tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/the-accord-15030/articlesThe Accord – The Conversation2022-06-12T23:09:04Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1843052022-06-12T23:09:04Z2022-06-12T23:09:04ZHawke’s special skill was levelling with the Australian people. It’s Albanese’s only option<p>As every historian knows, the frame you use to analyse the past affects the stories you tell about that past. Time is foremost among those frames.</p>
<p>Richard Flanagan wrote last month that the 2022 federal election result marked the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/morrison-government-s-fall-marks-end-of-howard-era-ascendancy-20220525-p5aod6.html">end of the Howard Era</a>. By that he meant the end of a pernicious kind of politics where institutions were not only hollowed out, but rubbished.</p>
<p>Wind the clock back further, and you start to see echoes of an earlier era, specifically one Labor governments presided over.</p>
<p>Once again, we are in the grip of an energy crisis. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is doing what events in the Middle East did in the 1970s.</p>
<p>The 1973 oil crisis forced massive inflation upon the Whitlam government. By 1975 inflation was 15% and Australia was teetering on the edge of recession.</p>
<p>Unemployment, previously within a narrow band of 1-3%, jumped above 3% and then above 4% where it stayed for half a century.</p>
<h2>Governing in crisis</h2>
<p>In 1983 the Hawke Labor government came to office with inflation still at 11.5%, unemployment at 10.3% and Australia in the middle of a long-lasting recession.</p>
<p>Hawke’s treasurer Paul Keating would later say about his early period as treasurer that there was no obvious place to look for an answer to the economy’s problems.</p>
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<p>This was especially so at a time when the West was embracing economic liberalism and turning decisions over to markets rather than governments.</p>
<p>But the Hawke government had one critical instrument at its disposal: centralised wage fixation.</p>
<h2>Finding the bargain</h2>
<p>Keating as a treasurer, and as a politician, understood bargains. You don’t get big change without giving something away. </p>
<p>The series of prices and incomes <a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-politics-explainer-the-prices-and-incomes-accord-75622">Accords</a> that began in 1983 pulled back wage-driven inflation by a trade-off: workers would forgo wage rises in exchange for social programs and better retirement incomes.</p>
<p>That’s how modern superannuation began.</p>
<p>Today, inflation is 5.1% – hardly the stuff of 1973 or 1983, but way beyond the 1-2% we have had for most of the last decade.</p>
<h2>Less to bargain with</h2>
<p>The Albanese government comes to power intending to call an economic summit of business, union and community leaders. It’s an idea straight out of the Hawke government’s 1983 playbook.</p>
<p>In the industrial relations portfolio, minister Tony Burke has a mandate from his leader to pursue a Hawke-style Accord.</p>
<p>But it’s unclear where the policy levers for significant reform are. </p>
<p>These days, workers <a href="https://theconversation.com/proof-positive-real-wages-are-shrinking-these-figures-put-it-beyond-doubt-183343">don’t have big wage rises</a> to trade away. </p>
<p>Trade unions have neither the coverage nor bargaining power they did. In the early 1980s, almost 50% of employees were members of a union. Today, it’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-record-vacancies-australians-shouldnt-expect-big-pay-rises-soon-180416">14%</a>.</p>
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<p>And we don’t have much centralised wage fixing. It was Keating who began the process of decentralising wages, moving away from a system of nationwide awards towards enterprise-by-enterprise bargaining. </p>
<p>It is difficult to see how a 1980s-style Accord-style could be struck in these circumstances. The genie bottle of private market forces has been unleashed.</p>
<p>George Megalogenis observed in his book <a href="https://www.angusrobertson.com.au/books/the-longest-decade-george-megalogenis/p/9781921215940">The Longest Decade</a> that deregulation, by definition, removed the government from economy</p>
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<p>and yet Keating talked as if he were the maestro. But he didn’t conduct; rather, he gave the orchestra a licence to improvise.</p>
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<p>And the Albanese lacks a mandate for serious reform. The election result shows the nation in favour of some light progressivism, but not up for major tax changes or redistribution. </p>
<p>Labor failed to gain office when it promised big changes in 2019. In the lead-up to the 2022 election, it <a href="https://theconversation.com/stand-by-for-the-oddly-designed-stage-3-tax-cut-that-will-send-middle-earners-backwards-and-give-high-earners-thousands-182751">agreed to pass</a> so-called stage 3 tax reforms that will deliver the biggest benefits to those on the highest incomes.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-new-dawn-over-stormy-seas-how-labor-should-manage-the-economy-183518">A new dawn over stormy seas: how Labor should manage the economy</a>
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<p>Albanese’s ministers will need to be good communicators. They will need to explain that they can only do so much.</p>
<p>But when the time comes, as it inevitably will, for a discussion about significant economic reform, they will need to level with the electorate, like Hawke.</p>
<h2>All the more need to be bold</h2>
<p>Treasurer Jim Chalmers has given very clear signals about the parlous state of the books ahead of the budget in October. He’ll likely be delivering that budget after more interest rate rises from the Reserve Bank.</p>
<p>It has become fashionable to say this year’s election might have been a good one to lose. But ironically, this might also be a period of such significant turmoil that policymakers have no choice but to be bold, and to take people with them. </p>
<p>It was Albanese himself who said the nation is at a <a href="https://anthonyalbanese.com.au/media-centre/time-to-advance-afr-conference">critical juncture</a>.</p>
<p>The tools mightn’t be all he would want, but there is nothing like a crisis to force a reformer’s hand.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184305/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emily Millane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The new prime minister has fewer economic levers to pull than previous Labor governments. That makes taking Australians into his confidence about the need for bolder change all the more important.Emily Millane, Senior Fellow, Melbourne Law School, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1315622020-06-16T02:09:07Z2020-06-16T02:09:07ZHow Paul Keating transformed the economy and the nation<p><em>The Conversation is running a series of explainers on key figures in Australian political history, examining how they changed the country and political debate. You can read the rest of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/key-figures-in-australian-political-history-86822">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://primeministers.moadoph.gov.au/prime-ministers/paul-keating">Paul Keating</a> was one of Australia’s most charismatic and controversial prime ministers. </p>
