tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/sunni-16931/articlesSunni – The Conversation2023-09-25T04:02:27Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2131482023-09-25T04:02:27Z2023-09-25T04:02:27ZHow popular music videos drove the fight against the Islamic State<p>Almost a decade ago, the Sunni jihadist network known as the Islamic State (IS) declared the formation of an Islamic Caliphate after they <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_of_Mosul">captured the Iraqi city of Mosul in June 2014</a>.</p>
<p>In response, tens of thousands of Shia men joined a complex patchwork of militias to fight against IS. Many of these militias are notoriously violent and directly loyal to Iran’s theocratic state.</p>
<p>But very little is known about how these Shia militias were so quickly and so effectively mobilised. In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2023.2196875">our research</a>, we have taken a novel approach, examining the many popular music videos produced by these militias.</p>
<p>These music videos drew on a complex cocktail of historical myths and contemporary clergymen to mobilise Iraq’s Shia population to fight the IS.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/understanding-islamic-state-where-does-it-come-from-and-what-does-it-want-52155">Understanding Islamic State: where does it come from and what does it want?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Foundational myths, historical grievances</h2>
<p>The popular music videos explicitly reference a deeply held set of religious myths and symbols that have informed Shia politics since its inception.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LUUGLiTzUSY">One video</a> shows images of militiamen driving towards the front-lines and firing from a bunker at IS targets. </p>
<p>The singer extols the religious virtues of fighting the IS by comparing those killed today with the Shia martyrs at the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Karbala">Battle of Karbala</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We fight our enemies. Our martyrs are similar to the martyrs of Karbala. Our people are supporters of Hussein.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The divide between the Sunni and Shia sects dates back to the early years of Islam. </p>
<p>A debate emerged after the Prophet Muhammad’s death about who should lead the Islamic community. The majority accepted the authority of the Prophet’s senior companion, Abu Bakr. A minority, later identified as Shiites, believed only a blood relative of the Prophet – in particular, his cousin Ali – had the right to lead.</p>
<p>In the year 680, the division between the two sects escalated at the Battle of Karbala, where Ali’s son Hussein and many of his followers were defeated and executed by Sunni forces.</p>
<p>The legend of the Battle of Karbala has come to symbolise the historical injustice of the Shia faithful at the hands of the Sunni majority. It is commemorated at the annual <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashura">Ashura</a> festival in which Shiites reenact the battle, including by self-flagellation. </p>
<p>The emotive lyrics and tone of the song are specifically designed to resonate with this history of suffering. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">What is the Shia-Sunni divide?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The Shia jihad against the IS</h2>
<p>The popular music videos produced by different Shia militias also draw on fatwas (religious edicts) issued by several prominent Shia clerics in response to the violence of the IS.</p>
<p>In 2014, Iraq’s most senior Shia cleric <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_al-Sistani">Grand Ayatollah Sistani</a> issued a fatwa announcing <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R7by5almGhA">a jihad (holy war) against the IS</a>.</p>
<p>He called for a mass Shia mobilisation, arguing </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is the legal and national responsibility of whoever can hold a weapon to take up arms to defend the country, the citizens and the holy sites.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Some popular music videos explicitly cite the fatwas of Sistani and other clerics, encouraging their young supporters to heed these calls. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gpvDC9XTRcU.">A short clip</a> shows armed members of one militia chanting: “Al-Sistani is like a crown on our heads. Your wish is our command.”</p>
<p>One very slickly produced <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q6DMWC93po8">music video</a> refers to both historical grievances over the failure to recognise Ali as the legitimate heir of the Prophet Muhammad and to the centrality of Sistani’s fatwa to their decision to fight the IS:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are the Turkmen [of Iraq] <br>
We follow Ali’s path <br>
Iraq must live in peace and happiness <br>
When Sistani orders us, we obey. We will defeat and destroy the IS <br>
We believe in the fatwas of our religious authorities, and we defend our holy sites.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As the singer recites each verse, the footage shows heavily armed Shia men posing in front of a tank. It also features live action footage from various battles against the IS, including advancing on key targets, firing machine guns and heavy artillery. </p>
<h2>Mobilising young men</h2>
<p>These videos serve as a unique archive of the war against the IS, demonstrating the ways in which these militias found novel ways to mobilise young men to fight by drawing on a rich catalogue of Shia religious symbolism as well as the fatwas of clerics like Sistani.</p>
<p>Slick popular music videos draw on a rich catalogue of historical motifs of suffering as well as the contemporary edicts of key clergymen, produced by different Shia militias and shared on YouTube and other social media platforms. </p>
<p>These evocative and poignant songs played an underappreciated and under-examined part in mobilising young men to fight back against the horrors of the IS, indicating the powerful role popular culture plays in contemporary warfare.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-islamic-state-flag-hijacks-muslim-words-of-faith-banning-it-could-cause-confusion-and-unfair-targeting-of-muslims-209042">The Islamic State flag hijacks Muslim words of faith. Banning it could cause confusion and unfair targeting of Muslims</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213148/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Isakhan receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Australian Department of Defence.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ali Akbar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In our new research we examined popular music videos which drew on historical myths and contemporary clergymen to mobilise Iraq’s Shia population to fight the Islamic State.Benjamin Isakhan, Professor of International Politics, Deakin UniversityAli Akbar, Sessional lecturer and researcher, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2016922023-03-13T16:29:19Z2023-03-13T16:29:19ZSaudi-Iran deal won’t bring peace to the Middle East but will enhance China’s role as power broker<p>After more than four decades as seemingly implacable enemies on either side of a deep political-religious divide in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Iran have agreed to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-64906996">restore diplomatic relations</a> and reopen embassies. The deal, which was signed in Beijing, comes seven years after diplomatic relations were severed in the aftermath of the execution in Saudi Arabia of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/10/iran-saudi-arabia-middle-east-war-nimr-al-nimr-execution">Shia cleric Nimr Al Nimr</a> and has been heralded as a “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/11/middleeast/iran-saudi-arabia-normalization-china-analysis-intl/index.html">game-changing moment</a>” for the Middle East. </p>
<p>While undeniably a positive move, the agreement will not end conflict in the region – with serious domestic issues continuing to drive conflict and violence in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. Yet serious economic challenges have prompted the Saudis and Iranians to engage in diplomatic talks over the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/10/iran-and-saudi-arabia-from-rivalry-to-mending-ties-a-timeline">past few years</a> to create a more stable regional order, allowing their countries to engage in domestic reform programmes as a result.</p>
<p>The rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has fractious roots, shaped by the interplay of security concerns, claims to leadership over the Muslim world, ethno-sectarian rivalries, and differing relationships with Washington. Lazy analysis has often reduced the rivalry to a sectarian conflict, a consequence of “ancient hatreds”. But such a reading of events is xenophobic and orientalist and ignores the context and contingencies shaping relations between the two states. </p>
<p>Despite the fractious roots, relations between the two states have oscillated between overt hostility and burgeoning detente since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, playing out in different ways across the Middle East.</p>
<h2>Troubled region</h2>
<p>The presence of shared religious, ethnic and ideological identities across the region has also prompted others to view conflict across the region through the lens of “proxy wars”. Various groups in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain and elsewhere have been seen as merely doing the bidding of paymasters in Riyadh or Tehran. This ignores the internal drivers of conflict and division, reducing analysis to a simplistic binary pitting Sunni against Shia. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Middle East, 2023" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=694&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=694&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=694&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Middle East is riven with conflict, both political and sectarian. Reconciliation between Riyadh and Tehran is unlikely to fundamentally change that.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://picryl.com/media/middle-east-graphic">Library of Congress</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Across the region, states where Saudi and Iranian interests have clashed, have also been beset by a range of their own complex socioeconomic and political challenges. </p>
<p>Since Saddam Hussein was deposed, Iraq has been characterised by a struggle among various factions to dominate the state. Shia parties, representing the country’s majority, have typically won elections, often with the support of Iran and much to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia. Yet to think of Iraqi politics purely as representing a proxy war between its two neighbours would be wrong. It ignores the domestic concerns of many and efforts to create a political landscape that works for Iraqis and is not just an arena for Riyadh and Tehran to increase their power. </p>
<p>In Yemen, while Saudi Arabia and Iran have both played a prominent role in the civil war, the key drivers of conflict are domestic, amid a broader struggle over territory, politics, visions of order, tribalism, resources and sectarian difference. The involvement of Riyadh and Tehran – in different ways – exacerbates these tensions. Fears about gains by Iran-backed Houthi rebels across Yemen prompted Saudi Arabia to embark on a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/saudi-war-crimes-yemen/">devastating bombing campaign</a> to curtail the group’s actions.</p>
<p>Tehran’s <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis">support for the Houthis</a> – and the group’s attacks on the Saudi mainland – exacerbated the kingdom’s fears. Yet the war in Yemen is also a consequence of the fragmentation of the state and the emergence of several different groups vying for influence across a landscape beset by serious environmental challenges and food shortages.</p>
<p>In Lebanon, a devastating socioeconomic crisis plays out in the shell of the state, with sectarian groups providing support and protection to their constituencies in place of a functioning government. Key groups have received support from Saudi Arabia and Iran – most notably <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">Hezbollah</a>, which possesses strong ideological links with the Islamic Republic, and the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/can-lebanon-s-future-movement-provide-moderate-sunni-alternative">Future Movement</a> the party of government across most of the past decade, which has a complex relationship with Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>Clearly the Saudis and Iranians have a keen interest in Lebanese politics. But in reality any conflict here is driven by competition between local groups seeking to impose their visions of order on a precarious political, social and economic landscape.</p>
<p>While there is little doubt that Saudi Arabia and Iran have the means to exert influence on politics across the region, local groups have their own agendas, aspirations and pressures. It remains to be seen how the reconciliation between Riyadh and Tehran will resonate in spaces beset by division. </p>
<p>There are undeniably positives for regional security. The reconciliation improves the possibility of a <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-revival-nuclear-deal-political-victory-over-west/32004644.html">revived nuclear deal with Tehran</a> – although it remains to be seen what Saudi Arabia has offered Iran to facilitate the agreement, and vice versa. Also, there are questions as to what monitoring and enforcement mechanisms have been put in place by China.</p>
<h2>The role of China</h2>
<p>Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of all of this concerns <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/12/china-saudi-iran-middle-east-united-states-relations-peace/">China’s role in proceedings</a>. While diplomatic efforts aimed at improving relations between the two rivals have been taking place for several years, China’s ability to forge an agreement out of these talks points to Beijing’s growing influence in the region. </p>
<p>China has long had <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/02/25/iran-china-cooperation-fraught-with-contradictions/">close economic ties with Iran</a>, but in recent years Beijing has sought to <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20221130-pentagon-china-significantly-increased-engagement-with-middle-east-in-2021/">increase its engagement with Arab states</a>, notably Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Deteriorating relations between the two major Gulf powers would have had a negative impact on Chinese engagement and investment across the Middle East, both in terms of its infrastructure projects and the broader Belt and Road Initiative. </p>
<p>Although the US has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/47e26a9f-0943-4e65-b8a0-604da6289153">publicly celebrated the initiative</a>, privately there are several concerns about the broader implications for the Middle East and for global politics. This comes at a time when relations between Riyadh and Washington are tense. </p>
<p>This was perhaps best seen in the visit of the US president, Joe Biden, to Saudi Arabia after his vocal criticism of the kingdom’s human rights record and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/26/jamal-khashoggi-mohammed-bin-salman-us-report">publication of a report</a> stating that Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman approved the operation to kill journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a US citizen. During the visit, Biden and bin Salman endured a tense meeting which <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/87662">largely failed to improve relations</a> and highlighted the precarious nature of relations. </p>
<p>In such an environment, rising Chinese influence in the kingdom and across the Middle East is hardly surprising. China’s move into mediation offers some semblance of hope that an agreement can also be reached to end the war in Ukraine, but at what cost? The Chinese model of investment and the provision of “untied aid” – the provision of financial support without conditions – has long ignored concerns about democracy and human rights. So the agreement between the Saudis and the Iranians has been read by some as a victory for authoritarianism, further marginalising reform movements in both countries.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1634608154112835585"}"></div></p>
<p>Much like the US, Israel is also concerned about the deal. For successive Israeli governments, Iran has long occupied the role of regional
bete noire, ultimately feeding into the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/two-years-what-state-abraham-accords">signing of the Abraham Accords</a> in the summer of 2020 which normalised relations between Israel, the UEA, Bahrain and Morocco as a strategic alliance against Tehran. The Netanyahu government has long sought to normalise relations with Saudi Arabia and hoped to use the Iranian threat as a means of achieving this goal. </p>
<p>Additionally, the deal raises questions about the future of regional security. The US has long been a mediator in regional disputes and has been viewed as a security guarantor by Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. China’s actions here suggest that it is seeking to assert itself more keenly in the region’s politics. Reports suggest that Beijing is to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-plans-summit-of-persian-gulf-arab-and-iranian-leaders-as-new-middle-east-role-takes-shape-357cfd7e">host a meeting of Arab and Iranian leaders</a> later in the year. If accurate, it positions China firmly as a – if not <em>the</em> – dominant actor across the Middle East.</p>
<p>A reconciliation between the Saudis and the Iranians is certainly good for regional order. But it will not address the causes of conflict in Yemen or elsewhere across the region. It also raises several serious issues around regional security and global order, the salience of democracy and human rights, and the future of US engagement with the Middle East. </p>
<p>While the initiative is a positive step, it is not a solution for the region’s conflicts. This Beijing-mediated agreement may in fact lead to further significant challenges for the people of the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201692/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon receives funding from Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Henry Luce Foundation. He is a Senior Fellow atthe Foreign Policy Centre. </span></em></p>Detente between Tehran and Riyadh will not magically solve all the political and sectarian tensions in the Middle East.Simon Mabon, Professor of International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1986472023-02-06T13:27:21Z2023-02-06T13:27:21ZThe politics of blasphemy: Why Pakistan and some other Muslim countries are passing new blasphemy laws<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506698/original/file-20230126-24317-zg6pjr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C38%2C5111%2C3472&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People gather around the body of a man who was killed when an enraged mob stoned him to death for allegedly desecrating the Quran, in eastern Pakistan in February 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PakistanBlasphemy/627a5c4fb72347f4b181cbe63397b031/photo?Query=pakistan%20blasphemy%202022&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=15&currentItemNo=13">AP Photo/Asim Tanveer</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Jan. 17, 2023, Pakistan’s National Assembly unanimously voted to expand the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-muslim-countries-are-quick-at-condemning-defamation-but-often-ignore-rights-violations-against-muslim-minorities-184624">laws on blasphemy</a>, which carries the death penalty for insulting the Prophet Muhammad. The new law now extends the punishment to those deemed to have insulted the prophet’s companions, which could include thousands of early Muslims, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/21/world/asia/pakistan-blasphemy-laws.html">with 10 years in prison or life imprisonment</a>.</p>
<p>Human rights activists <a href="https://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/amendments-to-blasphemy-laws-create-further-room-for-persecution/">are concerned that the expanded laws could target minorities</a>, particularly Shiite Muslims who are critical of many leading early Muslims. </p>
<p>Pakistan has the world’s <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Blasphemy%20Laws%20Report.pdf">second-strictest blasphemy laws after Iran</a>. About <a href="https://herald.dawn.com/news/1154036">1,500 Pakistanis</a> have been charged with blasphemy over the past three decades. In a case covered by the international media, Junaid Hafeez, a university lecturer, was <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/junaid-hafeez-pakistani-academic-given-death-sentence-for-blasphemy/a-51762475">sentenced to death</a> on the charge of insulting the prophet on Facebook in 2019. His sentence has been under <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN1YP07F?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews">appeal</a>.</p>
<p>Although no executions have ever taken place, extrajudicial killings related to blasphemy have occurred in Pakistan. Since 1990, more than <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46465247">70 people have been murdered</a> by mobs and vigilantes over allegations of insulting Islam.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/islam-authoritarianism-and-underdevelopment-global-and-historical-comparison?format=PB">My research</a> shows that blasphemy laws historically emerged to serve the political and religious authorities, and they continue to have a role in silencing dissent in many Muslim countries. </p>
<h2>Blasphemy and apostasy</h2>
<p>Of the <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Legislation%20Factsheet%20-%20Blasphemy_3.pdf">71 countries</a> that criminalize blasphemy, 32 are majority Muslim. Punishment and enforcement of these laws <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/blasphemy/index.php">vary</a>. </p>
<p>Blasphemy is punishable by death in Iran, Pakistan, <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/blasphemy/index.php#Afghanistan">Afghanistan</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/world/asia/brunei-stoning-gay-sex.html">Brunei</a>, <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Africa%20Speech%20Laws%20FINAL_0.pdf">Mauritania</a> and <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/national-laws-on-blasphemy-saudi-arabia">Saudi Arabia</a>. Among non-Muslim-majority countries, the <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Blasphemy%20Laws%20Report.pdf">harshest blasphemy laws are in Italy</a>, where the maximum penalty is two years in prison.</p>
<p>Half of the world’s 49 Muslim-majority countries have additional laws <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/29/which-countries-still-outlaw-apostasy-and-blasphemy/">banning apostasy</a>, meaning people may be <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/apostasy/index.php">punished for leaving Islam</a>. All countries with <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/29/which-countries-still-outlaw-apostasy-and-blasphemy/">apostasy laws</a> are Muslim-majority. Apostasy is often <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/blasphemy/index.php">charged along with blasphemy</a>. </p>
<p>Laws on apostasy are quite popular in some Muslim countries. According to a 2013 <a href="https://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-overview/">Pew survey</a>, about 75% of respondents in Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia favor making sharia, or Islamic law, the official law of the land. Among those who support sharia, around 25% in Southeast Asia, 50% in the Middle East and North Africa and 75% in South Asia say they support “executing those who leave Islam” – that is, they support laws punishing apostasy with death.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two firefighters stand in puddles in a burned-out between ." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Firefighters in a factory torched by an angry mob in Jhelum, Pakistan, after one of the factory’s employees was accused of desecrating the Quran, Nov. 21, 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/pakistani-firefighters-stand-in-a-burnt-out-factory-torched-news-photo/498134476?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The ulema and the state</h2>
<p>My 2019 book “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/islam-authoritarianism-and-underdevelopment-global-and-historical-comparison?format=PB">Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment</a>” traces the roots of blasphemy and apostasy laws in the Muslim world back to a historic alliance between Islamic scholars and government.</p>
<p>Starting around the year 1050, certain Sunni scholars of law and theology, called the “ulema,” began working closely with <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/V/bo5951736.html">political rulers</a> to challenge what they considered to be the sacrilegious influence of <a href="https://www.fulcrum.org/concern/monographs/s1784m135#toc">Muslim philosophers</a> on society. </p>
<p>Muslim philosophers had for three centuries been making major contributions to <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691135267/the-crest-of-the-peacock">mathematics</a>, <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/T/bo28119973.html">physics</a> and <a href="http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/medieval-islamic-medicine">medicine</a>. They developed the <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/305233/the-house-of-wisdom-by-jim-al-khalili/">Arabic number system</a> used across the West today and invented a forerunner of the modern <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674050044&content=toc">camera</a>.</p>
<p>The conservative ulema felt that these philosophers were inappropriately influenced by <a href="http://cup.columbia.edu/book/a-history-of-islamic-philosophy/9780231132206">Greek philosophy</a> and <a href="https://archive.org/stream/renaissanceofisl029336mbp/renaissanceofisl029336mbp_djvu.txt">Shiite Islam</a> against Sunni beliefs. The most prominent name in consolidating Sunni orthodoxy was the respected Islamic scholar <a href="https://fonsvitae.com/product/the-book-of-knowledge/">Ghazali</a>, who died in the year 1111.</p>
<p>In several <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo16220536.html">influential books</a> still widely read today, Ghazali declared two long-dead leading Muslim philosophers, <a href="https://fonsvitae.com/product/hardback-al-ghazali-deliverance-error-al-munqidh-min-al-dalal-works-copy/">Farabi and Ibn Sina</a>, as apostates for their unorthodox views on God’s power and the nature of resurrection. Their followers, Ghazali wrote, <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/I/bo3624354.html">could be punished with death</a>. </p>
<p>As modern-day historians <a href="https://uncpress.org/book/9780807856574/the-politics-of-knowledge-in-premodern-islam/">Omid Safi</a> and <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/al-ghazalis-philosophical-theology-9780195331622?cc=us&lang=en&">Frank Griffel</a> assert, Ghazali’s declaration provided justification to Muslim sultans from the 12th century onward who wished to <a href="https://www.iep.utm.edu/ibnrushd/">persecute</a> – even <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/as-Suhrawardi">execute</a> – <a href="https://criticalmuslim.com/issues/12-dangerous-freethinkers/abbasid-freethinking-humanism-aziz-al-azmeh">thinkers</a> seen as threats to conservative religious rule. </p>
<p>This “ulema-state alliance,” <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Islam_Authoritarianism_and_Underdevelopm/xjCdDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&bsq=%22ulema-state%22">as I call it</a>, began in the <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/V/bo5951736.html">mid-11th century</a> in <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691165851/lost-enlightenment">Central Asia</a>, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/continuity-and-change-in-medieval-persia-aspects-of-administrative-economic-and-social-history-11th-14th-century/oclc/16095227">Iran</a> and <a href="https://www.sunypress.edu/p-3207-a-learned-society-in-a-period-o.aspx">Iraq</a> and a century later spread to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/middle-east-history/knowledge-and-social-practice-medieval-damascus-11901350?format=PB">Syria</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/muslim-cities-in-the-later-middle-ages/02685655C9C18404192B9FE3E43E75D5">Egypt</a> and <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/muqaddimah-an-introduction-to-history/oclc/307867">North Africa</a>. In these regimes, questioning religious orthodoxy and political authority wasn’t merely dissent – it was apostasy.</p>
<h2>Wrong direction</h2>
<p>Parts of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/european-history-general-interest/rise-western-world-new-economic-history?format=PB">Western Europe</a> were ruled by a similar alliance between the Catholic Church and monarchs. These governments assaulted free thinking, too. During the Spanish Inquisition, between the 16th and 18th centuries, <a href="https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/publication/2150452">thousands of people</a> were tortured and killed for apostasy.</p>
