tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/truth-2979/articlesTruth – The Conversation2023-12-01T16:10:14Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2187422023-12-01T16:10:14Z2023-12-01T16:10:14ZSantos, now booted from the House, got elected as a master of duplicity – here’s how it worked<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562816/original/file-20231130-15-kdugvt.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C9%2C6508%2C4319&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rep. George Santos in the U.S. Capitol on Nov. 7, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/rep-george-santos-r-n-y-leaves-a-meeting-of-the-house-news-photo/1769554374?adppopup=true">Tom Williams/CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>U.S. Rep. George Santos, a Republican from New York, was expelled on Dec. 1, 2023, from Congress for doing what most people think all <a href="https://theconversation.com/all-politicians-must-lie-from-time-to-time-so-why-is-there-so-much-outrage-about-george-santos-a-political-philosopher-explains-197877">politicians</a> <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0261927X8800700204">do all the time</a>: lying.</p>
<p>Santos lied about his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/04/opinion/george-santos-jewish-heritage.html">religion</a>, <a href="https://www.advocate.com/politics/2022/12/22/george-santos-hid-marriage-woman-says-hell-explain-alleged-lies">marital status</a>, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/26/politics/george-santos-admits-embellishing-resume/index.html">business background</a>, <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2023/01/george-santos-facebook-comment-hitler-jews-black-people">grandparents</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/26/nyregion/george-santos-interview.html">college</a>, <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/guide-george-santos-lies.html#:%7E:text=He%20lied%20about%20where%20he%20went%20to%20high%20school%20%E2%80%A6&text=But%20a%20spokesperson%20for%20the,a%20high%2Dschool%20equivalency%20diploma.">high school</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/01/11/santos-lies-volleyball/#:%7E:text=George%20Santos%20lied%20about%20being,star%2C'%20county%20GOP%20chair%20says&text=George%20Santos%20allegedly%20told%20a,he%20claimed%20to%20have%20played.">sports-playing</a>, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/congressman-george-santos-charged-fraud-money-laundering-theft-public-funds-and-false">income</a> and <a href="https://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/documents/Committee%20Report_52.pdf">campaign donation expenditures</a>.</p>
<p>Santos’ fellow members of Congress – a professional class <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/09/19/evaluations-of-members-of-congress-and-the-biggest-problem-with-elected-officials-today">stereotypically</a> considered by the public to be littered with serial liars – apparently consider Santos peerless and are kicking him out of their midst <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/12/01/us/politics/santos-expulsion-vote.html">on a 311-114 vote, with two members voting present</a>. </p>
<p>How could a politician engage in such large-scale deception and get elected? What could stop it from happening again, as politicians seem to be growing more <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/joe-bidens-long-running-no-apology-tour-hits-the-metoo-era/2019/04/04/caf47bdc-56e7-11e9-9136-f8e636f1f6df_story.html">unapologetically</a> <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/psq.12809">deceptive</a> while evading voters’ scrutiny? </p>
<p>Santos’ success demonstrates a mastery of something more than just pathological lying. He managed to campaign in a district close to the media microscope of New York City, in one of the richest <a href="https://datausa.io/profile/geo/congressional-district-3-ny">districts</a> in the state, and get elected and stay in office for a year, despite making a mockery of any <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/guide-george-santos-lies.html">semblance of honesty</a>. </p>
<p>I am <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=50tVKogAAAAJ&hl=en">a scholar of political deception</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03637751.2023.2244030">Experiments I conducted</a> have revealed how the trustworthiness of politicians is judged almost entirely from perceptions of their demeanor, not the words they utter.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Politicians lie, as this compilation shows.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Misleading with a smile</h2>
<p>I have found that voters are drawn in by politicians’ demeanor cues, which are forms of body language and nonverbal communication that signal honesty or dishonesty and yet have no relationship to actual honesty. For example, looking nervous and fidgety or appearing confident and composed are demeanor cues, which give impressions of a politician’s sincerity and believability. Someone’s demeanor cues might signal that they are trustworthy when they’re actually lying, or could signal lying in someone who is actually telling the truth.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2011.01407.x">most authoritative index</a> of demeanor cues that affect people’s perceptions of honesty and deception was developed <a href="https://www.uab.edu/cas/communication/people/faculty/timothy-r-levine">by Tim Levine</a>, a professor of communication at the University of Alabama, Birmingham. Demeanor cues that convey sincerity and honesty include appearing confident and composed; having a pleasant, friendly, engaged and involved interaction style; and giving plausible explanations.</p>
<p>The insincere/dishonest demeanor cues include avoiding eye contact, appearing hesitant and slow in providing answers, vocal uncertainty in tone of voice, excessive fidgeting with hands or foot movements, and appearing tense, nervous or anxious. </p>
<p>Empirical research has long revealed that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2007.00362.x">voters are overwhelmingly influenced by politicians’ nonverbal communication</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.91.3.523">In one experiment</a>, participants were shown 10-second clips of unfamiliar gubernatorial debates. The participants were asked to predict who won the election. </p>
<p>Participants who saw muted 10-second clips – making their judgments solely on nonverbal cues – were able to predict which candidate would go on to win. But those who watched the video with the sound were no better at picking the winner than if they picked randomly without ever watching or listening to anything. Voters make their <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1110589">judgments of a politician’s competence</a>, it turns out, based on a 1-second glance at the politician’s face. </p>
<p>Another <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-1750(86)90190-9">study</a> also found that politicians’ facial expressions have the power to move us, literally: People watching clips of Ronald Reagan looking friendly adjusted their facial muscles accordingly and mimicked his smile, and people watching clips of Reagan looking angry tended to furrow their brow, too.</p>
<h2>How Santos does it</h2>
<p>Santos <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wYmCx2eaTRE">speaks with certitude</a>. He has a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/hcr/article/37/3/377/4107525">charming, friendly and interactive manner – all</a> sincere demeanor cues. He makes intense <a href="https://youtu.be/wYmCx2eaTRE?si=uKIPFcqkJcbWNtcy">eye contact</a> without fidgeting. He <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/17/style/george-santos-style.html">dresses well and is pleasant</a> looking. </p>
<p>He was able to make up <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/19/nyregion/george-santos-ny-republicans.html">lies</a> out of whole cloth and have them believed – a feat rarely accomplished by liars. He exudes <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2023/10/george-santos-baby.html">confidence</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1712908983403462691"}"></div></p>
<p>Santos dresses with sartorial elegance. He wears chic <a href="https://static01.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2023-04-21-santos/4fbfc343e7ce7b04bd6d4d593ba08e0a5781cc29/_assets/stantos_desktop.jpg">eyeglasses</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gU8evnkPLcg">sunglasses</a>, accessorized with bright but not tacky jewelry. All this is complemented by one of his signature <a href="https://static01.nyt.com/images/2022/12/15/multimedia/00ny-santos3-1-d66d/00ny-santos3-1-d66d-jumbo.jpg?quality=75&auto=webp">fleeces</a> or <a href="https://apnews.com/c89bf18bcd7e4133ad2794bfe863460b">sweaters</a>, typically worn over a collared dress shirt and under a smart <a href="https://pyxis.nymag.com/v1/imgs/03c/0df/28f256688a0f26500d713b0930eb4c6e52-GettyImages-1734001031.rhorizontal.w700.jpg">jacket</a>. Santos even bought his campaign staff Brooks Brothers <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/19/nyregion/george-santos-ny-republicans.html">shirts</a> to wear. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03637751.2023.2244030">In my experiments</a>, which have shown that voters base their judgment of politicians’ trustworthiness almost entirely from perceptions of demeanor, I found that Republicans are especially susceptible to demeanor cues. Republican voters will disbelieve their own honest politician if they perceive that the politician’s demeanor is insincere. But they will believe their own politician if they perceive sincerity. </p>
<p>Santos’ believable demeanor follows in the lineage of other con artists who could deceive absurdly yet adroitly. Disgraced financier <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2023/jan/04/netflix-bernie-madoff-monster-of-wall-street">Bernie Madoff</a> dressed well, looked dignified, acted <a href="https://youtu.be/Or3xOfemMEE?si=yuA0YqLyuuJauP3A">friendly and cordial</a>, and his resting face was a smiling expression. The <a href="https://www.netflix.com/title/81035279">Fyre Festival</a> fraudster Billy McFarland also had a resting face that was a smiling, aw-shucks <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/18/how-fyre-festivals-organizer-scammed-investors-out-of-26-million.html">expression</a>, and acted harmless and friendly.</p>
<p>And Elizabeth <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/07/business/elizabeth-holmes-theranos-interview.html">Holmes</a> of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/07/tech/theranos-rise-and-fall/index.html">Theranos</a> – who became the youngest female billionaire in <a href="https://www.wsj.com/news/collection/theranos-coverage-ea13b200">history</a> – faked a deep voice, walked upright with perfect posture, smiled and conveyed unrelenting confident poise, and maintained an unblinking gaze. All this enabled her to tell lies to some of the richest, most accomplished, intelligent titans of <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-whistleblower-shook-the-companyand-his-family-1479335963">industry</a>. </p>
<p>Madoff, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/06/billy-mcfarland-organizer-of-disastrous-fyre-festival-pleads-guilty-to-misleading-investors.html">McFarland</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-63685131">Holmes</a> could look people in the eye and steal their money – swindling largely through the same sorts of demeanor cues that Santos exhibits. </p>
<p><a href="https://youtu.be/T1NkZ41zjUg?si=LDqLiJWSIN2lwqpS">McFarland</a>, <a href="https://youtu.be/rGfaJZAdfNE?si=DYur3J8AJtqwvXB5">Holmes</a> and <a href="https://youtu.be/wYmCx2eaTRE?si=_Y9BJkfIsPfbAiqZ">Santos</a> have the ability to smile with their upper teeth showing while they are answering tough questions in interviews, which <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2111127">research shows</a> exudes trustworthiness.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562734/original/file-20231130-27-gptkfv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A brown haired man with glasses, wearing a white shirt and blue vest, fistbumps another man." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562734/original/file-20231130-27-gptkfv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562734/original/file-20231130-27-gptkfv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562734/original/file-20231130-27-gptkfv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562734/original/file-20231130-27-gptkfv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562734/original/file-20231130-27-gptkfv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562734/original/file-20231130-27-gptkfv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562734/original/file-20231130-27-gptkfv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Republican candidate George Santos, left, fist-bumps campaign volunteer John Maccarone while campaigning on Nov. 5, 2022, in Glen Cove, N.Y.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Election2022NewYorkHouse/58045c130be64798a4eed98ed7a1e93c/photo?Query=George%20Santos%20campaigning&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:asc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=103&currentItemNo=4">AP Photo/Mary Altaffer</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<h2>Fool me once …</h2>
<p>Just because someone speaks confidently, dresses well and acts friendly does not mean the person is honest. Pay attention to what people say – the content of their verbal messaging. </p>
<p>Don’t fall prey to <a href="https://www.thewrap.com/george-santos-snaps-at-oan-host-caitlin-sinclair/">body language or seemingly sincere behavioral impressions</a>, which actually have no correlation to actual truthfulness. As my <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X211045724">research</a> has shown, the appearance of sincerity is misleading. It is a <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/1076-8971.13.1.1">myth</a> <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0261927x14535916">that eye contact means someone is telling you the truth</a> and that a roving gaze or elevated blinking means they are lying. </p>
<p>Some people just <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0261927X14528804">look honest</a> but they are pulling the proverbial wool over your eyes. Some people <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0033-2909.134.4.477">look sketchy</a> and appear unbelievable, but what they say is truthful.</p>
<p>Santos’ disgrace is a teachable moment for citizens. As the proverb goes: Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218742/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David E. Clementson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of political deception says there is something especially deceitful about George Santos, and his success getting elected demonstrates mastery of something more than just pathological lying.David E. Clementson, Assistant Professor, Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of GeorgiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2148152023-10-26T12:30:52Z2023-10-26T12:30:52ZHow often do you lie? Deception researchers investigate how the recipient and the medium affect telling the truth<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555683/original/file-20231024-17-ua983q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=292%2C0%2C5903%2C3935&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hunter Biden has been charged with making a false claim on a federal firearms application.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXHunterBiden/8a209c980515489694a4607e62e4b782/photo">AP Photo/Julio Cortez</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Prominent cases of purported lying continue to dominate the news cycle. Hunter Biden was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/14/us/politics/hunter-biden-indictment-gun-charges.html">charged with lying on a government form</a> while purchasing a handgun. Republican Representative George Santos <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/guide-george-santos-lies.html">allegedly lied in many ways</a>, including to donors through a third party in order to misuse the funds raised. The rapper Offset <a href="https://people.com/offset-says-cardi-b-didnt-cheat-he-was-just-drunk-7568020">admitted to lying on Instagram</a> about his wife, Cardi B, being unfaithful.</p>
<p>There are a number of variables that distinguish these cases. One is the audience: the faceless government, particular donors and millions of online followers, respectively. Another is the medium used to convey the alleged lie: on a bureaucratic form, through intermediaries and via social media.</p>
<p>Differences like these lead researchers like me to wonder what factors influence the telling of lies. Does a personal connection increase or decrease the likelihood of sticking to the truth? Are lies more prevalent on text or email than on the phone or in person?</p>
<p>An emerging body of empirical research is trying to answer these questions, and some of the findings are surprising. They hold lessons, too - for how to think about the areas of your life where you might be more prone to tell lies, and also about where to be most cautious in trusting what others are saying. As the recent director of <a href="https://honestyproject.philosophy.wfu.edu/">The Honesty Project</a> and author of “<a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/honesty-9780197696040">Honesty: The Philosophy and Psychology of a Neglected Virtue</a>,” I am especially interested in whether most people tend to be honest or not.</p>
<h2>Figuring out the frequency of lies</h2>
<p>Most research on lying asks participants to self-report their lying behavior, say during the past day or week. (Whether you can trust liars to tell the truth about lying is another question.)</p>
<p>The classic study on lying frequency was conducted by psychologist <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=kCGIDeQAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Bella DePaulo</a> in the mid-1990s. It focused on face-to-face interactions and used a group of student participants and another group of volunteers from the community around the University of Virginia. The community members <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.979">averaged one lie per day</a>, while the students averaged two lies per day. This result became the benchmark finding in the field of honesty research and helped lead to an assumption among many researchers <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2009.01366.x">that lying is commonplace</a>.</p>
<p>But averages do not describe individuals. It could be that each person in the group tells one or two lies per day. But it’s also possible that there are some people who lie voraciously and others who lie very rarely.</p>
<p>In an influential 2010 study, this second scenario is indeed what Michigan State University communication researcher <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=TIqSMJoAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=sra">Kim Serota</a> and his colleagues found. Out of 1,000 American participants, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2009.01366.x">59.9% claimed not to have told a single lie</a> in the past 24 hours. Of those who admitted they did lie, most said they’d told very few lies. Participants reported 1,646 lies in total, but half of them came from just 5.3% of the participants.</p>
<p>This general pattern in the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/hcr/hqab019">data has been replicated</a> several times. Lying tends to be rare, except in the case of a small group of frequent liars.</p>
<h2>Does the medium make a difference?</h2>
<p>Might lying become more frequent under various conditions? What if you don’t just consider face-to-face interactions, but introduce some distance by communicating via text, email or the phone?</p>
<p>Research suggests the medium doesn’t matter much. For instance, a 2014 study by Northwestern University communication researcher <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=s8zROxUAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Madeline Smith</a> and her colleagues found that when participants were asked to look at their 30 most recent text messages, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2014.05.032">23% said there were no deceptive texts</a>. For the rest of the group, the vast majority said that 10% or fewer of their texts contained lies.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/are-people-lying-more-since-the-rise-of-social-media-and-smartphones-170609">Recent research by David Markowitz</a> at the University of Oregon successfully replicated earlier findings that had compared the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/985692.985709">rates of lying using different technologies</a>. Are lies more common on text, the phone or on email? Based on survey data from 205 participants, Markowitz found that on average, people <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/hcr/hqab019">told 1.08 lies per day</a>, but once again with the distribution of lies skewed by some frequent liars.</p>
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<p>Not only were the percentages fairly low, but the differences between the frequency with which lies were told via different media were not large. Still, it might be surprising to find that, say, lying on video chat was more common than lying face-to-face, with lying on email being least likely.</p>
<p>A couple of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/985692.985709">factors could be playing a role</a>. Recordability seems to rein in the lies – perhaps knowing that the communication leaves a record raises worries about detection and makes lying less appealing. Synchronicity seems to matter too. Many lies occur in the heat of the moment, so it makes sense that when there’s a delay in communication, as with email, lying would decrease.</p>
<h2>Does the audience change things?</h2>
<p>In addition to the medium, does the intended receiver of a potential lie make any difference?</p>
<p>Initially you might think that people are more inclined to lie to strangers than to friends and family, given the impersonality of the interaction in the one case and the bonds of care and concern in the other. But matters are a bit more complicated.</p>
<p>In her classic work, DePaulo found that people tend to tell what she called “everyday lies” <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.74.1.63">more often to strangers than family members</a>. To use her examples, these are smaller lies like “told her (that) her muffins were the best ever” and “exaggerated how sorry I was to be late.” For instance, DePaulo and her colleague Deborah Kashy reported that participants in one of their studies lied <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.74.1.63">less than once per 10 social interactions</a> with spouses and children.</p>
<p>However, when it came to serious lies about things like affairs or injuries, for instance, the pattern flipped. Now, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2004.9646402">53% of serious lies were to close partners</a> in the study’s community participants, and the proportion jumped up to 72.7% among student volunteers. Perhaps not surprisingly, in these situations people might value not damaging their relationships more than they value the truth. Other data also finds participants tell <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2009.01366.x">more lies to friends and family members</a> than to strangers.</p>
<h2>Investigating the truth about lies</h2>
<p>It is worth emphasizing that these are all initial findings. Further replication is needed, and cross-cultural studies using non-Western participants are scarce. Additionally, there are many other variables that could be examined, such as age, gender, religion and political affiliation.</p>
<p>When it comes to honesty, though, I find the results, in general, promising. Lying seems to happen rarely for many people, even toward strangers and even via social media and texting. Where people need to be especially discerning, though, is in identifying – and avoiding – the small number of rampant liars out there. If you’re one of them yourself, maybe you never realized that you’re actually in a small minority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214815/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>From 2020-2023, Christian B. Miller received funding from the John Templeton Foundation for the Honesty Project, which advancd research on the psychology and philosophy of honesty. </span></em></p>Researchers are interested in whether who you’re communicating with and how you’re interacting affect how likely you are to lie.Christian B. Miller, A. C. Reid Professor of Philosophy, Wake Forest UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2142832023-09-25T16:07:34Z2023-09-25T16:07:34ZDonald Trump’s truth: why liars might sometimes be considered honest – new research<p>According to fact checkers, Donald Trump made more than <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/24/trumps-false-or-misleading-claims-total-30573-over-four-years/">30,000 false or misleading claims</a> during his presidency. That’s around 20 a day. But, according to several opinion polls during his presidency, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/poll-republicans-who-think-trump-untruthful-still-approve-him-n870521">around 75% of Republican voters</a> still considered Trump to be honest. </p>
<p>It seems incredible that a serial liar – whose biggest lie about the 2020 election results led to a violent insurrection and nearly brought American democracy to its knees – is still considered honest by so many people.</p>
<p>We began to tackle this question <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-023-01691-w">in a recent article</a> that examined the political discussions of all members of the US Congress on Twitter between 2011 and 2022. To do this, we analysed nearly 4 million tweets. Our approach was based on the idea that people’s understanding of “honesty” involves two distinct components.</p>
<p>One component can be referred to as “fact-speaking”. This form of speech relies on evidence and emphasises veracity and seeks to communicate the actual state of the world. Most of us probably consider this an important aspect of honesty. By this criterion, Donald Trump cannot be considered honest.</p>
<p>The other component can be referred to as “belief-speaking”. This focuses on the communicator’s apparent sincerity, but pays little attention to factual accuracy. So when Trump claimed that the crowds at his inauguration were the largest ever (they were not), his followers may have considered this claim to be honest because Trump seemed to sincerely believe the claim he was making.</p>
<p>Healthy political debate involves both fact-speaking and belief-speaking. Political ideas often cannot be contested based on facts alone, but also require beliefs and values to be taken into account. </p>
<p>But democratic debate can be derailed if it is entirely based on the expression of belief irrespective of factual accuracy. </p>
<p>One of Trump’s senior advisers, then US counsellor to the president, Kellyanne Conway, coined the phrase “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_facts#:%7E:text=%22Alternative%20facts%22%20was%20a%20phrase,President%20of%20the%20United%20States">alternative facts</a>” in order to back her boss by persisting with the falsehood about the largest inauguration crowd. This allowed viewers to choose whose “facts” to accept.</p>
<p>Within two years Trump’s senior lawyer and adviser Rudy Giuliani was insisting on national TV that “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/aug/23/truth-isnt-truth-so-should-we-expect-lies-from-donald-trump">truth isn’t truth</a>”. He was defending Trump’s feet-dragging over submitting to an interview with special counsel Robert Mueller and the likelihood that Trump’s testimony would conflict with sworn testimony offered by another witness.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/CljsZ7lgbtw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">‘Truth isn’t truth’: Rudy Giuliani beggars belief, August 2018.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These are examples of an extreme form of belief-speaking that goes beyond the bounds of conventional democratic debate.</p>
<h2>Whose ‘truth’ are we talking about?</h2>
<p>We wanted to know the extent to which either belief-speaking or fact-speaking have become more prevalent in political speech, in this case in Twitter posts by Republican and Democrat members of the US Congress since 2011. To do this we set up and validated two “dictionaries” that captured those two components of honesty. To capture belief-speaking, we used words such as “feel”, “guess”, “seem”. To capture fact-speaking we used words such as “determine”, “evidence”, “examine”.</p>
<p>Using <a href="https://medium.com/analytics-vidhya/introduction-to-word-embeddings-c2ba135dce2f">advanced mathematical analysis</a>, we were able to measure the extent to which each tweet represented belief-speaking and fact-speaking, and how the two trended over time.</p>
<p>The figure below illustrates the results of our analysis with examples of tweets that involve a lot of belief-speaking (top) and fact-speaking (bottom), separately for members of the two parties, red being Republican and blue Democrat.</p>
<p>Our analysis first considered the long-term trend of belief-speaking and fact-speaking. We found that for both parties, both belief-speaking and fact-speaking increased considerably after Trump’s election in 2016. This may reflect the fact that topics concerning misinformation and “fake news” became particularly prominent after 2016 and may have resulted in opposing claims and corrections – involving belief-speaking and fact-speaking, respectively.</p>
<p>When we related the content of tweets to the quality of news sources they linked to, we found a striking asymmetry between the two parties and the honesty components. We used the news ratings agency <a href="https://www.newsguardtech.com/solutions/newsguard/">NewsGuard</a> to ascertain the quality of a domain being shared in a tweet. NewsGuard rates the trustworthiness of news domains on a 100-point scale based on established journalistic criteria, such as differentiating between news and opinion, regularly publishing corrections, and so on, without fact-checking individual items of content.</p>
<p>We find that for both parties, the more a tweet expresses fact-speaking, the more likely it is to point to a trustworthy domain.</p>
<p>By contrast, for belief-speaking we observed little effect on the trustworthiness of sources in tweets by Democratic members of Congress. There was, however, a striking association between belief-speaking and low trustworthiness of sources for Republicans: A 10% increase in belief-speaking was associated with a 12.8-point decrease in the quality of cited sources.</p>
<p>The findings illustrate that misinformation can be linked to a unique conception of honesty that emphasises sincerity over accuracy, and which appears to be used by Republicans – but not Democrats – as a gateway to sharing low-quality information.</p>
<p>Why does this happen? Another aspect of our results hints at an answer. We found that belief-speaking is particularly associated with negative emotions. So if Republican politicians want to use negative emotional language to criticise Democrats, this goal might be more readily achieved by sharing low-quality information because high-quality domains tend to be less derogatory of the main parties.</p>
<p>Finally, we also found that the voting patterns during the 2020 presidential election in their home state were not associated with the quality of news being shared by members of Congress. One interpretation of this result is that politicians do not pay a price at the ballot box for misleading the public. This may be linked to their convincing use of belief-speaking, which large segments of the public consider to be a marker of honesty.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214283/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephan Lewandowsky acknowledges financial support from the European Research Council (ERC Advanced Grant 101020961 PRODEMINFO), the Humboldt Foundation through a research award, the Volkswagen Foundation (grant "Reclaiming individual autonomy and democratic discourse online: How to rebalance human and algorithmic decision making"), and the European Commission (Horizon 2020 grants 964728 JITSUVAX and 101094752 SoMe4Dem). He also receives funding from Jigsaw (a technology incubator created by Google) and from UK Research and Innovation (through the Centre of Excellence, REPHRAIN, and from EU Horizon replacement funding grant number 10049415). He also interacts frequently with the European Commission's Join Research Centre in an advisory capacity and though scientific collaborations.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jana Lasser receives funding from the European Commission, Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant No. 101026507.</span></em></p>When sincerity counts as honesty, accuracy no longer matters.Stephan Lewandowsky, Chair of Cognitive Psychology, University of BristolJana Lasser, Postdoc Researcher, Graz University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2060922023-06-08T20:07:15Z2023-06-08T20:07:15ZVoice, treaty, truth: compared to other settler nations, Australia is the exception, not the rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529694/original/file-20230602-19-8wjczk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C1288%2C836&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/PhotoDetail.aspx?Barcode=11447034">National Archives of Australia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander readers are advised this article contains names and/or images of deceased people.</em></p>
<p>For many non-Indigenous Australians, it might seem the Voice to Parliament – the first step in the Uluru Statement’s process of “voice, treaty, truth” – is a recent idea. Conservative voices have framed it as a dangerously untested prospect. </p>
