tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/ukraine-protests-2013-8202/articlesUkraine protests 2013 – The Conversation2021-12-21T21:20:29Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1740292021-12-21T21:20:29Z2021-12-21T21:20:29ZWhy Putin has such a hard time accepting Ukrainian sovereignty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/438663/original/file-20211221-21-15qe6uk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C10%2C3489%2C2425&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vladimir Putin at a concert in March 2021 marking the seventh anniversary of its annexation of Crimea.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-talks-during-a-concert-news-photo/1231790861?adppopup=true">Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Image</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ukraine is again looking warily over its eastern border as Russia <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-is-russia-threatening-to-invade-ukraine">threatens its territorial integrity</a>.</p>
<p>In recent weeks, a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/17/politics/russia-troops-ukraine-border-biden/index.html">buildup of Russian troops</a> along the Ukrainian border has rattled Western leaders <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russia-ukraine-invasion/2021/12/03/98a3760e-546b-11ec-8769-2f4ecdf7a2ad_story.html">fearful of an incursion</a> similar to, or perhaps even more wide-ranging than, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/17/crimea-six-years-after-illegal-annexation/">Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014</a>.</p>
<p>Then, on Dec. 17, 2021, Vladimir <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/17/world/europe/russia-nato-security-deal.html">Putin demanded</a> that no former Soviet states, such as Ukraine, be added to NATO – the Western alliance that Ukraine has long expressed a desire to join – and that NATO cease all military cooperation in Eastern Europe.</p>
<p>Such rhetoric harks back to the Cold War, when global politics revolved around an ideological struggle between a communist Eastern Bloc and a capitalist West. It also serves Russia’s ideological and political goal of asserting its position as a global power.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://isearch.asu.edu/profile/3743765">scholars of the politics and culture</a> <a href="https://huri.harvard.edu/people/emily-channell-justice">of Ukraine and Russia</a>, we know that underpinning Putin’s goal is Russia’s historical view of Ukraine as a part of its greater empire, which at one time ranged from present-day Poland to the Russian Far East. Understanding this helps explain Putin’s actions, and how he leans into this view of Ukraine to advance his agenda. </p>
<h2>The view from Russia</h2>
<p>Ukraine today comprises 44 million people and is the second-largest nation by area in Europe. </p>
<p>But for centuries, within the Russian Empire, Ukraine was known as “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/origins-of-the-slavic-nations/4276E1B428693C30E0DB6B46D8A90674">Malorossiya” or “Little Russia.”</a></p>
<p>The use of this term strengthened the idea that Ukraine was a junior member of the empire. And it was backed by czarist policies dating from the 18th century that suppressed the use of the Ukrainian language and culture. The intention of these policies was to establish a dominant Russia and later strip Ukraine of an identity as an independent, sovereign nation.</p>
<p>A similar ploy has been used to downplay Ukrainian independence in the 21st century. In 2008 Putin’s then-spokesman, Vladislav Surkov, claimed that “<a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lseih/2020/07/01/there-is-no-ukraine-fact-checking-the-kremlins-version-of-ukrainian-history/">Ukraine is not a state</a>.”</p>
<p>Putin himself recently wrote an article claiming Russians and Ukrainians are “<a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181">one people – a single whole</a>.” This concept of a single people derives from the history of “Kyivan Rus” – the medieval federation that included parts of modern-day Ukraine and Russia and had as its center present day Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital.</p>
<p>In recent years, commemorations in Russia of Kyivan Rus’ history have increased in <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-ukraines-medieval-love-affair-12403">prominence and scale</a>.</p>
<p>In 2016, a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37871793">52-foot statue of Prince Vladimir of Kyiv</a>, considered a saintly ruler by Ukrainians and Russians alike, was unveiled in Moscow. The statue caused <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33689641">consternation among Ukrainians</a>. Placing a mammoth depiction of Vladimir in the center of Moscow signaled, to some, Russia’s attempt to own Ukraine’s history.</p>
<p>The fact that it came just two years after Russia’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/3/16/annexation-of-crimea-a-masterclass-in-political-manipulation">annexation of Crimea</a> in 2014 and the invasion of the eastern Ukrainian Donbass region didn’t help.</p>
<p><iframe id="GiX4j" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/GiX4j/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Ukraine’s Russian citizens</h2>
<p>The Donbass and Crimea are both home to large numbers of ethnic Russians and people who primarily speak Russian.</p>
<p>In the years leading up to Russia’s military actions, Putin and his allies often invoked the concept of the “<a href="https://www.ponarseurasia.org/the-russian-world-russia-s-soft-power-and-geopolitical-imagination/">Russian World” or “Russkiy Mir</a>” – the idea that Russian civilization extends to everywhere that ethnic Russians live. </p>
<p>The ideology also asserts that no matter where Russians are in the world, the Russian state has a right and an obligation to protect and defend them. </p>
<p>Ukraine – both in 2014 and with Putin’s seemingly increasingly belligerent stance now – provides the perfect landscape for this concept. And Russia has allegedly been promoting “Russian World” ideology through the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russian-court-says-countrys-soldiers-stationed-in-ukraine/a-60153034">arming of pro-Russian separatists</a> in the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk since 2014.</p>
<p>Viewing Ukraine as a country split between pro-Moscow ethnic Russians and pro-Western Ukrainians, however, is a gross oversimplification. </p>
<h2>Ethnic tensions?</h2>
<p>Ukraine’s ethnic makeup today – with an especially large minority of Russians living in the east – reflects the country’s absorption into the Soviet Union from 1922.</p>
<p>Ethnic Ukrainians lived across the country before it was incorporated into the Soviet Union. In 1932-33, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-holodomor-photographs-directory-wienerberger-abbe-whiting-bokan/31235172.html">orchestrated a famine</a> that killed some 4 million Ukrainians in the eastern regions. The famine, known as “Holodomor,” made it possible for ethnic Russians to move into the territory of Ukraine.</p>
<p>These new residents drove Stalin’s industrialization campaign. To this day, the Donbass remains the heart of Ukraine’s industrial economy.</p>
<p>When Ukrainians voted for independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, all of its 24 “oblasts,” or regions – including Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea – <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2015/05/21/10-maps-that-explain-ukraines-struggle-for-independence/">supported independence</a>. The large minority of ethnic Russians – <a href="http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality/">17.3% of the population at Ukraine’s last census in 2001</a> – were included as Ukrainian citizens in an independent state. For the most part, <a href="https://www.ukrweekly.com/archive/1991/The_Ukrainian_Weekly_1991-49.pdf">they too voted for independence</a>.</p>
<p>For most of the first two decades after independence, ethnic Russians have lived peacefully with Ukrainians and the country’s other ethnic minorities.</p>
<p>But that changed in 2010 when <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraines-real-problem-is-viktor-yanukovych-2014-1">Viktor Yanukovych</a>, a politician from Donetsk, became Ukraine’s president. Though he did not state outright that he preferred a pro-Russian future for Ukraine, many of his policies marked a move away from the pro-European policies of his predecessors and played into Vladimir Putin’s designs on Ukraine.</p>
<p>Ukraine was on track to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/ukraine-suspends-preparations-eu-trade-pact">sign an association agreement</a> with the European Union in 2013. Instead, Yanukovych decided to join an economic union with Russia. This set off mass protests around the country that resulted in Yanukovych’s being ousted. Putin then <a href="https://anthropoliteia.net/2014/03/31/little-green-men-russia-ukraine-and-post-soviet-sovereignty/">annexed Crimea</a> on the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians living on that peninsula. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, pro-Russian separatists took over multiple cities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the hope that Russia would have a similar interest in protecting Russians in eastern Ukraine.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A soldier stands in a trench while looking down the scope of a rifle." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/438665/original/file-20211221-49229-u14vgg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/438665/original/file-20211221-49229-u14vgg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/438665/original/file-20211221-49229-u14vgg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/438665/original/file-20211221-49229-u14vgg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/438665/original/file-20211221-49229-u14vgg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/438665/original/file-20211221-49229-u14vgg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/438665/original/file-20211221-49229-u14vgg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A pro-Ukrainian volunteer soldier watches for pro-Russian separatists.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/marksman-of-the-donbass-battalion-a-volunteer-militia-group-news-photo/479434622?adppopup=true">Anatolii Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine’s east did not automatically support the separatists or want to be part of Russia. Since 2014, <a href="https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiY2RhMmExMjgtZWRlMS00YjcwLWI0MzktNmEwNDkwYzdmYTM0IiwidCI6ImU1YzM3OTgxLTY2NjQtNDEzNC04YTBjLTY1NDNkMmFmODBiZSIsImMiOjh9">some 1.5 million people</a> have left the Donbass to live in other parts of Ukraine. Meanwhile, at least <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1719044">a million people have left for Russia</a>. </p>
<p>Many of those who remain in the territories occupied by separatists are now being <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/russias-passportisation-of-the-donbas">offered a fast track to Russian citizenship</a>. This policy allows Putin to increase pro-Russian sentiment in eastern Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Ukraine’s strengthening identity</h2>
<p>While Putin claims that ethnic Russians living in Ukraine are part of the Russian World, in reality, ethnicity is not a predictor of political affiliation in Ukraine. In other words, being an ethnic Russian or a Russian speaker does not indicate that one sees oneself as part of the Russian World. Rather, across Ukraine, there has been an increase in sentiment of a <a href="https://zn.ua/ukr/UKRAINE/bilshe-90-gromadyan-vvazhayut-sebe-etnichnimi-ukrayincyami-239470_.html">strong, unified Ukrainian identity</a> since 1991. Meanwhile, the vast <a href="https://suspilne.media/179890-ponad-50-ukrainciv-pidtrimuut-vstup-do-es-ta-nato/">majority of Ukrainians support</a> entrance into NATO. </p>
<p>Most Ukrainians see their future as a sovereign country that is part of Europe. But this directly contradicts Putin’s goals of expanding the Russian World. They are conflicting visions that help explain why Ukraine remains a flashpoint.</p>
<p>[<em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174029/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Ukraine wrestles with the latest threat from its larger neighbor, two scholars explain how the independent country is often viewed as part of a greater Russia – and why that inflames tensions.Jacob Lassin, Postdoctoral Research Scholar, Arizona State UniversityEmily Channell-Justice, Director of the Temerty Contemporary Ukraine Program, Harvard UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/718822017-02-28T00:01:43Z2017-02-28T00:01:43ZUkraine<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158226/original/image-20170224-32692-1xk7q9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158226/original/image-20170224-32692-1xk7q9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158226/original/image-20170224-32692-1xk7q9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158226/original/image-20170224-32692-1xk7q9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158226/original/image-20170224-32692-1xk7q9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158226/original/image-20170224-32692-1xk7q9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=682&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158226/original/image-20170224-32692-1xk7q9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=682&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158226/original/image-20170224-32692-1xk7q9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=682&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Conversation/Zenobia Ahmed</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The emergence of a democratic and independent Ukraine is transforming the geo-strategic landscape of Central Europe. </p>
<p>In the past three years, the 2013/2014 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/21/-sp-ukraine-maidan-protest-kiev">Euromaidan protests</a>, the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-putin-took-crimea">annexation of Crimea</a> and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/28/east-ukraine-frontline-europe-forgotten-war">war in East Ukraine</a> have reshaped the geopolitical map of Europe and derailed cooperation between Russia and the West.</p>
