tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/addis-ababa-20008/articlesAddis Ababa – The Conversation2024-02-18T07:07:33Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229282024-02-18T07:07:33Z2024-02-18T07:07:33ZOromia makes up a third of Ethiopia’s landmass and is key to its fortunes: expert unpacks its significance<p><em>Ethiopia’s largest and most populous region, Oromia, has been in the news following reports of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/23/im-scared-to-leave-addis-ababa-ethiopias-oromia-region-gripped-by-kidnapping-pandemic">a rise in kidnappings for ransom</a>. The region is <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">no stranger to war and strife</a>. Its people have long fought against political marginalisation. But the region is more than just the site of conflict.</em></p>
<p><em>We asked <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/gov/yimeni-bizuneh-getachew.aspx">Bizuneh Yimenu</a>, who’s researched the region for over a decade and studied its significance in the context of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">Ethiopian federalism</a>, to explain Oromia, its people and its economic and political importance.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the general overview of Oromia?</h2>
<p>Situated in the heart of Ethiopia, Oromia isn’t just a geographical entity but a cultural, economic and political powerhouse. It significantly shapes Ethiopia’s identity and trajectory. </p>
<p>It is the largest of Ethiopia’s 12 regions and covers a vast area. At over <a href="http://www.ethiodemographyandhealth.org/oromia.html">350,000 square kilometres</a>, it’s larger than Côte d'Ivoire or Italy. </p>
<p>The region spans Ethiopia’s central, western and southern parts. Oromia makes up <a href="https://epo.acleddata.com/oromia/">34% of Ethiopia’s landmass</a>. It shares borders with all other Ethiopian regions except Tigray, in the country’s north. It shares international boundary lines with Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya. </p>
<p>Its capital is Finfinne, also known as Addis Ababa – which is additionally Ethiopia’s capital and the headquarters of the African Union. </p>
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<p>Oromia’s diverse geography includes highlands, lowlands, forests and fertile plains. This contributes to its agricultural richness.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.ethiopianreview.com/pdf/001/Cen2007_firstdraft(1).pdf#page=91">the last census</a>, over 60 ethnic groups live in the region. </p>
<p>Oromia has a population of about <a href="https://www.citypopulation.de/en/ethiopia/cities/">40 million</a> people, about 38% of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.citypopulation.de/en/ethiopia/cities/">105 million</a>. There are also Oromo communities in Kenya and Somalia.</p>
<h2>What is Oromia’s cultural and economic significance?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oromo">Oromo</a>, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, speak Afaan Oromo, one of the <a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-languages-are-spoken-in-africa.html">five most spoken African languages</a>. Oromo traditions and customary practices have endured for centuries. </p>
<p>Oromia is known for its traditional democratic governance system, <a href="https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=utk_socopubs">the Geda system</a>, in which power is transferred peacefully every eight years. It regulates the community’s political, economic, social and religious activities. In 2016, Unesco recognised the system as an <a href="https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/gada-system-an-indigenous-democratic-socio-political-system-of-the-oromo-01164">intangible cultural heritage</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">What is federalism? Why Ethiopia uses this system of government and why it’s not perfect</a>
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<p>Economically, Oromia is one of Ethiopia’s breadbaskets. The region’s crop production accounts for about <a href="https://www.unicef.org/ethiopia/media/6511/file/Oromia%20regional%20brief.pdf#page=1">50% of total national production</a>. A <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/cea/5991#tocto1n5">majority</a> of residents work in the agricultural sector.</p>
<p>The region’s fertile soil supports crops like coffee, teff, maize and barley, which are popular for domestic consumption and export. </p>
<p>Outside agriculture, the region has many factories and industries that produce textile and garments, leather products, chemicals, construction materials and pharmaceuticals. </p>
<p>Oromia is additionally a <a href="https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/37159/">source</a> of export minerals, <a href="https://oromiatours.com/Nature-and-Map.html#:%7E:text=Oromia%20hosts%20many%20of%20Ethiopia%27s%20more%20alluring%20natural,gold%20and%20platinum%20to%20iron%20ore%20and%20limestone.">ranging from gold and platinum to iron ore and limestone</a>. In the 2021-2022 financial year, Oromia generated <a href="https://www.2merkato.com/news/alerts/6686-ethiopia-oromia-earns-usd-324-million-from-mining">US$324 million</a> from mining. </p>
<p>The capital, Addis Ababa, is a hub for domestic and international travel, and connected to economically essential cities in other regions, like Diredawa and Hawassa.</p>
<p>International highways, such as the Ethio-Djibouti road, the main route for Ethiopia’s foreign trade, intersect Oromia. This road is the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa">lifeblood of the country’s economy</a>. It enables the movement of goods to and from the port of Djibouti, connecting <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-quest-for-access-to-the-sea-success-rests-on-good-relations-with-its-neighbours-219621">landlocked Ethiopia</a> to global markets.</p>
<h2>What role has Oromia played in Ethiopia’s political development?</h2>
<p>Oromia holds substantial political importance within Ethiopia. As the largest and most populous region, it often sets the tone for national discourse and policymaking.</p>
<p>Its political influence in Ethiopia can be traced to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/29790544">the 1960s when Oromo nationalism</a> emerged due to subjugation and a lack of autonomy. This movement pushed Ethiopia’s transition from <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">a centralised unitary system to a federal one</a>. </p>
<p>In 2015, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">protests in the region</a> to push for greater autonomy and political representation helped drive political change. In 2018, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/12/13/2018-for-ethiopias-oromos-power-pain-protests-review/">Abiy Ahmed</a>, an Oromo, became Ethiopia’s prime minister. </p>
<p>Before Abiy’s entry, Ethiopia had been governed by a Tigray-dominated government for <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopias-new-leader-could-be-a-game-changer-94424">27 years</a>. Tigrayans make up about <a href="https://www.atlasofhumanity.com/tigray">6%</a> of the population.</p>
<p>Abiy’s appointment symbolised a significant step towards addressing the grievances of the Oromo people. </p>
<p>Overall, the political dynamics within Oromia have consistently been at the forefront of discussions surrounding federalism, identity and governance in Ethiopia. </p>
<h2>What are some of the challenges specific to the region?</h2>
<p>Despite its cultural richness and economic importance, Oromia faces challenges that have hindered its development and stability. </p>
<p>One challenge is the prevalence of conflict and tension. This includes <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/oromo-rebels-accuse-ethiopian-forces-attacks-following-peace-talks-2023-05-17/">the war between</a> the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/11/08/ethiopia-oromo-liberation-army-ola-the-other-group-fighting-federal-forces/">Oromo Liberation Army</a>, a rebel group, and the Ethiopian government. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">'Ethiopia's other conflict': what's driving the violence in Oromia?</a>
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<p>Oromia has also suffered from <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-tragic-ambush-by-armed-men-claims-13-lives-in-horo-guduru-wollega-oromia-region/">cross-border attacks launched by the Fano militia</a>, a rebel group operating in neighbouring Amhara. The attack is part of the militia’s agenda of expanding Amhara territory.</p>
<p>Additionally, the regional government has faced <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/ethiopia">allegations of human rights abuses</a>. It has been accused of extrajudicial killings and the unlawful detention of opposition leaders.</p>
<p>In recent months, there has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/23/im-scared-to-leave-addis-ababa-ethiopias-oromia-region-gripped-by-kidnapping-pandemic">a rise in kidnappings blamed on Oromo Liberation Army rebels</a>. This has exacerbated grievances and contributed to a climate of fear and uncertainty.</p>
<p>The underlying causes of conflict in Oromia are deeply rooted and complex. They stem from a combination of:</p>
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<li><p>historical injustices</p></li>
<li><p>marginalisation under previous regimes</p></li>
<li><p>ethnic tensions</p></li>
<li><p>competition over resources. </p></li>
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<p>Resolving these issues requires a comprehensive approach emphasising dialogue, reconciliation and inclusive governance.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen?</h2>
<p>Two things are needed to address Oromia’s challenges effectively. </p>
<p>First, immediate attention should be given to the region’s security. This can be ensured through a peace deal with the Oromo Liberation Army. Previous rounds of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/22/ethiopia-talks-with-rebel-group-ola-end-without-deal">peace talks held in Tanzania between the rebel group and the national government</a> have ended without agreement. </p>
<p>Both the government and the Oromo Liberation Army have <a href="https://x.com/OdaaTarbiiWBO/status/1650255474502008832?s=20">expressed a readiness</a> to resolve their differences through dialogue.</p>
