tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/south-korea-2712/articlesSouth Korea – The Conversation2024-03-22T12:30:59Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244782024-03-22T12:30:59Z2024-03-22T12:30:59ZBreakaway parties threaten to disrupt South Korea’s two-party system – can they also end parliamentary gridlock?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582322/original/file-20240316-30-z280lu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3994%2C2646&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Is South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol waving goodbye to his popularity?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/south-koreas-president-yoon-suk-yeol-and-his-wife-kim-keon-news-photo/1793664795?adppopup=true">Henry Nicholls/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Contemporary South Korean politics has traditionally been dominated by just two main parties – in <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1962968">common with many other countries</a> with strong presidential systems. But that could soon change.</p>
<p>Recent <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/south-korea-in-political-disarray-ahead-of-the-april-parliamentary-elections/#:%7E:text=The%20Yoon%20administration%20and%20the,defeat%20in%20Seoul%20last%20October.">voter discontent</a> is creating opportunities for smaller political parties in the upcoming parliamentary election on April 10, 2024. </p>
<p>Heading into that vote, the two main parties – President Yoon Suk Yeol’s People Power Party and the opposition Democratic Party – between them hold 270 seats in the 300-member parliament. But both parties are grappling with internal struggles and political controversies that are fueling the prospect of new, breakaway parties making gains. </p>
<p>The result could be a multi-party legislature. As a <a href="https://www.ngu.edu/faculty/jong-eun-lee">political scientist</a> with a focus on East Asia and international affairs, I believe that outcome has the potential of transforming the country’s domestic and international agenda. </p>
<h2>Parliamentary gridlock</h2>
<p>Polling suggests that South Koreans haven’t been happy with the performance of their politicians for years, with one 2022 survey putting <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1455207/south-korea-trust-in-the-national-parliament/">trust in the national assembly at just 24%</a>. Events since then are unlikely to have improved confidence in either main party.</p>
<p>Since Yoon being elected president in 2022, his legislative agenda has been met with <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230509000725">resistance</a> by the opposition-controlled National Assembly. His <a href="https://m.koreatimes.co.kr/pages/article.asp?newsIdx=345281">plans for reforming</a> the country’s education, pension and labor systems have stalled as a result. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Yoon has <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20240130000616">vetoed multiple bills</a> passed by the National Assembly, such as the <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20231201001653315">“yellow envelope” law</a>, which limits companies’ lawsuits for damage claims over labor union disputes, and legislation calling for special probes into the <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240130003053315">crowd crush</a> inside Seoul’s Itaewon district during Halloween weekend in 2022 that resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries.</p>
<p>On foreign policy, the opposition Democratic Party has faulted the <a href="https://theconversation.com/president-yoon-is-lauded-in-west-for-embracing-japan-in-south-korea-it-fits-a-conservative-agenda-that-is-proving-less-popular-220898">Yoon government’s pursuit of increased security ties</a> with Japan in the face of continued bilateral tensions over Japan’s past colonial history in Korea. </p>
<p>Specifically, the opposition criticized a <a href="https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/03/02/national/politics/lee-jaemyung-yoon-suk-yeol-wartime-labor/20230302094834562.html">bilateral deal</a> on compensation for the victims of forced wartime labor in Korea, and the Yoon government’s acceptance of Japan’s release of wastewater from the <a href="https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/politics-government/20230819-130723/">Fukushima nuclear plant</a> into the Pacific Ocean.</p>
<p>Last fall, partly as protest against the president’s foreign policy and in a bid to overhaul the government’s cabinet, the National Assembly passed a nonbinding <a href="https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2023-09-21/national/politics/First-noconfidence-motion-against-prime-minister-passes/1875180#:%7E:text=The%20National%20Assembly%20passed%20a,of%20an%20incumbent%20prime%20minister">no-confidence motion</a> against Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, though Yoon refused to dismiss his premier.</p>
<p>The net result of the political gridlock is that both the Yoon government and the Democratic Party face high levels of <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/02/113_366062.html">public disapproval</a>. Yoon’s approval rating <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20240212050041">has stagnated</a> below 40%, and the majority of voters have expressed an intention to <a href="https://www.straightnews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=246087">hold his government accountable in the upcoming election</a> by supporting opposition parties.</p>
<p>However, the Democratic Party has failed to capitalize on Yoon’s unpopularity, due to similar public <a href="https://www.kukinews.com/newsView/kuk202312120252">disapproval toward the party’s leader, Lee Jae-myung</a>.</p>
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<img alt="South Korean opposition party members hold signs at a rally." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582323/original/file-20240316-28-m3dlfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582323/original/file-20240316-28-m3dlfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582323/original/file-20240316-28-m3dlfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582323/original/file-20240316-28-m3dlfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582323/original/file-20240316-28-m3dlfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582323/original/file-20240316-28-m3dlfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582323/original/file-20240316-28-m3dlfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Lee Jae-myung, center, leader of the main opposition Democratic Party, holds a banner during a rally opposing Japan’s discharge of treated radioactive water into the ocean on Aug. 25, 2023, in Seoul, South Korea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/lee-jae-myung-leader-of-the-main-opposition-democratic-news-photo/1622143449?adppopup=true">Chris Jung/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Intraparty factions</h2>
<p>South Korea’s two main parties have frequently experienced internal feuds among factions supportive and opposed to party leadership. In recent months, such factions opposed to both Yoon and Lee’s leadership have bolted from their respective parties.</p>
<p>In January 2024, Lee Jun-Seok, former People Power Party chairman, started the <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/01/113_365883.html">New Reform Party</a> with party members <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230228000730">who protested</a> the pro-Yoon faction’s seemingly cliquish party leadership. This “non-Yoon” faction has also <a href="https://m.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2023122807400000123">criticized</a> the <a href="https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-01-05/national/politics/Yoon-vetoes-special-counsel-bill-to-investigate-first-lady/1951960">president’s veto</a> of the special counsel bill to investigate allegations surrounding first lady Kim Geon-hee, which includes claims of violating <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/09/asia/south-korea-dior-bag-scandal-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">anti-graft laws</a> and involvement in <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20240105000202">stock price manipulation</a>.</p>
<p>The Democratic Party is facing a similar challenge. Also in January 2024, Lee Nak-yon, former prime minister under the previous Democratic government of President Moon Jae-in, started the New Future Party, criticizing his former party as having turned into a “<a href="https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20240112/4678600/1">bulletproof shield</a>” for the unpopular leader Lee Jae-myung. Specifically, the “non Jae-myung” faction have criticized him for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/amid-legal-troubles-lee-jae-myung-tightens-grip-on-south-koreas-opposition-party/">refusing to step down</a> despite being under criminal investigation on corruption charges.</p>
<h2>Opportunities for breakaway parties</h2>
<p>These new breakaway parties’ strategy is to take advantage of South Korea’s <a href="https://keia.org/the-peninsula/how-does-south-koreas-new-election-system-work/">mixed-member</a> proportional election system, which provides opportunities for smaller parties to win seats. To do so, they have been focusing efforts on building concentrated support among core groups of voters. </p>
<p>The New Reform Party <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/01/113_367977.html">has gained support</a> among younger conservative male voters critical of the older generation of conservative politicians close to Yoon. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the New Future Party <a href="https://www.m-i.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=1084200">retains some support</a> among traditional Democratic Party members, who feel disappointed with the direction of the party. Several Democratic legislators who claimed to <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240307006351315">have been purged</a> by the party leadership have joined Lee Nak-yon, widening the schism within the main opposition party.</p>
<h2>Potential impact</h2>
<p>The latest polls <a href="https://www.straightnews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=246459">indicate a tight race</a> between the People Power Party and the Democratic Party, with a 37.7% and 36.9% share of the vote, respectively. If the breakaway parties <a href="https://www.m-i.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=1102927">win even a small number of seats</a>, the result could be a “hung parliament,” in which neither main party can form a single-party majority.</p>
<p>That would leave smaller parties with huge legislative leverage.</p>
<p>The New Reform Party is more likely to <a href="https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&id=Po&Seq_Code=183112">partner</a> with the Yoon government on policy agendas – despite <a href="https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/politics_general/1114142.html">personal antipathy</a> between Yoon and Lee Jun-Seok. On foreign policy, New Reform Party members have <a href="https://cbiz.chosun.com/svc/bulletin/bulletin_art.html?contid=2023031801098">expressed support</a> for pragmatic relations with Japan and have warned against excessive anti-Japan nationalist rhetoric in domestic politics. </p>
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<img alt="Woman at political rally shakes her fist in the air." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582324/original/file-20240316-18-tcp90i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582324/original/file-20240316-18-tcp90i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582324/original/file-20240316-18-tcp90i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582324/original/file-20240316-18-tcp90i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582324/original/file-20240316-18-tcp90i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582324/original/file-20240316-18-tcp90i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582324/original/file-20240316-18-tcp90i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A move to abolish a gender equality ministry has reemerged as a key issue ahead of parliamentary elections.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SouthKoreaInternationalWomensDay/bba9a2ccfd554c87b031a013fbb08189/photo?Query=south%20korea%20gender&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=91&currentItemNo=33">AP Photo/Lee Jin-man</a></span>
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<p>On social and economic policies, the New Reform Party’s platform likewise aligns with the Yoon government in supporting the expansion of South Korea’s <a href="https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20240205059800001">semiconductor industry</a> and abolishing the <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/02/113_369380.html">Ministry of Gender Equality</a>. </p>
<p>Particularly on gender issues, the New Reform Party could push the Yoon government further toward positions that appeal to <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www2/common/viewpage.asp?newsIdx=367977&categoryCode=113">younger male conservative voters</a>, such as by introducing female military service. At present, only men are subject to South Korea’s mandatory military conscription, a policy that many younger South Korean men perceive as discrimination. </p>
<p>Lee Nak-yon’s New Future Party is <a href="https://www.businesspost.co.kr/BP?command=article_view&num=315985">more critical</a> of the Yoon government’s domestic and foreign policies. However, with its <a href="https://www.inews24.com/view/1695770">platform to end</a> two-party gridlock, the New Future Party could also seek a role as <a href="https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20240226/123693471/1">an arbitrator</a> over contentious policy issues.</p>
<p>The new parties could also support the opposition Democratic Party in pressuring the Yoon government to be more accountable. Specifically, Yoon could face increased demands to approve investigations on the allegations surrounding the first lady and to solicit opposition parties’ consent for future cabinet nominations.</p>
<p>It is still uncertain how well the breakaway parties will perform in the upcoming election. And they face competition from <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20240312050698">another new party</a>, the National Innovation Party, that is politically aligned with the Democratic Party. </p>
<p>One recent election in East Asia will give <a href="https://n.news.naver.com/mnews/article/018/0005687178">these new parties encouragement</a>: Taiwan’s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/kmts-han-kuo-yu-is-taiwans-new-legislative-speaker/">legislative election</a> in January saw a new third party become kingmaker in the legislative assembly.</p>
<p>If any of the new South Korean parties are able to emerge from the election as a parliamentary kingmaker, it would represent a crack in the country’s two-party system and could free up the gridlock that has dogged parliamentary politics in recent years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224478/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jong Eun Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Heading into a parliamentary vote, there is very little gap between the ruling People Power Party and opposition Democratic Party – raising the prospect of a smaller party emerging as kingmaker.Jong Eun Lee, Assistant Professor, North Greenville UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250682024-03-07T17:53:14Z2024-03-07T17:53:14ZNot just a love story: ‘Past Lives’ gives a glimpse into growing up bicultural<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/06/09/1180748796/past-lives-review-greta-lee-teo-yoo"><em>Past Lives</em></a>, a film centring on a nostalgic love story between childhood soul mates, is one of this year’s <a href="https://www.oscars.org/oscars/ceremonies">Oscar nominees for best picture</a>. </p>
<p>Although it’s been somewhat overshadowed by <a href="https://apnews.com/article/barbenheimer-barbie-vs-oppenheimer-61a6ec6c67359b851ddeccd6d655b5ab"><em>“Barbenheimer,”</em></a> <em>Past Lives</em> is worth the watch. It can provide meaningful insights on how immigrant youth grow into their cultural identity. </p>
<p>The film follows childhood sweethearts Nora and Hae Sung, who grow up together in Seoul, South Korea, then are separated when Nora’s family immigrates to Toronto. They briefly reconnect as 24-year-olds via regular video calls, but their relationship fizzles. </p>
<p>Fast forward 12 years, and Nora is now a playwright in New York living with her husband, Arthur. Hae Sung has not forgotten about Nora and decides to visit her in New York. The two face their adult lives and realities, and although they wonder about what could have been, Hae Sung ultimately returns home. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Trailer for ‘Past Lives.’</span></figcaption>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/oscar-nominees-2024-past-lives-spotlights-the-pull-of-first-love-alongside-the-yearning-for-glory-221574">Oscar nominees 2024: 'Past Lives' spotlights the pull of first love alongside the yearning for glory</a>
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<h2>Not just a love story</h2>
<p>Reviewers have dubbed <em>Past Lives</em> an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/film/2023/jan/22/past-lives-review-delicately-sad-romantic-drama-is-a-real-achievement">achingly sad love story</a> that makes you question where you would be now if you had ended up with the one that got away. </p>
<p>But under the surface level, the film tells a subtle tale of the sometimes <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10560-021-00807-3">chaotic and emotionally draining</a> experience of newcomer youth as they grow into their <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0092-6566(02)00510-X">bicultural identity</a>. Their feet are in two worlds: their heritage culture and their current culture. And they must learn to ebb and flow between these worlds effortlessly. </p>
<p>As a developmental psychologist, I saw clear parallels between Nora’s experiences with her two loves and immigrant young people’s emotional turmoil as they grow up belonging to two worlds. Hae Sung represented Nora’s ties to her Korean heritage, while Arthur represented her identity as an American. <em>Past Lives</em> draws us into Nora’s intimate experiences as she courses between these two identities as a person who is bicultural. </p>
<h2>Navigating a bicultural identity</h2>
<p>Psychology research shows that immigrant youth who feel they truly belong to both their heritage and current cultures are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022111435097">socially, emotionally and psychologically well-adjusted</a>. Referred to as bicultural competence, immigrants who can move more fluidly between their heritage and current cultures have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/cdp0000467">better self-esteem and mental health</a>, and report having <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/21676968211034309">higher quality relationships with others</a>. </p>
<p>However, many immigrant children also have difficulty finding comfortable footing between these two worlds. In the film, reflecting on meeting with Hae Sung, Nora says to her husband, “I feel so not Korean when I’m with him, but also more Korean.” </p>
<p>Nora’s experiences are not uncommon among immigrant young adults who move at a young age. These individuals can feel that their heritage culture <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00228.x">starkly contrasts</a> with their currently held values that are based on the culture of their adoptive country. Yet, for many immigrant youth, spending time with others who share their heritage can increase <a href="https://doi.org/10.5195/jyd.2019.708">feelings of closeness and connection</a> to their ethnic and racial identity. </p>
<p>Nora’s bilingual <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/13670069211019466">code-switching</a> — spontaneous shifting between two languages in a single conversation — also mirrors immigrant youths’ shifting between their bicultural selves. Most immigrant bilingual youth <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X19865572">tend to code-switch easily</a>, and use the communication skill to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X19865572">mark how fluent they can be</a> in both of their cultures. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-non-english-language-cinema-is-reshaping-the-oscars-landscape-222484">How non-English language cinema is reshaping the Oscars landscape</a>
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<p>Korean Canadian director Celine Song, who wrote and directed the film partly based on her own life, has <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/past-lives-final-scene-ending-celine-song-explains-1850119">actually lived the intimate bar scene</a> in the film in which Nora code-switches when talking to Arthur and Hae Sung. In recalling her own experience, Song said, “At one point I realized I was translating beyond language and culture, that I was actually translating between two parts of my own self… But both of those people are me.”</p>
<h2>Two trees in one pot</h2>
<p><em>Past Lives</em> may resonate with many immigrant adults who arrived to North America at a young age, partly because it mirrors their own experiences. The film draws upon a life lived between two cultures as the two clash and flow both literally and figuratively.</p>
<p>When explaining why she and her husband fight, Nora reflects how immigrant youth form their bicultural identity: “It’s like planting two trees in one pot. Our roots are finding their place.” For many who live between cultures, bicultural identity takes root like two plants in one pot. </p>
<p>Nora’s story evokes a reflection of the push-and-pull of heritage and current cultural values, traditions and norms among bicultural youth. So be sure to put the film on your list if you’re planning on watching your way through this year’s nominees. </p>
<p>Not into sentimental love stories? No problem. </p>
<p>Instead, watch the film with the aim of immersing yourself into a first-hand account of how immigrant youth learn to unite their loved cultures. You might find your eyes opened up to the rich, and sometimes rollercoaster, experience of a bicultural identity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225068/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hali Kil receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.</span></em></p>The film ‘Past Lives’ provides meaningful insights on how immigrant youth grow into their cultural identity.Hali Kil, Assistant Professor, Psychology, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2208982024-03-06T13:35:55Z2024-03-06T13:35:55ZPresident Yoon is lauded in West for embracing Japan − in South Korea it fits a conservative agenda that is proving less popular<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576051/original/file-20240215-17705-dcmnsd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C0%2C4486%2C2991&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Korea's Yoon Suk Yeol, left, and Fumio Kishida of Japan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/yoon-suk-yeol-south-koreas-president-left-and-fumio-kishida-news-photo/1248372073?adppopup=true">Kiyoshi Otal/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When South Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol broke out into an impromptu performance of <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/south-korea-president-yoon-sings-american-pie-white-house-dinner-biden-rcna81712">the song “American Pie”</a> at a gala White House dinner in 2023, it was more than just a musical interlude. It was symbolic of how on the big Indo-Pacific issues of the day, Washington and Seoul are singing from the same songbook.</p>
<p>But so, too, is Japan. And for South Korea’s <a href="https://twitter.com/richardaeden/status/1709999502373867817">karaoke-loving leader</a>, that means humming a different tune to predecessors on the international stage – and risking hitting a sour note back at home.</p>
<p>Yoon, who <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/10/world/asia/south-korea-yoon-president.html">took office in May 2022</a>, has embraced closer ties with Japan, South Korea’s former colonizer, as part of an alignment with <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/01/15/south-koreas-global-geopolitical-pivot/">U.S.-led security cooperation</a> in the Indo-Pacific region. It entails a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/05/south-korea-mood-north-korea-weapons/1d4d0884-c495-11ee-bbc9-9b5ca9b20779_story.html">more demanding stance toward North Korea’s</a> denuclearization and a watchful eye on China and its <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-chinese-warships-near-miss-in-taiwan-strait-hints-at-ongoing-troubled-diplomatic-waters-despite-chatter-about-talks-207099">increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea</a>. </p>
<p>The approach culminated in a historic Camp David summit in 2023 aimed at solidifying relations between <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-south-korea-japan-agree-crisis-consultations-camp-david-summit-2023-08-18/">South Korea and Japan</a>.</p>
<p>Such rapprochement with Japan has <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230712000396">won Yoon plaudits in the U.S</a>.</p>
<p>But it has done nothing to improve his popularity back home. In South Korea there is growing disapproval of Yoon’s leadership. Critics point to an illiberal streak in his <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3233552/south-korea-us-japan-ties-deepen-yoon-uses-anti-communist-rhetoric-decide-whos-friend-or-foe">rhetoric and policies</a>, which has included attacks on his critics and the media. It has, they contend, contributed to a <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-worrying-democratic-erosions-in-south-korea">worrying trend of democratic erosion</a> in Korea. Yoon’s <a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/south-korean-president-sees-support-slide-after-dior-bag-uproar-1.2029826">poll ratings are sinking</a> at a time when his conservative party seeks control of parliament in elections slated for April 10, 2024.</p>
<p>As scholars who study <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=eKMLsOoAAAAJ&hl=en">democratization and authoritarian politics</a> and <a href="https://search.asu.edu/profile/4857318">modern Korea</a>,
we are watching as these concerns grow in the run-up to the <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/South-Korea-opposition-wins-by-election-in-blow-to-Yoon">parliamentary elections</a>. That vote will prove a test of the popular support for Yoon, his domestic agenda and his vision for South Korea’s more outward-looking international role. </p>
<h2>Japan is ‘now our partner’</h2>
<p>Yoon struck a raw nerve in an Aug. 15, 2023, speech celebrating National Liberation Day in Korea, in which he <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230815002000315">affirmed the country’s partnership with neighboring Japan</a>. He said the country’s former colonial occupier is “now our partner, sharing universal values and pursuing common interests,” and emphasized that “as security and economic partners, Korea and Japan will cooperate with a forward-looking approach, contributing to global peace and prosperity.”</p>
<p>His remarks were <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-South-Korea-ties/Yoon-riles-foes-by-extending-olive-branch-to-Japan-in-speech">met with public outrage</a>, especially given their timing: National Liberation Day commemorates Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule, which lasted from 1910 to 1945. </p>
<p>The Japanese occupation was brutal, simultaneously exploiting Korean women – as evident in the use of so-called “<a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/09/guide-understanding-history-comfort-women-issue">comfort women</a>,” or military sexual slaves – and treating Koreans generally as second-class citizens, all the while pushing obligatory assimilation into Japanese civilization on the occupied population.</p>
<p>Attempts by the Japanese colonial regime at erasing a separate Korean identity and culture – this included banning the teaching of the Korean language and coercing Koreans to adopt Japanese names, along with the violent suppression of independence movements – left deep scars on the collective Korean psyche.</p>
<p>For many Koreans, watching their country join Japan in <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/">a trilateral partnership</a> with the U.S. is too much to accept. </p>
<h2>Emergence of pro-Japan voices</h2>
<p>Yoon and his conservative administration’s foreign policy goals are based not on nationalism but on what has been described as “<a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/07/05/yoon-vows-to-build-a-value-based-alliance-with-washington/">a value-based alliance” with Washington</a>. This stance is at odds with the nationalist focus often seen in the right-wing politics of other countries.</p>
<p>Indeed, in South Korea it is the political left that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2023.103039">increasingly identifies with a form of nationalism</a>. Meanwhile, the “New Right” in South Korea has correspondingly embraced an anti-nationalist stance, specifically <a href="https://read.dukeupress.edu/journal-of-asian-studies/article-abstract/80/4/889/320818/An-Old-Right-in-New-Bottles-State-without-Nation">attacking anti-Japanese sentiment</a>.</p>
<p>Since the early 2000s, Korean conservatives have increasingly distanced themselves from nationalism, particularly of the anti-Japanese variety. If, as theorists such as <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Nations_and_Nationalism.html?id=jl7t2yMfxwIC">Ernest Gellner</a> have argued, modern nationalism is based on the presumed unity of state and nation, political developments in Korea since 1980 have destabilized this relationship.</p>
<p>After the <a href="https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/gi-wook-shin-gwangju-and-south-korea%E2%80%99s-democracy">bloodshed of the Gwangju Massacre in 1980</a>, during which the state killed hundreds of its own citizens, leftist nationalists argued that the South Korean state was neither the representative or defender of the Korean nation.</p>
<p>Rather, they saw the South Korean state’s inheritance of institutions and personnel from the Japanese colonial government, alongside the hegemonic presence of the United States in Korea – <a href="https://www.hamptonthink.org/read/from-stolen-land-to-riches-us-neo-colonialism-in-south-korea">characterized as “neocolonial</a>” by some – as diluting the state’s nationalist credentials.</p>
<p>In contrast, conservatives defended the South Korean authoritarian state’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-asian-studies/article/abs/an-old-right-in-new-bottles-state-without-nation-in-south-korean-new-right-historiography/E9951071B74D329266F850B11874FC62">legitimacy and its legacies</a>. They argued that authoritarian rule was responsible for the rapid economic growth that allowed South Koreans to live in prosperity.</p>
<p>As part of their defense of Korea’s legacy and attack on a political left increasingly identified with nationalism, conservatives embraced an anti-nationalist stance, specifically <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Japan-South-Korea-rift/South-Korean-bestseller-attacking-anti-Japan-tribalism-stirs-debate">attacking anti-Japanese rhetoric</a>. This has involved downplaying the negative effects of Japan’s colonial rule in Korea between 1910 and 1945 and even rejecting the validity of Korean comfort women testimonies. One additional motivation for conservatives has been to justify the achievements of right-wing heroes such as former dictator Park Chung Hee. Park, who has been credited with jump-starting Korea’s economic growth, has been <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190307-enemy-within-shadow-japanese-past-hangs-over-korea">castigated by nationalists as a pro-Japanese collaborator</a> due to his having been <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674659865">trained in the Manchurian and Japanese military academies during the 1940s</a>.</p>
<p>Starting around the turn of the century, there has been a gradual increase in the frequency and intensity of pro-Japan voices. Far-right organizations, such as the <a href="https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/647783.html">Republic of Korea Mom’s Brigade</a>, have since the 2010s organized rallies in defense of Japanese colonialism. More recently, far-right groups have <a href="https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1026135.html">systematically disrupted</a> so-called <a href="https://thesoulofseoul.net/korean-comfort-women-wednesday-protests/">Wednesday Demonstrations</a> – a protest that has been continually held for over 30 years in front of the Japanese embassy in Korea to demand that Japan address the comfort women issue.</p>
<p>In a 2019 bestselling book, conservatives even attacked anti-Japanese nationalism as <a href="https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/911772.html">a form of “tribalism” on the left</a>. It is in this context of the growing prominence of pro-Japan voices that Yoon, in a 2023 <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/24/south-korea-president-yoon-biden-summit/">interview with The Washington Post</a>, expressed that he “could not accept the notion that Japan must kneel because of what happened 100 years ago.”</p>
<h2>Attacks on critics and fake news</h2>
<p>Yoon embodies this reorientation of Korean conservative ideology and foreign policy that rejects nationalism in favor of closer relations with Japan, especially in the context of alignment with the U.S. against the threat of North Korea and China. The approach has seen Yoon <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/U.S.-Congress-to-invite-South-Korea-s-Yoon-for-address-with-eye-on-China">embraced by American policymakers</a>.</p>
<p>Yet his popularity at home has fallen from an approval rating of above 50% in mid-2022 to <a href="https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-02-02/national/politics/President-Yoons-approval-rating-hits-ninemonth-low/1973331">29% at the beginning of February 2024</a>, although it has since picked up a little. </p>
