tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/taiwan-3802/articlesTaiwan – The Conversation2024-03-26T21:21:40Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2258792024-03-26T21:21:40Z2024-03-26T21:21:40ZClimate change puts global semiconductor manufacturing at risk. Can the industry cope?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583587/original/file-20240321-28-sznorf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C18%2C3095%2C2037&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The chip manufacturing industry of the 21st century is the most significant industry, geopolitically speaking, as oil was in the 20th century.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-a-semiconductor-an-electrical-engineer-explains-how-these-critical-electronic-components-work-and-how-they-are-made-188337">Semiconductors</a> are the basic building blocks of microchips. These technological marvels are in everything from lightbulbs and toothbrushes to cars, trains and planes, not to mention the vast array of electronics that have become integral to many people’s daily lives. </p>
<p>The 21st century chip manufacturing industry has been described as “<a href="https://mondediplo.com/2021/08/03morozov">at least as significant geopolitically as oil was in the 20th</a>.” But semiconductor manufacturing <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/29/climate-change-could-push-chip-prices-higher-heres-how.html">requires vast quantities of water to keep machinery cool</a> and <a href="https://semiconductor.samsung.com/us/support/tools-resources/fabrication-process/eight-essential-semiconductor-fabrication-processes-part-1-what-is-a-wafer/">wafer sheets</a> free of debris, and the unfolding climate emergency puts the industry at risk.</p>
<p>Despite the industry’s dependence on water, little attention has been paid to how changing environmental conditions may impact it. Reporting by <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Chip-War/Chris-Miller/9781982172008">journalists</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep39833">think tanks</a> tend to overlook climate as a risk factor for the future of the industry. </p>
<p>Yet, globally and regionally there are signs of trouble. Taiwan, for example, produces about <a href="https://www.bcg.com/publications/2021/strengthening-the-global-semiconductor-supply-chain">90 per cent</a> of the world’s most advanced semiconductors and has been experiencing a significant <a href="https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/interconnectedrisks/reports/2022/Case-studies/TR_220830_TaiwanDrought.pdf">drought since 2021</a>. </p>
<p>The drought is bad enough that Taiwanese <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/08/technology/taiwan-drought-tsmc-semiconductors.html">farmers are being paid</a> to keep their fields fallow so water that would otherwise go to agriculture can be fed into semiconductor manufacturing plants. Taiwanese manufacturing plants have even had to resort to trucking water from one <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/watershed/">watershed</a> to another to overcome shortages.</p>
<p>Publicly available data <a href="https://www.wri.org/data/aqueduct-global-maps-30-data">on climate change-induced water stress</a>, combined with data on the location of existing, planned and announced <a href="https://www.cell.com/iscience/fulltext/S2589-0042(24)00012-9">semiconductor manufacturing facilities around the world</a>, all point to global patterns of concern for the future of semiconductor manufacturing.</p>
<h2>Looming water shortages ahead</h2>
<p>No matter the climate change scenario considered — whether optimistic, business-as-usual or pessimistic — <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2024.108791">a minimum of 40 per cent</a> of all existing semiconductor manufacturing plants are located in watersheds that are anticipated to experience high or extremely high water stress risk by 2030. </p>
<p>High-risk watersheds are those in which 40 to 80 per cent of the total renewable surface and ground water available for all purposes (e.g., irrigation, industrial, domestic use) are in use. Extremely high-risk watersheds are those in which greater than 80 per cent of the total renewable surface and ground water are in use.</p>
<p>Much of the recent concern expressed over semiconductor manufacturing paints the issue in geopolitical terms about interstate rivalry, especially <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-american-technological-war-against-china-could-backfire-219158">between China and the United States</a>. </p>
<p>Both the <a href="https://www.nist.gov/chips">U.S.</a> and <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/european-chips-act_en">Europe</a> have announced major government funding for the semiconductor manufacturing industry, especially to bring back the facilities of companies that <a href="https://www-sup.stanford.edu/books/extra/?id=33228&i=Preface.html">spent decades setting up manufacturing capacity outside of those regions</a>. However, the manufacturing facilities being announced or under construction in the U.S. and Europe are all located in regions that are already facing significant water stress. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/04/why-intel-tsmc-are-building-water-dependent-chip-plants-in-arizona.html">Intel, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company</a> (TSMC) and <a href="https://www.kvue.com/video/money/economy/boomtown-2040/boomtown-major-growth-on-the-way-for-taylor-texas/269-1f0df1f8-3ab0-49a9-86ce-7d4899fda6e7">Samsung</a> are all building new facilities in the southwestern U.S. — a region that has been under <a href="https://www.azwater.gov/drought/drought-frequently-asked-questions#">official drought conditions since 1994</a>. In 2021, the U.S. Bureau of reclamation made its first ever <a href="https://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/news-release/3950?filterBy=year&year=2021">shortage declaration for the Colorado River basin</a>.</p>
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<p>Future climate change scenarios suggest more than 40 per cent of all new semiconductor manufacturing facilities announced since 2021 will be in watersheds likely to experience high- or extremely high-risk water stress scenarios. </p>
<p>Put simply, climate change and water shortages is creating risks for semiconductor manufacture in both the short- and long-term.</p>
<h2>The state of the industry</h2>
<p>Semiconductor manufacturing facilities are multi-billion dollar investments. One does not simply pick a facility up from one location and plunk it down elsewhere if local water conditions become problematic.</p>
<p>As worrying as the future might be for the sector, aggregate water stress risks only tell part of the story. The importance of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2024.108791">particular nodes</a> in global production networks for semiconductors is another key factor. </p>
<p>For example, TSMC is widely acknowledged as a world leader in manufacturing advanced semiconductors for companies like <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/Taiwan-s-TSMC-wields-souped-up-iPhone-chips-to-overpower-rivals">Apple</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2024/3/19/tech-giant-nvidia-unveils-higher-performing-superchips-to-power-ai">Nvidia</a> and <a href="https://www.extremetech.com/computing/cerebras-unveils-cs-3-wafer-scale-ai-chip-with-900000-cores-and-4-trillion">Cerebras</a>. Yet, the facilities where TSMC manufactures for those companies are located in just three sites in Taiwan. This makes the global production networks that manufacture these technologies quite fragile. Semiconductors, especially the most advanced ones, rely on a network of only a handful of facilities like TSMC’s. </p>
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<img alt="A glass-fronted building with a sign on it that says tsmc" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583588/original/file-20240321-24-ufk6df.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583588/original/file-20240321-24-ufk6df.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583588/original/file-20240321-24-ufk6df.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583588/original/file-20240321-24-ufk6df.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583588/original/file-20240321-24-ufk6df.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583588/original/file-20240321-24-ufk6df.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583588/original/file-20240321-24-ufk6df.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">TSMC is widely acknowledged as a world leader in manufacturing advanced semiconductors for well-known companies like Apple.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
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<p>Customers of those facilities cannot easily switch to another supplier in the face of a disruption, so issues that arise at a single facility can cascade through global supply chains. This can impact a wide variety of commodities that make use of semiconductors, as was <a href="https://spectrum.ieee.org/chip-shortage">experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic</a>.</p>
<p>Major semiconductor manufacturers like Intel and TSMC claim to take water stewardship seriously. Yet, their own company <a href="https://esg.tsmc.com/download/file/2021_sustainabilityReport/english/e-all.pdf">reports suggest there may be trouble ahead</a>. Despite TSMC’s investments in water reclamation and recycling, the company anticipates being able to provide only two-thirds of the daily water consumption needed at its Taiwan-based facilities. </p>
<p>Intel, meanwhile, claims to achieve <a href="https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/corporate-responsibility/csr-report-builder.html">net positive water use</a> across its manufacturing network as a whole. But, it <a href="https://www.theregister.com/2022/07/13/intels_net_positive_water_use/">manages this achievement</a> only by counting surplus water at locations in one part of the world against water deficits at its facilities elsewhere.</p>
<h2>A concerning future ahead</h2>
<p>It is not going to be easy — or cheap — to overcome the chronic water stress risks for the semiconductor industry arising from the unfolding climate emergency. <a href="https://mondediplo.com/2023/07/11water-grenoble-microchips">Conflicts</a> already exist between the sector and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/08/technology/taiwan-drought-tsmc-semiconductors.html">other water users</a>. </p>
<p>Even as individual companies make impressive water use efficiency improvements, these efforts do not automatically result in systemic efficiencies across semiconductor production networks. And no amount of efficiency will ever overcome the problem of the water that is needed for semiconductor manufacturing also being needed by other users. </p>
<p>It may still be possible to avoid some of the worst consequences of locking in future water stress for the sector by rethinking the location of future facilities that have been announced, but are not yet under construction. </p>
<p>Without secure access to large volumes of water there are no semiconductors, and without semiconductors there are no electronics. The climate emergency is a major driver of water stress both now and in the future. Can the tech sector cope? It remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225879/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Josh Lepawsky receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). </span></em></p>Global semiconductor manufacturing is already under geopolitical stress, but climate change ups the ante.Josh Lepawsky, Full Professor of Geography, Memorial University of NewfoundlandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2255242024-03-21T17:53:21Z2024-03-21T17:53:21ZWhether it’s Trump or Biden as president, U.S. foreign policy endangers the world<p>Many observers of American politics are understandably terrified at the prospect of Donald Trump being re-elected president of the United States in November.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/11/9/has-us-democracy-failed-for-good">The U.S.</a> is already showing signs of a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/democracy-crisis">failed democracy</a>. <a href="https://www.citizen.org/news/twelve-years-since-citizens-united-big-money-corruption-keeps-getting-worse/">Its government</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/9/28/corruption-is-as-american-as-apple-pie">and politics</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/01/us/politics/government-dysfunction-normal.html">are often dysfunctional</a> and plagued <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/28/report-transparency-international-corruption-worst-decade-united-states/">with corruption</a>. </p>
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<p>A Trump victory would raise fears of a new level of decline into <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/20/us/politics/trump-rhetoric-fascism.html">fascist authoritarianism</a>. However, a second Trump presidency would not necessarily implement a foreign policy any more destructive than what is normal for the U.S. </p>
<h2>Violence part of U.S. foreign policy</h2>
<p>Since the start of the 21st century, the U.S. has unleashed enormous violence and instability on the global stage. This is a feature of American foreign policy, regardless of who’s president. </p>
<p>In 2001, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. launched its “war on terror.” It invaded and <a href="https://theconversation.com/by-not-investigating-the-u-s-for-war-crimes-the-international-criminal-court-shows-colonialism-still-thrives-in-international-law-115269">occupied Afghanistan</a>, then illegally invaded and occupied Iraq. </p>
<p>These actions <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/">caused the deaths of 4.6 million people over the next 20 years, destabilized the Middle East and caused massive refugee migrations</a>. </p>
<p>In 2007-2008, <a href="https://www.economicsobservatory.com/why-did-the-global-financial-crisis-of-2007-09-happen">the under-regulated U.S. economy caused a global financial crisis</a>. The <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2018/10/03/blog-lasting-effects-the-global-economic-recovery-10-years-after-the-crisis">associated political and economic fallout</a> <a href="https://hbr.org/2018/09/the-social-and-political-costs-of-the-financial-crisis-10-years-later">continues to resonate</a>. </p>
<p>In 2011, <a href="https://www.globalvillagespace.com/consequences-of-us-nato-military-intervention-in-libya/">the U.S. and its</a> <a href="https://www.cato.org/commentary/how-nato-pushed-us-libya-fiasco">NATO allies intervened in Libya</a>, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/libya-floods-nato/">collapsing that state, destabilizing northern Africa</a> and creating more refugees. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/11/opinion/nato-summit-vilnius-europe.html">The U.S. tried to</a> <a href="https://harpers.org/archive/2023/06/why-are-we-in-ukraine/">consolidate its dominance in Europe by expanding NATO</a>, despite Russia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/28/nato-expansion-war-russia-ukraine">warning against this for decades</a>. This strategy played a role in the Russia-Ukraine war in 2014 and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden’s administration <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/03/30/why-the-us-and-nato-have-long-wanted-russia-to-attack-ukraine/">has been accused both of helping to provoke the war</a> in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/25/russia-weakened-lloyd-austin-ukraine-visit/">hopes of permanently weakening Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/why-peace-talks-but-no-peace/">of resisting peace negotiations</a>.</p>
<p>Today, <a href="https://time.com/6695261/ukraine-forever-war-danger/">Ukraine appears to stand on the verge of defeat</a> and territorial division, and U.S. Congress <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/01/us-congress-support-ukraine-war/677256/">seems set to abandon it.</a></p>
<h2>Fuelling global tensions</h2>
<p>The U.S. has provoked tensions with China <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/11/harvard-guru-gives-biden-a-d-for-china-policy/">by reneging on American commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act (1979) to refrain from having official relations or an “alliance” with Taiwan</a>. <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/07/proposals-for-us-action-in-s-china-sea-should-worry-everyone/">The U.S. has also been accused</a> of <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2018/06/20/us-pundits-and-politicians-pushing-for-war-in-the-south-china-sea/">encouraging conflict in the South China Sea</a> as it has <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2023/2/14/david_vine_us_bases_china_philippines">surrounded China with hundreds of military bases.</a> </p>
<p>Israel’s assault on Gaza is partly the culmination of decades of misguided U.S. foreign policy. Unconditional American support of Israel has helped enable <a href="https://www.amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/israels-apartheid-against-palestinians-a-cruel-system-of-domination-and-a-crime-against-humanity/?psafe_param=1&gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAjw7-SvBhB6EiwAwYdCAVW84WyFFiEvbjzsIp5pPDN5CDlYOCBM52mCC6X6HGC6u52iuTDyyxoCM7MQAvD_BwE">the country’s degeneration</a> into what human rights organizations have called <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution">apartheid</a>, as the state has built illegal settlements on Palestinian land and violently suppressed Palestinian self-determination. </p>
<p>As Israel is accused <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68550937">of using starvation as a weapon against 2.3 million Palestinians in Gaza</a>, half of them children, the U.S. is fully <a href="https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/ccr-news/building-case-us-complicity">complicit in the Israeli war crimes</a> and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/south-african-lawyers-preparing-lawsuit-against-us-uk-for-complicity-in-israels-war-crimes-in-gaza/3109201">for facilitating a conflict</a> that is further inflaming a critically important region. </p>
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<p>Israel is of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/israel-strategic-liability">little to no strategic value</a> <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230804-israel-no-longer-serves-us-interest-says-ex-senior-white-house-official/">to the U.S</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3167/isf.2007.220205">American politicians contend that its overwhelming support for Israel reflects moral and cultural ties,</a> <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/11/us-ignores-israeli-war-crimes-domestic-politics-ex-official">but it’s mainly</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/13/us/politics/aipac-israel-gaza-democrats-republicans.html">driven by domestic politics</a>. </p>
<p>That suggests that for <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/7/24/5929705/us-israel-friends">domestic political reasons</a>, the U.S. has endangered global stability and supported atrocities. </p>
<h2>Biden/Trump foreign policy</h2>
<p>The Biden administration has continued many of the foreign policy initiatives it inherited from Trump. </p>
<p>Biden doubled down on <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2022/12/25/biden-escalates-the-economic-war-with-china/?sh=1f1caa1412f3">Trump’s economic</a>, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3253917/no-end-us-trade-war-china-biden-administration-pledges-policy-document">technological and political war against China</a>. </p>
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<p>He <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/biden-administration-continues-be-wrong-about-wto">reinforced Trump’s trade protectionism</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/08/wto-flops-usa-shrugs-00145691">left the World Trade Organization hobbled</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/07/09/1110109088/biden-is-building-on-the-abraham-accords-part-of-trumps-legacy-in-the-middle-eas">He built on Trump’s “Abraham Accords,”</a> an initiative to convince Arab states to normalize their relations with Israel without a resolution to the Palestine question. </p>
<p>The Biden administration’s efforts to push normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/11/analysis-why-did-hamas-attack-now-and-what-is-next">is considered part of Hamas’s motivation to attack Israel on Oct. 7, 2023</a>.</p>
<p>None of this inspires confidence in U.S. “global leadership.”</p>
<p>Biden and Trump share the same goal: <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/americas-plot-for-world-domination/">permanent American global domination</a>. They only differ in how to achieve this. </p>
<p>Trump <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/deconstructing-trumps-foreign-policy/">believes the U.S.</a> can <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/20/key-moments-in-trumps-foreign-policy">use economic and military might</a> <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_2020_the_year_of_economic_coercion_under_trump/">to coerce the world</a> into acquiescing to American desires, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-strong-arm-foreign-policy-tactics-create-tensions-with-both-us-friends-and-foes/2020/01/18/ddb76364-3991-11ea-bb7b-265f4554af6d_story.html">regardless of the costs to everyone else</a> and without the U.S. assuming any obligations to others. </p>
<p>In office, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/01/20/trump-the-anti-war-president-was-always-a-myth/">Trump tried to present himself as “anti-war.”</a> But his inclination to use of threats and violence reflected established American behaviour.</p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://jacobin.com/2022/10/biden-national-security-strategy-us-hegemony">follows a more diplomatic strategy</a> that tries to control international institutions and convince key states their interests are best served by accepting and co-operating with American domination. However, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/biden-warns-us-military-may-get-pulled-direct-conflict-russia-1856613">Biden readily resorts to economic and military coercion</a>, too. </p>
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<h2>Reality check?</h2>
<p>The silver lining to a Trump presidency is that it might force U.S. allies to confront reality.</p>
<p>American allies convinced themselves that <a href="https://www.policymagazine.ca/the-biden-doctrine-our-long-international-nightmare-is-over/">the Biden presidency was a return to normalcy</a>, but they’re still accepting and supporting American global violence. They’re also wilfully ignoring the ongoing American political decay that could not be masked by Biden’s defeat of Trump in 2020.</p>
<p>Trump is a <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/trump-symptom-diseased-american-democracy">symptom of American political dysfunction, not a cause</a>. Even if he loses in November, the Republican Party will continue its slide towards fascism and American politics will remain toxic.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/18/1232263785/generations-after-its-heyday-isolationism-is-alive-and-kicking-up-controversy">A second Trump presidency may convince American allies that the U.S. is unreliable and inconsistent</a>. It may undermine the mostly <a href="https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2024/03/14/how-europe-and-australia-can-end-our-slide-into-irrelevance-servility-national-press-club-of-australia-speech-13-march-2024/">western coalition that has dominated and damaged the world so profoundly</a>. </p>
<p>If Trump returns, traditional U.S. allies may recognize that their interests lie in reconsidering their relations with the U.S. </p>
<p>For American neighbours Canada and Mexico, a Trump presidency is only bad news. They’ll <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/joly-us-authoritarian-game-plan-1.6939369#:%7E:text=Politics-,Canada%20mulling%20'game%20plan'%20if%20U.S.%20takes%20far%2Dright,after%20next%20year's%20presidential%20elections.">have to somehow protect themselves from creeping U.S. fascism</a>. For the rest of the world, it may herald the start of a dynamic multipolar order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Narine has contributed to Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East and Jewish Voice for Peace.</span></em></p>A second Donald Trump presidency would not necessarily implement a foreign policy any more destructive than what is normal for the United States.Shaun Narine, Professor of International Relations and Political Science, St. Thomas University (Canada)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2258542024-03-21T17:26:20Z2024-03-21T17:26:20ZAI’s excessive water consumption threatens to drown out its environmental contributions<p>Water is needed for development, production and consumption, yet we are overusing and polluting an unsubstitutable resource and system. </p>
<p>Eight safe and just boundaries for five domains (climate, biosphere, water, nutrients and aerosols) have been identified beyond which there is significant harm to humans and nature and the risk of crossing tipping points increases. Humans have already crossed the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-023-06083-8">safe and just Earth System Boundaries for water</a>. </p>
<p>To date, seven of the eight boundaries have been crossed, and although the aerosol boundary has not been crossed at the global level, it has been crossed at city level in many parts of the world.</p>
<p>For water, the safe and just boundaries specify that surface water flows should not fluctuate more than 20 per cent relative to the natural flow on a monthly basis; while groundwater withdrawal should not be more than the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/groundwater-recharge">recharge rate</a>. Both of these boundaries have been crossed.</p>
<p>These thresholds have been crossed even though the minimum needs of the world’s poorest to access water and sanitation services <a href="https://www.unicef.org/wash#:%7E:text=Worldwide%2C%202.2%20billion%20people%20still,to%20handwashing%20facilities%20with%20soap">have not been met</a>. Addressing these needs will put an even greater pressure on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-022-00995-5">already-strained water systems</a>.</p>
<h2>AI’s potential</h2>
<p>Technological optimists argue that artificial intelligence (AI) holds the potential to solve the world’s water problems. Supporters of AI argue that it can help achieve both the environmental and social <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-14108-y">Sustainable Development Goals</a> (SDGs), for example by designing systems to address shortages of teachers and doctors, increase crop yields and manage our energy needs.</p>
<p>In the past decade, research into this area has grown exponentially, with potential applications including increasing <a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8622984">water efficiency and monitoring in agriculture</a>, <a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10058801">water security</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2019.11.014">enhancing wastewater treatment</a>. </p>
<p>AI-powered biosensors can more accurately <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gsd.2022.100888">detect toxic chemicals in drinking water</a> than current quality monitoring practices.</p>
<p>The potential for AI to change the water used in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3232485">agriculture</a> is evident through the building of smart machines, robots and sensors that optimize farming systems. </p>
<p>For example, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3232485">smart irrigation</a> automates irrigation through the collection and analysis of data to optimize water usage by <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2772427122000791">improving efficiency</a> and <a href="http://article.sapub.org/10.5923.j.ijnc.20170701.01.html">detecting leakage</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583274/original/file-20240320-20-ot4d8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="rows of lettuce beds" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583274/original/file-20240320-20-ot4d8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583274/original/file-20240320-20-ot4d8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583274/original/file-20240320-20-ot4d8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583274/original/file-20240320-20-ot4d8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583274/original/file-20240320-20-ot4d8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583274/original/file-20240320-20-ot4d8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583274/original/file-20240320-20-ot4d8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A smart irrigation system for green oak lettuce in Chiang Mai, Thailand.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As international development scholars who study the relationship between water, the environment and global inequality, we are curious about whether AI can actually make a difference or whether it exacerbates existing challenges. Although there is peer-reviewed literature on the use of AI for managing water and the SDGs, there are no peer-reviewed papers on the direct and indirect implications of AI on water use. </p>
<h2>AI and water use</h2>
<p>Initial research shows that AI has a significant water footprint. It uses water both for <a href="https://puiij.com/index.php/research/article/view/39/23">cooling the servers</a> that power its computations and for producing the energy it consumes. As AI becomes more integrated into our societies, its water footprint will inevitably grow. </p>
<p>The growth of ChatGPT and similar AI models has been hailed as “<a href="https://bootcamp.uxdesign.cc/is-chatgpt-the-new-google-5fdd0170c861">the new Google</a>.” But while a single Google search requires <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/MSPEC.2010.5466789">half a millilitre of water in energy</a>, ChatGPT consumes <a href="https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2304.03271">500 millilitres of water for every five to 50 prompts</a>. </p>
<p>AI <a href="https://puiij.com/index.php/research/article/view/39">uses</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2014.08.061">pollutes</a> water through related hardware production. Producing the AI hardware involves resource-intensive mining for rare materials such as silicon, germanium, gallium, boron and phosphorous. Extracting these minerals has a <a href="https://doi.org/10.5897/JGRP2015.0495">significant impact on the environment and contributes to water pollution</a>. </p>
<p>Semiconductors and microchips require large volumes of water in the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.watcyc.2023.01.004">manufacturing stage</a>. Other hardware, such as for various <a href="https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.analchem.5b01653">sensors</a>, also have an associated water footprint.</p>
<p>Data centres provide the physical infrastructure for training and running AI, and their energy consumption <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/electricity-2024">could double by 2026</a>. Technology firms using water to run and cool these data centres potentially require water withdrawals of 4.2 to 6.6 billion cubic metres by 2027.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583276/original/file-20240320-30-2qnook.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="an aerial view of uniformly arranged rectangular buildings" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583276/original/file-20240320-30-2qnook.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583276/original/file-20240320-30-2qnook.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583276/original/file-20240320-30-2qnook.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583276/original/file-20240320-30-2qnook.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583276/original/file-20240320-30-2qnook.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583276/original/file-20240320-30-2qnook.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583276/original/file-20240320-30-2qnook.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Microsoft data centers located in Noord-Holland, The Netherlands.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By comparison, <a href="https://sustainability.google/reports/google-2023-environmental-report/.">Google’s data centres</a> used over 21 billion litres of potable water in 2022, an increase of 20 per cent on its 2021 usage.</p>
<p>Training an AI at the computing level of a human brain for one year can cost <a href="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7855594">126,000 litres of water</a>. Each year the computing power needed to train AI <a href="https://openai.com/research/ai-and-compute">increases tenfold</a>, requiring more resources. </p>
<p>Water use of big tech companies’ data centres is grossly underestimated — for example, the <a href="http://www.aquatechtrade.com/news/industrial-water/microsoft-data-centre-uses-too-much-water">water consumption at Microsoft’s Dutch data centre was four times their initial plans</a>. Demand for water for cooling will only <a href="https://procido.com/2023/09/27/how-artificial-intelligence-ai-is-stealing-your-drinking-water/">increase</a> because of rising average temperatures due to climate change.</p>
<h2>Conflicting needs</h2>