<p>Second, it’s essential that regional and national stakeholders, and the international community collaborate. Initiatives focused on promoting peace and reconciliation should be prioritised to foster a more inclusive future for all residents of the region. Considering Oromia’s significance to Ethiopia, its stability should be a priority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222928/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bizuneh Yimenu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Oromia is a cultural, economic and political powerhouse. It significantly shapes Ethiopia’s identity and trajectory.Bizuneh Yimenu, Teaching Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2167612024-02-01T14:24:10Z2024-02-01T14:24:10ZEthiopian protest music: the songs of Hachalu Hundessa reveal the struggles of the Oromo people<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571833/original/file-20240129-25-vi0wpy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hachalu Hundessa's songs gave a soundtrack to the Oromo resistance.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Screengrab/Maalan Jira!/YouTube</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Oromo are the largest ethno-national group in Ethiopia, accounting for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/10/1/oromo-struggle-memories-of-an-atrocity">over 40 million people</a> or more than <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oromo">one-third of the population</a>. However, they have been politically oppressed, economically exploited and culturally marginalised <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">under successive Ethiopian regimes</a>. Since the 1960s, the Oromo have sought self-determination through various forms of resistance, such as armed struggle under the banner of the <a href="https://www.olf-olahq.org/">Oromo Liberation Front</a>. </p>
<p>Music has played a key role in the Oromo resistance movement. As is the case in many other societies – especially those where open political debate is risky – music serves as an instrument of defiance, allowing artists and their fans to stand up against dominant socio-economic, cultural and political forces. From legendary musicians to amateur singers, Oromo artists have used protest songs as part of their struggle for freedom, justice and equality.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/hachalu-hundessa-charismatic-musician-who-wasnt-afraid-to-champion-ethiopias-oromo-142062">Hachalu Hundessa</a> (also written in the Oromo language as Haacaaluu Hundeessaa) was one of those musicians. Through his poetically eloquent protest songs, the young singer-songwriter came to represent the Oromo struggle. Then, in June 2020, he was murdered. Three men <a href="https://nilepost.co.ug/news/109568/three-found-guilty-of-killing-ethiopian-singer-hachalu-hundessa">were convicted</a> for the crime a year later, but no motive was given. Many believe it was a political assassination.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hachalu-hundessa-charismatic-musician-who-wasnt-afraid-to-champion-ethiopias-oromo-142062">Hachalu Hundessa: charismatic musician who wasn't afraid to champion Ethiopia's Oromo</a>
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<p>Hundreds of thousands of young people across Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest regional state, <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-07-01-hachalu-hundessas-murder-sparks-unrest-in-ethiopia/">took to the streets in protest</a>, demanding justice for Hachalu. Members of Oromia’s large diaspora also staged protests in US and European cities. The Ethiopian government used the protests and ensuing violence (<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/01/ethiopia-cracks-down-following-popular-singers-killing">reports</a> at the time suggested that <a href="https://amp.dw.com/am/%E1%89%A0%E1%8A%A2%E1%89%B5%E1%8B%AE%E1%8C%B5%E1%8B%AB-%E1%8B%A8%E1%89%B0%E1%8C%88%E1%8B%B0%E1%88%89-%E1%88%B0%E1%8B%8E%E1%89%BD-%E1%89%81%E1%8C%A5%E1%88%AD-81-%E1%88%98%E1%8B%B5%E1%88%A8%E1%88%B1%E1%8A%95-%E1%8B%A8%E1%8A%A6%E1%88%AE%E1%88%9A%E1%8B%AB-%E1%8D%96%E1%88%8A%E1%88%B5-%E1%8A%A0%E1%88%B5%E1%89%B3%E1%8B%88%E1%89%80/a-54018050?__twitter_impression=true">more than 80 people</a> were killed) to justify <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/01/ethiopia-cracks-down-following-popular-singers-killing">its crackdown</a> on Oromo opposition political parties.</p>
<p>As a political geographer, I focus on the struggles of the dispossessed and their covert and overt forms of resistance – one of which is protest songs. After his death, I studied three of Hachalu’s works: Maalan Jira! (Do I even exist!), Jirra! (We are still there/alive!) and Jirtuu? (Are you there?). My interest goes beyond mere scholarly analysis; there is emotional attachment there, too. I was part of the <a href="https://www.opride.com/2016/12/31/oprides-oromo-person-year-2016-qubee-generation/">Qubee Generation</a>, the youth cohort that spearheaded the 2014-2018 Oromo protest movement to which Hachalu’s songs added inspirational impetus.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14725843.2023.2251693">the resulting paper</a>, I show how Oromo protest music like Hachalu’s reveals a history and geography of violence through land dispossession and political persecution. It is also more than just a record of events in time and space: protest music forges collective identity and spurs political movements. I also strive to comprehend what a musician like Hachalu Hundessa represents – and what it means to destroy a body that embodies the power of resistance.</p>
<h2>Three key songs</h2>
<p>Hachalu Hundessa was born in Ambo Town, some 120 kilometres to the west of the capital city, Addis Ababa, in 1984. He was active in Oromo student movements when he was at secondary school and was imprisoned by the government when he was just 17 years old, spending five years behind bars because of his activism. While in prison he worked on his first album, Sanyii Mootii. It was released in 2009 and immediately made him popular.</p>
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<img alt="A group of men, several carrying banners and one wearing a t-shirt that calls for justice for Hachalu Hundessa, raise their fists in the air" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571842/original/file-20240129-29-xy4d2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571842/original/file-20240129-29-xy4d2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571842/original/file-20240129-29-xy4d2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571842/original/file-20240129-29-xy4d2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571842/original/file-20240129-29-xy4d2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571842/original/file-20240129-29-xy4d2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571842/original/file-20240129-29-xy4d2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Members of Minnesota’s Oromo community protesting in the wake of Hachalu Hundessa’s murder in 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brandon Bell/Getty Images</span></span>
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<p>The first song I analysed was Maalan Jira! (Do I even exist!), the title track from his 2015 album. He tells of the <a href="https://journalajaees.com/index.php/AJAEES/article/view/917">occupation of Finfinne</a> (what is today Addis Ababa) in the 1880s that dispossessed the Tulama Oromo clans, displaced them from their ancestral homes and sacred places and dismantled their social institutions. </p>
<p>He takes the listener or viewer through a mental map of history. The lyrics can be viewed as a struggle to dismantle institutions and discourses of settler-colonial systems long imposed by the Ethiopian state upon the Oromo. The murder of Hachalu, then, can be interpreted as an attempt at silencing counter-histories in Ethiopia. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Malaan Jira, the title track from Hachalu’s 2015 album.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The second song in my paper, Jirra! (We are still alive!), was released in October 2017, when the Oromo protest movement was at its peak. He underscores the determination of the Oromo, locating the resistance in physical places. He does this by naming places where the movement had a strong presence, articulating the convergence of different corners of Oromia towards the goal: liberation.</p>
<p>The third song, Jirtuu? (Are you there?) again exposes the historical events related to land dispossession and political oppression. At a live performance in December 2017, during a fundraiser in Bole for Oromos displaced by <a href="https://theworld.org/stories/2017-12-15/hundreds-thousands-displaced-ethiopians-are-caught-between-ethnic-violence-and">clashes with the neighbouring Somali region</a> that year, he asked the crowd: “Where are you?”, then encouraged them: “Say we are in Bole!” The crowd cheerfully echoed his statement.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/D1qiF8Q_usI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A live performance of Jirra!</span></figcaption>
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<p>This was not just a singalong. Bole is a district of Addis Ababa, home to wealthy people who settled on land expropriated from Oromo farmers. The performance was a declaration of the Oromos’ right to self-determination and a call that they should one day control the <a href="https://thisisafrica.me/arts-and-culture/ethiopias-imperial-palace-opened-to-the-public-after-more-than-a-century/">Imperial Palace</a> – the offices and residence of the Ethiopian prime minister. </p>
<p>The lyrics include:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Kaafadhu farda keetiin loli, Arat Kiiloof situu aane (Fight with your horse, you deserve Arat Kilo – the national palace); Kaafadhu Eeboo keetiin loli, Arat Kiiloof situu aane (Fight with your spear, you deserve Arat Kilo)</p>
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<h2>Why this matters</h2>
<p>My analysis reveals the power of Hachalu’s protest songs in unsettling dominant narratives and institutions, and in serving as a strong instrument of the Oromos’ political and social movements. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-musicians-fled-the-country-after-the-1974-revolution-how-their-culture-lives-on-206214">Ethiopia's musicians fled the country after the 1974 revolution - how their culture lives on</a>
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<p>His music intertwines time, space and identity. It renders the reconstruction of the past and imaginations of the future amid contemporary uncertainties. In doing so, music serves as an archival library of the past, a platform of the present, and a mirror of the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216761/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asebe Regassa Debelo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Through his poetically eloquent protest songs, the young singer-songwriter came to represent the Oromo struggle.Asebe Regassa Debelo, Senior research and teaching fellow, Department of Geography, University of ZurichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2142782023-10-09T13:32:55Z2023-10-09T13:32:55ZEthiopia: religious tension is getting worse – 5 factors driving groups apart<p>Religion is highly present in Ethiopia. It’s visible in churches and mosques, in clothing, and in public rituals. </p>