<p>At first glance, his foreign policy seems to support liberal and democratic values. However, in domestic matters there has been growing concern that his rhetoric and policies reflect an <a href="https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1104533.html">illiberal character</a>.</p>
<p>Examples include <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/09/22/asia-pacific/politics/yoon-rally-conservative-base/">labeling his opponents as “communists</a>” and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/under-yoon-south-korea-defamation-cases-against-media-rise-/7388864.html">attacks on the media and “fake news</a>.”</p>
<p>This is perhaps unsurprising; the nature of Korean conservatism is <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2023.2301330?src=">deeply rooted in authoritarianism</a>. </p>
<p>The Biden administration is keen to present Yoon differently – as an ally, along with Japan, in the protection of Asia’s democracies. But this says more about a U.S. foreign policy that centers China as a threat than it does Yoon’s actual commitment to democratic freedoms.</p>
<p>To a South Korea audience, however, Yoon’s position on Japan only adds to general concern over his <a href="https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1104533.html">illiberal tendencies</a> ahead of April’s vote – the first general parliamentary elections during Yoon’s tenure.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: The article was updated on March 7, 2024 to clarify Park Chung Hee’s World War II record.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220898/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Critics of the South Korean leader accuse him of eroding democracy at home while embracing a historic enemy on the international stage.Myunghee Lee, Assistant Professor, Michigan State UniversitySungik Yang, Assistant Professor of History, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226412024-02-14T20:50:30Z2024-02-14T20:50:30ZHow policy in North Korea is affected by politics in South Korea – and vice versa<p>In a speech delivered at the Supreme People’s Assembly in January, North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-Un, stated that reunification with South Korea was no longer possible and that their neighbour should now represent the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-67990948">“primary foe and invariable principal enemy”</a>.</p>
<p>This amounted to a rare foreign policy pivot by Pyongyang, which consistently aimed for reunification of the peninsula since it was divided in the armistice that ended the 1950-1953 war.</p>
<p>Pyongyang’s new position towards the South has been widely interpreted as evidence of warmongering on the part of the North. The South, by contrast, is almost always portrayed as a benign neighbour and an unwilling target for threats of aggression. But it’s not as simple as that. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-nuclear-proliferation-and-why-the-madman-theory-is-wrong-about-kim-jong-un-167939">North Korea, nuclear proliferation and why the 'madman theory' is wrong about Kim Jong-un</a>
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<p>When it comes to North Korea’s foreign policy shifts, political developments and public opinion in the South plays a key – if often understated – role. Pyongyang must also take domestic factors into consideration when making statements about peninsular relations.</p>
<h2>Politics in South Korea</h2>
<p>Relations with the North are one of the most contentious issues in South Korean politics. Changes in power between political parties can often result in policy pivots in Seoul from hostility to reconciliation and back to hostility. Efforts towards friendlier peninsular relations are known as the “sunshine policy” in Seoul.</p>
<p>South Korea’s presidential system limits presidents to a single five-year term. This means that presidents interested in improving relations with Pyongyang only have a few years to make progress before leaving office. For continuity to be guaranteed, the incumbent president is reliant upon their successor being similarly minded and possibly even part of the diplomatic team in a junior or advisory role and so already known to North Koreans. </p>
<p>These circumstances are difficult to manufacture though. Meaning that most of what is agreed by the South during friendlier times amounts to minor or temporary bridge building, which is a considerable frustration to the North.</p>
<p>For example, Pyongyang and Seoul made strides towards better relations during the recent five-year presidency of Moon Jae-in between 2017 and 2022. This led to the landmark moment in April 2018 when the two leaders met at the Demilitarised Zone along the 38th parallel. Each leader <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-43920740">stepped into the other’s country</a>. Indeed, at the subsequent press event Kim spoke – albeit clumsily from notes and with his head down – of the two Koreas as “one nation” and of his personal desire to see reunification. Moon made similar utterances of further cooperation.</p>
<p>Moon’s efforts towards dialogue with the North – without receiving from Pyongyang any concrete commitments to denuclearisation in return – was widely criticised as weakness by his opponents. It was one of the main reasons his democratic party lost the 2022 presidential election. Critics even referred to Moon’s efforts as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/northkorea-missiles-southkorea-moon-idINKCN1BF1L7/">“moonshine policy”</a> in reference to the illegal homemade liquor guaranteed to induce intoxication.</p>
<p>When it comes to the South’s attitude towards the North, it’s important to realise that weapons manufacturers engage in sophisticated and well-funded <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jun/06/geoff-hoon-accused-of-directing-illegal-south-korea-lobbying">lobbying efforts</a> around the world. These are usually accompanied by mainstream news and social media campaigns and thinktank reports, reflecting a vested interest for some in keeping tensions high for financial gain.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of Moon’s presidency, the new administration of Yoon Suk Yeol of the People Power Party (from 2022 to the present) has taken a much tougher stance on North Korea. He has demanded “denuclearization first”, before any warming of relations. Yoon has also <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-64100974">been critical</a> of the South’s military capacity to deal with North Korean aggression and has pledged to increasing spending on technological advancements.</p>
<p>To this end, the fluctuating position of the South towards the North, alongside the limitations to progress caused by its political system, ought to receive greater recognition as a contributing factor to Pyongyang’s decision to declare the prospect of reunification to be dead.</p>
<h2>Domestic concerns in the North</h2>
<p>North Korea is one of the <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/book/9780300217810/">most militarised societies</a> in the world. This occurs in two ways. First, on account of the number of people whose livelihoods are attached to a thriving military in one form or another. And second, in terms of the important cultural space that the military takes within public life.</p>
<p>The North Korean military is widely revered and adored inside the country. The state-controlled mainstream media do not criticise the military, although they will acknowledge when missile tests, for example, are unsuccessful. Evening entertainment on North Korean television is regularly an assemble of military choirs or military personnel completing assault courses and other athletic challenges. </p>
<p>Public holidays such as September 9 (the anniversary of the founding of the Republic in 1948) are usually accompanied by military pageantry and news of a substantial military development – like the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37314927">successful test</a> of a nuclear bomb on September 9 2016.</p>
<p>Estimates are that around 20% to 25% of North Korea’s GDP is <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/northkorea/26220.htm#:%7E:text=North%20Korea%20now%20has%20the,in%20the%20regular%20armed%20forces.">taken up by military expenditure</a>, with more then spent by the state manufacturing military prestige through popular culture media content and the broadcasting of pageantry. By comparison, most western European countries spend between <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/feb/01/europe-defence-army-us-donald-trump-eu">1% and 3% of GDP per annum</a> in peacetime on military matters and there is greater cultural space for a range of views on the military.</p>
<p>Therefore, it should be acknowledged that Kim Jong-un faces domestic pressures if he is to preserve the power of his family’s dynasty. He must be seen to act decisively and he must have a prestigious military announcement for high-profile speeches on national holidays. </p>
<p>This is a situation that he inherited from his father and grandfather. But he has shown no sign of wanting it to change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222641/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Colin Alexander does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The two countries watch each other’s policy shifts very carefully and respond accordingly.Colin Alexander, Senior Lecturer in Political Communications, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231292024-02-14T16:56:01Z2024-02-14T16:56:01ZNorth Korea steps up efforts to stamp out consumption of illegal foreign media – but entertainment-hungry citizens continue to flout the ban<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575396/original/file-20240213-26-yfm4hy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C284%2C3456%2C2012&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People walking on the street in Pyongyang, North Korea, August 2012.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/pyongyang-north-korea-aug-2012-local-1308095560">Chintung Lee/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Consuming and sharing foreign media in North Korea can be punishable by death. But that did not stop <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2024/02/north-koreans-consumption-of-foreign-media-grows-over-last-decade-survey/">more than 83%</a> of those who escaped the country between 2016 and 2020 using increasingly sophisticated means to access foreign music, TV shows and films before they left.</p>
<p>According to a survey report that was released by the South Korean Ministry of Unification, illegal media consumption among those who left in the five years up to 2020 increased by 15% compared with the previous five-year period.</p>
<p>Since the mid-1990s, over 34,000 North Koreans have defected to South Korea. However, North Korea closed its borders during the COVID pandemic, and since then the steady flow of escapees has <a href="https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/">slowed considerably</a>.</p>
<p>The number of informants has dropped and the information they bring may be somewhat dated by the time they reach the South. But many tell a <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/book/9780300217810/north-koreas-hidden-revolution/">common story</a> of huddling around a TV or laptop behind locked doors, consuming foreign media that was smuggled into North Korea on USB sticks and SD cards.</p>
<p>Escapees also tell how knowledge of the outside has changed North Korean consumer behaviour, relationships and trust in the Kim family’s regime. This has prompted North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, to adopt increasingly harsh measures to combat access to illegal media.</p>
<h2>Crackdown</h2>
<p><a href="https://en.tjwg.org/publications/">Research</a> that I conducted with my colleagues in 2019 while working for a human rights documentation NGO in South Korea found that public execution had been used by the North Korean state against people convicted of consuming or disseminating foreign media. The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-68015652">BBC reported</a> one such case having recently taken place. </p>
<p>Forcing friends and neighbours to <a href="https://en.tjwg.org/publications/">witness the punishment</a> of those known to them for such a crime is a powerful deterrent deployed by a state that considers outside knowledge a <a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/44120">profound threat</a> to its ideology and the control of its people. </p>
<p>Shortly after inheriting the leadership in 2011, Kim tried a number of relatively soft approaches to controlling foreign media access, alongside continued punitive measures. They included a suite of <a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/44120">information strategies</a> aimed at making North Korea appear competitive and attractive in the eyes of its citizens, capable of producing its own “popular” content to rival the <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781351104128/south-korean-popular-culture-north-korea-youna-kim?refId=31ae7775-0a75-452a-bc83-dc4d7619c047&context=ubx">mighty force</a> of the (South) “Korean Wave”. </p>
<p>More recently, the North Korean government has capitalised on its <a href="https://www.nknews.org/pro/new-dprk-border-security-and-infrastructure-revealed-by-satellite-imagery/d-chinese-border-security-hurts-north-koreans/">border closure</a> to work harder than ever to keep foreign information out of the country. In 2020, it introduced a new “Law on the Elimination of Reactionary Thought and Culture”. This law sets out specific punishments for both viewers and distributors of foreign media, going further than the existing criminal code. </p>
<p>At the same time, Kim has <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/k-drama-takes-dark-turn">publicly condemned</a> K-Pop (pop music originating in South Korea) as a “vicious cancer” permeating North Korean society.</p>
<h2>Changing hearts and minds</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.nkmillennials.com/">Testimonies</a> published by organisations working with North Korean escapees show that consumption of South Korean television dramas has inspired young North Koreans to copy the fashion choices and catchphrases popularised by key characters.</p>
<p>North Korean escapees have also <a href="https://www.nkmillennials.com/">reported</a> paying keen attention to the settings they saw in films and dramas. Modern streets, cars and homes, with people displaying relative freedom of choice, expression and movement, all offer North Koreans a glimpse into life under capitalism.</p>
<p>These depictions profoundly contradict the state’s narrative. North Korea presents the South as a depraved hellhole where people are ideologically corrupt and languishing in poverty. </p>
<p>A recent video from North Korea shown to me by the <a href="https://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/index.do">Korea Institute for National Unification</a> shows that the new law on foreign media and culture is being accompanied by television campaigns. These campaigns harshly name and shame citizens seen wearing clothing in foreign styles, particularly with English language writing or slogans – the language of the “American bastards”. </p>
<p>A similar campaign condemns young North Koreans for showing affection in public and mimicking “western style” dating culture. Such behaviour is criticised as corrupt and destructive to North Korean societal purity.</p>
<h2>Building social bonds</h2>
<p>Consuming foreign media does more than just cause North Koreans to question their government’s claim that they live in an “ideal” society, striving to attain a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/03/north-koreas-kim-jong-un-opens-new-city-and-socialist-utopia-of-samjiyon">socialist utopia</a>. It also unsettles the government’s ability to maintain a culture of suspicion and mistrust between citizens. This could potentially <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2023/03/friendship-and-family-networks-are-key-to-getting-outside-info-to-north-koreans/">generate social change</a>. </p>
<p>When asked about his experience watching foreign media with friends and family before his escape, one North Korean man <a href="https://www.nkmillennials.com/">said</a>: “If you’ve watched it together, then no one would report it. They’d go down for it too.” For some North Koreans, consuming foreign media is an activity that builds closeness through shared indulgence in an illegal act.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="North Korean soldiers guarding a border fence." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575571/original/file-20240214-28-yvw98y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575571/original/file-20240214-28-yvw98y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575571/original/file-20240214-28-yvw98y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575571/original/file-20240214-28-yvw98y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575571/original/file-20240214-28-yvw98y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575571/original/file-20240214-28-yvw98y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575571/original/file-20240214-28-yvw98y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">North Korea’s borders have been closed since January 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/hyesan-ryanggang-province-north-korea-august-698336161">Stefan Bruder/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Foreign diplomats, humanitarian aid workers and tourists are not yet allowed back into North Korea following the pandemic. So, combined with many fewer escapees arriving in the South, it is difficult to know whether foreign media access and consumption has declined since 2020. </p>
<p>But the Ministry of Unification has pledged to <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2024/02/north-koreans-consumption-of-foreign-media-grows-over-last-decade-survey/">offer an update</a> in a year’s time to evaluate the effect of the new law against foreign culture and the campaign around it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223129/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah A. Son does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A survey shows the impact foreign media is having on North Korea’s residents, despite the government’s harsh crackdownSarah A. Son, Senior Lecturer in Korean Studies, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2221832024-02-06T15:58:28Z2024-02-06T15:58:28ZNorth Korea has demolished its monument to reunification but it can’t fully erase the dream<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573050/original/file-20240202-27-xopp8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=50%2C49%2C971%2C610&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://bjornfree.com/kim/">Bjørn Christian Tørrissen</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>North Korea has <a href="https://www.chosun.com/politics/north_korea/2024/01/24/WSRI6MUUQNG63BCQGXK24QLCYU/">demolished</a> the Arch of Reunification, a monument that symbolised hope for reconciliation with the South. The decision to demolish the monument came shortly after the regime’s leader, Kim Jong-un, delivered a <a href="https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1705369092-194545332/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-makes-policy-speech-at-10th-session-of-14th-spa/">speech</a> declaring it an “eyesore”. </p>
<p>In the same speech, Kim said that the peaceful reunification of the two Koreas, which have <a href="https://www.history.com/news/north-south-korea-divided-reasons-facts">remained divided</a> since August 1945, was no longer possible and called for an amendment to the North Korean constitution to reflect South Korea’s status as his country’s “principal enemy”. </p>
<p>Unveiled in 2001, the Arch of Reunification <a href="https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1452002412-480315630/monument-to-three-charters-for-national-reunification-erected/">featured</a> two Korean women wearing traditional dresses – called <em>hanbok</em> (한복 “Korean clothes”) in South Korea and <em>chosŏn-ot</em> (조선옷 “Korean clothes”) in the North. The women jointly held up an image of the unified Korean peninsula, reflecting the North Korean government’s genuine desire at the time to reunify the two countries.</p>
<p>This is not the first time North Korea has destroyed symbols of Korean cooperation, dialogue and hope for unification. In June 2020, North Korea recorded and released <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-53060620">footage</a> of it blowing up a joint liaison office with South Korea near the border town of Kaesong. The site was opened to help the the two countries communicate. </p>
<p>The following year, in August 2021, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nkorea-says-inter-korean-hotlines-will-be-restored-monday-kcna-2021-10-03/">North Korea severed</a> the Inter-Korean hotline – a series of over 40 telephone lines that connect North and South Korea – in protest against military drills jointly undertaken by South Korea and the US. Kim did, however, restore the hotlines two months later and urged Seoul to step up efforts to improve relations.</p>
<p>The Arch of Reunification’s demolition signals North Korea’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/16/unification-with-south-korea-no-longer-possible-says-kim-jong-un">determination</a> to brand reunification as impossible. But, despite the physical erasure of this monument, its depiction on five official postage stamps serves to immortalise the monument and what it symbolised.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A postage stamp depicting the Arch of Reunification against a clear blue sky." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">North Korean postage stamp issued on 30 May 2002 to mark the 30th anniversary of the Joint Declaration by North and South Korea for reunification.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Hall</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Propaganda postage stamps</h2>
<p>Postage stamps function not only as items that display the paying of postage rates, but also as small carriers of propaganda messages. They have, in the past, been described as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200948401900204">“ambassadors”</a> conveying official viewpoints, and <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1014307914500">“windows of the state”</a> that illustrate how it wishes to be seen by its own citizens and those beyond its boundaries. </p>
<p>In most authoritarian states, revisions to official party narratives require the alteration and removal of symbols associated with the previous narrative. The most <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4209080">notable example</a> of this is the removal of former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s name from many cities and landmarks following his death in 1953. </p>
<p>This formed part of the de-Stalinisation movement in the late 1950s and dismantled Stalin’s “cult of personality”. Stalin had used art and popular culture to improve his status as leader and inspire loyalty. </p>
<p>In a similar way, the official North Korean postage stamp <a href="http://www.korstamp.com.kp/">catalogue</a> removed five stamps from its listings that depicted the Arch of Reunification. Stamp catalogues provide information relating to when stamps were issued, who designed them, their dimensions and colour. Having this information is important when collecting and analysing them.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A postage stamp depicting the Arch of Reunification against red background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=258&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=258&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=258&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">North Korean postage stamp issued on 25 July 2016 to mark the 7th Congress of the Worker’s Party of Korea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Hall</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It’s not certain exactly when the stamps were removed. But <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/changes/http://www.korstamp.com.kp/home/index-en.html">Wayback Machine</a> (a digital archive of the World Wide Web) indicates there was a change to the website on January 19, placing the change squarely within the timeframe of Kim’s speech and the <a href="https://www.chosun.com/politics/north_korea/2024/01/24/WSRI6MUUQNG63BCQGXK24QLCYU/">reported demolition</a> of the monument. All visual and textual references to the stamps have been removed from the website.</p>
<p>NK News also <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/why-north-korean-websites-are-suddenly-vanishing-from-the-internet/">reported</a> around this time that North Korea was purging propaganda websites of old content, suggesting a rewriting of the official narrative. </p>
<p>There is precedent for this. North Korea has previously removed listings from its official stamp catalogues after they have been issued because they run contrary to new state narratives.</p>
<p>In 1960, for example, North Korea released a set of five stamps celebrating the <a href="https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/landing/article.kci?arti_id=ART002723908">reconstruction of Pyongyang</a> after the Korean War (1950–1953). Two of the place names shown on the stamps, “Mao Zedong Square” and “Stalin Street”, were later renamed “Triumph Arc Square” and “Victory Street”. However, as the stamps issued in 1960 contained the original names, their visual depictions in subsequently published stamp catalogues were not included.</p>
<h2>The reunification dream lives on</h2>
<p>The Arch of Reunification was first depicted on a North Korean postage stamp in May 2002, almost one year after its unveiling. But the monument has been depicted more recently, on two stamps issued in 2015, and two more stamps issued in 2016 and 2021 respectively.</p>
<p>North Korea is seeking to erase any remnant of the Arch of Reunification’s depiction. But, unfortunately for North Korea, these stamps exist in the private collections of foreign stamp collectors. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A North Korean postage stamp issued in 2021." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">North Korean postage stamps issued on 20 February 2021 to mark the 8th Congress of the Worker’s Party of Korea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Hall</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The stamps were released to the world through Korea Stamp Corporation (North Korea’s state-run postal authority) offices in Russia and China at the time of issue. These stamps can still easily be bought from stamp dealers on online platforms such as eBay. </p>
<p>For that reason, North Korea can never fully erase these depictions of the unification dream as it doesn’t have full control over how its state narrative is presented and potentially altered.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222183/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Arch of Reunification has been destroyed – reversing decades of government policy targeting eventual reunification with the South.David Hall, PhD Candidate in Korean Studies, University of Central LancashireLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2214572024-01-24T13:29:26Z2024-01-24T13:29:26ZDomestic woes put Kim Jong Un on the defensive – and the offensive – in the Korean Peninsula<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570985/original/file-20240123-29-kr6fby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C3595%2C2396&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on a screen at the Seoul Railway Station on Aug. 24, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-watch-a-television-broadcast-showing-a-file-image-of-news-photo/1634983526?adppopup=true">Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kim Jong Un has had a busy and bellicose start to 2024. </p>
<p>On Jan. 14, the North Korean leader presided over the test of a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-defines-south-korea-most-hostile-state-kcna-2024-01-09/">new solid-fuel hypersonic missile with intermediate range</a>.” Two days later, during a speech at the Supreme People’s Assembly meeting in Pyongyang, Kim declared South Korea “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/16/asia/north-korea-kim-unification-arch-intl-hnk/index.html">the North’s primary foe and invariable principal enemy</a>.” He also vowed to “<a href="https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/north-korea-to-destroy-inter-korean-links-redefine-borders-in-constitution/">purge unification language from the constitution</a>” and called for the destruction of “inter-Korean symbols,” such as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-tears-down-monument-symbolizing-union-with-south-report-2024-01-23/">Arch of Reunification monument</a>, which has since been torn down in Pyongyang.</p>
<p>Then Kim went a step further: He spoke of war. </p>
<p>Noting that while North Korea does not want conflict, the communist country nevertheless had no “<a href="https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/north-korea-to-destroy-inter-korean-links-redefine-borders-in-constitution/">intention of avoiding it</a>.” Kim went on to disclose the North’s plans to “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-calls-change-status-south-warns-war-2024-01-15/">occupy, subjugate and reclaim</a>” South Korea in the event of war. </p>
<p>Kim’s remarks served to escalate inter-Korean tensions in a way familiar to observers of relations on the peninsula, <a href="https://www.ubalt.edu/cpa/faculty/alphabetical-directory/nusta-carranza-ko.cfm">like myself</a>. Kim has a tendency to issue threats directed at the South <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/new-year-same-old-story-korean-peninsula-2024">at regular intervals</a>. </p>
<p>The difference, this time, was the backstory behind Kim’s threats. Understanding that shines a light on North Koreans’ awareness of deficiencies in their leadership – and on Kim’s desire to deflect from domestic problems.</p>
<h2>A train wreck</h2>
<p>On Jan. 16, 2024, <a href="https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/trainaccident-01162024092147.html">Radio Free Asia</a> published a news story about a train accident in North Korea. According to the outlet, a Hamkyung Province-bound passenger train departing from Pyongyang overturned due to a power shortage while traveling up a steep slope on Dec. 26, 2023.</p>
<p>North Korean passenger trains typically <a href="https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/trainaccident-01162024092147.html">consist of nine to 11 carriages</a>, with the first two carriages reserved for high-level government officials. In this accident, the last seven carriages – loaded with everyday Koreans – derailed, according to reports. It is believed that <a href="https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25222782#home">hundreds died as a result</a>.</p>
<p>The details of the accident remain murky because news in North Korea is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16255126">tightly controlled</a>. Some <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1NuHt88WV8">South Korean reports</a> suggest that it may have been a bus and not a train accident. But Kim was careful to point out the need to “<a href="https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25222782#home">improve safety of train rides</a>, during his Jan. 16 address, lending further weight to the train accident account.</p>
<h2>From crash to war threats</h2>
<p>The reported accident comes at a time of increased <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/19/north-korean-defectors-to-south-tripled-in-2023-seoul-says">awareness and discontent</a> among North Koreans that their leadership is not doing much to improve conditions, address the <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/North-Korea-struggles-with-food-shortage-despite-import-rebound">scarcity of resources</a> or enhance the safety of average citizens. This is particularly true for those who are not part of the <a href="https://www.bushcenter.org/freedom-collection/kim-seong-min-songbun">ruling elite</a>. </p>
<p>In various surveys conducted by human rights groups of <a href="https://nkdb.org/publication/?q=YToxOntzOjEyOiJrZXl3b3JkX3R5cGUiO3M6MzoiYWxsIjt9&bmode=view&idx=6613026&t=board">North Koreans who have fled to South Korea</a>, escapees mentioned both the dire living conditions of average North Koreans and the gap between their lives and those of high-level government officials.</p>
<p>The current crisis facing North Koreans may not be as acute as the <a href="https://www.38north.org/2023/01/food-insecurity-in-north-korea-is-at-its-worst-since-the-1990s-famine">period of severe famine</a> during the 1990s, during which an estimated
<a href="https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/7850/1/0000599140.pdf">600,000 to 1 million</a> people died.</p>
<p>But power shortages and food insecurity continue to blight North Koreans. The United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on North Korean Human Rights <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15387.doc.htm">highlighted in a 2023 report</a> conditions in which "some people are starving” and others are dying “"due to a combination of malnutrition, diseases and lack of access to health care.”</p>
<p>In such circumstances, the train accident may serve as a catalyst or focal point for discontent.</p>
<p>As social change scholar Jack Goldstone has noted, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780199858507.003.0002">societal unrest builds on</a> “some form of increasingly widespread popular anger at injustice” and when people feel “they are losing their proper place in society for reasons that are not inevitable and not their fault.”</p>
<h2>A master of deflection</h2>