<p>Blasphemy laws were also in place, if infrequently used, in various European countries until recently. <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/quran-burner-denmark-facebook-blasphemy-laws-repeal-a7771041.html">Denmark</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/27/ireland-votes-to-oust-blasphemy-ban-from-constitution">Ireland</a> and <a href="https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20160714/local/repealing-blasphemy-law-a-victory-for-freedom-of-speech-says-humanist.618859">Malta</a> all recently repealed their blasphemy laws. But they persist in many parts of the Muslim world. </p>
<p>In Pakistan, the military dictator <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/opinion/pakistans-tyranny-of-blasphemy.html">Zia-ul-Haq</a>, who ruled the country from 1978 to 1988, is responsible for its harsh blasphemy laws. An ally of the <a href="https://nation.com.pk/14-Oct-2016/10-things-you-need-to-know-about-pakistan-s-blasphemy-law">ulema</a>, Zia <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/565da4824.pdf">updated blasphemy laws</a> – written by British colonizers to avoid interreligious conflict – to defend specifically Sunni Islam and increased the maximum punishment to death. </p>
<p>From the 1920s until Zia, these laws had been applied <a href="https://nation.com.pk/14-Oct-2016/10-things-you-need-to-know-about-pakistan-s-blasphemy-law">only about a dozen times</a>. Since then, they have become a powerful tool for crushing dissent.</p>
<p>Some dozen Muslim countries, including <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/29/world/iran-drops-death-penalty-for-professor-guilty-of-blasphemy.html">Iran</a> and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/egypt-atheism-illegal-crackdown-non-believers-religion-islam-772471">Egypt</a>, have undergone a <a href="https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812264.001.0001/acprof-9780199812264">similar process</a> over the past four decades. </p>
<h2>Dissenting voices in Islam</h2>
<p>The conservative ulema base their case for blasphemy and apostasy laws on a few reported sayings of the prophet, known as hadith, primarily: “<a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Freedom_of_Religion_Apostasy_and_Islam/MrhBDgAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=apostasy+hadith+change+religion+kill&pg=PT87&printsec=frontcover">Whoever changes his religion, kill him</a>.” </p>
<p>But many <a href="https://english.kadivar.com/2006/09/29/the-freedom-of-thought-and-religion-in-islam-2/">Islamic scholars</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/opinion/islams-problem-with-blasphemy.html">Muslim intellectuals</a> reject <a href="https://yaqeeninstitute.org/jonathan-brown/the-issue-of-apostasy-in-islam/#.XjcRFy2ZNKN">this view as radical</a>. They argue that Prophet Muhammad never <a href="https://yaqeeninstitute.org/jonathan-brown/the-issue-of-apostasy-in-islam/#.XjcRFy2ZNKN">executed</a> anyone for apostasy, nor <a href="https://archive.org/details/MuhammadAndTheJewsAReExaminationByBarakatAhmad_201702">encouraged</a> his followers to do so. Criminalizing sacrilege isn’t based on Islam’s main sacred text, the Quran, either. It contains over <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315255002">100 verses</a> encouraging peace, freedom of conscience and religious tolerance. </p>
<p>In Chapter 2, Verse 256, the Quran states, “There is no coercion in religion.” Chapter 4, Verse 140 urges Muslims to simply leave blasphemous conversations: “When you hear the verses of God being rejected and mocked, do not sit with them.”</p>
<p>By using their political connections and <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691130705/the-ulama-in-contemporary-islam">historical authority</a> to interpret Islam, however, the conservative ulema have marginalized more <a href="https://oneworld-publications.com/progressive-muslims-pb.html">moderate voices</a>. </p>
<h2>Reaction to global Islamophobia</h2>
<p>Debates about blasphemy and apostasy laws among Muslims are influenced by international affairs.</p>
<p>Across the globe, Muslim minorities – including the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/israel/palestine">Palestinians</a> under Israeli occupation, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/10/world/europe/photos-chechen-war-russia.html">Chechens</a> of Russia, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/16/india-free-kashmiris-arbitrarily-detained">Muslim Kashmiris</a> of India, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis?gclid=CjwKCAiAsIDxBRAsEiwAV76N8zrlJqhi65w6DzRLwTrDYleM8U7DFswwKp61f3Oiav1Bq4schYpKzhoCfh4QAvD_BwE">Rohingya</a> of Myanmar and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html">Uyghurs</a> of China – have experienced persecution. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Several men and women, with faces covered, walk on a beach after being arrested." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Rohingya of Myanmar are among several Muslim minorities facing persecution worldwide. Rakhine state, Myanmar, Jan. 13, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/rohingya-people-who-were-arrested-at-sea-in-december-walk-news-photo/1193446518?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Alongside persecution are some <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-court-allows-courtroom-headscarf-ban/a-42857656">Western policies</a> that discriminate against certain Muslims, such as laws prohibiting <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/9781108476942">headscarves in schools</a>.</p>
<p>Such laws and policies can create the impression that Muslims are <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia-understanding-anti-muslim-sentiment-west.aspx">under siege</a> and provide an <a href="https://lb.boell.org/en/2012/08/15/muslim-political-theology-defamation-apostasy-and-anathema">excuse</a> for the belief that punishing sacrilege is a defense of the faith.</p>
<p>Instead, blasphemy laws have served political agendas of populist politicians and their <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/religious-populism-and-vigilantism-the-case-of-the-tehreek-e-labbaik-pakistan/">religious supporters in Pakistan</a> and some <a href="https://religiousfreedominstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/FORIS2_Blasphemy_ONLINE.pdf">other Muslim countries</a>.</p>
<p>Moreover, these laws contribute to <a href="https://deadline.com/2014/10/ben-affleck-comes-to-blows-with-bill-maher-over-his-opinions-toward-islam-video-845912/">anti-Muslim stereotypes</a> about religious intolerance. Some of my Turkish relatives even discourage my work on this topic, fearing it fuels Islamophobia. </p>
<p>But my research shows that criminalizing blasphemy and apostasy is more political than it is religious. The Quran does not require punishing sacrilege: Authoritarian politics do.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/execution-for-a-facebook-post-why-blasphemy-is-a-capital-offense-in-some-muslim-countries-129685">piece first published on February 20, 2020</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198647/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A political scientist explains the history of blasphemy laws in Muslim-majority nations and how they play a role in silencing dissent.Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1680592021-10-25T12:34:51Z2021-10-25T12:34:51ZHow ethnic and religious divides in Afghanistan are contributing to violence against minorities<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427863/original/file-20211021-21-1b4z10z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=80%2C17%2C5910%2C3808&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A powerful explosion Oct. 8, 2021, in a mosque in northern Afghanistan left several dead</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Afghanistan/40ef79cf2989416a8c9b87eff61f6ccc/photo?Query=afghanistan%20mosque%20explosion%20oct&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=21&currentItemNo=5">AP Photo/Abdullah Sahil</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Close to a hundred Afghan Shiite Muslims were killed in attacks on mosques in October 2021. One such attack took place on Oct. 15, when a group of suicide bombers <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/10/15/1046287550/suicide-bombers-attack-mosque-afghanistan">detonated explosives at a mosque in Kandahar</a>. Just over a week before that, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-prayer-religion-2b9d9863da38661ba6fa186a72ac5352">at least 46 people were killed in another suicide bomber attack</a> in northern Afghanistan. The Islamic State group claimed responsibility for both attacks.</p>
<p>Ethnicity and religion are key to understanding the politics and conflicts of today’s Afghanistan. <a href="http://sinno.com/publications---data.html">My research on Afghan affairs</a> can explain how they have created fault lines that have influenced Afghanistan’s politics since 1978.</p>
<h2>Afghanistan’s four largest ethnic groups</h2>
<p>The largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Afghanistan/Plant-and-animal-life#ref21424">estimated at around 45% of the population</a> and mostly concentrated in the south and east of the country, are the Sunni Muslim Pashtun.</p>
<p>The Pashtun population is split in half by the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Durand Line, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.11588/iaf.2013.44.1338">has a long history of challenging state authority and the legitimacy of official borders in both countries</a>. Until recently, when Pakistan <a href="https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-bd8165697772792b69d65c8509633cd9">built a fence on the border</a>, Pashtun tribesmen and fighters crossed the border as if it did not exist. </p>
<p>The Pashtun are often characterized as being fiercely independent and protective of their land, honor, traditions and faith. The first time Pashtun fighters defeated an invading superpower was when they destroyed a British army sent to colonize Afghanistan in what is known as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Anglo-Afghan-Wars">the First Anglo-Afghan War, which lasted from
1838 to 1942</a>. </p>
<p>The Pashtun tribes’ and clans’ martial prowess makes them very influential in the politics of Afghanistan. Except for two short-lived exceptions, <a href="https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/term/BIOG150239">in 1929</a> and <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801475788/organizations-at-war-in-afghanistan-and-beyond/#bookTabs=1">between 1992 and 1994</a>, only Pashtun leaders have ruled Afghanistan since 1750. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map showing the distribution of ethnic groups in Afghanistan" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=614&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=614&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428066/original/file-20211022-9357-rozzwa.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=614&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pashtuns constitute Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.loc.gov/resource/g7631e.ct001105/?r=-0.797,-0.02,2.594,1.066,0">Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division.</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The second-largest ethnic group in Afghanistan are the Tajiks, <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/129100/schetter.pdf">a term that refers to ethnic Tajiks as well as to other Sunni Muslim Persian speakers</a>. The Tajiks, who constitute some 30% of the Afghan population and are mostly concentrated in the northeast and west, have generally been accepted by Pashtuns as part of the fabric of life in Afghanistan, perhaps because of their common adherence to Sunni Islam. </p>
<p>The third-largest Sunni Muslim group are the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02634938408400451">Uzbeks and the closely related Turkmen in the north of the country</a>, who form around 10% of the population.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-hazara-of-afghanistan-an-expert-on-islam-explains-166776">The Hazara</a> – around 15% of the Afghan population – traditionally lived in the rough mountainous terrain in the center of Afghanistan, an area in which they historically sought shelter from Pashtun tribesmen who disapproved of their adherence to the Shiite sect of Islam. The Hazara have historically been some of the poorest and most marginalized people in Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Communist government and Soviet occupation</h2>
<p>Most Afghans hardly reacted when a faction of Afghanistan’s communist party took power in April 1978, because <a href="https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.2002.104.3.715">the Afghan government had traditionally played a very limited role outside of the larger cities</a>. </p>
<p>They did, however, rise in impromptu revolts when the communists sent their activists to conservative villages to teach Afghan children Marxist dogma. When the Soviets invaded in 1979, resistance spread to much of Afghanistan. Mujahideen – the Muslim warriors defending their land – <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801475788/organizations-at-war-in-afghanistan-and-beyond/#bookTabs=1">from all ethnic groups played a role in resisting the Soviet military</a>. </p>
<p>Later, a brutish Uzbek communist militia leader named Abdul Rashid Dostum eliminated most Uzbek Mujahideen, and most Hazara Mujahideen parties made a tacit agreement with the Soviets to reduce hostilities. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400834532">Most Pashtuns and Tajiks, however, continued to resist until the Soviet withdrawal</a> and the collapse of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul.</p>
<p>The Soviets promoted minority interests <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42909150?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">and gender equality</a> in areas of Afghanistan they controlled, which led the larger cities they controlled to evolve culturally to a point that made city life unrecognizably alien to many rural Afghans.</p>
<p>The withdrawal of the Soviet Red Army in February 1989 led to the cessation of U.S. aid to the Mujahideen parties, which turned Mujahideen field commanders, whose loyalty to party leaders was based on their ability to distribute financial and military resources, <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801475788/organizations-at-war-in-afghanistan-and-beyond/#bookTabs=1">into militarized independent local leaders</a>. Similarly, the regime’s militias and units also became independent after its collapse in April 1992. </p>
<p>Afghanistan, particularly the Pashtun areas, became fragmented, with hundreds of local leaders and warlords fighting over territory, drug production, smuggling routes and populations to tax. While many local leaders cared about the welfare of their kith and kin, <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501746420/warlord-survival/">some were warlords who abused fellow Afghans</a>. </p>
<h2>The first Taliban era</h2>
<p>In 1994, a group of previous Pashtun Mujahideen <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674032248">formed the Taliban and managed to control most of Afghanistan</a>, including Kabul, by the time the U.S. invaded in late 2001. </p>
<p>The Taliban’s rise <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674032248">was fueled by rural Pashtun support for its agenda</a> of ending warlord-generated insecurity, bringing back Pashtun prominence and recreating traditional Pashtun village life – as they imagined it to have been. The Taliban’s conservative views reflected the values of a large section of the public they governed in the south and east of the country.</p>
<p>The conservative rural Taliban, traumatized by decades of war, encountered an alien cultural environment when they took over Kabul. They reacted forcefully, limited urban women’s access to education and labor and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/23/hold-the-taliban-and-sharia-law-in-afghanistan">imposed strict limitations on dress, appearance and public behavior</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of Afghan women grieving at a funeral." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427865/original/file-20211021-27-1ef7md5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghan Hazaras face violence since the return of the Taliban.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/AfghanistanHazarasUnderAttack/18185cafd3314754a4d7ed874d9f5347/photo?Query=hazara&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=303&currentItemNo=7">AP Photo/Rahmat Gul</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Afghans in urban areas, particularly women, and members of Afghan minorities did not by and large share the parochial Taliban understanding of their common faith. They were undermined, threatened or punished when they attempted to challenge Taliban restrictions. The Shiite Hazara, in particular, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/afghan/Afrepor0.htm">were subjected to brutal retaliatory attacks</a> when they resisted Taliban rule. </p>
<h2>The US occupation</h2>
<p>The U.S. military <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/u-s-led-attack-on-afghanistan-begins">invaded Afghanistan and allied with minority local leaders</a> and some Pashtun warlords to oust the Taliban. These warlords ended up filling most key posts in the regime the U.S.-led coalition established in Kabul.</p>
<p>For warlords from all backgrounds, it appeared to be a golden age. The rest of the Afghan population, even more so in Pashtun areas than in others, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/06/how-us-funded-abuses-led-failure-afghanistan">went back to suffering from warlords’ predatory behavior</a>.</p>
<p>In 2004, three years after the U.S. occupation began, the mostly Pashtun Taliban <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf">reorganized as an insurgent force to fight the U.S.-led occupation</a> and the regime it established in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Enterprising urban youths, including women, from historically disadvantaged minorities, <a href="https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1246&context=gj_etds">particularly the Shiite Hazara</a>, took advantage of aid, education programs and foreign-driven employment opportunities to advance. In contrast, the rural Pashtun, who suffered the brunt of the warfare between the Taliban and U.S.-led coalition, were set back economically and hardly benefited from investments in health and education.</p>
<p>One of the byproducts of the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan was <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">the development of a local branch of the Islamic State, the Islamic State-Khorasan</a> (an Arabic name for the region). The organization was formed by defectors from the Taliban who felt that their leadership was too soft on the Americans. This group has engaged in attacks on Shiite civilians, whom it considers to be heretics and agents of Shiite Iran. It was responsible for attacks on U.S. troops such as the August 2021 <a href="https://apnews.com/article/europe-france-evacuations-kabul-9e457201e5bbe75a4eb1901fedeee7a1">attack on the Kabul airport</a>. It is also <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">antagonistic toward the Taliban</a>.</p>
<h2>The return of Taliban</h2>
<p>The return of the Taliban to Kabul after the withdrawal of U.S. troops in August 2021 is a return to a rural Pashtun order. Most Taliban leaders are rural Pashtuns who received their education in conservative madrassas in Afghanistan or Pashtun areas of Pakistan. <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/whos-who-in-taliban-interim-government/2360424">Only three of the 24 members</a> of the Taliban interim government are not Pashtuns – they are Tajiks.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 115,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>And the Taliban are running the country <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674032248">the way they imagine life in Pashtun villages used to be</a> before Afghanistan sank into perpetual war in 1979. The Taliban movement caters to the sensibilities of conservative rural Pashtun Muslims. Their understanding of Islam is not necessarily shared by other Afghans, religious as they may be.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the Islamic State group is conducting massive terrorist attacks on Shiite mosques, a tactic that originated with the Iraqi branch of the organization. One aim of the Islamic State’s attacks, I believe, is to drive recruitment that has weakened over the past years by appealing to anti-Shiite sentiment among the Pashtun, particularly after the U.S. withdrawal and Taliban successes on the battlefield.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168059/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdulkader Sinno does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of Afghan affairs explains the religious affiliations of different ethnic groups in Afghanistan and why they may not share a common understanding of Islam.Abdulkader Sinno, Associate Professor of Political Science and Middle Eastern Studies, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1550242021-08-30T21:08:59Z2021-08-30T21:08:59ZAmerica’s Muslims come from many traditions and cultures<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416847/original/file-20210818-23-d2hr8k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3600%2C2403&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">According to Islamic studies professor Abbas Barzegar, there are many ways Muslims practice their faith, with some young American Muslims even developing new interpretations of Islamic law.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/participants-in-the-iftar-at-trump-tower-event-of-the-m-news-photo/691710772?adppopup=true">Joana Toro/VIEWpress/Corbis via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>For people who would like to learn more about Islam, The Conversation is publishing <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/understanding-islam-108919">a series of articles</a>, available on our website or as <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/understanding-islam-79">six emails delivered every other day</a>, written by Senior Religion and Ethics Editor Kalpana Jain. Over the past few years she has commissioned dozens of articles on Islam written by academics. These articles draw from that archive and have been checked for accuracy by religion scholars.</em></p>
<p></p><hr><p></p>
<p>In the last installment of this series, you learned about some of the basic tenets of Islam that your neighbors, friends or colleagues may be practicing. In this newsletter, we will cover some of the different Muslim sects and the interesting ways they mix in the United States.</p>
<p>Journalists and scholars have pointed out how Muslims in the U.S. are often cast simplistically either as <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/are-you-good-or-bad-muslim-these-two-will-help-n302866">good or bad</a>: The good ones are raising their voices against terrorism and the bad ones are violent, or likely to be.</p>
<p>This view blocks out an “otherwise fascinating spectrum” of American Muslims, <a href="https://theconversation.com/eid-al-fitr-2016-understanding-the-differences-among-americas-muslims-61347">writes</a> scholar <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/abbas-barzegar-276672">Abbas Barzegar</a>. “Outside of Mecca itself,” he says, “there exists no other Muslim population that displays the theological, ideological, class and ethnic diversity as that which resides here” in the U.S.</p>
<p>So, what are the different ways of being a Muslim?</p>
<p>Many American Muslims belong to one of the two main sects in Islam – Sunni and Shiite. Each draws its faith and practice from the Quran and the life of the Prophet Muhammad. The two agree on most of the fundamentals of Islam.</p>
<p>But the two groups split after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">death of Prophet Muhammad in A.D. 632</a>, when issues over leadership emerged, writes religion scholar <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/ken-chitwood-160245">Ken Chitwood</a>. The majority of the Muslim community sided with Abu Bakr, one of the prophet’s closest companions. A minority, however, opted for the prophet’s cousin – Ali.</p>
<p>Muslims who rallied around Abu Bakr came to be called Sunni – meaning those who follow the Sunna, or sayings, deeds and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad.</p>
<p>Those who trusted in Ali came to be known as Shiite. The name comes from a contraction of “Shiat Ali,” meaning “partisans of Ali.” There are three main branches of Shiite Muslims: Zaydi, Twelver and Ismaili. Other Shiite-associated sects or movements include the Alawi in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-yemens-houthis-106423">Houthi</a> in Yemen. </p>
<p>Among Sunni Muslims there are four principal schools: Shafi'i, Hanbali, Maliki and Hanafi. There are also Sunni-associated religious reform movements like the Salafis and Wahhabis and political organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood. </p>
<p><iframe id="aPo6N" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/aPo6N/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Other than these sects, the Islamic tradition has other ways of approaching the divine.</p>
<p>Sufis believe in a more “inward, contemplative focus than many other forms of Islamic practice,” <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-sufis-and-why-does-is-see-them-as-threatening-73431">explains</a> scholar <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/peter-gottschalk-340446">Peter Gottschalk</a>. The 13th-century Persian poet and Sufi leader Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī communicated the yearning for a heartfelt relationship with God and believed contemplation was the way to achieve it.</p>
<p>Gottschalk explains that many Muslims and non-Muslims around the globe celebrate Sufi saints and gather together for worship in their shrines. Many Sufi saints are believed to be “friends of God” and have the power to perform miracles. The graves of these saints often become pilgrimage sites. However, militant groups, such as the Islamic State Group, do not embrace the traditions, and Sufi shrines have often been attacked in such countries as Afghanistan and Pakistan.</p>
<p>Another sect, the Ahmadiyya, was founded in the Punjab region of India by a Muslim religious leader, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, in 1889. Ahmadis believe Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was the promised Messiah of Islam. However, because of disagreements over who counts as a prophet in Islam, Ahmadis often face persecution from other Muslims. They have been declared heretics, or non-Muslim, in multiple countries. In Pakistan, the country with the largest number of Ahmadis, <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-pakistans-ahmadis-and-why-havent-they-voted-in-30-years-100797">they represent about 0.2% of the population of 208 million</a>. Because they are targeted for their beliefs, many Ahmadis come to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/12/ahmadi-ahmadiyya-muslims-islam-jalsa-salana-hampshire">United Kingdom</a>, <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-06-20/ahmadi-muslims-facing-persecution-abroad-finding-home-us">Canada, or the U.S.</a> to escape violence in their countries of origin. </p>
<p>All these global religious traditions are present in the U.S. <a href="https://theconversation.com/eid-al-fitr-2016-understanding-the-differences-among-americas-muslims-61347">As Barzegar points out</a>, small mosques in the United States may bring together different ethnic communities such as Bosnians, Turks, Bangladeshis and so on. Other large and diverse congregations may include both immigrants and Black Muslims.</p>
<p>Among these mosques is one in Harlem that was founded in 1964 by Malcolm X when he left the Nation of Islam. <a href="https://theconversation.com/eid-al-fitr-2016-understanding-the-differences-among-americas-muslims-61347">Bargezar writes</a> that the current spiritual leader of the mosque, Imam Talib Abdur Rashid, “champions” the fight against “institutional discrimination and structural inequality” as he joins hands with other “oppressed groups.”</p>
<p>American Muslims today are part of many traditions, beliefs and culture. In addition, they are developing new interpretations of Islamic law. For example, says Bargezar, an emerging number “lovingly accept queer and gay Muslims” and “<a href="https://theconversation.com/eid-al-fitr-2016-understanding-the-differences-among-americas-muslims-61347">allow for unconventional practices of women’s religious leadership</a>.” And a younger generation of Muslims are less likely to be affiliated with mosques. Instead, “you will find them in Silicon Valley, Syrian refugee camps and at the same time on Snapchat,” he adds.</p>
<p><em>This article was reviewed for accuracy by <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/ken-chitwood-160245">Ken Chitwood</a>, a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Berlin Graduate School of Muslim Cultures & Societies at Freie Universität Berlin. He is also a journalist-fellow at the University of Southern California’s Center for Religion and Civic Culture.</em></p>
<p><strong><a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-sufis-and-why-does-is-see-them-as-threatening-73431">Fact</a>:</strong> An eighth-century female Sufi saint, known popularly as Rabia al-Adawiyya, is said to have walked through her hometown of Basra, in modern-day Iraq, with a lit torch in one hand and a bucket of water in another. When asked why, she replied that she hoped to burn down heaven and douse hell’s fire so people would – without concern for reward or punishment – love God.