<p>But as First Nations have always known, voice, treaty and truth carry long histories. They’ve long been at the centre of Indigenous rights campaigns in Australia. They’ve also existed in other settler nations like New Zealand and Canada where treaties were forged at the point of colonisation. </p>
<p>These histories remind us how long First Nations people have waited for political recognition in this country – and that, compared to other former colonial sites, Australia is the exception, not the rule.</p>
<h2>The Larrakia petition</h2>
<p>Calls for voice as political representation have been part of First Nations activism in Australia for at least a century.</p>
<p>In the 1970s, Australian Aboriginal civil and lands rights movements harnessed long-running <a href="https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/1324869">campaigns</a> by Aboriginal activists calling for rights to treaty, land and political representation. </p>
<p>One famous example is the <a href="https://www.naa.gov.au/students-and-teachers/learning-resources/learning-resource-themes/first-australians/politics-and-advocacy/larrakia-petition-queen-land-rights">Larrakia petition to the queen</a>, organised in 1972 to coincide with Princess Margaret’s royal visit. It carried more than 1,000 signatures.</p>
<p>It drew the queen’s attention to the failure of the British Crown to sign treaties with Indigenous peoples in Australia, unlike in New Zealand and North America, and called for her assistance in achieving </p>
<blockquote>
<p>land rights and political representation, now. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Larrikia organisers waited patiently outside Government House in Darwin to hand the petition directly to Princess Margaret. When a police barricade prevented them and tore the petition, they taped it together and sent it directly to Buckingham Palace.</p>
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<h2>William Cooper’s petition</h2>
<p>Decades earlier, Yorta Yorta civil rights activist and co-founder of the Australian Aborigines’ League, <a href="https://www.nma.gov.au/defining-moments/resources/william-cooper-protests">William Cooper</a>, spent the mid-1930s collecting more than 1,800 signatures from Indigenous communities across Australia for a petition to the king.</p>
<p>It urged the Crown to safeguard the interests of Aboriginal people as the original heirs and successors of the land and called for Indigenous political representation in the federal parliament. </p>
<p>As with the Larrakia petition, Australian government officials prevented the delivery of Cooper’s petition.</p>
<p>Even so, it remains a powerful reminder of the longevity of First Nations campaigns for a parliamentary voice. It also reminds us how long Australia has resisted activating one.</p>
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<h2>In other countries, it has been different</h2>
<p>In Canada and New Zealand, the British Crown did make treaties with Indigenous peoples at the point of formal colonisation. In these countries, the right of political representation has not been contested in the same way.</p>
<p>That’s not to say these nations provide a direct model for Australia. Each country has its own history and political relationship between Indigenous peoples and government. And nobody’s suggesting treaties in other places fixed sovereignty disputes or guaranteed Indigenous rights.</p>
<p>But treaty rights dating back to the 1800s gave First Nations peoples in other settler colonial sites political leverage in a way Australia’s First Nations have been denied.</p>
<p>In Canada, First Nations treaty rights and rights of self-determination are enshrined in the Constitution. An elected <a href="https://www.afn.ca/">Assembly of First Nations</a> liaises with the federal government as the representative body.</p>
<p>In New Zealand, Māori have had dedicated parliamentary seats since the 1860s. Political representation is enshrined in the <a href="https://teara.govt.nz/en/zoomify/33905/maori-representation-act-1867">Māori Representation Act 1867</a>, which gave all Māori men the right to vote.</p>
<p>Colonial officials originally conceived the Māori Representation Act 1867 as a way to bring Māori into the <a href="https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/maori-and-the-vote/setting-up-seats">colonial political system</a> rather than as a vehicle for an independent political voice. </p>
<p>Despite its colonial underpinnings, it shows how a formal avenue of Indigenous political representation existed almost from the beginning of the colonial relationship in a setting where treaty existed.</p>
<p>This raises the longer history of treaty discussions in colonial Australia. </p>
<h2>Australia’s missed opportunities for treaty</h2>
<p>Australia was exceptional in Britain’s settler empire for having no formal history of treaty between Indigenous peoples and the Crown.</p>
<p>The doctrine of <a href="https://australian.museum/learn/first-nations/unsettled/recognising-invasions/terra-nullius/"><em>terra nullius</em></a>, or land belonging to no one, was how Britain claimed possession in 1788.</p>
<p>But that doctrine did not necessarily hold true in perpetuity, and the continuing absence of treaties in Australia was not inevitable. </p>
<p>By the 1800s, the mood of the Colonial Office (the British government department that managed colonies) had shifted. </p>
<p>In the early 1830s, Tasmania was coming through its devastating <a href="https://www.nma.gov.au/defining-moments/resources/the-black-line">land wars</a>. This experience motivated Tasmania’s Governor George Arthur to write to the Colonial Office in London. He suggested treaty arrangements should be made with Indigenous peoples in the territories of western and southern Australia to avoid a similar risk.</p>
<p>Arthur’s intervention dovetailed with a larger agenda for colonial reform after the abolition of slavery, and the British imperial government was receptive to his advice.</p>
<p>In 1835, the Colonial Office told South Australia’s colonisation commissioners that the Crown would not sanction British settlement there unless they could show they <a href="https://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/resources/transcripts/sa2_doc_1836.pdf">would</a> protect Aboriginal people’s</p>
<blockquote>
<p>earlier and preferable title.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The colonisation commissioners committed to purchase Aboriginal lands on those conditions. But because colonial authorities decided “earlier and preferable title” did not exist according to the law of possession, these purchases didn’t happen.</p>
<p>The year 1835, then, was a turning point. Treaties might have been forged with Indigenous peoples in the new colony of South Australia, but they <a href="https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/7127305">were not</a>. </p>
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<p>Instead, the Crown tried to mitigate problems of frontier warfare by claiming Aboriginal people as British subjects who would receive equal protection under the law. </p>
<p>This became settled colonial policy across Australia, although it was almost never realised in practice.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-the-1800s-colonisers-attempted-to-listen-to-first-nations-people-it-didnt-stop-the-massacres-204538">In the 1800s, colonisers attempted to listen to First Nations people. It didn't stop the massacres</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Truth: resetting the relationship, not just the record</h2>
<p>This brings us to the question of truth. When we speak about remembering past injustices – especially the history of colonial land wars – it’s often presented as uncovering a hidden or secret history.</p>
<p>But in 19th century Australia, the frontier wars were far from secret. Colonial authorities constantly debated the problem. Until the end of the 19th century (and later in northern Australia), it was one of the most persistent topics in official correspondence and the colonial press.</p>
<p>What’s missing from the colonial records are the voices and perspectives of the Indigenous communities who experienced the frontier wars. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/ondemand/tv-series/the-australian-wars">These histories</a>, however, have always had a strong presence in Indigenous intergenerational knowledge, as well as the intergenerational knowledge of settler-descended communities where these events occurred. </p>
<p>Legal scholars Gabrielle Appleby and Megan Davis <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1031461X.2018.1523838?journalCode=rahs20">have emphasised</a> that the value of truth is not just in resetting the historical record but in constructively resetting the relationship between First Nations and the rest of the nation. </p>
<p>The longer histories of voice, treaty and truth tell us the time for politically constructive reform is well overdue.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-voice-isnt-apartheid-or-a-veto-over-parliament-this-misinformation-is-undermining-democratic-debate-205474">The Voice isn't apartheid or a veto over parliament – this misinformation is undermining democratic debate</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanda Nettelbeck receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>These histories remind us how long First Nations people have waited for political recognition in this country – and that, compared to other former colonial sites, Australia is the exception, not the rule.Amanda Nettelbeck, Professor of History, Australian Catholic UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2037352023-06-07T15:21:06Z2023-06-07T15:21:06ZAlgorithms can be useful in detecting fake news, stopping its spread and countering misinformation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527840/original/file-20230523-16009-p03nte.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=98%2C0%2C5892%2C3000&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Stopping misinformation before it spreads is important.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fake news is a complex problem and can span text, images and video. </p>
<p>For written articles in particular, there are several ways of generating fake news. A fake news article could be produced by selectively editing facts, including people’s names, dates or statistics. An article could also be completely fabricated with made-up events or people.</p>
<p>Fake news articles can also be machine-generated as advances in artificial intelligence make it particularly easy to generate misinformation. </p>
<h2>Damaging effects</h2>
<p>Questions like: “Was there voter fraud during the 2020 U.S. elections?” or “Is climate change a hoax?” can be fact-checked by analyzing available data. These questions can be answered with true or false, but there is potential for misinformation surrounding questions like these.</p>
<p>Misinformation and disinformation — or fake news — can have <a href="https://doi.org/10.2471%2FBLT.21.287654">damaging effects on a large number of people in a short time</a>. Although the notion of <a href="https://www.cits.ucsb.edu/fake-news/brief-history">fake news has existed well before technological advances</a>, social media have exacerbated the problem. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559">A 2018 Twitter study showed that</a> false news stories were more commonly retweeted by humans than bots, and 70 per cent more likely to be retweeted than true stories. The same study found that it took true stories approximately six times longer to reach a group of 1,500 people and, while true stories rarely reached more than 1,000 people, popular false news could spread up to 100,000.</p>
<p>The 2020 U.S. presidential election, COVID-19 vaccines and climate change have all been the subject of misinformation campaigns with grave consequences. It is estimated that <a href="https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/sites/default/files/2023-02/20211020-misinformation-disinformation-cost.pdf">misinformation surrounding COVID-19 costs between US$50-300 million daily</a>. The cost of political misinformation could be civil disorder, violence or even erosion of public trust in democratic institutions.</p>
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<h2>Detecting misinformation</h2>
<p>Detecting misinformation can be done by a combination of algorithms, machine-learning models and humans. An important question is who is responsible for controlling, if not stopping, the spread of misinformation once it’s detected. Only social media companies are really in the position to exercise control over the spread of information through their networks.</p>
<p>A particularly simple but effective means of generating misinformation is to selectively edit news articles. For example, consider “Ukrainian director and playwright arrested and accused of ‘justifying terrorism.’” This was achieved by replacing “Russian” with “Ukrainian” in the original sentence in a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/06/europe/russia-theater-terror-arrests-intl/index.html">real news article</a>. </p>
<p>A multi-faceted approach is needed to detect misinformation online in order to control its growth and spread.</p>
<p>Communications in social media can be modelled as networks, with the users forming points in the network model and the communications forming links between them; a retweet or like of a post reflects a connection between two points. In this network model, spreaders of misinformation tend to form much more densely connected core-periphery structures than users spreading truth.</p>
<p>My research group <a href="https://doi.org/10.14778/3342263.3342645">has developed efficient algorithms</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3318464.3389697">for detecting dense structures</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3483940">from communication networks</a>. This information can be analyzed further for <a href="https://doi.org/10.14778/3551793.3551826">detecting instances of misinformation campaigns</a>. </p>
<p>Since these algorithms rely on communication structure alone, content analysis conducted by algorithms and humans is needed to confirm instances of misinformation. </p>
<p>Detecting manipulated articles takes careful analysis. Our research used a <a href="https://aclanthology.org/2022.acl-short.10.pdf">neural network-based approach</a> that combines textual information with an external knowledge base to detect such tampering.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530415/original/file-20230606-29-j7tbx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Photograph of an open outstretched hand with an illustration of figures floating above it with arrows pointing between them" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530415/original/file-20230606-29-j7tbx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530415/original/file-20230606-29-j7tbx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530415/original/file-20230606-29-j7tbx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530415/original/file-20230606-29-j7tbx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530415/original/file-20230606-29-j7tbx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530415/original/file-20230606-29-j7tbx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530415/original/file-20230606-29-j7tbx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Users form connections by interacting with each others’ posted content.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Stopping the spread</h2>
<p>Detecting misinformation is just half the battle — decisive action is required to stop its spread. Strategies for combating the spread of misinformation in social networks include both intervention by internet platforms and launching counter-campaigns to neutralize fake news campaigns. </p>
<p>Intervention can take hard forms, like suspending a user’s account, or softer measures like labelling a post as suspicious. </p>
<p>Algorithms and AI-powered networks are not 100 per cent reliable. There is a cost to intervening on a true item by mistake as well as not intervening on a fake item. </p>
<p>To that end, we designed a smart intervention policy that automatically decides whether to intervene on an item <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3448016.3452778">based on its predicted truthiness and predicted popularity</a>. </p>
<h2>Countering fake news</h2>
<p>Launching counter-campaigns to minimize if not neutralize the effects of misinformation campaigns needs to factor in the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559">major differences between truth and fake news in terms of how quickly and extensively each of them spreads</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-provinces-open-up-trust-erodes-when-what-we-experience-differs-from-what-institutions-tell-us-178133">As provinces open up, trust erodes when what we experience differs from what institutions tell us</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Besides these differences, reactions to stories can vary depending on the user, topic and length of the post. <a href="https://doi.org/10.14778/3547305.3547324">Our approach takes all these factors into account</a> and devises an efficient counter campaign strategy that effectively mitigates the propagation of misinformation.</p>
<p>Recent advances in generative AI, particularly those powered by large language models such ChatGPT, make it easier than ever to create articles at great speed and significant volume, raising the challenge of detecting misinformation and countering its spread at scale and in real time. Our current research continues to address this ongoing challenge which has enormous societal impact.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203735/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laks V.S. Lakshmanan receives funding from Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p>To restrict the spread of fake news on social media platforms, researchers designed an algorithm that can flag potential misinformation.Laks V.S. Lakshmanan, Professor of Computer Science, University of British ColumbiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2053882023-05-30T22:50:04Z2023-05-30T22:50:04ZWith so many people speaking ‘their truth’, how do we know what the truth really is?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528957/original/file-20230530-15-ao3pyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5379%2C3573&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Academy Awards boss Bill Kramer recently <a href="https://nz.news.yahoo.com/oscars-boss-bill-kramer-applauds-150147102.html">applauded comedian Chris Rock</a> for speaking “his truth” about being slapped by Will Smith at the 2022 Oscars ceremony, he used a turn of phrase that is fast becoming a part of everyday speech around the world.</p>
<p>Take <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/mar/06/harry-meghan-oprah-interview">Oprah Winfrey’s interview</a> with Prince Harry and the Duchess of Sussex Meghan Markle, for example. Oprah asked, “How do you feel about the palace hearing you speak your truth today?”</p>
<p>Or consider Samantha Imrie, a juror in the civil lawsuit over Gwyneth Paltrow’s role in a 2016 ski accident with Terry Sanderson. Asked about Sanderson’s testimony, <a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/entertainment/gwyneth-paltrow-utah-ski-collision-trial-juror-samantha-imrie-reveals-why-actress-won/AV5O32FOYZAXTD4DY6ECWUCCQY/">Imrie replied</a>, “He was telling his truth […] I do think he did not intend to tell a truth that wasn’t his truth.”</p>
<p>But what does it mean for someone to speak “their truth”? Perhaps it’s time to reconsider how we use this expression, given it can be easily misinterpreted as endorsing a problematic view of what it takes for a claim to be true.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528959/original/file-20230530-25-n1uxyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528959/original/file-20230530-25-n1uxyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528959/original/file-20230530-25-n1uxyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528959/original/file-20230530-25-n1uxyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528959/original/file-20230530-25-n1uxyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528959/original/file-20230530-25-n1uxyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528959/original/file-20230530-25-n1uxyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Speaking ‘his truth’: Gwyneth Paltrow speaks with retired optometrist Terry Sanderson after her skiing accident trial, March 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Truth relativism</h2>
<p>On its face, speaking about “my truth” or “your truth” suggests that <a href="https://psyche.co/guides/how-to-think-about-truth-in-a-philosophically-informed-way">truth is relative</a> to an individual. Philosophers call this view “truth relativism”. It says that when someone makes a claim, that claim is made true or false by what they believe or how they feel, rather than by the way the world actually is.</p>
<p>A problem with relativism is that it seems to leave reasoned debate without any clear goal. Suppose, for example, we are discussing whether the New Zealand government’s <a href="https://www.dia.govt.nz/Three-Waters-Reform-Programme">Three Waters Reform Programme</a> will “maintain and improve the water service infrastructure”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-cant-americans-agree-on-well-nearly-anything-philosophy-has-some-answers-193055">Why can't Americans agree on, well, nearly anything? Philosophy has some answers</a>
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<p>Presumably our goal is to determine whether it’s <em>true</em> that the reform will maintain and improve the water service infrastructure. However, if there is no truth to identify here – only “your truth” and “my truth” – then it isn’t clear why we should have this discussion at all.</p>
<p>What’s the alternative to truth relativism, then? To reject relativism is to grant that at least some of our claims are true or false because the world – which exists independently of our minds, languages and cultures – is a particular way.</p>
<p>For instance, because lemons are more acidic than milk chocolate, the claim that lemons are more acidic than milk chocolate is true, and the claim that milk chocolate is more acidic than lemons is false. Likewise, since <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-vaccine-opponents-think-they-know-more-than-medical-experts-99278">vaccines don’t cause autism</a>, the claim that vaccines cause autism is false, and the claim they don’t cause autism is true.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528961/original/file-20230530-21-3skvr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528961/original/file-20230530-21-3skvr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528961/original/file-20230530-21-3skvr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528961/original/file-20230530-21-3skvr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528961/original/file-20230530-21-3skvr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528961/original/file-20230530-21-3skvr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528961/original/file-20230530-21-3skvr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘I have spoken my truth’: Meka Whaitiri after announcing her intention to stand as a candidate for Te Pāti Māori.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Truth and respect</h2>
<p>You can stick with this straightforward view about truth and still recognise that everyone deserves to be heard and respected. As John Stuart Mill <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill/#LibeFreeSpee">pointed out in his book</a> <em>On Liberty</em> (1859), if we fail to consider a wide range of perspectives, even those views that may ultimately turn out to be false, it is more likely we will be unable to discover important truths about the world.</p>
<p>This means that valuing truth should actually encourage you to engage with points of view that differ from yours.</p>
<p>It’s also worth noting that, in some cases, people who claim to speak “their truth” may not actually be endorsing relativism. This might be said of the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O3pJBurhbZM">announcement</a> by Meka Whaitiri that she intended to join Te Pāti Māori.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/always-sticking-to-your-convictions-sounds-like-a-good-thing-but-it-isnt-122911">'Always sticking to your convictions' sounds like a good thing – but it isn't</a>
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<p>Offering a heartfelt explanation of her reasons for the decision, she concluded by directly addressing her Ikaroa-Rāwhiti constituents: “I have spoken my truth.” But she also explained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The point here, whanau, is Māori political activism. It’s part of being Māori. It comes from our whakapapa. And we as Māori have a responsibility to it. Not others — we. Today, I’m acknowledging that whakapapa. I’m acknowledging my responsibility to it, and it’s calling me home.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This suggests that in speaking “her truth”, Whaitiri was in fact outlining her <em>reasons</em> for joining Te Pāti Māori. Her main objective was to underscore the significance of whakapapa, rather than to defend truth relativism.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/alternative-facts-a-psychiatrists-guide-to-twisted-relationships-to-truth-72469">'Alternative facts': A psychiatrist’s guide to twisted relationships to truth</a>
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<p>Whaitiri’s reasons are certainly strong ones, though framing them in terms of “my truth” could lead others to misinterpret them. Moreover, if Pākehā responded to Whaitiri by saying “this is her truth, not our truth”, then we would be back again with the problem of relativism. </p>
<p>We need to value people’s unique identities, experiences and reasons for doing things, and we also need to value truth. Truth is a central goal of reasoned debate, and that’s something we will certainly need when addressing the many pressing issues currently facing Aotearoa New Zealand and the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What does it mean to say, ‘I have spoken my truth’? Can the truth really be relative – and how can we have reasoned debates if it is?Jeremy Wyatt, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of WaikatoJoseph Ulatowski, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2014182023-03-28T16:38:09Z2023-03-28T16:38:09ZBody language books get it wrong: the truth about reading nonverbal cues<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516674/original/file-20230321-26-yxltlq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=48%2C48%2C3546%2C2656&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Defensive, uncertain, confident, confrontational: can your body language reveal what you're thinking?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.pexels.com/photo/woman-wearing-teal-dress-sitting-on-chair-talking-to-man-2422280/">Pexels/Jopwell</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most of us have heard the one about if you <a href="https://www.scienceofpeople.com/arm-body-language/">cross your arms</a> over your chest you’re feeling defensive or if you’re <a href="https://www.elitedaily.com/lifestyle/hair-twirling-playing-touching-psychologist">fiddling with your hair</a> while talking you feel nervous – but is there <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=yqx1j8ynGfwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=body+language+research&ots=UgEWIy3m6l&sig=MCo0kkz0X0t4DOFafsMquERFYOo#v=onepage&q=body%20language%20research&f=false">really any truth</a> to some of these <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/blog/spycatcher/202207/debunking-body-language-myths">body language stereotypes</a>?</p>
<p>Reading <a href="https://www.popsci.com/story/science/body-language-analysis/">body language</a> can be a <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110302028/html">useful skill</a> in <a href="https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED077060">understanding</a> how someone is feeling or what they might be thinking. But it’s important to remember that it’s <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/youtube-body-language/">not an exact science</a> and there can be <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/body-language-around-the-world-2015-3?r=US&IR=T">cultural or individual variations</a> in how <a href="https://neuroclastic.com/autistic-body-language/">people express themselves</a> through body language. For example, <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4340785/#:%7E:text=In%20fact%2C%20in%20Japanese%20culture,their%20peripheral%20vision%20%5B28%5D.">eye contact in Japan</a> can be considered an act of aggression or rudeness.</p>
<p>Indeed, you can’t trust everything you read in body language guides. For example, in a <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1977-05780-000">book published in 1970</a>, author Ray Birdwhistell claimed that humans have 20,000 different facial expressions. But in the <a href="https://e-edu.nbu.bg/pluginfile.php/331752/mod_resource/content/0/Allan_and_Barbara_Pease_-_Body_Language_The_Definitive_Book.pdf">Definitive Book of Body Language</a> published in 2004 by Allan and Barbara Pease, that number suddenly increased to 250,000.</p>
<p>A quarter of a million different facial expressions – no wonder you need to read a guide on body language to decode those. More recent <a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.1322355111">scientific research</a> suggests that the real number of facial expressions is actually closer to 21.</p>
<p>There are body language books that promise success in the boardroom, the bedroom, bars and restaurants. They promise success at work and at home along with how to read the “tells” of your friends and neighbours. These popular books have two main aims (apart from making money) – they explain how to “expertly” read body language but also how to fake it for maximum effect.</p>
<h2>Dominant displays</h2>
<p>The Definitive Book of Body Language, for example, tells us that the crotch display (legs open, crotch slightly thrust forward, hand on the belt) is used by “macho men and tough guys”. It’s a powerful sexual signal the authors say and they claim it works. They write: “This gesture tells others, ‘I am virile – I can dominate’ which is why it’s a regular for men on the prowl.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Man standing with hands on hips." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516675/original/file-20230321-2285-d4qgd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516675/original/file-20230321-2285-d4qgd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516675/original/file-20230321-2285-d4qgd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516675/original/file-20230321-2285-d4qgd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516675/original/file-20230321-2285-d4qgd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516675/original/file-20230321-2285-d4qgd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516675/original/file-20230321-2285-d4qgd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A dominant crotch display or just posing with hands on hips? And is his smile even real?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/full-length-body-size-view-nice-1934401475">Roman Samborskyi/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Millions of people buy these books and try to recreate the crotch display or the “catapult” – the seated version of the hands-on-hip pose, with the hands behind the head and the elbows “menacingly pointed out”. The authors say this is an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/books/chapters/0924-1st-peas.html">almost exclusively male gesture</a> “used to intimidate others”.</p>
<p>It’s hard not to find either display a little comical partly because these “secret” meanings have been so widely shared in these bestselling books and partly because they are just inherently ridiculous. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517706/original/file-20230327-14-1geds5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man sitting on an orange beanbag doing the catapult body language position." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517706/original/file-20230327-14-1geds5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517706/original/file-20230327-14-1geds5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517706/original/file-20230327-14-1geds5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517706/original/file-20230327-14-1geds5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517706/original/file-20230327-14-1geds5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517706/original/file-20230327-14-1geds5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517706/original/file-20230327-14-1geds5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Is this the catapult or just a shoulder stretch?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/full-size-body-length-happy-elderly-2113243046">ViDI Studio/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>These books are full of static images of the body language of effective “communicators” – and that’s one fundamental issue because body language is dynamic: the body is in motion. You can’t stand in a crotch display or sit in the catapult all day.</p>
<p>But that’s not to say body language isn’t important. Its significance is immense, although it’s not 12 times more powerful than verbal communication – <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781351308724/nonverbal-communication-albert-mehrabian">as some have claimed</a>. </p>
<h2>Fake vs real</h2>
<p>In my book <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Rethinking-Body-Language-How-Hand-Movements-Reveal-Hidden-Thoughts/Beattie/p/book/9780415538893">Rethinking Body Language</a>, I argue that to read body language accurately you need to know where to look. There may not be 20,000 different facial expressions, but the face can still be very revealing of underlying emotional states. That is until the person starts to try to control it, for example, by masking emotions with a smile. </p>
