tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/abiy-ahmed-51948/articlesAbiy Ahmed – The Conversation2024-02-20T10:25:22Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2234902024-02-20T10:25:22Z2024-02-20T10:25:22ZEthiopia’s peace pacts with the Oromo Liberation Front have failed: here’s what was missing<p>Two attempts have been made over the past six years to broker peace between the Ethiopian government and the armed rebel group Oromo Liberation Front. The armed group was formed half a century ago with the goal of carving out an independent state for Oromia, the country’s largest regional state.</p>
<p>Both attempts at brokering peace – in <a href="https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/6133/">2018</a> and again in <a href="https://addisstandard.com/newsalert-govt-ola-second-talks-in-tanzania-end-without-agreement-again/#:%7E:text=The%20OLA%20in%20its%20part,insurmountable%20security%20and%20political%20challenges.%E2%80%9D">2023</a> – ended in failure and a <a href="https://borkena.com/2018/09/16/oromo-ethno-nationalists-massacred-at-least-60-ethiopians/">return to violence</a>.</p>
<p>Oromia is Ethiopia’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oromo">largest and most populous</a> region. The Oromo Liberation Front has sought autonomy for the region since the group <a href="https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230602085350/https://www.refworld.org/docid/5696030f4.html">emerged</a> in 1973. It was briefly part of a transitional government led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition in 1991. Since then, the Oromo Liberation Front has continued to wage a low-level armed struggle against the government. </p>
<p>Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed rose to power in 2018 following the abrupt <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/15/ethiopia-prime-minister-hailemariam-desalegn-resigns-after-mass-protests">resignation</a> of his predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn. At the time the country was reeling from widespread unrest, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/ethiopia-mass-protests-rooted-in-countrys-history">particularly in the Oromia and Amhara</a> regions. Among Abiy’s surprise reforms was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/5/ethiopia-removes-olf-onlf-and-ginbot-7-from-terror-list">amnesty</a> for numerous outlawed rebel groups harboured by Eritrea that were waging war on government. </p>
<p>The most prominent of these was the Oromo Liberation Front, which had been based in neighbouring Eritrea. Subsequently, the Oromo Liberation Front announced a ceasefire, made a peace agreement with the Ethiopian government in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, and later entered Ethiopia. </p>
<p>However, the details of the peace agreement were not made public and there was no clarity on its legal grounds. The peace agreement soon failed to deliver the expected outcome of peace, amid <a href="https://borkena.com/2018/09/16/oromo-ethno-nationalists-massacred-at-least-60-ethiopians/">renewed violence</a>. </p>
<p>I am a political scholar of Ethiopia with an interest in the country’s federal governance and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361708000_The_extra_constitutionality_of_election_postponement_in_Ethiopia_amidst_COVID-19_pandemic">constitution</a>. My 2022 <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370692256_The_causes_and_consequences_of_the_2018_failed_peace_agreement_between_the_Oromo_Liberation_Front_and_the_Ethiopian_government">research paper</a> examined the main reasons for the failure of the 2018 peace agreement. </p>
<p>I found that the most notable reasons were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>there was no signed pact, which meant that there was no clear plan</p></li>
<li><p>the presence of competing factions within the Oromo Liberation Front </p></li>
<li><p>a lack of political will from both sides</p></li>
<li><p>the absence of a democratic ethos among both parties. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Many peace agreements between the Oromo Liberation Front and Ethiopia had been concluded since the early <a href="https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/irbc/1993/en/93314">1990s</a> but did not bring the required stability. They were not durable because they did not address the factors at the core of their dispute. It is my view that these reasons also played a big part in the failure of the subsequent rounds of peace talks in 2018 and 2023. </p>
<p>A lasting peace can only be achieved when conflicting parties are willing to address the fundamental problems that trigger Ethiopia’s political challenges. </p>
<h2>A failed peace pact</h2>
<p>The first signs of failure came in September 2018, when more than 60 non-Oromo civilians were <a href="https://borkena.com/2018/09/16/oromo-ethno-nationalists-massacred-at-least-60-ethiopians/">killed</a> in Oromia region on the outskirts of western Addis Ababa. This alarmed many Ethiopians because it occurred shortly after the agreement was made.</p>
<p>Later, <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/10/07/charges-state-that-hachalus-assassins-were-part-of-olf-shane-anti-government-plot/">Hachalu Hundessa, a popular Oromo singer, was assassinated</a> in Addis Ababa. The government claimed that the assassination was part of the Oromo Liberation Front’s anti-government plot. This heightened the tension between the front and the Ethiopian government. On 23 June 2018, there was also an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45678760">assassination attempt targeting Abiy</a>.</p>
<p>From here on mutual suspicions overshadowed the peace agreement. It eventually collapsed for the following reasons.</p>
<p><strong>No signed document:</strong> A clear roadmap is central to post-conflict recovery and a pillar of any peace agreement. The 2018 Asmara peace agreement was reached without a written signed accord. </p>
<p>In August 2018, the Oromo Liberation Front leadership declared a unilateral ceasefire in response to Abiy’s request for dialogue with armed groups. This led to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/8/7/ethiopia-signs-deal-with-oromo-rebels-to-end-hostilities">7 August 2018</a> peace agreement to halt hostilities and restore peace and stability.</p>
<p>The deal was short-lived. Conflicting reports about what was agreed were traded between government and the Oromo Liberation Front. The absence of a signed peace agreement made the environment more volatile. </p>
<p><strong>Competing factions within the Oromo Liberation Front:</strong> The emergence of new factions has historically been the party’s weak point. Less than eight months after returning to Ethiopia, one Oromo Liberation Front faction and the army wing released a statement stating that the Oromo Liberation Army had separated from the front. </p>
<p>Over time, the Oromo Liberation Front has splintered into at least eight different groups. These include the Oromo Liberation Army, the Oromo Liberation Front, a secret grouping known as Abba Torbe and Oromo Democratic Front, which denounces the use of violence. </p>
<p>The extent to which the Oromo Liberation Front controls its armed wing is <a href="https://docslib.org/doc/984072/report-of-a-home-office-fact-finding-mission-ethiopia-the-political-situation">unclear</a>. <a href="https://docslib.org/doc/984072/report-of-a-home-office-fact-finding-mission-ethiopia-the-political-situation">According</a> to the Life and Peace Institute, an international peacebuilding lobby, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>it is difficult for the government to identify OLF combatants…there is no clear definition between members, fighters and supporters.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The divisions within the Oromo political elite and the history of competition among the Oromo opposition forces point to the failed peace effort.</p>
<p><strong>Lack of political goodwill:</strong> It appears that although the moment might have appeared ripe for a peace agreement in 2018, neither party was ready for such an agreement. The government tried to exercise strong control from the centre and was reluctant to manage conflict peacefully with the Oromo Liberation Front.</p>
<p>The peace agreement was short-lived largely due to the absence of open and genuine commitments by both sides. The absence of a democratic ethos on both sides also weakened the agreement.</p>
<p><strong>Unclear demands:</strong> The Oromo Liberation Front’s political options have not been clear and consistent. It’s <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/3360-exploring-new-political-alternatives-for-the-oromo">not clear at any given time</a> whether their demand is substantial autonomy for the Oromo people within an Ethiopian federation or an independent sovereign Oromo state. The strategy swings wildly between a political solution and an armed struggle.</p>
<h2>Difficult environment to pursue peace</h2>
<p>Following the 2018 Asmara peace agreement, the internal political intricacies of Ethiopia drastically deteriorated. The democratic reform and euphoria brought by Abiy Ahmed, which included him winning the 2019 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/15/world/africa/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-nobel-war.html">Nobel peace prize</a>, soon faded.</p>
<p>One of the factors that made Ethiopia less stable after the peace agreement was the postponement of elections, partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The government’s decision to delay the election was considered a power grab and an unconstitutional term extension. It was rejected by most opposition parties and it led to the war with the Tigray regional government. </p>
<p>Ethiopia has since descended into civil war with ethnically motivated killings, religious conflict and displacement throughout the country. These constraints weaken the Ethiopian government’s ability to implement any peace agreement. It’s the setting in which a new round of peace talks in Tanzania was also doomed to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223490/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marew Abebe Salemot does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The peace agreement was short-lived largely due to the absence of open and genuine commitments by both sides.Marew Abebe Salemot, Lecturer of Federalism, Debark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229282024-02-18T07:07:33Z2024-02-18T07:07:33ZOromia makes up a third of Ethiopia’s landmass and is key to its fortunes: expert unpacks its significance<p><em>Ethiopia’s largest and most populous region, Oromia, has been in the news following reports of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/23/im-scared-to-leave-addis-ababa-ethiopias-oromia-region-gripped-by-kidnapping-pandemic">a rise in kidnappings for ransom</a>. The region is <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">no stranger to war and strife</a>. Its people have long fought against political marginalisation. But the region is more than just the site of conflict.</em></p>
<p><em>We asked <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/gov/yimeni-bizuneh-getachew.aspx">Bizuneh Yimenu</a>, who’s researched the region for over a decade and studied its significance in the context of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">Ethiopian federalism</a>, to explain Oromia, its people and its economic and political importance.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the general overview of Oromia?</h2>
<p>Situated in the heart of Ethiopia, Oromia isn’t just a geographical entity but a cultural, economic and political powerhouse. It significantly shapes Ethiopia’s identity and trajectory. </p>
<p>It is the largest of Ethiopia’s 12 regions and covers a vast area. At over <a href="http://www.ethiodemographyandhealth.org/oromia.html">350,000 square kilometres</a>, it’s larger than Côte d'Ivoire or Italy. </p>
<p>The region spans Ethiopia’s central, western and southern parts. Oromia makes up <a href="https://epo.acleddata.com/oromia/">34% of Ethiopia’s landmass</a>. It shares borders with all other Ethiopian regions except Tigray, in the country’s north. It shares international boundary lines with Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya. </p>
<p>Its capital is Finfinne, also known as Addis Ababa – which is additionally Ethiopia’s capital and the headquarters of the African Union. </p>
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<p>Oromia’s diverse geography includes highlands, lowlands, forests and fertile plains. This contributes to its agricultural richness.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.ethiopianreview.com/pdf/001/Cen2007_firstdraft(1).pdf#page=91">the last census</a>, over 60 ethnic groups live in the region. </p>
<p>Oromia has a population of about <a href="https://www.citypopulation.de/en/ethiopia/cities/">40 million</a> people, about 38% of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.citypopulation.de/en/ethiopia/cities/">105 million</a>. There are also Oromo communities in Kenya and Somalia.</p>
<h2>What is Oromia’s cultural and economic significance?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oromo">Oromo</a>, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, speak Afaan Oromo, one of the <a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-languages-are-spoken-in-africa.html">five most spoken African languages</a>. Oromo traditions and customary practices have endured for centuries. </p>
<p>Oromia is known for its traditional democratic governance system, <a href="https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=utk_socopubs">the Geda system</a>, in which power is transferred peacefully every eight years. It regulates the community’s political, economic, social and religious activities. In 2016, Unesco recognised the system as an <a href="https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/gada-system-an-indigenous-democratic-socio-political-system-of-the-oromo-01164">intangible cultural heritage</a>.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">What is federalism? Why Ethiopia uses this system of government and why it’s not perfect</a>
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<p>Economically, Oromia is one of Ethiopia’s breadbaskets. The region’s crop production accounts for about <a href="https://www.unicef.org/ethiopia/media/6511/file/Oromia%20regional%20brief.pdf#page=1">50% of total national production</a>. A <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/cea/5991#tocto1n5">majority</a> of residents work in the agricultural sector.</p>
<p>The region’s fertile soil supports crops like coffee, teff, maize and barley, which are popular for domestic consumption and export. </p>
<p>Outside agriculture, the region has many factories and industries that produce textile and garments, leather products, chemicals, construction materials and pharmaceuticals. </p>
<p>Oromia is additionally a <a href="https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/37159/">source</a> of export minerals, <a href="https://oromiatours.com/Nature-and-Map.html#:%7E:text=Oromia%20hosts%20many%20of%20Ethiopia%27s%20more%20alluring%20natural,gold%20and%20platinum%20to%20iron%20ore%20and%20limestone.">ranging from gold and platinum to iron ore and limestone</a>. In the 2021-2022 financial year, Oromia generated <a href="https://www.2merkato.com/news/alerts/6686-ethiopia-oromia-earns-usd-324-million-from-mining">US$324 million</a> from mining. </p>
<p>The capital, Addis Ababa, is a hub for domestic and international travel, and connected to economically essential cities in other regions, like Diredawa and Hawassa.</p>
<p>International highways, such as the Ethio-Djibouti road, the main route for Ethiopia’s foreign trade, intersect Oromia. This road is the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa">lifeblood of the country’s economy</a>. It enables the movement of goods to and from the port of Djibouti, connecting <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-quest-for-access-to-the-sea-success-rests-on-good-relations-with-its-neighbours-219621">landlocked Ethiopia</a> to global markets.</p>
<h2>What role has Oromia played in Ethiopia’s political development?</h2>
<p>Oromia holds substantial political importance within Ethiopia. As the largest and most populous region, it often sets the tone for national discourse and policymaking.</p>
<p>Its political influence in Ethiopia can be traced to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/29790544">the 1960s when Oromo nationalism</a> emerged due to subjugation and a lack of autonomy. This movement pushed Ethiopia’s transition from <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">a centralised unitary system to a federal one</a>. </p>
<p>In 2015, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">protests in the region</a> to push for greater autonomy and political representation helped drive political change. In 2018, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/12/13/2018-for-ethiopias-oromos-power-pain-protests-review/">Abiy Ahmed</a>, an Oromo, became Ethiopia’s prime minister. </p>
<p>Before Abiy’s entry, Ethiopia had been governed by a Tigray-dominated government for <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopias-new-leader-could-be-a-game-changer-94424">27 years</a>. Tigrayans make up about <a href="https://www.atlasofhumanity.com/tigray">6%</a> of the population.</p>
<p>Abiy’s appointment symbolised a significant step towards addressing the grievances of the Oromo people. </p>
<p>Overall, the political dynamics within Oromia have consistently been at the forefront of discussions surrounding federalism, identity and governance in Ethiopia. </p>
<h2>What are some of the challenges specific to the region?</h2>
<p>Despite its cultural richness and economic importance, Oromia faces challenges that have hindered its development and stability. </p>
<p>One challenge is the prevalence of conflict and tension. This includes <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/oromo-rebels-accuse-ethiopian-forces-attacks-following-peace-talks-2023-05-17/">the war between</a> the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/11/08/ethiopia-oromo-liberation-army-ola-the-other-group-fighting-federal-forces/">Oromo Liberation Army</a>, a rebel group, and the Ethiopian government. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">'Ethiopia's other conflict': what's driving the violence in Oromia?</a>
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<p>Oromia has also suffered from <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-tragic-ambush-by-armed-men-claims-13-lives-in-horo-guduru-wollega-oromia-region/">cross-border attacks launched by the Fano militia</a>, a rebel group operating in neighbouring Amhara. The attack is part of the militia’s agenda of expanding Amhara territory.</p>
<p>Additionally, the regional government has faced <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/ethiopia">allegations of human rights abuses</a>. It has been accused of extrajudicial killings and the unlawful detention of opposition leaders.</p>
<p>In recent months, there has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/23/im-scared-to-leave-addis-ababa-ethiopias-oromia-region-gripped-by-kidnapping-pandemic">a rise in kidnappings blamed on Oromo Liberation Army rebels</a>. This has exacerbated grievances and contributed to a climate of fear and uncertainty.</p>
<p>The underlying causes of conflict in Oromia are deeply rooted and complex. They stem from a combination of:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>historical injustices</p></li>
<li><p>marginalisation under previous regimes</p></li>
<li><p>ethnic tensions</p></li>
<li><p>competition over resources. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Resolving these issues requires a comprehensive approach emphasising dialogue, reconciliation and inclusive governance.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen?</h2>
<p>Two things are needed to address Oromia’s challenges effectively. </p>
<p>First, immediate attention should be given to the region’s security. This can be ensured through a peace deal with the Oromo Liberation Army. Previous rounds of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/22/ethiopia-talks-with-rebel-group-ola-end-without-deal">peace talks held in Tanzania between the rebel group and the national government</a> have ended without agreement. </p>
<p>Both the government and the Oromo Liberation Army have <a href="https://x.com/OdaaTarbiiWBO/status/1650255474502008832?s=20">expressed a readiness</a> to resolve their differences through dialogue.</p>
<p>Second, it’s essential that regional and national stakeholders, and the international community collaborate. Initiatives focused on promoting peace and reconciliation should be prioritised to foster a more inclusive future for all residents of the region. Considering Oromia’s significance to Ethiopia, its stability should be a priority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222928/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bizuneh Yimenu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Oromia is a cultural, economic and political powerhouse. It significantly shapes Ethiopia’s identity and trajectory.Bizuneh Yimenu, Teaching Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215022024-01-24T13:28:13Z2024-01-24T13:28:13ZSomaliland has been pursuing independence for 33 years. Expert explains the impact of the latest deal with Ethiopia<p><em>Somaliland declared itself an independent state in 1991. It used colonial boundary lines to separate itself from Somalia. More than three decades later, however, it has yet to gain international recognition. It has had a difficult relationship with Somalia. A recent memorandum of understanding to grant landlocked Ethiopia access to the sea threatens the relationship further. But it could support Somaliland’s quest for recognition as an independent state. We asked <a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2397-7303">Aleksi Ylönen</a>, who has studied politics in the Horn of Africa and Somaliland’s quest for independence, some questions about this situation.</em></p>
<h2>1. What has Somaliland achieved in its quest for statehood?</h2>
<p>Somaliland unilaterally <a href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1877&context=auilr">declared its independence in 1991</a>, based heavily on its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/British-Somaliland">separate colonial experience</a> from Somalia. Britain declared a Somaliland protectorate in 1884. Italy established another protectorate, which became a colony, in 1889. </p>
<p>British Somaliland gained independence on 26 June 1960. It voluntarily joined the former Italian Somaliland upon its independence on 1 July 1960 to form Somalia. </p>
<p>This union <a href="https://mfa.govsomaliland.org/article/republic-somalilands-position-somaliland-somalia-talks">was never formally ratified</a> and eventually fell apart. </p>
<p>In the decades since 1991, Somaliland’s people and their representatives have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4392784">emphasised</a> their distinct colonial status and associated borders. Regional organisations and foreign powers have adhered to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2705705">colonial boundaries</a> when recognising independent states in post-colonial Africa. </p>
<p>Somaliland’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2013.776279">political system</a> is <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores">democratic</a> in a neighbourhood of authoritarian states like Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Sudans. </p>
<p>Somaliland has organised <a href="https://www.hadiamedical.ch/DE/pdf/Somaliland%20Elections.pdf">successful elections</a> and peaceful transfers of political power. Recently, however, there has been some <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/2022-journal-of-african-elections-v21n2-elections-electoral-processes-somaliland-fading-democracy-eisa.pdf">backsliding</a>.</p>
<p>Its security apparatus is elaborate. With the active contribution of citizens, it has ensured <a href="https://www.communitypolicing.eu/ehandbook/country-specific-information/africa/somaliland/">a measure of internal stability and security</a> in an otherwise troubled region. </p>
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<p>No United Nations member state or global organisation recognises Somaliland’s independence officially. Still, Somaliland <a href="https://www.republicofsomaliland.com/">has unofficial diplomatic relations</a> with various UN member states. It also maintains relations with other <a href="https://unpo.org/nations-peoples">marginalised nations and territories</a> and partially recognised <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/taiwan-somaliland-ties-growing-despite-diplomatic-isolation/">Taiwan</a>. </p>
<p>Several foreign nations have representative offices in its capital, Hargeisa. It maintains <a href="https://mfa.govsomaliland.org/article/visa-consular-services-1">liaison offices</a> in 20 countries on five continents. </p>
<h2>2. How would you describe the relationship with Somalia?</h2>
<p>It’s turbulent. </p>
<p>The Federal Republic of Somalia rejects Somaliland’s independence and agreements with foreign parties. Meanwhile, Somaliland has <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/somaliland-accuses-somalia-of-attacks-despite-truce-f80371da">accused Mogadishu</a> of involvement in the <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/OXAN-DB235834/full/html">conflict</a> in its eastern territories.</p>
<p>Negotiations over their relationship have taken place from time to time <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335684954_The_Somaliland-Somalia_Talks_in_2012-2015_A_Critical_Appraisal_Somali_Studies_Vol_4_2019">since 2012</a>, with little progress. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s recent announcement of a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566">memorandum of understanding</a> with Somaliland has set back relations between Somaliland and Somalia even further.</p>
<p>Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland president Muse Bihi Abdi in January <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566">announced a plan</a> to give Ethiopia access to 20km of the Somaliland shoreline. </p>
<p>In exchange, Ethiopia said it would <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-in-depth-assessment-of-somalilands-recognition-bid-by-ethiopia-part-of-mou/">seriously consider</a> Somaliland’s aim of international recognition. The exchange also included Somaliland getting a stake in Ethiopian Airlines or EthioTelecom. </p>
<p>The government of Somalia reacted swiftly to this announcement. </p>
<p>It held an emergency parliamentary session and withdrew its ambassador from Ethiopia for consultations. It also declared the proposed deal “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240102-somalia-recalls-envoy-to-ethiopia-over-null-and-void-somaliland-port-deal">null and void</a>” and a sign of Ethiopian “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67861390">aggression</a>” towards Somalia. </p>
<h2>3. What other bilateral arrangements has Somaliland signed?</h2>
<p>Many of the deals Somaliland has made with foreign agencies haven’t been made public. It does have unofficial diplomatic ties with various countries. It has also made agreements with <a href="https://more.bham.ac.uk/port-infrastructure/2022/09/19/waiting-for-ethiopia-hopes-and-aspirations-of-port-infrastructure-development-in-the-horn-of-africa/">foreign countries and organisations linked to their political elites</a>. </p>
<p>These include deals around <a href="https://africanreview.com/manufacturing/water-a-environment/british-government-signs-us-38mn-deal-to-support-development-in-somaliland">infrastructure development and management</a>, as well as <a href="https://african.business/2023/07/trade-investment/first-ever-funded-startup-sparks-somaliland-investment-hopes">investment</a> and <a href="https://www.upstreamonline.com/exploration/genel-boosts-somaliland-block-stake/2-1-704070">natural resource extraction</a>.</p>
<p>Ethiopia-Somaliland ties have been strong for decades. </p>
<p>In the early 1980s, Addis Ababa <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/723037.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ac99d580633354dfaf07401242dbf6900&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1">provided sanctuary</a> for the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Somali-National-Movement">Somali National Movement</a>, which sought to topple the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohamed-Siad-Barre">repressive Siad Barre</a> administration in Somalia. </p>
<p>In the 1990s, Ethiopia eyed Somaliland as a possible import-export route to the sea to lower its reliance on Djibouti. </p>
<p>As a result, Dubai Ports World, a state-linked United Arab Emirates ports and logistics company, <a href="https://www.horndiplomat.com/2016/08/22/dp-world-dubai-opens-door-for-ethiopia-in-somaliland/">agreed</a> with the Somaliland administration to develop and manage the Berbera port in 2016. Two years later, Ethiopia <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/somaliland-defends-stake-sale-of-dp-world-berbera-port-to-ethiopia-1.710037">agreed to take a 19% stake</a> in a Berbera port consortium. </p>
<p>Although Ethiopia <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-stake-in-port-of-berbera-3845366">didn’t follow through</a>, it still had plans for a logistics corridor through Somaliland. </p>
<h2>4. What can Ethiopia offer Somaliland on the independence issue?</h2>
<p>The understanding between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa includes a provision for an <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-in-depth-assessment-of-somalilands-recognition-bid-by-ethiopia-part-of-mou/">in-depth assessment</a> of Somaliland as a sovereign state. This would make Ethiopia the first UN member state to recognise it.</p>
<p>It would give Somaliland what it wants most. Recognition would help open doors for international public financing and raise Somaliland’s status in the region.</p>
<p>Ethiopia seems committed to the proposed deal. Some of the reasons for this include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>its wish for sea access </p></li>
<li><p>its strong ties with Somaliland</p></li>
<li><p>national security advisor <a href="https://twitter.com/addisstandard/status/1742164114351247808?t=hctuznfeOoXdYeDY7PzDXQ&s=09">Redwan Hussien’s comments</a> that discussions would include other sectors of collaboration. Ethiopia is already talking to Somaliland <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/ethiopia-holds-military-cooperation-talks-with-somaliland-4486080">about military cooperation</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Somaliland is holding a long-delayed presidential election towards the end of 2024. Gaining international recognition would likely give President Muse Bihi Abdi a second term in office, even though he has been <a href="https://www.somalidispatch.com/latest-news/ucid-chairman-muse-bihi-mishandled-the-defense-of-somaliland/">criticised for mishandling</a> the <a href="https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/inside-the-newest-conflict-in-somalias-long-civil-war/">conflict in Somaliland’s eastern borderlands</a>. People in this area have tried to set up their own state as part of federal Somalia.</p>
<h2>5. Why has Somaliland made so little progress and what needs to change?</h2>
<p>Achieving recognition has been a <a href="https://mfa.govsomaliland.org/article/about-mfa">foreign policy priority</a> for Somaliland. All administrations have <a href="https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/24272-a-shadow-on-tomorrows-dreams--somalilands-struggle">made efforts</a> to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/butty-somaliland-20th-anniversary-nur-18may11-122134824/158138.html">raise awareness</a> about its situation internationally. </p>
<p>But international politics have not favoured Somaliland. Most states, including great and middle powers, <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somaliland-30-years-de-facto-statehood-and-no-end-sight-30363">fear that recognising Somaliland could be destabilising</a>. They have opted to support unity, and peace and state building of federal Somalia. </p>
<p>One of their reasons for non-recognition is that Somaliland’s 1991 self-declaration of independence may appear illegal under international law.</p>
<p>In my view, it’s wrong to think that dividing up states inevitably causes instability and conflict. Each case is unique and deserves consideration based on historical and legal arguments, as well as current conditions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221502/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aleksi Ylönen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethiopia has maintained strong ties with Somaliland since the 1980s when it supported a rebel movement in the breakaway region.Aleksi Ylönen, Professor, United States International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2181792024-01-07T07:33:35Z2024-01-07T07:33:35ZYoung Africans could disrupt authoritarian states but they don’t – here’s why<p>Africa has the <a href="https://www.un.org/ohrlls/news/young-people%E2%80%99s-potential-key-africa%E2%80%99s-sustainable-development#:%7E:text=Africa%20has%20the%20youngest%20population,to%20realise%20their%20best%20potential.">world’s largest youth population</a>. By 2030, <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/africas-future-youth-and-the-data-defining-their-lives/">75%</a> of the African population will be under the age of 35. The number of young Africans aged 15-24 is projected to reach <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/06/27/investing-in-youth-transforming-afe-africa">500 million</a> in 2080. </p>