<p>The country’s main religious communities are Orthodox Christians, Muslims and Protestants. It’s home to one of the world’s oldest churches and has the third-largest Muslim population in sub-Saharan Africa. Orthodox Christians account for <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">about 43% of the population, while approximately 33% are Muslims</a>. Protestant Christianity arrived in the late 19th century and has expanded rapidly in recent decades to account for an estimated 20% of the population. </p>
<p>Ethiopia is <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">often portrayed</a> as a unique case of harmonious inter-religious relations where Christians and Muslims have lived peacefully together for centuries. But the country has also seen religious conflicts. </p>
<p>In the last three decades, there has been a worsening of religious tension. In <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/27/ambush-kills-20-muslim-worshippers-in-ethiopias-amhara-region#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20incident%20happened%20yesterday%20when,three%20people%20and%20wounding%20five.">2022</a>, for instance, more than 20 people were killed following attacks on Muslims in the north-western city of Gondar.</p>
<p>Ethiopia is constitutionally a secular state. Religion has no formal place in politics. Shared spaces and government buildings are to be free from any religious expressions. However, this has been unevenly practised. Religion is present everywhere. </p>
<p>I am a scholar of religion, with extensive <a href="https://religion.ufl.edu/directory/terje-ostebo/">fieldwork and research experience</a> in religion, ethnicity and politics in Ethiopia. In a recent <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">paper</a>, I analysed the developments over the last decades that have affected inter-religious relations, worsened polarisation and produced conflicts.</p>
<p>In my view, five factors have contributed to the rise in religious tensions.</p>
<p>First, the political transition in 1991, which allowed for greater expression of religious activities and changed the religious landscape. Second, the expansion of Christian Protestantism from the early 1990s. Third, the rise of a more visible and assertive Muslim population. Fourth, the response from the Ethiopian Orthodox church to a loss of influence. Finally, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abiy-Ahmed">Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed</a> allowing religion to enter the public political discourse.</p>
<h2>Growing conflict</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/08/15/ethiopia-risks-sliding-into-another-civil-war">Civil war</a> and <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/08/25/two-ethnic-revolts-rack-ethiopia-at-the-same-time">ethnic conflicts</a> have dominated news coming out of Ethiopia in recent years. Religious and ethnic identities are closely connected, but the ethnic dimension of conflict has tended to overshadow the growing tensions between religious communities.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.eip.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Ostebo-et-al-2021-Religion-ethnicity-and-charges-of-Extremism-in-Ethiopia-final.pdf#page=14">2018</a>, young rioters burned churches and killed several priests in Jijiga, in the eastern Ethiopian state of Somali. In <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ethiopia/">2020</a>, Muslim properties were attacked in Harar, eastern Ethiopia, during celebrations of an Orthodox Christian holiday. In <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/27/ambush-kills-20-muslim-worshippers-in-ethiopias-amhara-region#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20incident%20happened%20yesterday%20when,three%20people%20and%20wounding%20five.">2022</a>, attacks on Muslims in Gondar turned deadly. Such incidents have eroded trust between Ethiopia’s religious communities. </p>
<p>Inter-religious violence is often blamed on so-called extremist elements. However, a closer look reveals a more complex picture. </p>
<h2>The drivers</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91#ref1033852">political transition in 1991</a> and the arrival of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front led to important changes to the political, social and cultural landscape. Seeking to promote equal rights for the country’s ethnic and religious groups, the new government lifted formal restrictions on religious activities. </p>
<p>This affected the balance of power between religious groups. Historically, Ethiopia’s inter-religious co-existence was made possible by one community dominating the others. </p>
<p>Since its establishment in the fourth century, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church had been intimately tied to the state. The domination of the church contributed to the marginalisation of other religious communities. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91">1974 Ethiopian Revolution</a> ended the state-church marriage, and the changes after 1991 further eroded the church’s position and brought other religious communities in from the shadows. </p>
<p>The second driver of tensions has been the rise of Protestantism. Initially brought by western missionaries in the late 19th century, the religion was mainly found in Ethiopia’s non-Orthodox southern region. Protestantism grew rapidly after 1991, with churches and ministries expanding into traditional Orthodox and Muslim areas. On occasion, this has led to violent conflict. In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">2006 and 2010</a>, for instance, clashes erupted in the southwestern area of Jimma.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/religion-was-once-ethiopias-saviour-what-it-can-do-to-pull-the-nation-from-the-brink-171763">Religion was once Ethiopia's saviour. What it can do to pull the nation from the brink</a>
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<p>The 1991 changes also led to Islam becoming more visible in the country. Various Islamic reform movements began strengthening religious identity among Muslims and countering their historically marginalised position. This produced a more assertive community. Muslims have become more active in Ethiopia’s social and political life. Numerous mosques have been built across the country. And Muslims have become increasingly visible through a changing dress code, particularly the use of veiling among women, and through public celebrations of religious holidays. </p>
<p>Many Christians, both Orthodox and Protestant, interpret a more visible and assertive Muslim community as proof of Islamic “extremism”. It’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41240192">commonly claimed</a> that mosques and religious schools are funded by Saudi Arabia. And that the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i4FMpXkKFzQ&t=29s">ultimate aim</a> of Ethiopia’s Muslims is political power. </p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?hl=en&lr=&id=_6lVEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&ots=FAYRrOHs-A&sig=2baPJasl1_wE5VUWCtnWka-M_Vg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">Research</a> has shown that Saudi religious activism has actually dwindled over the last years. But the narrative about such ties continues to fuel suspicions and affect Christian-Muslim relations. </p>
<p>All these developments have been challenging for the Orthodox church. Many of its members are <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">changing their affiliation to Protestantism</a>. The Orthodox church has made efforts to limit this. It has, for instance, prohibited the construction of Protestant churches and mosques in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/arts/design/churches-of-aksum-and-lalibela.html">Lalibela and Axum</a> in Ethiopia’s north. The church has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48634427">declared</a> these cities as sacred Orthodox spaces. </p>
<p>The Orthodox church has also sought to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/religious-dynamics-and-conflicts-in-contemporary-ethiopia-expansion-protection-and-reclaiming-space/ABD9865F31A8D01E5D87AA38EDF1B0F5">reclaim its lost space</a> by, for example, celebrating religious holidays through highly visible ceremonies. During its Meskel holiday in September this year, the Addis Ababa government <a href="https://apanews.net/this-years-ethiopian-meskel-festival-sees-low-turnout-tight-security/#:%7E:text=The%20laity%20is%20restricted%20from,Shirts%20was%20not%20allowed%20too">placed restrictions</a> on the celebration.</p>
<p>The church’s responses have provoked reactions among other religious communities, particularly Muslims who view its actions as an attempt to curb the space they have carved out for themselves. </p>
<p>Finally, Abiy’s political language is laced with semi-religious references. The prime minister is a practising Pentecostal. His acknowledgement of religion has enabled actors to lift religion into the public sphere in ways that have <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429426957-45/strains-pente-politics-j%C3%B6rg-haustein-dereje-feyissa">sharpened boundaries and added to the tensions</a>. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Religious identities and belonging are important in today’s Ethiopia. Changes over the last decades have, however, deepened inter-religious tensions. There is potential to alleviate these tensions. Doing this will require political and religious leaders to communicate across religious boundaries to accommodate Ethiopia’s plurality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214278/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Terje Ostebo have receive funding from USAID.</span></em></p>News coverage of Ethiopia’s ethnic conflicts has overshadowed the growing tensions and polarisation between religious communities.Terje Ostebo, Chair of the Department of Religion and Professor at the Department of Religion and the Center for African Studies, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2048162023-05-15T13:50:25Z2023-05-15T13:50:25ZEthiopia has one of Africa’s most ambitious housing policies – but the lottery-based system is pulling communities apart<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523843/original/file-20230502-1435-2maof.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">New apartments blocks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eric Lafforgue/Art in All of Us/Corbis via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The shortage of adequate housing in cities is an issue around the globe, particularly among developing countries that are rapidly urbanising. <a href="https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2019/goal-11/">The UN estimates</a> that more than one billion people live in slums or informal settlements, 80% of them in Africa and Asia. Globally, three billion people will require adequate and affordable housing by 2030. </p>