<p>So how can you tell a fake smile from a genuine smile? A genuine one involves the muscles around the eyes and fades slowly from the face. A fake masking smile leaves the face abruptly, as the US psychologist, Paul Ekman, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00332747.1969.11023575?">has shown</a> in his pioneering experiments linking emotions and facial expressions. So to decode facial expressions more accurately, you need to focus on what’s going on when the fake smile disappears. It’s very brief but it can be very revealing.</p>
<p>Another problem with the static nature of these body language books is that speech and body language are intimately connected, as US psychologist and expert in psycholinguistics (the psychology of language), David McNeill argued in his 2000 book <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=DRBcMQuSrf8C&oi=fnd&pg=PP11&dq=David+McNeill&ots=jEGX5yuqlm&sig=NLWoRpApXoRDC6P-RYkYDuBHXlc&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=David%20McNeill&f=false">Language and Gesture</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Woman with fake smile." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516678/original/file-20230321-16-qgwbd1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516678/original/file-20230321-16-qgwbd1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516678/original/file-20230321-16-qgwbd1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516678/original/file-20230321-16-qgwbd1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516678/original/file-20230321-16-qgwbd1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516678/original/file-20230321-16-qgwbd1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516678/original/file-20230321-16-qgwbd1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘I’m happy, honest!’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/put-on-your-smile-young-girl-1344659774">Shutterstock/RomarioIen</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When people talk they often make spontaneous and unconscious hand movements that illustrate the content of what they’re saying. There’s no dictionary for these movements but they’re generated alongside speech itself. My own research <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/semi.1999.123.1-2.1/html">has shown</a> that meanings are expressed in these movements – and when people can’t see these gestures they miss important information. </p>
<p>Sometimes the gestural movement and the speech do not match. A speaker might say “my partner and I are very close” but their hands indicate a significant gap, rather than closeness. Another person says “I have very high ambitions” but their hand doesn’t rise that far, which you would expect if a person really felt that way. </p>
<p>I have argued in Rethinking Body Language that, in cases like this, the unconscious gesture is often the more reliable indicator of the underlying thought. But you need to know what they’re talking about to read the gestural movements.</p>
<p>It’s much easier to lie effectively in speech than in the accompanying gesture because these movements have intricate timings linked to the speech itself. The hand movement starts just before the speech and then the meaningful part of the gesture coincides exactly with the relevant word. It’s hard to get these timings right when lying. Again it’s all in the movement and the timing – and the close and unconscious connection between speech and body language.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201418/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Geoff Beattie has received funding from the ESRC for his work on gesture.</span></em></p>Why you shouldn’t judge a book by its cover: the limitations of reading body language.Geoff Beattie, Professor of Psychology, Edge Hill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2011272023-03-09T17:10:38Z2023-03-09T17:10:38ZChatGPT can’t lie to you, but you still shouldn’t trust it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513753/original/file-20230306-20-odgsqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=43%2C0%2C5659%2C3798&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/chatgpt-chat-ai-artificial-intelligence-young-2241913405">Chuan Chuan/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>“ChatGPT is a natural language generation platform based on the OpenAI GPT-3 language model.”</p>
<p>Why did you believe the above statement? A simple answer is that you trust the author of this article (or perhaps the editor). We cannot verify everything we are told, so we regularly trust the testimony of friends, strangers, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-trust-experts-even-when-they-admit-they-dont-know-the-answer-172562">“experts”</a> and institutions.</p>
<p>Trusting someone may not always be the primary reason for believing what they say is true. (I might already know what you’ve told me, for example.) But the fact that we trust the speaker gives us extra motivation for believing what they say.</p>
<p>AI <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/chatbot.asp">chatbots</a> therefore raise interesting issues about trust and testimony. We have to consider whether we trust what natural language generators like ChatGPT tell us. Another matter is whether these AI chatbots are even capable of being trustworthy.</p>
<h2>Justified beliefs</h2>
<p>Suppose you tell me it is raining outside. According to <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/testimony-episprob/#Redu">one way philosophers view testimony</a>, I am justified in believing you only if I have reasons for thinking your testimony is reliable – for example, you were just outside – and no overriding reasons for thinking it isn’t. This is known as the reductionist theory of testimony.</p>
<p>This view makes justified beliefs – assumptions that we feel entitled to hold – difficult to acquire. </p>
<p>But according to another view of testimony, I would be justified in believing it’s raining outside as long as I have no reason to think this statement is false. This makes justified beliefs through testimony much easier to acquire. This is called the non-reductionist theory of testimony.</p>
<p>Note that neither of these theories involves trust in the speaker. My relationship to them is one of reliance, not trust. </p>
<h2>Trust and reliance</h2>
<p>When I rely on someone or something, I make a prediction that it will do what I expect it to. For example, I rely on my alarm clock to sound at the time I set it, and I rely on other drivers to obey the rules of the road. </p>
<p>Trust, however, is more than <a href="https://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2021/07/29/medethics-2021-107464.long">mere reliance</a>. To illustrate this, let’s examine our reactions to misplaced trust compared with misplaced reliance. </p>
<p>If I trusted Roxy to water my prizewinning tulips while I was on vacation and she carelessly let them die, I might rightly feel betrayed. Whereas if I relied on my automatic sprinkler to water the tulips and it failed to come on, I might be disappointed but would be wrong to feel betrayed.</p>
<p>In other words, trust makes us vulnerable to betrayal, so being trustworthy is morally significant in a way that being reliable is not.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People shaking hands" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514001/original/file-20230307-299-l7c39r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514001/original/file-20230307-299-l7c39r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514001/original/file-20230307-299-l7c39r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514001/original/file-20230307-299-l7c39r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514001/original/file-20230307-299-l7c39r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514001/original/file-20230307-299-l7c39r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514001/original/file-20230307-299-l7c39r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In assurance theories of testimony, the speaker offers a kind of guarantee about the veracity of their statements.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/negotiating-businessimage-businesswomen-handshakinghappy-work-woman-528642268">sutadimages/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The difference between trust and reliance highlights some important points about testimony. When a person tells someone it is raining, they are not just sharing information; they are taking responsibility for the veracity of what they say. </p>
<p>In philosophy, this is called the <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-021-03074-y">assurance theory of testimony</a>. A speaker offers the listener a kind of guarantee that what they are saying is true, and in doing so gives the listener a reason to believe them. We trust the speaker, rather than rely on them, to tell the truth.</p>
<p>If I found out you were guessing about the rain but luckily got it right, I would still feel my trust had been let down because your “guarantee” was empty. The assurance aspect also helps capture why lies seem to us morally worse than false statements. While in both cases you invite me to trust and then let down my trust, lies attempt to use my trust against me to facilitate the betrayal.</p>
<h2>Moral agency</h2>
<p>If the assurance view is right, then ChatGPT needs to be capable of taking responsibility for what it says in order to be a trustworthy speaker, rather than merely reliable. While it seems we can sensibly attribute <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11948-017-9943-x#Sec2">agency to AI</a> to perform tasks as required, whether an AI could be a morally responsible agent is another question entirely. </p>
<p><a href="https://philarchive.org/rec/SULWIA-2">Some philosophers</a> argue that moral agency is not restricted to human beings. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computing-responsibility/#ComMorResAge">Others argue</a> that AI cannot be held morally responsible because, to quote a few examples, they are incapable of mental states, lack autonomy, or lack the capacity for moral reasoning.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, ChatGPT is not a moral agent; it cannot take responsibility for what it says. When it tells us something, it offers no assurances as to its truth. This is why it can give false statements, but not lie. On its website, OpenAI – which built ChatGPT – says that because the AI is trained on data from the internet, it “may be inaccurate, untruthful, and otherwise misleading at times”.</p>
<p>At best, it is a “truth-ometer” or fact-checker – and by <a href="https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/chatgpt-ai-mistakes-hallucinates-wrong-answers-edge-computing-morgan-stanley-2023-2">many accounts</a>, not a particularly <a href="https://theconversation.com/chatgpt-is-great-youre-just-using-it-wrong-198848">accurate one</a>. While we might sometimes be justified in relying on what it says, we shouldn’t trust it.</p>
<p>In case you are wondering, the opening quote of this article was an excerpt of ChatGPT’s response when I asked it: “What is ChatGPT?” So you should not have trusted that the statement was true. However, <em>I</em> can assure you that it is.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201127/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mackenzie Graham receives funding from the Wellcome Trust. </span></em></p>AI chatbots can’t take responsibility for what they say, so we shouldn’t trust them.Mackenzie Graham, Research Fellow of Philosophy, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1930552023-03-02T13:23:29Z2023-03-02T13:23:29ZWhy can’t Americans agree on, well, nearly anything? Philosophy has some answers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512734/original/file-20230228-22-sn8t3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C10%2C2302%2C1285&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Social media has made yelling past each other all the easier.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/collage-of-two-people-standing-back-to-back-royalty-free-image/1343278471?phrase=disagreement%20megaphone&adppopup=true">We Are/DigitalVision via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Does wearing a mask stop the spread of COVID-19? Is climate change driven primarily by human-made emissions? With these kinds of issues dividing the public, it sometimes feels as if Americans are losing our ability to agree about basic facts of the world. There have been <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2009/02/evolution-social-legal-dimensions.pdf">widespread disagreements</a> about matters of seemingly objective fact in the past, yet the number of recent examples can make it feel as though our shared sense of reality is shrinking.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://udayton.edu/directory/law/steiner_dillon_james.php">a law professor</a>, I’ve written about legal challenges to <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3334657">vaccination requirements</a> and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3720083">COVID-19 restrictions</a>, as well as <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3550212">what counts as “truth</a>” in court. In other words, I spend a lot of time mulling over how people define truth, and why U.S. society has such a hard time agreeing on it these days. </p>
<p>There are two ideas that can help us think about polarization on matters of fact. The first, “<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3334657">epistemic pluralism</a>,” helps describe U.S. society today, and how we got here. The second, “<a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-52410-2_7">epistemic dependence</a>,” can help us reflect on where our knowledge comes from in the first place.</p>
<h2>Many takes on ‘truth’</h2>
<p>I define <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3334657">epistemic pluralism</a> as a persistent state of public disagreement about empirical facts.</p>
<p>When it comes to things that can be proved or disproved, it’s easy to think that everyone could come to the same factual conclusions, if only they had equal access to the same information – which, after all, is more freely available today than at any point in human history. But while the inequality of access to information plays a role, it is not so simple: Psychological, social and political factors also contribute to epistemic pluralism.</p>
<p>For example, psychologist and law professor <a href="https://law.yale.edu/dan-m-kahan">Dan Kahan</a> and his collaborators have described two phenomena that affect the ways in which people form different beliefs from the same information. </p>
<p>The first is called “<a href="https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/kahan_hoffman_braman.pdf">identity-protective cognition</a>.” This describes how individuals are motivated to adopt the empirical beliefs of groups they identify with in order to signal that they belong.</p>
<p>The second is “<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1549444">cultural cognition</a>”: people tend to say that a behavior has a greater risk of harm if they disapprove of the behavior for other reasons – handgun regulation and nuclear waste disposal, for example.</p>
<p>These effects are not reduced by intelligence, access to information, or education. Indeed, greater scientific literacy and mathematical ability have been shown to actually increase polarization on scientific issues that have been politicized, such as the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2459057">cause of climate change</a> or the <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2319992">benefits of gun control</a>. Higher ability in these areas appears to boost people’s ability to interpret the available evidence in favor of their preferred conclusions. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511243/original/file-20230220-16-aay1g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a dark jacket and a woman in a green one appear to argue in front of a gate outside." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511243/original/file-20230220-16-aay1g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511243/original/file-20230220-16-aay1g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511243/original/file-20230220-16-aay1g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511243/original/file-20230220-16-aay1g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511243/original/file-20230220-16-aay1g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511243/original/file-20230220-16-aay1g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511243/original/file-20230220-16-aay1g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Psychological and social factors shape which evidence we want to believe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/couple-having-argument-in-a-hard-quarrel-outdoors-royalty-free-image/569569553?phrase=disagreement&adppopup=true">doble.d/Moment via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Beyond these psychological factors, there is another major source of epistemic pluralism. In a society characterized by freedom of conscience and freedom of expression, individuals bear “burdens of judgment,” as the American <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/political-liberalism/9780231130899">philosopher John Rawls wrote</a>. Without the government or an official church telling people what to think, we all have to decide for ourselves – and that inevitably leads to a diversity of moral viewpoints.</p>
<p>Although Rawls was focused on pluralism of moral values, the same is true of beliefs about matters of fact. In the U.S., legal rules and social norms attempt to ensure that <a href="https://reason.com/volokh/2020/06/14/no-official-high-or-petty-can-prescribe-what-shall-be-orthodox/">the state cannot constrain</a> an individual’s freedom of belief, whether that be about moral values or empirical facts. </p>
<p>This intellectual freedom contributes to epistemic pluralism. So do factors such as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098018815049">educational inequalities</a>, the proliferation of information from untrustworthy sources online, and misinformation campaigns. All together, they provide ample opportunity for people’s shared sense of reality <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691175515/republic">to fragment</a>.</p>
<h2>Knowledge takes trust</h2>
<p>Another contributor to epistemic pluralism is just how specialized human knowledge has become. No one person could hope to acquire the sum total of all knowledge in a single lifetime. This brings us to the second relevant concept: <a href="https://www.pdcnet.org/jphil/content/jphil_1985_0082_0007_0335_0349">epistemic dependence</a>. </p>
<p>Knowledge is almost never acquired firsthand, but transmitted by some trusted source. To take a simple example, how do you know who the first president of the United States was? No one alive today witnessed the first presidential inauguration. You could go to the National Archives and <a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1634180">ask to see records</a>, but hardly anyone does that. Instead, Americans learned from an elementary school teacher that George Washington was the first president, and we accept that fact because of the teacher’s epistemic authority. </p>
<p>There’s nothing wrong with this; everyone gets most knowledge that way. There’s simply too much knowledge for anyone to verify independently all the facts on which we routinely rely.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511244/original/file-20230220-14-jtvwb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A blond teacher shows young children sitting on the floor a poster about planets." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511244/original/file-20230220-14-jtvwb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511244/original/file-20230220-14-jtvwb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511244/original/file-20230220-14-jtvwb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511244/original/file-20230220-14-jtvwb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511244/original/file-20230220-14-jtvwb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511244/original/file-20230220-14-jtvwb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511244/original/file-20230220-14-jtvwb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Learning takes trust – but who deserves that trust?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/high-angle-view-of-pre-school-teacher-showing-royalty-free-image/1345093602?phrase=teacher&adppopup=true">Halfpoint Images/Moment via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>This is true even in highly specialized areas. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.0040028">Replication is essential to science</a>, but scientists don’t personally replicate every experiment relevant to their field. Even <a href="https://discover.hsp.org/Record/dc-9792/Description#tabnav">Sir Isaac Newton</a> famously said that his contributions to physics were possible only “by standing on the shoulders of giants.”</p>
<p>However, this raises a tricky problem: Who has sufficient epistemic authority to qualify as an expert on a particular topic? Much of the erosion of our shared reality in recent years seems to be driven by disagreement about whom to believe. </p>
<p>Whom should a nonexpert believe about whether a COVID-19 vaccine is safe and effective? Whom should a Georgia voter believe about the legitimacy of their state’s results in the 2020 election: <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/04/sidney-powell-amends-court-filing-that-said-georgia-votes-were-flipped-to-trump.html">Sidney Powell</a>, an attorney who helped Donald Trump’s legal team try to overturn the 2020 election, or Georgia Secretary of State <a href="https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/11/20/raffensperger-georgia-certified-election-because-numbers-dont-lie">Brad Raffensperger</a>?</p>
<p>The problem in these and other cases is that most people are unable to determine the truth of these matters on their own, yet they are also unable to agree on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00093.x">which experts to trust</a>. </p>
<h2>Curious ‘scouts’</h2>
<p>There isn’t a simple solution to this problem. But there may be rays of hope.</p>
<p>Intelligence alone doesn’t decrease people’s tendency to let their group identities sway their view of facts, according to Kahan and his colleagues – but very curious people tend to be <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12396">more resistant</a> to its effects.</p>
<p>Rationality researcher Julia Galef has written about how adopting a “<a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/555240/the-scout-mindset-by-julia-galef/">scout</a>” mindset rather than a “soldier’s” can help guard against the psychological factors that can lead our reasoning astray. In her description, a soldier thinker seeks information to use as ammunition against enemies, while a scout approaches the world with the goal of forming an accurate mental model of reality.</p>
<p>There are many forces pulling our collective understandings of the world apart; with some effort, however, we can try to reestablish our common ground.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193055/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Steiner-Dillon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two concepts can help explain why society seems increasingly unable to agree on basic facts.James Steiner-Dillon, Associate Professor of Law, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1965512023-02-16T13:26:21Z2023-02-16T13:26:21ZBad beliefs: Misinformation is factually wrong – but is it ethically wrong, too?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509857/original/file-20230213-14-psr9a4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=32%2C0%2C3606%2C2143&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Which is it?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/fake-news-illustration-fake-fact-dice-concept-royalty-free-image/1281315760?phrase=misinformation&adppopup=true">Anton Melnyk/iStock via Getty Images Plus</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The impact of <a href="https://theconversation.com/misinformation-disinformation-and-hoaxes-whats-the-difference-158491">disinformation and misinformation</a> has become impossible to ignore. Whether it is denial about climate change, conspiracy theories about elections, or misinformation about vaccines, the pervasiveness of <a href="https://theconversation.com/7-ways-to-avoid-becoming-a-misinformation-superspreader-157099">social media</a> has given “alternative facts” an influence previously not possible.</p>
<p>Bad information isn’t just a practical problem – it’s a philosophical one, too. For one thing, it’s about epistemology, the <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/epistemo/">branch of philosophy</a> that concerns itself with knowledge: how to discern truth, and what it means to “know” something, in the first place.</p>
<p>But what about ethics? People often think about responsibility in terms of actions and their consequences. We seldom discuss whether people are ethically accountable for not just what they do, but what they believe – and how they consume, analyze or ignore information to arrive at their beliefs.</p>
<p>So when someone embraces the idea that mankind has never touched the Moon, or that a mass shooting was a hoax, are they not just incorrect, but ethically wrong?</p>
<h2>Know the good, do the good</h2>
<p>Some thinkers have argued the answer is yes – arguments I’ve studied in <a href="https://www.rit.edu/directory/lgtghs-lawrence-torcello">my own work</a> as an ethicist. </p>
<p>Even back in the 5th century B.C., <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-socrates-and-the-life-worth-living-189312">Socrates</a> linked epistemology and ethics implicitly. Socrates is mostly known through his students’ writings, such as Plato’s “<a href="https://archive.org/details/allen-bloom-the-republic">Republic</a>,” in which Plato depicts Socrates’ endeavors to uncover the nature of justice and goodness. One of the ideas attributed to Socrates is often summarized with the adage that “to know the good is to do the good.”</p>
<p>The idea, in part, is that everyone seeks to do what they think is best – so no one errs intentionally. To err ethically, in this view, is the result of a mistaken belief about what the good is, rather than an intent to act unjustly.</p>
<p>More recently, in the 19th century, British mathematician and philosopher <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/William-Kingdon-Clifford">W.K. Clifford</a> linked the process of belief formation with ethics. In his 1877 essay “<a href="https://people.brandeis.edu/%7Eteuber/Clifford_ethics.pdf">The Ethics of Belief</a>,” Clifford made the forceful ethical claim that it is wrong – always, everywhere and for everyone – to believe something without sufficient evidence. </p>
<p>In his view, we all have an ethical duty to test our beliefs, to check our sources and to place more weight in scientific evidence than anecdotal hearsay. In short, we have a duty to cultivate what today might be called “epistemic humility”: the awareness that we ourselves can hold incorrect beliefs, and to act accordingly.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A black and white sketch of a man with a long beard above the handwritten words 'Yours most truly, W.K. Clifford'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509859/original/file-20230213-24-bulyzv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509859/original/file-20230213-24-bulyzv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509859/original/file-20230213-24-bulyzv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509859/original/file-20230213-24-bulyzv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509859/original/file-20230213-24-bulyzv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509859/original/file-20230213-24-bulyzv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509859/original/file-20230213-24-bulyzv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Clifford was a mathematician as well as a philosopher.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Clifford_William_Kingdon.jpg">Lectures and Essays by the Late William Kingdon Clifford, F.R.S./Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As <a href="https://www.rit.edu/directory/lgtghs-lawrence-torcello">a philosopher</a> interested in disinformation and its relationship to ethics and public discourse, I think there is a lot to be gained from his essay. In <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=cHLvEG0AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">my own research</a>, I have argued that each us has a responsibility to be mindful of how we form our beliefs, insofar as we are fellow citizens with a common stake in our larger society.</p>
<h2>Setting sail</h2>
<p>Clifford begins <a href="https://people.brandeis.edu/%7Eteuber/Clifford_ethics.pdf">his essay</a> with the example of a ship owner who has chartered his vessel to a group of emigrants leaving Europe for the Americas. The owner has reason to doubt the boat is in a seaworthy-enough condition to cross the Atlantic, and considers having the boat thoroughly overhauled to make sure it is safe. </p>
<p>In the end, though, he convinces himself otherwise, suppressing and rationalizing away any doubts. He wishes the passengers well with a light heart. When the ship goes down midsea, and the ship’s passengers with it, he quietly collects the insurance. </p>
<p>Most people would probably say the ship owner was at least somewhat ethically to blame. After all, he neglected his due diligence to make sure the ship was sound before its voyage. </p>
<p>What if the ship had been fit for voyage and made the trip safely? It would be no credit to the owner, Clifford argues, because he had no right to believe it was safe: He’d chosen not to learn whether it was seaworthy.</p>
<p>In other words, it’s not only the owner’s actions – or lack of action – that have ethical implications. His beliefs do, too. </p>
<p>In this example it is easy to see how belief guides actions. Part of Clifford’s larger point, however, is that a person’s beliefs always hold the potential to affect others and their actions.</p>
<h2>No man – or idea – is an island</h2>
<p>There are two premises that can be found in Clifford’s essay. </p>
<p>The first is that each belief creates the cognitive conditions for related beliefs to follow. In other words, once you hold one belief, it becomes easier to believe in similar ideas.</p>
<p>This is borne out in contemporary <a href="https://www.sdmlab.psychol.cam.ac.uk/research/gateway-belief-model">cognitive science research</a>. For example, a number of false <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612457686">conspiratorial beliefs</a> – like the belief that NASA faked the Apollo Moon landings – are found to correspond with the likelihood of a person falsely believing that climate change is a hoax. </p>
<p>Clifford’s second premise is that no human beings are so isolated that their beliefs won’t at some point influence other people. </p>
<p>People do not arrive at their beliefs in a vacuum. The influence of family, friends, social circles, media and political leaders on others’ views is well documented. Studies show that mere <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100612451018">exposure to misinformation</a> can have a lasting cognitive impact on how we interpret and remember events, even after the information has been corrected. In other words, once accepted, misinformation creates a bias that resists revision.</p>
<p>Taking these points together, Clifford argues that it is always wrong – not just factually, but ethically – to believe something on insufficient evidence. This point does not assume that each person always has the resources to develop an informed belief on each topic. He argues it is acceptable to defer to experts if they exist, or withhold judgment on matters where one has no sound grounding for an informed belief.</p>
<p>That said, as Clifford suggests in his essay, theft is still harmful, even if the thief has never been exposed to the lesson that it is wrong.</p>
<h2>An ounce of prevention</h2>
<p>Arguing that people are ethically responsible for nonevidential beliefs doesn’t necessarily mean they are blameworthy. As I have argued in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12179">other work</a>, Clifford’s premises show the morally relevant nature of belief formation. It is enough to suggest that developing and nurturing critical thinking is an ethical responsibility, without denouncing every person who holds a belief that can’t be supported as inherently immoral.</p>
<p>Ethics is often talked about as if it were merely a matter of identifying and chastising bad behaviors. Yet, as far back as Plato and Socrates, ethics has been about offering guidance for a life well lived in community with others. </p>
<p>Likewise, <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-belief/#:%7E:text=The%20%E2%80%9Cethics%20of%20belief%E2%80%9D%20refers,maintenance%2C%20and%20belief%2Drelinquishment.">the ethics of belief</a> can serve as a reminder of how important it is, for other people’s sakes, to develop good habits of inquiry. Learning to identify fallacious arguments can be a kind of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175799">cognitive inoculation against misinformation</a>. </p>