<p>Worryingly for Kim, disquiet over both the train crash report and food and energy shortages comes as North Korea enters what experts have noted is “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-power-structure">a critical period of change</a>” in the state. Kim is faced with a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/music-ap-top-news-north-korea-international-news-kim-jong-un-32ef1db725824060bbed9074128d6875">younger generation</a> more used to market economics – typified by the “<a href="https://austriancenter.com/north-korea-black-markets-saving-lives/">jangmadang” black markets</a> – and with greater access to external information. This clashes with the regime’s official ideology of economic <a href="https://www.time.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/korea1.pdf">self-reliance, or “juche</a>,” and an isolationist approach that cuts off much of the outside world.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A missile is seen being fired into the air trailed by a plume of smoke." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspecting the launch of a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/at-seouls-yongsan-railway-station-shows-north-korean-leader-news-photo/1859975434?adppopup=true">Kim Jae-Hwan/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Kim is aware of this new frontier in governance. To confront it, he has readopted the “<a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/byungjin.htm">byungjin” policy</a> he first rolled out in 2013 — a two-pillared approach based on building up both the military and the economy in a bid to reduce chances for domestic discontent. </p>
<p>To successfully carry out this policy, Kim has had to become a master of deflection.</p>
<p>He is aware that the train incident comes amid <a href="https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/peoplecontrol-01162024091639.html">discontent and protest</a> over policies that have seen increased government surveillance and people’s homes raided over suspicion of anti-socialist tendencies.</p>
<p>As such, Kim appears to be deflecting domestic anger by signaling war and creating uncertainty for North Koreans’ future. This is similar to what <a href="https://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Economics/Seminarsevents/Guriev-Micro.pdf">scholars explain</a> is a characteristic of new-style dictators who “manipulate beliefs” about the state of the world to make it look like outside threats are greater than domestic problems.</p>
<h2>International playbook</h2>
<p>The truth is, for Kim this deflection appears to be working. The war rhetoric has resulted in U.S., Japan and South Korea conducting combined naval exercises involving <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/us-south-korea-japan-conduct-naval-drills-tensions-106434423">American aircraft carriers</a>. Meanwhile, North Korea sent its foreign minister to Russia to cultivate bilateral relations that involve North Korean <a href="https://www.voakorea.com/a/7444240.html">weaponry used in the war against Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>No one – North Korean news outlets, foreign journalists or world leaders – is mentioning the hundreds of people that likely died in the train accident, or those starving in the country.</p>
<p>Kim’s deflection also has an intended audience outside of North Korea itself: U.S. politicians and the South Korean public.</p>
<p>The Biden administration has <a href="https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1089850.html">adopted a more hawkish</a> stance toward North Korea, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/13/trump-north-korea-nuclear-weapons-plan-00131469">moving closer to allies</a> Japan and South Korea to ensure a coordinated approach to North Korea. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Biden’s likely challenger in the upcoming presidential vote is Donald Trump – who as president met Kim during a 2018 Singapore summit and has since touted the idea of allowing North Korea to keep its nuclear weapons while offering financial incentives to <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/13/trump-north-korea-nuclear-weapons-plan-00131469">stop making new bombs</a>.</p>
<p>Trump has stressed how much he has gotten to know the North Korean leader and the “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/09/trump-book-kim-jong-un-00086410">great relationship</a>” he has formed with him. There is a scenario where Kim’s belligerent rhetoric could be seized by Trump as evidence that Biden’s approach is not working.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, South Korea’s legislative <a href="https://www.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no=2024011601070130103001">elections are also impacted</a> by Kim’s deflection tactics. The declaration of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/16/asia/north-korea-kim-unification-arch-intl-hnk/index.html">South Korea as the “enemy</a>,” and the launch of missiles are designed, in part, to influence the South Korean public’s perception about security on the peninsula. </p>
<p>Evans Revere, a former State Department official, explains that Kim’s remarks are “<a href="https://www.voakorea.com/a/7443247.html">designed to exploit political divisions</a>” in South Korea. In this kind of environment of war rhetoric, voters could be persuaded to support political parties that stress engagement and are less likely to support current President Yoon Suk Yeol’s party’s <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/South-Korea-picks-hard-liner-as-new-North-Korea-point-man">hardline approach</a> to North Korean matters.</p>
<p>For Kim, a South Korean legislative body that is willing to tolerate his whims is more favorable than one critical of its regime, as is a friendlier man in the White House.</p>
<p>Kim Jong Un’s deflection certainly has more than one audience, but only one aim: to keep him in power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221457/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ñusta Carranza Ko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Amid signs of growing domestic disquiet over his repressive regime, North Korea’s leader is trying to deflect scrutiny by upping war rhetoric.Ñusta Carranza Ko, Assistant Professor of Global Affairs and Human Security, University of BaltimoreLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2209262024-01-16T14:55:36Z2024-01-16T14:55:36ZWhy South Korea is banning the sale of dog meat<p>The South Korean dog meat trade will officially end in 2027 after a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/09/south-korea-votes-to-ban-production-and-sale-of-dog-meat">bill was passed</a> making the slaughter of dogs and the sale of dog meat for human consumption illegal in the country (though the consumption of dog meat will still be legal). People who violate this new law could be fined up to 30 million won (about £18,000) and be jailed for three years.</p>
<p>The news has been embraced in South Korea as a long-awaited victory by many animal protection organisations. But it has also been received very negatively by pro-dog-meat associations, as the livelihoods of dog meat farmers and retailers will be directly affected by this legislation. </p>
<p>Dog meat is the <a href="https://www.press.purdue.edu/9781612497075/">fourth-most consumed meat</a> in South Korea after pork, beef and chicken. However, the practice of eating dogs has been in sharp decline over the past few decades and has divided South Korean society for more than half a century. </p>
<p>For some, the trade represents resistance against cultural imperialism. For others, it is an obstacle to modernity. All the while, little attention is given to the fate of other animals whose death and commodification as meat are largely normalised and accepted.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A bowl of dog meat soup." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569279/original/file-20240115-23-jei9my.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569279/original/file-20240115-23-jei9my.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569279/original/file-20240115-23-jei9my.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569279/original/file-20240115-23-jei9my.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569279/original/file-20240115-23-jei9my.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569279/original/file-20240115-23-jei9my.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569279/original/file-20240115-23-jei9my.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bosintang is a traditional Korean soup that uses dog meat as its primary ingredient.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/boshintang-korean-soup-that-includes-dog-499106899">Fanfo/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Stigmatisation of a practice</h2>
<p>Dog consumption has a long history in Korea. Some Korean scholars point to the excavation of dog bones from Korean relics dating to the Neolithic age (roughly from 6000BC to 2000BC) as <a href="https://www.press.purdue.edu/9781612497075/">evidence</a> that dogs have been eaten since at least that period.</p>
<p>But an important moment of national and international friction around the practice occurred in the run-up to the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. The South Korean government at the time <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/D/bo3637968.html">banned the sale</a> of dog meat temporarily in the traditional markets of the capital and asked dog meat retailers to remove dog carcasses from their stalls to avoid offending foreigners. </p>
<p>This decision was <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10649867.2018.1547959">widely criticised</a> by part of South Korean civil society who saw it as a form of cultural imperialism reminiscent of colonial times when many Korean cultural traditions were erased or stigmatised. This episode aroused feelings of national pride and protection towards the consumption of dog meat.</p>
<p>It was followed by a stronger reaction during the 2002 Fifa World Cup (which was co-hosted by South Korea). Influential South Korean public and political figures <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/629658">took a public stance</a> in favour of dog meat as a national cultural symbol. </p>
<p>Tensions were further reignited before the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, a city in the country’s north-east. It was <a href="https://koreandogs.org/pc2018-sign-project/">reported</a> that the hiding of dog meat restaurant signs and dog carcasses had once again been introduced by the government. </p>
<h2>A practice in sharp decline</h2>
<p>However, there’s no denying that dog meat consumption in South Korea has slumped dramatically, particularly since 2000. In 2002, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07256868.2010.491272">3 million dogs</a> were slaughtered for consumption in South Korea per year. According to animal protection group, Kara, this had fallen to <a href="https://www.animals.or.kr/report/press/51382">just under 1 million</a> by the early 2020s – a third of what it was more than 20 years ago. </p>
<p>In recent decades, a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07256868.2010.491272">civil movement</a> led by animal protection charities has campaigned for the end of the trade. This movement has largely been supported by younger generations who, perhaps also influenced by the development of “pet culture”, are more inclined to challenge centuries of tradition than previous generations.</p>
<p>It could be argued that the COVID pandemic has also played a part in the sharp fall in dog meat consumption in recent years. Until the outbreak of COVID, live animals, including dogs, were often sold and slaughtered in traditional markets. Since then, municipal authorities have opened a dialogue with dog retailers to negotiate the demolition of dog slaughtering facilities. </p>
<p>Ongoing research conducted by one of us (Julien Dugnoille) alongside colleagues (Frédéric Keck and Miwon Seo-Plu) suggests that the pandemic may have facilitated a move away from the status quo on dog meat consumption. This shift has created a discussion around the end of the practice as a way to keep urban spaces free from the risk of diseases that can be spread between animals and humans.</p>
<h2>The perspective of the dog farmers</h2>
<p>Since 2014, some of these municipalities have agreed to compensate dog meat retailers for closing dog meat stalls in traditional markets. However, now that a full ban is coming into effect, dog meat farmers are requesting compensation schemes as this new law will directly affect their livelihoods.</p>
<p>The Korean Dog Meat Association has been <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/12/113_364963.html">arguing</a> that the bill represents an abuse of power that overlooks the perspective of many South Koreans, and that it infringes on the right to choose what one wants to eat. Last December, the Association demanded compensation for farmers of 2 million won per individual dog (about £1,200) and a grace period of ten years after the ban.</p>
<p>While the ban may be good news for Korean dogs, dog lovers and for animal protectionists, it adversely affects those whose livelihoods depend on the domestic trade and who have practised the profession for generations. </p>
<p>The change does not necessarily mean an end to the consumption of dog meat in South Korea. Dog meat consumption will continue to be lawful (presumably supplied by imported meat). </p>
<p>Still, this is a milestone for the Korean relation to dogs that cements the dog’s privileged status, in contrast to other animals whose commodification as meat remains normalised and invisible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220926/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julien Dugnoille received funding from the Korea Foundation and the Academy of Korean Studies to conduct part of the research on which this paper is based.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Knight does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new law has been introduced that officially brings dog meat to an end as a commodity in South Korea.Julien Dugnoille, Senior Lecturer in Anthropology, University of ExeterJohn Knight, Reader in Anthropology and Ethnomusicology, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2136962024-01-11T12:50:09Z2024-01-11T12:50:09ZNorth Korea ramps up military rhetoric as Kim gives up on reunification with South<p>North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un is continuing to ramp up his focus on nuclear weapons and taking a more aggressive military stance towards <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/31/asia/north-korea-reconciliation-south-korea-intl-hnk/index.html">his neighbour South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>In his 2023 year-end speech, in which he outlined his plans for 2024, Kim said inter-Korean relations had become “a relationship between two hostile countries and <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/31/asia/north-korea-reconciliation-south-korea-intl-hnk/index.html">two belligerents at war</a>”. For years Kim’s policy has been to attempt to reunify the two countries, which were separated in 1953 after the end of the Korean war. A tight <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/27/north-korea-moves-heavy-weapons-to-border-with-south">military border</a> has made it almost impossible for ordinary people to pass in or out of North Korea. </p>
<p>The North Korean leader also announced a plan to launch three new military <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/31/asia/north-korea-reconciliation-south-korea-intl-hnk/index.html">spy satellites</a> in 2024, highlighting the country’s continued focus on its space and military programmes. </p>
<p>In the first few days of January, state sources released photographs of his <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/kim-jong-un-visits-missile-launcher-factory-demands-flaws-in-production-fixed/">visit to a missile launcher factory</a>, and Kim was reported as saying North Korea <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/31/asia/north-korea-reconciliation-south-korea-intl-hnk/index.html">needed to “prepare for war”</a>.</p>
<p>In statements that showed Kim’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric, he is reported as saying that he “judged the Republic of Korea <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/kim-jong-un-visits-missile-launcher-factory-demands-flaws-in-production-fixed/">clan to be our main enemy</a>” and North Korea must keep “continuously stockpiling unparalleled overwhelming power”, due to growing hostilities with South Korea.</p>
<p>Kim’s new year’s plan was followed a few days later by North Korea firing around <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-67889551">200 artillery shells</a> towards Yeonpyeong island in South Korea. Over the days that followed it <a href="https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=182941">fired more shells</a> towards South Korea’s west coast. </p>
<p>During her <a href="https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2024/01/03/Kim-Yo-Jong-Yoon-Suk-Yeol-new-years-greeting-nuclear-weapons-threat/9961704260985">new year’s greetings</a> to South Korea, Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, who is seen as an increasingly powerful figure, issued a statement which appeared to support the pursuit of further nuclear capabilities. </p>
<p>This has prompted <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/07/17/asia-pacific/jake-sullivan-north-korea-nuclear-test">renewed discussions</a> among experts over the possibility of North Korea conducting a seventh nuclear test. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nkorea-warns-it-may-rethink-moratorium-nuclear-missile-tests-2022-01-19">last nuclear test</a> that it conducted was in 2017.</p>
<p>In 2022, North Korea <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20230928-north-korea-changes-constitution-and-declares-itself-a-nuclear-state">revised</a> its constitution to declare itself a nuclear state, and in 2023 North Korea recorded a record number of nuclear weapons tests, causing concern in South Korea and the US.</p>
<h2>Russia and North Korea</h2>
<p>Russia has moved closer to North Korea after its invasion of Ukraine. Facing international sanctions Putin has been forced to look for allies further afield, and has turned to Kim for a military weapons deal. Russia is believed to have used North Korean short-range ballistic weapons <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/05/europe/russia-north-korean-missiles-ukraine-asia-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">in attacks on Ukraine</a> on December 30 and January 2. </p>
<p>This has signalled a deepening of the relationship with Russia, as well as creating a new income stream for North Korea from military sales. Use of the missiles will also help North Korea gather information on how the weapons perform in a war-time context, something that will concern both South Korea and its allies. </p>
<p>The US State Department issued <a href="https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-dprk-russia-ballistic-missile-transfers/#:%7E:text=We%20condemn%20in%20the%20strongest,%2C%20and%20January%202%2C%202024.">a statement on behalf</a> of the US and 47 other nations condemning North Korea. It said: “Russia’s use of DPRK ballistic missiles in Ukraine also provides valuable technical and military insights to the DPRK. We are deeply concerned about the security implications that this cooperation has in Europe, on the Korean Peninsula, across the Indo-Pacific region, and around the world.” </p>
<h2>Kim’s historical position</h2>
<p>Until recently, Kim Jong-un had focused on three long-term plans. First, he sought the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-new-years-speech-n-koreas-kim-says-he-wants-peace-with-south/2013/01/01/bce3a4dc-53dd-11e2-8b9e-dd8773594efc_story.html">unification of the Korean peninsula</a> to continue his grandfather Kim Il-sung’s plans. Kim Il-sung invaded South Korea in 1950, but after a bitter conflict pitting South Korea, supported by the US, UK and United Nations, against North Korea, supported by the USSR and China, an <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/06/war-and-truce-the-korean-armistice-at-70">armistice was signed</a> in 1953. </p>
<p>Kim has also continued the work of his grandfather and father in developing North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme.</p>
<p>The North Korean leader has pursued economic development, along with military development, in previous years. But his growing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korean-special-economic-zone-poised-revival-new-russia-trade-2023-11-29/">relationship with Putin</a> could ease some of the pressures, with the special economic zone on the borders of the two countries showing signs of new investment in the port and transport.</p>
<p>Despite a struggling national economy, Kim and his inner circle still enjoy a <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2023/12/kim-jong-un-appears-to-reward-top-officials-with-luxury-mercedes-cars">luxurious lifestyle</a>, while ordinary people in North Korea are reported to be <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-65881803">starving to death</a>. </p>
<p>The country’s border is still closed, with only minimum access to other countries such as China and Russia, while self-isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-fears-of-a-new-famine-after-three-years-of-covid-isolation-and-harsh-repression-207852">devastated</a> the North Korean economy. The <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3173601/china-north-korea-trade-recovering-after-covid-induced">levels of trade</a> with China are not close to pre-pandemic levels. </p>
<p>The regime is known to make money out of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-64494094">cyber hacking</a>, but any profits seem to be spent mostly on nuclear development and Kim’s family.</p>
<p>One option that could stimulate the economy is for Kim Jong-un is to reopen his national borders, which would boost trade and tourism and help to revitalise the economy. However, opening the borders carries another threat for Kim – risking public resentment as the North Korean population becomes better aware of just how low living standards are in their country compared with their neighbours. </p>
<h2>Control of information</h2>
<p>Before the COVID-19 lockdowns, some North Koreans received financial help through <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-food-shortage-kim-jong-uns-covid-19-policy-could-lead-to-mass-starvation-162966">Jangmadang</a></em> (grey markets – literally, “outdoor market” in Korean). Some people received <a href="https://libertyinnorthkorea.org/blog/how-a-north-korean-defector-sends-money-back-home">remittances</a> from their relatives who had defected to South Korea. But since the border closure, none of those economic activities have been available. Basic support provided by humanitarian aid groups has also been <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/north-korea-facing-humanitarian-and-strategic-challenge">stopped</a>. </p>
<p>Among illegally traded items were <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-food-shortage-kim-jong-uns-covid-19-policy-could-lead-to-mass-starvation-162966">K-pop and K-dramas</a> from South Korea shared via USB or SD cards. Using illegal methods like these, South Korean culture has gradually leaked into <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003390282/international-aid-sustainable-development-north-korea-sojin-lim">North Korean society</a>, much to Kim’s <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/09/north-korea-and-china-arent-the-allies-you-think-they.html">intense disapproval</a>. </p>
<p>North Korea’s new year change of direction is causing concern in the west, but it will also be watched carefully by neighbouring China, which is wary of any threats to its regional and global power. China’s president, Xi Jinping, will be carefully <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/09/north-korea-and-china-arent-the-allies-you-think-they.html">monitoring the growing relationship</a> between Moscow and Pyongyang, and its ability to destabilise the region, or put pressure on China.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213696/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sojin Lim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kim Jong-un is continuing to release statements about a possible military conflict with South Korea.Sojin Lim, Reader in Asia Pacific Studies (with special reference to Korea), MA North Korean Studies Course Leader, Co-Director of the International Institute of Korean Studies, University of Central LancashireLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2176612024-01-08T13:35:39Z2024-01-08T13:35:39ZSouth Korea’s gender imbalance is bad news for men − outnumbering women, many face bleak marriage prospects<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563900/original/file-20231206-21-smw7n5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C5573%2C3699&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In South Korea, there are nor enough young Korean women for young Korean men to marry.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/airport-business-man-royalty-free-image/166973187?phrase=south+korea+men+together&searchscope=image%2Cfilm&adppopup=true">RUNSTUDIO/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Korea’s bachelor time bomb is about to really go off. Following a historic 30-year-long imbalance in the male-to-female sex ratio at birth, young men far outnumber young women in the country. As a result, some 700,000 to 800,000 “extra” South Korean boys born since the mid-1980s may not be able to find South Korean girls to marry.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jAfhO2YAAAAJ&hl=en">demographer</a> who over the past four decades has conducted extensive research on East Asian populations, I know that this increased number of South Korean boys will have huge impacts throughout South Korean society. Coincidentally, similar trends are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17450128.2011.630428">playing out in China</a>, Taiwan and India. </p>
<p><iframe id="matBO" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/matBO/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>The reasons</h2>
<p>In most countries, more boys are born than girls – around 105 to 107 boys per 100 girls. That sex ratio at birth (SRB) is a near constant. The gender imbalance is likely an evolutionary adaptation to the biological fact that females live longer than males. At every year of life, men have higher death rates than women. Hence an SRB of between 105 and 107 boys <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/population-and-society/5D47EB8139ED72FD59F7379F7D41B4FB">allows for there to be roughly equal numbers of men and women </a> when the groups reach childbearing ages.</p>
<p>The SRB in the United States in 1950 was 105 and was still 105 in 2021; in fact, it has been stable in the U.S. for as long as SRB data has been gathered. In contrast, in South Korea the SRB was at the normal range from 1950 to around 1980, but increased to 110 in 1985 and to 115 in 1990.</p>
<p>After fluctuating a bit at elevated levels through the 1990s and early 2000s, it returned to the biologically normal range by 2010. In 2022, South Korea’s SRB was 105 – well within the normal level. But by then, the seeds for today’s imbalance of marriage-age South Koreans was set.</p>
<h2>A preference for sons</h2>
<p>There are several reasons why South Korea’s SRB was out of balance for 30 years.</p>
<p>South Korea experienced a rapid fertility decline in a 20- to 30-year period beginning in the 1960s. From six children per woman in 1960, fertility fell to four children in 1972, then to two children in 1984. By 2022, South Korea’s fertility rate had dropped to 0.82 – <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-korea-has-the-lowest-fertility-rate-in-the-world-and-that-doesnt-bode-well-for-its-economy-207107">the lowest fertility rate in the world</a> and far below the rate of 2.1 needed to replace the population.</p>
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<p>Yet, South Korea’s long-held <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2584733">cultural preference for sons</a> did not shift as quickly as childbearing declined. Having at least one son was a strong desire influencing fertility preferences in South Korea, especially up through the early years of the 21st century. </p>
<p>And the declining fertility rate posed a problem. When women have many children, the probability that at least one will be a boy is high. With only two children, the probability that neither will be a son is around 25%, and when women have only one child, it is less than 50%.</p>
<p>In order to ensure that families would continue to have boys, many South Koreans turned to readily available techniques to identify the gender of the fetus, such as screening in the early stages of pregnancy. Abortion, which is legal and socially acceptable in South Korea, was then often used to allow families to select the sex of their child. </p>
<h2>Sex by the numbers</h2>
<p>In South Korea, beginning in around 1980 and lasting up to around 2010 or so, many more extra boys were born than girls. When these extra boys reach adulthood and start looking for South Korean girls to marry, many will be unsuccessful.</p>
<p>The extra boys born in the 1980s and 1990s are now of marriage age, and many will be looking to marry and start a family. Many more will be reaching marriage age in the next two decades.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Man kisses pregnant wife's belly." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563902/original/file-20231206-21-k1wz8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563902/original/file-20231206-21-k1wz8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563902/original/file-20231206-21-k1wz8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563902/original/file-20231206-21-k1wz8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563902/original/file-20231206-21-k1wz8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563902/original/file-20231206-21-k1wz8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563902/original/file-20231206-21-k1wz8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A deeply rooted cultural preference for sons was still influential in South Korea up through the early years of this century.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/asian-man-kissing-pregnant-wifes-belly-royalty-free-image/174522589?phrase=south+korea+abortion&searchscope=image%2Cfilm&adppopup=true">Greg Samborski via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I have calculated that owing to the unbalanced SRBs in South Korea between 1980 and 2010, approximately 700,000 to 800,000 extra boys were born.</p>
<p>Already this is having an effect in a society where over the centuries virtually everyone was expected to marry, and where marriage was nearly universal. Recent <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/south-koreans-losing-interest-in-marriage-report-finds-630642">research by Statistics Korea</a> showed that in 2023, over 36% of South Koreans between the ages of 19 and 34 intended to get married; this is a decline from over 56% in 2012.</p>
<h2>Foreign brides and ‘bachelor ghettos’</h2>
<p>The immigration of foreign-born women might help address the imbalance. Research by demographers <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0308518X18756640">Guy Abel and Nayoung Heo</a> has shown that financial assistance from the South Korean government is already supporting the immigration to South Korea of Korean women from northeastern China and of foreign women from some less wealthy countries, such as Vietnam, the Philippines and some Eastern European countries. </p>
<p>If the extra bachelors do not marry immigrant brides, they will have no alternative but to develop their own lives and livelihoods. Some might settle in “bachelor ghettos” in Seoul and in South Korea’s other big cities of Busan and Daegu, where commercial sex outlets are more prevalent. Such “ghettos” have already been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/7/20/gender-imbalance-threatens-china">observed in other Asian cities</a> where men outnumber women, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou in China.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Bridegroom flashes victory sign." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563903/original/file-20231206-27-z2krp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563903/original/file-20231206-27-z2krp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563903/original/file-20231206-27-z2krp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563903/original/file-20231206-27-z2krp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563903/original/file-20231206-27-z2krp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563903/original/file-20231206-27-z2krp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563903/original/file-20231206-27-z2krp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">While the desire for sons has been relaxed, the social issues, especially regarding the marriage market, remain.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/bridegroom-showing-victory-sign-royalty-free-image/903472740?phrase=south+korea+wedding&searchscope=image%2Cfilm&adppopup=true">RUNSTUDIO/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The consequences for South Korean society of the higher than biologically normal SRBs is a problem of the country’s own making. South Korea’s high fertility of the mid-20th century was holding the country back economically. Its program to bring down a fertility rate of nearly six children per woman was hugely successful. But its very success has been problematic. </p>
<p>The speed of South Korea’s fertility transition meant that the evolution to a more modern familial normative structure – that is, with about two children per family and with less preference given to boys – lagged behind. Today, the SRB imbalances appear to be <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38362474">a thing of the past</a>. Women in South Korea have greater access to education and employment, and there is less pressure for men to be sole wage earners. Together with the South Korean government’s efforts to reduce sex selection beginning in the late 1980s, the premium for boys over girls has dropped. </p>