<p>While population dynamics vary across the continent, most sub-Saharan countries have a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africas-median-age-about-19-median-age-its-leaders-about-63">median age below 19</a>. Niger is the youngest country in the world with a median age of 14.5, while South Africa, Seychelles, Tunisia and Algeria have median ages above 27. </p>
<p>These demographics are a potential <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/three-myths-about-youth-employment-in-africa-and-strategies-to-realize-the-demographic-dividend/">force for growth</a>. However, the potential of Africa’s demographic dividend has been overshadowed by concerns among governments and international donors about the relationship between large youth populations, unemployment rates and political instability. </p>
<p>Many countries with large youth populations and high rates of youth unemployment and under-employment <a href="https://ugapress.org/book/9780820348858/the-outcast-majority/">remain peaceful</a>. But the dominant policy narrative is that unemployed youth pose a threat to stability.</p>
<p>Further, the role of youth in popular protest – such as in <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7420-after-the-uprising-including-sudanese-youth">Sudan in 2019</a> – has created high expectations about their role in countering autocratic governments and contributing to democracy. </p>
<p>As political scientists and sociologists, we’re interested in understanding the interaction between youth and autocratic regimes – especially as elected autocracies <a href="https://alinstitute.org/images/Library/RetreatOfAfricanDemocracy.pdf#page=1">are taking hold</a> in Africa. </p>
<p>Electoral autocracies are regimes elected into power using authoritarian strategies. These include manipulation of elections and repression of the opposition, independent media and civil society.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research</a> focuses on the interactions between youth and regimes in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe. All are cases of electoral autocracies.</p>
<p>These regimes are aware of their large youth populations and are sometimes challenged by them. <a href="https://theconversation.com/bobi-wine-has-shaken-up-ugandan-politics-four-things-worth-knowing-about-him-153205">Uganda’s Bobi Wine</a>, a popular musician turned presidential candidate, is one example. </p>
<p>The four countries in our study have also been through civil wars, where the victorious armed groups have taken power and stayed in power since the end of the war. This has created a particular set of dynamics between the ageing rebel governments and the youth majorities.</p>
<p>In autocratic contexts like these ones, efforts to empower youth can easily be manipulated to serve the interests of the regime. Some young people may decide to play the game and take up opportunities offered by regime actors. Others might resist them. Some take up the opportunities, hoping it serves their own and not the regime’s interests. Still, this might reproduce forms of patronage. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">Abiy Ahmed gained power in Ethiopia with the help of young people – four years later he's silencing them</a>
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<p>All of this matters because the future of democracy is at stake, and using state-led opportunities might contribute to authoritarian renewal.</p>
<p>Our research teams in each country <a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">studied</a> the range of policies that governments put in place to “cater” for the youth. They included loans for young entrepreneurs, and setting up youth councils and youth quotas in political institutions. </p>
<p>We found that youth-targeted strategies – largely aimed at promoting employment and political participation – are part of the authoritarian rule book in all four countries we studied. Employment and entrepreneurship schemes were open to abuse through ruling party patronage networks and channelled to regime supporters.</p>
<h2>Not saving democracy</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research</a> found that young people in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe felt aggrieved about these opportunities being channelled to regime supporters. They also noted the lack of opportunities to have a meaningful voice. Institutions that were established to enable youth participation were co-opted and lacked independence from governments. </p>
<p>Some young people express their grievances through pro-democracy protests – like in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/violent-protests-break-out-mozambique-after-local-elections-2023-10-27/">Mozambique in October 2023</a>. But overall, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/221141/why-africas-youth-is-not-saving-democracy/">Africa’s youth are not saving democracy</a>. </p>
<p>Neither are they countering the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2022.2235656">deepening</a> trend of autocratisation on the continent, where incumbent governments have increasingly <a href="https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/60999">concentrated power</a> in the hands of the executive. Our research has confirmed this in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Uganda.</p>
<h2>Country case studies</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8797-the-risk-of-authoritarian-renewal-in-zimbabwe-understanding-zanu-pf-youth">Zimbabwe</a>, Zanu-PF has been in power since the country’s independence in 1980. The ruling party and many of its now ageing leaders use their history of having been part of the liberation war in the 1970s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600842472?casa_token=B53EF1Ev0XcAAAAA:7W-Izw-iDMuOCRc8RZiW8UcDpXn7kH5E-siDc2W1ux_L9w1WpyB-2mnTSMzmAXrLM5YmfFCx3Mlo4YA">to retain their hold on power</a>. </p>
<p>They do so by creating narratives around the country’s liberation history and patriotism, and accuse the “born-free” generation (those born after independence) of betraying the liberation war. This delegitimises any discontent young people may feel. Zanu-PF targets young people among its <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/14906">wider repertoire of strategies</a> to maintain power.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8798-poorly-designed-youth-employment-programmes-will-boost-the-insurgency-in-mozambique">Mozambique</a>, the ruling party Frelimo has won every election since 1992. The party has concentrated power and resources in the hands of the political elite. The youth continue to be under-represented and have serious challenges in accessing resources. This, in addition to other conflict dynamics, contributed to an insurgency in the northern region of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271">Cabo Delgado from 2017</a>. It’s led by the radical religious group locally called Al-Shabaab, or sometimes “machababo” (the youth).</p>
<p>Youth-dominated protests in <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">Ethiopia</a> contributed to the 2018 fall of the ruling party that had been in power since 1991. They also led to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-change-happened-in-ethiopia-a-review-of-how-abiy-rose-to-power-110737">coming to power</a> of Abiy Ahmed that year. </p>
<p>Mobilisation among the youth has since <a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">been silenced</a>. Only loyalists get access to job creation schemes. There has also been a militarising of youth-dominated ethnic movements. This was seen, for instance, with the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/322001/ethiopia-understanding-the-fano-and-the-fate-of-amhara/">Fano Amhara group</a> in the war in Tigray in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">2020-2022</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8801-moving-ugandas-national-development-planning-to-the-grassroots-whats-in-it-for-youth">Uganda</a> was a pioneer in institutionalising youth participation in decision-making. Youth engagement in political structures is considered to be a tool for government control. We found that young politicians felt that this flawed system of representation provided opportunities for mobilising both against and in favour of the current regime. Young candidates running for one of the youth quota seats in parliament, for instance, can’t easily evade ruling party patronage.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Young Africans are diverse. However, they have often been characterised as either <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/african-youth-and-growth-violent-extremism">violent</a> or as <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13968.doc.htm">changemakers and peace activists</a>. These characterisations represent opposite ends of a spectrum. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research project</a> engaged a diversity of young people positioned and constantly moving across different parts of the spectrum. This has enhanced our understanding of how they navigate and respond to the ways their regimes seek to handle the youth population.</p>
<p>In our view, research and policy initiatives towards young people in authoritarian states must acknowledge that well-intended youth interventions may reproduce authoritarian politics when they are channelled to party loyalists. </p>
<p>Interventions that aim to promote job creation and youth empowerment should monitor how youth participants are selected and funds disbursed to avoid interference from partisan actors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218179/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lovise Aalen receives funding from the Research Council of Norway's Norglobal programme (grant # 288489). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marjoke Oosterom received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) </span></em></p>Africa’s youth are not countering the deepening of autocratisation across the continent.Lovise Aalen, Research Professor, Political Science, Chr. Michelsen InstituteMarjoke Oosterom, Research Fellow and Cluster Leader, Power and Popular Politics research cluster, Institute of Development StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2172172023-11-26T08:40:58Z2023-11-26T08:40:58ZWhat is federalism? Why Ethiopia uses this system of government and why it’s not perfect<p><a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0CQBBAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Elazar,+federalism&ots=7_EoePhxVm&sig=vtSyxjKaMi8qqzhyHsk9Oj_OIrU#v=onepage&q=Elazar%2C%20federalism&f=false">Federalism</a> is a system of government where power is shared between a central authority and smaller regional governments. </p>
<p>Many countries adopt federalism to manage ethnic diversity within their borders and help promote unity. There are <a href="https://forumfed.org/countries/">25 federal countries globally</a>, representing 40% of the world’s population. </p>
<p>Federalism allows regions to govern some of their affairs – such as decisions regarding education or working languages – while being part of the larger country. </p>
<p>Ethiopia adopted federalism in 1991 when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) – a coalition of four major parties – came to power. This followed 17 years of insurgencies to depose the Derg, a communist military junta that ruled the country from 1974 to 1991.</p>
<p>The primary aim of Ethiopian federalism is to accommodate the country’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/history-of-modern-ethiopia-18551991/C0852BA84C34071333C899ACC8F1C863">diverse ethnic groups</a>. Before 1991, Ethiopia had a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">centralised unitary government</a> that suppressed diversity. It restricted ethnic groups from using their languages in official settings and schools. </p>
<p>Ethiopian federalism grants ethnic groups the <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=13">right to self-determination</a>. An ethnic group can form its own region or become an independent country. This approach has drawn both praise and criticism. </p>
<p>Some academics view it as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/524968">novel approach</a> to resolving conflicts and preventing state disintegration. It’s impossible to forge unity without the voluntary alliance and assurance of the right to self-determination. Others <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-african-law/article/abs/ethiopias-leap-in-the-dark-federalism-and-selfdetermination-in-the-new-constitution/A05454ABA30C4C79F78DD7397FF91BED">argue that it worsens tensions</a> and could eventually lead to disintegration. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad015">studied</a> Ethiopian politics for more than a decade, with a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac039">focus</a> on <a href="https://kar.kent.ac.uk/92367/">the implementation of federalism</a>. After more than 30 years, ethnic conflict in Ethiopia hasn’t been resolved – but neither has the country disintegrated. </p>
<p>In my view, federalism remains the best approach for Ethiopia. It allows for cultural and language freedoms. It enables self-rule at regional levels, and has contributed to economic growth. The system, however, is not without its drawbacks. An increase in democratic space would allow more voices to be heard.</p>
<h2>How Ethiopian federalism works</h2>
<p>Ethiopia’s approach to federalism is bold <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad015">compared to other highly diverse African</a> federal states. Nigeria, for instance, has avoided constitutional recognition of ethnic diversity. <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=13">Article 39 of Ethiopia’s federal constitution</a>, adopted in 1995, explicitly acknowledges the country’s ethnic diversity.</p>
<p>Ethiopia is a federation comprising nations and nationalities, each possessing sovereignty as defined in <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=4">Article 8 of the constitution</a>. Nations and nationalities with defined territorial homelands have the right to establish their own regions or even seek independence. </p>
<p>There are 12 regions in the country, each with <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=20">extensive authority</a>. This includes policymaking, constitution making, choosing a working language, and maintaining regional police and civil services.</p>
<p>However, the exercise of these powers has been constrained by <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ijgr/28/5/article-p972_972.xml">the dominance of the party system</a>. </p>
<p>Between 1991 and 2019, the EPRDF tightly controlled regional governments. It <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">suppressed any demands for self-rule</a>. The coming to power of Abiy Ahmed in 2018 helped open up the political space. The prime minister established the Prosperity Party by <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-50515636">merging three of the parties that made up the EPRDF</a>, as well as its smaller affiliates. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front refused to amalgamate. </p>
<p>Abiy addressed some of the demands from various ethnic groups for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">regional status</a>. He created three <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/ethiopia-creates-a-12th-regional-state-/7168313.html">additional regions</a> between 2019 and 2023.</p>
<p>The working of Ethiopian federalism, however, depends on the party system. Party norms often supersede constitutional principles. Internal party crises tend to lead to government instability and potential conflict. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">Tigray war</a> between 2020 and 2022 is a stark example. It originated from tensions between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the federal government. Disagreement was triggered by <a href="https://doi.org/10.14321/nortafristud.21.2.011v">the dissolution of the EPRDF</a>.</p>
<h2>Major benefits</h2>
<p>Ethiopian federalism has had three major benefits. </p>
<p>First, it allows for language and cultural freedom. The country’s 80 ethnic groups fought long and hard to secure their rights to culture, language and identity. More than <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00219096221097663#tab-contributors">57 of Ethiopia’s 80 languages</a> are used as mediums of instruction in schools. </p>
<p>Second, the system has allowed many <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">ethnic groups to exercise self-rule</a> in areas where they constitute the majority. Ethnic minorities are also entitled to form local governments, such as district administrations. </p>
<p>Third, the federal system has contributed to the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview#:%7E:text=Ethiopia%20aims%20to%20reach%20lower-middle-income%20status%20by%202025.,one%20of%20the%20highest%20rates%20in%20the%20world.">country’s economic growth</a> and its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2091580">relative stability</a>. It achieved this by <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.2020">decentralising power and resources</a> to regions and local governments.</p>
<h2>Key challenges</h2>
<p>One of the primary challenges of Ethiopian federalism lies in its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2015.1124580">inability to entirely resolve conflicts</a>. </p>
<p>Some of these conflicts – for instance in the western region of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/world/africa/ethiopia-ethnic-killings.html">Benishangul-Gumuz</a> and in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/01/ethiopia-ethnic-cleansing-persists-under-tigray-truce">western Tigray</a> – are instigated partly by the system’s attempt to empower a particular ethnic group in an area. This has created divisions between empowered groups and others. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://ethiopia.iom.int/news/more-438-million-people-displaced-ethiopia-more-half-due-conflict-new-iom-report">recent report</a> by the International Organization for Migration found that more than half of the 4.4 million internally displaced people in Ethiopia left their homes due to conflict. </p>
<p>A second challenge is the gap between the constitution and the practice of political rights. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">Certain ethnic groups have not exercised their rights</a> due to political repression. </p>
<p>Since Abiy assumed power in 2018, ethnic groups’ demands for regions has increased. The government addressed some of these demands, but repression of certain requests has led to grievances and conflicts. Some ethnic groups are too small to have their own region. </p>
<p>A third challenge is the dominance of the ruling party and the lack of democracy. The tendency of party norms to undermine constitutional principles casts a shadow on the federal system. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>While federalism may exist in form, it struggles to operate effectively without democracy and a multiparty system.</p>
<p>In a democratic system, the rule of law and protection of individual rights complement federalism by ensuring respect for citizen rights. A multiparty system would include diverse voices in decision-making and help protect minorities. Following these principles would help build peace and unity in a country as ethnically diverse as Ethiopia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bizuneh Yimenu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After more than 30 years of federalism, ethnic conflict in Ethiopia hasn’t been resolved – but neither has the country disintegrated.Bizuneh Yimenu, Teaching Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162372023-11-13T13:29:00Z2023-11-13T13:29:00ZEthiopia’s Abiy takes a page from Russia, China in asserting the right to restore historical claim to strategic waters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557242/original/file-20231102-17-tfg6ng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C2798%2C1868&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed arrives in Beijing on Oct. 16, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ethiopian-prime-minister-abiy-ahmed-arrives-at-beijing-news-photo/1726773830?adppopup=true">Ken Ishii/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed <a href="https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_3458629">claimed on Oct. 13, 2023</a>, that his landlocked country has a right to demand maritime access to a Red Sea port from its neighbors in the Horn of Africa – first through diplomatic means, he said, or by force if necessary. </p>
<p>In confrontational language, Abiy all but threatened conflict should Ethiopia be denied what he called the country’s intrinsic right to waterway expansion. He has since <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/world/ethiopia-pm-abiy-seeks-to-quell-neighbours-concerns-over-invasion">sought to soften his comments</a>, but the remarks have nonetheless <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/11/02/ethiopias-prime-minister-wants-a-red-sea-harbour">rattled the region</a>.</p>
<p>Such a move would help Ethiopia to reassert itself as <a href="https://theconversation.com/landlocked-ethiopia-wants-better-sea-access-a-port-deal-with-neighbours-could-benefit-the-region-211759">the dominant player</a> in the Horn of Africa, located in East Africa along a strategic maritime trade route. Ethiopia has been landlocked since coastal <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/6/29/ethiopia-eritrea-and-the-hope-for-lasting-peace">Eritrea broke away and became independent</a> in 1993 after a decadeslong war.</p>
<p><iframe id="jKFO6" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/jKFO6/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Abiy, a <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2019/summary/">Nobel Peace Prize winner</a> once acclaimed for promoting peace and international cooperation but later accused of being <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/11/29/939902460/nobel-peace-prize-winner-to-belligerent-warmaker-ethiopia-under-abiy-ahmed">a belligerent warmaker</a>, has alarmed countries in the region with his recent remarks. Abiy invoked a 19th-century Abyssinian warrior, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/ras-alula-and-the-scramble-for-africa-a-political-biography-ethiopia-eritrea-1875-1897/oclc/34320977">Ras Alula Aba Nega</a>, who had proclaimed the Red Sea as Ethiopia’s “natural boundary.” The concern is in attempting to assert itself, Ethiopia might risk <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67332811">reigniting a conflict</a>.</p>
<p>Abiy’s comments come at a time when Ethiopia is in a period of soul-searching, caught between the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/08/ethiopias-transition-democracy-has-hit-rough-patch-it-needs-support-abroad">paths of democracy and authoritarianism</a>. They also signal a potential willingness by Abiy to break with international norms amid a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/blinken-meet-ethiopian-government-leaders-repair-ties-2023-03-15/">growing shift away</a> from once welcoming powers in the West. </p>
<p>His rhetoric echoes ambitious geopolitical powers like China and Russia, both of which have shown a willingness to use military force to dominate strategic waters – as evidenced by Russia’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/07/ukraine-russia-crimea-naval-base-tatars-explainer">invasion of Crimea in 2014</a> and China’s <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-boxed-america-out-of-south-china-sea-military-d2833768">military posturing in the South China Sea</a>. </p>
<p>They also come at a time when <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/7/abiys-efforts-to-unify-ethiopia-could-lead-to-its-disintegration">Abiy struggles to unite Ethiopia</a> behind a single ideological nationalism and is unable to contain insurgencies by two ethnic groups – the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67361386">Amhara paramilitary organization Fano</a> and the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/09/second-round-of-talks-between-ethiopian-government-and-oromo-rebels/">Oromo Liberation Army</a> – both of whom hold historical grievances against the Ethiopian government and strive for greater political self-determination.</p>
<h2>Africa’s ties with the major powers</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Leaders of China, Russia, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Kazakhstan walking." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Indonesian President Joko Widodo and Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev head to a group photo session at the third Belt and Road forum on Oct. 18, 2023, in Beijing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-president-xi-jinping-russian-president-vladimir-news-photo/1730510539?adppopup=true">Photo by Suo Takekuma-Pool/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.libarts.colostate.edu/people/mmahad/">researcher in international relations and conflict resolution</a>, I have watched as African countries have been courted by international powers, partly because of <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-is-being-courted-by-china-russia-and-the-us-why-the-continent-shouldnt-pick-sides-210516">sea trade routes</a>. Africa’s sea trade routes are of strategic and economic importance for major powers like China and the U.S. They provide international shipping and trade, and access to critical resources. They also are key for maintaining geopolitical influence, as evidenced by military outposts such as the <a href="https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/Camp-Lemonnier-Djibouti/#:%7E:text=Welcome%20to%20Camp%20Lemonnier%2C%20Djibouti,in%20the%20Horn%20of%20Africa.">U.S. base in Djibouti</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/15/russia-sudan-putin-east-africa-port-red-sea-naval-base-scuttled/">Russian attempts to establish a naval presence</a> in the Red Sea.</p>
<p>Abiy’s new diplomatic alliances were on display on Oct. 18, 2023, during his visit to China for a forum on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-turns-10-xi-announces-8-new-priorities-continues-push-for-global-influence-216014">Belt and Road Initiative</a> – an infrastructure project that has seen China grow its influence across the Global South. During the meeting, Abiy was seen walking in step with Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. Photos from the conference seemingly conveyed Abiy’s alignment with those leaders and renewed Washington’s long-standing concerns over <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/15/refile-blinken-to-meet-ethiopian-government-leaders-to-repair-ties">its weakening ties</a> to Ethiopia.</p>
<p>Such concerns have been in the air since the outbreak of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/11/2/photos-one-year-on-peace-holds-in-tigray-but-ethiopia-still-fractured">Ethiopia’s Tigray war</a> in late 2020. The conflict led to President Joe Biden’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/09/07/notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-ethiopia-2/">Executive Order 14046</a>, imposing sanctions on certain persons in the Ethiopian government over documented human-rights abuses, and subsequent economic and arms embargoes, effectively isolating Ethiopia from its traditional Western allies. </p>
<p>In response, Ethiopia turned toward China and Iran, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html">procuring drones</a> that eventually tipped the balance in the Tigray conflict. The Ethiopian government’s rhetoric has since become increasingly Eastern-focused, distancing itself from the West.</p>
<p>This shift culminated in Ethiopia’s accession alongside five other states, including Iran, to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/21/world/asia/brics-summit-members.html?searchResultPosition=1">the BRICS group</a>, composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – a move that offers Ethiopia additional avenues to circumvent future U.S. sanctions.</p>
<h2>Domestic turmoil</h2>
<p>In addition to emulating Russia and China, the timing and riskiness of Abiy’s maritime motivations warrant scrutiny, especially given Ethiopia’s ongoing internal strife. </p>
<p>I believe that a motivating factor for the maritime claim is Abiy seeking to galvanize the people of Africa’s second most populous country through the creation of a potent nationalist narrative. This comes in the wake of his unsuccessful “<a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/02/16/medemer-in-a-land-of-extremes/">Medemer” campaign</a>, which tried but failed to create a single unifying ideology for Ethiopians to rally behind. Medemer, which means “togetherness,” was coined by Abiy when he took power in 2018 in hopes to unite and galvanize an Ethiopia divided along ethnic lines for the past 30 years. </p>
<p>In addition to the insurrection threat, Ethiopia is beset by <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/02/ethiopia-atrocities-mar-ceasefire-anniversary">political violence</a>, <a href="https://www.wfp.org/countries/ethiopia">hunger and poverty</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-religious-tension-is-getting-worse-5-factors-driving-groups-apart-214278">worsening religious tensions</a>, problems that Abiy may want to divert attention from. </p>
<h2>What Abiy risks</h2>
<p>Abiy’s bold rhetoric may backfire in several ways, both domestically and internationally.</p>
<p>Given the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/07/ethiopia-eritrea-war-tplf/">heightened state of regional alert</a> following Abiy’s comments, his approach could easily lead to escalated tensions or even armed conflict with neighboring countries. There are already reports of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/07/ethiopia-eritrea-war-tplf/">Eritrea being on high alert</a> amid Ethiopia’s amassing troops between its border and Eritrea.</p>
<p>Abiy’s attempt to distract from internal discord may inadvertently generate new crises for Ethiopia’s already stretched military and recovering economy, and thereby jeopardize Ethiopia’s already strained economic and security capabilities.</p>
<p>In addition, Abiy’s attempts to emulate global powers like China and Russia and impose its will through force carries its own risks. China and Russia have the military might to enforce their geopolitical ambitions, a luxury that Ethiopia does not have. </p>
<p>And it is unlikely that China will extend the same level of support to Ethiopia as it <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/china-firms-russia-body-armor-bullet-proof-drones-thermal-optics-army-equipment-shanghai-h-win/">did to Russia</a> during its invasion of Ukraine. Unlike with Russia, Beijing doesn’t rely on Ethiopia for access to raw materials it needs. Similarly, Russia is not expected to supply arms to Ethiopia while it is <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-desperate-need-for-weapons-ukraine-win-for-north-korea-2023-9">seeking to replenish its own arsenal from North Korea</a> to continue its fight in Ukraine. </p>
<p>As such, trying to adopt a similar assertive maritime stance in a region already fraught with tensions could prove disastrous for Ethiopia – plunging the country and its neighbors into extended turmoil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216237/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahad Darar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed claims his landlocked country has a right to demand maritime access to a Red Sea port from its neighbors in the Horn of Africa − Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti.Mahad Darar, Ph.D. Student of Political Science, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2142782023-10-09T13:32:55Z2023-10-09T13:32:55ZEthiopia: religious tension is getting worse – 5 factors driving groups apart<p>Religion is highly present in Ethiopia. It’s visible in churches and mosques, in clothing, and in public rituals. </p>
<p>The country’s main religious communities are Orthodox Christians, Muslims and Protestants. It’s home to one of the world’s oldest churches and has the third-largest Muslim population in sub-Saharan Africa. Orthodox Christians account for <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">about 43% of the population, while approximately 33% are Muslims</a>. Protestant Christianity arrived in the late 19th century and has expanded rapidly in recent decades to account for an estimated 20% of the population. </p>
<p>Ethiopia is <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">often portrayed</a> as a unique case of harmonious inter-religious relations where Christians and Muslims have lived peacefully together for centuries. But the country has also seen religious conflicts. </p>
<p>In the last three decades, there has been a worsening of religious tension. In <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/27/ambush-kills-20-muslim-worshippers-in-ethiopias-amhara-region#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20incident%20happened%20yesterday%20when,three%20people%20and%20wounding%20five.">2022</a>, for instance, more than 20 people were killed following attacks on Muslims in the north-western city of Gondar.</p>
<p>Ethiopia is constitutionally a secular state. Religion has no formal place in politics. Shared spaces and government buildings are to be free from any religious expressions. However, this has been unevenly practised. Religion is present everywhere. </p>
<p>I am a scholar of religion, with extensive <a href="https://religion.ufl.edu/directory/terje-ostebo/">fieldwork and research experience</a> in religion, ethnicity and politics in Ethiopia. In a recent <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">paper</a>, I analysed the developments over the last decades that have affected inter-religious relations, worsened polarisation and produced conflicts.</p>
<p>In my view, five factors have contributed to the rise in religious tensions.</p>