<p>That might mean renewing educational institutions’ investment in disciplines that, like philosophy, have historically taught students how to think critically and communicate clearly. Modern society tends to look for technological mechanisms to guard us against misinformation, but the best solution might still be a solid education with generous exposure to the liberal arts – and ensuring all citizens have access to it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196551/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lawrence Torcello does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A philosopher unpacks the ‘ethics of belief’ for an age awash in bad information.Lawrence Torcello, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Rochester Institute of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1989112023-02-01T16:07:00Z2023-02-01T16:07:00ZWhy I believe the truth to be like an onion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507350/original/file-20230131-26-81dhpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C2389%2C1588&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Truth is a fact coated in many layers.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/es/fotos/0_fkPHulv-M">K8 / Unsplash</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the dawn of philosophical knowledge, the existence of truth has been debated. We all talk about the truth. We all ask for the truth. We demand it, even if we sometimes deny its existence. This article will attempt to give another view of what, for now, I believe to be the truth.</p>
<p>In journalism, truth is often equated with the facts: “There was an accident on such-and-such a corner, on such-and-such a day at such-and-such an hour and so many people were injured.” This is a purely informative conception of truth, based on the rule of “the 5 ‘W’s”, which frame the story: “Who, what, when, where, why.”</p>
<p>But we cannot take a fact as the truth. What if someone comes along and says: “It was not an accident. One of the drivers was drunk”? Here we enter into the world of interpretations.</p>
<h2>There is no truth</h2>
<p>In his <a href="https://abadaeditores.com/filosofia/fragmentos-postumos-.html">Posthumous Fragments</a>, the German philosopher <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Friedrich-Nietzsche">Friedrich Nietzsche</a> wrote his most famous phrase: “There are no facts, only interpretations.” </p>
<p>The phrase is as interesting as it is controversial and misinterpreted. It has been used to decree the death of truth and to indicate that everyone can have their own interpretation, i.e. their own truth. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, Nietzsche’s phrase fell into its own interpretative trap. When he says that there are interpretations, he is not seeking to relativise the concept of truth, but rather to say that when something happens, people find different interpretations of the event.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475453/original/file-20220721-12930-3szi3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475453/original/file-20220721-12930-3szi3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475453/original/file-20220721-12930-3szi3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=763&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475453/original/file-20220721-12930-3szi3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=763&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475453/original/file-20220721-12930-3szi3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=763&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475453/original/file-20220721-12930-3szi3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=959&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475453/original/file-20220721-12930-3szi3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=959&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475453/original/file-20220721-12930-3szi3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=959&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Portrait of Michel Foucault (1926-1984) French philosopher. Ink and watercolour.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Michel_Foucault.jpg">Nemomain / Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The French philosopher <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Michel-Foucault">Michel Foucault</a> supports Nietzsche’s theory, but adds his trademark: power. According to Foucault, there are multiple interpretations of the facts, but power is in charge of imposing its interpretation (its truth) and totalising it. When we imagine power, we often think of gentlemen in expensive suits sitting around a table thinking “what can we arrange now?”.</p>
<p>But for Foucault, power is simply the capacity to position one’s own interpretation as general truth. It can be a citizen from a social network, a politician of any sign and ideology, a businesswoman or even a neighbour who starts a rumour in the neighbourhood and establishes it as absolute truth. This is also how the concept of <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262535045/post-truth/">post-truth</a> is born.</p>
<h2>Truth is an onion</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, I would like to propose a simpler, but no less sophisticated, way of understanding the very concept of truth.</p>
<p>First of all, all theories are partly right. Truth as a concept in itself is broad. Truth is the sum of all interpretations, of facts, past and present. And one may wonder what the past has to do with the truth of the present. A quote from the existentialist philosopher <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jean-Paul-Sartre">Jean-Paul Sartre</a> explains it well: “We are not lumps of clay; what is important is not what people make of us, but what we ourselves make of what they have made of us.” The present cannot be separated from the past, as we are its consequence. Without understanding the past, it is impossible to understand the present.</p>
<p>To make it clearer, let us imagine the concept of truth as an onion. Onions are vegetables made up of several layers that cover a core. If we make the parallel, the core would be a concrete fact: the accident on the street corner, for example. The layer that covers it would be the vision of the witnesses and the protagonists of that accident. The next layer would be the past of those involved. And so the layers overlap, moving further and further away from the event itself.</p>
<p>But inevitably, in one way or another, all the layers are involved in the fact we are analysing. Therefore, truth is that onion. Truth is that set of interpretations and macro-views that make a global and complete picture of all the facts possible.</p>
<h2>The truth is not within our reach</h2>
<p>So, is there such a thing as truth? The answer I can give is yes. Is it possible to possess the truth? My answer is a resounding no. Unless one is God or an omnipresent, omnipotent, omnitemporal being, it is impossible to possess or attain it. </p>
<p>But belief in the existence of a truth is fundamental. In his work <a href="https://archive.org/details/modernthemeorte">The modern theme</a>, the Spanish philosopher <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jose-Ortega-y-Gasset">José Ortega y Gasset</a> explains why this is important: “Life without truth is not livable. In such a way, then, truth exists, which is reciprocal with man. Without man there is no truth, but vice versa, without truth there is no man. Man can be defined as the being that absolutely needs truth and, conversely, truth is the only thing that man essentially needs, his only unconditional need.”</p>
<p>This makes the concept of truth a utopia. And what is a utopia? Uruguayan journalist and writer Eduardo Galeano <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GaRpIBj5xho">explains</a> it in an exceptional way by paraphrasing a friend:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Utopia is on the horizon. I walk ten paces and she walks ten paces away. So what is utopia for? That’s what it’s for, to give us a reason to be walking.”</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
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<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198911/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Agustín Joel Fernandes Cabal no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.</span></em></p>Truth is fundamental to our lives. Human beings cannot exist without truth, but this concept is more complex than we think.Agustín Joel Fernandes Cabal, Investigador predoctoral en Filosofía, Universidade de Santiago de CompostelaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1984632023-01-30T19:22:57Z2023-01-30T19:22:57ZUnlike with academics and reporters, you can’t check when ChatGPT’s telling the truth<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506273/original/file-20230125-18-6yb4mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C17%2C5736%2C3790&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Being able to verify how information is produced is important, especially for academics and journalists.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/unlike-with-academics-and-reporters--you-can-t-check-when-chatgpt-s-telling-the-truth" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Of all the reactions elicited by ChatGPT, the chatbot from the American for-profit company OpenAI that produces grammatically correct responses to natural-language queries, few have matched those of educators and academics.</p>
<p>Academic publishers have moved <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/science/2023/jan/26/science-journals-ban-listing-of-chatgpt-as-co-author-on-papers">to ban ChatGPT from being listed as a co-author and issue strict guidelines outlining the conditions under which it may be used</a>. Leading universities and schools around the world, from France’s renowned <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/top-french-university-bans-use-chatgpt-prevent-plagiarism-2023-01-27/">Sciences Po</a> to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/jan/10/universities-to-return-to-pen-and-paper-exams-after-students-caught-using-ai-to-write-essays">many Australian universities</a>, have banned its use. </p>
<p>These bans are not merely the actions of academics who are worried they won’t be able to catch cheaters. This is not just about catching students who copied a source without attribution. Rather, the severity of these actions reflects a question, one that is not getting enough attention in the endless coverage of OpenAI’s ChatGPT chatbot: Why should we trust anything that it outputs?</p>
<p>This is a vitally important question, as ChatGPT and programs like it can easily be used, with or without acknowledgement, in the information sources that comprise the foundation of our society, especially academia and the news media.</p>
<p>Based on my work on the <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003008309">political</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14540-8">economy</a> of <a href="https://utorontopress.com/9781442666221/copyfight/">knowledge governance</a>, academic bans on ChatGPT’s use are a proportionate reaction to the threat ChatGPT poses to our entire information ecosystem. Journalists and academics should be wary of using ChatGPT. </p>
<p>Based on its output, ChatGPT might seem like just another information source or tool. However, in reality, ChatGPT — or, rather the means by which ChatGPT produces its output — is <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/chatgpt-strikes-at-the-heart-of-the-scientific-world-view/">a dagger aimed directly at their very credibility as authoritative sources of knowledge</a>. It should not be taken lightly.</p>
<h2>Trust and information</h2>
<p>Think about why we see some information sources or types of knowledge as more trusted than others. Since <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Enlightenment-European-history">the European Enlightenment</a>, we’ve tended to equate scientific knowledge with knowledge in general. </p>
<p>Science is more than laboratory research: it’s a way of thinking that prioritizes empirically based evidence and the pursuit of transparent methods regarding evidence collection and evaluation. And it tends to be the gold standard by which all knowledge is judged.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ai-and-the-future-of-work-5-experts-on-what-chatgpt-dall-e-and-other-ai-tools-mean-for-artists-and-knowledge-workers-196783">AI and the future of work: 5 experts on what ChatGPT, DALL-E and other AI tools mean for artists and knowledge workers</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<p>For example, journalists have credibility because they investigate information, cite sources and provide evidence. Even though sometimes the reporting may contain errors or omissions, that doesn’t change the profession’s authority.</p>
<p>The same goes for opinion editorial writers, especially academics and other experts because they — we — draw our authority from our status as experts in a subject. Expertise involves a command of the sources that are recognized as comprising legitimate knowledge in our fields. </p>
<p>Most op-eds aren’t citation-heavy, but responsible academics will be able to point you to the <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/ca/states-and-markets-9781474236935/">thinkers</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jinfopoli.7.2017.0176">the work</a> <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/12390/the-social-construction-of-reality-by-peter-l-berger/">they’re</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v12i2.4776">drawing</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2012.678878">on</a>. And those sources themselves are built on verifiable sources that a reader should be able to verify for themselves.</p>
<h2>Truth and outputs</h2>
<p>Because human writers and ChatGPT seem to be producing the same output — sentences and paragraphs — it’s understandable that some people may mistakenly confer this scientifically sourced authority onto ChatGPT’s output. </p>
<p>That both ChatGPT and reporters produce sentences is where the similarity ends. What’s most important — the source of authority — is not <em>what</em> they produce, but <em>how</em> they produce it.</p>
<p>ChatGPT doesn’t produce sentences in the same way a reporter does. ChatGPT, and other machine-learning, large language models, may seem sophisticated, but they’re basically just complex autocomplete machines. Only instead of suggesting the next word in an email, they produce the most statistically likely words in much longer packages. </p>
<p>These programs repackage others’ work as if it were something new. It does not “understand” what it produces. </p>
<p>The justification for these outputs can never be truth. Its truth is the truth of the correlation, that the word “sentence” should always complete the phrase “We finish each other’s …” because it is the most common occurrence, not because it is expressing anything that has been observed.</p>
<p>Because ChatGPT’s truth is only a statistical truth, output produced by this program cannot ever be trusted in the same way that we can trust a reporter or an academic’s output. It cannot be verified because it has been constructed to create output in a different way than what we usually think of as being “scientific.” </p>
<p>You can’t check ChatGPT’s sources because the source is the statistical fact that most of the time, a set of words tend to follow each other.</p>
<p>No matter how coherent ChatGPT’s output may seem, simply publishing what it produces is still the equivalent of letting autocomplete run wild. It’s an irresponsible practice because it pretends that these statistical tricks are equivalent to well-sourced and verified knowledge.</p>
<p>Similarly, academics and others who incorporate ChatGPT into their workflow run the existential risk of kicking the entire edifice of scientific knowledge out from underneath themselves. </p>
<p>Because ChatGPT’s output is correlation-based, how does the writer know that it is accurate? Did they verify it against actual sources, or does the output simply conform to their personal prejudices? And if they’re experts in their field, why are they using ChatGPT in the first place?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506942/original/file-20230129-36877-sutezm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a man gives a lecture while reading from two laptop screens" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506942/original/file-20230129-36877-sutezm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506942/original/file-20230129-36877-sutezm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=304&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506942/original/file-20230129-36877-sutezm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=304&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506942/original/file-20230129-36877-sutezm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=304&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506942/original/file-20230129-36877-sutezm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506942/original/file-20230129-36877-sutezm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506942/original/file-20230129-36877-sutezm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Academics have authority on their subject of expertise because there exists a scientific and evidence-based method to verify their work.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Knowledge production and verification</h2>
<p>The point is that ChatGPT’s processes give us no way to verify its truthfulness. In contrast, that reporters and academics have a scientific, evidence-based method of producing knowledge serves to validate their work, even if the results might go against our preconceived notions.</p>
<p>The problem is especially acute for academics, given our central role in creating knowledge. Relying on ChatGPT to write even part of a column means they’re no longer relying on the scientific authority embedded in verified sources. </p>
<p>Instead, by resorting to statistically generated text, they are effectively making an argument from authority. Such actions also mislead the reader, because the reader can’t distinguish between text by an author and an AI.</p>
<p>ChatGPT may produce seemingly legible knowledge, as if by magic. But we would be well advised not to mistake its output for actual, scientific knowledge. One should never confuse coherence with understanding.</p>
<p>ChatGPT promises easy access to new and existing knowledge, but it is a poisoned chalice. Readers, academics and reporters beware.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198463/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Blayne Haggart receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. He is a Senior Fellow with the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI).</span></em></p>ChatGPT is a sophisticated AI program that generates text from vast databases. But it doesn’t understand the information it produces, which also can’t be verified through scientific means.Blayne Haggart, Associate Professor of Political Science, Brock UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1885142022-09-27T12:27:24Z2022-09-27T12:27:24ZHow to get away with torture, insurrection, you name it: The techniques of denial and distraction that politicians use to manage scandal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485991/original/file-20220921-15489-27uhle.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C26%2C5846%2C3783&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An image of a mock gallows on the grounds of the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, is shown during a House committee hearing. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/CapitolRiotInvestigationTheHearings/607bcab2249f4b43ba259f6bceb3aa02/photo?Query=capitol%20hearing%20jan&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=6791&currentItemNo=47">AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The U.S. House select committee investigating the Jan. 6, 2021 insurrection intends to hold <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/09/27/1125436577/jan-6-hearings-committee-postponed-hurricane-ian">another public hearing</a>, likely the last before it releases its official report. The hearing had been scheduled for Sept. 28, 2022 but was postponed because of Hurricane Ian.</p>
<p>Through earlier hearings this past summer, the committee has shown how former President Donald Trump and close associates <a href="https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-capitol-siege-ivanka-trump-biden-presidential-56da6a3963ee91021b4a52a0b4b00e62">spread the “big lie” of a stolen election</a>. The hearings have also shown how Trump stoked the rage of protesters who marched to the U.S. Capitol and then <a href="https://apnews.com/article/Jan-6-hearings-Trump-capitol-10351fe6d555eaee7554379ceed8bb24">refused to act</a> when they breached the building. </p>
<p>The hearings have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/22/arts/television/jan-6-hearings-tv.html">aired in prime time</a> and dominated news cycles. Still, <a href="https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/reports/monmouthpoll_us_080922/">polling conducted in August by Monmouth University</a> found that around 3 in 10 Americans still believe that Trump “did nothing wrong regarding January 6.”</p>
<p>As <a href="https://liberalarts.du.edu/about/people/jared-del-rosso">a sociologist</a> who <a href="https://nyupress.org/9781479828968/denial">studies denial</a>, I analyze how people ignore clear truths and use rhetoric to convince others to deny them, too. Politicians and their media allies have long used this rhetoric to manage scandals. Trump and his supporters’ responses to the Jan. 6 investigation are no exception.</p>
<h2>Stages of denial</h2>
<p>Commonly, people think of denial as a state of being: Someone is “in denial” when they reject obvious truths. However, denial also consists of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/socf.12399">linguistic strategies</a> that people use to downplay their misconduct and avoid responsibility for it.</p>
<p>These strategies are remarkably adaptable. They’ve been used by both political parties to manage wildly different scandals. Even so, the strategies tend to be used in fairly predictable ways. Because of this, we can often see scandals unfold through clear stages of denial. </p>
<p>In my <a href="http://cup.columbia.edu/book/talking-about-torture/9780231170925">previous research on denial and U.S. torture</a>, I analyzed how the George W. Bush administration and supporters in Congress adjusted the forms of denial they used as new allegations and evidence of abuses in the global “war on terror” became public.</p>
<p>For instance, after photographs of <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/04/04/472964974/it-was-torture-an-abu-ghraib-interrogator-acknowledges-horrible-mistakes">torture at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq</a> were released in the spring of 2004, Abu Ghraib was described as a deplorable but <a href="https://www.academia.edu/21999356/The_Textual_Mediation_of_Denial_Congress_Abu_Ghraib_and_the_Construction_of_an_Isolated_Incident?from=cover_page">isolated incident</a>. At the time, there wasn’t serious public evidence of detainee abuse at other U.S. facilities.</p>
<p>Later revelations about the use of torture at <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43653932">Guantánamo Bay</a> and secret <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/sou060">CIA black sites</a> changed things. The Bush administration could no longer claim that torture was an isolated incident. Officials also faced allegations that they had <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/12/21/fbi-agents-allege-abuse-of-detainees-at-guantanamo-bay/8fb551bb-ac5b-4f74-b1c0-3b026e15f68b/">directly and knowingly authorized torture</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A museum display shows a wooden board the size of a person below the words 'What is torture?'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486010/original/file-20220921-8445-u0nvyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486010/original/file-20220921-8445-u0nvyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486010/original/file-20220921-8445-u0nvyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486010/original/file-20220921-8445-u0nvyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486010/original/file-20220921-8445-u0nvyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486010/original/file-20220921-8445-u0nvyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486010/original/file-20220921-8445-u0nvyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An exhibit on torture includes a section on waterboarding in the International Spy Museum in Washington in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SpyMuseum/c0624dc9a30845058afeed9579aaf222/photo?Query=waterboarding&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=40&currentItemNo=3">AP Photo/Jacquelyn Martin</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Facing these allegations, Bush and his supporters began justifying and downplaying torture. To many Americans, torture, once deplorable, was rebranded as <a href="https://www.reed.edu/poli_sci/faculty/rejali/articles/US_Public_Opinion_Torture_Gronke_Rejali.pdf">an acceptable national security tool</a>: “enhanced interrogation.” </p>
<p>As the debate about torture shows, political responses to scandal often begin with outright denials. But rarely do they end there. When politicians face credible evidence of political misconduct, they often try other forms of denial. Instead of saying allegations are untrue, they may downplay the seriousness of allegations, justify their behavior or try to distract from it.</p>
<p>It’s not just Republican administrations that use denial in this way. When the Obama administration could no longer <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/world/asia/12drones.html">outright deny civilian casualties</a> caused by drone strikes, it downplayed them. In a <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university">2013 national security speech</a>, President Barack Obama contrasted drone strikes with the use of “conventional air power or missiles,” which he described as “far less precise.” He also justified drone strikes, arguing that “to do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more civilian casualties.”</p>
<h2>Scandal strategies in play</h2>
<p>Americans watched the Jan. 6 insurrection on TV and social media as it happened. Given the vividness of the day, outright denials of the insurrection are particularly far-fetched and marginal – though they do exist. For example, some Trump supporters have claimed that left-wing “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/race-and-ethnicity-the-conversation-ec8606bc075f7922c9041f3068e4bc25">antifa</a>” groups breached the Capitol – a claim many <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/03/02/972564176/antifa-didnt-storm-the-capitol-just-ask-the-rioters">rioters themselves</a> have rejected.</p>
<p>Some of Trump’s supporters in Congress and the media have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/09/we-looked-antifa-capitol-we-couldnt-find-any/">repeated the claim</a> that the insurrection was staged to discredit Trump. But given Trump’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/01/trump-jan-6-rioters-pardon/">own vocal support for the insurrectionists</a>, supporters usually deploy more nuanced denials to downplay the day’s events. </p>
<p>So what happens when outright denial fails? From ordinary citizens to political elites, people often respond to allegations by “condemning the condemners,” accusing their accusers of exaggerating – or of doing worse things themselves, a strategy called “advantageous comparisons.”</p>
<p>Together, these two strategies paint those making accusations as untrustworthy or hypocritical. As I show in <a href="https://nyupress.org/9781479828968/denial">my new book on denial </a>, these are standard denials of those managing scandals. </p>
<p>“Condemning the condemners” and “advantageous comparisons” have been central to efforts to minimize the Jan. 6 insurrection, as well. Some critics of the committee downplay the insurrection by <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/false-equivalency-black-lives-matter-capitol-siege-experts/story?id=75251279">likening it to the Black Lives Matter protests</a>, despite the fact that <a href="https://acleddata.com/2020/09/03/demonstrations-political-violence-in-america-new-data-for-summer-2020/">the vast majority were peaceful</a>.</p>
<p>“For months, our cities burned, police stations burned, our businesses were shattered. And they said nothing. Or they cheer-led for it. And they fund-raised for it. And they allowed it to happen in the greatest country in the world,” Republican Rep. Matt Gaetz <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1LF6182o-4">said during Trump’s second impeachment</a>. “Now, some have cited the metaphor that the president lit the flames. Well, they lit actual flames, actual fires!” </p>
<p><a href="https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/commentary/we-need-congressional-investigation-the-2020-riots">Similar comparisons</a> reappeared amid the <a href="https://nypost.com/2022/06/15/the-hypocrisy-and-disconnect-of-the-partisan-jan-6-probe/">House select committee’s hearings</a>. One NFL coach called Jan. 6 a “<a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/06/09/1103906789/washington-commanders-defensive-coordinator-jack-del-rio-jan-6-riot-a-dust-up">dust-up</a>” by comparison to the Black Lives Matter protests. </p>
<p>These forms of denial do several things at once. They direct attention away from the original focus of the scandal. They minimize Trump’s role in inciting the violence of Jan. 6 by making the claim that Democrats incite even more destructive forms of violence. And they discredit the investigation by suggesting that those leading it are hypocrites, more interested in scoring political points than in curtailing political violence. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A small group of protesters in a circle, with a man holding a 'Trump won' poster in the middle." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486011/original/file-20220921-15489-rstvio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486011/original/file-20220921-15489-rstvio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486011/original/file-20220921-15489-rstvio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486011/original/file-20220921-15489-rstvio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486011/original/file-20220921-15489-rstvio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486011/original/file-20220921-15489-rstvio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486011/original/file-20220921-15489-rstvio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trump supporters and members of the far-right group Proud Boys gather during a ‘Justice for January 6th Vigil’ in New York on Jan. 6, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/CapitolRiotAnniversary/17950ea7bc0a4162b00f0b97ba71a308/photo?Query=trump%20capitol%20january%206&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=106&currentItemNo=29">AP Photo/Yuki Iwamura</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Trickle-down denial</h2>
<p>These denials may not sway a majority of Americans. Still, they’re consequential. Denial trickles down by providing ordinary citizens with scripts for talking about political scandals. Denials also reaffirm beliefs, allowing people to filter out information that contradicts what they hold to be true. Indeed, ordinary Americans <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/17/us/politics/Capitol-conspiracy-theories-blm-antifa.html">have adapted “advantageous comparisons</a>” to justify the insurrection. </p>
<p>This has happened before. For example, in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/socf.12035">a study of politically active Americans</a>, sociologists <a href="https://www.albany.edu/womensstudies/faculty/barbara-sutton">Barbara Sutton</a> and <a href="https://sociology.uoregon.edu/profile/norgaard/">Kari Marie Norgaard</a> found that some Americans adopted pro-torture politicians’ rhetoric – such as supporting “enhanced interrogation” and defending practices like waterboarding as a way to gather intelligence, even as they condemned “torture.” </p>
<p>For this reason, it’s important to recognize when politicians and the media draw from the denial’s playbook. By doing so, observers can better distinguish between genuine political disagreements and the predictable denials, which protect the most powerful by excusing their misconduct. </p>
<p><em>Article updated to indicate that the House select committee hearing scheduled for Sept. 28, 2022 was postponed on Sept. 27, 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188514/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jared Del Rosso has volunteered with the Center for Victims of Torture (CVT), a non-profit organization that engages in policy advocacy work. His partner was previously employed by CVT and currently consults with the organization. </span></em></p>There are genuine political disagreements, and then there are time-worn strategies for selling denial to the public. A sociologist breaks down the patterns.Jared Del Rosso, Associate Professor of Sociology and Criminology, University of DenverLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1846232022-07-05T12:15:55Z2022-07-05T12:15:55ZBuying into conspiracy theories can be exciting – that’s what makes them dangerous<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471454/original/file-20220628-14476-p4rpam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C22%2C5007%2C3330&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protester holds a Q sign as he waits to enter a campaign rally with then-President Donald Trump in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., in August 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/QAnonEventVegas/a4e2c53c530b45b8b3a6b1bce25ba084/photo?Query=qanon&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=107&currentItemNo=31">AP Photo/Matt Rourke</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Conspiracy theories have been around for centuries, from <a href="https://theconversation.com/most-witches-are-women-because-witch-hunts-were-all-about-persecuting-the-powerless-125427">witch trials</a> and antisemitic campaigns to <a href="https://archive.org/details/proofsofconspira00r">beliefs that Freemasons were trying to topple European monarchies</a>. In the mid-20th century, historian <a href="http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_celebrates/remarkable_columbians/richard_hofstadter.html">Richard Hofstadter</a> described a “<a href="https://harpers.org/archive/1964/11/the-paranoid-style-in-american-politics/">paranoid style</a>” that he observed in right-wing U.S. politics and culture: a blend of “heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy.”</p>