<p>Yet despite the relaxed desire for sons, long-term social issues related to gender imbalance, especially regarding the marriage market, will remain in South Korea for decades to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217661/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dudley L. Poston Jr. does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Following a 30-year boy-to-girl birth rate imbalance, up to 800,000 ‘extra’ men born since the mid-1980s will be unable to find a South Korean woman to marry. That has big demographic consequences.Dudley L. Poston Jr., Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2196812024-01-07T12:37:16Z2024-01-07T12:37:16ZWhy we should take competitive video games more seriously<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564974/original/file-20231115-25-zcd5l2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C0%2C980%2C666&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Today, the esports industry is worth several billion dollars globally.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Is playing competitive video games a serious business? </p>
<p>There’s no question about it for the thousands of <a href="https://www.leagueoflegends.com/en-us/">League of Legends</a> fans who flocked to South Korea last October to attend the <a href="https://youtu.be/tHMcncCS-XE?si=KFfNbrcjaTSCaCB6">Worlds 2023</a> championships of this ultra-popular game. The grand prize? <a href="https://lol.fandom.com/wiki/2023_Season_World_Championship">US$2,225,000</a>. </p>
<p>The Worlds 2023 event, which is still largely unknown to the general public, provides an opportunity for video game law specialists such as ourselves to explain just why competitive video games should be taken more seriously. </p>
<h2>Esports: a global social, cultural and economic phenomenon</h2>
<p>While North American sports leagues such as the NHL and NFL are well known — as are major traditional sporting competitions such as the Football World Cup or the Olympic Games — the same cannot be said for video game competitions. And yet, there is a whole world of professional competitions in the video game universe. Like traditional sports, the competitive video games world has its own leagues, well-established international competitions, its share of famous athletes and <a href="https://mashable.com/video/esports-events-are-filling-stadiums">hordes of fans</a>. These are known as esports.</p>
<p>Esports can be described simply as video games played in a competitive environment.</p>
<p>Although esports do not always enjoy the same level of recognition as traditional sports, they represent a sector that has grown significantly <a href="https://youtu.be/B_59wZ27ROE?si=4OWyy6Klh40POwwJ">over the last 10 years</a> and regularly attracts <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/490480/global-esports-audience-size-viewer-type/">millions of simultaneous viewers</a>. </p>
<p>A huge variety of esports games are now played competitively. In games such as <a href="https://lolesports.com/">League of Legends</a> or <a href="https://www.dota2.com/home">Dota</a>, two teams of players compete in multiplayer online battle arenas (MOBAs). These action-strategy games are something like supercharged chess games in which the aim is to destroy the opposing base. </p>
<p>There are also a number of very popular first-person shooting games such as <a href="https://valorantesports.com/">Valorant</a>, <a href="https://pro.eslgaming.com/csgo/proleague/">CSGO</a>, <a href="https://overwatchworldcup.com/en-us/">Overwatch</a> and <a href="https://www.fortnite.com/competitive">Fortnite</a>. </p>
<p>In short, when it comes to esports, there’s something for everyone, including those who prefer to (virtually!) play <a href="https://www.ea.com/en-ca/sports">traditional sports</a>.</p>
<h2>A booming sector</h2>
<p>In terms of viewership and popularity, the esports industry has <a href="https://www.insiderintelligence.com/insights/esports-ecosystem-market-report/">started to overtake traditional sports</a> in the past 10 years. The COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to this phenomenon.</p>
<p>Esports has also seen the emergence of internationally renowned superstars such as <a href="https://youtu.be/wU-1ZaT0hIg?si=vLKp_Krn37NSmKFV">Faker</a>, an athlete often considered the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/sport/china/article/3236384/asian-games-2023-south-koreas-league-legends-esports-gold-without-goat-faker-earns-military-service">greatest League of Legends player of all time</a> thanks to his huge victories and consistent success over the past decade.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1544343462476402688"}"></div></p>
<p>Today, the esports industry is worth <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/490522/global-esports-market-revenue/#:%7E:text=The%20term%20%22eSports%22%20is%20characterized,over%201.38%20billion%20U.S.%20dollars.">several billion dollars globally.</a></p>
<p>So it’s worth asking if esports will come to be recognized alongside traditional sports, or even have organized events as part of the Olympic Games?</p>
<p>It’s certainly possible. Esports are becoming more popular and have recently been added to the programs of major regional and international competitions. Several esports games have been included as demonstration events at the <a href="https://olympics.com/en/news/esports-historic-medal-debut-19th-asian-games-hangzhou-schedule-live">Asian Games since 2018</a> and were on the official program of the <a href="https://olympics.com/en/news/asian-games-2023-overall-medal-table-complete-list">2023 Asian Games held in Hangzhou, China</a>. <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/10/600_360240.html">South Korea won the gold medal</a> in the League of Legends competition at these games, which led to Faker getting a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/sports/korean-gamers-cusp-gold-avoiding-military-service-2023-09-28/">rare exemption from South Korea’s compulsory military service</a>. This exemption demonstrates how much recognition esports athletes are getting today in certain countries.</p>
<p>Regarding the inclusion of esports in the Olympics, video games were included as part of the <a href="https://olympics.com/en/esports/">Olympic Esports Series</a> in 2023. The event is organized by the International Olympic Committee (IOC).</p>
<p>This committee, which explores ways to rejuvenate the image of the Olympic Games and attract new audiences, has also initiated discussions about the <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-president-announces-plans-to-create-olympic-esports-games-at-opening-of-141st-ioc-session-in-mumbai">creation of an esports Olympic Games</a>.</p>
<h2>Career opportunities, but little support infrastructure</h2>
<p>Much like traditional sports, the opportunity to get involved in esports isn’t reserved exclusively for professional gamers who compete in official events.</p>
<p>As with any competitive event, professional management and support teams are essential for achieving a high performance level.</p>
<p>That means the development of electronic sports has opened up a <a href="https://esportslane.com/esports-job-profiles-non-gaming/">vast field of career possibilities</a> for game enthusiasts: as event organizers and managers, specialized journalists, nutritionists, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/sports/olympics/winter/beijing-winter-olympics-athlete-mental-health-1.6348932">consultants in mental preparation</a>, physiotherapists and even lawyers to organize the relationships between all these actors.</p>
<p>However, despite the popularity and immense potential of electronic sports, Canada lacks infrastructure and programs. This is especially obvious within educational institutions, places which nevertheless have many young fans of this booming industry.</p>
<p>Ideally, infrastructure suitable for esports should include high-performance computers, a dedicated esports room, a support team, intercollegiate competitions and, above all, an atmosphere that promotes the inclusion and participation of all in esports.</p>
<p>Some post-secondary institutions have created spaces on their campuses dedicated to esports. These spaces contribute to student recruitment. This is the case, for example, of <a href="https://www.stclaircollege.ca/news/2022/nexus-esports-arena-unveiled-opening-don-france-student-commons">St. Clair College in Ontario</a> which in 2022 created a brand new space at the cutting edge of technology — with a $23 million budget.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the University of British Columbia (UBC) invested $100,000 in equipment to create a <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/3001912/ubc-esports-club-%20opens-online-gaming-lounge/">lounge dedicated to electronic sports</a>.</p>
<p>Other organizations, such as the <a href="https://www.osea.gg">Ontario School Esports Associations (OSEA)</a>, are actively promoting the integration of an esports program into the school curriculum.</p>
<p>In the near future, if these efforts expand, we can imagine young esports fans will have the chance to turn their passion for video games into a professional career — whether they would compete at high-level competitions or whether they would pursue another career in the video game field.</p>
<h2>Players’ health</h2>
<p>Even with the growth and dazzling popularity the sector has gained in recent years, the picture of esports today is not entirely rosy.</p>
<p>The daily life of professional esports athletes is not easy. Their <a href="https://www.invenglobal.com/articles/8845/skt-fakers-24-hour-schedule-infographic-with-mobalyticsgg">schedules</a> are particularly busy and they spend a large part of their day <a href="https://youtu.be/uyF6ZwtLonM?si=IcG1dt7zjtHxtKZR">training</a> or <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@T1_Faker">producing online content</a>.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/uyF6ZwtLonM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
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<p>The competitive seasons are particularly demanding and, with some exceptions, most players’ careers are very short. In recent years, more and more players have opened up about their <a href="https://www.esports.net/news/industry/hidden-struggles-of-esports-athletes-mental-health-crisis/">mental health struggles</a>. Others have simply <a href="https://dotesports.com/league-of-legends/news/depression-burnout-insomnia-lec-pros-reveal-the-mental-toll-of-a-lol-esports-career">disappeared from the radar</a> after having made a thunderous breakthrough on the professional scene.</p>
<p>Research and support related to athletes’ working conditions will be necessary to ensure that they <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00494755221122493?icid=int.sj-abstract.citing-articles.5">do not endanger their health</a> and that they are not exploited by professional teams and leagues.</p>
<h2>Prevention and treatment of addiction phenomena</h2>
<p>The practice of esports can also have harmful effects on professional players, aspiring athletes or the general public due to excessive play time and/or expenses.</p>
<p>These phenomena are encouraged and exacerbated by the presence of mechanisms or strategies called <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/301007767.pdf">“Dark Patterns,”</a> widely used in <a href="https://www.darkpattern.games">certain video games</a>.</p>
<p>Dark Patterns can be temporal, encouraging players to invest an extended period of time in playing the game. For example, rewards for progressing in the game can be offered to players who play regularly every day.</p>
<p>Dark Patterns can also be monetary, by maximizing how much players will spend on a game. These expenses include mechanisms allowing players to pay to unlock aesthetic content or additional parts of a game.</p>
<p>Because of these mechanisms, it is essential to monitor and regulate the practices of the video game companies that use them.</p>
<h2>Esports are growing</h2>
<p>Electronic sports is a relatively recent practice that has grown incredibly over the last 10 years. However, this development has gone largely unnoticed by a large part of the general public.</p>
<p>Esports is nevertheless in a position to offer <a href="https://youtu.be/mP3fGkpmVM0?si=x6d7Pk9xr7BPOPTz">major events</a> which can easily rival the biggest traditional sporting events in popularity. It would be a mistake to underestimate esports, as it attracts both large crowds and talent.</p>
<p>On the contrary, it is important to support those who aspire to work in this field.</p>
<p>And above all, it is important to take a serious interest in the challenges and problems that esports face today, both in its professional and amateur practice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219681/count.gif" alt="La Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Electronic sports, or esports, is a practice that is often looked down upon. But it is a growing global phenomenon played on an incredible scale.Thomas Burelli, Professeur en droit, Section de droit civil, Université d’Ottawa (Canada), membre du Conseil scientifique de la Fondation France Libertés, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaHaoran Liu, Reaserch Assistant, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaMarie Dykukha, Research Assistant, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2197612023-12-19T16:53:53Z2023-12-19T16:53:53ZUkraine war: with stalemate on the battlefield Nato needs unity and commitment more than ever<p>As the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, arrived in Washington earlier this month for talks aimed at securing further military aid, Republican congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene <a href="https://twitter.com/RepMTG/status/1734267150628724931">posted on X</a> (formerly Twitter): “With Zelensky in town and Ukraine money running dry, why doesn’t anyone in Washington talk about a peace treaty with Russia?? A deal with Putin promising he will not continue any further invasions. Answer: Washington wants war, not peace. Isn’t that awful?! I’m still a NO.” </p>
<p>Greene and her hard-right Republican colleagues have been attempting to leverage domestic politics to influence the US response to an international crisis without truly understanding the consequences. What is not being made clear by those who argue an isolationist “America first” line to a receptive conservative audience is that a significant proportion of the aid given to Ukraine, possibly as much as 90%, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/11/29/ukraine-military-aid-american-economy-boost/">stays within the US</a>. It is used to buy American-made armaments and other goods. </p>
<p>But the geopolitical repercussions are very clear and very significant. If the US stops providing Ukraine with military aid, it will lose the war and leave Putin with the message that it has everything to gain from military aggression. </p>
<p>Greene and her ilk clearly haven’t grasped the coldblooded ease with which Putin has broken both Russia’s treaty obligations and international law with the illegal invasion of Ukraine. It demonstrates a clear lack of understanding of the realities of relations with Russia. </p>
<p>But it’s an ominous sign for Ukraine that a growing number of its allies within Nato are having these internal discussions over supplying Kyiv with military aid. It goes to the heart of Nato’s core task of crisis management and cooperative security, as described in its <a href="https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/">2022 Strategic Concept</a>, which identifies Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as the key crisis facing the alliance.</p>
<p>The key question now is whether Nato can continue to provide a coherent and coordinated response to Russia’s aggression. </p>
<h2>Nato capabilities</h2>
<p>The war has put enormous pressure on Nato’s weapons manufacturing capability. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Nato strategy was to produce and stockpile a limited supply of weapons and ammunition to fight small or <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1021906">“come-as-you-are” wars</a> – a term often used to describe the sort of conflict that doesn’t require a shift to a wartime economy. </p>
<p>The question now is whether the west can ramp up its manufacturing capacity to fight what is in essence a proxy war. To give just one example, the number of Javelin missiles sent by the US to Ukraine from the end of February 2022 to August 2022 represented <a href="https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-01/230119_Jones_Empty_Bins.pdf?VersionId=mW3OOngwul8V2nR2EHKBYxkpiOzMiS88">seven years</a> of regular production.</p>
<p>Perhaps Nato could learn from the experience of South Korea, which for the whole of its existence has been familiar with border tensions and the need to maintain a strong military capability. </p>
<p>For decades it has stockpiled weapons and ammunition and has shipped more 155mm shells to Ukraine than <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war/">all of Kyiv’s European allies combined</a>. Seoul now has one of the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremybogaisky/2022/11/07/south-korea-has-quietly-become-one-of-the-worlds-biggest-weapons-suppliers/">world’s biggest stockpiles</a> of weapons and ammunition. Perhaps Nato needs to do likewise.</p>
<p>But the main problem that this conflict presents to Nato is that on the one hand it is willing and ready to share its military doctrine with Ukraine, but on the other it has not been able – or willing, in some cases – to provide the wherewithal for Ukraine to fight the war accordingly.</p>
<p>Nato’s combined arms doctrine relies on the coordination of land and air power. Without one, the other will not provide the results demanded. And, as yet, Ukraine cannot control the skies above the battlefield as it has insufficient fighter jets and trained pilots. </p>
<p>The third element of a combined military doctrine is sea power, which is where Ukraine has enjoyed a degree of success, denying Russia control of the northwestern Black Sea and launching several attacks on Russia’s Black Sea fleet at Sevastopol, which has compelled Russia to move its naval assets to safer ports further afield.</p>
<p>Britain, the Netherlands and Norway have agreed to <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/12/11/ukraine-allies-provide-ships-to-ward-off-russia-in-the-black-sea/">send mine clearing ships to Ukraine</a> to help secure shipping lanes against Russian attempts to set a blockade. </p>
<p>Significantly, access to the Black Sea through the Dardanelles is controlled by Turkey, a Nato member, and transit of warships of belligerent nations can be refused. Turkey has denied at least one Russian request to <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Most-read-in-2022/Turkey-rejects-Russia-s-request-for-navy-ships-to-pass-Bosporus">transit warships through the straits</a>, but it cannot refuse access to Russian ships which are based in the Black Sea.</p>
<h2>Playing politics</h2>
<p>The key concern, though, is political. In recent months – and certainly since the conflict in Gaza exploded into life on October 7 – there have been signs that support for Ukraine’s war effort from western countries may have a limit. </p>
<p>In the US, Republican senators <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67637679">blocked the passage</a> of an aid bill which would have delivered up to US$60 billion (£47 billion) for Ukraine as well as funds for Israel and aid for Gaza. Meanwhile Hungary <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-67724357">recently vetoed</a> a EU aid package of a further €50 billion (£43 billion).</p>
<p>Both the EU and the Biden administration in the US <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/the-limits-of-as-long-as-it-takes-why-ukraines-allies-need-to-update-their-strategy/">are confident</a> that they will eventually get their funding bills through, but voices calling for Ukraine to seek a ceasefire with a possibility of a territorial settlement with Russia have grown larger since it became clear that Kyiv’s summer counter-offensive would not be the success that had been hoped for.</p>
<p>Putin signalled in his <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-four-hour-qanda-is-a-valuable-insight-into-the-russian-presidents-version-of-reality-219985">annual press conference</a> recently that Russia’s war aims had not changed, saying: “There will be peace when we achieve our goals. They haven’t changed. Denazification of Ukraine, the demilitarisation of Ukraine.”</p>
<p>Nato needs to be equally clear about what it wants the outcome of this conflict to look like.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219761/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kenton White does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nato is showing ominous signs of becoming war weary. It must maintain its support for Ukraine.Kenton White, Lecturer in Strategic Studies and International Relations, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2129862023-09-06T15:47:32Z2023-09-06T15:47:32ZSouth Korean president’s anti-communist taunts are opening up deep divisions as country ponders alliance with Japan and US<p>Recent heated debate in South Korea about how its colonial-era independence movement should be remembered has exposed the deep faultlines that run through the country’s politics, between the conservative and liberal-progressive camps. </p>
<p>At the end of August, the <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230831000689">Korean Military Academy announced</a> its intention to relocate the statue of independence activist General Hong Beom-do from its front lawn, along with that of four other independence activists. In addition, South Korea’s defence minister, Lee Jong-sup, <a href="https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2023-09-04/national/politics/Historical-clash-continues-as-ministry-reconsiders-subs-name/1861851">openly considered</a> renaming a navy submarine that had also been named after General Hong.</p>
<p>Hong Beom-do is remembered for leading the Korean Liberation Army to victory over Imperial Japan in the <a href="https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Battle_of_Fengwudong">1920 battle of Fengwudong</a>. But the academy and the conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration take issue with the fact that Hong later sought refuge in the Soviet Union and became a member of the Communist Party.</p>
<p>This furore over Hong’s statue more broadly has come against a background of an intensification of red-baiting rhetoric by the Yoon administration. In his August 15 <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230815002000315#:%7E:text=Our%20independence%20movement%20was%20to,or%20to%20return%20to%20monarchy.">Liberation Day speech</a>, Yoon argued that: “The forces of communist totalitarianism have always disguised themselves as democracy activists, human rights advocates or progressive activists while engaging in despicable and unethical tactics and false propaganda. We must never succumb to the forces of communist totalitarianism.” </p>
<p>The implication of such statements has been that any opposition to the Yoon government’s policies are a result of the forces of “communist totalitarianism”.</p>
<p>Yoon’s actions are a recurrent feature of South Korea’s increasingly polarised political culture. Incumbent administrations go to great lengths to differentiate themselves from their predecessors. </p>
<p>It is no coincidence that the bust of Hong and the other independence fighters had originally been placed there in 2018 by the preceding liberal-progressive Moon Jae-in government.</p>
<h2>Foreign policy realignment, domestic dissent</h2>
<p>A more immediate factor is recent realignments in South Korea’s foreign policy. Seoul is moving toward closer cooperation with the United States and Japan. For decades, tensions between Japan and South Korea <a href="https://www.9dashline.com/article/thawing-between-seoul-and-tokyo-a-false-spring">have impeded</a> Washington’s goal of bringing the two countries together in a trilateral alliance to tackle challenges from China and North Korea.</p>
<p>Anti-Japanese sentiment remains strong in South Korea. This is sustained by Japan’s perceived failure to address historical wrongdoings during the colonial and wartime eras. As a result, many Koreans remain wary of closer security cooperation. The Yoon government, however, has unilaterally abandoned longstanding Korean demands for Japan to show greater remorse, and for victims’ compensation.</p>
<p>Yet this pursuit of trilateral security cooperation at all costs has created a legitimacy crisis for the government, which is seen by many to be increasingly out of step with much of the public. Rather than seeking to convince the public through persuasive argument, the Yoon government has increasingly resorted to red baiting.</p>
<p>On September 1, Yoon <a href="https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1107070.html">gave a speech</a> at the Korean National Diplomatic Academy in which he implied that any criticism of his administration’s pro-US and pro-Japan leanings were again a result of “communist totalitarian” or “anti-state” forces.</p>
<h2>Korean conservatism – an Achilles heel</h2>
<p>In several respects Yoon’s approach reflects longer-term fissures within Korean politics since it transitioned to democracy in 1987. Since then, South Korean conservatives (and in particular the so-called <em>ch’inilp’a</em>, or “pro-Japanese faction” whose wealth and power date back to collaboration with the Japanese) have suffered from a chronic deficit of legitimacy.</p>
<p>During the post-liberation era, they compensated for this with an ideology of virulent anti-communism. As a result, the main split in Korean society came to be defined as between communist and anti-communist – rather than between nationalist and collaborator. Anything that was judged to go against the authoritarian conservatism of the era was defined as “benefiting the North”.</p>
<p>The firm grip held by the authoritarian regime in post-liberation South Korea meant that there was little need to develop any genuinely conservative ideology. But the democratic transition made it increasingly difficult for conservatives to adhere to the logic of communism versus anti-communism.</p>
<p>Liberal governments, backed by the rising power of new civic movements, were able to attack conservatives for their history of colonial collaboration and post-war authoritarianism. Conservatives were blamed for episodes seen as having caused national humiliation. These include the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20583/volume-583-I-8473-English.pdf">1965 Japan-Korea Treaty</a> and the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/the-gwangju-uprising-battle-over-south-koreas-history">Kwangju massacre of 1980</a> in which a pro-democracy movement in the southwest of the country was brutally suppressed by the Korean military.</p>
<p>One broad response to this challenge has been the emergence since the 2000s of an alternative so-called “<a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114962716222173009">New Right</a>” history movement. This explicitly sought to establish a new moral grounding for South Korean conservativism. It aimed to address a perceived ideological vacuum through a strong belief in free market liberalism. This was combined with the promotion of a more positive view of the Japanese colonial occupation and the involvement of the US in Korea’s modern development.</p>
<p>The New Right movement largely <a href="https://www.ejks.org.uk/download/vladimir-tikhonov-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-new-right-movement-and-the-historical-wars-in-2000s-south-korea-pages-5-36/">failed to make an impact</a> in the academic study of history in Korea. But Yoon has appointed prominent New Right figures <a href="https://koreapro.org/2023/08/reframing-south-koreas-history-yoons-dance-with-the-new-right/">to key government positions</a>. Their views have evidently had an impact on his thinking and rhetoric.</p>
<p>But his increasing reliance on red-baiting seems at odds with the aspirations of New Right ideologues to put conservatism on a firmer and more persuasive ideological basis. Instead it feels like a throwback to the cold war McCarthyism. </p>
<p>Yoon’s simple anti-communist rhetoric is unlikely to appeal to the majority of the South Korea public – many of whom find themselves associated with the president’s notion of “communist totalitarianism”.</p>
<p>But while Yoon’s red-baiting may be politically ineffectual, it looks set to deepen the polarisation of politics in South Korea. This could threaten the principles of democracy in Korea by de-legitimising dissent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212986/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin Gray does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Korean president, Yoon Suk-yeol, is branding indulging in a display of ‘red-baiting’ to cast his opponents as communists.Kevin Gray, Professor in International Relations, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2115762023-08-17T15:45:18Z2023-08-17T15:45:18ZSolidarity and symbolism the order of the day as US, Japan and South Korea leaders meet at Camp David<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543080/original/file-20230816-21-r0c5o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C106%2C7898%2C5166&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US President Joe Biden, Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korea's President Yoon Suk Yeol hold a side meeting at the G7 summit.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-japans-prime-minister-fumio-kishida-and-news-photo/1256659186?adppopup=true">Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Camp David is associated with some <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/the-grounds/camp-david/">special moments in diplomacy</a>. In 1978, the presidential retreat in Maryland hosted Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin – leading to the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david">first peace treaty</a> between Israel and an Arab state.</p>
<p>Although not quite on that level, the <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/08/14/biden-summit-camp-david-japan-south-korea-alliance">trilateral meeting being held</a> at the location on Aug. 18, 2023 – between President Joe Biden, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida – is nonetheless of great significance.</p>
<p>It represents a culmination of substantial advancements in the relationship between the three countries over the past year, based on the furthering of reconciliation between <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-49330531">two historically antagonistic</a> East Asian nations, and a commitment by all three countries to a common vision for the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf">future of the Indo-Pacific region</a>. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.drake.edu/polsci/facultystaff/marymmccarthy/">expert on U.S.-East Asian foreign relations</a>, I believe the importance of this meeting cannot be overestimated – both for reasons symbolic and strategic; domestic and global. For many observers in Japan and South Korea, images of the two nations’ leaders standing together and putting aside their political differences at such a venue will be deeply meaningful, if controversial for some. Meanwhile the show of solidarity between all three men will be geared towards outside countries, notably China.</p>
<h2>A united front</h2>
<p>This first standalone meeting among the three leaders is a follow-up to their brief gathering in May on the sidelines of the <a href="https://www.g7hiroshima.go.jp/en/">G7 summit in Hiroshima</a>. It is also the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asia/us-japan-south-korea-reveal-new-joint-defenses-chinese-north-korean-mi-rcna100331">first visit of any foreign leader to Camp David since 2015</a>.</p>
<p>The summit takes place at a time of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-china-relations">heightened U.S.-China rivalry</a> and an undermining of global norms by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">Russian invasion of Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>With that in mind, expect a heavy focus on the symbolism of the meeting. Pictures and videos of the three leaders together will likely be carefully staged and scrutinized not only in the U.S., Japan and South Korea but also in China, Russia and North Korea.</p>
<p>The message that Biden, Yoon and Kishida want to send is clear: The three nations stand solidly against any and all threats to the region.</p>
<p>And although there likely won’t be a formal security alliance established among the three countries, due to reluctance in Tokyo and Seoul, the summit will result in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-korea-japan-set-launch-new-steps-defense-tech-camp-david-officials-2023-08-14/">steps toward greater coordination</a>. This will reportedly include a “<a href="https://news.yahoo.com/us-set-hotline-japan-south-015140363.html">three-way hotline</a>” and plans for an annual leaders summit.</p>
<h2>Playing to a domestic crowd</h2>
<p>While presenting a unified front to current or potential common adversaries, all three leaders will also have an eye towards their domestic audiences.</p>
<p>President Yoon <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/9/south-korean-opposition-candidate-yoon-wins-presidential-election">entered office in May 2022</a> prioritizing improvement in Japan-South Korea relations. This came at significant political risk domestically. Diplomatic relations between the two countries have been at a low point in recent years – as has <a href="https://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5562.html">public opinion towards Japan</a> within South Korea. </p>
<p>The points of antagonism are both deep-rooted and recent. Underscoring it are unresolved historical legacy issues relating to <a href="https://www.history.com/news/japan-colonization-korea">Japan’s colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945</a>. During that time Koreans endured cultural oppression, forced labor and sexual slavery at the hands of the Japanese.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Senior citizens hold signs at a rally" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South Korean victims of Japan’s wartime forced labor and sexual slavery attend a rally in Seoul in March 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/yang-geum-deok-a-south-korean-victim-of-japans-wartime-news-photo/1247573314">Jung Yeon-Je/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Recent moves in South Korea to address those wrongs have led to resentment in Japan, not least when the South Korean Supreme Court issued a series of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/29/world/asia/south-korea-wartime-compensation-japan.html">rulings in 2018</a> in favor of plaintiffs seeking compensation from Japanese businesses for forced labor during the colonial period.</p>