<em>– From an <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-sufis-and-why-does-is-see-them-as-threatening-73431">article</a> written by Peter Gottschalk, Professor of Religion, Wesleyan University</em></p>
<p><strong>In the next issue: <a href="https://theconversation.com/four-understanding-islam-its-contribution-to-the-world-155107">Islam’s contributions to the world</a></strong></p>
<p></p><hr><p></p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418527/original/file-20210830-17-1ssshg1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418527/original/file-20210830-17-1ssshg1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418527/original/file-20210830-17-1ssshg1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418527/original/file-20210830-17-1ssshg1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418527/original/file-20210830-17-1ssshg1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418527/original/file-20210830-17-1ssshg1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418527/original/file-20210830-17-1ssshg1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>You can read all six articles in this <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/understanding-islam-108919">Understanding Islam series on TheConversation.com</a>, or we can deliver them straight to your inbox if you <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/understanding-islam-79">sign up for our email newsletter course</a>.</em></p>
<p></p><hr><p></p>
<h2>Articles from The Conversation in this edition:</h2>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/eid-al-fitr-2016-understanding-the-differences-among-americas-muslims-61347">Eid al-Fitr 2016: Understanding the differences among America’s Muslims</a></p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-sufis-and-why-does-is-see-them-as-threatening-73431">Who are the Sufis and why does IS see them as threatening?</a></p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-pakistans-ahmadis-and-why-havent-they-voted-in-30-years-100797">Who are Pakistan’s Ahmadis and why haven’t they voted in 30 years</a></p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">What is the Shia-Sunni divide</a> </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-yemens-houthis-106423">Who are Yemen’s Houthis?</a></p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Further Reading and Resources:</h2>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://reportingislam.org/">Reporting Islam Project</a>: Based in Australia, the website provides information to journalists and others to help them understand Islam and to clear stereotypes and misconceptions.</p></li>
<li><p>“<a href="https://uncpress.org/book/9780807899762/mystical-dimensions-of-islam/">Mystical Dimensions of Islam</a>,” by influential Islamic scholar Annemarie Schimmel. She was a professor at Harvard University from 1967 to 1992. This book provides valuable introduction to Sufism, the main form of Islamic mysticism.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155024/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Day 3 of our Understanding Islam series. Many Muslims belong to one of two sects of Islam, which agree on most of the fundamentals of Islam but vary in others.Kalpana Jain, Senior Religion + Ethics Editor/ Director of the Global Religion Journalism InitiativeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1663232021-08-25T12:28:45Z2021-08-25T12:28:45ZTaliban’s religious ideology – Deobandi Islam – has roots in colonial India<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417455/original/file-20210823-26-gu7pjr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Students on the campus of Darul Uloom, the Deoband school of Islam located in a small town, Deoband, in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-picture-taken-on-september-7-2011-muslim-students-news-photo/128403818?adppopup=true">Sajjad Hussain/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Following the Taliban’s rapid taking of power in what it describes as a reestablished “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-kabul-bagram-e1ed33fe0c665ee67ba132c51b8e32a5">Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan</a>,” fears of a certain kind of Islamist ideology being brought back <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/talibans-rapid-advance-across-afghanistan-2021-08-10/">have led a large number of Afghans to flee, or fear for their lives</a>. </p>
<p>The Taliban were known for their oppressive rule. They ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, at which point they were <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/afghanistan-war">pushed out of power by U.S. and British troops</a>. Under the Taliban rule, religious minorities and other Muslims who did not share their fundamentalist understanding of Islam were not tolerated. The Taliban also <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/taliban-rules-for-women-during-last-afghanistan-takeover-2021-8">severely restricted</a> the rights of women and girls.</p>
<p>As scholars who <a href="https://polisci.indiana.edu/about/faculty/ganguly-sumit.html">research ethno-religious conflicts</a> in South Asia, we have studied the origins of the Taliban’s religious beliefs. The roots of this ideology – Deobandi Islam – can be traced to 19th century colonial India. </p>
<h2>Colonialism and Islam</h2>
<p>Deobandi Islam <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520298002/revival-from-below">emerged in India in 1867</a>, 10 years after a major Indian nationalist uprising against the rule of the British East India Company.</p>
<p>Two Muslims clerics, Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi and Maulana Rashid Muhammad Gangohi, <a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2715157/view">were behind the setting up of the Deobandi school</a>. Their aim was to indoctrinate Muslim youth with an austere, rigid and pristine vision of Islam. At its heart, Deobandi Islam was an anti-colonial movement designed to revitalize Islam. </p>
<p>This school of Islamic thought had a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1215/1089201x-2006-049">very particular understanding of the faith</a>. The Deobandi brand of Islam adheres to orthodox Islamism insisting that the adherence to Sunni Islamic law, or sharia, is the path of salvation. It <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-deobandi.htm">insists on the revival of Islamic practices</a> that go back to the seventh century – the time of the Prophet Muhammad. It upholds the notion of global jihad as a sacred duty to protect Muslims across the world, and is opposed to any non-Islamic ideas. </p>
<p>The first <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-madrasa-schools-and-what-skills-do-they-impart-99497">madrassa</a> – or Islamic school – to educate Muslim youth in the Deobandi tradition was set up in the north Indian state of present-day Uttar Pradesh toward the end of the 19th century.</p>
<p>The Deobandi school system spread over the next several decades and attracted Muslim youth in different parts of the Indian subcontinent. For instance, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1356186307007778">Deobandi tradition became the most popular school of Islamic thought</a> among the Pashtuns, an ethnic group living in an area on either side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. </p>
<p>Pashtun leaders played an instrumental role in establishing and <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.org/article/durand-line/">expanding the Deobandi curriculum</a> and tradition in the Pashtun belt across the <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.org/article/durand-line">Durand line</a>, the colonial border separating British India from Afghanistan. </p>
<h2>Funding and enrollments</h2>
<p>After British India was partitioned in 1947 between India and Pakistan, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/deoband-school-and-the-demand-for-pakistan/oclc/592479?tab=details">many prominent Deobandi scholars migrated to Pakistan</a>, setting up a large number of madrassas. </p>
<p>With the independence of India and Pakistan, the school placed its full attention on training the students <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-deobandi.htm">within this fundamentalist Islamic tradition</a>.</p>
<p>In the years and decades after the independence of Pakistan, Deobandi madrassas spread across Pakistan, and one of their principal causes of political activism became <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/4d67513f2.html">India’s treatment of Muslims</a> in the Indian-controlled portion of Jammu and Kashmir. </p>
<p>According to one estimate, by 1967 there were as many as <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-past-and-future-of-deobandi-islam/">8,000 Deobandi schools worldwide</a> and thousands of Deobandi graduates mainly in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Malaysia. </p>
<p>At first, the Deobandi madrassas tended to be poorly funded. One event that greatly boosted the growth of enrollment in Deobandi madrassas was the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/08/the-soviet-war-in-afghanistan-1979-1989/100786/">Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979</a>. </p>
<p>The CIA’s covert involvement in the war fueled Islamic militancy and inadvertently helped <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Ghost_Wars.html?id=ToYxFL5wmBIC">organize and orchestrate a resistance</a> movement mostly composed of ardent religious fighters. A substantial number of these Afghan fighters were drawn from the Deobandi madrassas, especially the Pashtuns, who played a leading role in the resistance. </p>
<p>During that time, the Deobandi madrassas also <a href="https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00023">gained financial assistance</a>. This assistance, as scholar <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=8khoUBcAAAAJ&hl=en">Thomas Hegghammer</a> writes, came mainly through American aid dollars meant for Pakistan and money from Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>Saudi leaders, in fact, used the <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/Religion_and_Politics_in_Saudi_Arabia_Wahhabism_and_the_State">influence of their money to push their own interpretation of Islam – Wahhabism – at the Deobandi madrassas</a>. Wahhabism is a deeply conservative form of Islam that believes in a literal interpretation of the Quran. At this point, <a href="https://theprint.in/india/were-indians-first-taliban-view-of-islam-not-ours-say-deoband-islamic-scholars-locals/720283/">the Deobandi madrassas moved far away from their religious roots</a>. </p>
<h2>Ties of kinship</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Afghans refugees line up for food disbursement at a camp in Pakistan in 2001." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghans have fled upheaval in their country for more than 40 years, often landing in refugee camps in Pakistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/afghan-refugees-line-up-for-cooking-oil-during-a-food-news-photo/1171969?adppopup=true">Chris Hondros/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Following the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, <a href="https://media.nationalgeographic.org/assets/file/afghan_MIG.pdf">millions of Afghan refugees, in several waves</a>, took shelter in Pakistan, especially in its Pashtun belt. </p>
<p>Keen on obtaining a strategic toehold in Afghanistan, Pakistan <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/pw_175-afghanistan_pakistan_ties_and_future_stability_in_afghanistan.pdf">actively recruited young men in refugee camps</a>, imbuing them further with religious zeal to <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300163681/taliban">fight the Soviets</a>. </p>
<p>Driven out of their homes in Afghanistan, the dispossessed young Afghans thrived in the refugee camps, in part due to ties of ethnicity as Pashtuns. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316226803.010">Drawn to a religiously based offensive against what they deemed to be an infidel</a>, or foreign occupier, they became ready recruits to the anti-Soviet cause.</p>
<p>Many of the Taliban’s key leaders and fighters, including <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230106581_6">Mullah Omar, the founder of the organization</a>, had studied in the Deobandi seminaries in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. </p>
<h2>After the civil war</h2>
<p>After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the fighters <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-02.htm">continued to enjoy the support of Pakistan’s security establishment</a> and private actors for financial assistance.</p>
<p>When Afghanistan plunged into a civil war in 1992, various factions of the anti-Soviet resistance vied for power. Among them was the Northern Alliance, a group that India and Russia had backed and was under the <a href="https://doi.org/10.2968/057006004">leadership of an ethnic Tajik, Ahmed Shah Massoud</a>, who resisted the Taliban and acquired an almost mythic status.</p>
<p>However, as scholar <a href="https://www.carlisle.army.mil/kmn/curriculumVitae/287993_CurriculumVitae.pdf">Larry P. Goodson</a> writes, with the crucial and substantial assistance of Pakistan’s security establishment, <a href="https://uwapress.uw.edu/book/9780295980508/afghanistans-endless-war/">the Taliban emerged victorious and seized power in 1996</a>. </p>
<p>Once in power, they imposed their distinctive brand of Islam on the country – far removed from its religious roots in colonial India. </p>
<p>[<em>3 media outlets, 1 religion newsletter.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/this-week-in-religion-76/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=religion-3-in-1">Get stories from The Conversation, AP and RNS.</a>]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166323/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Deobandi Islam, the religious school that the Taliban draw their ideology from, was set up in 19th century India to educate Muslim youth.Sohel Rana, PhD Student, Indiana UniversitySumit Ganguly, Distinguished Professor of Political Science and the Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1658532021-08-11T12:29:55Z2021-08-11T12:29:55ZWhat is the Islamic New Year? A scholar of religion explains<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415549/original/file-20210810-25-ouym6u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=27%2C22%2C1499%2C754&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A late 19th-early 20th century painting by Abbas Al-Musavi depicting the Battle of Karbala, which occurred in 680.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brooklynmuseum.org/opencollection/objects/3054">Gift of K. Thomas Elghanayan in honor of Nourollah Elghanayan, Photo: Brooklyn Museum</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Much of the world today follows the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Gregorian-calendar">Gregorian solar calendar</a>, which has its origins in medieval Western Christianity. Conversely, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvwrm4gj.8">Islamic calendar</a> or hijrī, is a lunar calendar. There are 12 months in the hijrī calendar, with each month being 29 or 30 days long. </p>
<p>It would be over 32 to 33 years that the lunar calendar will completely cycle the solar calendar. That’s why the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan can fall in October one year, and a few years later it would be in July. It also means that the Islamic New Year is never on the same date and would also depend on the sighting of the <a href="http://adsabs.harvard.edu/pdf/1994QJRAS..35..425L">moon</a>.</p>
<p>Year one of the hijrī calendar is based on the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Muhammad-the-Prophet-and-Arabia/Rubin/p/book/9781409408468">emigration of the Prophet Muhammad</a> from Mecca to Medina in the year A.D. 622 to establish the first Muslim community. Despite Muhammad being from Mecca, his new faith and followers were persecuted for their beliefs. The Islamic calendar marks that beginning in Medina. </p>
<p>Additionally, the Islamic New Year is associated with the <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_23081">prophets</a> of the Christian faith as well: This is the day when Noah’s Ark is believed to have to have come to rest on land, the day on which God forgave Adam, the day of Joseph’s release from prison, the day of the births of Jesus, Abraham, and Adam, throughout the ages. It is also believed to be the day of the Prophet Muḥammad’s conception in the year 570.</p>
<p>Currently, while much of the world sees this as 2021, it is the Islamic year 1443, <a href="https://www.news18.com/news/lifestyle/islamic-new-year-2021-date-significance-and-all-you-need-to-know-about-the-hijri-new-year-4060433.html">starting on Aug. 10</a> A.H.. In Latin, A.H. means Anno Hegirae – the year of the hijra, or emigration.</p>
<p>Unlike many traditions that celebrate the new year as a joyous occasion, the Islamic New Year is typically a somber affair. The first Islamic month is <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20837003.pdf">Muḥarram</a>, a sacred time for prayer and reflection for both <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">Sunni and Shiite</a> Muslims.</p>
<h2>Why the Islamic New Year matters</h2>
<p>The 10th day of Muḥarram, known as Ashura, is particularly significant to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5hk0qh">Shiite</a> Muslims. In the year 680, the Prophet Mohammad’s grandson <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_30572">Ḥusayn</a> was killed along with most of his family and supporters in the <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/185346/pdf">Battle of Karbala</a> in present-day Iraq. </p>
<p><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2214-871X_ei1_SIM_6019">Yazīd</a>
the caliph of the Ummayad dynasty, which ruled an area spanning from Spain to Persia from 661 to 750, saw Ḥusayn as a political threat and brutally suppressed him and his movement. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 100,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>The battle was a turning point for the Shiites, who saw indifference by the majority in the massacre of the rightful heirs of Muhammad as final proof of a fundamental irreconcilability with Sunni Islam. It solidified the <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Islam%3A+A+Brief+History%2C+2nd+Edition-p-9781444358988">Sunni-Shia</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">schism</a> in Islam. </p>
<p>For the Shiites, Ḥusayn represents someone who stood against the forces of injustice and evil. They <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110803310">commemorate the battle during the first two Islamic months</a> of Muḥarram and Ṣafar.</p>
<p>In many countries like India and Iran, the Islamic New Year and Ashura are public holidays. Life events, such as birthdays and marriages, historically were not celebrated for the first 10 days of the month. Sunnis also observe Ashura. Many observe fasts as a way to atone for their sins and perform acts of charity. </p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. publishes short, accessible explanations of newsworthy subjects by academics in their areas of expertise.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165853/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Iqbal Akhtar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Islamic New Year marks the first day of Muharram, a sacred month of prayer and annual reflection.Iqbal Akhtar, Associate Professor of Religious Studies, Florida International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1359002020-04-23T12:10:49Z2020-04-23T12:10:49ZHajj cancellation due to coronavirus is not the first time plague has disrupted this Muslim pilgrimage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343589/original/file-20200623-188921-1mmj4wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C5742%2C3828&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muslim pilgrims at the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia's holy city of Mecca, February 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/muslim-pilgrims-wear-masks-at-the-grand-mosque-in-saudi-news-photo/1203962527?adppopup=true">Photo by Abdel Ghani Bashir/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Saudi Arabia has effectively <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/06/22/881876215/saudi-arabia-announces-this-years-hajj-will-be-very-limited">canceled the hajj for most of the world’s Muslims</a>, saying the obligatory pilgrimage to Mecca will be “very limited” this year due to the coronavirus. Only pilgrims residing in Saudi Arabia may attend the event, which begins in late July.</p>
<p>Earlier this year, Saudi authorities <a href="https://time.com/5813644/saudi-arabia-hajj-postpone-coronavirus/">had indicated that this decision might be coming</a> and had also <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-fears-put-a-halt-to-the-muslim-pilgrimage-of-umrah-but-not-yet-the-hajj-132943">halted travel to holy sites as part of the umrah</a>, the “lesser pilgrimage” that takes place throughout the year.</p>
<p>A dramatically scaled down hajj will be a <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/coronavirus-thousands-of-muslims-in-limbo-as-saudi-arabia-bans-religious-pilgrimages">massive economic hit</a> for the country and many <a href="https://www.nationalobserver.com/2020/03/16/news/massive-economic-losses-expected-if-covid-19-closes-down-hajj">businesses</a> globally, such as the hajj travel industry. <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-02-26/saudi-arabia-halts-travel-to-islams-holiest-site-over-virus">Millions of Muslims visit the Saudi kingdom</a> each year, and the pilgrimage has not been canceled since the founding of the Saudi Kingdom in 1932. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=cQRzNv8AAAAJ&hl=en">as a scholar of global Islam</a>, I have encountered many instances in the more than 1,400-year history of the pilgrimage when its planning had to be altered due to armed conflicts, disease or just plain politics. Here are just a few.</p>
<h2>Armed conflicts</h2>
<p>One of the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/archive-editions/history/middle-east-history/records-hajj-documentary-history-pilgrimage-mecca?format=WW&isbn=9781852074302">earliest significant interruptions of the hajj</a> took place in A.D. 930, when a sect of Ismailis, a minority <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">Shiite</a> community, known as <a href="https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/*-SIM_1997">the Qarmatians</a> raided Mecca because they believed the hajj to be a pagan ritual. </p>
<p>The Qarmatians were said to have killed scores of pilgrims and absconded with the black stone of the Kaaba – which Muslims believed was sent down from heaven. They took the stone to their stronghold in modern-day Bahrain. </p>
<p>Hajj was suspended until the Abbasids, a dynasty that ruled over a vast empire stretching across North Africa, the Middle East to modern-day India from A.D. 750-1258, <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=E50rDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA123&lpg=PA123&dq=Mecca:+A+Literary+History+of+the+Muslim+Holy+Land+qarmatians&source=bl&ots=8LzR1Oe8-r&sig=ACfU3U2iLvRnR1YuuPrNNTkSD5hoWfIc4Q&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Mecca%3A%20A%20Literary%20History%20of%20the%20Muslim%20Holy%20Land%20qarmatians&f=false">paid a ransom for its return over 20 years later</a> </p>
<h2>Political disputes</h2>
<p>Political disagreements and conflict have often meant that pilgrims from certain places were kept from performing hajj because of lack of protection along overland routes into the Hijaz, the region in the west of Saudi Arabia where both Mecca and Medina are located.</p>
<p>In A.D. 983, <a href="https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01604632/document">the rulers of Baghdad and Egypt were at war</a>. The Fatimid rulers of Egypt claimed to be the true leaders of Islam and opposed the rule of the Abbasid dynasty in Iraq and Syria. </p>
<p>Their political tug-of-war kept various pilgrims from Mecca and Medina for eight years, until A.D. 991. </p>
<p>Then, during the fall of the Fatimids in A.D. 1168, Egyptians could not enter the Hijaz. It is also said that no one from Baghdad performed hajj for years after the city fell to Mongol invasion in A.D. 1258. </p>
<p>Many years later, <a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8rzGxWUQiKkC&oi=fnd&pg=PP10&dq=napoleon%27s+invasion+of+middle+east&ots=xOlA2E9Vgl&sig=rJRR505D6ImdPYhgHL-JQwQk3gw&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">Napoleon’s military incursions aimed at checking British colonial influence in the region</a> prevented many pilgrims from hajj between A.D. 1798 and 1801. </p>
<h2>Diseases and hajj</h2>
<p>Much like the present, diseases and other natural calamities have also come in the way of the pilgrimage. </p>
<p>There are reports that <a href="https://blog.siasat.pk/40-times-when-hajj-was-cancelled-in-the-past/">the first time an epidemic of any kind caused hajj to be canceled was an outbreak of plague in A.D. 967</a>. And <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3e59/05c526e05a6a70ef731dcfc44ff10dc50ba9.pdf">drought and famine</a> caused the Fatimid ruler to cancel overland hajj routes in A.D. 1048.</p>
<p>Cholera outbreaks in <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(17)30454-1/fulltext">multiple years throughout the 19th century</a> claimed thousands of pilgrims’ lives during the hajj. One cholera outbreak in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in 1858 forced thousands of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30069613?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Egyptians to flee to Egypt’s Red Sea border</a>, where they were quarantined before being allowed back in. </p>
<p>Indeed, for much of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, cholera remained a “<a href="https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=history_theses">perennial threat</a>” and caused frequent disruption to the annual hajj. </p>
<p>An outbreak of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/30069613.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Af28803d78a667edb15d40266150a6df8">cholera in India in 1831</a> claimed thousands of pilgrims’ lives on their way to perform hajj. </p>
<p>In fact, with many outbreaks in quick succession, the hajj was frequently interrupted throughout the mid-19th century.</p>
<h2>Recent years</h2>
<p>In more recent years, too, the pilgrimage has been disrupted for many similar reasons.</p>
<p>In 2012 and 2013 Saudi authorities encouraged the ill and the elderly not to undertake the pilgrimage amid concerns over <a href="https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/20/4/13-1708_article">Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, or MERS</a>. </p>
<p>Contemporary geopolitics and human rights issues have also played a role in who was able to perform the pilgrimage.</p>
<p>In 2017, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/hajj-qataris-year-saudi-row-170825192148831.html">the 1.8 million Muslim citizens of Qatar were not able to perform the hajj</a> following the decision by Saudi Arabia and three other Arab nations to sever diplomatic ties with the country over differences of opinion on various geopolitical issues. </p>
<p>The same year, some Shiite governments such as Iran leveled charges <a href="http://www.alterinter.org/spip.php?article4502">alleging that Shiites were not allowed</a> to perform the pilgrimage by Sunni Saudi authorities.</p>
<p>In other cases, faithful Muslims <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/02/mohammed-bin-salman-is-making-muslims-boycott-mecca-hajj-islam-pilgrimage-saudi-arabia/">have called for boycotts</a>, citing Saudi Arabia’s <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-06-19/un-report-sees-credible-evidence-linking-saudi-crown-prince-khashoggi-murder">human rights</a> <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/yemen">record</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329187/original/file-20200420-152563-fw3vsj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329187/original/file-20200420-152563-fw3vsj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329187/original/file-20200420-152563-fw3vsj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329187/original/file-20200420-152563-fw3vsj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329187/original/file-20200420-152563-fw3vsj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329187/original/file-20200420-152563-fw3vsj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329187/original/file-20200420-152563-fw3vsj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sanitary workers wearing protective face masks clean the Grand Mosque complex in Mecca on Feb. 27, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/sanitary-workers-wearing-protective-face-masks-continue-to-news-photo/1203849601?adppopup=true">Haitham el-Tabei/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While the decision to cancel the hajj will surely disappoint Muslims looking to perform the pilgrimage, many among them have been sharing online a relevant hadith – a tradition reporting the sayings and practice of the prophet Muhammad – that provides guidance about <a href="http://www.iupui.edu/%7Emsaiupui/071.sbt.html">traveling during a time of an epidemic</a>: “If you hear of an outbreak of plague in a land, do not enter it; but if the plague breaks out in a place while you are in it, do not leave that place.”</p>
<p><em>This story has been updated to reflect the latest developments.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/135900/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ken Chitwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Saudi Arabia is barring international visitors for the hajj. A scholar explains a long history of disease, politics and war that have previously prevented people from making the journey to Mecca.Ken Chitwood, Lecturer, Concordia College New York | Journalist-fellow, USC Center for Religion and Civic Culture, Concordia College New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1261752019-11-13T13:10:03Z2019-11-13T13:10:03ZWhat is a caliph? The Islamic State tries to boost its legitimacy by hijacking a historic institution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300751/original/file-20191107-10930-39lr05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An image of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who died on Oct. 26, 2019..</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/US-Islamic-State/fee3c4433beb4f088323b85b942a5c0c/38/0">Department of Defense via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Just days after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/27/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-isis-leader-killed-us-donald-trump">death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a> on Oct. 27, the Islamic State named <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50254785">Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi</a> as the new “caliph.” </p>
<p>In 2014, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2014/jun/30/isis-declares-caliphate-in-iraq-and-syria-live-updates">IS conquered vast swaths of Iraq and Syria</a> and declared itself to be the “caliphate.” </p>
<p>Defined and applied in different ways over the centuries, the fundamental idea behind the caliphate is the <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/hugh-kennedy/caliphate/9780465094394/?lens=perseus">just ordering of society</a> according to the will of God. </p>
<p>The Islamic State’s caliphate was never widely recognized among the global Muslim community and no longer has significant territory. But the Islamic State still uses the history of the caliphate to push their claims.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=cQRzNv8AAAAJ&hl=en">a scholar of global Islam</a>, every time I teach my “Introduction to Islam” class, questions about the caliphate come up, in part because of IS’s claims. </p>