<p>But the “golden age” of conspiracy theories, it seems, is now. On June 24, 2022, the unknown leader of the QAnon conspiracy theory <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/25/technology/qanon-leader-returns.html">posted online</a> for the first time in over a year. QAnon’s enthusiasts tend to be ardent supporters of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-rise-of-a-conspiracy-candidate-65514">Donald Trump</a>, who made conspiracy theories <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98158-1">a signature feature of his political brand</a>, from Pizzagate and QAnon to “Stop the Steal” and <a href="https://theconversation.com/birtherism-trump-and-anti-black-racism-conspiracy-theorists-twist-evidence-to-maintain-status-quo-174444">the racist “birther” movement</a>. Key themes in conspiracy theories – like a sinister network of “pedophiles” and “groomers,” shadowy “bankers” and “globalists” – have <a href="https://theconversation.com/qanon-hasnt-gone-away-its-alive-and-kicking-in-states-across-the-country-154788">moved into the mainstream</a> of right-wing talking points.</p>
<p>Much of the commentary on conspiracy theories presumes that followers simply have bad information, <a href="https://www.wired.com/video/watch/why-you-can-never-argue-with-conspiracy-theorists">or not enough</a>, and that they can be helped along with a better diet of facts.</p>
<p>But anyone who talks to conspiracy theorists knows that they’re never short on details, or at least “<a href="https://theconversation.com/theres-no-such-thing-as-alternative-facts-5-ways-to-spot-misinformation-and-stop-sharing-it-online-152894">alternative facts</a>.” They have plenty of information, but they insist that it be interpreted in a particular way – the way that feels most exciting. </p>
<p><a href="https://rels.sas.upenn.edu/people/donovan-schaefer">My research</a> focuses on how emotion <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/religious-affects">drives human experience</a>, including strong beliefs. In <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/wild-experiment">my latest book</a>, I argue that confronting conspiracy theories requires understanding the feelings that make them so appealing – and the way those feelings shape what seems reasonable to devotees. If we want to understand why people believe what they believe, we need to look not just at the content of their thoughts, but how that information feels to them. Just as the “X-Files” predicted, conspiracy theories’ acolytes “want to believe.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A blue and green poster shows a UFO above a forest and the words 'I want to believe.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471693/original/file-20220629-17-oifdvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471693/original/file-20220629-17-oifdvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471693/original/file-20220629-17-oifdvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471693/original/file-20220629-17-oifdvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471693/original/file-20220629-17-oifdvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1009&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471693/original/file-20220629-17-oifdvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1009&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471693/original/file-20220629-17-oifdvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1009&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Our desire to feel a certain way can drive our beliefs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/illustration/i-want-to-believe-with-background-for-world-royalty-free-illustration/983343934?adppopup=true">Olexandr Nitsevych/iStock via Getty Images Plus</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Thinking and feeling</h2>
<p>Over 100 years ago, the American psychologist <a href="https://psychology.fas.harvard.edu/people/william-james">William James</a> <a href="https://www.uky.edu/%7Eeushe2/Pajares/JamesSentimentOfRationality">noted</a>: “The transition from a state of perplexity to one of resolve is full of lively pleasure and relief.” In other words, confusion doesn’t feel good, but certainty certainly does.</p>
<p>He was deeply interested in an issue that is urgent today: how information feels, and why thinking about the world in a particular way might be <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12522">exciting or exhilarating</a> – so much so that it becomes <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20211001-i-feel-like-i-ve-lost-him-families-torn-apart-by-conspiracy-theories">difficult to see the world in any other way</a>.</p>
<p>James called this the “<a href="https://www.uky.edu/%7Eeushe2/Pajares/JamesSentimentOfRationality">sentiment of rationality</a>”: the feelings that go along with thinking. People often talk about thinking and feeling as though they’re separate, but James realized that they’re inextricably related.</p>
<p>For instance, he believed that the best science was driven forward by the excitement of discovery – which he said was “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2246769?seq=1">caviar</a>” for scientists – but also anxiety about getting things wrong.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A black and white photograph shows two men posed next to each other in suits." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471481/original/file-20220628-25-i03jlv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471481/original/file-20220628-25-i03jlv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471481/original/file-20220628-25-i03jlv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471481/original/file-20220628-25-i03jlv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471481/original/file-20220628-25-i03jlv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471481/original/file-20220628-25-i03jlv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471481/original/file-20220628-25-i03jlv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Psychologist William James, right, next to his brother, the famous novelist Henry James.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/henry-james-novelist-and-his-brother-psychologist-william-news-photo/514865914?adppopup=true">Bettmann/Bettmann via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The allure of the 2%</h2>
<p>So how does conspiracy theory feel? First of all, it lets you feel like you’re smarter than everyone. Political scientist <a href="https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/directory/michael-barkun">Michael Barkun</a> points out that conspiracy theory devotees love what he calls “<a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520276826/a-culture-of-conspiracy">stigmatized knowledge</a>,” sources that are obscure or even looked down upon.</p>
<p>In fact, the more obscure the source is, the more true believers want to trust it. This is the stock in trade of popular podcast “<a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/01/21/1074442185/joe-rogan-doctor-covid-podcast-spotify-misinformation">The Joe Rogan Experience</a>” – “scientists” who present themselves as the lone voice in the wilderness and are somehow seen as more credible because they’ve been repudiated by their colleagues. Ninety-eight percent of scientists may agree on something, but the conspiracy mindset imagines the other 2% are really on to something. This allows conspiracists to see themselves as “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3790">critical thinkers</a>” who have separated themselves from the pack, rather than outliers who have fallen for a snake oil pitch.</p>
<p>One of the most exciting parts of a conspiracy theory is that it makes everything make sense. We all know the pleasure of solving a puzzle: the “click” of satisfaction when you complete a Wordle, crossword or sudoku. But of course, the whole point of games is that they simplify things. Detective shows are the same: All the clues are right there on the screen. </p>
<h2>Powerful appeal</h2>
<p>But what if the whole world were like that? In essence, that’s the illusion of conspiracy theory. All the answers are there, and everything fits with everything else. The big players are sinister and devious – but not as smart as you.</p>
<p>QAnon works like <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/qanon-game-plays-believers/2021/05/10/31d8ea46-928b-11eb-a74e-1f4cf89fd948_story.html">a massive live-action video game</a> in which a showrunner teases viewers with tantalizing clues. Followers make every detail into something profoundly significant. </p>
<p>When Donald Trump <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-usa-trump-quotes-fact/factbox-selected-quotes-as-u-s-president-trump-tests-positive-for-covid-19-idUSKBN26N0QJ">announced his COVID-19 diagnosis</a>, for instance, he tweeted, “We will get through this TOGETHER.” QAnon followers <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/oct/03/trump-coronavirus-conspiracy-theory-qanon">saw this as a signal</a> that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/05/opinion/qanon-hillary-clinton.html">their long-sought endgame</a> – Hillary Clinton arrested and convicted of unspeakable crimes – was finally in play. They thought the capitalized word “TOGETHER” was code for “TO GET HER,” and that Trump was saying that his diagnosis was a feint in order to beat the “deep state.” For devotees, it was a perfectly crafted puzzle with a neatly thrilling solution.</p>
<p>It’s important to remember that conspiracy theory very often <a href="https://theconversation.com/conspiracy-theories-fuel-prejudice-towards-minority-groups-113508">goes hand in hand</a> with racism – <a href="https://forward.com/culture/502541/four-reasons-why-a-racist-and-antisemitic-theory-has-become-so-popular-and-why-we-need-to-stop-it/">anti-Black racism</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/18/great-replacement-the-conspiracy-theory-stoking-racist-violence">anti-immigrant racism</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-antisemitic-conspiracy-theories-contributed-to-the-recent-hostage-taking-at-the-texas-synagogue-175229">antisemitism</a> and <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/trump-resurrects-conspiracy-theories-about-huma-abedin/story-AQPr91YlOXfeHWsTt4AMLK.html">Islamophobia</a>. People who craft conspiracies – or are willing to exploit them – know how <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/0048721X.2020.1810817">emotionally powerful</a> these racist beliefs are.</p>
<p>It’s also key to avoid saying that conspiracy theories are “simply” irrational or emotional. What James realized is that all thinking is related to feeling – whether we’re learning about the world in useful ways or whether we’re being led astray by our own biases. As cultural theorist <a href="https://news.uchicago.edu/story/lauren-berlant-preeminent-literary-scholar-and-cultural-theorist-1957-2021">Lauren Berlant</a> <a href="https://thenewinquiry.com/trump-or-political-emotions/">wrote in 2016</a>, “All the messages are emotional,” no matter which political party they come from.</p>
<p>Conspiracy theories encourage their followers to see themselves as the only ones with their eyes open, and everyone else as “sheeple.” But paradoxically, this fantasy leads to self-delusion – and helping followers recognize that can be a first step. Unraveling their beliefs requires the patient work of persuading devotees that the world is just a more boring, more random, less interesting place than one might have hoped.</p>
<p>Part of why conspiracy theories have such a strong hold is that they have flashes of truth: There really are elites who hold themselves above the law; there really is exploitation, violence and inequality. But the best way to unmask abuses of power isn’t to take shortcuts – a critical point in “<a href="https://www.climatechangecommunication.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ConspiracyTheoryHandbook.pdf">Conspiracy Theory Handbook</a>,” a guide to combating them that was written by <a href="https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/conspiracy-theory-handbook/">experts on climate change denial</a>.</p>
<p>To make progress, we have to patiently prove what’s happening – to research, learn and find the most plausible interpretation of the evidence, not the one that’s most fun.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184623/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Donovan Schaefer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Overcoming conspiracy theories isn’t just about information. A scholar of religion explains that the emotions they inspire are part of their appeal.Donovan Schaefer, Assistant Professor of Religious Studies, University of PennsylvaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1753142022-03-30T12:38:54Z2022-03-30T12:38:54ZWhat the new science of authenticity says about discovering your true self<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453181/original/file-20220321-92108-1ktfp6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C92%2C5085%2C3326&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Studies show that feelings of ease and comfort in a given situation – what psychologists call 'fluency' – are tied to feelings of authenticity.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/mature-woman-laughing-royalty-free-image/1303348926?adppopup=true">Tara Moore/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After following a white rabbit down a hole in the ground and changing sizes several times, Alice finds herself wondering “Who in the world am I?”</p>
<p>This scene, from Lewis Carroll’s “<a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/files/11/11-h/11-h.htm">Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland</a>,” might resonate with you:
In a world that’s constantly changing, it can be challenging to find your authentic self.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.selfmindsociety.com">I am a social psychologist</a>, and over the past few years my colleagues and I have been <a href="https://psyarxiv.com/8mh7x/">conducting research</a> to better understand what it means to be authentic. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1089268019829474">Our findings</a> provide some valuable insights that not only shed light on what is meant by authenticity – a somewhat vague term whose definition has been debated – but can also offer some tips for how to tap into your true self.</p>
<h2>What is authenticity?</h2>
<p>In “<a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674808614">Sincerity and Authenticity</a>,” literary critic and professor Lionel Trilling described how society in past centuries was held together by the commitment of people to fulfilling their stations in life, whether they were blacksmiths or barons.</p>
<p>Trilling argued that people in modern societies are much less willing to give up their individuality, and instead value authenticity.</p>
<p>But what, exactly, did he mean by authenticity?</p>
<p>Like Trilling, many modern philosophers also understood authenticity as a kind of individuality. For example, Søren Kierkegaard believed that being authentic <a href="https://lithub.com/on-kierkegaard-authenticity-and-how-a-person-should-be/">meant breaking from cultural and social constraints</a> and living a self-determined life. The German philosopher Martin Heidegger <a href="https://www.harpercollins.com/products/being-and-time-martin-heidegger">equated authenticity to accepting who you are today</a> and living up to all the potential you have in the future. Writing many decades after Heidegger, the French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre had a <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sartre/">similar idea</a>: People have the freedom to interpret themselves, and their experiences, however they like. So being true to oneself means living as the person you think yourself to be.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Man stands on balcony holding a cigarette." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453176/original/file-20220320-19-1uu15kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453176/original/file-20220320-19-1uu15kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453176/original/file-20220320-19-1uu15kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453176/original/file-20220320-19-1uu15kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453176/original/file-20220320-19-1uu15kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453176/original/file-20220320-19-1uu15kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/453176/original/file-20220320-19-1uu15kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Philosophers like Jean-Paul Sartre have long viewed authenticity through the lens of understanding yourself and what makes you unique.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/jean-paul-sartre-in-paris-france-in-1966-writer-and-news-photo/120446182?adppopup=true">Dominique Berretty/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Common among these different perspectives is the notion that there is something about a person that represents who they really are. If we could only find the true self hidden behind the false self, we could live a perfectly authentic life.</p>
<p>This is how contemporary psychologists <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0167.55.3.385">understood authenticity</a> as well – at least at first.</p>
<h2>The authentic personality</h2>
<p>In an attempt to define authenticity, psychologists in the early 21st century <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(06)38006-9">started to characterize</a> what an authentic person looks like. </p>
<p>They settled on some criteria: An authentic person is supposed to be self-aware and willing to learn what makes them who they really are. Once an authentic person gains insight into their true self, they will aim to be unbiased about it – choosing not to delude themselves and distort the reality of who they are. After deciding what defines the true self, the authentic person will then behave in a way that is true to those characteristics, and avoid being “false” or “fake” merely to please others.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0167.55.3.385">Some researchers</a> have used this framework to create measurement scales that can test how authentic a person is. In this view, authenticity is a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/h0075406">psychological trait</a> – a part of someone’s personality. </p>
<p>But my colleagues and I felt there was more to the experience of authenticity – something that goes beyond a list of characteristics or certain ways of living. In our <a href="https://psyarxiv.com/8mh7x/">most recent work</a>, we explain why this traditional definition of authenticity might be falling short.</p>
<h2>Thinking is hard</h2>
<p>Have you ever found yourself trying to analyze your own thoughts or feelings about something, only to make yourself more confused? The poet <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Collected-Poems-Roethke/aeee3fde60d98a3c637bdeff6676f60d2284fdfb">Theodore Roethke once wrote</a> that “self-contemplation is a curse, that makes an old confusion worse.” </p>
<p>And there’s a growing body of psychological research supporting this idea. Thinking, on its own, is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1250830">surprisingly effortful and even a little bit boring</a>, and people will do almost anything to avoid it. One study found they’ll even <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1250830">shock themselves</a> to avoid having to sit with their own thoughts.</p>
<p>This is a problem for a definition of authenticity that requires people to think about who they are and then act on that knowledge in an unbiased way. We don’t find thinking very enjoyable, and even when we do, our <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0033-295X.84.3.231">reflection and introspection abilities</a> are rather poor.</p>
<p>Fortunately, our research gets around this problem by defining authenticity not as something about a person, but as a feeling.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Statue of man hunched over resting chin on hand." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455005/original/file-20220329-27-4mmg1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455005/original/file-20220329-27-4mmg1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455005/original/file-20220329-27-4mmg1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455005/original/file-20220329-27-4mmg1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455005/original/file-20220329-27-4mmg1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455005/original/file-20220329-27-4mmg1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455005/original/file-20220329-27-4mmg1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Humans aren’t great at introspection – and would often rather avoid thinking to begin with.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-thinker-by-french-sculptor-auguste-rodin-on-display-at-news-photo/832292966?adppopup=true">Fiona Hanson/PA Images via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>When something feels ‘right’</h2>
<p>We propose that authenticity is a feeling that people interpret as a sign that what they are doing in the moment aligns with their true self. </p>
<p>Importantly, this view does not require people to know what their true self is, nor do they need to have a true self at all. According to this view, an authentic person can look many different ways; and as long as something feels authentic, it is. Although <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0963721417713296">we are not the first to take this view</a>, our research aims to describe exactly what this feeling is like.</p>
<p>This is where we depart a bit from tradition. We propose that the feeling of authenticity is actually <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.014">an experience of fluency</a>.</p>
<p>Have you ever been playing a sport, reading a book, or having a conversation, and had the feeling that it was just right? </p>
<p>This is what some psychologists call fluency, or the subjective experience of ease associated with an experience. Fluency usually happens outside of our immediate awareness – in what psychologist William James called <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S1053-8100(03)00049-7">fringe consciousness</a>.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://psyarxiv.com/8mh7x/">our research</a>, this feeling of fluency might contribute to feelings of authenticity. </p>
<p>In one study, we asked U.S. adults to recall the last activity they did and to rate how fluent it felt. We found that, regardless of the activity – whether it was work, leisure or something else – people felt more authentic the more fluent the activity was.</p>
<h2>Getting in the way of fluency</h2>
<p>We were also able to show that when an activity becomes less fluent, people feel less authentic. </p>
<p>To do this, we asked participants to list some attributes that describe who they really are. However, sometimes we asked them to try to remember complicated strings of numbers at the same time, which increased their <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-1-4419-8126-4#about">cognitive load</a>. At the end, participants answered some questions about how authentic they felt while completing the task.</p>
<p>As we predicted, the participants felt less authentic when they had to think about their attributes under cognitive load, because being forced to do the memory task at the same time created a distraction that impeded fluency.</p>
<p>At the same time, this doesn’t necessarily mean you’re not being authentic if you take on challenging tasks.</p>
<p>While some people may interpret feelings of unease as a hint that they aren’t being true to themselves, in some cases difficulty might be <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/2017-25134-003.html">interpreted as importance</a>. </p>
<p>Research by a team of psychologists led by Daphna Oyserman has shown that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672211065595">people have different personal theories</a> about ease and difficulty when carrying out tasks. Sometimes when something is too easy it feels “not worth our time.” Conversely, when something gets difficult – or when life gives us lemons – we might see it as especially important and worth doing. </p>
<p>We choose to make lemonade instead of giving up. </p>
<p>This might mean that there are times when we feel particularly true to ourselves when the going gets tough – as long as we interpret that difficulty as important to who we are.</p>
<h2>Trust your gut</h2>
<p>As romantic as it sounds to have a true self that’s merely hiding behind a false one, it probably isn’t that simple. But that doesn’t mean authenticity shouldn’t be an something to strive for. </p>
<p>Seeking fluency – and avoiding internal conflict – is probably a pretty good way to stay on the path to being true to yourself, pursuing what is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691616689495">morally good</a> and knowing when you’re “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868317734080">in the right place</a>.” </p>
<p>When you go searching for the self in a sea of change, you might find yourself feeling like Alice in Wonderland. </p>
<p>But the new science of authenticity suggests that if you let feelings of fluency be your guide, you might find what you’ve been looking for all along. </p>
<p>[<em>Get fascinating science, health and technology news.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=science&source=inline-science-fascinating">Sign up for The Conversation’s weekly science newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175314/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Baldwin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What if cultivating your authentic self doesn’t involve self-reflection, but instead means focusing on what feels good and natural?Matthew Baldwin, Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1740342022-01-18T13:40:48Z2022-01-18T13:40:48ZFact-checking may be important, but it won’t help Americans learn to disagree better<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440135/original/file-20220110-23-1ml31og.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C0%2C5472%2C3628&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">You're not the only one having trouble discerning the truth.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/pregnant-woman-with-pc-tablet-remembering-important-royalty-free-image/1210098351">nicoletaionescu/iStock/Getty Images Plus</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Entering the new year, Americans are increasingly divided. They clash not only over differing opinions on COVID-19 risk or abortion, but basic facts like election counts and whether vaccines work. Surveying rising political antagonism, journalist George Packer recently <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/01/imagine-death-american-democracy-trump-insurrection/620841/">wondered in The Atlantic</a>, “Are we doomed?”</p>
<p>It is common to blame people who are intentionally distributing false information for these divisions. Nobel Prize-winning journalist Maria Ressa says Facebook’s “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/oct/09/facebook-biased-against-facts-nobel-peace-prize-winner-philippines-maria-ressa-misinformation">[bias] against facts</a>” threatens democracy. Others lament losing the “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/26/democracy-requires-shared-sense-reality-america-is-failing-test/">shared sense of reality</a>” and “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/11/why-obama-fears-for-our-democracy/617087/">common baseline of fact</a>” thought to be a prerequisite for democracy.</p>
<p>Fact-checking, the rigorous independent verification of claims, is often presented as vital for fighting falsehoods. Elena Hernandez, a spokesperson for YouTube, <a href="https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2022/youtube-misinformation-fact-checking-letter/">states that</a> “Fact checking is a crucial tool to help viewers make their own informed decisions” and “to address the spread of misinformation.” Ariel Riera, head of Argentina-based fact-checking organization Chequeado, <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/medialse/2020/03/27/fact-checking-matters-now-more-than-ever/">argues</a> that fact checking and “quality information” are key in the fight against “the COVID-19 ‘infodemic.‘”</p>
<p>Many people, including TV commentator <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/john-oliver-tackles-whatsapp-misinformation-immigrants-rcna2861">John Oliver</a>, are <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/10/28/misinformation-spanish-facebook-social-media/">demanding</a> that social media platforms better flag and combat the “flood of lies.” And worried Twitter engineers sought to “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/11/01/twitter-climate-disinformation/">pre-bunk</a>” viral falsehoods before they arose during the United Nations’ Glasgow climate summit in 2021. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=pgIYWJUAAAAJ">social scientist</a> who researches the role of truth in a democracy, I believe this response to Americans’ deepening political divisions is missing something. </p>
<p>Fact-checking may be vital for media literacy, discouraging politicians from lying and correcting the journalistic record. But I worry about citizens hoping for too much from fact-checking, and that fact checks oversimplify and distort Americans’ political conflicts. </p>
<p>Whether democracy requires a shared sense of reality or not, the more fundamental prerequisite is that citizens are capable of civilly working through their disagreements. </p>
<h2>Curing misinformation?</h2>
<p>Misinformation is no doubt troubling. COVID-19 fatalities and vaccine refusal are <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/12/05/1059828993/data-vaccine-misinformation-trump-counties-covid-death-rate">much higher</a> among Republicans, who are more likely to believe unproven claims that COVID-19 deaths are intentionally exaggerated or that the vaccine harms reproductive health. And studies find that exposure to misinformation is <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-021-01056-1">correlated with a reduced willingness</a> to get vaccinated. </p>
<p>Brookings Institution researchers found fact-checking <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/when-are-readers-likely-to-believe-a-fact-check/">mostly influences the politically uncommitted</a> – those who do not have much information about an issue, rather than those who have inaccurate information. And debunking can <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/12/vaccine-myth-busting-can-backfire/383700/">backfire</a>: Informing people that the flu shot cannot cause the flu or that the MMR injection is safe for children may make vaccine skeptics even more hesitant. Some participants in a study appeared to reject the information because it threatened their worldview. But some scientists <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7462781/">say</a> that fact-checking only very rarely backfires. </p>
<p>A 2019 experiment found that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-019-0632-4">carefully crafted rebuttals to misinformation</a> could dull the effects of false claims about vaccines or climate change, even for conservatives. </p>
<p>Still, a 2020 meta-analysis, a study that systematically combines dozens of research findings, concluded that fact-checking’s impact on people’s beliefs is “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2019.1668894">quite weak</a>.” The more that a study looked like the real world, the less fact-checking changed participants’ minds.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440136/original/file-20220110-17-17d86us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people sit and stand in a meeting room" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440136/original/file-20220110-17-17d86us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440136/original/file-20220110-17-17d86us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=318&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/440136/original/file-20220110-17-17d86us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=318&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/440136/original/file-20220110-17-17d86us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=318&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/440136/original/file-20220110-17-17d86us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/440136/original/file-20220110-17-17d86us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/440136/original/file-20220110-17-17d86us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">When citizens of differing views meet up, getting them working together may be more effective than getting them to agree on specific facts.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-jackman-town-office-was-filled-with-50-residents-to-news-photo/909720354">David Leaming/Portland Portland Press Herald via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Not that simple</h2>
<p>The task of fact-checking also comes with its own set of problems. In my view, when the science is complex and uncertain, fact-checking’s biggest risk is exaggerating scientific consensus. </p>
<p>For example, the idea that COVID-19 might have emerged, or escaped, from a Wuhan, China, laboratory was labeled as “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/01/was-new-coronavirus-accidentally-released-wuhan-lab-its-doubtful">doubtful</a>” in 2020 by The Washington Post’s fact-checkers. Facebook flagged it as “<a href="https://unherd.com/thepost/facebook-censors-award-winning-journalist-for-criticising-the-who/">false information</a>” in early 2021. But <a href="https://undark.org/2021/03/17/lab-leak-science-lost-in-politics/">many scientists</a> think the hypothesis <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02903-x">merits investigation</a>.</p>