<p>The technology sector’s water demand is so high that communities are protesting against it as it threatens their livelihoods. Google’s data centre in drought-prone The Dalles, Ore. is sparking concern as it uses a <a href="https://www.oregonlive.com/silicon-forest/2022/12/googles-water-use-is-soaring-in-the-dalles-records-show-with-two-more-data-centers-to-come.html">quarter of the city’s water</a>. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/9Kqfdq8ljUI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The Associated Press looks at Google’s water consumption in The Dalles, Ore.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Taiwan, responsible for 90 per cent of the world’s <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/03/06/taiwans-dominance-of-the-chip-industry-makes-it-more-important">advanced semiconductor chip production</a>, has resorted to cloud seeding, water desalination, interbasin water transfers and halting irrigation for 180,000 hectares <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/08/technology/taiwan-drought-tsmc-semiconductors.html">to address its water needs</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-microchip-industry-would-implode-if-china-invaded-taiwan-and-it-would-affect-everyone-206335">The microchip industry would implode if China invaded Taiwan, and it would affect everyone</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Locating data centres</h2>
<p>As water becomes increasingly expensive and scarce in relation to demand, companies are now strategically placing their data centres in the <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2023/11/the-cloud-vs-drought-water-hog-data-centers-threaten-latin-america-critics-say/">developing world</a> — even in dry sub-Saharan Africa, <a href="https://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/africas-data-centre-boom/156344/">data centre investments are increasing</a>. </p>
<p>Google’s planned data centre in Uruguay, which recently suffered its <a href="https://hir.harvard.edu/running-dry-the-battle-for-water-security-in-uruguay-and-why-it-foreshadows-a-greater-issue/">worst drought in 74 years</a>, would require 7.6 million litres per day, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/11/uruguay-drought-water-google-data-center">sparking widespread protest</a>. </p>
<p>What emerges is a familiar picture of geographic inequality, as developing countries find themselves caught in a dilemma between the economic benefits offered by international investment and the strain this places on local water resources availability. </p>
<p>We believe there is sufficient evidence for concern that the rapid uptake of AI risks exacerbating the water crises rather than help addressing them. As yet, there are no systematic studies on the AI industry and its water consumption. Technology companies have been tightlipped about the water footprint of their new products. </p>
<p>The broader question is: Will the social and environmental contributions of AI be overshadowed by its huge water footprint?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225854/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joyeeta Gupta receives funding from the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO), under grant number 5000005700 and case number 31184622</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hilmer Bosch receives funding from the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO), under grant number 5000005700 and case number 31184622</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luc van Vliet receives funding from the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO), under grant number 5000005700 and case number 31184622</span></em></p>Artificial intelligence promises revolutionary solutions to global challenges, but the water costs to produce and power AI hardware and infrastructure may exceed the benefits.Joyeeta Gupta, Professor, Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of AmsterdamHilmer Bosch, Postdoctoral researcher on the Global Commission on the Economics of Water, University of AmsterdamLuc van Vliet, Researcher, Human Geography, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2246102024-03-07T13:28:44Z2024-03-07T13:28:44ZCherry blossoms – celebrated in Japan for centuries and gifted to Americans – are an appreciation of impermanence and spring<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579995/original/file-20240305-22-u58mno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C9%2C1916%2C1352&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Families relax under lush cherry trees in the Shinjuku Gyoen in Tokyo.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/shankaronline/48624796381">shankar s./Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cherry blossoms mark the beginning of spring. Various festivals are regularly organized in <a href="https://sfcherryblossom.org/">California</a>, <a href="https://cherryblossomdenver.org/">Colorado</a>, <a href="https://cherryblossom.com/">Georgia</a>, <a href="http://www.nashvillecherryblossomfestival.org/">Tennessee</a> and <a href="https://nationalcherryblossomfestival.org/">Washington, D.C.</a>, to celebrate the bloom of cherry trees. </p>
<p>The blossoms, however, are short-lived and usually fall within a week. Indeed, “sakura,” as the cherry tree is known in Japanese, is a recognized <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Mizue_Sawano_The_Art_of_the_Cherry_Tree/nHf8lxLOYsUC?hl=en">symbol of impermanence</a> in Japan and beyond. </p>
<p>Every year, many people all around Japan gather under the cherry trees in parks and gardens for a spring picnic to watch the blossoms fall while they chat with their companions over seasonal drinks and snacks. Such gatherings are called “hanami,” literally meaning “viewing the flowers.” </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://wlc.utk.edu/?people=malgorzata-k-citko-duplantis">scholar of premodern Japanese literature and culture</a>, I was introduced to the custom of viewing cherry blossoms early on in my education. It is an ancient ritual that has been celebrated and written about in Japan for centuries and continues to be an indispensable element of welcoming spring. In the U.S., the tradition of hanami started with the first cherry trees being planted in Washington D.C. in 1912 as a <a href="https://www.nps.gov/subjects/cherryblossom/history-of-the-cherry-trees.htm">gift of friendship from Japan</a>. </p>
<h2>Poetry about nature</h2>
<p>The custom of viewing blooming trees in spring arrived in Japan from the Asian continent. Watching blooming plum trees, often by moonlight, as a symbol of <a href="https://www.archwaypublishing.com/en/bookstore/bookdetails/799255-The-Plum-Blossom-of-Luojia-Mountain">strength, vitality and end of winter</a> was practiced in China since antiquity. It was adopted in Japan sometime in the eighth century.</p>
<p>Poetic examples of blooming plums, or “ume” in Japanese, are found in “<a href="https://www.kokugakuin.ac.jp/assets/uploads/2021/03/KJS2-2Oishi.pdf">Man’yōshū,” or a “Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves</a>,” the oldest collection of Japanese poetry, which dates to the eighth century. </p>
<p>Scholar of East Asian Literatures <a href="https://lit.mit.edu/denecke/">Wiebke Denecke</a> explains that classical Japanese poets <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25066837">wrote poetry about plum blossoms when they were in season</a>. Their compositions shaped Japanese court poetry, or “waka” in Japanese, which is rooted in nature and its constant seasonal cycle. </p>
<p>However, it is the sakura, not plum trees, that occupies a special place in Japanese culture. Imperial waka anthologies compiled in Japan between 905 and 1439 C.E. usually contain more spring poems composed about cherry blossoms than plum blossoms. </p>
<h2>Central to waka composition</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/558474/the-sakura-obsession-by-naoko-abe/">The first cherry blossom viewing</a> was held by Emperor Saga in 812 C.E. and soon became a regular event at the imperial court, often accompanied by music, food and writing poetry. </p>
<p>Cherry blossoms became one of the regular topics of waka composition. In fact, I started studying Japanese poetry thanks to a sakura-themed poem written by a classical female poet, Izumi Shikibu, who is believed to have actively composed waka around 1000 C.E. <a href="http://www.misawa-ac.jp/drama/daihon/genji/bunken/zoku.html">The poem is prefaced with its author’s memory</a> about her ex-lover wishing to see the cherry blossoms again before they fall. </p>
<blockquote>tō o koyo<br>
saku to miru ma ni<br>
chirinu beshi<br>
tsuyu to hana to no<br>
naka zo yo no naka</blockquote>
<blockquote>Come quickly!<br>
As soon as they start to open<br>
they must fall.<br>
Our world dwells<br>
in dew on top of the cherry blossoms.</blockquote>
<p>The poem is not the most famous example of waka about cherry blossoms in premodern Japanese poetry, but it contains layers of traditional imagery symbolizing impermanence. It emphasizes that once cherry blossoms bloom, they are destined to fall. Witnessing the moment of their fall is the very purpose of hanami. </p>
<p>Dew is usually interpreted as a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2385169">symbol of tears</a> in waka, but it can be also read more erotically as a reference to other <a href="https://uhpress.hawaii.edu/title/mapping-courtship-and-kinship-in-classical-japan-the-tale-of-genji-and-its-predecessors/%22%22">bodily fluids</a>. Such an interpretation reveals the poem to be an allusion to a romantic relationship, which is as fragile as evaporating dew on soon-falling cherry blossoms; it does not last long, so it should be appreciated while it exists. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579998/original/file-20240305-18-vujctw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A blossoming Japanese tree laden with clusters of pink flowers in a garden." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579998/original/file-20240305-18-vujctw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579998/original/file-20240305-18-vujctw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579998/original/file-20240305-18-vujctw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579998/original/file-20240305-18-vujctw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579998/original/file-20240305-18-vujctw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579998/original/file-20240305-18-vujctw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579998/original/file-20240305-18-vujctw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In Japan, cherry blossoms symbolize impermanence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/25228175@N08/4549363374">Elvin/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The poem can also be interpreted more generally: Dew is a symbol of human life, and the fall of cherry blossoms a metaphor for death.</p>
<h2>Militarized by the Empire of Japan</h2>
<p>The notion of falling cherry blossoms was used by <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/imperial-japan-and-defeat-in-the-second-world-war-9781350246799/">the Empire of Japan</a>, a historic state that existed from the Meiji Restoration in 1868 until the enactment of the Constitution of Japan in 1947. The empire is known for the <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/japanese-taiwan-9781472576743/">colonization of Taiwan</a> and <a href="https://www.peterlang.com/document/1049131">annexation of Korea</a> to expand its territories. </p>
<p><a href="https://kokubunken.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/4747">Sasaki Nobutsuna</a>, a scholar of Japanese classics with strong ties to the imperial court, was a supporter of the empire’s nationalistic ideology. In 1894, he composed a lengthy poem, “<a href="https://dl.ndl.go.jp/pid/873478/1/10">Shina seibatsu no uta</a>,” or “The Song of the Conquest of the Chinese,” to coincide with the First Sino-Japanese war, which lasted from 1894 to 1895. The poem compares falling cherry blossoms to the sacrifice of Japanese soldiers who <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/K/bo3656741.html">fall in battles for their country and emperor</a>. </p>
<h2>Commodification of the season</h2>
<p>In contemporary Japan, the cherry blossoms are celebrated by many members of society, not only the imperial court. Blooming around the <a href="https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/national-international/lunar-new-year-2024-how-to-celebrated/3447961/">Lunar New Year</a> celebrated in premodern Japan for centuries, they are symbolic of new beginnings in all areas of life. </p>
<p>In the contemporary era, vendors have commodified the cherry blossoms, selling sakura-flavored <a href="https://stories.starbucks.com/asia/stories/2024/sakura-season-starts-at-starbucks-japan-on-thursday-february-15/">tea, coffee</a>, <a href="https://japantoday.com/category/features/food/haagen-dazs-releases-two-new-seasonal-flavors">ice cream</a>, <a href="https://www.oenon.jp/news/2020/0205-1.html">drinks</a> or <a href="https://www.fujingaho.jp/gourmet/sweets/g43015580/fujingahonootoriyose-sakura-sweets20240215/">cookies</a>, turning the image of blooming sakura into a seasonal brand. <a href="https://sakura.weathermap.jp/en.php">Weather forecasts</a> track the cherry trees’ bloom to ensure that everyone has a chance to participate in the ancient ritual of viewing sakura. </p>
<p>The obsession with cherry blossoms may seem trivial, but hanami gathers people during an era when much communication is conducted virtually and remotely, uniting family members, friends, coworkers and sometimes even strangers, as happened to me when I lived in Japan. </p>
<p>Viewing sakura is also evidence of modern Japan’s unique relationship with its own history. At the same time, it is a reminder that impermanence is possibly the only constant in life. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580005/original/file-20240305-23810-vdbysn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two rows of tall trees with clusters of pink flowers on either side of a pathway." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580005/original/file-20240305-23810-vdbysn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580005/original/file-20240305-23810-vdbysn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580005/original/file-20240305-23810-vdbysn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580005/original/file-20240305-23810-vdbysn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580005/original/file-20240305-23810-vdbysn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580005/original/file-20240305-23810-vdbysn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580005/original/file-20240305-23810-vdbysn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Cherry trees, with their lovely blossoms, arrived in Washington D.C. as a gift from Japan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/dannyfowler/4469426717">Danny Navarro/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>Today, cherry blossoms are celebrated in spring <a href="https://localadventurer.com/places-to-see-cherry-blossoms-in-the-world/">all around the world</a>, encouraging the appreciation of impermanence through observation of nature.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224610/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Małgorzata (Gosia) K. Citko-DuPlantis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The first cherry blossom viewing was organized in Japan by Emperor Saga in 812 C.E. In the ensuing years, poetry on cherry blossoms came to have a special place in Japanese culture.Małgorzata (Gosia) K. Citko-DuPlantis, Assistant Professor in Japanese Literature and Culture, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244382024-03-04T13:41:42Z2024-03-04T13:41:42ZDemand for computer chips fuelled by AI could reshape global politics and security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578585/original/file-20240228-18-rudxyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=28%2C0%2C6361%2C3592&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/close-silicon-die-being-extracted-semiconductor-2262331365">IM Imagery / Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A global race to build powerful computer chips that are essential for the next generation of artificial intelligence (AI) tools could have a major impact on global politics and security. </p>
<p>The US is currently leading the race in the design of these chips, also known as semiconductors. But most of the manufacturing is carried out in Taiwan. The debate has been fuelled by the call by Sam Altman, CEO of ChatGPT’s developer OpenAI, for <a href="https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/sam-altman-seeks-trillions-of-dollars-to-reshape-business-of-chips-and-ai-89ab3db0">a US$5 trillion to US$7 trillion</a> (£3.9 trillion to £5.5 trillion) global investment to <a href="https://venturebeat.com/ai/sam-altman-wants-up-to-7-trillion-for-ai-chips-the-natural-resources-required-would-be-mind-boggling/">produce more powerful chips</a> for the next generation of AI platforms. </p>
<p>The amount of money Altman called for is more than the chip industry has spent in total since it began. Whatever the facts about those numbers, overall projections for the AI market are mind blowing. The data analytics company GlobalData <a href="https://www.globaldata.com/media/technology/generative-ai-will-go-mainstream-2024-driven-adoption-specialized-custom-models-multimodal-tool-experimentation-says-globaldata/">forecasts that the market will be worth US$909 billion</a> by 2030.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, over the past two years, the US, China, Japan and several European countries have increased their budget allocations and put in place measures to secure or maintain a share of the chip industry for themselves. China is catching up fast and is <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/china-boosts-semiconductor-subsidies-as-us-tightens-restrictions/">subsidising chips, including next-generation ones for AI</a>, by hundreds of billions over the next decade to build a manufacturing supply chain. </p>
<p>Subsidies seem to be the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/germany-earmarks-20-bln-eur-chip-industry-coming-years-2023-07-25/">preferred strategy for Germany too</a>. The UK government has announced its <a href="https://www.ukri.org/news/100m-boost-in-ai-research-will-propel-transformative-innovations/#:%7E:text=%C2%A3100m%20boost%20in%20AI%20research%20will%20propel%20transformative%20innovations,-6%20February%202024&text=Nine%20new%20research%20hubs%20located,help%20to%20define%20responsible%20AI.">plans to invest £100 million</a> to support regulators and universities in addressing challenges around artificial intelligence. </p>
<p>The economic historian Chris Miller, the author of the book Chip War, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ai-chip-race-fears-grow-of-huge-financial-bubble/a-68272265">has talked about how powerful chips have become a “strategic commodity”</a> on the global geopolitical stage.</p>
<p>Despite the efforts by several countries to invest in the future of chips, there is currently a shortage of the types currently needed for AI systems. Miller recently explained that 90% of the chips used to train, or improve, AI systems are <a href="https://www.siliconrepublic.com/future-human/chip-war-semiconductors-supply-tech-geopolitics-chris-miller">produced by just one company</a>.</p>
<p>That company is the <a href="https://www.tsmc.com/english">Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC)</a>. Taiwan’s dominance in the chip manufacturing industry is notable because the island is also the focus for tensions between China and the US. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-microchip-industry-would-implode-if-china-invaded-taiwan-and-it-would-affect-everyone-206335">The microchip industry would implode if China invaded Taiwan, and it would affect everyone</a>
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<p>Taiwan has, for the most part, <a href="https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_3.php#:%7E:text=The%20ROC%20government%20relocated%20to,rule%20of%20a%20different%20government.">been independent since the middle of the 20th century</a>. However, Beijing believes it should be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-calls-taiwan-president-frontrunner-destroyer-peace-2023-12-31/">reunited with the rest of China</a> and US legislation requires Washington to <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479#:%7E:text=Declares%20that%20in%20furtherance%20of,defense%20capacity%20as%20determined%20by">help defend Taiwan if it is invaded</a>. What would happen to the chip industry under such a scenario is unclear, but it is obviously a focus for global concern.</p>
<p>The disruption of supply chains in chip manufacturing have the potential to bring entire industries to a halt. Access to the raw materials, such as rare earth metals, used in computer chips has also proven to be an important bottleneck. For example, China <a href="https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2024/technology/">controls 60% of the production of gallium metal</a> and 80% of the global production of germanium. These are both critical raw products used in chip manufacturing.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Sam Altman" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">OpenAI CEO Sam Altman has called for a US$5 trillion to $7 trillion investment in chips to support the growth in AI.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/openai-ceo-sam-altman-attends-artificial-2412159621">Photosince / Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>And there are other, lesser known bottlenecks. A process called <a href="https://research.ibm.com/blog/what-is-euv-lithography">extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography</a> is vital for the ability to continue making computer chips smaller and smaller – and therefore more powerful. <a href="https://www.asml.com/en">A single company in the Netherlands, ASML</a>, is the only manufacturer of EUV systems for chip production.</p>
<p>However, chip factories are increasingly being built outside Asia again – something that has the potential to reduce over-reliance on a few supply chains. Plants in the US are being subsidised to the tune of <a href="https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2024/technology/">US$43 billion and in Europe, US$53 billion</a>. </p>
<p>For example, the Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturer TSMC is planning to build a multibillion dollar facility in Arizona. When it opens, that factory <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-microchip-industry-would-implode-if-china-invaded-taiwan-and-it-would-affect-everyone-206335">will not be producing the most advanced chips</a> that it’s possible to currently make, many of which are still produced by Taiwan.</p>
<p>Moving chip production outside Taiwan could reduce the risk to global supplies in the event that manufacturing were somehow disrupted. But this process could take years to have a meaningful impact. It’s perhaps not surprising that, for the first time, this year’s Munich Security Conference <a href="https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2024/technology/">created a chapter devoted to technology</a> as a global security issue, with discussion of the role of computer chips. </p>
<h2>Wider issues</h2>
<p>Of course, the demand for chips to fuel AI’s growth is not the only way that artificial intelligence will make major impact on geopolitics and global security. The growth of disinformation and misinformation online has transformed politics in recent years by inflating prejudices on both sides of debates. </p>
<p>We have seen it <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26675075">during the Brexit campaign</a>, during <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20563051231177943">US presidential elections</a> and, more recently, during the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-gaza-misinformation-fact-check-e58f9ab8696309305c3ea2bfb269258e">conflict in Gaza</a>. AI could be the ultimate amplifier of disinformation. Take, for example, deepfakes – AI-manipulated videos, audio or images of public figures. These could easily fool people into thinking a major <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/feb/26/ai-deepfakes-disinformation-election">political candidate had said something they didn’t</a>.</p>
<p>As a sign of this technology’s growing importance, at the 2024 Munich Security Conference, 20 of the world’s largest tech companies <a href="https://news.microsoft.com/2024/02/16/technology-industry-to-combat-deceptive-use-of-ai-in-2024-elections/">launched something called the “Tech Accord”</a>. In it, they pledged to cooperate to create tools to spot, label and debunk deepfakes. </p>
<p>But should such important issues be left to tech companies to police? Mechanisms such as the EU’s Digital Service Act, the UK’s Online Safety Bill as well as frameworks to regulate AI itself should help. But it remains to be seen what impact they can have on the issue.</p>
<p>The issues raised by the chip industry and the growing demand driven by AI’s growth are just one way that AI is driving change on the global stage. But it remains a vitally important one. National leaders and authorities must not underestimate the influence of AI. Its potential to redefine geopolitics and global security could exceed our ability to both predict and plan for the changes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224438/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alina Vaduva is affiliated with the Labour Party, as a member and elected councillor in Dartford, Kent. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kirk Chang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The effects of AI’s growth on global security could be difficult to predict.Kirk Chang, Professor of Management and Technology, University of East LondonAlina Vaduva, Director of the Business Advice Centre for Post Graduate Students at UEL, Ambassador of the Centre for Innovation, Management and Enterprise, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2240362024-03-01T17:24:48Z2024-03-01T17:24:48ZTaiwan’s election was a clear show of defiance in the face of Chinese intimidation and pressure<p>Taiwan’s recent election result highlights voters’ steadfast determination to resist China’s influence on their politics. Despite all Beijing’s efforts to sway popular support towards its preferred party, the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/01/taiwans-democracy-prevailed-despite-chinas-election-interference">Kuomintang (KMT)</a>, the election was won by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, incumbent vice-president William Lai.</p>
<p>Lai Ching-te, who is known as William in the west and Lai Qingde in mainland China, won with 40% of the vote. A nationalist who firmly supports Taiwanese independence from China, he scored a convincing victory over KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih, who placed second with 33.5%. In third place was Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je, who received 26.5%.</p>
<p>Lai will succeed the outgoing DPP president, Tsai Ing-wen, when he is <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/five-things-you-need-to-know-about-taiwan-new-president-william-lai-elections-dpp/">inaugurated in May</a>. His election is more than just a victory for Taiwan’s democratic values. It’s an unequivocal rejection by Taiwanese voters of Beijing’s persistent and intrusive meddling in their politics.</p>
<p>Since Taiwan first held direct presidential elections in 1996, Beijing has adeptly employed a dual-faceted strategy towards the island it claims as an inalienable part of its territory. Its “carrot-and-stick approach” is meticulously designed to appeal to voters’ sense of Chinese identity while also trying to steer them way from independence candidates.</p>
<p>This is very much of a piece with China’s <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/01/taiwans-democracy-prevailed-despite-chinas-election-interference">complex relationship</a> with Taiwan. It combines military intimidation and economic incentives, with informal influence operations targeting media organisations and civil society groups.</p>
<p>Beijing reacted to Lai’s election by restating its commitment to unification: “This election cannot change the basic pattern and direction of development of cross-strait relations … that the motherland will eventually be reunified.” </p>
<h2>International reactions</h2>
<p>Beijing also reacted angrily to messages of congratulations received by Lai from an array of world leaders including the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, and the British foreign secretary, David Cameron, who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/14/taiwan-election-global-leaders-draw-beijings-ire-for-congratulating-new-president">said that</a> the result was “testament to Taiwan’s vibrant democracy”.</p>
<p>Western involvement with Taiwan has been complicated by the fact that <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-that-recognize-taiwan">no major western power recognises Taiwan</a> as an independent country. Instead, most countries pay at least official lip-service to Beijing’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-38285354">“one China” policy</a>. </p>
<p>This holds that Taiwan is the same country as the People’s Republic (mainland China). At the same time, Taiwan’s western allies <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-67909120">supply it with arms</a> to defend itself against any forced assimilation into China.</p>
<p>In reporting the election result, the international media focused squarely on what it suggested about Taiwan’s relations with the mainland. The message was clear in headlines such as “Taiwan voters rebuff China, ruling party gets third presidential term,” (<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/polls-open-taiwans-critical-elections-watched-closely-by-china-2024-01-13/">Reuters’</a>) or “Taiwan Elects US-Friendly President, Defying China Warnings” (<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-13/taiwan-set-to-elect-president-reviled-by-china-in-setback-for-xi">Bloomberg</a>). Throughout the west the election was billed as a defiant Taiwan refusing to back down to Beijing.</p>
<p>It was against this tense backdrop that a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-68346855">five-member US congressional delegation</a> led by the House China committee chairman, Mike Gallagher, arrived in Taipei to pay their respects to the president-elect. Gallagher, a known China hawk, assured Lai of his country’s continuing support. </p>
<p>He said: “I’m confident regardless of how the presidential election goes, we will maintain our support not only for Taiwan but also a posture of internationalism and engagement.”</p>
<p>Gallagher’s trip angered Beijing, which demanded that the US <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/china-demands-us-stop-official-contact-taiwan-congressional-107459161">cease any official contact with Taiwan</a>. “China opposes any form of official interaction between the US and Taiwan authorities and rejects US interference in Taiwan affairs in whatever form or under whatever pretext,” a foreign ministry spokeswoman said, urging Washington to be “mindful of the extreme complexity and sensitivity” of the situation.</p>
<p>Taiwanese foreign minister, Jaushieh Joseph Wu, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R0wuZR0fnmc">welcomed the visit</a>: “Taiwan has been under tremendous military, economic, and also hybrid coercion by the PRC and under these circumstances, the visit of US congressmen has been of tremendous support to Taiwan.”</p>
<h2>China ups the ante</h2>
<p>Most recently, the response from the Chinese Communist party has taken a more strident tone. Wang Huning – a key figure overseeing Taiwanese affairs in China – <a href="https://www.zytzb.gov.cn/zytzb/2024-02/23/article_2024022317133791028.shtml">urged the annual Taiwan Work Conference</a> held in Beijing on February 23 to “resolutely combat ‘Taiwan independence’ separatism, curb interference from external forces, firmly support the patriotic unification forces on the island, broadly unite Taiwan compatriots, and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait”.</p>
<p>Communist party rhetoric has also <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/28172cc1-b3b7-4a72-88b0-5a963d0ce823">ramped up</a> towards advocates of Taiwanese independence since the election. Where previously party officials had used the term “oppose” (fandui 反对), this year it has shifted to “kill” or “combat” (daji 打击) against “Taiwan separatists.” </p>
<p>It’s a notable change in tone compared to previous conferences. This more aggressive stance would appear to affirm widespread expectations that Beijing will <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/27/taiwan-china-lai-ccp-unification-election-invasion-disinformation/">intensify its attempts</a> to push Taiwan towards unification.</p>
<p>China tried a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/09/taiwan-presidential-election-china-influence">range of gambits</a> to interfere with the recent election. These ranged from hosting visits from hundreds of pro-Beijing Taiwanese local officials in the hope that they could use their influence to sway voters (carrot) to threatening to cancel trade concessions for Taiwanese businesses (stick). </p>
<p>There was deep-fake content pushing Beijing’s message and a blizzard of other misleading online content promoting conspiracy theories about DPP candidates. Chinese aircraft and spy balloons violated Taiwan’s airspace regularly during the campaign.</p>
<p>None of this worked. Turnout for the recent election <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwans-2024-elections-results-and-implications">was 71.86%</a> – significantly higher than in the most recent elections in the US and UK. And there was clear distance between Lai’s 40% of the vote and the other candidates. Clearly the Taiwanese people value their democracy and wanted to send their own message to Beijing through the best medium there is: the ballot box.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224036/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Yukteshwar Kumar is affiliated with the Conservative Party. </span></em></p>Global reaction to the recent Taiwan election, which was won by a pro-independence candidate, contrasts sharply with that of Beijing.Yukteshwar Kumar, Course Director, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2236082024-02-26T13:09:07Z2024-02-26T13:09:07ZTaiwan election 2024: how presidential candidates left women voters unimpressed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577406/original/file-20240222-15836-azi6l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C5%2C3889%2C2591&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/supporters-founder-tech-giant-foxconn-terry-2302096449">jamesonwu1972/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Lai Ching-te (also known as William Lai) of the Democratic Progressive Party was elected as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/13/taiwan-ruling-partys-lai-ching-te-wins-presidential-election">new president of Taiwan</a> in January, beating Hou Yu-ih and Ko Wen-je of the Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party respectively. </p>
