tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/sovereignty-6512/articlesSovereignty – The Conversation2024-02-05T03:40:54Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223842024-02-05T03:40:54Z2024-02-05T03:40:54ZSovereignty is sacred: in Timor-Leste’s remote Oecusse Enclave, a border dispute threatens to open old wounds<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573320/original/file-20240205-17-gb5sa9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C2%2C954%2C715&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michael Rose</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In September, Timor-Leste will mark a quarter century since its vote for independence from Indonesia, the conclusion of a 24-year long struggle that left few Timorese families <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_occupation_of_East_Timor#Number_of_deaths">untouched</a>. </p>
<p>Reconciliation with its giant neighbour stands out as one of Timor-Leste proudest achievements, but as 2024 begins, a long simmering border dispute, in which a border hamlet faces the prospect of its land being transferred to Indonesia, is stirring both political strife and ghosts many hoped were at rest.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/timor-leste-election-offers-an-extraordinary-lesson-in-how-to-build-a-stable-democracy-206421">Timor-Leste election offers an extraordinary lesson in how to build a stable democracy</a>
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<h2>Where is the land?</h2>
<p>The area in question is a hamlet called <a href="https://www.google.com.au/maps/place/Naktuka,+Timor-Leste/@-9.3473574,124.0538669,7268m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m6!3m5!1s0x2c550ea704aafb87:0xb7b71c467eda2f81!8m2!3d-9.3469731!4d124.0617151!16s%2Fg%2F11bx56h2nt?entry=ttu">Naktuka</a>. It’s around 1,000 hectares of rare old-growth forest and rice fields on the western edge of Timor-Leste’s <a href="https://www.google.com.au/maps/@-9.2802797,124.1371103,10.75z?entry=ttu">Oecusse</a> (also spelled Oecussi) Enclave. Oecusse is 800 square kilometres of rugged coast and mountains some 70 kilometres west of the rest of Timor-Leste. </p>
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<p>Although Naktuka is home to only around 60 families, and a four hour drive along a coastal track from the nearest major town, to the people of Oecusse it is anything but marginal. Its <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14442210601161732">forests</a> are the domain of Oecusse’s king (<em>usif</em>), and the place he periodically <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/ocea.5240">gathers</a> the Enclave’s clans to celebrate their identity as “people of the dry land” (Atoni Pah Meto) and subjects of their legendary forebear, Lord Benu (Ama Benu). For them, Naktuka is <em><a href="https://devpolicy.org/publications/books/MRose_indigenous-spirits-and-global-aspirations-in-a-southeast-asian-borderlandDevPol.pdf">pah le’u</a></em> (sacred land). </p>
<p>However, in the wake of recent border <a href="http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=35443&lang=en&n=1">negotiations</a> between Indonesia and Timor-Leste, concerns have been raised over how much longer they will be free to access it. </p>
<p>At the end of 2023, Naktuka was visited by a team from the Timor-Leste’s government who oversaw the placement of around 76 metal stakes (<em>estaka</em>) along a line some 350 meters inland from the frontier. Suspicions quickly grew it was to be a new border.</p>
<p>Such a border would cede around <a href="https://www.fundasaunmahein.org/2024/01/24/land-border-agreement-with-indonesia-pragmatism-and-high-level-politics-over-sovereignty-and-community-rights/">270 hectares</a> of forest and rice fields to Indonesia.</p>
<p>Subsequent developments didn’t allay concerns. On February 1 2024, the head of the technical team working on the border said the stakes <a href="https://tatoli.tl/2024/02/01/abitante-naktuka-fo-fiar-ba-xanana-luta-too-finaliza-fronteira-terrestre/">did not</a> represent a new frontier, but were being used to assess where one might be placed. </p>
<p>Coupled with an <a href="https://www.facebook.com/CNRTMediaCenter/posts/pfbid02X7TdCALJ4MtR1RbYi4opTkfU5R8JZJNmXpNPFbX9KjhcDN9MM3GR8KmApbigmZ1Yl">announcement</a> by the CNRT Media Centre, mouth-piece of Timor-Leste’s ruling party, that a “win-win” solution could involve dividing Naktuka in half and giving away around 500 hectares, this was cold comfort. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cash-for-the-winner-the-loser-for-dinner-cockfighting-in-timor-leste-is-a-complicated-game-131027">Cash for the winner, the loser for dinner: cockfighting in Timor Leste is a complicated game</a>
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<p>They even posted a <a href="https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=687045866942460&set=pcb.687045883609125">map</a> from the Indonesian <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-Land-Boundary-Division-in-Noel-Besi-Segment-Citrana-Source-The-Development_fig1_370053360">Geospatial</a> Information Agency showing how it might look.</p>
<p>In Timor-Leste, this has <a href="https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=naktuka">resulted</a> in an angry backlash. The signing of the border agreement, which was to have <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/5667/berita/indonesia-completes-6-border-agreements-with-neighbouring-countries-in-the-last-9-years">occurred</a> in Jakarta in late January, has been postponed.</p>
<h2>A small hamlet on a divided island</h2>
<p>Recent questions over the ownership of Naktuka stem from unresolved negotiations over the border between Timor-Leste and Indonesia, created when the latter regained its independence in 2002. </p>
<p>While Naktuka is governed by Timor-Leste, in 2005, Timor-Leste <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/09/world/asia/east-timor-and-indonesia-sign-border-pact.html">signed</a> an agreement confirming the status of around 95% of its border with Indonesia, with a small number of areas to be clarified later. Naktuka was one. The reason goes back at least 120 years.</p>
<p>In 1904, when the Dutch and Portuguese moved to finalise the division of Timor, they differed in their interpretation where Oecussi’s borders should be. By 1915 the question was effectively settled. The Portuguese put down <a href="https://www.newmandala.org/the-timor-crisis-and-dom-bonaventuras-plea-for-help-houbens-archival-investigations/">milestones</a> and proceeded to govern <a href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/47/Timor_1914.png">Naktuka</a> for 50 years.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/asean-leaders-give-in-principle-support-for-timor-lestes-membership-what-does-this-actually-mean-194462">ASEAN leaders give 'in-principle' support for Timor-Leste's membership. What does this actually mean?</a>
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<p>With the Indonesian invasion of 1975, Naktuka, along with the rest of Portuguese Timor, became part of the province of <a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/97682212/">Timor Timur</a>. In 1999 it voted in Timor-Leste’s independence referendum and was <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uti_possidetis">incorporated</a>, as a former part of both Portuguese Timor and Timor Timur, into Timor-Leste. </p>
<p>Indonesia argues that as Naktuka should not (<a href="https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-boundaries-in-the-island-of-timor-the-netherlands-v-portugal-award-thursday-25th-june-1914">arguably</a>) have become part of Portuguese Timor 110 years ago, it should not be part of Timor-Leste now. Suffice to say this is not an argument that makes such sense to the people who live there today, or many of their compatriots.</p>
<p>Naktuka is remote and poor. After independence its people got on with life. Their days revolved around rice farming and their role as caretakers of the land, including the king’s forest, site of the royal feast of <em>‘seu puah</em> (the communal betel nut harvest). The population grew, slowly, and in many ways Naktuka was similar to any other hamlet in Timor-Leste.</p>
<p>And yet, periodic incidents reminded people of their limbo. In 2013, the Timor-Leste Police were <a href="https://www.easttimorlawandjusticebulletin.com/2013/01/naktuka-border-dispute-needs-diplomacy.html">prevented</a> from building a guard-post. Indonesian soldiers would come across the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-ZkjAyCy5I">frontier</a>, often just bored, but an unpleasant reminder of the occupation. In 2012 there was even a <a href="https://www.easttimorlawandjusticebulletin.com/2013/01/indonesian-military-suspected-of.html">murder</a> which local media reported was committed by people from across the border. The Indonesian press carried the occasional article about citizens of Timor-Leste settling <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/01/22/ri-reprimands-timor-leste-over-border-area-violation.html">illegally</a> in an area they called “disputed”, but to residents was simply <a href="https://www.pinterest.com.au/pin/277815870741736776/">home</a>.</p>
<p>There’s no doubt the intentions of Timor-Leste government in seeking a permanent fix on its western border are good, but the idea it can do so by ceding land is surprisingly out of touch with reality. In Timor-Leste sovereignty is sacred, literally, as is the principle of consent and consultation on matters relating to land. Any solution to the situation in Naktuka that ignores this is very unlikely to work.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222384/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Rose does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>On a remote stretch of border between Timor-Leste and Indonesia, a dispute over a remote hamlet is stirring memories of conflict many hoped was behind them.Michael Rose, Research Associate, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2219732024-02-01T19:05:21Z2024-02-01T19:05:21ZWaitangi Day 2024: 5 myths and misconceptions that confuse the Treaty debate<p>When it comes to grappling with the <a href="https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/treaty-of-waitangi">Treaty of Waitangi</a>/Te Tiriti o Waitangi, one of the commonest responses is that it’s a matter of interpretation. It seems to be a perfectly fair reaction, except that historical interpretation generally requires adherence to rules of evidence.</p>
<p>It is not a licence to make any claims whatsoever about the Treaty, and then to assert their truth by appealing to the authority of personal interpretation.</p>
<p>Yet since the 1970s we’ve been faced with the paradoxical situation of a growing body of Treaty scholarship that has led to less consensus about its meaning and purpose.</p>
<p>It is therefore worthwhile to investigate some of the more common misconceptions about the Treaty that have accrued over recent decades. This will not lead to a definitive interpretation of the Treaty. But it might remove a few obstacles currently in the way of understanding it better.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/history-and-myth-why-the-treaty-of-waitangi-remains-such-a-bloody-difficult-subject-202038">History and myth: why the Treaty of Waitangi remains such a ‘bloody difficult subject’</a>
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<h2>1. The Treaty or Te Tiriti?</h2>
<p>A common view persists that the English and Māori versions of the Treaty are fundamentally at odds with each other, especially over the central issue of sovereignty.</p>
<p>But research over the past two decades on <a href="https://waitangitribunal.govt.nz/assets/WT-Part-2-Report-on-stage-1-of-the-Te-Paparahi-o-Te-Raki-inquiry.pdf">British colonial policy prior to 1840</a> has revealed that Britain wanted a treaty to enable it to extend its jurisdiction to its subjects living in New Zealand. </p>
<p>It had no intention to govern Māori or usurp Māori sovereignty. On this critical point, the two versions are essentially in agreement.</p>
<h2>2. The Treaty is not a contract</h2>
<p>The principle of <em>contra proferentem</em> – appropriated from contract law – refers to ambiguous provisions that can be interpreted in a way that works against the drafter of the contract.</p>
<p>However, there are several problems in applying this principle to the Treaty. Firstly, treaties are <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/byrint11&div=8&id=&page=">different legal instruments from contracts</a>. This explains why there are correspondingly few examples of this principle being used in international law for interpreting treaties.</p>
<p>Secondly, as there are no major material differences between the English and Māori versions of the Treaty when it comes to Māori retaining sovereignty, there is no need to apply such a principle.</p>
<p>And thirdly, under international law, treaties are not to be interpreted in an adversarial manner, but in good faith (the principle of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2203309"><em>pacta sunt servanda</em></a>). Thus, rather than the parties fighting over the Treaty’s meaning, the requirement is for them to work <em>with</em> rather than against each other.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/learning-to-live-with-the-messy-complicated-history-of-how-aotearoa-new-zealand-was-colonised-172219">Learning to live with the 'messy, complicated history' of how Aotearoa New Zealand was colonised</a>
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<h2>3. Relationships evolve over time</h2>
<p>No rangatira (chief) ceded sovereignty over their own people through the Treaty. Nor was that Britain’s intention – hence Britain’s recognition in August 1839 of hapū (kinship group) sovereignty and the guarantee in the Treaty that rangatiratanga (the powers of the chiefs) would be protected.</p>
<p>Britain simply wanted jurisdiction over its own subjects in the colony. This is what is known as an “originalist” interpretation – one that follows the Treaty’s meaning as it was understood in 1840.</p>
<p>This has several limitations: it precludes the emergence of Treaty principles; it wrongly presumes that all involved at the time of the Treaty’s signing had an identical view on its meaning; and, crucially, it ignores all subsequent historical developments.</p>
<p>Treaty relationships evolve over time in numerous ways. Originalist interpretations fail to take that into account.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-significance-of-the-treaty-of-waitangi-110982">Explainer: the significance of the Treaty of Waitangi</a>
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<h2>4. Questions of motive</h2>
<p>British motives for the Treaty were made explicit in 1839, yet in the following 185 years false motives have entered into the historical bloodstream, where they have continued circulating.</p>
<p>What Britain wanted was the right to apply its laws to its people living in New Zealand. It also intended to “civilise” Māori (through creating the short-lived Office of Protector of Aborigines) and protect Māori land from unethical purchases (the pre-emption provision in Article Two of the Treaty).</p>
<p>And Britain wanted to afford Māori the same rights as British subjects in cases where one group’s actions impinged on the other’s (as in the 1842 <a href="https://ojs.aut.ac.nz/te-kaharoa/index.php/tekaharoa/article/view/61/58">Maketū case</a>, involving the conviction for murder and execution of a young Māori man).</p>
<p>The Treaty was not a response to a <a href="https://h-france.net/rude/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/vol5_11_Jennings_Marists_Colonial_Policy_final.pdf">French threat to New Zealand</a>. And it was not an attempt to conquer Māori, nor to deceive them through subterfuge.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-pebble-in-the-shoe-to-future-power-broker-the-rise-and-rise-of-te-pati-maori-212089">From 'pebble in the shoe' to future power broker – the rise and rise of te Pāti Māori</a>
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<h2>5. Myths of a ‘real’ Treaty and 4th article</h2>
<p>Over the past two decades, some have alleged there is a “real” Treaty – the so-called “<a href="https://www.wgtn.ac.nz/stout-centre/research-and-publications2/research-units/towru/publications/The-Littlewood-Treaty.pdf">Littlewood Treaty</a>” – that has been concealed because it contains a different set of provisions. Such conspiratorial claims are easily dispelled.</p>
<p>The text of the Littlewood Treaty is known and it is merely a handwritten copy of the actual Treaty. And, most obviously, it cannot be regarded as a treaty on the basis that no one signed it.</p>
<p>Another popular myth is that there is a fourth article of the Treaty, which purportedly guarantees religious freedom. This article <a href="https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/treaty-of-waitangi/meaning-of-the-treaty/">does not appear</a> in either the Māori or English texts of the Treaty, and there is no evidence the signatories regarded it as a provision of the agreement. It is a suggestion that emerged in the 1990s, but lacks any evidential or legal basis.</p>
<p>Finally, there is the argument that the Treaty <a href="https://theconversation.com/waitangi-2024-how-the-treaty-strengthens-democracy-and-provides-a-check-on-unbridled-power-221723">supports the democratic process</a>. In fact, the Treaty ushered in a non-representative regime in the colony. It was the <a href="https://nzhistory.govt.nz/proclamation-of-1852-constitution-act">1852 New Zealand Constitution Act</a> that gave the country a democratic government – a statute that incidentally made no reference to the Treaty’s provisions.</p>
<p>This list is not exhaustive. But in dispensing with areas of poor interpretation, we can improve the chances of a more informed and productive discussion about the Treaty.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-idea-of-sovereignty-is-central-to-the-treaty-debate-why-is-it-so-hard-to-define-220201">The idea of ‘sovereignty’ is central to the Treaty debate – why is it so hard to define?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221973/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Moon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Decades of Treaty scholarship have failed to arrive at a consensus about its meaning and purpose. Dispensing with various mistaken interpretations would improve the chances of productive discussion.Paul Moon, Professor of History, Auckland University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2202012024-01-30T17:42:17Z2024-01-30T17:42:17ZThe idea of ‘sovereignty’ is central to the Treaty debate – why is it so hard to define?<p>The coalition government’s approach to <a href="https://teara.govt.nz/en/te-tiriti-o-waitangi-the-treaty-of-waitangi/print">Te Tiriti o Waitangi</a> (Treaty of Waitangi) will inevitably set the scene for Waitangi Day next week, with the ACT Party’s <a href="https://www.act.org.nz/defining-the-treaty-principles">Treaty Principles Bill</a> already generating protest and <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/politics/350157533/three-headed-taniwha-government-enemy-maori-ratana-criticism-should-give-pm">ill will</a>. </p>
<p>But ACT’s initiative, even if ill-conceived, could still open up a widened debate that is long overdue.</p>
<p>The current Treaty “<a href="https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/WT-Principles-of-the-Treaty-of-Waitangi-as-expressed-by-the-Courts-and-the-Waitangi-Tribunal.pdf">principles</a>” were devised by the <a href="https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/">Waitangi Tribunal</a> and the courts, and are based on interpretations of both English and Māori texts. ACT’s draft bill would rewrite the principles according to the English text only – or, at best, on a shallow reading of the Māori. </p>
<p>On the other far side of the debate, Māori “decolonialists” would simply abandon the principles, and advocate a return to their interpretation of the Māori text of Te Tiriti.</p>
<p>The decolonialists are correct on two key points: the Māori text is the original text and has the standing in international law; and the principles derived from both texts are problematic. </p>
<p>However, the decolonialists say Māori did not cede sovereignty in Te Tiriti, only the right for the Crown to govern non-Māori. They then revert back to a poorly defined Treaty principle in calling for an “equal partnership” that would constitutionally entrench a Māori parliament deep in the political process. </p>
<p>I argue against such a major constitutional change. If Māori did not explicitly cede sovereignty in 1840, neither did they fully retain it. Sovereignty is already being shared. </p>
<p>Because te Tiriti was between the Crown and <a href="https://teara.govt.nz/en/tribal-organisation/page-1">iwi and hapū</a>, demands for their greater self-determination can and are being addressed within our current constitution.</p>
<h2>Complete government forever</h2>
<p>Like ACT’s bill, the decolonial interpretation of Te Tiriti is both shallow and partial. It relies on a narrow legalistic interpretation of the concept of sovereignty, albeit one that is shared by <a href="https://www.crownlaw.govt.nz/">Crown Law</a> and much of the legal establishment. </p>
<p>The alleged lack of cession of sovereignty has been widely recognised by historians and legal experts for many years. Yet the late <a href="https://teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/6k2/kawharu-ian-hugh">Hugh Kawharu</a>’s authoritative translation of the key text of Te Tiriti says: </p>
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<p>The chiefs […] give absolutely to the Queen of England for ever the complete government over their land. </p>
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<p>To a commonsense reader, “complete government for ever” might seem to mean “sovereignty”. However, as Kawhuru pointed out, at the time Māori had no experience or cultural understanding of the concept.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, “complete government” was not without meaning to Māori. Many had knowledge of the government of New South Wales, and some had even visited Britain. Māori accepted the Crown would govern settlers under British law.</p>
<p>Māori also accepted the Crown would “protect” them. In <a href="https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/treaty-of-waitangi/translation-of-te-reo-maori-text/">Kawhuru’s translation</a>, that protection was for “the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship over their lands, villages, and treasures”, and over “all ordinary people of New Zealand”, who would have “the same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England”.</p>
<p>Kawharu also noted that “chieftainship” was based on limited authority and is best understood as “trusteeship”. By implication, then, chieftainship did not mean sovereignty. This idea was simply not in the Māori conceptual toolbox at the time.</p>
<p>An Indigenous people had agreed that an immigrant people could come to their land and be governed, not by Indigenous authorities, but by an immigrant government. </p>
<p>The Indigenous people also agreed that the immigrant government had a duty of protection over them: not just over the authority of their chiefs, but also over the “ordinary people”. </p>
<p>Such protection would require action to prevent tribal warfare and end slavery. It stretches credibility to interpret these agreements as meaning Māori signatories of Te Tiriti retained “absolute sovereignty”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-significance-of-the-treaty-of-waitangi-110982">Explainer: the significance of the Treaty of Waitangi</a>
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<h2>Secular sovereignty</h2>
<p>Why is interpretation of Te Tiriti so subject to debate? One answer is that we are confused by misunderstanding of the concept of “sovereignty”. </p>
<p>It is a word and idea with big connotations. Traditionally it was drawn from the power of monarchies, the authority of which was said to be derived from God. The Crown was held by a single person. </p>
<p>In Māori terms it has been retrospectively interpreted as “<a href="https://maoridictionary.co.nz/search?keywords=mana">mana</a>”, another concept with big emotional resonance. In 2013, when arguing the <a href="https://thespinoff.co.nz/atea/13-11-2019/an-insiders-guide-to-the-ngapuhi-settlement">Ngāpui claim</a> at the Waitangi Tribunal, Crown Law defined sovereignty as meaning “absolute and undivided power to make law”. </p>
<p>But this legal interpretation is incomplete. Making law is but one part of sovereignty, and not necessarily the most important one.</p>
<p>Secular understanding of the concept of sovereignty emerged after disastrous civil wars in England and France, and devastating wars throughout Europe. </p>
<p>In England, a king was executed and a republic temporarily established. There was much fear, uncertainty and insecurity. Secular sovereignty is rooted in a belief in the need for a government that can preserve peace and order and thus protect its citizens. </p>
<p>That government must also be able to defend its borders and protect against foreign incursion. There can be little doubt Māori ceded those protective aspects of sovereignty to the Crown in 1840.</p>
<p>However, in Article Two of Te Tiriti, Māori retained the continuation of chiefly authority over their peoples. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571539/original/file-20240125-17-upvr3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="fragment of Te Tiriti" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571539/original/file-20240125-17-upvr3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571539/original/file-20240125-17-upvr3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571539/original/file-20240125-17-upvr3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571539/original/file-20240125-17-upvr3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571539/original/file-20240125-17-upvr3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571539/original/file-20240125-17-upvr3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571539/original/file-20240125-17-upvr3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A fragment of Te Tiriti signed at Waitangi in 1840.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Sovereignty of the people</h2>
<p>Some legal historians now argue that at the time of the signing of Te Tiriti in 1840, the British Colonial Office understood British sovereignty to be consistent with a pluralistic recognition of persisting Indigenous political and legal authorities. In other words, sovereignty could be shared. </p>
<p>But an abstract, absolute and undivided legal understanding of sovereignty was soon imposed, and Te Tiriti ignored.</p>
<p>Yet during the 20th century the tide turned. Changes in the meaning of sovereignty under democratic government have recovered its pluralist interpretation. Meanwhile, governments’ protective powers have also grown. They have acquired responsibilities to protect people’s health and welfare in ways few would have anticipated in 1840. </p>
<p>Lawyers continue to describe parliament as sovereign or “supreme” and to speak of “the Crown” as a legal entity. In political terms, the Crown is a useful fiction that sums up a much more complex set of phenomena. It is a symbol of sovereignty, not its reality. </p>
<p>In a democracy, sovereignty is sourced in “the people”. Like everyone else, Māori vote in elections and elect MPs and are therefore part of the Crown: the sovereign people. </p>
<p>The authority of “the people” is transferred to representatives who make decisions for them. Those representatives transfer authority to a cabinet and prime minister. Further authority is transferred into the public service – and beyond it. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/maori-atheism-on-the-rise-the-legacy-of-colonisation-is-driving-a-decline-in-traditional-christian-beliefs-214701">Māori atheism on the rise: the legacy of colonisation is driving a decline in traditional Christian beliefs</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The key to understanding sovereignty is simply this: there is no one consistent “particular place” where decisions with the force of sovereignty are always made. </p>
<p>Between elections, parliament may be supreme in terms of lawmaking, but parliament is subject to election every three years. In a democracy the people are the source of sovereignty but delegate its power to others. And the extent of popular sovereignty may be limited in particular ways by constitutions or treaties – like Te Tiriti o Waitangi.</p>
<p>Sovereignty is effective where, at any one place or time, a binding decision is made within an entire system of government. Sovereignty cannot be divided, because such division would inevitably result in conflict that would often fail to be resolved. </p>
<p>However, sovereignty can be passed around and shared. Sovereignty is not only found in a prime minister’s office or in cabinet. Sovereignty is found in many places, at different times: or at the same time in many places, when multiple choices are being made by different actors about various different things. </p>
<p>So long as those choices are recognised as decisive at that time, and on that matter, there is no paralysis or divided authority. Although, of course, they may be challenged later by other arms of government, such as in the courts.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-zealands-indigenous-reconciliation-efforts-show-having-a-treaty-isnt-enough-49890">New Zealand's indigenous reconciliation efforts show having a treaty isn't enough</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>Te Tiriti and the constitution</h2>
<p>Sovereignty is found in the legislation passed by parliament, but also in the way the courts interpret that legislation. It is found in the decisions made by the police to prosecute or not prosecute, and in the ways the police choose to use their powers, because the police are not subject to direct ministerial control. </p>
<p>It is found in the policy and administrative decisions made throughout the machinery of government within the framework of legislation, and in non-governmental organisations that have been delegated to run government programmes. </p>
<p>It is found where any private individual or organisation can use powers made effective by legislation and delegations of authority, such as the ability of a private company to issue a parking fine. </p>
<p>Sovereignty lies behind the ways in which individuals and groups can claim ownership and control of resources, as it is “the Crown” that recognises and protects property rights.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/learning-to-live-with-the-messy-complicated-history-of-how-aotearoa-new-zealand-was-colonised-172219">Learning to live with the 'messy, complicated history' of how Aotearoa New Zealand was colonised</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Some claim that elections based on popular sovereignty and majority rule ignore the rights of minorities. But others argue that in a representative democracy minority rule is a bigger problem than majority rule. </p>
<p>Majority votes in elections are modified and constrained by deliberation in parliament, including public submissions that can bring minority concerns to the table, as well as the influential lobbying of special interests.</p>
<p>The interpretation and application of law may be challenged in the courts, where interpretations of Te Tiriti o Waitangi may also be brought to bear.</p>
<p>The institutions of government in Aotearoa New Zealand have evolved since 1840 and in the process have been fundamentally transformed. Because we do not have a formal constitution, our institutions have adapted to changing needs and demands. </p>
<p>If we can more clearly accept, define and clarify its constraints on popular sovereignty, Te Tiriti’s promise that Māori iwi and hapū should govern themselves as much as is possible can be addressed under our existing constitution, and can be accommodated within its liberal democratic principles.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220201/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jack Vowles does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If Māori did not explicitly cede sovereignty in 1840, neither did they fully retain it. If sovereignty is already being shared, where does Te Tiriti o Waitangi sit within our unwritten constitution?Jack Vowles, Professor of Political Science, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of WellingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2217232024-01-23T17:50:38Z2024-01-23T17:50:38ZWaitangi 2024: how the Treaty strengthens democracy and provides a check on unbridled power<p>The ACT Party’s election promise of a referendum to redefine and enshrine the “principles” of the Treaty of Waitangi is likely to dominate debate at this year’s <a href="https://www.1news.co.nz/2024/01/23/why-ratana-is-an-important-date-on-the-political-calendar/">Rātana</a> and Waitangi Day events. </p>
<p>ACT’s <a href="https://assets.nationbuilder.com/nzfirst/pages/4462/attachments/original/1700784896/National___NZF_Coalition_Agreement_signed_-_24_Nov_2023.pdf">coalition agreement</a> with the National Party commits the government to supporting a Treaty Principles Bill for select committee consideration. The bill may not make it into law, but the idea is raising considerable alarm.</p>
<p>Leaked <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/507090/government-confirms-leaked-document-was-a-ministry-treaty-principles-bill-memo">draft advice</a> to Cabinet from the Ministry of Justice says the principles should be defined in legislation because “their importance requires there be certainty and clarity about their meaning”. The advice also says ACT’s proposal will:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>change the nature of the principles from reflecting a relationship akin to a partnership between the Crown and Māori to reflecting the relationship the Crown has with all citizens of New Zealand. This is not supported by either the spirit of the Treaty or the text of the Treaty.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Setting aside arguments that the notion of “partnership” diminishes self-determination, the 10,000 people attending a <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/te-manu-korihi/507161/in-photos-hui-aa-iwi-at-tuurangawaewae-marae">meeting</a> last weekend called by <a href="https://teara.govt.nz/en/photograph/27167/king-tuheitia">King Tūheitia</a> were motivated by the prospect of the Treaty being diminished.</p>
<h2>Do we need Treaty principles?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.tpk.govt.nz/en/o-matou-mohiotanga/crownmaori-relations/he-tirohanga-o-kawa-ki-te-tiriti-o-waitangi">Treaty principles</a> were developed and elaborated by parliaments, courts and the Waitangi Tribunal over more than 50 years to guide policy implementation and mediate tensions between the Māori and English texts of the document.</p>
<p>The Māori text, which more than 500 rangatira (chiefs) signed, conferred the right to establish government on the British Crown. The English text conferred absolute sovereignty; 39 rangatira signed this text after having it explained in Māori, a language that has <a href="https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/treaty/read-the-Treaty/differences-between-the-texts">no concept of sovereignty</a> as a political and legal authority to be given away.</p>
<p>Because the English text wasn’t widely signed, there is a view that it holds no influential standing, and that perhaps there isn’t a tension to mediate. Former chief justice <a href="https://natlib.govt.nz/he-tohu/korero/interview-with-dame-sian-elias">Sian Elias has said</a> “it can’t be disputed that the Treaty is actually the Māori text”.</p>