<p>Since coming to power, Yoon has taken concrete steps to bolster relations between the two East Asian nations, including highlighting Japan as a “partner that shares the same universal values with us” in his <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230301002300315">2023 speech marking the 1919 independence movement against colonial Japan</a>.</p>
<p>In a further olive branch aimed at mitigating ill feelings over the court decisions, Foreign Minister Park Jin announced in March that the South Korean government was <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/06/1161250054/u-s-allies-south-korea-and-japan-move-closer-to-resolve-forced-labor-feud">creating a foundation</a> to collect donations and pay the compensation to forced labor survivors, rather than making demands of Japanese companies or the Japanese government. </p>
<p>This announcement was timed to come right before <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/skoreas-yoon-visit-japan-first-such-trip-12-years-2023-03-09/">President Yoon’s visit to Tokyo</a> – the first such visit of a South Korean leader to Japan in 12 years.</p>
<p>Prime Minister Kishida, who entered office in October 2021, initially approached President Yoon’s overtures with caution. Yet, by this May, relations had improved to such an extent that Kishida returned Yoon’s visit with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/7/japans-kishida-visits-s-korea-to-boost-ties-amid-n-korea-threat">his own trip to Seoul</a> for a bilateral summit.</p>
<h2>Diplomatic niceties</h2>
<p>Better relations between Japan and South Korea benefits U.S. foreign policy goals in Asia. It forms the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china">backbone of the U.S.’s attempt</a> to counter China’s influence in the region. As such, Washington has been working behind the scenes to pressure Japan and South Korea to improve bilateral ties.</p>
<p>Yet, the show of solidarity expected at Camp David does not mean that there aren’t ongoing issues that need to be addressed – or politely ignored in the name of diplomacy.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023">Global uncertainties</a>, for example over the geopolitical fallout of the Ukraine war and a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/07/25/politics/mark-milley-china-aggression/index.html">seemingly more aggressive China</a> could lead the U.S. to play a more stabilizing role in East Asia. But it could also pull allies of Washington reluctantly into a conflict between the U.S. and other great powers. </p>
<p>And Japan and South Korea are also competitors, both economically and in courting the favor and attention of the U.S. Both East Asian nations are keen to leverage their relationship with the U.S to achieve their own goals in the region and globally.</p>
<p>There will also be critics of the meeting between Kishida and Yoon in both Japan and South Korea, for historical, diplomatic and political reasons. </p>
<p>The presence of the U.S. president and the location of the summit in such a famous venue will likely mitigate some of the criticism. This is especially the case if organizers can showcase Kishida and Yoon as equals in term of their partnership with the Biden administration, without one seeming to outshine the other.</p>
<h2>Biden’s place in the world</h2>
<p>In the U.S., the domestic audience will likely be less attentive than in Asia. But Biden still has much to gain. First, he can illustrate the value of his own vision for global leadership as one that successfully brings together allies – in contrast to that of the Trump administration and any other Republican White House contenders who seek to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/10/donald-trump-foreign-policy-america-first/616872/">downplay the importance of alliances</a>. Second, it will help convey an image of Biden as a strong world leader. </p>
<p>All three leaders face unprecedented challenges as they navigate their country’s role in a changing international system. Yet the symbolism of standing shoulder to shoulder at such a historic location should not be discounted. As the White House has said, this meeting is intended to open a “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/07/28/statement-from-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-on-the-upcoming-trilateral-leaders-summit-of-the-united-states-japan-and-the-republic-of-korea/">new chapter</a>” in trilateral cooperation – displaying solidarity on the basis of the common values of democracy, freedom and international norms. It is a strong pitch. If followed through, the lasting legacy of the summit could go beyond the symbolic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211576/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mary M. McCarthy has received funding or other financial support from the Japan Foundation, the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, the Korea Economic Institute of America, and the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation.</span></em></p>President Biden has an opportunity to show himself as a global leader who can bring historically antagonistic U.S. allies together.Mary M. McCarthy, Professor of Political Science, Drake UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2071072023-06-27T12:23:02Z2023-06-27T12:23:02ZSouth Korea has the lowest fertility rate in the world – and that doesn’t bode well for its economy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534163/original/file-20230626-5418-k0jzlq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C11%2C7842%2C4032&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An aging population, a tired economy.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-elderly-lady-rests-near-her-street-stall-as-pedestrians-news-photo/1251981087?adppopup=true">Anthony Wallace/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Around <a href="https://www.livescience.com/worlds-population-could-plummet-to-six-billion-by-the-end-of-the-century-new-study-suggests">the world</a>, nations are looking at the <a href="https://www.economist.com/podcasts/2023/06/20/what-does-a-shrinking-population-mean-for-china">prospect of shrinking</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wellness/2023/02/14/aging-boomers-more-older-americans/">aging populations</a> – but none more so than <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/22/s-korea-breaks-record-for-worlds-lowest-fertility-rate-again">South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>Over the last 60 years, South Korea has undergone the most rapid fertility decline in recorded human history. In 1960, the nation’s total fertility rate – the number of children, on average, that a woman has during her reproductive years – stood at just under six children per woman. In 2022, that figure was 0.78. South Korea is the only country in the world to register a fertility rate of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/19/1163341684/south-korea-fertility-rate">less than one child per woman</a>, although others – <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/22/1155943055/ukraine-low-birth-rate-russia-war">Ukraine</a>, <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-low-fertility-rate-population-decline-by-yi-fuxian-2023-02">China</a> and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/births-in-spain-drop-to-lowest-level-on-record/2614667">Spain</a> – are close.</p>
<p><iframe id="FNa7q" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/FNa7q/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jAfhO2YAAAAJ&hl=en">a demographer</a> who over the past four decades has conducted extensive research on Asian populations, I know that this prolonged and steep decline will have huge impacts on South Korea. It may <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230102000602">slow down economic growth</a>, contributing to a shift that will see the country <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/29/south-korea-s-demographic-crisis-is-challenging-its-national-story-pub-84820">end up less rich and with a smaller population</a>.</p>
<h2>Older, poorer, more dependent</h2>
<p>Countries need a total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman to replace their population, when the effects of immigration and emigration aren’t considered. And South Korea’s fertility rate has been consistently below that number since 1984, when it dropped to 1.93, from 2.17 the year before.</p>
<p>What makes the South Korean fertility rate decline more astonishing is the relatively short period in which it has occurred.</p>
<p>Back in 1800, the U.S. total fertility rate was <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1033027/fertility-rate-us-1800-2020/">well over 6.0</a>. But it took the U.S. around 170 years to consistently drop below the replacement level. Moreover, in the little over 60 years in which South Korea’s fertility rate fell from 6.0 to 0.8, the U.S. saw a more gradual decline from 3.0 to 1.7.</p>
<p>Fertility decline can have a positive effect in certain circumstances, via something demographers refer to as “<a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/fact-sheet-attaining-the-demographic-dividend/">the demographic dividend</a>.” This dividend refers to accelerated increases in a country’s economy that follow a decline in birth rates and subsequent changes in its age composition that result in more working-age people and fewer dependent young children and elderly people.</p>
<p>And that is what happened in South Korea – a decline in fertility helped convert South Korea from a very poor country <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/miracle-maturity-growth-korean-economy">to a very rich one</a>.</p>
<h2>Behind the economic miracle</h2>
<p>South Korea’s fertility decline began in the early 1960s when the government adopted an <a href="https://countrystudies.us/south-korea/47.htm">economic planning program</a> and a <a href="https://doi.org//10.3349/ymj.1971.12.1.55">population and family planning program</a>.</p>
<p>By that time, South Korea was languishing, having seen its <a href="https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/ijoks/v5i1/f_0013337_10833.pdf">economy and society destroyed</a> by the Korean War of 1950 to 1953. Indeed by the late-1950s, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. In 1961, its annual per capita income <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198796954.003.0006">was only about US$82</a>. </p>
<p>But dramatic increases in economic growth began in 1962, when the South Korean government introduced a five-year economic development plan. </p>
<p>Crucially, the government also introduced a population planning program in a bid to bring down the nation’s fertility rate. This included a goal of getting <a href="https://doi.org//10.3349/ymj.1971.12.1.55">45% of married couples</a> to use contraception – until then, very few Koreans used contraception.</p>
<p>This further contributed to the fertility reduction, as many couples realized that having fewer children would often lead to improvements in family living standards. </p>
<p>Both the economic and family planning programs were instrumental in moving South Korea from one with a high fertility rate to one with a low fertility rate.</p>
<p>As a result, the country’s dependent population – the young and the elderly – grew smaller in relation to its working-age population.</p>
<p>The demographic change kick-started economic growth that continued well into the mid-1990s. Increases in productivity, combined with an increasing labor force and a gradual reduction of unemployment, produced average annual growth rates in gross domestic product <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/KOR/south-korea/gnp-gross-national-product">of between 6% and 10% for many years</a>.</p>
<p>South Korea today is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true">one of the richest countries</a>
in the world with a <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=KR">per capita income of $35,000</a>.</p>
<h2>Losing people every year</h2>
<p>Much of this transformation of South Korea from a poor country to a rich country has been due to the demographic dividend realized during the country’s fertility decline. But the demographic dividend only works in the short term. Long-term fertility declines are often <a href="https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2022/12/the-long-term-decline-in-fertility-and-what-it-means-for-state-budgets">disastrous for a nation’s economy</a>. </p>
<p>With an extremely low fertility rate of 0.78, South Korea is losing population each year and experiencing more deaths than births. The once-vibrant nation is on the way to becoming a country with lots of elderly people and fewer workers.</p>
<p>The Korean Statistical Office reported recently that the <a href="https://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblId=DT_1B8000F&language=en">country lost population</a> in the past three years: It was down by 32,611 people in 2020, 57,118 in 2021 and 123,800 in 2022.</p>
<p>If this trend continues, and if the country doesn’t welcome millions of immigrants, South Korea’s present population of 51 million <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/biz/2023/06/602_335593.html">will drop to under 38 million</a> in the next four or five decades.</p>
<p>And a growing proportion of the society will be over the age of 65.</p>
<p>South Korea’s population aged 65 and over comprised under 7% of the population in 2000. Today, <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-south/#people-and-society">nearly 17% of South Koreans</a> are older people.</p>
<p>The older people population is projected to be 20% of the country by 2025 and could reach an unprecedented and astoundingly high 46% in 2067. South Korea’s working-age population will then be smaller in size than its population of people over the age of 65.</p>
<p>In a bid to avert a demographic nightmare, the South Korean government is <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/south-korea-families-770-month-183500253.html">providing financial incentives</a> for couples to have children and is boosting the monthly allowance already in place for parents. President Yoon Suk Yeol has also <a href="https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/03/28/national/politics/Korea-birth-rate-Yoon-Suk-Yeol/20230328184849297.html">established a new government team</a> to establish policies to increase the birth rate.</p>
<p>But to date, programs to increase the low fertility rate have had little effect. Since 2006, the South Korean government has already <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/03/asia/south-korea-worlds-lowest-fertility-rate-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">spent over $200 billion</a> in programs to increase the birth rate, with virtually no impact.</p>
<h2>Opening the trapdoor</h2>
<p>The South Korean fertility rate has not increased in the past 16 years. Rather, it has continued to decrease. This is due to what demographers refer to as the “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23025482">low-fertility trap</a>.” The principle, set forth by demographers in the early 2000s, states that once a country’s fertility rate drops below 1.5 or 1.4, it is difficult – if not impossible – to increase it significantly. </p>
<p>South Korea, along with many other countries – including France, Australia and Russia – have developed policies to encourage fertility rate increases, but with little to no success. </p>
<p>The only real way for South Korea to turn this around would be to rely heavily on immigration.</p>
<p>Migrants are <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2020/06/19/blog-weo-chapter4-migration-to-advanced-economies-can-raise-growth">typically young and productive</a> and usually have more children than the native-born population. But South Korea has a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/16/upshot/comparing-immigration-policies-across-countries.html">very restrictive immigration policy</a> with no path for immigrants to become citizens or permanent residents unless they marry South Koreans.</p>
<p>Indeed, the foreign-born population in 2022 was just over 1.6 million, which is around <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220414000692">3.1% of the population</a>. In contrast, the U.S. has always relied on immigration to bolster its working population, with foreign-born residents now <a href="https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigrants-in-the-united-states">comprising over 14%</a> of the population.</p>
<p>For immigration to offset South Korea’s declining fertility rate, the number of foreign workers would likely need to rise almost tenfold.</p>
<p>Without that, South Korea’s demographic destiny will have the nation continuing to lose population every year and becoming one of the oldest – if not the oldest – country in the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207107/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dudley L. Poston Jr. does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Korea’s fertility rate fell below the level needed to sustain a population in the mid-1980s – and it never recovered. It is now below one child per woman during her reproductive years.Dudley L. Poston Jr., Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2063352023-06-09T15:53:31Z2023-06-09T15:53:31ZThe microchip industry would implode if China invaded Taiwan, and it would affect everyone<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530810/original/file-20230608-27-1qwpg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C8%2C5734%2C3224&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Taiwan holds a dominant position in the microchip industry and also makes the most advanced types.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/ultra-modern-electronic-manufacturing-factory-design-684989755">Gorodenkoff / Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A conflict between the US and China over computer chips – or semiconductors – has been <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/12/24/beijing-washington-and-the-art-of-chip-war/">escalating in recent months</a>. In particular, the US has taken steps to limit China’s access to advanced chip technology amid heightened international competition in the area.</p>
<p>The US recently <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/04/25/us-deals-signal-heightened-semiconductor-equipment-competition/">tightened export controls</a> to undercut China’s access to high-end chip manufacturing equipment and has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-17/ban-on-us-persons-at-china-chip-firms-thwarts-xi-s-key-ambition#xj4y7vzkg">banned top talent</a> from working for Chinese semiconductor firms. <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/article/3222936/global-impact-washingtons-chip-restrictions-grow-longer-day-why-china-adding-list">Beijing retaliated</a> by banning US chip maker Micron from operating in China.</p>
<p>Taiwan plays a critical role in this struggle. It has a huge share of the global semiconductor industry, but is also the focus of tensions between Beijing and Washington over its political status. </p>
<p>For all practical purposes, Taiwan has been independent since 1949, but Beijing believes it should be reunited with the rest of China – possibly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/02/all-necessary-means-xi-jinping-reserves-right-to-use-force-against-taiwan">by force</a>. In April 2023, China conducted <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-us-mccarthy-military-exercises-992440661295869bc2b02455093cf4d2">extensive military drills</a> near Taiwan, simulating <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-65219219">an encirclement</a> of the island.</p>
<p>So, what might happen to the chip industry were China to invade? </p>
<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan_Relations_Act#:%7E:text=The%20TRA%20requires%20the%20United,of%20the%20people%20on%20Taiwan.%22">A US act passed in 1979</a> requires Washington to help defend Taiwan. Providing for the island’s security also fits with wider US objectives <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1459?s=1&r=7">on technology</a> and <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1425">economic security</a>. US politicians have not minced their words in affirming that a Chinese invasion would be met with a swift military response. </p>
<p>A Democratic congressman from Massachusetts, Seth Moulton, recently quipped that if China invades, “<a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/TSMC-s-fate-will-indeed-be-at-stake-if-China-attacks-Taiwan">We’re going to blow up TSMC</a>” – this being the acronym for Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the world’s most valuable semiconductor company. Congressman Moulton later clarified that he had been discussing several options for conveying the enormous costs of invading Taiwan to Beijing.</p>
<p>Because of Taiwan’s dominant position in the chip industry, its economy has been described as the <a href="https://www.ft.com/products?location=https%3A%2F%2F%2Ftaiwan-economy%2F">the “most indispensable”</a> in the world. And TSMC is the cornerstone of what’s been described as <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3222471/how-us-china-chip-war-dismantling-taiwans-silicon-shield">Taiwan’s “silicon shield”</a> – the idea that an outsize global reliance on its microchips protects it from invasion by China.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Morris Chang" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530882/original/file-20230608-20-zhwk32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530882/original/file-20230608-20-zhwk32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530882/original/file-20230608-20-zhwk32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530882/original/file-20230608-20-zhwk32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530882/original/file-20230608-20-zhwk32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530882/original/file-20230608-20-zhwk32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530882/original/file-20230608-20-zhwk32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">TSMC founder Morris Chang is sometimes described as a ‘godfather’ of Taiwan’s industry.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/hsinchu-taiwan-jun-5-2017-tsmc-653813449">glen photo / Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Critical technology</h2>
<p>The author Chris Miller tells the story of how Taiwan reached this dominant position <a href="https://www.christophermiller.net/semiconductors-1">in his book Chip War</a>. It turns out to have been largely the result of strategic geopolitics and the <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/09/asia-tech-godfathers-to-decide-us-chips-fate/">individual leadership of several chip industry “godfathers”</a>, including Morris Chang, the founder of TSMC.</p>
<p>Semiconductors are produced by a remarkably global supply chain, with design often stemming from US, Japanese or European firms, and manufacturing taking place in Taiwan and South Korea. However, Taiwan alone <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/03/06/taiwans-dominance-of-the-chip-industry-makes-it-more-important">manufactures more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors</a> -— and crucially, 90% of the most advanced ones.</p>
<p>There are fears the silicon shield might not hold forever, and an invasion by China would threaten the global economy with implosion. However, if TSMC were to build new manufacturing facilities elsewhere it would reduce the world’s reliance on Taiwan for chip production. <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/09/28/washington-shores-up-friends-in-the-semiconductor-industry/">A practice called “friendshoring”</a> could concentrate manufacturing and the sourcing of materials outside Taiwan in countries friendly to the US. This would reduce risks to the US and its partners from an invasion.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Aerial view of Taipei financial district." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531081/original/file-20230609-19-ohn2oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531081/original/file-20230609-19-ohn2oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531081/original/file-20230609-19-ohn2oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531081/original/file-20230609-19-ohn2oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531081/original/file-20230609-19-ohn2oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531081/original/file-20230609-19-ohn2oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531081/original/file-20230609-19-ohn2oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Silicon Shield was intended to deter an invasion of Taiwan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/aerial-view-cars-trains-intersection-junction-1457094053">Tavarius / Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, such a shift would take years to complete and would be challenging to implement. In 2021, TSMC announced its plan to build a multi-billion-dollar facility in Arizona. But the plant will only be ready from 2025 at the earliest, and will probably not be capable of producing chips at what will by then be the technological frontier in terms of scale.</p>
<p>Generally speaking, the smaller the chip, the more transistors can fit on it. This enables the development of faster, more powerful electronic devices.</p>
<p>The Arizona facility is expected to produce chips at the <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/05/19/geopolitics-and-the-push-for-made-in-the-usa-semiconductors/">5 nanometre (nm) scale</a>, and, at some stage, <a href="https://www.ft.com/products?location=https%3A%2F%2F%2Ftaiwan-economy%2F">3nm</a>. This wouldn’t undermine Taiwan’s leadership, however, because TSMC is already working at 3nm in Taiwan and is likely to be further advanced by 2025.</p>
<p>TSMC may also face <a href="https://fortune.com/2023/06/03/tsmc-arizona-plant-jobs-salary-culture-hiring">a challenge</a> in attracting enough skilled employees to run its US operation. </p>
<h2>The chip shortage</h2>
<p>There is already a shortage of microchips, which began with the onset of COVID-19 in 2020 and has affected many industries and products. In 2021, <a href="https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/research/supply-chain-chip-shortage">global car production slumped 26%</a> and consumer electronic product launches have been delayed largely as a result.</p>
<p>In a bid to boost chip supplies, the Biden administration and the EU have tried to improve supply chain resilience by incentivising production closer to home. The 2022 <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/">CHIPS and Science Act</a>, for instance, offers more than US$50 billion (£40 billion) for semiconductor research and development, manufacturing and workforce development in the US. </p>
<p>Yet, these policies run counter to trade war tactics. Export controls and other downward pressures on global “friends” working with Chinese firms have meant that even when TSMC is at capacity, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/smic-reports-35-rise-q3-revenue-lifts-capital-expenditure-plan-2022-11-10/">additional supply cannot come from Chinese manufacturers</a>. Under current chip war conditions, low supply is likely to continue, which means <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2022/05/19/impacts-of-the-global-chip-shortage-and-how-to-prepare-as-the-backlog-stabilizes/">price increases and product delays</a>.</p>
<p>The military response to an invasion of Taiwan could see manufacturing of semiconductors on the island halted overnight. This would place marked pressure on the price of the chips manufactured outside Taiwan. The increase in chip prices would unleash massive inflation on a range of products and services, including cars, phones and healthcare equipment such as ultrasounds and vital sign monitors.</p>
<p>The reduction in semiconductor supply would also affect the very national security context that is shaping the contours of its production. A Taiwanese invasion would mean a halt to the availability of the advanced chips used in <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/semiconductors-and-national-defense-what-are-stakes">satellites, stealth jets, and supercomputers</a>. China’s ambition of having a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3107686/policy-meeting-ends-defiant-note-chinese-leadership-insists">“fully modern” military by 2027</a>, and its <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Made_in_China_2025">Made in China 2025 plan</a>, to boost manufacturing, both hold semiconductor capabilities at the core.</p>
<p>Having access to TSMC know-how and supplies would be pivotal for delivering on these goals. But the US commitment to defending Taiwan – if it holds – would mean the destruction of TSMC facilities on the island. The world’s cutting-edge facilities for advanced chips would be decimated.</p>
<p>We should all care about a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The global semiconductor industry would freeze. Inflation would spiral further upwards and the post-COVID recovery would be reversed. So many of the tools we rely on would disappear from our shops for years. It would wreak enormous damage on us all —- with the Taiwanese people bearing the greatest cost.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206335/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robyn Klingler-Vidra receives funding from the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation. </span></em></p>The disruption of Taiwan’s chip industry would affect everyone.Robyn Klingler-Vidra, Associate Dean, Global Engagement | Associate Professor in Entrepreneurship and Sustainability, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2025872023-05-15T12:32:50Z2023-05-15T12:32:50ZWhy so many South Korean women are refusing to date, marry or have kids<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525713/original/file-20230511-36633-3ze3d6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C29%2C3976%2C2628&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Korean women protest against sexism and digital sex crimes, such as the making of pornography using hidden cameras.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/south-korean-women-protest-against-sexism-and-hidden-camera-news-photo/1046462564">Jean Chung/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Korea finds itself embroiled in an all-out gender war – and it keeps getting worse.</p>
<p>The animosity between Korean men and women has reached a point where some women are outright refusing to date, marry and have kids with men – a phenomenon known as <a href="https://www.thecut.com/2023/03/4b-movement-feminism-south-korea.html">the 4B movement</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=2_iGT-QAAAAJ&hl=en">As a Korean feminist scholar</a> living in the U.S., I’ve followed this gender war from afar as I conducted research on contemporary Korean gender politics. </p>
<p>However, I also became embroiled in it myself after my research on Korean masculinity <a href="https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/south-korea-western-women-seeking-love-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">was published by CNN</a>. </p>
<p>The article described foreign women who traveled to Korea after becoming enamored of the idea of dating Korean men from watching Korean television dramas. I pointed out that since the tourists’ fantasies were based on fictional characters, some of them ended up disappointed with the Korean men they dated in real life. </p>
<p>The article was about racial politics and the masculine ideals. But some Korean readers thought that I was simply criticizing Korean men for not being romantic and handsome enough. One enraged Korean man commented that I was an “ugly feminist.” </p>
<p>But this was tame in comparison to what women living in South Korea have endured in recent years.</p>
<h2>Extreme misogyny and a feminist backlash</h2>
<p>Over the past couple of decades, there have been flash points in this gender war.</p>
<p>In 2010, Ilbe, <a href="https://koreaexpose.com/south-koreas-angry-young-men/">a right-wing website</a> that traffics in misogyny, started attracting users who <a href="https://www.ilbe.com/view/11200697424">peppered the forums with vulgar posts</a> about women.</p>
<p>Then in 2015, an online extremist feminist group <a href="https://koreaexpose.com/megalia-south-korean-feminism-marshals-the-power-of-the-internet/">named Megalia</a> arose. Its goal was to fight back by <a href="https://10mag.com/megalia-south-koreas-radical-feminism-community/">demeaning Korean men</a> in ways that mirrored the rhetoric on sites like Ilbe. </p>
<p>A year later, a man who had professed his hatred of women <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-korea-woman-killed-20160521-snap-story.html">murdered a random woman in a public bathroom</a> near a Seoul subway station. He was eventually sentenced to decades in prison, but the lines were quickly drawn. On one side were feminists, who saw misogyny as the underlying motive. On the other side were men who claimed that it was merely the isolated actions of a mentally ill man. The <a href="https://www.ytn.co.kr/_ln/0103_201605231913446582">two groups violently clashed</a> during competing protests at the site of the murder. </p>
<h2>A backdrop of digital sex crimes</h2>
<p>However, none of these events have elicited as much public controversy as the steep rise in digital sex crimes. These are newer forms of sexual violence facilitated by technology: <a href="https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1532/revenge-pornography">revenge porn</a>; <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-upskirting-and-what-are-your-rights-to-privacy-under-the-law-158060">upskirting</a>, which refers to surreptitiously snapping photos under women’s skirts in public; and the use of hidden cameras to film women having sex or undressing.</p>