<p>Lai picked Hsiao Bi-khim to be his running mate. Hsiao, who had been Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to the US since 2020, is the second woman to become vice president in Taiwan. </p>
<p>Seeing women on the tickets for major political seats is <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0192512120935517?casa_token=pFwzsqGqu7cAAAAA%3AH8HNx-pNysvT4B9yojPw3wxVw3R6y2f2en6AYhLom9eI-6onmaEpMzIjBehJC3_v-4-BS57rgAJR4Q">not unusual</a> for Taiwanese voters. Taiwan’s national legislature has almost attained gender parity, significantly higher than the <a href="https://data.ipu.org/women-averages">global average</a>, and in 2016 it elected a woman as president (Tsai Ing-wen).</p>
<p>Nevertheless, no presidential candidate in the recent election offered concrete plans for how to achieve gender equality in society and, perhaps as a result, did not attract a great deal of support from women. Instead, candidates who chose women as their vice-presidential running mates appeared to do so as a political gesture aimed at attracting support from women, rather than displaying any real intent to advance gender equality in Taiwan.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two Taiwanese politicians (a man and a woman) cheering on a stage in front of a crowd." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577540/original/file-20240223-22-23d6h3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577540/original/file-20240223-22-23d6h3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577540/original/file-20240223-22-23d6h3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577540/original/file-20240223-22-23d6h3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577540/original/file-20240223-22-23d6h3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577540/original/file-20240223-22-23d6h3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577540/original/file-20240223-22-23d6h3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lai Ching-te (William Lai) and his running mate Hsiao Bi-Khim during a campaign rally.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/lai-chingte-william-vice-president-dpp-2396136779">jamesonwu1972/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Misogyny throughout the campaigns</h2>
<p>As Taiwan geared up for the election, all three candidates spoke about the importance of gender diversity. But none of them truly campaigned for gender justice, at least not with any real conviction. </p>
<p>Ko advocated for the legalisation of surrogacy and gender-neutral bathrooms. Hou campaigned for incorporating gender diversity and equality in school curriculum’s and workplaces. Lai offered no nuances as his platform did not differ much from his opponents. </p>
<p>However, the <a href="https://www.38.org.tw/en/en-index">Modern Women’s Foundation</a> and other leading women’s organisations <a href="https://asianews.network/taiwans-female-v-p-picks-reflect-commitment-to-gender-equality-but-challenges-remain/">demanded</a> that attention be paid to gender-based violence, the gender pay gap, state-subsidised care and, among other things, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article/do-government-positions-held-by-women-matter-a-crossnational-examination-of-female-ministers-impacts-on-womens-political-participation/1C587287F90462338F69B9A774096732">women’s ministerial representation</a>. Their efforts were to no avail as none of the candidates offered a concrete solution to any of these problems. </p>
<p>The election also scored high for misogynistic remarks from candidates. Since being elected as the mayor of Taipei ten years ago, Ko has regularly made sexist comments – for example, after a rally in July 2023 where a woman held a sign listing his remarks, his supporters <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2023/07/26/2003803741">harassed her online</a>. Ko refused to take responsibility for his own statements, saying: “What has that got to do with me?” </p>
<p>Hou also has a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-12/taiwan-presidential-election-what-to-know-about-the-candidates?leadSource=uverify%20wall">history</a> of objectifying women. At a press conference in 2018 where Hou launched a ride-sharing policy, he complimented the woman host’s appearance and age, <a href="https://www.gvm.com.tw/article/107994">saying</a> she had an “unsafe face”. He proceeded by saying that ride sharing would allow men like him to make friends with young women. </p>
<h2>Appealing to women voters</h2>
<p>Needless to say, the main electoral battles in January did not focus on women’s issues. They mainly concentrated on relations with China and on the cost of living. Women make up half of Taiwan’s population, yet their issues were largely ignored.</p>
<p>This lack of appeal was reflected in voting. Based on our own analysis of <a href="http://teds.nccu.edu.tw/teds_plan/">Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study</a> (which collects data of voting behaviour and changes in democratic values), all three candidates struggled to secure support from women. </p>
<p>Lai, the eventual successor, stood out as the only candidate to receive a positive response from women. But even then, only 40% of <a href="https://www.tpof.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231229-TPOF-December-2023-Public-Opinion-Poll-%E2%80%93-English-Excerpt.pdf">women without clear political preferences</a> (characterised here as “median voters”) said they voted for him. </p>
<p>More than half of women voters <a href="http://teds.nccu.edu.tw/teds_plan/">expressed unfavourable views</a> towards Ko and Hou. Ko particularly lagged in women’s support, despite enjoying considerable backing from men.<br>
Further analysis revealed an interplay between gender, education, age and candidate preference. Among college-educated men, 63% favoured Ko, compared with only 49% of college-educated women. And among those aged between 30 and 39 years, men favoured Ko to a significantly greater degree than women.</p>
<p>This gender gap suggests that highly educated women, and those in their 30s, were more critical of Ko than men. The differences in support based on gender, age and education were less pronounced for Hou and Lai. </p>
<p>Hou’s supporters are predominantly older, with no significant differences in gender across various ages or educational levels. On the other hand, Lai attracts slightly more college-educated women than men. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A close-up shot of a Taiwanese man wearing glasses and dressed in a white jacket at a rally." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577543/original/file-20240223-26-fmc9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577543/original/file-20240223-26-fmc9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577543/original/file-20240223-26-fmc9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577543/original/file-20240223-26-fmc9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577543/original/file-20240223-26-fmc9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577543/original/file-20240223-26-fmc9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577543/original/file-20240223-26-fmc9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ko Wen-je, the presidential candidate from the Taiwan People’s Party.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/president-candidate-ko-wenje-attended-rally-2410913131">Alex Chan Tsz Yuk/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Selective running mates</h2>
<p>Polling taken <a href="http://my-formosa.com/DOC_201239.htm">before running mates were announced</a> suggested a neck-and-neck competition, with no candidate demonstrating a substantial lead. This tight race underscored the importance of median voters.</p>
<p>Research suggests that, while vice president picks do not usually sway the electorate broadly, they can appeal to particular voter segments. Therefore, Lai and Ko both <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwan-s-female-v-p-picks-reflect-commitment-to-gender-equality-but-challenges-remain">made strategic choices</a> of women to be their vice presidential picks. </p>
<p>But did this strategy pay off? The popularity of both Lai and Ko with women voters saw no improvement. In fact, Ko’s support among women <a href="https://www.tpof.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/TPOF-12%E6%9C%88%E6%B0%91%E8%AA%BF%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A.pdf">continued to decline</a> even after introducing his running mate. His challenge in securing women’s support shows that putting a woman on the ticket was not enough to counteract his misogyny and boost women’s support.</p>
<p>Many challenges on gender inequality and injustice await Lai. He campaigned by prioritising other issues such as care for the elderly and the minimum wage. But even these issues cannot be addressed without accounting for gender. </p>
<p>Domestic needs like this can only be resolved by systematically evaluating and incorporating the interests and needs of women.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223608/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Taiwan’s presidential candidates failed to address women’s interests and resonate with women voters.Shan-Jan Sarah Liu, Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in Gender and Politics, The University of EdinburghLi-Yin Liu, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2224852024-02-21T03:28:12Z2024-02-21T03:28:12ZTaiwan’s Indigenous languages are under threat – what can NZ learn from their successes and failures?<p>There has been a <a href="https://openrepository.aut.ac.nz/server/api/core/bitstreams/7463c742-7737-4e91-af20-5ed32da53aad/content">global push to revitalise Indigenous languages</a> since the late 1980s. </p>
<p>Aotearoa New Zealand has been at the <a href="https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/maori-language-week/history-of-the-maori-language">forefront of revitalisation efforts</a>, earning the admiration of campaigners in other countries, including Taiwan. </p>
<p>Te reo Māori became an official language in 1987. Immersion education is an option for students alongside dedicated Māori news media. Te reo Māori is also increasingly used in mainstream schools, universities and public life. </p>
<p>But the work is not finished. Academics and campaigners have expressed concerns <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/education/118654781/te-reo-mori-on-a-pathway-towards-extinction">te reo Māori could still go extinct by 2100</a>. And the current government has made moves to <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/504025/government-s-move-to-discourage-use-of-te-reo-maori-backwards-disappointing-hipkins-says">discourage the use of te reo Māori</a> in official spheres.</p>
<p>New Zealand can learn from the successes and difficulties of countries like Taiwan. The colonial language (Mandarin Chinese) has had dominance in Taiwan for generations, despite efforts to save threatened Indigenous languages, cultures and identities. </p>
<p>The answer for Taiwan – and New Zealand – may lie in supporting the work of grassroots campaigners instead of relying on the government.</p>
<h2>The colonisation of Taiwan</h2>
<p>Taiwan has 16 Indigenous groups – making up around 2% of the island’s 23.5 million population. Each group has <a href="https://www.cip.gov.tw/en/index.html?cumid=B54B5C7E1E0F994092EDA9D0B7048931">its own unique language and culture</a>. These languages are believed to be the <a href="https://theconversation.com/linguistics-locates-the-beginnings-of-the-austronesian-expansion-with-indigenous-seafaring-people-in-eastern-taiwan-186547">root of the Austronesian language family</a>, encompassing te reo Māori, Hawaiian and several Pacific languages.</p>
<p>The island of Taiwan was governed by mainland China for hundreds of years before being ruled by Japan between the late 19th century and the end of the second world war. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/reviving-indigenous-languages-not-as-easy-as-it-seems-68977">Reviving Indigenous languages – not as easy as it seems</a>
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</p>
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<p>Taiwan became the home of the Kuomintang (KMT) – the Chinese Nationalist government – after the faction lost <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/topics/chinese-civil-war-1946-1950">China’s civil war in 1949</a>. The KMT implemented martial law and a Chinese-only language policy. It had a significant impact on the survival of Indigenous languages. </p>
<p>This policy disrupted the sharing of these languages within families, leading to their rapid decline. Mandarin Chinese became the dominant language for communication in all social domains. </p>
<p>While Taiwan was presented to the world as the “democratic China”, there was no democratically elected president until 1996. The election of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/24/world/taiwan-s-leader-wins-its-election-and-a-mandate.html">President Lee Teng-hui</a> marked the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304755267_Taiwanization_in_Taiwan's_Politics">start of the “Taiwanisation” movement</a>.</p>
<p>In 2016, <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/new-president-makes-first-formal-apology-taiwans-indigenous-peoples-180959990/">Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen issued a formal apology</a> to the Indigenous peoples on behalf of the government for “four centuries of pain and mistreatment … indigenous peoples’ languages suffered great losses” . </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1747527435099513219"}"></div></p>
<h2>The revitalisation of Taiwan’s languages</h2>
<p>While Indigenous peoples welcomed the gesture, the effectiveness of government measures to revitalise Taiwan’s original tongues remains in question.</p>
<p>Taiwan has introduced a series of policies dedicated to bolstering the revitalisation of Indigenous languages. These efforts started with the <a href="https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawHistory.aspx?pcode=H0020037">Education Act for Indigenous Peoples</a> in 1988 and culminated in the most recent <a href="https://www.moc.gov.tw/en/cp.aspx?n=412">Development of National Languages Act</a> in 2019. </p>
<p>These laws look good on paper and reflect the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/josl.12630">government’s inclusion of Indigenous peoples</a> as a key part of national Taiwanese identity.</p>
<p>However, linguistic analysis of the policies show that ideologically they act to say “we are not China” rather than creating a positive, long-term framework for language revitalisation. The Education Act, for example, introduced “mother-tongue” classes (classes to teach one of the Indigenous languages). </p>
<p>But these classes are plagued by the question: whose mother tongue gets taught? </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/linguistics-locates-the-beginnings-of-the-austronesian-expansion-with-indigenous-seafaring-people-in-eastern-taiwan-186547">Linguistics locates the beginnings of the Austronesian expansion – with Indigenous seafaring people in eastern Taiwan</a>
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<p>By the time these classes were introduced, the vast majority of Indigenous families were speaking Mandarin Chinese in the home, the <a href="https://openrepository.aut.ac.nz/server/api/core/bitstreams/7463c742-7737-4e91-af20-5ed32da53aad/content">single most important domain for inter-generational transmission of language</a>. </p>
<p>Even with the Indigenous Language Development Act in 2017, Indigenous languages continue to decline. A <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000187026">2010 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) report</a> identified six of Taiwan’s Indigenous languages as “critically endangered” and others as “rapidly in decline”. </p>
<p><a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-981-10-3899-0_11">Very few Taiwanese can claim fluency</a> in any of the Indigenous languages, particularly those with a limited number of speakers, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/29736885_Chapter_6_Documenting_and_Revitalizing_Kavalan">such as Kavalan</a>.</p>
<p>Research shows the usual problems of not enough teachers and materials are a smokescreen. The real problem is the pervasive use of Mandarin Chinese in all facets of Taiwanese life and the failure of “mother-tongue classes” to provide any sort of fluency.</p>
<h2>Reclaiming indigeneity</h2>
<p>What can Aotearoa New Zealand learn from Taiwan’s experience? </p>
<p>Firstly, it is clear policies might just be words if the government isn’t honest about its intentions. <a href="https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/journals/cadaad/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Vol11.2-6-Ting.pdf">One study</a> found that while the policies are technically for language revitalisation, they are really about enhancing Taiwan’s international reputation and avoiding direct opposition to the one-China ideology.</p>
<p>Additionally, it’s not simple for many Taiwanese Indigenous people to “decolonise” because their families and histories are deeply connected to Taiwan’s past. There’s been intermarriage, urbanisation, relocation and even coercion. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-decolonisation-131455">Explainer: what is decolonisation?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>But what Indigenous communities can do is “recolonise indigeneity” by <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/35478/chapter-abstract/303898417?redirectedFrom=fulltext">establishing grassroot language revitalisation efforts</a>, continuing <a href="https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/creating-space-and-fulfilling-responsibility-indigenous-language-transmission">Indigenous journalism and television productions</a> and <a href="https://www.tekaharoa.com/index.php/tekaharoa/article/view/252/232">creating Indigenous art and creative spaces</a>. </p>
<p>Indigenous communities also need to be part of policy-making and participants in all political and cultural domains.</p>
<p>Undoubtedly, Indigenous people and their language contribute to national identities. Taiwanese Indigenous people aren’t Chinese, but the question arises – are they Taiwanese? What matters most to them is <a href="https://openrepository.aut.ac.nz/items/e95cea0e-97db-448c-839e-8c94e2bad85e">being recognised as “Indigenous Taiwanese”</a>, standing alongside their non-Indigenous counterparts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222485/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chien Ju Ting does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The indigenous languages of Taiwan are struggling in the face of Chinese dominance. The answer to language revitalisation could lie in grassroots efforts rather than government legislation.Chien Ju Ting, Research Fellow, Auckland University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229582024-02-13T12:45:09Z2024-02-13T12:45:09ZChina’s chip industry is gaining momentum – it could alter the global economic and security landscape<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574634/original/file-20240209-20-qhpgx6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C0%2C4977%2C3337&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/cropped-image-engineer-showing-computer-microchip-151125485">Dragon Images/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>China’s national champions for computer chip – or semiconductor – design and manufacturing, HiSilicon and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), are making waves in Washington. </p>
<p>SMIC was long considered a laggard. Despite being the recipient of billions of dollars from the Chinese government since its founding in 2000, it remained far from the technological frontier. But that perception — and the self-assurance it gave the US — is changing. </p>
<p>In August 2023, Huawei launched its high-end Huawei Mate 60 smartphone. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (an American think tank based in Washington DC), the launch <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/327414d2-fe13-438e-9767-333cdb94c7e1">“surprised the US”</a> as the chip powering it showed that Chinese self-sufficiency in HiSilicon’s semiconductor design and SMIC’s manufacturing capabilities were catching up at an alarming pace.</p>
<p>More recent news that Huawei and SMIC are scheming to mass-produce so-called 5-nanometre processor chips in <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b5e0dba3-689f-4d0e-88f6-673ff4452977">new Shanghai production facilities</a> has only stoked further fears about leaps in their next-generation prowess. These chips remain a generation behind the current cutting-edge ones, but they show that China’s move to create more advanced chips is well on track, despite US export controls.</p>
<p>The US has long managed to maintain its clear position as the frontrunner in chip design, and has ensured it was close allies who were supplying the manufacturing of cutting-edge chips. But now it faces formidable competition from China, who’s technological advance carries profound economic, geopolitical and security implications.</p>
<h2>Semiconductors are a big business</h2>
<p>For decades, chipmakers have sought to make ever more compact products. Smaller transistors result in lower energy consumption and faster processing speeds, so massively improve the performance of a microchip. </p>
<p>Moore’s Law — the expectation that the number of transistors on a microchip doubles every two years — has remained valid in chips designed in the Netherlands and the US, and manufactured in Korea and Taiwan. Chinese technology has therefore remained years behind. While the world’s frontier has moved to 3-nanometre chips, Huawei’s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/what-does-huaweis-homemade-chip-really-mean-for-chinas-semiconductor-industry/">homemade chip</a> is at 7 nanometres. </p>
<p>Maintaining this distance has been important for economic and security reasons. Semiconductors are the backbone of the modern economy. They are critical to telecommunications, defence and artificial intelligence.</p>
<p>The US push for <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2021/05/19/geopolitics-and-the-push-for-made-in-the-usa-semiconductors/">“made in the USA”</a> semiconductors has to do with this systemic importance. Chip shortages <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/07/28/how-the-world-went-from-a-semiconductor-shortage-to-a-major-glut.html">wreak havoc</a> on global production since they power so many of the products that define contemporary life. </p>
<p>Today’s military prowess even directly relies on chips. In fact, according to the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/semiconductors-and-national-defense-what-are-stakes">Center for Strategic and International Studies</a>, “all major US defence systems and platforms rely on semiconductors.” </p>
<p>The prospect of relying on Chinese-made chips — and the backdoors, Trojan horses and control over supply that would pose — are unacceptable to Washington and its allies.</p>
<h2>Stifling China’s chip industry</h2>
<p>Since the 1980s, the US has helped establish and maintain a distribution of chip manufacturing that is dominated by South Korea and Taiwan. But the US has recently sought to safeguard its technological supremacy and independence by bolstering its <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/10/17/how-the-chips-act-is-aiming-to-restore-a-us-lead-in-semiconductors.html">own manufacturing ability</a>.</p>
<p>Through large-scale <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/">industrial policy</a>, billions of dollars are being poured into US chip manufacturing facilities, including a multi-billion dollar <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/aug/28/phoenix-microchip-plant-biden-union-tsmc">plant in Arizona</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A large factory under construction on a clear, sunny day." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574637/original/file-20240209-16-wo3zz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574637/original/file-20240209-16-wo3zz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574637/original/file-20240209-16-wo3zz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574637/original/file-20240209-16-wo3zz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574637/original/file-20240209-16-wo3zz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574637/original/file-20240209-16-wo3zz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574637/original/file-20240209-16-wo3zz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">TSMC, the world’s largest chipmaker, building an advanced semiconductor factory in the US state of Arizona.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/phoenix-arizona-march-08-2023-ongoing-2272665185">Around the World Photos/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>The second major tack is exclusion. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has subjected <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-at-stake-in-trumps-war-on-huawei-control-of-the-global-computer-chip-industry-124079">numerous investment and acquisition deals</a> to review, ultimately even blocking some in the name of US national security. This includes the high-profile case of <a href="https://www.economist.com/business/2018/03/08/cfius-intervenes-in-broadcoms-attempt-to-buy-qualcomm">Broadcom’s attempt to buy Qualcomm</a> in 2018 due to its China links.</p>
<p>In 2023, the US government issued an <a href="https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/us-government-issues-executive-order-restricting-us-outbound-investment-in-advanced-technologies-involving-countries-of-concern-china/">executive order</a> inhibiting the export of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment and technologies to China. By imposing stringent export controls, the US aims to impede China’s access to critical components. </p>
<p>The hypothesis has been that HiSilicon and SMIC would continue to stumble as they attempt self-sufficiency at the frontier. The US government has called on its friends to adopt a unified stance around excluding chip exports to China. Notably, ASML, a leading Dutch designer, has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/jan/02/asml-halts-hi-tech-chip-making-exports-to-china-reportedly-after-us-request#:%7E:text=1%20month%20old-,ASML%20halts%20hi%2Dtech%20chip%2Dmaking%20exports%20to,China%20reportedly%20after%20US%20request&text=A%20Dutch%20manufacturer%20has%20cancelled,government%2C%20it%20has%20been%20reported.">halted shipments</a> of its hi-tech chips to China on account of US policy. </p>
<p>Washington has also <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/china-quietly-recruits-overseas-chip-talent-as-us-tightens-curbs/articleshow/103004607.cms?from=mdr">limited talent flows</a> to the Chinese semiconductor industry. The regulations to limit the movements of talent are motivated by the observation that even “godfathers” of semiconductor manufacturing in Japan, Korea and Taiwan <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2022/09/28/washington-shores-up-friends-in-the-semiconductor-industry/">went on to work</a> for Chinese chipmakers — taking their know-how and connections with them. </p>
<p>This, and the <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/taiwan/comments/154x9vt/tsmc_delays_us_chip_fab_opening_says_us_talent_is/">recurring headlines</a> about the need for more semiconductor talent in the US, has fuelled the clampdown on the outflow of American talent. </p>
<p>Finally, the US government has explicitly targeted China’s national champion firms: Huawei and SMIC. It banned the sale and import of equipment from <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-China-tensions/After-Huawei-5G-chip-debut-U.S.-lawmakers-call-for-tighter-export-controls#:%7E:text=After%20the%20U.S.%20government%20put,SMIC%20has%20also%20been%20blacklisted.">Huawei in 2019</a> and has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/9/15/us-republicans-demand-full-sanctions-charges-against-chinas-huawei-smic">imposed sanctions on SMIC</a> since 2020. </p>
<h2>What’s at stake?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://ig.ft.com/sites/business-book-award/books/2022/winner/chip-war-by-chris-miller/">“chip war”</a> is about economic and security dominance. Beijing’s ascent to the technological frontier would mean an economic boom for China and bust for the US. And it would have profound security implications.</p>
<p>Economically, China’s emergence as a major semiconductor player could disrupt existing supply chains, reshape the division of labour and distribution of human capital in the global electronics industry. From a security perspective, China’s rise poses a heightened risk of vulnerabilities in Chinese-made chips being exploited to compromise critical infrastructure or conduct cyber espionage. </p>
<p>Chinese self-sufficiency in semiconductor design and manufacturing would also undermine Taiwan’s “silicon shield”. Taiwan’s status as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-microchip-industry-would-implode-if-china-invaded-taiwan-and-it-would-affect-everyone-206335">leading manufacturer</a> of semiconductors has so far deterred China from using force to attack the island.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-microchip-industry-would-implode-if-china-invaded-taiwan-and-it-would-affect-everyone-206335">The microchip industry would implode if China invaded Taiwan, and it would affect everyone</a>
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<p>China is advancing its semiconductor capabilities. The economic, geopolitical and security implications will be profound and far-reaching. Given the stakes that both superpowers face, what we can be sure about is that Washington will not easily acquiesce, nor will Beijing give up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222958/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China is making chip progress despite US efforts to contain its industry.Robyn Klingler-Vidra, Associate Dean, Global Engagement | Associate Professor in Entrepreneurship and Sustainability, King's College LondonSteven Hai, Affiliate Fellow, King’s Institute for Artificial Intelligence, King’s College London, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2221052024-02-09T16:50:28Z2024-02-09T16:50:28ZChina’s increasing political influence in the south Pacific has sparked an international response<p>Taiwan elected <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/13/taiwan-ruling-partys-lai-ching-te-wins-presidential-election">Lai Ching-te</a>, also known as William Lai, to be its next president on January 13. His election marks the continuation of a government that promotes an independent Taiwan. </p>
<p>Just two days later, the Pacific nation of Nauru <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/nauru-severs-ties-with-taiwan-switches-diplomatic-allegiance-to-china-20240115-p5exh1.html">severed ties</a> with Taiwan and transferred its diplomatic allegiance to Beijing. </p>
<p>More recently, on January 27, Tuvalu’s pro-Taiwan prime minister, Kausea Natano, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/27/tuvalus-pro-taiwan-prime-minister-kausea-natano-loses-seat-in-partial-election-results?ref=upstract.com">lost his seat</a> in the nation’s general election. Natano’s finance minister, Seve Paeniu, who is aiming for the prime ministership himself, was returned to his seat. In his campaign, Paeniu pledged to <a href="https://devpolicy.org/2024-tuvalu-general-election-a-changing-political-landscape-20240130/#:%7E:text=In%20Tuvalu%20elections%2C%20candidates%20run,both%20incumbents%20won%20re%2Delection.">review</a> Tuvalu’s relationships with China and Taiwan.</p>
<p>These examples indicate China’s growing influence in the south Pacific, a region that the world’s major powers are competing for influence over. But why is the region significant? And how are these major powers exerting their influence there?</p>
<h2>Preventing recognition of Taiwan</h2>
<p>Taiwan has been governed independently since 1949. But Beijing believes it should be reunited with the rest of China. It is not an option for states to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/04/not-about-the-highest-bidder-the-countries-defying-china-to-stick-with-taiwan">diplomatically recognise</a> both China and Taiwan – China forces them to choose. </p>
<p>For decades, the Chinese government has used a combination of carrots and sticks to pressure such states into transferring diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. </p>
<p>China has, for example, imposed significant political, diplomatic and economic sanctions on countries that continue to formally recognise Taiwan. In 2022, China curbed imports from Lithuania to <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/tough-trade-the-hidden-costs-of-economic-coercion/">punish the country</a> for allowing Taiwan to open a de facto embassy in the country.</p>
<p>But China also offers states – and their governing elites – economic and political incentives for <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-020-09682-8">withdrawing diplomatic recognition</a> of Taiwan. It has, in the past, used its influence in the UN and other international organisations to block assistance or elect specific people to international positions.</p>
<p>Nauru’s change of diplomatic position, and the political debate unfolding in Tuvulu, should be understood as part of China’s longstanding effort to prevent and reduce recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state. </p>