<p>On Saturday, <a href="https://www.1news.co.nz/2024/01/20/be-maori-kiingi-tuuheitia-gives-closing-speech-at-national-hui/">Tūheitia said</a>: “There’s no principles, the Treaty is written, that’s it.” This view is supported by arguments that the principles are <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/14687968211047902">reductionist</a> and take attention away from the substance of <a href="https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/treaty-of-waitangi/translation-of-te-reo-maori-text/">Te Tiriti’s articles</a>: the Crown may establish government; Māori may retain authority over their own affairs and enjoy citizenship of the state in ways that reflect equal tikanga (cultural values).</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-redefining-the-treaty-principles-would-undermine-real-political-equality-in-nz-218511">Why redefining the Treaty principles would undermine real political equality in NZ</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Democratic or undemocratic?</h2>
<p>The ACT Party says this is undemocratic because it gives Māori a privileged voice in public decision making. Of the previous government, <a href="https://www.act.org.nz/defining-the-treaty-principles">ACT has said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Labour is trying to make New Zealand an unequal society on purpose. It believes there are two types of New Zealanders. Tangata Whenua, who are here by right, and Tangata Tiriti who are lucky to be here.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Liberal democracy was not the form of government Britain established in 1840. There’s even an <a href="https://nwo.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MatikeMaiAotearoa25Jan16.pdf">argument</a> that state government doesn’t concern Māori. The Crown exercises government only over “<a href="https://nwo.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MatikeMaiAotearoa25Jan16.pdf">its people</a>” – settlers and their descendants. Māori political authority is found in tino rangatiratanga and through shared decision making on matters of common interest.</p>
<p>Tino rangatiratanga <a href="https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/2292/65738/2021%20Mutu%20Mana%20Sovereignty%20for%20Routledge%20Handbook%20of%20Critical%20Indigenous%20Studies.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">has been defined</a> as “the exercise of ultimate and paramount power and authority”. In practice, like all power, this is relative and relational to the power of others, and constrained by circumstances beyond human control.</p>
<p>But the power of others has to be fair and reasonable, and rangatiratanga requires freedom from arbitrary interference by the state. That way, authority and responsibility may be exercised, and independence upheld, in relation to Māori people’s own affairs and resources.</p>
<h2>Assertions of rangatiratanga</h2>
<p>Social integration – especially through intermarriage, economic interdependence and economies of scale – makes a rigid “them and us” binary an unlikely path to a better life for anybody.</p>
<p>However, rangatiratanga might be found in Tūheitia’s advice about the best form of protest against rewriting the Treaty principles to diminish the Treaty itself:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Be who we are, live our values, speak our reo (language), care for our mokopuna (children), our awa (rivers), our maunga (mountains), just be Māori. Māori all day, every day.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-kingitanga-movement-160-years-of-maori-monarchy-102029">The kīngitanga movement: 160 years of Māori monarchy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>As the government <a href="https://assets.nationbuilder.com/nationalparty/pages/18466/attachments/original/1700778597/NZFirst_Agreement_2.pdf?1700778597">introduces measures</a> to reduce the use of te reo Māori in public life, repeal child care and protection legislation that promotes Māori leadership and responsibility, and repeal <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-repeal-three-waters-legislation">water management legislation</a> that ensures Māori participation, Tūheitia’s words are all assertions of rangatiratanga.</p>
<p>Those government policies sit alongside the proposed Treaty Principles Bill to diminish Māori opportunities to be Māori in public life. For the ACT Party, this is necessary to protect democratic equality.</p>
<p>In effect, the proposed bill says that to be equal, Māori people can’t contribute to public decisions with reference to their own culture. As anthropologist <a href="https://newsroom.co.nz/2023/12/15/anne-salmond-on-the-treaty-debate-maori-and-pakeha-think-differently/">Anne Salmond has written</a>, this means the state cannot admit there are “reasonable people who reason differently”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putting-te-tiriti-at-the-centre-of-aotearoa-new-zealands-public-policy-can-strengthen-democracy-heres-how-180305">Putting te Tiriti at the centre of Aotearoa New Zealand’s public policy can strengthen democracy – here's how</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Liberal democracy and freedom</h2>
<p>Equality through sameness is a false equality that liberal democracy is well-equipped to contest. Liberal democracy did not emerge to suppress difference. It is concerned with much more than counting votes to see who wins on election day.</p>
<p>Liberal democracy is a political system intended to manage fair and reasonable differences in an orderly way. This means it doesn’t concentrate power in one place. It’s not a select few exercising sovereignty as the absolute and indivisible power to tell everybody else what to do.</p>
<p>This is because one of its ultimate purposes is to protect people’s freedom – the freedom to be Māori as much as the freedom to be <a href="https://maoridictionary.co.nz/search?keywords=pakeha">Pakeha</a>. If we want it to, democracy may help all and not just some of us to protect our freedom through our different ways of reasoning.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/three-parties-two-deals-one-government-the-stress-points-within-new-zealands-coalition-of-many-colours-217673">Three parties, two deals, one government: the stress points within New Zealand's 'coalition of many colours'</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Freedom is protected by checks and balances on power. Parliament checks the powers of government. Citizens, including Māori citizens with equality of <a href="https://maoridictionary.co.nz/search?idiom=&phrase=&proverb=&loan=&histLoanWords=&keywords=tikanga">tikanga</a>, check the powers of parliament.</p>
<p>One of the ways this happens is through the distribution of power from the centre – to local governments, school boards and non-governmental providers of public services. This includes Māori health providers whose work was intended to be supported by the Māori Health Authority, which the government also intends to disestablish.</p>
<p>The rights of hapū (kinship groups), as the political communities whose representatives signed Te Tiriti, mean that rangatiratanga, too, checks and balances the concentration of power in the hands of a few.</p>
<p>Checking and balancing the powers of government requires the contribution of all and not just some citizens. When they do so in their own ways, and according to their own modes of reasoning, citizens contribute to democratic contest – not as a divisive activity, but to protect the common good from the accumulation of power for some people’s use in the domination of others.</p>
<p>Te Tiriti supports this democratic process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221723/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dominic O'Sullivan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>ACT’s Treaty Principles Bill assumes Māori have been granted special privileges. But it can equally be argued the Treaty prevents the undemocratic concentration of power in the hands of a few.Dominic O'Sullivan, Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Health and Environmental Sciences, Auckland University of Technology, and Professor of Political Science, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2043482023-06-15T16:14:44Z2023-06-15T16:14:44ZListen: Why preserving Indigenous languages is so critical to culture<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531799/original/file-20230613-29-hv2b6r.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=209%2C35%2C3431%2C2574&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Language is so important, says prof. Frank Deer. Generational knowledge of culture is passed through stories, language, and symbols. Here two young women wearing ribbon skirts arrive for 2022 National Day for Truth and Reconciliation ceremonies in Calgary, Alta.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(CP/Jeff McIntosh)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe height="200px" width="100%" frameborder="no" scrolling="no" seamless="" src="https://player.simplecast.com/a86fbe0c-20a9-4680-92d9-e1391511ec9f?dark=true"></iframe>
<p><em>As we look ahead to <a href="https://www.statcan.gc.ca/o1/en/plus/1207-national-indigenous-peoples-day">National Indigenous Peoples Day</a>, guest host Prof. Veldon Coburn speaks with Prof. Frank Deer, Canada Research Chair and associate dean of Indigenous Education at the University of Manitoba to tackle the issue of disappearing Indigenous languages and delve into how much more needs to be done to revitalize them and why doing so is critical.</em></p>
<p>Language, if we are not thinking about it, can be just a way to get from place A to B, a way to order lunch or a way to pass an exam. </p>
<p>But language is much more than a way to communicate with words. This is especially true if you have had your language forcibly removed from you, like the thousands of Indigenous children who survived Canada’s colonial assimilation project.</p>
<p>Languages <a href="https://theconversation.com/ancestral-languages-are-essential-to-indigenous-identities-in-canada-117655">hold within them</a> philosophies, worldviews, culture and identity.</p>
<p>Language also has a lot to do with our relationships — how we relate to other people, to our families, to our ancestors and to the natural environment.</p>
<p>These are precisely the aspects of Indigenous life that the Indian Residential School system was designed to destroy. </p>
<p>Last year, the United Nations acknowledged the importance of Indigenous languages by declaring the decade ahead to be the <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/indigenous-languages.html">International Decade of Indigenous Languages.</a></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A close up of a smartphone with a person's hand and text on the screen" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531758/original/file-20230613-27-sz5k95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531758/original/file-20230613-27-sz5k95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531758/original/file-20230613-27-sz5k95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531758/original/file-20230613-27-sz5k95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531758/original/file-20230613-27-sz5k95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531758/original/file-20230613-27-sz5k95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531758/original/file-20230613-27-sz5k95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">While translation apps are an an exciting development, they are limited to literal translations. Here Joseph Erb demonstrates a smartphone with the Cherokee language at the Cherokee Nation Immersion School in Tahlequah, Okla.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP/Sue Ogrocki)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But long before the UN declaration, First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples have been pushing to revitalize more than <a href="https://www.uvic.ca/about-uvic/about-the-university/indigenous-focus/indigenous-language-revitalization/index.php">70 Indigenous languages</a> across Canada. </p>
<p>In 2019, the <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/i-7.85/page-1.html">Indigenous Languages Act</a> was passed by the government of Canada.</p>
<p>Still, progress — and redress — have been slow to come.</p>
<p>In this special episode of <em>Don’t Call Me Resilient</em>, Guest Host, Prof. Veldon Coburn speaks with Prof. Frank Deer, Canada Research Chair and associate dean of Indigenous Education at the University of Manitoba. They tackle the issue of disappearing Indigenous languages and delve into how much more needs to be done to revitalize them and why doing so is critical.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Elder woman wearing grey shirt and colorful scarf reading a children's book." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531806/original/file-20230613-19-xem5zj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531806/original/file-20230613-19-xem5zj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531806/original/file-20230613-19-xem5zj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531806/original/file-20230613-19-xem5zj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531806/original/file-20230613-19-xem5zj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531806/original/file-20230613-19-xem5zj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531806/original/file-20230613-19-xem5zj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Much of the work to preserve Indigenous languages comes from within communities. Here elder Winnfred Beaver scans through a new textbook of the Stoney language, which is facing extinction, at a ceremony in Kananaskis, Alta.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(CP/Jeff McIntosh)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>This week’s episode was produced in collaboration with <a href="https://indiginews.com/">IndigiNews</a></em> </p>
<p><em>Thank you to Eden Fineday, publisher at IndigiNews, and Susannah Schmidt, education and arts editor at the Conversation Canada who contributed to this episode</em></p>
<h2>Listen and Follow</h2>
<p>You can listen to or follow <em>Don’t Call Me Resilient</em> on <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/dont-call-me-resilient/id1549798876">Apple Podcasts</a>, <a href="https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkcy5zaW1wbGVjYXN0LmNvbS9qZFg0Ql9DOA">Google Podcasts</a>, <a href="https://open.spotify.com/show/37tK4zmjWvq2Sh6jLIpzp7">Spotify</a> or <a href="https://dont-call-me-resilient.simplecast.com">wherever you listen to your favourite podcasts</a>. </p>
<p><a href="mailto:DCMR@theconversation.com">We’d love to hear from you</a>, including any ideas for future episodes. Join The Conversation on <a href="https://twitter.com/ConversationCA">Twitter</a>, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/TheConversationCanada">Facebook</a>, <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/">Instagram</a> and <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@theconversation">TikTok</a> and use #DontCallMeResilient.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531763/original/file-20230613-25-2na9ye.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531763/original/file-20230613-25-2na9ye.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531763/original/file-20230613-25-2na9ye.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531763/original/file-20230613-25-2na9ye.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531763/original/file-20230613-25-2na9ye.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531763/original/file-20230613-25-2na9ye.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531763/original/file-20230613-25-2na9ye.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A protest against Bill 96 in Montreal on May 26, 2022. The law forbids provincial government agencies and municipal bodies from making systematic use of languages other than French. (CP/Graham Hughes)</span>
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</figure>
<h2>Resources</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/ratiwenn%C3%B3kwas-kanien-k%C3%A9ha-language-project-1.6748298">As 1st language Kanien'kéha speakers dwindle, communities unite to revitalize the language</a> by Candace Maracle (<em>CBC</em>)</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/new-indigenous-language-podcast-hopes-to-help-revitalize-preserve-languages/">New Indigenous language podcast hopes to help revitalize, preserve languages</a> by Leanna Sanders (<em>APTN News</em>)</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/bill-96-indigenous-court-case-1.6817437">First Nations organizations going to court over Quebec’s French language reforms</a> by Pierre Saint-Arnaud (<em>CBC</em>)</p>
<p><a href="https://news.umanitoba.ca/mohawk-scholar-believes-experiential-learning-provides-a-deeper-appreciation-for-the-land/">Mohawk scholar believes experiential learning provides a deeper appreciation for the land: Meet Dr. Brian Rice</a><br>
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xZ8ekuRBZHc">Dorothy Lazore: Interview by Gerald L. Hill</a> (<em>Indigenous Languages Institute</em>)</p>
<p><a href="https://indiginews.com/weekly-cree-lessons">Aunty Eden’s Weekly Cree Lessons</a> by Eden Fineday (<em>IndigiNews</em>)</p>
<h2>From The Conversation archives</h2>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ancestral-languages-are-essential-to-indigenous-identities-in-canada-117655">Ancestral languages are essential to Indigenous identities in Canada</a>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/to-revitalize-indigenous-communities-the-residential-school-settlement-must-prioritize-language-education-198582">To revitalize Indigenous communities, the Residential School settlement must prioritize language education</a>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indigenous-spiritual-teaching-in-schools-can-foster-reconciliation-and-inclusion-194324">Indigenous spiritual teaching in schools can foster reconciliation and inclusion</a>
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</em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fishing-with-elders-builds-these-childrens-oji-cree-language-cultural-knowledge-and-writing-138915">Fishing with Elders builds these children’s Oji-Cree language, cultural knowledge and writing</a>
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</em>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/national-indigenous-languages-day-keeping-languages-thriving-for-generations-to-come-179528">National Indigenous Languages Day: Keeping languages thriving for generations to come</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204348/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The revitalization of Indigenous languages is essential because language reflects philosophies that guide social, political, cultural and ecological relationships.Vinita Srivastava, Host + Producer, Don't Call Me ResilientBoké Saisi, Associate Producer, Don't Call Me ResilientLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2026072023-03-29T03:15:46Z2023-03-29T03:15:46ZFears AUKUS will undermine Australia’s defence sovereignty are misplaced<p>The AUKUS submarine announcement earlier this month reignited a long-running debate about how to best preserve Australia’s sovereignty.</p>
<p>The announcement addressed some key concerns. For example, the United States will sell (rather than lease) Australia its Virginia class submarines so Australia can keep these boats. The submarine commanders and crew will be Australian. The rotational deployments of US and UK submarines through Perth won’t become a foreign base. And Australia will ultimately build its own AUKUS class nuclear-powered submarines, likely in Adelaide.</p>
<p>Even so, the AUKUS announcement was met with sharp criticism. For <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/aukus-subs-deal-binds-us-to-a-country-that-can-change-its-mind-on-whim-20230316-p5cskq.html">some</a> commentators, AUKUS is the last nail in the coffin of Australian <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/this-outrageously-expensive-subs-deal-simply-caters-to-the-us-again-20230322-p5cu8n">independence</a> from the US. </p>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/02/malcolm-turnbull-says-labor-has-failed-to-answer-if-aukus-deal-compromises-australian-sovereignty">concerns</a> about the reliance on others for technology and skills, especially regarding the nuclear reactors. Also, the massive investment allocated to the submarines may undermine a more <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/the-balance-sheet-of-the-nuclear-subs-deal-20230315-p5csgi">balanced defence force</a> needed for defending the continent.</p>
<p>What’s more, some analysts have questioned whether Australia can maintain independent <a href="https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/opinion/topic/2023/03/25/paul-keating-has-point-aukus">military decision-making in future conflicts</a>. For example, would Australia’s submarines be used to support the US in a war with China?</p>
<p>These concerns deserve serious consideration.</p>
<p>But many <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukus-submarines-will-strengthen-australias-sovereignty/">Australian</a> <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/far-from-breaking-with-the-past-aukus-advances-australias-commitment-to-collective-defence/">strategists</a> reject them. For them, AUKUS is less revolution than evolution, merely the logical <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/mar/15/those-worried-about-australias-sovereignty-under-aukus-miss-the-point-that-ship-has-sailed">extension</a> of Australia’s robust defence cooperation with the US over many decades.</p>
<p>The AUKUS submarine plan represents a new shade of the dependency that Australia has always had on the US for advanced capabilities, and with which Australia has always been comfortable. So long as Australia is able to use these tools as it sees fit, the argument goes, then sovereignty is ensured. This is the way of the alliance.</p>
<p>We haven’t yet sacrificed our defence sovereignty or sovereign industrial capabilities on the altar of AUKUS.</p>
<p>Here’s why.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aukus-submarine-plan-will-be-the-biggest-defence-scheme-in-australian-history-so-how-will-it-work-199492">AUKUS submarine plan will be the biggest defence scheme in Australian history. So how will it work?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What are Australia’s defence sovereignty objectives?</h2>
<p>Many critiques of AUKUS go far beyond the specific issue of whether the proposed submarine pathway compromises Australia’s defence sovereignty. Instead, they touch on deeper questions of Australia’s strategic alignment with the US and the UK, and our national decision-making writ large.</p>
<p>For example, the most headline-grabbing critique is that AUKUS has deprived Australia of its freedom to choose what to do in a possible military contingency over Taiwan. But this hinges on a hypothetical future scenario, the answer to which cannot be known today.</p>
<p>We simply don’t know if Australia is now more locked into a potential US-China conflict than was already the case before September 2021, when AUKUS was first announced.</p>
<p>Answering that question involves far more than an assessment of just our submarine industrial capability.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1638998811870924800"}"></div></p>
<p>We should instead judge the submarine announcement, and whether it undermines Australia’s sovereignty, against the actual procurement objectives that lay behind the need to replace the retiring Collins class submarines.</p>
<p>Will the submarine plan help Australia enhance its “defence sovereignty”? And will it help Australia build a “sovereign industrial capability” that gives future governments credible military options at a time of their choosing?</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/business-industry/capability-plans/defence-industrial-capability-plan">2018 Defence Industrial Capability Plan</a> defined “defence sovereignty” as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the ability to independently employ Defence capability or force when and where required to produce the desired military effect.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If the Virginia class or AUKUS class submarines couldn’t be independently operated and needed US commanders or nuclear technicians, this would undermine our defence sovereignty. But this isn’t the case.</p>
<p>Similarly, if a future Australian prime minister wished to send a submarine on a mission and could only do so with US and UK approval and technical support, that would also suggest the government didn’t have full defence sovereignty. But this isn’t the case either.</p>
<h2>A century of partnerships with others</h2>
<p>The same 2018 capability plan defined a “sovereign industrial capability” as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>when Australia assesses it is strategically critical and must therefore have access to, or control over, the essential skills, technology, intellectual property, financial resources and infrastructure as and when required.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In fact, Australia’s domestic defence industrial base has focused on controlling key elements of a capability, rather than manufacturing everything onshore. On the submarines, those will be the components to operate and sustain the boats from Australian shipyards.</p>
<p>Australia has, therefore, chosen to largely equip its defence force with the most advanced capabilities available from abroad – it’s the world’s <a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2023/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2022#:%7E:text=The%20%EF%AC%81ve%20largest%20arms%20importers,%2C%20France%2C%20China%20and%20Germany.&text=for%20future%20supplier%E2%80%93recipient%20arms%20trade%20relations%20globally.">fourth</a> largest arms importer for a reason. </p>
<p>It’s worth remembering Australia has never had a truly sovereign <a href="https://www.submarineinstitute.com/submarines-in-australia/Between-the-wars.html">submarine industrial capability</a>. The cancelled program with France was but the latest in a century of partnership with others.</p>
<p>This has included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>jointly crewed boats with the UK before the first world war</p></li>
<li><p>dependence on the US submarine fleet operating from our ports during the second world war</p></li>
<li><p>British-built Oberon submarines in the Cold War</p></li>
<li><p>and Swedish-designed Collins class submarines in the 1990s, incorporating a US combat system and French sensors and radars.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In this sense, AUKUS isn’t a “Brave New World”. It’s more “Back to the Future” for Australia’s shipbuilding aspirations.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1636563848017891330"}"></div></p>
<h2>AUKUS is a sovereign choice</h2>
<p>The dream of an entirely self-sufficient defence industry is inherently appealing. There’s something unsettling about relying on others for capabilities to defend oneself.</p>
<p>But Australia’s entry into AUKUS doesn’t only entail sovereign risks for Canberra. The US is also making a big bet putting its most closely-guarded nuclear reactor technology and boats in Australian hands at a time when it <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2023/01/exclusive-reed-inhofe-warn-biden-aukus-risks-becoming-zero-sum-game-for-us-navy/">needs them most</a>.</p>
<p>So what does the US get out of this deal? In 2021, US officials were at pains to reassure us there was no <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-austin-australian-foreign-minister-marise-payne-and-australian-defence-minister-peter-dutton-at-a-joint-press-availability/#:%7E:text=SECRETARY%20AUSTIN%3A%C2%A0%C2%A0Yeah,that%20you%20mentioned%20earlier.">quid-pro-quo</a> to the deal. But even if there were such a request, there’s nothing about AUKUS that locks Australia into actions future governments cannot withdraw from.</p>
<p>The UK received nuclear propulsion technology from the US in <a href="https://www.baesystems.com/en/heritage/dreadnought-submarine">1958</a> but stayed out of the Vietnam War.</p>
<p><a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA437607">Canada</a> was also offered nuclear-powered submarines in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/04/28/reagan-canada-can-buy-sub-reactors/46af5081-d70b-4c1b-993e-142b74fbd734/">1988</a>, but chose not to pursue the offer due to budget constraints and public opposition. That backtrack didn’t doom US-Canada relations.</p>
<p>Every day for the next half century, Australia’s leaders will wake up each morning and be free to make a choice about the future of the AUKUS partnership.</p>
<p>So, too, will the Australian people, who at each election will be able to vote for political parties who might offer different visions for the future of AUKUS. That is what it means to be sovereign.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202607/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Foreign Policy and Defence Program where Peter K. Lee works receives funding from the Australian Department of Defence as well as corporate support from Northrop Grumman Australia and Thales Australia. Peter Lee also receives funding as a Korea Foundation research fellow, part of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the University of Melbourne. </span></em></p>There’s nothing about the deal that locks Australia into actions future governments cannot withdraw from.Peter K. Lee, Research Fellow, Foreign Policy and Defence Program, USSC, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1994182023-02-14T13:43:04Z2023-02-14T13:43:04ZWhen two elephants fight: how the global south uses non-alignment to avoid great power rivalries<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509129/original/file-20230209-24-gfvsje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Indonesian military honour guard marks the 60th anniversary of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 2015. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Achmad Ibrahim /AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>An African proverb notes that “when two elephants fight, it is the grass underneath that suffers”.</p>
<p>Many states in the global south are, therefore, seeking to avoid getting caught in the middle of any future battles between the US and China. Instead, they are calling for a renewal of the concept of non-alignment. This was an approach employed in the 1950s by newly independent countries to <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-non-aligned-movement-in-the-21st-century-66057">balance</a> between the two ideological power blocs of east and west during the era of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War">Cold War</a></p>
<p>The new non-alignment stance is based on a perceived need to maintain southern sovereignty, pursue socio-economic development, and benefit from powerful external partners without having to choose sides. It also comes from historical grievances during the era of slavery, colonialism and Cold War interventionism. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/washington-wants-to-address-anti-west-sentiment-in-africa-blinken-is-doing-his-bit-188407">Washington wants to address anti-west sentiment in Africa: Blinken is doing his bit</a>
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<p>These grievances include unilateral American military interventions in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/U-S-invasion-of-Grenada">Grenada</a> (1983), <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50837024">Panama</a> (1989) and <a href="https://origins.osu.edu/milestones/march-2013-us-invasion-iraq-10-years-later?language_content_entity=en">Iraq</a> (2003) as well as support by the US and France for autocracies in countries like Egypt, Morocco, Chad and Saudi Arabia, when it suits their interests. </p>
<p>Many southern governments are particularly irked by America’s Manichaean division of the world into “good” democracies and “bad” autocracies. More recently, countries in the global south have highlighted north-south trade disputes and <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9168349/">western hoarding</a> of COVID-19 vaccines as reinforcing the unequal international system of <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2022-01-04/vaccine-apartheid-risks-rising-global-shortages-in-2022">“global apartheid”</a>. </p>
<p>A return of non-alignment was evident at the March 2022 UN General Assembly special session on Ukraine. Fifty-two governments from the global south did not support western sanctions against <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129492">Russia</a>. This, despite Russia’s clear violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, which southern states have historically condemned.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/five-essential-reads-on-russia-africa-relations-187568">Five essential reads on Russia-Africa relations</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<p>A month later, 82 southern states <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782">refused to back</a> western efforts to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council.</p>
<p>These included powerful southern states such as India, Indonesia, South Africa, Ethiopia, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. </p>
<h2>The origins of non-alignment</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.southcentre.int/question/revisiting-the-1955-bandung-asian-african-conference-and-its-legacy/">1955</a>, a conference was held in the Indonesian city of Bandung to regain the sovereignty of Africa and Asia from western imperial rule. The summit also sought to foster global peace, promote economic and cultural cooperation, and end racial domination. Governments attending were urged to abstain from collective defence arrangements with great powers. </p>
<p>Six years later, in 1961, the 120-strong Non-Aligned Movement <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Non-Aligned-Movement">emerged</a>. Members were required to shun military alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as bilateral security treaties with great powers.</p>
<p>Non-alignment advocated “positive” – not passive – neutrality. States were encouraged to contribute actively to strengthening and reforming institutions such as the UN and the World Bank. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rethinking-how-we-look-at-africas-relationship-with-china-159747">Rethinking how we look at Africa's relationship with China</a>
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</em>
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<p>India’s patrician prime minister, <a href="https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/former_pm/shri-jawaharlal-nehru/">Jawaharlal Nehru</a>, is widely regarded to have been the intellectual “<a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/non-alignment-was-coined-by-nehru-in-1954/articleshow/2000656.cms">father of non-alignment</a>”. He regarded the concept as an insurance policy against world domination by either superpower bloc or China. He also advocated nuclear disarmament.</p>
<p>Indonesia’s military strongman, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Suharto">Suharto</a>, championed non-alignment through “<a href="https://asean.org/opening-statement-his-excellency-mr-soeharto-president-of-the-republic-of-indonesia/">regional resilience</a>”. South-east Asian states were urged to seek autonomy and prevent external powers from intervening in the region.</p>
<p>Egypt’s charismatic prophet of Arab unity, <a href="https://www.presidency.eg/en/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A4%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86/%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1/">Gamal Abdel Nasser</a>, strongly backed the use of force in conducting wars of liberation <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/6/20/arab-unity-nassers-revolution">in Algeria and southern Africa</a>, buying arms and receiving aid from both east and west.
