he creates.</p>
<p>To complete the parallel, we might turn to the novel’s ending, which could have a sobering effect. Basic incivility gives way to an anarchic vision of creative destruction; many die or lose their minds due to Pyotr’s machinations. At one point, seemingly without thinking, crowds crush a female character to death because they falsely believe she’s responsible for the violence in town. </p>
<p>When audiences at Trump rallies verbalize violence by screaming “<a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/rnc-2016-lock-her-up-chant-hillary-clinton-225916">Lock her up</a>” and “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/04/us/politics/donald-trump-supporters.html?_r=0">Kill her</a>,” or when Donald Trump – either wittingly or unwittingly – <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/us/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton.html?_r=0">advocates Second Amendment violence</a>, I wonder whether they aren’t coming dangerously close to the primal violence of “Demons.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63799/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ani Kokobobo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When penning his novel ‘Demons,’ Fyodor Dostoevsky was influenced by political turmoil in Russia. But his impulsive, crass antagonist bears a striking similarity to the GOP’s candidate for president.Ani Kokobobo, Assistant Professor of Russian Literature, University of KansasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/550752016-02-21T13:45:10Z2016-02-21T13:45:10ZSouthern Africa is hobbled by the language and legacy of its histories<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/112245/original/image-20160221-25894-1jb4zpq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cattle drink water from an almost dry dam in South Africa. The drought in the region is one of a number of troubling issues that remain largely hidden from public sight.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Rogan Ward</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the many intriguing ideas of the Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, was this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the limits of my language means the limits of my world.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Does this explain the failure to see the gathering gloom across southern Africa?</p>
<p>Consider three issues that should be troubling about the region but which remain largely hidden from public sight.</p>
<p>First, agriculture production is in crisis. As the UN World Food Programme recently reported, 49 million people in southern Africa will be affected by the worst and most severe drought in <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-drought-idUSKCN0VO1DG">35 years</a>.</p>
<p>Secondly, a torrent of migration continues: much, but not all, is drawn to South Africa where, as the New York Times recently claimed, there may be <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-06-do-5-million-immigrants-live-in-sa">5 million migrants</a>.</p>
<p>Thirdly, political instability is pervasive. Less obvious instances of this are Swaziland where domestic politics, for all the claims to Swazi exceptionalism, remains feudal. In nearby Lesotho the struggle for scarce resources has brought murder to the very streets of the capital.</p>
<p>Diplomatically, these places are called “trouble spots”, but it is more difficult to choose a euphemism when talking about Zimbabwe. On any political (let alone, actuarial) chart that country’s president – now in the 92nd year of his life – should be discussed in the past tense. And, if this opinion is judged to be too hard on a man who was once regarded as a liberation hero, it needs to be pointed out that diplomats in Harare openly speak nowadays of the “post-Mugabe era”.</p>
<h2>Three inter-linked languages</h2>
<p>Invariably these, and other, challenges to regional order are addressed by three inter-linked languages – each has differing priorities while each relies on the same analytical categories.</p>
<p>These have their origins in the late-19th Century capture of the region’s politics by a language which aimed to secure the primacy of sovereign-centered states. Its primary goal was not to promote nationalism - this was to come later - but to advance the cause of British imperialism.</p>
<p>The fact that sovereign-centered borders remain the primary categories in ordering the region is testimony to the power of this language. And this points to one of history’s many ironies: the intense nationalism of the liberation movement, if anything, reinforced the hold of colonial mapping.</p>
<p>As the call for liberation deepened, southern Africa (and much the rest of the world) was seized by the language of the Cold War. Here, a simple binary thinking – encouraged by irrational fear of global destruction – turned the region into a mirror of the global divide. The east/west divide became a code for the politics between black-ruled states and the residue of colonial thinking.</p>
<p>At the Century’s end, a new language arose. This promoted the market: it argued that the purpose of the sovereign state was to service global capital in the belief that economic growth will trickle down to the benefit of all.</p>
<p>Here, too, historical irony was at work – the region’s sovereign states mattered, but only because markets matter more!</p>
<p>Carried by nice-sounding words – accountability, governance, rights-based regimes and the like – the force of market-centered language trumped an idea that, perhaps, was ripe to rethink the analytical categories that had organised the region for a century and more.</p>
<p>But this language effectively paralysed regional multilateralism that had promised growth, protection of rights and security.</p>
<p>There is no better example of this paralysis than the 2011 decision by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) heads of state to disband the SADC Tribunal – effectively a regional court. This happened after the judges, drawn from the region, held that Mugabe’s land seizures violated the rule of law.</p>