<p>Born in Bankstown, New South Wales, into an Irish-Catholic, working-class and Labor-voting family, he left school before he turned 15. Keating joined the Labor Party as a teenager, quickly honing the political skills that would serve him so well in later life. He entered parliament as MP for Blaxland in 1969 at just 25 years old, and briefly served as minister for Northern Australia in the ill-fated <a href="http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/whitlam/">Whitlam government</a>. </p>
<p>He subsequently served as a very high-profile treasurer in the <a href="http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/hawke/">Hawke government</a> from 1983-1991, before defeating Bob Hawke in a leadership ballot in December 1991. In doing so Keating became Australia’s 24th prime minister, serving until John Howard defeated him in the 1996 election.</p>
<p>To Keating’s supporters, he is a visionary figure whose “<a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-8960">big picture</a>” ideas helped transform the Australian economy, while still pursuing socially inclusive policies. To his conservative critics, Keating left a legacy of government debt and rejected “mainstream” Australians in favour of politically correct “special interests”. </p>
<p>He was a skilled parliamentary performer, renowned for his <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-12/the-collected-insults-of-paul-keating/5071412">excoriating</a> put-downs and wit. </p>
<p>Keating played a major role in transforming Australian political debate. He highlighted the role of markets in restructuring the economy, engagement with Asia, Australian national identity and the economic benefits of social inclusion. </p>
<h2>Economic rationalism</h2>
<p>Keating is remembered most for his eloquent advocacy of so-called “economic rationalism” both as treasurer and later as prime minister. </p>
<p>Under Hawke and Keating, Labor advocated free markets, globalisation, deregulation and privatisation, albeit in a less extreme <a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-9662">form</a> than the Liberals advocated. For example, while Labor introduced major public sector cuts, it attempted to use means tests to target the cuts and protect those most in need. Nonetheless, Hawke and Keating embraced the market far more than previous <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/18900068?q&versionId=44615320">Labor leaders</a> had. </p>
<p>Along with New Zealand Labour, Australian Labor became one of the international pioneers of a rapprochement between social democracy and a watered-down form of free-market <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-exactly-is-neoliberalism-84755">neoliberalism</a>. Years later, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who had visited Australia during the Hawke and Keating years, was to acknowledge <a href="https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/tpp/pap/2002/00000030/00000001/art00002">the influence</a> of Australian Labor on his own “Third Way” approach to politics.</p>
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<span class="caption">The Hawke cabinet in 1990, with Keating again as treasurer.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/National Archives of Australia</span></span>
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<p>Keating justified his economic rationalism on the grounds that the Australian economy needed to transform to be internationally competitive in a changing world. To avoid becoming one of the world’s “<a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-8485">economic museums</a>” or “<a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-8682">banana republics</a>”, in Keating’s view, there was no alternative but to embrace his economic rationalist agenda. </p>
<h2>Trade unions and the ‘social wage’</h2>
<p>At the same time, Keating <a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-9662">argued</a> that his economic policies would avoid social injustices. This contrasted with the outcomes of the extreme economic rationalism of the <a href="https://www.margaretthatcher.org/">Thatcher</a> and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/ronald-reagan/">Reagan</a> governments. </p>
<p>Unlike in the UK or US, where anti-union policies were pursued, the Labor government was prepared to work with the <a href="https://brill.com/view/title/35076">trade union movement</a> to introduce its economic policies. Under <a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-politics-explainer-the-prices-and-incomes-accord-75622">the Accord</a> agreements, trade unions agreed to wage restraint, and eventually real wage cuts, in return for government services and benefits. </p>
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<p>Hawke and Keating referred to this as the <a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-9662">“social wage”</a>. They claimed the resulting increased business profits would encourage economic growth and rising standards of living.</p>
<h2>Social inclusion and economic growth</h2>
<p>Keating saw his economic policies and progressive social policies as <a href="http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv/UQ:195374/JQ4031_J64_2000.pdf">compatible</a>. Increased social inclusion would contribute to economic growth. </p>
<p>Drawing on Hawke-era <a href="https://www.annesummers.com.au/a/50079/bob-hawke's-legacy-for-women-in-australia">affirmative action legislation</a>, Keating argued improved gender equality would mean women could contribute their skills to the economy.</p>
<p>Keating was also a <a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-8765">passionate advocate</a> for reconciliation with Indigenous Australians, including acknowledging the injustices of Australia’s colonial past and facilitating <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/1011/IndigenousAffairs2#_Toc295218056">Native Title</a>. He envisaged an Australia where Indigenous people would <a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-9945">benefit</a> from sustainable economic development, cultural tourism and could sell their artworks to the world.</p>
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<h2>National identity, Asia and the republic</h2>
<p>In Keating’s <a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-9392">ideal</a> vision, Australia would engage more with Asia and benefit from the geo-economic changes occurring in the Asia-Pacific region. </p>
<p>Then Opposition Leader John Howard <a href="https://australianpolitics.com/1995/12/13/national-identity-howard-headland-speech.html">accused</a> Keating of rejecting Australia’s British heritage. In fact, Keating <a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-8924">acknowledged</a> many positive British influences on Australian society. However, he argued that Australia had developed its own democratic innovations such as the secret ballot long before Britain accepted these. He also <a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-9557">suggested</a> Australian values had become more inclusive as a result of diverse waves of immigration. </p>