<p>In the years leading to the Euromaidan protests, the directionless political drift and pervasive corruption inspired not only the movement for <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-chinese-investment-sacrifice-ukraines-dreams-of-democracy-to-economic-needs-61151">democratisation in Ukraine</a>, but also the ambition to join the European Union and solidify ties with the West.</p>
<p>Following the Euromaidan protests, the sharp departure from Russia’s sphere of influence caused social cleavages, particularly in the Ukrainian cross-border territories, and the rise of extremism on both sides. </p>
<p>Ukraine is now in sharp economic and industrial decline. It is battling a massive decline in population (due to a mass exodus for economic reasons and an increase in death rates caused by war) and ecological catastrophe in the self-proclaimed independent republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. The prospect of joining the EU as a full member is now very distant. </p>
<p>As a result, Ukraine, a young democracy in the heart of Europe, is grappling with an almost impossible set of tasks. It must prevent its economy from collapsing, reform its state and secure international support to defend its territory.</p>
<p>Despite these challenges, Ukraine may be nearer to the democratic pole than other regimes in the post-Soviet region. This offers us an insight into how a young democracy with turbulent internal dynamics can develop and strengthen in a hostile geopolitical environment.</p>
<p>Political scholars, observers and international leaders from around the world recognise the global importance of Ukraine’s crisis. It has impacts on European security policy, US strategy, efforts to calm the Syrian war and China’s foreign policy, as well as broader democratic developments in post-Soviet Eastern Europe.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71882/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olga Oleinikova does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The emergence of a democratic and independent Ukraine is transforming the geo-strategic landscape of Central Europe. In the past three years, the 2013/2014 Euromaidan protests, the annexation of Crimea…Olga Oleinikova, Postdoctoral Research Fellow & Director of Ukraine Democracy Initiative, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/249162014-03-31T05:17:51Z2014-03-31T05:17:51ZPutin should know that Crimea is not Kosovo when it comes to self-determination<p>In a <a href="http://rt.com/news/putin-address-parliament-crimea-562/">historic speech</a> to both houses of the Russian parliament on 18 March in support of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Vladimir Putin drew a bold comparison between the Crimean crisis and the recognition of Kosovo. In doing so, he raised crucial questions about the legality of ethnic and national self-determination – and about what exactly Russia considers Crimea’s interests to be.</p>
<p>Putin’s reading of the referendum held on 16 March seems to be that the vast majority of Crimeans evidently want to join Russia. No account is given of the many Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians and even ethnic Russians who voiced their opposition to the referendum and declared their intention to <a href="http://news.sky.com/story/1226278/crimea-tatar-muslims-plan-referendum-boycott">boycott</a> it. </p>
<p>In a similar attempt to establish Crimea’s trajectory, Putin pointed to constitutional flaws in the transfer of Crimea from Russia back in 1954. But Russia’s <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-us-intelligence-russia-ukraine-20140303,0,4657644.story">disregard</a> for treaty obligations to recognise Crimea as part of Ukraine, as well as for Ukraine’s territorial integrity more broadly, cannot be justified by recourse to alleged constitutional irregularities in the Soviet Union. Unsurprisingly, the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/03/un-general-assembly-calls-crimea-vote-illegal-2014327179033856.html">UN General Assembly</a> has strongly backed Ukraine’s international borders.</p>
<p>Putin sought to justify the absorption of Crimea as “national” self-determination, and did so by invoking the idea of “historical Russia”. He argued that since they constitute self-determination, the Crimean referendum and Russian takeover are in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Russia’s claim is said to reflect the same aspirations that were deemed acceptable for the Ukrainians in 1991 – and more recently, for the Kosovars. </p>
<p>How plausible is this? In legal terms, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was generally seen as a process of “dissolution”. The former republics gained independence as a result of that process, not through distinctive acts of “ethnic” self-determination or even secession. And despite the <a href="http://www.president-ksgov.net/?page=2,54">recognition of Kosovo’s independence</a> by a number of states (though by no means the whole international community), at no point have the “Kosovar Albanians”, or even the “people of Kosovo” been considered to have right to unilateral secession under international law.</p>
<h2>Matters of principle</h2>
<p>The principle of “equal rights and self-determination of peoples” as embodied in the UN Charter initially took the form of independence within colonial or otherwise pre-defined boundaries, not for ethno-cultural communities. Similarly, in recent times, national and international adjudicators have shown considerable reluctance to accept claims to statehood based on the ethno-cultural makeup of the people or groups making them. </p>
<p>Tellingly, none of the most recent key international legal pronouncements on ethnic claims to statehood have granted the petitioning group their wish. “National minorities” have never been regarded as entitled to unilateral independence or secession. Rather, contemporary self-determination is understood as an all-encompassing process of participation and accommodation within the state, including remedial elements for identity-based groups. In this sense, there cannot be any “people of Crimea” for the legal purpose of secession – only groups within Crimea to be accommodated within a wider territorial unit. Declarations of independence are not internationally unlawful, but they cannot legitimately achieve secession from a state on their own. </p>
<p>Putin’s comparison with Kosovo is inappropriate for two reasons. It glosses over the ways the Kosovar Albanians were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2043075.stm">oppressed by the Milosevic regime</a>, with a scale, longevity and intensity that is simply unseen in Crimea. Whether or not “remedial secession” for severely oppressed groups can be a concrete option under international law – a matter the International Court of Justice cautiously avoided in its <a href="http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&code=kos&case=141&k=21">advisory opinion</a> on Kosovo – it is clear that Pristina’s assertion of independence back in 2008 garnered a moral legitimacy that does not apply to Russia’s intervention in Crimea. </p>
<p>Secondly, the United Nations administrated Kosovo for several years in an attempt to facilitate a lasting solution to its status, and the settlement proposed by UN mediator <a href="http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/101244.htm">Martti Ahtisaari</a> provided the basis for a negotiated agreement. For its part, the UN Security Council recognised Serbia’s territorial integrity, but did not rule out Kosovo’s independence either. Uncertainties remain over the status of Kosovo, mainly because of Serbia’s lack of recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state. </p>
<p>But no UN-supervised process has ever been put in place in Crimea, and no negotiated solution has ever been attempted. Most glaringly, no serious (let alone widespread) “persecution” against ethnic Russians in Crimea has been revealed. The Russian-backed secessionist move has effectively bypassed the standard of constitutional arrangements with the rest of Ukraine (and within Crimea itself) as upheld by leading national and international law practice.</p>
<p>Some form of bilateral settlement between Kiev and Moscow will have to be found. This must allow for greater OSCE involvement on the ground and a framework for the protection of Russian minorities’ language rights, as well as protection for smaller groups such as the <a href="http://news.liv.ac.uk/2014/03/11/viewpoint-russia-and-the-inflated-minority-card-in-ukraine">Crimean Tatars</a>. Such an agreement might not change the reality of Russia’s control over Crimea in the short-term, but it would at least contribute to de-escalating tensions. It would also help clarify the international legal standard for self-determination and group protection – and help us to see Putin’s opportunistic exaggerations for what they are.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/24916/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gaetano Pentassuglia has received funding from a range of sources and his research is fully independent.</span></em></p>In a historic speech to both houses of the Russian parliament on 18 March in support of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Vladimir Putin drew a bold comparison between the Crimean crisis and the recognition…Gaetano Pentassuglia, Reader in International Law and Human Rights, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/239582014-03-14T16:07:05Z2014-03-14T16:07:05ZUkraine crisis: Crimea is to all intents and purposes Russian<p>The Crimean crisis is sliding from bad to worse, not least for the inhabitants of what until a month ago was an idyllic peninsula waiting for the glory of springtime. As the ultra-right and neo-Nazi thuggery of the Kievan fringes has spread to Sevastopol and Simferopol, Crimea’s political status as a proxy in struggles between Russia, the EU and the US has taken the spotlight off the plight of its inhabitants. </p>
<p>To the West, Crimea’s people are Ukrainian whether they like it or not; and if they don’t shut up, Putin will pay for it. We are, sadly, already accustomed to sickening violence on Kiev’s streets and squares, but both western Ukraine and Crimea have become the new focus for various militant nutcases to attach themselves to the cause as parasites. </p>
<p><a href="http://rt.com/news/ukrainian-nationalist-mass-murder-394/">Former Chechen fighters</a> have apparently turned up in western Ukraine to promote the anti-Russian cause. Meanwhile, in Crimea, Chetniks, extreme nationalists from Serbia, have <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ukraine-crimea-crisis-serb-chetnik-militia-joins-pro-russian-patrols-1439654">descended to help</a> their Russian “brothers and sisters” in return for Russian support for Serbia in 1914, 1941 and the 1990s.</p>
<p>The situation is a mess, and will be for as long as the West parades its trophy “prime minister” around its capitals – a prime minister imposed without election on a now bitterly divided country.</p>
<p>Viewed from Moscow, the West’s actions look wearyingly familiar. Various western powers did not hesitate to kick over the traces when it suited them. Hypocritical cant about the sovereignty of nations and the inviolability of borders raises the names Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo and many other unilaterally-created states in the Russian mind. Especially ironic are references to the violation of the Helsinki Accords – which, among other things, recognised the borders of the Soviet Union. </p>
<p>Since the time of Gorbachev, the main impact of western policy in eastern Europe has been to peel states away from Soviet/Russian influence with as little sensitivity and grace as possible, and to incorporate them into the EU and NATO. In the extreme case of the now-abandoned American ballistic missile system once planned for installation in <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6720153.stm">Poland and the Czech Republic</a>, forward-based nuclear missiles were brandished directly in Russia’s face. The pretext that they were to be put there as a defence against Iran rang particularly hollow in Russia. </p>
<p>However, everyone should have the sense to know that trying to drive a wedge between Russia and Ukraine was an irresponsible step too far. Playing on the extreme anti-Russian sentiment voiced by the interim prime minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, not only provokes Putin; it provokes ethnic Russians and others within Ukraine’s diverse population.</p>
<h2>All sides at fault</h2>
<p>So, to repeat a question which has rung through Russian history since the 1860s, what is to be done? No one looks likely to come out of this crisis with their honour intact. The EU has pursued irresponsibly divisive policies which it can only back up with words, lacking decisive reserves of money or force. Even the carrot of EU membership was deceptive, as it is hard to see Ukraine fitting EU membership criteria within 25 years. </p>
<p>Thanks to Ukraine’s pre-coup rulers of all factions, the country has spent the last quarter century as Europe’s worst-governed large state. A beautiful country, full of potential, has become an economic basket case way beyond even Greek dimensions. Ironically, since the make-up of Ukraine is very similar to that of Russia – they share the Soviet legacy, dangerous oligarchs, a cowed population and so on – one can see why Russians like Putin. Under Yeltsin, Russia was heading in the same direction as Ukraine. While Putin’s rule is far from ideal, his authoritarianism has established a platform of stability and even some prosperity in Russia. </p>
<p>The third group of actors in this crisis, the post-coup EU-backed authorities, who naively believed the promises of support from the West would boost their domestic political heft, have been ludicrously provocative. Even though many leaders distanced themselves from it quickly, the attempt to <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/watch-your-tongue-language-controversy-one-fundamental-conflicts-ukraine-1559069">ban Russian as an official language</a> was a moment of revelatory truth for ethnic Russians. An even bigger stupidity is Yatsenyuk’s threat to <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/what-black-sea-fleet-5-interesting-facts-history-russias-crimea-naval-patrol-1558751">throw Russia out</a> of its Sevastopol base by 2017, which could only be done by annulling the Kahrkiv Pact that gives them access until 2047. This is like Cuba telling the US to quit Guantanamo in three years’ time, and we all know how the US would react to that. </p>