<p>Governments, particularly in developing countries, are responding with mass housing programmes built with state money or in partnerships with private developers. The <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43192341">mass housing projects</a> implemented in Europe after the second world war have been emulated in many African, Latin American and Asian countries.</p>
<p>In Ethiopia, the German aid organisation GIZ successfully advocated this model in the early 2000s and <a href="https://www.doc-developpement-durable.org/file/Construction-Maisons_et_routes/MaisonsABasCout/en-low-cost-housing-ethiopia-technical-manual-I.pdf">provided technical support</a> to pilot it. </p>
<p>As a result, Ethiopia rolled out <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-landrights-cities-idUSKCN12P1SL">one of the largest housing programmes</a> in sub-Saharan Africa. Under the <a href="https://publicadministration.un.org/en/Research/Case-Studies/unpsacases/ctl/NominationProfilev2014/mid/1170/id/3250">Integrated Housing Development Programme</a>, launched in 2006, about half a million housing units nationwide have been built and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/dec/04/addis-ababa-ethiopia-redesign-housing-project">transferred to individuals</a>. An estimated two million people have moved in. About a million others have registered for units in the capital city of Addis Ababa alone. The government heavily subsidises the programme, lowering the price per house. </p>
<p>In 2021 and 2022, I spent six months of <a href="https://www.concordia.ca/sgs/public-scholars/profiles/hone-mandefro-belaye.html">doctoral fieldwork</a> researching everyday life for beneficiaries of the programme. In particular, I examined the social fabric of residents who had relocated to new neighbourhoods developed under the housing programme in the Lemi-Kura sub-city, in the outskirts of Addis Ababa. </p>
<p>The fieldwork is part of my PhD project, which examines the change and continuity in relationships among neighbours as their living spaces in Addis Ababa change from single-storey houses to high-rise condominiums.</p>
<p>Based on this research, I have identified some of the problems facing the housing programme. </p>
<p>First, the programme is creating weak and fragmented communities. Most houses are located away from the city centre, where job opportunities are concentrated, which means residents spend more time and money travelling to work, and less time interacting and building relationships with their neighbours. The lottery system used to distribute houses has also dismantled residents’ social networks.</p>
<p>Second, not enough condominiums are being built. While about half a million units have been built nationwide, this is insignificant considering the government estimates a need for 5.5 million houses by 2030. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/megaprojects-in-addis-ababa-raise-questions-about-spatial-justice-141067">Megaprojects in Addis Ababa raise questions about spatial justice</a>
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<p>Third, because of challenges of leadership and financing, the programme has delivered a tiny percentage of its promise. The government has stopped taking new registrations. There are already several hundred thousand people on the waiting list from previous registration rounds. Some of them have been on the list for 17 years. </p>
<p>Fourth, price increases in units due to the <a href="https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/32758/#:%7E:text=The%20increase%20in%20construction%20costs%20has%20already%20been%20reflected,final%20pricing%20of%20housing%20units.&text=Residential%20flats%20can%20now%20cost,charging%20up%20to%20120%2C000%20birr.">increasing cost of supplies</a> and <a href="https://docplayer.net/52244884-Manipulating-ambiguous-rules-informal-actors-in-urban-land-management-a-case-study-in-kolfe-keranio-sub-city-addis-ababa.html">corruption</a> are making the units unaffordable for the intended lower- and middle-income residents. Others have called out the poor quality of the houses, suggesting the condos could be <a href="https://addisstandard.com/condominiums-in-addis-ababa-slums-in-the-making/">slums in the making</a>. </p>
<h2>How the programme works</h2>
<p>The Integrated Housing Development Programme promotes individual house ownership. It builds standardised housing blocks, ranging from studios to three-bedroom units. These homes are cheaper but smaller than similar units built by private developers. The government officials I interviewed said the programme had built 63 new neighbourhoods <a href="https://theconversation.com/addis-ababa-yet-to-meet-the-needs-of-residents-what-has-to-change-174612">in Addis Ababa</a> alone. These consist of blocks of usually five-storey buildings. </p>
<p>To be eligible for registration in <a href="https://publicadministration.un.org/en/Research/Case-Studies/unpsacases/ctl/NominationProfilev2014/mid/1170/id/3250">the programme</a>, individuals should not already own a house and should be in the low- and middle-income category, although no defined income category <a href="https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/socialhousing-addis/">is enforced</a>. Once registered, individuals have to save 10%, 20% or 40% of the price of the units (depending on the housing category they register for) as a down payment. </p>
<p>The remaining percentage is financed through a mortgage from the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, with the units used as the collateral. The government subsidises the programme by providing land, and covering the costs of programme administration and infrastructure development, such as roads, water, electricity and sewerage lines. </p>
<p>The units are distributed through a lottery system. Individuals who have the down payment are entered into a digital system that generates winners. While this portrays equity through chance, allegations of corruption and system tampering are common. In July 2022, for instance, Addis Ababa administrators <a href="https://addisfortune.news/city-admin-annuls-condominium-lottery-draw/">annulled the lottery of 25,000 units</a> and charged officials with corruption. </p>
<h2>What’s working, and what’s not working</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.concordia.ca/news/stories/2023/01/24/concordia-public-scholar-hone-mandefro-belaye-uncovers-how-a-city-s-social-fabric-changes-during-rapid-urban-growth.html?c=/sgs/public-scholars/profiles/hone-mandefro-belaye">My research</a> found that people appreciate the quality of the new houses as many inhabitants used to live in dense, slum-like conditions. They didn’t have private facilities. Now, they have a bathroom, kitchen and tap water in their homes. They have more privacy.</p>
<p>However, the long commute to job sites, the exclusion of tenants from neighbourhood committee leadership, and limited financial and political spaces for local committees has reduced opportunities for activities that promote social cohesion. Additionally, the lottery-based distribution of houses has dismantled residents’ social networks, and many expressed feeling lonely and isolated.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/addis-ababa-yet-to-meet-the-needs-of-residents-what-has-to-change-174612">Addis Ababa yet to meet the needs of residents: what has to change</a>
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<p>These observations are not unique to the neighbourhoods in Addis Ababa’s outskirts. <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/urbanplanning/article/view/1239">A study done in a condominium</a> in the city that was built under the housing programme found that only 7% of residents felt secure in their condo neighbourhood, while 95% said they used to feel secure in their previous neighbourhoods. Additionally, 97% of condo residents said they trusted their neighbours in the previous neighbourhood, while only 34% trusted their neighbours in their current neighbourhood. </p>
<p><a href="https://mdl.donau-uni.ac.at/ses/pluginfile.php/405/mod_page/content/18/UoG_BekeleV1-SOCIAL%20CAPITAL.pdf">My previous research in Gondar</a>, a small city in northern Ethiopia, found similar trends. Condominium residents had lower social capital compared to residents in other neighbourhoods.</p>
<p>These findings indicate that Ethiopia’s condominium housing programme is creating a new problem: weak and fragmented communities. Standardised mass housing programmes have become less popular in the west after it was found that they <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01944360108976236">intensified inequality and social exclusion</a>. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>Public housing projects are <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352011169_Housing_systems_in_the_Global_South_The_relevance_of_the_'social_housing'_approach_in_meeting_housing_needs">critical to solving the housing crisis</a> in the global south. However, they need to be part of a healthy and socially inclusive process of urbanism. </p>
<p>In Ethiopia’s case, this would mean:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>redeveloping slums without randomly distributing current residents through a lottery system </p></li>
<li><p>offering the option of relocating community members into neighbourhoods of their choice – or considering group relocation so that people can move while retaining the support system in their neighbours</p></li>
<li><p>enabling residents to decide on neighbourhood matters through duly elected and empowered local committees</p></li>
<li><p>promoting employment opportunities in and around social housing neighbourhoods.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204816/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hone Mandefro's research was supported by a Vanier Scholarship from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and Wadsworth International Fellowship from the Wenner-Gren Foundation. </span></em></p>Ethiopia’s mass housing project has built and transferred half-a-million houses in two decades – but it’s damaging the social fabric of communities.Hone Mandefro, Ph.D Candidate and Public Scholar, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1997912023-02-16T08:26:04Z2023-02-16T08:26:04ZPan-Africanism remains a dream: four key issues the African Union must tackle<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510080/original/file-20230214-22-qyk3hy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Delegates at an African Union summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-general-view-shows-delegates-in-malabo-on-may-27-2022-news-photo/1240955390?phrase=african%20union&adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://au.int/en/overview">African Union</a> (AU) – made up of 55 member countries – has made significant progress with integrating the countries of the continent and giving them a voice in global politics. </p>