<p>Consequently, it was time for Australia to throw off its colonial heritage, including the British monarchy, and become a republic. Keating believed that doing so would enable Australia to be more easily accepted as an independent nation in the Asian region. He established a Republic Advisory Committee as part of preparations for a referendum on becoming a republic. </p>
<h2>Keating’s legacy</h2>
<p>Australia’s greater relationship with Asia has had major benefits for the economy, although Keating <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472336.2018.1441894?journalCode=rjoc20">underestimated</a> the downsides of increased competition. Recently, he <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-06/federal-election-bill-shorten-disagrees-with-paul-keating-china/11082144">complained</a> about what he sees as excessive security fears in relation to China and their impact on Asian engagement. The republic remains unfinished business. </p>
<p>Keating’s vision has also left some unintended consequences for Labor today. Despite his patchy record in achieving them, Keating <a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-9585">argued</a> that both tax cuts and budget surpluses were important, even at the expense of public sector cuts. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/vale-bob-hawke-a-giant-of-australian-political-and-industrial-history-93719">Vale Bob Hawke, a giant of Australian political and industrial history</a>
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<p>Consequently, it became harder for Labor leaders to make a case for deficit-funded stimulus packages when needed (as Kevin Rudd <a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-16867">tried to do</a> during the Global Financial Crisis). Similarly, it became harder for Labor leaders to argue for increased taxes to fund a bigger role for government, as Bill Shorten <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/7.30/opposition-leader-bill-shorten-discusses-labors/11064844">attempted</a> during the 2019 election. </p>
<p>In addition, as I argue in <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-13-6299-6_5">a recent book</a>, Keating-era policy contributed in the longer term to poorer wages and conditions for workers. Labor is predictably loath to acknowledge this. Keating also underestimated the detrimental impacts of economic rationalism on other vulnerable groups in the community.</p>
<p>The 2019 election result suggests many Australians no longer <a href="https://theconversation.com/labors-election-defeat-reveals-its-continued-inability-to-convince-people-it-can-make-their-lives-better-117082">believe</a> Labor governments will improve their standards of living. </p>
<p>Rather than the prosperous brave new world he envisaged, parts of the Keating legacy may have made things harder for subsequent Labor leaders. Nonetheless, Keating remains a revered figure in the Labor Party and one of its most memorable leaders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131562/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carol Johnson has received funding from the Australian Research Council for research on the history of Labor governments. </span></em></p>Charismatic, controversial and witty, Paul Keating, along with Bob Hawke, modernised the Australian economy and opened it up to Asia.Carol Johnson, Emerita Professor, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1294422020-01-15T19:10:22Z2020-01-15T19:10:22ZMight the bushfire crisis be the turning point on climate politics Australian needs?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310128/original/file-20200115-151844-x41owh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C467%2C3532%2C2137&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The bushfire crisis is big enough to change the government's emissions policy, but it swill need more.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Countries have long periods in which policies change little, and only by increments.</p>
<p>Occasionally there are turning points, when previously intractable policy problems are suddenly resolved, recasting policy for the long term.</p>
<p>Many are asking whether this summer’s environmental catastrophe might be such a turning point – a <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/business/the-economy/port-arthur-moment-business-urges-pm-to-lead-on-climate-amid-bushfire-crisis-20200113-p53qzq.html">Port Arthur moment</a> or Australia’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/07/this-apocalyptic-australian-summer-is-our-sandy-hook-moment-if-we-dont-take-climate-action-now-we-never-will">Sandy Hook</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/dec/13/australias-politicians-face-a-crisis-of-legitimacy-as-fire-and-smoke-chokes-the-country">Chernobyl</a> or <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/this-tragic-bushfire-crisis-is-our-pearl-harbor-moment/news-story/e9f0cce6fc2511b72dbbc1b325a85eb5">Pearl Harbour</a>.</p>
<p>The short answer is: it is too soon to tell, but the early signals from the federal government are not good.</p>
<p>Crises can provide a window for big policy changes. In such times, the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/study-of-critical-junctures-theory-narrative-and-counterfactuals-in-historical-institutionalism/BAAE0860F1F641357C29C9AC72A54758">normal political constraints are relaxed</a>, although not for long.</p>
<h2>Crisis can beget change</h2>
<p>The need for revenue during World War I opened the way for the federal government to levy a <a href="https://www.austaxpolicy.com/income-tax-at-100-years-a-little-history/">national income tax</a>. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 stimulated <a href="http://theconversation.com/australia-has-enacted-82-anti-terror-laws-since-2001-but-tough-laws-alone-cant-eliminate-terrorism-123521">many changes concerned with national security</a>.</p>
<p>Typically, a crisis only leads to substantial policy changes if there is also a broader understanding about the need to act, and the shape of the change needed. </p>
<p>The economic theories of <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/j/john_maynard_keynes.asp">John Maynard Keynes</a> provided the basis for policies that ensured full employment during and after World War II. </p>
<p>The monetarist theories of <a href="https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Friedman.html">Milton Friedman</a> provided the means to limit inflation in the 1970s and 1980s. </p>
<p>A library of pre-existing publications on national security directed policy in the wake of 9/11.</p>
<h2>Theory is needed as well</h2>
<p>Crisis and economic theory were essential to some of the big reforms under the Hawke and Keating governments, including a new approach to Australian retirement incomes. </p>
<p>Superannuation had been a patchwork of individual employer arrangements since before federation. </p>