<h2>Caliph conundrums</h2>
<p>The leader of a caliphate is called the caliph, meaning deputy or representative. All caliphs are believed to be the successor to Prophet Muhammad. Muhammad was not a caliph; <a href="https://quran.com/33/40">according to the Quran</a> he was the last and greatest of the prophets. </p>
<p>That means no one can replace Muhammad as the messenger of God. The caliph, for example, is not always seen as holding special spiritual authority. But he is meant to preside over the caliphate in the absence of Muhammad.</p>
<p>The debate over who was the rightful representative of the prophet began immediately after his death. <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=O36yXxCMiQIC&printsec=frontcover&dq=islam+a+brief+history&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">While the majority supported Abu Bakr</a> – one of the prophet’s closest companions – a minority opted for his young son-in-law and cousin, Ali. </p>
<p>Abu Bakr’s supporters would come to be known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">Sunni Muslims</a>, who believe that Muhammad did not leave instructions regarding his successor. Those who felt Ali was appointed by the prophet to be the political and spiritual leader of the fledgling Muslim community became known as Shiite Muslims. </p>
<p>Abu Bakr was the first caliph and Ali the fourth. </p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=EmN8tCx_jR4C&pg=PA9&dq=the+rashidun&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwisvPS13uHlAhUGjqQKHeqGB_0Q6AEIWjAH#v=onepage&q=the%20rashidun&f=false">The second and third caliphs were Umar and Uthman</a>. Under Umar, the caliphate expanded to include many regions of the world such as the lands of the former Byzantine and Sassanian empires in Asia Minor, Persia and Central Asia. Uthman is credited with compiling the Quran. </p>
<p>That al-Baghdadi adopted the name of the first caliph was no coincidence. Together, Sunni Muslims call the first four caliphs <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118455074.wbeoe277">the Rashidun, or the “Rightly Guided Caliphs,”</a> because they were close companions or relations of Muhammad. They are also believed to be extraordinarily pious. This period lasted about 30 years. </p>
<h2>The complex history of the caliphate</h2>
<p>After rebels assassinated Uthman in A.D. 656, Ali was elected caliph. However, a civil war soon broke out between Ali and Muʿawiya ibn Abi Sufyan. The civil war ended in Sufyan’s victory and the formation of the Umayyad caliphate in A.D. 661. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/isru/hd_isru.htm">The Umayyad dynasty lasted 89 years</a>.</p>
<p>The Abbasid dynasty descended from Muhammad’s uncle, Abbas ibn Abdul-Muttalib, and succeeded the Umayyads.</p>
<p>These two caliphates oversaw the continuing expansion of the empire. <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-24774-8_2">Under them architecture, the arts and sciences flourished</a>.</p>
<p>For example, the “Dome of the Rock,” a shrine in the Old City of Jerusalem, was built under an Umayyad caliph as <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233604991_The_Dome_of_the_Rock_Origin_of_its_Octagonal_Plan">a monument</a> to the rising supremacy of their empire.</p>
<p>The Grand Library of Baghdad, also known as the “House of Wisdom,” was supported by Abbasid patronage. The “House of Wisdom” is credited with being a center of translation, scientific study and academic exchange. This period of flourishing, from the eighth to the 14th century, is often referred to as the <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=O36yXxCMiQIC&pg=PA39&dq=islamic+golden+age&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiGvsuz4OHlAhU9wAIHHdFcBmo4FBDoAQgvMAE#v=onepage&q=islamic%20golden%20age&f=false">“Islamic Golden Age</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dome of The Rock, in Jerusalem.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/rayinmanila/24665287394">Ray in Manila</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Both before and after the fall of the Abbasids in A.D. 1258, a succession of various empires <a href="http://teachmideast.org/articles/timeline-of-islamic-dynasties/">made overlapping and competing claims</a> to the caliphate. These included the Mamluks of Cairo and the Umayyads in Cordóba, Spain. </p>
<p>In 1517, the Turkish Ottomans amassed enough land and power throughout Asia Minor, North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and Eastern Europe to claim the title “caliphate.” Ottoman sultans, however, were not universally recognized as caliphs. <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/declaring-caliphate-doesnt-make-one-caliph">Many Muslims believe</a> that the caliphate effectively ended after the Mongol conquest of Abbasid Baghdad in A.D. 1258.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the Ottomans effectively held on to that title until 1924, when the Turkish nationalist and secularist Kemal Ataturk <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=R3SYDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=ataturk+abolished+caliphate&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi_tJ-e4eHlAhVS2KQKHTeXA4kQ6AEISDAE#v=onepage&q=ataturk%20abolished%20caliphate&f=false">abolished the caliphate</a>. </p>
<h2>Resurrecting the caliphate?</h2>
<p>The idea of the caliphate, which the Islamic State has forcefully promoted, recalls a time and a place when Islamic states flourished politically, economically and socially. It also summons up a spiritual vision of a supposedly more devout and dedicated Muslim community than exists today. </p>
<p>Other modern-day Islamists have called for a <a href="https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4287&context=gc_etds">resurrection of the caliphate,</a> or at least its ideals, as a way to recapture the vibrancy of the past. However, only violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida or the Islamic State have tried to make it a tangible reality.</p>
<p>Killing al-Baghdadi has not quashed the Islamic State’s version of the caliphate. The idea <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state">lives on and continues to motivate</a> its members in enclaves across the globe. It is worth mentioning that the name of their new caliph is an honorific title for a member of Prophet Muhammad’s family – “al-Qurashi.” This prophetic lineage is one more way IS is trying to resurrect the history of the caliphate for its destructive purposes. </p>
<p>[ <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=expertise">Expertise in your inbox. Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter and get a digest of academic takes on today’s news, every day.</a></em> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126175/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ken Chitwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Islamic State has appointed yet another ‘caliph’ after the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. What is the idea behind the caliphate?Ken Chitwood, Lecturer, Concordia College New York, Concordia College New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1253112019-10-23T19:06:23Z2019-10-23T19:06:23ZUS retreat from Syria could see Islamic State roar back to life<p>“Remaining and expanding”. The <a href="https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/remaining-and-expanding-why-local-violent-extremist-organizations-reflag-isis">propaganda tagline</a> of Islamic State (IS) has rung hollow since the collapse of the physical caliphate. But recent developments in northeastern Syria threaten to give it fresh legitimacy. </p>
<p>US President Donald Trump lifted sanctions on Turkey after he announced the Turkish government agreed to a <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/trump-says-turkey-s-ceasefire-in-syria-now-permanent-sanctions-lifted-20191024-p533ob.html">permanent ceasefire</a> in northern Syria. </p>
<p>In a televised speech, he pushed back against criticisms of his decision to remove 1,000 troops from Syria, abandoning their Kurdish allies.</p>
<p>This decision allowed Turkish forces – a hybrid of Turkish military and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/14/turkish-backed-forces-freeing-islamic-state-prisoners-syria/">Free Syrian Army</a> rebels, including jihadi extremists – to surge across the Turkish border and begin <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49963649">intense bombardment</a> of towns and cities liberated from IS. </p>
<p>Just how quickly and how far IS will rise from now remains unclear. One thing that’s certain, however, is that IS and the al-Qaeda movement that spawned it, plan and act for the long-term. They believe in their divine destiny and are prepared to sacrifice anything to achieve it.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-turkish-troops-move-in-to-syria-the-risks-are-great-including-for-turkey-itself-124782">As Turkish troops move in to Syria, the risks are great – including for Turkey itself</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In speaking about the resurgence of IS, we risk talking up the IS brand, the very thing it cares so very much about. But the greater risk is underestimating the capacity for reinvention, resilience and enduring appeal of IS. </p>
<p>And complacency and short-sighted politics threaten to lead us to repeat the mistakes of a decade ago that saw a decimated Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) insurgency roar back to life. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/dlIvtHqKkUk?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<h2>From violent beginnings</h2>
<p>In 2006, Sunni tribes in northwestern Iraq killed or arrested the majority of ISI fighters <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2017-06-24/anbars-illusions">with US support</a>, reducing their strength from many thousands to a few hundred. </p>
<p>But with no backing for the Sunni tribes from the poorly functioning, Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, the outbreak of civil war in Syria, and the draw-down of US troops, ISI launched an insurgency in Syria before rising triumphant as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).</p>
<p>ISIS quickly became the most potent terrorist group in history, drawing more than 40,000 fighters from around the world, and seizing control of north eastern Syria and north western Iraq. </p>
<p>The final defeat of the IS caliphate in north eastern Syria came after five hard years of fighting and 11,000 lives from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), largely composed of members of the Kurdish YPG. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-decision-to-withdraw-troops-from-syria-opens-way-for-dangerous-middle-east-power-play-124784">Trump decision to withdraw troops from Syria opens way for dangerous Middle East power play</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>To the US, the SDF fighters were local partners and boots-on-the-ground after multiple false starts and expensive mistakes from allying with rebel groups in the Free Syrian Army. Without this SDF alliance, the IS caliphate could not be toppled. </p>
<h2>Trump’s betrayal could open up ISIS recruitment</h2>
<p>Donald Trump’s betrayal of the SDF in recent weeks is disastrous on several levels. It ignores the threat IS represents and validates ISIS’s central narrative. </p>
<p>What’s more, it contributes to the very circumstances of neglect, cynical short-term thinking and governance failures that lead to giving the IS insurgency an open pathway for recruiting. </p>
<p>Trump’s reckless move to withdraw 1,000 special forces troops from Syria comes from an impatience to end an 18-year long “Global War on Terrorism” military campaign of unprecedented expense. </p>
<p>This is somewhat understandable. After almost <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/research/2018/59-trillion-spent-and-obligated-post-911-wars">US$6 trillion</a> of US Federal expenditure and two decades of fighting, surely enough is enough. </p>
<p>But the inconvenient truth is IS and al-Qaeda jihadi fighters around the world <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-jihadist-threat">have increased</a>, in some estimates nearly four-fold, since September 11. </p>
<p>Still, betraying the SDF and pulling out of Syria for small short-term savings risks jeopardising all that has been achieved in defeating the IS caliphate in northwestern Iraq.</p>
<h2>IS hardliners in overcrowded camps</h2>
<p>IS will never return to its days of power as a physical caliphate, but all the evidence points to it tipping past an inflection point and beginning a long, steady resurgence. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1181232249821388801"}"></div></p>
<p>IS <a href="https://undocs.org/en/S/2018/770">has thousands</a> of terrorist fighters still active in the field in northern Iraq. They’re attacking by night and rebuilding strength from disgruntled Sunni communities, as well as having <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45181501">thousands</a> of fighters lying low in Syria. </p>
<p>But in recent months, the tempo of IS attacks has shifted from Iraq to Syria with the previously hidden insurgency reemerging.</p>
<p>As many as <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/isis-prison-escape-kurdish-jail-us-turkey-2019-10?r=US&IR=T">12,000 terrorist fighters</a>, including 2,000 foreigners, are detained in prisons run, at least until this week, by the SDF. Many are located in the border region now being overrun by the Turkish military and the Syrian jihadi it counts as loyal instruments. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-states-must-repatriate-is-fighters-and-their-families-before-more-break-free-from-syrian-camps-125168">Western states must repatriate IS fighters and their families before more break free from Syrian camps</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Elsewhere, in poorly secured overcrowded camps for internally displaced peoples (IDPs), tens of thousands of women, many fiercely loyal to IS, and children are held in precarious circumstances. </p>
<p>In the Al Hawl camp alone <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/09/women-and-children-expected-to-break-out-from-al-hawl-camp">there are more</a> than 60,000 women and children linked to IS, including 11 Australian women and their 44 children, along with 10,000 IDPs. </p>
<p>The IS hardliners not only enforce a reign of terror within the camps, but are in regular communication with IS insurgents. They <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyNote70-Zelin.pdf">confidently await</a> their liberation by the IS insurgent forces.</p>
<h2>Liberated ISIS fighters</h2>
<p>The hope of being freed is neither naive nor remote. Already, hundreds of fighters and IDPs <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/isis-prison-breaks-foreseeable-tragedy/599980/">have escaped</a> the prisons and camps since the Turkish offensive began. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1183381163236352003"}"></div></p>
<p>From mid-2012 until mid-2013, IS ran an insurgent campaign called “Breaking the Walls”. It saw thousands of hardened senior ISIS leaders, and many other militants who would later join the movement, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/26/the-great-iraqi-jail-break/">broken out</a> of half a dozen prisons surrounding Baghdad. </p>
<p>Suicide squads were used to blast holes in prison walls. Heavily armed assault teams moved rapidly through the prisons, blasting open cells and rushing the hundreds of liberated terrorist fighters into tactical four-wheel-drives. They were to be driven away in the desert through the night to rebuild the senior ranks of ISIS. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-states-must-repatriate-is-fighters-and-their-families-before-more-break-free-from-syrian-camps-125168">Western states must repatriate IS fighters and their families before more break free from Syrian camps</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The liberated fighters were not only more valuable to ISIS after their time in prison, with many switching allegiances to join the movement, they were better educated and more deeply radicalised graduating for what they refer to as their terrorist universities. </p>
<p>It would appear the same cycle is now being repeated in northeastern Syria.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125311/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton is engaged in a range of projects working to understand and counter violent extremism in Australia and in Southeast Asia that are funded by the Australian government.</span></em></p>We cannot underestimate the capacity for reinvention, resilience and the enduring appeal of IS.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1226102019-09-06T11:18:17Z2019-09-06T11:18:17ZWhat is Ashura? How this Shiite Muslim holiday inspires millions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290796/original/file-20190903-175673-8bwl2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ashura in Syria</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ashura_in_Syria-_2017_01_(2).jpg">Tasnim News Agency</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Thousands of Shiite Muslims from around the world will <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/93yvgy/look-at-these-spectacular-images-of-shia-muslims-marking-ashura-in-iraq">visit Iraq this month to see the shrines</a> of Hussain, grandson of Prophet Mohammed, and his brother Abbas on the day of “Ashura.” </p>
<p>This annual pilgrimage marks the 10th day of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic new year. As the Islamic calendar is a lunar one, the day of Ashura changes from year to year.</p>
<p>Muslims visit the shrines to observe the martyrdom day of Hussain, who was killed in the desert of Karbala in today’s Iraq in A.D. 680. Shiite Muslims believe that Hussain was their third imam – a line of 12 divinely appointed spiritual and political successors. </p>
<p>Muharram may be an ancient festival, but as <a href="https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1169/">my research</a> tracing the modern-day impact of Islamic pilgrimage shows, its meaning has changed over the centuries. What was once a commemoration of martyrdom today inspires much more, including social justice work around the globe. </p>
<h2>Martyrdom of Hussain</h2>
<p>The story of Muharram dates back 13 centuries, to events that followed the death of Prophet Mohammed.</p>
<p>After the prophet’s death in A.D. 632, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">a dispute emerged</a> over who would inherit the leadership of the Muslim community and the title of caliph, or “deputy of God.” A majority of Muslims backed Abu Bakr, a close companion of the prophet, to become the first caliph. A minority wanted the prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali. Those that supported his claim later came to be called Shiite Muslims. </p>
<p>Even if Ali was not made the caliph, Shiite Muslims would consider Ali their first imam – a leader divinely appointed by God. The title of imam would be passed on to his sons and his descendants.</p>
<p>Political leadership largely remained out of the hands of Shiite Imams. They would not be caliphs, but Shiites came to believe that their imam was the true leader to be followed. </p>
<p>By the time Ali’s second son, Hussain, came to be the third imam, divisions between the caliph and the imam had further deepened.</p>
<p>In A.D. 680, during the holy month of Muharram, a caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, Yazīd, ordered Hussain to pledge allegiance to him and his <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780203137000">caliphate</a> – a dynasty that ruled the Islamic world from A.D. 661 to 750. </p>
<p>Hussain refused because he believed Yazīd’s rule to be unjust and illegitimate. </p>
<p>His rejection resulted in a massive 10-day standoff at Karbala, in modern-day Iraq, between Umayyad’s large army and <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=egGgUM_YdL8C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=A%20Brief%20Historical%20Background&f=false">Hussain’s small band</a>, which included his half-brother, wives, children, sisters and closest followers. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291000/original/file-20190904-175700-nsjgco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291000/original/file-20190904-175700-nsjgco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291000/original/file-20190904-175700-nsjgco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291000/original/file-20190904-175700-nsjgco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291000/original/file-20190904-175700-nsjgco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291000/original/file-20190904-175700-nsjgco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291000/original/file-20190904-175700-nsjgco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Umayyad Mosque in Damascus.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/akocman/4598825877">Alessandra Kocman</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Umayyad army cut off food and water for Hussain and his companions. And on the day of Ashura, Hussain was brutally killed. Among the men, only Hussain’s sick son was spared. Women were unveiled – a violation of their honor as the family members of the prophet – and paraded to Damascus, the seat of Umayyad rule. </p>
<h2>Passion plays and performances</h2>
<p>This history is reenacted throughout the world on the day of Ashura. </p>
<p>In Iraq, millions of pilgrims fill the streets to visit the shrines, chanting poems of lamentation, and witness a reenactment of violence in Karbala and the capture of the women and children. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/tc4tZTEQ3VA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Lights of Hussain’s shrine, in Karbala, present-day Iraq, change from white to red, the color of martyrdom, on the first night of Muharram, while the crowds chant ‘Labbayk Ya Husayn,’ meaning ‘I am here, Hussain,’ answering the call he is believed to have made centuries earlier.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>From New York and London to Hyderabad and Melbourne, thousands take part in Ashura processions carrying replicas of Hussain’s battle standard and following a white horse. This symbolizes Hussain’s riderless horse returning to the camp after his martyrdom. </p>
<p>Persian passion plays known as “taziyeh,” music dramas of the many martyrs and tragedies of Karbala, are performed across Iran and many other countries. Taziyeh performances are <a href="https://asiasociety.org/time-out-memory-taziyeh-total-drama">meant to evoke deep emotions</a> of grief in the audience. </p>
<h2>A powerful set of themes</h2>
<p>Numerous historians and anthropologists have explored how communities across time and space have <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=_62A00tLaygC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=Contents&f=false">adapted the story</a> of <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300035537/shiism-and-social-protest">Karbala</a> or the <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=bd3Mst27MlkC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=Karbala&f=false">rituals around Ashūrā</a>. </p>
<p>In the 16th century, <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/E/bo8922300.html">a vast majority of the population</a> across Persia, or today’s Iran, would be converted to Shiite Muslims. In this region, the passion plays evolved into a popular form of religious and artistic expression. </p>
<p>The character of Zainab, the Prophet Mohammed’s granddaughter, has also come to play a central role in remembrance of the Karbala story. </p>
<p>Scholars have <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=MntMCAAAQBAJ&pg=PT144&lpg=PT144&dq=khutba+zainab&source=bl&ots=FhwAf7KvCs&sig=ACfU3U1_74Uk5WVpfDYT8LedFn4YKNP9aA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjlmfiUxLXkAhUxq1kKHXxcBHQ4ChDoATAHegQIBxAB#v=onepage&q=khutba%20zainab&f=false">drawn attention</a> to speeches in which Zainab denounced the violence in Karbala and lauded Hussain’s “martyrdom.” </p>
<p>Today, Zainab is seen as a strong female model of resistance. </p>
<p>In the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the story of Karbala became a <a href="http://www.iranchamber.com/personalities/ashariati/works/red_black_shiism.php">rallying point</a> for opponents of the shah, who were fighting against the shah’s brutal and oppressive regime. They compared the shah to the caliph Yazīd and argued that ordinary Iranians had to stand up to an oppressor, just like Hussain had.</p>
<p>Zainab’s resistance to oppression <a href="https://utpress.utexas.edu/books/aghwom">helped emphasize the role of women</a> in Islamic society. </p>
<p>Anthropologist <a href="https://anthropology.mit.edu/people/faculty/michael-fischer">Michael Fischer</a> calls this the “<a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=QzDMzTWRnFIC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=paradigm&f=false">Karbala paradigm</a>” – a story that captures a powerful set of themes, including people standing up to the state and fighting for justice and morality.</p>
<h2>Inspiring change?</h2>
<p>Today the story of Karbala has become a powerful tool of fight for social justice in Muslim communities. </p>
<p><a href="https://whoishussain.org/">“Who is Hussain?,”</a> a social movement with chapters in over 60 cities worldwide, carries out charitable activities and blood donations in the name of Hussain. Volunteers are encouraged to organize around events that will be meaningful in their communities and will tie into social justice issues that Hussain is believed to have fought for. </p>
<p>In 2018, <a href="https://whoishussain.org/tag/michigan/">local volunteers donated</a> tens of thousands of bottles of water in Flint, Michigan in remembrance of Hussain and his companions, who were denied water for three days before they were killed. </p>
<p>As historian <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/yitzhak-nakash">Yitzhak Nakash</a> points out, the tragedy of Karbala gives Shiite Muslims a <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/wdi/33/2/article-p161_1.xml">common narrative</a> to pass on to the next generations. And commemorating it in multiple ways is an part of their unique identity.</p>
<p>[ <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=expertise">Expertise in your inbox. Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter and get a digest of academic takes on today’s news, every day.</a></em> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122610/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Noorzehra Zaidi received funding from Gerda Henkel Stiftung to carry out research on transnational Ashūra rituals. </span></em></p>For Muslims, Ashura marks the martyrdom of the Prophet Muhammed’s grandson Hussain.Noorzehra Zaidi, Assistant Professor of HIstory, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1119522019-02-15T18:24:20Z2019-02-15T18:24:20ZSenate vote could end US complicity in the Saudi-led genocide in Yemen<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259331/original/file-20190215-56215-kyv5id.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Severe malnutrition, like this Yemeni boy experienced, is one of the results of the Yemen conflict. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Yemen-Malnutrition/ab4969ee717245b8ac36b4dd034437c0/91/0">AP/Hani Mohammed</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The U.S. House of Representatives has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/13/us/politics/yemen-war-saudi-arabia.html">voted overwhelmingly</a> to pass legislation to deny further military assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen.</p>
<p>The bipartisan vote for the bill was a repudiation of the Obama and Trump administrations’ support for the Saudis and a war that many charge includes violations of human rights. A Saudi-led coalition of states has been <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker?marker=36#!/conflict/war-in-yemen">aggressively bombing Yemen</a> and imposing an air and naval blockade of its ports for more than three years, leading U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres <a href="https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/27F6CCAD7178F3E9C1258264003311FA?OpenDocument">to describe</a> Yemen as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”</p>
<p>The legislation now goes to the Senate. <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/429894-house-passes-bill-to-end-us-military-support-to-saudis-in-yemen">President Trump has said that he would veto</a> it if passed. </p>
<p>Guterres put the crisis in stark perspective, emphasizing the near complete lack of security for the Yemeni people. More than 22 million people out of a total population of 28 million are in need of humanitarian aid and protection. Eighteen million people lack reliable access to food; 8.4 million people “do not know how they will obtain their next meal.”</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/bachman.cfm">scholar of genocide and human rights</a>, I believe the destruction brought about by these attacks combined with the blockade amounts to genocide.</p>
<p>Based on my research, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2018.1539910">published online</a> by Third World Quarterly, I believe the coalition would not be capable of committing this crime without the material and logistical support of both the Obama and Trump administrations.</p>
<h2>A ‘storm’ recast as ‘hope’</h2>
<p>Yemen has been gripped by a civil war since 2015, pitting the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">Shia Houthi movement</a> – which has fought for centuries for control of parts of Yemen – against <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423">a government backed by Sunni Saudi Arabia</a>. Because of these religious differences, it would be easy to recast what is largely a political conflict in Yemen as a sectarian one. </p>
<p>That characterization fits Saudi and U.S. <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/houthis-deny-u-s-saudi-claim-that-they-are-irans-puppets">assertions</a> that the Houthis are controlled by Shiite Iran, a claim that has not gone <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/16/contrary-to-popular-belief-houthis-arent-iranian-proxies/?utm_term=.cc639b2c69c8">uncontested</a>. Both the Saudis and the U.S. are hostile to Iran, so U.S. support of Saudia Arabia in Yemen represents what U.S. administrations have said are strategic interests in the region.</p>
<p>Besides Saudi Arabia, the coalition attacking Yemen includes the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar was part of the coalition but is no longer.</p>
<p>During the first three years of “Operation Decisive Storm,” later renamed “Operation Renewal of Hope,” 16,749 coalition air attacks in Yemen were documented by the <a href="http://yemendataproject.org/">Yemen Data Project</a>, which describes itself as an “independent data collection project aimed at collecting and disseminating data on the conduct of the war in Yemen.” </p>
<p><iframe id="gHIiB" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/gHIiB/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Based on the information available to it using open sources, the Yemen Data Project reports that two-thirds of the coalition’s bombing attacks have been against nonmilitary and unknown targets. The coalition isn’t accidentally attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure – it’s doing it deliberately. </p>
<p>That’s evident from the kind – and volume – of civilian targets documented. They include places that are generally protected against attack even under the lax <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/fundamental-principles-ihl">rules</a> of international humanitarian law: Residential areas, vehicles, marketplaces and mosques as well as boats, social gatherings and camps for internally displaced persons.</p>