<p>There is no way Yatsenyuk can enforce an attempt to turf Russia out without a major conflict, which Ukraine would be sure to lose. History shows that when he looks over his shoulder for his EU and American allies, there will be supportive gestures backed by money, but no boots on the ground. Yatsenyuk’s behaviour is highly provocative and completely toothless, both dangerous and incompetent.</p>
<h2>Flashpoint: Crimea</h2>
<p>Which brings us back to Crimea. This contentious and independent-minded region stretches the definition of “sovereign territory” to its extreme. It was only a Soviet caprice that put it under Ukrainian jurisdiction, a status it had not had for centuries. In 1954, as one of his “[hare-brained schemes](http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/20/news/20iht-past.html)”, Khrushchev magnanimously <a href="http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/02/27/283481587/crimea-a-gift-to-ukraine-becomes-a-political-flash-point">transferred Crimea to Ukraine</a> as a meaningless gesture to commemorate 300 years of Russian/Ukrainian unity. The ironies arising from this are almost limitless, not least the fact the transfer was made to cement what, in Sovietspeak, was called Russia and Ukraine’s “unbreakable friendship”. </p>
<p>Is the west really prepared to go to the brink of regional war to defend the legitimacy of a piece of Soviet serendipity? How many other Soviet territorial arrangements has the West considered to be inviolable? In reality, Crimea is to all intents and purposes Russian, and is very close to Russian hearts – not least because of the heroic defence of Sevastopol, one of the USSR “hero cities” alongside Stalingrad and Leningrad. As things stand, Crimea seems unlikely to cease to be either formally or informally Russian when the crisis is over.</p>
<p>None of the above considerations means the fourth actor in the crisis, Putin, deserves any more credit than anyone else. He has asserted Russia’s interests in the crisis very much à la Putin – that is with no subtlety, finesse or openness to dialogue, but simply through a bullying demeanour, adolescent bellicosity and a clear contempt for the hollow threats of his major adversaries. It should be noted that this crude disdain for empty American and EU bluster plays well to a large Russian constituency, and will surely bolster Putin’s lately fading support at home.</p>
<p>Given how poorly all four major actors in this crisis have behaved, the prospect of a lasting agreement to end the crisis seems remote. However, who can define what the crisis is about? What exactly is it that is keeping the sides apart? Russia and the West both claim to support the proposition that Ukraine should be open to the EU and Russia, not least because a joint effort will be required to bail it out of its fiscal mire. The difference is that Russia wants a return to the <a href="http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article1350403.ece">pre-coup January agreement</a>, while the west insists on the inviolability of the coup they set up. </p>
<p>The differences here might be ironed out if the upcoming elections turn out to be fair and reasonable, by Ukrainian standards at least. The dream outcome would be a mini-Marshall plan, co-sponsored by the EU, US and Russia, to help Ukraine fulfil its potential; in addition, Russia’s long-term lease on the Sevastopol base must be upheld. If any revision of Ukraine’s borders is to come about, it should be by due process and not by Russian land grab or Ukrainian internal repression of Russians, a breathtakingly dangerous option.</p>
<p>Crimea will likely emerge with an unrecognised but de facto independence; it might even face incorporation into the Russian Federation. Cool heads and a willingness to engage with realities rather than to posture could foster a reasonable solution along these lines. The story of the crisis so far, however, suggests these vital commodities are in short supply all round.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/23958/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Read does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Crimean crisis is sliding from bad to worse, not least for the inhabitants of what until a month ago was an idyllic peninsula waiting for the glory of springtime. As the ultra-right and neo-Nazi thuggery…Christopher Read, Professor in Twentieth-Century European History, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/242342014-03-12T06:37:11Z2014-03-12T06:37:11ZWorld War II symbolism runs deep in Ukraine-Russia standoff<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/43617/original/hzvnvc3c-1394559169.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In post-Soviet Russia, orange and black are the new black.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RIAN_archive_389238_St._George_Ribbon_project_gets_underway_in_Moscow.jpg">RIA Novosti</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many of the images of pro-Russian demonstrators in Ukraine, from Crimea to Donetsk, have shown them wearing black-and-orange-striped ribbons. The symbolism here is opaque to most Western observers, it is the “<a href="http://rt.com/news/st-george-ribbon-recalls-russian-heroism/">George Ribbon</a>”, from a Tsarist-era medal for bravery that was reinstated under a different name following the battle of Stalingrad in 1943. It reverted to its original title in the post-Soviet era, and ever since the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, the ribbon has been widely worn in the run-up to the Russian national holiday of Victory Day, on 9 May. </p>
<p>It is often displayed on lapels or car aerials, recalling both the British remembrance-day poppy and an England football flag. It is a sign that the wearer remembers the war, and the price paid for Russian victory – not Soviet, and certainly not Allied, but definitively Russian.</p>
<p>All parties have been drawing historical analogies to interpret the Ukraine crisis: Hillary Clinton and western commentators have <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-echochambers-26476643">compared Putin to Hitler</a>, the annexation of Crimea to the Sudetenland, and referred to appeasement. The Russians insist that the pro-European Ukrainians are <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/02/20/russia_says_the_ukrainian_protesters_are_fascists_and_nazis_are_they.html">fascists</a>.</p>
<p>While the presence of the genuine neo-Nazis of the Svoboda party in Ukraine’s interim government is <a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-party-jeopardises-ukraines-path-to-democracy-23999">undeniable</a>, it seems paradoxical that both the West and Russia legitimise their positions by reference to World War II, and opposition to the Nazis. To understand this situation better, it helps to examine quite how different Russian and Western memories of the war really are.</p>
<h2>Fighting old battles</h2>
<p>As the West recalls it, World War II saw democracy take a stand against tyranny – but only after prevaricating through appeasement, at the immediate cost of Czechoslovakia and the ultimate price of the Holocaust. The war’s main lesson is the importance of universal human rights, and the need to oppose expansionist dictators intent on small annexations or lesser crimes before they invade at will and commit mass murder.</p>
<p>From the Russian perspective, when it is discussed at all, appeasement is seen as confirmation of Western hypocrisy, and as the factor that drove the Soviets to sign a non-aggression pact with Hitler in self-defence. But in Russia, the real story of World War II begins with the Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941. The victims of the unchecked rise of Nazism are not so much the Jewish population of occupied Europe, but rather Russia and Russians. They were both the Nazis’ primary victims and the principal heroes of their defeat. Fascism is therefore not seen in terms of its anti-Semitic and anti-democratic dimensions, but as an anti-Russian phenomenon springing from Western Europe. </p>
<p>Consequently, the Russian media frequently use the label “fascist” for anyone hostile to Russia, the Russian language, Russian people, Russian speakers, or the interests of the Russian state. It is a synonym for the recent coinage “Russophobia”, echoing the term Islamophobia; it is evidently open to abuse, and allows for the silencing of any criticism of Russia.</p>
<p>There is, of course, an important element of truth to the worldview it implies. The Soviet role in defeating Hitler is often understated in the West, and the killing of three million prisoners of war, more than five million non-Jewish civilians, and two million Soviet Jews in the Nazi-occupied Soviet Union are all facts often neglected, albeit never denied, in Western discussions of both the war and the Holocaust.</p>
<p>But this view of the war also means that someone who holds extreme right-wing Russian nationalist views is also by definition an anti-fascist. They may espouse anti-Semitism and homophobia and contempt for democracy, free speech, human rights and the rule of law – but as long as they oppose many Ukrainians’ aspiration to European integration and European-style democracy, they are opposing fascism. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, those on the other side also see themselves as re-fighting World War II in their attempt to oppose the rise and expansion of an authoritarian ruler, in this case Vladimir Putin. In Europe, the legacy of World War II is more ambiguous than casual analogies with appeasement, or the presence of so many George Ribbons, would imply.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/24234/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeremy Hicks does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many of the images of pro-Russian demonstrators in Ukraine, from Crimea to Donetsk, have shown them wearing black-and-orange-striped ribbons. The symbolism here is opaque to most Western observers, it…Jeremy Hicks, Reader in Russian Culture and Film, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/239442014-03-10T06:03:01Z2014-03-10T06:03:01ZRussia fuels Ukrainian crisis with disingenuous diaspora politics<p>The incursion into Ukraine by Russian forces, ostensibly in the name of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26414600">“protecting” the Russian population</a> of Crimea from harassment and violence at the hands of ethnic Ukrainians, is a classic case of a state sponsored “Big Lie”. Despite the manifest absurdity of the claim that Ukraine’s Russian population is being persecuted, Russia’s actions still raise serious questions about the role of diaspora politics in international affairs more broadly, and the obligations states have to their citizens who live elsewhere.</p>
<p>In various countries with immigrant populations, members of ethnic communities and political parties are often <a href="http://www.nccar.ca/publications/nccar-quoted-in-embassy-how-diaspora-politics-are-beginning-to-drive-canadas-foreign-policy/">accused</a> of “playing diaspora politics”. The concern is that members of diaspora communities and organisations illegitimately engage in lobbying to garner support for various “homeland issues” and that politicians accede to diaspora lobbying in the expectation of a payoff at election time. Diaspora politics are often cast in a negative light on the grounds that they import “old world” conflicts into a new country, and use it to distort that country’s “real” foreign policy interests. But the Russian authorities have lately added a new twist to how diaspora politics are played. </p>
<p>Though there are longstanding historical ties between Ukraine and Russia, the presence of substantial numbers of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine is, in part, a legacy of empire. The Soviet “<a href="http://ukrainianweek.com/Politics/25747?attempt=1">Russification</a>” of republics like Ukraine involved resettling ethnic Russians in order to dilute the influence and power of non-Russian ethnic groups. It also involved the promotion of the Russian language as the lingua franca of the Soviet Union; under the Soviets, many non-Russians learned Russian in order to take advantage of opportunities for social mobility. </p>
<p>It is important, therefore, to not conflate “ethnic Russians” with “Russian speakers” in Ukraine. Though there is overlap between the two categories, for some who eventually became Russian speakers, learning the language was not necessarily a reflection of their undying loyalty to Russia, nor some primordial attachment to a Russian identity.</p>
<p>The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that many of the former Russian republics were left with a stranded Russian imperial diaspora in their territory. Given their privileges under the former Soviet system, it is not surprising some ethnic Russians who are stranded in a former republic have not entirely severed their attachment to their ancestral homeland of Russia. At the same time, one wonders how much the apparent loyalty to Russia in eastern Ukraine in fact reflects a broader nostalgia for the old Soviet Union. For many people, life in independent Ukraine has been extraordinarily hard, and it is understandable that some individuals would like to return to what they see as the good old days, when bread was cheap even if the lines were long.</p>
<h2>Home and away</h2>
<p>Ukraine’s admittedly substantial Russian population (whether defined linguistically or ethnically), concentrated primarily in Crimea and in a number eastern oblasts, cannot justify the country’s being divided in two. Political loyalties and identities are not necessarily zero-sum. Many ethnic Russians in Ukraine no doubt have attachments and loyalties to Russia, but it cannot be assumed that those loyalties come at the expense of their attachment to Ukraine.</p>
<p>Russia’s claim that it is coming to the defence of Russians in Ukraine highlights the significance of victim narratives in diaspora politics. One of the defining features of a diaspora is its ability to preserve instances of historical victimisation in its collective memory, and in doing so to maintain group solidarity. President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov are adding another layer to diaspora victim narratives; their claims ought to be scrutinised with an eye to the role that such strategies play in political, and in this case military, mobilisation.</p>
<p>Any diaspora’s relationship with its ancestral homeland has an ebb and flow to it. The Ukrainian diaspora was euphoric when the Soviet Union collapsed and Ukraine declared independence in 1991. The opening of Ukraine to the west, and to the Ukrainian diaspora in particular, meant opportunities for first-generation emigrants to return, and for second- and third-generation members to connect with relatives they had never met or had only known through letters. Many diaspora Ukrainians also worked hard to raise money and start projects to support various civil society initiatives in the newly independent country.</p>