<p>First, the political transition in 1991, which allowed for greater expression of religious activities and changed the religious landscape. Second, the expansion of Christian Protestantism from the early 1990s. Third, the rise of a more visible and assertive Muslim population. Fourth, the response from the Ethiopian Orthodox church to a loss of influence. Finally, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abiy-Ahmed">Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed</a> allowing religion to enter the public political discourse.</p>
<h2>Growing conflict</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/08/15/ethiopia-risks-sliding-into-another-civil-war">Civil war</a> and <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/08/25/two-ethnic-revolts-rack-ethiopia-at-the-same-time">ethnic conflicts</a> have dominated news coming out of Ethiopia in recent years. Religious and ethnic identities are closely connected, but the ethnic dimension of conflict has tended to overshadow the growing tensions between religious communities.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.eip.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Ostebo-et-al-2021-Religion-ethnicity-and-charges-of-Extremism-in-Ethiopia-final.pdf#page=14">2018</a>, young rioters burned churches and killed several priests in Jijiga, in the eastern Ethiopian state of Somali. In <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ethiopia/">2020</a>, Muslim properties were attacked in Harar, eastern Ethiopia, during celebrations of an Orthodox Christian holiday. In <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/27/ambush-kills-20-muslim-worshippers-in-ethiopias-amhara-region#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20incident%20happened%20yesterday%20when,three%20people%20and%20wounding%20five.">2022</a>, attacks on Muslims in Gondar turned deadly. Such incidents have eroded trust between Ethiopia’s religious communities. </p>
<p>Inter-religious violence is often blamed on so-called extremist elements. However, a closer look reveals a more complex picture. </p>
<h2>The drivers</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91#ref1033852">political transition in 1991</a> and the arrival of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front led to important changes to the political, social and cultural landscape. Seeking to promote equal rights for the country’s ethnic and religious groups, the new government lifted formal restrictions on religious activities. </p>
<p>This affected the balance of power between religious groups. Historically, Ethiopia’s inter-religious co-existence was made possible by one community dominating the others. </p>
<p>Since its establishment in the fourth century, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church had been intimately tied to the state. The domination of the church contributed to the marginalisation of other religious communities. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91">1974 Ethiopian Revolution</a> ended the state-church marriage, and the changes after 1991 further eroded the church’s position and brought other religious communities in from the shadows. </p>
<p>The second driver of tensions has been the rise of Protestantism. Initially brought by western missionaries in the late 19th century, the religion was mainly found in Ethiopia’s non-Orthodox southern region. Protestantism grew rapidly after 1991, with churches and ministries expanding into traditional Orthodox and Muslim areas. On occasion, this has led to violent conflict. In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">2006 and 2010</a>, for instance, clashes erupted in the southwestern area of Jimma.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/religion-was-once-ethiopias-saviour-what-it-can-do-to-pull-the-nation-from-the-brink-171763">Religion was once Ethiopia's saviour. What it can do to pull the nation from the brink</a>
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<p>The 1991 changes also led to Islam becoming more visible in the country. Various Islamic reform movements began strengthening religious identity among Muslims and countering their historically marginalised position. This produced a more assertive community. Muslims have become more active in Ethiopia’s social and political life. Numerous mosques have been built across the country. And Muslims have become increasingly visible through a changing dress code, particularly the use of veiling among women, and through public celebrations of religious holidays. </p>
<p>Many Christians, both Orthodox and Protestant, interpret a more visible and assertive Muslim community as proof of Islamic “extremism”. It’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41240192">commonly claimed</a> that mosques and religious schools are funded by Saudi Arabia. And that the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i4FMpXkKFzQ&t=29s">ultimate aim</a> of Ethiopia’s Muslims is political power. </p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?hl=en&lr=&id=_6lVEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&ots=FAYRrOHs-A&sig=2baPJasl1_wE5VUWCtnWka-M_Vg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">Research</a> has shown that Saudi religious activism has actually dwindled over the last years. But the narrative about such ties continues to fuel suspicions and affect Christian-Muslim relations. </p>
<p>All these developments have been challenging for the Orthodox church. Many of its members are <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">changing their affiliation to Protestantism</a>. The Orthodox church has made efforts to limit this. It has, for instance, prohibited the construction of Protestant churches and mosques in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/arts/design/churches-of-aksum-and-lalibela.html">Lalibela and Axum</a> in Ethiopia’s north. The church has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48634427">declared</a> these cities as sacred Orthodox spaces. </p>
<p>The Orthodox church has also sought to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">reclaim its lost space</a> by, for example, celebrating religious holidays through highly visible ceremonies. During its Meskel holiday in September this year, the Addis Ababa government <a href="https://apanews.net/this-years-ethiopian-meskel-festival-sees-low-turnout-tight-security/#:%7E:text=The%20laity%20is%20restricted%20from,Shirts%20was%20not%20allowed%20too">placed restrictions</a> on the celebration.</p>
<p>The church’s responses have provoked reactions among other religious communities, particularly Muslims who view its actions as an attempt to curb the space they have carved out for themselves. </p>
<p>Finally, Abiy’s political language is laced with semi-religious references. The prime minister is a practising Pentecostal. His acknowledgement of religion has enabled actors to lift religion into the public sphere in ways that have <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429426957-45/strains-pente-politics-j%C3%B6rg-haustein-dereje-feyissa">sharpened boundaries and added to the tensions</a>. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Religious identities and belonging are important in today’s Ethiopia. Changes over the last decades have, however, deepened inter-religious tensions. There is potential to alleviate these tensions. Doing this will require political and religious leaders to communicate across religious boundaries to accommodate Ethiopia’s plurality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214278/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Terje Ostebo have receive funding from USAID.</span></em></p>News coverage of Ethiopia’s ethnic conflicts has overshadowed the growing tensions and polarisation between religious communities.Terje Ostebo, Chair of the Department of Religion and Professor at the Department of Religion and the Center for African Studies, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2133402023-10-04T12:33:07Z2023-10-04T12:33:07ZThe Nobel Peace Prize offers no guarantee its winners actually create peace, or make it last<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551816/original/file-20231003-21-46u90x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1091%2C0%2C71%2C233&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Norwegian Nobel Committee is set to announce its annual winner for the peace prize on Friday, Oct. 6, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/plaque-depicting-alfred-nobel-at-the-nobel-peace-prize-news-photo/83979203?adppopup=true">Chris Jackson/Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Norwegian Nobel Committee is <a href="https://www.nobelpeaceprize.org/presse/arrangementer/accreditation-announcement-nobel-peace-prize-2023?instance=0">set to announce</a> the recipient of the annual Nobel Peace Prize on Oct. 6, 2023, drawing from a pool of 351 nominees. </p>
<p>Environmental activist Greta Thunberg and Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Zelenskyy <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/how-is-nobel-peace-prize-decided-2023-09-29/">are reportedly two of the nominees</a>, among political dissidents, leaders and human rights activists who are up for the prize. The winner will receive a medal, US$994,000 and global recognition.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.sandiego.edu/peace/about/biography.php?profile_id=2091">worked in the peace-building field</a> for over 20 years to support societies as they work to prevent violence and end wars. Each year, I think I should look forward to this moment, when a champion of peace is celebrated on the world stage. But given the track record of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, I always feel some dread before the peace prize announcement. Will the award celebrate a true peace builder, or a politician that just happened to sign a peace agreement? Will it celebrate a true and historic achievement, or what happens to be in the newspaper right now? </p>
<h2>A mixed history</h2>
<p>Admittedly, the <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/about/the-norwegian-nobel-committee/">Norwegian Nobel Committee</a> – made up of five Norwegians, mostly former politicians, whom the Norwegian parliament appoints for a six-year term – has made some great peace prize selections over the years. </p>
<p>South African politician Nelson Mandela, for example, <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1993/summary/#">won the prize</a> in 1993 for his work to help end apartheid.</p>
<p>And Leymah Gbowee, an activist who helped bring peace to Liberia, <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2011/gbowee/facts/">won the award</a> in 2011, alongside former Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Yemeni women’s rights activist Tawakkul Karman.</p>
<p>Gbowee brought Christian and Muslim women together to end Liberia’s devastating 14-year civil war by using creative tactics – <a href="https://qz.com/958346/history-shows-that-sex-strikes-are-a-surprisingly-effective-strategy-for-political-change">including a sex strike</a>, in which Liberian women promised to withhold sex from their husbands until a peace agreement was signed. </p>
<p>Despite the prize’s mixed track record – and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/end-nobel-peace-prize/616300/">despite calls by some to stop giving the award</a> – I think the Nobel Peace Prize should continue. War remains one of humankind’s greatest problems, and peace is still a human achievement worth celebrating.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Leymah Gbowee wears a white shirt and marches with a long line of women, also wearing white." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Leymah Gbowee, who was a joint Nobel Peace Prize winner in 2011, marches with women’s rights activists to pray for peace in Monrovia, Liberia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/liberias-joint-nobel-peace-prize-2011-leymah-gbowee-and-news-photo/1250772202?adppopup=true">Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The prize can be off-mark</h2>
<p>The Nobel Committee, in my view, does not always give the peace prize to people who actually deserve the recognition. And the prize is not a precursor to peace actually happening, or lasting. </p>
<p>Some previous awardees are head-scratchers, for peace experts and casual observers and recipients alike. For example, former President Barack Obama said that <a href="https://www.npr.org/2009/10/09/113677764/obama-surprised-at-winning-nobel-peace-prize">he was even surprised by the award</a> when he won it in 2009.</p>
<p>The committee gave him the award “based on his extraordinary efforts to <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2009/press-release/">strengthen international diplomacy</a> and cooperation between peoples.” However, Obama had been in office for less than a year when he got the prize, which is likely not enough time to do either of these things.</p>
<p>Geir Lundestad, a former secretary of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee, wrote in his 2019 memoir that he had hoped the award “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34277960">would strengthen Mr. Obama</a>” to pursue nuclear disarmament, but in the end he said that he regretted giving Obama the award. </p>
<p>Others selections, such as Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, have proved embarrassing in hindsight. </p>
<p>Just one year after winning the award in 2019, Abiy ordered a large-scale military offensive against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia">a controversial political party</a> that represents the northern Tigray region of Ethiopia. </p>
<p>The war between the Ethiopian military and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front resulted in tens of thousands of civilian deaths before it ended in November 2022. A <a href="https://apnews.com/article/health-united-nations-africa-ethiopia-eritrea-dcb992b8389069490c8b44357500cabe">United Nations investigation</a> found in 2022 that all sides in the conflict have committed <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/war-crimes.shtml">war crimes</a> against civilians.</p>
<p>Berit Reiss-Andersen, the chair of the Nobel award committee, later said in 2022 that Ahmed “has a special responsibility to end the conflict and contribute to peace.” </p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, such statements encouraging peace – alongside the Nobel Prize itself – have had little effect on how prize winners act. The factors that drive war or peace are complex and are unlikely to be significantly influenced by an annual award given in Norway.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A picture of the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali is on display at the Nobel Peace Center in Oslo, alongside other framed photos of people in a dark room with blue lighting." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A photo of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is on display at the Nobel Peace Center in Oslo, Norway, recognizing winners of the Nobel Peace Prize.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-of-the-2019-nobel-peace-prize-laureate-ethiopian-news-photo/1175337675?adppopup=true">Stan Lysberg Solum/NTB Scanpix/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Peace is long term</h2>
<p>Other Nobel awarding committees seem to understand that it takes a significant amount of time to judge whether an achievement truly merits the prize.</p>
<p>Both physicists and economists wait an average of 23 years to <a href="https://www.nature.com/nature-index/news/chemistry-fastest-path-nobel-prize">receive an award</a> after they achieve their award-winning work. </p>
<p>In contrast, American diplomat Henry Kissinger won a Nobel Peace Prize in 1973 for negotiating a <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/cease-fire-goes-into-effect">cease-fire in Vietnam that same year</a>. The cease-fire began to falter almost immediately, and Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam, fell to the North Vietnamese army in May 1975. Kissinger then unsuccessfully tried to return the prize, noting that <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/world/kissinger-nobel-peace-prize-vietnam-war-b2261492.html">“peace we sought through negotiations has been overturned by force</a>.”</p>
<p>Similarly, the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli political leaders Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin won the peace prize in 1994, one year after they signed the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/israelopt-osloaccord93">Oslo Accords,</a> a series of agreements that set up Palestinian self-governance for the West Bank and Gaza. But by 2000, Palestinians had launched the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Israel/The-second-intifada">second intifada</a>, and widespread violence returned to the region.</p>
<p>The Nobel committee tends to award prizes to those involved in current events and doesn’t award prizes long after those events have happened. But some awards have stood the test of time, in part because they were given to individuals following long struggles.</p>
<p>Mandela, for instance, won the prize 53 years after his expulsion from university for joining a protest. This sparked <a href="https://southafrica-info.com/history/nelson-mandela-timeline/">a 53-yearlong career in activism and politics</a> that included 27 years of incarceration as a political prisoner by the government he had fought against – and later led as president.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Yaser Arafat, Shimon Peres and Yitzak Rabin stand in a row and show an open book with a gold Nobel peace prize in it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Palestinian leader Yaser Arafat, left, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, center, and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin display their joint Nobel Peace Prizes in 1994.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-handout-from-the-government-press-office-israeli-news-photo/51663003?adppopup=true">Government Press Office via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>It’s about peace</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/alfred-nobel/alfred-nobels-life-and-work/">Swedish scientist Alfred Nobel</a> – the founder of the Nobel awards – said the Nobel Peace Prize should go to the person “who has done the most or best to advance fellowship among nations, the abolition or reduction of standing armies, and the establishment and promotion of peace congresses.” </p>
<p>The language is somewhat archaic, but the message is clear – the peace prize was designed to be about stopping war and promoting peace. </p>
<p>However, in the last 20 years, the peace prize has been awarded to those working on a variety of issues, including <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2021/summary/">freedom of expression</a>, <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2014/summary/">children’s education</a> and <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2007/summary/">climate change</a>.</p>
<p>All of these are important issues that require more support and recognition – but it is not the case that freedom of expression or climate change adaptation directly leads to peace.</p>
<p>In my view, there are more than enough problems and deadly conflicts in the world whose solutions merit the award of the Nobel Peace Prize as a reflection of its original intent – to acknowledge attempts aimed at ending the scourge of war and building a sustainable peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213340/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Blum does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Nobel Peace Prize has recognized some legendary leaders and peace activists, but it has a mixed track record of recognizing people who actually deserve the prize.Andrew Blum, Executive Director and Professor of Practice at Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace, University of San DiegoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2126262023-09-06T13:18:16Z2023-09-06T13:18:16ZEthiopia’s Amhara people are being portrayed as the enemy: the dangerous history of ethnic politics<p>The Ethiopian government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/aug/04/ethiopia-declares-a-state-of-emergency-in-amhara-amid-increasing-violence">declared a state of emergency</a> on 4 August 2023 and sent the military into the Amhara region to engage the Fano, a local armed militia. Some suggested that Ethiopia <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/08/15/ethiopia-risks-sliding-into-another-civil-war">risked slipping into another civil war</a>.</p>
<p>It is only 10 months since <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-11-03/ethiopia-tigray-peace-deal-ends-two-year-war/101611324">the end of a civil war</a> in which around 600,000 Ethiopians were killed, <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-01-27/ethiopias-forgotten-war-is-the-deadliest-of-the-21st-century-with-around-600000-civilian-deaths.html">making it the deadliest war of the 21st century</a>.</p>
<p>The conflict was mainly between the federal government, led by the Oromo-dominated Prosperity Party, and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the party it succeeded in 2018. When the TPLF entered the Amhara region, committing <a href="https://editorials.voa.gov/a/tplf-must-be-held-accountable-for-atrocites-in-amhara/6477256.html">atrocities against civilians</a> and taking over <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tigrayan-forces-take-control-ethiopian-town-lalibela-un-world-heritage-site-2021-08-05/">towns</a>, the Fano worked with government forces to maintain local stability. With their support, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was able to push the TPLF back to Tigray.</p>
<p>During and after the war, massacres and mass displacement of Amhara occurred in the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/11/ethiopia-over-50-ethnic-amhara-killed-in-attack-on-village-by-armed-group/">Oromia</a> region, the <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2021/2/23/fear-runs-deep-after-ethnic-violence-in-western-Ethiopia">Benshangul Gumuz</a> region and other regions of Ethiopia. There were numerous <a href="https://www.amharaamerica.org/_files/ugd/e494ca_0403f104b0584c18b351291d33cfea45.pdf">reports of</a> rapes, arbitrary arrests, abductions, forced evictions and people being <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/ethiopia-horrific-massacre-400-ethnic-amhara-must-be-investigated-immediately">burned alive</a>. </p>
<p>One independent account <a href="https://www.lemkininstitute.com/statements-new-page/statement-on-ongoing-ethnic-massacres-of-the-amhara-people-in-the-oromia-region-of-ethiopia">reported</a> that Orthodox Christians, seen as synonymous with Amhara, were </p>
<blockquote>
<p>chopped with machetes, stabbed with spears, cut down with scythes, beaten with bats and stoned to death.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A <a href="https://igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Download-the-signed-agreement-here.pdf">peace agreement</a> between the TPLF and the government in November 2022 brought relative calm to Tigray and other regions. But the Amhara were left out of the agreement and continue to be targeted even by <a href="https://www.lemkininstitute.com/statements-new-page/statement-on-ongoing-ethnic-massacres-of-the-amhara-people-in-the-oromia-region-of-ethiopia">government forces</a>. </p>
<p>This is the context in which Amhara’s Fano militia rejected the federal government order <a href="https://thegeopolitics.com/why-are-amhara-militias-fighting-to-keep-their-weapons-it-all-boils-down-to-lack-of-protection/">to surrender their weapons</a> and be integrated into the police and federal army. </p>
<p>The government response was to bombard Amhara towns with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-amhara-arrests-emergency-d9e07bd51061c75e8436849085cd888e">drones</a> and heavy artillery. There have also been mass <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/aug/14/lawyers-and-witnesses-say-ethiopian-police-have-ar/">arrests</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cwlw3xz047jt/ethiopia?pinned_post_locator=urn:asset:6ea0c1ab-627f-4f55-9a80-938a4ac4fa2f&pinned_post_asset_id=64e44b1647bc945c1788d203&pinned_post_type=share#:%7E:text=The%20whereabouts%20of%20opposition%20Ethiopian%20lawmaker%20Christian%20Tadele%2C,in%20the%20capital%2C%20Addis%20Ababa%2C%20earlier%20this%20month.">detentions</a> of Amhara leaders. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://staffportal.curtin.edu.au/staff/profile/view/yirga-gelaw-woldeyes-b922d208/">scholar</a> of history, human rights and decolonisation in Africa with a keen interest in Ethiopia. The rhetoric that presents the Amhara people as a national enemy has gone on, <a href="https://www.resetdoc.org/story/identity-violence-abiy-ahmed-amhara-genocide-denial/">unchallenged</a>, for almost 50 years. What has changed now is that the rhetoric has shifted towards widespread, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-aims-end-illegal-administration-disputed-territory-2023-08-22/">government-sanctioned</a> violence. </p>
<p>Article 2 of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">UN Genocide Convention</a> defines genocide as acts “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”. Following widespread attacks on Amharas in 2021, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission <a href="https://ehrc.org/download/violence-human-rights-violations-following-musician-hachalu-hundessas-assassination-investigative-report/">warned</a> of “the risk of atrocity crimes, including genocide”. In February 2023, a US-based <a href="https://www.lemkininstitute.com/about-us">charity</a> focused on genocide prevention <a href="https://www.lemkininstitute.com/statements-new-page/statement-on-ongoing-ethnic-massacres-of-the-amhara-people-in-the-oromia-region-of-ethiopia">reported</a> that “all Oromia armed forces are conducting what appears to be a systematic policy of erasing the Amhara presence” in two administrative zones.</p>
<p>It is important to shine a light on what is happening and unpack the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44873804">decades-long project</a> of ethnic politics that has allowed the Amhara to be targeted. </p>
<h2>The history of ethnic politics in Ethiopia</h2>
<p>Ethiopia has a long history of ethnic harmony. Historically, Ethiopian rulers came from different regions and were often of mixed lineage. For instance, King Menelik II (1844-1913) came from Amhara and Oromo ancestry. King Yohannes IV (1837-1889) was from Tigray. The Oromo king Mikael (1850-1918) ruled over the Amhara region of Wollo. His son, King Eyasu, inherited Menelik’s throne. </p>
<p>The last monarch, Emperor Haile Selassie, had Amhara and Oromo parents, as does Abiy himself. Until recently, mixing among ethnic groups wasn’t considered controversial. Indeed, it was Ethiopia’s ability to unite across ethnic, linguistic and religious boundaries that defeated Italy’s attempt at colonisation at <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-battle-of-adwa-an-ethiopian-victory-that-ran-against-the-current-of-colonialism-132360">the Battle of Adwa</a> in 1896.</p>
<p>When the fascist Italian prime minister Benito Mussolini invaded and occupied Ethiopia from 1935 to 1942 <a href="https://tassew.wordpress.com/2012/04/24/origin-of-tribalisation-of-ethiopian-politics-from-fascism-to-fascism-by-prof-aleme-eshete/">dividing the country</a> along ethnic lines took centre stage. It was carried out along plans <a href="https://archive.org/details/abyssinia-the-powder-barrel">devised</a> earlier by the Austrian Nazi Roman Prochazka to portray the Amhara as the enemy of all other ethnic groups. </p>
<p>After the expulsion of Italy, Haile Selassie sent Ethiopians from diverse ethnic groups overseas for higher education. During the 1960s <a href="https://arsof-history.org/articles/v4n4_1960s_page_1.html">decade of revolutions</a>, students formed the Ethiopian Student Movement to remove the monarchy. Two ideological positions of nation building <a href="https://jacobin.com/2019/12/ethiopian-student-movement-bahru-zewde-abiy-ahmed-1974-revolution">emerged</a>: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>The first viewed the monarchy as a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2021.1974698">class-based</a> feudal system that should be destroyed. It saw ethnic politics as a hindrance to achieving a socialist republic. </p></li>
<li><p>The second adopted the <a href="https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1929/03/18.htm">Stalinist approach</a> that defined cultural and linguistic groups within a country as nations. They saw the monarchy as an ethnic-based, colonial power.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Members from the first group created an alliance with the Derg, a committee of military officers, which overthrew Haile Selassie in 1974 but refused to create a civilian government. It ruled through dictatorship, destroying the monarchy and anyone <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/204000/afr250101978en.pdf">who opposed its power</a>.</p>
<p>The student groups who viewed the monarchy as an ethnic-based colonial power formed the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41931375">Tigray People’s Liberation Front</a>. The two combined, organised other ethnic allies, and removed the Derg from power in 1991. The TPLF led a transitional government which approved the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the adoption of the current constitution.</p>
<p>This set the stage for 27 years of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/118/472/463/5505401">autocratic rule</a> in which the Amhara <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/118/472/463/5505401?login=false">were cast as the oppressor</a> of all ethnic groups and the TPLF placed itself at the centre of the liberation of all Ethiopians.</p>
<h2>The Amhara as national enemy</h2>
<p>Ethiopia’s 80-plus ethnolinguistic communities were framed as sovereign “nations” under the 1995 <a href="http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/etovpia.pdf#page=3">constitution</a> ostensibly to rectify “historically unjust relationships”. </p>
<p>Although the Ethiopian monarchy was established in Tigray and many Tigrayan (and, indeed, Oromo, Amhara and mixed) emperors ruled the country, the TPLF singled out the Amhara as the monarchical oppressor of all ethnic nations. This was partly convenient because Ethiopian emperors, regardless of ethnic origin, used Amharic as the language of their court. </p>
<p>Ethnic politics was enshrined in law. Once the TPLF came to power, all citizens were required to have ID cards stating their ethnicity. Individuals from mixed backgrounds must choose an ethnic identity. Regional states created their own constitutions, borders, flags and anthems. As Ethiopian historian Yohannes Gedamu <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1311288/ethiopia-amhara-persecution-stands-in-way-of-abiy-ahmed-reform-agenda/">notes</a>, many constitutions state that “the ownership of the region” is based on ethnicity, resulting in cases where</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the Amharas in various regional states are now considered settlers in their own country. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Amharic speaking people of the Amhara region and beyond have lived in Ethiopia for thousands of years, as evidenced by the millions of manuscripts written in their ancient language of Ge’ez, which is the basis of Amharic and Tigrinya. Their almost millennium-old rock churches, imbued with Ethiopian Orthodox architecture and artwork, speak to the Amhara’s ongoing connection to the land.</p>
<p>Labelling an indigenous group of people as “settlers” allows those perpetrating violence to co-opt the language of decolonisation to justify murder. The Amhara are labelled as <a href="https://bilisummaa.com/settler-colonial-neftenga-safaris-abyssinia-is-structural-not-an-event/"><em>neftegna</em></a>, which means a monarchical soldier, despite the monarchy being an institution led by kings from mixed ethnic groups. </p>
<p>Even if one believes that the Amhara were monarchical oppressors, the monarchy was destroyed almost 50 years ago and the Amhara have been excluded from power ever since. The thesis that they are oppressors does not correlate with reality.</p>
<h2>Heading towards genocide</h2>
<p>The federal government has strengthened its ties to its former enemy, the TPLF. The defence minister, Abraham Belay, announced that the Ethiopian army would <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-aims-end-illegal-administration-disputed-territory-2023-08-22/">dismantle</a> the Amhara administration in Wolkaite, a contested region between Tigray and Amhara.</p>
<p>In August 2023, Oromia state government representatives travelled to Tigray to <a href="https://twitter.com/HeranTigray/status/1694441667317633471">declare</a> war:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The war we just started [on the Amhara] is a major war. Right now, this group we are fighting wants to impose one religion, one country, and one language by force on all of us. We have reached the moment that Tigrayans and Oromos must join forces, along other Ethiopians, to defeat this force so that Ethiopia can prosper.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In fact, Amhara has no power to do that. </p>
<p>Ethiopia can draw a lesson from Rwanda. Similar demonisation of the Tutsi by Hutu genocide agitators led to genocide 30 years ago in which 800,000 Tutsis and Tutsi sympathisers were killed. The Tutsi were described as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/25166069221084855#fn3-25166069221084855">foreigners</a> who had links with long-dead Belgian colonialism. ID cards listing ethnicity were used to identify the victims.</p>