<p>Or consider how <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2021/08/13/fact-check-vaccine-has-benefits-even-those-past-covid-19-infections/5545009001/">USA Today has labeled as “false”</a> the idea that “natural” immunity protects as well as vaccination. The newspaper’s fact-checkers only cited a recent <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/covid-vaccines-offer-five-times-more-protection-immunity-catching-virus-cdc-1644106">Centers for Disease Control and Prevention study</a> and did not address earlier <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/having-sars-cov-2-once-confers-much-greater-immunity-vaccine-vaccination-remains-vital">Israeli research</a> suggesting the exact opposite. When fact-checkers show limited views of the facts in a scientific debate, they can leave citizens with the impression that the science is settled when it really may not be.</p>
<p>Exaggerating the certainty of science can undermine public trust in science and journalism. When <a href="https://factcheck.afp.com/coronavirus-protection-masks-hawked-misleading-video-ad-facebook">fact checks</a> about masking <a href="https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/12/15/fact-check-covid-19-tests-real-and-masks-do-work/3824781001/">flip-flopped</a> in 2020, some people wondered whether the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/05/opinion/omicron-covid-testing-cdc.html">experts behind the fact checks were being genuine</a>. </p>
<p>Also lost in worries about the dangers of misinformation is the reality that factually dubious speech can be politically important. A screed against the MMR vaccine might repeat a discredited claim about immunization causing autism, but it also contains <a href="https://upittpress.org/books/9780822966906/">vital political facts</a>: Some people distrust the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the pharmaceutical industry and resent the amount of control they feel that state health officials wield over them. </p>
<p>Citizens don’t just need to be alerted to potential misinformation. They need to know why other people are skeptical of officials and their facts.</p>
<h2>No winners, no losers</h2>
<p>The problems that Americans face are often too complex for fact-checking. And people’s conflicts run far deeper than a belief in falsehoods. </p>
<p>Maybe it is better to let go, at least a little, of the idea that Americans must occupy a shared reality. The point of political systems is to peaceably resolve conflicts. It may be less important to our democracy that the media focus on factual clarity, and more vital that it helps people to disagree more civilly. </p>
<p>Psychologist Peter Coleman studies how people discuss contentious issues. He has found that those conversations <a href="https://www.yesmagazine.org/social-justice/2019/07/11/hard-conversations-solve-conflicts">aren’t constructive</a> when participants think of them in terms of truth and falsehood or pro and con positions, which tend to spur feelings of contempt. </p>
<p>Rather, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/27/make-america-talk-again-how-to-bridge-the-partisan-divide">productive discussions</a> about difficult topics happen by encouraging participants to see reality as complex. Simply reading an essay highlighting the contradictions and ambiguities in an issue leads people to argue less and converse more. The focus becomes mutual learning rather than being right. </p>
<p>But it isn’t clear how best to bring Coleman’s findings out of the laboratory and into the world. </p>
<p>I propose that news outlets offer not only fact checks but also “disagreement checks.”</p>
<p>Rather than label the “lab leak” hypothesis or “natural immunity” idea as true or false, disagreement checkers would highlight the complicated sub-issues involved. They would show how the uncertain science looks very different depending on people’s values and level of trust. </p>
<p>Disagreement checks would be less concerned, for instance, with <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/media/cnn-don-lemon-joe-rogan-horse-dewormer-ivermectin">the correctness</a> of calling ivermectin a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/10/21/joe-rogan-cnn-ivermectin-statement-gupta/">“horse dewormer”</a>. Instead they would focus on exploring why some citizens might favor untested treatments over the vaccine, focusing on reasons other than misinformation.</p>
<p>Maybe some combination of fact-checking and other tools can <a href="https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2018/the-week-in-fact-checking-these-people-are-trying-to-solve-fake-news/">curb the public’s susceptibility to</a> being misled. But by focusing a little less on the facts and more on the complexities of the problems that divide them, Americans can take one big step back from the abyss, and toward each other.</p>
<p>[<em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Taylor Dotson receives funding from the Fulbright Scholar Program.</span></em></p>Fact-checking risks oversimplifying and distorting Americans’ political conflicts, while not actually helping people find ways to work together productively.Taylor Dotson, Associate Professor of Social Science, New Mexico TechLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1584912021-04-21T12:24:57Z2021-04-21T12:24:57ZMisinformation, disinformation and hoaxes: What’s the difference?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394818/original/file-20210413-19-1x3ilue.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C23%2C5263%2C3574&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The flood of information can be overwhelming.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/illustration/sad-young-woman-covering-ears-royalty-free-illustration/1290377914">Rudzhan Nagiev/iStock/Getty Images Plus</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sorting through the vast amount of information created and shared online is challenging, even for the experts.</p>
<p>Just talking about this ever-shifting landscape is confusing, with terms like “misinformation,” “disinformation” and “hoax” getting mixed up with buzzwords like “fake news.” </p>
<p>Misinformation is perhaps the most innocent of the terms – it’s misleading information created or shared without the intent to manipulate people. An example would be sharing a rumor that a celebrity died, before finding out it’s false.</p>
<p>Disinformation, by contrast, refers to deliberate attempts to confuse or manipulate people with dishonest information. These campaigns, at times orchestrated by groups outside the U.S., such as the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2019.05.027">Internet Research Agency, a well-known Russian troll factory</a>, can be coordinated across multiple social media accounts and may also use <a href="https://theconversation.com/on-twitter-bots-spread-conspiracy-theories-and-qanon-talking-points-149039">automated systems, called bots</a>, to post and share information online. Disinformation can turn into misinformation when spread by unwitting readers who believe the material.</p>
<p>Hoaxes, similar to disinformation, are created to persuade people that things that are unsupported by facts are true. For example, the person responsible for the celebrity-death story has created a hoax.</p>
<p>Though many people are just paying attention to these problems now, they are not new – and they even date back to ancient Rome. Around 31 B.C., Octavian, a Roman military official, launched a smear campaign against his political enemy, Mark Antony. This effort used, as one writer put it, “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/aaf2bb08-dca2-11e6-86ac-f253db7791c61">short, sharp slogans written on coins in the style of archaic Tweets</a>.” His campaign was built around the point that Antony was a soldier gone awry: a philanderer, a womanizer and a drunk not fit to hold office. It worked. Octavian, not Antony, became the first Roman emperor, taking the name Augustus Caesar. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393648/original/file-20210406-21-rcrhin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chart showing various categories of misinformation and disinformation" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393648/original/file-20210406-21-rcrhin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393648/original/file-20210406-21-rcrhin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=848&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393648/original/file-20210406-21-rcrhin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=848&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393648/original/file-20210406-21-rcrhin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=848&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393648/original/file-20210406-21-rcrhin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1066&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393648/original/file-20210406-21-rcrhin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1066&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393648/original/file-20210406-21-rcrhin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1066&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">There are several subcategories of misinformation and disinformation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://groundviews.org/2018/05/12/infographic-10-types-of-mis-and-disinformation/">Groundviews</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The University of Missouri example</h2>
<p>In the 21st century, new technology makes manipulation and fabrication of information simple. Social networks make it easy for uncritical readers to dramatically amplify falsehoods peddled by governments, populist politicians and dishonest businesses.</p>
<p>Our research focuses specifically on how <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipm.2020.102303">certain types of disinformation</a> can turn what might otherwise be normal developments in society into major disruptions. </p>
<p>One sobering example we’ve reviewed in detail is a situation you might remember: racial tensions at the University of Missouri in 2015, in the wake of <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/10/the-cop">Michael Brown’s death in Ferguson, Missouri</a>. One of us, Michael O'Brien, was dean of the university’s College of Arts and Science at the time and saw firsthand the protests and their aftermath.</p>
<p>Black students at the university, just over 100 miles to the west of Ferguson, raised concerns about their safety, civil rights and racial equity in society and on campus. Unhappy with the university’s responses, they <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/09/us/university-of-missouri-enrollment-protests-fallout.html">began to protest</a>.</p>
<p>The incident that got the most national attention involved a white professor in the communication department pushing student journalists away from an area where Black students had congregated in the center of campus, yelling, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/10/us/university-missouri-protesters-block-journalists-press-freedom.html">I need some muscle over here!</a>” in an effort to keep reporters at bay.</p>
<p>Other events didn’t get as much national coverage, including a <a href="https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/missteps-not-student-revolt-led-to-mizzou-chancellors-demise/article_f955e9cf-6fc8-5fb0-b2cc-1b798d53fccc.html">hunger strike by a Black student and the resignations of university leaders</a>. But there was enough publicity about racial tensions for <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-4/Prier.pdf">Russian information warriors to take notice</a>.</p>
<p>Soon, the hashtag #PrayforMizzou, created by Russian hackers using the university’s nickname, began trending on Twitter, warning residents that the <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-4/Prier.pdf">Ku Klux Klan was in town and had joined the local police to hunt down Black students</a>. A photo surfaced on Facebook purporting to show a large white cross burning on the lawn of the university’s library.</p>
<p>A Twitter user claimed the police were marching with the KKK, tweeting: “They beat up my little brother! Watch out!” and a picture of a black child with a severely bruised face. This user was later found to be <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-4/Prier.pdf">a Russian troll who went on to spread rumors about Syrian refugees</a>.</p>
<p>These were a rich mix of different types of false information. The photos of the burning cross and the bruised child were hoaxes – the photos were legitimate, but their context was fabricated. A Google search for “bruised black child,” for example, revealed that it was a <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-4/Prier.pdf">year-old picture from a disturbance in Ohio</a>.</p>
<p>The rumor about the KKK on campus started as <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-4/Prier.pdf">disinformation by Russian hackers</a> and then spread as misinformation, even <a href="https://www.fox61.com/article/news/local/outreach/awareness-months/one-person-in-custody-after-making-threats-to-university-of-missouri-students/520-91c7575b-f651-4415-bb0a-bb36758b325e">ensnaring the student-body president</a>, a young Black man who posted a warning on Facebook. When it became clear the information was false, he deleted the post. </p>
<h2>The fallout</h2>
<p>Undoubtedly, not all of the fallout from the Mizzou protests was the direct result of disinformation and hoaxes. But the disruptions were factors in big changes in student numbers. </p>
<p>In the two years following the protests, the university saw a <a href="https://www.columbiatribune.com/news/20170515/university-of-missouri-enrollment-to-decline-more-than-7-percent-400-jobs-to-be-eliminated">35% drop in freshman enrollment and an overall enrollment drop of 14%</a>. That caused campus university officials to cut about <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/09/us/university-of-missouri-enrollment-protests-fallout.html">12% – or US$55 million</a> – from the university’s budget, including significant layoffs of faculty and staff. Even today, the campus is not yet back to what it was before the protests, financially, socially or politically.</p>
<p>The take-home message is clear: the world is a dangerous place, made all the more so by malevolent intent, especially in the online age. Learning to recognize misinformation, disinformation and hoaxes helps people stay better informed about what’s really happening.</p>
<p>[<em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158491/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Though many people are just paying attention to these problems now, they are not new – and they even date back to ancient Rome.Michael J. O'Brien, Vice President for Academic Affairs and Provost, Texas A&M University-San AntonioIzzat Alsmadi, Associate Professor of Computing and Cybersecurity, Texas A&M University-San AntonioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1570992021-03-18T12:19:39Z2021-03-18T12:19:39Z7 ways to avoid becoming a misinformation superspreader<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389858/original/file-20210316-16-1ifjiq8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=14%2C14%2C4778%2C3671&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Identify and stop the lies.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/illustration/big-hand-with-cartoon-character-stop-sign-royalty-free-illustration/1292878719">NLshop/iStock via Getty Images Plus</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The problem of misinformation isn’t going away. Internet platforms like Facebook and Twitter have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-twitter-idUSKCN2590FU">taken some steps to curb its spread</a> and say they are working on doing more. But no method yet introduced has been completely successful at removing all misleading content from social media. The best defense, then, is self-defense. </p>
<p>Misleading or outright false information – broadly called “misinformation” – can come from websites pretending to be news outlets, political propaganda or “<a href="http://source.sheridancollege.ca/fhass_huma_publ/1">pseudo-profound</a>” reports that seem meaningful but are not. Disinformation is a type of misinformation that is deliberately generated to maliciously mislead people. Disinformation is intentionally shared, knowing it is false, but misinformation can be <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0239666">shared by people who don’t know it’s not true</a>, especially because people often share links online <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/dont-want-to-fall-for-fake-news-dont-be-lazy/">without thinking</a>.</p>
<p>Emerging psychology research has revealed some tactics that can help protect our society from misinformation. Here are seven strategies you can use to avoid being misled, and to prevent yourself – and others – from spreading inaccuracies.</p>
<h2>1. Educate yourself</h2>
<p>The best inoculation against what the World Health Organization is calling the “<a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/immunizing-the-public-against-misinformation">infodemic</a>” is to understand the <a href="https://theconversation.com/10-ways-to-spot-online-misinformation-132246">tricks that agents of disinformation are using</a> to try to manipulate you.</p>
<p>One strategy is called “<a href="https://www.spsp.org/news-center/blog/roozenbeek-van-der-linden-resisting-digital-misinformation">prebunking</a>” – a type of debunking that happens before you hear myths and lies. Research has shown that <a href="https://doi.org/10.5334/joc.91">familiarizing yourself with the tricks of the disinformation trade</a> can help you <a href="https://doi.apa.org/doi/10.1037/xap0000315">recognize false stories</a> when you encounter them, making you less susceptible to those tricks.</p>
<p>Researchers at the University of Cambridge have developed an online game called “<a href="https://www.getbadnews.com/">Bad News</a>,” which their studies have shown can <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-027">improve players’ identification of falsehoods</a>.</p>
<p>In addition to the game, you can also learn more about how <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1920498117">internet and social media platforms work</a>, so you better understand the tools available to people seeking to manipulate you. You can also learn more about <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/sce.21581">scientific research and standards of evidence</a>, which can help you be <a href="https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.201199">less susceptible to lies and misleading statements</a> about health-related and scientific topics. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389863/original/file-20210316-13-j493c8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Badges identify ways misinformation exploits people's minds" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389863/original/file-20210316-13-j493c8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389863/original/file-20210316-13-j493c8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389863/original/file-20210316-13-j493c8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389863/original/file-20210316-13-j493c8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389863/original/file-20210316-13-j493c8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=633&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389863/original/file-20210316-13-j493c8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=633&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389863/original/file-20210316-13-j493c8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=633&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Playing the ‘Bad News’ online game illustrates different ways information warriors can prey on people’s psychological vulnerabilities.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.getbadnews.com/">Screenshot of Get Bad News</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>2. Recognize your vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>The prebunking approach works for people across the political spectrum, but it turns out that people who underestimate their biases are actually more vulnerable to being misled than people who acknowledge their biases. </p>
<p>Research has found people are more <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/biases-make-people-vulnerable-to-misinformation-spread-by-social-media/">susceptible to misinformation</a> that aligns with their preexisting views. This is called “<a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/2018/05/15/fake-news-social-media-confirmation-bias-echo-chambers/533857002/">confirmation bias</a>,” because a person is biased toward believing information that confirms what they already believe.</p>
<p>The lesson is to be particularly critical of information from groups or people with whom you agree or find yourself aligned – whether politically, religiously, or by ethnicity or nationality. Remind yourself to <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fdata.2019.00011">look for other points of view</a>, and other sources with information on the same topic. </p>
<p>It is especially important to be honest with yourself about <a href="https://www.allsides.com/rate-your-bias">what your biases are</a>. Many people assume others are biased, but <a href="https://www.cmu.edu/news/stories/archives/2015/june/bias-blind-spot.html">believe they themselves are not</a> – and imagine that <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/poi3.214">others are more likely to share misinformation</a> than they themselves are.</p>
<h2>3. Consider the source</h2>
<p>Media outlets have a range of biases. The <a href="https://www.adfontesmedia.com/">Media Bias Chart</a> describes which outlets are <a href="https://observer.com/2018/06/media-bias-can-readers-trust-media-pew-research-center-knight-foundation/">most and least partisan</a> as well as how reliable they are at <a href="https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/media-literacy/2021/should-you-trust-media-bias-charts/">reporting facts</a>.</p>
<p>You can play an online game called “<a href="https://fakey.osome.iu.edu/">Fakey</a>” to see how susceptible you are to different ways news is presented online.</p>
<p>When consuming news, make sure you know how trustworthy the source is – or whether it’s <a href="https://www.cjr.org/fake-beta">not trustworthy at all</a>. Double-check stories from other sources with low biases and high fact ratings to find out who – and what – you can actually trust, rather than just <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12586">what your gut tells you</a>. </p>
<p>Also, be aware that some disinformation agents <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherelliott/2019/02/21/these-are-the-real-fake-news-sites/">make fake sites</a> that look like real news sources – so make sure you’re conscious of which site you are actually visiting. Engaging in this level of <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1806781116">thinking about your own thinking</a> has been shown to improve your ability to tell fact from fiction.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389867/original/file-20210316-17-1xajml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man leans back from his desk" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389867/original/file-20210316-17-1xajml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389867/original/file-20210316-17-1xajml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389867/original/file-20210316-17-1xajml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389867/original/file-20210316-17-1xajml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389867/original/file-20210316-17-1xajml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389867/original/file-20210316-17-1xajml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389867/original/file-20210316-17-1xajml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Take a moment to think before you decide to share something online.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/man-in-office-royalty-free-image/641199968">10'000 Hours/Digital Vision via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>4. Take a pause</h2>
<p>When most people go online, especially on social media, they’re there for <a href="https://www.searchenginejournal.com/seo-101/why-do-people-visit-websites-today/">entertainment, connection or even distraction</a>. Accuracy isn’t always high on the priority list. Yet <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444820969893">few want to be a liar</a>, and the <a href="https://www.hbo.com/documentaries/after-truth-disinformation-and-the-cost-of-fake-news">costs of sharing misinformation</a> can be high – to individuals, their relationships and society as a whole. Before you decide to share something, take a moment to remind yourself of the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0956797620939054">value you place on truth and accuracy</a>. </p>
<p>Thinking “is what I am sharing true?” can help you stop the spread of misinformation and will encourage you to <a href="https://www.patheos.com/blogs/nosacredcows/2018/09/study-confirms-most-people-share-articles-based-only-on-headlines/">look beyond the headline</a> and potentially fact-check before sharing. </p>
<p>Even if you don’t think specifically about accuracy, <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000729">just taking a pause before sharing</a> can give you a chance for your mind to catch up with your emotions. Ask yourself whether you really want to share it, and if so, <a href="https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-009">why</a>. Think about what the potential consequences of sharing it might be. </p>
<p>Research shows that most misinformation is shared quickly and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.011">without much thought</a>. The impulse to share without thinking can <a href="https://www.apa.org/news/apa/2020/02/fake-news">even be more powerful</a> than partisan sharing tendencies. Take your time. There is no hurry. You are not a <a href="https://www.niemanlab.org/2013/11/sharing-fast-and-slow-the-psychological-connection-between-how-we-think-and-how-we-spread-news-on-social-media/">breaking-news</a> organization upon whom thousands depend for immediate information. </p>
<h2>5. Be aware of your emotions</h2>
<p>People often share things because of their gut reactions, rather than the conclusions of critical thinking. In a <a href="https://www.spsp.org/news-center/blog/martel-emotion-misinformation-social-media">recent study</a>, researchers found that people who viewed their social media feed while in an emotional mindset were <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-020-00252-3">significantly more likely to share misinformation</a> than those who went in with a more rational state of mind. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12164">Anger and anxiety</a>, in particular, make people more vulnerable to falling for misinformation.</p>
<h2>6. If you see something, say something</h2>
<p>Stand up to misinformation publicly. It may feel uncomfortable to challenge your friends online, especially if you fear conflict. The person to whom you respond with a link to a <a href="https://snopes.com">Snopes post</a> or other fact-checking site may not appreciate being called out. </p>
<p>But evidence shows that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000635">explicitly critiquing the specific reasoning</a> in the post and <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1313883">providing counterevidence like a link</a> about how it is fake is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10810730.2020.1838671">an effective technique</a>.</p>
<p>Even <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12383">short-format refutations</a> – like “this isn’t true” – are more effective than saying nothing. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1077699017710453">Humor – though not ridicule of the person</a> – can work, too. When <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2019.03.032">actual people correct misinformation online</a>, it can be <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10410236.2017.1331312">as effective</a>, if not <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10410236.2020.1794553">more so</a>, as when a social media company labels something as questionable. </p>
<p>People <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2056305120935102">trust other humans</a> more than algorithms and bots, especially those in our own social circles. That’s particularly true if you have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1075547017731776">expertise in the subject</a> or are a <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2017.1334018">close connection</a> with the person who shared it. </p>
<p>An additional benefit is that public debunking notifies other viewers that they may want to look more closely before choosing to share it themselves. So even if you don’t discourage the original poster, you are discouraging others.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389871/original/file-20210316-22-1ehva9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A child raises a finger" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389871/original/file-20210316-22-1ehva9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389871/original/file-20210316-22-1ehva9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389871/original/file-20210316-22-1ehva9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389871/original/file-20210316-22-1ehva9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389871/original/file-20210316-22-1ehva9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389871/original/file-20210316-22-1ehva9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389871/original/file-20210316-22-1ehva9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Even kids know to speak up when they see something wrong.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/latinx-toddler-points-his-index-finger-while-royalty-free-image/1198721866">Mireya Acierto/DigitalVision via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>7. If you see someone else stand up, stand with them</h2>
<p>If you see someone else has posted that a story is false, don’t say “well, they beat me to it so I don’t need to.” When more people chime in on a post as being false, it signals that sharing misinformation is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2019.03.032">frowned upon by the group more generally</a>.</p>
<p>Stand with those who stand up. If you don’t and something gets shared over and over, that <a href="https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/12/191203094813.htm">reinforces people’s beliefs that it is OK</a> to share misinformation – because everyone else is doing it, and only a few, if any, are objecting.</p>
<p>Allowing misinformation to spread also makes it more likely that even more people will start to believe it – because people come to <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000098">believe things they hear repeatedly</a>, even if they know at first <a href="https://theconversation.com/unbelievable-news-read-it-again-and-you-might-think-its-true-69602">they’re not true</a>.</p>
<p>There is no perfect solution. Some misinformation is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03637751.2018.1467564">harder to counter than others</a>, and some countering tactics are more effective at different times or for different people. But you can go a long way toward protecting yourself and those in your social networks from confusion, deception and falsehood.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 100,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157099/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>H. Colleen Sinclair receives funding from the Department of Defense.</span></em></p>A social psychologist explains how to avoid being misled, and how to prevent yourself – and others – from spreading inaccurate information.H. Colleen Sinclair, Associate Professor of Social Psychology, Mississippi State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1550112021-02-18T13:43:55Z2021-02-18T13:43:55ZWhat belief in extraterrestrial visitors to Earth reveals about trust in elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384561/original/file-20210216-21-74x41x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C13%2C4420%2C3922&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People who believe aliens have visited Earth are less likely to trust the 2020 election results.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/beam-from-ufo-over-tractor-at-farm-royalty-free-image/672154467"> Colin Anderson Productions pty ltd/DigitalVision via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12234">Partisanship is not enough</a> to explain why so many Americans – <a href="https://www.muhlenberg.edu/media/contentassets/pdf/about/polling/surveys/pennsylvania/PPEPP%20KEY%20FINDINGS%20REPORT%20(2).pdf">mostly Republicans</a> – <a href="http://maristpoll.marist.edu/npr-pbs-newshour-marist-poll-results-the-trump-legacy-biden-administration/">distrust the outcome</a> of the 2020 presidential election. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=3sQSen4AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scholars in political</a> <a href="https://www.uno.edu/profile/faculty/anthony_">behavior and methods</a>, we are aware of another <a href="https://theconversation.com/conspiracy-theories-why-are-they-thriving-in-the-pandemic-153657">factor in voters’ thinking that has increased</a> right alongside electoral distrust: Americans’ beliefs in conspiracy theories, especially those that express mistrust of government officials. </p>