<p>As was pointed out at the time, its disbandment reflected SADC’s priorities – the subordination of new understandings of regional order and multilateralism to the sovereign interests of <a href="http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/42461/Nathan_Disbanding_2013.pdf?sequence=1">individual states</a>.</p>
<h2>The need to move beyond sovereign-centered grammar</h2>
<p>This example shows that changing the sovereign-centered grammar of southern Africa – and the resulting politics – will not be an easy task.</p>
<p>But can we speak about the region in a different way? Will this make a difference?</p>
<p>The drought, especially, suggests that the region’s lived reality is increasingly at some distance from the categories used to explain it. Moreover, as a flight to Maputo recently reminded me, places which are often thought to be at the edges of the region are only a heartbeat away from places that are said to be at region’s centre.</p>
<p>Very often this inter-connectedness and the region’s seeming vulnerability give rise to security fears. Often, too, these are constructed by the categories which are readily at hand.</p>
<p>These must, however, be recognised for what they are – burdens of a sagging language.</p>
<p>To meet southern Africa’s mounting challenges requires not more of the sovereign sameness, persistence with the old categories, but an imagining of a regional future that looks beyond the familiar, the routine, the everyday. In short, it requires a new language.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55075/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
One of the many intriguing ideas of the Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, was this: the limits of my language means the limits of my world. Does this explain the failure to see the gathering gloom…Peter Vale, Professor of Humanities and the Director of the Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study (JIAS), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/509982015-11-23T04:39:11Z2015-11-23T04:39:11ZHow the new peace and violence development goals can be met<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/102636/original/image-20151120-408-al61ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Violence has become a normal part of life in Somalia and some other countries.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Feisal Omar</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For the first time, issues of violence and peace are part of a global development framework. The recently launched <a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300">Sustainable Development Goals</a> aim to
“significantly reduce all forms of violence and related deaths everywhere”. </p>
<p>While admirable in its intent and ambition, is this possible? And, if so, how? </p>
<p>Earlier global agreements, notably the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/mdg/summit2010/pdf/List%20of%20MDGs%20English.pdf">Millennium Development Goals</a>, did not consider issues of conflict and violence. Critics point to the omission as one reason areas affected by conflict and violence lagged so far behind peaceful and stable countries on <a href="http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/bd/41/bd416680-6d66-4362-b1a5-5d586cbe379f/conflict_fragility_and_mdgs_en.pdf">achieving the goals</a>. Human development indicators are often far worse in conflict areas. </p>
<p>On top of this delivering development is made more difficult by continuing violent insecurity, politicised divisions and militarisation. Unsurprisingly, people in these areas see reducing levels of violence and conflict as the most important way in which their lives could be improved.</p>
<p>The inclusion of violence and peace in the latest goals follows a groundswell of thinking about the issue since the 1990s. Over the past 25 years practical approaches have been developed to deliver a range of basic services and other social support in conflict areas.</p>
<h2>Putting violence into perspective</h2>
<p>There is a litany of guidance for acting sensitively and avoiding the possibility of inadvertently <a href="http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/">aggravating tensions</a> for any agency wanting to intervene in conflict areas. And since the publication of the World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development <a href="http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/0,,contentMDK:23252415%7EpagePK:478093%7EpiPK:477627%7EtheSitePK:477624,00.html">in 2011</a>, there has been a welcome focus on violence. The report emphasised that violence afflicted not only poor countries but also many transition states like South Africa, Nigeria and Pakistan. </p>
<p>It also affected wealthy countries such as the US, Brazil and Israel. It emphasised that the capability of any society to cope with the impacts of violence and to become more peaceful depended on the existence of legitimate institutions.</p>
<p>A burgeoning field of policy analysis now focuses on reducing armed violence. Remarkable consensus has emerged at high policy levels around the basic elements of an approach to reduce violence. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the need to create legitimate institutions, often through efforts to craft political settlements;</p></li>
<li><p>strengthening access to justice;</p></li>
<li><p>extending economic opportunities and employment, especially for young people; and</p></li>
<li><p>fostering societal resilience, both through institutions as well as by considering the sustainability of interventions.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These are enshrined under Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals, which is aimed at</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Best practice paradigm in reducing violence</h2>
<p>The rapid emergence of this best practice paradigm is significant on many fronts. It establishes priorities for donors desperately searching for answers to often longstanding situations of violent insecurity and conflict. It directs trends in research funding to those areas that are thought to be most likely to uncover solutions.</p>