<p>Since the demonisation of the Amhara has been built into constitutions, government policy and dehumanising nation-building rhetoric, it has filtered down to people who previously lived together in harmony. </p>
<p>This is the consequence of ethnic politics in Ethiopia. Without more attention and action from the media and global actors, Ethiopia could be heading towards a Rwandan-style genocide.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212626/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yirga Gelaw Woldeyes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The rhetoric that presents the Amhara people as a national enemy has gone on, unchallenged, for far too long.Yirga Gelaw Woldeyes, Senior Lecturer, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2117592023-08-29T13:33:49Z2023-08-29T13:33:49ZLandlocked Ethiopia wants better sea access: a port deal with neighbours could benefit the region<p>Ethiopia’s <a href="https://www.horndaily.com/2023/07/24/ethiopian-prime-minister-abiy-ahmed-announces-strategy-to-attain-port-access-through-diplomacy-or/">access to the coast</a> has occupied the minds of the country’s rulers since <a href="https://books.openedition.org/cfee/1177?lang=en">time immemorial</a>. This is because being landlocked undermines Ethiopia’s ability to grow its economy, develop its military (navy force) and exert influence across the Horn of Africa. </p>
<p>We see this preoccupation in the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1166919?searchText=&searchUri=&ab_segments=&searchKey=&refreqid=fastly-default%3Ae2533ea933721917995bc7204bc1fb39">history</a> of Ethiopia and Eritrea. In 1952, Eritrea – a coastal country – was controversially federated into Ethiopia. Failure to maintain this annexation led to Eritrean independence in 1993 and Ethiopia became a landlocked country once again. This was a major blow for the new administration that had taken over political power in 1991. For the new government this translated into some limitations on their economic and political goals for the country. </p>
<p>As a scholar of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=MSHuq_UAAAAJ&hl=en">African politics</a>, I have researched Ethiopia and its relations with its neighbours, including its <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/nana.12835">civil wars</a>, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2020.1736139">political reforms</a>, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/122/486/119/7026175">national identity</a>, <a href="https://sihma.org.za/journals/Namhla-T-Matshanda.pdf">state building</a> and <a href="https://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/10566/5815">border tensions</a>. </p>
<p>There is no doubt that Ethiopia’s lack of direct access to the sea has constrained its ability to cater for its large population and hindered economic growth and development. Politically, being landlocked limits Ethiopia’s geostrategic options in the Horn of Africa and beyond.</p>
<p>Ethiopia has <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-an-ethiopia-backed-port-is-changing-power-dynamics-in-the-horn-of-africa-93308">several options</a> for peaceful access to the sea. All of them could have a positive economic impact not only in Ethiopia but across the region. The options include further engagement with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-eritrea-port-idUSKCN1LL0UW">Eritrea</a>, <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/news/ethiopia-to-acquire-portion-of-djibouti-port-2200310">Djibouti</a> and <a href="https://www.ship-technology.com/news/ethiopia-buy-19-stake-dp-worlds-berbera-port-somaliland/">Somaliland</a> on equitable terms for the use of their ports. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/waiting-for-ethiopia-berbera-port-upgrade-raises-somalilands-hopes-for-trade-188949">Waiting for Ethiopia: Berbera port upgrade raises Somaliland's hopes for trade</a>
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<p>The Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/lapsset">corridor</a> with Kenya – which is still in its early phases – could also be a game-changer in the region if built to completion. </p>
<iframe title="" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-bFy6k" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/bFy6k/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="650" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<h2>Economic motivations</h2>
<p>Ethiopia is one of the <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/za/en/pages/strategy/articles/ethiopia-growth-miracle.html">fastest</a> growing economies on the continent. It also has a large population, estimated at around 126 million and <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ethiopia-population/">projected</a> to grow at about 2.7% a year. This indicates a big market and many needs to be met. </p>
<p>Economic development became central to fiscal and economic planning and projections in the period between 2000 and 2012. But lack of direct coastal access became a notable <a href="https://harvardpolitics.com/an-emerging-and-troubled-power-overcoming-ethiopias-landlocked-geography/#:%7E:text=When%20Eritrea%20seceded%20in%201993,status%20via%20export%2Doriented%20industrialization">obstacle</a> to Ethiopia’s efforts to achieve middle-income status via export-oriented industrialisation. </p>
<p>At one time Eritrea’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Asseb">Assab port</a> handled 70% of Ethiopia’s trade.</p>
<p>At present Ethiopia’s imports and exports <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/djibouti-needs-plan-b-post-guelleh-era">mainly</a> pass via the port of Djibouti. Reliance on Djibouti has proved costly and unsustainable, however, leading Addis to search for <a href="https://www.garoweonline.com/en/world/africa/ethiopia-reduces-import-volume-in-port-of-djibouti">alternatives</a>. </p>
<h2>Political considerations</h2>
<p>Coastal access would give Ethiopia more political clout to help it achieve its ambition of dominating the Horn of Africa.</p>
<p>Peaceful access to the coast would depend on its relationships with its neighbours. Some have been strained, others harmonious.</p>
<p>Since 1991, Ethiopia has been on a path of regional domination, aided by its economic dominance in the region and in Africa. This was interrupted by its <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44004212">war</a> with Eritrea between 1998 and 2000, which remained unresolved until 2018. The conflict limited but did not end Ethiopia’s political ambitions in the region, as seen in the country’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41756936">foreign policy</a> since the early 1990s. Addis has appeared willing to get its own way in the region by whatever means.</p>
<p>Ethiopia continues to host the African Union and has been an active and dominant member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, a regional organisation. Since 2018, the country’s foreign policy has taken a conciliatory tone. We see this in the rapprochement with Eritrea following a <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/08/ethiopia-eritrea-peace-deal-brings-hope-horn-africa">peace deal</a> that restored relations between the two states after two decades of conflict. This <a href="https://issafrica.org/events/assessing-ethiopias-foreign-policy-in-the-horn">suggests</a> a shift from a rigid security-focused foreign policy to a more pragmatic approach to issues that include diplomacy, climate change, migration, terrorism and access to the sea. </p>
<p>Because of its history and geopolitical position, Ethiopia has the potential to be a force for either stability or instability in the region. Finding a peaceful way to improve coastal access would make it a force for stability. </p>
<h2>Agreement would benefit all countries</h2>
<p>If Ethiopia opted for a forceful approach this would add fuel to a fire. Countries in the region, including Ethiopia, are currently battling various internal conflicts, with real potential to spill over. </p>
<p>Despite the fact of being landlocked, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44369382">sought</a> to revive the country’s navy, suggesting grand ambitions for the country’s armed forces.</p>
<p>There is no way forceful access to the coast would be a feasible option for Ethiopia. </p>
<p>The country is already engaged in <a href="https://www.ti-insight.com/briefs/why-and-how-is-ethiopia-reaching-for-the-coastline/">negotiations</a> with Djibouti and Kenya for more equitable terms for the use of their coasts. Peaceful and mutually beneficial agreements with any of the neighbouring countries will have positive outcomes for all. Ethiopia would still emerge stronger, and would continue on its economic growth path.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211759/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Namhla Matshanda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lack of sea access has constrained Ethiopia’s ability to cater for its large population.Namhla Matshanda, Senior Lecturer, Political Studies, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2117542023-08-24T09:09:44Z2023-08-24T09:09:44ZEthiopia’s Amhara crisis: Abiy’s political failures threaten a return to war<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-amhara-crisis-abiys-political-failures-threaten-a-return-to-war-211754&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>The federal government of Ethiopia declared a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/4/ethiopia-declares-state-of-emergency-following-clashes-in-amhara">state of emergency</a> in Amhara region on 4 August 2023. A special session of parliament endorsed this decision, placing the administration of the country’s second largest region under the military. This followed clashes between federal troops and Amhara forces resisting a government order to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-pm-vows-to-dismantle-regional-military-forces/7042661.html">disarm and demobilise</a> regional special forces. </p>
<p>Amhara region is the second most populous region in Ethiopia. Its northern neighbour is the Tigray region, which was the epicentre less than a year ago of the most <a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/316661/tigray-at-two-years-the-worlds-deadliest-war">destructive civil war</a> in the history of modern Ethiopia. Combined with a political climate that is dominated by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/5/10/what-ethiopia-needs-is-less-not-more-ethno-nationalism">ethnic narratives</a>, ethnic parties and regional militias, the current crisis in Amhara has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-just-ended-one-war-is-another-one-beginning-2023-08-08/">sparked fears of another civil war</a>. </p>
<p>Political tensions with ethnic undertones have been high in Ethiopia. However, forced <a href="https://borkena.com/2023/04/15/amhara-displacement-the-ongoing-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopia/">displacements</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/6/massacre-of-hundreds-fuels-protests-resentment-in-ethiopia">massacres</a> targeting ethnic Amharas have continued under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s watch since 2018. </p>
<p>In 2019 Ethiopia was <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/05/13/ethiopia-is-global-leader-on-internally-displaced-persons-grid//">ranked first</a> in the world for the number of internally displaced people. This was more than those <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2022/05/28/1100469734/ethiopia-set-a-world-record-for-displacements-in-a-single-year-5-1-million-in-20">displaced</a> by wars in Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-concerned-about-increasing-political-ethnic-polarization-ethiopia-2021-05-14/">ethnic polarisation</a> higher than ever, pan-Ethiopian unity forces and political parties lost their appeal long ago. Ethnic grievances are now the main organising principles in Ethiopia, which shows why Amharas who were mostly known for supporting national political movements are now organising just as Amharas. </p>
<p>In the last two years alone, ethnic Amharas were <a href="https://borkena.com/2023/04/15/amhara-displacement-the-ongoing-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopia/">displaced</a> from suburbs surrounding Addis Ababa, the capital. Amharas also continue to face harassment by Oromia’s security forces when travelling to Addis Ababa, which is a self administrating city but geographically an enclave of Oromia region. </p>
<p>Then there’s the government’s reliance on ethnic-based militias, such as Amhara Fano fighters whenever it deemed necessary to ensure its survival. During the federal government’s war on Tigray, for example, the overstretched Ethiopia National Defence Force mobilised Amhara youth to fight. Following the war, the Fano emerged well-armed and much stronger with somewhat obscure but seemingly centralised command. This unsettled Abiy and led directly to the present crisis. </p>
<p>For the Amhara Fano fighters, however, main causes for their struggle are the continued massacres targeting their group, displacements, and discriminatory treatments that Amharas face across Ethiopia. For example, they mention that the recent <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-amhara-arrests-emergency-d9e07bd51061c75e8436849085cd888e">mass arrest</a> of Amharas in Addis Ababa by the federal police are examples of Abiy’s continued mistreatment of their group. To make matters worse, families who are demanding to know about the <a href="https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/36028/">whereabouts</a> of their imprisoned children are facing harassment. </p>
<p>I am a political science scholar with a focus on the Horn of Africa countries. I have also authored a <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Politics-of-Contemporary-Ethiopia-Ethnic-Federalism-and-Authoritarian/Gedamu/p/book/9781032029054">book</a> on ethnic federalism and authoritarian survival in Ethiopia. Nine months into Abiy’s rise to power in Ethiopia, I warned that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/persecution-of-ethnic-amharas-will-harm-ethiopias-reform-agenda-98201">persecution of ethnic Amharas</a> could derail his then highly touted political reforms. At the time, he vowed to deal with political violence that targeted any ethnic group and impeded freedom of movement of citizens. Sadly, he failed to deliver.</p>
<p>Today, many in Ethiopia and especially citizens in the Amhara region believe that the incumbent Prosperity Party has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66496137">lost both the credibility and the administrative capacity</a> to lead the region. It’s my view that Abiy’s use of the military to address such a critical challenge will prove a failure. A military approach could result in more bloodshed.</p>
<h2>Ethiopia’s increasing challenges</h2>
<p>Once considered the lone hope to resolve Ethiopia’s problems, Abiy eluded scrutiny because of his <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/abiys-agenda-and-future-ethiopia">unifying</a> political rhetoric. But the political challenges continued to <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-political-crisis-plays-out-in-the-regions-why-its-a-federal-problem-144893">intensify</a>. It was not long before political dissent was met with <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/08/ethiopia-stop-the-use-of-deadly-force-on-protesters/">violence</a> by his security forces.</p>
<p>By 2021, the media reported that <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2022/05/28/1100469734/ethiopia-set-a-world-record-for-displacements-in-a-single-year-5-1-million-in-20">5.1 million people</a> had been displaced internally. People from all of Ethiopia’s regional states had experienced forced displacement, mainly due to their ethnic identity. A disproportionate number of these were Amharas <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2022/08/24/oromo-nationalism-should-cross-the-river-of-resentment/">targeted</a> in five regions. </p>
<p>The Tigray war was to follow. Two years of fighting, mainly between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, intensified the destruction in the country. Hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2f385e95-0899-403a-9e3b-ed8c24adf4e7">have died</a> and the country needs at least <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2023/03/29/ethiopia-war-crimes-accountability">US$20 billion</a> for post conflict reconstruction.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/persecution-of-ethnic-amharas-will-harm-ethiopias-reform-agenda-98201">Persecution of ethnic Amharas will harm Ethiopia’s reform agenda</a>
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<p>A peace <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/turning-pretoria-deal-lasting-peace-ethiopia">agreement</a> was eventually signed in Pretoria, South Africa, in November 2022. The political settlement brought relief in the country’s north. But Abiy’s regime did not attempt to find political solutions for all the country’s other challenges. For example, once peace in Tigray was achieved, the government did not also attempt to address the grievances of Amharas related to massacres, displacements and harassment they persistently had to endure. Even during the Tigray war, regions such as Afar and Amhara equally suffered from the destruction the war had caused. But the government seems to have ignored the suffering of Afar and Amhara Ethiopians. </p>
<p>As a result, the Amhara region is the centre of conflict with federal forces that has parallels with the Tigray war. The deployment of military drones – an important tool against Tigray – is responsible for the deaths of at least <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-amhara-arrests-emergency-d9e07bd51061c75e8436849085cd888e">26 civilians</a> in the Amhara city of Finote Selam. </p>
<p>Interestingly, now that the government’s peace deal with Tigray forces is holding, Abiy’s Oromo prosperity party officials are now openly <a href="https://twitter.com/addisinsight/status/1694082774217392178?s=20">inviting</a> Tigrayans to also arm against the Amhara, which shows that the government is only steadfast to respond to violence by way of more violence. </p>
<h2>Amhara region’s case</h2>
<p>Amhara’s popular president and top leadership were <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/6/23/ethiopias-amhara-state-chief-killed-amid-regional-coup-attempt">assassinated</a> months after they came to power in 2019. Since then, the region has not witnessed any semblance of normalcy. Successive Amhara leaders from incumbent Prosperity Party have also become failures. </p>
<p>Into this void stepped Amhara youth groups organised as impromptu militia units tasked with protecting and securing their localities. Over time these morphed into an Amhara popular resistance. A considerable number of disgruntled former Amhara special force members are <a href="https://borkena.com/2023/08/15/ethiopia-defunct-amhara-special-force-joined-fano-says-minister-for-peace/">now part of this Fano led resistance</a> after rejecting an offer to integrate with the federal defence force. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-political-crisis-plays-out-in-the-regions-why-its-a-federal-problem-144893">Ethiopia's political crisis plays out in the regions. Why it's a federal problem</a>
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<p>This rise in the strength of the Fano forces was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-just-ended-one-war-is-another-one-beginning-2023-08-08/">cited by Ethiopia’s spy chief</a> to be behind the federal government’s decision to dissolve regional special forces. </p>
<p>The order applies to all regions, but the Amhara view it as a ploy that only targets Amhara’s strong special forces while leaving others intact. They also believe that such a move could expose their region to possible attacks from Oromia and Tigray regions. These regions have claims over Amhara territory that have stoked longstanding tensions. </p>
<p>Amhara also see the move to disarm them as a betrayal, after they made sacrifices during the Tigray war to secure the prime minister’s survival.</p>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>Fears of another war that could match or even eclipse what happened in Tigray are not misplaced if a solution is not found. The international community must press all groups, especially Ethiopia’s federal government, to start political dialogue immediately and agree a ceasefire. Federal Authorities in Ethiopia must also learn that only dialogue and direct engagement with the public could help with conflict resolution.</p>
<p>It’s also time for Abiy to prove that Ethiopia can be at peace under his leadership. The impact of another civil war in the Horn of Africa, at the same time as Sudan’s, would be catastrophic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211754/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yohannes Gedamu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Abiy Ahmed’s use of the military to address a critical challenge is likely to fail.Yohannes Gedamu, Senior Lecturer of Political Science, Georgia Gwinnett CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2102552023-07-26T14:54:19Z2023-07-26T14:54:19ZEgypt and Ethiopia are finally working on a water deal – what that means for other Nile River states<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539011/original/file-20230724-25-5rnfy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam began generating electricity in 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Minasse Hailu/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Egypt and Ethiopia have waged a diplomatic war of words over Ethiopia’s massive new dam – the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – on the Blue Nile, which started filling up in July 2020. The political row has threatened to get out of hand on occasion but now the two countries have <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/rest-of-africa/egypt-ethiopia-agree-to-reach-deal-on-dam-in-4-months-4303192">finally agreed</a> to conclude “a mutually acceptable agreement” within four months. We asked John Mukum Mbaku, the author of a <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/856122/pdf">recent article</a> on the Ethiopian dam and a co-author of a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/books/governing-the-nile-river-basin/">book</a> on the Nile River’s changing legal regime, to answer four key questions.</em></p>
<h2>What is the context of the current tussle?</h2>
<p>Ethiopia, whose highlands provide more than 85% of the water that flows into the Nile, has long argued that it has the right under international law to manage resources within its own borders for its national development. It sees the “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/12/ethiopia-says-completes-third-filling-of-mega-dam-reservoir">Nile as a gift of God</a>” given to Ethiopians to use for their development. </p>
<p>Egypt, which depends on the Nile for more than 90% of its fresh water, has argued that the Ethiopian dam represents a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/6/30/egypt-warns-of-existential-threat-from-ethiopia-dam">threat</a> to its water security and its very existence as a people.</p>
<p>The decision by Addis Ababa to begin construction of the dam on the Blue Nile in 2011 exacerbated an already deteriorating relationship between Ethiopia and its two downstream neighbours, Egypt and Sudan, over access to Nile waters. After Egypt’s diplomatic efforts failed to stop construction, Cairo redirected its energies to securing a legally binding agreement for filling and operating the dam. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://enterprise.press/stories/2018/04/10/egypt-sudan-ethiopia-fail-to-reach-agreement-in-gerd-talks/">no mutually</a> acceptable <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/5/egypt-ethiopia-sudan-fail-to-succeed-in-disputed-dam-talks">agreement</a> for filling and operating the dam was ever reached.</p>
<p>In August <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/20/ethiopia-electricity-production-gerd-blue-nile-mega-dam#:%7E:text=The%20process%20of%20filling%20the,was%20to%20add%2013.5%20billion.">2020</a>, Addis Ababa began to fill the dam’s reservoir. That process was repeated in <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/second-filling-gerd-reservoir">2021</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/12/ethiopia-says-completes-third-filling-of-mega-dam-reservoir">2022</a>. </p>
<p>In 2023, Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed announced that the country would delay the fourth filling until September “to alleviate the <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/ethiopia-delays-filling-of-flagship-dam-vows-to-heed-downstream-nations-concerns/2940475">concerns of neighbouring people</a>”. </p>
<p>The dam’s reservoir filling in particular, and its operation in general, are issues that the three countries must resolve, most likely through a legally binding agreement or treaty. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/egypt-reacts-ethiopia-switches-first-nile-dam-turbine">February 2022</a>, the Ethiopian dam started producing electricity. Egyptians claimed that Addis Ababa was “violating its obligations under the 2015 Declaration of Principles” and endangering Egyptian “<a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/egypt-reacts-ethiopia-switches-first-nile-dam-turbine">water interests</a>”.</p>
<h2>What are the main sticking points going into the talks?</h2>
<p>An agreement would have to explicitly deal with issues that are important to Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. The most important are Egypt’s and Sudan’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/">historically acquired rights</a> to Nile waters. The rights were granted by the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan (1959 Nile Treaty). </p>
<p>After estimating the average annual flow of the Nile River as measured at Aswan to be 84 billion cubic metres, the two treaties granted <a href="https://theconversation.com/colonial-era-treaties-are-to-blame-for-the-unresolved-dispute-over-ethiopias-dam-133538">66%</a> of Nile waters to Egypt, 22% to Sudan and 12% to account for <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/">seepage and evaporation</a>. These allocations exhausted all the Nile’s average annual flow of water. Egypt was also granted veto power over all construction projects on the Nile and its tributaries. </p>
<p>These rights came to be known as Egypt’s and Sudan’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-limits-of-the-new-nile-agreement/">acquired rights</a>. They have been the main <a href="https://theconversation.com/colonial-era-treaties-are-to-blame-for-the-unresolved-dispute-over-ethiopias-dam-133538">sticking point</a> in efforts to conclude a treaty between all <a href="https://www.nilebasin.org/index.php/media-center/maps#:%7E:text=The%20Nile%20River%20flows%20through,%2C%20Tanzania%2C%20and%20Uganda">11 Nile riparian states</a> for the allocation of the waters of the Nile, as well as between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over the Ethiopian dam. </p>
<p>While Ethiopia and other upstream riparian states see these two treaties as colonial anachronisms that have no relevance to modern Nile governance, Egypt and Sudan insist that they are <a href="https://theconversation.com/colonial-era-treaties-are-to-blame-for-the-unresolved-dispute-over-ethiopias-dam-133538">binding</a>.</p>
<h2>What impact would a breakthrough have on other Nile Basin agreements?</h2>
<p>The impact will depend on what type of agreement is reached. Assume that both Egypt and Sudan agree to abandon the rights granted by the 1929 and 1959 treaties. They could then enter into negotiation with Ethiopia to produce a new treaty that creates rights for all three states. </p>
<p>Such a treaty could provide the impetus for all 11 Nile Basin states to return to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/colonial-era-treaties-are-to-blame-for-the-unresolved-dispute-over-ethiopias-dam-133538">Cooperative Framework Agreement</a>, which was expected to provide a legal framework for governing the Nile based on equitable and reasonable water use. The framework agreement has been in limbo since Egypt and Sudan <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article60989/">rejected</a> it. </p>
<p>The other Nile Basin states see these colonial-era treaties as a violation of <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article60989/">international law principles</a>, and a breach of the vision of the Nile Basin Initiative.</p>
<h2>What other claims threaten the status quo?</h2>
<p>Egypt fears that if Addis Ababa is allowed to fill the reservoir without a legally binding agreement, other Nile Basin states might also take unilateral actions. This could harm Egypt’s water security and ability to control projects on the Nile River and its tributaries. </p>
<p>Then, there is the matter of how to manage issues related to climate change, such as droughts and floods. The existence of the dam means Addis Ababa’s cooperation will be required. In times of drought, for example, the Ethiopian dam will be expected to release some water to help Egypt and Sudan. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s right to water for agriculture and household consumption is an issue that has not yet been agreed upon by all three countries.</p>
<p>Egypt and Sudan are worried about the <a href="https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/491429.aspx">harm</a> that could come to them from activities upstream. Egypt remains adamant that the dam will hurt its <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-gerd-dam-a-potential-boon-for-all-experts-say/a-65254058">water supply</a> and threaten domestic development. </p>
<p>But Sudanese officials appear to have changed their assessment of the impact of the dam. They now see it as a potential regulator of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-gerd-dam-a-potential-boon-for-all-experts-say/a-65254058">seasonal floods</a> and provider of clean energy. </p>
<p>These issues should be examined thoroughly during the negotiations. The three countries should adopt a treaty or agreement that is mutually acceptable and beneficial. </p>
<p>Over the years, the three countries have struggled to bring meaning to terms like “significant harm” and “equitable and reasonable utilisation”. The final treaty should define these terms. It should also create a mediation mechanism, which can include referring certain specified matters to the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/how-the-court-works">International Court of Justice</a> for resolution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210255/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Nile Basin states are keen to see what kind of deal Ethiopia reaches with Egypt and Sudan.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2091412023-07-11T16:16:27Z2023-07-11T16:16:27ZEthiopia wants to join the BRICS group of nations: an expert unpacks the pros and cons<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536810/original/file-20230711-23-y6x8b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (left) with China's President Xi Jinping in Beijing in 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andy Wong / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A few years ago, the BRICS grouping – Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa – had lost salience because three of its members were in severe economic difficulty. Brazil, Russia and South Africa are primarily natural resource exporters and were badly affected by the global <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/what-triggered-oil-price-plunge-2014-2016-and-why-it-failed-deliver-economic-impetus-eight-charts">commodity price bust</a> of 2014.</p>
<p>Russia’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/2022-Russian-invasion-of-Ukraine">invasion</a> of Ukraine has now given BRICS a new geopolitical salience as the members and their respective allies respond to events. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-role-as-host-of-the-brics-summit-is-fraught-with-dangers-a-guide-to-who-is-in-the-group-and-why-it-exists-206898">South Africa's role as host of the BRICS summit is fraught with dangers. A guide to who is in the group, and why it exists</a>
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<p>In the emerging world order there is also now <a href="https://www.livemint.com/news/world/brics-gets-influx-of-interest-as-saudi-arabia-iran-and-more-knock-on-its-door-will-members-open-up-11682501595762.html">increased demand</a> to join BRICS, in part as a countervailing power to “the west”. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentina-says-has-chinas-support-join-brics-group-2022-07-07/">Argentina</a>, <a href="https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=393341622&Country=China&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=International+relations&oid=863331669&flid=93319592">Saudi Arabia</a> and lately, <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/ethiopia-applies-to-join-brics-bloc-of-emerging-economies-4288736">Ethiopia</a>, have expressed strong interest in becoming members.</p>
<p>I have researched the political economy of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=P%C3%A1draig+Carmody+%2B+RESEARCH&hl=en&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart">globalisation in Africa</a> over the last 30 years. I have specifically examined the scramble for Africa by <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0962629807000406">the US and China</a>, <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/ejdr.2012.8">South Africa’s involvement in BRICS</a>, the nature of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/33547/chapter-abstract/287921649?redirectedFrom=fulltext">BRICS engagement with Africa</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2017.1337359">market and resource access by BRICS in southern Africa</a>.