For his part, Ghana’s prophet of African unity, <a href="https://theconversation.com/kwame-nkrumah-why-every-now-and-then-his-legacy-is-questioned-120790">Kwame Nkrumah</a>, promoted the idea of <a href="https://www.internationalscholarsjournals.com/articles/kwame-nkrumah-and-the-proposed-african-common-government.pdf">an African High Command</a> as a common army to ward off external intervention and support Africa’s liberation.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/non-aligned-movement-nam/#:%7E:text=The%20Non%2DAligned%20Movement%20was,to%20remain%20independent%20or%20neutral">Non-Aligned Movement</a>, however, suffered from the problems of trying to maintain cohesion among a large, diverse group. Many countries were clearly aligned to one or other power bloc. </p>
<p>By the early 1980s, the group had switched its focus from east-west geo-politics to north–south geo-economics. The Non-Aligned Movement started advocating a “<a href="http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3201.htm">new international economic order</a>”. This envisaged technology and resources being transferred from the rich north to the global south in order to promote industrialisation. </p>
<p>The north, however, simply refused to support these efforts.</p>
<h2>Latin America and south-east Asia</h2>
<p>Most of the recent thinking and debates on non-alignment have occurred in Latin America and south-east Asia. </p>
<p>Most Latin American countries have refused to align with any major power. They have also ignored Washington’s warnings <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-and-europe-deteriorating-relations-with-latin-america-china-by-ana-palacio-2022-07">to avoid doing business with China</a>. Many have embraced Chinese infrastructure, 5G technology and digital connectivity. </p>
<p>Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela refused to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Many of the region’s states declined western requests to impose sanctions on Moscow. The return of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Luiz-Inacio-Lula-da-Silva">Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva</a> as <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-big-challenges-for-lulas-presidency-of-brazil-197967">president</a> of Brazil – the largest and wealthiest country in the region – heralds the “second coming” (following his first presidency between 2003 and 2011) of a champion of global south solidarity.</p>
<p>For its part, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (<a href="https://asean.org/member-states/">ASEAN</a>) has shown that non-alignment has as much to do with geography as strategy. Singapore sanctioned Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. Indonesia condemned the intervention but rejected sanctions. Myanmar backed the invasion while Laos and Vietnam <a href="http://www.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2022/6/30/11206652fbb64821-c.pdf">refused to condemn Moscow’s aggression</a>.</p>
<p>Many ASEAN states have historically championed “declaratory non-alignment”. They have used the concept largely rhetorically while, in reality, practising a promiscuous “multi-alignment”. Singapore and the Philippines forged close military ties with the US; Myanmar with India; Vietnam with Russia, India, and the US; and Malaysia with Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. </p>
<p>This is also a region in which states simultaneously embrace and fear Chinese economic assistance and military cooperation. This, while seeking to avoid any external powers dominating the region or forming exclusionary military alliances.</p>
<p>Strong African voices are largely absent from these non-alignment debates, and are urgently needed. </p>
<h2>Pursuing non-alignment in Africa</h2>
<p>Africa is the world’s most insecure continent, <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data">hosting 84%</a> of UN peacekeepers. This points to a need for a cohesive southern bloc that can produce a self-sustaining security system – <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/the-quest-for-pax-africana/">Pax Africana</a> – while promoting socio-economic development.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-and-security-in-africa-how-china-can-help-address-weaknesses-156219">Peace and security in Africa: how China can help address weaknesses</a>
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<p>Uganda aims to champion this approach when it takes over the three-year rotating chair of the Non-Aligned Movement <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/category/news/uganda-to-chair-non-aligned-movement-in-2023-117191">in December 2023</a>. Strengthening the organisation into a more cohesive bloc, while fostering unity within the global south, is a major goal of its tenure.</p>
<p>Uganda has strong potential allies. For example, South Africa has championed “strategic non-alignment” in the Ukraine conflict, advocating a UN-negotiated solution, while <a href="http://www.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2022/6/30/11206652fbb64821-c.pdf">refusing to sanction its BRICS ally, Russia</a>. It has also relentlessly courted its largest bilateral trading partner, China, whose <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a> and <a href="https://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/brics-ndb-factsheet-final-1.pdf">BRICS bank</a> are building infrastructure across the global south.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-and-russia-president-cyril-ramaphosas-foreign-policy-explained-198430">South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy explained</a>
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<p>Beijing is Africa’s largest trading partner at US$254 billion, and <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/27880/trade-between-china-and-africa/">builds a third of the continent’s infrastructure</a>.</p>
<p>If a new non-alignment is to be achieved in Africa, the foreign military bases of the US, France and China – and the Russian military presence – must, however, be dismantled.</p>
<p>At the same time the continent should continue to support the UN-led rules-based international order, condemning unilateral interventions in both Ukraine and Iraq. Pax Africana would best be served by:</p>
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<li><p>building local security capacity in close cooperation with the UN; </p></li>
<li><p>promoting effective regional integration; and </p></li>
<li><p>fencing off the continent from meddling external powers, while continuing to welcome trade and investment from both east and west.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199418/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adekeye Adebajo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If a new non-alignment is to be achieved in Africa, the foreign military bases of the US, France, and China - and the Russian military presence - must be dismantled.Adekeye Adebajo, Professor and Senior research fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1993062023-02-07T01:32:34Z2023-02-07T01:32:34ZPolitics with Michelle Grattan: Senator Malarndirri McCarthy on Alice Springs and the Voice<p>Alcohol bans are being reimposed on Northern Territory Indigenous communities, as the federal and territory governments grapple with intractable problems in Alice Springs and elsewhere in the NT.</p>
<p>The situation in Alice Springs and the surrounding communities has come into the national news at the same time as debate ramps up about this year’s referendum for an Indigenous Voice to Parliament.</p>
<p>In this podcast, Michelle talks with Malarndirri McCarthy, Labor senator for the Northern Territory and Assistant Minister for Indigenous Australians. McCarthy is a former journalist and also served in the territory parliament, including as minister for children and families. </p>
<p>McCarthy argues for the bans, which the NT government previously described as “race-based”. “What we’ve witnessed over the last few weeks in particular are scenes that show us that the urgency that’s required does need a circuit breaker […] there is no doubt we do have issues with alcohol across the Northern Territory, but I’m also seeing it on our borders as well with Western Australia and also with Queensland.</p>
<p>"There’s a deeper issue here about what is the future for these Australians who require jobs, who require hope for what the future looks like, but also require a safe place for their children and families to grow up in.”</p>
<p>Asked her perspective, as a former minister for children, on the dilemma involved in deciding whether and when to remove Indigenous children at risk, McCarthy says: “One of the things I worked very closely on when I had the portfolio in the Northern Territory government as families minister was the absolute importance of the kinship structure. That when a child is in a dire situation with their mother, with their father, that they have other options within their family network […] It’s something I do. I look after three children in a very kinship environment. You know, an eight year old and twins who are nine.</p>
<p>"Of course, if a child is at risk, whatever that risk, they must be removed to be safe.”</p>
<p>Is this the right time for a referendum and how confident is she about its passing? “This is the right time, 2023, to embark on this journey. I know it’s going to be tough. It’s already started out that way […] but I do believe that in the goodness of our country. I have this deep abiding optimism that no matter how tough it gets, you know, I do essentially believe Australians are good people at heart and that we will get to the other side of this.”</p>
<p>“Treaty” was a theme of the recent Invasion Day protests. How quickly would the government pursue a treaty after it passed the Voice? “We’ve already begun conversations around a Makarrata Commission and what that may possibly look like, we’ve been engaging with state and territory ministers or premiers and chief ministers about the work they’re doing towards treaty in their respective jurisdictions.”</p>
<p>If the referendum succeeds, there has been a suggestion the Voice might not be operating until 2025. Pressed on the timetable McCarthy is blunt. “Well, it’s been a long time over the last ten years for this process, and I think people have been very patient and very particular about their research and about the work that they’ve done. I would think that 2025 would be better than 2035.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199306/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In this podcast, Michelle talks with Malarndirri McCarthy, Labor Senator for the Northern Territory and Assistant Minister for Indigenous AustraliansMichelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1979952023-01-27T12:37:41Z2023-01-27T12:37:41ZSomaliland’s oil find could reset the regional balance: here’s how<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504851/original/file-20230117-24-k69nqy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"> Somaliland has been assessed as holding commercial quantities of oil and gas. EDUARDO SOTERAS/AFP via </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/women-walk-in-front-of-a-gas-station-in-the-city-of-news-photo/1235886286?phrase=somaliland%20&adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The presence of oil in Somaliland has been <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/africa/2023-01-09-somaliland-announces-first-oil-discovery/">confirmed</a> by a recent exploration. The discovery has raised the stakes in Somaliland’s claim for independence from Somalia as it holds the potential for a new stream of revenue for the semi-autonomous state. But the oil exploration is deepening <a href="https://www.worldoil.com/news/2022/12/28/genel-oil-s-oil-operations-in-east-african-region-declared-illegal-by-somalia/">the rift with Somalia</a>, which claims sovereignty over the region. Michael Walls answers five key questions.</em></p>
<h2>What is Somaliland’s hydrocarbon potential?</h2>
<p>In 2020, Norwegian seismic survey company, TGS, estimated that the Somali basin as a whole likely holds <a href="https://www.petro-online.com/news/analytical-instrumentation/11/breaking-news/somalia-agrees-to-offshore-oil-plans-with-shellexxon/51729">offshore reserves of about 30 billion barrels</a>, with additional onshore reserves, although land estimates are considerably less consistent. Assessments generally include Somaliland and would place Somalia reserves <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/oil/oil-reserves-by-country/">at about the same level as Kazakhstan</a>, which would give the area the 18th or 19th largest reserve globally, as assessed in 2016. </p>
<p>Geological conditions seem to support the view that there are likely to be commercially viable deposits in the region. Whether they prove close to estimates remains unknown at this stage. </p>
<p>There is also evidence of offshore (undersea) reserves in the region, as well as onshore (beneath the land) in the Somali region of the neighbouring Ethiopia. Bordering Somalia, and located next to Oromia Regional State, the Somali Regional State (also Ogaden) is Ethiopia’s second largest federal region.</p>
<h2>Why has it taken so long to make an oil find?</h2>
<p>This find is being billed as the first discovery in Somaliland but in fact there have been several instances of oil seepage. An oil seep occurs when geological or unrelated human activity results in oil “seeping” into the ocean or onto land. In such cases, the physical appearance of oil occurs unexpectedly rather than as a result of deliberate exploration. It is unsurprisingly taken as evidence of a substantial reserve that is close to the surface, but doesn’t always indicate the presence of commercially viable quantities or accessibility.</p>
<p>Genel Energy, the UK oil exploration firm on whose concession this discovery occurred, has held rights to explore in Somaliland since 2012. So the find isn’t quite the sudden and unexpected bonus that’s been implied by some reports.</p>
<p>Progress has been slow because Somaliland’s lack of international sovereign recognition creates an uncertain context for significant investment. Somalia still claims sovereignty over Somaliland even though the region has operated as a fully if informally independent state since 1991. </p>
<p>This creates a vacuum. The Somali federal authorities cannot enter into meaningful agreements over exploration or extraction in Somaliland. Somaliland is limited by investment risk. And Somalia’s threats and <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/somalia-rejects-genel-energy-claim-to-oil-permits-somaliland-4070698">complaints</a> emphasise that risk.</p>
<p>This has not stopped Somaliland from entering into agreements, but it has slowed activities taking place under them.</p>
<p>In addition, there have been disputes within Somaliland over how the proceeds of hydrocarbon exploitation would be shared. </p>
<p>One of the areas with significant potential is the Nugaal Valley, which stretches across the border of eastern Somaliland into Puntland. Genel Energy was already exploring in that zone a decade ago. It <a href="https://www.africa-energy.com/news-centre/article/genel-suspends-somaliland-operations-enis-scaroni-meets-somali">withdrew</a> for a time in 2013, citing security concerns. In the same time period, Africa Oil secured rights from the Puntland administration that overlapped with those issued by Somaliland to explore in the Nugaal Valley. A 2014 UN report expressed concern that hydrocarbon exploration in the Nugaal Valley risked fuelling violent conflict. Africa Oil <a href="https://ejatlas.org/conflict/oil-exploration-within-somalias-semi-autonomous-puntland-region">ceased active operation in the area a year later</a>.</p>
<p>The most recent find is in a different area of Somaliland: Salaxley in the Maroodi Jeex region, which is less politically volatile. This makes it more likely that Genel Energy will be able to advance its work.</p>
<h2>What challenges lie ahead?</h2>
<p>The uncertainty created by a lack of international recognition makes it difficult to mobilise sufficient investment. And there is little doubt that Somalia will continue to remain hostile to both exploration and extraction. </p>
<p>Similarly, local sensitivities around the sharing of financial rewards will need to be managed with care and deep local engagement.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozabs-africa-oil-somaliland-20111101-idAFJOE7A00AB20111101">commentaries</a> have suggested that the newly discovered oil could be abundant. But the reserves could also prove limited and may present technical challenges in extraction. It is therefore possible that extractive plans will operate at the margin of financial feasibility. </p>
<p>The latest find was the result of an <a href="https://www.share-talk.com/drilling-for-water-in-the-bahadhamal-village-sallahley-area-somalia-rig-hits-a-near-surface-oil-vein/">accidental release of oil</a> during drilling for water rather than from deliberate exploration. This may be evidence of a significant and easily accessed reserve, but seepages and strikes like this have happened in the past in Somaliland. A more extensive geo-seismic surveying will be needed before the full extent of the reserve is confirmed.</p>
<h2>What would be the political implications of oil wealth in Somaliland?</h2>
<p>I had previously studied the place of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263593602_Somalia_Oil_and_insecurity">oil in Somalia and its breakaway states</a> . Somali society is kinship-based. Specific groups identify with particular geographic areas. This means that the political implications vary sharply depending on the location of any oil discovery. </p>
<p>Previous experience of exploration in the Nugaal Valley showed how socially and politically volatile the exercise could be. </p>
<p>The area of the latest find, around Salaxley, is likely to prove less volatile. Unlike the Nugaal Valley, Salaxley has not customarily been subject to the same inter-clan and political disputes. But there will still need to be significant negotiation over sharing of the proceeds of exploration. The government will be keen to ensure that the windfall advantages those in power. Local clan groups will be keen to ensure there is a clear benefit accruing to their communities. Other clans will equally want a say in how increased wealth benefits Somaliland as a whole. </p>
<p>Depending on how negotiations conclude, there is potential for this clan-based process to mitigate the <a href="https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_Resource-Curse.pdf">“resource curse” effect</a>. In other words, the system of inter-group negotiation that underpins Somali society might provide some protection from the narrow economic impact of oil wealth that has been felt elsewhere. However, that is by no means certain and the process of negotiation itself has the potential to fuel violence, just as the <a href="https://unpo.org/article/16961">UN worried in 2014</a>.</p>
<p>Either way, the Somaliland economy remains tiny. Any influx of significant new wealth, even on a fairly modest scale, will create new social, economic and therefore political tensions.</p>
<h2>What are the implications for regional dynamics?</h2>
<p>The regional impact will depend on the extent of the discovery. Somalia has consistently objected to hydrocarbon exploration in Somaliland as all concessions have been granted under Somaliland legislation. It would object even more strongly to commercial extraction. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s interest is likely to be more equivocal. Salaxley is close to the Ethiopian border, and not far from active hydrocarbon exploration concessions in Ethiopia’s Somali region. If the Somaliland reserves prove to be extensive after a technical appraisal, it would suggest that those in the adjacent Ogaden Basin are also significant. In this case Somaliland and Ethiopia would hold a mutual interest in ensuring sufficient regional security to enable extraction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197995/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Walls has in the past received funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and other research funders to conduct research and consultancy. All such funding has been to undertake specified and time-limited research or consultancy work through UCL. </span></em></p>Any new wealth will create new social, economic and political tensions.Michael Walls, Professor of Development Politics and Economy & DPU Director, Faculty of the Built Environment, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1902072022-09-08T21:57:27Z2022-09-08T21:57:27ZÉric Duhaime and the Conservative Party of Québec’s contradictory stance on nationalism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483565/original/file-20220908-9395-pdgu6b.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C0%2C2991%2C2151&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Conservative Party of Québec leader Éric Duhaime speaks at the unveiling of his campaign platform in Drummondville on Aug. 14, 2022. Quebecers will go to the polls on Oct. 3. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Canadian Press/Graham Hughes</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The current Québec election campaign is an opportune moment to measure the political divisions brought about by the sovereignty question. It also provides an opportunity to see how Éric Duhaime’s Conservative Party of Québec (PCQ) is attempting to position itself on this issue.</p>
<p>Between 1976 and 2018, Québec elections were structured by the division between federalists and sovereignists. This division was reflected in the alternating in power of the Québec Liberal Party and the Parti Québécois. When the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) party took power in 2018, it muddied the waters of this persistent division.</p>
<p>What role will Québec’s Conservative Party play in the election on Oct. 3? And where does it stand on the political spectrum of the right? As a professor in the department of sociology at the University of Québec in Montréal, my current research focuses on nationalism and populism in Canada, Québec and Germany.</p>
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À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/convoi-des-camionneurs-aux-origines-dun-mouvement-en-pleine-derive-176833">Convoi des camionneurs : aux origines d’un mouvement en pleine dérive</a>
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<h2>Nationalism without a quest for statehood</h2>
<p>If the national question no longer creates the same division and no longer puts the same two political parties in the forefront of Québec politics, the last four years have shown that it is too early to declare an end to nationalist dynamics in Québec politics. </p>
<p>Some, like Duhaime, believe that the divide between sovereignists and federalists has given way to one between the left and the right. My co-author and I do not share this view. There is not one nationalist movement in Québec, but rather several movements that do not all share the same objectives. They can sometimes be contradictory. </p>
<p>These dynamics will certainly shape this election campaign. With the decline of the sovereignist option, the type of nationalism oriented toward statehood that is historically associated with the Parti Québécois, as well as with Québec Solidaire, is on the decline among the electorate. Although <a href="https://montreal.ctvnews.ca/quebec-premier-confirms-another-sovereigntist-candidate-for-fall-election-1.5933718">many CAQ voters still identify themselves as sovereignists</a>, they do not vote for a political party that openly promotes this type of nationalism.</p>
<p>The strength of the CAQ’s nationalist mobilization strategy is that it brings economic, republican, autonomous and populist nationalists together under one umbrella. The party is quite adept at seizing opportunities to win the loyalty of these different currents by playing on a number of legal and symbolic issues, but without arousing the fears often associated with the referendum option and the sovereignist horizon.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Premier François Legault speaks at the microphone, accompanied by a man and a woman" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481354/original/file-20220826-16-4hffco.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481354/original/file-20220826-16-4hffco.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481354/original/file-20220826-16-4hffco.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481354/original/file-20220826-16-4hffco.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481354/original/file-20220826-16-4hffco.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481354/original/file-20220826-16-4hffco.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481354/original/file-20220826-16-4hffco.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Québec Premier François Legault, surrounded by CAQ candidates, speaks to the press in Laval on Aug. 12. The strength of the CAQ’s nationalist mobilization strategy is that it reaches out to a cross-section of economic, republican, autonomist and populist nationalists.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Canadian Press/Peter McCabe</span></span>
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<p>The CAQ has been willing to provoke conflict with the federal Liberal government. This strategy has been relatively successful so far, with the exception of <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/federal-election-trudeau-legault-1.6183682">François Legault’s support for the Conservative Party</a> in the last federal election.</p>
<p>Beyond that, the CAQ tries to create situations where it can win in one of two ways. Either it gets what it wants, or it denounces the interference of the federal government or the rest of Canada in Québec politics. One example is the <a href="https://montrealgazette.com/news/quebec/ottawa-will-join-supreme-court-legal-challenge-of-bill-21-lametti-says">ongoing challenge to Bill 96 (French language law)</a>. Many Québec voters, even if they are opposed to Bill 21 (on state secularism) or Bill 96, are equally opposed to the federal government interfering in legislation passed by Québec’s National Assembly.</p>
<p>If the Parti Québécois, Québec Solidaire and CAQ are sticking to familiar ground when it comes to the nationalist question, it remains to be seen where the PCQ and its new leader Duhaime will position themselves.</p>
<h2>Where does the PCQ stand in Québec’s political landscape?</h2>
<p>Duhaime’s party <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/quebecs-provincial-conservative-party-surges-as-protest-vote-against-provinces-heavy-handed-government">was galvanized by opposition to health measures related to the COVID-19 pandemic</a>. Its libertarian and convoluted position on the vaccination issue allowed the party to gain support via a protest vote. </p>
<p>It has also built a loyal base that often flirts with conspiracy theories <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-report-finds-people-increasingly-distrust-media-avoid-news-out-of/">in a context of strong distrust toward the media in Québec</a>. Early in the campaign, a Conservative candidate was once again forced to explain himself <a href="https://www.thestar.com/politics/federal/2022/08/25/did-a-conservative-leadership-hopeful-compare-covid-19-vaccines-to-nazi-atrocities-leslyn-lewis-rejects-cowardly-accusation.html">after associating the government’s treatment of non-vaccinated people with that of Jews “at one time”</a>.</p>
<p>Some members of the Conservative team – <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/investigates/quebec-s-conservative-party-surges-in-the-polls-as-some-of-its-candidates-spread-conspiracy-theories-1.6532486">up to 30 per cent of candidates according to a CBC survey</a> – have spread misinformation about vaccines and other treatments related to COVID-19. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053168021993979">Research</a> shows a correlation between opposition to health measures, voting for populist right-wing parties and conspiracy thinking.</p>
<p>In a political climate in Québec <a href="https://montrealgazette.com/opinion/columnists/allison-hanes-threats-to-politicians-are-a-threat-to-democracy">where threats against politicians of all stripes have never been higher</a>, many point out that Duhaime is playing a dangerous game by adopting the anti-establishment, friend-enemy rhetoric of radical right-wing insurrectionist movements, <a href="https://montrealgazette.com/news/quebec/liberals-rizqy-accuses-conservative-leader-duhaime-of-channelling-hate">only to timidly call his activists to order later</a>. </p>
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<img alt="A man and a woman embrace, in a crowd" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481353/original/file-20220826-6184-zxgvqy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481353/original/file-20220826-6184-zxgvqy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481353/original/file-20220826-6184-zxgvqy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481353/original/file-20220826-6184-zxgvqy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481353/original/file-20220826-6184-zxgvqy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481353/original/file-20220826-6184-zxgvqy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481353/original/file-20220826-6184-zxgvqy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Conservative Party of Québec Leader Éric Duhaime with one of his controversial candidates, Anne Casabonne, during the unveiling of his election campaign platform in Drummondville on Aug. 14.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Graham Hughes</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ladhesion-aux-complots-et-aux-populismes-une-question-deducation-174929">L’adhésion aux complots et aux populismes, une question d’éducation ?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The party is placing all the cards in its very right-wing hand on economic issues, occupying a void left by the CAQ’s centre-right politics. In a context where young voters are dealing with inflation, the carrot of a tax cut — also proposed by its Liberal and CAQ competitors — could pay off. With this tax cut and its proposal to suspend the provincial gas tax, the PCQ is trying to position itself as the party of tax relief.</p>
<p>In terms of socio-demographics, the party has significant appeal among <a href="https://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/pandemic-weary-quebecers-boost-conservatives-popularity-poll-suggests">young voters</a>, particularly young men. Some <a href="https://angusreid.org/quebec-spotlight-bill-96/">polls</a> measured a disparity in voting intentions by gender with up to eight percentage points more among men. This gap has <a href="https://338canada.com/quebec/polls.htm">narrowed</a> recently. The PCQ now exceeds the Parti Québécois in voting intentions.</p>
<p>The PCQ’s strategy on the national question can be gleaned from two clear sources, the election platform and the program, and two grey sources, the leader’s public statements and the <a href="https://en-quebecproud.nationbuilder.com">Québec Proud platform</a>.</p>
<p>This platform includes the strategic and tactical repertoire that will be mobilized in the election campaign, what Duhaime calls <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/duhaime-conservative-party-quebec-1.6551168">priority issues</a>. These include privatizing health care and the exploitation of hydrocarbons.</p>
<h2>National populist and libertarian themes</h2>
<p>The election platform presented on Aug.t 14 is silent on nationalist issues. It includes no reference to secularism, immigration or protection of the French language. This is not, however, the case with the party platform, nor with Duhaime’s public statements.</p>
<p>After advocating for a decrease in immigration, <a href="https://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/parti-quebecois-would-reduce-immigration-to-quebec-if-elected">Duhaime is now sticking to the 50,000-immigrant threshold proposed by the CAQ</a>. Speaking in French, he has repeatedly introduced the notion of “civilizational compatibility” as a principle that should structure immigration policy. In the vocabulary of the populist right, this notion of immigration is a dog whistle referring to the limitation of Muslim immigration. The program also aspires to a pro-natalist policy without detailing its content. The family, <a href="https://www.conservative.quebec/values">explains the electoral platform</a> (in French), is “the primary institution of our society and the foundation of our nation.”</p>
<p>These themes align the party’s semantics and program with the national-populist right, but give it a clear federalist tone. By <a href="https://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/quebec-election-campaign-2022-live-updates-news-opinion-montreal-sovereignty">Duhaime’s own admission</a>, this program shares many points in common with the nationalism of the CAQ. It could therefore appeal to a part of the electorate that supported Legault in 2018. </p>
<p>Beyond general statements, the concrete positioning of the PCQ on language issues is less clear. The PCQ seeks to present itself both as a defender of the French language, and as representing libertarian positions that oppose <a href="https://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/duhaime-would-repeal-bill-96-saying-anglos-shouldnt-trade-in-historic-rights">Québec’s language laws</a>. </p>
<p>The program claims to want to protect French, “the most important vector of national identity and of the unique character of the Québec people in Canada and in America.” But while seeking to defend an identity centred around language, family and defending civilization, Duhaime is trying to appeal to an <a href="https://montreal.ctvnews.ca/hostage-to-a-single-party-conservative-duhaime-courts-english-voters-promotes-bilingualism-1.6057354">English-speaking electorate</a> jaded by the Québec Liberal Party. On Tuesday, before an English-speaking audience in Montréal, <a href="https://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/duhaime-would-repeal-bill-96-saying-anglos-shouldnt-trade-in-historic-rights">he said he was opposed to using the notwithstanding clause to protect Bill 96</a>.</p>
<p>These are difficult tensions to reconcile in Québec politics. It is hard to imagine how libertarians can commit to supporting Québec culture if they systematically oppose the institutional and cultural instruments that allow the state to subsidize, disseminate and promote that culture. So, even for federalists who support traditional Québec constitutional claims, Duhaime’s platform remains very vague. </p>
<p>This wide-ranging position could end up arousing the suspicion of both nationalists and federalists who are worried about the status of French in Québec and in the rest of Canada.</p>
<h2>Embarrassing support from the Alberta oil and gas industry</h2>
<p>Although ambiguities remain around identity issues, the PCQ is not hesitant when it comes to the question of exploiting of Québec’s energy resources, including natural gas. In this case, petro-populism complements nationalist populism.</p>
<p>Duhaime strongly supports the development of these resources, and his party has ties to <a href="https://pressprogress.ca/this-right-wing-quebec-media-website-has-mysterious-ties-with-albertas-oil-lobby/">pro-oil interest groups</a> in Western Canada. The Facebook page Québec Proud, the French-language counterpart of Canada Proud, <a href="https://ici.radio-canada.ca/recit-numerique/4207/quebec-fier-parti-conservateur-eric-duhaime">was recently described as a content factory for Duhaime’s formation</a>.</p>
<p>The page is a team effort between the oil and gas industry in the West and the PCQ, according to Radio-Canada. The group Québec Proud was recently funded by the <a href="https://canadastrongandfree.network">Canada Strong and Free network</a>. The <a href="https://www.modernmiraclenetwork.org">Modern Miracle Network</a>, an oil and gas advocacy organization, describes Québec Proud as a <a href="https://www.nationalobserver.com/2019/10/19/news/little-known-colossus-behind-conservatives-anti-climate-agenda">fossil industry advocacy group</a>.</p>