<p>The stagflation crisis of simultaneous unemployment and inflation in the 1970s created the conditions for a new approach. Inflation rose to 15%, unemployment to 6%. It led to government-union <a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-politics-explainer-the-prices-and-incomes-accord-75622">Accords</a> and <a href="https://www.austaxpolicy.com/what-is-superannuation/">deferred wage increases</a> that were the basis for Australia’s universal employee superannuation scheme.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-politics-explainer-the-prices-and-incomes-accord-75622">Australian politics explainer: the Prices and Incomes Accord</a>
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<p>Many see the 1986 Chernobyl disaster as a <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/turning-point-at-chernobyl">turning point in ending the cold war</a> and dismantling the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev acted decisively in the midst of a disaster that created a groundswell of support for change bringing in an system (capitalism) which had deep theoretical underpinnings.</p>
<h2>Not every crisis leads to change</h2>
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<span class="caption">US President Obama hugs Mark Barden, whose seven year old son Daniel was shot and killed in the Sandy Hook Elementary School attack in 2012.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">MICHAEL REYNOLDS/EPA</span></span>
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<p>For decades, gun control has been contentious in the United States, where <a href="https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2016/06/18/a-history-of-violence">gun-related homicides are ten times the rates elsewhere</a>. 26 people, including 20 children aged 6 and 7, in a gun massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2012. </p>
<p>President Obama was personally committed to, and moved fast after the crisis to call for, tighter gun control. But change was stymied by <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/08/16/obama-gun-control-227625">powerful stakeholders</a>.</p>
<p>By contrast, John Howard was successful in moving quickly after the 1996 Port Arthur massacre to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-arguments-that-carried-australias-1996-gun-law-reforms-58431">tighten gun controls</a>.</p>
<p>The Australian gun lobby lacked the political sophistication of America’s National Rifle Association, and Australia’s political system has fewer veto points than in the US.</p>
<p>The attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 brought World War II to America, <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/this-tragic-bushfire-crisis-is-our-pearl-harbor-moment/news-story/e9f0cce6fc2511b72dbbc1b325a85eb5">mobilising huge levels of public support</a> for American involvement. Within days, Roosevelt declared war on Japan. </p>
<h2>The nation might not be ready</h2>
<p>There are high levels of public support for action climate change in Australia, but can we say it is the same as “<a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/this-tragic-bushfire-crisis-is-our-pearl-harbor-moment/news-story/e9f0cce6fc2511b72dbbc1b325a85eb5">war fever</a>”?</p>
<p>Australia’s emissions policy has been stuck for a long time. Australia was recently ranked as having the <a href="https://newclimate.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/CCPI-2020-Results_Web_Version.pdf">worst climate policy in the world</a>, and some of the worst outcomes. </p>
<p>Australia’s annual emissions are <a href="https://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/resources/4aa038fc-b9ee-4694-99d0-c5346afb5bfb/files/australias-emissions-projections-2019-report.pdf">not expected to change much</a> between 2020 and 2030 – which doesn’t give Australia much chance of getting to near zero emissions by 2050, which is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/jul/30/un-chief-calls-for-2050-zero-emissions-plans-but-australia-remains-tightlipped">generally regarded</a> as what’s needed to avoid runaway climate change.</p>
<p>Many in public policy have spent years developing credible policy responses to climate change. But Australia has repealed or failed to implement <a href="https://grattan.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/922-Power-play.pdf">five versions of climate policy since 2007</a>.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-the-nations-leading-and-failing-on-climate-action-123581">The good, the bad and the ugly: the nations leading and failing on climate action</a>
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<p>There are reasons to believe the summer bushfire crisis won’t be any different.</p>
<p>No-one has accused the Prime Minister of moving too fast or too far in responding to the fires. In his <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/interview-david-speers-abc-insiders">interview with ABC at the weekend</a>, he did not commit to tightening, or even reviewing, Australia’s carbon emissions targets in light of the fires.</p>
<p>Powerful stakeholders continue to deny the need for significant policy change: last month the federal resources minister, Matt Canavan, referred to the “<a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/blame-the-climate-bogeyman-for-nsw-fires/news-story/9a76c7fc10f11324fe2271b526ca224f">bogeyman of climate change</a>” as a distraction from “<a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/blame-the-climate-bogeyman-for-nsw-fires/news-story/9a76c7fc10f11324fe2271b526ca224f">shortcomings in managing our land</a>.”</p>
<p>Fake news on social media and in some sections of the mainstream media about an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/08/world/australia/fires-murdoch-disinformation.html">arson emergency</a> has blunted the chance of a broad-based popular groundswell.</p>
<h2>There’s hope, but not much</h2>
<p>The proposed <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament-house-2">royal commission</a> might be a means to find a way forward on climate change. But by the time it reports, the fires will be out, and the moment of crisis will have passed. </p>
<p>For now, the fires smoulder on. It’s not too late for the federal government to seize the opportunity for substantial change. State governments may well use the aftermath of the fires to coordinate their responses to climate change – possibly without the Commonwealth. For the moment, they are understandably preoccupied with responding to an ongoing emergency.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bushfires-wont-change-climate-policy-overnight-but-morrison-can-shift-the-coalition-without-losing-face-129354">Bushfires won't change climate policy overnight. But Morrison can shift the Coalition without losing face</a>
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<p>There is a real possibility that Australia will have to wait for another crisis – with different leadership, and more public consensus – before there is significant change on emissions policy. </p>