<p>Over the past two decades it has developed meaningful policies on <a href="https://au.int/documents/1504">peace and security</a>, and trade, like the <a href="https://au-afcfta.org/">African Continental Free Trade Area</a>. The <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">African Union Commission</a> helps set the agenda and represent African interests in global forums alongside important partners like the United Nations and the European Union. </p>
<p>But the AU still has a long way to go to achieve the political, economic and cultural goals set out in <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">Agenda 2063</a>, adopted in 2013. </p>
<p>I was an adviser to the union for over a decade and I am now the editor of the <a href="https://brill.com/display/title/61135">Yearbook of the African Union</a>. In my view, progress in implementing the pan-African agenda has stalled. This is partially due to the challenging dynamics in how member states, the AU’s governing organs and external partners relate and pursue their interests. </p>
<p>The annual <a href="https://au.int/en/assembly">Assembly of African Heads of State and Government</a> offers an opportunity to consider these issues and decide how to resolve them. In 2023, the summit will be held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from <a href="https://au.int/en/summit/36">18 to 19 February</a>.</p>
<h2>Four factors stalling progress</h2>
<p>I believe that four issues have stalled progress in the pan-African agenda. These issues relate to collective decision making, independent financing, division of labour and the adoption of common policies that would nurture strategic partnerships. </p>
<p><strong>1. Member states have implemented too few collective decisions</strong> </p>
<p>The AU has adopted several <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties">important legal documents</a> which member states are supposed to adopt for themselves, too. These documents – signed during heads of state and government meetings – must be ratified and then deposited with the union. </p>
<p>This usually happens very slowly and only very patchily. The reasons vary. According to one of the few <a href="https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/1687380/Maluwa.pdf">academic inquiries</a> into the subject, these reasons include a lack of political will, administrative lethargy and deficits in technical capacity among member states.</p>
<p>The AU has no power to force member states to carry out common decisions. It can only monitor compliance on three legal instruments, including the 2007 <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36384-treaty-african-charter-on-democracy-and-governance.pdf">African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance</a>).</p>
<p>To see progress in policy implementation, member states will have to think seriously about how to arrive at binding, transparent and enforceable mechanisms. </p>
<p>One way to do this would be through introducing a clear and limited window of time for ratifying legal documents. The union could also make it mandatory to report on the implementation of all decisions. </p>
<p><strong>2. Independent finances have not been established</strong></p>
<p>The AU’s ambitious plans depend heavily on external finance. Almost two-thirds of the union’s annual budget comes from donors, dubbed international partners. </p>
<p>Contributions from member states account for the remaining third. However, these tend to come late, or in some cases only in part. About <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/31953-file-faq.pdf">30 member states</a> default partially or completely each year. In 2007, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa volunteered to make higher contributions. They account for 45% of the funds raised by African governments. Morocco, which rejoined the AU in 2017 after a 33-year absence, has replaced Libya as a major donor. </p>
<p>The AU’s <a href="https://au.int/en/aureforms/financing">financial reform</a> process began in 2015 to make the organisation more self-reliant. Members committed to paying a <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/31953-file-faq.pdf">0.2% levy</a> on various goods imported from outside the continent.</p>
<p>This money is expected to support 100% of the union’s operational budget (which includes maintenance and salaries), 75% of the programme budget (which includes implementation of policies) and 25% of the budget for union-led peace operations.</p>
<p>The union still must decide how the 100/75/25 target will be met by 2025. In the <a href="http://apanews.net/en/news/aus-2023-budget-at-6548m">current budget</a> (US$655 million for the 2023 financial year), the financial shortfall stands at US$201 million, a 31% deficit.</p>
<p><strong>3. The division of labour between the African Union and regional economic communities remains unclear</strong></p>
<p>Relations between the African Union and the eight officially recognised <a href="https://au.int/en/recs">regional economic communities</a> are based on two principles. These are subsidiarity (where, whenever possible, the regional level takes the lead) and comparative advantage (where the institution that’s better equipped to deal with a situation leads).</p>
<p>A <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/Kagame_Report.pdf">2017 report</a> on the operations of the AU noted that the division of labour between the union and regional communities was “unclear”. This caused a duplication of roles and a lack of clear boundaries.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/15548-how-relevant-is-the-protocol-on-relations-between-the-recs-and-au">new protocol</a> on the relationship between the AU and regional economic blocs was adopted in 2020. But its details are yet to be finalised.</p>
<p><strong>4. The instruments of a common global policy are either underused or underdeveloped</strong></p>
<p>The AU is working to increase its bargaining power in global politics by developing common policies and nurturing strategic partnerships. </p>
<p>But because of member states’ insistence on sovereignty, <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar-30-2.pdf">few common policies</a> have been developed. The most prominent one relates to the <a href="https://oau-aec-au-documents.uwazi.io/en/document/jc4bndxh7vpc23nevov18aor?page=2">reform of the UN Security Council</a> to give Africa more power. </p>
<p>In terms of strategic partnerships, the AU currently is <a href="https://au.int/en/partnerships">focusing its activities</a> on three multilateral (Arab League, European Union and United Nations) and five bilateral (China, India, Japan, South Korea and Turkey) partnerships. However, the frequency of meetings, scope of activities and meaning of the word “strategic” vary widely. </p>
<h2>Opportunity for change</h2>
<p>This year’s <a href="https://au.int/en/assembly">Assembly of African Heads of State and Government</a> is expected to attend to these urgent items:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>implementing and domesticating union decisions</p></li>
<li><p>the division of labour between the AU and regional economic communities</p></li>
<li><p>how best to use the organisation to shape Africa’s place in the world. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The financial dependency issue will be tackled by the African Union <a href="https://au.int/en/executivecouncil">Executive Council</a> in July.</p>
<p>In my view, there is likely to be progress on some of these issues and stalling on others. What’s at stake is Africa’s place in the world and averting harm to the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199791/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ulf Engel receives research funding from the German Research Council, the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, and the EU Commission. </span></em></p>Member states need to arrive at binding, transparent and enforceable priorities to see progress.Ulf Engel, Professor, Institute of African Studies, University of LeipzigLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1984582023-01-30T14:27:27Z2023-01-30T14:27:27ZKampala, Kigali and Addis Ababa are changing fast: new book follows their distinct paths<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506296/original/file-20230125-22-fk3erh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kampala is one of the three Eastern African cities that transformed with little historical precedence</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kampala, the Ugandan capital where I live, is naturally the city I have studied and worked on the most as an urban economist. Yet even with this background, reading <a href="https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/usp/people/academic-staff/tom-goodfellow">Tom Goodfellow’s</a> recently published book, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/44624">Politics and the Urban Frontier: Transformation and Divergence in Late Urbanizing East Africa</a>, I learned astonishing new facts about Kampala. </p>
<p>I also learnt a great deal about the urbanisation processes of two other major East African cities – Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, and Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. </p>
<p>Goodfellow is <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/tom-goodfellow-119040">professor of urban studies and international development</a> at the University of Sheffield. His research focuses on the political economy of urban development and change in Africa. He has also worked with universities across Africa.</p>
<p>In this review I provide a glimpse of the comparative analytical journey Goodfellow takes across these three cities. I also make the case that anyone interested in East Africa’s dynamic urbanisation process should have this book as a core part of their reading list. </p>
<h2>Three cities</h2>
<p>At the start of the 2000s, Addis Ababa, Kampala and Kigali were some of the least urbanised cities in the region. And, for different reasons, they didn’t command much attention from national policy makers. </p>
<p>Fast forward to 2023, and all three cities are undergoing an urban transformation that has little historical precedence in terms of speed or scale. They have become, for differing reasons, central to national, regional and in some senses even global, policy making. </p>
<p>Based simply on this fact, the cities are unique. </p>