<p>These endorsements could be dangerous for the PCQ. If the party appears to be a Québec branch of an Alberta-based party, it could drive away voters who had been attracted to the CAQ’s autonomist positions and economic nationalism.</p>
<p>In other words, it will be difficult to present the party as a ruler of its own economic policies if it is perceived as a lackey of Alberta interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190207/count.gif" alt="La Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Where do the Conservative Party of Québec and its leader, Éric Duhaime, a newcomer on the political scene, fit in?Frédérick Guillaume Dufour, Professeur en sociologie politique, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)François Tanguay, Doctorant, Université de MontréalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1885832022-08-18T20:05:28Z2022-08-18T20:05:28ZColonial ideas have kept NZ and Australia in a rut of policy failure. We need policy by Indigenous people, for the people<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479557/original/file-20220817-11-jvcwcd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=311%2C5%2C3377%2C1988&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock/The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Crisis is a word often used in politics and the media – the COVID crisis, the housing crisis, the cost of living crisis, and so on. The term usually refers to single events at odds with common ideas of what’s acceptable, fair or good. </p>
<p>But in New Zealand, Australia and elsewhere, Indigenous policy can be portrayed as a different kind of crisis altogether. Indeed, it can often just seem like one crisis after another, one policy failure after another: poor health, poor education, all kinds of poor statistics. A kind of permanent crisis. </p>
<p>Policy success, on the other hand, often doesn’t fit the crisis narrative: <a href="https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/unemployment-rate-at-3-3-percent">record low Māori unemployment</a>, for instance, or the Māori economy being worth NZ$70 billion and <a href="https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2022/07/m-ori-economy-thriving-growth-largely-driven-by-increasing-number-of-m-ori-women-owning-own-business-new-report-finds.html">forecast to grow 5% annually</a>.</p>
<p>It may be that crisis makes better headlines. But we also need to ask why, and what the deeper implications might be for Indigenous peoples and policy in Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479506/original/file-20220816-2693-nkukmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479506/original/file-20220816-2693-nkukmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479506/original/file-20220816-2693-nkukmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479506/original/file-20220816-2693-nkukmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479506/original/file-20220816-2693-nkukmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479506/original/file-20220816-2693-nkukmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479506/original/file-20220816-2693-nkukmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Sharing the sovereign? The Australian Aboriginal flag and Australian national flag fly above Sydney harbour bridge.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span>
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<h2>Colonialism as crisis</h2>
<p>Last month I published a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00323187.2022.2099915?src=&journalCode=rpnz20">journal article</a> titled “The crisis of policy failure or the moral crisis of an idea: colonial politics in contemporary Australia and New Zealand”. In it I argue that when public services don’t work well for Indigenous peoples, the explanation does not just come down to isolated examples of policy failure. </p>
<p>The solution is not that governments simply get better at making policy. Instead, colonialism itself is what I call “the moral crisis of an idea”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indigenous-recognition-is-more-than-a-voice-to-government-its-a-matter-of-political-equality-154057">Indigenous recognition is more than a Voice to Government - it's a matter of political equality</a>
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<p>Earlier this year, former Australian prime minister Scott Morrison said that <a href="https://nacchocommunique.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/prime-minister-ctg-report-speech.pdf">Indigenous policy usually fails</a> because:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[Governments] perpetuated an ingrained way of thinking, passed down over two centuries and more, and it was the belief that we knew better than our Indigenous peoples. We don’t. We also thought we understood their problems better than they did. We don’t. They live them.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Morrison was describing a problem with the way the system ordinarily works. Yet a crisis is supposed to be something out of the ordinary, something that needs fixing. How, then, do we fix an idea?</p>
<h2>Listening, reflection and justification</h2>
<p>Colonialism presumes a moral hierarchy of human worth. It presumes Indigenous people shouldn’t have the same influence over public decision making as others (for example, ensuring a hospital or school works in their favour).</p>
<p>Addressing this problem is the point of the <a href="https://www.teakawhaiora.nz/">Māori Health Authority</a>, established in New Zealand last month, and the <a href="https://www.education.govt.nz/our-work/overall-strategies-and-policies/ka-hikitia-ka-hapaitia/ka-hikitia-ka-hapaitia-the-maori-education-strategy/">Māori Education Strategy</a> released in 2020.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/racism-exclusion-and-tokenism-how-maori-and-pacific-science-graduates-are-still-marginalised-at-university-188052">Racism, exclusion and tokenism: how Māori and Pacific science graduates are still marginalised at university</a>
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<p>The democratic theorist John Dryzek says there is a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/abs/deliberative-global-governance/0600340BE65DF74F44E0F1938ABD610F">crisis of communication</a> in modern democracy. This is because people understate the importance of listening, reflection and justification in public decision making.</p>
<p>Colonialism, however, doesn’t require listening, reflection or justification. Its essential idea is that some people just aren’t as entitled as others to a meaningful say in public policy.</p>
<p>Entrenching listening, reflection and justification in the workings of democratic politics would support different and non-colonial aspirations. This is something I have called “sharing the sovereign” in my <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-33-4172-2">2021 book</a> of the same name.</p>
<h2>Sharing the sovereign</h2>
<p>Sharing the sovereign means recognising many sites of decision-making authority. This is the point of the treaties being considered in Victoria, the Northern Territory and Queensland. It’s also the point of <a href="https://www.tepapa.govt.nz/discover-collections/read-watch-play/maori/treaty-waitangi/treaty-close/full-text-te-tiriti-o">Te Tiriti o Waitangi</a>/the Treaty of Waitangi in Aotearoa New Zealand.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479507/original/file-20220816-18424-o373py.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479507/original/file-20220816-18424-o373py.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479507/original/file-20220816-18424-o373py.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=846&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479507/original/file-20220816-18424-o373py.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=846&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479507/original/file-20220816-18424-o373py.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=846&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479507/original/file-20220816-18424-o373py.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1063&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479507/original/file-20220816-18424-o373py.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1063&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479507/original/file-20220816-18424-o373py.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1063&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>Te Tiriti affirmed the Māori right to authority (rangatiratanga) over their own affairs. It also conferred on Māori the rights and privileges of British subjects, which continue to evolve as New Zealand citizenship. This was the right to influence the affairs of the new state – the right to be part of the new state in a meaningful way.</p>
<p>Successive <a href="https://waitangitribunal.govt.nz/publications-and-resources/waitangi-tribunal-reports/">Waitangi Tribunal</a> reports show that crisis in Māori policy occurs when these two simple ideas of independent authority and meaningful participation in the state are absent.</p>
<p>In Australia, the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00323187.2022.2099915?src=&journalCode=rpnz20">Victorian Treaty Assembly says</a>: “Treaty is a chance to address [the] future together as equals”. The idea of an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/video/2022/jul/30/if-not-now-when-albanese-reveals-wording-of-referendum-question-on-indigenous-voice-video">Indigenous voice to parliament</a>, which the new Australian government is supporting, is also a step towards sharing the sovereign among all citizens.</p>
<p>In Aotearoa New Zealand, sharing the sovereign would mean the Crown is not, in the <a href="https://e-tangata.co.nz/comment-and-analysis/the-crown-isnt-just-pakeha-it-is-also-maori/">words of the first Maori judge of the Supreme Court</a>, Justice Joe Williams, “Pakeha, English-speaking, and distinct from Māori”. </p>
<p>Political equality then becomes possible because the sovereign is not an ethnically exclusive entity. It’s not an all-powerful authority over which Indigenous people should not expect any real influence.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-colonialism-be-reversed-the-uns-declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples-provides-some-answers-147017">Can colonialism be reversed? The UN's Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides some answers</a>
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<h2>Colonialism under permanent scrutiny</h2>
<p>Equality through inclusivity is fundamentally different from colonialism and its inherent moral crisis. Equality and inclusivity make different assumptions about what the state is and to whom it belongs.</p>
<p>However, normalising public institutions to work for Indigenous peoples as well as they work for anyone else is still a contested idea. In 2019, for example, the New Zealand cabinet instructed public servants on the questions they should consider when advising ministers on Treaty/Tiriti policy. </p>
<p>On one hand, cabinet affirmed Māori influence in the policy process. On the other, it didn’t consider the possibility that governments might sometimes stand aside entirely in the making of effective and fair public policy. So, cabinet didn’t require advisers to ask <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/14687968211047902">questions such as</a>:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Why is the government presuming to make this decision?</p></li>
<li><p>And why does the decision not belong (partly or entirely) to the sphere of <a href="https://maoridictionary.co.nz/search?keywords=tino+rangatiratanga">tino rangatiratanga</a> (self-determination, sovereignty)?</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Asking these kinds of questions involves sharing the sovereign. They presume listening, reflection and justification to put colonialism, as the moral crisis of an idea, under permanent scrutiny.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188583/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dominic O'Sullivan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When public services don’t work for Indigenous peoples, it’s more than just a case of policy failure. As long as colonial assumptions are embedded in the system, there can never be real progress.Dominic O'Sullivan, Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Health and Environmental Sciences, Auckland University of Technology and Professor of Political Science, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1866752022-08-01T13:54:46Z2022-08-01T13:54:46ZUnpacking the power plays over Western Sahara<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475103/original/file-20220720-14-firre3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters demand the freedom of the Sahrawi population. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jesus Merida/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/unpacking-the-power-plays-over-western-sahara-186675&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>The western Mediterranean region has recently witnessed an intensifying set of diplomatic and economic stand-offs between neighbours Morocco, Algeria, and Spain. </p>
<p>In 2021, Algiers <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/algeria-morocco-sever-diplomatic-ties">completely severed</a> its already fractured relations with Rabat, and then <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/11/01/algeria-to-halt-gas-exports-to-spain-via-morocco//">halted gas exports</a> via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline that flows through Morocco. </p>
<p>More recently, Algeria has launched a number of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/8/algeria-suspends-spain-co-operation-over-w-sahara-dispute">diplomatic protests</a> against Spain and frozen some of its trade relations. It has also suggested that it no longer views Madrid as a <a href="https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/algeria-suspends-treaty-of-friendship-and-cooperation-with-spain">reliable</a> political and economic partner. </p>
<p>At the centre of these tensions is the disputed territory of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14115273">Western Sahara</a>, a 266,000km² country slightly larger than the whole of the United Kingdom. It is located across from Spain’s Canary Islands along Africa’s Atlantic coast, primarily between Mauritania and Morocco. </p>
<p>For a long time the Western Sahara dispute was considered a frozen conflict. But it roared back to life in late 2020 when the Algerian-backed Sahrawi nationalist movement, the Frente Polisario (Polisario Front), <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-westernsahara-idUSKBN27U0GE">resumed</a> its armed struggle. The front, which is demanding independent statehood, had been adhering to a United Nations ceasefire since 1991.</p>
<p>Morocco has illegally occupied Western Sahara with tacit European and American blessing since 1975. It controls roughly three fourths of the territory, including its major cities and economic resources. The most important of these are <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16101666">fisheries and phosphate rock</a>. </p>
<p>Morocco has also encouraged mass migration of its own citizens, who now likely equal the number of native Sahrawis in the territory. </p>
<p>Rabat has asserted historical title to Western Sahara since the 1950s. But the territory’s right to independence has been enshrined under <a href="https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/sites/www.un.org.dppa.decolonization/files/2009_5_nsgt_western_sahara.pdf">UN decolonisation law</a>. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://vest-sahara.no/en/news/the-question-of-sovereignty-in-the-western-sahara-conflict">landmark 1975 opinion</a> of the International Court of Justice found the justices unconvinced that the territory belonged to anyone but the native Sahrawi people. </p>
<p>Spain first took control of the land in <a href="https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1991/dec/12/western-sahara">1885</a>. </p>
<p>Subsequent UN opinions and rulings of the European Union Court of Justice have upheld Western Sahara’s right to independence. Western Sahara remains on the UN list of non-self-governing territories. But it’s the only one without a clearly designated administering power. </p>
<p>Western Sahara matters because of the legal principles at stake. These include Morocco’s expansion of territory by force. Another is the right of non-self-governing territories like Western Sahara to choose their sovereign status. </p>
<p>Experts have <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/free-to-choose-a-new-plan-for-peace-in-western-sahara/">warned</a> for a long time that the unwillingness of the North Atlantic powers to put pressure on Morocco to resolve the conflict will inevitably lead to an even more complicated and entangled set of crises.</p>
<p>This has now come to pass. The failure to resolve the issue is having a negative effect on security and trade relations across the western Mediterranean. </p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>In October 1975, knowing that Spain intended to grant Western Sahara its independence, Morocco announced its intent to take the territory by force. To this end it launched a secret <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4005894">military invasion</a>. </p>
<p>In the chaos of the ensuing transition from Spanish to joint Moroccan-Mauritanian rule, <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/decades-displacement-45-years-sahrawi-refugee-camps">nearly 40%</a> of the Sahrawi population fled to neighbouring Algeria. Today, over 170,000 continue to live in these refugee camps. </p>
<p>The Cold War strongly influenced the 1975–1991 war between Morocco and Polisario. Rabat received substantial backing from the US, France and Saudi Arabia. For its part, the Western Saharan nationalist movement received extensive support from Algeria and other influential members of the Non-Aligned Movement.</p>
<p>This aid allowed Polisario to quickly eject Mauritania from the territory. Nevertheless Moroccan forces successfully ensconced themselves behind a <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-polisario-front-morocco-and-the-western-sahara-conflict/">heavily mined 2,700km barrier</a> that bisects the territory to this day. </p>
<p>By the time the UN was able to arrange a cease-fire in the early 1990s, Western Sahara had been recognised as its own state by dozens of countries and the African Union. </p>
<h2>Dashed hopes</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minurso">UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</a> (Minurso, its French acronym) was also created in 1991. It sought to poll the native Sahrawi population on the simple question of whether to join with Morocco or form an independent state. </p>
<p>Despite the elegance of this solution, Morocco and Polisario maintained wildly different understandings of how the UN should go about identifying the Sahrawi electorate for the vote. </p>
<p>These criteria were eventually solidified in a series of agreements negotiated by former US Secretary of State James Baker in the <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic_62897.html">Houston Accords of 1997</a>. </p>
<p>Just as Minurso was finalising the provisional voter list, two critical developments derailed the UN referendum effort. Morocco’s long-reigning monarch, <a href="https://www.economist.com/obituary/1999/07/29/king-hassan-of-morocco">Hassan II</a>, died in the summer of 1999, handing his kingdom to a young and untested Mohammed VI. </p>
<p>Then, in East Timor, a similar UN referendum effort saw Indonesian security forces go on a <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/1999/09/02/the-violent-reaction-to-east-timors-voice">violent rampage</a> when the Timorese voted for independence. </p>
<p>Morocco’s allies on the Security Council, primarily France and the US, realised that the referendum in Western Sahara was heading towards a similar outcome. The fear was that people would vote for independence but the occupying power would refuse to recognise it. </p>
<p>Since 2000 the Security Council has pressed Morocco and Polisario to develop a more comprehensive political agreement between themselves. The Security Council wanted an agreement that would satisfy Western Sahara’s legal right to self-determination. This has proved to be a fool’s errand. </p>
<p>Under Mohammed VI, Morocco’s policy has shifted to vehemently opposing any process or proposal that could lead to an independent Western Sahara. Morocco has instead put forward a proposal to offer Western Sahara limited self-governance under ultimate Moroccan control. </p>
<p>New tensions were added to the mix in 2022 when Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/13992/Madrid_embroiled_in_zero-sum_fight_with_Rabat_and_Algiers">endorsed</a> Morocco’s proposal. The endorsement reflected an important change in Madrid’s policy towards Western Sahara, its former colony, which had been officially neutral on the question of final status. </p>
<p>The statement precipitated the recent break in Algerian-Spanish relations. </p>
<p>An even more extreme position had been taken by Donald Trump. In his last days in office in late 2020, the former US president extended official <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/united-states-recognizes-moroccos-sovereignty-over-western-sahara/36A7A41EC0BB341D79CE4661EDD8B60E">US recognition</a> of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. No other North Atlantic power has done so.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Polisario, citing international law, continues to demand a final status vote with an independence option. </p>
<p>With the UN Security Council continually focused on more pressing crises, the Western Sahara issue has faded, barely keeping the comatose peace process on life support. </p>
<p>The fifth in a series of UN envoys attempted to visit Moroccan occupied Western Sahara for the first time in July 2022 only to be <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/un-envoy-cancels-western-sahara-trip-after-rabat-visit">denied access</a> by Rabat. </p>
<p>Thus recent developments between Morocco, Spain, and Algeria should be understood as a more aggressive posture on the part of Algiers to defend its strategic interests vis-à-vis Western Sahara. </p>
<p>What makes Algeria’s policy shift all the more extraordinary is Algiers’ traditional refusal to mix politics (Western Sahara) and economics (oil). </p>
<p>The global energy crisis stemming from the war in Ukraine would appear to strengthen its position, as Algeria is Africa’s largest exporter of gas. </p>
<p>What remains to be seen is whether Madrid, Paris, Brussels and Washington have got the message yet.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186675/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacob Mundy is a visiting fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations. He has previously received funding from the American Institute for Maghreb Studies (AIMS), the Project on Middle East Political Science, the Social Science Research Council, the Century Foundation, Security in Context, and the Fulbright program. He is a member of the AIMS board of directors and the editorial committee of Middle East Report. </span></em></p>Long considered a frozen conflict, the Western Sahara dispute roared back to life in late 2020, reviving old wounds and inflicting fresh ones.Jacob Mundy, Associate Professor, Colgate UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1807992022-04-08T11:04:22Z2022-04-08T11:04:22ZAfrican countries showed disunity in UN votes on Russia: South Africa’s role was pivotal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456834/original/file-20220407-22-fnto70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky addresses a Security Council meeting on Russia's invasion via a video link. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Peter Foley</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The preamble of the founding Act of the African Union (AU) <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf#page=3">calls for </a> “collective action in Africa and in our relations with the rest of the world”.</p>
<p>The credibility of this pan-African commitment has been damaged by the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/unga-resolution-against-ukraine-invasion-full-text">unwillingness of African governments to forge a unified position on the Russia-Ukraine war</a>.</p>
<p>They could not agree on the merits of two non-binding resolutions. Half of the AU’s members abstained from the vote demanding that Russia abide by this principle, in the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152">first resolution</a>. And on <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114632">the second resolution</a> three weeks later demanding an end to the humanitarian crisis, the show of African disunity was the same. </p>
<p>Most recently, the General Assembly <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782">voted overwhelmingly to suspend Russia</a> from the UN Human Rights Council. By my count, of the 24 “No” votes, nine were African. South Africa was among the 23 African abstentions, with another 11 not voting, despite human rights being a key objective of the AU and South Africa. </p>
<p>Given this pattern, how will African countries ever agree to act collectively to achieve the ambitious goals on the AU’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/33126-doc-01_background_note.pdf">Agenda 2063</a> for Africa’s growth and development?</p>
<p>The issue at stake is not trivial. The core principle of respect for territorial integrity and sovereign equality has been at the heart of postcolonial African international relations since the founding of the Organisation of African Unity <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf">in 1963</a>. As soon as the war began, the AU chair Macky Sall and chairperson of the AU Commission Moussa Faki Mahamat called on Russia to </p>
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<p><a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220224/african-union-statement-situation-ukraine">respect the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Ukraine. </a>.</p>
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<p>What has been particularly surprising in all three votes is that South Africa, normally a champion of greater African unity and human rights, has chosen either to actively <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202203250047.html">pursue a pro-Russian stance</a>, or to stand on the sidelines.</p>
<p>In my view this will imperil the country’s claim to be a leading human rights advocate, and a leader of an emerging and more potent African voice in world affairs. </p>
<h2>The South African factor</h2>
<p>This article does not address the pros and cons of maintaining friendly relations with Russia. </p>
<p>It poses a different question: Could African states that abstained on the two UN resolutions have voted with the majority, thus preserving a semblance of African unity, without jeopardising the interests they stated to justify abstaining?</p>
<p>And what about defending core AU values, such as <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">human rights</a>?</p>
<p>I draw primarily from the rationale for abstentions offered by South Africa for three reasons: Firstly, it is among Africa’s most prominent and influential countries. Secondly, since the end of apartheid, it has been an <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2020-africa-day-25-may-2020-0000">outspoken proponent of African unity </a> and the catalyst for several practical initiatives to advance collective self-reliance. Lastly, I live amid South Africa’s public debates about these issues.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-war-decoding-how-african-countries-voted-at-the-un-178663">Russia-Ukraine war: decoding how African countries voted at the UN</a>
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<p>I assume that had South Africa chosen to make defending the principle of territorial integrity and sovereign equality a priority, and lobbied other African governments to support it, there would have been a much better show of African solidarity in voting for the resolution. </p>
<p>Consider three prominent and broad reasons that South Africans offer to justify abstaining: The war is foremost a proxy struggle between Russia and the US; For South Africa to play a mediating role it should not take sides; and, The need for continued Russian trade and security assistance.</p>
<h2>Unpacking South Africa’s reasoning</h2>
<p>Consider the proxy war between Russia and US argument. In a recent <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ojA1u430eEg">University of the Witwatersrand webinar</a> a senior government official described the war as a proxy one, between Russia and the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). He said it was not in South Africa’s interest, which is primarily the cause of peace, to choose sides. He went on to accuse the US of similar aggression in <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/sas-opposition-to-the-us-invasion-of-iraq-ten-year">the 2003 invasion of Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>In response, <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/gilbert-m-khadiagala-173180">Gilbert Khadiagala</a>, a Professor of International Relations and Director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States, noted that “two wrongs don’t make a right”. He also recalled that South Africa immediately criticised the US invasion and <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2003-03-20-south-africa-reacts-to-war-in-iraq/">its specious justification</a>. That criticism did not seriously affect South Africa-United States cooperation when in the best interests of both. And, if even-handedness is a valid concern, then voting and pressing for African unity in support of respect for core UN/AU principles should not affect South Africa-Russia relations, or perceptions of Pretoria’s SA non-alignment.</p>
<p>Now to the role of mediator. There were expectations in some quarters that there might be a useful role for South Africa in actively supporting a peaceful end to the current war. This was because of the country’s relatively peaceful transition to full democracy in the early 1990s, a process in which President Cyril Ramaphosa’s played a critical role. And his contribution to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ringside-seat-at-irish-theater-of-war-ira-sinn-fein-irish-politics/">a negotiated end to the war in Northern Ireland</a> between 2000-05.</p>
<p>But to be acceptable as mediator in any conflict, one has to be acceptable to both sides. This is not the case. The only current host acceptable to both sides is Turkey. The country has maintained good relations with Moscow, despite being a NATO member and reportedly selling Ukraine dozens of deadly drones since 2019. It also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/11/turkey-drones-use-ukraine">voted for both UN resolutions</a>.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-war-with-ukraine-five-reasons-why-many-african-countries-choose-to-be-neutral-180135">Russia’s war with Ukraine: Five reasons why many African countries choose to be ‘neutral’</a>
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<p>In addition, South Africa, presumably, is far away from the conflict. Nor does it have sufficient influence to act alone. Prospects for leveraging its membership of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/brics-brazil-russia-india-china-south-africa-1">Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) bloc</a> have dimmed. </p>
<p>Had South Africa led an effort to forge a united African position on the UN resolutions, I believe, this would have had no bearing on its prospects for helping mediate an end to the war.</p>
<p>Lastly, the trade imperative. It is true that there is <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-ukraine-conflict-could-influence-africas-food-supplies-177843">significant agricultural trade between countries on the continent and Russia and Ukraine</a>. Major importing countries are Egypt, which accounted for nearly half, followed by Sudan, Nigeria, Tanzania, Algeria, Kenya and South Africa.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-ukraine-conflict-could-influence-africas-food-supplies-177843">How Russia-Ukraine conflict could influence Africa's food supplies</a>
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<p>Sanctions against Russia will also <a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-russia-will-affect-arms-sales-to-africa-the-risks-and-opportunities-180038">affect arms sales</a>. Africa needs military hardware, especially in the Sahel region, and pays for private military <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/08/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">assistance from Russians employed by the Wagner Group</a>, regardless of politics.</p>
<p>In my view, however, none of this justifies South Africa’s chosen path.</p>
<h2>Imperatives for collective action</h2>
<p>Looking ahead, the failure to forge common cause in mostly symbolic UN votes on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will fade amid Africa’s real hardships resulting from that war. Already, spikes in the costs of food are having dire consequences <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/conflict-humanitarian-crisis-ukraine-threatening-future-global-food-security-prices">on many poor African families</a>.</p>
<p>Issues vital to human security for Africa are certain to accelerate as with the imperatives for African unity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180799/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The unwillingness of African governments to forge a unified position on the Russian invasion has damaged the credibility of their pan-African commitments.John J Stremlau, Honorary Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1793032022-03-24T01:59:37Z2022-03-24T01:59:37ZUkraine’s fight for its identity is more than a century old – it is not about to stop<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452739/original/file-20220317-13-qfyxai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bianca De Marchi/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In just three weeks, the war in Ukraine has seen what could be the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/refugees-fleeing-ukraine-now-represent-biggest-movement-of-people-in-europe-since-world-war-ii-11646493910">largest refugee movement</a> since the second world war. </p>
<p>There are currently <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">more than 3 million</a> Ukrainian refugees, with a further <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/almost-65-million-people-internally-displaced-ukraine-iom">6.5 million people</a> displaced inside Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities and civilians continue. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ukrainian-refugee-crisis-could-last-years-but-host-communities-might-not-be-prepared-178482">The Ukrainian refugee crisis could last years – but host communities might not be prepared</a>
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<p>Various organisations including the <a href="https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/media/media-statements/australia-must-open-its-doors-to-ukrainian-refugees">Law Council of Australia</a> have called for Australia to “open its doors” to Ukrainian refugees, and Ukrainian community organisation in Australia are also working to assist refugees to resettle here.</p>
<p>But Ukrainian organisations have also pointed out that refugees are only part of the issue. Ukrainian national sovereignty is also key. As a historian of post-second world war displaced persons, it is important to understand how this history informs the current moment. </p>
<h2>Ukraine between the wars</h2>
<p>Between the two world wars, what we now know as “Ukraine” was split. It became the Soviet Ukraine in the east, with the west ruled by Poland.