<p>The early euphoria eventually gave way to disenchantment, and led some within the diaspora to disengage with Ukraine. Though family visits were personally satisfying, broader initiatives to run civil society projects or start businesses often ended in frustration because of widespread corruption and graft, a problem that it still has. Disengagement also reflected a grudging recognition that there were limits to what the diaspora could do to help Ukraine, and that Ukraine’s problems had to be solved by Ukrainians. </p>
<p>But one of the unintended consequences of Russia’s actions over the past few days will be to reinvigorate the Ukrainian diaspora’s interest in and support of Ukraine from abroad – and to put to the test their ability to leverage their global presence for the benefit of those in the country itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/23944/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vic Satzewich receives funding from The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) for his research. He published a book titled The Ukrainian Diaspora (Routledge) in 2002 with the support of a SSHRC grant. </span></em></p>The incursion into Ukraine by Russian forces, ostensibly in the name of “protecting” the Russian population of Crimea from harassment and violence at the hands of ethnic Ukrainians, is a classic case of…Vic Satzewich, Professor of Sociology, McMaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/240932014-03-07T14:22:28Z2014-03-07T14:22:28ZRussian confidence dealt a blow by Sochi Paralympics boycotts<p>The founding fathers of the Paralympics must be turning in their graves. The Sochi Paralympics is the latest in a long list of sporting events to be <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/02/british-ministers-boycott-sochi-paralympics-russia-ukraine">marred by politics</a>. The <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/carter-olympic-boycott-1980-103308.html">1980 Olympics</a> in the then USSR are best remembered for boycotts by the United States and 64 other teams in protest against the invasion of Afghanistan; the Moscow Paralympics were <a href="http://www.dw.de/sochi-paralympic-games-highlight-russian-discrimination/a-17479262">moved to the Netherlands</a> because, as a Soviet official put it, “we do not have anyone with impairments here”. </p>
<p>So when the new International Paralympic Committee President, Sir Philip Craven, stated this week – in reference to Russia’s de facto military take-over of the Crimea – that he would “<a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/general/athletics/international-paralympic-committe-eager-to-leave-global-politics-to-the-politicians-ahead-of-sochi-paralympic-winter-games-9167852.html">leave global politics to the politicians</a>”, this was simply a variant of the tired refrain: “Sport and politics do not mix.” </p>
<p>There are some parallels between the 1980 Olympics and Sochi. David Cameron has <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/02/uk-ukraine-crisis-britain-paralympics-idUKBREA210L120140302">ordered a boycott</a> of the Paralympics by British Ministers and Prince Edward, patron of the British Paralympic Association, is staying away.</p>
<p>Far from sport not mixing with politics, it would appear that sports mega-events in particular have become increasingly politicised in recent years, with governments of all political hues, based in a wide range of regime types (from advanced capitalist to dictatorship), falling over themselves to play host. The answer as to why this is the case is not as simple as one would imagine: motives range from “showcasing the nation” to “coming-out parties” to “domestic nation-building”. </p>
<p>Trends suggest that states with historical pasts and international images that need burnishing are flocking to host sports mega-events, especially after the spectacular success of Germany’s 2006 FIFA World Cup (in terms of image improvement). There is an inherent danger to this strategy: hosting is a double-edged sword. Intense media scrutiny is simply one of the by-products of hosting and the longed-for recognition may not be quite what was intended. </p>
<p>Since winning the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/shock-as-qatar-win-vote-for-2022-world-cup-2149429.html">bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup</a>, Qatar has learnt this the hard way by having its <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24980013">treatment of construction and domestic workers</a> examined closely. This could be a case of accidental democratisation: the decision to award Qatar the event was political, made by an undemocratic and unelected organisation. But it might lead to an improvement in conditions for workers in Qatar.</p>
<p>This kind of outcome does not appear to be the case in Russia. Shortly before the Sochi Games, Russia announced its controversial anti-gay laws; shortly after, it mobilised troops in response to the growing crises in the Ukraine, let off <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/04/ukraine-russia-warning-shots-military">warning shots</a> and provocatively <a href="http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/world-news/missile-is-test-fired-by-russia-amid-crisis-in-crimea.23608270">tested a ballistic missile</a> amid the tension. </p>
<p>The Sochi Winter Olympics and the 2018 FIFA World Cup are more than just showcasing events for Russia. Hosting the most expensive Olympics of all time (including summer events) is part of the growing confidence of a state which sees itself returning to its former glory after two decades of difficult economic and social transition. </p>
<p>Mega-sporting events can be used as a show of strength by the host to the international community; internally they can aid the process of binding the nation’s citizens around a common cause. </p>
<p>Russia appears to be testing the boundaries of global opinion and the Sochi Olympics and Paralympics has ensured everyone is paying attention. In the run up to the 2018 FIFA World Cup, the showcase event of the world’s most popular sport, it is likely that Russia, as a (re-)emerging state, will once again be at the forefront of debates on the changing face of global power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/24093/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Grix does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The founding fathers of the Paralympics must be turning in their graves. The Sochi Paralympics is the latest in a long list of sporting events to be marred by politics. The 1980 Olympics in the then USSR…Jonathan Grix, Reader (Associate Professor) in Sport Policy and Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/239992014-03-07T06:05:09Z2014-03-07T06:05:09ZFar-right party jeopardises Ukraine’s path to democracy<p>Following days of protest and the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine’s new interim government was announced on 26 February 2014. This is not an ordinary government. Politicians linked to the extreme right-wing Svoboda party have taken up important posts, including deputy prime minister, the heads of the agriculture and environmental ministries, and a chief law officer. </p>
<p>This is partly the result of the fact that Svoboda leader Oleh Tyahnybok was a key figure in the Euromaidan protests, but it also reflects the party’s electoral strength. Svoboda is one of Ukraine’s five major parties. It experienced a dramatic boost in the 2012 Parliamentary elections, capitalising on a strong protest vote against corruption to enter parliament for the first time: it received 10% of the vote, translating into 37 seats.</p>
<p>The party was founded in the early 1990s under the name “Social-National Party of Ukraine”, clearly alluding to the ideology of National Socialism. Under Tyahnybok’s leadership in the mid-2000s, the party changed its name to All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” in an attempt to distance itself from overt references to Nazism and appear less extreme. </p>
<p>But despite this modernisation effort, the party remains staunchly anti-communist. It presents itself as the only defender of Ukrainian identity, religion and culture. For Svoboda, membership of the Ukrainian nation is ethnically defined on the basis of language, blood and creed. As such, party membership is restricted to ethnic Ukrainians, and eligibility is denied to both atheists and former communists. Its electoral program (entitled <a href="http://en.svoboda.org.ua/about/program/">Program for the Protection of Ukrainians</a>) argues that the main purpose of the party is to “build a powerful Ukrainian State based on the principles of social and national justice” – which can be read as an implicit acceptance of National Socialism.</p>
<p>Svoboda has an anti-Semitic and anti-Russian agenda, using references to a “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20824693">Muscovite-Jewish mafia</a>” to tie together two perceived enemies of the nation. The party was the key organiser of a recent rally on 1 January 2014 in honour of the 105th birthday of Ukrainian nationalist <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/multimedia/photo/ukrainians-march-to-honor-105th-birthday-of-stepan-bandera-1909-1959-334567.html">Stepan Bandera</a>, a controversial figure in Ukrainian history.</p>
<p>In 2010, Bandera was posthumously honoured by President Viktor Yushchenko as a “Hero of Ukraine” for being the leader of Ukraine’s liberation movement. However, Bandera had an ambivalent relationship with Nazi Germany. He is dismissed by some as a Nazi collaborator, working against the Russians and the Jews of the Soviet Union. Demonstrators associated with the party shouted “Glory to Ukraine!” and “Death to the enemies!”, and were dressed in the uniform of a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25571805">Ukrainian division of the German army</a> in World War II.</p>
<h2>Svodoba and the new Ukraine</h2>
<p>Svoboda’s involvement in the recent protests has been characterised by radical anti-Moscow rhetoric, which is fuelling anti-Russian sentiment among the Ukrainian population. Party members are clearly ready to defend the motherland. On 4 March 2014, <a href="http://en.svoboda.org.ua/about/program/">Tiahnybok</a> stated: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We stress that no one should speculate on the underlying constitutional principles: language, nationality, the unitary state. I urge all to be ready to defend Ukraine. In the case of a real military intervention, we should battle the enemy and win. Not a piece of the Ukrainian land should be surrendered to the invaders!</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Parliament’s recent decision to remove the official status of the Russian language following Svoboda’s intervention may be interpreted as an act of discrimination against Ukraine’s Russian-speaking citizens, estimated at around a quarter of the population. This has instigated a backlash from Ukraine’s Russophones, further dividing the country. Pro-Russia groups are increasingly active in various provinces of eastern Ukraine, calling for “<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/04/ukraine-russia-protesters-donetsk-separate-by-force">local resistance</a>” against the government in Kiev and seeking independence from a country they feel they no longer belong to.</p>
<p>It remains unclear what Svodoba’s status will be after the presidential elections in May 2014. The party’s agenda, completely out of line with the principles of procedural democracy, is clearly antithetical to a united Ukraine; its participation in the interim government may have serious consequences for the country’s relations with its neighbours, the international resolution of the crisis, and the domestic handling of the crisis. </p>
<p>Externally, government decisions instigated by Svoboda may legitimise Russia’s own aggressive policy, and may make direct talks between Russia and the interim government less likely. Internally, Svoboda’s policy may contribute to the rise of protest and violent acts against those considered as ethnically non-Ukrainian, as well as backlash from Ukraine’s Russian-speaking population. This in turn could lead to the division of the country. </p>
<p>In short, Svodoba’s central participation in such a crucial and sensitive phase of government should worry anyone concerned about Ukraine’s path to democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/23999/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sofia Vasilopoulou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Following days of protest and the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine’s new interim government was announced on 26 February 2014. This is not an ordinary government. Politicians linked to the…Sofia Vasilopoulou, Lecturer, Department of Politics, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/240032014-03-06T15:24:23Z2014-03-06T15:24:23ZOn Ukraine, Putin has outfoxed the West at every turn<p>As talks stall between US and Russia in the ongoing crisis over Ukraine, Russia – written off by so many just two weeks ago as <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-02-25/a-humiliated-putin-plans-his-next-move-in-ukraine">“humiliated” and “at a loss”</a> – now appears to be in control of the situation, with observers now talking about the <a href="http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2014/03/02/Putin-Humiliates-Obama-and-U-S-Media-in-Ukraine">humiliation</a> of the West. Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown an aptitude for crisis diplomacy and brinkmanship that many had dismissed. </p>
<p>One way to judge a country’s foreign policy success is to consider that country’s objectives and whether they have been achieved – and at what cost. The problem for analysts in terms of Russia and Ukraine is that it is not entirely clear what those objectives are. Some have been openly communicated by Putin and his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, while others have to be inferred from their behaviour. </p>
<p>Successes have to be measured over a period of time. In the short term, we have seen in Putin a return to the canny political operator we thought had lost his touch. The ill-fated parliamentary and presidential <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/dec/04/russia-elections-putin-editorial">elections of 2011 and 2012</a> saw his popularity and that of his party United Russia plummet, and it seemed that the president had misjudged what his people would put up with and how far they would go to be heard. The events in Ukraine leave no doubt that Putin is in control – and this will play well on the domestic front. In the longer term, however, Russia may have shot itself in the foot.</p>