<p>It also directs advocacy efforts at international and national levels. It offers an explanation for complex dynamics, trends and continuities to a wider public to which violence appears altogether normal. Here, places like Darfur, Somalia and Afghanistan come to mind. It also provides regimes in areas affected by violence a touchstone for seeking international support and funds.</p>
<p>The limits of the best practice paradigm is that it states the obvious: to be less violent, societies and states should become more like places that are peaceful and stable. While the elements of reducing violence are well known, they are the outcomes of long processes of change, conflict and adjustment. They are not logical outcomes of more funding, capacity building and political attention.</p>
<p>The best practice paradigm has less to say about what can be done to reduce violence over the short and medium term. Development funders and planners who seek to reduce violence face a fundamental problem. It is that violence exists because it so often works as a way of developing new political relations.</p>
<p>An earlier generation of research showed that conflict and violence were not the antithesis of <a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/civil-war-is-not-a-stupid-thing/">development</a>. Instead, they were often close bedfellows.</p>
<p>And economic growth and change have not guaranteed peaceful outcomes. Far from it. In many places, the opportunities created through globalisation have given rise to extra-legal trans-boundary economic activity involving the <a href="http://www.didierbigo.com/students/readings/IPS2011/4/duffield%20global%20governance%20-%20Unknown.pdf">use of violence</a>.</p>
<p>Similarly, violence is often the currency of <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2014/10/17/the-political-marketplace-analyzing-political-entrepreneurs-and-political-bargaining-with-a-business-lens/">politics</a>, the bedrock of development writ large in places now mired in seemingly intractable situations. Take South Sudan, Somalia and Syria.</p>
<p>Best practice will take development actors only so far. Far more attention is needed on how violence operates and its logic in particular settings. This type of analysis is more likely to generate useful insights than measurements of institutional weakness and social fragility based on contrasts with more peaceful and stable situations. </p>
<h2>No one-size-fits-all approach</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/0,,contentMDK:23252415%7EpagePK:478093%7EpiPK:477627%7EtheSitePK:477624,00.html">World Development Report</a> cautioned against the temptation to impose certain institutional arrangements from one society onto another. </p>
<p>And <a href="http://www.ids.ac.uk/idsresearch/addressing-and-mitigating-violence">recent research</a> on addressing and mitigating violence suggests that there is no single formula to reducing violence. The optimal design of institutions is never an absolute. </p>
<p>Rather, it changes in response to political conditions and trends, and framings of these in places where violence is a way of life, a currency of politics. Further, what is legitimate is a matter of political and social positioning, and at different levels.</p>
<p>What appears to be legitimate in the halls of the United Nations may look very different from the office of the president in Juba. Likewise from the perspective of a community terrorised by violence in the South Sudan margins.</p>
<p>Most accept that reducing violence is essential for sustainable development. And that it is a way of measuring and indicating progress in times of dynamic change globally and in places remote from political and economic power. </p>
<p>Reducing violence is development’s latest tall order. The adoption of best practice will help. But the journey requires much more attention to mapping the routes of violence in particular places, where it is not separate from but fundamentally part of development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeremy Lind receives funding from the UK Department for International Development (DfID). </span></em></p>A growing field of policy analysis now focuses on reducing armed violence. Remarkable consensus has emerged at high policy levels around the basic elements of an approach to reduce violence.Jeremy Lind, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/490062015-10-14T03:55:34Z2015-10-14T03:55:34ZIllegal guns fuel violent crime, wreak deadly havoc in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98250/original/image-20151013-31126-j4uo6u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man walks among crosses outside Pretoria, South Africa, representing farmers killed in violent attacks.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Juda Ngwenya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Police statistics in South Africa show a worrying trend: the increased use of illegal small arms and light weapons in the country’s growing problem of <a href="http://www.saps.gov.za/resource_centre/publications/statistics/crimestats/2015/crime_stats.php">violent crime</a>.</p>
<p>Gun-related murders are the leading cause of violent death, placing the country <a href="http://businesstech.co.za/news/government/91284/south-africa-is-the-second-worst-country-for-gun-deaths-in-the-world/">second</a> in the world after the US. South Africa’s population is <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/">51,8 million</a> compared to the US’ <a href="http://www.census.gov/popclock/">321,9 million</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.genevadeclaration.org/">Geneva Declaration Secretariat</a> says South Africa’s homicide rates are indicative of a warzone or a country in crisis, struggling with stability.</p>
<p>Although South Africa’s <a href="http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2013/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2013-Chapter-6-EN.pdf">homicide rates</a> have declined consistently since democracy, they remain among the highest in the world. They are about four times the global average at more than 30 per 100,000 people. </p>