<p>The histories that shaped them include their colonial pasts, or resistance to it in the case of Ethiopia, their struggles for independence and post independence political and economic policies. </p>
<p>Take the varied approaches that Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda adopted to the World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s and 1990s. The Bank’s misguided neoliberal approach continues to have lingering after-effects on each of them. This is particularly true when it comes to the composition of their urban economies. In particular, the increased privatisation promoted by the programmes led to cuts in formal employment opportunities in the public sector as well industry, pushing people into informality. </p>
<p>Another consequence was the sharp decline in public service provision, particularly in urban areas.</p>
<p>They have also been influenced by external economic forces. East Africa, as a global latecomer to the urbanisation process, is urbanising at a time when globalisation has resulted in significant flows of capital. For example, East Africa as a region receives one of the <a href="https://repository.hanyang.ac.kr/bitstream/20.500.11754/114286/1/Official%20Development%20Assistance%20and%20Economic%20Growth%20in%20East%20African%20Countries.pdf">largest shares of development assistance</a>. It is also a central focus for China’s Belt and Road Strategy. </p>
<p>As Goodfellow illustrates, these forces of globalisation are continuously reshaping East Africa’s cities in terms of the infrastructure investments that are currently taking place. Influence can also be seen in the new patterns of commerce, employment and entrepreneurialism within them.</p>
<h2>A granular comparison</h2>
<p>Goodfellow’s most formidable achievement in the book is that he has been able to draw clear comparisons between three very different cities. At the same time he hasn’t lost critical details that have shaped each one of their unique and complex systems. </p>
<p>To do this, he employs a comparative framework with four dimensions. They are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>each city’s urban planning vision, including major infrastructure projects, which has affected political outcomes </p></li>
<li><p>changing patterns of urban property development (propertyscapes) and how these interacted with and have been shaped by the underlying institutions</p></li>
<li><p>the diverse and powerful forces of the urban marketplace, generically termed “the informal sector”, as centres of urban working lives and livelihoods</p></li>
<li><p>the forms political mobilisation has taken in each of these contexts and how these have been institutionalised and therefore generally resisted change.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Throughout Goodfellow’s book he keeps drawing on the theme of infrastructure creating property value, while property, shaped by several prevailing forces, creates the demand and need for infrastructure.</p>
<p>For example, he illustrates how the affordable housing crisis has played out in each city. There are differences of course, which can clearly be seen in Addis Ababa’s immense public condominium construction project compared to Kampala’s near lack of government engagement in the housing space.</p>
<p>But there are also similarities. For example, across all three cities construction costs are substantial and much of the housing finance being provided is coming from the domestic and diaspora elites. This partially reflects constraints across the banking systems in the three countries. </p>
<p>A further similarity is the prevalence of expensive international aid worker housing resulting from substantial inflows of development assistance. This has skewed property markets in all three cities to an oversupply of high-end properties. The extent of this is huge. For example, the average rent for someone working in the diplomatic corps or an international institution in Kigali is usually upwards of US$4,000 a month. In contrast the annual GDP per capita of Rwanda is currently about <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=RW">US$822</a>. </p>
<h2>New and dynamic forms of urbanism</h2>
<p>Over the past years all three cities have been experimenting with new forms of urban visioning. This has shaped, and been shaped by, property, infrastructure and the underlying state-society relations in highly contested political spaces. </p>
<p>Perhaps this is most aptly illustrated by the Kigali Urban Master Plan that was developed by <a href="https://surbanajurong.com/sector/kigali-city-master-plan/">Singaporean firm Surbana Jurong</a>. The plan aspires to transform Kigali into a type of Singapore of Africa – essentially proposing to replace the existing city with something entirely new. </p>
<p>In Addis Ababa, the vision is epitomised by a major infrastructure investment, namely the light rail train system. A Chinese company constructed the rail system at a cost of <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/business/2019-04/25/content_74720232.htm">US$475 million for 34km</a>. This was an expensive undertaking that has reorganised the economic form of the city.</p>
<p>Similar spatial disruption has occurred in Kampala through the Chinese constructed expressway that connects it to the airport in Entebbe. This is now the <a href="https://www.thevaluechainng.com/the-most-expensive-road-in-the-world-is-located-in-east-africa/">most expensive road per kilometre in the world</a>. </p>
<h2>The devil is in the complex details</h2>
<p>Goodfellow’s book is a must-read for those who are working in policy or project development within any of these cities. </p>
<p>It manages to show why attempting to supplant models from urban development elsewhere, including “best practices”, will not work. Rather we need to understand local contexts and complex systems.</p>
<p>The imperative for this is clear: East Africa is one of the fastest urbanising regions in the world, but it’s still in the early phases of this process. There’s a major opportunity to get the region’s cities right.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198458/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Astrid R.N. Haas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>East Africa is one of the fastest urbanising regions in the world, but it’s still in the early phases. There’s a big opportunity to get the region’s cities right.Astrid R.N. Haas, Fellow, Infrastructure Institute, School of Cities, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1814862022-05-12T14:02:44Z2022-05-12T14:02:44ZDar es Salaam’s bus rapid transit: why it’s been a long, bumpy ride<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460513/original/file-20220429-14-vmfrxi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"> Dar's rapid bus transit system is expected to be faster to build and cheaper to operate than railways. SAID KHALFAN/AFP via </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-picture-taken-on-august-18-2016-shows-a-dart-bus-news-photo/591875410?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Infrastructure projects are often subject to political aspirations. But when they are not realised as promised or their costs multiply over the years, the projects turn into public controversies. After a while, the aspirations, promises and controversies settle as the infrastructure system becomes an <a href="https://theconversation.com/megaprojects-in-addis-ababa-raise-questions-about-spatial-justice-141067">integral</a> part of the environment and society. </p>
<p>Dar es Salaam Bus Rapid Transit is such a project. It was planned to improve urban transport by gradually replacing minibuses in Tanzania’s largest city.</p>
<p>Various challenges, like unclear construction plans, residents’ protests and unexpected costs, led to several years of delay in constructing and implementing the transport system. Planning started in the early 2000s and it began to operate in 2016. </p>
<p>One out of six construction phases is complete, offering more than 300,000 trips daily. The second phase is under construction and funding has been secured for its third to fifth phases. Phase six is still under discussion.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Assembling-Bus-Rapid-Transit-in-the-Global-South-Translating-Global-Models/Jacobsen/p/book/9780367894771">research</a> shows how the Dar es Salaam Bus Rapid Transit is both political and deeply embedded into global and local social structures. It also looks at what these entanglements mean for the implementation of a bus rapid transit model in a specific context.</p>
<p>Despite concrete plans and binding contracts that framed the infrastructural project over decades, local social and political conditions still shape its development.</p>
<h2>Pioneer project</h2>
<p>This transport project has played a central role in Tanzania’s national politics. The government set a strong focus on infrastructural development, and the project served as a pioneer of urban transport innovations and large infrastructure systems. It was mainly promoted by the late President John Magufuli while he served as minister for works.</p>
<p>Dar es Salaam <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/rapid-buses-to-bring-relief-2510284">experiences</a> heavy congestion. Minibuses, called “daladala”, are the main mode of urban transport. They are reliable and efficient, but they cannot handle the city’s rapid population growth. This is mainly because they do not have their own physical infrastructure like the rail and bus rapid transit systems do. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/dar-es-salaams-new-rapid-bus-system-won-international-acclaim-but-it-excludes-the-poor-109987">Dar es Salaam's new rapid bus system won international acclaim – but it excludes the poor</a>
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<p>A bus rapid transit system has designated lanes and high-capacity buses that call at stations every few minutes. It also <a href="https://www.itdp.org/library/standards-and-guides/the-bus-rapid-transit-standard/what-is-brt/">features</a> off-board fare collection, enclosed stations and access for pedestrians and cycles. Compared to rail-based systems, the rapid bus transit is expected to be faster and cheaper in terms of planning, construction and operation. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/2VLc9sqJ6VM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Dar’s bus rapid transit system is beset by lack of operational schedules and infrastructure delays but is in high demand.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Policymakers – international NGOs, development corporations and consultancies, local governments and transport businesses – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/aug/27/buses-future-of-urban-transport-brt-bus-rapid-transit">say</a> that these bus systems make for high-quality transport available to the people. They have become a trend in cities of the global South for the last two decades. The Transmilenio system of Bogotá was used as a model of the concept that has been spreading to the African continent. </p>