It would be a major coup for Ethiopia if it were able to join the grouping as it would raise its global profile, allow it to interact and coordinate more closely with some of the major world powers and move the discourse beyond the recent civil war there, potentially enabling it to attract more investment.</p>
<h2>Opportunities</h2>
<p>Ethiopia has <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-ethiopia-submits-application-to-join-brics-bloc-of-developing-nations/">cited</a> its key role in founding the African Union and other institutions, along with its national interest as grounds for seeking BRICS membership. In my opinion, there are five key reasons why Ethiopia would want to join the grouping. </p>
<p><strong>Deteriorating relations with western powers</strong>: Ethiopia has historically depended on substantial western support through <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-suspends-food-aid-ethiopia-because-diversions-2023-06-08/">aid</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260.2022.2091580">security</a> cooperation. But its relations with the west <a href="https://ethiopianbusinessreview.net/foreign-aid-holds-itself-back/">have soured</a> as a result of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">civil war</a>, in which human rights violations were <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/09/un-experts-warn-potential-further-atrocities-amid-resumption-conflict">reported</a>. Joining BRICS would make the country more geostrategically important, perhaps encouraging western powers to downplay human rights concerns, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/58653/drc-how-the-cia-got-under-patrice-lumumbas-skin/">as they have in the past</a> in the interests of “realpolitik”.</p>
<p><strong>Alternative growth frontier</strong>: Ethiopia remains one of Africa’s fastest growing economies, at <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-economic-outlook">over 5% a year</a>. It has developed strong <a href="https://www.africa-newsroom.com/press/ethiopian-prime-minister-abiy-ahmed-ali-meets-with-qin-gang?lang=en">economic ties</a> with China in recent decades. Similarly, <a href="https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/en_33771">Indian companies</a> have been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10455752.2012.759247/">acquiring land</a> in Ethiopia. China and India are now Africa’s <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1234977/main-trade-partners-of-africa/">two largest</a> single trading partners (not counting the European Union as a single entity). Joining BRICS would signal openness and lead to greater cooperation through platforms like the business council and forum. It could also add impetus to the “<a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/how-real-is-the-ethiopia_b_7985180">resurgent Ethiopia</a>” narrative, an image the authorities are keen to promote to attract investments. </p>
<p><strong>Negotiations over finance</strong>: The Ethiopian government is <a href="https://newsaf.cgtn.com/news/2023-04-08/IMF-talks-with-Ethiopia-to-continue-after-progress-made-1iONtaKnpLi/index.html">negotiating</a> a financial package with the International Monetary Fund. Joining BRICS might give it greater leverage. Western powers, which largely control the IMF, might be more wary of alienating Ethiopia in BRICS and driving it further “into the arms” of China. The creation of a new BRICS currency, to challenge US dollar hegemony, is on the agenda and its existing Contingency Reserve Arrangement already partly competes with the IMF. </p>
<p><strong>Non-interference policy</strong>: BRICS powers rhetorically largely subscribe to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep05168.10.pdf">non-interference</a> in the sovereign affairs of other states, with the qualification that President Lula de Silva of Brazil <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285596738_Brazilian_Foreign_Policy_under_Lula_from_non-intervention_to_non-indifference">talked about</a> “non-indifference” to human rights when he was previously in power and Russia has violated the principle through invasions and election interference, amongst others. Ethiopia may be interested in the political cover that joining BRICS would provide. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has received political cover from China, and some would argue from South Africa. The Ethiopian government may be keen to avoid human rights governance conditions attached to new loans, aid or debt relief from the west. </p>
<p><strong>A prime minister seeking new friends:</strong> BRICS membership would help restore the tarnished image of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who is a Nobel peace prize recipient. Ahmed was heavily <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopian-leader-marking-year-war-says-he-will-bury-his-foes-with-our-blood-2021-11-03/">criticised</a> as a war-monger during the civil war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. Joining the BRICS club would show that his government is still politically acceptable to some major world powers. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="Photo of Russian president Vladimir Putin with Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed on the sidelines of the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi on 23 October 2019" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535799/original/file-20230705-15-sqixl8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535799/original/file-20230705-15-sqixl8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535799/original/file-20230705-15-sqixl8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535799/original/file-20230705-15-sqixl8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535799/original/file-20230705-15-sqixl8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535799/original/file-20230705-15-sqixl8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535799/original/file-20230705-15-sqixl8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Abiy Ahmed with Vladimir Putin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sergei Chirikov/POOL/AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
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<h2>The risks</h2>
<p>There would of course be risks in Ethiopia joining the BRICS. Western powers might perceive it as drifting into the alternative geopolitical bloc or alignment, which could reduce aid and investment from them. But this could also have advantages for Ethiopia’s relations with the west by making the country more geo-strategically important. </p>
<p>Based on past experience, Ethiopia would be an unlikely addition to the grouping. The last and only country to be admitted after the group’s founding was South Africa in 2010. Other countries have applied and have not been admitted. BRICS now operates in what is sometimes described as a <a href="https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/russia-s-new-foreign-policy-concept-the-impact-on-brics-plus.html/">BRICS-plus</a> format with countries such as Egypt already members of its development bank and all African leaders invited to the up-coming BRICS’ summit in South Africa. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s economy, <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=ET">estimated</a> at around US$126.78 billion in 2022, is less than half the size of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=ZA">South Africa’s US$405.87 billion</a>. South Africa is by far the smallest economy in the BRICS. But in some ways Ethiopia might be seen as a more representative African country in BRICS than South Africa. Ethiopia hosts the African Union headquarters and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Its capital, Addis Ababa, is sometimes described as the continent’s diplomatic capital. The outcome of Ethiopia’s application will likely be known after the next summit in August.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209141/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Padraig Carmody previously received funding from National Geographic and the University of Johannesburg to conduct research on related topics. </span></em></p>There is increased demand to join BRICS in the emerging world order, partly as a countervailing power to “the west”.Padraig Carmody, Professor in Geography, Trinity College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2056632023-05-23T13:57:23Z2023-05-23T13:57:23ZSudan’s peace mediation should be led by the African Union: 3 reasons why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526781/original/file-20230517-12607-2lblkm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudanese protesters in Khartoum. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mahmoud Hjaj/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Questions about who mediates in a conflict – and when – are crucial. Mediation is about trust, an awareness of regional realities and insights into complex politics. It should happen before conflict reaches a <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/TimingofPeaceInitiatives_Zartman2001.pdf">mutually damaging stalemate</a>. This spares lives and political disintegration of the kind seen in <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-06-25/The-U-S-is-to-blame-for-Libya-s-disintegration-11npdH9dn5C/index.html">Libya</a> and <a href="https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=bildhaan">Somalia</a>. </p>
<p>Who’s likely to be the most successful as a mediator is a question that needs to be addressed urgently in the ongoing <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-has-fighting-broken-out-again-in-sudan-and-what-does-it-mean-for-the-region-203928">Sudan civil war</a>.</p>
<p>Based on our <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7">research</a> on <a href="https://www.routledge.com/African-Borders-Conflict-Regional-and-Continental-Integration/Moyo-Nshimbi/p/book/9781032543499">continental integration</a> and <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Conflict-Management-and-Resolution-in-South-Sudan/Alusala-Liaga-Rupiya/p/book/9781032530932">conflict management</a> in <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/MONO129FULL.PDF">war situations</a>, we believe that an African Union-led mediation process promises a better and more stable peace agreement than a non-African mediation process. </p>
<p><a href="https://au.int/en/overview">The African Union’s</a> mediation would bring on board Sudan’s immediate neighbours (Chad, the Central African Republic, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya and South Sudan). This would give these countries an opportunity to address <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/26/humanitarian-fears-as-thousands-of-sudanese-flee-to-chad-on-foot">their concerns</a> and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/impact-sudan-crisis-central-african-republic-flash-update-27-april-2023#:%7E:text=The%20ongoing%20conflict%20in%20Sudan,the%20price%20of%20basic%20commodities.">interests</a> in the conflict for a lasting peace agreement.</p>
<p>The African Union successfully <a href="http://www.internationalpolicybrief.org/images/2020/DECEMBER/IJCSIRD/ARTICLE1.pdf">mediated in 2019</a> in Sudan after the military overthrew president <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16010445">Omar al-Bashir</a>. This <a href="https://www.news24.com/News24/new-sudan-thousands-celebrate-as-protesters-army-sign-deal-20190818">intervention</a> helped, at the time, to prevent the country’s descent into a military dictatorship. It also helped align the demands of the Sudanese people in anticipation of a transition to civilian rule. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-is-awash-with-weapons-how-the-two-forces-compare-and-what-that-means-for-the-war-205434">warring parties</a> in the ongoing conflict have also shown an openness to the African Union’s mediation. <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-coup-abdel-fattah-burhan-who">General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan</a>, who led a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/25/africa/sudan-military-prime-minister-intl-hnk/index.html">coup in October 2021</a>, sent a team to the union’s Peace and Security Council in <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article270455/">February 2023</a>. The team lobbied for the lifting of sanctions on Sudan. The African Union <a href="https://au.int/en/articles/sudan-suspended-african-union">suspended</a> Sudan in 2019 from participating in the organisation’s activities until it sets up a civilian-led government. </p>
<p>The African Union has refrained from taking a position on the conflict, which makes it a suitably neutral negotiator. Additionally, it’s working on <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230502/meeting-extended-mechanism-sudan-crisis">measures</a> to ensure that Sudan gets back to <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-people-toppled-a-dictator-despite-the-war-theyre-still-working-to-bring-about-democratic-change-205236">transitioning to democracy and civilian rule</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">Sudan crisis explained: What's behind the latest fighting and how it fits nation's troubled past</a>
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<p>We’re not against the ongoing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/06/sudans-warring-sides-to-begin-talks-in-saudi-arabia-as-fighting-rages-on">US-Saudi Arabia-mediated initiative</a> in Jeddah. But these negotiations are primarily about opening <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/22/air-strikes-hit-sudans-capital-as-ceasefire-approaches">humanitarian corridors</a> for civilians. They’re not for negotiating an end to the fighting. </p>
<p>In our view, this is a process that the African Union is best placed to lead. This doesn’t exclude the participation of other countries. Three reasons favour the African Union as the lead mediator in Sudan. </p>
<h2>Trust, regional realities and insights into complex politics</h2>
<p>Firstly, the African Union has the trust of Sudan’s warring parties after its successful mediation in 2019. This intervention was in line with the union’s policy to provide “<a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9654-assembly_au_dec_474-489_xxi_e.pdf#page=23">African solutions to African problems</a>”. This policy resonates with the union’s 55 member states. It played out in Ethiopia in November 2022 when the organisation helped negotiate a <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/cessation-of-hostilities-agreement-between-the-government-of-the-federal-democratic-republic-of-ethiopia-and-the-tigray-peoples-liberation-front-tplf">cessation of hostilities</a> agreement between prime minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. </p>
<p>Secondly, regional realities, dynamics and the interests of Sudan’s neighbours are crucial to the resolution of the conflict. Take Chad, with which Sudan shares a 1,403km border. Chad is just emerging from decades of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13164690">sustained conflict</a>. It shares strong historical, economic, cultural and religious relations with Sudan. But these relations are strained. </p>
<p>Sudanese rebels have previously <a href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/master/frd/frdcstdy/su/sudancountrystud00berry/sudancountrystud00berry.pdf#page=343">attacked Sudan</a> from hideouts in Chad’s territory. Chadian rebels have done the same to Chad from Sudan’s territory. Both countries have accused each other of launching these <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/sudan-and-chad-accuse-each-other-helping-rebels?gclid=Cj0KCQjwpPKiBhDvARIsACn-gzB1bsLURmfXaUtZqhYe6NknKh1UcaIsBeRu9WoxPmd_GZVrySN7NlwaAn_fEALw_wcB">proxy attacks</a> through their respective rebel groups. This has led to clashes between their militaries along their common border in the past, straining stability.</p>
<p>The fallout of conflict in Sudan extends beyond Chad. Sudan’s seven neighbours have <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">an interest in Sudan’s stability</a>. None wants to host <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-refugee-crisis-aid-agencies-face-huge-challenges-as-hundreds-of-thousands-flee-violence-205217">Sudanese refugees</a> as the situation degenerates into a humanitarian crisis. Fighting in one country easily causes <a href="https://www.routledge.com/African-Borders-Conflict-Regional-and-Continental-Integration/Moyo-Nshimbi/p/book/9781032543499">cross-border flows</a> of people. This threatens regional stability. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">Sudan: the longer the conflict lasts, the higher the risk of a regional war</a>
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<p>These threats to stability are best understood and resolved by the African Union. The union is a leading and active mediator in African conflicts and has a generally <a href="http://ssrc-cdn1.s3.amazonaws.com/crmuploads/new_publication_3/a-survey-of-mediation-in-african-coups.pdf">successful mediation track record</a>. Mediators from outside Africa are either not cognisant of – or ignore – <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/Peacemaking_in_Civil_War_International_Mediation_in_Zimbabwe_1974_1980">these sensitive African elements</a> to conflict. </p>
<p>Thirdly, the war in Sudan is driven by complex politics. In our view, only mediators who have been involved in helping the country solve its tensions before can possibly help both sides stand down.</p>
<p>The armed conflict in Sudan between the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/18/the-sudan-crisis-a-power-struggle-by-design">Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces</a> was <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-entire-history-has-been-dominated-by-soldiers-and-the-violence-and-corruption-they-bring-204928">inevitable</a> because of pre-existing instability. </p>
<p>One reason for this was the 2019 overthrow of Bashir. The military subsequently established a <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/sudan/">transitional military council</a>. But the Sudanese people <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics-idUSKCN1RY0EI">demanded civilian rule</a>. </p>
<p>The African Union mediated a settlement between the military and civilian representatives. This helped establish a three-year power-sharing <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/17/sudan-protest-leaders-military-sign-transitional-government-deal">Transitional Sovereign Council</a> in 2019. However, Burhan’s 2021 coup undid this agreement. This led to a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/26/one-killed-on-sudan-anti-coup-protest-anniversary">political deadlock and civilian protests</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-people-toppled-a-dictator-despite-the-war-theyre-still-working-to-bring-about-democratic-change-205236">Sudan's people toppled a dictator – despite the war they’re still working to bring about democratic change</a>
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<p>The African Union understands this context. </p>
<p>As a continental body, the union has <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aus-role-in-brokering-sudan-deal-offers-lessons-for-the-future-121822">legitimacy and the authority</a> to sanction member states into compliance. It also <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230502/african-union-condemns-violence-sudan-calls-humanitarian-ceasefire-and-urges">desires a satisfactory outcome</a> for citizens of a state for which it is an umbrella organisation. </p>
<h2>Continental interests</h2>
<p>International actors like the US and Saudi Arabia engage others because they’re driven by <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/anarchy-is-what-states-make-of-it-the-social-construction-of-power-politics/B03BC7C9AAC5211B6DC319C077C1A854">national interests</a>. The African Union’s participation would serve continental interests. The union has the goal to <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-african-union-has-failed-to-silence-the-guns-and-some-solutions-139567">silence the guns</a> and boost African integration and peace. It’s aware that continental development is at stake. It should <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230502/meeting-extended-mechanism-sudan-crisis">continue asserting its role</a> in addressing the situation in Sudan.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205663/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Changwe Nshimbi receives funding from the National Research Foundation (South Africa) and the European Commission. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nelson Alusala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An African-led process would take into account complex regional dynamics – which would lead to a better and more stable peace agreement.Chris Changwe Nshimbi, Director & SARChI Research Chair: Political Economy of Migration in the SADC Region, University of PretoriaNelson Alusala, Senior Research Associate, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956012022-12-08T13:38:39Z2022-12-08T13:38:39ZAbiy Ahmed gained power in Ethiopia with the help of young people – four years later he’s silencing them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498761/original/file-20221203-16-gyawnf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopians celebrate Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's Nobel Peace Prize win in 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Minasse Wondimu Hailu/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Abiy Ahmed took power as Ethiopia’s prime minister in April 2018, he was the <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-new-ethiopian-leader-abiy-ahmed-youngest-in-africa-sparks-hope-of/">youngest head of government</a> in Africa. </p>
<p>At 42, he represented a stark contrast to <a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-biya-has-been-cameroons-president-for-40-years-and-he-might-win-office-yet-again-194856">many ageing African leaders</a> who had been in position for decades. These leaders often stake their claim to power by referring to their victories in revolutionary wars many decades back. </p>
<p>Before Abiy’s entry, Ethiopia had been governed by the same party for 27 years – the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. This was a coalition of parties established by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in 1991. The party claimed legitimacy by pointing to its victory in a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91">civil war in 1991</a>. </p>
<p>It took mass protests from the youth – and an elite split within the government – to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/ethiopia-mass-protests-rooted-in-countrys-history">overthrow this regime</a>.</p>
<p>After rising to power, Abiy replaced the old ruling party with the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/03/12/ethiopian-pm-abiy-calls-for-peace-at-launch-of-party-s-first-congress//">Prosperity Party</a>. This, along with his relative youthfulness, was seen as a break with the past. </p>
<p>The hope was that this change would bring the political and economic inclusion of young people in Ethiopia. This category includes those aged 15 to 29, who make up <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Fact_Sheet_Developing_Ethiopias_Youth_Jul_2017.pdf">28%</a> of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ethiopia-population/">122 million</a>. </p>
<p>This group at the time experienced high unemployment levels and political marginalisation. Little has changed since then.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopians-are-losing-faith-in-abiys-promises-for-peace-126440">Why Ethiopians are losing faith in Abiy's promises for peace</a>
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<p>My co-researchers and I have been <a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">investigating</a> regime-youth interactions in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe since 2019. By exploring these interactions and the major policies addressing young people, we aim to see whether state policies empower the youth or keep them on the margins.</p>
<p>In Ethiopia, we <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">identified</a> two major policy responses to the youth. The first was job creation. The second was political representation through youth-specific representative bodies. </p>
<p>We found that while these responses are officially meant to address economic and political marginalisation, they have instead been used to repress or co-opt the youth. </p>
<p>We argue that regime strategies towards the youth in Ethiopia – as in the other countries in our study – are part of the “menu” of authoritarian strategies for incumbents to hold on to power. </p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>Our research in the four countries started with the question: are youth agency and regime policy leading to empowerment, or to suppression and old patterns of subordination? </p>
<p>The question was particularly intriguing in the context of Ethiopia, where <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-ethiopians-in-oromia-and-sidama-fought-for-change-161440">youth-dominated protests</a> were instrumental in bringing Abiy to power. </p>
<p>Recognising this, Abiy and his allies <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/08/abiy-ahmed-upending-ethiopian-politics">promised to address</a> the demands of the youth for inclusion. This naturally created high expectations. </p>
<p>But more than four years after this promise, the situation for Ethiopia’s large youth population looks bleak. It’s <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-fractured-after-two-years-of-war-4007368">arguably even more so</a> than before. A two-year war in the country’s northern region of Tigray reinforced ethnic divisions and created a humanitarian crisis. Unemployment rates are still high and the youth are still being mobilised for political ends.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-ethiopians-in-oromia-and-sidama-fought-for-change-161440">Why young Ethiopians in Oromia and Sidama fought for change</a>
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<p>Employment schemes, such as the <a href="https://chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/995_2017-ethiopian-youth-revolving-fund-establishment.pdf">Youth Revolving Fund</a> and <a href="https://jobscommission.gov.et/who-we-are/">Job Creation Commission</a>, have been used as mechanisms to silence and co-opt the youth. Youth protest movements have either been co-opted into the established party machinery or turned into militarised vigilante groups. These became instrumental in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethnic-violence-in-tigray-has-echoes-of-ethiopias-tragic-past-150403">2020 war in Tigray</a>. </p>
<h2>Co-option</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">case study of the Youth Revolving Fund</a> shows that this government scheme failed to create sustainable job opportunities and improve livelihoods. </p>
<p>Introduced at the height of the youth-dominated protest in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2dj-EKYZ8AA">2017</a>, the scheme was used to pacify the youth. Consequently, it lacked sufficient capacity and skills training components. Loans were made without proper guarantees for repayment, preventing money from revolving and becoming available to fund new youth projects. </p>
<p>Our study of regime-youth interactions in Oromia and Amhara – the most populous regional states in Ethiopia and home to the youth protests – revealed that the government resorted to co-opting and repressing young people. </p>
<p>In Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest state, material co-option was seen in the distribution of credit, land, rights over resources and even condominium housing. </p>
<p>In Amhara, in north-west Ethiopia, rhetorical co-option was used. The worldview dominant among protesters was ostensibly adopted so as to get their support. Abiy appeared to castigate the country’s federal system and emphasise “national unity”. </p>
<p>We also observed institutional co-option: bringing activists and opposition leaders into government. </p>
<h2>Repression</h2>
<p>While the immediate post-2018 period saw a decline in repressive tactics, it resumed as the youth <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-oromos-insight-idUSKCN1N7108">started to challenge</a> the Abiy regime. </p>
<p>The Prosperity Party considers Oromia its home base – Abiy is considered an Oromo leader. The party was, therefore, less likely to tolerate dissent in the region. This, coupled with an active insurgency from the Oromo Liberation Army, made Oromia youth exceptionally vulnerable to repression. Arbitrary mass arrests and a crude counter-insurgency resulted in severe human rights violations. </p>
<p>In Amhara, the government resorted to repression as youth protests <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/05/villagers-massacred-western-ethiopia-says-state-appointed-body">returned</a> in 2019. </p>
<p>The government relaxed the use of force as it needed the Amhara youth following the outbreak of war in Tigray in 2020. Repression resumed when the government felt the initial threat from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front had been reversed.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Co-option and repression weakened and fragmented the youth movements responsible for the anti-government protests of 2014-2018 in Ethiopia. </p>
<p>The war in Tigray – which is <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/cease-fire-agreed-to-stop-ethiopias-tigray-conflict/a-63640781">currently on pause</a> – also resulted in the heavy militarisation of the youth, especially in the Amhara region. </p>
<p>Our research demonstrates that governments coming to power riding a wave of youth protests can nonetheless resort to authoritarian tactics to neutralise dissent from the same movements. In authoritarian contexts, translating protest gains into genuine political (and economic) gains is an uphill battle. </p>
<p>The alternative is to think strategically about young people’s potential to achieve the “prosperity” the ruling party promises. </p>
<p>We also found that youth employment schemes can be turned into instruments to silence the youth.</p>
<p>Deeper analyses of youth-specific policies should be contextually grounded to reveal possible authoritarian uses beyond official objectives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lovise Aalen receives funding from the Norglobal programme at Research Council of Norway (project no. 288489). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanuel Tesfaye is an associate researcher under the Youth in Africa project, currently writing on regime-youth interactions in post-2018 Ethiopia.</span></em></p>Governments coming to power riding a wave of youth protests can employ authoritarian tactics to silence dissent from the same movements.Lovise Aalen, Senior Researcher, Political Science, Chr. Michelsen InstituteAmanuel Tesfaye, Lecturer, Addis Ababa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1936362022-11-02T14:55:54Z2022-11-02T14:55:54ZEthiopia-Tigray war parties agree pause: expert insights into two years of devastating conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492781/original/file-20221101-18-5aqn3j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Atlantide Phototravel via GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The main combatants in the two-year Ethiopia-Tigray war have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/african-union-parties-ethiopia-conflict-have-agreed-cease-hostilities-2022-11-02/">announced</a> a dramatic pause in hostilities. What started on November 3 2020 as a <a href="https://twitter.com/abiyahmedali/status/1326069599994056705?lang=en">swift armed mission</a> by Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed to bring the rebellious state of Tigray to order soon degenerated into a humanitarian nightmare in which innocent civilians have been killed and many more rendered homeless or destitute. </p>