<p>The South African Police Service stopped publishing disaggregated <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/reports/15year_review/jcps/firearms.pdf">firearm data</a> in 2000. Different processes are used to collect and monitor data, so firearm statistics have become fragmented and speculative. </p>
<p>A consistent and disturbing trend in post-apartheid South Africa is the rate that state-owned guns land in the hands of criminals through theft, negligence, <a href="https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/will-fewer-firearms-make-south-africa-safer">fraud</a> and <a href="http://www.gfsa.org.za/gfsa-condemns-theft-of-guns-by-corrupt-cops/">corruption</a>. The police’s secretariat recently said that more than <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-03-24-national-firearms-summit-the-battle-over-sas-guns-rages-on/#.Vhy5Mfmqqko">1900 guns</a> belonging to the police, defence force and the prisons went missing over the past year.</p>
<p>Police sting operations frequently uncover and destroy large illegal <a href="https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africas-efforts-to-collect-and-destroy-firearms-losing-the-battle-but-winning-the-war">caches</a>. Several <a href="https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper134.pdf">amnesty programmes</a> have been used to <a href="https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/assessing-the-impact-of-firearm-amnesties-for-south-africa">reduce</a> the number of illegal firearms in circulation. The 2005 amnesty netted 100,000 guns. But without reliable, transparent crime statistics and ongoing research, measures to eliminate illegal small arms and light weapons will remain largely “hit and miss”. Their proliferation will remain largely misunderstood.</p>
<h2>A continental problem</h2>
<p>Africa is awash with arms. It has the greatest number of <a href="http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_33138.pdf">armed conflicts</a>. Numerous <a href="https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/Books/SocietyUnderSiege1/Batchelor.pdf">intra-state clashes</a>, extremist insurgencies and resource conflicts dominate the post-Cold War geopolitical landscape.</p>
<p>A distinct feature of these <a href="http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/kaldor.htm">“new wars”</a> is the use of fast-paced, mobile, guerrilla warfare tactics. The tools, increasingly hi-tech, are <a href="http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw/">small arms and light weapons</a> – the perfect instruments in this theatre of violence.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw/">United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research</a> categorises small arms as revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles, submachine guns and light machine guns. Light weapons are heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable launchers of antitank and antiaircraft missile systems and mortars of less than 100mm calibre.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98232/original/image-20151013-31132-1gdxbtj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98232/original/image-20151013-31132-1gdxbtj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98232/original/image-20151013-31132-1gdxbtj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98232/original/image-20151013-31132-1gdxbtj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98232/original/image-20151013-31132-1gdxbtj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98232/original/image-20151013-31132-1gdxbtj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98232/original/image-20151013-31132-1gdxbtj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Turkana boys play with rifles in the Turkana, northwest Kenya.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Goran Tomasevic</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Small arms and light weapons have distinctive <a href="http://www.ajol.info/index.php/ai/article/view/94921">advantages</a> which make them ideally suited to “modern” guerrilla warfare and urban armed crime. They are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>low cost and widely available. They are accessible, cheaply manufactured and easily distributed by illegal trading and trafficking;</p></li>
<li><p>increasingly lethal. Non-state actors, informal militias, and extremists have lethal firepower that often exceeds that of state military forces;</p></li>
<li><p>simple and durable. They are easy to maintain, can be recycled and can last decades; and</p></li>
<li><p>in need of little training. Their utility is unrestrained by gender or age, increasing their use by informal militias and child soldiers.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The <a href="http://www.militaryfactory.com/smallarms/detail.asp?smallarms_id=19">AK-47</a>, an iconic struggle weapon of African liberation, lasts 20 to 40 years. It is also the weapon of choice for terrorists and drug lords globally. It is easily transported, smuggled to conflict zones and cached.</p>
<p>The sources of the proliferate weapons in Africa are many and diverse, legal and illegal. Their flow is extremely difficult to track or monitor. One important source is the <a href="http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2001/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2001-Chapter-02-EN.pdf">stockpiles of Cold War weaponry</a> still circulating throughout the continent. Small arms and light weapons are frequently <a href="http://www.accord.org.za/publications/conflict-trends/downloads/476-conflict-trends-2009-1">recycled</a> from conflict zone to conflict zone, and among fighters, security forces and war profiteers.</p>
<p>The scourge of the weapons has transformed the landscape of African armed violence. Their accumulation has devastating <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2484743">consequences</a>, with huge humanitarian costs, human rights violations and abuses. They are implicated in the massive flows of refugees and internally displaced people in Africa.</p>