<p>But they are a significant step forward for China. Nauru has a leading position in the Pacific Islands Forum – the main political decision-making body for the region – so the country’s change of stance could lead to wider formal diplomatic changes in the south Pacific. </p>
<p>China, of course, has legitimate economic and political interests in the south Pacific too. It is a vital export market for natural resources from Pacific island states and is a key source of incoming tourism. According to <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202205/t20220524_10691917.html">Chinese statistics</a>, total trade volume between China and Pacific island states grew from US$153 million (£121 million) to US$5.3 billion (£4.2 billion) between 1992 and 2021.</p>
<h2>Competing for influence</h2>
<p>Nauru’s decision is another diplomatic setback for Taiwan, which is now formally recognised by just 11 countries. However, this is not in itself a serious concern for the US, Australia and their allies. </p>
<p>They all formally recognise China, while at the same time maintaining close, informal links with Taiwan. Their focus is on trying to limit the depth of Chinese political and economic influence over Pacific island states and elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region. The US is concerned that growing Chinese political influence may ultimately result in it enjoying significant military presence in the region.</p>
<p>The Pacific region encompasses the US state of Hawaii, multiple US territories, and is also home to several crucial US military bases. So, the US has made an effort to <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11208">enhance its diplomatic relations</a> in the region by providing financial support for initiatives around climate change adaption, sustainable fishing and economic growth. </p>
<p>However, increased tension between China and the west over the past decade has made it increasingly challenging to reign in Chinese influence. China has been asserting its primacy in and around Taiwan in the South China Sea, and has increasingly <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/chinas-military-aggression-in-the-indo-pacific-region/">exerted military pressure</a>. </p>
<p>China’s struggle for influence in the region now also includes taking opportunities to challenge previously undisputed western security dominance in the south Pacific. In 2022, China put forward a proposal for a diplomatic, economic and security agreement with the region. The agreement was, however, later <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11208">abandoned</a> due to resistance from some Pacific island nations at the urging of the US and Australia.</p>
<h2>US strategy in the south Pacific</h2>
<p>When president, Donald Trump launched a number of deals with Pacific islands including Nauru, Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Palau and Micronesia. However, Trump’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-trump-administration-and-the-free-and-open-indo-pacific/#:%7E:text=The%20administration%20has%20rolled%20out,programs%2C%20which%20support%20these%20goals">strategy</a> for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” had limited success. This was not only due to his confrontational posture towards China, but also to his threatening and protectionist “America first” rhetoric. </p>
<p>Joe Biden’s comparatively measured diplomacy has seen more success. In 2022, the Biden administration <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Pacific-Partnership-Strategy.pdf">announced</a> its “Pacific partnership strategy”.</p>
<p>The initiative included a commitment of US$810 million in development aid across the Pacific island region. And in May 2023, the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/25/fact-sheet-enhancing-the-u-s-pacific-islands-partnership/#:%7E:text=Last%20year%2C%20the%20Biden%2DHarris,%24810%20million%20in%20new%20assistance">stated</a> that he would work with Congress to provide over US$7.2 billion to support the region. </p>
<p>Since then, the US has <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/25/statement-by-president-biden-on-the-recognition-of-the-cook-islands-and-the-establishment-of-diplomatic-relations/">recognised</a> the Cook Islands and Niue as independent, sovereign nations, increased its diplomatic footprint in the region and has committed strongly to work with the Pacific Islands Forum to promote a “democratic, resilient and prosperous Pacific islands region”.</p>
<p>The shift of diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China does not mean that Pacific island nations want to reduce their ties with the west. But the US, Australia and their allies will need to invest a lot more in diplomatic, economic and security assistance if they want to counter China’s growing influence there.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222105/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China is asserting itself in the South Pacific, prompting efforts from the US and its allies to contain its influence.Owen Greene, Professor of International Security and Development, University of BradfordChristoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2208222024-02-07T13:12:35Z2024-02-07T13:12:35ZThe divine matchmaker in Chinese mythology − Old Man Under the Moon − who helps couples find love<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573555/original/file-20240205-21-5gjipi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=58%2C22%2C4806%2C3184&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Looking for love − a store in Huaian, in China's eastern Jiangsu province, selling flowers on Valentine's Day.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/vendor-prepares-flowers-for-sale-on-valentines-day-in-news-photo/1247125259?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In China, people celebrate Valentine’s Day on Feb. 14, but there are at least three holidays and cultural traditions centered on romantic love. A figure that ties together these other holidays is the Old Man Under the Moon – Yuexia Laoren in Mandarin, or Yuelao for short – who is believed to be a <a href="https://www.lungshan.org.tw/tw/02_2_19_gods.php">divine matchmaker</a>. </p>
<p>In many cultures across the world, including China, <a href="https://archive.org/details/encyclopediaofsexandgendervolume3/page/n157/mode/2up">parents traditionally arranged their children’s marriages</a>, and love was not necessarily their main concern. In pre-modern China, daughters had little say over their marriage partners. Moreover, they were seen as belonging more to their future husbands’ families than to their birth families. Under these conditions, unmarried girls would <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Food-and-Festivals-of-China/Yan-Liao/China-The-Emerging-Superpower/9781422294482">pray to the Old Man Under the Moon for a happy marriage</a>.</p>
<p>Girls could either make offerings at home or visit a temple where an image of the Old Man Under the Moon was enshrined. There are other figures in Chinese mythology, such as the “Weaving Maiden” and “Moon Goddess,” who are worshiped for good luck in love. But the Old Man Under the Moon is the most popular god of love and marriage. These days, the name Yuelao has even become a <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.17507/tpls.0612.10">general term for “matchmaker</a>.” </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://faculty.utk.edu/Megan.Bryson">scholar of Chinese religious history</a>, I know that understandings of gods can change over time. These days, men and women pray to the Old Man Under the Moon to find their own love match, while the Rabbit God takes care of devotees looking for same-sex romance. </p>
<h2>The Old Man Under the Moon</h2>
<p>The Old Man Under the Moon was first mentioned in a ninth-century short story called “<a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520081581/the-inner-quarters">Engagement Inn</a>,” where he arranged marriages as a divine official. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573556/original/file-20240205-19-c60osd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An icon of an old man with a long flowing beard, holding a long chord in one one hand and register in another." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573556/original/file-20240205-19-c60osd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573556/original/file-20240205-19-c60osd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1271&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573556/original/file-20240205-19-c60osd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1271&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573556/original/file-20240205-19-c60osd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1271&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573556/original/file-20240205-19-c60osd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1597&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573556/original/file-20240205-19-c60osd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1597&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573556/original/file-20240205-19-c60osd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1597&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The Old Man Under the Moon at Xiahai City God’s Temple in Dadaocheng, Taipei, Taiwan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/47/%E5%A4%A7%E7%A8%BB%E5%9F%95%E9%9C%9E%E6%B5%B7%E5%9F%8E%E9%9A%8D%E5%BB%9F%E6%9C%88%E4%B8%8B%E8%80%81%E4%BA%BA.jpg">Sean Chiu via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the story, an unmarried man named Wei Gu set out before sunrise to meet a matchmaker. He saw an old man reading a document by moonlight and tried to get a peek, but found that he could not decipher the script. The old man laughed and told Wei Gu that he was a divine bureaucrat in charge of human marriages, and his document was a marriage register written in an otherworldly script. </p>
<p>Wei Gu then asked about his own prospects, to which the old man replied that Wei Gu would get married, but it would take 14 years. Wei Gu then asked about a bag the old man was holding. The old man pulled a red cord out of the bag and explained that he used those to tie the feet of a future couple so that fate would bring them together.</p>
<p>In the centuries that followed, the Old Man Under the Moon became an increasingly popular figure in Chinese literature, drama and religion. His statue was enshrined in temples, where unmarried people and their relatives could pray and make offerings in the hope of finding a match.</p>
<p>Like other divine bureaucrats in charge of human affairs, the Old Man Under the Moon is rarely a temple’s central deity, but his icon appears in side halls alongside deities in charge of fertility and education. </p>
<p>Fittingly, he looks like an old man with a long white beard, and he holds the red cords that bind couples to each other. People looking to find a partner often leave red strings tied to tree branches, sometimes with short prayer texts attached to the strings, outside shrines to Old Man Under the Moon. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573340/original/file-20240205-17-oc7yd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Red strings and prayer texts tied around a tree outside a shrine to the Old Man Under the Moon in Yunnan, China." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573340/original/file-20240205-17-oc7yd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573340/original/file-20240205-17-oc7yd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573340/original/file-20240205-17-oc7yd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573340/original/file-20240205-17-oc7yd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573340/original/file-20240205-17-oc7yd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573340/original/file-20240205-17-oc7yd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573340/original/file-20240205-17-oc7yd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Those looking for love will pray to the Old Man Under the Moon and tie red threads.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Megan Bryson</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Heavenly romance</h2>
<p>The Old Man Under the Moon can be worshiped year-round, but he has special ties to two holidays in the traditional Chinese calendar: the Double Seventh Festival and the Moon Festival. Valentine’s Day is a new addition to existing Chinese holidays celebrating love and marriage. </p>
<p>In Chinese culture, the most important holiday for romance is the Double Seventh Festival, which appropriately falls on the seventh day of the seventh lunar month. This festival commemorates the story of the star-crossed lovers <a href="https://search.proquest.com/openview/9c442d8613959f71c8340a3a8407530f/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y">Weaving Maiden and Cowherd</a>, who live on separate constellations and can meet only once a year.</p>
<p>Unmarried girls make offerings to the Weaving Maiden in hopes of finding a good husband, in addition to saying prayers to Old Man. According to Taiwanese tradition, on the Double Seventh Festival, the Weaving Maiden <a href="https://historic.tainan.gov.tw/index.php?option=module&lang=cht&task=pageinfo&id=957&index=7">compiles a list of all unmarried men and women</a> to give to the Old Man Under the Moon. The Old Man then pairs up the single men and women in his marriage registry, binding their feet to seal their shared fate. </p>
<p>The Mid-Autumn Festival, or Moon Festival, on the 15th day of the eighth lunar month focuses on family togetherness, but it also includes <a href="https://www.nlb.gov.sg/main/article-detail?cmsuuid=9907c553-19b3-4168-a613-49d35f2893ae">romantic themes</a>. Unmarried girls traditionally <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Food-and-Festivals-of-China/Yan-Liao/China-The-Emerging-Superpower/9781422294482">pray to the Moon Goddess Chang’e</a> and to the divine matchmaker Old Man Under the Moon for a good husband. The Moon Festival is seen as the <a href="https://www.lungshan.org.tw/tw/04_activity2.php?p=150&page=0">birthday</a> of the Old Man Under the Moon, so temples sometimes have special events in his honor. The moon represents both wholeness and romance, making it a fitting symbol for the divine matchmaker.</p>
<p>Even the most important holiday on the Chinese calendar, Lunar New Year, can be a time to <a href="https://www.womenshealthmag.com/tw/mental/relationship/g38893042/pray-to-yue-lao-you-need-to-know/">worship the Old Man Under the Moon</a>. As celebrants set their intentions and goals for the new year, those looking for love and marriage will make a point of sending prayers to the Old Man Under the Moon. </p>
<h2>The Rabbit God</h2>
<p>Apart from the Old Man Under the Moon, another divine matchmaker in Chinese mythology is the Rabbit God, who has been worshiped <a href="https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/cult-hu-tianbao-eighteenth-century-discourse/docview/1308083280/se-2">as far back as the 18th century</a> as a god of love between men. </p>
<p>Members of the LGBTQ+ community in Taiwan revived the worship of this deity as a <a href="https://youtu.be/8iyBiV4ixW0?si=AWyDCjDrOiuLSpI7">same-sex counterpart</a> to the Old Man Under the Moon. The Rabbit God binds same-sex couples, just as the Old Man Under the Moon binds couples of the opposite sex.</p>
<p>Same-sex couples in Taiwan can visit <a href="https://www.weimingtang.org/index.php">Wei Ming Tang temple</a>, which is dedicated to the Rabbit God, to seek lasting romantic love and marriage. Worship of the Rabbit God can be done more openly in Taiwan, which is the only place in Asia where <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/17/asia/taiwan-same-sex-marriage-intl/index.html">same-sex marriage is legal</a>. LGBTQ+ relationships are frowned upon in mainland China.</p>
<p>The Old Man Under the Moon has long sustained the hope for romance and love in arranged marriages. Now that most people in Chinese culture find their own marriage partners, he offers hope that people will be able to find their match in a sea of possibilities. The Rabbit God offers the same hope for the LGBTQ+ community, especially in Taiwan.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220822/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Megan Bryson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Young people in China are no longer settling into marriages arranged by their parents. But they are still looking for blessings from Chinese gods to find everlasting love.Megan Bryson, Associate Professor of Religious Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215022024-01-24T13:28:13Z2024-01-24T13:28:13ZSomaliland has been pursuing independence for 33 years. Expert explains the impact of the latest deal with Ethiopia<p><em>Somaliland declared itself an independent state in 1991. It used colonial boundary lines to separate itself from Somalia. More than three decades later, however, it has yet to gain international recognition. It has had a difficult relationship with Somalia. A recent memorandum of understanding to grant landlocked Ethiopia access to the sea threatens the relationship further. But it could support Somaliland’s quest for recognition as an independent state. We asked <a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2397-7303">Aleksi Ylönen</a>, who has studied politics in the Horn of Africa and Somaliland’s quest for independence, some questions about this situation.</em></p>
<h2>1. What has Somaliland achieved in its quest for statehood?</h2>
<p>Somaliland unilaterally <a href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1877&context=auilr">declared its independence in 1991</a>, based heavily on its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/British-Somaliland">separate colonial experience</a> from Somalia. Britain declared a Somaliland protectorate in 1884. Italy established another protectorate, which became a colony, in 1889. </p>
<p>British Somaliland gained independence on 26 June 1960. It voluntarily joined the former Italian Somaliland upon its independence on 1 July 1960 to form Somalia. </p>
<p>This union <a href="https://mfa.govsomaliland.org/article/republic-somalilands-position-somaliland-somalia-talks">was never formally ratified</a> and eventually fell apart. </p>
<p>In the decades since 1991, Somaliland’s people and their representatives have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4392784">emphasised</a> their distinct colonial status and associated borders. Regional organisations and foreign powers have adhered to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2705705">colonial boundaries</a> when recognising independent states in post-colonial Africa. </p>
<p>Somaliland’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2013.776279">political system</a> is <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores">democratic</a> in a neighbourhood of authoritarian states like Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Sudans. </p>
<p>Somaliland has organised <a href="https://www.hadiamedical.ch/DE/pdf/Somaliland%20Elections.pdf">successful elections</a> and peaceful transfers of political power. Recently, however, there has been some <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/2022-journal-of-african-elections-v21n2-elections-electoral-processes-somaliland-fading-democracy-eisa.pdf">backsliding</a>.</p>
<p>Its security apparatus is elaborate. With the active contribution of citizens, it has ensured <a href="https://www.communitypolicing.eu/ehandbook/country-specific-information/africa/somaliland/">a measure of internal stability and security</a> in an otherwise troubled region. </p>
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<p>No United Nations member state or global organisation recognises Somaliland’s independence officially. Still, Somaliland <a href="https://www.republicofsomaliland.com/">has unofficial diplomatic relations</a> with various UN member states. It also maintains relations with other <a href="https://unpo.org/nations-peoples">marginalised nations and territories</a> and partially recognised <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/taiwan-somaliland-ties-growing-despite-diplomatic-isolation/">Taiwan</a>. </p>
<p>Several foreign nations have representative offices in its capital, Hargeisa. It maintains <a href="https://mfa.govsomaliland.org/article/visa-consular-services-1">liaison offices</a> in 20 countries on five continents. </p>
<h2>2. How would you describe the relationship with Somalia?</h2>
<p>It’s turbulent. </p>
<p>The Federal Republic of Somalia rejects Somaliland’s independence and agreements with foreign parties. Meanwhile, Somaliland has <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/somaliland-accuses-somalia-of-attacks-despite-truce-f80371da">accused Mogadishu</a> of involvement in the <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/OXAN-DB235834/full/html">conflict</a> in its eastern territories.</p>
<p>Negotiations over their relationship have taken place from time to time <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335684954_The_Somaliland-Somalia_Talks_in_2012-2015_A_Critical_Appraisal_Somali_Studies_Vol_4_2019">since 2012</a>, with little progress. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s recent announcement of a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566">memorandum of understanding</a> with Somaliland has set back relations between Somaliland and Somalia even further.</p>
<p>Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland president Muse Bihi Abdi in January <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566">announced a plan</a> to give Ethiopia access to 20km of the Somaliland shoreline. </p>
<p>In exchange, Ethiopia said it would <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-in-depth-assessment-of-somalilands-recognition-bid-by-ethiopia-part-of-mou/">seriously consider</a> Somaliland’s aim of international recognition. The exchange also included Somaliland getting a stake in Ethiopian Airlines or EthioTelecom. </p>
<p>The government of Somalia reacted swiftly to this announcement. </p>
<p>It held an emergency parliamentary session and withdrew its ambassador from Ethiopia for consultations. It also declared the proposed deal “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240102-somalia-recalls-envoy-to-ethiopia-over-null-and-void-somaliland-port-deal">null and void</a>” and a sign of Ethiopian “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67861390">aggression</a>” towards Somalia. </p>
<h2>3. What other bilateral arrangements has Somaliland signed?</h2>
<p>Many of the deals Somaliland has made with foreign agencies haven’t been made public. It does have unofficial diplomatic ties with various countries. It has also made agreements with <a href="https://more.bham.ac.uk/port-infrastructure/2022/09/19/waiting-for-ethiopia-hopes-and-aspirations-of-port-infrastructure-development-in-the-horn-of-africa/">foreign countries and organisations linked to their political elites</a>. </p>
<p>These include deals around <a href="https://africanreview.com/manufacturing/water-a-environment/british-government-signs-us-38mn-deal-to-support-development-in-somaliland">infrastructure development and management</a>, as well as <a href="https://african.business/2023/07/trade-investment/first-ever-funded-startup-sparks-somaliland-investment-hopes">investment</a> and <a href="https://www.upstreamonline.com/exploration/genel-boosts-somaliland-block-stake/2-1-704070">natural resource extraction</a>.</p>
<p>Ethiopia-Somaliland ties have been strong for decades. </p>
<p>In the early 1980s, Addis Ababa <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/723037.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ac99d580633354dfaf07401242dbf6900&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1">provided sanctuary</a> for the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Somali-National-Movement">Somali National Movement</a>, which sought to topple the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohamed-Siad-Barre">repressive Siad Barre</a> administration in Somalia. </p>
<p>In the 1990s, Ethiopia eyed Somaliland as a possible import-export route to the sea to lower its reliance on Djibouti. </p>
<p>As a result, Dubai Ports World, a state-linked United Arab Emirates ports and logistics company, <a href="https://www.horndiplomat.com/2016/08/22/dp-world-dubai-opens-door-for-ethiopia-in-somaliland/">agreed</a> with the Somaliland administration to develop and manage the Berbera port in 2016. Two years later, Ethiopia <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/somaliland-defends-stake-sale-of-dp-world-berbera-port-to-ethiopia-1.710037">agreed to take a 19% stake</a> in a Berbera port consortium. </p>
<p>Although Ethiopia <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-stake-in-port-of-berbera-3845366">didn’t follow through</a>, it still had plans for a logistics corridor through Somaliland. </p>
<h2>4. What can Ethiopia offer Somaliland on the independence issue?</h2>
<p>The understanding between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa includes a provision for an <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-in-depth-assessment-of-somalilands-recognition-bid-by-ethiopia-part-of-mou/">in-depth assessment</a> of Somaliland as a sovereign state. This would make Ethiopia the first UN member state to recognise it.</p>
<p>It would give Somaliland what it wants most. Recognition would help open doors for international public financing and raise Somaliland’s status in the region.</p>
<p>Ethiopia seems committed to the proposed deal. Some of the reasons for this include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>its wish for sea access </p></li>
<li><p>its strong ties with Somaliland</p></li>
<li><p>national security advisor <a href="https://twitter.com/addisstandard/status/1742164114351247808?t=hctuznfeOoXdYeDY7PzDXQ&s=09">Redwan Hussien’s comments</a> that discussions would include other sectors of collaboration. Ethiopia is already talking to Somaliland <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/ethiopia-holds-military-cooperation-talks-with-somaliland-4486080">about military cooperation</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Somaliland is holding a long-delayed presidential election towards the end of 2024. Gaining international recognition would likely give President Muse Bihi Abdi a second term in office, even though he has been <a href="https://www.somalidispatch.com/latest-news/ucid-chairman-muse-bihi-mishandled-the-defense-of-somaliland/">criticised for mishandling</a> the <a href="https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/inside-the-newest-conflict-in-somalias-long-civil-war/">conflict in Somaliland’s eastern borderlands</a>. People in this area have tried to set up their own state as part of federal Somalia.</p>
<h2>5. Why has Somaliland made so little progress and what needs to change?</h2>
<p>Achieving recognition has been a <a href="https://mfa.govsomaliland.org/article/about-mfa">foreign policy priority</a> for Somaliland. All administrations have <a href="https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/24272-a-shadow-on-tomorrows-dreams--somalilands-struggle">made efforts</a> to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/butty-somaliland-20th-anniversary-nur-18may11-122134824/158138.html">raise awareness</a> about its situation internationally. </p>
<p>But international politics have not favoured Somaliland. Most states, including great and middle powers, <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somaliland-30-years-de-facto-statehood-and-no-end-sight-30363">fear that recognising Somaliland could be destabilising</a>. They have opted to support unity, and peace and state building of federal Somalia. </p>
<p>One of their reasons for non-recognition is that Somaliland’s 1991 self-declaration of independence may appear illegal under international law.</p>
<p>In my view, it’s wrong to think that dividing up states inevitably causes instability and conflict. Each case is unique and deserves consideration based on historical and legal arguments, as well as current conditions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221502/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aleksi Ylönen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethiopia has maintained strong ties with Somaliland since the 1980s when it supported a rebel movement in the breakaway region.Aleksi Ylönen, Professor, United States International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2198102024-01-14T03:14:37Z2024-01-14T03:14:37ZIn re-electing its government, Taiwan has kept the status quo, but the victory hides a transformed political landscape<p>After months of intense campaigning, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) emerged victorious in the 2024 Taiwan presidential election, securing an historic third consecutive term. However, the party’s dominance has gone from absolute to relative; it secured only 40% of the presidential votes, and fell short of retaining the majority of legislative seats. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Kuomintang (KMT) failed to retake the presidency as well as the majority of legislative seats. The remaining seats are held by Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). </p>
<p>The Taiwan People’s Party, despite occupying third place in the Legislative Yuan with eight seats, achieved a remarkable 26% in the presidential race, punching above its weight considering its limited resources and recent formation. </p>
<p>These results signify a shift in Taiwan’s political landscape. The long-standing two-party system appears to be transitioning into a messy three-party dynamic. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwanese-election-may-determine-whether-beijing-opts-to-force-the-issue-of-reunification-217955">Taiwanese election may determine whether Beijing opts to force the issue of reunification</a>
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<h2>Why is there a third-party rise?</h2>
<p>While the Democratic Progressive Party’s third consecutive presidential term may seem like a victory, cracks in the foundation of Taiwan’s political landscape are widening. </p>
<p>The roots of this instability stretch <a href="https://www.ajpor.org/article/77478-still-aquamarine-china-factor-and-the-2020-election-revisited">back to 2020</a>, where anti-establishment sentiment simmered beneath the surface, even as the China factor dominated headlines. This time, the discontent is boiling over.</p>
<p>The Democratic Progressive government, once riding a wave of youthful support, now faces accusations of <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-amidst-the-division-a-third-wave-emerges/">power abuse</a> and, crucially, a failure to address the very issues that propelled them to power in 2016; skyrocketing housing prices, stagnant wages, and widening inequality. These woes fuelled the rise of the Taiwan People’s Party. </p>
<p>The Kuomintang, the other pillar of the old order, struggles to offer solutions. Their proposed <a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202310270021">subsidised interest rates</a> risk further inflating the housing bubble, alienating the young generation they desperately need to win. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Taiwan People’s Party proposes alternatives – public
housing, rent subsidies, and even property tax hikes – aimed at making housing truly affordable.</p>
<p>For decades, power has swayed between the Kuomintang and Democratic Progressive Party, yet voter satisfaction with
Taiwanese democracy languishes <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/753202">below 50%</a>. </p>
<p>This stark statistic betrays a profound representation crisis, an outcry against the established parties, often due to a perceived failure to tackle core issues. </p>
<p>The Taiwan People’s Party, riding this wave of disillusionment, attracts those who yearn for a political shift, focusing on domestic woes. It emerges as a beacon of hope for those who have lost faith in the two-party system. </p>
<h2>Why did the DPP win again?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/5070525">Pre-election polls</a> painted a clear picture: more than 60% craved a change, a break from the Democratic Progressive Party’s grip on power. </p>
<p>But the tide of discontent splintered, dividing voters between the established Kuomintang and the rising force of the Taiwan People’s Party. </p>
<p>Youth flocked to the newcomer, while the Kuomintang found favour among older
demographics. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-taiwans-election-just-a-month-away-the-china-threat-looms-large-216069">With Taiwan's election just a month away, the China threat looms large</a>
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<p>To unseat the government, a united front seemed logical. Yet, cooperation crumbled, replaced by escalating animosity between the opposition parties. This fractured landscape handed the ruling party an advantage: a divided opposition meant their own victory was practically guaranteed.</p>
<p>The Kuomintang, desperate to tip the scales, resorted to <a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202401060021">strategic voting</a>, aiming to marginalise the Taiwan People’s Party.</p>
<p>Negative campaigns against the Taiwan People’s Party intensified after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/war-with-china-is-not-an-option-taiwan-ruling-party-vp-candidate-says-2023-11-23/">failed negotiation attempts</a> on November 23. With Taiwan’s traditional media heavily aligned with either the Kuomintang or the government, the Taiwan People’s Party faced an uphill battle for airtime. </p>
<p>Instead of ceding the stage, they went digital. They launched their own YouTube channel, and their supporters spearheaded online and offline campaigns and created alternative news channels. This counteroffensive transformed the fight into a three-pronged clash. </p>
<p>The battle became more than just a contest between the establishment and the anti-establishment. It morphed into a clash between traditional media and
the burgeoning power of social media. </p>
<p>The Taiwan People’s Party’s digital insurgency challenged the long-held dominance of traditional media and carved out a space for their voices to be heard. </p>