<p>As many as <a href="https://martinplaut.com/2022/03/13/breaking-tigray-war-mortality-half-a-million-people-ghent-university/">500,000 people had died</a> as a result of war-related violence and famine by late 2022. In 2021, Ethiopia reported 5.1 million internally displaced people in 12 months. This, according to a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia">report</a>, is the highest number internally displaced in any country in any single year. Millions more have fled to Sudan as northern Ethiopia, especially Tigray, remains cut off from food, water and medical aid.</p>
<p>Over the course of the war, various scholars have written important articles for The Conversation Africa on the war and its devastating consequences. Here are five essential reads.</p>
<h2>1. African Union’s failure to broker peace</h2>
<p>The African Union pledged in 2016 to “silence the guns” by the end of 2020: to end armed conflict on the continent. But until now the AU has not exerted its influence to broker a ceasefire or find peace over the past two years. </p>
<p>Most international actors, such as the UN, the US, the EU and the UK, condemned the resumption of hostilities in recent months and the involvement of Eritrea in the war. But the AU did not.</p>
<p>Mulugeta G Berhe <a href="https://theconversation.com/tigray-war-two-years-on-the-au-has-failed-to-broker-peace-and-silence-the-guns-192420">writes</a> that the AU’s chairperson and his high representative failed Africa at a critical moment.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tigray-war-two-years-on-the-au-has-failed-to-broker-peace-and-silence-the-guns-192420">Tigray war: two years on, the AU has failed to broker peace and silence the guns</a>
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<h2>2. Why Tigray’s army is holding off the onslaught</h2>
<p>For almost two years, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea – along with Amhara regional forces and militia – have waged war against Tigray’s regional government and society. Tigray is a tiny ethnonational group that makes up about 6% of Ethiopia’s population of 121 million. Yet it has been able to hold off well-armed military forces.</p>
<p>Asafa Jalata, a sociologist who has written extensively on the cultures of nationalism in the region, <a href="https://theconversation.com/tigray-has-resisted-ethiopias-far-greater-military-might-for-two-years-heres-why-neither-side-is-giving-in-192252">sets out</a> the historical roots of Tigray’s resolve to keep at bay a far greater military might than its own.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tigray-has-resisted-ethiopias-far-greater-military-might-for-two-years-heres-why-neither-side-is-giving-in-192252">Tigray has resisted Ethiopia's far greater military might for two years -- here's why neither side is giving in</a>
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<h2>3. The history behind aid blockades</h2>
<p>Nearly 40% of northern Ethiopia’s six million inhabitants face “an extreme lack of food”. This is not the result of a natural disaster, <a href="https://theconversation.com/famine-in-ethiopia-the-roots-lie-in-eritreas-long-running-feud-with-tigrayans-181866">writes</a> Martin Plaut: </p>
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<p>it is a famine induced by the closure of the borders of Tigray by Ethiopian, Eritrean and Somali forces, reinforced by militia from Ethiopia’s Amhara and Afar ethnic groups.</p>
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<p>Asmara’s determination to crush the Tigrayans stems from the longstanding, complex and visceral enmity between the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front - now renamed the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice - and the governing Tigray People’s Liberation Front.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/famine-in-ethiopia-the-roots-lie-in-eritreas-long-running-feud-with-tigrayans-181866">Famine in Ethiopia: the roots lie in Eritrea's long-running feud with Tigrayans</a>
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<h2>4. Healthcare workers are ‘fair game’</h2>
<p>Tragic stories of human suffering have emerged from Tigray since 2020 – such as women’s malnutrition resulting in childbirth complications and deaths. It’s not only the patients who are suffering, <a href="https://theconversation.com/tigrays-healthcare-workers-havent-been-paid-in-over-a-year-and-bear-the-brunt-of-the-war-192344">write</a> Hailay Gesesew, Fasika Amdesellassie and Fisaha Tesfay. Despite being protected by international laws, healthcare workers and health facilities in the region are extremely vulnerable. Since the war broke out, healthcare workers have lost their jobs, been displaced, and been wounded, threatened or killed.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tigrays-healthcare-workers-havent-been-paid-in-over-a-year-and-bear-the-brunt-of-the-war-192344">Tigray's healthcare workers haven't been paid in over a year -- and bear the brunt of the war</a>
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<h2>5. Centuries of the world’s history at risk</h2>
<p>The Tigray region’s heritage sites have been deliberately targeted. The bombing and destruction of centuries-old churches, as well as other religious sites, strikes at traditional power structures. To appreciate the weight of these attacks, the role and influence of the church in Ethiopia needs to be understood, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-war-in-tigray-risks-wiping-out-centuries-of-the-worlds-history-179829">explains</a> Hagos Abrha Abay. The church underpins historical and modern claims of political and military authority in Ethiopia. It has shaped community identity and informed cultural narratives.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-war-in-tigray-risks-wiping-out-centuries-of-the-worlds-history-179829">Ethiopia's war in Tigray risks wiping out centuries of the world's history</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193636/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Parties to the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region have agreed to end hostilities after two years. Here is a selection of previously published articles on its devastating consequences.Julius Maina, Regional Editor East AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1924202022-10-18T15:31:30Z2022-10-18T15:31:30ZTigray war: two years on, the AU has failed to broker peace and silence the guns<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490024/original/file-20221017-18-h1y70o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A damaged tank on the road north of Mekelle, the capital of Tigray, in February 2021.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union pledged in 2016 to “<a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/au-retreat-to-elaborate-a-roadmap-on-practical-steps-to-silence-the-guns-in-africa-by-2020-concludes-in-lusaka-zambia">silence the guns</a>” by the end of 2020, an ambitious agenda of ending armed conflicts on the continent. Just two months before that deadline, the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-03-22/ethiopia-s-war-toll-grows-as-the-world-looks-away">deadliest war</a> in years erupted in Ethiopia. On 3 November 2020, the armies of the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea <a href="https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2020/11/ethiopia-military-operations-reported-in-tigray-region-november-3">attacked</a> the region of Tigray. Since then, the guns have not been silent. Instead, it is the African Union that has been silent.</p>
<p>That war is now two years old. Crimes against humanity and war crimes have been committed during this time. Some <a href="https://martinplaut.com/2022/03/13/breaking-tigray-war-mortality-half-a-million-people-ghent-university/">estimates</a> show that over 500,000 civilians have been killed. Rape, displacement and starvation have been prevalent. Tigray has been under a complete siege with no access to land and air transport, telephone and internet access, banks and all kinds of humanitarian supplies. </p>
<p>The AU has shown itself to be of no use or consequence since the conflict started. During the first year of conflict, it failed to even acknowledge that there was a war. Instead, it adopted the Ethiopian government’s narrative of a “<a href="https://twitter.com/abiyahmedali/status/1326069599994056705?lang=en">law enforcement operation</a>” by a legitimate government against a rebellious entity. It was not until August 2021 that the AU took the first steps at mediating. </p>
<p>The chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki, <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">appointed</a> the former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, as his “high representative” to <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">promote</a> peace, security, stability and political dialogue all over the Horn of Africa region. This was a welcome development. But it soon became evident that the AU was not impartial. And the peace initiative was a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-african-unions-mediation-effort-in-tigray-is-a-non-starter-169293">non-starter</a>. </p>
<p>One year on from Obasanjo’s appointment, the AU’s failures are as evident as they’ve been from the start. The AU Peace and Security Council – which is <a href="https://au.int/en/psc">charged</a> with prevention, management and resolution of conflicts – has never had any substantive agenda on Tigray. The two times it sat to discuss the war on Tigray were only to hear the briefings of Obasanjo as envoy. </p>
<p>The war has intensified to alarming levels. And another <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/7/au-led-ethiopia-peace-talks-delayed-over-logistics-diplomats">attempt</a> by the AU to convene peace talks in South Africa has met delays. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-african-unions-mediation-effort-in-tigray-is-a-non-starter-169293">Why the African Union's mediation effort in Tigray is a non-starter</a>
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<p>The AU has failed in applying its norms and principles to the conflict in Ethiopia. Its institutions were not activated and best practices were not utilised. The AU chairperson and his special envoy have put themselves at the service of the Ethiopian government. </p>
<p>The AU needs to launch a credible and robust peace process with mediators mutually agreed by the conflicting parties. The guns can only be silenced by engaging genuine peace processes guided by the norms and principles of the AU.</p>
<h2>AU’s failed diplomacy</h2>
<p>Despite their reservations, the authorities in Tigray gave Obasanjo the benefit of the doubt, and cooperated with him for the whole year. </p>
<p>Obasanjo shuttled between Addis Ababa and Mekelle, the Tigrayan regional capital, six times. Tigray received him as an elderly statesperson and engaged with him constructively. They accepted his advice to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/20/ethiopias-tigray-forces-announce-release-of-4000-prisoners">release</a> 4,500 prisoners of war as a confidence-building measure. Tigray was told that this would be reciprocated by Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed releasing an equal number of Tigrayan civilian prisoners. But when Abiy failed to deliver his end of the bargain, Obasanjo did nothing. </p>
<p>Before long, the Tigray leadership realised that Obasanjo was not capable of handling a complex problem that has a politico-military, historical and regional dimension. He never produced an organised agenda with measurable outputs. In three of his trips, his main agenda was to ask the authorities to release prisoners of war. </p>
<p>In March 2022, a “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/world/africa/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-truce.html">humanitarian truce</a>” was brokered by the Americans. Obasanjo is not known to have contributed anything towards it. In August 2022, Obasanjo <a href="https://twitter.com/rabdianalyst/status/1556028070716481538?lang=en">proposed</a> inviting Eritrea to the negotiating table, despite knowing that this crossed a red line for Tigray.</p>
<p>The AU failed in other ways, too. It lost its credibility in relation to the current war when it failed to condemn the atrocities. It has never demanded that Eritrea pull out troops from the Tigray war. It was very careful to call Obasanjo’s position “<a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">high representative</a>” and not “mediator”. Also his brief is the Horn and not Ethiopia-Tigray conflict, a clear nod to Abiy’s preference not to be seen to negotiate.</p>
<p>The AU was also behind the three African states represented at the United Nations Security Council. The so-called “A3” – Ghana, Gambia and Kenya – have continuously blocked any security council action, <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/09/ethiopia-informal-interactive-dialogue.php">most recently</a> in September 2022. </p>
<h2>Litany of errors</h2>
<p>The war in Tigray has intensified. Ethiopian and Eritrean armies have encircled Tigray in an attempt to break the resistance. Up to 60% of Ethiopian federal troops are deployed to Eritrea to fight under the command of the Eritreans. The Ethiopian Air Force has moved its operational base into Asmara. So far, several towns have been decimated by indiscriminate air raids and artillery shelling of the joint forces. </p>
<p>Most international actors, such as the UN, US, EU and the UK, have condemned the resumption of hostilities and the involvement of Eritrea in the war. But the AU has not. </p>
<p>In the middle of this, the AU chairperson <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ethiopias-tigray-leader-invited-peace-talks-africa-91023467">invited</a> the president of Tigray for talks in South Africa. The letter fell below the standards of the AU Commission. It did not say who else was invited. It misstated the date for the talks and didn’t say anything about logistical arrangements for the Tigrayan delegates living under a complete siege. </p>
<p>These mistakes are unusual from a bureaucracy that routinely organises such talks.</p>
<p>The letter claimed that there were continuous consultations with the parties on the issues. But the authorities in Tigray <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/7/au-led-ethiopia-peace-talks-delayed-over-logistics-diplomats">denied</a> this. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenyatta-to-skip-ethiopia-peace-talks-3977112">strongly worded letter</a>, former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta – a would-be co-mediator in South Africa – confirmed this lack of consultation by the AU Commission. There were also reports that the second co-mediator, former South African deputy president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, and the South African government were not consulted on the event. </p>
<p>The AU’s listed agenda did not include an immediate <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202210060051.html">cessation of hostilities</a>.</p>
<h2>AU principles</h2>
<p>The chairperson of the AU and his high representative have failed Africa and the norms, principles and institutions of the African Union. The AU needs to launch a credible, robust mediation process with mutually accepted mediators. This is what the Tigrayan authorities demanded at the outset. </p>
<p>The AU peace and security council should also be active enough to hold the chairperson in check and hold him to the norms and principles of the union.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192420/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mulugeta G Berhe (PhD) is affiliated to the Tigraian resistance and now lives in Mekelle. Does everything he can to support the resistance. </span></em></p>The African Union needs to launch a credible, robust mediation process with mutually accepted mediators.Mulugeta G Berhe, Senior Fellow, World Peace Foundation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1922522022-10-16T07:51:53Z2022-10-16T07:51:53ZTigray has resisted Ethiopia’s far greater military might for two years – here’s why neither side is giving in<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489408/original/file-20221012-20-g31ivm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters in the UK demonstrate against Ethiopia's Tigray war in October 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mike Kemp/In Pictures via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/tigray-has-resisted-ethiopias-far-greater-military-might-for-two-years-heres-why-neither-side-is-giving-in-192252&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>The Ethio-Tigray war started on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">4 November 2020</a>. For almost two years, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea – along with Amhara regional forces and militia – have waged war against Tigray’s regional government and society. </p>
<p>Tigray is a tiny ethnonational group that makes up about <a href="https://www.atlasofhumanity.com/tigray">6%</a> of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ethiopia-population/">121 million</a>. Yet, it has been able to hold off well-armed military forces.</p>
<p>As a sociologist who has <a href="https://works.bepress.com/asafa_jalata/">written extensively</a> on the cultures of nationalism in the region, I have studied the deep and complex roots of this conflict. I believe that understanding its history is key to comprehending how Tigray has developed the resolve to hold off a far greater military might than its own.</p>
<p>Neither the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea nor those of Tigray accept the principles of compromise, peaceful coexistence or equal partnership. According to their political cultures, winners take all. It’s zero-sum politics.</p>
<h2>The war today</h2>
<p>The Ethiopian National Defence Force <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/battle-mekelle-and-its-implications-ethiopia">captured Mekelle</a>, Tigray’s capital city, on 28 November 2020. The Ethiopian army was helped by Eritrean and Amhara military forces. </p>
<p>Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s prime minister, congratulated his army and allied forces for what looked like a quick victory. </p>
<p>However, the Tigrayan Defence Force made a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/battle-mekelle-and-its-implications-ethiopia">tactical retreat</a>. Its troops moved to rural areas and used guerrilla operations supported by war veterans. This strategy demonstrated Tigray’s effective fighting force, which was first developed in the 1970s.</p>
<p>As a result, eight months after the start of the war, Tigrayan troops returned to their capital. The Ethiopian army <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/world/asia/tigray-mekelle-ethiopia-retreat.html">retreated</a> from Mekelle and other cities.</p>
<p>Tigrayan troops then invaded the neighbouring Afar and Amhara regions, and almost made it into Finfinnee (<a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tigrayan-forces-advance-toward-ethiopian-capital/av-59712725">Addis Ababa</a>) in November 2021. However, they soon retreated to their region.</p>
<p>Since then, Tigrayan forces have controlled and administered most of Tigray. </p>
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<p>The Ethio-Tigray war has been <a href="https://mereja.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=305544#p1331271">devastating</a> for Tigrayans. They have faced mass killings, military bombardment, rape, looting and the destruction of property. The conflict has denied them access to food, electricity, telecommunications, medicine, banking services and other necessities. </p>
<p>Yet they support the Tigray Defence Force. To understand why requires a deeper reading of Ethiopia’s history.</p>
<h2>A complex history</h2>
<p>Two Amhara emperors and one Tigrayan emperor laid the foundation of the modern imperial state of Ethiopia. The first emperor of Abyssinia/Ethiopia was Tewodros (1855-1868). He was followed by Yohannes IV (1872-1889) of Tigray and then Menelik II (1889-1913). </p>
<p>Under Menelik II, the Amhara state elite replaced Tigray’s leaders. They made Tigrayan society a junior partner in building the Ethiopian empire. </p>
<p>But Tigrayan nationalists believe their society was the foundation of the Ethiopian state. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-war-in-tigray-risks-wiping-out-centuries-of-the-worlds-history-179829">Ethiopia's war in Tigray risks wiping out centuries of the world's history</a>
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<p>In the last decades of the 1800s, the Ethiopian empire <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/isbn/9781685855772/html?lang=en">expanded</a> from its northern core of Tigray and Amhara by colonising the Oromo and other ethnonational groups. </p>
<p>It established slavery, the nafxanya-gabbar system (semi-slavery) and the colonial land-holding system by taking the land of conquered people. </p>
<p>The nafxanya (gun-carrying settlers) elite – led by the Amhara – dislodged the Tigrayan elite from Ethiopian state power. Tigray was pushed to the periphery of an Amhara-dominated society. This created <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/isbn/9781685855772/html?lang=en">political rivalry</a> between the two groups. </p>
<p>The status and living conditions of the Tigrayan elite and people deteriorated. This, along with several wars in the region, aggravated political, economic and social problems. </p>
<p>Accumulated grievances and many forms of resistance produced the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in 1975. It aimed to <a href="https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/a-political-history-of-the-tigray-peoples-liberation-front-1975-1">liberate Tigrayans</a> from Amhara-led governments. This helped develop Tigrayan nationalism. </p>
<h2>Tigray’s two nationalisms</h2>
<p>Tigrayans maintain two forms of nationalism. </p>
<p>The first promotes Tigrayan autonomy, self-reliance and development. </p>
<p>The second is Tigrayan Ethiopianism. This theoretically maintains Ethiopia’s current geopolitical boundary, with its decentralised political structures where different population groups have some autonomy. </p>
<p>After building military power in the 1980s, Tigrayan elite <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Cultural-Capital-and-Prospects-for-Democracy-in-Botswana-and-Ethiopia/Jalata/p/book/9780367786373">dominated</a> other ethnonational groups, particularly the Oromo, the empire’s largest ethnonational group. </p>
<p>Between 1991 and 2018, the Tigrayan elite <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-the-war-in-tigray-150147">controlled</a> state power and the political economy. The Tigrayan elite created a pseudo-democracy. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front was the mover and shaker of the Ethiopian state. </p>
<p>The Oromo expressed their collective grievances with this political arrangement through the struggles of the Oromo Liberation Front. The Qeerroo/Qarree (Oromo youth) movement got involved between 2014 and 2018. This eventually <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">dislodged Tigrayan leadership</a> from Ethiopian central power in 2018. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-ethiopians-in-oromia-and-sidama-fought-for-change-161440">Why young Ethiopians in Oromia and Sidama fought for change</a>
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<p>Abiy was a member of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation, a subsidiary political party of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The Tigrayan Front, alongside its allied organisations, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/3/28/abiy-ahmed-elected-as-chairman-of-ethiopias-ruling-coalition">elected Abiy</a> as Ethiopia’s prime minister in April 2018. He later turned on his support base. </p>
<p>Once he came to power, Abiy and his allies believed they wouldn’t stay in control if they did not destroy Tigrayan and Oromo nationalists. These were symbolised by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Oromo youth movement. </p>
<h2>Zero-sum politics</h2>
<p>Tigrayan and Amhara elites express and practice Ethiopianism differently.</p>
<p>The Amhara elite dominated Ethiopia from 1889 to 1991. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front overthrew them in 1991. </p>
<p>The wealth and experience Tigrayan elite accumulated over nearly three decades increased their national organisational capacity. This has helped them in the current war. </p>
<p>The Oromo have rejected the dominance and tyranny of both these groups. They have carried out their <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">liberation struggle</a>.</p>
<p>Abiy and his Amhara collaborators are fighting Tigrayans, Oromos and others to control Ethiopian state power. Their winning the war in Tigray and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">Oromia</a> would allow the Abiy regime to continue a modified version of Ethiopia’s pre-1991 policy. </p>
<p>For Tigrayans, losing this battle would be equivalent to losing political power and returning to victimisation, poverty and the threat of annihilation. </p>
<h2>Uncertain future</h2>
<p>Given their complicated political history, reconciling the central government and the Tigrayan regional government is challenging. Even if these two groups negotiate a peace deal, conflict will continue if the Oromo are left out of the process. </p>
<p>If Tigray and Oromia’s political problems aren’t correctly understood and resolved, conflicts will continue until the collapse of the Ethiopian state.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asafa Jalata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Leaders at the centre of the Ethio-Tigray war don’t believe in equal partnership. In their political cultures, winners take all.Asafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global and Africana Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1889492022-08-24T13:51:47Z2022-08-24T13:51:47ZWaiting for Ethiopia: Berbera port upgrade raises Somaliland’s hopes for trade<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479837/original/file-20220818-1509-y4rpi4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dubai-based port operator DP World and the Government of Somaliland, opened a container terminal at Berbera Port in June 2021. Photo by ED RAM/AFP via </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/general-view-of-berbera-port-and-bebera-city-on-august-31-news-photo/1237806121?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Berbera port is the main overseas trade gateway of the breakaway Republic of Somaliland. The port city is <a href="https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ports/19473?name=BERBERA&country=Somalia">located</a> on the Gulf of Aden – one of the globally most frequented seaways connecting the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.</p>
<p>Only a few years ago, Berbera port was a dilapidated runway, originally built by the British empire, and then modernised first by the Soviet Union and later the US. The port is the lifeline of Somaliland, which imports most of what it needs, from food to construction material, cars and furniture. Its <a href="https://pastoralismjournal.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s13570-019-0155-7">main export</a> is livestock to the Arabian Peninsula. </p>
<p>This picture changed considerably after the Emirates-based Dubai Ports World (DP World), a leading global port operator and logistics giant, <a href="https://www.somalilandbiz.com/watch-list-dp-world-berbera-deal/">took over</a> the port management in 2017. It expanded the quay by 400m, established a new container terminal, designed a free zone, and started to manage the port’s operations.</p>
<p>Lined up alongside the quay are the latest crane models, which have become operational since June 2022. DP World employees practise operating the cranes every day. The hope is that the port will attract 500,000 TEU (unit of cargo capacity) per year, about <a href="https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/aldc2018d6_en.pdf">one third of the capacity</a> of neighbouring Doraleh port in Djibouti. This would allow Somaliland to become a logistical hub on the Gulf of Aden competing with other ports in the region such as Djibouti, Mogadishu and Mombasa. </p>
<p>The cranes are crucial for the speedy handling of cargo required in a modern port. The staff training, however, takes place in a port that is yet to get busy. So far, container ships arrive only infrequently.</p>
<p>We have been <a href="http://portinfrastructure.org/">studying</a> the Horn of Africa’s emerging port infrastructures. The boost that the revamped Berbera port needs is for Ethiopia to come to the party. Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea gained independence in 1993, and relies on the port of Djibouti – <a href="https://unctadstat.unctad.org/countryprofile/maritimeprofile/en-gb/262/index.html">95% of its trade</a> goes through the port.</p>
<p>In 2017, a <a href="https://www.somalilandbiz.com/watch-list-dp-world-berbera-deal/">concession agreement</a> was signed between DP World, Ethiopia, and the government of Somaliland to rebuild and modernise the port of Berbera. The 30-year concession involves: a commercial port, a free zone, a corridor from Berbera to Ethiopia’s borders, and an airport in Berbera. </p>
<p>The concession allowed Somaliland’s government to retain 30% of the shares in the port, 19% for Ethiopia, and 51% for DP World. But in June 2022, Somaliland announced that Ethiopia had failed to acquire its 19% share of Berbera port. <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-stake-in-port-of-berbera-3845366">Ethiopia failed to meet the conditions</a>.</p>
<p>Somalilanders remain optimistic, nonetheless. The infrastructure project means a great deal to the country. It promises to foster its ambition to receive international recognition, achieve economic development, and fulfil hopes for improved living conditions of its citizens. </p>
<h2>The context</h2>
<p>DP World’s expansion in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is taking place in the context of turbulent political transformations in the Horn of Africa. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018 on the back of popular protests and awakened hopes of a democratic transition in the country. He ended the two-decades-long rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which brought him the Nobel Peace Prize. With a population of more than 100 million and one of the fastest growing economies in Africa, Ethiopia’s transition brought prospects of developments across the Horn of Africa.</p>
<p>DP World’s will to expand its operations in the region coincided with conflicts between DP World and Djibouti. In 2006, DP World had signed a 30-year concession to design, build, and operate the Doraleh container terminal in Djibouti. Growing tensions led the government of Djibouti to cancel DP World’s concession in 2018.</p>
<p>DP World shifted its interest from the port in Djibouti to Berbera in Somaliland and Bosaso in Somalia (Puntland). In 2017, a concession agreement was signed between DP World, Ethiopia, and the government of Somaliland to rebuild and modernise the port of Berbera. The projects covered by the 30-year concession included a commercial port, a free zone, a corridor from Berbera to Ethiopia’s borders, and an airport. </p>
<p>These projects are steadily progressing. Berbera port has already completed its first expansion phase. The DP World-owned free zone is under construction. Large parts of the Berbera corridor, a highway linking Berbera to Toqwajale at the Ethiopian-Somaliland border; and from there to Jigjiga and Addis in Ethiopia are finalised. According to Somaliland officials, the airport is also completed, but its original designation as a military outlet for the UAE remains ambiguous.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>The infrastructure project means a great deal to Somaliland, promising to put the country on the path to international recognition and achieve economic development. However, these aspirations will not materialise without Ethiopia on board, which has not met the conditions under which it was to get a 19% share of the Berbera port. In addition it has not yet opened its markets to Somaliland traders.</p>