<p><iframe id="zYNNl" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/zYNNl/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Because of the role it plays in movement of people, food and medicine, Yemen’s transportation infrastructure is especially important. Airports, ports, bridges and roads have all been repeatedly attacked. </p>
<p>Yemen’s economic infrastructure – farms, private businesses and factories, oil and gas facilities, water and electricity lines and food storage – have also been hit. And the coalition has targeted and destroyed schools and medical facilities, too. </p>
<p><iframe id="s7FOm" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/s7FOm/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Finally, Yemen’s cultural heritage has been attacked. In all, at least 78 cultural sites have been damaged or destroyed, including archaeological sites, museums, mosques, churches and tombs, as well as numerous other monuments and residences that have great historical and cultural significance.</p>
<p><iframe id="JxS3p" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/JxS3p/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>How to make a crisis</h2>
<p>The attacks aren’t the only way the coalition is creating a massive humanitarian crisis.</p>
<p>The air and naval blockade, in effect since March 2015, “is essentially using the threat of starvation as a bargaining tool and an instrument of war,” <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1800513.pdf">according</a> to the U.N. panel of experts on Yemen.</p>
<p>The blockade stops and inspects vessels seeking entry to Yemen’s ports. That allows the coalition to regulate and restrict Yemenis’ access to food, fuel, medical supplies and humanitarian aid. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40802-017-0092-3">analysis of the blockade’s legality</a>, <a href="http://www.uva.nl/en/profile/f/i/m.d.fink/m.d.fink.html">Dutch military scholar Martin Fink</a> writes that the blockade means “massive time delays and uncertainty on what products would be allowed to enter.” </p>
<p>Despite U.N. efforts to alleviate some of the worst delays, imports are often held up for a long time. In some cases, food that makes it through the blockade has already spoiled, if entry is not denied altogether.</p>
<p>In some ways, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is unprecedented and can be tied directly to the conflict. As the World Bank <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/376891524812213584/Securing-imports-of-essential-food-commodities-to-Yemen-an-assessment-of-constraints-and-options-for-intervention">notes</a>, “Yemen’s very difficult economic challenges before the current conflict cannot be compared to the intensely critical situation the country is facing today.” </p>
<p>Similarly, Tufts University scholar <a href="https://now.tufts.edu/articles/mass-starvation-political-weapon">Alex de Waal describes Yemen</a> as “the greatest famine atrocity of our lifetimes.” It was caused, writes de Waal, by the coalition “<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Mass+Starvation%3A+The+History+and+Future+of+Famine-p-9781509524662">deliberately destroying the country’s food-producing infrastructure</a>.” </p>
<p>The failing security for the people of Yemen has been compounded by a failing health system. The World Health Organization reported in September 2017 that <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/response-plans/2017/yemen/en/">only 45 percent of health facilities in Yemen</a> were functional. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/27F6CCAD7178F3E9C1258264003311FA?OpenDocument">Secretary-General Guterres put it</a>, “Treatable illnesses become a death sentence when local health services are suspended and it is impossible to travel outside the country.”</p>
<p>As of February 2018, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22651&LangID=E">according</a> to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the coalition had killed 6,000 people in airstrikes and wounded nearly 10,000 more. </p>
<p>Yet, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights report, these counts are conservative. Tens of thousands of Yemenis have also died from causes related to the war. According to Save the Children, an <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-famine-children-deaths-1.4914179">estimated</a> 85,000 children under five may have died since 2015, with more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/opinion/yemen-al-hudaydah-famine-houthis.html">50,000 child deaths</a> in 2017 alone from hunger and related causes.</p>
<p>Coalition actions in Yemen amount to nothing short of what <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/coining-a-word-and-championing-a-cause-the-story-of-raphael-lemkin">Raphael Lemkin, the individual who coined the term “genocide</a>,” referred to as a <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=bEcTDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147&dq=#v=onepage&q&f=false">“synchronized attack on different aspects of life</a>.” </p>
<h2>The US contribution</h2>
<p>The coalition’s genocide in Yemen would not be possible without the complicity of the U.S. This has been a bipartisan presidential effort, covering both <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/25/statement-nsc-spokesperson-bernadette-meehan-situation-yemen">the Obama</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/12/trumps-one-step-back-on-yemen-wont-satisfy-critics/">Trump administrations</a>.</p>
<p>U.S. arms are being used to kill Yemenis and destroy their country. <a href="https://securityassistance.org/sites/default/files/US%20Arms%20Sales%202017%20Report.pdf">In 2016</a>, well after the coalition began its genocidal assault on Yemen, four of the top five recipients of U.S. arms sales were members of the coalition.</p>
<p><iframe id="duz6t" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/duz6t/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The U.S. has also provided the coalition with logistical support, including mid-air refueling, targeting advice and support, intelligence, expedited munitions resupply and maintenance. </p>
<p>Other than the sale of arms, perhaps the most significant contribution to the coalition’s ability to commit genocide in Yemen has been the provision of fuel and midair refueling of coalition warplanes, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-to-end-refueling-for-saudi-coalition-aircraft-in-yemen/2018/11/09/d08ff6c3-babd-4958-bcca-cdb1caa9d5b4_story.html?utm_term=.b66185ea63b1">which was halted in early November 2018</a>. By the middle of 2017, the U.S. had delivered over 67 million pounds of fuel to the coalition and refueled coalition aircraft more than 9,000 times. </p>
<h2>Shared responsibility for genocide</h2>
<p>As a genocide scholar, I believe that under <a href="http://legal.un.org/legislativeseries/documents/Book25/Book25.pdf">international law</a>, the U.S. shares responsibility with the coalition for genocide in Yemen. </p>
<p>What does this mean? It means that the U.S. must cease and desist all activities that facilitate genocide in Yemen. This would include stopping all sales of weapons and ending logistical support for coalition action. The legislation passed by the House would largely accomplish this, though the House bill would allow intelligence sharing with Saudi Arabia to continue when “appropriate in the national security interest of the United States.” </p>
<p>However, even if the Senate passes it, the president’s likely veto of the bill will mean no change in the deadly status quo unless the legislation garners enough support to override a presidential veto. </p>
<p>In an ideal world, one in which all states are equally subjects before international law, the U.S. would also seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding what restitution it owes the people of Yemen for its role in the coalition’s genocide. </p>
<p>Similarly, the U.S. would request an International Criminal Court investigation into individual culpability of U.S. officials in both the Obama and Trump administrations for their role in facilitating the crimes committed in Yemen. </p>
<p>Of course, this is not an ideal world. </p>
<p>The U.S. recognizes neither the International Court of Justice’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/19/world/text-of-us-statement-on-withdrawal-from-case-before-the-world-court.html">authority</a> to judge the legality of its actions, nor the International Criminal Court’s <a href="https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/06/15/on-the-failed-authority-of-the-international-criminal-court/">authority</a> to investigate the suspected criminal acts of individual U.S. officials. Such an investigation could be triggered by a U.N. Security Council referral, but the U.S. would simply veto any such effort.</p>
<p>All that is left, then, is for the people of the U.S. to hold their own to account for the crimes committed in their names.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-complicity-in-the-saudi-led-genocide-in-yemen-spans-obama-trump-administrations-106896">an article</a> originally published on November 26, 2018.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111952/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeff Bachman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US has supported a Saudi-led military coalition that has inflicted profound and deadly damage on Yemen. A Senate vote could end what a human rights scholar says is US complicity in genocide.Jeff Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights; Director, Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights MA Program, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1104062019-01-29T11:44:32Z2019-01-29T11:44:32ZWhat are Muslim prayer rugs?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255439/original/file-20190124-196228-1sikc3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muslims can pray anywhere in the world using the prayer carpet.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Muslims-in-Hollywood/a7d6715d97494b5eb17fe03347a25bb9/212/0">AP Photo/Damian Dovarganes</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1086252588088082432?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fd-1599397641671435474.ampproject.net%2F1901081935550%2Fframe.html">recent tweet</a>, President Trump stated that ranchers have been finding prayer rugs scattered along the U.S.-Mexico border. Late last year, <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1054351078328885248">he tweeted</a> that “criminals and unknown Middle Easterners” were mixed in with the caravan heading to the U.S.</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=FvTDlCsAAAAJ&hl=en">My research</a> indicates that Islamophobia often targets visible signs of Muslimness, such as modest clothing like headscarves, as well as prayer rituals and mosques. This time it is the prayer rug.</p>
<p>These fearmongering tweets bear an uncanny resemblance to a 2018 action film, <a href="http://www.philly.com/philly/entertainment/movies/sicario-day-of-the-soldado-movie-review-20180627.html">“Sicario: Day of the Soldado</a>.” Its trailer shows a scene of a Muslim man praying and a row of prayer rugs at the border. In the movie, U.S. officials who find the rugs use them as “evidence” that Muslims are entering the U.S. illegally in order to expand the jurisdiction of the war on terror.</p>
<p>Other than these recent mentions, carpets found fame through Disney’s “Aladdin,” where they were imagined to have the power to fly. However, prayer carpets actually have a much more mundane daily use among Muslims. </p>
<h2>Much more than a plain carpet</h2>
<p>Ritual purity is extremely important for Muslim prayers practices. As Islamic studies scholar <a href="https://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/faculty/marion-h-katz.html">Marion Katz</a> explains, prayer carpets <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=allSNvtTpZwC&lpg=PR9&ots=GBfhgR7H4P&dq=islamic%20prayer%20carpet&lr&pg=PA23#v=onepage&q=%20carpet&f=false">provide a protective layer</a> between the worshiper and the ground, protecting the clothing from anything on ground that is polluting.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A prayer niche in a mosque.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/royluck/31897950555">Roy Luck</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="http://muslimheritage.com/article/muslim-carpet">Muslim carpets</a> have been traditionally produced for centuries in Muslim majority regions, sometimes known as “the rug belt,” spanning from Morocco to Central Asia and northern India. There is a wide variety of designs and materials. Islamic art historian <a href="https://www.umass.edu/arthistory/member/walter-denny">Walter B. Denny</a>, in <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=D7vDBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PA5&ots=WFU05K0dne&dq=islamic%20prayer%20rug&lr&pg=PA5#v=onepage&q=islamic%20prayer%20rug&f=false">“How to Read Islamic Carpets,”</a> explains the different materials and symbolism in weaves used in these carpets. </p>
<p>For example, it is common to find symbols such as the prayer niche, a recess in the wall indicating the direction of Mecca; also a lamp, which is a reference to God; as well as flowers and trees that symbolize the abundance of nature in God’s paradise. </p>
<p>Prayer carpets that are used in homes are generally sized for one individual. Those used in mosques are much bigger, <a href="http://islamicart.museumwnf.org/database_item.php?id=object;ISL;tr;Mus01;17;en">often with a motif showing a row of arches</a> to indicate where each worshiper should stand in prayer.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prayer carpets in mosques have a row of arches.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Muslim-Day-Oklahoma/539b10997667400897d9e9f7aaf5c65c/139/0">AP Photo/Sue Ogrocki</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Islamic carpets have been popular for centuries in Europe and beyond, often picking up symbolism, social meaning and ways of being used. Islamic carpets <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/isca/hd_isca.htm">were popular</a> among the wealthy of Europe, displayed proudly on the floor of their living rooms and on the walls. </p>
<p>Carpets designs have come down through generations. Some depict simple geometric patterns in rough wool, while other are <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/452553">produced by professional artisans</a> for the elite and show hunting scenes and elaborate scenes of paradise. </p>
<h2>Different costs and forms of practice</h2>
<p>Practices vary according to personal and sectarian preference among Muslims. </p>
<p>For everyday use, Muslims purchase simple prayer carpets, mass-produced in Turkey, throughout the Middle East and even China. For use outside, they often carry a thinner travel rug. There are also high-priced versions. An antique carpet was auctioned for <a href="https://www.architecturaldigest.com/gallery/most-expensive-carpets-at-auction-slideshow">US$4.3 million in 2009</a> and an <a href="http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/ecatalogue/2015/carpets-textiles-n09323/lot.51.html">Ottoman-era prayer rug</a> sold for $30,000 in 2015. </p>
<p>Not all sects of Muslims use the prayer carpet. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=YF4BAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&pg=PR8#v=onepage&q&f=false">Shiite Muslims usually pray</a> on a clay disk called a “turba” in Arabic and “mohr” in Persian. This disk is often made from <a href="https://www.al-islam.org/articles/why-prostrate-karbalas-turba-yasin-t-al-jibouri">soil from Karbala</a>, the place of martyrdom of Hussein, Prophet Muhammad’s grandson in today’s Iraq, or another sacred site. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/utn94yJIAdU?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Shiite Muslims use a clay disk.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>They often place the disk on top of a prayer carpet. When Shiites prostrate their foreheads on the floor during prayer, they want their forehead to be in contact with an organic material rather than the synthetic fibers of a carpet. So, depending on circumstance, they might also place any natural material such as a small straw mat where they pray.</p>
<p>It is highly unlikely for Muslims to leave behind their prayer rugs or to even carry one on a perilous journey through the harsh desert.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110406/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rose S. Aslan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trump recently tweeted about prayer rugs being left along the border. Many may not know the role and history of Muslim prayer rugs and why they are not likely to be left behind.Rose S. Aslan, Assistant Professor of Religion, California Lutheran UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1064232018-12-14T11:44:59Z2018-12-14T11:44:59ZWho are Yemen’s Houthis?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250550/original/file-20181213-178570-rs5rzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Shiite Houthi rebels attend a rally in Sanaa, Yemen, in 2017.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Yemen/5e3dba120f09431cb34025096ffbadca/71/0">AP Photo/Hani Mohammed, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fully half of Yemen’s population – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/world/middleeast/famine-yemen-saudi-arabia-hudaydah.html">14 million people</a> – are on the brink of starvation. Some analysts blame their inability to access basic foodstuff on escalating conflict between two religious factions: the country’s Sunni Muslims and its Houthis. The Houthis belong to the Shiite branch of Islam. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia, which shares a border with <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/these-maps-show-where-yemens-conflict-could-be-heading-2015-3">Yemen</a> and is predominantly Sunni, has been helping Yemen’s government forces try to regain control over Houthi-held parts of the country. For several weeks, a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/world/middleeast/famine-yemen-saudi-arabia-hudaydah.html">Saudi-led coalition</a> has unleashed near-continuous airstrikes on Houthi strongholds including access points for the majority of humanitarian aid coming into country. </p>
<p>What are the Houthis’ religious beliefs? </p>
<h2>Roots of Houthi movement</h2>
<p>Just as the Protestant tradition is subdivided into Methodists, Presbyterians, Congregationalists and others, Shiite Islam is also subdivided. Houthis belong to the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249485351_Zaydism_A_Theological_and_Political_Survey_Zaydism">Zaydi branch</a>. </p>
<p>From the ninth century onward, or for a thousand years, <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2567">a state ruled by Zaydi</a> religious leaders and politicians existed in northern Yemen. Then, in 1962, Egyptian-trained Yemeni military officers <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">toppled the Zaydi monarchy</a> and replaced it with a republic. Because of their ties to the ancient regime, Zaydis were perceived as a threat to the new government and were subjected to <a href="http://www.mei.edu/publications/huthi-ascent-power">severe repression</a>. </p>
<p>Nearly three decades later, in 1990, the region known as south Yemen merged with north Yemen to become the <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2010/11/yemen/">Republic of Yemen</a>. Zaydis remained <a href="https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen">a majority in the north and west</a> of the country, and also in the capital city of Sanaa. However, in terms of the overall population, they became a minority.</p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html">2010 CIA estimate</a>, 65 percent of Yemen’s people are Sunnis and 35 percent are Shiites. The majority of those Shiites are Zaydis. Jews, Bahais, Hindus and Christians make up less than 1 percent of inhabitants, many of whom are refugees or temporary foreign residents.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250556/original/file-20181213-178573-1mffisw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250556/original/file-20181213-178573-1mffisw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250556/original/file-20181213-178573-1mffisw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250556/original/file-20181213-178573-1mffisw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250556/original/file-20181213-178573-1mffisw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250556/original/file-20181213-178573-1mffisw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250556/original/file-20181213-178573-1mffisw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Yemen: 2015 Civil War map. The section in green is controlled by the Houthis.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yemen_war_detailed_map.png#/media/File:Yemen_war_detailed_map.png">0ali1,via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To reduce the dominance of Zaydis in the north, government authorities encouraged Muslims belonging to two Sunni branches with links to Saudi Arabia – Salafis and Wahhabis – <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100903262716?src=recsys&journalCode=uter20">to settle</a> in the heart of the Zaydis’ traditional territories. </p>
<h2>Start of Houthi insurgency</h2>
<p>Contributing to this trend, in the early 1990s, a Yemeni cleric founded a <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/deconstructing-salafism-in-yemen-2/">teaching institute</a> in the Zaydis’ heartland. This cleric, educated in Saudi Arabia, developed a version of Salafi Islam.</p>
<p>His institute proselytized with the goal of reforming Muslims through conversion. It educated thousands of Yemeni students and, in less than three decades, the new religious group grew large enough to compete with older groups such as the Zaydis.</p>
<p>According to scholar <a href="https://www.towson.edu/cla/departments/geography/cschmitz.html">Charles Schmitz</a>, the Houthi insurgency began in the early 1990s, spurred, in part, by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31645145">Zaydi resistance</a> to growing Salafi and Wahhabi <a href="https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/what-houthi-movement">influence</a> in the north. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.academia.edu/4818151/A_Portrait_of_Tunisia_s_Ansar_al-_Shari_a_Leader_Abu_Iyad_al-Tunisi_His_Strategy_on_Jihad">Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi</a>, son of a prominent Zaydi cleric, gave the grassroots movement its name. He coalesced support among his followers around a narrative of Houthis as defenders and revivers of Zaydi religion and culture. </p>
<h2>Sunni vs. Zaydi Shiite beliefs</h2>
<p>What beliefs set Zaydis apart from Sunni Muslims? That is an old story, dating back to the seventh century when the Prophet Muhammad died. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">Shiites and Sunnis disagree</a> about who should have been selected to succeed Muhammad as head of the Muslim community. Two groups emerged after his death. One group of the Prophet’s followers – later called Sunnis – recognized four of his companions as <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2018">“rightly guided” leaders</a> In contrast, another group – later called Shiites – recognized only Ali, the fourth of these leaders, as legitimate.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Ali_ibn_Abi_Talib">Ali</a> was the Prophet’s first cousin and closest male blood relative. He was also married to Fatima, Muhammad’s youngest daughter. For these and other reasons, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/616187">Shiites believe that Ali was uniquely qualified</a> to lead. In support of this claim, they cite sources describing Muhammad’s wish that Ali succeed him. Shiites consider Ali second in importance only to the Prophet. </p>
<p><iframe id="lPEaI" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/lPEaI/5/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Over time, <a href="https://iis.ac.uk/academic-articles/what-shi-islam#zaydi%20shiism">further divisions</a> took place. Allegiances to different descendants of Ali and his two sons, Hassan and Hussein, split Shiites into sub-branches. A grandson of Hussein called <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2566">Zayd</a> gave the Zaydis their name. To them, he is the fifth imam after Muhammad, giving the Zaydis their other name: “Fivers.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The family genealogy of the Zaydi Shiites’ first five imams.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Conversation, CC-BY-ND</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Zayd earned the respect of his followers when he rose up against the powerful Muslim rulers of his time, whom he believed to be tyrannical and corrupt. Though his rebellion was ill-fated, his fight against oppression and injustice inspires Zaydis to actively resist. </p>
<p>A key Zaydi belief is that only blood relatives of Ali and Fatima are eligible to serve as religious leaders, or imams. In Yemen, these relatives form a notable class of people called <a href="https://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/war-in-yemen-who-is-involved">Sada</a>. Hussein al-Houthi, the first leader of the Houthis, came from a prestigious clan of Sada. </p>
<h2>Impact of sectarian differences</h2>
<p>Not all Zaydis have a favorable view of Sada elites. When north and south Yemen merged in 1990, the republican government, led by a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/04/former-yemen-president-saleh-killed-in-fresh-fighting">Zaydi president</a> sought to reduce their outsized influence and limit their privileges.</p>
<p>Some members of the Sada reacted to the country’s changing political landscape by joining electoral politics to secure honor and exercise power. This path was initially followed by Hussein al-Houthi but, after he decided it was ineffective, he abandoned it. </p>
<p>Other members of the Sada, particularly the youth, reacted by pledging to teach and promote Zaydism among their peers who had forgotten their ancestors’ religion. To accomplish this, they founded the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100903262716?src=recsys&journalCode=uter20">Believing Youth organization</a> and set up a cultural education program based on a network of summer camps in the north. Hussein al-Houthi joined this organization in the early 2000s and later transformed it into a political movement critical of the Yemeni government’s ties to the West.</p>
<p>Security forces sent to arrest Hussein al-Houthi touched off the first war with the Houthis. Hussein was killed during the conflict and <a href="https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/what-houthi-movement">leadership</a> passed to Hussein’s father and then to Hussein’s youngest brother, Abdul-Malik Badreddin al-Houthi. Abdul-Malik helped transform the Houthi movement into a powerful fighting force. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.academia.edu/4818151/A_Portrait_of_Tunisia_s_Ansar_al-_Shari_a_Leader_Abu_Iyad_al-Tunisi_His_Strategy_on_Jihad">Five additional wars</a> followed over the next six years until, in 2010, the rebels had grown strong enough to repel a ground and aerial offensive launched against them by Saudi Arabia. During these wars, the <a href="https://cfr.org/interview/who-are-yemens-houthis">Houthis</a> pushed beyond their traditional base and captured vast sections of territory.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244002/original/file-20181105-74775-tcslag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244002/original/file-20181105-74775-tcslag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244002/original/file-20181105-74775-tcslag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244002/original/file-20181105-74775-tcslag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244002/original/file-20181105-74775-tcslag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244002/original/file-20181105-74775-tcslag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244002/original/file-20181105-74775-tcslag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Yemeni women and children at a camp in north Yemen.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/irinphotos/4437447101/in/photolist-7LbBas-7L85qD-7KTgRD-7L85qV-r9xKk3-V1rFYe-FVXHwd-244XFAY-S991QM-pXsjFW-26KRXzQ-F3ZFHT-HaNyf4-22oWX1e-23Lrqqk-FCty1E-FCqegb-ryxv8k-ryrExv-22oWWmD-qBLbnB-E7fq1K-23HuKuA-278Vcw2-FSoMgM-ryrWCC-23LrpMM-244XFUU-JPpdox-244XDzJ-FCqekE-275e39G-Kv6DzP-25seAwc">IRIN Photos/Flickr.com</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many Yemenis, <a href="https://civiliansinconflict.org/dt_team/nadwa-al-dawsari/">according to one expert</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/houthis-endgame-yemen-171221082107181.html">believe</a> that the Houthis are fighting to restore a state like the one prior to 1962, led by imams who came exclusively from Sada families. </p>
<h2>Complex factors today</h2>
<p>Houthis continue to focus on protecting the Zaydi region of north Yemen from state control. However, they have also forged <a href="http://www.mei.edu/publications/huthi-ascent-power">coalitions</a> with other groups – some of them Sunni – unhappy with Yemen’s persistent high <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-13917706/yemen-s-unemployment-crisis">unemployment and corruption</a>.</p>
<p>A 2015 U.N. <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/wp-content/uploads/s_2015_125.pdf">Security Council report</a> estimates that the Houthi movement includes 75,000 armed fighters. However, if unarmed loyalists are taken into account, they could number between 100,000 and 120,000.</p>
<p>Sectarian tension is only one factor in the complex set of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/yemens-spiraling-crisis">interlocking factors</a> responsible for violence and starvation in Yemen. But it is, without a doubt, a contributing factor.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106423/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Myriam Renaud is affiliated with the Parliament of the World's Religions. </span></em></p>The Houthis belong to the Shiite branch of Islam. The Houthi insurgency began in the early 1990s, spurred in part by growing influence of different Sunni branches of Islam.Myriam Renaud, Principal Investigator and Project Director of the Global Ethic Project, Parliament of the World's Religions, University of ChicagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1068962018-11-26T11:36:31Z2018-11-26T11:36:31ZUS complicity in the Saudi-led genocide in Yemen spans Obama, Trump administrations<p>A Saudi-led coalition of states has been <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker?marker=36#!/conflict/war-in-yemen">aggressively bombing Yemen</a> and imposing an air and naval blockade of its ports for more than three years, leading UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres <a href="https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/27F6CCAD7178F3E9C1258264003311FA?OpenDocument">to describe</a> Yemen as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”</p>
<p>Guterres put the crisis in stark perspective, emphasizing the near complete lack of security for the Yemeni people. More than 22 million people out of a total population of 28 million are in need of humanitarian aid and protection. Eighteen million people lack reliable access to food; 8.4 million people “do not know how they will obtain their next meal.”</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/bachman.cfm">scholar of genocide and human rights</a>, I believe the destruction brought about by these attacks combined with the blockade amounts to genocide.</p>
<p>Based on my research, to be published in an upcoming issue of Third World Quarterly, I believe the coalition would not be capable of committing this crime without the material and logistical support of both the Obama and Trump administrations.</p>