<p>While the outcome of the election may be set, the digital battleground shows a new force has emerged in Taiwan’s political landscape.</p>
<h2>The future of the cross-strait relations</h2>
<p>On the international front, continuity seems to be the watchword. </p>
<p>The established relationship with the US, nurtured by President Tsai Ing-wen, is likely to continue under the guidance of Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao. Her esteemed record as former ambassador to the US inspires confidence in maintaining strong ties.</p>
<p>However, cross-strait relations with China face a potential storm. </p>
<p>With both the President and Vice President openly supporting Taiwan’s independence in the past, China perceives them as a united <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202311/1302696.shtml">“independence duo”</a>. This stance may trigger harsh responses, from further curtailing trade via terminating the free trade agreement to heightened military tensions. </p>
<p>The path forward requires navigating a delicate balance of upholding Taiwan’s democratic values while recognising the complex geopolitical realities. The future of Taiwan’s cross-strait relationship hinges on how well this balance is upheld. The governing Democratic Progressive Party will be judged on how they walk the tightrope.</p>
<p>The Taiwan People’s Party’s emergence may seem to add another layer of complexity, with its potentially divergent views on cross-strait policy. The party believes demonstrating goodwill can lower the temperature and avoid harsher measures like trade restrictions or military escalation. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-china-preparing-for-a-war-over-taiwan-or-has-the-west-got-it-wrong-here-are-the-indicators-220348">Is China preparing for a war over Taiwan, or has the west got it wrong? Here are the indicators</a>
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<p>Yet, unlike the Kuomintang’s focus on <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/01/11/could-taiwan-be-the-next-ukraine-00135009">appeasement</a>, the Taiwan People’s Party advocates for <a href="https://www.tpp.org.tw/en/our_platform-detail.php?id=20">strengthening national defence </a>to deter aggression and ensure peaceful coexistence with China. </p>
<p>Therefore, while the immediate outlook for cross-strait relations may be turbulent, the robust growth of Taiwan’s democracy offers a glimmer of hope for a future where pragmatism holds sway.</p>
<p>Taiwan’s election has presented a paradox: a familiar victory yet a
fundamental shift in the political landscape. </p>
<p>While the immediate future may be uncertain, the rise of the Taiwan People’s Party and the continued US support offer hope for a more open and responsive
democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219810/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kai-Ping Huang receives funding from National Sceince and Technology Council, Taiwan for a research proposal on negative campaigns. </span></em></p>The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has retained government, but it wasn’t a straightforward race. The campaign revealed much about Taiwan’s changing politics.Kai-Ping Huang, Associate Professor, National Taiwan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2204502024-01-10T18:30:35Z2024-01-10T18:30:35ZWhy domestic politics will prevent a thaw in China-Canada tensions in 2024<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/why-domestic-politics-will-prevent-a-thaw-in-china-canada-tensions-in-2024" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>China-Canada relations appear caught in a well-charted downward spiral in recent years amid tensions on various fronts that encompass human rights concerns, cybersecurity issues and, of course, disputes related to the arrests of Meng Wanzhou and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/11/21/from-friends-to-foes-the-canadian-tale-of-two-michaels-accused-of-spying-in-china_6275957_4.html">the “two Michaels.”</a> </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/meng-for-the-two-michaels-lessons-for-the-world-from-the-china-canada-prisoner-swap-168737">Meng for the two Michaels: Lessons for the world from the China-Canada prisoner swap</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-expels-chinese-diplomat-accused-targeting-lawmaker-2023-05-08/">Expelling each other’s diplomats in May 2023</a> further strained already deteriorating relations. </p>
<p>As both countries faced numerous challenges in domestic and international affairs, Beijing and Ottawa, coincidentally, sent signals of <a href="https://english.news.cn/20230527/aa62e479292646fc9f95916d2dbc3958/c.html">what’s known as “de-risking”</a> their foreign policy later in 2023.</p>
<p>China was apparently intent to ease tensions with its key trading partners. This was evident in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/nov/07/anthony-albanese-china-trip-is-historic-but-for-canberra-not-for-beijing">Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to Beijing</a>, and President Xi Jinping’s meeting with United States President Joe Biden and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/japan-pm-kishida-hold-talks-with-chinas-xi-nov-16-nikkei-2023-11-16/">Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida</a> during the APEC Summit in San Francisco.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-joe-bidens-meeting-with-xi-jinping-means-for-geopolitical-tensions-217754">What Joe Biden's meeting with Xi Jinping means for geopolitical tensions</a>
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<h2>Chinese, Canadian woes</h2>
<p>Domestic socioeconomic issues have largely fuelled China’s recent diplomatic activism. A lack of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/11/business/china-consumer-spending.html">consumer and capital market confidence</a> in China’s <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/09/china-investors-will-be-asking-these-3-questions-in-2024.html">economic outlook</a> has slowed its economy, causing <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/root-chinas-growing-youth-unemployment-crisis">high unemployment</a> as well as a series of social problems that have put pressure on the government.</p>
<p>For Canada, meantime, diplomatic achievements in 2023 were few and far between. Apart from increasingly tumultuous relations with China, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/25/india-canada-rift-trudeau-modi-sikh-separatists-diplomats/">Canada and India</a> are also embroiled in a significant diplomatic crisis. It’s not ideal for Ottawa to find itself at odds with Asia’s two great powers.</p>
<p>That’s likely why Ottawa is also attempting to chart a new path for Canada’s international engagement. In October 2023, Foreign Affairs Minister <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2023/11/address-by-minister-joly-on-canadian-diplomacy-amidst-geopolitical-uncertainty.html">Mélanie Joly</a> provided details about Canada’s goal to practise “pragmatic diplomacy, to engage countries of different perspectives in order to prevent an international conflict.” </p>
<p>But even though both countries are now embracing more pro-active foreign policy, it’s unlikely there will be a noticeable détente between China and Canada in 2024. </p>
<h2>Canada isn’t Beijing’s priority</h2>
<p>In a recent article in <em>Ottawa Life</em> magazine, Chinese Ambassador <a href="https://www.ottawalife.com/article/jointly-build-a-community-with-a-shared-future-for-mankind/">Cong Peiwu</a> wrote:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“For the road ahead, it is hoped that Canada will work in the same direction with China, uphold the principle of mutual respect, seeking common ground while shelving differences, and win-win co-operation, to bring our bilateral relationship back on track at an early date.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, Beijing’s aspirations may prove challenging.</p>
<p>Canada’s insubstantial position on China’s strategic chessboard means Beijing isn’t likely to either prioritize the Canadian-Chinese relationship or have a dedicated strategy to achieve a bilateral détente. </p>
<p>China classifies the major targets of its diplomacy into <a href="http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0912/c40531-31350174.html">four categories</a>: great powers, neighbouring states, developing countries and multilateral platforms. However, as a traditional western middle power, Canada doesn’t fit into any of these categories. </p>
<p>China <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/fundamental-misunderstandings-in-the-australia-china-relationship/">has developed partnerships</a> with other nations that range from friendly and co-operative to comprehensive strategic ties at a higher level, depending on the level of importance Beijing attaches to that specific state. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canada-and-china-sign-strategic-partnership-discuss-human-rights-1.546781">China and Canada established a strategic partnership in 2005</a>, a relationship that ranks lower than the “comprehensive strategic partnerships” China has with western countries like the United Kingdom, Australia, France and Germany.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1721406168218693704"}"></div></p>
<p><a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/economist-economiste/analysis-analyse/china-canada-2020-commerce-chine.aspx?lang=eng">Canada is also ranked only 18th on China’s list of top trade partners</a>, which also stops Beijing from expending more diplomatic resources to solve its dispute with Ottawa. </p>
<p>That means that even though China may talk about repairing relations with Canada, it’s unlikely to have a dedicated plan to do so. Instead, China’s policies on Canada will likely depend on Canada’s attitude towards Chinese priorities. In particular, Canada’s approach to Indo-Pacific regional affairs in 2024 could significantly influence the Canada-China relationship.</p>
<h2>On the horizon</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/taiwan-prepares-for-contentious-presidential-election/7430650.html">A victory in Taiwan by its ruling party, DPP, in the country’s upcoming presidential election</a> will undoubtedly heighten tensions with China, potentially leading to an increase in economic and military pressure against the Taiwanese.</p>
<p><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/01/navigating-south-china-sea-security-in-2024/">The South China Sea</a> remains a significant flashpoint in the region and will probably be the site of sustained tensions between China and other countries, including the U.S. and its allies. </p>
<p>Since Canada regards itself as a <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng">stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific region</a>, its support of the liberal rules-based regional order inevitably puts it at odds with China’s claims in the region, which could deepen Chinese distrust of Canada in 2024.</p>
<p>While Canada’s lack of engagement with China makes it an outlier among western nations, Canadian domestic politics provides little incentive for the government to improve its relations with China. </p>
<p>Canadians currently have a negative view of China, with a <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/07/27/chinas-approach-to-foreign-policy-gets-largely-negative-reviews-in-24-country-survey/">Pew Research poll</a> conducted last summer indicating only 14 per cent have a favourable opinion of China. Much of this negativity is the result of <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/real-concerns-around-foreign-interference-impeding-improvement-of-canada-china-relations-trudeau-1.6551196">several foreign interference scandals involving China</a>.</p>
<p>The Liberal Party and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau have had a difficult time on the China file. Accusations of <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-china-foreign-interference-canada-guide/">ignored intelligence reports</a> and concerns over <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-foundation-donation-fournier-1.6825761">financial connections</a> to China have led the government to continually backtrack on engagement with the Chinese. <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cbc-ca-news-politics-appeals-rejected-hogue-1.7068082">Public hearings into election interference are beginning soon</a>.</p>
<p>In 2024, the Liberals face an unstable supply-and-confidence agreement with the NDP and the opposition Conservatives are polling well ahead of them. The Conservatives <a href="https://www.conservative.ca/minister-guilbeaults-baffling-trip-to-beijing/">even criticized the Liberals</a> for sending the federal environment minister to China last year.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/will-the-supply-and-confidence-deal-between-the-liberals-and-ndp-survive-in-2024-219478">Will the supply-and-confidence deal between the Liberals and NDP survive in 2024?</a>
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<h2>Trade numbers remain strong</h2>
<p>Poor relations have yet to significantly impact recent trade between Canada and China. There were record bilateral trade numbers <a href="https://www.ualberta.ca/china-institute/research/analysis-briefs/2023/2022-yearinreview.html">in 2022</a>, and while data for 2023 indicates a <a href="https://www.ualberta.ca/china-institute/research/analysis-briefs/2023/2023-q2.html">reduction in imports</a>, exports are up. </p>
<p>As long as exports to China continue unimpeded, the Liberals have minimal incentive to re-engage with the Chinese. A lack of engagement won’t improve the relationship, but it also avoids the chance of another diplomatic spat that could put key export industries at risk. </p>
<p>While China is Canada’s second-largest trading partner, it only represents 3.9 per cent of exports and 11.9 per cent of imports, according to the most <a href="https://www.ic.gc.ca/app/scr/tdst/tdo/crtr.html?grouped=GROUPED&searchType=All&areaCodes=553&naArea=9999&countryList=specific&toFromCountry=CDN&reportType=TB&timePeriod=2%7CYear+To+Date&currency=CDN&productType=NAICS&runReport=true">recent data</a>. That means outside of key export industries, concerns about China likely outweigh the trade benefits in the eyes of many Canadians.</p>
<p>Even Canadians who buy Chinese imports, like cellphones and computers, are probably willing to get them from somewhere else. China is therefore low on the federal government’s priority list. </p>
<p>A shift in Canadian public opinion about China is likely a prerequisite for re-engagement by both current and future governments. This shift in opinion can’t happen overnight and must be genuine; otherwise the government will look soft on China to wary Canadian citizens. </p>
<p>With the foreign interference inquiry soon to begin featuring public testimony in the weeks ahead, China may feature prominently in the Canadian news cycle in 2024 — meaning a genuine thaw in Canada-China relations isn’t yet in the cards.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220450/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With a public inquiry into Chinese interference about to begin, China may feature prominently in the Canadian news cycle in 2024 — meaning a genuine thaw in Canada-China relations isn’t in the cards.Ye Xue, Research Fellow, International Relations, China Institute, University of AlbertaKarel Brandenbarg, Policy Researcher, Political Science, China Institute, University of AlbertaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2206852024-01-09T17:02:27Z2024-01-09T17:02:27ZChina: Xi’s new year’s address wasn’t a threat against Taiwan – it was a strategic move for legitimacy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568260/original/file-20240108-19-vqrmp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3738%2C2678&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/moscow-russia-march-23-chinese-president-132906761">Kaliva/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In his <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202312/t20231231_11215608.html">new year address</a>, Chinese president Xi Jinping claimed that Taiwan would “surely be reunified” with China. Against the backdrop of increased Chinese military posturing in the Taiwan Strait, some western journalists are framing Xi’s remarks as an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fc1dfe48-a390-48c3-b27c-7e405978c166">overt and direct threat against Taiwan</a>. They argue that Xi’s rhetoric validates concerns about a potential invasion.</p>
<p>This framing misses the point and overlooks the domestic political context of Xi’s speech. Xi also celebrated the successes of the Chinese nation and economy, while acknowledging the economic struggles of the Chinese people. Rather than threatening Taiwan, this rhetoric is intended to protect Xi’s regime.</p>
<p>Western governments draw their legitimacy from a popular mandate, which is established through elections. The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to govern China is also premised on a mandate. But instead of through elections, this mandate is established through the party’s record on ensuring continued economic prosperity and national success.</p>
<p>In this context, Xi’s emphasis on economic growth and the nation should be considered performative – an example of political theatre portraying the CCP in a carefully curated way for a Chinese audience.</p>
<p>Following the Cultural Revolution (which had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion">disastrous consequences</a> for China’s people and economy) and Mao’s death in 1976, the CCP re-established its legitimacy on <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/chinas-new-remembering-of-the-antijapanese-war-of-resistance-19371945/84F3184AF89EBA79F54561774379EAC6">twin pillars of economic prosperity and nationalism</a>. </p>
<p>Former leader Deng Xiaoping secured the economic pillar in the 1980s through reforms that <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview">raised 800 million people out of poverty</a>. The nationalist pillar involved retelling Chinese history. The regime emphasised historical achievements, commemorated national struggles and portrayed the CCP as the vanguard of the Chinese nation. </p>
<p>Under Mao, Japan’s invasion of China in the second Sino-Japanese war (the Chinese theatre of the second world war) was presented as an ideological class struggle. According to this narrative, both Chinese and Japanese workers were exploited by militaristic bourgeois elites. Nowadays, China’s nationalist narrative presents Japan as a foreign oppressor that China heroically resisted and overcame under the CCP’s leadership.</p>
<p>Such narratives of Chinese history have resulted in a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2004.44.2.276">contemporary Chinese nationalism</a> sensitive to what it considers renewed victimisation of the Chinese nation. This includes international opposition to reunification with Taiwan, a historic province of China.</p>
<h2>Relying on nationalism</h2>
<p>As China’s economy slows, the CCP has become increasingly reliant on the nationalist pillar to retain its legitimacy. This limits the CCP’s options in nationalistic disputes as it must act in such a way that upholds its nationalist credentials. </p>
<p>In 2005, China saw large anti-Japanese protests triggered by Japan’s downplaying of the atrocities it committed during its invasion of China. Within the context of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN">11.4% economic growth</a>, the CCP shut down public transport to block protesters from arriving in the largest cities and officials condemned the protests.</p>
<p>But, by 2012, China’s <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN">economic growth had slowed to 7.9%</a>. And the CCP was notably silent during similarly large anti-Japanese protests over the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China) – a <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/98119">territorial dispute in the East China Sea</a> associated with the second Sino-Japanese war.</p>
<p>China’s nationalist movement <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-japan-politics-idUSBRE88I0AU20120919/">criticised the CCP</a> for being too soft on Japan, prompting then vice-president Xi to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/19/china-japan-senkaku-diaoyu-islands">publicly renounce</a> Japan’s territorial claim. This constitutes a performative acquiescence to nationalist pressure, with Xi acting to secure the nationalist pillar while the economic pillar faltered.</p>
<h2>Understanding Xi’s performance</h2>
<p>Xi’s mention of national reunification with Taiwan in his new year address is in keeping with the CCP’s increased reliance on nationalism to secure legitimacy as China’s economy slows.</p>
<p>This can also explain China’s posturing in the Taiwan Strait. China experienced <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN">3% economic growth in 2022</a>, the lowest growth rate since Deng’s reforms (excluding the height of the COVID pandemic). So to deflect scrutiny, the CCP is intensifying its embrace of brinkmanship in the Taiwan Strait.</p>
<p>Ultimately, this brinkmanship is unlikely to culminate in a war considering how an invasion could backfire on the CCP. In the event of an unsuccessful invasion, the CCP would suffer significant damage to its reputation. Even a successful but <a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwan-how-the-porcupine-doctrine-might-help-deter-armed-conflict-with-china-169488">prolonged conflict with heavy losses</a> would have a similar effect.</p>
<p>Either way, the near-certain economic consequences, such as sanctions and embargoes, would topple the party’s economic pillar.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwan-how-the-porcupine-doctrine-might-help-deter-armed-conflict-with-china-169488">Taiwan: how the 'porcupine doctrine' might help deter armed conflict with China</a>
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<h2>Acknowledging economic shortcomings</h2>
<p>More interesting than Xi’s talk of reunification is his admission of the economic struggles of the Chinese people. In his address, Xi explained that “some people had difficulty finding jobs and meeting basic needs”. </p>
<p>There is very little precedent for acknowledging the shortcomings of the CCP’s delivery of economic prosperity. Doing so contradicts the economic pillar. It is particularly odd given that the CCP has recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/29/china-cracks-down-on-negativity-over-economy-in-bid-to-boost-confidence">suppressed negative commentaries</a> on China’s economy to avoid damaging public confidence in its economic stewardship.</p>
<p>As brinkmanship in the Taiwan Strait reaches its limits, it seems the CCP is shifting away from an over-dependence on the nationalist pillar. Instead, it may be pursuing a less immediately risky strategy, acknowledging current economic issues while emphasising the potential for economic growth under the CCP. This approach would be a safer way to maintain the party’s legitimacy than escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait.</p>
<p>Xi’s speech indicates a changing nuance in CCP discourse – one that may become increasingly apparent over the course of the coming year.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220685/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lewis Eves does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Xi’s New Year address wasn’t about threatening Taiwan – there’s more going on than we think.Lewis Eves, Teaching Associate in Politics and International Relations, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2179552024-01-09T13:44:22Z2024-01-09T13:44:22ZTaiwanese election may determine whether Beijing opts to force the issue of reunification<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568309/original/file-20240108-19-kmxh2e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6000%2C3988&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Posters of presidential candidate William Lai and his running mate, Hsiao Bi-khim.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/posters-of-presidential-candidate-lai-ching-te-and-his-news-photo/1905136679?adppopup=true">Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the votes are being tallied in <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2024/1/6/24026992/taiwan-china-president-war-xi-jinping-asia-semiconductors-chips">Taiwan’s presidential election</a>, it won’t be only the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/taiwan/">23.6 million inhabitants of the island</a> eagerly awaiting a result – in Beijing and Washington, too, there will be some anxious faces.</p>
<p>The vote of Jan. 13, 2024, is seen as a litmus test for the future of cross-strait relations, coming at a time when the status quo over Taiwan – a territory <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-taiwan-a-country-or-not-213638">Beijing claims as an integral part of “one China</a>” – is being challenged. If Taiwan’s incumbent, independence-oriented party stays in power, Chinese leader Xi Jinping might feel he has no choice but to force the issue of reunification.</p>
<p>Conversely, if the opposition – which agrees with Beijing that Taiwan and the mainland are part of “one China” but not about who governs it – wins, Beijing might feel it has more space to be patient on the issue.</p>
<p>In the run-up to the vote, Beijing has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-says-taiwan-is-hyping-up-military-threat-its-own-gain-2023-12-28/">ramped up military exercises</a> in and around the Taiwan Strait in an apparent warning to Taiwanese voters. On Jan. 6, in one of the most recent incidents, China <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/taiwan-chinese-balloons-harassment-threat-air-safety-106154165">sent a series of balloons</a> over the island, which the Taiwan government cited as a threat to air travel and an attempt at intimidation.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in his <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202312/t20231231_11215608.html">annual New Year’s address</a>, Xi stated that “China will surely be reunified,” raising fears internationally that he intends to pursue the issue militarily if necessary. </p>
<p>For Washington, too, the outcome of the vote <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/2/us-watching-taiwan-elections-closely-as-beijing-reiterates-claim-to-island">will have implications</a>. The United States has cultivated strong ties with the current leadership of Taiwan. But recent tensions in the strait have raised the risk of war. U.S. actions deemed provocative by Beijing, such as the 2022 <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-puts-the-white-house-in-delicate-straits-of-diplomacy-with-china-188116">visit of then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan</a>, have resulted in China upping its military threats in the strait. And this has raised speculation that China’s patience is growing thin and its timeline for reunification is growing shorter. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/but-can-the-united-states-defend-taiwan/">questions about the U.S. capacity</a> to respond to any Chinese aggression over Taiwan have risen; the specter of war in a third region of the world – after Ukraine and Israel – <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/top-us-general-warns-everyone-should-worried-about-war-china-1849085">worries national security leadership</a> in Washington.</p>
<h2>Independence on the ballot?</h2>
<p>The presidential election in Taiwan has come down to a three-way race. The front-runner is <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-analyzing-william-lais-foreign-policy-positions">current Vice President William Lai</a>, who is the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party. The DPP views Taiwan as a sovereign country and does not seek reunification with China.</p>
<p>Lai’s challengers are New Taipei City mayor Hou Yu-ih, of the Kuomintang (KMT), and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei running for the center-left Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). The KMT embraces the idea of future reunification with China under a democratic government. The TPP criticizes both DPP and KMT platforms on cross-strait relations as too extreme and seeks a middle ground that maintains the status quo: A Taiwan that is de facto sovereign, but with strong economic and cultural ties with China. </p>
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<img alt="A woman makes a heart shape with her arms, behind her are people carrying flags and placards." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Supporters of Kuomintang at a campaign rally in Taichung, Taiwan, on Jan. 8, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-listen-kuomintang-presidential-candidate-hou-yu-news-photo/1910638618?adppopup=true">Man Hei Leung/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Taiwan law mandates that no polls are published in the 10 days before the election. As of Jan. 3, when the final polls were published, <a href="https://www.economist.com/interactive/2024-taiwan-election">averages had Lai leading</a> with 36%, with Hou at 31% and Ko at 24%.</p>
<p>Lai has consistently led in the polls, prompting the KMT and TPP to earlier <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwans-opposition-parties-decide-joint-presidential-ticket-2023-11-15/">consider running on a joint ticket</a>. But the two parties <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67471139">failed to agree on terms</a>, and the coalition attempt imploded. </p>
<p>This may prove crucial, as joining forces may have represented the best chance of a KMT candidate being elected – an outcome that may have cooled tensions with Beijing.</p>
<h2>Taiwanese democracy</h2>
<p>The island of Taiwan has been governed as the “Republic of China” since 1949, when the KMT <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev">lost a civil war to the Chinese Communist Party</a>. The CCP set up the People’s Republic of China on the mainland, and the KMT retreated to Taiwan.</p>
<p>For decades, both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China diverged on every possible policy except one: Both governments agreed that there was <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-the-one-china-policy/">only one China</a>, and that Taiwan was a part of China. They each sought to unite Taiwan and the mainland – but under their own rule.</p>
<p>Although that remains the goal in Beijing today, for Taiwan the outlook has started to change. </p>
<p>The change began with <a href="https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/-democratic-transition-and-consolidation-in-taiwan_122745967872.pdf">Taiwanese democratization</a> – a process that began in the early 1990s after decades of autocratic rule. After gradually rolling out direct elections for the legislature, governors and mayors, the island held its <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/24/world/taiwan-s-leader-wins-its-election-and-a-mandate.html">first democratic election for president in 1996</a>. Despite Beijing holding military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in an attempt to interfere with the vote, the KMT-affiliated incumbent won against a DPP candidate with strong ties to the Taiwan independence movement.</p>
<p>Four years later, the DPP’s candidate won and started the first of two consecutive terms. In 2008, a <a href="https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.3423">KMT candidate returned to power</a>. But since 2016, Taiwan has been led by Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP. </p>
<h2>Uneasy consensus</h2>
<p>Cross-strait tensions tend to rise when the DPP is in office and calm somewhat when the KMT is in power. This isn’t because the KMT agrees with Beijing over the status of Taiwan – the party has always been clear that unification could happen only under its own government and never under the leadership of the Communist Party in Beijing. But the KMT affirms the idea that eventual unification with China is its goal for Taiwan. </p>
<p>In 1992, representatives of the KMT and the CCP met in Hong Kong and reached the “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart/">1992 Consensus</a>.” Despite the name, the two sides do not fully agree on what it meant. The KMT affirmed the idea of one China but noted disagreement on what the government of that China should be; the People’s Republic of China interpreted it as affirming one China under CCP rule. </p>
<p>Still, the 1992 Consensus became the basis of a series of policies strengthening cross-strait ties, and it made KMT-led governments easier for the PRC to tolerate.</p>
<h2>Pro-independence sentiment</h2>
<p>Though speculation about the geopolitical fallout and China’s reaction to the election has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-election-poses-early-2024-test-us-aim-steady-china-ties-2024-01-05/">dominated coverage</a> <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/china-tells-taiwan-vote-right-side-history-election-could-determine-cross-strait-relations">of the vote</a> <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/article/3247604/global-impact-taiwan-heads-polls-what-does-islands-presidential-election-mean-cross-strait-and-us">around the world</a>, for Taiwan voters, independence is one of several critical issues the island faces. The <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-are-the-key-issues-in-taiwans-2024-presidential-election/">economy frequently rises even above cross-strait issues</a> in importance, with many voters expressing concern over the rapid rise of housing prices, stagnating salaries, slow economic growth and how the incumbent party handled the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>On the issue of independence itself, Taiwanese polls have shown a creep toward pro-independence sentiment. As of September 2023, <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/09/02/2003805648">nearly half of Taiwanese voters</a> said they preferred independence (48.9%) for the island, while 26.9% sought a continuation of the status quo. A shrinking minority – now just 11.8% – said they hoped for future reunification.</p>