<p>Somalilanders remain optimistic, nonetheless, expecting that especially trade from eastern parts of Ethiopia will redirected to Somaliland. But this plan is not without risks. The pandemic and war in Tigray has slowed down Ethiopia’s economic growth, and the stability of the country is on the brink. </p>
<p>While DP World’s strategy to control ports along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is already transforming the political geography of the Horn of Africa, the success of its strategy largely hinges upon Ethiopia, and so do the hopes and aspirations of Ethiopia’s coastal neighbours. </p>
<p>Everybody, so it seems, is currently waiting for Ethiopia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188949/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This research was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. The research is part of the project: Port Infrastructure, International Politics, Everyday Life in the Horn of Africa, <a href="http://portinfrastructure.org">http://portinfrastructure.org</a></span></em></p>The project promises improved living condition for citizens and fosters ambition for international recognition.May Darwich, Associate Professor of International Relations of the Middle East, University of BirminghamJutta Bakonyi, Professor in Development and Conflict, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1886672022-08-21T09:57:49Z2022-08-21T09:57:49ZAlarm bells as Somalia’s new president sours relationship with Ethiopia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480050/original/file-20220819-20-84sf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (centre) is hosted in Cairo by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in June, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Egyptian Presidency/Handout/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The new government in Somalia that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalias-new-president-be-elected-by-parliament-behind-barricades-2022-05-15/">won</a> elections held in May has got off to a rocky political start in its relations with the relatively powerful and influential neighbour, Ethiopia.</p>
<p>Ethiopia enjoyed warm relations with the previous government in Somalia. But recent incidents have soured relations. First was that Somalia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalias-new-president-hassan-sheikh-his-strengths-and-weaknesses-183647">new president</a>, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, bypassed his Ethiopian counterpart Abiy Ahmed during visits to regional capitals in May, June and July.</p>
<p>Then, during a <a href="https://newsaf.cgtn.com/news/2022-07-25/Somali-president-embarks-on-tour-of-Egypt-1bWgegx8NXy/index.html">visit to Cairo</a>, Hassan Sheikh waded into the controversy between <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-dam-dispute-five-key-reads-about-how-it-started-and-how-it-could-end-187644">Ethiopia and Egypt</a> over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Egyptian ruler Abdel Fattah el-Sisi hinted at a press conference that Somalia and Egypt saw eye-to-eye on the <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2129881/middle-east">contentious dam</a>.</p>
<p>The final stroke appears to be Hassan Sheikh’s unexpected decision to appoint a former Al-Shabaab commander, Mukhtar Roobow Mansuur, to Somalia’s new cabinet. Mansuur was the former deputy of the militant group Al-Shabaab. This appointment was met with a mixture of shock and disbelief <a href="https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cq59g2p2p9do">at home</a> and in the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/somalia-pm-names-ex-shabaab-leader-mukhtar-rubow-to-cabinet-3900544">region and beyond</a>.</p>
<p>The fiercest reaction came from Ethiopia, which dreads Al-Shabaab and its radicalised elements. Successive Ethiopian governments have always expected a menace from Somalia. Addis Ababa was nevertheless taken by surprise when Al-Shabaab launched a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-warns-al-shabab-attack-on-ethiopia-not-a-fluke/6677868.html">cross-border attack</a> on Ethiopian forces in late July. It showed that the militant group could easily dent Ethiopia’s capability to control the border with southern Somalia. </p>
<h2>Ethiopia’s reaction</h2>
<p>Ethiopian authorities responded to Mansuur’s appointment by engaging directly with leaders of Somalia’s semi-autonomous regions instead of with the central government. They embarked on approaching Southwest, which now has a political tension with the new government in Mogadishu over the recent dispensation of power in the cabinet. Like the Ethiopian authorities, Southwest authorities were unacceptable to Mansuur’s ministerial appointment.</p>
<p>Abdiaziz Lafta-Gareen, the president of Southwest, was flown to Addis Ababa by the Ethiopian army. He was reported to have held <a href="https://www.qaranimo.com/2022/08/06/madaxweynaha-maamulka-koonfur-oo-gaarey-magaalada-addis-ababa/">secret talks</a> with the Ethiopian military intelligence at an army base outside Addis Ababa. </p>
<p>Lafta-Gareen is a staunch ally of former Somali president Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmaajo” and his former chief spy Fahad Yasin Haji Daher.</p>
<p>Lafta-Gareen then flew to Jigjiga, the regional capital of Ethiopia’s Somali region, where he met the region’s president Mustafe Muhumed Omer, who distrusts the past <a href="https://addisstandard.com/asdailyscoop-somalias-south-west-somali-regional-state-presidents-agree-to-fight-al-shabaab/">links</a> between Hassan Sheikh and the deposed Tigray leaders in northern Ethiopia. </p>
<p>Lafta-Gareen, together with other regional presidents, including Said Abdullahi Deni of Puntland in northeast Somalia, will form an Ethiopian-supported strong opposition to the new government. This will make it harder for the government to consolidate its power and build a peaceful state. </p>
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<img alt="Map of Somalia showing colour-coded regions" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479677/original/file-20220817-11662-m7scnz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479677/original/file-20220817-11662-m7scnz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=729&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479677/original/file-20220817-11662-m7scnz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=729&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479677/original/file-20220817-11662-m7scnz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=729&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479677/original/file-20220817-11662-m7scnz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479677/original/file-20220817-11662-m7scnz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479677/original/file-20220817-11662-m7scnz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Map of Somalia’s regional governments and breakaway Somaliland/GettyImages.</span>
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<h2>Wider tensions</h2>
<p>Political tensions in the Horn of Africa rose after Hassan Sheikh bypassed Ethiopia during a flurry of state visits even before he formed his government. He visited the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Turkey, Kenya, Djibouti and Eritrea. Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed and his government advisers interpreted this as hostile.</p>
<p>Hassan Sheikh’s visit to Egypt came at a critical time when Cairo was galvanising Arab solidarity against Addis Ababa in their <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-dam-dispute-five-key-reads-about-how-it-started-and-how-it-could-end-187644">dispute</a> over the exploitation of the Nile River. Appearing side by side with El-Sisi, the Somali president publicly <a href="https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/117860/Egyptian-Somali-presidents-affirm-need-to-reach-binding-deal-on">sided</a> with Egypt against Ethiopia. </p>
<p>An additional factor behind the tensions is that Abiy enjoyed close ties with Farmaajo, whom Hassan Sheikh ousted. And Hassan Sheikh was close to the ousted leadership of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front when he <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalias-new-president-hassan-sheikh-his-strengths-and-weaknesses-183647">served as president</a> between 2012 and 2017. It came as no surprise that the Front, which was recently at war with the Ethiopian government, quickly <a href="https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2022/May/186220/tigray_leaders_congratulate_president_hassan_sheikh_mohamud_on_election_victory.aspx">welcomed</a> Hassan Sheikh’s re-election.</p>
<p>This explains the Ethiopian government’s renewed policy of engaging directly with regional governments. This is likely to further weaken the prospects to restore a functioning Somali state. It will also hinder the state authorities’ attempts to reach out to the periphery.</p>
<p>Ethiopia pursued this approach against the Somali state before – between 2000 and 2010. Initially, even the US was content with this policy, which it dubbed a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2011/6/9/dual-track-policy-in-somalia-misses-the-point">“dual-track policy”</a>, meaning to treat the centre and the periphery in the same category. But the outcome was that the regions developed more leverage than the centre.</p>
<p>The Somali government has remained silent on these visits and the implications for the future of Somali politics.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/somalias-new-president-hassan-sheikh-his-strengths-and-weaknesses-183647">Somalia's new president Hassan Sheikh: his strengths and weaknesses</a>
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<h2>Controversial appointment</h2>
<p>Within Somalia, it remains to be seen how the appointment of a former Al-Shabaab leader as minister for religious affairs plays out in the search for peace. Mukhtar Roobow Mansuur came to prominence in Al-Shabaab in 2013 during a radical shake-up of its hierarchy. </p>
<p>In 2017, however, he crossed over to the Somali government side and moved to Mogadishu. At first, he was allowed to move and make contact freely, but under the close surveillance of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). I met him at this time during Friday midday prayers at the mosque in the presidential palace. He was reticent, reserved and careful to speak out of his guards’ earshot.</p>
<p>Mansuur fell foul of the Somali government in December 2018 shortly after declaring his candidacy for presidency of the Southwest state. He was placed under house arrest inside the intelligence headquarters in Mogadishu and remained there until his appointment as religious affairs minister on 2 August. </p>
<p>This is not the first time that a Somali government has appointed former Al-Shabaab leaders to positions of power. But it is the first time it has done so officially. Previous governments deployed Al-Shabaab defectors to work with intelligence and other security agencies. The list includes <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30611758">Sakariye Ismail Hersi</a>, the former head of intelligence for Al-Shabaab.</p>
<p>In each case, the ultimate goal has been to tackle security and to free the country from Al-Shabaab’s iron grip. Many ordinary Somalis see Mansuur’s appointment in this light. They wish to see reconciliation between government authorities and Al-Shabaab authorities to end years of insecurity.</p>
<p>Others disagree because it suggests that being involved in bloodshed doesn’t preclude people from holding office. </p>
<p>Whatever the perspectives, Mansuur’s appointment will not automatically usher in a new era for Somalia. It will be one step forward, two steps backward. All in all, a “business as usual” in Somali politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188667/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed Haji Ingiriis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethiopia’s direct engagement with Somalia’s regional governments will likely weaken the prospects of restoring a functioning Somali state.Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, The Faculty of History, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1870352022-07-20T13:56:51Z2022-07-20T13:56:51Z‘Ethiopia’s other conflict’: what’s driving the violence in Oromia?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474614/original/file-20220718-16-r6d178.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Oromo women protest against Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed over violence in their homeland in 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keith Mayhew via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In November 2020 an outbreak of violence in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/02/ethiopia-1900-people-killed-in-massacres-in-tigray-identified">Ethiopia’s Tigray region</a> captured worldwide attention. The conflict was between Tigrayan forces and the forces of the Ethiopian government and its allies. </p>
<p>Since then, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has been under <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/abiy-walks-fine-line-in-possible-peace-talks-in-ethiopia-20220619">increasing global pressure</a> to negotiate with Tigrayan officials to stop the carnage in the region. </p>
<p>Even before fighting broke out in Tigray, though, the government had established military command posts in Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest state. Oromo people were <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">protesting</a> and calling for self-determination. </p>
<p>In Oromia’s latest wave of violence in June 2022, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/inside-story/2022/6/25/whats-behind-the-recent-ethnic-violence-in-ethiopia">Al Jazeera</a>, the <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/more-than-200-feared-dead-in-ethiopia-massacre/">New York Times</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-says-gunmen-killed-338-people-oromiya-region-june-2022-06-30/">Reuters</a> reported that hundreds of people had been killed by the Oromo Liberation Army in Wallaga, Oromia.</p>
<p>These news reports labelled all the victims Amharas, members of Ethiopia’s second-largest ethno-national group. The Oromo are the largest. </p>
<p>As a scholar of Ethiopian politics and society, I’ve <a href="https://works.bepress.com/asafa_jalata/">researched and written extensively</a> on the Oromo movement, and identified the historical forces that have shaped its current politics. </p>
<p>My understanding – taking into account the history of oppression of the Oromo in Ethiopia and numerous reports by rights groups of attacks against the community – is that the violence in Oromia is mainly driven by the federal government and its agents. The <a href="https://olacommunique.com/">Oromo Liberation Army</a> is responding to state terrorism and gross human rights violations.</p>
<p>Oromo voices are <a href="https://minorityrights.org/minorities/oromo/">not represented</a> in the Ethiopian government, the global system or the media. The federal government and its allies, particularly Amhara elites and forces, blame the Oromo movement for the violence. This is a <a href="https://borkena.com/2022/06/24/creeping-genocide-in-ethiopia-dawit-w-giorgis/">strategy</a> to delegitimise the Oromo struggle for self-determination. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/genocide-in-ethiopia-why-answering-the-question-will-be-a-challenge-160872">Genocide in Ethiopia? Why answering the question will be a challenge</a>
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<h2>Oromo identity</h2>
<p>The Oromo <a href="https://www.unrepresentedunitednations.org/en/unrepresented-united-nations-directory/oromo-en">consider themselves a nation</a>. They are estimated to make up between 35% and 50% of Ethiopia’s <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ethiopia-population">115 million people</a>. An exact figure is difficult to come by as the government doesn’t provide this data. </p>
<p>Ethiopia has about 80 ethno-national groups. The Amhara make up about 27% of the population. Their language, culture, history and religion have dominated other ethno-national groups. Their warlords and leaders have dominated Ethiopia’s political economy for almost 150 years. </p>
<p>Despite their numbers, the Oromo consider themselves colonial subjects. This is because, like other subjugated ethno-national groups, they have been denied access to their country’s political, economic and cultural resources. </p>
<p>Habasha (Amhara-Tigray) warlords <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Invention-Ethiopia-Dependent-Colonial-Northeast/dp/093241558X">colonised</a> Oromia. The region was then incorporated into Abyssinia (the Ethiopian Empire) in the late 19th century. </p>
<p>Menelik II, the Ethiopian emperor, established a form of colonialism that settled Amhara, Tigrayan and other ethnic soldiers in Oromia. Most Oromos were reduced to serfs, providing free labour and tax revenue.</p>
<p>The colonial government claimed about three-quarters of Oromo lands for its officials and soldiers. It granted the remaining quarter to Oromo collaborators.</p>
<p>In the 1970s, to oppose political, economic and cultural marginalisation, Oromo nationalists created the Oromo Liberation Front. Its military wing is the Oromo Liberation Army. They wanted national self-determination and democracy, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/mar/13/freedom-oromo-activists-qeerroo-ethiopia-standstill">participated</a> in the failed revolutions of 1974, 1991 and 2018. </p>
<p>The Ethiopian state has continued to subject the Oromo people to violence and human rights violations. Successive Ethiopian governments have <a href="https://www.scirp.org/pdf/SM20110100003_59514457.pdf">caused</a> deep social, political, cultural and economic crises in Oromo society.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopians-are-losing-faith-in-abiys-promises-for-peace-126440">Why Ethiopians are losing faith in Abiy's promises for peace</a>
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<h2>Drivers of violence</h2>
<p>The government and the Oromo Liberation Front have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/5/new-killings-in-ethiopias-oromia">blamed each other</a> for the latest outbreak of violence in Oromia, particularly in Wallaga.</p>
<p>A sub-group of the Oromo, the Macha, live in Wallaga. They have been targets of the Ethiopian government and expansionist Amharas, who <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2X2UIvv6Jac">claim</a> to be the original owners of the region. </p>
<p>During the famine of the 1970s, desperate Tigrayans, Amharas and Oromos from elsewhere settled in Wallaga. Amhara expansionists began to call all these people Amharas to justify their claim to the territory.</p>
<p>Prime Minister Ahmed has <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2021/01/23/the-peace-that-delivered-total-war-against-tigray/">taken the side</a> of Amhara expansionists. </p>
<p>Ahmed came to power in 2018 mainly because of the Oromo struggle but later <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-oromos-insight-idUSKCN1N7108">turned against</a> the movement. His vision is of a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/7/abiys-efforts-to-unify-ethiopia-could-lead-to-its-disintegration">centralised state</a> rather than self-determination for Ethiopia’s different groups. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/eritrea-is-involved-in-tigray-to-boost-its-stature-why-the-strategy-could-backfire-175591">Eritrea is involved in Tigray to boost its stature. Why the strategy could backfire</a>
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<p>The state’s <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/oromia-and-ethiopia-state-formation-and-ethnonational-conflict-1868-2004/oclc/938275015?referer=di&ht=edition">ideology</a> of “Ethiopianism” has been used to justify the subordination of the Oromo and other colonised peoples. It has empowered the class that dominates the bureaucracy, army, culture, Orthodox Christianity and Ethiopian colonial-political economy.</p>
<p>The Oromo Liberation Army, which has been <a href="https://apnews.com/article/africa-race-and-ethnicity-kenya-ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-16cef83f823be6f0d485d9e8eddd4792">outlawed and labelled a terror group</a>, asserts that the government has created a clandestine security structure that <a href="https://olacommunique.com/2022/06/20/the-abiy-regimes-militia-are-responsible-for-the-tole-massacre-of-west-wollega/">masquerades</a> as the Oromo army. It says this structure is responsible for the latest attack and those before it.</p>
<p>Between December 2018 and December 2019, in southern Oromia, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/may/29/ethiopias-security-forces-accused-of-torture-evictions-and-killings-report">government soldiers</a> displaced 80,000 Oromos and detained more than 10,000. </p>
<p>An Amnesty International <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/05/ethiopia-rape-extrajudicial-executions-homes-set-alight-in-security-operations-in-amhara-and-oromia/">report</a> found that state soldiers executed 52 people over this period on suspicion that they supported the Oromo Liberation Army. </p>
<p>The government additionally took incarcerated Oromos through mandatory training for several months. These detainees were trained on the constitution and the history of the Oromo people. These “lessons” were intended to get the detainees to abandon the quest for nationalism.</p>
<p>A July 2022 Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/04/ethiopias-other-conflict">report</a> termed the government’s actions in western Oromia “abusive”. It documented communication shutdowns, executions and arbitrary detentions. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>The global community must pressure the Ethiopian government to reach peace with the Oromo Liberation Army. However, this will only be successful if a neutral body mediates on behalf of the United Nations. </p>
<p>Ahmed’s government is willing to negotiate with the Tigrayan defence forces mainly because of the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-giving-talks-chance">pressure</a> from global powers. However, it refuses to reconcile with the Oromo Liberation Front and is determined to solve a political problem militarily. </p>
<p>Ethiopia cannot be at peace without an independent reconciliation body that solves the Oromo political problem fairly and democratically.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187035/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asafa Jalata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethiopia’s largest region is pushing for self-determination - it hasn’t gone down well with Abiy Ahmed’s vision of a centralised state.Asafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global and Africana Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818662022-05-09T13:35:17Z2022-05-09T13:35:17ZFamine in Ethiopia: the roots lie in Eritrea’s long-running feud with Tigrayans<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461524/original/file-20220505-14-mcsp8r.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman receives food aid at a distribution centre in Ethiopia. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jemal Countess/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The war in northern Ethiopia that began in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">November 2020</a> has left millions in Tigray on the brink of famine. </p>
<p><a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/aid-convoys-ethiopias-tigray-truce-180227148.html?guccounter=1">Reports</a> suggest that nearly 40% of the region’s six million inhabitants face “an extreme lack of food”. Shortages have forced aid workers to deliver medicines and other crucial supplies “sometimes by foot”. </p>
<p>A few convoys have been allowed to enter Tigray, but the United Nations <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia">says</a> convoys of at least 115 trucks are required daily, yet the entire region is classified “hard to reach”. This indicates that it is effectively inaccessible. </p>
<p>This is not the result of a natural disaster: it is a famine induced by the closure of the borders of Tigray by Ethiopian, Eritrean and Somali forces, reinforced by militia from Ethiopia’s Amhara and Afar ethnic groups. </p>
<p>Since the Tigrayans’ army <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/20/tplf-rebels-announce-retreat-to-ethiopias-tigray-region">retreated</a> into their region in December 2021, they have been surrounded by armies that have blockaded Tigray. </p>
<p>A handful of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/aid-convoy-enters-ethiopian-territory-controlled-by-tigray-forces-first-time-3-2022-04-01/">aid convoys</a> have been allowed through. They have been far fewer than the humanitarian assistance required daily to feed the population. </p>
<p>The blockade and resulting famine are well recognised. What is poorly understood are the origins of this crisis. </p>
<p>They lie in a bitter feud between Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki and Tigrayans that dates back to the 1970s, and the president’s determination not to allow them to rebuild their forces by cutting their supply lines to Sudan. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2021.1981630?src=&journalCode=rusi20">paper</a> I wrote last year, <a href="https://eritreahub.org/the-tigray-famine-lessons-from-1984-85">I revisited this history</a>, in particular the seminal moment in relations between the Eritrean and Tigrayan liberation movements. </p>
<h2>Lessons from the 1983-1985 famine</h2>
<p>The Ethiopian famine of 1983 to 1985 was the result of a combination of a devastating drought and a ferocious war as Eritreans fought for their independence and Tigrayans for their rights. </p>
<p>Both liberation movements used a lifeline through Sudan to provide aid to millions. They also brought in supplies essential for their war efforts. </p>
<p>It is the memory of the utility of these supply lines that explains why the Eritrean, Ethiopian and Somali <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-another-regional-alliance-what-the-horn-needs">alliance</a> fought so hard to sever ties between Tigray and Sudan when the current conflict began in November 2020. </p>
<p>Their aim was clear: to cut possible routes to Sudan, as well as meet the grievances of the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/28/ethiopia-tigray-war-amhara-abiy-ahmed-expansionism/">Amhara community,</a> who claimed that Western Tigray was part of its ancestral lands. </p>
<p>Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/11/ethiopia-unlawful-shelling-tigray-urban-areas">reported</a> that the attack on Humera (at the tri-point of Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea) began on 9 November 2020. Within two days, the town was in the hands of the invading forces. </p>
<p>Tigrayan forces were forced northwards and eastwards. Tens of thousands of Tigrayan civilians were <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/over-1-million-people-displaced-due-conflict-northern-ethiopia-iom-dtm">forcibly expelled</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-people-from-war-torn-tigray-told-us-about-the-state-of-their-lives-amid-the-war-180594">What people from war-torn Tigray told us about the state of their lives amid the war</a>
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<p>Afwerki’s determination to crush the Tigrayans – who are, after all, the government of a region in a neighbouring state – needs unravelling. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2003.9659773">enmity</a> between the Afwerki-led Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) – now renamed the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice – and the governing Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is longstanding, complex and visceral. </p>
<h2>A toxic fued between rebel groups</h2>
<p>Afwerki’s loathing came about because of deep-seated differences over political strategy, which originated in student politics in Addis Ababa in the <a href="https://africaworldpressbooks.com/without-troops-and-tanks-humanitarian-intervention-in-ethiopia-and-eritrea-by-mark-duffield-john-prendergast-hardcover/">1970s</a>. But – perhaps above all else – there was the question of which liberation movement was the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/peasant-revolution-in-ethiopia/E3B7988793DC3063511E3765B026EE16">region’s ‘top dog’</a>. </p>
<p>This feud festered over time, but came to the fore at the worst possible moment: the famine that struck Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa in 1983 to 1985. Their quarrel peaked just as huge quantities of aid were being trucked from Sudan into the remote areas of Eritrea and Tigray held by the respective liberation movements. </p>
<p>Both rebel groups had established relief subsidiaries – the Eritrean Relief Association and the Relief Society of Tigray – to work with international humanitarian organisations to provide the resources needed to feed their people. They were remarkably successful. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-legal-implications-of-humanitarian-aid-blockades-154847">The legal implications of humanitarian aid blockades</a>
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<p>Some three-quarters of a million tonnes of supplies, worth around $350 million at the time, were transported into rebel-held areas from Sudan before, during and after the famine, from 1981 to 1991. </p>
<p>The relief operation was not immune to divisions between the Eritrean and Tigrayan political organisations that had established them. </p>
<p>In the mid-1980s, these divisions spilled over into an open dispute. There was a complete <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/10149208-historical-dictionary-of-eritrea">suspension of communication</a> between the Eritrean and Tigrayan liberation fronts from 1985 to 1988. </p>
<p>Afwerki, determined to show the Tigrayans that the Eritrean movement was the most powerful actor in the region, ordered his forces in 1985 to cut the road through territory they held and on which vital supplies from Sudan got into Tigray.</p>
<p>Closing the border became etched on Tigrayan consciousness. Recalling the suffering the Eritreans inflicted, a Tigrayan leader <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/alemseged-abay-identity-jilted-or-reimagining-identity-the-divergent-paths-of-the-eritrean-and-tigrayan-nationalist-struggles-trenton-nj-red-sea-press-1998-232-pp-1499-isbn-1-56902-072-8-paperback/5EFF1C492081169A49828C0EAB235BB7">declared</a>: </p>
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<p>I do not hesitate to categorise it a ‘savage act’. It must be recorded in history like that! </p>
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<p>Tekleweini Assefa, the head of the Relief Society of Tigray, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/alemseged-abay-identity-jilted-or-reimagining-identity-the-divergent-paths-of-the-eritrean-and-tigrayan-nationalist-struggles-trenton-nj-red-sea-press-1998-232-pp-1499-isbn-1-56902-072-8-paperback/5EFF1C492081169A49828C0EAB235BB7">made clear</a> the bitterness he felt about the Eritrean front’s decision.</p>
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<p>They closed the road for about two years and we had no access to the Sudan for one month until we built a new road ourselves. And that was at the height of the famine!</p>