<p>In 2018, there were <a href="https://easylaw.go.kr/CSP/CnpClsMain.laf?popMenu=ov&csmSeq=1594&ccfNo=1&cciNo=1&cnpClsNo=2">2,289 reported cases</a> of digital sex crimes; in 2021, the number <a href="https://easylaw.go.kr/CSP/CnpClsMain.laf?popMenu=ov&csmSeq=1594&ccfNo=1&cciNo=1&cnpClsNo=2">snowballed to 10,353</a>.</p>
<p>In 2019, there were two major incidents that involved digital sex crimes. </p>
<p>In one, a number of male K-pop stars were indicted for filming and circulating videos of women in group chatrooms <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-50596943">without their consent</a>.</p>
<p>A few months later, Koreans were shocked to learn about what became known as the “<a href="https://www.esquire.com/uk/culture/tv/a40018199/what-is-nth-room-true-story-cyber-hell-destroy-the-nth-chatroom-netflix/">Nth Room Incident</a>,” during which hundreds of perpetrators – mostly men – committed digital sex crimes on dozens of women and minors. </p>
<p>They tended to target poorer women – sex workers, or women who wanted to make a few bucks by sharing anonymous nude photos of themselves. The perpetrators either hacked into their social media accounts or approached these women and offered them money, but asked for their personal information so they could transmit the funds. Once they obtained this information, they blackmailed the women by threatening to reveal their sex work and their nudes to their friends and family. </p>
<p>Since <a href="https://koreaexpose.com/sex-workers-speaking-out-koreas-shadowy-underbelly/">sex work</a> and <a href="https://easylaw.go.kr/CSP/CnpClsMain.laf?popMenu=ov&csmSeq=901&ccfNo=2&cciNo=1&cnpClsNo=1">posting nude images of yourself online</a> are illegal in Korea, the women, fearing arrest or being ostracized by friends and family, complied with the perpetrators’ demands to send even more compromising images of themselves. The men would then swap these images in chatrooms. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Protester holds sign that reads 'Korea is from top to bottom the rape cartel itself.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525716/original/file-20230511-19-rpy9jv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525716/original/file-20230511-19-rpy9jv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525716/original/file-20230511-19-rpy9jv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525716/original/file-20230511-19-rpy9jv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525716/original/file-20230511-19-rpy9jv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525716/original/file-20230511-19-rpy9jv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525716/original/file-20230511-19-rpy9jv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protests erupted in Seoul in July 2019 after women were drugged and sexually abused at a popular nightclub partly owned by the K-Pop star Seungri.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/feminists-chant-slogans-as-they-hold-signs-that-read-korea-news-photo/1157943309?adppopup=true">Jean Chung/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And yet a 2019 <a href="http://www.mogef.go.kr/kor/skin/doc.html?fn=4ee3d24743c343d9ad7df17a5211eb0c.pdf&rs=/rsfiles/202305/">survey conducted by the Korean government</a> found that large swaths of the population blamed women for these sex crimes: 52% said that they believed sexual violence occurs because women wear revealing clothes, while 37% thought if women experienced sexual assault while drunk, they are partly to blame for their victimization. </p>
<p>In other words, a significant percentage of the Korean population believes that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/23268743.2021.1901602">female sexuality is the problem</a> – not the sexual violence.</p>
<h2>Government policy lays the groundwork</h2>
<p>Digital sex crimes are too widespread to lay the blame at the feet of a handful of bad actors. </p>
<p>To me, part of the problem stems from the long history of “gendered citizenship.” </p>
<p>Korean feminist scholar <a href="https://www.vassar.edu/faculty/semoon">Seungsook Moon</a> has written about the ways in which <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/militarized-modernity-and-gendered-citizenship-in-south-korea">the government created one track for men and another for women</a> as the country sought to modernize in the second half of the 20th century:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Men were mobilized for mandatory military service and then, as conscripts, utilized as workers and researchers in the industrializing economy. Women were consigned to lesser factory jobs, and their roles as members of the modern nation were defined largely in terms of biological reproduction and household management.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Although these policies are no longer officially carried out, the underlying attitudes about gender roles remain embedded in Korean life and culture. Women who veer from being mothers and housewives expose themselves to public and private backlash. </p>
<p>The government has created gender quotas in certain industries to try to unravel this system of gendered citizenship.</p>
<p>For instance, some government jobs have <a href="https://www.womennews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=234654">minimum gender quotas</a> for new hires, and the government <a href="https://www.seoulfn.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=483074">encourages the private sector to implement similar policies</a>. In historically male-dominant industries, such as construction, there are quotas for female hires, while in historically female-dominant industries, such as education, <a href="https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20190222011034">there are male quotas</a>. </p>
<p>In some ways, this has only made things worse. Each gender feels as if the other is receiving special treatment due to these affirmative action policies. Resentment festers. </p>
<h2>‘The generation that has given up’</h2>
<p>Today, the sense of competition between young men and women is exacerbated by the <a href="https://keia.org/the-peninsula/low-youth-employment-in-korea-part-1the-golden-ticket-syndrome/">soaring cost of living</a> and rampant unemployment. </p>
<p>Called the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/N-po_generation">N-Po Generation</a>,” which roughly translates as “the generation that has given up,” many young South Koreans don’t think they can achieve certain milestones that previous generations took for granted: marriage, having kids, finding a job, owning a home and even friendships.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two women in purple jackets hand out stickers." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525955/original/file-20230512-15-g1trvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525955/original/file-20230512-15-g1trvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525955/original/file-20230512-15-g1trvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525955/original/file-20230512-15-g1trvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525955/original/file-20230512-15-g1trvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525955/original/file-20230512-15-g1trvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525955/original/file-20230512-15-g1trvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Members of South Korea’s Women’s Party campaign ahead of the 2020 election. Though the party didn’t win any races, it marked the first time a feminist party sought seats in the National Assembly.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-photo-taken-on-april-9-2020-shows-womens-party-news-photo/1209572028?adppopup=true">Jung Yeon-Je/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Although all genders find themselves discouraged, the act of “giving up” has caused more problems for women. Men see women who forgo marriage and having kids as selfish. And when they then try to compete against men for jobs, some men become incensed. </p>
<p>Many of the men who have become radicalized commit digital sex crimes to take revenge on women who, in their view, have abandoned their duties.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the competitive dynamic created by the Korean government’s embrace of gendered citizenship has stoked the virulent gender war between Korean men and women, with digital sex crimes used as ammunition.</p>
<p>The 4B movement, whereby Korean women forego heterosexual dating, marriage, and childbirth, represents a radical escalation of the gender war by seeking to create an online and offline world devoid of men. Rather than engaging in altercations, these women are refusing to interact with men, period. </p>
<h2>Digital sex crimes are a global problem</h2>
<p>To be sure, digital sex crimes are not unique to Korea. </p>
<p>When I teach my college class on digital sex crimes in the U.S., I’m surprised by how many of my students admit that they’ve been victims of digital sex crimes, or knew of it happening at their high schools. And at the National Women’s Studies Association’s <a href="https://gwss.washington.edu/2022-nwsa-conference">annual conference in 2022</a>, I watched feminist activists and scholars from all over the world present their findings about digital sex crimes back home.</p>
<p>Since each country has its own cultural context for the rise in digital sex crimes, there isn’t a single solution to solve the problems. But in South Korea, continuing to unravel the system of gendered citizenship could be part of the solution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202587/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Min Joo Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The South Korean government’s embrace of gendered citizenship has fueled the virulent gender war between men and women, with digital sex crimes used as ammunition.Min Joo Lee, Postdoctoral Fellow, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1985852023-05-09T11:43:29Z2023-05-09T11:43:29ZThousands of badgers being farmed in South Korea could be a disease risk<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522722/original/file-20230425-3184-sj0dw5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=209%2C144%2C1045%2C523&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">The photographer wishes to remain anonymous</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Campaigners in South Korea are celebrating news that the country will <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-korea-to-ban-bear-farming-but-what-to-do-about-hundreds-of-captive-animals-that-remain-197316">ban bear farming by 2026</a>. This follows three decades of uncertainty over an industry dogged by claims of <a href="https://acrobat.adobe.com/link/review?uri=urn:aaid:scds:US:67b4a8c1-312c-3dce-a951-4564ba066d43#pageNum=2">poor welfare conditions, animal abuse and illegal breeding</a>.</p>
<p>However, colleagues and I just published the first ever <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2287884X23000316">scientific assessment</a> of a form of wildlife farming that, by contrast, has gone completely under the radar: the farming of badgers.</p>
<p>While wildlife trade involving badgers is probably best-known from the fur used in luxury shaving brushes (most of which comes from <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/hs/badger-and-other-brush-making-hair">farms in China</a>), the use and trade of badgers has a surprisingly long – and global – history. For example, apothecaries in medieval France sold badger bones, dried blood, brains, testicles and livers as cures for a range of ailments. </p>
<p>In the 21st century, <a href="https://www.kfbg.org/images/download/Wild%2520Animal%2520Trade%2520Monitoring%2520in%2520Selected%2520Markets%2520in%2520Guangzhou%2520and%2520Shenzhen,%2520South%2520China,%25202000-2003_ENG.pdf">wildlife market surveys</a> in China, Vietnam, Laos and Indonesia have reported several different species of badger being sold as bushmeat.</p>
<p>Asian badgers, which are closely related to European badgers, have historically been hunted and traded on the Korean Peninsula for their meat or for use in traditional medicine. In the 1990s, however, this trade took a new turn with the emergence of badger farms in South Korea.</p>
<p>This development coincided with increased restrictions on bear bile farming, following the country’s accession to the <a href="https://cites.org/eng/disc/what.php">convention on international trade in endangered species</a> (Cites). Though badger is valued in its own right for traditional medicine, it is also marketed as a potential substitute for bear.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523824/original/file-20230502-1574-3rp2qp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two badgers sitting in a cage." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523824/original/file-20230502-1574-3rp2qp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523824/original/file-20230502-1574-3rp2qp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523824/original/file-20230502-1574-3rp2qp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523824/original/file-20230502-1574-3rp2qp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523824/original/file-20230502-1574-3rp2qp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523824/original/file-20230502-1574-3rp2qp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523824/original/file-20230502-1574-3rp2qp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Badgers on an illegal farm in South Korea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photographer wishes to remain anonymous</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While there are questions about the reliability of official records of the number of animals on badger farms, the two data sets that are collected annually both agree that in 2019 there were about 4,000 farmed badgers in South Korea, ten times the number of farmed bears.</p>
<p>The number of animals involved has surprised researchers and raises concerns over the welfare of captive badgers, which are highly social and territorial animals. Badgers are difficult to breed in captivity, and very dated advice for badger farmers <a href="https://lib.mafra.go.kr/skyblueimage/eb01761.pdf">still published online</a> by the South Korean government includes the use of hormone injections on females to induce breeding.</p>
<p>Badgers famously dig underground setts, so farmers are advised to construct pens with wire or concrete floors to prevent their escape. There is even some evidence of badger cubs being <a href="https://blog.naver.com/multipet_designdog/221326665696">sold as pets</a>, despite their highly unsuitable temperament.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523822/original/file-20230502-28-miypsu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Bear looks through cage" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523822/original/file-20230502-28-miypsu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523822/original/file-20230502-28-miypsu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523822/original/file-20230502-28-miypsu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523822/original/file-20230502-28-miypsu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523822/original/file-20230502-28-miypsu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523822/original/file-20230502-28-miypsu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523822/original/file-20230502-28-miypsu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A bear bile farm in South Korea. Badger farming appears to have emerged in part as a substitute for bear farming.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joshua Powell</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While wild badgers have some legal protection in South Korea, products such as badger gallbladders soaked in liquor, which are sold online, claim to come from either domestic farms or, sometimes, wild animals from Russia or China. </p>
<p>However, we know that badger poaching still occurs in <a href="https://m.mbn.co.kr/news/society/4885121">rural South Korea</a>. There would be almost no way for a discerning buyer to distinguish between legal products and those from illegally harvested wild animals.</p>
<p>The trade now also supplies less traditional products. Perhaps the most startling are badger-derived cosmetics, such as soaps, oils and creams which are typically marketed as moisturisers, skin whiteners or as anti-ageing products.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523893/original/file-20230502-3585-1nrq1h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Screenshot of badger cream online shopping" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523893/original/file-20230502-3585-1nrq1h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523893/original/file-20230502-3585-1nrq1h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523893/original/file-20230502-3585-1nrq1h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523893/original/file-20230502-3585-1nrq1h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523893/original/file-20230502-3585-1nrq1h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523893/original/file-20230502-3585-1nrq1h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523893/original/file-20230502-3585-1nrq1h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This cream using badger oil, marketed as anti-ageing, whitening and moisturising cream, is available to buy on a well-known Korean online marketplace.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">misocos.cafe24.com</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This trade comes with a number of important risks which have so far been almost entirely overlooked, in what can best be summarised as a complete absence of government regulation beyond the collection of basic agricultural records on the number of badgers held by farms.</p>
<h2>Farming badgers is a potential biosecurity risk</h2>
<p>Researchers have <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2351989418302312">previously warned</a> that wildlife farms could provide the ideal environments for the emergence of future zoonotic diseases. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523823/original/file-20230502-24-yd36r7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Badger leans on rock" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523823/original/file-20230502-24-yd36r7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523823/original/file-20230502-24-yd36r7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523823/original/file-20230502-24-yd36r7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523823/original/file-20230502-24-yd36r7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523823/original/file-20230502-24-yd36r7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523823/original/file-20230502-24-yd36r7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523823/original/file-20230502-24-yd36r7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Camera trap footage of a wild Asian badger in the mountains of South Korea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">C.R. Dobson</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Badgers belong to a family of mammals known as mustelids. Recent outbreaks of zoonotic diseases on mustelid farms, such as the COVID outbreak on a <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7857398/">Danish mink farm in 2020</a> that led to millions of animals being slaughtered, show how this could have implications for both animal and human health.</p>
<p>There are several reasons to be concerned about the transmission of disease (either to animals or humans) on badger farms specifically. The most important is the current lack of sufficient biosecurity protocols, such as checks on the disease status of live animals being sold between farms or to the public, and the hygiene standards required of slaughter facilities. </p>
<p>And there are reports of both wild badgers having been used to stock farms and farmed badgers having been released <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330162745_Mammals_of_Korea">into the wild</a>, which could facilitate the spread of disease. </p>
<p>From tigers to the giant panda, there can be a tendency for conservation to focus on large, charismatic species. This can sometimes help protect habitat for other species, or draw attention to particular issues. </p>
<p>However, sometimes it can obscure less well-known species and the impacts that we might be having on them. The Asian badger would seem to be one such species. </p>
<p>In South Korea, badger farming appears to present many of the same conservation, welfare and health risks as bear farming does. Unlike bears, badgers have so far been largely overlooked. Hopefully that will now change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198585/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Elves-Powell receives funding from the London NERC DTP and his work is supported by Research England. In 2021-22, he was a visiting research student at Seoul National University's College of Veterinary Medicine. </span></em></p>New research investigates a poorly known wildlife trade.Joshua Elves-Powell, PhD Researcher, Conservation Biology, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2046282023-04-28T14:32:36Z2023-04-28T14:32:36ZUS-Korea summit: Joe Biden’s ‘American Pie’ won’t include stationing nuclear weapons on the peninsula<p>The <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2023/04/28/2003798776">rendition</a> of Don McLean’s classic pop song American Pie by Yoon Suk Yeol may have dominated the headlines as the South Korean president enjoyed dinner at the White House with Joe Biden – Yoon is, reportedly, a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/04/27/1172613834/yoon-suk-yeol-south-korea-president-united-states-visit-biden-musk">devotee of “<em>noraebang</em>”, Korean karaoke</a>. But the frivolity of the moment was a break from the deadly serious purpose of his six-day visit to the US: how to combat the growing regional threat from China and North Korea.</p>
<p>The key takeaway from the visit was what has been dubbed the “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/">Washington Declaration</a>” aimed at bolstering the two countries’ defence alliance in the region. </p>
<p>It is clear from the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf">latest assessment</a> released by the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence that the threat from China and North Korea is seen as critical. The report highlights China’s increasing foreign policy assertiveness and its growing military power. It concludes that: “China is reorienting its nuclear posture for strategic rivalry with the United States because its leaders have concluded that their current capabilities are insufficient.” </p>
<p>The report also forecasts that this year China will increase pressure on Taiwan and ramp up its military presence in the South China Sea. </p>
<p>On North Korea, the report says Pyongyang is “using its nuclear-capable missile programme to try to establish strategic dominance over South Korea and US forces in the region”.</p>
<p>In Seoul, meanwhile, the South Korean political elite is particularly concerned at North Korea’s aggressive posturing on its nuclear ambitions and believes Pyongyang is getting closer to a genuine intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. This would threaten the continental US and reduces the credibility of Washington’s <a href="https://features.csis.org/north-korea-extended-deterrence/">doctrine of extended deterrence</a>. This holds that Washington’s commitment to use – if necessary – its nuclear arsenal to deter North Korea from attacking the South means that Seoul has no need for its own nuclear capability.</p>
<p>In January Yoon told South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo that he feared that the status quo of extended deterrence <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230102002500315">was no longer sufficient</a>. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What we call extended deterrence was also the US telling us not to worry because it will take care of everything, but now, it’s difficult to convince our people with just that. The US government also understands that to some degree.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Washington Declaration aims to address this. Biden and Yoon agreed on a range of measures to <a href="https://www.nknews.org/pro/what-the-us-rok-summit-means-for-security-on-the-korean-peninsula/">enhance nuclear deterrence on the Korean peninsula</a>. These include the establishment of a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/">Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG)</a> to help “plan for nuclear contingencies and cooperate on the Alliance’s approach to nuclear deterrence”.</p>
<p>But, while committing to consultation over “any possible nuclear weapons employment on the Korean Peninsula” the US retains the sole right to decide on the use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances. </p>
<p>In July 2022, Seoul set up a “<a href="https://www.nknews.org/2022/07/south-korea-to-forge-new-strategic-command-to-counter-north-korean-threats/#">strategic command</a>” that controls a so-called “precision strike” system for responding to attacks to North Korea. This will now be integrated with the <a href="https://www.usfk.mil/About/CFC/">US-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC)</a>. The new agreement <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/">also sets out that</a> the two countries will engage in “joint execution and planning for ROK conventional support to US nuclear operations … on the Korean Peninsula”.</p>
<p>This goes at least some way towards the “joint nuclear exercises” that Yoon called for at the time of their <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/">first summit in May 2022</a>. </p>
<h2>More visible US presence on peninsula</h2>
<p>An issue raised in public discourse by politicians and <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/whats-needed-to-put-nukes-in-s-korea-its-time-to-start-planning-new-report-says/">experts</a> prior to the summit was the idea of Washington deploying nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula – something that would mitigate the need for Seoul to develop its own nuclear deterrent. Under the heading: “More visible US strategic asset deployment”, the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/fact-sheet-republic-of-korea-state-visit-to-the-united-states/">new agreement commits to</a> “enhancing the deployment of US strategic assets in and around the Korean Peninsula, in particular US nuclear-capable platforms”. </p>
<p>The words “more visible” are significant here because normally the location and deployment of sea-based nuclear deterrents is kept strictly secret. Biden clarified this in a joint press conference, saying: “we’re not going to be stationing nuclear weapons on – on the peninsula, but we will have visits to – port visits of nuclear submarines and things like that. We are not walking away from that”.</p>
<p>Yoon told reporters at the press conference that he and Biden agreed that the response to a nuclear attack from North Korea would involve the use of “full force of the alliance including the United States’ nuclear weapons. But Biden stopped short of a public commitment to this, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/04/26/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-yoon-suk-yeol-of-the-republic-of-korea-in-joint-press-conference-2">instead declaring that</a> "a nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its allies or partisans … is unacceptable and will result in the end of whatever regime, were it to take such an action”.</p>
<p>This was a big success for Yoon’s administration. In terms of nuclear consultation, joint exercises, strategic planning and command, he secured about as much as he could have expected from any US president. Whether this will be enough to placate those in South Korea who want a homegrown nuclear capability remains to be seen and will very much depend on what North Korea does next. In spite of the close relationship between Washington and Seoul, engagement on security issues with North Korea remains an urgent priority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth received funding from the Korea Foundation.</span></em></p>The US and South Korea are significantly beefing up security arrangements in the face of the perceived growing threat from China and North Korea.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2046042023-04-27T12:50:58Z2023-04-27T12:50:58ZUS-South Korea nuclear weapons deal – what you need to know<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523089/original/file-20230426-20-xe77sh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=31%2C0%2C3546%2C2330&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Korea's Yoon Suk Yeol is only the second leader to travel to the U.S. for a state visit during the Biden administration.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BidenUSSouthKorea/d77d19187b24453d8e374f6d8a4e80ec/photo?Query=Yoon%20Suk%20Yeol&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1237&currentItemNo=2">AP Photo/Evan Vucci</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The United States and South Korea have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/26/us/politics/biden-south-korea-state-visit.html">unveiled an agreement</a> under which leaders in Seoul will be handed an enhanced role in planning any nuclear response to a strike in the region by North Korea.</em></p>
<p><em>Announced at a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-korea-us-presidents-to-meet-in-washington-amid-wary-glances-in-the-direction-of-pyongyang-beijing-and-moscow-204418">state visit to Washington</a> by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol on April 26, 2023, the so-called “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/">Washington Declaration</a>” will see U.S. deployments of “strategic assets” around the Korean Peninsula, including an upcoming visit by a nuclear submarine. The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/10/19/us-decides-to-withdraw-a-weapons-from-s-korea/3759ee3f-e9bf-4944-bfdf-2f9ea727b546/">last time the U.S. had nuclear weapons</a> in South Korea was 1991</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked Sung-Yoon Lee, an <a href="https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/faculty/sung-yoon-lee">expert on U.S.-Korean relations</a> at Tufts University, to explain what the decision to revamp nuclear relations means and why it has come now.</em></p>
<h2>What is in the ‘Washington Declaration’?</h2>
<p>Well, there’s strong language. Whereas the U.S. has repeatedly “reaffirmed” its commitment in the past to the defense of South Korea, the wording in the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/">Washington Declaration</a> is more robust. It builds on the language contained in the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/">joint statement released during Biden’s visit</a> to Seoul soon after <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/10/world/asia/south-korea-yoon-president.html">Yoon assumed office</a> in May 2022. On that occasion, the U.S. pledged its “extended deterrence commitment to the (Republic of Korea) using the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities.”</p>
<p><iframe id="lQGDz" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/lQGDz/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>This time, lest there be doubt, that <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/">affirmation is made</a> “in the strongest words possible.” </p>
<p>But what does that mean in real terms? First, the U.S. “commits to make every effort to consult with the (Republic of Korea) on any possible nuclear weapons employment on the Korean Peninsula.”</p>
<p>More substantively, the two sides commit “to engage in deeper, cooperative decision-making on nuclear deterrence,” including through “enhanced dialogue and information sharing regarding growing nuclear threats” to South Korea.</p>
<p>It will come as a welcome development to decision-makers in South Korea, although it raises questions about just how much intel on North Korea’s threat and capabilities the U.S. – and Japan, with its advanced signal intelligence systems – did not share with previous administrations in Seoul.</p>
<p>Second, the two allies will establish a new nuclear consultative group to “strengthen extended deterrence, discuss nuclear and strategic planning and manage” the growing threat posed by Pyongyang. This means Seoul now will have a seat at the table when it comes to planning any nuclear response strategy and in readying its “conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency.”</p>
<p>In sum, Seoul will now have a much greater say in intel-sharing and planning for a joint long-term nuclear strategy, with a focus on its own role in any future flare-up in the Korean Peninsula.</p>
<p>It is a big step forward.</p>
<h2>Why are the US and South Korea announcing this now?</h2>
<p>The international security environment has drastically changed over the past year, necessitating credible countermeasures from the two allies, in cooperation with Japan. North Korea has <a href="https://time.com/6266737/north-korea-ballistic-missile-tests-2023/">fired well over 100 missiles</a> since January 2022. Meanwhile, Russia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">invasion of Ukraine</a> and its many <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60690688">alleged war crimes</a> have only pulled <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/21/russia-and-china-are-becoming-ever-closer-and-the-west-should-worry.html">China and</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-north-korea-forge-closer-ties-amid-shared-isolation-2022-11-04/">North Korea closer</a> into its sphere. And China has gone beyond its usual “<a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/geopolitics/2023/04/china-big-stick-diplomacy-is-pushing-closer-russia">wolf-warrior diplomacy</a>” rhetoric by conducting threatening military drills around Taiwan last August and, again, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-us-mccarthy-military-exercises-992440661295869bc2b02455093cf4d2">this April</a>.</p>