<p>If the DPP remains in power, Beijing may feel the pressure to force the issue of reunification. Xi has called for the Chinese military to be capable of <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2023/Apr/24/2003205865/-1/-1/1/07-AMONSON%20&%20EGLI_FEATURE%20IWD.PDF">a successful cross-strait invasion by 2027</a>, though a forceful reunification effort might include a combination of economic blockade and military pressure. </p>
<p>If that were to be the case, U.S. commitments to Taiwan – along with U.S. credibility among its Asian allies – could be on the line. President Joe Biden has repeatedly said that he is <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-again-indicates-that-us-will-defend-taiwan-militarily-does-this-constitute-a-change-in-policy-190946">prepared to defend the island militarily</a> against an attack from mainland China.</p>
<p>Already in 2024, the U.S. is having to contend with two significant conflicts that are demanding its attention. How Taiwanese voters mark their ballot – and how policymakers in Beijing respond – may determine whether a third war is more or less likely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A candidate from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party looks set to win the presidency despite Beijing’s pressure and rhetoric.Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2203482024-01-08T14:49:26Z2024-01-08T14:49:26ZIs China preparing for a war over Taiwan, or has the west got it wrong? Here are the indicators<p>At a time when Russia has been making gains in <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/what-russia-gains-from-marinka-capture/ar-AA1m6YpE">Ukraine</a> and the Middle East appears to be on the brink of further regional conflict, a China-US military stand off is the last thing the world needs.</p>
<p>At first glance however, it might appear that China is preparing for a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/united-states-big-one-krepinevich?utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20231222">long-term conflict</a> with the US over Taiwan, the self-governing island of 24 million people, which the mainland claims.</p>
<p>In his New Year’s address China’s president, Xi Jinping, stated that Taiwan would “surely be reunited” with China. This is particularly significant as it comes days ahead of Taiwan’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-67855477">national election</a> on January 13. The <a href="https://www.economist.com/interactive/2024-taiwan-election?utm_campaign=a.the-economist-today&utm_medium=email.internal-newsletter.np&utm_source=salesforce-marketing-cloud&utm_term=1/3/2024&utm_id=1841170">result</a> which may deliver a more pro-Beijing government opting for closer ties, or what is currently looking more likely a Taiwanese leader who wants to keep Beijing at arms length. </p>
<p>The election will see the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) face off against the conservative Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP’s candidate, Lai Ching-te, who has been <a href="https://www.economist.com/interactive/2024-taiwan-election?utm_campaign=a.the-economist-today&utm_medium=email.internal-newsletter.np&utm_source=salesforce-marketing-cloud&utm_term=1/3/2024&utm_id=1841170">leading in the polls</a>, has often been <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3246039/frontrunner-william-lai-challenged-renounce-independence-first-taiwan-election-debate">described</a> as a more outspoken advocate of Taiwanese independence than his predecessor, the outgoing Tsai Yingwen, who took a more diplomatic approach, believing there was no need to state her support for independence as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/24/taiwans-choice-who-will-replace-tsai-ing-wen-as-president-amid-china-tensions">island was a sovereign nation</a>. </p>
<p>Any shift or <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3246039/frontrunner-william-lai-challenged-renounce-independence-first-taiwan-election-debate">pro-independence statement</a> is likely to be seen by Beijing as a prompt for <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-elections-military-threats-ea68fa11a0b172c31162c0ff128cabf7">military action</a>, since a formal declaration of independence is a red line for Beijing. In contrast, the KMT is seen <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/why-taiwans-main-opposition-party-cant-shake-its-pro-china-stance/">as closer to Beijing</a>. The US has traditionally supported Taiwan’s semi-independent status and sees it as a convenient regional ally. Coupled with the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/18/world/asia/china-taiwan-military-planes.html">intensification</a> of Chinese military flights around Taiwan’s airspace, all of these elements point to Taiwan as a potential trigger for a conventional US-China conflict.</p>
<h2>Other key indicators</h2>
<p>There are other key indicators to watch out for. The Chinese <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/03/why-is-china-strengthening-its-military-its-not-all.html">military</a> has expanded and modernised over the past five years, and its advances in <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-hypersonic-missiles-threaten-us-power-in-the-pacific-an-aerospace-engineer-explains-how-the-weapons-work-and-the-unique-threats-they-pose-206271">hypersonic missile technology</a> puts Beijing at an advantage, as the US hasn’t yet deployed an equivalent.</p>
<p>Also significant is the growing <a href="https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/15/1/27/6548121?searchresult=1">perception</a> of the US as an enemy among the Chinese public, part of a government narrative, especially since 2017. This is also a common theme among Chinese netizens as well, many of whom tend to be more <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10511065/#:%7E:text=They%20demonstrate%20greater%20confidence%20in,incident%20%5B43%2C44%5D.">nationalistic</a> than the government is. </p>
<h2>Technical battles</h2>
<p>The US and China are already engaged in an economic and technological competition. This has continued despite the apparent <a href="https://globaleurope.eu/globalization/xi-biden-at-apec-a-reset-in-relations-but-for-how-long/">thaw</a> in relations at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in 2023, with the US and Chinese presidents sitting down for a four-hour chat, and agreeing to resume military-to-military communications which can avoid accidental military escalation. </p>
<p>In doing so Biden signalled he may be prepared to appeared to edge away slightly from his hardline policies <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/ikebrannon/2023/08/11/chinas-resilient-chip-sector-reinforces-the-need-for-stronger-us-policy-action/?sh=a0f9e00721b2">to reduce dependence on</a> China’s <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/12/26/china-trade-tech-00072232">technology</a>. His administration <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-11-17/trade-war-joe-biden-s-devotion-to-donald-trump-s-tariffs-is-a-mistake">has not allowed</a> US chip manufacturers to sell to China as well encouraging <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/jan/02/asml-halts-hi-tech-chip-making-exports-to-china-reportedly-after-us-request">its allies </a> to block the sale of hi-tech chip making exports. Dutch manufacturer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/jan/02/asml-halts-hi-tech-chip-making-exports-to-china-reportedly-after-us-request">ASML’s</a> cancellation of its shipments of chip-making machinery to China, was <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-01/us-pushed-asml-to-block-chinese-sales-before-january-deadline">attributed </a> to pressure from Washington. A competition for economic and technological supremacy is already well under way.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-american-technological-war-against-china-could-backfire-219158">Why the American technological war against China could backfire</a>
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<p>This China-US competition is akin to the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20043377">US-Japan tension</a> of the 1980s and early 1990s, where Japan’s economic development and technological prowess caused notable <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1991-09-01/coming-war-japan">concern</a> among US policymakers to the extent that by the late 1980s, Japan was seen as a bigger challenge than the USSR.</p>
<p>But, while Beijing has adjusted to the new reality of an increasingly confrontational China-US relationship, this does not mean that China is definitely keen to start a long-term conflict. China is adjusting to <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/economic-indicators/article/3241354/china-gdp-economic-growth-expected-slip-2025-after-1-trillion-yuan-bond-bonanza-wears">massive challenges</a> within its struggling economy, which makes Beijing somewhat reluctant to move to a war footing, despite its confrontational rhetoric. </p>
<h2>Both sides have reservations</h2>
<p>China’s significant <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/12/china-industry-manufacturing-cold-war/">industrial capacity</a> and the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/04/europe/uk-nato-ukraine-war-ammunition-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">reduction</a> of western military stockpiles caused by the war in Ukraine, mean a conflict with China is something that the US can ill afford.</p>
<p>This was further underlined by <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/us-military-changing-strategy-after-losing-simulated-war-with-china-b1894062.html">several simulation exercises</a> of a Taiwan conflict by the US military in 2020. They discovered that nine out of ten of the possible outcomes ended in a US defeat. So, a potential conflict with China poses a notable challenge for American power.</p>
<p>It’s clear that the present crises have provided an opportunity for China to gain understanding of current military challenges, as well as delivering some benefits. The conflict in Ukraine has <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/china-stands-to-gain-from-a-weakened-russia-the-west-should-prepare-now/#:%7E:text=Today%2C%20it's%20a%20different%20story,favor%20for%20years%20to%20come.">provided</a> China with several economic benefits, most notably in the form of greater <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/2/24/how-china-and-indias-appetite-for-oil-and-gas-kept-russia-afloat">access</a> to Russian oil and gas, that had been the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7095e5d7-7a72-483f-9464-52d36bac03f7">lifeblood</a> of many European industries which Chinese firms have competed against. Equally, the tensions in the Middle East have served as a <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4333687-how-foreign-wars-distracting-us-china-threat/">distraction</a> for the US, which has had to focus more on the Middle East and Ukraine rather than fully committing to a confrontation with China. These crises have bought China time to prepare for what might come next.</p>
<p>These events show what knowledge China has accumulated. In the case of Ukraine, this is the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/12/04/arsenal-of-democracy-integrating-ukraine-into-west-s-defense-industrial-base-pub-91150">importance</a> of industrial production to warfare, with Russia’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ramps-up-output-some-military-hardware-by-more-than-tenfold-state-company-2023-09-19/">industrial base</a> enabling Moscow to continue with the conflict. It also highlights the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66984944">limitations</a> of Nato’s capabilities in supplying Ukraine. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.economist.com/briefing/2019/11/14/aircraft-carriers-are-big-expensive-vulnerable-and-popular">vulnerabilities</a> of maritime power have been illustrated by the Houthi <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/the-red-sea-crisis-explained-houthis-austin-israel-gaza-iran-shipping-suez-drones-yemen-task-forse-153-red-sea/">blockade</a> of the Red Sea. This has demonstrated the possibilities of <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/24010092/houthis-red-sea-shipping-yemen-israel-gaza">using</a> missile and drone technologies to challenge stronger powers. In the case of China, this could take the <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/RB9700/RB9709/RAND_RB9709.pdf">form</a> of Beijing using its anti-ship and hypersonic missile capabilities to challenge Washington’s naval strength. </p>
<p>What is becoming clear is that Beijing is increasingly preparing for a possible conflict, just in case. This preparation could help determine the outcome in Beijing’s favour.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220348/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Harper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China has learned a lot from the Ukraine war that could help it prepare for a conflict with the west over Taiwan.Tom Harper, Lecturer in International Relations, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2199682023-12-21T19:07:56Z2023-12-21T19:07:56ZWhy Taiwan’s falling birth rate has become a national security issue<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566794/original/file-20231220-25-ds88ao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Christmas is coming to Taipei and the city is at least partially decked out for the season. In Muzha, on the city’s outskirts, the Catholic church has set up a nativity scene. There is as yet no baby in the manger and the scene looks rather forlorn. That’s somehow appropriate for Taiwan, where there is a dearth of actual babies in cradles. </p>
<p>Over the road from the church are two pet-grooming shops, testimony to the changing composition of Taiwanese households. There are more registered <a href="https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4820340"> cats and dogs</a> in Taiwan than there are <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1305485/taiwan-population-distribution-by-one-year-age-group/">children under ten</a>. As the country heads towards its eighth presidential election, to be held on January 13 2024, it is hitting a <a href="https://tw.stock.yahoo.com/news/%25E7%25A4%25BE%25E6%259C%2583-%25E9%2580%25A335%25E6%259C%2588%25E7%2594%259F%25E4%25B8%258D%25E5%25A6%2582%25E6%25AD%25BB-%25E5%2585%25A8%25E5%25B9%25B4%25E6%2596%25B0%25E7%2594%259F%25E5%2585%2592%25E6%2595%25B8%25E6%2581%2590%25E7%25BA%258C%25E5%2589%25B5%25E4%25BD%258E-085300154.html">new low in births per year</a>.</p>
<p>Taiwan’s fertility rate is one of many things on the minds of the three presidential candidates: front-runner Vice President Lai Ching-te, the candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP); close rival Hou Yu-ih, running for the once all-powerful KMT; and Ko Wen-je, candidate for Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), the latest of a series of minor parties to make a splash in the country’s lively electoral landscape.</p>
<p>Ko is a populist who offers disaffected youth an alternative to the two large parties. He effectively politicised the fertility rate when he called a press conference on November 7 specifically to discuss <a href="https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4482466">responses to the declining birth rate</a>. </p>
<p>Apart from announcing his own ten-point plan, notable for its novel pregnancy bonus, he took the opportunity to wax sarcastic about Hou’s planned third-child bonus and to <a href="https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4482562">attack</a> Lai’s record on related policies.</p>
<p><a href="https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4482562">In response</a>, Lai’s team drew attention to Ko’s long history of misogynistic statements such as “unmarried women are like disabled parking spaces” and “[unmarried women] are causing instability and a national security crisis”.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-taiwans-election-just-a-month-away-the-china-threat-looms-large-216069">With Taiwan's election just a month away, the China threat looms large</a>
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<p>In fact, all candidates take the problem of the falling birth rate seriously. For three years now, deaths have exceeded births in Taiwan. Only immigration is preventing a real decline in population. </p>
<p>The policies the candidates offer vary more in detail than in substance: the particular amounts of money differ, as do the circumstances under which the money is paid. But in the end, their policies all amount to throwing money at the problem.</p>
<h2>A long-term problem in Taiwan</h2>
<p>The fertility crisis has long been a matter of concern in Taiwan. In a perfect illustration of “be careful of what you wish for”, early population planning targets set by the then-dominant KMT were met and then exceeded in the 1980s. The fertility rate dropped below replacement level in 1983 and has never recovered. </p>
<p>It was identified as an issue of national security in Taiwan’s first national security report, issued in 2006. Since then the issue has been consistently in the news, local and international. <a href="https://www.ly.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=6590&pid=85529">It is associated</a> with several negative economic and social indicators: the gradual increase in the burden of the national debt on each individual; the weakening of domestic demand; the reduced supply of labour; the problem of aged care in a <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2022/08/23/2003783991">super-aged society</a>. </p>
<p>For all these reasons, politicians take the problem seriously. Nonetheless, the fertility rate is a slow burner in Taiwanese politics – it lacks the immediacy of cross-strait relations, widely held to be the main issue in the current political contest. </p>
<p>But there is a meeting point between the two issues. Already many fewer young men are available for military service in Taiwan than there were a decade ago. The air force in particular is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-04/taiwan-faces-urgent-fighter-pilot-shortage-as-xi-tests-defenses">low on trained personnel</a> and its fighter pilots are exhausted from the constant need to respond to Chinese jets crossing into Taiwanese air space.</p>
<p>This problem is only to some degree balanced by a parallel problem in China, where the fertility rate (<a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/total-fertility-rate/country-comparison/">1.45 in 2022</a>) is also in precipitate decline.</p>
<p>On neither side of the Taiwan Strait does anyone have good ideas about how to reverse the fall. Candidates for the election in Taiwan all promise potential parents enhanced financial support while no doubt fully aware of the <a href="https://ifstudies.org/blog/pro-natal-policies-work-but-they-come-with-a-hefty-price-tag">limited effects</a> of such measures on fertility choices. </p>
<p>In China, President Xi Jinping’s <a href="https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Xi-Jinping-blames-women-for-population-decline,-but-the-reasons-are-many-59482.html">advice to women</a> that they should “play their role in carrying forward the traditional virtues of the Chinese nation” seems even less likely to yield results.</p>
<h2>So why are so few people having babies?</h2>
<p>Young women in Taiwan <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w3ct4n4m">tend to explain</a> their preference for pets over babies in terms of financial pressures, particularly the cost of housing. Housing is recognised as a serious problem in Taiwan and all contenders for the presidency are promising to help with housing for couples with children. </p>
<p>But in a society where having children is normatively associated with marriage, being married is generally a prerequisite for enjoying even existing benefits. The fertility rate for married couples in Taiwan is reasonably high, two children being standard. The key question appears not to be why don’t women have children? The question is why don’t women get married?</p>
<p>In Taiwan, as in much of East Asia, marriage avoidance has become a marked phenomenon. In 2021, a mere 50% of young Taiwanese between the ages of 25 and 34 <a href="https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4851000">were married</a>. </p>
<p>Of the unmarried group, 70% of the men wanted to get married at some future date. A majority of the unmarried women had no such intention. Similarly, many more unmarried men (61.22%) than unmarried women (42.98%) wanted eventually to have children. </p>
<p>Since housing and raising children are costs for men as well as for women, there is presumably something more to the falling birth rate than simply the financial pressure.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hidden-women-of-history-hsieh-hsueh-hung-communist-champion-of-taiwanese-self-determination-112604">Hidden women of history: Hsieh Hsüeh-hung, communist champion of Taiwanese self-determination</a>
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<p>Analysing the uniformly low and falling birth rates across East Asia, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27041932">Yen-hsin Alice Cheng</a> argues the problem is grounded in the Confucian cultural bedrock of the region. Family and society are rigidly patriarchal. Workplace organisation and wider societal structures are unfavourable to women. </p>
<p>Historical sex ratios at birth reflect, to varying degrees, a default preference for sons, Japan offering the only exception. Government initiatives frequently land on infertile ground, a phenomenon most notable in South Korea where only a small minority of women and a tiny percentage of men have taken advantage of extremely generous parental leave schemes aimed at arresting the declining birth rate.</p>
<p>In this East Asian mix, Taiwan has a more progressive society than China and a less rigid patriarchy than South Korea. It has high numbers of women participating in politics. Voter turnout among women is large, and the current president is a woman: the redoubtable Tsai Ing-wen. Women in <a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202302020013">leadership at local level</a> – the all-important position of mayor – outnumber men. The sex ratio at birth has been skewed in recent history but now seems to have settled into a “within normal” range.</p>
<p>Given the relative advantages women enjoy in Taiwan, especially relative to South Korea, it is worth pondering the possible variables for its particularly low birth rate. In a comparative study of mental health in Ukraine, Poland and Taiwan during the first year of the Russo-Ukrainian war, researchers found post-traumatic stress effects among Taiwan respondents were only slightly lower than in Ukraine, with female gender a significant risk factor. Vicarious experience of the war, predicated on the anticipation of conflict in their own country, appears to have prompted a high degree of anxiety in Taiwan.</p>
<p>This finding raises the question of whether, in addition to other social forces informing their life choices, Taiwanese live with an undercurrent of concern about the future of their country. If so, the crisis of national security constituted by the declining birthrate would seem to be part of a vicious cycle, where a lack of security in geopolitical terms is informing decisions about whether or not to marry and have children.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219968/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Antonia Finnane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Young Taiwanese women in particular seem reluctant to have babies these days – and there may be quite a few reasons for that.Antonia Finnane, Professor (honorary), The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2160692023-12-11T19:02:33Z2023-12-11T19:02:33ZWith Taiwan’s election just a month away, the China threat looms large<p>Taiwan is gearing up for important presidential and legislative elections next month. How to manage “cross-strait” relations with China is not surprisingly emerging as the critical issue of the campaigns.</p>
<p>Taiwan <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/24/world/taiwan-s-leader-wins-its-election-and-a-mandate.html">first held competitive presidential elections</a> in 1996. Democracy has proven popular with the people. In the 2020 elections, voter turnout was nearly <a href="https://anfrel.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Taiwan-Report-2020-FINAL_ol.pdf">75%</a>, which is <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/11/01/turnout-in-u-s-has-soared-in-recent-elections-but-by-some-measures-still-trails-that-of-many-other-countries/">high</a> for a system with non-compulsory voting.</p>
<p>Yet, there are concerns about China’s efforts to shape the election result through influencing public opinion. In a recent visit, one representative told me there are actually four parties in the January 13 election: the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) – and China. </p>
<h2>Who is running?</h2>
<p>President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party cannot run again due to term limits, so the DPP’s presidential candidate is Vice President Lai Ching-te (known also as William Lai).</p>
<p>The election is the DPP’s to lose. While Tsai’s approval ratings have dropped recently, and Lai’s ratings fell <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3239038/latest-taiwan-election-survey-more-bad-news-tsai-ing-wens-ruling-dpp">below 30%</a> for the first time since entering the presidential race, he is still <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/2024-taiwanese-elections-primer">leading the polls</a>. </p>
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<p>His election hopes were boosted when a negotiation between KMT and TPP to establish a unity, “pan-blue” ticket <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/how-the-taiwan-opposition-alliance-talks-fell-apart/">fell through</a>. In a first-past-the-post electoral system, the winner only needs to get the most votes. Now, the “pan-blue” vote - the Kuomintang’s party colour - will split between the KMT and TPP.</p>
<p>It will be a struggle, however, for the DPP to win a majority in the <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/2024-taiwanese-elections-primer">Legislative Yuan</a>, meaning the president might have to negotiate with a potentially hostile legislature. </p>
<h2>The main parties’ positions on China</h2>
<p>Since Tsai was first elected president in 2016, her administration has sought to prevent China from isolating Taiwan internationally, partly through forging closer relations with the United States and other regional democracies, such as Japan and Australia.</p>
<p>The DPP is now concerned about China’s role in attempting to shape the outcome of the election.</p>
<p>There is <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/07/17/2003803317">growing evidence</a> China has sought to influence Taiwanese public opinion through disinformation campaigns, particularly targeting younger audiences through TikTok. In Taiwan, Chinese-owned TikTok is <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/07/17/2003803317">barred from government-issued devices</a>. This makes countering disinformation challenging, especially when it spreads to more popular social media sites and traditional media.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-microchip-industry-would-implode-if-china-invaded-taiwan-and-it-would-affect-everyone-206335">The microchip industry would implode if China invaded Taiwan, and it would affect everyone</a>
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<p>For example, a Taiwanese newspaper, United Daily News, published a story based on supposedly leaked government meeting minutes that the US had asked <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/06/19/when-it-comes-to-a-war-with-taiwan-many-chinese-urge-caution">Taiwan</a> to make biological weapons at a lab run by its defence ministry. The minutes, however, contained <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/09/26/china-is-flooding-taiwan-with-disinformation">official-sounding phrases</a> that are used in China, not in Taiwan.</p>
<p>At a recent <a href="https://www.latrobe.edu.au/events/all/asias-changing-security-order-the-view-from-taiwan">La Trobe University</a> event, Taiwan’s foreign minister, Joseph Wu, also expressed concern about China’s “grey zone tactics”, such as the use of cognitive and cyber warfare, non-military assets like fishing vessels and the coastguard and economic coercion, to pressure Taiwan and regional countries.</p>
<p>The DPP’s policy platform is centred on building Taiwan’s ability to militarily deter and defend against a potential Chinese invasion, strengthening international partnerships (capitalising on the close coalitions that China does not have) and resisting attempts by China to subordinate Taiwan.</p>
<p>In contrast, the KMT views the current state of tense cross-strait relations as a consequence of DPP policies. </p>
<p>In dealing with China and regional security more broadly, KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih has proposed a “three Ds” strategy: <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/2024-taiwanese-elections-primer">deterrence, dialogue and de-escalation.</a>. He says Taiwan needs to resume cross-strait interaction in a “<a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202312100006">low-level and stable</a>” way. </p>
<p>The KMT argues that DPP policies are escalating tensions. They also contend the DPP cannot maintain diplomatic relations with China, which is needed to buy time and stabilise cross-strait relations, especially as Taiwan waits for important military capabilities to arrive over the next three years. </p>
<p>According to one <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/video/full-interview-cia-director-william-burns-on-face-the-nation-with-margaret-brennan/">CIA report</a>, 2027 is a critical year because Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered the military to be ready by then to invade Taiwan. </p>
<p>Instead, the KMT argues it can lower the temperature and reduce risk. Hou has said that “<a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/11/what-you-need-know-about-taiwans-pivotal-presidential-elections">there will be no war</a> on both sides of the Taiwan Strait” if the KMT is elected.</p>
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<p>The DPP views this as an oversimplified “war” versus “peace” narrative. Lai says the presidential election is rather a choice between “<a href="https://jp.reuters.com/article/china-taiwan-idAFKBN2ZV00Q/">democracy and autocracy</a>”.</p>
<p>The TPP’s candidate, Ko Wen-je, meanwhile, has focused on treading a middle path between the two other parties. Its representatives argue the DPP is too hostile and hawkish on China, while the KMT gives the impression they’re too submissive. </p>
<p>Policy-wise, the TPP promises to keep communication channels with Beijing open, viewing the current suspension in high-level talks as unhelpful. While broadly “pan-blue” in nature, the TPP’s position is that younger voters don’t like the KMT.</p>
<h2>Who can bring Taiwan economic security?</h2>
<p>While Taiwanese people are concerned about potential conflict - one poll finds more than <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/23/taiwan-poll-shows-dip-in-us-trust-amid-growing-concern-over-china#:%7E:text=It%2520found%2520that%2520only%25209.3,a%2520stable%2520partner%2520for%2520Taiwan.">80%</a> of Taiwanese people believe the China threat is worsening – prospects for peace and stability are also affecting the island’s international business and investment outlook. This has consequences for Taiwan’s economic interests, as well as China’s and the rest of the world.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/war-in-ukraine-is-a-warning-to-china-of-the-risks-in-attacking-taiwan-211251">War in Ukraine is a warning to China of the risks in attacking Taiwan</a>
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<p>Like many other economies in the region, China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner, accounting for <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/taiwan-market-overview#:%7E:text=10.2%2520percent%2520of%2520Taiwan%2520imports,of%2520Korea%2520(6.1%2520percent).">a quarter</a> of total trade in 2021. “De-risking” and diversifying the economy and providing economic security and supply chain stability is viewed as critical by the current government. As is encouraging businesses to see the security imperative in diversifying away from China.</p>
<p>The DPP is also concerned about China’s use of economic activities to affect political outcomes, targeting business people and lower-level political figures and using social, cultural and religious exchanges to influence public opinion in Taiwan. Yet, some of these public diplomacy activities are not unusual and Taiwan itself provides opportunities for similar exchanges.</p>
<p>In contrast to the DPP, the KMT argues it is not so easy to “decouple” Taiwan’s economy from China. There are still strong business links with China, and a democratic country cannot force businesses to pull out of China, particularly if their main competition comes from South Korea or Japan.</p>
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<p>The TPP is hoping to capitalise on young voters’ <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/wild-card-youth-voters-taiwan-elections">dissatisfaction</a> with the DPP and KMT by focusing on domestic issues such as cost of living, income stagnation and housing affordability. While adopting a pragmatic relationship with Beijing is important given the economic realities, the TPP still views the US as a critical partner for Taiwan.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the DPP advocates for <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/taiwans-election-isnt-about-war-its-about-clarity/">clarity</a> in cross-strait relations. The KMT finds value in maintaining an ambiguous and flexible stance. The relatively new TPP, meanwhile, positions itself somewhere in the middle.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216069/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Strating received support from the Australian International Institute Affairs to travel to Taiwan in December.