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<p>The Tigrayan movement was forced to march more than 100,000 Tigrayans across the difficult terrain of western Tigray into Sudan where they could receive international assistance. Many of those who made the journey were old, children, frail or ill. As many as 13,000 people are <a href="http://www.harep.org/Africa/7219.pdf">reported</a> to have died along the way. </p>
<p>Relations were eventually repaired and the two movements went on to coordinate their offensives against the Ethiopian government. This culminated in the capture of their respective capitals in coordinated operations in 1991. The Eritrean liberation front was in power in Eritrea, while the Tigrayan front led a coalition government in Ethiopia. </p>
<p>But the rift never really healed. Rather, the wounds festered, leading to the disastrous <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44004212">Ethiopia-Eritrea border war</a> of 1998 to 2000. It also underlies Afwerki’s unwavering determination to destroy the Tigrayans as a political force. </p>
<h2>Unresolved tensions</h2>
<p>In 2018, Afwerki welcomed the end of the Tigray-led government and the entry of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea was <a href="https://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/ethiopia-and-eritrea-sign-peace-agreement-in-saudi-arabia/">sealed</a> in Saudi Arabia on 16 September 2018. </p>
<p>However, Afwerki continued to plot against the Tigrayans. In his <a href="http://www.afrikakomitee.ch/eritrea/2018_08_Eritrea-Ethiopia.pdf">2018 speech</a> to the Eritrean nation, he declared that <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Politics-of-Contemporary-Ethiopia-Ethnic-Federalism-and-Authoritarian/Gedamu/p/book/9781032029047">their loss of power</a> had critical implications for the region and that the “TPLF’s toxic and malignant legacy” needed to be removed. It was an attitude that contributed to the November 2020 war. </p>
<p>But Afwerki knew from experience that winning that war required cutting the links between Tigray and Sudan. </p>
<p>Western Tigray, linking the region and Sudan, remains the most deeply contested question and will be extraordinarily difficult to resolve. It is claimed by both the Tigrayan and Amhara people. </p>
<p>Whoever holds Western Tigray holds the future of Tigray. This is the key lesson from the famine of 1983-85 and one reason it is such a complex question. As the Crisis Group <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/building-ethiopias-fragile-truce">put it</a>:</p>
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<p>The future of Amhara-occupied Western Tigray is the thorniest issue to resolve.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181866/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Plaut is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Commonwealth Studies of the University of London</span></em></p>The origins of Ethiopia’s food crisis can be traced to a bitter feud between Eritrean and Tigrayan liberation fighters.Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1820262022-05-03T13:51:00Z2022-05-03T13:51:00ZTigray’s ancient rock-hewn churches are under threat: why it matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460554/original/file-20220429-20-3sxf9t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Monastery of Abunä Abraham in Ger'alta, eastern Tigray, Ethiopia. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Hagos Abrha Abay</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Ethiopia’s <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000184034?2=null&queryId=02581159-4e3a-42a4-abca-971b05100911">ancient civilisations</a> are believed to date back more than 3,000 years. Many of the country’s most famous ancient artefacts are found in Tigray. The region has been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">embroiled in war</a> since November 2020. Fighting between forces allied to Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Tigrayan troops has led to the deaths of thousands of people and displaced millions. It has also caused the destruction of numerous historical monuments. With the region under a blockade, it has been difficult to track the scale of the damage done. Hagos Abrha Abay, a philologist, is <a href="https://eritreahub.org/first-comprehensive-analysis-of-the-looting-of-tigrays-heritage-as-ebay-halts-sale-of-ethiopian-treasures">documenting</a> the region’s heritage loss. He sheds light on new reports of destruction in Ger'alta, which hosts some of Tigray’s oldest churches and monasteries.</em></p>
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<h2>What is the historical importance of Ger'alta in Ethiopia?</h2>
<p>Ger‘alta is a principally mountainous zone located in a sandstone escarpment in south-central Tigray. It is in the district of Hawzen, which is presumed to date back to the South-Arabian migration to Ethiopia in 8th to 7th BCE.</p>
<p>Pottery, inscriptions and hagiographic traditions dating back to the Aksumite period depict Ger‘alta as one of the most important regions of ancient civilisation in the Horn of Africa. Cartographically, it appears in the 15th century as a component of the Ǝndärta province that occupied eastern and south eastern Tigray. </p>
<p>Ger'alta’s mountains give it one of the most <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PWEU_53ahws">captivating terrains</a> in the northern Ethiopian highlands. Many of these mountains host ancient rock-hewn churches and monasteries, making the area a spiritual haven for pilgrims. These structures are recognised as world heritage sites. Despite having low levels of tourism development, the area was among Tigray’s most popular travel destinations. </p>
<h2>What is unique about the architecture?</h2>
<p>More than 150 of the thousands of ancient churches and monasteries in Tigray are rock-hewn. Ger‘alta accounts for a big share of these. Its ancient monasteries and churches are made up of a single bedrock and are carved into steep cliff sides. </p>
<p>These sites have preserved thousands of manuscripts for centuries. They are treasure troves of architectural engineering and artistic design.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/religion-was-once-ethiopias-saviour-what-it-can-do-to-pull-the-nation-from-the-brink-171763">Religion was once Ethiopia's saviour. What it can do to pull the nation from the brink</a>
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<p>Most Ethiopian churches and monasteries were built on top of mountains for three reasons. </p>
<p>First, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church believes the biblical Zion symbolises a heavenly mountain shelter. <a href="https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew%2024&version=KJV">Matthew 24:16</a> extols</p>
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<p>those who are in Judea flee to the mountains. </p>
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<p>It’s believed that the mountain here is a metaphor for a church. Aksum Zion – found in central Tigray and assumed to be the dwelling of the Old Testament Ark of the Covenant – is not only the head of churches and monasteries in Ethiopia, but is also believed to be the ultimate sanctuary. </p>
<p>Second, spiritual dwellings in mountains were believed to be nearer to the heavens. Mountains were sometimes seen as ‘God’s throne’.</p>
<p>Third, mountains have been used as safe havens during wars and related disasters. Ethiopia has seen its fair share of both throughout its history. The Ger’alta mountains are part of a sandstone escarpment, which made them suitable for hewing places of refuge.</p>
<h2>What physical damage has been done to the sites?</h2>
<p>I have received local reports and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8BxFxIfU92s">footage</a> of the destruction of some of these sites. </p>
<p>The district of Hawzen, especially the Ger'alta area, has seen several attacks from Ethiopian military, Eritrean and Amhara special forces, and militia groups. Civilian massacres have been committed in the ancient monasteries of <a href="https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=803037166958723">Maryam Dängälät</a> and Abba Yǝm‘atta (Guḥ). These two monasteries were visited and admired by <a href="https://archive.org/details/narrativeofportu00alvarich/page/268/mode/2up">Francisco Alvares</a>, an early 16th-century Portuguese traveller</p>
<p>The monastery of Abubä Yǝmʿatta, a colourfully painted cloister at the top of one of Ger’alta’s mountains, is named after one of the Nine Saints. According to tradition, the saints were part of the <a href="https://ixtheo.de/Record/1762644436?fbclid=IwAR11kPNIvXfCVPwGGFDJkysoyPJ_d2BnxOqb3VwLtUGzC-0suKML0wA_hQI">Roman-Byzantine monks</a>. It is believed that the saints fled the Council of Chalcedon in 451 and established a monastic cult in Tigray. The monastery was the site of the <a href="https://www.tghat.com/2021/05/24/a-massacre-in-abuna-yemata-guh-at-the-foot-of-the-famous-rock-hewn-church/">massacre</a> of 19 civilians who had sought refuge there on 7 May 2021.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tigray-war-antagonists-are-reluctant-to-talk-peace-why-and-whats-next-168193">Tigray war antagonists are reluctant to talk peace: why and what's next</a>
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<p>The Monastery of Abunä Abraham was established before the 14th Century. It is famous for its diverse architectural features that include 40 pillars, with some false ones carved out of the walls. It also has old wall paintings and 72 archaic Biblical and hagiographic Gǝʿǝz manuscripts that were digitised under a Mekelle University (St Yared Center for Ethiopian Philology and Manuscript Studies) project where I was the principal investigator. It is among the sites that have been <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8BxFxIfU92s">bombed</a>.</p>
<p>Debre Medhanit Amanuel Ma‘go, a church in Wuqro, was <a href="https://twitter.com/tehawet/status/1356754588465045505?s=21">shelled</a> by invading troops in November 2020. Residents <a href="https://www.facebook.com/yrga.haileselasy/videos/694138491824907">filmed</a> the destruction. </p>
<p>There is also <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vrx4YLUzNLA">local testimony</a> of the destruction of the library of the rock-hewn church and monastery of Maryam Yerefeda. The site is dedicated to Mary, the mother of Jesus, with two arks dedicated to the saints Michael and Gabriel. Other church properties were destroyed and looted.</p>
<p>Membere Gebremedhin, a coordinator for the culture and tourism sector of the district of Hawzen in eastern Tigray, has reported that 31 monasteries and churches in the area have been heavily damaged. He added that church property and ecclesiastical materials have been looted. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8BxFxIfU92s">Footage</a> of this destruction was shared by Dimtsi Weyane Television, a Tigrayan station. </p>
<p>This damage to churches and monasteries has destroyed Tigray’s vital heritage. It has also destroyed the potential of its tourism industry. </p>
<h2>What does this heritage mean to people today?</h2>
<p>The Ger‘alta heritage monuments carry emotional and spiritual links for the people of Tigray. These sacred heritage objects are believed to connect people to God. They are believed to offer intercession and spiritual healing power. It is devastating for believers to live with the destruction of a manuscript used in hagiographic rituals for women’s fertility, for instance.</p>
<p>Heritage sites are sources of historical pride, indigenous knowledge, and cultural and religious identity. They are also a source of income through tourism. Losing this heritage may lead to identity and psychological crises. It could lead to rage and trauma, cultural shocks and social collapse. The economic benefits from tourism could also be lost.</p>
<p>Finally, some heritage objects like manuscripts are epistemological tablets. They carry evidence of world history. Their destruction wipes out critical insights into humanity’s past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182026/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hagos Abrha Abay receives funding from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under German’s Excellence Strategy, project no. 390893796. He/she is affiliated with Center for the Study of Manuscript Culture (CSMC) at Universität Hamburg.</span></em></p>Heritage sites are sources of historical pride, indigenous knowledge and cultural identity.Hagos Abrha Abay, Postdoctoral researcher, University of HamburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1798292022-03-29T16:12:12Z2022-03-29T16:12:12ZEthiopia’s war in Tigray risks wiping out centuries of the world’s history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453819/original/file-20220323-27-1xt3zno.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tigray's al-Nejashi Mosque, one of Africa's oldest Islamic sites, was damaged in December 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-war-in-tigray-risks-wiping-out-centuries-of-the-worlds-history-179829&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>The human carnage and heritage destruction in Ethiopia’s Tigray region that began in November 2020 has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/02/ethiopia-1900-people-killed-in-massacres-in-tigray-identified">devastating</a>. Thousands have been killed, millions displaced and several historical monuments damaged by invading forces in the East African country’s north.</p>
<p>Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed launched a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">military campaign</a> against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front on 4 November 2020. As troops from the Ethiopian military and Eritrea, as well as Amhara militia groups, brutally attack civilians, they have also destroyed religious, historical and cultural sites of immense value. Some of the damage to these sites has been documented through calls made by Tigrayans using satellite phones.</p>
<p>The region’s heritage sites have been <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/03/tigray-why-are-soldiers-attacking-religious-heritage-sites/">deliberately</a> targeted. To appreciate the weight of these attacks, the role and influence of <a href="https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/28644/1/10672804.pdf">the church in Ethiopia</a> needs to be understood. </p>
<p>The church underpins historical and modern claims of political and military authority in Ethiopia. It has shaped community identity and informed cultural narratives. </p>
<p>Therefore, the <a href="https://eritreahub.org/the-destruction-of-tigrays-world-important-cultural-heritage">bombing and destruction</a> of churches, as well as other religious sites, strikes at traditional power structures. These sites are <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/03/tigray-why-are-soldiers-attacking-religious-heritage-sites/">cherished</a>, multi-functional gathering places and sacred spaces. Looting and attacking them is a grave dishonouring of cultural values.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1499010183778361&set=pcb.1499010343778345">report</a> from the Tigray Orthodox Church Diocese three months into the war in February 2021 found 326 members of the priesthood had been killed. There is no clear data on how many members of the clergy have been killed since then. While at least 40 churches and monasteries have had a general assessment of damages, <a href="https://eritreahub.org/tigray-war-regional-implications-volume-2">my analysis</a> finds hundreds of such sites have been affected by the war.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/religion-was-once-ethiopias-saviour-what-it-can-do-to-pull-the-nation-from-the-brink-171763">Religion was once Ethiopia's saviour. What it can do to pull the nation from the brink</a>
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<p>I have received <a href="https://eritreahub.org/first-comprehensive-analysis-of-the-looting-of-tigrays-heritage-as-ebay-halts-sale-of-ethiopian-treasures">confidential local reports</a> from those with satellite phones on the scale of devastation. This is a result of the network I have established over the past decade during <a href="https://martinplaut.com/2022/03/22/the-tigray-crises-and-the-monastery-of-waldba/">visits</a> to several historical sites in Tigray to carry out manuscript assessments and digitisation. </p>
<h2>Monuments of civilisation</h2>
<p>Ethiopia is the <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201506191183.html#:%7E:text=It%20is%20being%20regarded%20as,the%20land%20of%20religion%20tolerance.">source</a> of various civilisations in sub-Saharan Africa. It is believed to have more than 3,000 years of history. Most of the historical artefacts the country is famous for are originally from today’s Tigray. </p>
<p>For example, the <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.org/article/kingdom-aksum/">Aksumite civilisation</a>, one of the four known civilisations established in the first century CE (in addition to Rome, Persia and China), was in today’s central Tigray. </p>
<p>In the Bible, Qurʿan and inscriptions in South Arabia, terms like “Ethiopia” and “HBST” (Abyssinia) exist. Almost all the city-states and centres of civilisations prior to 13CE were found in today’s Tigray, Eritrea, and Agaw (a highland in today’s northern Ethiopia). </p>
<p>The <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/15/#:%7E:text=The%20ruins%20of%20the%20ancient%20Aksumite%20Civilization%20covered%20a%20wide,3rd%20and%204th%20centuries%20AD.">Aksumite Monuments</a> and <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/18/">Lalibela rock-hewn churches</a>, both UNESCO-registered heritage sites, are among the treasures of East African civilisation. </p>
<p>The alpha-syllabic Aksumite writing system, Gǝʿǝz/Fidäl, is the only ancient writing system still functional in modern Africa. Gǝʿǝz script is still used in Ethiopia, illustrating that Africa is not only the cradle of people and culture, but also of literacy. </p>
<p>Tigray is the foundation for hundreds of thousands of manuscripts, and hundreds of inscriptions written in Gǝʿǝz. The world’s oldest existent Christian manuscript (from 6CE) – The Gospel of Gärima – is preserved in central Tigray. </p>
<p>Abrahamic religions were introduced in the early ages – Christianity before the 4th century and Islam in the first half of the 7th century – in Africa through Tigray. </p>
<p>Its early introduction to these monotheistic religions and its writing system saw Tigray preserve a huge amount of religious and cultural artefacts. This heritage documents the history of the Ethiopian state and its religious institutions. </p>
<h2>Complex political culture</h2>
<p>Ethiopia is a country of rich anthropological value and complex political culture. It is also known for wars with foreign invaders, as well as civil conflict. In these clashes, countless cultural heritage items have been destroyed. </p>
<p>In the current war, many of Tigray’s heritage sites have been targeted by invading troops. The region has thousands of churches, monasteries, mosques and symbolic Islamic settlements, archaeological sites, museums and ritual centres. These spaces are popular with tourists from around the world and pilgrims from across the country.</p>
<p>Hundreds of these heritage sites have been <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-in-tigrays-war-ancient-christian-and-muslim-houses-of-worship-risk/">destroyed</a> in the ongoing war. For instance, the Church of Aksum Tsion is the head of Ethiopian churches and monasteries. It is symbolised as the dwelling place of the Ark of the Covenant. It was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/24/fabled-ark-could-be-among-ancient-treasures-in-danger-in-ethiopias-deadly-war">vandalised</a> after hundreds of civilians were <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/3730/2021/en/">massacred</a> around its yard by Eritrean soldiers in November 2020. </p>
<p>The al-Nejashi Mosque, a symbol for the first introduction of Islam in Africa, was <a href="https://eritreahub.org/historic-al-nejashi-mosque-in-tigray-badly-damaged-and-looted">bombed</a> in December 2020. </p>
<p>Precious medieval manuscripts have been <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B591G8u42pw">burned and vandalised</a>. Thousands of artefacts have been looted and smuggled for an <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/civil-war-to-blame-for-surge-in-online-sales-of-ethiopian-artifacts/a-61069797">international market</a>. </p>
<h2>The impact</h2>
<p>Heritage artefacts offer historical evidence and are a means of tourism development. But more than that, they are a social ingredient, upgrading human existence and giving it more meaning. People are emotionally connected to their heritage, beliefs, language and identity. </p>
<p>Religious objects and ecclesiastical materials are transcendent, emotive instruments between believers and their God/creator. They are also a display of genetic memory between descendants and their ancestors. </p>
<p>In this conflict, the people of Tigray have been denied their natural and human rights. They have had both their existence and meaningful life challenged. </p>
<p>The global community needs to step in to address the continuing loss of human lives and salvage Tigray’s cultural heritage. The destruction of the region’s tangible heritage and vandalising of its monuments of intangible value may lead to irreversible cultural shocks and social collapse. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-african-unions-mediation-effort-in-tigray-is-a-non-starter-169293">Why the African Union's mediation effort in Tigray is a non-starter</a>
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<p>While <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59227672">many</a> international agencies have expressed their concern about the situation in Ethiopia, there hasn’t been practical action taken to save the lives of Tigrayans or their inheritance.</p>
<p>The African Union put up its headquarters in Addis Ababa in <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/organisation-african-unity-oau">a nod</a> to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-battle-of-adwa-an-ethiopian-victory-that-ran-against-the-current-of-colonialism-132360">Battle of Adwa</a> (in Tigray), which was against colonialism. Yet, in a stroke of historical irony, the union has been slow to condemn the brutal killing of Tigrayans and the destruction of historical artefacts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179829/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hagos Abrha Abay receives funding from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under German’s Excellence Strategy, project no. 390893796. He/she is affiliated with Center for the Study of Manuscript Culture (CSMC) at Universität Hamburg. </span></em></p>Many of the artefacts Ethiopia is famous for are found in Tigray. Their continued destruction could lead to irreversible culture shock and social collapse.Hagos Abrha Abay, Postdoctoral researcher, University of HamburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1755912022-01-30T07:32:59Z2022-01-30T07:32:59ZEritrea is involved in Tigray to boost its stature. Why the strategy could backfire<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442673/original/file-20220126-19-1el1euu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki (L) and Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed at an event in Ethiopia in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Eritrean military has been involved in the war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region since the conflict broke out <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">in November 2020</a>. Eritrea shares a <a href="https://sovereignlimits.com/boundaries/eritrea-ethiopia-land">1,000 km border with Ethiopia</a>, including with Tigray. It sent thousands of soldiers in support of the Ethiopian federal forces in their operations against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.</p>
<p>These actions have both prolonged and worsened the hugely <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b171-ethiopias-tigray-war-deadly-dangerous-stalemate#:%7E:text=Ethiopia%E2%80%99s%20Tigray%20War%3A%20A%20Deadly%2C%20Dangerous%20Stalemate%20Both,the%20war%20zone%2C%20while%20maintaining%20pressure%20for%20talks.">destructive conflict</a>. </p>
<p>Eritrea’s involvement also has wider implications. It represents an attempt by Asmara to reassert itself on the regional stage, following two decades of relative diplomatic isolation.</p>
<p>The large-scale commitment of soldiers – as well as logistical and political support for Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed – is the result of a remarkable turnaround in relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa. After almost two decades of hostility, Abiy struck a peace deal with Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki in <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-legal-materials/article/joint-declaration-of-peace-and-friendship-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia/76C651A25602F6DF3E2D62B01BC5984E">July 2018 </a>. This appeared to usher in a new era of stability and cooperation. </p>
<p>But that’s not what transpired. In the following months, Abiy intensified his programme of political reform in Ethiopia. He <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/269-managing-ethiopias-unsettled-transition">consolidated his power</a> at the expense of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The movement had <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/understanding-contemporary-ethiopia/">dominated politics in Ethiopia since 1991</a>.</p>
<p>The front was also Eritrea’s bitterest enemy. There had been a troubled history of relations between it and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front dating back to the 1970s. This antagonism culminated in a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/0384AC30F3C8F59E15F88AE823623DA7/S000197200009166Xa.pdf/old_problems_in_new_conflicts_some_observations_on_eritrea_and_its_relations_with_tigray_from_liberation_struggle_to_interstate_war.pdf">between 1998 and 2000</a>.</p>
<p>The outbreak of the war in Tigray served a number of purposes for Isaias. Firstly, it gave him the opportunity to end Eritrea’s long-standing international isolation. It did this by enabling him to exercise influence in a conflict which threatened to completely destabilise the region. This was a deeply worrying prospect to a range of international actors.</p>
<p>Secondly, it reasserted his influence in Ethiopia’s internal affairs. </p>
<p>And lastly it provided an opportunity to seek revenge on the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The front’s leadership outwitted and outgunned Eritrea militarily in the 1998-2000 war. It also outmanoeuvred Eritrea diplomatically in the years following the conflict.</p>
<h2>Eritrea’s opportunistic policy</h2>
<p>The government in Asmara has pursued an opportunistic foreign policy. Its aim has essentially been to gain regional superiority at <a href="https://libcat.simmons.edu/Record/b2158131/TOC">Ethiopia’s</a> expense. </p>
<p>Eritrea has sought to exercise leverage by getting involved in others’ conflicts. For much of the 2000s and 2010s, for instance, Asmara defied the international consensus on Somalia. This consensus was primarily orchestrated by the government in Ethiopia, at the time led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Reaching the consensus involved the creation of a Transitional Federal Government with broad international support. </p>
<p>Ethiopian troops and African Union peacekeepers, supported in the air by the US, launched offensives against al-Shabaab, the Somali Islamist group which Eritrea was accused of supporting.</p>
<p>This led to the 2009 imposition of <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9833.doc.htm">sanctions on Eritrea</a>. There were also interventions in Darfur and eastern Sudan by the Eritrean government.</p>
<p>Eritrea’s regional policy has largely been influenced by Ethiopia, its much more powerful southerly neighbour. But Ethiopia has represented both an obstacle and an opportunity in the pursuit of regional dominance. </p>
<p>In many respects, the single biggest obstacle facing the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front regime in Asmara is a strong, united Ethiopia. A country capable of dominating the region in economic, military and diplomatic terms – and especially one covertly or overtly hostile to Eritrea itself. This was the case under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/bpethiopiaeritrea.pdf">regime</a> led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. </p>
<p>A weakened and disunited Ethiopia – with at least some political actors who are easy to influence – therefore represents an opportunity for Eritrea’s interests. This is because the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’s vision for the country is as regional gatekeeper and pivot – secure in itself, cohesive and militarily potent. </p>
<p>In search of that status, the best scenario is to have Ethiopia unstable enough to allow opportunities for intervention and influence. Asmara would also want to be able to justify prolonged militarisation, which has become the hallmark of independent Eritrean nationhood. But, it wants to avoid Ethiopia’s total collapse. </p>
<p>Asmara’s best-case scenario is a prolonged, unresolved conflict in Ethiopia in which the presence of Eritrean forces and political support are still required by Addis Ababa. </p>
<p>Abiy’s assent to power and the marginalisation of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front – combined with widespread and growing political protest in the preceding years – presented just such an opportunity. </p>
<h2>Risky strategy</h2>
<p>But this is a risky strategy. </p>
<p>Isaias has essentially harnessed his cause to that of Abiy. When things were going well against the Tigrayan forces – as in late 2020 and early 2021 – it looked like a justifiable policy, however catastrophic for the civilian population. But it could backfire. </p>
<p>There have been signs that negotiations between the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan leadership may be <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/rare-chance-peace-ethiopia#:%7E:text=A%20Rare%20Chance%20for%20Peace%20in%20Ethiopia%20Tigray%E2%80%99s,should%20step%20up%20to%20provide%20support%20for%20talks.">possible</a>. </p>
<p>If there is to be serious dialogue between Addis Ababa and Mekele, the Tigrayan leadership will demand the withdrawal of Eritrean forces and Isaias’ removal from discussions over Ethiopia’s future. Abiy will need to concede this. In such a scenario, Isaias will quickly find himself isolated. This would take him back to the pariah status he has occupied for most of the last two <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/eritrea/eritrea-siege-state">decades</a>. </p>
<p>Further, in the longer term, an Ethiopia where various parties are reconciled to one another’s legitimacy could once again become a hostile entity on Eritrea’s southern flank. </p>
<p>Involvement in other people’s wars is inherently risky business. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front regime has frequently played with fire. It has done so domestically and regionally. Yet, to date, it has seemingly defied geopolitical gravity.</p>
<p>But the Eritrean army’s disproportionately violent and inhumane intervention in Ethiopia in pursuit of payback against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the regional stature Isaias has long craved could result in the most destructive blowback imaginable: a coalescence of Ethiopian antagonists and domestic opposition that presents an existential threat to the Eritrean government itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175591/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Reid does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The war in Tigray appears to have boosted Eritrea’s efforts at regional pre-eminence. But it could backfire.Richard Reid, Professor of African History, St Cross College, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.