<p>The bushfire smoke that chokes 10 million people in Sydney, Melbourne, Canberra, and elsewhere will no doubt contribute to changing attitudes, and it might even shift the media’s coverage of climate change, but there’s no guarantee that it will be the policy turning point we need.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129442/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Grattan Institute began with contributions to its endowment of $15 million from each of the Federal and Victorian Governments, $4 million from BHP Billiton, and $1 million from NAB. In order to safeguard its independence, Grattan Institute’s board controls this endowment. The funds are invested and contribute to funding Grattan Institute's activities. Grattan Institute also receives funding from corporates, foundations, and individuals to support its general activities, as disclosed on its website.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emily Millane received funding for her doctoral studies from the Australian government under the Australian Government Research Training Program Stipend Scholarship.</span></em></p>An old political maxim is to ‘never waste a crisis’, but sometimes a crisis isn’t enough.John Daley, Chief Executive Officer, Grattan InstituteEmily Millane, Senior Associate, Grattan InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/756222017-04-24T04:43:08Z2017-04-24T04:43:08ZAustralian politics explainer: the Prices and Incomes Accord<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164642/original/image-20170410-22688-1ma2w9c.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Hawke Labor government had a strong incentive to seek a new approach to industrial relations when it came to office.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/PhotoSearchItemDetail.asp?M=0&B=11607706&SE=1">National Archives of Australia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The Conversation is running a <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/australian-politics-explainer-37192">series of explainers</a> on key moments in Australian political history, looking at what happened, its impact then, and its relevance to politics today.</em></p>
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<p>During the Hawke-Keating years, the union movement – under the leadership of Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) secretary Bill Kelty – became a partner in Labor’s economic rationalist agenda.</p>
<p>Through Accord agreements, unions accepted a degree of responsibility for Australia’s broader economic health. This was often at the expense of their own members’ interests.</p>
<h2>What happened?</h2>
<p>The Hawke Labor government had a strong incentive to seek a new approach to industrial relations when it came to office. </p>
<p>The last time Labor held government was under Gough Whitlam, between 1972 and 1975. At that time, Hawke was ACTU president, and the front man for the industrial militancy and wages explosion that saw inflation peak at 18% and unemployment reach 5% for the first time since the early 1940s.</p>
<p>Hawke was a confrontational union leader. But Hawke 2.0, the self-possessed teetotaller who became prime minister in 1983, preferred consensus. </p>
<p>In opposition, Labor’s industrial relations spokesperson, Ralph Willis, developed the idea of a formalised agreement between the unions and Labor in government, which was adopted as policy at the Labor Party conference in 1979.</p>
<p>The Prices and Incomes Accord was a series of agreements between Labor and the ACTU where unions would moderate their wage demands in exchange for improvements in the “social wage”. </p>
<p>The first Accord was struck in February 1983, just before the election of the Hawke government. There were six subsequent accords, culminating in Accord Mark VII in October 1991, which ushered in the system of enterprise bargaining. </p>
<p>The Industrial Relations Commission developed a policy of “two-tier” wage fixation, in a shift from the “wage indexation” system of the past. Basic increases would be provided but additional wage rises were dependent on “efficiency offsets”.</p>
<p>By the early 1990s, this had developed into the dual system of basic annual wage increases for award-covered workers, and the opportunity to implement enterprise-based agreements to drive productivity at the workplace level.</p>
<p>The Accord’s social wage elements included better public health provision through Medicare, improvements to pensions and unemployment benefits, tax cuts, and – eventually – superannuation.</p>
<h2>What was its impact?</h2>
<p>The Accord was a key component of the Hawke-Keating governments’ economic reform program. Along with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-float-australia-had-to-have-21361">floating of the Australian dollar</a>, opening the door to international banks and the reduction of tariffs, the Accord signalled a turn toward a more globally engaged Australian economy.</p>
<p>Hawke’s consensus-oriented style brought the union movement inside the economic policy management tent. This was also a corporatist project: although business groups were not formally part of the Accord, Hawke brought big business into other institutions such as the Economic Planning Advisory Council.</p>
<p>Generally, business groups became critical of the influence the ACTU exerted over Labor through the Accord years. From the mid-1980s, arguments for radical reform of the industrial relations system grew stronger. </p>
<p>Elements in the Coalition and the New Right pushed for individual workplace bargaining and a reduction of union power. They saw the Accord as symbolic of the much-reviled <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-enduring-myth-of-the-industrial-relations-club-34647">“industrial relations club”</a>.</p>
<p>Within the union movement itself, the Accord was always controversial. Critics argued it transferred power from the grassroots network of delegates and shop stewards to an elite group of senior officials sitting around the table with business and government.</p>
<p>The Accord evolved over the 1980s to focus mainly on managing wages outcomes while ignoring accompanying increases in the social wage. In response, left-wing officials like Laurie Carmichael of the Metalworkers Union became increasingly critical of the Accord. For many, the union movement had simply given up too much for too little.</p>
<h2>What are its contemporary implications?</h2>
<p>On the 30th anniversary of the Accord in 2013, ACTU president Ged Kearney said the Accord’s spirit should be revived to meet the challenges of job insecurity and wage inequality.</p>
<p>Rising inequality is behind the backlash now underway against neoliberalism and the mantra of prosperity through free trade and globalisation. </p>
<p>The ACTU’s new secretary, Sally McManus, has been in the headlines since assuming her position in March this year. McManus <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-15/actu-boss-happy-for-workers-to-break-unjust-laws/8357698">said</a> she believed workers were justified in breaking laws that they judged to be unfair. </p>
<p>She <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/mar/29/neoliberalism-has-run-its-course-says-actu-boss-sally-mcmanus">later declared</a> neoliberalism had “run its course”, and:</p>
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<p>The Keating years created vast wealth for Australia, but it has not been shared, and too much has ended up in offshore bank accounts or in CEO’s back pockets.</p>