</span></em></p>There is growing evidence China is attempting to influence the election through disinformation campaigns, putting Taiwan’s vibrant democracy to the test.Rebecca Strating, Director, La Trobe Asia and Associate Professor, La Trobe University, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2105392023-12-05T13:17:24Z2023-12-05T13:17:24ZHow sacred images in many Asian cultures incorporate divine presence and make them come ‘alive’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559865/original/file-20231116-23-care6q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C19%2C3264%2C2423&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A gilded statue of the Buddha at Wat Phanan Choeng Temple in Thailand.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/wat-phanan-choeng-temple-this-highly-respected-royalty-free-image/1217280251?phrase=eye-opening+Buddhist+ritual&searchscope=image%2Cfilm&adppopup=true">Kittipong Chararoj/ iStock via Getty Images Plus</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Walking into a favorite restaurant here in Knoxville, Tennessee, I was immediately greeted by a golden statue of Buddha, its sparkling gemstone eyes meeting my own as I made my way through the door. The aromas of Thai curries beckoned, but as I was led to a table, I kept thinking about those glinting eyes.</p>
<p>Sacred objects are everywhere: Statues and paintings of gods fill museum galleries and catalog pages alike. You might also see them gracing a neighbor’s yard or upon an altar in your friend’s home.</p>
<p>Some dazzle in bejeweled splendor. Others may appear more humble, their luster softened through generations of hands passing them down. Oftentimes, it can feel as though sacred images are looking back.</p>
<p>I <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/michael-naparstek-1457307">research the ways in which objects express the power of divine presence</a> in Asian religious contexts. Studying different perspectives on sacred objects helps us think beyond religious contexts and allows us to rethink how objects and images play an active role in our lives.</p>
<h2>Sacred visual culture</h2>
<p>Hindu practice is defined by “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/darshan">darśan” – a ritual act of interacting with the divine</a> through the visual experience. Scholar <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/dianaeck/home">Diana Eck</a> describes this interaction in her seminal study of Indian visual culture, “<a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/darsan/9780231112659">Darśan</a>,” in the following way: “to stand in the presence of the deity and to behold the image with one’s own eyes, to see and be seen by the deity.”</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A couple, with a young child in the woman's lap, sitting before the Hindu God Ganesha, with folded hands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A family prays to the Hindu god Ganesha.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/family-praying-royalty-free-image/548295807?phrase=hindu+worship&adppopup=true">IndiaPix/IndiaPicture via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-theravada-buddhism-a-scholar-of-asian-religions-explains-205737">Theravada Buddhist</a> rituals in Southeast Asia include all-night chanting sessions to recharge statues’ power. As scholar of Theravada Buddhism <a href="https://www.swarthmore.edu/Humanities/dsweare1/">Donald Swearer</a> notes in “<a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691114354/becoming-the-buddha">Becoming the Buddha</a>,” monastics and laypeople in northern Thailand will gather to recite Buddhist sutras while holding cords attached to an image of the Buddha, forming an intricate web of connection between the image and the Buddhist community. </p>
<p>The benefits gained from these chants is understood to enter the statue, recharging its karmic power and reanimating it to once again interact with the community.</p>
<p><a href="https://asiasociety.org/education/buddhism-japan">Japanese Buddhist</a> statues <a href="https://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/fellows-book/behold-the-buddha-religious-meanings-of-japanese-buddhist-icons/">contain multiple items ritually placed</a> within their wooden cavities: bones of saints, robes from eminent monastics and even silk-fashioned replicas of visceral organs like lungs and kidneys. As art historian <a href="https://oberlin.academia.edu/JamesDobbins">James Dobbins</a> notes, certain Buddhist rituals are performed in order to transform the body of a statue into a living body. </p>
<p>In cases like this, inanimate objects are believed to transform into not only sacred things, but also active, living beings who can see, hear, taste and respond to the concerns of those who worship them.</p>
<h2>‘Eye-opening’ ritual</h2>
<p>There are many different ways to enliven an image, and each ritual tradition carries its own unique process. However, the most well-known across Asia is commonly referred to as the “<a href="https://pluralism.org/news/eye-opening-ceremony-buddhist-statues-draws-hundreds-connecticut">eye-opening” ceremony</a>. The term “eye-opening” gets its name from the culmination of an intense ritual process wherein the monk paints in the pupils of the image, thus opening its eye to see. </p>
<p>In Sri Lanka, Buddhist monks perform a version known as the netra-pinkama, which loosely translates to “meritorious action of the eyes.” </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The netra-pinkama ritual.</span></figcaption>
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<p><a href="https://www.ox.ac.uk/research/research-in-conversation/how-live-happy-life/professor-richard-gombrich#:%7E:text=Richard%20Gombrich%20is%20the%20Emeritus,of%20the%20Clay%20Sanskrit%20Library.">Richard Gombrich</a>, a scholar of Buddhism and Sanskrit, <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2051829">noted in his study of Buddhism in Sri Lanka</a> that “Before consecration, a statue is treated with no more respect than one would give the materials of which it is composed. … The very act of consecration indicates that a statue is being brought to life.” </p>
<p>Enlivening an image is not a task undertaken lightly, as it is believed in some cases that any demonic spirits loitering around could interrupt the process, thereby resulting in an ineffective ritual or even a malevolent icon. Both the temple grounds and the ritual specialists must undergo purification rites before beginning. The whole process is filled with strict procedures and avoidance of taboos – a common theme among consecration rituals across Asian religious traditions. </p>
<p>Perhaps most importantly, the monk must refrain from looking directly into the icon’s eyes, and thus uses a mirror to look over their shoulder in order to paint in the icon’s pupils.</p>
<p>In Taiwan, statues and paintings of Buddhist, Daoist and local gods will undergo a similar kind of practice known as “kaiguang,” meaning “<a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674504363">opening the radiance</a>.” Monks, Daoist masters and even the artists who carve the statues may perform the rite on behalf of the individuals or temple communities that commission the image.</p>
<p>Once completed, shops will wrap a piece of red paper around to cover the statue’s eyes to ensure that the first thing that the image sees is the face of the one who requested it. The power of sacred vision is such that it must literally be kept under wraps.</p>
<h2>Living images</h2>
<p>Once its eyes have been opened, the image becomes a living thing capable of performing powerful deeds. As such, people may behave much differently – making offerings of incense and taking pains to follow social etiquette lest they offend. The care with which these objects are treated once they have been “activated” suggests that there is a lot more here than meets the eye. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/darsan/9780231112659">Eck’s observation attests</a>, being seen is critical to understanding what images do. By seemingly looking back at us, sacred images remind us that we are not alone in this world. In so doing, they also send a message that the world is not there for our eyes only, but that other viewpoints are just as powerful as our own.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210539/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Naparstek does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Through the power of rituals, inanimate objects can be understood to transform into agents who can see, hear, taste and respond to the concerns of those who worship them.Michael Naparstek, Lecturer in Religious Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2179782023-11-17T13:59:33Z2023-11-17T13:59:33ZDon’t be fooled by Biden and Xi talks − China and the US are enduring rivals rather than engaged partners<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560070/original/file-20231116-24-lu1i3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C7187%2C4474&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rolling out the red carpet for presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXAPECBidenXI/ad7b12a415724dab8637d4c538ea63af/photo?Query=Xi%20biden&mediaType=photo,video,graphic,audio&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=476&currentItemNo=1">Doug Mills/The New York Times via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>There were <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVnxZGcTXnQ">smiles for the camera, handshakes</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/16/china-praises-warm-xi-biden-meeting-in-change-of-rhetoric">warm words</a> and the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/15/politics/biden-xi-meeting/index.html">unveiling of a couple of agreements</a>.</p>
<p>But beyond the optics of the first meeting in over a year between the leaders of the world’s two biggest economies, not an awful lot had changed: There was nothing to suggest a “reset” in U.S. and China relations that in recent years have been <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/the-china-threat">rooted in suspicion</a> <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA290-3.html">and competition</a>.</p>
<p>President Joe Biden hinted as much just hours after the face-to-face talks, confirming that he still <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-calls-xi-dictator-after-carefully-planned-summit-2023-11-16/">considered his Chinese counterpart</a>, Xi Jinping, a “dictator.” Beijing hit back, with foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning telling reporters Biden’s remark was “extremely wrong and irresponsible political manipulation.”</p>
<p>As a scholar of U.S.-China relations, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-delusions-detente-rivals">I believe the relationship</a> between the two countries can be best described as an “enduring rivalry” – a <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2600766">term used by political scientists</a> to denote two powers that have singled each other out for intense security competition. Examples from history include <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/1/timeline-india-pakistan-relations">India and Pakistan</a>, <a href="https://www.worldhistory.org/article/1520/the-hundred-years-war-consequences--effects/">France and England</a>, and the West and the Soviet Union. Over the past two centuries, such rivals have accounted for only 1% of the world’s international relationships but <a href="https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/handle/2022/26044">80% of its wars</a>. History suggest these rivalries <a href="https://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/0472111272-08.pdf">last around 40 years</a> and end only when one side loses the ability to compete – or when the two sides ally against a common enemy. Neither scenario looks likely any time soon in regards to China and the U.S.</p>
<h2>How enduring rivalries end</h2>
<p>China “is a communist country … based on a form of government totally different than ours,” <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2023/nov/16/china-responds-to-biden-calling-xi-jinping-a-dictator-video">Biden said after his meeting</a> with Xi.</p>
<p>That comment gets to the heart of why diplomacy alone cannot reset the U.S.-China relationship. Washington and Beijing are not rivals due to any misunderstanding that can be sorted out through talks alone. Rather, they are rivals because of the opposite reason: They understand each other only too well and have come to the conclusion that their respective world outlooks cannot be reconciled.</p>
<p>The same is true for many of the issues that divide the two countries – they are framed as binary win-lose scenarios. Taiwan can be governed from Taipei or Beijing, but not both. Similarly, the East China and South China seas can be international waters or Chinese territory; Russia can be crippled or supported.</p>
<p>For the United States, its Asian alliances are a force for stability; for China, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3231201/china-watching-closely-us-japan-south-korea-aim-de-facto-asian-nato">they’re hostile encirclement</a>. And both countries are right in their respective assessments.</p>
<p>Diplomacy alone is insufficient to resolve a rivalry. At best, it can help manage it. </p>
<h2>When the US calls, who picks up?</h2>
<p>Part of this management of the U.S-China rivalry involves finding areas of agreement that can be committed to. </p>
<p>And on Nov. 15, Biden and Xi announced deals over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/15/business/economy/biden-xi-fentanyl.html">curbing China’s production of the deadly drug fentanyl</a> and the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-china-military-relations-339980a0d494bcde92905411838808a4">restoring of high-level, military-to-military dialogue</a> between the two countries.</p>
<p>But the fentanyl announcement is <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/01/asia/china-us-fentanyl-trump-intl/index.html">very similar to the one</a> Xi gave to then-President Donald Trump in 2019. The U.S. administration <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-fentanyl/trump-accuses-chinas-xi-of-failing-to-halt-fentanyl-exports-to-u-s-idUSKCN1US1WI/">later accused China</a> of reneging on the agreement.</p>
<p>Similarly, committing to restarting high-level dialogue is one thing; following up on it is another. History is dotted with occasions when having an open line between Beijing and Washington hasn’t meant a whole lot in times of crisis. In 2001, when a U.S. surveillance aircraft collided with a Chinese jet over Hainan Island, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/01/us-china-military-hotline-508140">Beijing didn’t pick up the phone</a>. Likewise, during the Tiananmen Square massacre, then-President George H.W. Bush urgently tried to call his counterpart Deng Xiaoping but was unable to get through.</p>
<p>Moreover, focusing on what was agreed to in talks also highlights what wasn’t – and is unlikely to ever be – agreed to without a substantial shift in power that forces one side to concede to the other. </p>
<p>For example, China wants the U.S. to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-reports-21-chinese-air-force-planes-entered-its-air-defence-zone-2023-03-02/">stop selling arms to Taiwan</a>. But Washington has no intention of doing this, as it knows that this will make the disputed island more vulnerable to Beijing. Washington would like China to end its military displays of strength over the Taiwan Strait; Beijing knows doing so risks seeing Taiwan drift toward independence.</p>
<p>American policymakers have long said what they want is <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/what-america-wants-china-hass">China to “change</a>” – by which it means to liberalize its system of governance. But the Chinese Communist Party knows that doing so means self-liquidation – every communist regime that has allowed space for alternative political parties has unraveled. Which is why American attempts to engage China are often met with suspicion in China. As former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin commented, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-delusions-detente-rivals">engagement and containment policies have the same aim</a>: to end China’s socialist system.</p>
<p>For similar reasons, Xi has shunned attempts by the U.S. to bring China further into the rules-based international order. The Chinese leader saw what happened when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev <a href="https://time.com/5512665/mikhail-gorbachev-glasnost-perestroika/">tried to integrate the Soviet Union</a> into the Western order in the late 1980s – it only hastened the demise of the socialist entity.</p>
<p>Instead, Xi calls for a massive military buildup, the reassertion of Chinese Communist Party control and an economic policy <a href="https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis//2020/11/china-economic-technological-self-reliance">based on self-reliance</a>.</p>
<h2>Actions speak louder …</h2>
<p>The encouraging words and limited agreements hammered out in the latest meeting between Xi and Biden should also not distract from the actions that continue to push the U.S. and China further apart.</p>
<p>China’s show of force in the Taiwan Strait has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/13/china-biden-xi-meeting-apec-taiwan/">sustained for three years now</a> and shows no sign of abating. Meanwhile, Beijing’s navy continues to <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-is-the-south-china-sea-such-a-hotly-contested-region-143435">harass other nations in the South China Sea</a>.</p>
<p>Similarly, Biden has continued the U.S. path toward military alliances aimed at countering China’s threat. It recently entered a <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3498451/japan-south-korea-us-strengthen-trilateral-cooperation/">trilateral agreement between the U.S., Japan and South Korea</a>. And that came two years after the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/AUKUS/">establishment of AUKUS</a>, a security partnership between the the U.S., Australia and the U.K. that has similar aims.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the U.S. administration will continue to tighten the screws on China’s economy through <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/president-biden-has-banned-some-us-investment-china-heres-what-know">investment restrictions</a>. Biden is well aware that easy flowing money from Wall Street is helping China weather choppier economic waters of late and is keen to turn off the tap.</p>
<h2>The point of diplomacy</h2>
<p>This isn’t to say that diplomacy and face-to-face talks are pointless. They do, in fact, serve a number of interests.</p>
<p>For both men involved, there is a domestic upside. For Biden, playing nice with China projects the image of a statesman – especially at a time when, due to U.S. positions on Ukraine and the Middle East, he is facing <a href="https://jacobin.com/2021/04/joe-biden-keir-starmer-warmonger-internationalism-foreign-policy">accusations from the political left of being a “warmonger</a>.” And encouraging Beijing to tread softly during the U.S. election year may blunt a potential line of attack from Republicans that the administration’s China policy is not working.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Xi is able to showcase his own diplomatic skills and present China as an alternative superpower to the U.S. and to potentially <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-xi-draws-standing-ovation-from-u-s-business-leadersand-some-doubts-13fc3ad2">cleave the Western business community</a> – and perhaps even major European nations – from what he would see as the U.S. anti-China coalition.</p>
<p>Moreover, summits like the one in San Francisco signal that both the U.S. and China are jointly committed to at least keep talking, helping ensure that a rocky relationship doesn’t descend into anything more belligerent – even it that doesn’t make them any friendlier.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217978/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Beckley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s good to talk − just don’t expect it to result in a reset in relations between Beijing and Washington.Michael Beckley, Associate Professor of Political Science, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2173732023-11-16T02:22:26Z2023-11-16T02:22:26ZBiden-Xi meeting at APEC a reminder of the importance of global summits in dangerous times<p>For three decades, the leaders of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum have met to advance their shared interests in improving trade and investment across the region. </p>
<p>This year’s meeting in San Francisco has a particular prominence. US President Joe Biden and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping have met for the first time since last year’s G20 summit in Bali, amid efforts by the two great powers to improve their fraught relationship. APEC is normally held alongside the annual ASEAN and East Asia summits, but those jamborees were held a little earlier this year, giving the trans-Pacific grouping some much-needed clear air.</p>
<p>Established in 1989, APEC was intended to drive trade liberalisation in the Asia-Pacific at a time when global efforts had stalled. US President Bill Clinton was the inaugural host of the leaders’ meeting in 1993. In the 1990s, the grouping launched ambitious goals about free trade and took on what now seems like a curious mix of members. </p>
<p>APEC is one of the few international bodies in which Taiwan participates, alongside Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China. The grouping manages this by having member economies, rather than states. It also includes Canada, Mexico, Peru and Chile, but not India. While many countries use the “Indo-Pacific” label to describe the region, APEC is a reminder that not so long ago the region’s future was imagined in rather different terms.</p>
<p>By the early 2000s, political interest in advancing free trade had ebbed and APEC’s influence began to wane. This was exacerbated by ASEAN’s offshoots, such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, appearing better placed to advance a cooperative agenda. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-xi-meeting-6-essential-reads-on-what-to-look-out-for-as-us-chinese-leaders-hold-face-to-face-talks-217611">Biden-Xi meeting: 6 essential reads on what to look out for as US, Chinese leaders hold face-to-face talks</a>
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<p>But the grouping remained valuable to its members less for the specific policy benefits it could provide, and more for the annual opportunity to gather and occasionally manage crises. </p>
<p>In 2001, the APEC summit in Shanghai allowed then US President George Bush and Chinese leader Jiang Zemin to meet and reset their relations following <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/gall/0,8542,468363,00.html">an incident in April that year</a> in which a US EP3 reconnaissance aircraft was forced to crash land on Hainan Island. China held 24 crew members and the craft for ten days. </p>
<p>US-China relations were badly damaged, and APEC created the space for a high-level reset. Then, as now, the forum provides a useful pretext for the leaders to meet without either side feeling they were signalling weakness by travelling to the other’s territory.</p>
<p>Two decades later, and US-China relations have been in their most difficult phase since the normalisation of relations in the 1970s. The much-anticipated meeting between Xi and Biden appears to have been a success. </p>
<p>In the lead-up, both sides sought to manage expectations, making clear that neither anticipated any major breakthrough in relations. However, the four-hour discussion seems to have produced several important achievements. Perhaps the most important, at least in terms of managing risk, is the reopening of communication channels between the countries’ militaries, which had been shut down by Beijing in response to the then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August last year. </p>
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<p>China has also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/14/biden-china-fentanyl-deal">agreed to crack down</a> on exporters who manufacture chemicals used in fentanyl production, and have agreed to establish a forum to maintain separation between AI and nuclear weapons systems. </p>
<p>Reportedly, the two leaders also discussed the <a href="https://apnews.com/live/apec-summit-live-updates">question of Taiwan</a>. The island has long been a regional flashpoint, but in recent years it has become a lighting rod for hawks on both sides of the Pacific. Both would benefit from a less heated environment. </p>
<p>More broadly, Biden and Xi appear to have succeeded in putting a floor under the relationship, and while they’re still some way from an agreed set of “rules of the road” in managing their regional competition, Asia can take some comfort that communication between the two is now better and the trajectory of the relationship is more positive than it has been.</p>
<p>Beijing and Washington have incentives for improving their relations. China’s economy is its worst shape since the reform era began. Biden faces wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and has surprisingly poor domestic political stocks less than a year out from the presidential election. </p>
<p>While the summit has improved things, the expectation bar was set low. The contest between the world’s two biggest economies remains heated, largely without guardrails and of immense risk.</p>
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<p>APEC is more than just the US and China bilateral meeting. The group is about economic cooperation, and in the coming days the US will also try to deliver more on the so-far meagre offerings of its “<a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/organisations/wto-g20-oecd-apec/indo-pacific-economic-framework">Indo-Pacific Economic Framework</a>”. </p>
<p>While its efforts to advance things like infrastructure standards and supply chain resilience will be appreciated, the real prize – improved access to the US market – remains politically off the table. This will limit what Washington can achieve.</p>
<p>The members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> (CPTPP), a trade agreement established after the US withdrew from its predecessor the TPP, will also gather to consider new applicants. Taiwan and China are prominent among these, but it is unlikely either will be allowed to join in the short term.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-drums-of-war-are-receding-but-anthony-albanese-still-faces-many-uncertainties-on-his-trip-to-china-216727">The 'drums of war' are receding, but Anthony Albanese still faces many uncertainties on his trip to China</a>
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<p>APEC 2023 is a reminder of how important multilateral gatherings are in times of geopolitical crisis. Without the excuse that the summit provided, there can be no doubt Xi and Biden would have found it much harder to meet and achieve what are, in the context of their parlous relations, some important positive steps to stabilise regional geopolitics. </p>
<p>Yet it is also a salutary reminder of the real limits of multilateralism in the region. The summit normally concludes with an agreed joint statement, but differences in views about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Gaza conflict and myriad other issues mean that even the veneer of concord is unlikely. The old expansive institutions seem not to be well suited to the current period of heightened geopolitical tension.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217373/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley has received funding from the Commonwealth government for research on regional multilateralism.</span></em></p>Despite a positive meeting, the contest between the world’s two biggest economies remains heated, largely without guardrails and of immense risk.Nick Bisley, Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences and Professor of International Relations at La Trobe University., La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2177542023-11-16T01:35:59Z2023-11-16T01:35:59ZWhat Joe Biden’s meeting with Xi Jinping means for geopolitical tensions<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/what-joe-bidens-meeting-with-xi-jinping-means-for-geopolitical-tensions" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden has engaged in a crucial <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/joe-biden-has-points-to-prove-as-he-meets-xi-jinping-on-wednesday/articleshow/105217280.cms">face-to-face meeting</a> with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in San Francisco.</p>
<p>This high-stakes diplomatic encounter was <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/15/politics/biden-xi-meeting/index.html">aimed at alleviating tensions between the world’s two superpowers</a>. The meeting carried immense significance as leaders of the world’s largest economies seek to establish a sense of stability following a challenging year in U.S.-China relations.</p>
<p>Even though both leaders have said they want <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-xi-apec-san-francisco-58d11e7e3902955302182c2bc41430e0">to stabilize their relationship</a>, the meeting is unlikely to bring about transformative changes between the two countries that are inherently antagonistic due to deeper structural reasons. </p>