<h2>A ‘storm’ recast as ‘hope’</h2>
<p>Yemen has been gripped by a civil war since 2015, pitting the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">Shia Houthi movement</a> – which has fought for centuries for control of parts of Yemen – against <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423">a government backed by Sunni Saudi Arabia</a>. Because of these religious differences, it would be easy to recast what is largely a political conflict in Yemen as a sectarian one. </p>
<p>That characterization fits Saudi and U.S. <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/houthis-deny-u-s-saudi-claim-that-they-are-irans-puppets">assertions</a> that the Houthis are controlled by Shiite Iran, a claim that has not gone <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/16/contrary-to-popular-belief-houthis-arent-iranian-proxies/?utm_term=.cc639b2c69c8">uncontested</a>. Both the Saudis and the U.S. are hostile to Iran, so U.S. support of Saudia Arabia in Yemen represents what U.S. administrations have said are strategic interests in the region.</p>
<p>Besides Saudi Arabia, the coalition attacking Yemen includes the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar was part of the coalition but is no longer.</p>
<p>During the first three years of “Operation Decisive Storm,” later renamed “Operation Renewal of Hope,” 16,749 coalition air attacks in Yemen were documented by the <a href="http://yemendataproject.org/">Yemen Data Project (YDP)</a>, which describes itself as an “independent data collection project aimed at collecting and disseminating data on the conduct of the war in Yemen.” </p>
<p><iframe id="gHIiB" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/gHIiB/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Based on the information available to it using open sources, YDP reports that two-thirds of the coalition’s bombing attacks have been against non-military and unknown targets. The coalition isn’t accidentally attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure – it’s doing it deliberately. </p>
<p>That’s evident from the kind – and volume – of civilian targets documented. They include places that are generally protected against attack even under the lax <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/fundamental-principles-ihl">rules</a> of international humanitarian law: Residential areas, vehicles, marketplaces and mosques as well as boats, social gatherings and camps for internally displaced persons.</p>
<p><iframe id="zYNNl" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/zYNNl/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Because of the role it plays in movement of people, food and medicine, Yemen’s transportation infrastructure is especially important. Airports, ports, bridges and roads have all been repeatedly attacked. </p>
<p>Yemen’s economic infrastructure – farms, private businesses and factories, oil and gas facilities, water and electricity lines and food storage – have also been hit. And the coalition has targeted and destroyed schools and medical facilities, too. </p>
<p><iframe id="s7FOm" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/s7FOm/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Finally, Yemen’s cultural heritage has been attacked. In all, at least 78 cultural sites have been damaged or destroyed, including archaeological sites, museums, mosques, churches and tombs, as well as numerous other monuments and residences that have great historical and cultural significance.</p>
<p><iframe id="JxS3p" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/JxS3p/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>How to make a crisis</h2>
<p>The attacks aren’t the only way the coalition is creating a massive humanitarian crisis.</p>
<p>The air and naval blockade, in effect since March 2015, “is essentially using the threat of starvation as a bargaining tool and an instrument of war,” <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1800513.pdf">according</a> to the UN panel of experts on Yemen.</p>
<p>The blockade stops and inspects vessels seeking entry to Yemen’s ports. That allows the coalition to regulate and restrict Yemenis’ access to food, fuel, medical supplies and humanitarian aid. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40802-017-0092-3">analysis of the blockade’s legality</a>, <a href="http://www.uva.nl/en/profile/f/i/m.d.fink/m.d.fink.html">Dutch military scholar Martin Fink</a> writes that the blockade means “massive time delays and uncertainty on what products would be allowed to enter.” </p>
<p>Despite UN efforts to alleviate some of the worst delays, imports are often held up for a long time. In some cases, food that makes it through the blockade has already spoiled, if entry is not denied altogether.</p>
<p>In some ways, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is unprecedented and can be tied directly to the conflict. As the World Bank <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/376891524812213584/Securing-imports-of-essential-food-commodities-to-Yemen-an-assessment-of-constraints-and-options-for-intervention">notes</a>, “Yemen’s very difficult economic challenges before the current conflict cannot be compared to the intensely critical situation the country is facing today.” </p>
<p>Similarly, Tufts University scholar <a href="https://now.tufts.edu/articles/mass-starvation-political-weapon">Alex de Waal describes Yemen</a> as “the greatest famine atrocity of our lifetimes.” It was caused, writes de Waal, by the coalition “<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Mass+Starvation%3A+The+History+and+Future+of+Famine-p-9781509524662">deliberately destroying the country’s food-producing infrastructure</a>.” </p>
<p>The failing security for the people of Yemen has been compounded by a failing health system. The World Health Organization reported in September 2017 that <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/response-plans/2017/yemen/en/">only 45 percent of health facilities in Yemen</a> were functional. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/27F6CCAD7178F3E9C1258264003311FA?OpenDocument">Secretary-General Guterres put it</a>, “Treatable illnesses become a death sentence when local health services are suspended and it is impossible to travel outside the country.”</p>
<p>As of February 2018, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22651&LangID=E">according</a> to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the coalition had killed 6,000 people in airstrikes and wounded nearly 10,000 more. </p>
<p>Yet, according to the OHCHR report, these counts are conservative. Tens of thousands of Yemenis have also died from causes related to the war. According to Save the Children, an <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-famine-children-deaths-1.4914179">estimated</a> 85,000 children under five may have died since 2015, with more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/opinion/yemen-al-hudaydah-famine-houthis.html">50,000 child deaths</a> in 2017 alone from hunger and related causes.</p>
<p>Coalition actions in Yemen amount to nothing short of what <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/coining-a-word-and-championing-a-cause-the-story-of-raphael-lemkin">Raphael Lemkin, the individual who coined the term “genocide</a>,” referred to as a <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=bEcTDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147&dq=#v=onepage&q&f=false">“synchronized attack on different aspects of life</a>.” </p>
<h2>The US contribution</h2>
<p>The coalition’s genocide in Yemen would not be possible without the complicity of the U.S. This has been a bipartisan presidential effort, covering both <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/25/statement-nsc-spokesperson-bernadette-meehan-situation-yemen">the Obama</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/12/trumps-one-step-back-on-yemen-wont-satisfy-critics/">Trump administrations</a>.</p>
<p>U.S. arms are being used to kill Yemenis and destroy their country. <a href="https://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/actions/MAR_6--US_Arms_Sales_2017_Report_manual_footnotes_%281%29_1.pdf">In 2016</a>, well after the coalition began its genocidal assault on Yemen, four of the top five recipients of U.S. arms sales were members of the coalition.</p>
<p><iframe id="duz6t" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/duz6t/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The U.S. has also provided the coalition with logistical support, including mid-air refueling, targeting advice and support, intelligence, expedited munitions resupply and maintenance. </p>
<p>Other than the sale of arms, perhaps the most significant contribution to the coalition’s ability to commit genocide in Yemen has been the provision of fuel and mid-air refueling of Coalition warplanes, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-to-end-refueling-for-saudi-coalition-aircraft-in-yemen/2018/11/09/d08ff6c3-babd-4958-bcca-cdb1caa9d5b4_story.html?utm_term=.b66185ea63b1">which was halted in early November, 2018</a>. By the middle of 2017, the U.S. had delivered over 67 million pounds of fuel to the coalition and refueled coalition aircraft more than 9,000 times. </p>
<h2>Shared responsibility for genocide</h2>
<p>As a genocide scholar, I believe that under <a href="http://legal.un.org/legislativeseries/documents/Book25/Book25.pdf">international law</a>, the U.S. shares responsibility with the Coalition for genocide in Yemen. </p>
<p>What does this mean? It means that the U.S. must cease and desist all activities that facilitate genocide in Yemen. This would include stopping all sales of weapons and ending logistical support for Coalition action.</p>
<p>In an ideal world, one in which all states are equally subjects before international law, the U.S. would also seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding what restitution it owes the people of Yemen for its role in the coalition’s genocide. </p>
<p>Similarly, the U.S. would request an International Criminal Court investigation into individual culpability of U.S. officials in both the Obama and Trump administrations for their role in facilitating the crimes committed in Yemen. </p>
<p>Of course, this is not an ideal world. </p>
<p>The U.S. recognizes neither the International Court of Justice’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/19/world/text-of-us-statement-on-withdrawal-from-case-before-the-world-court.html">authority</a> to judge the legality of its actions, nor the International Criminal Court’s <a href="https://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol30_2003/winter2003/irr_hr_winter03_usopposition/">authority</a> to investigate the suspected criminal acts of individual U.S. officials. Such an investigation could be triggered by a UN Security Council referral, but the U.S. would simply veto any such effort.</p>
<p>All that is left, then, is for the people of the U.S. to hold their own to account for the crimes committed in their names.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106896/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeff Bachman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Obama and Trump administrations have supported a military coalition that has inflicted profound and deadly damage on Yemen. A human rights scholar says the US is complicit in genocide.Jeff Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights; Director, Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights MA Program, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1048892018-11-05T11:40:55Z2018-11-05T11:40:55ZThree things we can learn from contemporary Muslim women’s fashion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244579/original/file-20181108-74754-1y4ouv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ilhan Omar, a Somali American, who was elected from Minnesota’s 5th congressional district, will be the first woman in U.S. Congress to wear a hijab.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Minnesota-Somali-Lawmaker-Harassed/beaa99bc05ae4dcaa1d59f32cc5df55a/27/0">AP Photo/Jim Mone, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Major art museums have realized there is much to learn from clothing that is both religiously coded and fashion forward.</p>
<p>In 2018, the Metropolitan Museum of Art hosted a fashion exhibition inspired by the Catholic faith titled <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/exhibitions/listings/2018/heavenly-bodies">“Heavenly Bodies: Fashion and Catholic Imagination</a>.” With more than 1.6 million visitors, it was the <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/press/news/2018/heavenly-bodies-most-visited-exhibition">most popular exhibit</a> in the Met’s history.</p>
<p>That same year the de Young Museum of San Francisco had the first major exhibit devoted to the Islamic fashion scene. <a href="https://deyoung.famsf.org/exhibitions/contemporary-muslim-fashions">“Contemporary Muslim Fashions”</a> displayed 80 swoon-worthy ensembles – glamorous gowns, edgy streetwear, conceptual couture – loosely organized by region and emphasizing distinct textile traditions. This exhibit wa a bold statement of cultural appreciation during a time of heightened <a href="https://www.cair.com/cair_report_anti_muslim_bias_incidents_hate_crimes_spike_in_second_quarter_of_2018">anti-Muslim rhetoric</a>. </p>
<p>In studying <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674976160&content=bios">how Muslim women dress</a> for over a decade, I realized a deeper understanding of Muslim women’s clothing can challenge popular stereotypes about Islam. Here are three takeaways. </p>
<h2>1. Modesty is not one thing</h2>
<p>While there are <a href="https://quran.com/24/31">scattered references to modest dress</a> in the sacred written sources of Islam, these religious texts do not spend a lot of time discussing the ethics of Muslim attire. And once I started to pay attention to how Muslims dress, I quickly realized that modesty does not look the same everywhere. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243701/original/file-20181102-83638-1k6b9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243701/original/file-20181102-83638-1k6b9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243701/original/file-20181102-83638-1k6b9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243701/original/file-20181102-83638-1k6b9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243701/original/file-20181102-83638-1k6b9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243701/original/file-20181102-83638-1k6b9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243701/original/file-20181102-83638-1k6b9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Streetstyle in Iran.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://deyoung.famsf.org/exhibitions/contemporary-muslim-fashions">Contemporary Muslim Fashions 22 September 2018 - 6 January 2019 de Young Museum</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I traveled to Iran, Indonesia and Turkey for my research on Muslim women’s clothing. The Iranian penal code <a href="http://mehr.org/Islamic_Penal_Code_of_Iran.pdf">requires women to wear proper Islamic clothing</a> in public, although what that entails is never defined. The morality police harass and arrest women who they think expose too much hair or skin. Yet even under these conditions of intense regulation and scrutiny, women wear a remarkable range of styles – from edgy ripped jeans and graphic tees to bohemian loose flowy separates. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243692/original/file-20181102-83632-12u6kxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243692/original/file-20181102-83632-12u6kxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243692/original/file-20181102-83632-12u6kxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243692/original/file-20181102-83632-12u6kxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243692/original/file-20181102-83632-12u6kxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243692/original/file-20181102-83632-12u6kxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243692/original/file-20181102-83632-12u6kxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Local textiles in Indonesian fashion.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://deyoung.famsf.org/exhibitions/contemporary-muslim-fashions">Contemporary Muslim Fashions 22 September 2018 - 6 January 2019 de Young Museum</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Indonesia is the most populous Muslim nation in the world, but Indonesian women <a href="https://www.colorado.edu/anthropology/sites/default/files/attached-files/3fashionandfaith.pdf">did not wear head coverings or modest clothing</a> until about 30 years ago. Today local styles integrate crystal and sequin embellishments. Popular fabric choices include everything from pastel chiffon to bright batik, which is promoted as the national textile.</p>
<p>When it comes to Turkey, for much of the last century authorities discouraged Muslim women from wearing pious fashion, claiming <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/649910?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">these styles were “unmodern”</a> because they were not secular. That changed with the rise of the Islamic middle class, when Muslim women began to demand an education, to work outside the home and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/mew.2010.6.3.118?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">to wear modest clothing and a headscarf as they did so</a>. Today local styles tend to be tailored closely to the body, with high necklines and low hemlines and complete coverage of the hair. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243702/original/file-20181102-83657-12ke71c.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243702/original/file-20181102-83657-12ke71c.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243702/original/file-20181102-83657-12ke71c.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243702/original/file-20181102-83657-12ke71c.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243702/original/file-20181102-83657-12ke71c.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243702/original/file-20181102-83657-12ke71c.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243702/original/file-20181102-83657-12ke71c.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tailored trench from Turkey.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://deyoung.famsf.org/exhibitions/contemporary-muslim-fashions">Contemporary Muslim Fashions 22 September 2018 - 6 January 2019 de Young Museum</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A stunning range of Muslim fashions are found here in the United States as well, reflecting the diversity of its approximately <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/03/new-estimates-show-u-s-muslim-population-continues-to-grow/">3.45 million Muslims</a>. Fifty-eight percent <a href="http://www.pewforum.org/essay/muslims-in-america-immigrants-and-those-born-in-u-s-see-life-differently-in-many-ways/">of Muslim adults in the U.S. are immigrants</a>, <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2018/05/being-muslim-in-america/?user.testname=lazyloading:1">coming from some 75 countries</a>. And U.S.-born Muslims are diverse as well. For instance, <a href="http://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/demographic-portrait-of-muslim-americans/">more than half of Muslims</a> whose families have been in the U.S. for at least three generations are black. </p>
<p>This diversity provides the opportunity for hybrid identities, which are displayed through clothing styles. </p>
<h2>2. Muslim women don’t need saving</h2>
<p>Many non-Muslims see Muslim women’s clothing and headscarves as a sign of oppression. It is true that a Muslim woman’s clothing choices are shaped by her community’s ideas about what it means to be a good Muslim. But this situation is not unlike that for non-Muslim women, who likewise have to negotiate expectations concerning their behavior. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674976160&content=bios">my book</a>, I introduce readers to a number of women who use their clothing to express their identity and assert their independence. Tari is an Indonesian college student who covers her head at her parents’ objections. Her parents worry that a headscarf will make it harder for Tari to get a job after graduation. But for Tari, whose friends all cover their hair, her clothing is the primary way she communicates her personal style and her Muslim identity.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243685/original/file-20181102-83635-n2trlx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243685/original/file-20181102-83635-n2trlx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=855&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243685/original/file-20181102-83635-n2trlx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=855&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243685/original/file-20181102-83635-n2trlx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=855&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243685/original/file-20181102-83635-n2trlx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1075&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243685/original/file-20181102-83635-n2trlx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1075&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243685/original/file-20181102-83635-n2trlx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1075&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fashion to confront social issues.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://deyoung.famsf.org/exhibitions/contemporary-muslim-fashions">Contemporary Muslim Fashions 22 September 2018 - 6 January 2019 de Young Museum</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nur, who majored in communications at Istanbul Commerce University, dresses modestly but is highly critical of the pressure she sees the apparel industry putting on Muslim women to buy brand-name clothing. For her, Muslim style does not have to come with a high price tag.</p>
<p>Leila works for the Iranian government and considers her off-duty clothing choices a form of civil disobedience. Monday through Friday she wears dark colors and long baggy overcoats. But on the weekends she pushes the limits of acceptability with tight-fitting outfits and heavy makeup – sartorial choices that might get her in trouble with the morality police. She accepts the legal obligation to wear Islamic clothing in public, but asserts her right to decide what that entails. </p>
<p>Designers have also used clothing to protest issues affecting their communities. The de Young exhibit, for example, includes <a href="https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/01/smallbusiness/slow-factory-celine-semaan/index.html">a scarf</a> by designer Céline Semaan to protest against Trump’s travel ban. The scarf features a NASA satellite image of several of the countries whose citizens are denied entry to the U.S , overlaid with the word “Banned.” </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243680/original/file-20181102-83629-1dcz25k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243680/original/file-20181102-83629-1dcz25k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=311&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243680/original/file-20181102-83629-1dcz25k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=311&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243680/original/file-20181102-83629-1dcz25k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=311&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243680/original/file-20181102-83629-1dcz25k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243680/original/file-20181102-83629-1dcz25k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243680/original/file-20181102-83629-1dcz25k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Banned headscarf by Céline Semaan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://deyoung.famsf.org/exhibitions/contemporary-muslim-fashions">Contemporary Muslim Fashions 22 September 2018 - 6 January 2019 de Young Museum</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. Muslims contribute to mainstream society</h2>
<p>A 2017 Pew survey showed that <a href="http://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/how-the-u-s-general-public-views-muslims-and-islam/pf_2017-06-26_muslimamericans-07-04/">50 percent of Americans say Islam is not a part of</a> mainstream society. But as Muslim models and Muslim designers are increasingly recognized by the fashion world, the misperception of Muslims as outsiders has the potential to change. </p>
<p>Muslim models are spokespersons for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/fashion/covergirl-beauty-hijab.html">top cosmetic brands</a>, walk the catwalk for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/fashion/2018/feb/22/max-maras-milan-show-puts-empowerment-centre-stage">high end designers</a> and are featured in <a href="https://theconversation.com/gap-back-to-school-hijab-ad-ignites-social-media-101760">print ads for major labels</a>. </p>
<p>Today clothing inspired by Islamic aesthetics is marketed to all consumers, not just Muslim ones. Take the most <a href="https://www.uniqlo.com/my/hanatajima/">recent collection</a> of British Muslim designer Hana Tajima for Uniqlo. In its promotional materials, the global casual wear retailer described the garments as <a href="https://www.uniqlo.com/my/hanatajima/">“culturally sensitive and extremely versatile,”</a> clothing for cosmopolitan women of all backgrounds. </p>
<p>To be hip today is to dress in culturally inclusive ways, and this includes modest styles created by Muslim designers and popularized by Muslim consumers. Fashion makes it clear that Muslims are not only part of mainstream society, they are contributors to it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104889/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liz Bucar received funding from the Theology of Character Project at Wake Forest University for this work. For other work she has received funding from the AAUW, the Enhancing Life Project at the University of Chicago, the ACLS, and Henry Luce Foundation.</span></em></p>The de Young Museum of San Francisco recently opened an exhibit devoted to the Islamic fashion scene. Here’s how Muslim women’s fashions challenge popular stereotypes.Liz Bucar, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion, Northeastern UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/816942017-08-01T17:30:21Z2017-08-01T17:30:21ZIslamic State: the West must embrace local state ownership of the region’s conflicts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/180376/original/file-20170731-5295-cfgm53.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The offensive to retake Mosul from Islamic State has damaged thousands of structures in the historic Old City.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Has the Middle East – now beset by inter-nation, inter-Muslim and inter-ethnic conflict – been engulfed in a war without end unleashed by the barbarism and terror of Islamic State <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-versus-daish-or-daesh-the-political-battle-over-naming-50822">(ISIL)</a>?</p>
<p>ISIL murders both other fundamentalist Sunni Muslims as well as Shia Muslims; Saudi Arabia is combating Iran; Turkey belatedly fights ISIL while attacking the Kurds. And the US and Russia, their bombs raining down on Syria, have been sucked into this maelstrom, sometimes in uneasy alliance against ISIL, sometimes supporting their own factions in direct opposition to each other.</p>
<p>The Syrian crisis is apocalyptic – a disaster of biblical proportions, with more than <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-refugees-idUSKBN1710XY">five million refugees</a>. The acts of unspeakable brutality carried out by ISIL are quite deliberate. They help create the myth that it’s omnipotent.</p>
<p>But tragically, headline grabbing British, European and American soundbites over Syria have substituted for a proper understanding of the conflict. </p>
<p>Since 9/11, the West has had a pretty poor success rate for its interventions in Muslim countries. Yet indulging in the fictitious luxury of isolationism — doing nothing in the face of genocide as it shamefully did over <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-its-important-that-the-world-still-reflects-on-rwandas-genocide-75751">Rwanda in 1994 </a>– is indefensible.</p>
<p>Instead, countries like Britain should act carefully and not bombastically. They should make common cause with both Saudi Arabia and Iran to confront a common ISIL enemy. They should also seek to dissuade Turkey from its sectarian role, encouraging a realignment of Middle East politics to overcome its violently corrosive fault lines.</p>
<p>That may be the only way to prevent the continuing war and terror.</p>
<h2>Western intervention</h2>
<p>Tony Blair’s Labour government was right to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/18/sierra-leone-international-aid-blair">intervene and save Sierra Leone</a> from savagery in 2000 and also to prevent the genocide of Muslims in <a href="http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/former-yugoslavia-and-the-role-of-british-forces">Kosovo in 1999</a>. But very few, even those supporting it at the time, dispute that Blair’s 2003 support of Bush in Iraq has led to disaster.</p>
<p>Now, Britain is helping defend, with – unusually – Iran on the same side, a fledgling Iraqi government. The current Prime Minister of Iraq, Haider Al-Abadi, has promised inclusive Shia-Sunni rule quite different from the Shia sectarianism of his Western backed predecessor Al-Maliki. But he is weak and Sunni-influenced sectarianism remains rife in Iraq.</p>
<p>Nevertheless there is a real danger that, by stepping in at all, western powers risk freeing Middle East governments – and their militia proxies – to pursue other sectarian agendas to the detriment of the anti-ISIL campaign.</p>
<p>The West must be very determined to ensure that there is regional ownership of – and responsibility for – tackling the ISIL problem. Otherwise the conflict becomes the very one ISIL craves: with the “infidels” of the West.</p>
<h2>But what is ISIL?</h2>
<p>Although in 2014 ISIL seemed to have sprung out of nowhere, its emergence from Al-Qaeda in Iraq came from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/16/terrifying-rise-of-isis-iraq-executions">Syria in 2011</a> when President Bashar al-Assad unleashed a campaign of butchery against protesters peacefully demanding the democratic values of the <a href="https://global.britannica.com/event/Jasmine-Revolution">Arab Spring</a>.</p>
<p>ISIL contains many foreign fighters from across the Arab and Islamic world. But its leadership included several senior ex-Saddam Hussein army and intelligence officers of legendary cruelty – a powerful mix of extremist ideology and professional military expertise.</p>
<p>Yet within Iraq, the goals of the ex-Saddam Sunni Baathist leadership and ISIL are very different. It was a marriage of convenience which subsequently deteriorated. ISIL’s objective is an Islamic State stretching from Iraq to Syria. By contrast, its Sunni Iraqi allies either wanted to overthrow what is a Shia dominated government to regain the Sunni supremacy they lost when Saddam was removed, or favoured a semi-autonomous region, like the Kurds.</p>
<p>ISIL is medieval both in its barbarism and in its fanatical religious zeal. But, at the same time, it is a product of a deep seated sense of Sunni disenfranchisement from the autocracies in the region. Unless that political malaise is addressed, ISIL – and groups like it – will continue to feed off popular resentment.</p>
<p>ISIL’s members possess a devout belief that the sole truth is possessed by the conservative <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-wahhabism-in-saudi-arabia-36693">Wahhabi sect</a> dating from the 18th century within the Sunni strand of Islam. The rise of a new caliphate has long been the stated aim of global Jihadi terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. But the rigidly extreme Wahhabism specific to ISIL makes them an even more potent threat than Al-Qaeda.</p>