<p>As for Russia’s goals in this crisis, it is clearly of vital importance that Ukraine remains within its sphere of influence. Despite Lavrov’s denial that it is the <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2014/03/05/russian-troops-not-in-control-of-crimea-says-lavrov/">Russian military</a> in control in Crimea, few would argue Russia has not very firmly and effectively marked its territory. While it declined to play a role in Kiev when the French, German and Polish foreign ministers <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/ukraine-crisis-president-claims-deal-with-opposition-after-77-killed-in-kiev">brokered the short-lived deal</a> that brought an end to the violence there, Russia’s presence was very firmly felt at the Paris talks on 5 March – despite refusing to meet with members of the interim Ukrainian government. One objective is achieved: Ukraine’s future will be decided either in dialogue or confrontation with Russia, but it will not be achieved without it.</p>
<p>A strong thread in the Putin-led narrative has been <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10513330/Vladimir-Putin-claims-Russia-is-moral-compass-of-the-world.html">the West’s decline and Russia’s rise</a>. What looked like the loss of Ukraine to the interim pro-EU government at the end of February was therefore not only an insult to Russia, but a suggestion that Russian regional power was in decline compared to the EU’s inexorable eastward march. Seen from this perspective, Russia’s actions in Crimea are understandable: not only have they earned back the seat at the table that had seemingly been withdrawn when the former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych fled the country – this change has come about against a backdrop of Western helplessness.</p>
<p>As the stand-off in Crimea goes on, Russia is also making matters increasingly difficult for the interim Kiev government, presenting an insurmountable obstacle to decision making, relationship building, and crucially, an injection of sorely needed financial assistance and investment. With each passing day, the importance of Ukraine to Russia is reasserted at the expense of Ukraine’s room for manoeuvre. This is likely to ensure there will be no more Ukrainian snubs, such as the interim government’s decision to <a href="http://rt.com/news/minority-language-law-ukraine-035/">downgrade the Russian language</a> in late February.</p>
<p>Finally, Putin has managed to satisfy the “derzhavniki” in his own country – those political elites for whom Russia’s great power status is a <em>sine qua non</em>. Beyond the political elites, we should not forget that Russia, like any country, has its share of nationalists, xenophobes and extremists. Putin owes his continued power to his ability to negotiate competing and dangerous domestic interests. His future would have been short-lived had he presided over the loss of Ukraine. Not only, therefore, has Putin managed to serve Russia’s interests, he has managed to secure his own position for a while longer at least and therefore some continuity in Russian politics.</p>
<h2>Playing the long game</h2>
<p>Putin’s success looks less secure once we consider possible developments in the longer term. Russia has well-justified fears of separatist movements of its own (think Chechnya and Dagestan); it has always, even if disingenuously, argued the need to ensure territorial integrity and sovereignty. Russia’s actions in Crimea and the standstill they have created in Ukrainian politics have contributed to violence in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/eyewitness-russia-and-ukraine-supporters-face-off-in-donetsk-24048">eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk</a>, and any situation that results in the division of Ukraine will give momentum to separatist movements elsewhere. </p>
<p>If Russia can contain matters and contribute to a solution that keeps Ukraine together, this will be less of a problem. The show of Russian determination and might may be enough to signal that the time is certainly not ripe for secessionism. However, if Ukraine divides, this will be a painful process, the ripples of which are likely to be felt most deeply in Russia itself.</p>
<p>It is in the longer term that the West is most likely to have the last laugh. One of Russia’s greater foreign policy objectives lies with forming a customs union with the former Soviet states (excepting the Baltics) and ultimately a Eurasian Union to rival that of the European Union. Currently, Kazakhstan is the important player here and it has already made clear that the <a href="http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Situation-in-Ukraine-has-a-direct-impact-on-the-Customs-Union-President-26483/">future of the customs union</a> may be dependent on what happens in Ukraine. Kazakhstan has no desire to return to the past that was life in the Soviet Union and has long been clear that its membership in a Eurasian Union must be voluntary and a meeting of willing equals and not coerced weaker parties.</p>
<p>Finally, despite Sergei Lavrov’s claim that China is supportive of the Russian position, there is nothing in <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1133558.shtml">China’s official statement</a> on the subject to suggest this is so. And China has its own ongoing problems with separatists as the recent attack by <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/05/china-knife-massacre-wage-jihad-abroad">Uighurs</a> there show. For the moment, Russia and China have good relations but history should tell Russia to expect relatively little in the way of permanence there.</p>
<p>As for the West, at the current time, decline does not seem to be so far from the truth. International law offers no clear answers as to the legality of Russian actions and the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-un-special-representative-seized-by-armed-men-in-crimeaukrainian-ministry-9171405.html">UN Special Envoy</a> was forced into an ignominious departure on his visit to Crimea on 5 March. We can expect no action from NATO. The EU had its opportunity with Ukraine and the result is as we see; plus its member states are divided, unable even to agree on the use of sanctions. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/04/us-ukraine-crisis-security-idUSBREA230NQ20140304">OSCE</a> has no assurance that its observers will be allowed in to Crimea when they arrive from Kiev. As for the US, Washington has rightly identified that all it has left is rhetoric and sanctions, the <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/06/statement-press-secretary-ukraine">latest of which</a> will target “officials and individuals” who are “threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine”. </p>
<p>There is also, of course, “the market”. After initial dips, the Russian market bounced back strongly, the <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7144374a-a2fa-11e3-9685-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=uk#axzz2uy8SlqsZ">Financial Times</a> advised that this was the time to invest in Russia, and <a href="http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/ikea-to-invest-28bln-in-russia-through-2020/495531.html">IKEA</a> announced it would invest €2 billion (US$2.74 billion) there. Putin is right: the world is interconnected, and so far this is playing to Russia’s advantage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/24003/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maxine David does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As talks stall between US and Russia in the ongoing crisis over Ukraine, Russia – written off by so many just two weeks ago as “humiliated” and “at a loss” – now appears to be in control of the situation…Maxine David, Lecturer in European politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/218522014-03-05T06:12:01Z2014-03-05T06:12:01ZUN Security Council’s failure stretches from Syria to Crimea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/43101/original/brjgrwkn-1393951342.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lights are on, but no-one's home.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:United_Nations_Security_Council.jpg">Patrick Gruban</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-calling-all-the-shots-in-ukraine-what-next-for-relations-between-russia-and-the-west-23867">crisis in Ukraine</a>, as Russian troops apparently occupy Crimea and threaten its borders with the rest of the country, has sent strong tremors through the international diplomatic community. Both <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/02/obama-putin-phone-call-ukraine-russia-crimea">Barack Obama</a> and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/02/ukraine-crisis-russia-germany-idUSL6N0LZ0SR20140302">Angela Merkel</a> have made lengthy phone calls to Vladimir Putin to urge restraint, and to make him aware of “consequences” if Ukraine’s sovereignty isn’t respected.</p>
<p>As to what consequences Russia’s military incursion into Crimea may have, we cannot yet be sure. There is talk of <a href="http://mashable.com/2014/03/02/g7-sochi-russia-ukraine/">boycotting the G8</a> meeting in Sochi later this year; there is also talk of <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/russia-could-be-expelled-from-g8-if-aggression-continues-harper-says/article17213658/">expelling Russia from the G8 altogether</a> in favour of a G7. Meanwhile, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, Catherine Ashton, is <a href="http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_03_02/Catherine-Ashton-to-meet-with-Sergey-Lavrov-on-Ukraine-next-week-in-Russia-EU-press-service-9552/">heading to Ukraine</a> this week. EU <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/03/us-ukraine-crisis-eu-idUSBREA221XW20140303">sanctions</a> are being discussed, and the IMF will visit Kiev to discuss a financial aid package to the interim government.</p>
<p>But what of the United Nations? What action can the UN take to help defuse the situation? To get a sense of whether or not the UN can achieve anything, we only have to look to Syria – where, after three years, a nightmarish conflict still rages at a cost of <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/02/uk-syria-crisis-islamists-idUKBREA210BM20140302">more than 140,000</a> people killed, millions exiled, and millions more internally displaced.</p>
<p>There are numerous other examples of conflicts shaped by the military interventions of the US or Russia: Iraq, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Chile, Iran, Vietnam and Kosovo, to name a few. The UN has been spectacularly unable to deal with those as well. At the heart of its failing are the organisation’s power structure, and the problem of enforcing member states’ accountability to international law – and the institutional failings of the UN Security Council (UNSC). </p>
<p>The UNSC is one of the principal organs of the UN, whose powers exercised through its Resolutions are legally binding among all UN members. It is also dominated by the Big Five permanent members: the US, the UK, France, Russia and China. Any of these can veto a resolution tabled in UNSC, and the council’s ability to maintain peace and security therefore depends upon their interests – and not necessarily the concerns of those directly affected by conflicts and wars. </p>
<p>So the US continues to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/19/us-veto-israel-settlement">veto</a> any resolution that condemns Israel’s actions in Palestine, while Russia similarly vetoes any resolution that involves intervening in Syria against its client <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/12/us-syria-crisis-russia-aid-idUSBREA1B0HN20140212">Bashar al-Assad</a>.</p>
<p>The UN was established in 1945 to prevent a third world war, and in this at least it has been successful. But in recent years, it has been unable to prevent a number of major conflicts and millions of casualties. Many of these conflicts have involved members of the UNSC – in the case of Iraq, for example, the US and Britain. The UN could not block that intervention, and it would probably have been bypassed had the UK parliament voted for military intervention in Syria. The fact is, irrespective of the nature and scale of conflict, the power structure of the UN prevents joint decisions on the most pressing and immediate issues if the interests of any Big Five clash.</p>
<h2>Bypasses and violations</h2>
<p>Another problem with the UN is the ratification of subsidiary bodies such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which has ramifications for the legal accountability of member states. <a href="http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter14.shtml">Chapter XIV</a> of the UN Charter authorises the UNSC to enforce ICJ rulings, but this is still subject to the veto power of the five permanent members of the Council. Which means we are back where we started if any of the Big 5 is involved. When you add US’s <a href="http://www.cfr.org/courts-and-tribunals/united-states-icj/p26905">refusal to recognise</a> the ICJ or the ICC, this renders those bodies meaningless. </p>
<p>Despite this, the US has recently <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/03/obama-putin-clash-over-ukraine-20143281822988235.html">criticised</a> Russia’s moves in Ukraine for being in breach of international law, including Russia’s obligations under the UN Charter, and of its 1997 military basing agreement with Ukraine. </p>
<p>The UN’s inability to reach a solution for peace in Syria and also the entire Middle East peace process is widely exposed. The ascendancy of Palestine as an “observer state” after getting <a href="http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm">overwhelming support</a> in the General Assembly of the UN has already shown the existing differences in the institution at large. Immediately after UNESCO recognised Palestine as its newest member, the US <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/10/31/us-palestinians-unesco-usa-funding-idUSTRE79U5ED20111031">stopped its funding</a> to the organisation – but it still has only haltingly reassessed its <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24471148">aid to Egypt</a> after the military coup there. Any resolutions to bring Israel to the ICC for war crimes committed in Gaza, or to stop it from building more settlements on Palestinian land, are blocked by the US on a regular basis.</p>