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<p>McManus’ combative style recalls an era before market economics gained bipartisan support, when the lines between labour and capital were more sharply drawn. Her approach also raises important questions about the future of the relationship between the industrial and political wings of the Australian labour movement.</p>
<p>McManus appears to be positioning the union movement as the bulwark against unfairness, and the vigorous defender of long-held conditions. There is none of the Kelty “pinstriped proletarian” in her approach. It is unknown whether the McManus-led ACTU will entertain a similar kind of compact with a Shorten Labor government, or take a more conflict-oriented approach.</p>
<p>Bill Shorten is by nature a consensus Labor leader, who is inclined to seek common ground between business and labour. At present, though, he is riding the turn against neoliberalism, adopting a pro-union position and populist rhetoric on issues such as corporate tax cuts and penalty rates.</p>
<p>There is some prospect therefore of a new Labor-ACTU compact for the 2020s. This would not focus so much on the Accord’s economic objectives, but on the protection of workers’ rights in the fast-changing world of automation and new platforms of service delivery.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75622/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Forsyth has received research funding from organisations including the BCA, CFMEU, Fair Work Commission and Victorian Government. He is a Consultant with Corrs Chambers Westgarth. The views expressed in this article are his own.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carolyn Holbrook does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Prices and Incomes Accord was a series of agreements between Labor and the ACTU where unions would moderate their wage demands in exchange for improvements in the ‘social wage’.Anthony Forsyth, Professor of Workplace Law, RMIT UniversityCarolyn Holbrook, Alfred Deakin Research Fellow, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/701392016-12-31T20:33:43Z2016-12-31T20:33:43ZCabinet papers 1992-93: the rise and fall of enterprise bargaining agreements<p>1992 was landmark year in Australian industrial relations. The Keating government pushed for enterprise bargaining in the face of reluctance from the Industrial Relations Commission and employers’ concerns at the prospect of wage inflation. </p>
<p>The 1992-93 cabinet papers – released by the National Archives of Australia – mark this historic major reform, in the context of a set of broader economic reforms implemented by the Hawke/Keating Labor government. This all occurred when the economic outlook for growth and unemployment at the time was highly uncertain.</p>
<h2>Before the changes</h2>
<p>Up until this point, most people relied on National Wage Cases – or Living Wage Cases, as they had become known – handed down by the Industrial Relations Commission for improvements in wages. These generally happened yearly, and accounted for more than 90% of all wage movements during the period prior to enterprise bargaining. </p>
<p>Not only was bargaining a minor part of the system, but industrial awards were the primary instrument that set out, in a comprehensive way, terms and conditions of employment for most workers. </p>
<p>There were literally hundreds of awards – covering different occupations, industries, and even for some single companies, that set minimum employment conditions. </p>
<p>Australia had no formal minimum wage, unlike most other advanced industrial relations systems. And strikes remained unlawful tactics, although this was not reflective of practice. </p>
<h2>What the introduction of enterprise bargaining meant</h2>
<p>The decision to introduce enterprise bargaining was also taken in the middle of the period in which the broad elements of economic policy – including the wages system – were negotiated through the Prices and Incomes Accord. </p>
<p>The Accord was an agreement first struck between Labor and the unions in 1983 while Labor was in opposition. It formed the centrepiece of economic and industrial relations policy for the both the Hawke and Keating governments for more than a decade. </p>
<p>In many ways, the largely peaceful negotiation that enabled this shift to enterprise bargaining – or a system of “managed decentralism”, as it was often referred to – may not have happened without considerable industrial dispute if it hadn’t been negotiated as part of the Accord.</p>
<p>At the time, many unions were not convinced that enterprise bargaining was the best approach. But under Bill Kelty’s forceful leadership, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) saw it as inevitable, and sought to ensure that it occurred in a fair and equitable manner.</p>
<p>A key feature of the reforms approved by cabinet in 1992 was the choice to include a role for awards as a safety net to protect those without bargaining power. Equally important were provisions to ensure that gains made in more productive sectors of the economy – or where unions were able to leverage greater bargaining power – did not flow to other groups through pattern bargaining. </p>
<p>While these provisions did not prove as effective as hoped, these changes formalised an end to the longstanding principle of comparative wage justice as a guiding one for determining wage outcomes. This principle dictated that individuals doing the same job in different sectors or firms should be paid the same irrespective of the profitability of the firm, or the economic state of the industry.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151337/original/image-20161222-4056-14nbdoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151337/original/image-20161222-4056-14nbdoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151337/original/image-20161222-4056-14nbdoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151337/original/image-20161222-4056-14nbdoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151337/original/image-20161222-4056-14nbdoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=758&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151337/original/image-20161222-4056-14nbdoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=758&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151337/original/image-20161222-4056-14nbdoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=758&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The Keating government pushed for the introduction of the enterprise bargaining agreements.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The National Archives of Australia</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<h2>The controversy</h2>
<p>At the time, the introduction of enterprise bargaining was not only momentous but also controversial – although you would barely be aware of these controversies based on the cabinet submission that formed the basis for this decision. </p>
<p>Perhaps surprising for many, the ACTU, not employer groups, was the strongest advocate for the introduction of statutory provisions for enterprise bargaining.