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<h2>New Cold War?</h2>
<p>The U.S. and China are enmeshed in a grand power competition in which <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-long-game-chinas-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-order/">China aspires to supplant the United States as a superpower</a> while the U.S. aims to maintain its position. </p>
<p>This rivalry spans various facets of global politics, encompassing military, economic and technological domains. However, the contours of this new Cold War differ markedly <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/cold-war">from the previous one</a>, with three key distinctions:</p>
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<li>In contrast to the Soviet Union, China is intricately woven into the American-built economic order. <a href="https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2021/09/28/how-the-liberal-international-order-shaped-chinas-challenge-to-global-economic-governance/">Beijing’s integration</a> into the global economic framework has been instrumental in its substantial economic development. Unlike the Soviet Union, which existed outside this economic order, China’s active participation has transformed the dynamics of the current geopolitical landscape.</li>
<li>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/14/business/us-china-economy-trade.html">economic interdependence</a> between the U.S. and China sets this rivalry apart. Unlike the relatively self-contained economies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, China relies on the American market for its product sales, while the U.S. depends on China for financial transactions.</li>
<li>People-to-people contact between the U.S. and China surpasses the ties between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. With a 5.4 million-strong <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/chinese-immigrants-united-states/">Chinese diaspora</a> in the U.S. and 300,000 Chinese students studying in American universities, the connections between both countries make outright hostilities less likely.</li>
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<h2>Stabilizing relations</h2>
<p>In this context, the term coined by American political scientist Joseph Nye — “<a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joe-biden-us-china-relations-cooperative-rivalry-by-joseph-s-nye-2021-05">co-operative rivalry</a>” — aptly characterizes Chinese-American relations. </p>
<p>The challenges of our globalized world — including climate change, pandemics, artificial intelligence, economic volatility and human security — necessitate active Chinese participation. These challenges make it particularly important that the U.S. and China stabilize relations. </p>
<p>The current emphasis on competition over co-operation needs to be shelved. Both nations should seek equilibrium by fostering co-operation in areas of mutual interest while navigating competition in areas of divergence.</p>
<p>Already complex relations between the U.S. and China have been tense in recent years. China was miffed when former U.S. House Speaker <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/pelosi-taiwan-china-us-1.6538434">Nancy Pelosi visited</a> Taiwan in August 2022. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-causes-an-ongoing-chinese-tantrum-in-the-taiwan-strait-188205">Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan causes an ongoing Chinese tantrum in the Taiwan Strait</a>
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<p>Because China asserts territorial claims over Taiwan, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/29/asia/tsai-ing-wen-taiwan-president-us-stopover-central-america-trip-intl-hnk/index.html">a stopover</a> in the U.S. by Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen added to the list of contentious issues. </p>
<p>Beijing also expressed displeasure over new <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/oct/07/biden-administration-tech-restrictions-china">U.S. exports restrictions</a> on advanced technology, and Biden’s directive to shoot down a Chinese <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/09/politics/spy-balloon-technology/index.html">spy balloon</a> in February 2023.</p>
<h2>Spats intensified</h2>
<p>Tensions escalated to the point that China severed military-to-military communications with the U.S. after Pelosi’s Taiwan visit, despite <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3224794/why-china-still-refusing-resume-military-dialogue-us-despite-antony-blinkens-latest-appeal">repeated American appeals for China to reopen these lines of communication</a> to prevent any misconceptions or accidental escalations of conflict in the South China region and Taiwan. </p>
<p>When the U.S. downed the Chinese spy balloon, China’s foreign ministry contended that it was conducting meteorological research. American authorities, however, insisted it carried surveillance equipment inconsistent with a weather balloon.</p>
<p>In response to the balloon incident, Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/03/politics/china-us-balloon-intl/index.html">cancelled his planned visit to Beijing</a> in protest. </p>
<p>Subsequently, China declined to reschedule the visit for several months. This communications void at both military and political levels between China and the U.S. <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/amid-tensions-biden-xi-discuss-restoring-us-china/story?id=104916838">posed a significant risk of potentially dangerous consequences</a>. One of the outcomes of the Biden-Xi meeting is that military-to-military discussions will resume.</p>
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<h2>The Xi-Biden meeting</h2>
<p>Prior to the meeting, U.S. National Security Adviser <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/national-security-adviser-jake-sullivan-face-the-nation-transcript-11-12-2023/">Jake Sullivan emphasized</a> the importance of addressing fundamental aspects of the U.S.-China relationship, highlighting the need to strengthen open lines of communication and responsibly manage competition to prevent it from escalating into conflict.</p>
<p>Sullivan acknowledged the necessity of “intense diplomacy” to clarify misconceptions and avert surprises.</p>
<p>China’s economy is currently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/why-is-chinas-economy-slowing-down-could-it-get-worse-2023-09-01/">experiencing a slowdown</a>, marked by falling prices due to subdued demand from both consumers and businesses. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/economists-stick-to-2024-china-outlook-while-assessing-stimulus-1.1991680">With a projected economic growth of five per cent this year and an expected dip to 4.5 per cent in 2024</a>, these economic challenges have adversely affected Xi’s domestic political standing. That may be behind any motivation to improve relations with the U.S. to address these domestic issues.</p>
<p>Biden, too, is keen on stabilizing relations with China. Confronted with escalating conflicts in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/14/israel-hamas-war-list-of-key-events-day-39">Middle East</a> and the ongoing <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/russia-ukraine-war-live-zelenskiy-says-russian-frontline-attacks-rising-germany-says-eu-won-t-meet-1m-pieces-of-ammo-target/ar-AA1jTjAI">war in Ukraine</a>, Biden is eager to avert the emergence of another global crisis during his tenure. </p>
<p>Restoring a semblance of stability to the Washington-Beijing relationship <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/14/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">has been among the top priorities in his foreign policy agenda.</a> </p>
<h2>What the meeting might accomplish</h2>
<p>One summit alone cannot resolve the extensive list of grievances between the two superpowers. Those challenges include issues like espionage, intellectual property theft, human rights abuses, foreign interference and trade penalties, as well as the sensitive matter of Taiwan. </p>
<p>The meeting addressed another point of contention between the two countries: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/biden-xi-talk-fentanyl-city-gripped-by-opioid-crisis-2023-11-15/">fentanyl shipments</a>. The leaders announced an agreement intended to stop China’s illicit exports of chemicals that can be used to make the drug that has led to the overdose deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans.</p>
<p>The agreement on re-opening communication channels at both military and civilian levels could be a crucial step in improving China-U.S. relations. It might serve as a foundation to prevent relations from spiralling out of control, and lay the groundwork for addressing broader challenges in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217754/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Saira Bano does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Relations between the U.S. and China have been particularly tense for the last few years. Can one summit between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping significantly improve relations?Saira Bano, Assistant Professor in Political Science, Thompson Rivers UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2173952023-11-10T15:20:06Z2023-11-10T15:20:06ZJoe Biden to meet with Xi Jinping – what a good result looks like for the US president<p>US president, Joe Biden, is expected to meet China’s leader, Xi Jinping, in San Francisco as part of the <a href="https://abc7news.com/apec-summit-san-francisco-schedule-asia-pacific-economic-cooperation-2023/14028661/">Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</a> (Apec) conference on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/10/us/politics/biden-xi-meeting.html">Wednesday November 15</a>. </p>
<p>Their meeting has great significance, as the two leaders have not met since the G20 in 2022, and because of their lack of agreement concerning current global conflicts, particularly the Ukraine war.</p>
<p>Biden’s relationship with Xi is already strained. At the G20 meeting, Biden <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/16/china-xi-biden-meeting-g20-taiwan/#cookie_message_anchor">spoke with Xi</a> about China’s position on Taiwan (the US is worried about China military action towards the self-governing island), the Russian invasion of Ukraine (the US would like China to put pressure on Russia to bring an end to the conflict), and the US-China trade relationship (which has been extremely rocky). These issues are all expected to be on the agenda.</p>
<p>While the US-China relationship is unlikely to be the deciding factor in 2024’s US presidential election, it could feature. Around <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/04/12/americans-are-critical-of-chinas-global-role-as-well-as-its-relationship-with-russia/#:%7E:text=Just%2014%25%20have%20a%20positive,of%20those%2018%20to%2029.">83% of Americans</a> have a negative view of China, with people concerned about China’s role in the world and the fate of Taiwan, according to Pew Research. But Chinese attitudes to the US might be mellowing. According to a <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/11/08/us-china-hostility-declined-economy">poll</a> conducted in October, fewer Chinese (48%) think of the US as an enemy than in 2022 (74%). </p>
<h2>What Biden needs</h2>
<p>Biden is unlikely to significantly change his <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/bidens-china-strategy-coalition-driven-competition-or-cold-war-style-confrontation/">current position</a> on China, one that aims to curb China’s economic growth and limit its diplomatic influence while maintaining US geopolitical dominance. But the Atlantic Council think-tank <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-biden-can-make-the-most-of-a-meeting-with-xi/">suggests</a> that maintaining open dialogue with China will gain Biden support from the US public. Only <a href="https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000018b-4ddf-deb8-ad8b-dfdf3c660000">13% of Americans</a> want a confrontational approach to China, a recent poll suggests.</p>
<p>Biden needs a bump in the polls. <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/2024/national/">Latest surveys</a> on the upcoming presidential election put Biden slightly behind Trump, despite record job creation and 3.7% inflation nearing US Federal Reserve’s target level of 2%. The uncertainty about who might be in the White House in 2025 will influence Chinese expectations of the meeting. It’s likely that China will not commit to any long-term agreements until after the 2024 election.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-putin-meeting-heres-what-it-says-about-their-current-and-future-relationship-215509">Xi-Putin meeting: here's what it says about their current, and future, relationship</a>
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<p>Some commentators <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/11/08/biden-xi-jinping-china-military-communication">expect</a> that resumption of high-level military dialogue between the two nations will be a major topic for both leaders. Such dialogue potentially helps to divert a military crisis, especially in contested regions such as the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait where China claims sovereignty. The Biden administration wants to see greater stability in the US-China relationship and to ensure there is no military misunderstanding between the two countries.</p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/11/09/ai-nuclear-decisions-shouldnt-mix-us-says-ahead-biden-xi-summit/">Washington Post</a>, political correspondent Olivier Knox speculates that discussions around AI will be on the agenda. The US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, believes that AI should not be involved in the decision-making processes concerning the use of nuclear weapons. Earlier in November, China signed a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-summit-2023-the-bletchley-declaration/the-bletchley-declaration-by-countries-attending-the-ai-safety-summit-1-2-november-2023">declaration</a> at the AI Safety Summit, hosted by the UK at Bletchley Park, signalling a commitment to an international approach to AI and its use. </p>
<p>Some sources <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-looks-china-commit-working-together-fentanyl-crisis-biden-xi-prepar-rcna124318">have suggested</a> that US authorities are hoping to discuss the possibility that China will restrict the supply of chemicals used to make fentanyl. Deaths involving the drug, a synthetic opioid more powerful than heroin, were more than 100,000 in the US in 2021, according to a recent <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/add.16318">report</a> from the University of California, Los Angeles.</p>
<p>Neither the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-xi-china-economic-summit-d17d68456306568ac9c3b37b69e7f8b2">White House nor Beijing</a> have outlined their expectations of the meeting, but that’s probably deliberate. Jude Blanchette, chair of China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-xi-china-economic-summit-d17d68456306568ac9c3b37b69e7f8b2">said</a> the objective of the meeting was to act as catalyst for further negotiations.</p>
<p>There has been a flurry of meetings between Chinese and US officials in the lead up to the Apec summit. Janet Yellen, the US treasury secretary, was <a href="https://fortune.com/2023/11/09/us-china-janet-yellen-he-lifeng-finance-meeting-biden-xi/">due to meet</a> the Chinese vice premier, He Lifeng, ahead of the Biden-Xi meeting. </p>
<p>China is also looking for solutions to its economic crisis, and this may open up some space for negotiation. China’s economy is facing many <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/21/economy/china-economy-troubles-intl-hnk/index.html#:%7E:text=A%20lack%20of%20resolute%20measures,economic%20growth%20to%20below%205%25.">challenges</a> and has not returned to pre-COVID growth levels. China’s foreign trade is in decline and it will seek to discuss improving its trade relationship with the US.</p>
<h2>The Trump factor</h2>
<p>With an election in 12 months’ time, Biden cannot be seen to be weak towards China. His likely Republican opponent, former president Donald Trump, has continuously adopted a belligerent attitude towards China’s economic challenge to the US, introducing a number of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/did-trumps-tariffs-benefit-american-workers-and-national-security/">tariffs</a> on Chinese imports after 2018.</p>
<p>In January 2020, Trump signed what he <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-u-s-china-phase-one-trade-agreement-2/">called</a> an “historic trade deal” with China that committed China to buying US$200 billion (£163 billion) of US exports before the end of 2021. But China did not keep their end of the bargain, with one <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/china-bought-none-extra-200-billion-us-exports-trumps-trade-deal">report</a> stating that China only bought 58% of the agreed amount, less than it had before the agreement.</p>
<p>Republicans on the House select committee on China have written to Biden and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/house-republicans-urge-biden-make-demands-xi-jinping-ahead-meeting-wee-rcna124074">demanded</a> that he takes a more assertive position to “to defend American interests and values”. The letter also calls on Biden to demand Xi releases Hong Kong pro-democracy campaigner <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-53717843">Jimmy Lai</a> and others held by China authorities.</p>
<p>There are suggestions that the possibility of Trump returning to the White House is making diplomats around the globe <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-07-09/trump-s-possible-win-is-shaping-policies-of-china-russia-japan-eu">reluctant to commit</a> to long-term partnerships with the US. Trump has <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-rolls-out-2024-trade-policy-tax-china-build-up-america-reward-us-producers">promised</a> to “tax China to build up America”. This would resume the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-45899310">trade war</a> that resulted in the Trump administration placing tariffs on Chinese exports to the US.</p>
<p>This meeting could cap tension levels and offer some stability for further negotiations. For Biden, it’s a domestic minefield. If he is too “hard” in his positioning, he risks alienating the electorate, while if he is too soft, he will attract criticism from Republicans. If Biden can walk this tightrope successfully, he may be able to use it during next year’s election cycle, showing he’s the right person to lead the United States.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217395/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dafydd Townley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US president Joe Biden is facing difficult talks with China’s president, but needs a good result to give him a bump in the polls.Dafydd Townley, Teaching Fellow in International Security, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2132062023-10-31T12:33:18Z2023-10-31T12:33:18ZFrom India and Taiwan to Tibet, the living assist the dead in their passage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556195/original/file-20231026-27-b64ql7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1024%2C679&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hindu devotees prepare to scatter ashes of the deceased into the sea as part of Ngaben, a mass cremation ceremony, in Surabaya, Indonesia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/hindu-devotees-prepare-to-scatter-ashes-of-the-deceased-news-photo/1243611860?adppopup=true">Juni Kriswanto/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many people see death as a rite of a passage: a journey to some new place, or a threshold between two kinds of being. Zoroastrians believe that there is <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803133541542">a bridge of judgment</a> that each person who dies must cross; depending on deeds done during life, the bridge takes the deceased to different places. Ancient Greek sources depict the deceased <a href="https://www.hellenic.org.au/post/the-final-journey-crossing-the-styx">crossing the river Styx</a>, overcoming obstacles with the help of coins and food.</p>
<p>But the dead cannot make this transition alone – surviving family or friends play key roles. Ritual actions the living perform on behalf of the dead are said to help the deceased with their journey. At the same time, these actions give the living a chance to grieve and say goodbye. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://miamioh.edu/profiles/cas/liz-wilson.html">a scholar of South Asian religions</a> specializing in death and dying, I have seen how much surviving family depend on these rituals for peace of mind. Traditions vary widely by region and religious tradition, but all of them help mourners feel that they have given one last gift to their loved one.</p>
<h2>Fire, water and food</h2>
<p><a href="https://openfolklore.org/content/make-sesame-rice-please-appetites-dead-hinduism-1">Some Hindu death rituals</a> have roots in ancient Vedic rites as old as 1,500 B.C.E. The survivors’ goal is to ensure that a dead person separates from the realm of the living and makes a safe transition to a blessed afterlife or rebirth.</p>
<p>Death rites <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/28709299">typically use fire, water and food</a> in a sequence of three stages.</p>
<p>Stage one is cremation, the fiery incineration of a corpse on a stack of wood infused with flammable oils. Cremation is considered the dead person’s willing, final gift to the god of fire, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-57894855">traditionally officiated by the oldest son</a> of the deceased.</p>
<p>Stage two is the immersion of cremated remains in a flowing body of water, such as the Ganges River. There are many sacred rivers in India where the ashes of a loved one can be immersed, and Hindus <a href="https://www.clevelandart.org/art/1966.119">regard them as goddesses</a> who carry off impurities and sins, assisting the soul on its journey.</p>
<p>Many Hindus believe the ideal place to immerse a loved one’s ashes is in the sacred city of Varanasi, in northern India, where the Ganges flows in a broad stream. Families carry corpses in festive processions to the cremation site, hopeful that their rituals will help loved ones move to another state of existence.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Though the Ganges is considered the holiest river, many rivers are viewed as sacred.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Stage three is entrance into the realm of the ancestors. Ancient Hindu belief depicts relatives who have died living in a realm where they are maintained by offerings given by their living descendants, whom they assist with fertility and wealth.</p>
<p>Hindu beliefs and practices are extremely diverse. In many communities, however, descendants perform rites that offer nourishment to the dead person, <a href="https://scroll.in/article/1032342/devdutt-pattanaik-on-the-3000-year-old-hindu-ritual-of-feeding-the-dead">represented in the form of a ball of rice</a>. Through these offerings, which can be performed after the death or during certain holidays and anniversaries, the deceased spirit is said to gradually become an embodied ancestor, reborn thanks to the ritual labor of their offspring. </p>
<h2>Colorful processions</h2>
<p>Buddhist death rituals differ considerably from culture to culture, yet one commonality is the amount of human effort that goes into sending off the dead. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Nine men in black outfits with brightly colored patterns on them hold a huge puppet of a dragon outside a building with Chinese characters on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Dragon dancers perform during a funeral for Taiwanese TV star Chu Ke-liang in New Taipei City on June 20, 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/dragon-dancers-perform-outside-a-funeral-hall-during-a-news-photo/698172402?adppopup=true">Sam Yeh/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>In Chinese and Taiwanese culture, it is thought best to send off the deceased with a well-attended funeral procession, full of pageantry for deities and mortals alike. Many people rent “Electric Flower Cars,” trucks that serve as moving stages for performers – even pole dancers are not uncommon. Fifty jeeps with pole-dancing women graced <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38528122">the funeral procession of a Taiwanese politician</a> who died in 2017. </p>
<p>Though pole dancers are a newer phenomenon, Taiwanese funerals and religious processions have long showcased women and young people, including female mourners hired to wail. Scholars such as <a href="https://www.harvard-yenching.org/person/chang-hsun/">anthropologist Chang Hsun</a> suggest that a combination of such traditions <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZCRmmSdYwDc">led to the inclusion</a> of women dancing and singing in some modern funeral processions. </p>
<p>By the 1980s, scantily clad women were a fixture of rural Taiwanese funeral culture. In 2011, <a href="https://sc.edu/study/colleges_schools/artsandsciences/anthropology/our_people/directory/moskowitz_marc.php">anthropologist Marc L. Moskowitz</a> produced a short documentary called “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZCRmmSdYwDc">Dancing for the Dead: Funeral Strippers in Taiwan</a>” about the phenomenon. </p>
<p>Funeral performances show tremendous freedom and innovation; one sees drummers, marching bands and Taiwanese opera singers. Paper objects in the shape of things the deceased is believed to use in the afterlife are burned, from microwaves to cars. Likewise, specially printed money called “ghost money” is burned to provide the deceased with funds.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a yellow monk's robe and someone wearing black stand behind what looks like a dollhouse, as the monk rings a bell." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A paper model of a villa, used as an offering for the dead during a ceremony in New Taipei City, Taiwan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-picture-taken-on-march-16-2019-shows-a-relative-news-photo/1134772913?adppopup=true">Sam Yeh/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Guiding the dead</h2>
<p>In Tibet, Buddhists believe that the vital energy of a person who has died stays with the body <a href="https://theasiadialogue.com/2016/05/04/tibetan-death-rituals/">for 49 days</a>. During this time, the dead person receives instruction from priests to help them navigate the journey ahead.</p>
<p>This journey toward the next stage of being involves a series of choices that will determine the realm of their rebirth – including rebirth as an animal, a hungry ghost, a deity, a being in hell, another human being or immediate enlightenment. </p>
<p>Priests whisper instructions into the ear of the dead person, who is believed to be capable of hearing so long as they retain their vital energy. Being told what to expect after death allows a person to face death with equanimity.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black and white photo shows a man seated in prayer on top of a mountain, as other people work in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A Tibetan Buddhist priest chants prayers and repeats passages from religious scrolls while his helpers make a funeral pyre.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/lamaist-priest-chants-prayers-and-repeats-passages-from-news-photo/646273502?adppopup=true">Hulton Deutsch/Corbis via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The instructions given to the dead are described in a sacred text called the “Bardo Thodol,” often translated in English as “<a href="https://theconversation.com/guide-to-the-classics-the-tibetan-book-of-the-dead-172962">The Tibetan Book of the Dead</a>.” “Bardo” is the Tibetan term for an intermediate or in-between state; one might think of the bardo of death as a train that stops at various destinations, opening doors and giving the passenger opportunities to depart. </p>
<p>Tibetan Buddhists believe that these instructions allow the deceased to make good choices in the 49-day interim between their death and the next life. Different rebirth realms will appear to the person, taking the form of colored lights. Based on the karma of the deceased, some realms will seem more alluring than others. The person is told to be fearless: to let themselves be drawn toward higher realms, even if they appear frightening.</p>
<p>For several days before burial, the deceased is visited by friends, family and well-wishers – all able to work out their grief while assisting the dead in a postmortem journey.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213206/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liz Wilson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Across cultures, death rituals give mourners a chance to grieve. But they also offer one last opportunity to help the deceased as they transition to the next stage of existence.Liz Wilson, Professor of Comparative Religion, Miami UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.