<p>Unlike Al-Qaeda, ISIL have run the necessary trappings of a state in the areas that they have captured – courts, schools and a degree of welfare support. This can bring local people used to an unregulated, chaotic and often violent power vacuum on side.</p>
<p>Aside from being the bloodiest, ISIL was also, allegedly, the world’s richest terrorist organisation. In 2014 it had reserves of over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/16/terrifying-rise-of-isis-iraq-executions">USD$2 billion</a> according to British intelligence. </p>
<h2>What makes ISIL so dangerous?</h2>
<p>Sunni support for ISIL was encouraged not just by the disastrously anti-Sunni sectarianism of the previous Iraq’s Al-Maliki, a Shia, but by the butchery of Assad, also Shia-aligned.</p>
<p>Because the Al-Maliki regime openly persecuted Sunnis, ISIL’s call to arms resonated with those who normally wouldn’t support its extremism. This is one of the reasons the Iraqi army folded at the sight of the oncoming ISIL hordes in 2014.</p>
<p>Adding to the toxic mix in Iraq has been the presence of up to a million fighters belonging to disparate Shia militias, some directly funded by Iran, of which local Sunnis are deeply suspicious.</p>
<p>There are other groups who would also look favourably on an ISIL-led caliphate spreading their way. These include Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia for example. </p>
<h2>What can be done about ISIL?</h2>
<p>In proudly publicising its own atrocities ISIL seeks to goad the West into reacting emotionally, not strategically, on the basis of a hypothetical threat when the real threat is in the region.</p>
<p>Yet for all their blood lust, capabilities and wealth, ISIL has been no match for the military, drone, surveillance and intelligence capacities of NATO. Nor Russia’s ferocious air power. </p>
<p>Iran’s de facto, if covert, blessing for Western military strikes against ISIL, especially in Iraq, might have opened an opportunity for future engagement and collaboration. This could be transformative for the whole region, including Israel/Palestine.</p>
<p>But US President Donald Trump’s bitter opposition to the nuclear deal with Tehran, his bellicose rhetoric and his Saudi favouritism, threatens that.</p>
<p>Across the region, Iranians as Shiites sponsor Hezbollah and other militias. Saudis and Qataris as Sunnis sponsor Al Qaeda and other Jihadists – including ISIL – helping unleash a monster.</p>
<p>But, unless the US and Europe are prepared to embrace local state ownership of the region’s conflicts and to put the onus on those states to find a solution, there’s no prospect of peace and stability in the Middle East.</p>
<p><em>This is an edited version of a speech delivered by Lord Hain, a former British anti-apartheid leader, MP, and cabinet minister. He is now Visiting Adjunct Professor at Wits Business School.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81694/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Hain does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The West needs to push for local action against Islamic State’s reign of terror in the Middle East. States in the region must find solutions to the conflicts to bring peace and stability.Peter Hain, Visiting Adjunct Professor at Wits Business School, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/733152017-02-27T07:42:25Z2017-02-27T07:42:25ZSons of Iraq: Mosul will only recover if we heed the lessons of the US invasion<p>After months of fighting, Iraqi Security Forces have finally regained control of the <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/01/18/iraq-military-troops-have-full-control-eastern-mosul/96710782/">eastern half of Mosul</a>, the last urban stronghold of Islamic State in Iraq. They are now <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/24/middleeast/western-mosul-offensive/">advancing on the city’s west</a>. </p>
<p>The recapture of the northern Iraqi city will be a strategic victory for Iraq and its international partners. But did it ever have to come to this?</p>
<p>Violent opposition has gone up like a mushroom cloud in Iraq since the early years of US occupation. The US military believed that buying people’s hearts and minds with cash was an effective tool to counter against the opposition. Things did not always work out that way.</p>
<h2>Bad money after good</h2>
<p>Back in 2003, shortly after taking control of Baghdad, US forces discovered millions of dollars of <a href="http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a523853.pdf">loot</a> taken by the Ba’athist Party during its rule. The US government decided to use it as the seed funding for the Commander’s Emergency Response Programme (CERP).</p>
<p>The CERP aims to rebuild the country by funding hundreds of small-scale projects on water and sanitation infrastructure, food production, health care, education, and transport. And <a href="http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/661983">research</a> shows that these small projects have improved the security situation in Iraq in the short term.</p>
<p>But the hearts and minds strategy <a href="http://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/wppdf/2017/wp2017-006.pdf">may not be as effective as it appears in the case of Iraq</a>. Aid can <a href="http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/681239">fuel conflict</a> by creating incentives for looting, and providing a fertile ground for criminal activities. It is frequently <a href="http://us.macmillan.com/thecrisiscaravan/lindapolman/9780312610586/">stolen en route</a> and <a href="https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/sigir/20131001083727/http:/www.sigir.mil/files/lessonslearned/SpecialReportLeadersPerceptions.pdf#view=fit">induces fraud and corruption</a>. </p>
<p>This new resource base can strengthen rebels’ capacity in an armed struggle. And many Iraqis see this foreign assistance as occupation forces simply giving them a tent after burning down their home.</p>
<h2>A missed opportunity</h2>
<p>The relationship between different religious groups is a decisive determinant of aid effectiveness in Iraq, and it was crucial in this case. </p>
<p>After the US invasion, the Shia-led government had the chance to reduce the enmity of the Sunni population towards them. To this end, part of the emergency response funds were used to sponsor the Sons of Iraq programme, which paid Sunnis to become security providers.</p>
<p>Sons of Iraq had two effects in the short term: it rewarded people who chose to stop fighting and, it gave incentives to local people to cooperate with security forces by providing them with local intelligence. After the introduction of the programme, the number of attacks <a href="http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Biddle%25204-2-08%2520Testimony.pdf">in Iraq</a> between 2007 and 2012 decreased.</p>
<p>According to the plan, the Government of Iraq would offer participants, most of them Sunni, a job in the security sector or civilian ministry. But in the end, only a small number of Sunnis were <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100102810">lucky enough to get a government job</a>. Worse still, there were reports that the Shia-led government <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/07/world/fg-baqubah7">arrested, tortured, and murdered Sunni members</a> of the programme.</p>
<p>Between 2009 and 2013, former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki gradually dismantled the programme, and filled Iraqi security forces with Shias; Sunnis began to be excluded in Iraqi society once more. This stirred up religious tensions between the two groups. The conflict escalated, leading to a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22261422">massacre in Hawija in 2013</a>, where hundreds of Sunnis were killed in clashes with security forces.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158393/original/image-20170225-22986-6cpw7e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158393/original/image-20170225-22986-6cpw7e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158393/original/image-20170225-22986-6cpw7e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158393/original/image-20170225-22986-6cpw7e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158393/original/image-20170225-22986-6cpw7e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158393/original/image-20170225-22986-6cpw7e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158393/original/image-20170225-22986-6cpw7e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iraqi boy holds a rifle at a Sons of Iraq checkpoint in 2009.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:SOI_boy_at_check_point.JPG">US Army</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The case of Mosul</h2>
<p>Mosul has long been a site much-contested between different religious groups. These include Sunni and Shia Arabs, Kurds and Assyrian Christians. The complex tribal structure of the region and its proximity to the Syrian border make governing the area almost impossible.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/sons-iraq-and-awakening-forces">Fearing a perception of favoritism</a> towards Sunnis, the US tamed the Sons of Iraq programme in Mosul. But doing so contributed to the rise of insurgency in the region. It has had the unintended consequence of making Mosul a safe haven for members of al-Qaeda in Iraq, who were repelled from Baghdad, Anbar, and Diyala.</p>
<p>By now, all the conditions were set for a firestorm. Angry people were gathered in Mosul, willing to fight for whichever group was ready to overthrow the government. </p>
<p>Arguably, if the Shia government took the chance to absorb more Sunnis into the regime according to the original plan, ISIS, which stormed onto world stage in June 2014, taking both <a href="http://time.com/4384000/isis-fallujah-iraq-mosul-campaign/">Fallujah</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-sweeps-across-borders-and-takes-grip-of-an-iraq-collapsing-back-into-civil-war-27886">Mosul</a> in the space of a few months, would have found it more difficult to initiate a war that has since become a political crisis at the global level.</p>
<h2>Learning from history</h2>
<p>While there is still a long way to go before a decisive victory in Iraq, it is time to plan ahead.</p>
<p>What can the international society do to prevent ISIS from re-emerging?</p>
<p>Humanitarian assistance is necessary for rebuilding houses and infrastructure destroyed by rockets and car bombs. But as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/04/battle-for-mosul-maps-visual-guide-fighting-iraq-isis">military advancement of the past few months shows</a>, the key to success is cooperation that transcends religious and ethnic identities.</p>
<p>On one hand, the Shia-dominated security forces and Kurdish Peshmerga need intelligence from local citizens, mainly Sunni Arabs. On the other hand, local people require the help of the security forces to free them from ISIS’s harsh rule.</p>
<p>Behind the major identity fault lines between Sunni and Shia lie numerous <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521156011">grassroots-level rivalries</a> over land and resources that have led to decades-long enmity. To achieve sustainable peace, different community members have to reach reconciliation. At the minimum, all groups should realise that no one is more righteous than the other.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/div-classtitleethnic-conflict-and-civil-society-india-and-beyonddiv/2F8EEAACC16E9A8366A9914C0301F08D">Studies</a> have found that cross-ethnic interactions in unions, theatres or even playgrounds can explain why Hindu-Muslim riots are less common in some places than others. </p>
<p>In this light, donors should fund social and <a href="http://unhabitat.org/books/unhabitat-country-programme-document-2016-2019-afghanistan/">urban design</a> projects that help to build <a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11">more inclusive, safe and resilient cities</a> for all Iraqis. Hopefully, through these small steps, disparate groups can begin to reach a national-level reconciliation.</p>
<p>Even when ISIS is defeated, unless different groups can repair their relationship, violent extremism will remain, and peace in Iraq will stay elusive. Donor funding must be directed to programmes that help bridge divides.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73315/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pui Hang Wong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Even when ISIS is defeated, unless different groups can repair their relationship, violent extremism will remain, and peace in Iraq will stay elusive.Pui Hang Wong, PhD Fellow, United Nations UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/550892016-03-01T12:50:56Z2016-03-01T12:50:56ZIran’s cynical pandering to its ethnic minorities will do it no good<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113386/original/image-20160301-31040-nv4w5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> </figcaption></figure><p>Iran’s parliamentary election has yielded a victory for the so-called <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-election-idUSKCN0W218K">reformists</a>, an apparent vote of confidence in Hasan Rouhani’s relatively moderate government after the deal to curb Tehran’s nuclear weapons programme. But the campaign was also marked by promises to finally start meeting the demands and hopes of Iran’s ethnic minorities – and now the election’s over, that won’t be forgotten.</p>
<p>Ethnic minorities make up about 40-50% of Iran’s population. The largest five major ethnic groups, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and Turkmen, are large, territorially located, and transnational. They all have long histories of political struggle for their ethnic rights. </p>
<p>While Iran is a majority Shia country, 10% of the Iranian population practices Sunni Islam, and the majority of the Kurds, Baluchis, and Turkmen are Sunni. That means the central government needs ethnic votes not only to shore up its legitimacy, but also to strengthen its national security and territorial integrity. </p>
<p>In the absence of ethnic political parties, ethnic activists, elites, and candidates use sharper rhetoric to stir up ethnic grievances and mobilise minority communities during local and national elections. </p>
<p>This was particularly apparent in the 1997 presidential election, when the reformist movement played the ethnic card, promising civil rights for all Iranians and distributing election leaflets in Arabic, Azeri, and Kurdish. President Muhammad Khatami duly gained the largest share of the vote in the ethnic provinces. But even though ethnic groups enjoyed freedom of a sort under Khatami, his failure to keep his reformist promises only added to minorities’ dissatisfaction. </p>
<p>Despite the consequences, this pattern has been followed ever since. Embracing ethnic issues during election campaigns certainly helps raise ethnic minority people’s profile and amplify their demands. But unfulfilled promises only widen the gap between these groups’ expectations and their chances of getting what they want and need – and the wider that gap, the more Iran will struggle with serious ethnic tensions. </p>
<h2>Democracy undermined</h2>
<p>None of this is good for Iran’s democracy. Whereas many states use elections to unify citizens and to solidify a sense of togetherness among people of different socio-cultural and ethnic backgrounds, the ethnicisation of Iran’s local and national elections achieves precisely the opposite. It also drives divisions between the country’s main political factions, namely <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-whats-at-stake-in-irans-parliamentary-elections-55354">reformists and conservatives</a>, who end up advancing diametrically opposed ethnic policies as a way of marking out their differences. </p>
<p>Given that Iran is increasingly entangled in the Middle East’s growing ethno-sectarian strife, it sees its own diversity as a potential threat to its national security. Iran’s ethno-sectarian groups straddle the borders of neighbouring states, meaning Tehran regards them as potential Trojan horses for foreign interference. </p>
<p>This is particularly important given Iran’s highly sectarian rivalry with predominantly Sunni Saudi Arabia, which domestic politicians discuss in belligerent nationalist tones. That hardly sits well with Iran’s own Sunni minority, who find themselves implicitly labelled as a risk to the state they call home.</p>
<p>Many of the demands Iran’s ethnic groups make of their country are justified, perfectly legal and recognised by the constitution. But just like other major national security-related decisions, ethnic policies aren’t made by the government or by members of parliament but by the Supreme National Security Council, which is appointed rather than elected. Any electoral promises made by electoral candidates are hollow and opportunistic. </p>
<p>This isn’t to say that Iran’s political elites should stay away from ethnic issues, or avoid acknowledging minority concerns. But pandering to ethnic demands during elections only to leave promises unfulfilled will only widen the gap between minority groups and the state.</p>
<p>If this habit doesn’t change, the consequences might be severe. The long-term damage already done by this electoral opportunism might be irreversible – and the earlier Tehran actually starts to grapple with ethnic disenchantment, the better.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55089/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alam Saleh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Every time Iran has an election, its minority groups are suddenly the centre of attention – and then they’re quickly forgotten again.Alam Saleh, Lecturer in Middle Eastern Politics, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/518042016-02-18T19:19:57Z2016-02-18T19:19:57ZWhy is Islam so different in different countries?<p><em>The rise of Islamic State has led to much speculation about the group’s origins: how do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of the jihadist group?</em></p>
<p><em>In the fourth article of our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>, Aaron Hughes explains the amazing regional variation in Islamic practice to illustrate why Islamic State appeared where it did.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>No religion is unified. How Catholicism, for example, is practised in rural Italy differs from the way this is done, say, in New York city. Language, culture, tradition, the political and social contexts, and even food is different in these two places. </p>
<p>Such geographic differences are certainly important in Islam. But also important are the numerous legal schools and their interpretations. Since Islam is a religion predicated on law (sharia), variations in the interpretation of that law have contributed to regional differences. </p>
<p>Also significant in the modern world is the existence of other religions. Malaysia, for example, has a relatively <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Malaysia">large percentage of religious minorities</a> (up to 40% of the population). Saudi Arabia <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Saudi_Arabia">has virtually none</a>. </p>
<p>This means Malaysia has had to develop a constitution that protects the rights of religious minorities, whereas Saudi Arabia has not. And it’s why Islam is so different in these two countries.</p>
<h2>Schools of thought</h2>
<p>There are historical reasons for this variation. Despite popular opinion, Islam didn’t appear fully formed at the time of Muhammad (570-632). There were huge debates over the nature of religious and political authority, for instance, and who was or was not a Muslim. </p>
<p>It’s similarly misguided to assume that a unified teaching simply spread throughout the Mediterranean region and beyond. </p>
<p>How Muhammad’s message developed into the religion of Islam — complete with legal and doctrinal content — took centuries to develop and cannot concern us here. </p>
<p>What <em>is</em> important to note, however, is that his message spread into various (unbordered) regions. Modern nation states would only arise much later. And each of these areas was already in possession of its own set of religious, legal and cultural traditions.</p>
<p>The result was that Islam had to be articulated in the light of local customs and understandings. This was done, in part, through the creation of legal courts, a class of jurists (ulema; mullas in Shi`ism), a legal code (sharia) and a system of interpretation of that code based on rulings (fatwas).</p>
<p>Many local customs arose based on trying to understand Muhammad’s message. And these customs and understandings gave rise to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_schools_and_branches">distinct legal schools</a>. </p>
<p>Although there were originally many such schools, they gradually reduced to four in Sunni Islam – Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi`i and Hanbali. While these four schools all regard one another as orthodox, they nevertheless have distinct interpretations of Islamic law. Some of their interpretations are more conservative than others. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are also a number of such schools in Shi`i Islam, as you can see from the image above. </p>
<p>The four Sunni schools are associated with distinct regions (as are the Shi`i schools). The Maliki school, for example, is prominent today in Egypt and North Africa. The Hanafi is in western Asia, the Shafi`i in Southeast Asia and the Hanbali (the most conservative) is found primarily in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. </p>
<h2>Fundamental differences</h2>
<p>All this legal and local variation has produced different interpretations of the religion. But despite such regional and legal diversity, many Muslims and non-Muslims insist on referring to Islam and sharia as if they were stable entities.</p>
<p>An example might be illustrative of the extent of the differences within Islam. Many non-Muslims are often surprised to learn of the cult of saints, namely the role Sufi saints (Sufism is Islamic mysticism) have played and continue to play in the daily life of Muslims. </p>
<p>A Sufi saint is someone who is considered holy and who has achieved nearness to God. Praying to these saints and making pilgrimages to their shrines is a way to, among other things, ask for intercession. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Although these practices are not unlike the role and place of saints in Catholicism, in Islam they are much more localised. And this locally varied cult of saints played and continues to play an important role in Islamic religious life from Morocco in the West to Pakistan in the East. </p>
<p>Devotion to the saints is believed to cure the sick, make fertile the barren, bring rain, and so on. Needless to say, such devotion is often frowned upon by more fundamentalist interpretations. </p>
<p>While most legal schools are content – albeit somewhat bothered – by such practices, the conservative Hanbali school forbids cults like this. Its adherents have, among other things, destroyed tombs of saints in both the premodern and modern eras. They have also been responsible for the destruction of shrines associated with Muhammad’s family, such as the shrines and tombs of Muhammad’s wife. </p>
<p>The Hanbali school, backed by the wealth of the Saudi ruling family, has also tried to make inroads into other areas. Those associated with this legal school, for example, have built madrasas (religious seminaries) in regions traditionally influenced by other legal schools of thought. </p>
<p>Most fundamentalist movements in Islam, including Islamic State, have emanated from such ultra-conservative elements. The Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, for instance, are influenced by the more conservative elements of Hanbali ideology, even though they exist in a predominantly Hanafi legal environment. </p>
<p>The goal of many of these groups, sometimes referred to as Wahhabis or Salafis, is to return to what they imagine to be the pure or pristine version of Islam as practised by Muhammad and his earliest followers. They often have strict interpretations of Islam, strict dress codes and separation of the sexes. </p>
<p>Today, there are more than one and a half billion Muslims worldwide, making Islam the second-largest religion on the planet after Christianity. But it is a rich and variegated religion. And this variation must be taken into account when dealing with it. </p>
<p>Most importantly, the variation cannot be papered over with simplistic slogans or stereotypes. That women are not allowed to drive in Saudi Arabia but are in places like Malaysia tells you something about this variation.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article is the fourth in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51804/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aaron W. Hughes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since Islam is predicated on law, variations in the interpretation of that law – along with geography and distinct legal schools – have all contributed to differences in the religion.Aaron W. Hughes, Philip S. Bernstein Professor of Jewish Studies, University of RochesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/521552016-02-15T19:21:12Z2016-02-15T19:21:12ZUnderstanding Islamic State: where does it come from and what does it want?<p><em>Since announcing its arrival as a global force in June 2014 with the declaration of a caliphate on territory captured in Iraq and Syria, the jihadist group Islamic State has shocked the world with its brutality.</em> </p>
<p><em>Its seemingly sudden prominence has led to much speculation about the group’s origins: how do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State?</em></p>
<p><em>In the article kicking off <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">our series on the genesis of the group</a> below, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History James Gelvin cautions against easy answers. It’s a logical fallacy, he adds, to think that just because one event followed another, it was also caused by it.</em> </p>
<p><em>Far better to look at the interplay of historical and social forces, as well as recognising that outfits such as Islamic State often cherry-pick ideas to justify their ideas and behaviours.</em></p>
<p><em>Our series attempts, in a dispassionate way, to catalogue many of the forces and events that can arguably have played a part in creating the conditions necessary for these jihadists to emerge. We have tried to spread the net wide, but we make no claim to being comprehensive or having the final word on the origins of Islamic State.</em></p>
<p><em>Over the next two weeks, a selection of religious studies scholars and historians – modern and medieval – from around the world will bring their expertise to our discussion of what led to the most notorious jihadist group in recent history.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>How far back in history does one have to go to find the roots of the so-called Islamic State (IS)?</p>
<p>To the <a href="http://vm136.lib.berkeley.edu/BANC/ROHO/projects/debt/oilcrisis.html">oil shock of 1973-74</a>, when Persian Gulf oil producers used the huge surplus of dollars flowing into their coffers to finance the spread of their severe interpretation of Islam?</p>
<p>To the end of the first world war, when the victorious Entente powers sparked resentment throughout the Arab world by <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553">drawing artificial national borders</a> we hear so much about today? </p>
<p>How about 632 AD, the date of the <a href="http://www.cyberistan.org/islamic/death.html">death of the Prophet Muhammad</a>, when the early Islamic community split on who should succeed him as its leader — a breach that led to <a href="http://origins.osu.edu/article/tradition-vs-charisma-sunni-shii-divide-muslim-world/page/0/0">the Sunni-Shi'i divide</a> that IS exploits for its own ends?</p>
<p>The possibilities seem endless and would make for an entertaining variation on the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Degrees_of_Kevin_Bacon">Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon</a> parlour game (which suggests any two people on earth are six or fewer acquaintance links apart) were the subject not so macabre. </p>
<p>But to look at any and all historical phenomena through a simple string of causes and effects is to ignore the almost infinite number of possible effects that might follow from any one purported cause. </p>
<p>It also opens the door to one of the most pernicious logical fallacies historians might commit: <em>post hoc, ergo propter hoc</em> (after this, therefore because of this). So rather than tracing the rise of IS to one or more events in the past, I suggest we take a different tack.</p>
<h2>A long line</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Muhammad Ahmad, one of a long line of self-professed redeemers of the Islamic faith.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Ahmad#/media/File:Muhammad_Ahmad_al-Mahdi.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>IS is an instance of a phenomenon that recurs in most religions, and certainly in all <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/monotheism">monotheistic religions</a>. Every so often militant strains emerge, flourish temporarily, then vanish. They are then replaced by another militant strain whose own beginning is linked to a predecessor by nothing more profound than drawing from the same cultural pool as its predecessor.</p>
<p>In the seventh century, there were <a href="http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0047.xml">the Kharijites</a> (the first sect of Islam), a starkly puritanical group that assassinated two of the early caliphs. Like IS, the Kharajites thought they knew best what and who were truly Islamic, and what and who were not.</p>
<p>In the 18th century, there were the followers of <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Muhammad-ibn-Abd-al-Wahhab">Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab</a>, a central Arabian preacher whose followers included <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_bin_Saud">Muhammad ibn Saud</a>, the founder of the Saudi dynasty. Believing that the worship of saints and the construction of mausoleums were impious acts, ibn Saud’s army destroyed sites holy to both Sunnis and Shi‘is in Arabia and present-day Iraq, much as <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/isis-destruction-of-palmyra-syria-heart-been-ripped-out-of-the-city">IS targets sites from antiquity</a> today. </p>
<p>During the 19th century, <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Muhammad_Ahmad">Muhammad Ahmad</a>, a member of a religious order in what is now Sudan, proclaimed himself mahdi (redeemer of the Islamic faith), just as <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27801676">Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a>, inventor and leader of IS, recently proclaimed himself caliph (leader of the Islamic faith) — a more prosaic position. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Khartoum">Ahmad’s army overran Khartoum</a>, where it massacred a British-led garrison and beheaded its commander.</p>
<p>Between Muhammad Ahmad and al-Baghdadi there were many, many others.</p>
<p>While tempting, it would be a mistake to believe that each militant group “gave rise to” the next (although later militants have sometimes drawn from or been inspired by their predecessors). That would be the equivalent of saying that <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/Zealot">the ancient Zealots</a> (a Jewish sect that fought the Romans) gave rise to militant Israeli settlers on the West Bank, or that <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/crusades">medieval Crusaders</a> gave rise to abortion-clinic bombers. </p>
<h2>The right stuff</h2>