<p>Thorough reforms of the UN, especially the UNSC, could work towards better international governance and maintenance of peace and security in the world, but they can only work if the Big Five are ready to give up their veto and engage in more democratic power-sharing. Timid reforms, such as including more non-permanent members in the UN for two year periods, are not going to help in the long run: countries elected as non-permanent members to the UNSC can vote on a resolution, but the permanent members can still veto it. And while other subsidiary bodies of the UN continue to work and engage in development work around the world, these have acted as a veil to hide the ineffectiveness of the UN in the areas of global governance. </p>
<p>The world needs a truly legitimate international organisation that serves the needs of those affected by conflicts directly, and not the interests of the power-hungry nations who run the show. This can only be achieved when there are serious diplomatic efforts to make the UNSC a truly “one member, one vote” system, serving the interests of all nations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/21852/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammad Amir Anwar has received funding from the Foundation of Urban Regional Studies.</span></em></p>The crisis in Ukraine, as Russian troops apparently occupy Crimea and threaten its borders with the rest of the country, has sent strong tremors through the international diplomatic community. Both Barack…Mohammad Amir Anwar, Post-doctoral fellow, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/239462014-03-04T00:04:34Z2014-03-04T00:04:34ZA divided Ukraine could see two radically different states emerge<p>It is increasingly difficult to predict what the future holds for Ukraine. One scenario sees the country becoming divided along roughly ethnic lines, with an ethnic Ukrainian western state and a more Russia-oriented eastern state comprising today’s southern and eastern Ukraine. So what would the economies of these potential new states look like?</p>
<p>The most obvious question is where the borders between the two new states state would be drawn. For simplicity, the subsequent analysis is based on the assumption that a future “East Ukraine” would comprise those regions (oblasts) where recently deposed leader Viktor Yanukovych received over half of the vote during the 2010 Presidential election. “West Ukraine” would include the other 17 of the total 27 oblasts.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/43080/original/wmm4bgwk-1393921430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/43080/original/wmm4bgwk-1393921430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/43080/original/wmm4bgwk-1393921430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/43080/original/wmm4bgwk-1393921430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/43080/original/wmm4bgwk-1393921430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/43080/original/wmm4bgwk-1393921430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/43080/original/wmm4bgwk-1393921430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/43080/original/wmm4bgwk-1393921430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2014/2/mapping-ukraine-sidentitycrisis.html">Aljazeera</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This is, of course, an extremely crude assumption – it is certainly not a forecast – but it does allow us to imagine how Ukraine’s current economic geography might shape the future of the two hypothetical states.</p>
<h2>Town and country</h2>
<p>In the event of a split, Ukraine’s 45m inhabitants would be split fairly evenly between the two halves. West Ukraine would be relatively rural, with only 14.4m of its 24m inhabitants (57%) <a href="http://ukrstat.org/en">classed as urban dwellers</a>. By contrast, East Ukraine would be a less populous but more urbanised state, with 79% living in urban areas.</p>
<p>West would be poorer than East. The current unweighted average monthly income of western Ukrainian regions is US$291, compared to <a href="http://ukrstat.org/en">US$320 in the east</a>. These averages conceal significant regional variation, with Kiev and its surrounding region the only areas in the West with average incomes greater than the current Ukrainian average.</p>
<p>In East Ukraine, the average income is almost uniformly higher than in the West. Only Kherson, a sparsely populated region just north of Crimea, is poorer than the West Ukrainian average. The <a href="http://ukrstat.org/en">unemployment rate</a> is also higher in West Ukraine (8.5%) than in the East (6.8%).</p>
<h2>Farms and factories</h2>
<p>The economic structures of the two states could hardly be any more different. In West Ukraine, the economy is dominated by agrarian production and the huge service sector centred on the capital city of Kiev. Ukraine is currently the world’s largest producer of sunflower oil, and a major exporter of other agricultural products, such as wheat, grain and sugar. Much of this production takes place in the West. </p>
<p>Many of the country’s largest services – phone operator Kyivstar, say, or aerospace design companies – and energy companies such as Naftogaz Ukrainy or EnergoRynok are concentrated in Kiev. Western Ukraine accounted for just over 42% of total exports in 2013, with over half these exports registered to companies in Kiev alone. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/42992/original/fywdv443-1393868587.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/42992/original/fywdv443-1393868587.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/42992/original/fywdv443-1393868587.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=214&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/42992/original/fywdv443-1393868587.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=214&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/42992/original/fywdv443-1393868587.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=214&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/42992/original/fywdv443-1393868587.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=269&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/42992/original/fywdv443-1393868587.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=269&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/42992/original/fywdv443-1393868587.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=269&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">West Ukraine isn’t short of farmland.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/thisisbossi/5070573876/sizes/o/">thisisbossi</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, given their links with industrial production in Eastern Ukraine, it is unlikely that these companies would continue to generate current levels of revenue in the event of any future split. What would happen, for example, to Kiev-based design bureaus working for Kharkiv-based aerospace firms?</p>
<p>Ukraine’s industry centres on the East. Nearly all steel production and most arms manufacturing takes place in the region, and the country is currently one of the world’s <a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraine-worlds-4th-largest-arms-exporter-in-2012-according-to-sipri-321878.html?flavour=full">leading exporters</a> in both sectors. Other higher value-added sectors, including the auto and aerospace industries, are also predominantly located in the East, although the competitiveness of enterprises in this region is patchy.</p>
<p>But cars don’t build themselves, and all these energy-intensive factories use up a lot of power. It is likely that East Ukraine would continue to import large quantities of natural gas from Russia. West Ukraine’s energy demands would be much lower.</p>
<h2>The wildcards</h2>
<p>Two other issues might define the respective economic futures of a divided nation: the future of Ukraine’s large stock of public debt; and the potential transformative impact of shale gas.</p>
<p>The first key issue is how the large stock of existing Ukrainian public debt would be divided up. Ukraine currently has a public debt-to-GDP ratio of around 40%. That’s a lower share than many advanced economies, like the US and the UK, but the fact that Ukraine has been unable to balance its budget for a number of years has caused its debt burden to grow rapidly. </p>
<p>Assuming that this stock of debt would be split evenly between the two states, it is clear that the debt-to-GDP ratio would increase even more in the poorer, more agrarian West, especially if it were unable to balance government expenditure and income. It is likely that West Ukraine would require significant external support to manage any future debt obligations. While the East would also inherit a relatively high debt burden, it would, by virtue of its greater export and productive potential, be better equipped to manage this debt.</p>
<p>The second area of uncertainty relates to Ukraine’s two large deposits of shale gas – one in the western Lublin basin, and the other in the eastern Dnieper-Donetsk basin.</p>
<p>Large scale shale gas extraction has the potential to boost the fortunes of both states although at this stage the prospects for both deposits are uncertain. However, Royal Dutch Shell’s decision last year to invest in a <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/01/24/uk-shale-ukraine-idUKBRE90N11S20130124">US$10 billion project</a> in the eastern Yuzivska field indicates that the prospects in East Ukraine currently look brighter.</p>
<h2>Differing futures</h2>
<p>Western Ukraine’s economic powerhouse, the city of Kiev, would likely experience significant disruption in the event of a division. West Ukraine would require enormous levels of external assistance, both to manage its large public debt burden, and to generate the type of economic restructuring that would be required to increase income levels across the country. Without restructuring, West Ukraine would be one of the poorest countries in Europe. The financial assistance and open market for exports provided by the EU would be crucial to the economic future of the country.</p>
<p>East Ukraine, on the other hand, has the potential for a brighter future. It would inherit the richer, more urbanised and on the whole more productive sections of the Ukrainian economy. It is also further along in developing its shale gas resources. Consequently, East Ukraine would be more viable as an independent state and would possess the capabilities to compete in some areas of the global economy. In an alternative scenario, East Ukraine would also represent a significant and relatively modern addition to an enlarged Russian economy.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Are you an academic in Ukraine? If so we are keen to hear from you: uk-editors@theconversation.com</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/23946/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Connolly does not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has no relevant affiliations.</span></em></p>It is increasingly difficult to predict what the future holds for Ukraine. One scenario sees the country becoming divided along roughly ethnic lines, with an ethnic Ukrainian western state and a more Russia-oriented…Richard Connolly, Lecturer in Political Economy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/236702014-02-25T21:11:02Z2014-02-25T21:11:02ZUkraine a pawn in high-stakes global game with no quick win in sight for EU, US or Russia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/42486/original/gtrtbs6j-1393347648.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">To Russia with love?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://images.pressassociation.com/meta/2.19126444.html">AP Photo/Darko Bandic</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It was just last Friday that the Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych and three leaders of the parliamentary opposition – Vitaliy Klichko, Oleh Tyahnibok, and Arsenij Yatseniuk – signed an <a href="http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/671350/publicationFile/190051/140221-UKR_Erklaerung.pdf">agreement</a> on how to end the two-month crisis that has engulfed Ukraine. They did so as the protests turned increasingly violent, with up to 100 people killed in the days immediately before the agreement. </p>
<p>Witnessed by the foreign ministers of France, Poland and Germany, the agreement was hailed as another major success of EU diplomacy. A special envoy of the Russian president had also participated in the negotiations, but refused to sign the agreement as a witness, arguing that it was difficult to see how it could be implemented.</p>
<p>That gloomy assessment unfortunately proved accurate. The agreement, among other things, optimistically laid the ground for the restoration of the 2004 constitution of Ukraine, the formation of a national unity government, constitutional revisions to limit presidential powers, presidential elections, and an amnesty. But within three days, President Yanukovych had been impeached by parliament and a warrant for his arrest <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26320004%5D">had been issued</a> after he <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-protests-continue-in-kiev-despite-deal-signed-by-president--but-where-is-viktor-yanukovych-9146182.html">left Kiev</a> on Saturday, insisting that he did not resign, and apparently <a href="http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/02/24/arrest-warrant-issued-for-ukrainian-president-viktor-yanukoych-on-charge-of-mass-murder/">disappeared entirely</a> by Sunday. Meanwhile, protests in Kiev’s Independence Square continue, encouraged (to a mixed reception) by former prime minister, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/tymoshenko-release-centre-stage-ukraine-soap-opera">Yulia Tymoshenko</a>, newly freed from prison.</p>
<p>Demonstrations have also escalated elsewhere in the country in response to the agreement and its subsequent partial annulment. They extend even to Yanukovych’s presumptive stronghold in the southeast. Meanwhile, in the western parts of Ukraine, where pro-Western and nationalist Ukrainian sentiment are strongest, protesters established so-called <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/klytschko-yatseniuk-and-tiahnybok-elected-to-peoples-council-presidium-335408.html">People’s Councils</a> – alternative and informal parallel structures of governance at the local level – that have assumed control of local administrations and security forces. These “takeovers” took place before the agreement was signed and continues at the time of writing, highlighting the long-standing fragility of the Ukrainian state and its institutions.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, tensions have also escalated between Russia on the one hand and the US and the EU on the other. Russia has condemned the developments in Ukraine since the agreement was signed as an unconstitutional, Western-backed coup, while the US and the EU have warned Russia not to stoke Ukraine’s continuing crisis.</p>