<p>The Washington Declaration comes on the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/leaders-joint-statement-in-commemoration-of-the-70th-anniversary-of-the-alliance-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-republic-of-korea/">70th anniversary of the alliance</a> between Washington and Seoul. The timing serves as an opportunity to reflect on and reassess the relationship. But, no doubt, the main drivers in this strongly worded reaffirmation of the alliance are the recent actions taken by the governments in Pyongyang, Moscow and Beijing.</p>
<h2>How has South Korea’s position on nuclear options evolved?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nti.org/countries/south-korea/">Korean Peninsula</a> has been through two periods of actual “denuclearization” since the 1953 armistice that ended combat during the Korean War.</p>
<p>The first was <a href="https://keia.org/the-peninsula/comparing-contexts-south-koreas-potential-nuclear-armament-in-the-1970s-2020s/">in the 1970s</a> when the U.S., <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-united-states-and-south-koreas-nuclear-weapons-program-1974-1976">catching wind of South Korea’s secret nuclear weapons program</a>, threatened to withdraw all U.S. troops from the South unless Seoul completely dismantled the program. And, so, the government abandoned its nuclear ambitions.</p>
<p>The second came in 1991 when the U.S. and South Korea – perhaps anticipating the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union#:%7E:text=On%20December%2025%2C%201991%2C%20the,the%20newly%20independent%20Russian%20state.">coming collapse of the Soviet empire</a> and a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/how-did-the-north-korean-famine-happen">severely debilitated North Korea</a> – agreed to withdraw all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from the South, even as the North was <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/revisiting-history-north-korea-and-nuclear-weapons">working on its own nuclear program</a> while <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclear-negotiations">vigorously talking “denuclearization.</a>”</p>
<p>But in recent years, public opinion in South Korea has <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/thinking-nuclear-south-korean-attitudes-nuclear-weapons">strongly shifted toward self-nuclearization</a> rather than rely on the U.S. stockpile off South Korea’s shores. North Korea’s relentless pursuit of more powerful nuclear and missile capabilities, starting with the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2019-05-16/why-north-korea-testing-missiles-again">resumption of ballistic missiles tests</a> in May 2019 after an 18-month lull, has stiffened views in the South.</p>
<p>President Yoon himself <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/asia/south-korea-nuclear-weapons.html">floated the idea of self-nuclearization</a> earlier this year. But the Washington Declaration appears to have tempered down such sentiment. In it, Yoon “reaffirmed the (Republic of Korea’s) longstanding commitment” to the <a href="https://www.state.gov/nuclear-nonproliferation-treaty/">Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty</a>, which would prevent the country from building up its own nuclear weapons stockpile.</p>
<h2>How will the declaration affect regional tensions?</h2>
<p>A staple of North Korean propaganda is that its arms program is a response to <a href="https://beyondparallel.csis.org/hostile-policy-north-korean-views-united-states/">U.S. “hostile policy”</a> – which Pyongyang defines as anything from Washington raising concerns about its <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/north-korea">egregious human rights record</a> to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-alliance/factbox-u-s-and-south-koreas-security-arrangement-cost-of-troops-idUSKBN2AZ0S0">stationing of U.S. troops in South Korea</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/south-north-korea-us-drills-nuclear-66f94a64982e255b23ae6ac7860a5e2c">joint U.S.-South Korea military drills</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People walk in front of a TV screen showing a missile taking off." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523193/original/file-20230427-27-c80jv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523193/original/file-20230427-27-c80jv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523193/original/file-20230427-27-c80jv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523193/original/file-20230427-27-c80jv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523193/original/file-20230427-27-c80jv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523193/original/file-20230427-27-c80jv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523193/original/file-20230427-27-c80jv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">North Korea has launched more than 100 missiles since the beginning of 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-watch-a-television-screen-showing-a-news-broadcast-news-photo/1251763562?adppopup=true">Jung Yeon-je/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>As such, it is reasonable to assume that Pyongyang will respond with a threatening act or two in the coming days. Using the Washington Declaration as cover, expect North Korea to embark on another brazen act of defiance. Last December, Kim Yo Jong, the North Korean leader’s sister and deputy, threatened an intercontinental ballistic missile test on a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/south-korea-north-8c77f7b14bf07a1fee8d05da8a30a850">normal trajectory</a>, rather than the steep angle launches that avoid threatening nearby countries. And in 2017, North Korea’s former foreign minister Ri Yong Ho suggested that Kim Jong Un was considering testing a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-atmospheric-test/a-north-korea-nuclear-test-over-the-pacific-logical-terrifying-idUSKCN1BX0W5">hydrogen bomb test over the Pacific</a>. Either would represent a ratcheting up of North Korea’s provocations.</p>
<p>China, meanwhile, is likely to fall back on its decades-old mantra that issues on the Korean Peninsula need to be <a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/c36100/201903/ba8ff1d273bb472fb6ebd390ca63d114.shtml">resolved “through dialogue</a>” – a position that not only fails to penalize Pyongyang but indirectly empowers the isolationist state.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204604/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sung-Yoon Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ‘Washington Declaration’ unveiled during the state visit by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol gives Seoul a greater role in coordinating a nuclear response strategy.Sung-Yoon Lee, Professor in Korean Studies, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2044182023-04-25T12:27:47Z2023-04-25T12:27:47ZSouth Korea, US presidents to meet in Washington – amid wary glances in the direction of Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522633/original/file-20230424-22-anbhth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C104%2C3883%2C2801&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Running a few bilateral ideas up the flagpole.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/lamp-posts-near-the-white-house-are-adorned-with-south-news-photo/1252053149?adppopup=true">Daniel Slim/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol will <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/03/07/biden-south-korea-state-dinner/">meet his U.S. counterpart Joe Biden</a> at the White House on April 26, 2023 – a rare state visit that comes as the two nations seek to confront common concerns.</p>
<p>The event is <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/07/statement-from-white-house-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-on-the-state-visit-of-president-yoon-suk-yeol-and-first-lady-kim-keon-hee-of-the-republic-of-korea/">only the second state visit</a> to the U.S. of a foreign head of state during the Biden administration, following a <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2022/12/02/macron-s-state-visit-to-the-us-in-pictures_6006403_7.html">trip by President Emmanuel Macron of France</a> in late 2022. That the White House handed the honor to Yoon, a relative political novice before <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/yoon-suk-yeol-what-expect-south-koreas-next-president">taking office in May 2022</a>, may come as a surprise to some foreign policy observers. Seoul does not carry the same clout in international politics as some other U.S. allies. It is an important economic partner but so, too, are Japan, Germany, Canada and Mexico – all of whom <a href="https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/toppartners.html">rank above South Korea</a> in terms of overall U.S. trade.</p>
<p>Why, then, the pomp and ceremony for Yoon? As a <a href="https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/faculty/sung-yoon-lee">scholar of Korean political history</a> and U.S.-East Asia relations, I believe the answer can be found in three locations on the map and their respective governments: Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow. The White House meeting might well frame the event around the strengthening of ties between Seoul and Washington, but in reality they will want to send a message of unity in the face of saber-rattling – and worse – by North Korea, China and Russia.</p>
<h2>A friendship forged in war</h2>
<p>Washington and Seoul’s relationship was forged in the bloody crucible of the <a href="https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/research/online-documents/korean-war">Korean War of 1950-53</a>. For several decades, the alliance was lopsided, especially in the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/koreas-path-from-poverty-to-philanthropy/">lean two decades</a> following the <a href="https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/armistice-agreement-restoration-south-korean-state">armistice of 1953</a> when the South Korean subsistence economy was almost totally <a href="https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/the-u-s-south-korea-economic-relationship/">dependent on U.S. aid</a>. But over the past two decades, South Korea has evened up the ledger, becoming a <a href="https://www.oecd.org/country/korea/thematic-focus/sustaining-the-miracle-on-the-han-river-103653fa/">world leader in electronics</a>, shipping, vehicles, arms and <a href="https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/insights/koreas-cultural-exports-and-soft-power-understanding-the-true-scale-of-this-trend">pop culture</a>. The U.S-South Korea alliance has developed into one based as much on economic interests as diplomatic and strategic concerns. </p>
<p>Even the awkward issue of recent reports of alleged <a href="https://apnews.com/article/south-korea-us-leaked-documents-yoon-biden-5d88d7c6624865ca5d5b361ed8ce0d26">U.S. spying on the South Korean presidential office</a> is not likely to dampen the show of friendliness expected on display during the bilateral meeting.</p>
<p>After all, Biden and Yoon have more serious matters to contend with. The state visit follows a year in which North Korea <a href="https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-missile-launches-us-drills-55e946567117c176b027ee7c4253483e">fired nearly 100 missiles</a> into the skies in and around the Korean Peninsula, Russia <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine-178512">brazenly invaded Ukraine</a>, and China <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/02/taiwan-and-china-step-up-military-rhetoric-as-expected-pelosi-visit-looms">upped its rhetoric</a> around the disputed island of Taiwan. And each will need addressing in the summit.</p>
<h2>North Korean missiles</h2>
<p>To South Korea, the threat of the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/north-koreas-unparalleled-self-isolation-must-cease-un-expert">isolationist state to its north</a> is the most existential. Biden will likely underscore the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/">U.S. commitment to the defense</a> of South Korea against a nuclear-armed North Korea. </p>
<p>But the threat is not confined to imperiling the Korean Peninsula. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s intercontinental ballistic missiles now have the <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/08/north-korea-missile-capability-icbms-00081993">capability to hit</a> the U.S. mainland. Such a development may be <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-63494752">intended to draw Washington’s attention</a>, but it has another consequence: aligning the existential threat that South Korea faces with that of the United States.</p>
<p>Growing apprehension in South Korea – where more than 70% now <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/21/south-korea-nuclear-weapons/">favor a domestic nuclear weapons program</a> rather than rely on its powerful ally – means that Yoon will seek U.S. reassurances that go beyond the rhetoric of “<a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230420000597">extended deterrence</a>” and promises of an <a href="https://www.usfk.mil/Media/Newsroom/News/Article/626857/carter-south-korean-alliance-ironclad-in-face-of-constant-danger/">“ironclad” alliance</a>.</p>
<p>North Korean leader Kim, having told the world last week that he is gearing up to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/19/kim-jong-un-orders-launch-of-spy-satellite-to-proceed">launch a spy satellite</a> into space, has also used the opportunity of Yoon’s U.S. visit to <a href="https://wgnradio.com/news/political-news/biden-to-unveil-new-efforts-to-protect-s-korea-from-nukes/amp/">step up the country’s ballistic missiles tests</a> – a reminder to his two main adversaries that he can always make life for them difficult.</p>
<h2>China’s regional push</h2>
<p>That China and Russia <a href="https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-missiles-us-china-6ce477f7e6267aba412cd4020f0bd263">continue to block</a> any move at the U.N. Security Council to punish North Korea over its tests only emboldens Pyongyang.</p>
<p>But the threat posed by North Korea is not the only East Asian security concern for the U.S. or South Korea. The <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/how-chinas-rise-is-reshaping-indo-pacific-security-order/a-64165164">rise of China as an Indo-Pacific force</a> – and a rival to Washington’s and Seoul’s economic and strategic interests – is another likely topic to come up in the White House meeting.</p>
<p>Indeed, Yoon may have foreshadowed U.S. and South Korean thinking on China with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-lodges-complaint-over-south-korean-presidents-erroneous-taiwan-remarks-2023-04-23/">comments made to the Reuters news agency</a> just days ago. </p>
<p>“The Taiwan issue is not simply an issue between China and Taiwan, but like the issue of North Korea, it is a global issue,” he said. Yoon may just have been echoing what Biden and he <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/">declared at the pair’s first summit</a> in Seoul in May 2022 over the importance of preserving “peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as an essential element in security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.” But the remark raised the ire of officials in Beijing <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/23/china-lodges-complaint-over-s-korean-presidents-taiwan-comments">to howls of protest</a>. And the fact that a South Korean leader should join the U.S. as it ups the rhetoric over Taiwan will likely be welcomed by Washington and, of course, Taipei.</p>
<p>It also comes on the back of efforts by Yoon to make amends with Japan – an erstwhile “friend of a friend” in regards to the U.S., but one with which Seoul has long-festering wounds going back to the <a href="https://www.history.com/news/japan-colonization-korea">Japanese occupation of Korea</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two men shake hands in front of a South Korean and Japanese flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522714/original/file-20230424-1294-qt37bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522714/original/file-20230424-1294-qt37bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522714/original/file-20230424-1294-qt37bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522714/original/file-20230424-1294-qt37bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522714/original/file-20230424-1294-qt37bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522714/original/file-20230424-1294-qt37bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522714/original/file-20230424-1294-qt37bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida shake hands on March 16, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/468d30f88454431c8d64d4a526b81822?ext=true">Kiyoshi Ota/Pool Photo via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In March, Yoon <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/03/17/commentary/japan-commentary/yoon-kishida-meeting/">visited Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida</a> – the first official bilateral meeting between the two countries’ leaders in 12 years.</p>
<p>Friendlier terms between Tokyo and Seoul – both democracies – serve Washington’s plans to counter the influence of autocracies in the region, forming a quasi-trilateral alliance structure.</p>
<p>Biden will be hoping to isolate China further through economic means. Yoon will <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/2023/04/19/metro/south-korea-president-visit-mass-speak-kennedy-school/">visit Boston</a> during his trip, underscoring the importance of collaboration in the biotech and high-tech industries. It comes as South Korea’s leading microchip producers, including Samsung and SK Hynix, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/4/24/us-asks-south-korea-not-to-fill-chip-shortfalls-in-china-report">face pressure from the U.S.</a> to curtail their semiconductor business in China. Yoon will be seeking to promote U.S.-Korean joint investment in the semiconductor sector to compensate for the impact from reducing sales to China’s market.</p>
<h2>Ukraine’s need for weapons</h2>
<p>And then there is the war in Ukraine, which tends to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/20/ukraine-russia-united-nations-general-assembly/">loom over diplomatic matters</a> since Russia’s invasion.</p>
<p>In the past, South Korea has remained largely parochial on security issues, understandably, given the threat it faces on the peninsula. For example, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/south-korea-will-stay-out-of-a-taiwan-strait-war/">no previous administration has even floated</a> the notion of military support for the U.S. in the event of war in the Taiwan Strait.</p>
<p>Similarly, Seoul has provided only economic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, although it is the <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20221209005700325">world’s eighth-biggest exporter</a> of arms. But Yoon’s vision for his nation is that of a “<a href="https://www.globalasia.org/v18no1/feature/yoons-vision-for-south-korea-as-a-global-pivotal-state-is-there-anything-to-it_john-nilsson-wright">global pivotal state</a>” that places freedom, values and international rules-based order at the heart of its foreign policy – and that opens up the possibility of further intervention. </p>
<p>If Biden is able to coax his guest to commit to supply, discreetly, more weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, it will prove a win for both Yoon’s vision as well as that of Biden.</p>
<p>State visits are by their nature ceremonial – and 2023 marks the 70th anniversary of the United States-Republic of Korea alliance. But as strategic and economic concerns converge, the future relationship between the countries is being redefined by how the two allies confront simultaneously geopolitical concerns on South Korea’s doorstep, the wider region and the world beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204418/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sung-Yoon Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The meeting is just the second US state visit during the Biden administration. It comes as Washington and Seoul face common concerns.Sung-Yoon Lee, Professor in Korean Studies, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1986512023-04-19T12:44:42Z2023-04-19T12:44:42ZThe US is about to blow up a fake warship in the South China Sea – but naval rivalry with Beijing is very real and growing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521714/original/file-20230418-28-hiqec4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C146%2C3377%2C2411&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Marine amphibious assault vehicle takes part in a 2019 joint U.S.-Philippines exercise.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/marine-amphibious-assault-vehicle-maneouvers-before-the-uss-news-photo/1136245278?adppopup=true">Ted Aljibe/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As part of a joint military exercise with the Philippines, the U.S. Navy is slated to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-philippines-military-exercises-60af099f1526c6fce180d217e97788ad">sink a mock warship</a> on April 26, 2023, in the South China Sea. </p>
<p>The live-fire drill is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65236459">not a response to increased tensions</a> with China over Taiwan, both the U.S. and the Philippines have stressed. But, either way, Beijing isn’t happy – responding by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-following-chinas-taiwan-drills-with-great-interest-2023-04-10/">holding its own staged military event</a> involving actual warships and fighter jets deployed around Taiwan, a self-governed island that Beijing claims as its own.</p>
<p>The tit-for-tat war games underscore a reality that U.S. presidents have increasingly had to contend with as the 21st century has drawn on. More than a century after President Theodore Roosevelt <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2022/april/theodore-roosevelts-great-power-navy">made the United States the preeminent maritime power</a> in the Pacific, that <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/16/asia/china-navy-fleet-size-history-victory-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">position is under threat</a>. China is seeking to displace it. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://bakercenter.utk.edu/find-an-expert/krista-wiegand/">scholar of East Asian security and maritime disputes</a>, I believe that the growing rivalry between the U.S. and China over dominance of the Pacific has the potential to define <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf">geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region</a> for the next half-century.</p>
<p>Already, ongoing maritime disputes pit China against several Asian countries. For example, China regularly <a href="https://www.cfr.org/chinas-maritime-disputes/#!/chinas-maritime-disputes?cid=otr-marketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide">challenges the maritime rights</a> of Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia in the South China Sea and Japan in the East China Sea. </p>
<p>But the disputed waters are also of huge strategic importance to the U.S. It is where China is flexing its growing military might in the face of U.S. allies and partners, notably Taiwan, which the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-us-forces-would-defend-taiwan-event-chinese-invasion-2022-09-18/#:%7E:text=Asked%20last%20October%20if%20the,a%20commitment%20to%20do%20that.%22">U.S. has committed to defend</a>. If a war between China and the U.S. is going to happen, I believe the South China Sea is likely to be a major theater, with Chinese aggression toward Taiwan the spark.</p>
<h2>The scramble over the South China Sea</h2>
<p>For centuries, the dozens of islands, shoals, reefs, banks and rocks in the South China Sea were regarded as little more than hazards to navigation. </p>
<p>But with the discovery of large reserves of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0360-5442(85)90057-X">oil and gas in the 1970s</a> and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-south-china-sea-is-really-a-fishery-dispute/">billions of dollars’ worth of fisheries</a>, the previously largely ignored sea has gained significant attention from the countries whose shorelines meet it.</p>
<p>It led to a revival of elapsed conflicting claims of “ownership” over the sea.</p>
<p>China currently claims legal rights to the vast majority of the South China Sea, extending well beyond the boundaries established by the 1982 U.N. <a href="https://www.noaa.gov/law-of-sea-convention#:%7E:text=The%201982%20Law%20of%20the,both%20natural%20and%20cultural%20resources.">Convention on the Law of the Sea</a> (UNCLOS).</p>
<p>This claim by China, designated on maps by a <a href="https://time.com/4412191/nine-dash-line-9-south-china-sea/">nine-dash line</a>, overlaps with the legally recognized maritime and territorial rights of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An infographic shows a map of the South China Sea and surrounding countries with their claims to the waters represented by dotted lines." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521596/original/file-20230418-18-y9zoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521596/original/file-20230418-18-y9zoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521596/original/file-20230418-18-y9zoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521596/original/file-20230418-18-y9zoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521596/original/file-20230418-18-y9zoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521596/original/file-20230418-18-y9zoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521596/original/file-20230418-18-y9zoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-infographic-titled-south-china-sea-a-hotbed-of-news-photo/1246032083?adppopup=true">Omar Zaghloul/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Over the past decade, China has consistently engaged in low-level coercive activities called “<a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA594-1.html">gray zone tactics</a>,” such as small-scale deployment of the Chinese Coast Guard in disputed waters and the manning of fishing vessels with civilians trained by the Chinese military. The purpose is to harass others and assert Chinese maritime rights outside legal Chinese waters, as recognized under UNCLOS. </p>
<p>Since 2013, China has also built up several reefs and shoals into artificial islands, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/21/china-has-fully-militarized-three-islands-in-south-china-sea-us-admiral-says">building military bases</a> with runways, radar technology and missile-launching capabilities. </p>
<p>In 2016, an UNCLOS Annex VII arbitration panel ruled that China’s nine-dash line <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/tribunal-issues-landmark-ruling-south-china-sea-arbitration">claims were illegal</a> and rejected China’s rights to maritime features in the legal waters of the Philippines.</p>
<p>But despite the legally binding nature of the ruling, China has continued to militarize its artificially built-up islands and harass neighboring countries’ military and fishing vessels. It has also <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/china/article/2023/03/23/us-military-rejects-china-s-claim-that-warship-entered-south-china-sea-illegally_6020398_162.html">denied passage to U.S. Navy ships</a> legally sailing through waters in the South China Sea. </p>
<p>Successive U.S. administrations have aired concern over developments in the sea. In 2020, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/index.html">issued a U.S. position</a> on the South China Sea, rejecting China’s maritime claims and its “bullying” tactics as “unlawful.” His successor, Antony Blinken, <a href="https://www.state.gov/fifth-anniversary-of-the-arbitral-tribunal-ruling-on-the-south-china-sea/">in 2021 declared</a>: “Nowhere is the rules-based maritime order under greater threat than in the South China Sea.” </p>
<p>But why does the South China Sea matter so much to the U.S.? The answer lies in economics and power politics. </p>
<h2>A source of trade, natural resources</h2>
<p>About one-third of the world’s shipping transits the South China Sea. In all, more than <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/">US$3.4 trillion worth of products</a> – everything from rubber ducks to cars – is transported through its waters every year. </p>
<p>The sea connects the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean, allowing trade from East Asian countries to flow to and from billions of people in South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe. It is also where <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/">14% of all U.S. maritime trade</a> passes through. It is a crucial route for outgoing U.S. goods as well as getting products to the U.S. Without it, the transport of products we use every day would slow down, and these products would cost more.</p>
<p>And then there are oil and gas. Around <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36952">30% of all global crude oil</a> transits through the South China Sea. Furthermore, there is an estimated <a href="https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-interest/South_China_Sea">$11 billion worth of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of proven deposits of natural gas</a> in the sea, as well as undiscovered oil and gas.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, more than <a href="https://ocean.csis.org/spotlights/illuminating-the-south-china-seas-dark-fishing-fleets/">half of all fishing vessels in the world</a> operate in the South China Sea. </p>
<p>For economic reasons alone, the U.S. and the rest of the world need open trade routes and sea lanes in the South China Sea. Preventing one country – especially a hostile China – from controlling these trade routes and resources is a crucial policy concern for Washington.</p>
<h2>Power politics at sea</h2>
<p>Although economics plays a part, China’s actions in the South China Sea are part of a much broader aggressive campaign. Beijing views territorial and maritime control in the region <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-are-china-s-leaders-saying-about-south-china-sea">through the lens of its national security</a>. It seeks to project its power in the region and defend the Chinese mainland.</p>
<p>Ultimately, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf">as acknowledged by the U.S. government</a>, China is looking to overturn the status quo, replacing the U.S. as the superpower. </p>
<p>This battle for power is already taking shape in the South China Sea, with <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/east-asia/us-china-confrontation-south-china-sea-b2307238.html">regular confrontations</a> between U.S. naval vessels and China’s maritime militia and navy. </p>
<p>The artificial islands in the South China Sea provide China with military capabilities far beyond the mainland alone. These outposts can be used to help counter and fight the U.S. and its allies, for example, in a war over Taiwan. </p>
<p>While the U.S. is not itself a claimant in the South China Sea disputes, the waters there remain a significant priority for <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/14/the-united-states-is-deeply-invested-in-the-south-china-sea/">the national security interests of Washington</a>, too.</p>
<p>It is why the U.S. and its allies conduct freedom of navigation missions through the South China Sea and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/south-korea-us-announce-largest-military-exercises-in-5-years/">engage in naval exercises</a> such as the one <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-philippines-military-exercises-60af099f1526c6fce180d217e97788ad">taking place in April 2023</a> with the Philippines.</p>
<p>With China playing by a different set of rules than the U.S. and its allies in the region, the risk of clashes at sea is very real. It could even lead to conflict between the two most powerful countries in the world today. </p>
<p>The next time a warship is blown up in the South China Sea, I fear that it may not be just a drill.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198651/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Krista Wiegand received funding as a Senior Fulbright Scholar to conduct research on the South China Sea. </span></em></p>The South China Sea is of strategic and economic importance to Beijing and the US, setting up a potential power struggle that could spark conflict.Krista Wiegand, Professor of Political Science, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1975512023-01-16T18:19:33Z2023-01-16T18:19:33ZJapan is paying families 1 million yen to move to the countryside – but it won’t make Tokyo any smaller<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504664/original/file-20230116-16-dga048.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/7Xl0a6KCDyM">Denys Nevozhai | Unsplash</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Japanese government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/03/million-yen-per-child-to-leave-tokyo-japans-offer-to-families">has announced</a> a fresh round of incentives for people to move out of the Tokyo region. From April 2023, families seeking a new life in greener pastures will receive JPY1 million (£6,380), per child. This represents an increase of JPY700,000 on previous such payments. </p>
<p>Once the whole benefits package is included, the maximum amount a family will be able to receive is JPY5 million. 5 million yen might sound like a lot of money. However this translates to £31,900, which <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7gdzy/japan-pays-families-leave-tokyo">will be quickly used up</a> in relocating to a new home, job and community, and reduced incomes.</p>