<p>From time to time (it’s impossible to predict when), some figure emerges in each tradition who puts his own spin on that tradition. To be successful, that spin must capture the imagination of some of that tradition’s adherents, who then try to put it into practice. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A newspaper featuring former al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ali Jasim/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some spins, such as that of contemporary <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-wahhabism-in-saudi-arabia-36693">Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabis</a>, have sticking power. This is not because they are somehow “truer” than others, but because those who advocate for them are better able to mobilise resources – a core group of committed followers, for instance, military capabilities, or outside support – than others. Most do not.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27801676">Al-Baghdadi</a> is one such figure (as was al-Qaeda founder <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10741005">Osama bin Laden</a>). His spin melds together three ideas that come from the Islamic tradition. </p>
<p>The first is <em>khilafa</em> (caliphate). Al-Baghdadi believes that Islam requires a caliphate — governance in accordance with Islamic law over territory that’s under the authority of a caliph (a righteous and knowledgeable descendant of the prophet). </p>
<p>When <a href="http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/100620153">his forces took over Mosul</a> in the summer of 2014, al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself caliph and burnished his credentials for the job by changing his name to Caliph Ibrahim al-Quraishi al-Hashimi. The last two names signify he’s a member of the tribe of Muhammad and a descendant of the prophet.</p>
<p>The second idea al-Baghdadi brought into the mix is <em>takfir</em> – the act of pronouncing Muslims who disagree with IS’s strict interpretation of Islamic law to be apostates, which makes them punishable by death. This is the reason for IS’s murderous rampages against Shi‘is; rampages that even al-Qaeda central finds counter-productive, if not repugnant.</p>
<p>Resurrecting the concept of <em>takfir</em> was the idea of <a href="http://www.cfr.org/iraq/profile-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/p9866">Abu Musab al-Zarqawi</a>, founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq. His strategy was to use the concept to tighten communal ties among Iraq’s Sunnis by mobilising them against its Shi‘is, thus making post-American-invasion Iraq ungovernable. </p>
<p>Al-Baghdadi has gone one step further, finding the concept useful in his effort to purify the territory of the caliphate which, he believes, will soon stretch across the Islamic world.</p>
<p>Finally, there is <em>hijra</em>, the migration of Muslims from <em>dar al-harb</em> (the abode of war, that is, non-Muslim majority countries) to <em>dar al-Islam</em> (the abode of Islam) – just as Muhammad and his early companions migrated from Mecca to Medina, where they established the first permanent Islamic community. </p>
<p>IS wants a great incoming of Muslims into the caliphate. This is both because it needs skilled administrators and fighters and because it considers emigration from “non-Muslim territory” to “Muslim territory” a religious obligation. </p>
<h2>A dangerous distraction</h2>
<p>According to some commentators, al-Baghdadi brought a fourth idea to the table: <a href="http://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250080905">an apocalyptic vision</a>. They base this on the name of IS’s glossy magazine, Dabiq (the site in northern Syria where, Islamic tradition has it, the Battle of Armageddon will take place), articles in the magazine and propaganda videos.</p>
<p>It’s not too much of a stretch to attribute an apocalyptic vision to IS — after all, just as every monotheism is prone to militant strains, all are prone to apocalyptic visions as well. Nevertheless, I remain unconvinced that the concept represents a significant part of IS’s worldview. </p>
<p>Whatever the future may hold, IS, like some <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/06/end-of-world-7-october-ebible-fellowship">apocalyptic Christian groups</a>, has proved itself so tactically and strategically adept that it has obviously kicked any “end of days” can well down the road (roughly the same distance al-Qaeda kicked the re-establishment of the caliphate can).</p>
<p>Further, much of the IS leadership consists of hard-headed <a href="http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate/">former Iraqi Ba‘th military officers</a> who, if they think about an apocalypse at all, probably treat it much as Hitler’s generals treated the purported musings of Nazi true believers – with a roll of their eyes. </p>
<p>Foregrounding IS’s apocalyptic worldview enables us to disparage the group as irrational and even medieval – a dangerous thing to do. If the recent past has demonstrated one thing, it’s that IS thrives when its adversaries underestimate it.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is the first article in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52155/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James L. Gelvin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How far back in history does one have to go to find the roots of the so-called Islamic State? The first article in our series on the genesis of the terrorist outfit considers some fundamentals.James L. Gelvin, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/443832015-07-16T11:09:49Z2015-07-16T11:09:49ZWhy it’s time to give up on the idea of an Iraqi nation<p>The end of Iraq is no longer a matter of if, or a matter of when – it has already happened. The country has been on life support for too long, and no matter how hard external players try to save it, Iraq cannot save itself.</p>
<p>One of the fundamental properties of any nation state is some sense a national consciousness, a sense of belonging; shared values regardless of how abstract they may be and, most importantly, a collective commitment to the perpetuation of the nation itself, which is perceived to be organically connected to the state. Without these ingredients, there never can be a stable nation state. </p>
<p>Of course, one could argue that perhaps Iraq never had a cohesive national consciousness anyway. After all, Iraq was only constructed almost on a whim by the colonial masters of the previous century. Even at the height of “stability” under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a state without a nation. </p>
<p>There was very little effort put into building an Iraqi nation and the obstacles were always huge. The Kurds, who made up about <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28147263">17-20%</a> of the population, hardly subscribed to an Iraqi identity, and the Shia majority felt deeply marginalised by the political elite who were mainly Sunni.</p>
<p>But what’s happening in Iraq today is different from the realities of a classic multi-ethnic or multi-religious society in the Middle East. Similar situations and grievances exist in much of the region, but what makes the situation hopeless in Iraq is that there is no longer any strong state in power – and, more importantly, no prospect of one emerging any time soon. </p>
<h2>Out of the bottle</h2>
<p>Until 2003, Saddam’s Hussein’s repressive state at least put a lid on the chaos, but invasion, disastrous post-war policies and the opportunistic interference of regional states and sub-state actors finally let the genie out of the bottle. </p>
<p>The forces unleashed are now beyond control, and old animosities between ethno-sectarian groups are channelled into armed confrontation. This cycle of violence has effectively burned any grassroots bridges between the divided groups, who were supposed to be part of a nation, and these problems are here to stay even if Iraq cleanses itself of transnational jihadism. </p>
<p>The rise of Islamic State (IS) reflects a history of poor nation-building as much as anything else. The international coalition against IS has so far been ineffective but, in any case, cutting down IS without pulling up its roots would be nothing more than cosmetic surgery. IS is not really a threat to Iraq’s nationhood, rather a sign of its failure. The current hyper-sectarian conflict is not the cause, but the symptom of the failed nation-state model.</p>
<p>The country is divided into three parts, each of which centres around strong identities – Kurdish, Sunni and Shia – which predate the modern borders. For each of these groups, self-interest comes first. </p>
<p>The Kurds’ loyalty is first and foremost to Kurdistan – and they see an opportunity in the current chaos to realise their long-term <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15467672">dream of a Kurdish state</a>. In many aspects, the Kurdish region is already independent, and given what they have gone through over the years spent resisting IS, it would be inconceivable to imagine them embracing the old system.</p>
<p>Southern Iraq, meanwhile, is effectively a country of its own. The majority of Shia live in the south with a very strong sense of Shia identity. The Shia political elite has dominated what is left of the Iraqi state and has shown little appetite for acknowledging the interests of other ethnic and religious groups – which would have been the only way to save Iraq. After all, in this hyper-sectarian climate being attentive to other minorities could have negative implications for a “state” which is effectively dependent on Shia militia for survival.</p>
<p>Many Sunni tribes, on the other hand, are stuck between the likes of IS or a Shia majority government, which has a track record of discrimination against them. In the same week that there was an <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/world/middleeast/coalition-fighting-islamic-state-meets-in-paris.html?_r=0">anti-IS coalition conference</a> in Paris to try to save Iraq, 50 more Sunni tribes <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/sunni-sheiks-pledge-allegiance-isil-iraq-anbar-150604074642668.html">gave their allegiance</a> to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi because they feared the rise of Shia militia with links to Iran.</p>
<h2>Face facts</h2>
<p>So what could be the answer? Democracy? Federalism? Iraq’s hyper-sectarian politics would never allow a democratic system to flourish within either a federal or centrist system. Sectarianism destroys the roots of civic culture and undermines the development of any functioning civil society, which is the backbone of any democratic system. </p>
<p>As has been proven time and time again in Iraq, people vote to empower their sect, meaning the Sunni minority will be perpetually disadvantaged. This inevitably feeds the politics of victimisation and, in turn, leads to endless battles over the distribution of power between the haves and the have-nots. </p>
<p>Although there are uncertainties about the result of this painful disintegration process, there is very little chance that an Iraqi nation state like that we knew before 2003 can ever be resurrected.</p>
<p>It’s about time we faced facts: Iraq is dead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44383/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Afshin Shahi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Attempts to build a nation out of Iraq have failed spectacularly. Why is everyone still so intent on keeping it together?Afshin Shahi, Director of the Centre for the Study of Political Islam & Lecturer in International Relations and Middle East Politics, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/421462015-05-22T10:20:25Z2015-05-22T10:20:25ZThe ISIS takeover of Ramadi means hard choices face the Iraqi and US governments<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82584/original/image-20150521-979-4rvhkl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">ISIS take Ramadi; on the move in Iraq</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-254517352/stock-photo-islamic-state-isis-or-isil-unrecognized-state-and-sunni-jihadist-group-active-in-iraq-and-syria.html?src=pp-same_artist-237997351-1&ws=1">Steve Allen/Shutterstock </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last Friday, the city of Ramadi – provincial capital of Iraq’s Anbar Province, and symbolic seat of its Sunni population – <a href="http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/05/21/Taking-Ramadi-Behind-ISISs-Bloody-Assault">fell</a> to an ISIS assault. </p>
<p>The loss is devastating, and not only because of the city’s size or symbolic value, or because it’s another reminder that ISIS is on the march. The loss is devastating because between Ramadi and Baghdad there is only one major city, Fallujah, which has long since fallen to ISIS and has always been known as a radical hotbed. </p>
<p>Beyond that is the capital itself. On the Baghdad side of the provincial frontier, Iranian-backed, Shiite militias are poised to move across the line to retake Anbar.</p>
<p>Hard choices about halting ISIS now and building a secure, inclusive Iraq confront both the Iraqi government and the US and its allies in the region. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82461/original/image-20150520-11422-ve4fnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82461/original/image-20150520-11422-ve4fnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=642&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82461/original/image-20150520-11422-ve4fnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=642&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82461/original/image-20150520-11422-ve4fnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=642&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82461/original/image-20150520-11422-ve4fnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82461/original/image-20150520-11422-ve4fnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82461/original/image-20150520-11422-ve4fnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iraq.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pavalena/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The experience of working in Anbar</h2>
<p>My work for an <a href="http://www.ird.org">international nonprofit organization</a> first brought me to Anbar in the summer of 2007, not long after the American-led coalition had written the province off as “lost to the insurgency.” The push to retake it by combining the efforts of US forces and tribal militias (the “Sunni Awakening Movement” or <a href="http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/iraqs-tribal-sahwa-its-rise-and-fall">Sahwa</a>) had begun earlier that year, and by the summer had gained traction. </p>
<p>From that summer through the spring of 2008, I led a locally hired staff in efforts to reduce the involvement of youth in the insurgency in the area of a city called Hit, a few miles west into Anbar from Ramadi; in 2010, I returned to Anbar with a different organization, this time to Ramadi itself, as head of a <a href="http://www.globalcommunities.org">project</a> integrating internally displaced people who had fled to the Ramadi district from elsewhere in Iraq. My leadership role required understanding the politics and society of the area well enough to effect change without also creating unintended consequences.</p>
<p>My observations here are based in large part on my own knowledge of the region. </p>
<h2>How ISIS found a beachhead in Anbar province</h2>
<p>ISIS’ successes in Anbar province do not come out of nowhere; they come from long history of negative interactions between the Sunni and Shia of Iraq and from American and Iranian interventions. </p>
<p>ISIS’ beachhead within Sunni-dominated Anbar – that segment of the population that either didn’t resist the extremist group or that actively facilitated its advance – has its foundations in the way the US pursued the war in Iraq from the 2003 invasion onward. The US strategy prioritized short-term stability over long-term inclusive governance, and ignored the Shiite-dominated government’s pursuit of that stability through the exclusion and repression of the Sunni minority. That was followed by the sense of betrayal among Anbar’s tribal militias and the Sahwa fighters, who had fought alongside US troops to retake Anbar from the insurgency in 2007 and 2008. </p>
<p>Those fighters were subjected to greater-than-average exclusion by the government in Baghdad, ejected from or denied jobs that had been promised during the American tenure, and targeted by Iranian-backed Shia militia violence. Many saw the American withdrawal of forces as abandonment, and some have since joined the ranks of ISIS’ fighters. </p>
<p>That was worsened by the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11733715">Nouri al-Maliki</a> government’s overtly repressive and exclusionary policies toward the Sunni population, which were in turn worsened by the new <a href="http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/21117">Haider al-Abadi</a> government’s failure to change those policies, and use of Shia paramilitaries – long a battlefield enemy to the Sunni – to bolster the overwhelmed Iraqi army in fighting ISIS. </p>
<p>Anbar’s Sunni population is very much aware of the threat from ISIS; the fighters under the black flag have not met with an unalloyed welcome, but rather by Sunni tribal militias fighting them street by street. </p>
<h2>Who is seen as the greater threat? ISIS or the Shiite government?</h2>
<p>But while <em>some</em> of the Sunni population sees threat from ISIS, <em>all</em> of the population sees threat from the Shiite government and militias. ISIS’ combination of superior force and political beachhead has been amplified by the fact that the group has good administrators as well as good fighters – a contrast to central government failures with regard to basic services, which has served it well throughout the Sunni parts of Iraq and Syria alike.</p>
<h2>So what happens next?</h2>
<p>American and other international actors, seeing one strategy in ruins, argue over what to replace it with, and whether the fall of Ramadi represents a strategic failure or merely a setback. </p>
<p>But this misses a critical point. The real question isn’t about the strategy of the American administration. The real question is about the strategy of the <em>Iraqi</em> administration – not to defeat ISIS, but to build an Iraqi society and politics that’s inclusive of Sunni and Kurd as well as Shiite.</p>
<p>Throughout its years in power, the Maliki government could hardly have done more to convince <a href="http://aina.org/news/20140615144922.htm">Iraqi Sunnis</a> that they faced a real threat. The new government, distracted by ISIS since almost its first day in office, <a href="http://www.npr.org/2014/06/26/325909167/in-new-iraqi-conflict-sunni-awakening-stays-dormant">has done far too little </a>to ameliorate that perception. Instead, it has already used <a href="http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/saddam-hussein-isis-leadership/2015/04/05/id/636539/">paramilitary Shia militias</a> to bolster its flagging regular military – the same militias that fought with Sunni counterparts during recent years of warfare. </p>
<p>The use of those militias, exacerbated by reports that they turned their violence on <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/shia-fighters-accused-killing-civilians-iraq-150127062642331.html">Sunni populations</a> immediately after engaging ISIS’ fighters in <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/04/07/398004441/after-retaking-tikrit-shiite-militias-accused-of-violence-against-sunnis">Tikrit</a> and elsewhere, has only added to the problem. </p>
<p>The result: All the easy options are long since gone, and any strategy to defeat ISIS will fail if it doesn’t address the underlying drivers of insecurity and/or continues using the same tools that previously fueled violence.</p>
<h2>Facing the hard options in Iraq</h2>
<p>That may sound glib, but it’s also going to be impossible to rouse the will to tackle the hard options until this tough reality is recognized and accepted. Some situations simply do not lend themselves to easy, straightforward solutions. </p>
<p>In the meantime, those Shiite militias massing west of Baghdad on the Anbar frontier are certainly capable of winning the initial fight against ISIS. With more easily defensible supply lines, they can mobilize greater numbers and greater firepower than the ISIS fighters now holding Ramadi. The US, seeking to defeat ISIS as soon as possible, will likely add air power and perhaps even special operations troops to the fight. The Iraqi flag will fly over Ramadi again, however briefly. </p>
<p>But unless an Iraqi-conceived and Iraqi-led plan for a peaceful governance – which includes Sunnis – follows, the victory will be Pyrrhic. Those militias will be seen – for good reason – as a worse threat than ISIS in the long term and at least as bad in the short term by the population of Ramadi. The militias are symbolic of more than a decade’s worth of sectarian violence, and while there may be a temporary alliance against a larger enemy, that alliance will be entirely ephemeral.</p>
<h2>Two key actions, short term and long term, are required</h2>
<p>ISIS cannot, of course, be allowed to continue its expansion or to continue holding the territory it has already taken. But two things are required if Baghdad wants to halt ISIS and also ensure that a civil war between Sunni tribal militias and Shia paramilitaries does not begin the second the fighting with ISIS is done. </p>
<p>For the short term, the Iraqi government should ensure that any troops massing on the Anbar provincial frontier are Sunni, with Sunni leadership and the full and explicit blessing of the national government as such. </p>
<p>For the long term, Baghdad will need to provide guarantees of inclusive, nonrepressive government and power-sharing for the Sunni population. </p>
<p>Iraq’s government will need to lay out its own explicitly Iraqi strategy for socio-political inclusion and power sharing -— something it has yet to do. That strategy cannot be seen as either American or Iranian, if it hopes to induce willing Sunni participation in a shared government. </p>
<p>No American strategy, no matter how tactically decisive, will make a positive difference in the presence of an Iraqi government that continues to do its utmost to marginalize and repress the Sunni population. The US has been reminded that imposed regime change is a losing battle – change needs to be argued out by the Iraqis themselves. </p>
<p>A successful strategy regarding ISIS would aim to produce a peaceful, unified Iraq in which ISIS cannot find common cause. There will, of course, be a need for some tactical action to dislodge the group and protect civilians in the short term. </p>
<p>But the attempt to “defeat ISIS militarily” without also ensuring that change is the same strategy that scattered broken pieces of al-Qaida into the fertile ground of Iraqi exclusion … only to see it grow into this new menace. </p>
<p>As will happen again, if we continue to make the mistake of bringing defeat and forgetting to build peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42146/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Alpher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>ISIS victories in Iraq do not come out of the blue; the group’s military success results from a long history of tensions between Sunnis and Shia and US policies that fostered such tension.David Alpher, Adjunct Professor at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/416752015-05-14T03:09:12Z2015-05-14T03:09:12ZBeware secular fundamentalism: we need to be open to religion’s role in a troubled world<p>For many years, there has been much talk about the fall of religions as a result of enlightenment and modernity, leading to “<a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=lIb69vVaQRUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR1&dq=disenchantment+Max+Weber+&ots=sT3BOq_WoQ&sig=YC-pGbnnkO_ta2VdNfPyjk6XVu4#v=snippet&q=disenchantment&f=false">disenchantment</a>” as Max Weber argued. Some extreme movements even <a href="http://victimsofcommunism.org/the-war-on-religion/">sought to eliminate religion</a> completely.</p>
<p>But religions are still alive and strong. They have a wide and deep influence on the public sphere. </p>
<p>Does that present a threat to secularism? Is religion part of the problem in the rise of extremism globally, or can it be part of the solution? </p>
<p>This is not an advocacy of the religious state in all its forms; rather, it is an attempt to understand how sufficient is the globally dominant Western secularism. It is a critique of particular forms of adjustment of the separation between religiosity and politics. </p>
<h2>Is religion to blame for extremism?</h2>
<p>In the modern era, it is very common to attack religion as a problem-maker. We see this following any violent incident in any part of the world where religion is merely one factor among many others in the violence.</p>
<p>This shows that ideas about secularism (at least in the Western context) have gone beyond the formal separation of state and religion. This has evolved to the level of what Charles Taylor calls “<a href="http://www.thedivineconspiracy.org/Z5233S.pdf">the condition of belief</a>”: there is a clear emphasis on the necessity of disappearance of God and religion combined with a strong rejection of religious involvement in public activities.</p>
<p>This “<a href="http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/4401460?uid=3737536&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21106360227061">ethical secularism</a>”, as Rajeev Bhargava puts it, regards religion as merely a disease in the public sphere, which should be forced to retreat to a very secluded part of the private life. It leaves no space for acknowledging the strong potential of spirituality and religion in conflict resolution and peacemaking.</p>
<p>Ethical secularism as an ideology has the potential for being radicalised itself by privileging secular humanism, exclusive humanism or atheism over religions. The unfairness of favouring one part of society over others and the potential for radical secularism point to the need for a moderate version of secularism. </p>
<p>From this perspective, the correlation between religion and extremism would be understood differently, as radical secularism produces extremism as well. This is <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/0811/The-dangers-of-secularism-in-the-Middle-East">the case in the Middle East</a>, for instance. The forcible imposition of the secular nation-state upon the Muslim world led to not just despotism, suppression and massacres in the last century, but also paved the way for Islamic fundamentalism to come to the surface at the expense of moderates. </p>
<p>Secularism as a critique of religious hegemony must not just be a “mechanical repetition of violence-enacting critique, but rather the manifestation of critique as a receptivity-enacting, possibility-disclosing practice” as <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=FQTrBgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA184&dq=mechanical+repetition+of+violence-enacting+critique,+but+rather+the+manifestation+of+critique&ots=lTbuU8F4C_&sig=83zwCw-wwMEb1NFKcGuwvuMBeFg#v=onepage&q=mechanical%20repetition%20of%20violence-enacting%20critique%2C%20but%20rather%20the%20manifestation%20of%20critique&f=false">Nikolas Kompridis</a> argues. Secularism as a <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=aKenKtONX2MC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false">system of “mediation”</a>, using Abdullahi An-Naim’s description, must promote compromise between religious and non-religious groups, rather than prioritising or privileging a non-religious lifestyle. </p>
<p>Another issue with blaming religion is that a distinction needs to be made between religion as an abstract phenomenon and the actions of specific adherents. Religion, secularism, atheism and other such concepts need to be viewed through an agency. Consequently, a particular religious institute, a specific secular state or a certain religious or non-religious conduct can usefully be discussed. </p>
<p>Religion is a far more complex entity, with a broad variety of interpretations. It is not necessarily tyrannical or oppressive by nature. </p>
<h2>Religion has a proven record of peacemaking</h2>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81517/original/image-20150513-32313-1bvl1zc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81517/original/image-20150513-32313-1bvl1zc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81517/original/image-20150513-32313-1bvl1zc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81517/original/image-20150513-32313-1bvl1zc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81517/original/image-20150513-32313-1bvl1zc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1001&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81517/original/image-20150513-32313-1bvl1zc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1001&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81517/original/image-20150513-32313-1bvl1zc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1001&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ayatollah Sistani has been a highly influential, calming presence in Iraq.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Religions with a long history of traditions, wisdom and spiritual experience have a very big potential to be a part of the solution, not the problem. According to the <a href="http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PWJan2006.pdf">Institute of Peace</a>, religious or faith-based peacemaking “is becoming much more common, and the number of cases cited is growing at an increasing pace”. </p>
<p>Some faith-based peacemaking has successfully averted civil war. As an instance, the Christian-rooted <a href="http://www.santegidio.org/index.php?idLng=1064">Community of Sant’Egidio</a> in its 50-year history has contributed to many cases of peacemaking. With 70,000 active volunteers of various religions in more than 70 countries, it has vast experience in conflict resolution and in promoting peace worldwide.</p>
<p>The community has contributed to peace negotiations in <a href="https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/12948">Algeria, Mozambique</a>, the <a href="http://www.italianinsider.it/?q=node/2124">Philippines</a> and <a href="http://www.state.gov/j/cso/releases/other/2014/234381.htm">elsewhere</a>. It recently hosted two dialogue meetings between high-ranking <a href="https://medium.com/@alimamouri/sunni-shiite-scholars-gather-in-rome-to-fight-extremism-in-iraq-9ea19f698922">Shiite and Sunni</a> leaders in Iraq, and <a href="https://medium.com/@alimamouri/the-vatican-oversees-shiite-catholic-meeting-to-confront-global-challenges-8d5b275481a4">Shiite and Catholic</a> religious leaders to confront global challenges in terms of extremism and conflicts.</p>
<p>In another example, the Muslim-Shiite cleric <a href="http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/colinfreeman/100262048/forget-obama-and-the-eu-the-man-who-should-really-have-the-nobel-peace-prize-is-an-obscure-iraqi-cleric/">Ayatollah Sistani</a> has had a prominent role in countering religious extremism and promoting forgiveness and peace. He has acted wisely during Iraq’s occupation and sectarian strife; his presence has helped avoid even worse humanitarian catastrophes. He never asked for an “Islamic state”; rather, he calls for a democratic civil state in Iraq. </p>
<p>The religious contribution to peacemaking and resolution of various social issues must be recognised and encouraged, instead of simplistically blaming religions and pushing them out of the public sphere based on an extreme understanding of secularism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41675/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ali Mamouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are religious and non-religious extremists and we should not confuse violent believers with religion itself, which has a long history of peacemaking.Ali Mamouri, PhD Candidate at the Institute for Social Justice, Australian Catholic UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.