<h2>Deep trouble</h2>
<p>There are some fairly obvious underlying problems perpetuating the Ukrainian crisis. For one thing, only the current government and the parliamentary opposition were party to the agreement; the opposition in the streets were left out in the cold.</p>
<p>On top of this, the parliamentary opposition is not homogeneous in its composition or political platforms; it is neither fully representative of the protesters in Independence Square nor in any position to control them. In fact, many of the protesters, who themselves are highly heterogeneous and have no unified leadership either, deeply distrust the parliamentary opposition, and see it to some extent as part of the same corrupt system to which they are opposed.</p>
<p>Another problem is that Ukraine has become a pawn in a much larger geopolitical game with significantly higher stakes. The current crisis was triggered by Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25162563">Association Agreement</a> with the European Union, arguably under significant pressure and incentives from Russia. For both the EU and Russia, Ukraine is a valued prize in the competition for influence in the post-Soviet borderlands, similar to Georgia and Moldova but much more important because of its size, its strategic location, and its potential to destabilise the entire Black Sea region – and NATO and EU borders along with it.</p>
<p>That said, Ukraine’s fundamental problem is not really whether it faces east towards Russia or west towards the EU, the US and potentially NATO. The really pressing issue is whether Ukrainians have a choice about their country’s direction and whether they can take for granted the rule of law and the protection of their human rights as they go about making that choice.</p>
<p>While the EU has steadily worked on improving the rule of law and the protection of human rights across the area of the <a href="http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm">Eastern Partnership</a>, in which Ukraine is a strategic “target”, this is still a long-term work in progress. The Association Agreement was just one step along the road in an environment of taut geopolitical competition. When Yanukovych brushed the Association Agreement aside, the geopolitical dimension of the EU’s engagement in the region suddenly became more open than ever. </p>
<p>The result is an elite-level agreement that can at best be interpreted as an attempt to foster a political situation in which Ukraine’s underlying governance problems can finally be addressed. But so long as the agendas of domestic and external actors remain as disparate as they are today, the prospects for this look bleak indeed. </p>
<p>Neither Russia nor the EU and US has a clear interest in further escalation, but it is equally hard to see any incentive for Russia to work with the West to calm the crisis. Yanukovych may have been disowned by his Party of the Regions and a “unity government” including the parliamentary opposition may have been formed, but this has simply entrenched rather than done away with an essentially dysfunctional and corrupt governance system. Many of the Maidan protesters rightly loathe it, and they are very unlikely to lend it any support.</p>
<p>Given the depth of these problems, Ukraine’s crisis is certain to continue. Any effort to resolve it in a sustainable way will require a more comprehensive agreement and the breathing space to negotiate it – neither of which will be possible without highly responsible and strategic leadership in Kiev, Moscow, Brussels and Washington.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/23670/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff currently receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It was just last Friday that the Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych and three leaders of the parliamentary opposition – Vitaliy Klichko, Oleh Tyahnibok, and Arsenij Yatseniuk – signed an agreement…Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of Public Administration, Donetsk State Management UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/215382013-12-18T14:11:32Z2013-12-18T14:11:32ZUkraine’s opposition needs help from Europe’s 89 generation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/38024/original/w5nvpzyj-1387285172.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">From orange to blue and yellow: Ukraine's protesters fly the EU flag front and centre.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>I will never forget the 12 hours I spent in the Ukrainian women’s prison in Kharkiv. Never in my life have I seen such misery or degrading treatment of prisoners, Nor will I forget my brief conversation with imprisoned former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko when I finally arrived at her sickbed: “Promise me you will not forget Ukraine’s struggle for democracy”.</p>
<p>Since President Yanukovych <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25162563">rejected</a> Europe in favour of Russia in late November, the streets of Ukrainian cities, Kiev in particular, have been filled with young demonstrators. But whereas in 2004, <a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60620/adrian-karatnycky/ukraines-orange-revolution">orange</a> was the colour of revolution, this time it’s the blue and yellow of the EU that symbolises change. Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony echoes around Independence Square in Kiev, which has long since been dubbed Euromaidan. </p>
<p>Many Ukrainians, the young in particular, want to return to the European fold; they strongly oppose Yanukovych’s rejection of the EU’s offer of an association agreement. Being part of a Russian customs union or becoming a pariah state like Belarus is not for them. To paraphrase the <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/dec/05/ukraine-protests-way-out/">American historian Timothy Snyder</a>, we are witnessing a “common-sense revolution” fuelled by the desire of the young to live normal lives in a normal country.</p>
<p>The political map of Europe is back on the drawing board, much as it was in 1989, with a crucial decision to be made: whether Ukraine should be part of Europe, with everything that entails – from respect for human rights to free trade – or fall further under the influence of Russia.</p>
<p>But what is Europe doing for them? Particularly the 1989 generation, the one that hailed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe as their “defining moment”. What are they doing to support the protesters on the streets of Kiev and Kharkiv – like the previous generation did when it lent its support to Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel and the East Germans in <a href="http://open.salon.com/blog/lost_in_berlin/2009/10/10/we_are_the_people_how_leipzig_launched_a_revolution">Leipzig</a> with their rhythmic chant of “Wir sind das Volk” – “we are the people”? </p>
<h2>Europe to the rescue</h2>
<p>Yes, the EU and NATO have <a href="http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/us-and-europe-denounce-raid-on-kiev-protesters-1.1624206">denounced</a> the recent police violence, but European politicians have mostly spent the protests fretting over the question of “who lost Ukraine?” Was the West wrong to put so much <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ukrainian-parliament-votes-against-bills-to-release-tymoshenko-a-934887.html">emphasis</a> on the release of Tymoshenko? Should we have realised much earlier on that Ukraine had dragged us into a modern version of “chequebook diplomacy”, in which the West was encouraged to outbid Russia’s offer of cash and liquid gas? Did the EU commit a strategic blunder in 2004, when it reacted too slowly and failed to offer the parents of the Orange generation the prospect of full membership?</p>
<p>Whatever the answers to these questions, soul-searching is not an adequate response at a time when protesters continue to defy the cold and tens of thousands are singing for their country on Euromaidan. Now, with a presidential election just around the corner, is the time for action.</p>
<p>Rather than focusing on the dead-in-the-water association agreement, the EU should change course as fast as possible and devise a longer-term policy towards Ukraine, one that sends a strong signal to the protesters and the government alike. It goes without saying that the EU should be prepared to implement real crisis management measures if the situation escalates further.</p>
<p>The EU countries need to focus on the presidential election in 2015. As we know, Yanukovych will do everything in his power to ensure this is a pseudo-election with no real opposition. In fact, he has already begun: Tymoshenko is still behind bars, and the President is currently striving to disbar the opposition’s new hope, the Udar party’s <a href="http://world.time.com/2013/12/16/vitali-klitschko-ukraines-revolutionary-heavyweight-vacates-title-to-lead-uprising/">Vitali Klitschko</a>, on the grounds that he has not been continuously resident in Ukraine in recent years. The West must, of course, protest against this. As they did in 1989, the EU countries should openly and enthusiastically support the opposition parties. </p>
<p>Germany, spearheaded by the CDU think tank Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, has already started this process. KAS is in full swing, providing the opposition with everything from financial support to basic training in building political parties. Germany is also trying to convince the opposition to coalesce around a single, strong candidate to challenge Yanukovych.</p>
<p>As a part of this strategy, the EU should mobilise in support of the group that most strongly backs the EU: the young. In practice, this means that the EU and its member states should offer scholarships to European universities and university colleges as soon as possible. Here, there are obvious parallels with the 1989 revolution, not least for Denmark. When the wave of change hit the Baltic countries, Denmark offered scholarships for talented students, particularly at Aarhus University. Many of these students went on to take up prominent positions in the young democracies, among them the current Latvian Minister of Defence, Artis Pabriks.</p>
<p>The EU countries should also ease up on visa requirements so that young people are actually able to enter the EU. The EU must also work out how best to influence Yanukovych to allow Klitschko’s candidacy for president and to stop the violence against protesters. If there is one thing the EU should have learned from the association agreement car crash, it is that money talks. Throughout the process, especially when he played the EU off against Russia, Yanukovych very much had his own fortune in mind – not to mention his son’s (Yanukovych’s son, a dentist, is suddenly one of Ukraine’s richest people, with a fortune of more than $510m). As has been suggested by the US think tank Freedom House and in the <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8eb70b9e-6291-11e3-99d1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2njAqak1j">US Senate</a>, the EU should consider freezing the Yanukovych family’s assets abroad and prevent them from travelling to the Europe they do not want their population to enjoy.</p>
<p>Last, but not least, Europe’s politicians must decide whether they consider Ukraine a potential part of the EU, or whether the country should, quite literally, remain on the periphery of Europe. In short, the EU countries must decide whether they are willing to offer a post-Yanukovych Ukraine the realistic prospect of actual membership. So-called “<a href="http://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/124">enlargement fatigue</a>” and the excessive focus on “<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10361971/Britain-admits-it-has-no-figures-on-EU-welfare-tourist-numbers.html">welfare tourism</a>” make it politically difficult for EU leaders to advocate Ukraine’s full membership; still, something less –- free trade, economic aid, a voice in EU foreign policy, freedom of travel – would do, at least for now.</p>
<p>In all honesty, what will remain of the EU’s values and basic narrative of democratisation if its member states just stand idly by, wringing their hands as young Ukrainians wrapped in the EU flag are beaten to a pulp? The parallels with 1989 are clear. During that revolution, in the words of the Czech writer Milan Kundera, we let the protesters know that Central Europe was “the kidnapped West” and would soon return to the rest of the continent. It is high time we sent a similar message to the people on the streets in Ukraine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/21538/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lykke Friis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>I will never forget the 12 hours I spent in the Ukrainian women’s prison in Kharkiv. Never in my life have I seen such misery or degrading treatment of prisoners, Nor will I forget my brief conversation…Lykke Friis, Prorector for Education, University of CopenhagenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/212632013-12-09T13:22:52Z2013-12-09T13:22:52ZGoodbye Lenin? Ukraine has been wondering for 20 years<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/37250/original/4tfwrzrx-1386592976.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vlad the impaled.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Efrem Lukatsky/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>That late summer day, the crowds were joyful. They cheered as the flag they had come to loathe was lowered. In its place, the blue and yellow colours of Ukraine rose above parliament. As the demonstrators sang in celebration, some showed mouths filled with gold teeth, the masterpieces of Soviet dentistry. </p>
<p>It was August 1991. Earlier that month, an attempt by a “State Emergency Committee” to depose the leader of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, had backfired. Their coup d'etat lasted only three days, and, rather than preserving the Soviet system, as the plotters had hoped, arguably hastened its collapse. </p>