Soviet Ukraine endured a bloody civil war, forced collectivisation and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60353677">Holodomor</a> (literally “hunger-extermination”) – the Soviet-made famine in 1932-33.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Members of the Ukrainian community sing the national anthem at the National Press Club in Canberra." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452738/original/file-20220317-27-1kg1ye5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452738/original/file-20220317-27-1kg1ye5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452738/original/file-20220317-27-1kg1ye5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452738/original/file-20220317-27-1kg1ye5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452738/original/file-20220317-27-1kg1ye5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452738/original/file-20220317-27-1kg1ye5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452738/original/file-20220317-27-1kg1ye5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Members of the Ukrainian community sing the national anthem at the National Press Club in Canberra.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After the Soviet Union invaded Poland in 1939, it deported 315,000 people, including Ukrainians, into gulags. </p>
<p>During the war, the Ukrainian radical-right in Poland collaborated with the subsequent German occupiers against Poles, Jews and the Red Army. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was highly nationalist and then declared an independent Ukrainian state, with its leaders imprisoned in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp in Germany.</p>
<h2>Ukraine after 1945</h2>
<p>By 1945, Stalin had taken control of most of eastern Europe, including all of Ukraine. But the OUN was extraordinarily successful in advocating for an independent Ukrainian state in the post-war displaced persons camps in Europe. </p>
<p>“Ukrainian” was not originally a nationality categorisation used by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Ethnic Ukrainians were technically either from the Soviet Union or Poland. It was only after Ukrainians protested it was agreed to create a separate category: “Ukrainian”, and separate camps. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-as-a-borderland-a-brief-history-of-ukraines-place-between-europe-and-russia-178168">Ukraine as a 'borderland': a brief history of Ukraine's place between Europe and Russia</a>
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<hr>
<p>Displaced persons camps also became training grounds for the Ukrainian-dominated Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, which claimed to represent 32 nationalities “imprisoned” by the Soviet Union. These included the Balts (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Hungarians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Belorussians and Cossacks. </p>
<p>The bloc argued for a separatist “new order” based on independent and ethnically homogeneous states. Their slogan was “Freedom for nations! Freedom for individuals!” In the Cold War, such initiatives received support from the west, particularly the United States.</p>
<h2>Ukrainians in Australia</h2>
<p>In Australia, Ukrainian community organisations were founded by the 14,000 Ukrainians who arrived in the country between 1947 and 1952. They included former forced labourers under Nazi occupation and former prisoners-of-war who found themselves in Germany and Austria in May 1945. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Ukrainian supporters gathered in Sydney." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452737/original/file-20220317-27-10o1byd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452737/original/file-20220317-27-10o1byd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452737/original/file-20220317-27-10o1byd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452737/original/file-20220317-27-10o1byd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452737/original/file-20220317-27-10o1byd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452737/original/file-20220317-27-10o1byd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452737/original/file-20220317-27-10o1byd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Ukrainian supporters have been gathering all around the world, including in Sydney.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bianca De Marchi/AAP</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>All were anti-Soviet and refused to return to lands under the control of the Soviet Union. Many were anti-Communist but, above all, they were nationalists and against what they saw as Russian imperialism.</p>
<p>So, while Ukrainian displaced persons who resettled in Australia became “new Australians”, many also saw themselves as Cold War warriors, advocating for Ukrainian nationalism. They felt vindicated decades later when the Soviet Union fell. </p>
<h2>Ukrainian nationalism</h2>
<p>For more than a century, Ukrainian nationalism has proved that it has not - and will not - disappear. </p>
<p>This means that as well as refugee support the <a href="https://www.ozeukes.com/">Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations</a> is also calling for concrete political assistance from Australia. This includes support for Ukrainian membership in the European Union, a #NoFlyZone over Ukraine and for business leaders to divest from Russia. </p>
<p>As chair Stefan Romaniw has <a href="https://9now.nine.com.au/a-current-affair/russia-ukraine-update-chair-of-australian-federation-of-ukrainian-organisations-stefan-romaniw-speaks-out-over-attacks/f79c29b7-3b7e-45e5-a0c1-5ee75562d133">asked</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>At the end of the day, who is going to help Ukraine defend its territory?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>War is complex and traumatic. Our first response is naturally to think of people who are injured and displaced. But we should not forget, Ukrainians want their country as well as temporary relief.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179303/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Jayne Persian receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>An expert in post-World War II displaced people looks at how history informs the current situation in Ukraine.Jayne Persian, Senior Lecturer in History, University of Southern QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1792032022-03-15T14:26:58Z2022-03-15T14:26:58ZRussia’s invasion of Ukraine is illegal under international law: suggesting it’s not is dangerous<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451833/original/file-20220314-28-ezu28b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The destroyed main building of a school in Zhytomyr, Ukraine.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Miguela A. Lopes</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>While the world is largely united <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152">against the invasion of Ukraine by Russia</a>, South African public figures, including the government, have attempted to downplay that it is, in fact, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-03-11-ukraine-needs-an-inclusive-and-lasting-roadmap-to-peace/">an invasion</a>. And their frequent calls for negotiation tend to present the conflict as one in which both sides should be prepared to make concessions.</p>
<p>President Cyril Ramaphosa has even reported that Russian president Vladimir Putin appreciates his <a href="https://twitter.com/CyrilRamaphosa/status/1501970616680910850?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">‘balanced approach’</a> to the conflict. So what does international law say about one country sending armed troops across a border and shelling another’s towns? The answer calls for some historical background.</p>
<p>After World War II ended in 1945, the United Nations was established. Its <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/preamble">first stated purpose was</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To this end, it emphasised that the global order was based on the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-1">sovereignty of states</a>) (article 2(1)) and <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-1">outlawed the use of force</a> by one state against another (article 2(4)). </p>
<p>There are only two, narrowly defined exceptions in the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf">United Nations Charter</a>, the world body’s founding document, to the prohibition on the use of force. These are met when states act either in self defence or under the authorisation of the UN Security Council. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine can, therefore, be legal only if it falls within one of those exceptions. </p>
<p>It is completely uncontroversial that sending armed forces across the border of a state, without its consent, is a use of force. This happened when Russia sent tanks and infantry across the internationally recognised borders of Ukraine. President Putin’s recognition of two breakaway regions in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-60470900">southeast Ukraine</a> before this move does not affect their status as Ukrainian territory under international law. Indeed, it violates a separate rule protecting state sovereignty: that <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/russias-recognition-of-the-separatist-republics-in-ukraine-was-manifestly-unlawful/">states may not interfere in each other’s internal affairs</a>.</p>
<p>Apologists for the invasion have focused on the West’s ‘provocation’ of Russia, particularly through <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-03-11-ukraine-needs-an-inclusive-and-lasting-roadmap-to-peace/">its expansion of NATO</a> to include Eastern European states such as <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm">Croatia, Estonia and Poland</a>.</p>
<p>But focusing on the reasons why Russia feels threatened by the West confuses causation with justification. In addition, by referring only to the reasons why Russia supposedly feels threatened, and failing to address the legal position at all, the South African government, the governing African National Congress – and other apologists – undermine the most cardinal rule of our international legal order. It is a rule on which the South Africa’s own survival as a state depends.</p>
<h2>The legal analysis</h2>
<p>As we have established that Russia has used force against Ukraine, the next step is to analyse whether Russia can call on any of the exceptions justifying force. Before we do so, we must dispose of one possible objection to a legal argument based on the UN Charter. At the time the UN was established, many states, including most African states, were still colonised. They could, therefore, not participate in the creation of the charter. </p>
<p>Although they voluntarily acceded to the UN after acquiring statehood, they played no role in formulating the text of the charter. Such decolonised states have occasionally <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/chinesejil/jmx012">rejected</a> rules that were drawn up without their consent. But they have never resisted the underlying principle of the sovereignty of states, nor the rule that states may not use force against one another. </p>
<p>Indeed, as the Kenyan representative to the United Nations, Martin Kimani, recently emphasised, decolonised African states even prioritised the norms of territorial integrity and state sovereignty over any right they might have had to reclaim territory they had due to the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tf0gb0sQI40">arbitrary map-making of their former colonial powers</a>. As Kenya has pointed out, African states accepted the borders that the colonial powers had imposed on them in order to preserve peace and foster cooperation.</p>
<p>So does Russia meet the exceptions to art 2(4) of the UN Charter? </p>
<p>There are only two in the charter itself: when force is <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7">authorised by the UN Security Council</a> (article 42), or when a state is <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7">acting in self-defence</a> (art 51). </p>
<p>A third exception has also been suggested by <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/06/humanitarian-intervention-a-legal-analysis/">scholars and commentators</a>, based not on the charter but on moral considerations and (limited) state practice: humanitarian intervention, or, in its most widely accepted formulation, the duty to protect. In the form in which this has been accepted by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/general-assembly.shtml">UN General Assembly</a>, this exception would not allow Russia to use force <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/">without Security Council authorisation</a>. The Security Council has not authorised Russia to use force against Ukraine.</p>
<p>Russia’s only remaining justification is, therefore, self defence, which is set out in Article 51. That says that states have the right to self defence “if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations”. </p>
<p>An armed attack is, therefore, an essential prerequisite to a legal use of force, and it is one that is <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/70/070-19860627-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf">strictly interpreted</a>.</p>
<p>This legal requirement is supplemented by customary international law. The formulation here is that the necessity of self-defence must be</p>
<blockquote>
<p>instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation … and that the {defending} force, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorised {it} to enter the territories of the {attacking state} at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, <a href="https://www.open.edu/openlearn/society-politics-law/the-use-force-international-law/content-section-1.3">and kept clearly within it</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There must, therefore, be an armed attack, that has already begun or is imminent, and the force used in self-defence must be the only way of averting or repelling it.</p>
<p>Russia has not suffered an armed attack from Ukraine, or, indeed, any state. Neither NATO’s presence in Ukraine nor any of the other justifications offered by Russia and its apologists reach the threshold of an armed attack. This includes a range of <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/what-is-russias-legal-justification-for-using-force-against-ukraine/">allegations</a>. These cover the alleged mistreatment by Ukraine of Russian speakers in that state, alleged links between the West and the far-right in Ukraine, and the alleged presence of sophisticated weapons in the state.</p>
<p>There are other channels of resolution for these kinds of grievances. And even if these channels don’t work, and Russia is left with a situation in which it ‘feels’ threatened, it does not have the right to use force. Whether the requirements of self defence are met is a question of fact, not feeling. </p>
<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is, therefore, illegal.</p>
<h2>The dangers</h2>
<p>There are two significant dangers that follow from any attempt to disguise or distort the illegality of the invasion, which South Africa’s foreign affairs department’s recent pronouncements illustrate only too well. </p>
<p>The department’s call to “all sides to uphold international law, humanitarian law, human rights, and the principles of the UN Charter, and to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-03-11-ukraine-needs-an-inclusive-and-lasting-roadmap-to-peace/">respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity</a>” misrepresents the facts. That’s because it creates the impression that Ukrainian troops are occupying Russian territory, or shelling its towns. </p>
<p>The moral equivalence that this creates between the opposing states is then underscored by the department’s <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-03-11-ukraines-ambassador-calls-for-two-sided-talks-and-for-ramaphosa-to-call-the-situation-a-war/?utm_source=top_reads_block&utm_campaign=ukraine_crisis">call for negotiation for resolution of the current ‘situation’</a>. </p>
<p>This is the second, and more dangerous, threat, in South Africa’s defence of Russia. We dare not ignore that it is a shocking proposal that Ukraine should have to negotiate to secure the withdrawal of Russian troops. It is shocking because it transfers responsibility for the invasion to Ukraine itself. In fact, Ukraine should not have to do anything at all to get Russia to obey one of the most cardinal rules of international law. </p>
<p>No state, whether Ukraine or anyone else in the global community, should have to earn Russia’s compliance with the law. If the rule of law is not respected, the entire global community becomes as vulnerable as Ukraine is now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179203/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cathleen Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>No state in the global community should have to earn Russia’s compliance with the law. If the rule of law is not respected, the entire global community becomes as vulnerable as Ukraine is now.Cathleen Powell, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1787482022-03-09T13:18:03Z2022-03-09T13:18:03ZIt’s ‘Ukraine,’ not ‘the Ukraine’ – here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450831/original/file-20220309-3336-3yl268.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C6%2C1014%2C671&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ukrainian passports say "Ukraine" with no "the." On the Polish border, March 5, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-shows-her-passport-at-the-train-station-in-news-photo/1238967473?adppopup=true">Enrico Mattia Del Punta/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For most of the 20th century, English speakers referred to “the Ukraine,” following Soviet practice. That’s not the case now. Ukraine’s official name in English does not include “the,” and for good reason. </p>
<p><a href="https://time.com/12597/the-ukraine-or-ukraine/">Ambassadors</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/10/01/its-ukraine-not-ukraine-ukrainians-want-you-get-it-right/">commentators and historians have tried to explain the change</a>, but not everyone has gotten the message.</p>
<p>So let me try. I’m <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=XGmDtosAAAAJ">a linguistic anthropologist and an expert on language politics in Russia</a>. I’m also bilingual in Russian and English, so I understand the subtleties of the distinction.</p>
<p>What is at stake? Nothing less than the political sovereignty of Ukraine. Yet in their coverage of the current crisis, some journalists and commentators still refer to events unfolding “in the Ukraine.”</p>
<p>It might seem innocent, but it’s not.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450689/original/file-20220308-23-t34m6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A balding white man in a suit sits behind microphones. In front of him is a sign reading " src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450689/original/file-20220308-23-t34m6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450689/original/file-20220308-23-t34m6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450689/original/file-20220308-23-t34m6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450689/original/file-20220308-23-t34m6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450689/original/file-20220308-23-t34m6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450689/original/file-20220308-23-t34m6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450689/original/file-20220308-23-t34m6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">For Russian President Vladimir Putin, it’s ‘the Ukraine.’ That’s political.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-speaks-during-the-22nd-news-photo/458789302?adppopup=true">Lan Hongguang/Xinhua/Pool/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>It’s Russian and English too</h2>
<p>Both the Russian and English languages make subtle distinctions between territories that are politically delimited and territories that are not. In Russian, people refer to events happening “na Ukraine” or “v Ukraine.” Russian language teachers usually explain the difference between “na” and “v” as the respective difference between “on” and “in.” One places the ketchup “na” the table and puts it away “v” the refrigerator.</p>
<p>Things get a little more complicated when describing larger spaces. In Russian, a person is “na” an unbounded territory, such as a hill, but “v” a bounded territory that is defined politically or institutionally, such as a nation-state. This distinction between unbounded and bounded territories holds even when English speakers would universally use “in.” So a person is “na” the Caucasus (“in the Caucasus”) but “v” Germany (“in Germany”).</p>
<p>English makes this distinction not with different prepositions but with the definite article “the.” English speakers use “in” before the name of a politically defined unit such as a nation or a state, and “in the” for a territory that is not politically defined. Hence, “Last week I was in Kentucky,” or, “Last week I was in the Bluegrass region.”</p>
<p>“Last week I was in Ohio” is fine, but if I turn to a friend and say, “Last week I was in the Ohio,” she might reasonably think I was in the waters of the Ohio River, on a cold swim.</p>
<p>There are exceptions, but these are the general principles that bind speakers of Russian and English.</p>
<p><iframe id="GiX4j" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/GiX4j/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The distinction is critically important for the sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation-state, suggesting as it does that Ukraine is either a bounded nation-state – like Germany – or a region of Russia with amorphous borders – like the Caucasus. This is why, in 1993, Ukraine’s government asked Russia’s government to abandon <a href="https://www.gazeta.ru/science/2014/03/22_a_5958681.shtml">the Soviet-era practice of referring to Ukraine as “na Ukraine”</a> and use only “v Ukraine.” The na construction is, however, still widely used in Russia.</p>
<p>To a Ukrainian worried about the nation-state’s territorial integrity, that little word “the” might suggest that the speaker does not much care whether Ukraine is an independent state. Like it or not, and intentionally or not, the language a person uses reflects their political positions, including their position on Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. </p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>So, does Putin say na Ukraine – “in the Ukraine” – or v Ukraine (“in Ukraine”)? In a subtle twist of diplomacy, <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828">the English-language translations of Putin’s recent addresses have him describing “the events in Ukraine”</a>, even though <a href="http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828">he says “na Ukraine” in Russian throughout his addresses</a>.</p>
<p>Even Putin’s translators see the benefit of sticking with the official English-language name of Ukraine. Perhaps they hope it will make the content more palatable to a Western Anglophone audience. But make no mistake: Putin is arguing that Ukraine’s sovereignty is a historical fiction, and he is underscoring his point by referring to events happening “na,” not “v,” Ukraine. English speakers don’t have to follow him by saying “the.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178748/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kathryn E. Graber has previously received funding from the National Science Foundation, the U.S. Department of Education, the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, and the Social Science Research Council for field research in the Russian Federation.</span></em></p>That three-letter word erases the country’s political sovereignty.Kathryn E. Graber, Associate Professor of Anthropology and Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1785482022-03-06T08:22:03Z2022-03-06T08:22:03ZNamibia’s abstention on Russia violates its foreign policy principles<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450013/original/file-20220304-17-1v685ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Voting at the United Nations General Assembly special session on Russia's invasion of Ukraine.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the United Nations General Assembly <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152">took a vote</a> on Russia’s <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/russias-war-on-ukraine-who-is-winning-the-war-one-week-in-1495000?ico=in-line_link">war against Ukraine</a> in an emergency session on 2 March, an overwhelming 141 out of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us#:%7E:text=The%20UN's%20Membership%20has%20grown,recommendation%20of%20the%20Security%20Council">193 member states</a> supported the resolution calling on Russia to withdraw from Ukraine. </p>
<p>Namibia abstained along with 15 other African states. One (Eritrea) voted against the resolution. Nine did not show up at all. In all, 28 African yes votes (among these seven cosponsors of the resolution) joined 113 other member states in condemning Russia’s aggression. </p>
<p>The voting pattern show that there is no pan-Africanism in practice – as before, African nations do not speak with one voice in global affairs.</p>
<p>Internal divisions are also within the 120 member states of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Non-Aligned-Movement">Non-Aligned Movement</a>. The 1955 <a href="https://www.southcentre.int/question/revisiting-the-1955-bandung-asian-african-conference-and-its-legacy/">Bandung Conference</a> was the cradle for newly independent countries to declare a non-pact position in the East-West conflict. As <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/perspectives-global-african-history/asian-african-bandung-conference-fact-and-fiction/">Asian-African Conference</a> it marked the beginning of a declared in-between-course during the Cold War.</p>
<p>But the misunderstanding that non-alignment means abstention in conflicts holds no water. Pseudo neutrality does in fact take sides with aggressors. Refraining from condemnation of wrongdoing translates such “non-alignment” into not supporting the principles of a global order.</p>
<p>This undermines the credibility of claims to support national sovereignty, territorial integrity and self-determination as a fundamental international order of states. These principles are held dearly in Namibia, where the colonised majority resisted occupation for a century. </p>
<p>As the Preamble of Namibia’s <a href="https://www.lac.org.na/laws/annoSTAT/Namibian%20Constitution.pdf">Constitution</a> declares:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is indispensable for freedom, justice and peace; … most effectively maintained and protected in a democratic society,
where the government is responsible to freely elected representatives of the people.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Taken seriously, this should have required a condemnation of the Russian war against Ukraine in support of the resolution.</p>
<h2>Namibia’s constitution and foreign policy</h2>
<p>On 28 February the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/human-rights-council-opens-forty-ninth-session-decides-hold-urgent-debate-situation">United Nations Human Rights Council voted</a> to urgently debate the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Here too, Namibia decided, like 12 other members to abstain, while 29 voted in favour and five against. </p>
<p>Namibia’s international relations minister (and deputy Prime Minister) Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/110473/read/Namibia-sits-on-fence">justified the abstention</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Why not abstain? I am saying we are monitoring and evaluating the situation, and I want to draw {your attention} to Article 96 of the Namibian Constitution. That is what is guiding us in handling issues such as this.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.lac.org.na/laws/annoSTAT/Namibian%20Constitution.pdf">Namibia’s constitution</a> is indeed a worthwhile reference point.</p>
<p>Article 96 outlines the country’s foreign policy principles as one of non-alignment. This includes adherence to fundamental value-based norms in the international system. It:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>commits Namibia to the promotion of peace and security,</p></li>
<li><p>stresses respect for international law and treaty obligations, and </p></li>
<li><p>emphasises the need to settle international disputes by peaceful means.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>This framework does not condone warfare, invasion, occupation, or any other denial of the right to self-determination of people in sovereign states.</p>
<p>Namibian President Hage Geingob has repeatedly stressed such understanding. </p>
<p>Addressing the UN General Assembly <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1020691">on 26 September 2018</a> he warned that the world had drifted away from dialogue, towards unilateral action. He appealed that UN members embrace multilateralism and stressed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Democracy might have its flaws, but it is by far the best system that enables key values of the United Nations.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>During the 79th UN General Assembly debate on 24 September 2020 he <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202009240678.html">declared</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>As a nation that has experienced the outpouring of international solidarity during the dark days of our struggle for independence, we wish to express our continued support for the right to self-determination and freedom of the peoples of Palestine and Western Sahara.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>His statement at the 2021 General Assembly <a href="https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20210923/MBCmdqQ6m0uY/S4bA24joclhF_en.pdf">concluded</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>through unity, we will revitalise the United Nations, transforming it into a bastion of global democracy that will save the world from the scourge of war and reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, dignity and worth of each and every human being on this planet.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>One would expect from such unreserved commitment to clearly defined value-based policy, that voting in the General Assembly would support these principles in every context.</p>
<h2>Old ties – new realities</h2>
<p>Namibia’s foreign policy is guided by the slogan </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331876658_The_Harambee_Prosperity_Plan_Namibia's_Foreign_Policy_Directions_and_Human_Security_Dimensions">a friend to all and enemy to none</a>. This stresses the approach seeking friendly relations with countries in pursuance of the best interest of Namibia. It is guided by an economic foreign policy, seeking mutual collaboration for own benefits. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>As a recent <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/el_obeid_mendelsohn_namibia_2021.pdf">analysis suggests</a>, the country has “fair-weather friends” and in China “one all-weather friend”. In contrast to the Chinese and Western economic ties, Russia doesn’t play a significant <a href="https://bit.ly/Trade-stats-Jan-2022">role</a>. </p>
<p>That Russian-Namibian bilateralism doesn’t centre stage is clear from a <a href="https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=e32a7100-f595-9d8a-daec-e0f3e3c65315&groupId=252038">450-page 2014 volume</a> on Namibia’s Foreign Relations. Initiated by the local office of the German Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation with contributions by mainly Namibian scholars and political office bearers it remains silent on Russia. Its section on bilateral relations deals with Angola, China, Germany, South Africa, and the US. </p>
<p>Bonds with the former Soviet Union (in as much as Cuba, for that matter) have left deep marks and loyalties since the struggle days. But Russia has not played any prominent role in Namibia’s day-to-day public culture since independence in 1990. It is more a nostalgic reminder of the exile days. </p>
<p>Namibia’s general voting patterns in the United Nations display a knee-jerk response in refusing to take any critical distance from Moscow. In a Namibian perspective, Russia remains the embodiment of the former USSR as a main supporter of the anti-colonial struggle.</p>