<p>In 2003, international consultants picked Dar es Salaam’s system as the best practice model for urban Africa. Cities like Addis Ababa, Kampala and Nairobi are following suit, trying the Dar es Salaam model. Professional and personal networks around former Bogotá mayor <a href="https://www.pps.org/article/epenalosa-2">Enrique Penalosa</a> and the New York-headquartered <a href="https://www.itdp.org/about/">Institute for Transportation and Development Policy</a> have made the Tanzanian metropolis the point of reference for African technocrats instead of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12135">South African cities</a>, which implemented the Transmilenio bus rapid transit model earlier.</p>
<p>But there is no guarantee that African cities will learn better from Dar es Salaam than they would from a Latin American or Asian city. Contexts like the attitude towards public-private partnerships or the structure and political power of the minibus industry differ from city to city, between and within continents.</p>
<h2>Plans and reality</h2>
<p>Since it began, Dar es Salaam’s project has been under pressure to succeed and act as a model. Its promoters tend to <a href="https://www.itdp.org/2018/06/01/webinar-dart-transforming-mobility/">portray</a> it as the way it was planned rather than how it actually operates. </p>
<p>On the ground, the system is grappling with overcrowded buses, lack of operational schedules and long delays in constructing and operating bus corridors and stations. The delays and changes of plans point to controversies and power struggles. </p>
<p>Controversies are nothing unusual in large-scale planning processes. They often have productive moments as they reveal uncertainties and enable renegotiation. </p>
<p>In contrast to the strong political will at international and national levels, not all Tanzanian politicians are in favour of the project. Some would have preferred a rail-based solution while others are part of the minibus industry.</p>
<p>In addition, the largest bus company — the state-controlled Shirika la Usafiri Dar es Salaam (UDA) — has been vying for a monopoly. The bus company tried to frustrate the contract between the Tanzanian government and the World Bank, which financed the first phase of the project. Under the agreement, the system was to run through a public-private partnership consortium, which would consist of Tanzanians and international operators.</p>
<p>The bus company used three tactics to render the international partnership impossible:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>It merged with the Dar es Salaam Commuter Bus Owners Association to form a new company: UDA Rapid Transit.</p></li>
<li><p>It lobbied politicians to support its joint venture as the interim operator of the rapid transit system pending the international public private partnership procurement.</p></li>
<li><p>It made huge investments that were inconsistent with its status as an interim operator. It installed an automated fare collection system and bought more than 200 buses. The investments made it appear irreplaceable. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>To ensure that the only available option for rapid transit operations did not become insolvent, the UDA Rapid Transit was allowed to earn revenue from its buses and fare collection system. </p>
<p>UDA Rapid Transit continues to be the single operator of the Dar es Salaam Rapid Transit System. Whether other operators might come on board in future phases is still uncertain. </p>
<p>Social practice, personal relations and political negotiations direct the system’s development. Infrastructure projects are political, controversial and permanently under transformation. They tell us about global models, national development agendas and sociopolitical negotiations on the ground.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181486/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Malve Jacobsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Local realities shape the transport system, making it less directly applicable as a model elsewhere.Malve Jacobsen, Post-doctoral researcher, Johannes Gutenberg University of MainzLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1746122022-02-14T14:53:07Z2022-02-14T14:53:07ZAddis Ababa yet to meet the needs of residents: what has to change<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442449/original/file-20220125-17-cnwl2r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Addis Ababa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sigel Eschkol / EyeEm/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With an estimated population of more than <a href="https://www.statsethiopia.gov.et/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Population-of-Weredas-as-of-July-2021.pdf">3.7 million people</a>, Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, is home to about <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23245/Addis0Ababa00E0ing0urban0resilience.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">a quarter of Ethiopia’s urban population</a>. The city generates well above <a href="https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/download-manager-files/State%20of%20Addis%20Ababa%202017%20Report-web.pdf">29% of Ethiopia’s urban GDP and 20% of national urban employment</a>. </p>
<p>Over the last two decades, Addis Ababa has witnessed rapid socio-economic changes and a drastic physical transformation. This was propelled by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/dec/04/addis-ababa-ethiopia-redesign-housing-project">a development-oriented government</a> and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1468-2427.12550?saml_referrer">the private sector</a>. </p>
<p>However, the city faces challenges around housing, transport, infrastructure, services, youth unemployment and displacement. </p>
<p>I’m part of the <a href="https://www.african-cities.org/">African Cities Research Consortium</a>, a new six-year initiative committed to addressing critical challenges in 13 cities in sub-Saharan Africa, including Addis. </p>
<p>I <a href="https://www.african-cities.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ACRC_Addis-Ababa_City-Scoping-Study.pdf">argue that</a> the solution lies in the way the city is governed. Currently, political elites influence the city’s governance and its physical transformation. The planning is top-down and excludes the majority of the city’s residents.</p>
<p>The result is that development has focused on features like skyscrapers, shopping malls and luxury housing complexes. These might fit the government’s aspirational template for a modern African city but they do not meet the needs or reflect the realities – <a href="https://www.habitatforhumanity.org.uk/blog/2018/01/toilet-shortage-in-the-slums-of-ethiopia/#:%7E:text=But%20in%20Addis%20Ababa%2C%20where,and%20dangerous%20to%20be%20around.">about 80%</a> of city residents live in dilapidated housing conditions.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/megaprojects-in-addis-ababa-raise-questions-about-spatial-justice-141067">Megaprojects in Addis Ababa raise questions about spatial justice</a>
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<p>A rethink is needed on how the city residents –- particularly the low-income urban citizens –- can actively shape their city and overcome the challenges they face every day.</p>
<h2>Urban challenges</h2>
<p>Addis Ababa was established in the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41967609?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">late 1880s</a>, under King Menelik (1889-1913). It was an area that was previously <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/307608936_State_of_Oromia%27s_Interest_in_Addis_Ababa_Finfinnee_Undelivered_Constitutional_Promises">inhabited by ethnic Oromo</a> agro-pastoralists. </p>
<p>Constitutionally, Addis Ababa is governed by a city council, which are directly elected by city residents every five years. And the council elect a mayor among its members, who will lead the executive branch of the city government. However, the federal government has the legislative power to <a href="https://urbanlex.unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/faolex//eth135251.pdf">dissolve the city council</a>, extend <a href="https://chilot.me/2020/03/14/addis-ababa-city-government-revised-charter-amendment-proclamation-no-1094-2018/?fbclid=IwAR11M4Lf4AdUVQNMuJTBoTAnMonyBa9U3qKrYPidbJwxhtefnqrodM9DWUM">its term limits beyond five years and appoint a deputy mayor with full executive power</a>. </p>
<p>Even though residents elect the city council, they don’t have much say. Urban planning processes tend to be <a href="https://thesis.eur.nl/pub/11584/(1)35623.pdf">expert-led</a> –- for instance, the <a href="https://c40-production-images.s3.amazonaws.com/other_uploads/images/2036_Addis_Ababa_Structural_Plan_2017_to_2027.original.pdf?1544193458">10-year structural plan</a> (2017-2027) which was effected to guide the development of the city. However, due to <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ejossah/article/view/100818/90024">constant city leadership changes</a>, <a href="https://theses.gla.ac.uk/74327/7/2019KloosterboerPhD.pdf">imposition of modernist urban models</a>, and <a href="https://docplayer.net/52244884-Manipulating-ambiguous-rules-informal-actors-in-urban-land-management-a-case-study-in-kolfe-keranio-sub-city-addis-ababa.html">corruption</a>, it’s common to find developments that violate the urban plans. These include <a href="https://theconversation.com/megaprojects-in-addis-ababa-raise-questions-about-spatial-justice-141067">government projects</a>.</p>
<p>Federal and city governments have invested in infrastructure over the past 20 years. This has helped to reduce <a href="https://www.african-cities.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ACRC_Addis-Ababa_City-Scoping-Study.pdf">poverty, inequality and unemployment</a>. However, since the city started from a low development base the reduction is marginal. Addis Ababa still faces complex and interrelated urban challenges. </p>
<p>Around <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/22979/Ethiopia000Urb0ddle0income0Ethiopia.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">70-80% of Addis Ababa’s housing stock</a> is congested, dilapidated and lacks basic services and sanitation facilities. Although the city government has constructed more than 270,000 housing units since 2005, they are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/dec/04/addis-ababa-ethiopia-redesign-housing-project">unaffordable</a> for most of the city’s low-income residents.</p>