<p>Our research, which has not yet been published, finds that <a href="https://www.bigeasymagazine.com/2021/02/11/la-statewide-survey-on-voter-religiosity-belief-in-extraterrestrials-and-voter-fraud-in-the-2020-u-s-presidential-election/">these two beliefs are linked</a> – to the extent that Americans who believe aliens have visited Earth are more likely than disbelievers to say that Joe Biden is not the legitimate winner of the 2020 presidential election. As conspiracy theory beliefs grow in the U.S., we expect a corresponding drop in public trust in elections.</p>
<h2>Polling voters</h2>
<p>Drawing on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1065912917721061">academic literature</a> focused on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2019.1593181">trust in electoral processes</a>, we decided to look specifically at voters’ conspiratorial beliefs. On Jan. 19, 2021, the eve of President Joe Biden’s inauguration, we conducted a survey of 633 Louisiana registered voters, selected at random. We asked a series of questions about their religious beliefs, their beliefs in extraterrestrial life and whether Joe Biden had been the rightful winner of the 2020 U.S. presidential election.</p>
<p>The key questions we asked were:</p>
<ul>
<li>Do you believe that there is life in the universe other than on Earth?</li>
<li>Do you believe that extraterrestrials have visited the Earth?</li>
<li>Do you believe that Joe Biden is the rightful winner of the 2020 U.S. presidential election?</li>
</ul>
<p>We weighted the answers to reflect the statewide population balance of gender, age and race.</p>
<p><iframe id="qTVgM" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/qTVgM/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Aliens and electoral trust</h2>
<p>We found that Democrats and third-party and independent voters were somewhat more inclined to believe conspiracy theories than Republicans. That fits with other recent surveys indicating that both parties do indeed have <a href="https://www.americansurveycenter.org/research/conspiracy-theories-misinformation-covid-19-and-the-2020-election/">conspiratorial leanings</a>, though the partisan divide may influence which particular conspiracies a person believes. </p>
<p>Belief in conspiracy theories – the idea that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199351800.001.0001">secret causes</a> are behind real-world events – have circulated broadly in the <a href="https://www.vox.com/21558524/conspiracy-theories-2020-qanon-covid-conspiracies-why">pandemic crisis and election cycle</a> in part because of the evolution of social media networks and their ability to create <a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-blame-fox-news-for-the-attack-on-the-capitol-154047">echo chambers</a>, communities where people encounter only those who agree with them.</p>
<p>The QAnon movement, which holds the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00257-y">election was fraudulent</a> in particular, has developed from periphery to <a href="https://medium.com/curiouserinstitute/a-game-designers-analysis-of-qanon-580972548be5">a growing mainstream group</a> with <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-time-is-up-but-his-twitter-legacy-lives-on-in-the-global-spread-of-qanon-conspiracy-theories-153298">widespread influence</a>. </p>
<p>Conspiracist thinking fits well with Donald Trump’s false claims that the election was fraudulent. QAnon believers consider the fact that he has <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-election-fraud-claims-arent-showing-up-in-his-lawsuits-challenging-the-results-150505">lost all the legal challenges</a> attempting to prove his claim to be <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00257-y">more evidence that powerful and secretive forces are at work</a> to steal the election and hide the truth from the public.</p>
<p>Most of our survey’s respondents – 59.7% – believe the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-idea-of-alien-life-now-seems-inevitable-and-possibly-imminent-115643">defensible possibility that life exists elsewhere in the universe</a> than just on Earth. And 32.3% – nearly one-third – of the respondents believe that <a href="https://theconversation.com/internet-jokesters-call-for-people-to-storm-area-51-to-find-aliens-heres-some-science-to-consider-120715">aliens have actually visited Earth</a>, though <a href="https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/research/a29771548/navy-ufo-witnesses-tell-truth/">governments continue to deny</a> any such thing. Third-party and independent voters are more likely to believe this than Democrats or Republicans.</p>
<p><iframe id="475Ez" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/475Ez/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>We also found that just over half of the respondents did not believe Biden was rightfully elected president. There was a clear partisan split there, with 74% of Democrats trusting the results but only 12% of Republicans believing them. Third-party and independent voters were more evenly divided, with 36% trusting the results, 45% not believing them and 19% unsure.</p>
<p>Both of these beliefs express doubt about government officials’ truth-telling: In one, leaders are covering up an alien visit, and in the other, they are misleading the public about election results. When we look at people who share both of these beliefs, we find that out of the respondents who believe aliens have visited Earth, 57.6% also believe Biden was not rightfully elected president.</p>
<p><iframe id="D9vdO" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/D9vdO/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The connection between belief in ET visitation and electoral mistrust is statistically significant, even when controlling for various other determinants such as partisanship, age, race and sex. </p>
<p>These findings are limited because we surveyed only Louisiana voters. But we believe voters’ beliefs could be similar in several other states where Trump also won by double-digit margins, including Alabama, Idaho, Kansas and West Virginia.</p>
<p>While a specific belief in extraterrestrial visits to Earth may not be directly causing a belief in election fraud, these two ideas are conspiracy-oriented: People who believe the government is lying about one are more likely to believe officials are hiding the truth about the other.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155011/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Americans who believe aliens have visited Earth are more likely than disbelievers to say that Joe Biden is not the legitimate winner of the 2020 presidential election.Joshua Lambert, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs, University of Central FloridaAnthony Licciardi Jr., Research Associate in Political Science, University of New OrleansLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1523052020-12-21T20:00:53Z2020-12-21T20:00:53ZThe psychology of fairness: Why some Americans don’t believe the election results<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/375936/original/file-20201218-15-eksk49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C25%2C5760%2C3785&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Polls show that some three-quarters of Republicans claim the election was rigged.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/tens-of-thousands-of-trump-supporters-rally-and-march-to-news-photo/1285832244?adppopup=true">Andrew Lichtenstein/Corbis News via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The electoral votes have confirmed <a href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-270-electoral-college-vote-d429ef97af2bf574d16463384dc7cc1e">Joe Biden won the 2020 United States presidential election</a>. The presidential electors gave Biden 306 electoral votes to President Donald Trump’s 232 votes. Biden also recorded a <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/joe-biden-popular-vote-record-barack-obama-us-presidential-election-donald-trump/">solid lead of over 7 million</a> in the popular vote.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/375997/original/file-20201218-13-1t1xrw0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Voters deeply divided over accuracy of vote count" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/375997/original/file-20201218-13-1t1xrw0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/375997/original/file-20201218-13-1t1xrw0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1032&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/375997/original/file-20201218-13-1t1xrw0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1032&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/375997/original/file-20201218-13-1t1xrw0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1032&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/375997/original/file-20201218-13-1t1xrw0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1297&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/375997/original/file-20201218-13-1t1xrw0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1297&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/375997/original/file-20201218-13-1t1xrw0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1297&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Voters deeply divided over election process and accuracy of vote count.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/11/20/sharp-divisions-on-vote-counts-as-biden-gets-high-marks-for-his-post-election-conduct/pp_2020-11-20_post-election_0-01/">Based on voter survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2020. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C.</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nonetheless, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/12/09/944685514/most-americans-believe-the-election-results-some-dont">results from a new NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist survey</a> found that approximately three-quarters of Republicans did not trust the election results. Corroborating this finding, a separate study of 24,000 Americans <a href="https://news.northeastern.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/COVID19-CONSORTIUM-REPORT-29-ELECTION-DEC-2020.pdf">found that nearly two-thirds of Republicans lacked confidence</a> in the fairness of the election and over 80% feared fraud, inaccuracy, bias and illegality. In addition, <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/trump-election-court-losses-electoral-college">nearly 60 lawsuits filed by Trump</a> claiming various forms of election fraud have been dismissed, including two evaluated by the U.S. Supreme Court.</p>
<p>Of course, doubting the fairness of a disappointing decision is not a Republican phenomenon – it’s a human one.</p>
<p>When a decision is made and people get the outcome they want, they often tend to see the outcome as fair. For example, when people apply for a promotion and get it, they are more than likely to believe they deserved it. But if they didn’t get the promotion, it is likely to drive a different reaction. At that point, the process used to make the decision becomes of utmost importance. Some might ask whether the <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/buy/2001-06715-002">process</a> <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/11/20/sharp-divisions-on-vote-counts-as-biden-gets-high-marks-for-his-post-election-conduct/pp_2020-11-20_post-election_0-01/">was free of bias</a>, consistent and ethical. </p>
<p>To investigate this perplexing phenomenon, it’s important to understand the psychology of fairness. </p>
<h2>Fair procedures usually matter</h2>
<p><a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1996-01404-002">Research</a> consistently finds that when people get an unfavorable outcome but believe the process used to make the decision was fair, they react more positively. </p>
<p>They may be disappointed, but they tend to accept the decision and stay loyal to the institution that made the decision. This is known as the “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.72.5.1034">fair process effect</a>”: the tendency for fair procedures to mitigate negative reactions to an unfavorable decision.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013108">research</a> my colleagues and I conducted in 2009 identifies an important caveat to this effect. We found that when an unfavorable decision is very important to someone – that it is central to their identity as part of a group or their personal values – they tend to look for flaws demonstrating that the process used to make the decision was unfair.</p>
<p>In the first study, we asked 180 university students about a decision that the administration would soon make about limiting the free speech of students. We manipulated whether the outcome was favorable such that half of the students were told the administration planned to restrict free speech and the other half were told there would be no restrictions. We also manipulated the process by telling students they had an opportunity to express their concerns in a public forum or did not have that opportunity. </p>
<p>We then assessed whether the decision made by the administration violated students’ identity as a member of the university and their personal values. </p>
<p>We found that when students felt the decision violated their social or personal identity, they perceived the process and outcome were unfair even when they had the opportunity to express their views at a public forum. In other words, there was a weak or no relationship between providing an opportunity for voice and fairness perceptions for people whose identity was violated. </p>
<p>In the second study we asked 277 adults with work experience about a time a decision was made at work when the outcome was favorable (or not) and the process was fair (or not).</p>
<p>As in the prior study, we found that an objectively fair process <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013108">did not improve fairness perceptions</a> when an outcome violated one’s identity. Instead, these participants were more likely to say that there was a procedural flaw – they doubted the opinions they provided to the decision-maker were ever considered. </p>
<p>The fact that they did not get the outcome they wanted on something that was central to their identity led participants to seek out reasons that an objectively fair process was somehow flawed in a meaningful way. They felt the need to discredit the process. </p>
<p>These findings are consistent with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.90.4.629">other research</a> showing that for those who have a strong moral stance on an issue,judgments about whether the process and outcome are fair are determined more by whether the outcome was favorable than whether the procedure was objectively fair. </p>
<p>For example, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.90.4.629">when participants supported</a> abortion rights, and a defendant in a trial was not convicted of bombing a clinic that performed abortions, these participants believed the trial process was less fair than those who held anti-abortion rights beliefs. </p>
<p>Similarly, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.90.4.629">when participants held anti-abortion rights beliefs</a> and a physician on trial for providing illegal late-term abortions was acquitted, participants believed the trial was less fair than did those with abortion-rights beliefs. When we care deeply about an issue and get an unfavorable outcome, we question the process used to make the decision. </p>
<h2>What can you do?</h2>
<p>In an environment in which partisan and identity politics rule, perhaps it is not surprising that a decision that hurts one’s in-group – in this case, Republican supporters – is dismissed on the basis of perceived procedural flaws that render the election unfair despite objective reality. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/375976/original/file-20201218-21-m6wmem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Some believed Brett Kavanaugh's confirmation hearings were unjust" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/375976/original/file-20201218-21-m6wmem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/375976/original/file-20201218-21-m6wmem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/375976/original/file-20201218-21-m6wmem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/375976/original/file-20201218-21-m6wmem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/375976/original/file-20201218-21-m6wmem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/375976/original/file-20201218-21-m6wmem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/375976/original/file-20201218-21-m6wmem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation as a Supreme Court justice, there were those who claimed that the hearings were unjust.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-demonstrate-against-judge-brett-kavanaughs-news-photo/1134056889?adppopup=true">VW Pics/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Of course, the act of discounting the fairness of a decision process when a decision violates one’s identity is not limited to one political party. For example, after Brett Kavanaugh was confirmed as a Supreme Court justice, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-kavanaugh-hearings-were-a-show-trial-gone-bad-102025">Democrats tended to believe</a> that his confirmation hearings were unjust, including the withholding of important evidence. </p>
<p>Given that anyone can fall victim to this bias, several things can be done. First, it is important for leaders to legitimize the decision process. For example, when an organization makes a policy change to extend or reduce the number of remote days of work per week, it is important for leadership at all levels to clarify there was reasonable and fair process used to make the decision. </p>
<p>Second, it is critical to ask someone who is impartial. When wrestling with an ethical conundrum, people often come to a conclusion that is aligned with their self-interest – what psychologists call “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0079-7421(08)00410-6">motivated moral reasoning</a>.” Thus, a neutral person can more accurately assess the decision. </p>
<p>Third, reducing how much a person feels distinct and isolated from members of another group by not <a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115045">dehumanizing</a> members of the other group can lessen beliefs that a decision process was rigged or biased. </p>
<p>People often do not get the outcome they want on issues central to their identity, so it is important to actively guard against questioning the legitimacy of an objective and fair process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152305/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David M. Mayer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When a decision is made and people don’t get the outcome they want, they often tend to see it as unfair. Here’s why.David M. Mayer, Professor of Management & Organizations, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1510352020-12-03T14:57:14Z2020-12-03T14:57:14ZSpotting liars is hard – but our new method is effective and ethical<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372830/original/file-20201203-19-sm2eg8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=126%2C45%2C3684%2C2063&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Guilty? The length of your answer may give it away.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/investigation-officer-showing-murder-suspect-victim-1169300518">Motortion Films/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most people lie occasionally. The lies are often trivial and essentially inconsequential – such as pretending to like a tasteless gift. But in other contexts, deception is more serious and can have harmful effects on criminal justice. From a societal perspective, such lying is better detected than ignored and tolerated.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, it is difficult to detect lies accurately. Lie detectors, such as polygraphs, which work by measuring the level of anxiety in a subject while they answer questions, <a href="https://theconversation.com/polygraph-lie-detector-tests-can-they-really-stop-criminals-reoffending-130477">are considered “theoretically weak”</a> and of dubious reliability. This is because, as any traveller who has been questioned by customs officials knows, it’s possible to be anxious without being guilty.</p>
<p>We have developed a new approach to spot liars based on interviewing technique and psychological manipulation, with <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S221136812030005X">results just published</a> in the Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. </p>
<p>Our technique is part of a new generation of <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00014/full">cognitive-based lie-detection methods</a> that are being increasingly researched and developed. These approaches postulate that the mental and strategic processes adopted by truth-tellers during interviews differ significantly from those of liars. By using specific techniques, these differences can be amplified and detected. </p>
<p>One such approach is the <a href="https://osf.io/j43kr/">Asymmetric Information Management (AIM) technique</a>. At its core, it is designed to provide suspects with a clear means to demonstrate their innocence or guilt to investigators by providing detailed information. Small details are the lifeblood of forensic investigations and can provide investigators with facts to check and witnesses to question. Importantly, longer, more detailed statements <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9066-4">typically contain more clues</a> to a deception than short statements.</p>
<p>Essentially, the AIM method involves informing suspects of these facts. Specifically, interviewers make it clear to interviewees that if they provide longer, more detailed statements about the event of interest, then the investigator will be better able to detect if they are telling the truth or lying. For truth-tellers, this is good news. For liars, this is less good news.</p>
<p>Indeed, research shows that when suspects are provided with these instructions, they behave differently depending on whether they are telling the truth or not. Truth-tellers typically seek to demonstrate their innocence and commonly provide more detailed information in response to such instructions. </p>
<p>In contrast, liars wish to conceal their guilt. This means they are more likely to strategically withhold information in response to the AIM instructions. Their (totally correct) assumption here is that providing more information will make it easier for the investigator to detect their lie, so instead, they provide less information.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Picture of a police interrogation." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372658/original/file-20201202-21-ror8kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=133%2C8%2C5441%2C3661&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372658/original/file-20201202-21-ror8kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372658/original/file-20201202-21-ror8kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372658/original/file-20201202-21-ror8kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372658/original/file-20201202-21-ror8kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372658/original/file-20201202-21-ror8kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372658/original/file-20201202-21-ror8kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Liars tend to withhold information.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/junkie-man-interrogated-by-policewoman-dark-306850145">Photographee.eu/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>This asymmetry in responses from liars and truth-tellers - from which the AIM technique derives its name - suggests two conclusions. When using the AIM instructions, if the investigator is presented with a potential suspect who is providing lots of detailed information, they are likely to be telling the truth. In contrast, if the potential suspect is lying then the investigator would typically be presented with shorter statements.</p>
<h2>The experiment</h2>
<p>But how effective is this approach? Preliminary research on the AIM technique has been promising. For our study, we recruited 104 people who were sent on one of two covert missions to different locations in a university to retrieve and/or deposit intelligence material. </p>
<p>All interviewees were then told there had been a data breach in their absence. They were, therefore, a suspect and faced an interview with an independent analyst. Half were told to tell the truth about their mission to convince the interviewer of their innocence. The other half were told that they could not disclose any information about their mission, and that they should come up with a cover story about where they had been at the time and place of the breach to convince the analyst of their innocence. </p>
<p>They were then interviewed, and the AIM technique was used in half of the cases. We found that when the AIM technique was used, it was easier for the interviewer to spot liars. In fact, lie-detection accuracy rates increased from 48% (no AIM) to 81% – with truth-tellers providing more information. </p>
<p>Research is also exploring methods for enhancing the AIM technique using cues which may support truth-tellers to provide even more information. Recalling information can be difficult, and truth-tellers often struggle with their recall.</p>
<p>Memory tools known as “<a href="https://www.psychologistworld.com/memory/mnemonics">mnemonics</a>” may be able to enhance this process. For example, if a witness of a robbery has provided an initial statement and cannot recall additional information, investigators could use a “change perspective” mnemonic – asking the witness to think about the events from the perspective of someone else (“what would a police officer have seen if they were there”). This can elicit new - previously unreported - information from memory. </p>
<p>If this is the case, our new technique could become even more accurate at being able to detect verbal differences between truth-tellers and liars.</p>
<p>Either way, our method is an ethical, non-accusatory and information-gathering approach to interviewing. The AIM instructions are simple to understand, easy to implement and appear promising. While initially tested for use in police suspect interviews, such instructions could be implemented in a variety of settings, such as insurance-claim settings.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151035/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cody Porter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It turns out liars and truth-tellers behave very differently when questioned.Cody Porter, Senior Teaching Fellow in Psychology and Offending Behaviour, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1491322020-11-09T13:14:37Z2020-11-09T13:14:37ZConservatives value personal stories more than liberals do when evaluating scientific evidence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367850/original/file-20201105-22-11gidpl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=98%2C0%2C5892%2C3997&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">When science and anecdote share a podium, you must decide how to value each.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/director-of-the-national-institute-of-allergy-and-news-photo/1208907352">Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/research-brief-83231">Research Brief</a> is a short take about interesting academic work.</em></p>
<h2>The big idea</h2>
<p>Conservatives tend to see expert evidence and personal experience as more equally legitimate than liberals, who put a lot more weight on the scientific perspective, according to our new study <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12706">published in the journal Political Psychology</a>.</p>
<p>Our findings add nuance to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/20/opinion/coronavirus-conservatives.html">a common claim</a> that conservatives want to hear “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/grogonomics/2019/aug/04/both-sides-of-the-climate-change-debate-how-bad-we-think-it-is-and-how-bad-it-really-is">both sides</a>” of arguments, even for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/21/us/politicized-scholars-put-evolution-on-the-defensive.html">settled science</a> that’s not really up for debate. </p>
<p>We asked 913 American adults to read an excerpt from an article debunking a common misconception, such as the existence of “lucky streaks” in games of chance. The article quoted a scientist explaining why people hold the misconception – for instance, people tend to see patterns in random data. The article also included a dissenting voice that drew from personal experience – such as someone claiming to have seen lucky streaks firsthand.</p>
<p>Our participants read one of two versions of the article. One version presented the dissenting voice as a quote from someone with relevant professional experience but no scientific expertise, such as a casino manager. In the other version, the dissenting opinion was a comment at the bottom from a random previous participant in our study who also disagreed with the scientist but had no clearly relevant expertise – analogous to a random poster in the comment section of an online article. </p>
<p>Though both liberals and conservatives tended to see the researcher as more legitimate overall, conservatives see less of a difference in legitimacy between the expert and the dissenter.</p>
<h2>Why it matters</h2>
<p>Looking at both our studies together, while about three-quarters of liberals rated the researcher as more legitimate, just over half of conservatives did. Additionally, about two-thirds of those who favored the anecdotal voice were conservative. Our data also showed that conservatives’ tendency to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.011">trust their intuitions</a> accounted for the ideological split.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1547">Other studies</a> of a scientific ideological divide have focused on politicized issues like climate change, where conservatives, who are more likely to oppose regulation, may believe they have something to lose if policies to curb climate change are implemented. By using apolitical topics in our studies, we’ve shown that science denial isn’t just a matter of self-interest.</p>
<p>In stripping away political interest, we have revealed something more basic about how conservatives and liberals differ in the ways they interact with evidence. Conservatives are more likely to see intuitive, direct experience as legitimate. Scientific evidence, then, may become just another viewpoint. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367884/original/file-20201106-21-pi7nb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="two women talking and walking on the sidewalk, one with a mask on" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367884/original/file-20201106-21-pi7nb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367884/original/file-20201106-21-pi7nb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367884/original/file-20201106-21-pi7nb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367884/original/file-20201106-21-pi7nb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367884/original/file-20201106-21-pi7nb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367884/original/file-20201106-21-pi7nb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/367884/original/file-20201106-21-pi7nb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">For some people, a personal anecdote can be as influential as a science-backed public message.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-holds-her-mask-while-talking-to-a-woman-wearing-a-news-photo/1254914571">Alexi Rosenfeld/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Though we conducted these studies in 2018 before the pandemic, they help explain some of the ideological reactions to it in the U.S.</p>
<p>Among conservatives especially, the idea that the pandemic itself is <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/03/18/u-s-public-sees-multiple-threats-from-the-coronavirus-and-concerns-are-growing/">not a major threat</a> can hold as long as there’s personal evidence on offer that supports that view. President Donald Trump’s recovery from COVID-19 and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/oct/06/trump-says-dont-be-afraid-of-covid-thats-easy-for-him-to-say">his assertion</a> based on his own experience that the disease is not so bad would have bolstered this belief. Recommendations from researchers to wear masks can remain mere suggestions so long as the court of public opinion is still undecided.</p>
<h2>What other research is being done</h2>
<p>Social scientists are already documenting ideological reactions to the pandemic that fit our findings. For example, many conservatives see the coronavirus as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620940539">less of a threat and are more susceptible to misinformation</a>. They also tend to see <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/711834">preventive efforts as less effective</a>. Our studies suggest these views will continue to proliferate as long as anecdotal experience conflicts with scientific expertise.</p>
<h2>What’s next</h2>
<p>An individual’s understanding of scientific evidence depends on more than just his or her political ideology. Basic science literacy also plays a role.</p>
<p>The pandemic has forced people to confront how hard it is to understand the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/tell-me-what-to-do-please-even-experts-struggle-with-coronavirus-unknowns/2020/05/25/e11f9870-9d08-11ea-ad09-8da7ec214672_story.html">uncertainty inherent in many scientific estimates</a>. Even liberals who are initially more sympathetic to science information might find their confidence in public health messages tested if these messages waver and evolve. </p>