<p>Waiting, uncertainty, and being slightly on edge all the while, is the lot of the journalist covering a developing political crisis. The removal of the flag of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic suggested the country had decided to go forward alone: severing political, and historical, ties with Moscow. In terms of TV journalism (I was then a producer for Reuters Television), the next question was whether the statue of Lenin in central Kiev would share the fate of the Soviet flag. I stayed a day or two in case it was about to be hauled down too. </p>
<p>It would have been a long wait if I’d stuck around. The statue only came down last weekend.</p>
<p>Giving a lecture earlier this year on the reporting of the Russian Revolution of 1917, I showed part of Sergei Eistenstein’s film October. Watching the pulling down of the statue of the tsar again, I thought of the countless pictures of Lenin with a noose around his neck as the Soviet bloc crumbled, and of Saddam Hussein’s statue suffering that fate. I wondered whether Eistenstein’s sequence, predating TV news by decades, had actually invented one of the moments protesters and editors alike now need for a televised revolution. At the weekend, the protesters in Kiev seemed to be addressing that. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/37251/original/3j95wqm3-1386593220.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/37251/original/3j95wqm3-1386593220.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=721&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/37251/original/3j95wqm3-1386593220.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=721&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/37251/original/3j95wqm3-1386593220.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=721&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/37251/original/3j95wqm3-1386593220.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=907&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/37251/original/3j95wqm3-1386593220.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=907&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/37251/original/3j95wqm3-1386593220.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=907&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A toppled statue does not a revolution make.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">defenselink</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet, as Ukraine’s experience has shown, revolutions require more than a changing of symbols. I did not <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6539177.stm">return to Kiev until 2007</a>, when the country was in the midst of another political confrontation. Still, the hotel where I stayed had plenty of international guests, most of whom seemed to be there to do business. The streets were full of shoppers. In other words, it was not that much of a crisis. </p>
<p>This time it seems more serious. Today, as then in 2007, Ukraine’s choice is broadly seen as between closer ties with Russia, or with the European Union. </p>
<p>Two events from 2008 have shaped those choices: Russia’s war with Georgia, and the financial crisis. </p>
<p>Although the former was ostensibly over the status of Georgia’s separatist territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, its consequence was to end Georgia’s – and Ukraine’s – hopes of joining NATO. Presumably, this was Russia’s aim all along: to send very forcefully the message that being with NATO – or any western institution – is being against us. </p>
<p>The financial crisis made the future direction of the EU itself uncertain. There is little current appetite for further expansion; Eurosceptics in a number of member states seek to leave. </p>
<p>While the EU struggles with its own internal difficulties, Russia is not trouble-free either. President Putin may retain his power and popularity, but the unprecedented opposition demonstrations of 2011 and 2012 have raised the question as to whether that power and popularity can last indefinitely. </p>
<p>So if Ukraine is entering a decisive phase of its long revolution, the stakes are high. It would not be the object of a diplomatic game between Moscow and Brussels if it was not important. Neither Russia or the EU, though, seems well placed to rescue the country if the crisis leads to chaos. </p>
<p>At the time, the Orange Revolution of 2004 was supposed to have set Ukraine’s future course. Nine years later, that revolution may be over. The one which began with the break up of the Soviet Union, however, is not. </p>
<p>At the end of 2011, the late Eric Hobsbawm gave a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16217726">BBC interview</a> in which he compared the Arab uprisings of that year to the revolutions that rocked Europe in the mid-nineteenth century. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Two years after 1848, it looked as if it had all failed. In the long run, it hadn’t failed. A good deal of liberal advances had been made. So it was an immediate failure but a longer term partial success – though no longer in the form of a revolution.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Ukraine has not known the bloodshed of Syria, Libya, or Egypt, but its recent history is a reminder that, as Hobsbawm suggested, the outcomes of revolutions are known only in the long run. </p>
<p>Perhaps some of the demonstrators from that day in 1991 were among the crowd that smashed the statue of Lenin at the weekend. If so, they know well what long run means – and how long, in today’s uncertain world, a political crisis can last. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/21263/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Rodgers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>That late summer day, the crowds were joyful. They cheered as the flag they had come to loathe was lowered. In its place, the blue and yellow colours of Ukraine rose above parliament. As the demonstrators…James Rodgers, Lecturer in Journalism, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/210522013-12-02T18:42:20Z2013-12-02T18:42:20ZDreams of a new Europe dashed in Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/36707/original/vdydxrwp-1386008501.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">If not you, then who?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">mac_ivan</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25180502">Mass protests</a> in Ukraine have come one week shy of the 22nd anniversary of the USSR being signed into obsolescence.</p>
<p>Ukrainians are protesting against a decision made by their government that will make a nonsense of December 8 1991, to say nothing of the Orange Revolution of November-December 2004. Both these events were supposed to usher Ukraine further into the new Europe envisaged and so hopefully described by the historic Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Rome in 1993. </p>
<p>Then, the talk was of the indivisibility of security across Europe. How states and peoples are made secure, of course, is much debated but in the CSCE and Ukrainian vision, security would come with respect for human rights and democratic choice. </p>
<p>That may seem like a dream for those opposing president Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/29/ukraine-yanukovych-moscow-eu-summit">shun deepening integration</a> with the European Union in favour of strengthening ties with Russia. Simply put, protesters do not believe this decision reflected the people’s preferences.</p>
<p>We should not forget, of course, that Yanukovych was a central figure in the fraudulent elections of 2004, he was then-President Leonid Kuchma’s choice for Prime Minister, against the far more European-leaning Viktor Yuschenko. The Orange Revolution was fought in 2004 in protest at what was regarded as his political appointment rather than election, and his pro-Russian attitude, which would see them taken back to a closer relationship with Russia and away from the possibility of a deeper relationship with western Europe, through eventual membership of the EU. So there is more than a hint of déjà vu in the protests in Ukraine today.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/36711/original/3vydd67z-1386008732.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/36711/original/3vydd67z-1386008732.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=242&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36711/original/3vydd67z-1386008732.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=242&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36711/original/3vydd67z-1386008732.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=242&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36711/original/3vydd67z-1386008732.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=304&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36711/original/3vydd67z-1386008732.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=304&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36711/original/3vydd67z-1386008732.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=304&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shades of 2004.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">nessa.gnatoush</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ukraine’s choice</h2>
<p>That Yanukovych was frustrated with the terms of the EU’s <a href="http://www.eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2012/140912_ukraine_en.htm">Association Agreement</a> is well known. Particularly galling for him was the insistence that he release his one-time rival, Yulia Tymoshenko, from prison in order to receive medical treatment in Germany. Tymoshenko is widely believed to have been imprisoned for political reasons. She, after all, was one of the leaders of the Orange Revolution. Her imprisonment became a sticking point in EU-Ukrainian negotiations, seen by the EU as a symbol of a poor human rights record in Ukraine under Yanukovych’s leadership and by Yanukovych himself as a threat to his authority.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/36710/original/8m3h7t8j-1386008646.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/36710/original/8m3h7t8j-1386008646.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=833&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36710/original/8m3h7t8j-1386008646.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=833&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36710/original/8m3h7t8j-1386008646.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=833&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36710/original/8m3h7t8j-1386008646.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1047&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36710/original/8m3h7t8j-1386008646.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1047&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36710/original/8m3h7t8j-1386008646.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1047&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">I dream of Europe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">nessa.gnatoush</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But deeper political reasons underpin Yanukovych’s rejection of the EU and reflect the divided nature of Ukraine. Half the country is western-leaning and Catholic with stronger historical ties to parts of Europe, particularly Poland. The other half is Orthodox, with a long historical association with Russia. Russia continues to be a key player and has provided Ukraine with an alternative vision to that provided by the EU, one of membership of the Eurasian Economic Community. It is not speculation to say that Russia has put enormous pressure on Ukraine not to try to join the EU. Despite its recent claims to be a soft power actor, Russia has played hardball with Ukraine, warning that it had to make a choice between Russia and the EU and that choosing the latter would see the former adopt protectionist measures against Ukraine. </p>
<p>Energy is also a major factor in Ukrainian calculations. Developments since Yanukovych’s rejection of the EU suggest Russia bought that rejection with the promise of lower gas prices. In a powerful piece for Russian newspaper Kommersant, Sergei Naryshkin, Chairman of the Russian State Duma, spoke of the EU promising Ukraine only a decade of suffering, difficult times, loss of local industry and mass unemployment.</p>
<p>But given the not so-illustrious state of the Russian economy and previous years in which Ukraine has effectively been held to ransom by Russia over energy, it is of little surprise that so many Ukrainians would not be happy at the prospect of this level of dependence on Russia.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/36709/original/f8qh43nm-1386008626.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/36709/original/f8qh43nm-1386008626.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36709/original/f8qh43nm-1386008626.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36709/original/f8qh43nm-1386008626.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36709/original/f8qh43nm-1386008626.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36709/original/f8qh43nm-1386008626.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36709/original/f8qh43nm-1386008626.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">nessa.gnatoush</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One beacon of light for those who continue to believe in the European integration project is that the EU, despite its ongoing financial crisis, evidently remains relevant for others. </p>
<p>Images of Ukrainians on the street are images in favour of the new Europe promised two decades ago. The EU has certainly put conditions upon Ukraine in relation to the Association Agreement. But there is a difference between conditions that relate to choice, especially in relation to the protection of human rights; and conditions which relate to threat, especially in relation to something as fundamental to the wellbeing of a people as energy provision.</p>
<p>Why are the people of Ukraine protesting? Because they see themselves as faced with a stark choice between the promise of the new democratic Europe or a return to the old authoritarian one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/21052/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maxine David does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mass protests in Ukraine have come one week shy of the 22nd anniversary of the USSR being signed into obsolescence. Ukrainians are protesting against a decision made by their government that will make…Maxine David, Lecturer in European politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.