Employers were fearful that it could lead to a wage-price spiral associated with the end of wage indexation in the 1970s. </p>
<p>The national tribunal – which was then called the Industrial Relations Commission, was by and large opposed to a shift towards enterprise bargaining. It had just a year earlier, in the <a href="http://www.airc.gov.au/safetynet_review/decisions/J7400.htm">April 1991 National wage Case decision</a>, refused a request by the ACTU to enunciate principles for enterprise bargaining on the grounds that the industrial parties were not yet mature enough to engage in collective bargaining with exacting economic damage on the Australian economy. </p>
<p>By October, in a reconvened National wage case hearing, the Commission yielded to pressure form the ACTU and government and set out the first principles for enterprise bargaining. However, for government these proved too restrictive and so in 1992, changes to the legislation to create a new form of statutory agreement were introduced. These reforms also limited the ability of the Industrial relations Commission to veto enterprise agreements struck by employers and unions, but rather sought to provide a more active role in the oversight of implementation.</p>
<p>Yet, 1992 was not the end of the process of reform. In April 1993, in a speech to the Australian Institute of Company Directors, Prime Minister Keating signalled that his ambition was to further entrench enterprise bargaining and restrict the role of awards. </p>
<p>It was widely acknowledged the speech caused some rift between the ACTU and the Keating government. For many in the union movement, it was a step too far down a slippery slope towards labour market deregulation.</p>
<p>That fear has proved unfounded. After the battles around the introduction of Australian Workplace Agreements in the mid 1990s, which allowed employers to create agreements directly with individual employees, and then <a href="http://www.findlaw.com.au/faqs/1916/what-was-workchoices-and-why-was-it-so-unpopular.aspx">the Work Choices controversy in 2006</a>, the Fair Work Act first introduced under the Rudd government has proved stable. </p>
<p>It has found some common ground with the conservative side of politics, and the current government has no plans for a major haul of the system at this stage. <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/fwa2009114/">The Fair Work Act</a> embeds enterprise bargaining as the primary mechanism by which wages and conditions are determined. Awards have shrunk in relevance – in the scope of issues they cover and the proportion of the workers reliant on them. </p>
<p>But will enterprise bargaining survive? If the trends reported in recent data on agreement making are any indicator, enterprise bargaining is now facing a period of decline. The <a href="https://docs.employment.gov.au/node/37341">latest release from the Commonwealth Department of Employment</a> shows the number of enterprise agreements being made is falling, and now the number of workers covered by enterprise agreements is also shrinking significantly. </p>
<p>This is of course closely related to the dramatic falls in union membership that have been occurring over several decades. This data suggests that neither the hopes and fears around the introduction of enterprise bargaining agreements have been realised. The ambitious hopes held by unions for the Fair Work Act to reverse their declining fortunes, nor the worst fears of many employer groups that the same legislation would lead to unions given a new found source of power to raise wages and reduce employment. </p>
<p>If anything, after 21 years of growth, we are now witnessing a decline of enterprise bargaining – a decline which will not be reversed without some legislative reform to support it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Centre for Workplace Leadership receives funding from the Commonwealth Government. </span></em></p>Even though enterprise bargaining agreements proved controversial when introduced, their use is actually in decline today.Peter Gahan, Professor of Management + Director, Centre for Workplace Leadership, Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/373652015-02-22T19:12:17Z2015-02-22T19:12:17ZUnions: part of the solution, or part of the problem?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/72565/original/image-20150220-28204-58w9c6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The WorkChoices campaign was a rare and important success for the Australian union movement, but can it build on this success of eight years ago?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the 1980s, Australia, like many industrialised countries, has experienced rising inequality and growing concentration of income, wealth and power. Within the workplace, there are major concerns about working hours, work intensity, work-life balance, pressures on women, “overemployment” and underemployment, demands on employees for flexibility, insecurity, micro-management of time and managerial efforts to control “culture”. </p>
<p>Upward redistribution of income and power has accompanied the spread of “market liberal” or “neoliberal” policies in most industrialised countries – without any distinguishable improvement in productivity to justify it.</p>
<p>In this grim context, are unions part of the solution, or part of the problem?</p>
<h2>Unions and the problems of the past</h2>
<p>Through much of the 20th century, unions’ high membership and industrial and political strategies gave workers – both members and non-members – substantial gains, helping moderate or reduce inequality.</p>
<p>In the 1990s, though, what had worked well for unions (tribunal advocacy and doing politics with the ALP) became a liability in a context where employers and governments became belligerent and the workplace, not the tribunal, became the centre of wage determination. </p>
<p>Membership declined. To varying degrees unions sought to reorganise, devoting more resources to the workplace and training of workplace delegates. This boosted influence in some workplaces but the environment remained adverse. A rare but major success was the Your Rights at Work campaign against the Howard government. </p>
<h2>Now the problem?</h2>
<p>Although the decline was stabilised by the early 2000s, membership failed to grow sufficiently to match workforce growth, so union density (membership as a proportion of the workforce) continued to ease. If unions were once part of a solution, their situation now is a barrier to redressing the growth in inequality, and hence is part of the problem. Increased inequality in several countries has been linked to fallen union density. Few Australian unions have been fully transformed and it is important not to understate the magnitude of changes now demanded of them. </p>