<p>The main purpose of the scheme is to contribute both to easing overcrowding in the Tokyo region and revitalising more rural and remote areas of Japan with an injection of youth and entrepreneurialism.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Grasses in the foreground of a deep countryside view under sunshine." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504663/original/file-20230116-12-q5m884.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504663/original/file-20230116-12-q5m884.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504663/original/file-20230116-12-q5m884.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504663/original/file-20230116-12-q5m884.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504663/original/file-20230116-12-q5m884.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504663/original/file-20230116-12-q5m884.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504663/original/file-20230116-12-q5m884.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The government is seeking to revitalise the Japanese countryside.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/dfdFyCyKHto">Muhammad Faiz Zulkeflee | Unsplash</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is significant that this new scheme was announced in December, ahead of the new year holidays when many urban dwellers return to their rural roots, and conversations inevitably turn to what the future holds. </p>
<p>Even more significant is the fact that this is not the first time the government has launched such a scheme. In fact, successive Japanese administrations have tried – and largely failed – to stabilise rural prefectures’ populations and reduce urban overcrowding for 70 years.</p>
<h2>Attempts at counterurbanisation</h2>
<p>The scheme concerns residents from the 23 wards of Tokyo proper, as well as commuter cities in neighbouring Chiba, Saitama and Kanagawa prefectures, seeking to move to one of 1,800 provincial municipalities. The government hopes that around 10,000 people annually will take advantage of the offer.</p>
<p>There are conditions, of course. At least one earner in each household must either set up a business in their new locale or take up employment in a small or medium sized enterprise there. And the family must stay for a minimum of five years. Failure to do so may result in having to repay the whole amount.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An empty, run-down train station platform." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504660/original/file-20230116-6411-caekqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504660/original/file-20230116-6411-caekqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504660/original/file-20230116-6411-caekqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504660/original/file-20230116-6411-caekqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504660/original/file-20230116-6411-caekqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504660/original/file-20230116-6411-caekqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504660/original/file-20230116-6411-caekqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rural Japan is emptying of residents and investment.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/gMVsDTcWyzI">Tzepang Ngaa | Unsplash</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Japan is not the only country where governments pay people to relocate to the countryside. In 2021, Ireland started to move up to 68,000 government workers out of Dublin in its <a href="https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/4c236-our-rural-future-vision-and-policy-context/">Our Rural Future</a> plan. </p>
<p>Many countries have taken similar advantage of the increased flexibility of remote working the pandemic has stimulated, such as with the so-called <a href="https://www.william-russell.com/blog/zoom-towns-the-countries-and-states-that-will-pay-you-to-move-there/">“Zoom towns”</a> in rural US. Other examples include <a href="https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/paid-to-relocate_albinen-cash-incentives-attract-new-residents/44308024">Albinen</a> in Switzerland, various <a href="https://www.thinkspain.com/news-spain/33497/rural-allure-six-villages-that-have-paid-people-to-move-in">Spanish villages</a> and <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/travel/article/presicce-italy-pay-to-move/index.html">Presicce</a> in Italy, which is offering £30,000 to buy an empty dwelling and take up residency.</p>
<p>There have been a long list of such measures in Japan since world war two. As detailed by <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/udi.2012.26">German geographer Thomas Feldhoff</a>, starting with the 1953 Remote Island Promotion Act, most of them met with only marginal success.</p>
<p>In the early 1970s, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s government invested in huge infrastructure development programmes in Japan’s provinces. This was partly in an effort to boost employment and stabilise populations. </p>
<p>Tanaka was so ambitious that he wrote a book about it, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1795023#metadata_info_tab_contents">Remodelling the Japanese Archipelago</a>, which was published in 1972. And his plan did work for a while. However, it generated enormous environmental damage in the process, with which Japan is still coming to terms.</p>
<p>In the 1980s, the <em>Isson Ippon</em>, or One Village One Product movement, as it is known in English, was launched in Oita prefecture in Kyushu. It provided a gentler alternative, which is still being <a href="https://www.fao.org/3/cc2693en/cc2693en.pdf">promoted internationally</a> by the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization, as part of Japan’s overseas development activities. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A street scene in a small town in the mountains." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504667/original/file-20230116-26-yi0k29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504667/original/file-20230116-26-yi0k29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504667/original/file-20230116-26-yi0k29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504667/original/file-20230116-26-yi0k29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504667/original/file-20230116-26-yi0k29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504667/original/file-20230116-26-yi0k29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504667/original/file-20230116-26-yi0k29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Oita prefecture, in Kyushu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/LJil2jfhTxU">Tayawee Supan | Unsplash</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>More recently, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ssjj/article-abstract/13/2/187/1698938">research</a> I have undertaken with my colleague Yasuyuki Sato has shown how rural municipalities have resigned themselves to ever reducing populations. In an attempt to take control of such futures, they have begun instead to focus on the health, wellbeing and living conditions of those people who remain.</p>
<h2>A global concern</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/the-era-of-the-megalopolis-how-the-worlds-cities-are-merging-193424">Urban sprawl</a> and rural emptying are two sides of the same 21st-century coin, and are global in their extent. In the 19th and 20th centuries, as populations across the world grew exponentially, urbanisation processes didn’t necessarily affect rural regions negatively. Some communities benefited from younger people moving out to seek employment, education, and marriage in nearby cities, as families often had more children than they could adequately support.</p>
<p>In the 21st century, however, as family size has shrunk dramatically nearly everywhere, the so-called <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1274.html">demographic dividend</a> – that is, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-8-billionth-person-is-born-heres-how-africa-will-shape-the-future-of-the-planets-population-194067">benefits</a> of a growing population – has come to an end in developed countries. </p>
<p>Japan has led the way in East Asia. In 1974, the Japanese total fertility rate <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=JP">fell below</a> the population replacement rate of 2.1. Demographers would have known then that, should conditions persist, the country would eventually slip into depopulation. Sure enough, conditions did persist, and in 2008 Japan registered its <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/psp.2543">first peacetime population decrease</a>.</p>
<p>Although Tokyo’s population is now 13 million, the Kanto region of which it is the core boasts more than 37 million people – 30% of the whole population of Japan. Elsewhere in the country, hundreds of rural hamlets and villages face <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennawang/2019/07/31/waiting-for-the-end-in-japans-terminal-villages/">imminent extinction</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An aerial view of a city and traffic at sunset." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504668/original/file-20230116-26-82jp3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504668/original/file-20230116-26-82jp3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504668/original/file-20230116-26-82jp3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504668/original/file-20230116-26-82jp3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504668/original/file-20230116-26-82jp3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504668/original/file-20230116-26-82jp3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504668/original/file-20230116-26-82jp3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Seoul cityscape.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/01hH6y7oZFk">Mathew Schwartz | Unsplash</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Japan is not unique. Greater Seoul has around 25 million people, nearly half of South Korea’s population in one urban area with the rest spread out across the rest of the country. And in China, the Pearl River delta area, which encompasses Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Macau and Guangzhou, counts <a href="https://www.thestoryinstitute.com/pearl-river">100 million people</a> living within it, while the wider country now boasts <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/cities/china">155 cities</a> with more than 1 million population.</p>
<p>Further afield, at 1.7 million, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/05/bulging-at-the-seams-auckland-a-super-city-struggling-with-its-own-success">the city of Auckland</a> comprises nearly a third of New Zealand’s population. Only 1.2 million people, <a href="https://www.citypopulation.de/en/newzealand/southisland/">by contrast</a>, live in all of the South Island. </p>
<p>The spatial impacts of this demographic transition have been felt most deeply in rural regions of the Asia-Pacific. These grew most rapidly in the 20th century, and now face almost as rapid a depopulation in the 21st. <a href="https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/78027/1/MatanleFCO2014_Deposit.pdf">Entire communities</a> are disappearing. Land and housing are being abandoned. Infrastructure is decaying.</p>
<p>As the rest of east and south-east Asia follows in Japan’s footsteps, the archipelago is to some extent a laboratory for devising effective policies for dealing with the socioeconomic and environmental outcomes of depopulation, a phenomenon which will increasingly be felt globally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197551/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>In the course of his research on Japanese spatial demography Peter Matanle received funding from the Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation, the Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation, the Economic and Social Research Council, the Arts and Humanities Research Council, and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.</span></em></p>Successive Japanese administrations have tried – and largely failed – to reduce urban overcrowding for 70 years.Peter Matanle, Senior Lecturer in Japanese Studies, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1973662023-01-13T16:20:49Z2023-01-13T16:20:49ZBTS singer set for military training – but South Korea is far from alone in retaining national service<p>Late last year, the first member of the most <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/06/23/what-is-the-legacy-of-bts-the-worlds-biggest-boyband">successful and famous</a> boy band on the planet – BTS – began military service. Singer and songwriter, Kim Seok-jin (popularly known as Jin), 30, began five weeks of compulsory military training in South Korea by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/music/2022/dec/12/k-pop-star-jin-of-bts-starts-his-military-service-in-south-korea">posting a selfie</a> of his new “buzz cut” hairstyle.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A young Korean man with a new army buzzcut." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503439/original/file-20230106-6712-dl05sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503439/original/file-20230106-6712-dl05sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503439/original/file-20230106-6712-dl05sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503439/original/file-20230106-6712-dl05sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503439/original/file-20230106-6712-dl05sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503439/original/file-20230106-6712-dl05sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503439/original/file-20230106-6712-dl05sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">You’re in the army now: Jin’s new haircut.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Twitter</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There had been speculation this call-up was on the horizon and that upcoming military service for several members of BTS was the real reason for the band’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/bts-take-a-break-worlds-biggest-k-pop-group-is-caught-between-koreas-soft-power-ambitions-and-national-security-185433">break-up</a> which had been announced during the summer. </p>
<p>Jin’s service has sparked a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/15/bts-members-hiatus-kpop-army/">debate</a> in South Korea about exemptions for its stars, echoing similar discussions when Tottenham Hotspur footballer and national captain <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2020/jun/03/tottenham-son-heung-min-south-korea-tough-military-service">Son Heung-min</a> was called up in 2020. Son was excused the full 21 months of service and only served three weeks thanks to having led his team to victory in the 2018 Asian games. Jin, by contrast, is still required to complete an 18-month posting.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/IQGJVaivn4g?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">BBC News: BTS members to join South Korean military for national service.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Military service – sometimes called national service or conscription – is compulsory for all able-bodied men in South Korea and young <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/glob.12056">Korean migrants</a> living and working in other countries – such as Son, for example. </p>
<h2>‘Moral fibre’</h2>
<p>More than 70 countries worldwide have military training of some sort for their young adult citizens. These include other countries in Asia such as China and Singapore, but also European countries, including Austria, Finland, Norway and Greece. </p>
<p>Geographical <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Mapping-the-Moral-Geographies-of-Education-Character-Citizenship-and-Values/Mills/p/book/9781138300828#:%7E:text=Resources%20Support%20Material-,Book%20Description,debates%20through%20a%20geopolitic">research</a> shows that mapping national service matters. It can reveal a lot about an individual nation’s hopes and fears. For example, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/27/taiwan-extends-compulsory-military-service-amid-mounting-tensions-with-china">Taiwan very recently extended its compulsory military service</a> from four months to one year, likely due to growing geopolitical tensions with China.</p>
<p>In the UK, national service ran from the second world war until the early 1960s. Since then, there have been regular calls from famous figures, commentators and politicians to “bring it back”, including from <a href="https://www.theweek.co.uk/94653/should-the-uk-bring-back-national-service">Prince Harry</a>. These nostalgic requests often happen during times of national crisis or in response to a youth crime event or perceived youth apathy. These calls therefore reveal wider anxieties about young people’s character, duty, discipline and “moral fibre”.</p>
<p>Public opinion on national service in the UK, and elsewhere, is often split. The idea of compulsory military service and everyday militarism in the lives of children and young people is <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-the-classroom-to-the-frontline-schools-must-be-careful-what-they-teach-kids-about-the-army-84085">controversial for many</a> – especially where national service recruits are destined to be involved in military operations. </p>
<p>Academic <a href="https://theconversation.com/national-service-in-britain-why-men-who-served-dont-think-we-should-bring-it-back-179229">research</a> reveals that most British men who served in this way do not think it should be brought back. A <a href="https://theconversation.com/national-service-in-britain-why-men-who-served-dont-think-we-should-bring-it-back-179229">study</a> from the University of Essex interviewed more than 100 ex-national servicemen who recalled some positive memories during those years, but only a minority supported a return to compulsory service.</p>
<p>Although the reintroduction of conscription in the UK would be unlikely, a modern non-military youth volunteering programme for older teenagers launched by David Cameron in 2010 still chose to echo these connections via its name – “<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-national-citizen-service-59648">National Citizen Service</a>”.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/EeJI3eOGBXY?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">‘National Citizen Service’ - a voluntary scheme in England and Northern Ireland.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>National Citizen Service (NCS) remains a short-term optional experience, but its “<a href="https://repository.lboro.ac.uk/articles/journal_contribution/Brands_of_youth_citizenship_and_the_politics_of_scale_National_Citizen_Service_in_the_United_Kingdom/9482555">brand</a>” of youth citizenship with military echoes has attracted over half a million young people in England and Northern Ireland to join up. </p>
<h2>Instilling ‘character’ through service</h2>
<p>The past decade has also seen a growing number of <a href="https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/92496/">military ethos providers</a> and schemes within UK schools that promote versions of <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Mapping-the-Moral-Geographies-of-Education-Character-Citizenship-and-Values/Mills/p/book/9781138300828#:%7E:text=Resources%20Support%20Material-,Book%20Description,debates%20through%20a%20geopolitic">character education</a> connected to wider ideas of values, virtues and moral fortitude. This relationship can also be found in the Department for Education’s support of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/thousands-more-pupils-to-benefit-from-cadet-programme">cadet units in schools</a> and its recent patriotic promotion of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/one-britain-one-nation-day-is-the-perfect-vehicle-for-the-governments-values-campaign-163300">One Britain One Nation</a>” Day.</p>
<p>These “softer” forms of military ethos in the UK are noteworthy but have not been as controversial as others, including Emmanuel Macron’s <a href="https://www.snu.gouv.fr/"><em>Service National Universel</em> (SNU) in France</a>, launched in 2019. This effort to recapture “French spirit” is currently voluntary, but the eventual plan is a <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20220714-france-s-macron-urges-armed-forces-to-get-behind-national-service">mandatory</a> uniformed four-week programme for those aged 16-25. </p>
<p>Macron’s new scheme has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/19/rollout-of-compulsory-civic-service-for-young-people-in-france-sparks-criticisms">divided citizens</a>. Supporters claim it is a useful skills-based experience to mend social divisions, but its critics oppose the promotion of forced nationalism and argue that compulsion denies free will. The voluntary version has <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/macron-france-national-military-service-mandatory-compulsory-teenagers-2np2n8zgf">not proved popular with teenagers</a>.</p>
<p>It is crucial to recognise the spectrum of contemporary approaches to “national service” by different nations. These range from formal military conscription to boost reserves (as in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/27/taiwan-extends-compulsory-military-service-amid-mounting-tensions-with-china">Taiwan</a>), uniformed civic schemes with military pathways and a compulsory vision (as in France), through to optional youth volunteering programmes with military echoes (as in the UK).</p>
<p>These shifting geographies and geopolitics are vital to map, but all are united in their focus on training young people and young adults as future citizens of the nation.</p>
<p>Back in South Korea, Jin’s military service is being closely followed by news outlets and BTS’ own international army of fans are sharing news about Jin’s progress as well as discussing future call-ups on social media.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1613790523072065538"}"></div></p>
<p>There is no doubt more young people across the globe are now aware of national service and their own potential future experiences. This celebrity spotlight has brought the topic of military service to a massive global audience and fuelled a debate that will no doubt continue long beyond the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/music/2022/oct/17/bts-k-pop-members-military-service-south-korea">band’s announced return in 2025</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article previously asserted that only Israel and North Korea currently have compulsory military service for women as well as men. Other countries have also had mandatory conscription for women, including Eritrea, Mali, Morocco and Tunisia, and some other countries have elective service systems that encompass men and women. We apologise for the error.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197366/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Mills has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, Arts and Humanities Research Council, and Royal Geographical Society.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophie Milnes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>More countries are using ‘national service’, whether they are military or civic programmes.Sarah Mills, Reader in Human Geography, Loughborough UniversitySophie Milnes, PhD Researcher in Human Geography, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1973162023-01-12T05:54:08Z2023-01-12T05:54:08ZSouth Korea to ban bear farming, but what to do about hundreds of captive animals that remain?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503799/original/file-20230110-5012-dcjql6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joshua Powell</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Korea’s successful restoration of a wild Asiatic black bear population to Jirisan National Park is a huge conservation <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-korea-is-bringing-back-bears-in-a-country-of-52-million-people-i-went-to-find-out-how-164301">success story</a>. But the fortune of this wild population stands in contrast to the plight of more than 300 captive bears that remain on bear farms across the country, often in <a href="https://acrobat.adobe.com/link/review?uri=urn:aaid:scds:US:67b4a8c1-312c-3dce-a951-4564ba066d43%23pageNum=2">extremely poor conditions</a>.</p>
<p>A series of <a href="https://www.bearbiology.org/313-fall-2022-nl/">major policy changes during the past year</a> have included the announcement of a joint declaration between the South Korean government, bear farmers and NGOs to ban bear farming in the country by the start of 2026. After almost 30 years of policy deadlock over the fate of captive bears in South Korea, the joint declaration sets out a clear pathway towards the end of bear farming in the country.</p>
<p>Bear farms, which are also found in other countries in Asia, including China, Vietnam and North Korea, were originally established as a source of bear bile and body parts for traditional medicine and bear meat for food. However, the practice of bear farming has been criticised for <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/oryx/article/challenges-and-conservation-implications-of-bear-bile-farming-in-viet-nam/9BF020B8C6649C08083B284BBDE9335B">failing to alleviate pressure on wild bear populations</a> and its <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/animal-welfare/article/abs/compromised-health-and-welfare-of-bears-farmed-for-bile-in-china/BC8326EF8D496A1A10DD202971D3D6AC">consequences for animal welfare</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503801/original/file-20230110-11-o3k739.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503801/original/file-20230110-11-o3k739.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503801/original/file-20230110-11-o3k739.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503801/original/file-20230110-11-o3k739.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503801/original/file-20230110-11-o3k739.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503801/original/file-20230110-11-o3k739.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503801/original/file-20230110-11-o3k739.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503801/original/file-20230110-11-o3k739.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Asiatic black bear (a species also known as the moon bear) on a bear bile farm in South Korea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joshua Powell</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While the agreement to ban bear farming is a major success for South Korea’s environmental movement, I wanted to see how the captive bears on a farm I first visited in 2021 were faring, so in late October 2022, I travelled to the mountains of Gangwon province, just south of the demilitarised zone that divides North and South Korea.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503820/original/file-20230110-15-pl9v0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Furry and friendly-looking bear" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503820/original/file-20230110-15-pl9v0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503820/original/file-20230110-15-pl9v0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503820/original/file-20230110-15-pl9v0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503820/original/file-20230110-15-pl9v0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503820/original/file-20230110-15-pl9v0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503820/original/file-20230110-15-pl9v0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503820/original/file-20230110-15-pl9v0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Asiatic black bears are better suited to climbing trees than most other bears and are also more comfortable walking on two legs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joshua Powell</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While this farm no longer actively harvested its bears, when I first visited in 2021, the animals languished in small cages, malnourished and lacking regular access to water. This state of affairs is not unusual; although <a href="https://www.traffic.org/publications/reports/pills-powders-vials-flakes-the-bear-bile-trade-in-asia/">a 2007 study</a> found that many South Korean bear farmers wanted to see an end to bear farming, the captive bears themselves had previously been largely overlooked by government attempts to regulate the industry.</p>
<h2>Improved conditions</h2>
<p>The change in the past year was scarcely believable. A new outside enclosure had been constructed by a team of volunteers from two Korean NGOs, <a href="http://projectmoonbear.org/">Project Moon Bear</a> and <a href="https://www.ekara.org/">Korea Animal Rights Advocates (KARA)</a>, featuring a pool and “enrichment” (items that provide stimulation for captive animals). Hollow logs lined with honey and nuts were a particular favourite. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503805/original/file-20230110-26-k3nhwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two bears behind bars" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503805/original/file-20230110-26-k3nhwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503805/original/file-20230110-26-k3nhwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503805/original/file-20230110-26-k3nhwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503805/original/file-20230110-26-k3nhwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503805/original/file-20230110-26-k3nhwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503805/original/file-20230110-26-k3nhwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503805/original/file-20230110-26-k3nhwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Two of the bears on the farm that the author visited in spring 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joshua Powell</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While you could still see abnormal repetitive behaviours in some of the bears (a sign of long-term stress), they appeared in much better physical condition and were benefiting from a new, improved diet, provided for them by the NGOs. Specialist animal trainers had even taught the bears to accept hand vaccinations from veterinarians, something which allows captive animals to be treated without the need for heightened stress or sedatives.</p>
<p>These bears could never be released into the wild, as they are too used to being fed by humans. Some may not even be the native Asiatic black bear, given that <a href="https://www.traffic.org/publications/reports/pills-powders-vials-flakes-the-bear-bile-trade-in-asia/">a number of different species were originally imported</a> to stock South Korea’s bear farms. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503806/original/file-20230110-24-622z41.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Bear walks over rocky ground" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503806/original/file-20230110-24-622z41.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503806/original/file-20230110-24-622z41.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503806/original/file-20230110-24-622z41.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503806/original/file-20230110-24-622z41.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503806/original/file-20230110-24-622z41.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503806/original/file-20230110-24-622z41.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503806/original/file-20230110-24-622z41.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One of the two bears in the photo above explores its new home in autumn 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joshua Powell</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, bear sanctuaries in Europe have shown how captive animals that cannot be released into the wild can still be provided with much improved welfare conditions. The <a href="https://millionsoffriends.org/en/libearty/">Libearty Brown Bear Sanctuary in Zarnesti, Romania</a> is one of the largest and houses bears that have been rescued from entertainment facilities and animal shows, including circuses, restaurants and hotels. </p>
<p>The changes by Project Moon Bear and KARA to the farm in Gangwon province have made life better for the bears. But they also illustrate the expertise in captive bear management that is needed to successfully rehouse potentially hundreds of bears from farms across the country.</p>
<h2>Hundreds of bears still captive</h2>
<p>In order to make an end to bear farming in South Korea a reality, there are also legislative and budgetary hurdles to be overcome. Then there is the question of whether the planned public sanctuaries will have sufficient capacity (the current target is 120 animals) for the number of bears they might be expected to hold. </p>
<p>There are currently 322 captive bears spread across 20 farms in South Korea. While Project Moon Bear and KARA plan to build a private sanctuary to help address the shortfall, it is estimated that this will cost as much as US$2.25 million (£1.85 million). That is on top of the government’s current expectation that the NGOs will help buy animals from bear farms.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503807/original/file-20230110-20-h086ao.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Bear steps out of cage" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503807/original/file-20230110-20-h086ao.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503807/original/file-20230110-20-h086ao.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503807/original/file-20230110-20-h086ao.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503807/original/file-20230110-20-h086ao.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503807/original/file-20230110-20-h086ao.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503807/original/file-20230110-20-h086ao.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503807/original/file-20230110-20-h086ao.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A captive bear takes its first steps outside of a cage.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joshua Powell</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite the clear challenges ahead if South Korea is to fulfil its stated aim to end bear farming by 2026, the outlook for captive bears in the country now looks much brighter. Conservationists and policy makers in other countries where bear farming occurs will undoubtedly be watching with interest.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197316/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Powell receives funding from the London NERC DTP. In 2021-22, he was a visiting research student at Seoul National University's College of Veterinary Medicine. He was invited to visit a bear farm with Project Moon Bear. </span></em></p>These bears cannot be released into the wild, so sanctuaries are being built.Joshua Elves-Powell, London NERC DTP PhD Researcher, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.