<p>But the loyalty to Moscow is flawed. After all, Ukraine’s independence as a sovereign state came only after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ukrainians, therefore, were as much an integral part of Soviet solidarity with Namibia’s liberation struggle as Russians were. Namibia gained independence in on <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/namibia-gains-independence">21 March 1990</a>.</p>
<h2>History should oblige differently</h2>
<p>Namibia’s long fight for freedom also brought about a strong affinity to the United Nations as the facilitator of diplomacy and mediation towards Namibian independence. The government repeatedly declares the UN system as the midwife to Namibian independence. This explicitly recognises the role the global governance body should and could play.</p>
<p>In his 2020 UN General Assembly address Geingob <a href="https://neweralive.na/posts/geingob-hails-united-nations-role-in-namibias-independence">declared</a> the fact that the world had averted a Third World War for 75 years testifies to the “success of this great human experiment in multilateralism”.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We recognise the pivotal role this distinguished organisation has played to promote and sustain world peace, and in the decolonisation of Africa. As Namibians, we can attest to this fact, given our own history.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>By abstaining from the vote condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Namibia betrays fundamental values practised by all those in solidarity with – and international support of – the struggle for self-determination.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178548/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber has been a member of SWAPO since 1974. </span></em></p>Namibia’s refusal to condemn Russia undermines the credibility of its claims to support sovereignty, territorial integrity, and self-determination of all nations.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1778152022-02-24T12:07:28Z2022-02-24T12:07:28ZRussia invades Ukraine – 5 essential reads from experts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448297/original/file-20220224-32797-x86quq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C20%2C6968%2C4537&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Damaged radar arrays and other equipment is seen at a Ukrainian military facility outside Mariupol, Ukraine, Feb. 24, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/UkraineTensions/8382ce68062e4d1e9080a40359c42103/photo?Query=Ukraine&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=92082&currentItemNo=45">AP Photo/Sergei Grits</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>This is a frightening moment. Russia has invaded Ukraine, and certainly those most frightened right now are the people of Ukraine. But violent aggression – a war mounted by a country with vast military resources against a smaller, weaker country – strikes fear in all of us. As a Washington Post headline writer recently wrote: The Ukraine crisis is “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/02/23/5000-miles-away-hitting-home-how-russias-advance-ukraine-is-rattling-americans/">5,000 miles away but hitting home</a>.”</p>
<p>The Conversation U.S. has spent the past couple of months digging into the history and politics of Ukraine and Russia. We’ve looked at their cultures, their religions, their military and technological capacities. We’ve provided you with stories about NATO, about cyberwarfare, the Cold War and the efficacy of sanctions. </p>
<p>Below, you’ll find a selection of stories from our coverage. We hope they will help you understand that today may feel both inevitable – yet inexplicable. </p>
<h2>1. The US promised to protect Ukraine</h2>
<p>In 1994, Ukraine got a signed commitment from Russia, the U.S. and the U.K. in which the three countries promised to protect the newly independent state’s sovereignty. </p>
<p>“Ukraine as an independent state was born from the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union,” write scholars <a href="https://hls.indiana.edu/about/founding-dean.html">Lee Feinstein of Indiana University</a> and <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/person/mariana-budjeryn">Mariana Budjeryn of Harvard</a>. “Its independence came with a complicated Cold War inheritance: the world’s third-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons. Ukraine was one of the three non-Russian former Soviet states, including Belarus and Kazakhstan, that emerged from the Soviet collapse with nuclear weapons on its territory.”</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier wearing a helmet peeks out of a tank." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A Ukrainian serviceman rides atop a military vehicle past Independence Square in central Kyiv on Feb. 24, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-serviceman-rides-atop-a-military-vehicle-past-news-photo/1238721286?adppopup=true">Daniel Leal/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
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<p>The 1994 agreement was signed in return for Ukraine giving up the nuclear weapons within its borders, sending them to Russia for dismantling. But the agreement, not legally binding, was broken by Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014. And today’s invasion is yet another example of the weakness of that agreement.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-got-a-signed-commitment-in-1994-to-ensure-its-security-but-can-the-us-and-allies-stop-putins-aggression-now-173481">Ukraine got a signed commitment in 1994 to ensure its security – but can the US and allies stop Putin's aggression now?</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<h2>2. Clues to how Russia will wage war</h2>
<p>During the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Russia invaded Georgia, a country on the Black Sea. In 2014, Putin ordered troops to seize Crimea, a peninsula that juts into the Black Sea and housed a Russian naval base.</p>
<p>West Point scholar and career U.S. special forces officer <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=mHR1GJYAAAAJ&hl=en">Liam Collins</a> conducted field research on the 2008 and 2014 wars in Georgia and Ukraine.</p>
<p>“From what I have learned, I expect a possible Russian invasion would start with cyberattacks and electronic warfare to sever communications between Ukraine’s capital and the troops. Shortly thereafter, tanks and mechanized infantry formations supported by the Russian air force would cross at multiple points along the nearly 1,200-mile border, assisted by Russian special forces. Russia would seek to bypass large urban areas.”</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-recent-invasions-of-ukraine-and-georgia-offer-clues-to-what-putin-might-be-thinking-now-175489">Russia's recent invasions of Ukraine and Georgia offer clues to what Putin might be thinking now</a>
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<h2>3. Spies replaced by smartphones</h2>
<p>If you love spy movies, you’ve got an image of how intelligence is gathered: agents on the ground and satellites in the sky.</p>
<p>But you’re way out of date. These days, writes <a href="https://azcast.arizona.edu/person/craig-nazareth-ms">Craig Nazareth</a>, a scholar of intelligence and information operations at the University of Arizona, “massive amounts of valuable information are publicly available, and not all of it is collected by governments. Satellites and drones are much cheaper than they were even a decade ago, allowing private companies to operate them, and nearly everyone has a smartphone with advanced photo and video capabilities.”</p>
<p>This means people around the world may see this invasion unfold in real time. “Commercial imaging companies are posting up-to-the-minute, geographically precise images of Russia’s military forces. Several news agencies are regularly monitoring and reporting on the situation. TikTok users are posting video of Russian military equipment on rail cars allegedly on their way to augment forces already in position around Ukraine. And internet sleuths are tracking this flow of information.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/technology-is-revolutionizing-how-intelligence-is-gathered-and-analyzed-and-opening-a-window-onto-russian-military-activity-around-ukraine-176446">Technology is revolutionizing how intelligence is gathered and analyzed – and opening a window onto Russian military activity around Ukraine</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A rocket is stuck coming through the ceiling of a damaged apartment with rubble around it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The body of a rocket stuck in a flat after recent shelling on the northern outskirts of Kharkiv, Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-body-of-a-rocket-stuck-in-a-flat-after-recent-shelling-news-photo/1238721713?adppopup=true">Sergey Bobok/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>4. Targeting the US with cyberattacks</h2>
<p>As Russia edged closer to war with Ukraine, cybersecurity scholar <a href="https://www.rit.edu/computing/directory/jxpics-justin-pelletier">Justin Pelletier</a> at Rochester Institute of Technology wrote of the growing likelihood of destructive Russian cyberattacks against the U.S. </p>
<p>Pelletier quoted a Department of Homeland Security bulletin from late January that said, “We assess that Russia would consider initiating a cyberattack against the Homeland if it perceived a U.S. or NATO response to a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine threatened its long-term national security.”</p>
<p>And that’s not all. “Americans can probably expect to see Russian-sponsored cyber-activities working in tandem with propaganda campaigns,” writes Pelletier. The aim of such campaigns: to use “social and other online media like a military-grade fog machine that confuses the U.S. population and encourages mistrust in the strength and validity of the U.S. government.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-could-unleash-disruptive-cyberattacks-against-the-us-but-efforts-to-sow-confusion-and-division-are-more-likely-175471">Russia could unleash disruptive cyberattacks against the US – but efforts to sow confusion and division are more likely</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>5. Will war sink Putin’s stock with Russians?</h2>
<p>“War ultimately requires an enormous amount of public goodwill and support for a political leader,” writes <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/arik-burakovsky-1243696">Arik Burakovsky</a>, a scholar of Russia and public opinion at Tufts University’s Fletcher School. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 140,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>Putin’s support among Russians has been rising as the country massed troops along the Ukrainian border - the public believes that its leaders are defending Russia by standing up to the West. But Burakovsky writes that “the rally ‘round the flag effect of supporting political leadership during an international crisis will likely be short-lived.” </p>
<p>Most Russians, it turns out, don’t want war. The return of body bags from the front could well prove damaging to Putin domestically.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-public-approval-is-soaring-during-the-russia-ukraine-crisis-but-its-unlikely-to-last-177302">Putin’s public approval is soaring during the Russia-Ukraine crisis, but it's unlikely to last</a>
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</em>
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<p><em>Editor’s note: This story is a roundup of articles from The Conversation’s archives.</em></p>
<p><em>Want to learn more? Here’s <a href="https://flipboard.com/@conversationus/ukraine-russia-and-the-threat-of-war-essential-reading-lvd1d4ofptudmenv/">an even bigger collection of our coverage</a> of the crisis in Ukraine.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177815/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
As war begins between Ukraine and Russia, a range of stories provides context to help readers understand the conflict.Naomi Schalit, Senior Editor, Politics + Democracy, The Conversation USLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1776872022-02-23T13:36:19Z2022-02-23T13:36:19ZPutin’s antagonism toward Ukraine was never just about NATO – it’s about creating a new Russian empire<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447924/original/file-20220222-13-14gb21h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=33%2C0%2C7510%2C5033&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protest outside the Russian Embassy on Feb. 22, 2022 in Kyiv, Ukraine. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-hold-signs-and-chant-slogans-during-a-protest-news-photo/1372165364?adppopup=true">Chris McGrath/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As some Western observers have feared, Russian President Vladimir Putin has just proved that his aggression toward Ukraine was never really about NATO. </p>
<p>In a speech on Feb. 21, 2022, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/21/what-is-donbas-donetsk-luhansk-conflict/">Putin recognized</a> the occupied territories in Ukraine of Donetsk and Luhansk and moved <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/kremlin-says-no-concrete-plans-summit-with-biden-over-ukraine-2022-02-21/">Russian forces</a> into them. </p>
<p>Putin’s speech showed that he has <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/22/putin-speech-ukraine-war-history-russia/">concocted his own view of history and world affairs</a>. In his view, Ukraine’s independence is an anomaly – it’s a state that should not exist. Putin sees his military moves as a way of correcting this divergence. Largely absent from his discussion was his earlier emphatic grievance that an eventual spread of NATO to Ukraine threatens Russia’s security. </p>
<p>Since he came to power in 1999, Putin has created an ever-shrinking group of advisers who reinforce his worldview. This allows Putin to ignore not only Ukrainian public opinion, which has turned strongly <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/what-do-russians-think-of-ukrainians-and-vice-versa/">against Russia</a> since 2014, but also global voices condemning his moves. </p>
<h2>Putin’s echo chamber</h2>
<p>Many writers have debated <a href="https://www.ponarseurasia.org/new-book-the-red-mirror-by-gulnaz-sharafutdinova/">how Putin</a> has remained <a href="https://www.npr.org/2014/12/13/370612995/how-putins-kleptocracy-made-his-friends-rich">in power</a> for <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/10/17/catherine-beltons-putins-people-is-essential-reading-a75310">over two decades</a>. While his popular support in Russia has generally been high – especially during <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/14/what-is-putins-greatest-worry-right-now-his-own-citizens.html">high-profile moves</a> such as the annexation of Crimea – what may be more important in facilitating his longevity is this small circle of advisers who tell him what he wants to hear. After he served as prime minister, he returned to the presidency in 2012. <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-tight-hawkish-circle/31705183.html">From that point onward</a>, Putin began to focus heavily on his narratives about Russia in the world, and he began to make moves on Ukraine. </p>
<p>Putin’s echo chamber keeps him insulated from needing to respond to public opinion that might otherwise discourage him from trying to bring Ukraine back into Russia’s orbit by force. Military operations in Ukraine are <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/11/russia-may-be-about-invade-ukraine-russians-dont-want-it/">unpopular among Russians</a>, but Putin’s inner circle continues to protect the president and defend his decisions. </p>
<h2>Ukrainian negativity toward Russia</h2>
<p>One of Putin’s most important ideas is that <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2021/07/12/the-heirs-of-ancient-rus">Ukrainians and Russians are the same</a>, sharing history, cultural traditions and, in many cases, a language. </p>
<p>Putin’s claims on Ukraine have made Ukrainians <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/14/world/europe/ukraine-russia-invasion-identity.html">more united</a> in their views of their own country and its European future. </p>
<p>Ukrainians also feel more <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/war-with-russia-has-pushed-ukrainians-toward-the-west/">negatively</a> toward Russia than they have in the past, with a sharp drop in pro-Russian attitudes since 2014. <a href="http://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1015&page=1">Fully 88% of Ukrainians</a> support their country’s independence from Russia. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/04/majority-ukrainians-support-joining-nato-does-this-matter/">Survey data</a> from February 2021 shows that 56% of people across Ukraine support the country’s path toward NATO membership. This number was 30% in 2014, just after the annexation of Crimea. </p>
<p>Even the Ukrainian citizens living in the occupied territories care increasingly less about how the conflict is resolved. They are less concerned about being part of Ukraine or Russia and more worried about their own <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/17/russia-wants-recognize-independence-two-eastern-ukraine-republics-what-do-people-there-think/">economic well-being</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447928/original/file-20220222-27-oeh9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Men and women dressed in black and brown are gathered in two lines holding candles." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447928/original/file-20220222-27-oeh9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447928/original/file-20220222-27-oeh9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447928/original/file-20220222-27-oeh9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447928/original/file-20220222-27-oeh9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447928/original/file-20220222-27-oeh9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447928/original/file-20220222-27-oeh9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447928/original/file-20220222-27-oeh9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A funeral in Kyiv on Feb. 22, 2022, for a Ukrainian soldier killed during shelling by Russian-backed separatists in the east.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/relatives-and-comrades-attend-the-funeral-of-captain-anton-news-photo/1238685987?adppopup=true">Pierre Crom/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Russian aggression was never about NATO</h2>
<p>Putin’s anti-NATO rhetoric has also pushed Ukraine’s Western allies toward unity against Russia. <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-crisis-of-european-security-what-europeans-think-about-the-war-in-ukraine/">These Western countries see</a> a further Russian invasion of Ukraine as a European problem, and many support a NATO response to defend Ukraine. </p>
<p>But we’d argue that Putin’s claims that NATO threatens Russia’s security, and that the only way Russia will back down is if NATO promises never to admit Ukraine, is a bait and switch. </p>
<p>First, Ukraine <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/13/us/politics/nato-ukraine.html">does not have a clear path</a> toward NATO membership. Ukraine would need to implement substantial reforms – including, but not limited to, major reforms in its military – in order to qualify for NATO membership. </p>
<p>Second, Putin has <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/18/1081858672/putin-lies-says-the-top-u-s-diplomat-in-ukraine?mkt_tok=NjU5LVdaWC0wNzUAAAGCrf3Hd-In2gQr7egwEoq9o8h7eSppys4fBYQr3gTGWfHY25L6RY5mMdgNK4VokM0WndO_eA-lkDDibEvME-wOeoBPfJ7IgKlFEGDhsg4C">lied</a> many times about his <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-russia-diplomacy-emmanuel-macron-europe-9dd7eb560d26a81306604dcb1c81bddb">plans for Ukraine</a>. Any concession from NATO is <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukrainian-neutrality-would-not-appease-putin-or-prevent-further-russian-aggression/">no guarantee</a> of peace or security for Ukraine. </p>
<p>Finally, as scholars of contemporary <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=9ah4V7gAAAAJ&hl=en">Ukraine</a> and <a href="https://isearch.asu.edu/profile/3743765">Russia</a>, we have seen this tactic from Putin before. In response to the 2013-2014 pro-democracy, anti-corruption <a href="https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-ukraines-euromaidan-protests">Euromaidan protests in Ukraine</a> that ousted a Russian-backed leader, Putin <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html">annexed Crimea</a>, a large peninsula in the south of Ukraine. When separatists declared autonomy in Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014, Russia supported them first with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/22/russian-convoy-crosses-border-ukraine-without-permission">economic and military aid</a> and later with <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/ev9dbz/russia-denies-that-its-soldiers-are-in-ukraine-but-we-tracked-one-there-using-his-selfies">Russian troops</a>. While Putin claimed this was to protect Russian speakers in these regions, it is now clear that these moves were a precursor to this week’s territorial grabs. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447929/original/file-20220222-21-l311og.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Russian President Vladimir Putin, wearing black jacket and white shirt, sitting at a table and talking to a meeting in a large hall." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447929/original/file-20220222-21-l311og.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447929/original/file-20220222-21-l311og.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447929/original/file-20220222-21-l311og.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447929/original/file-20220222-21-l311og.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447929/original/file-20220222-21-l311og.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447929/original/file-20220222-21-l311og.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/447929/original/file-20220222-21-l311og.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin, at a meeting of advisers on Feb. 21, 2022 in Moscow.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-chairs-a-meeting-with-news-photo/1238671810?adppopup=true">Alexey Nikolsky / Sputnik / AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>The increasing hostilities threaten to exacerbate a crisis of internally displaced peoples and refugees. At least <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/ua/en/internally-displaced-persons">1.5 million people</a> have already been forced to leave their homes in Donetsk and Luhansk. Current estimates project that some <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/22/central-europe-braced-for-ukrainian-refugee-crisis">5 million Ukrainians</a> might be forced to leave the country if Russia invades further. </p>
<p>Putin’s recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics could have a spillover effect on other territorial disputes in the region. Some believe that <a href="https://cepa.org/buckle-up-this-is-just-the-first-step/">Transnistria</a>, located on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, could be the next to receive recognition from Russia. The recognition of separatist claims in Ukraine could just be the start of a greater trend of Russian action to capture more former Soviet territories. </p>
<p>In an attempt to thwart further violence and aggression, the European Union and the United States have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/22/world/russia-ukraine-biden-putin">imposed new, aggressive sanctions</a> on Russia, targeting its politicians and members of the economic elite. The German government made the decision <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/reaction-german-decision-halt-nord-stream-2-approval-2022-02-22/">not to certify the Nord Stream 2 pipeline</a>, which would have brought Russian natural gas directly to Germany instead of transiting through Ukraine. </p>
<p>Of course, taking these stands against Russia will have an economic impact in Europe. <a href="https://twitter.com/medvedevrussiae/status/1496112456858574849">In a tweet</a> responding to Germany’s decision, Dmitry Medvedev, the former President of Russia, snidely noted that Europeans should be prepared for more expensive gas. The U.S., too, may see higher prices on certain goods such as fuel, and the conflict could impact <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/ukraines-rising-role-grain-exports-complicates-impact-crisis-2022-01-26/">global food security</a> if Ukraine’s significant agricultural exports are affected.</p>
<p>However, we’d argue that such concerns pale in comparison to the hardships that Ukrainians are facing. </p>
<p>Ultimately, Russia’s actions are not caused by fears of NATO expansion. That is merely pretext. Rather, as Putin so clearly laid out on Feb. 21, they are motivated by an antagonism that refuses to recognize the reality of Ukrainian statehood.</p>
<p>[<em><a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=politics&source=inline-politics-important">Get The Conversation’s most important politics headlines, in our Politics Weekly newsletter</a>.</em>]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177687/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacob Lassin receives funding from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emily Channell-Justice does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The crisis between Russia and Ukraine began with Russian objections to potential Ukrainian membership in NATO. Now it’s clear that Vladimir Putin really wants something else.Emily Channell-Justice, Director of the Temerty Contemporary Ukraine Program, Harvard UniversityJacob Lassin, Postdoctoral Research Scholar in Russian and East European Studies, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1773812022-02-21T17:52:22Z2022-02-21T17:52:22ZChagos Islands: Mauritius’s latest challenge to UK shows row over sovereignty will not go away<p>A superyacht hired by Mauritius recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/08/mauritian-ship-takes-scientific-team-to-contested-chagos-islands">set out</a> to conduct a scientific survey of the Blenheim reef, 230km off the coast of Diego Garcia in the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debate/chagos-question">Chagos archipelago</a>. A group of Chagossians accompanied the scientists in what <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/mauritius-sets-sail-chagos">has been hailed</a> as an “historic” event by Mauritian prime minister Pravind Jugnauth. </p>
<p>This trip was controversial not only <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/meridian/2022-02-14/chagos-islanders-living-in-sussex-criticise-problematic-flag-raising">among Chagossians</a> but also because the international legal status of the islands has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-mauritius-and-the-uk-are-still-sparring-over-decolonisation-40911">in contention</a> for the past 60 years. The visit took in the outer atolls of Peros Banhos and the Salomon, the last to be inhabited by Chagossians before the British government removed them in the 1960s to establish an American military base in the archipelago. </p>
<p>This was the first time Chagossians were visiting their homeland without UK support. The Mauritian flag was raised by Mauritian officials on both atolls and on Blenheim reef. At stake is the issue of Mauritian sovereignty.</p>
<h2>British involvement</h2>
<p>The Chagos archipelago is a collection of seven coral atolls made up of over 60 islands in the Indian Ocean, about 500km south of the Maldives, midway between Tanzania and Indonesia. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4000/oceanindien.2003">In the late 18th century</a> French planters established coconut plantations and brought in enslaved people, initially from Senegal, and later labourers from Madagascar, Mozambique and India to work on these plantations. </p>
<p>Today many of those identifying as Chagossians are the descendants of these enslaved and indentured labourers. Some research refers to them as the islands’ <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20179938?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">indigenous people</a>. </p>
<p>These issues are significant because of the historical and contemporary relationship of the UK, US and Mauritius with the islands. The Chagos islands, which were dependencies of Mauritius, came under British sovereignty in 1814, having formerly been part of the French empire. </p>
<p>Internationally, the islands were largely neglected until the cold war. In the 1960s the US and the UK jointly identified Diego Garcia, the largest of the islands, as an ideal location for a military base in the Indian Ocean. Consequently, in 1965, the UK government <a href="https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/sand-gcybilj2-copy.pdf">detached</a> the Chagos islands from Mauritius and from Seychelles. </p>
<p>While some islands were already uninhabited, between 1967 and 1973 the remaining population, around 1,500 inhabitants, was <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debate/chagos-question">removed and relocated</a>. Some were resettled in Mauritius, some in Seychelles and some in the UK. Laws were subsequently passed by the UK government to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10854681.2021.1888514">prevent people resettling</a> to the islands. </p>
<p>Britain created a new colony from islands formerly part of Seychelles and Mauritius (the former were returned to Seychelles on its independence in 1976)- the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). In 1966 the UK and US concluded the agreement to establish a joint military facility on the BIOT island of Diego Garcia. The agreement was to last for 50 years with an option of a 20-year rollover which was triggered in 2016. The agreement now lasts to 2036.</p>
<h2>Contemporary litigation</h2>
<p>Considerable litigation has been brought before the UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights by Chagossian Oliver Bancoult and as a group action by the Chagos Islanders regarding <a href="https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004204416/Bej.9789004202603.i-293_013.xml">the right to return</a> to the islands. In recent years there have been three important decisions.</p>
<p>In 2010, the UK established a no-fishing protected area around the Chagos archipelago. Mauritius claimed this infringed Mauritian fishing rights and instituted proceedings against the UK under <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf">international law</a>. </p>
<p>In March 2015, the tribunal established under international law, to which the matter had been referred for <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/annex8.htm">arbitration</a>, ruled in favour of Mauritius. It held that the UK had breached its obligations under international law and, in particular, the fishing rights of <a href="https://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/MU-UK%2020150318%20Award.pdf">Mauritius</a>.</p>
<p>Since Mauritian independence in 1968, consecutive governments have challenged the detachment of the Chagos islands, claiming they are part of Mauritius. In 2019, the International Court of Justice published an <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/169">Advisory Opinion</a> in response to a request from the United National General Assembly on behalf of Mauritius, stating that decolonisation had <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/mauritius-v-uk-chagos-marine-protected-area-unlawful">not been lawfully carried out</a>. </p>
<p>In particular, it said that detaching the Chagos archipelago from Mauritius was not based on the free and genuine will of the people. Consequently, the UK’s continuing administration of the Chagos archipelago was unlawful.</p>
<p>The United Nations <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12146.doc.htm">accepted this Advisory Opinion</a> in a resolution that ordered the UK to withdraw from the archipelago within a period of six months. Almost four years on, the UK <a href="https://theconversation.com/chagos-islands-uk-refusal-to-return-archipelago-to-mauritius-show-the-limits-of-international-law-127650">has still not done so</a>. Instead the British government continues to hold that neither the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion nor the UN resolution have any legally binding effect. </p>