<p>The weapons fuel, aggravate and escalate conflicts. They also spawn a culture of <a href="https://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/Social%20Impact%20.pdf">violence</a> and impunity. Their intractability thwarts conflict resolution and peace-building efforts on the continent.</p>
<p>Given the accessibility, low cost and portability of the weapons, the lucrative, illicit arms trade is extremely challenging to governments. Even the most comprehensive, long standing arms <a href="http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes">embargoes</a>, non-proliferation <a href="http://www.aefjn.org/index.php/366/articles/africa-fight-against-small-arms-and-light-weapons.html">treaties</a>, and <a href="http://www.poa-iss.org/FirearmsProtocol/FirearmsProtocol.aspx">UN protocols</a> have <a href="http://www.ajol.info/index.php/ai/article/view/94921">failed</a> to shut down their illicit trade and trafficking.</p>
<h2>Structural violence in South Africa</h2>
<p>Arms are entrenched in the South African psyche, thanks to a militarised police state under apartheid and a history of protracted armed conflicts. Accumulating small arms and light weapons was rife during apartheid. </p>
<p>With post-Cold War <a href="https://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/Newsletters/OAU/OAUISS1.html">weapons</a> still in circulation and <a href="http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2001/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2001-Chapter-02-EN.pdf">caches of arms</a> of the liberation armies seemingly not accounted for, post-apartheid South Africa was always at risk of continued instability from armed crime.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98238/original/image-20151013-31132-1v930ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98238/original/image-20151013-31132-1v930ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98238/original/image-20151013-31132-1v930ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98238/original/image-20151013-31132-1v930ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98238/original/image-20151013-31132-1v930ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98238/original/image-20151013-31132-1v930ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98238/original/image-20151013-31132-1v930ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A child soldier with the Mai Mai militia in the DRC brandishes an AK-47.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This has been the post-conflict experience in Africa, where criminal syndicates fill the vacuum caused by the cessation of political hostilities, capitalising on existing arms networks. Porous and extensive <a href="https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/CRIMEINDEX/00VOL4NO3/Borders.html">borders</a> such as those of South Africa facilitate the illegal trafficking of weapons, other illicit goods and the movements of crime syndicates.</p>
<p>Research confirms that the proliferation of arms and the <a href="https://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/Social%20Impact%20.pdf">process of militarisation</a> in regions where structural violence is the norm exacerbate societal dysfunction, political turmoil and erode state authority.</p>
<h2>Disconcerting future</h2>
<p><a href="http://sanews.gov.za/south-africa/police-arrested-ficksburg-killing-appear-court">Incidents</a> in South Africa reflect the growing <a href="http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2013/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2013-Chapter-6-EN.pdf">militarisation</a> of the police, reminiscent of apartheid policing and armed struggle. This speaks to serious regression in South Africa’s progressive agenda of human rights, dignity and democracy.</p>
<p>The 2012 <a href="http://theconversation.com/marikana-tagedy-must-be-understood-against-the-backdrop-of-structural-violence-in-south-africa-43868">Marikana massacre</a> epitomises this military-style brutality by police, who killed 34 striking miners. The <a href="http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Annual%20International%20Report%202012.pdf">Human Rights Commission</a> criticised the police for using excessive and lethal force.</p>
<p>Research suggests armed violence, systemic poverty and inequality are <a href="http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2013/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2013-Chapter-6-EN.pdf">linked</a>. Countries with entrenched armed violence, as experienced in South Africa, are in danger of being trapped in cycles of <a href="http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2013/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2013-Chapter-6-EN.pdf">under-development</a>. The proliferation of weapons contributes to <a href="https://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/Social%20Impact%20.pdf">disintegrative trends</a> in society, accelerating tensions through criminal activities and civil conflict.</p>
<p>South Africa, which is one of the most <a href="http://theconversation.com/factcheck-is-south-africa-the-most-unequal-society-in-the-world-48334">unequal societies</a> in the world, with severe levels of structural violence and poverty, is particularly vulnerable to ever widening socioeconomic cleavages. Proliferating illicit weapons pose a real threat to sustainable peace and the fabric of society as they accelerate armed criminal violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49006/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lyn Snodgrass receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>South Africa’s homicide rates have declined consistently since democracy, but remain among the highest in the world. They are about four times the global average at more than 30 per 100,000 people.Lyn Snodgrass, Associate Professor and Head of Department of Political and Conflict Studies, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.