<p>Australian unions are in a weaker situation than during the Accord of the 1980s and early 1990s. Competition for “rents”, generating a spiral of unemployment and inflation, had prompted the Accord as a solution. These days rents are still being extracted, but by different groups – extremely high income earners, top managers and directors of large firms, and some financiers. </p>
<p>By the Rudd-Gillard years, unions were relegated to just another lobby group. They maintained links with the Labor Party, but that government seemingly figured, “where else could unions go?”. Unions put resources into the ALP, which badly needs the resources but does not want the unions. </p>
<p>Structurally, unionism is no longer a primarily male, blue-collar affair. Soon there will be more female trade unionists than males. White-collar unionists now out-number blue-collars by two to one. Professionals are unions’ biggest occupational group. Manufacturing accounts for only 7% of members, less than half those in health care and social assistance. Many of the “heartlands” of unionism are no longer so. </p>
<p>Governance remains an issue. There are well-argued claims that proceedings of the <a href="http://www.tradeunionroyalcommission.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx">Royal Commission on Union Corruption</a> demonstrated bias against unions, but also no doubt that some corruption existed within some unions. To the extent certain union officials enriched themselves and disenfranchised members, this anti-democratic activity undermined workplace unionism. The governance challenge is how can unions be demonstrably pure without also appearing impotent. </p>
<p>Meanwhile there is a clear need for major rethinking of economic and social policy, in Australia and overseas. Despite the failure of liberal market policies through the global financial crisis, pushing millions out of work globally, the ideas behind market liberalism showed zombie-like persistence. Civil society failed to develop and articulate an alternative vision.</p>
<h2>Can unions be part of the solution?</h2>
<p>The net effect of globalisation’s contradictory tendencies – promoting economic and employment growth alongside greater demands for flexibility and risk shifting – depends on choices taken by many actors. </p>
<p>But what is unions’ capacity to shape these forces and mobilise responses? Australian unions do not face unique problems, though national factors have exacerbated them. Canadians <a href="http://trs.sagepub.com/content/16/3/333.short">Lévesque and Murray</a> identified key “power resources” for unions, including their internal solidarity and infrastructure. But unions must also be capable of using these resources as contexts change. Much depends on unions’ capacities for learning, framing issues, fostering collaborative action and networks, and devising actions across time and space. </p>
<p>Effective union mobilisation requires power and capabilities on many levels. But perhaps the foundation is the workplace. Workplace influence requires workplace activism. This depends on effective delegates with self-belief, supported by union offices, with access to networks providing back-up, information and ideas. Formal training of delegates is essential but almost wasted if resources are not put into follow-up of training. Necessary structural changes can be both expensive and controversial. </p>
<p>Workplace influence requires delegates and members believe they can and do influence what the union does. Workers cannot have power in the workplace if they don’t have power in the union. </p>
<p>Democratisation is not so much about elected structures as it is about members’ and delegates’ ability to shape what the union does and how open it is to members’ preferences and their diversity. </p>
<p>An effective response to workplace and national problems requires new ways of doing and thinking about things. The prominence given to Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century reflects how it “suits the mood of the times”. The need to develop an alternative vision is greater now than ever before. </p>
<p>But can unions mobilise outside labour? Are they capable of engagement in a ‘big conversation’ about alternatives? It would require change to the “insider” mentality – precisely what the Accord did when pensioners and poverty became industrial issues. It would require confronting unions’ old anti-environmental image – but already many actively engage in environmental and climate issues. Unions are probably the only group with the resources, breadth of membership, and organising capability to draw together the disparate groups and individuals concerned with developing an alternative. In that way, they could be central to the solution.</p>
<p>In the end, if unions are to be part of the solution, there is much to be done. It requires action in developing and empowering workplace delegates and members, democratising union processes, strengthening articulations between levels, developing framing capabilities, managing governance, becoming learning organisations, deepening links and networks with other organisations and movements in the community, and using such links to build and articulate an alternative vision of society. It is a huge task. But if unions don’t do this, who will?</p>
<p><em>This is an abbreviated version of a fully-referenced article in <a href="http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2015/02/peetz.html">Australian Review of Public Affairs</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37365/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>As a university employee, David Peetz has undertaken research over many years with occasional financial support from governments from both sides of politics, employers and unions. His most recent major consultancy was for the New Zealand government. At present he is involved in several Australian Research Council-funded and approved projects which included contributions from the employer body Universities Australia, the superannuation fund Unisuper, the National Tertiary Education Union and the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union. The projects do not concern the subject matter of this article. He is a research associate of the T J Ryan Foundation in Brisbane and the New Zealand Work Research Institute in Auckland, a co-researcher of the Inter-University Centre for Research on Globalisation and Work (CRIMT) based in Quebec, and a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia.</span></em></p>Unions were once integral to working life but their influence has been severely eroded. Can they regain their relevance?David Peetz, Professor of Employment Relations, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.