<p>The UK has consistently indicated that it will cede the islands to Mauritius once they are no longer required for defence purposes. The UK has made a number of financial payments to Chagossians and is currently delivering about £40 million in support to <a href="https://www.chagossupport.org.uk/post/2017/03/02/british-government-comment-on-40m-support-package-for-chagossians">improve the livelihoods</a> of those in Seychelles, Mauritius and UK</p>
<p>Mauritius has said that the recent visit was not intended as a hostile act towards the UK. Nor was it an overture to resettlement. Nevertheless, it is a clear indication that Mauritius is not going to let the dispute of sovereignty disappear any time soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177381/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sue Farran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By raising the Mauritian flag on the Chagos Islands, the east African nation has reasserted – if only symbolically – its claim to sovereignty.Sue Farran, Reader of Law, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1762212022-02-07T13:19:47Z2022-02-07T13:19:47ZRussia has been at war with Ukraine for years – in cyberspace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444578/original/file-20220204-27-1lb4f9n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C2649%2C2256&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin walks through a hall in the building housing Russia's GRU military intelligence service.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaPoisonedSpyGRU/66d4b73d747e49d597e5a5c4aab14e2e/photo?Query=GRU%20Dmitry%20Astakhov&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1&currentItemNo=0">Dmitry Astakhov, Sputnik, Government Pool Photo via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The build up of Russian forces along Belarus’ <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/29/world/europe/russia-troops-belarus-border-ukraine.html">665-mile border</a> with Ukraine is a physical manifestation of Russia’s intense interest in the region. Russia <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/03/15/revisiting-2014-annexation-of-crimea-pub-68423">annexed Crimea</a> in 2014, and now Russian President Valdimir Putin appears intent on pulling Ukraine under Russia’s influence and denying it a close relationship with the West. </p>
<p>But even as Russia engages in brinksmanship from snow-covered fields in Belarus to meeting rooms in Geneva, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-01-28/how-russia-has-turned-ukraine-cyber-battlefield">Moscow is already at war</a> with Kyiv – cyberwar. Russia has been waging this fight since at least 2014. </p>
<p>In cyberspace, Russia has interfered in <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/foreign-interference-in-ukraine-s-election/">Ukrainian elections</a>, targeted its <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ukraine-cyberattack-power-grid-blackout-destruction/">power grid</a>, <a href="https://www.pcmag.com/news/ukrainian-government-websites-defaced-amid-threat-of-russian-invasion">defaced</a> its government websites and spread <a href="https://www.state.gov/fact-vs-fiction-russian-disinformation-on-ukraine/">disinformation</a>. Strategically, Russian cyber operations are designed to undermine the Ukrainian government and private sector organizations. Tactically, the operations aim to influence, scare and subdue the population. They are also <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/a-moment-of-excruciating-anticipation-in-kyiv">harbingers of invasion</a>.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=mMlCZbgAAAAJ">cybersecurity and public policy researcher</a>, I believe that Russian cyber operations are likely to continue. These operations are likely to further <a href="https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/a-new-path-to-cyber-conflict-with-russia">destabilize Ukraine’s political environment</a> – namely, its government, its institutions and the people and organizations that depend on them. </p>
<h2>National power in cyberspace</h2>
<p>To date, Russia has been aggressive in its attempts to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/02/russian-disinformation-distorted-reality-in-ukraine-americans-should-take-note-putin-mueller-elections-antisemitism/">Russian propaganda</a> has painted a war with Ukraine as one of liberation. Many <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/02/russia-ukraine-liberated/">false narratives</a> paint the Ukrainians as submissive and eager for reunification. Russia’s intent is to sow confusion, shape the public perception of the conflict and influence the <a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/major-ethnic-groups-of-the-ukraine.html">ethnic Russian population</a> within Ukraine. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444587/original/file-20220204-17-1ikrjgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A smart phone screen showing text in Ukrainian, Russian and Polish" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444587/original/file-20220204-17-1ikrjgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444587/original/file-20220204-17-1ikrjgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444587/original/file-20220204-17-1ikrjgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444587/original/file-20220204-17-1ikrjgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444587/original/file-20220204-17-1ikrjgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444587/original/file-20220204-17-1ikrjgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444587/original/file-20220204-17-1ikrjgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On Jan. 14, 2022, hackers that the Ukrainian government identified as Russian took over Ukrainian government websites and posted threatening messages.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-photo-illustration-a-warning-message-in-ukrainian-news-photo/1237728779">Photo Illustration by Pavlo Gonchar/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Russia has artfully employed cyber operations to project national power, particularly through its GRU military intelligence service. The phrase “<a href="https://www.thelightningpress.com/the-instruments-of-national-power/">instruments of national power</a>” defines power as diplomatic, information, military and economic – all are mechanisms for influencing other countries or international organizations. Cyberspace is unique as a <a href="https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-910">domain of warfare</a> because cyber operations can be used in the service of all four instruments of national power. </p>
<p>Diplomatically, Russia has tried to shape international norms in cyberspace by influencing discussions on cyberspace norms and behaviors. In 2018, Russia introduced a <a href="https://undocs.org/A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1">resolution to the United Nations</a> creating a working group with like-minded states to revisit and reinterpret the U.N.’s rule for cyberspace, emphasizing that a state’s sovereignty should extend into cyberspace. Some analysts argue that Russia’s true goal is to <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/incyder-articles/a-surprising-turn-of-events-un-creates-two-working-groups-on-cyberspace/#footnote_5_3341">legitimize its surveillance-state internet tactics</a> in the guise of state sovereignty. </p>
<p>Economically, the Russian <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/">“NotPetya”</a> attack crippled international ports, paralyzed corporations, disrupted supply chains and effectively stalled the global economy – all with a single piece of code.</p>
<p>In the information environment, Russia is especially adept at <a href="https://cissar.com/research-reports-the-military-and-diplomatic-significance-of-russian-cyber-attacks/">influencing and manipulating information</a> to suit its strategic interests. For example, Russian efforts against the U.K. have targeted its relationship with NATO by using bots to spread false stories about British troops in Estonia during a <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/troops-face-new-enemy-kremlins-fake-news-q0dbnfq79">NATO military exercise</a> in 2017. </p>
<p>Notably, Russia has a pattern of pairing information with military operations as tools of national power. During previous military conflicts in <a href="https://www.ausa.org/articles/russia-gives-lessons-electronic-warfare">eastern Ukraine</a>, the Russian military employed cyber capabilities to jam Ukrainian satellite, cellular and radio communications. </p>
<p>Overall, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313252767_Russian_Military_Thinking_-_A_New_Generation_of_Warfare">Russia sees warfare as a continuum</a> that is ongoing with varying intensity across multiple fronts. Simply put, for Russia, war never stops and cyberspace is a key domain of its persistent conflict with Ukraine and the West. </p>
<h2>Probing the US, hammering Ukraine</h2>
<p>Russia has aimed its cyber operations at other nations, including the U.S. and Western European countries. Russia has targeted <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A">U.S. critical infrastructure</a> and <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2021/10/24/new-activity-from-russian-actor-nobelium/">supply chains</a>, and conducted <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-russian-government-used-disinformation-and-cyber-warfare-in-2016-election-an-ethical-hacker-explains-99989">disinformation campaigns</a>. U.S. officials are still investigating the extent of the recent <a href="https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/the-solarwinds-cyberattack">SolarWinds</a> cyberattack, for example, but they have determined that the attack compromised federal agencies, courts, numerous private companies and state and local governments. The Russian activities are aimed at undermining U.S. domestic and national security, democratic institutions and even <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/05/us/politics/covid-vaccines-russian-disinformation.html">public health efforts</a>. </p>
<p>But Russia is more <a href="https://mwi.usma.edu/striking-the-right-balance-how-russian-information-operations-in-the-baltic-states-should-inform-us-strategy-in-great-power-competition/">destructive</a> in its own backyard. Attacks on <a href="https://stratcomcoe.org/cuploads/pfiles/cyber_attacks_estonia.pdf">Estonia</a> and <a href="https://osce.usmission.gov/u-s-condemnation-of-russian-cyber-attack-on-georgia/">Georgia</a> illustrate how Russia can disrupt government functions and sow confusion as it prepares for military operations. </p>
<p>Most recently, Microsoft detected <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-fake-ransomware-targets-ukraine-in-data-wiping-attacks/">data wiping malware</a> in Ukrainian government computer systems. Ukraine publicly <a href="https://thedigital.gov.ua/news/rosiya-mae-namir-zniziti-doviru-do-vladi-feykami-pro-vrazlivist-kritichnoi-informatsiynoi-infrastrukturi-ta-zliv-danikh-ukraintsiv">named Moscow as the perpetrator</a> and attributed the software designed to destroy data to Russian hackers. The presence of the malware marks an escalation of Russia’s current behavior toward Ukraine in cyberspace. The malware, if triggered, <a href="https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/ukraine-cyberattack-microsoft-malware-russia">would have destroyed</a> Ukrainian government records, disrupted online services and prevented the government from communicating with its citizens.</p>
<p>The ongoing aggression against Ukraine follows <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2015/04/28/402678116/report-to-aid-combat-russia-wages-cyberwar-against-ukraine">Russia’s pattern</a> of waging cyberwar while publicly threatening and preparing for a military invasion. In many ways, for Ukrainians, the prospect of war and anticipating invasion have become <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/a-moment-of-excruciating-anticipation-in-kyiv">normalized</a>.</p>
<h2>Deadly consequences</h2>
<p>Website defacement and data loss are not the only concerns for Ukraine as Russia continues to mass troops and equipment along its borders. In the winter of 2015-2016, Russia demonstrated its ability to <a href="https://theconversation.com/cyberattack-on-ukraine-grid-heres-how-it-worked-and-perhaps-why-it-was-done-52802">hack Ukraine’s power grid</a> in a first-of-its-kind attack that cut off power to thousands of Ukrainians. <a href="https://www.climatestotravel.com/climate/ukraine">Temperatures in Kyiv</a> in the winter hover around freezing during the day and become dangerously cold at night. Any loss of power could be deadly.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444435/original/file-20220203-27-17uf9j1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2908%2C1958&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a view of earth from space at night with scattered clouds and city lights below them" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444435/original/file-20220203-27-17uf9j1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2908%2C1958&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444435/original/file-20220203-27-17uf9j1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444435/original/file-20220203-27-17uf9j1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444435/original/file-20220203-27-17uf9j1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444435/original/file-20220203-27-17uf9j1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444435/original/file-20220203-27-17uf9j1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444435/original/file-20220203-27-17uf9j1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, is the bright spot at the top center of this photo taken from the International Space Station. Russia demonstrated its ability to knock out parts of Ukraine’s power grid in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nasamarshall/6289116940">NASA</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Similarly, cyberattacks could disrupt Ukraine’s economy and communications infrastructure. An attack on the financial sector could prevent Ukrainians from withdrawing money or accessing their bank accounts. An attack on the communications infrastructure could cripple the Ukrainian military and limit the country’s ability to defend itself. Civilians would also lose their means of communications and with it the ability to organize evacuations and coordinate resistance. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 140,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>Ultimately, Russia is likely to continue to use cyber-enabled sabotage against Ukraine. Russian cyber operations over the past eight years hold three lessons to support this. First, cyberattacks that have costly physical effects, like knocking out the power grid, are destabilizing and can be used to erode the will of the Ukrainian people and counter their lean toward economic, military and political alliances with Europe and NATO. Second, cyberattacks that have a physical effect put Russian cyber capabilities on display and demonstrate their superiority over Ukrainian defenses. And third, Russia has done it before.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The author is an officer in the United States Army. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.</span></em></p>Troop buildups and diplomatic negotiations highlight the threat of a major land war in Europe. In cyberspace, Russia has been attacking Ukrainian infrastructure and government operations for years.Maggie Smith, Assistant Professor of Public Policy, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1704692021-11-11T14:44:44Z2021-11-11T14:44:44ZSouth Africa’s apartheid regime manipulated borders. Today, the effects linger<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428766/original/file-20211027-23-1mpzjqd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Elizabeth Dlamini at her curio stall in the Ezulwini Valley near Mbabane, eSwatini. The kingdom's economy is dependent on its larger neightbour, South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/John Hrusha</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The issue of land, especially its redistribution, remains <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/05/land-reform-south-africa-election/586900/">contentious</a> in South Africa 27 years after the formal end of apartheid. Land redistribution was promised at the end of apartheid. The failure of the African National Congress (ANC) government to do so is emblematic of its failure to fundamentally transform the country. </p>
<p>Yet, dispossession of land is a historically rooted problem. The <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/natives-land-act-1913">Land Act of 1913</a> forbade black ownership of land in roughly 93% of the country (amended in 1936 to 87%). In the 1960s and 1970s, the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> regime forcibly removed millions of black South Africans from their homes, dumping them in squalid conditions in the so-called <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/homelands">bantustans</a>. </p>
<p>The apartheid-created bantustans, or “homelands”, were 10 undeveloped territories the regime carved out for particular ethnic groups. These territories’ internal borders have disappeared from the map. But, for people living in them, the lack of opportunities that typified their lives during apartheid remains largely the same today.</p>
<p>In addition to the bantustans, two micro-states existed within the borders of South Africa: <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/lesotho">Lesotho</a> and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/eswatini-formerly-swaziland">Swaziland</a> (today called eSwatini). The coexistence of these “legitimate” states – they were <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/growth-in-un-membership">recognised</a> by the United Nations – cheek by jowl with the bantustans challenged the meanings of state recognition and sovereignty.</p>
<p>Today, the governments and residents of both Lesotho and eSwatini still lay claim to some of South Africa’s land. What residents of former “homelands” and the two states have in common are limited government services and few job prospects. This has happened because residents of all these places have historically been denied the freedom to seek employment in South Africa’s best jobs. This was done through <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23271564">job reservation for whites</a>, passport requirements and pass laws that restricted the movement of black people. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2021.1982264?journalCode=cjss20">journal article</a> examined the history of border claims by Lesotho and Swaziland, as well as internal boundary changes the South African apartheid government made as it tried to implement the bantustan system. This showed how policymakers during apartheid attempted to manipulate these borders for strategic gain.</p>
<p>Borders are a socially constructed phenomenon. They are hardly immutable, as the <a href="https://merip.org/2012/03/the-sudan-split/">splitting of Sudan in 2011</a> showed. But, to the residents of what used to be South Africa’s “homelands”, as well as Lesotho and eSwatini, former borders still stand as a barrier. Passports are required for citizens of the two countries. Former homelands residents have built lives and own houses in these distant and under-serviced places. Residents remain trapped: both by decisions taken during apartheid and by the inflexibility of modern states and decision makers.</p>
<p>This research builds on the literature of the last decade that has finally started to tackle the continuing legacy of the bantustans on the lives of millions of South Africans. Additionally, we want to help refocus attention on Lesotho and eSwatini, which have been relatively ignored by scholars since the fall of apartheid. </p>
<p>By studying literature on these sites, scholars will be able to examine southern Africa as an interconnected regional economy, rather than a series of discrete national economies. This will highlight the historical roots of continued regional inequities.</p>
<h2>Strategic choices</h2>
<p>Our article examines the possibility of territorial transfer and border adjustments in the 1970s and 1980s. Then, South Africa was pushing for international recognition for the bantustans in order to generate a sense of legitimacy for the apartheid project.</p>
<p>It focused on getting its most vulnerable regional neighbours – Lesotho and Swaziland – to recognise the bantustans, whether formally via diplomatic recognition or in everyday relations on mundane matters like border control. </p>
<p>In trying to force its neighbours’ hands, South Africa proposed the possibility of making good on claims on South African land made by Lesotho and Swaziland dating back to the 19th century. Proposals to transfer land caused leaders on all sides to make difficult decisions that pitted national interests against global geopolitics. All too often, borderlands residents paid the price for disputes over sovereignty. This position of vulnerability continues today.</p>
<p>We examined a variety of records, including South African and United Kingdom archival sources, as well as contemporary reports on potential land transfers. </p>
<p>We focused on the ideas of land transfer and border adjustments because they are emotive issues for residents. They also signal state priorities. The <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0305707042000215383">transfer</a> of Glen Grey and Herschel districts from the Ciskei to the Transkei “homelands” in 1975, for instance, shows that the apartheid regime made land concessions to further strategic goals.</p>
<p>South Africa approved the transfer to convince Transkei’s leader <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/kaiser-daliwonga-matanzima">Kaiser Matanzima</a> to declare “independence”. On the other hand, while demanding back the “conquered territory” (portions of South Africa’s Free State province taken by Afrikaner settlers in the 19th century), the leaders of Lesotho were unwilling to take on the Basotho bantustan of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Qwaqwa">Qwaqwa</a> (offered by South Africa) because it was not the whole conquered territory, and it would have meant recognising apartheid.</p>
<p>Lesotho’s leaders also calculated that international aid received from its status as a “front line state” – neighbouring states <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/chapter-3-historical-lesotho">harbouring South Africans fighting against apartheid</a> – was more valuable than a <a href="https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/4134/1/John_Bardill_-_Destabilization%2C_The_Lesotho_case.pdf">partial return</a> of the conquered territory.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/king-sobhuza-ii-1899-1982">Swaziland’s King Sobhuza II</a>, meanwhile, signed a deal in 1982 that would have enlarged the Swazi kingdom by incorporating <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/kangwane">KaNgwane</a>, the area that had been designated as a bantustan for Swazi-speaking South Africans. In exchange, Sobhuza and the Swazi state would take on as citizens every Swazi-speaking person in South Africa. And, in a secret pact, they would expel the then-banned liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), from its forward bases in the kingdom.</p>
<p>KaNgwane leaders rejected the deal. The KwaZulu administration, which would have lost its Ingwavuma District as well under the deal, sued in court to have it declared void. And so, the deal gradually fell apart and was never consummated.</p>
<p>These examples show that while international borders may seem fixed, they were negotiable for the right price in southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. It’s also clear that Lesotho would not, and Swaziland could not, take the apartheid state’s border deals. This shows the important role internal pressure and international aid played in influencing border changes. </p>
<h2>Continued disadvantages</h2>
<p>These cases also show how residents of the bantustans and small regional states paid the price for border and boundary disputes. Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana all faced an increased <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/south-african-defence-force-sadf-raid-maseru-effort-kill-suspected-members-african">military threat</a> from the apartheid regime.</p>
<p>Even after the fall of apartheid in 1994, borderlands occupants continue to face greater difficulty in crossing borders to access <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2021/03/border-wars">work</a>, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-02-14-swazi-parents-in-matric-panic/">school</a> and <a href="https://samponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Acrobat26.pdf">services</a>. </p>
<p>The challenge for the region is better integration to allow for a more just and humane border policy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170469/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>International borders were negotiable for the right price. What residents of former ‘homelands’ and of Lesotho and eSwatini have in common now are limited government services and few job prospects.John Aerni-Flessner, Associate Professor of African History, Michigan State UniversityChitja Twala, Associate Professor of History, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1625182021-07-07T02:09:02Z2021-07-07T02:09:02ZWhy is Australia ‘micronation central’? And do you still have to pay tax if you secede?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409634/original/file-20210705-27-1x0013c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Imperial Majesty George II presents The Empire of Atlantium at Ried Flats, NSW.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rob Griffith/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Would you like to buy a micronation? </p>
<p>The Principality of Hutt River <a href="https://www.domain.com.au/news/former-micro-nation-hutt-river-in-west-australia-hits-the-market-for-the-first-time-in-50-years-1066866/">is on the market</a>. For 50 years, the sprawling 6,100 hectare property, more than 500 kilometers from Perth, styled itself as the “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10361146.2021.1935450">second-largest country in Australia</a>”. </p>
<p>It was formed in 1970 by Leonard Casley (Prince Leonard), who seceded from Australia following a dispute with the state government over wheat production quotas. Casley died in 2019 and in August 2020, his son, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-03/hutt-river-province-dissolves-into-commonwealth/12518898">Prince Graeme announced</a> he would sell the family farm to pay a A$3 million tax bill. </p>
<p>Despite the demise of Hutt River, many micronations continue to exist. During research for an upcoming book on micronations, I have identified at least 135 around the world. </p>
<p>Australia has a particular reputation for this phenomenon. Some estimates suggest <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/04/the-royal-me/308912/">a third of all micronations</a> are located in Australia. </p>
<h2>Why pretend to be a country?</h2>
<p>Led by committed and eccentric people, micronations assert their claims to sovereignty in many ways. They issue passports, print stamps, mint coins, compose national anthems, design flags and sometimes even declare war on recognised states. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Prince Leonard of the Hutt River Principality." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409635/original/file-20210705-13832-1vorenx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409635/original/file-20210705-13832-1vorenx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409635/original/file-20210705-13832-1vorenx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409635/original/file-20210705-13832-1vorenx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409635/original/file-20210705-13832-1vorenx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409635/original/file-20210705-13832-1vorenx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409635/original/file-20210705-13832-1vorenx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prince Leonard of the Hutt River Principality.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hugh Brown/AAP</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>However, despite acting like a nation, micronations are not actual states. They are self-declared nations that mimic acts of sovereignty. </p>
<p>People decide to create their own micronation for many reasons. </p>
<p>Sometimes, it is an attempt to avoid the ordinary laws of the land — like in Hutt River. </p>
<p>Similarly, Prince Paul and Princess Helena founded the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/snake-hill-nation-fights-back-against-banks-20110306-1bjie.html">Snake Hill Principality</a> (located near Mudgee in New South Wales) following a long-running dispute with their bank. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radio/programs/correspondentsreport/principality-of-wy:-a-visit-to-one-of-sydneys-micro-nations/8977794">Principality of Wy</a> (Mosman, North Sydney) was established after the local council rejected an application to build a driveway. </p>
<h2>Protest, tourism, art</h2>
<p>Micronations may also be formed to protest government policy or legislation. In 2004, Dale Anderson sailed to the uninhabited island of Cato east of the Great Barrier Reef. He planted a flag and announced the formation of the <a href="https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/nancy/episodes/nancy-podcast-make-australia-gay-again">Gay and Lesbian Kingdom of the Coral Sea Islands</a> to protest the passage of Australian legislation banning same-sex marriage. In 2017, Emperor Dale dissolved the kingdom following the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Australia. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People celebrate out the Whangamōmona Hotel." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409636/original/file-20210705-39677-1e5et79.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409636/original/file-20210705-39677-1e5et79.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409636/original/file-20210705-39677-1e5et79.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409636/original/file-20210705-39677-1e5et79.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409636/original/file-20210705-39677-1e5et79.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409636/original/file-20210705-39677-1e5et79.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409636/original/file-20210705-39677-1e5et79.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Annual celebrations took place this January at the Republic of Whangamōmona.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ben McKay/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Not all micronations are so serious. The <a href="https://nzhistory.govt.nz/keyword/whangamomona">Republic of Whangamōmona</a> on the North Island of New Zealand emerged when regional council boundaries were changed. Upset about the potential of having to play rugby for their neighbours, the residents decided to secede. Republic Day is now celebrated every second January, attracting thousands of tourists. </p>
<p>Micronations might also be used as a vehicle to critique the concept of statehood. The <a href="https://www.modernamuseet.se/stockholm/en/exhibitions/elgaland-vargaland/">Kingdom of Elgaland & Vargaland</a>, created by two Swedish artists, claims sovereignty over the areas between the borders of countries. It also asserts authority over other intervals, such as the transition from being asleep to wakefulness.</p>
<h2>Why are there so many Australian micronations?</h2>
<p>Three reasons explain why Australia is known as “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/04/the-royal-me/308912/">micronation central</a>”. </p>
<p>First, the act of seceding from the state and declaring one’s own country is consistent with an Australian culture that celebrates larrikinism and mocking authority. What better way to exemplify these traits than by founding your own country? As His Imperial Majesty George II of Atlantium <a href="http://www.atlantium.org/images/SMH_Australia_07052004_bw.pdf">notes</a>, micronationalism in Australia stems “from our convict heritage and disrespect for authority”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/larrikin-carnival-an-australian-style-of-cultural-subversion-42884">Larrikin carnival: an Australian style of cultural subversion</a>
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<p>Second, Australia is a secure and stable country. For this reason, it sees micronations as irrelevant or a nuisance, rather than a genuine threat. So long as you pay your taxes and follow the road rules, you can call yourself whatever you want. </p>