<p>As such, we expect future research will focus on how health officials can most effectively <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.181870">communicate scientific uncertainty</a> to the public.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149132/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How much weight would you put on a scientist’s expertise versus the opinion of a random stranger? People on either end of the political spectrum decide differently what seems true.Randy Stein, Assistant Professor of Marketing, California State Polytechnic University, PomonaAlexander Swan, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Eureka CollegeMichelle Sarraf, Master's Student in Economics, California State Polytechnic University, PomonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1476312020-10-26T12:01:46Z2020-10-26T12:01:46ZWhy mixed messaging can erode trust in institutions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365292/original/file-20201023-18-12t3i63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=26%2C33%2C4432%2C2923&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The CDC has put out several conflicting messages of late, giving rise to concerns about trust.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-walk-past-a-cdc-trailer-near-a-covid-19-testing-news-photo/1228984696?adppopup=true">Photo by MANDEL NGAN/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/cdc-updates-covid-19-guidelines-acknowledging-virus-can-spread-via-tiny-air-particles-11601921416">recently revised its guidance</a> to acknowledge that COVID-19 can be spread through tiny airborne particles, known as aerosols. It had earlier <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/21/health/cdc-reverts-airborne-transmission-guidance/index.html">removed a similar guidance from its website</a>, saying it was “posted in error.”</p>
<p>Similarly, there have been <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/05/trump-white-house-give-mixed-messages-masks-coronavirus-spread/5368455002/">conflicting messages</a> from the Trump administration regarding the use of masks. White House press secretary Kayleigh McEnany has repeatedly said that masks are a recommendation, not a requirement. But others in the administration, such as White House counselor Kellyanne Conway and Vice President Mike Pence, have urged people to wear masks. </p>
<p>Such messaging can lead people to wonder what to believe and whom to trust. As a <a href="https://www.memphis.edu/philosophy/people/bios/deborah-tollefsen.php">philosopher studying the nature of trust</a> and its function in institutions, I explore the analogy between trust in people and trust in institutions. </p>
<p>Just as conflicting messages can lead us to distrust people, they can also erode the public’s trust in institutions. </p>
<h2>What is trust?</h2>
<p>Philosophers tend to <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trust/">distinguish between two varieties of trust</a>: practical trust and intellectual trust.</p>
<p>Practical trust involves trusting that someone will either do something or refrain from doing it. For example, I might trust that my friend will water my plants while I am out of town. </p>
<p>Intellectual trust involves trusting what someone says. In particular, when I trust the word of another, I trust that what they have said is true. </p>
<p>Both types of trust are subject to erosion.</p>
<p>When individuals trust one another, they expect certain things to happen; thus, trust involves a certain reliance. For instance, when I trust that my friend will water my plants while I am out of town, I rely on her to do so. </p>
<p>However, trust always involves a risk. If there were no risk of my friend failing to water my plants, I wouldn’t have to trust her. </p>
<h2>More than mere reliance</h2>
<p>But I also rely on things or objects. I rely on my car to start in the morning, my computer to properly store information and my phone calendar to tell me when my next meeting is. But there is a difference between relying on objects and trusting people.</p>
<p>Philosopher <a href="https://www.utimes.pitt.edu/archives/?p=23544">Annette Baier</a> explains in a paper that trust among people also carries the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2381376?seq=1">possibility of a betrayal</a>. When objects fail to do what is expected, irritation, anger and disappointment are common emotional responses, but betrayal seems misplaced. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365283/original/file-20201023-21-1ps9chd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365283/original/file-20201023-21-1ps9chd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365283/original/file-20201023-21-1ps9chd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365283/original/file-20201023-21-1ps9chd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365283/original/file-20201023-21-1ps9chd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365283/original/file-20201023-21-1ps9chd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365283/original/file-20201023-21-1ps9chd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365283/original/file-20201023-21-1ps9chd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trusting people means believing that they will act out of goodwill.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/participant-holding-a-stronger-together-sign-at-the-protest-news-photo/1222811718?adppopup=true">Photo by Erik McGregor/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Baier argues that to trust someone is to believe <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2381376?seq=1">that they will act out of goodwill</a> toward you. If you are merely relying on people to act in self-interested ways, then it isn’t trust. For instance, if I rely on my colleague to replace me on a university committee knowing that he will agree to do so only because of his desire to gain more power, I don’t, according to Baier, trust my colleague. </p>
<p>Some philosophers have argued that trust involves not just a belief but also an emotional component. </p>
<p>University of Melbourne philosopher <a href="https://philpeople.org/profiles/karen-jones">Karen Jones</a>, for instance, argues that trust also carries a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2382241?seq=1">feeling of optimism</a> that people will do what they are being trusted with. </p>
<p>Another scholar, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=I_WER4MAAAAJ&hl=en">Richard Holton</a>, has argued that trust involves the possibility of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048409412345881">feeling the emotion of betrayal</a>. When a person trusts another, they will be inclined to feel betrayal when the person fails to meet their expectations. </p>
<h2>How does trust erode?</h2>
<p>Trust and trustworthiness are two distinct things. People may trust someone even when the person they trust is untrustworthy. People may also <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trust/">fail to trust someone</a> who is, in fact, trustworthy. </p>
<p>Importantly, trust can erode even when people are competent, intend to do what they say or speak only the truth. The mere perception of not being trustworthy is sometimes enough to erode trust. </p>
<p>Feminist philosophers such as <a href="https://www.gc.cuny.edu/Page-Elements/Academics-Research-Centers-Initiatives/Doctoral-Programs/Philosophy/Faculty-Bios/Miranda-Fricker">Miranda Fricker</a> and <a href="https://philosophy.msu.edu/faculty-staff/kristie-dotson/">Kristie Dotson</a> have <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001/acprof-9780198237907?rskey=z1Acvs&result=5">pointed out</a> the ways in which <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01177.x">gender and race</a> impact perceptions of trustworthiness and result in women and minorities <a href="https://www.tedxmilehigh.com/gender-credibility-gap/">receiving less credibility</a> than they deserve due to prejudicial stereotypes. </p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<h2>Steadying the mind</h2>
<p>Another factor that contributes to the erosion of trust is the perception of inconsistency. A person who says one thing and then says the opposite the next day may lose the trust of their audience. </p>
<p>Our ability to rely on the word of another essentially depends on what philosopher <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/williams-bernard/">Bernard Williams</a> has called “<a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691117911/truth-and-truthfulness">steadying the mind</a>.” </p>
<p>The idea here is that becoming a reliable source of information involves having convictions that avoid fluctuating without good reasons. “Flip-flopping” too much can lead one to appear unreliable. </p>
<p>Philosophical theories of trust have tended to focus almost exclusively on trusting people, but we engage in relations of trust with institutions as well as individuals. </p>
<p>The erosion of public trust surrounding CDC guidelines is the erosion of trust in an institution – not in a particular person. Reflecting on how trust erodes in the interpersonal case might shed light on how the <a href="http://www.kateto.net/covid19/COVID19%20CONSORTIUM%20REPORT%2013%20TRUST%20SEP%202020.pdf">erosion of trust</a> happens in the institutional case. </p>
<p>In particular, inconsistent and conflicting messages produced by an institution can <a href="https://qz.com/1907011/the-cdc-is-losing-trust-with-every-reversal-of-covid-19-guidance/">contribute</a> to a perception that the institutional “mind” is “unsteady” – calling into question its reliability, competency and intentions. </p>
<p>Just like people, institutions need to <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691117911/truth-and-truthfulness">learn to present themselves</a> to others as agents who, as Bernard Williams said, “have moderately steady outlooks or beliefs.” Without such stability, the public’s trust in institutions can erode.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147631/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Deborah Perron Tollefsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The CDC has released conflicting messages on masks and transmission of the coronavirus. A scholar explains the nature of trust and why institutions need to be careful.Deborah Perron Tollefsen, Professor of Philosophy, University of MemphisLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1413352020-06-25T12:18:56Z2020-06-25T12:18:56ZCoronavirus responses highlight how humans are hardwired to dismiss facts that don’t fit their worldview<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343846/original/file-20200624-132961-fwo33u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=165%2C285%2C4547%2C3051&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The more politicized an issue, the harder it is for people to absorb contradictory evidence.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/flanked-by-white-house-coronavirus-response-coordinator-dr-news-photo/1213154746">Drew Angerer/Getty Images News via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Bemoaning uneven individual and state compliance with public health recommendations, top U.S. COVID-19 adviser Anthony Fauci <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/18/politics/anthony-fauci-coronavirus-anti-science-bias/index.html">recently blamed</a> the country’s ineffective pandemic response on an American “anti-science bias.” He called this bias “inconceivable,” because “science is truth.” Fauci compared those discounting the importance of masks and social distancing to “anti-vaxxers” in their “amazing” refusal to listen to science. </p>
<p>It is Fauci’s profession of amazement that amazes me. As well-versed as he is in the science of the coronavirus, he’s overlooking the <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/04/denial-science-chris-mooney/">well-established science</a> of “anti-science bias,” or science denial.</p>
<p>Americans increasingly exist in highly polarized, informationally insulated ideological communities occupying their own <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/11/16/20964281/impeachment-hearings-trump-america-epistemic-crisis">information universes</a>. </p>
<p>Within segments of the political blogosphere, <a href="https://www.desmogblog.com/heartland-institute">global warming</a> is dismissed as either a hoax or so uncertain as to be unworthy of response. Within other geographic or online communities, the science of <a href="https://www.npr.org/tags/399145964/anti-vaccination-movement">vaccine safety</a>, <a href="https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/but-not-simpler/why-portland-is-wrong-about-water-fluoridation/">fluoridated drinking water</a> and <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/food/the-plate/2016/05/17/scientists-say-gmo-foods-are-safe-public-skepticism-remains/">genetically modified foods</a> is distorted or ignored. There is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-new-survey-shows-how-republicans-and-democrats-are-responding-differently-138394">marked gap in expressed concern</a> over the coronavirus depending on political party affiliation, apparently based in part on partisan disagreements over factual issues like the <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/06/03/partisan-differences-over-the-pandemic-response-are-growing/ps_2020-06-03_sci-am-trust_00-3/">effectiveness of social distancing</a> or <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/311408/republicans-skeptical-covid-lethality.aspx">the actual COVID-19 death rate</a>.</p>
<p>In theory, resolving factual disputes should be relatively easy: Just present strong evidence, or evidence of a strong expert consensus. This approach succeeds most of the time, when the issue is, say, the atomic weight of hydrogen.</p>
<p>But things don’t work that way when scientific advice presents a picture that threatens someone’s perceived interests or ideological worldview. In practice, it turns out that one’s political, religious or ethnic identity quite effectively predicts one’s willingness to accept expertise on any given politicized issue.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/motivated-reasoning">Motivated reasoning</a>” is what social scientists call the process of deciding what evidence to accept based on the conclusion one prefers. As I explain in my book, “<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Truth-About-Denial-Self-Deception-Politics/dp/0190062274">The Truth About Denial</a>,” this very human tendency applies to all kinds of facts about the physical world, economic history and current events.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312935/original/file-20200130-41527-1q4zuso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The same facts will sound different to people depending on what they already believe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Nightclub-Shooting-Florida/4d33732e41f34ce89a416c03d669a0b0/1/0">AP Photo/John Raoux</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Denial doesn’t stem from ignorance</h2>
<p>The interdisciplinary study of this phenomenon has made one thing clear: The failure of various groups to acknowledge the truth about, say, climate change, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/facts-versus-feelings-isnt-the-way-to-think-about-communicating-science-80255">not explained by a lack of information</a> about the scientific consensus on the subject.</p>
<p>Instead, what strongly predicts denial of expertise on many controversial topics is simply one’s political persuasion.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214558393">2015 metastudy</a> showed that ideological polarization over the reality of climate change actually increases with respondents’ knowledge of politics, science and/or energy policy. The chances that a conservative is a climate science denier is <a href="http://www.people-press.org/2008/05/08/a-deeper-partisan-divide-over-global-warming/">significantly higher</a> if he or she is college educated. Conservatives scoring highest on tests for <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2182588">cognitive sophistication</a> or <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2319992">quantitative reasoning skills</a> are most susceptible to motivated reasoning about climate science. </p>
<p>Denialism is not just a problem for conservatives. Studies have found <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2010.511246">liberals are less likely to accept</a> a hypothetical expert consensus on the possibility of safe storage of nuclear waste, or on the effects of concealed-carry gun laws.</p>
<h2>Denial is natural</h2>
<p>The human talent for rationalization is a product of many hundreds of thousands of years of adaptation. Our ancestors evolved in small groups, where <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X10000968">cooperation and persuasion</a> had at least as much to do with reproductive success as holding accurate factual beliefs about the world. Assimilation into one’s tribe required assimilation into the group’s ideological belief system – regardless of whether it was grounded in science or superstition. An instinctive bias in favor of one’s “<a href="https://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html">in-group</a>” and its worldview is deeply ingrained in human psychology. </p>
<p>A human being’s very sense of self <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280701592070">is intimately tied up with</a> his or her identity group’s status and beliefs. Unsurprisingly, then, people respond automatically and defensively to information that threatens the worldview of groups with which they identify. We respond with rationalization and selective assessment of evidence – that is, we engage in “<a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/science-choice/201504/what-is-confirmation-bias">confirmation bias</a>,” giving credit to expert testimony we like while finding reasons to reject the rest.</p>
<p>Unwelcome information can also threaten in other ways. “<a href="https://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2017/06/system-justification">System justification</a>” theorists like psychologist <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Zh1vTeMAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">John Jost</a> have shown how situations that represent a perceived threat to established systems trigger inflexible thinking. For example, populations experiencing economic distress or an external threat have often turned to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/tps0000122">authoritarian leaders</a> who <a href="https://medium.com/@bardona/varieties-of-bullsh-t-6fd1cfeb102f?source=friends_link&sk=b6096254e8c3873da683a9dbbc165ac1">promise security and stability</a>.</p>
<p>In ideologically charged situations, one’s prejudices end up affecting one’s factual beliefs. Insofar as you define yourself in terms of your <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2010.511246">cultural affiliations</a>, your attachment to the social or economic status quo, or a combination, information that threatens your belief system – say, about the negative effects of industrial production on the environment – can threaten your sense of identity itself. If trusted political leaders or partisan media are telling you that the COVID-19 crisis is overblown, factual information about a scientific consensus to the contrary can feel like a personal attack. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312934/original/file-20200130-41490-1fn1e5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Everyone sees the world through one partisan lens or another, based on their identity and beliefs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/3d-cinema-glasses-isolated-on-white-62373739">Vladyslav Starozhylov/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Denial is everywhere</h2>
<p>This kind of affect-laden, motivated thinking explains a wide range of examples of an extreme, evidence-resistant rejection of historical fact and scientific consensus.</p>
<p>Have tax cuts been shown to pay for themselves in terms of economic growth? Do communities with high numbers of immigrants have higher rates of violent crime? Did Russia interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election? Predictably, expert opinion regarding such matters is treated by partisan media as though evidence is itself <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2014/04/28/george_will_global_warming_is_socialism_by_the_back_door.html">inherently partisan</a>.</p>
<p>Denialist phenomena are many and varied, but the story behind them is, ultimately, quite simple. Human cognition is inseparable from the unconscious emotional responses that go with it. Under the right conditions, universal human traits like in-group favoritism, existential anxiety and a desire for stability and control combine into a toxic, system-justifying identity politics. </p>
<p>Science denial is notoriously resistant to facts because it isn’t about facts in the first place. Science denial is an expression of identity – usually in the face of perceived threats to the social and economic status quo – and it typically manifests in response to elite messaging.</p>
<p>I’d be very surprised if Anthony Fauci is, in fact, actually unaware of the significant impact of politics on COVID-19 attitudes, or of what signals are being sent by <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2020/04/21/texas-dan-patrick-economy-coronavirus/">Republican state government officials’ statements</a>, <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/06/pelosi-enforce-new-mask-rule-congress-republicans-committee-hearings.html">partisan mask refusal in Congress</a>, or the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-rally-in-tulsa-a-day-after-juneteenth-awakens-memories-of-1921-racist-massacre-140915">Trump rally in Tulsa</a>. Effective science communication is critically important because of the profound effects partisan messaging can have on public attitudes. Vaccination, resource depletion, climate and COVID-19 are life-and-death matters. To successfully tackle them, we must not ignore what the science tells us about science denial. </p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/humans-are-hardwired-to-dismiss-facts-that-dont-fit-their-worldview-127168">an article originally published</a> on Jan. 31, 2020.</em></p>
<p>[<em>Get our best science, health and technology stories.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/science-editors-picks-71/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=science-best">Sign up for The Conversation’s science newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141335/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Bardon received funding from the Humility and Conviction in Public Life project at the University of Connecticut.</span></em></p>Whether in situations relating to scientific consensus, economic history or current political events, denialism has its roots in what psychologists call ‘motivated reasoning.’Adrian Bardon, Professor of Philosophy, Wake Forest UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1349622020-03-28T14:44:09Z2020-03-28T14:44:09ZIt’s a bad idea for journalists to censor Trump – instead, they can help the public identify what’s true or false<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323707/original/file-20200327-146671-1w2glsg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Donald Trump, flanked by administration and public health officials, during a briefing on the coronavirus on March 25.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-donald-trump-flanked-by-response-coordinator-for-news-photo/1208243080?adppopup=true">Getty/Mandel Ngan / AFP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In times of mortal strife, humans crave information more than ever, and it’s journalists’ responsibility to deliver it.</p>
<p>But what if that information is inaccurate, or could even kill people?</p>
<p>That’s the <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/03/media-orgs-wrestle-with-covering-trumps-campaign-rally-covid-19-briefings">quandary journalists have found themselves in</a> as they decide whether to cover President Donald J. Trump’s press briefings live. </p>
<p>Some television <a href="https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/article241453211.html">networks have started cutting away</a> from the briefings, saying the events are no more than campaign rallies, and that the <a href="https://www.factcheck.org/2020/03/correcting-trumps-press-conference-misinformation/">president is spreading falsehoods</a> that endanger the public.</p>
<p>“If Trump is going to keep lying like he has been every day on stuff this important, we should, all of us, stop broadcasting it,” MSNBC’s <a href="https://twitter.com/MaddowBlog/status/1241184095302008835">Rachel Maddow tweeted</a>. “Honestly, it’s going to cost lives.”</p>
<p>News decisions and ethical dilemmas aren’t simple, but withholding information from the public is inconsistent with journalistic norms, and while well-meaning, could actually cause more harm than good in the long run. Keeping the president’s statements from the public prevents the public from being able to evaluate his performance, for example.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1241184095302008835"}"></div></p>
<h2>Truth and falsehood can fight it out</h2>
<p>The Society of Professional Journalists’ code of ethics, updated in 2014 during my term as president, states that the press must <a href="https://www.spj.org/pdf/spj-code-of-ethics.pdf">“seek truth and report it,”</a> while also minimizing harm. </p>
<p>When the president of the United States speaks, it matters – it is newsworthy, it’s history in the making. Relaying that event to the public as it plays out is critical for citizens, who can see and hear for themselves what their leader is saying, and evaluate the facts for themselves so that they may adequately self-govern.</p>
<p>That’s true even if leaders lie. Actually, it’s even more important when leaders lie.</p>
<p>Think of libertarian philosopher John Milton’s plea for <a href="https://firstamendmentwatch.org/history-speaks-essay-john-milton-areopagitica-1644/">the free flow of information and end of censorship</a> in 1600s England. Put it all out there and let people sort the lies from the truth, Milton urged: “<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/608/608-h/608-h.htm">Let her and Falsehood grapple.</a>”</p>
<p>If a president spreads lies and disinformation, or minimizes health risks, then the electorate needs to know that to make informed decisions at the polls, perhaps to vote the person out to prevent future missteps. </p>
<p>Likewise, there’s a chance the president could be correct in his representation of at least some of the facts. </p>
<p>It’s not up to journalists to decide, but simply report what is said while providing additional context and facts that may or may not support what the president said.</p>
<p>Maddow is correct that journalists should not simply parrot information spoon fed by those in power to readers and viewers who might struggle to make sense of it in a vacuum. That is why it’s imperative journalists continuously challenge false and misleading statements, and trust the public to figure it out.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323709/original/file-20200327-146712-oj2cfn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323709/original/file-20200327-146712-oj2cfn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323709/original/file-20200327-146712-oj2cfn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323709/original/file-20200327-146712-oj2cfn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323709/original/file-20200327-146712-oj2cfn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323709/original/file-20200327-146712-oj2cfn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323709/original/file-20200327-146712-oj2cfn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323709/original/file-20200327-146712-oj2cfn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">During a crisis, people want to know what’s happening.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/man-sits-on-a-bench-reading-a-newspaper-with-tracking-the-news-photo/1215037687?adppopup=true">Getty/Cindy Ord</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Craving information</h2>
<p>Those who would urge the media’s censorship of the president’s speeches may feel they are protecting citizens from being duped, because they believe the average person can’t distinguish fact from fiction. <a href="http://cscc.scu.edu/trends/v24/v24_2.pdf">Communication scholars call this “third-person effect,”</a> where we feel ourselves savvy enough to identify lies, but think other more vulnerable, gullible and impressionable minds cannot.</p>
<p>It is understandable why journalists would try to protect the public from lies. That’s the “minimizing harm” part in the SPJ code of ethics, which is critical in these times, when inaccurate information <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/23/health/arizona-coronavirus-chloroquine-death/index.html">can put a person’s health at risk</a> – or cause them to make a fatal decision.</p>
<p>So how do journalists report the day’s events while minimizing harm and tamping down the spread of disinformation? Perhaps this can be accomplished through techniques already in use during this unorthodox presidential period:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Report the press briefings live for all to see, while providing live commentary and fact-checking, as <a href="https://www.politifact.com/article/2020/mar/15/live-fact-checking-biden-sanders-democratic-presid/">PolitiFact and others have done for live presidential debates</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>Fact-check the president after his talks, through <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/24/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-easter.html">contextual stories that provide the public accurate information</a>, in the media and <a href="https://www.factcheck.org/2020/03/trumps-statements-about-the-coronavirus/">through websites such as FactCheck.org</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>Call intentional mistruths what they are: <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/03/trumps-lies-about-coronavirus/608647/">Lies</a>. With this administration, journalists have become more willing to call intentional falsehoods “lies,” and that needs to continue, if not even more bluntly.</p></li>
<li><p>Develop a deep list of independent experts that can be on hand to counter misinformation as it is communicated.</p></li>
<li><p>Report transparently and openly, clearly identifying sources, providing supplemental documents online, and acknowledging limitations of information.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>The coronavirus pandemic is a critical time for the nation’s health and its democracy. Now, more than ever, we need information. As humans, we crave knowing what is going on around us, a basic “awareness instinct,” as termed by Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel in their foundational book, “<a href="https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/journalism-essentials/what-is-journalism/elements-journalism/">The Elements of Journalism</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323749/original/file-20200328-146666-sfi6nx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323749/original/file-20200328-146666-sfi6nx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323749/original/file-20200328-146666-sfi6nx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323749/original/file-20200328-146666-sfi6nx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323749/original/file-20200328-146666-sfi6nx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323749/original/file-20200328-146666-sfi6nx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323749/original/file-20200328-146666-sfi6nx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323749/original/file-20200328-146666-sfi6nx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On March 27, CNN provided live fact-checking of Trump’s statements during a coronavirus briefing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo: Naomi Schalit</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘People aren’t dummies’</h2>
<p>Sometimes people don’t even realize they need information until after they have lost it.</p>
<p>In his <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=mOb4DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA221&lpg=PA221&dq=The+thing+I+missed+most+was+information+%E2%80%93+free,+uncensored,+undistorted,+abundant+information.&source=bl&ots=SeIfrRgY5X&sig=ACfU3U0V3uM0-kOi-CAWYFpGVtQ1fHO_gQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiEidTuq7voAhWhV98KHY1pBUAQ6AEwAXoECAkQAQ">autobiography, the late Sen. John McCain</a> wrote that upon his release after five years as a Vietnamese prisoner of war, the first thing he did when he got to a Philippines military base was order a steak dinner and stack of newspapers.</p>
<p>“I wanted to know what was going on in the world, and I grasped anything I could find that might offer a little enlightenment,” McCain wrote. “The thing I missed most was information – free, uncensored, undistorted, abundant information.”</p>
<p>People aren’t dummies. They can decipher good information from bad, as long as they have all the facts at their disposal.</p>
<p>And journalists are the ones best positioned to deliver it.</p>
<p>[<em>You need to understand the coronavirus pandemic, and we can help.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=upper-coronavirus-help">Read our newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/134962/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Cuillier is former president of the Society of Professional Journalists and currently president of the nonprofit National Freedom of Information Coalition, which provides education and research regarding citizen access to government information.</span></em></p>Journalism’s ethics code says the press must ‘seek truth and report it,’ and also minimize harm. During a public health crisis, how should the press deal with President Trump’s inaccuracies and lies?David Cuillier, Associate Professor, School of Journalism, University of ArizonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.