<p>Third, Australia is a large country with a relatively small population — its population density is just three people per square kilometre. This ranks Australia <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST?locations=AU&most_recent_value_desc=true">192 out of 194 countries</a> in the world for population density, ahead only of Namibia and Mongolia. There is plenty of room for people to create their own country. </p>
<h2>Does it work?</h2>
<p>If you are interested in avoiding the law, the answer is no. The Principality of Hutt River was never able to convince an Australian court it did not have to pay tax. As Justice Rene Le Miere of the <a href="http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASC/2017/161.html">WA Supreme Court noted in 2017</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Anyone can declare themselves a sovereign in their own home but they cannot ignore the laws of Australia or not pay tax.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Other would-be nation builders have faced similar challenges. The <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00223344.2019.1573664?journalCode=cjph20">Republic of Minerva’s</a> attempt to build a new state on a coral atoll in the South Pacific in the 1970s was ended by the Tongan military. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.newspapers.com/clip/3723879/taluga-or-abalonia/">nations of Abalonia and Taluga</a> (located off the coast of San Diego) were both put down by the US Department of the Interior. The <a href="https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol17/iss1/10/">Republic of Liberland</a>, which claims an uninhabited island on the Danube River between Croatia and Serbia, is unable to get its citizens across the Croatian border. </p>
<p>No micronation has ever become a state. It is very unlikely that any micronation will ever become one. This is because <a href="https://www.google.com.au/books/edition/The_Creation_of_States_in_International/63XnCwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0">to be a state</a>, an entity</p>
<blockquote>
<p>must possess a government or system of government in general control of its territory, to the exclusion of other entities not claiming through or under it. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Prince Leonard may have been the lawful owner of his wheat farm, but he did not possess sovereignty over that land. Micronations may declare their independence, but they are unable to do so to the exclusion of other states.</p>
<h2>What makes a successful micronation?</h2>
<p>However, success should be measured against a range of motivations. </p>
<p>Artistic micronations, like the Kingdom of Elgaland & Vargaland, can raise challenging questions about the nature of statehood and borders. Those created for a laugh or for tourism can also succeed. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Peter Anderson, the secretary general of the Conch Republic, during a 2005 pub crawl." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409637/original/file-20210705-21-1l8r2yh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409637/original/file-20210705-21-1l8r2yh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409637/original/file-20210705-21-1l8r2yh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409637/original/file-20210705-21-1l8r2yh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409637/original/file-20210705-21-1l8r2yh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409637/original/file-20210705-21-1l8r2yh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409637/original/file-20210705-21-1l8r2yh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Peter Anderson, the former secretary general of the Conch Republic, during a 2005 pub crawl.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lynne Sladky/AP/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The small township of Whangamōmona welcomed about 1,000 visitors to its Republic Day in <a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/stratford-press/news/incumbent-republic-of-whangamomona-president-keeps-top-job-after-tight-election-race/TUBCLPY52IRTFSLUFY65C4OO44/%3e.">January of this year</a>. Next year, the <a href="https://conchrepublic.com/">Conch Republic</a> in Key West Florida will celebrate its 40th annual independence celebration.</p>
<p>The success of micronations can also be seen in the growth of community events and social media. Every two years, micronations from around the world meet at <a href="http://www.molossia.org/microcon/index.html">MicroCon</a>. Many others discuss, compare notes and become friends online. </p>
<p>So while Hutt River may have ended, the future of micronationalism is bright.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162518/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harry Hobbs does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>People create their own micronations out of protest, art and eccentricity. For ‘larrikin’ Australians, the prospect is particularly tempting.Harry Hobbs, Senior lecturer, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1597532021-05-26T18:09:57Z2021-05-26T18:09:57ZDelay in sending regional forces to Mozambique could exact a high price<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402876/original/file-20210526-17-2ro1xf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some of the thousands of people displaced by the killings in the Cabo Delgado province.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Joas Relvas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-20-sadc-leaders-will-meet-this-month-to-consider-mozambique-intervention-plan/">poised</a> to intervene militarily on the side of the Mozambican government to stop the emerging deadly Islamist insurgency in the Cabo Delgado Province, in the north of the country.</p>
<p>This comes after the regional body of <a href="https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc#:%7E:text=The%20Southern%20African%20Development%20Community,%2C%20Tanzania%2C%20Zambia%20and%20Zimbabwe.">16-nation states</a> sent a technical team to verify events in the area and advise its heads of state forum on the way forward. </p>
<p>The technical team has recommended that SADC deploys a 3 000-strong <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-04-28-sadc-ministers-agree-to-deploy-a-regional-force-in-mozambique/">robust intervention force</a> comprised of land, air and naval assets to help quell the insurgency.</p>
<p>The decision to intervene militarily is a clear indicator that the deadly insurgency, which began in earnest <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">in October 2017</a>, has long passed the stage where it can be seen as a purely domestic problem to be addressed by Mozambique as a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438705001018?casa_token=zVwfnh-fXPsAAAAA:85qqLoMgXk36_IE257qYPMUesqoDdZq80T2FtQP8d8sutOaZ5Up2TXsChVU0PqnWm8a-jLGU6A">sovereign state</a>.</p>
<p>Having failed to act to prevent the insurgency escalating, SADC and Mozambique are now in the difficult position of having to react after extensive damage has already been done. They will thus have to help stop the insurgency as well as embark on post-conflict rebuilding. These two responses are more complicated, expensive and more dangerous than prevention.</p>
<p>SADC’s late entry into the fray raises the need to deal with its own array of bureaucratic and other pitfalls that make it less than agile. Its overcautious and sluggish response has resulted in the loss of initiative and opportunities to prevent the insurgency escalating. </p>
<p>But, the problem is not purely of its own making. The African Union took too long to designate it as the preferred regional actor to address the Mozambican insurgency problem in a timely way. </p>
<p>Intervention in Cabo Delgado is a potentially dangerous move with far-reaching consequences for SADC if its efforts fail, or it becomes a protracted intervention. </p>
<h2>The basis of intervention</h2>
<p>The SADC response to events in Mozambique is in line with the United Nation’s <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml">“responsibility to protect principle”</a> to prevent human catastrophe. </p>
<p>The principle has <a href="https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/18432/IDL-18432.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y">three elements</a>. These are to prevent conflict, to react once conflict has started with a view to stopping the violence, and to rebuild in the aftermath of the conflict. </p>
<p>The SADC intervention fits in with the commitment by African leaders to find <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277886206_AFRICAN_SOLUTIONS_TO_AFRICA'S_PROBLEMS_AFRICAN_APPROACHES_TO_PEACE_SECURITY_AND_STABILITY">“African solutions for African problems”</a>. It is underpinned by SADC’s <a href="https://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf">peace and security protocol</a> and its <a href="https://www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-security/regional-peacekeeping/standby-force/">Standby Force and SADC Brigade</a> to guide and execute decisions.</p>
<p>SADC is also guided by its 2003 <a href="https://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/1038">Mutual Defence Pact</a> regulating responses to armed attacks on a fellow SADC member state. The pact outlines the type of responses to be undertaken to defend a member state under attack. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/3613/5292/8367/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf">Protocol on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation</a> stipulates that a member state under siege should invite SADC to intervene. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/offshore-gas-finds-offered-major-promise-for-mozambique-what-went-wrong-158079">Offshore gas finds offered major promise for Mozambique: what went wrong</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Mozambique has been slow to invite SADC to intervene. A final decision is likely at a meeting of SADC and Mozambique set for the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-20-sadc-leaders-will-meet-this-month-to-consider-mozambique-intervention-plan/">end of May</a>. </p>
<p>In terms of SADC protocols and the report of the technical team following its visit to Mozambique, military support is recommended as an instrument to assist the Mozambique government. The recommendation points to assembling a military contingent with mixed military capabilities. That aligns with the following functions under the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/3613/5292/8367/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf">SADC Protocol</a> on politics, defence and security cooperation. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Observation and monitoring missions such as peace support missions,</p></li>
<li><p>Interventions for peace and security restoration at the request of a member state, and</p></li>
<li><p>Actions to prevent the spread of conflict to neighbouring states, or the resurgence of violence after agreements have been reached.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Dangers and vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>At the moment, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provides an example of ongoing military intervention in a fellow SADC member country. SADC member states - South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi - are actively involved in a UN peacekeeping mission, <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/un-drc">MUNOSCO</a>, in the country. </p>
<p>It is the largest ongoing UN mission and dates back to 2010. Elements from SADC are now largely concentrated in the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/sadc-interventions-democratic-republic-congo/">Force Intervention Brigade</a> to pursue armed groups in the east and help the DRC government regain control of its territory.</p>
<p>The operation in Mozambique will be different as SADC will be operating without the cover of the UN. This places it in a precarious position. It will have to take full responsibility for any fall-out resulting from failure. </p>
<p>There’s no precedent for an intervention of this kind. <a href="http://wis.orasecom.org/content/study/UNDP-GEF/NAP-SAP/Documents/References/tda.nap.sap/SA-%20Lesotho%201998.pdf">In 1998</a> South Africa and Botswana sent troops into Lesotho. In the same year <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/sadc-interventions-democratic-republic-congo/">Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe intervened in the DRC</a>. In both cases the interventions were controversial and messy. SADC authorisation came after deployment and placed great strain on relationships within the regional body.</p>
<p>SADC’s decision to intervene in Mozambique comes with its own set of difficulties. Chief among these is to get member states to commit resources to establish an <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2021/04/sadc-to-deploy-force-intervention-brigade-in-mozambique/">intervention brigade</a> to deploy against the insurgents.</p>
<p>The size of the final force will be depend on how extensive the armed conflict has become, and what level of intervention the Mozambican government is willing to accept from SADC.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-has-a-keen-interest-in-extremist-violence-in-northern-mozambique-140745">Why South Africa has a keen interest in extremist violence in northern Mozambique</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>To succeed, SADCS’s intervention in Mozambique will require extensive investment in time, human resources and money. The extent of this investment will, of course, be determined by the speed with which it contains – or even defeats – the insurgents.</p>
<p>Military action will need to entail a parallel process of rebuilding physical infrastructure and assisting with returning people to their normal life. Most of all, it must help the Mozambique government prevent a resurgence of the violence. </p>
<p>The violence has had a devastating effect on security and rule of law. The impact spilled offshore as gas companies placed extensive foreign infrastructure development for the energy sector on hold. </p>
<p>Rebuilding the confidence needed <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/opinion-the-extractive-gas-industry-in-mozambique-has-done-more-damage-than-good-for-mozambicans-by-iiham-rawoot-153657/">for the gas industry</a> to resume activities is a major incentive to get the insurgency under control.</p>
<h2>Costly and dangerous mission ahead</h2>
<p>Success in turning the tide against militants in Cabo Delgado could give SADC’s image a major boost. Failure, however, could tarnish its image of protecting a fellow member country and the region for years to come.</p>
<p>In essence, Cabo Delgado shows how a slow and over-cautious approach to a potentially explosive security situation can allow matters to deteriorate to such an extent that deadly violence can’t be prevented.</p>
<p>The scene is now set for a military response that leaves SADC facing an expensive and dangerous intervention, and rebuilding costs that a poor country such as Mozambique can ill afford.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159753/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prof Francois Vreÿ receives funding from the NRF and Stellenbosch University.</span></em></p>Intervention in Cabo Delgado is a potentially dangerous move with far-reaching consequences for SADC if its efforts fail, or it becomes a protracted intervention.Francois Vreÿ, Research Coordinator, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1559352021-03-25T12:25:10Z2021-03-25T12:25:10ZWho gets Cherokee citizenship has long been a struggle between the tribe and the US government<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391389/original/file-20210324-17-1cdahr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=51%2C44%2C4217%2C2182&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Cherokee Census card from 1904. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Enrollment_for_Cherokee_Census_Card_R645_-_NARA_-_259708.jpg#/media/File:Enrollment_for_Cherokee_Census_Card_R645_-_NARA_-_259708.jpg">Wikimedia Commons/U.S. National Archives and Records Administration</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.cherokeephoenix.org/news/cherokee-nation-supreme-court-rules-by-blood-reference-be-stricken-from-tribe-s/article_e79f78b4-756b-11eb-b0bc-13a1954dc30b.html">recent decision by the Cherokee Nation’s Supreme Court</a> struck down a law that freedmen – descendants of people enslaved by Cherokees in the 18th and 19th centuries – cannot hold elective tribal office. The ruling is the latest development in a long-standing dispute about the tribal rights available to Black people once held in bondage by Native Americans.</p>
<p>National media reported this news as a victory against racism in the tribe. “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/24/us/politics/cherokee-nation-black-freedmen.html">Cherokee Nation Addresses Bias Against Descendants of Enslaved People</a>,” reads a representative headline from The New York Times.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://isearch.asu.edu/profile/3531774">as a scholar of Cherokee law and history</a>, I argue this development can be seen another way: as only the latest chapter in a long struggle between the Cherokee Nation and the federal government over which has the power to determine who should be considered a tribal citizen, and which culture’s values should be most important in that determination.</p>
<h2>Status of freedmen</h2>
<p>On Feb. 22, the <a href="https://www.cherokeecourts.org/Supreme-Court/SC-2017-01-to-current">Cherokee Supreme Court</a> struck the words “by blood” from the <a href="https://www.cherokee.org/our-government/cherokee-nation-constitution/">Cherokee Constitution</a>. </p>
<p>This decision means that the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/25/us/cherokee-nation-ruling-freedmen-citizenship-trnd/index.html">8,500</a> tribal descendants of Cherokee freedmen can <a href="https://www.cherokeephoenix.org/news/election-complaint-filed-over-freedmen-descendants-eligibility/article_3589c336-b676-5906-bb9b-d55292529663.html">run for tribal office</a>. Freedmen currently have access to voting and other benefits of citizenship that were not a part of this particular decision.</p>
<p>The Cherokee Nation has wrestled with the tribal citizenship status of freedmen since U.S. officials <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20100630013134/http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/VOL2/treaties/che0942.htm">forced Cherokees to adopt freedmen</a> into the tribe in 1866. Part of the tension, as I have <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/studies-in-american-political-development/article/abs/cherokee-political-thought-and-the-development-of-tribal-citizenship/CC9A3DA37538AAE21F1AEBAF9DE061A6">written elsewhere</a>, stems from the Cherokee commitment to limit citizenship to those meeting certain eligibility requirements – in this case, those who are Cherokee by blood. For the Nation, keeping citizenship exclusive preserves both Cherokee culture and status as a distinct sovereign entity. </p>
<p>Historically, U.S. officials, often encouraged by public opinion, have wanted Cherokees to adopt U.S. legal and cultural practices. When not attempting to <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/7690-a-move-to-destroy-the-cherokee-nation">terminate the tribe</a>, U.S. officials have sided with freedmen whenever tribal citizenship disputes <a href="https://casetext.com/case/cherokee-nation-v-nash-4">reach U.S. courts</a>. U.S. politicians have also repeatedly threatened to <a href="https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11280553">withhold federal money</a> should the Cherokee Nation not grant freedmen citizenship.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391276/original/file-20210323-17-1a2jm34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Information from the Cherokee Nation on how to register as a tribal citizen." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391276/original/file-20210323-17-1a2jm34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391276/original/file-20210323-17-1a2jm34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=248&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391276/original/file-20210323-17-1a2jm34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=248&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391276/original/file-20210323-17-1a2jm34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=248&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391276/original/file-20210323-17-1a2jm34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=312&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391276/original/file-20210323-17-1a2jm34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=312&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391276/original/file-20210323-17-1a2jm34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=312&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A screenshot from the Cherokee Nation’s tribal registration webpage.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.cherokee.org/all-services/tribal-registration/">Cherokee Nation website</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Origins of a conflict</h2>
<p>Before living in Indian Territory – now Oklahoma – Cherokees lived for centuries in the American Southeast. Their society was a collection of towns held together by <a href="https://www.cherokeephoenix.org/education/the-cherokee-clan-system/article_a88fcc42-f3f8-5f33-b575-8cff7d3bffd2.html">clan affiliation</a> and kinship bonds. </p>
<p>These clan and kin relationships were the basis of Cherokee <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691006277/cherokee-renascence-in-the-new-republic">social and political life</a>. Their strong communal ethic, with <a href="https://www.oupress.com/books/14444470/serving-the-nation">each person playing a particular role in determining the health and strength of the community</a>, supported and was encouraged by the practice of holding land in common; Cherokees did not own land privately. </p>
<p>Cherokees were also <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/000271627843600104">intensely spiritual</a>, believing that frequent personal and communal rituals maintained harmony and balance between all living things. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X20000176">Exclusive membership</a>, limited to Cherokees with few exceptions, was one natural extension of their cultural beliefs and practices. </p>
<p>Colonists, later U.S. citizens, wanted to acquire Cherokee land and to make Cherokees more like whites in terms of their religious, government and economic practices. That meant that Cherokees would have to abandon their practice of holding land communally, which made land difficult for U.S. settlers to acquire because they could not deal with individuals. </p>
<p>By the 1820s, Cherokees had adopted many customs and institutions from Americans, including <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/how-native-american-slaveholders-complicate-trail-tears-narrative-180968339/">Black slavery</a>, a written language and a <a href="https://www.wcu.edu/library/DigitalCollections/CherokeePhoenix/Vol1/no01/constitution-of-the-cherokee-nation-page-1-column-2a-page-2-column-3a.html">constitution</a>. But instead of making the tribe more white – and thereby giving up their lands, as settlers hoped – the Cherokee constitution declared the tribe’s intent to preserve its lands.</p>
<p>Hungry for Cherokee land and the gold in it, and disdaining the Cherokee way of life, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Indian-Removal-Act">Congress in the 1830s gave</a> the president power to force the Cherokee west. Roughly <a href="https://ugapress.org/book/9780820323671/john-ross-cherokee-chief/">16,000 Cherokees</a>, along with <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2012/02/25/us/pain-of-trail-of-tears-shared-by-blacks-as-well-as-native-americans">many slaves</a>, walked the Trail of Tears to Indian Territory – some <a href="https://www.nps.gov/trte/learn/historyculture/what-happened-on-the-trail-of-tears.htm">4,000 dying</a> as a result.</p>
<h2>1866 treaty</h2>
<p>Cherokees rebuilt their nation in what is now northeastern Oklahoma. Enslaved Black labor aided this process. </p>
<p>When the Civil War began, the Cherokee first <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/how-native-americans-ended-up-fighting-for-the-confederacy-2019-6">joined the Confederacy</a>. The Nation, however, <a href="https://indiancountrytoday.com/archive/how-the-cherokee-fought-the-civil-war">experienced a schism</a> that led most, including Chief John Ross, the Nation’s leader, to flee to the Union side. Ross’ rival, Stand Watie, and others remained with the Confederates.</p>
<p>After the war, the U.S. forced the Cherokee Nation to sign the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20100630013134/http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/VOL2/treaties/che0942.htm">Treaty of 1866</a>. The tribe’s <a href="https://www.cherokeephoenix.org/news/1839-cherokee-constitution-born-from-act-of-union/article_5621e3f8-f65c-5990-8af2-c889b21b0abc.html">1839 Constitution</a>, affirming previous laws, had stated that Cherokee citizens must be descended from Cherokees, not their Black slaves. But in this peace treaty, Cherokees agreed to make their former slaves full tribal citizens. </p>
<p>This meant granting many who did not share in <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520230972/blood-politics">clan affiliation</a> or Cherokee blood access to tribal services like education and potentially a portion of federal monetary payments.</p>
<p>For many, <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300234671/cherokee-diaspora">being a Cherokee</a> citizen was not merely about receiving things from the government – it was also about living the Cherokee lifestyle and dedicating one’s life to that culture. Many Cherokees <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/third-annual-message-of-hon-jb-mayes-principal-chief-of-the-cherokee-nation/oclc/593622785">opposed making freedmen citizens</a>, since most were not Cherokee by blood. </p>
<p>Importantly, they <a href="https://www.gilderlehrman.org/collection/glc0738405">did not want</a> U.S. officials dictating who could be a tribal citizen. </p>
<p>The 1866 treaty stipulated that only freedmen living on Cherokee land within six months of the signing could be citizens. While some freedmen did gain citizenship this way, Cherokees used that provision to <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520230972/blood-politics">deny it to those who did not return on time</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391279/original/file-20210323-2283-1q28xwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman who descends from Cherokee Freedmen holding her tribal ID card." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391279/original/file-20210323-2283-1q28xwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391279/original/file-20210323-2283-1q28xwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391279/original/file-20210323-2283-1q28xwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391279/original/file-20210323-2283-1q28xwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391279/original/file-20210323-2283-1q28xwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391279/original/file-20210323-2283-1q28xwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391279/original/file-20210323-2283-1q28xwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rena Logan, whose ancestors were enslaved by the Cherokee Indians in the 1800s, fought to gain full tribal membership for descendants of freedmen like her.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/CherokeeFreedmen/c8e7ed4dfd514580bda402f115b55b00/photo?Query=freedmen&mediaType=photo,graphic&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=29&currentItemNo=19">Dave Crenshaw/AP photos</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Termination</h2>
<p>After the Civil War, U.S. officials, settlers and freedmen made demands on Cherokee land and resources. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/4144838">Freedmen wanted</a> to <a href="https://www.blairpub.com/shop/black-indian-slave-narratives">build a life</a> – most returned to Cherokee territory from surrounding states, as they were not wanted there.</p>
<p>Settlers wanted Cherokee lands. Christian and philanthropic organizations also pressured U.S. politicians to <a href="https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393304978">hasten the “civilization” of Indians</a>. This meant forcing them to adopt American economic and social norms – especially private land ownership. </p>
<p>The federal government used freedmen’s petitions for Cherokee citizenship to undermine tribal authority. Freedmen who wanted to live among the Cherokee but were stymied by tribal leaders <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1185118">appealed to the Office of Indian Affairs</a>. Federal representatives, called “Indian agents,” stepped in, superseding Cherokee sovereignty, giving freedmen (and white settlers) Cherokee land. </p>
<p>Congress forced the conversion of Cherokee communal lands into individual lots in 1887 with the <a href="https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/dawes-act.htm">Dawes Act</a>. As part of this process, U.S. agents counted those living on tribal land – creating the <a href="https://www.okhistory.org/research/dawes">Dawes Rolls</a>, which divided the inhabitants into three categories: Cherokee, white and freedmen. </p>
<p>Congress’ ultimately successful goal was to dissolve tribal governments, freeing up land for new American cities and farms in Oklahoma – which achieved statehood in 1907. </p>
<h2>Rebirth</h2>
<p>In the 1970s, Congress passed legislation <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/STATUTE-84/STATUTE-84-Pg1091-2">enabling Cherokees to re-form their sovereign government</a>, recognized by the U.S. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tahlequahdailypress.com/news/cherokees-ratified-first-modern-constitution-in-1976/article_19fc963d-1df6-5f9c-a700-c8320012fc1e.html">Cherokees drafted a constitution</a> in 1975, re-articulating their sovereignty, including citizenship requirements. </p>
<p>The Cherokee Nation, <a href="https://utpress.utexas.edu/books/lemame">40,000 strong</a>, used the Cherokee Dawes Rolls – excluding the freedmen list – to determine citizenship. Identifying individual Cherokee by blood had become impossible without some arbitrary reference point; they chose the 1906 list that U.S. agents had compiled to reestablish exclusive citizenship as a sovereign nation. </p>
<p>Descendants of freedmen objected to Cherokees not including the Dawes freedmen list too; <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1185118">freedmen had wanted citizenship</a> to gain access to tribal services and suffrage. This became an even greater issue as the Cherokee Nation <a href="https://utpress.utexas.edu/books/lemame">expanded to 200,000 people in the 1990s</a>. </p>
<p>Cherokees have <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780312206628">legally and socially wrestled</a> with whether excluding freedmen was <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1185118">an act of racism</a> or a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X20000176">show of strength against the U.S.</a> for repeatedly denying tribal sovereignty. </p>
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<p>Freedmen struggled against the Cherokee Nation for decades to secure citizenship, often getting the U.S. involved. In 2017, a U.S. district judge ruled that the Cherokee <a href="https://casetext.com/case/cherokee-nation-v-nash-4">do not have the sovereign authority to deny citizenship</a> to freedmen, since they agreed to make them citizens in the Treaty of 1866. </p>
<p>The 2021 decision to strike “by blood” from the candidate requirement is the next step in that process of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y1MaAlo2o6s">debating what Cherokee citizenship means</a> – and how to keep it exclusive despite U.S. interference.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155935/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aaron Kushner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When the Cherokee Supreme Court ruled that tribal elected officials no longer had to be Cherokee “by blood,” it was the latest chapter in a long-running fight over who controls tribal citizenship.Aaron Kushner, Postdoctoral Scholar, School of Civic and Economic Thought and Leadership, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.