<p><a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23245/Addis0Ababa00E0ing0urban0resilience.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">Only 44% </a> of the population have access to clean water, and <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23245/Addis0Ababa00E0ing0urban0resilience.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">less than 30%</a> have access to sewerage services. </p>
<p><a href="https://resilientaddis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/addis-ababa-resilience-strategy-ENG.pdf">Flooding, landslides and fire hazards</a> affect many due to informal housing construction in risk-prone areas, congested settlement patterns, and poor housing quality.</p>
<p>The city is challenged by youth unemployment. About <a href="https://www.statsethiopia.gov.et/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Key-Findings-on-The-2020-Urban-Employment-Unemployment-Survey-UEUS.pdf">a quarter of Addis Ababa’s young population</a> (aged 15-29) are unemployed. This is <a href="https://thesis.eur.nl/pub/17474/Beshir-Butta-DALE.pdf">mainly due to</a> the mismatch between the new jobs the economy creates and the increasing number of youth joining the labour market.</p>
<p>Addis Ababa is also under pressure from the influx of migrants. Within the last five years, <a href="https://www.statsethiopia.gov.et/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Final-2021-LABOUR-FORCE-AND-MIGRATION-SURVEY_Key-finding-Report-.17AUG2021.pdf">the proportion</a> of net recent migrants (people who migrated in the last five years) was 16.2 per 1000 total population. Most of these recent migrants endure <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/pt/207921468022733336/pdf/Urban-Migration-Final-Version8242010.pdf">economic hardship and poor quality of life</a>, especially during their initial years in the city. </p>
<p>Additionaly, city officials’ drive to make the city a well governed modern-city created a hostile environment to <a href="http://www2.econ.uu.nl/users/marrewijk/pdf/ihs%20workshop/fransen%20paper.pdf">the many</a> independent informal sector operators. Although official statistics tend to <a href="https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/download-manager-files/State%20of%20Addis%20Ababa%202017%20Report-web.pdf">underestimate</a> informal employment, some scholars estimate it to be as high as <a href="http://www2.econ.uu.nl/users/marrewijk/pdf/ihs%20workshop/fransen%20paper.pdf">69% of all employment</a> in Addis Ababa. Nevertheless, small informal businesses are forced to <a href="https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/download-manager-files/State%20of%20Addis%20Ababa%202017%20Report-web.pdf">register their businesses and abide by tax regulations</a> which is a challenge for them. And street vendors face <a href="https://nordopen.nord.no/nord-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/225025/Sibhat.pdf?sequence=1">harassment and intimidation</a>. </p>
<p>Overall, the city is unable to unlock its full development potential.</p>
<h2>Fix the politics first</h2>
<p>Many strategies have been proposed to tackle Addis Ababa’s urban challenges. But few seriously consider the city’s complex politics and how this determines resource allocation.</p>
<p>I suggest four areas of improvement.</p>
<p><strong>Fix the relationship between Addis and Oromia</strong></p>
<p>Addis is the capital of both Ethiopia and the Regional State of Oromia. </p>
<p>However, due to the absence of an institutional framework between the city government and the surrounding Oromia National Regional State – to demarcate the boundary and collaborate in joint governance concerns – cooperation is limited and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/feb/12/ethiopia-state-of-emergency-anger-oromo-people">politically contentious</a>. This needs to be resolved. </p>
<p>Without a clear agreement about how to work together or what each is responsible for, the city and the state can’t easily coordinate development, like water supply or landfill sites.</p>
<p>The establishment, and further expansion, of Addis has displaced thousands of ethnic Oromo farmers. The 1995 constitution guarantees the Oromia National Regional State a “<a href="http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/etovpia.pdf">special interest</a>” in Addis Ababa to address the historical ownership claims of ethnic Oromos. But the details of the “special interest” have not yet been specified in law. </p>
<p>A protest sparked by a <a href="https://eng.addisstandard.com/how-not-to-make-a-master-plan">draft metropolitan plan</a> shook the country between 2014 and 2018. Many ethnic Oromos perceived it as a plan to expand the administrative boundary of Addis Ababa into Oromia. In response, the city government decided to <a href="https://resilientaddis.org/2019/01/30/061/">rehabilitate previously displaced ethnic Oromo farmers</a> and allocate them subsidised condominium flats. The city government also sought to support them in urban agriculture. </p>
<p>The federal government should build on this and facilitate institutionalised coordination between the Addis Ababa city government and Oromia national regional state.</p>
<p><strong>More representation</strong></p>
<p>City residents must be better represented in how the city is governed and elected officials must be accountable to them. </p>
<p>The federal government <a href="https://chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/self-governing-addis-ababa-the-federal-government-oromia.pdf">meddling</a> in the governance of the city means city officials are loyal to the ruling party, rather than the city residents. And, because they are not accountable to residents, corruption and mismanagement can go unchecked. </p>
<p>It’s paramount that city residents are properly represented at each tier of the city’s administration; city, sub-city and district. This will enhance their role in shaping the city’s future. City and local council elections must be held regularly and in accordance with the <a href="https://urbanlex.unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/faolex//eth135251.pdf">city charter</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Imposed city models</strong></p>
<p>City and national governments have imposed their vision of a “<a href="https://www.african-cities.org/the-political-opportunities-and-obstacles-associated-with-africas-urban-challenges/">modern city</a>”. This has resulted in <a href="https://theses.gla.ac.uk/74327/7/2019KloosterboerPhD.pdf">city models</a> that do not meet the needs of the majority of citizens. Instead, they favour <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1873924/ethiopias-addis-ababa-projects-harm-spatial-justice-design/">urban elites and international tourists</a>. This must change. </p>
<p>Two examples of this include the current government’s flagship <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9QPi7oj6OtI">Beautifying Sheger</a> project – aimed at cleaning Addis’ rivers and building green spaces along the 56km riverbanks – and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9QPi7oj6OtI">Dubai-inspired</a>, upscale commercial and residential public-private partnership developments. With the introduction of these developments the policy focus and <a href="https://www.capitalethiopia.com/news-news/finance-halts-new-condo-projects/">resource allocation</a> of the city government shifted away from the pro-poor schemes, such as <a href="https://www.pasgr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/FINAL-The-Governance-of-Addis-Ababa-City-Turn-Around-Projects-.pdf">subsidised housing and light rail</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/megaprojects-in-addis-ababa-raise-questions-about-spatial-justice-141067">Megaprojects in Addis Ababa raise questions about spatial justice</a>
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<p>Moreover, these developments threaten <a href="https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/03/12/addis-ababa-riverside-project-gives-priority-development-residents/">to displace thousands of slum dwellers</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Supporting the informal</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://www.effective-states.org/the-politics-of-dominating-addis-ababa/?cn-reloaded=1">Repressive politics</a> have made it <a href="https://addiszeybe.com/opinion/politics/eskinder-nega-the-balderas-council-and-the-debate-on-addis-ababas-legal-and-political-status-implications-to-addis-ababa-residents">difficult</a> for civil society organisations to defend the rights and interests of their constituency. For instance, government can <a href="https://addisfortune.net/columns/ethiopians-yet-to-own-rights-to-cities/">displace inner-city slum dwellers</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/mar/13/life-death-growth-addis-ababa-racial-tensions">demolish peripheral informal settlements</a> without providing alternative housing. </p>
<p>The city needs organised communities that can reorient top-down, exclusionary urban development towards inclusive development. </p>
<p>Ultimately, what is needed is a shift to inclusivity. This requires that the relations between Oromia National Regional State and Addis Ababa City Government by addressed. In addition, the city residents must govern and pro-poor urban developments be promoted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174612/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nothing to disclose. The views expressed in the piece are all Ezana's and do not represent their employer's official position.</span></em></p>Addis may be shaping up to look like the modern city that the government wants, but it is yet to meet the needs of most residents.Ezana Weldeghebrael, Research Fellow, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1754412022-01-28T07:12:15Z2022-01-28T07:12:15ZWHO head Tedros faces a challenge all humanitarians know well<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/441932/original/file-20220121-19-xq9p76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">World Health Organisation Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fabrice Coffrini/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2017, the World Health Organisation (WHO) appointed <a href="https://www.who.int/director-general/biography">Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus</a> as its director general. He’s the first African and the first person from the global south to occupy this high office. </p>
<p>His <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/357/bmj.j2605.full">election process</a> was equally historic: a secret ballot that gave equal voting opportunity to all member states for the first time in WHO’s 70-year history. The post had been filled previously <a href="https://www.statnews.com/2017/05/23/who-director-general-tedros/">by a vote</a> of the executive board. Tedros – as he is popularly known – got an overwhelming two-thirds majority.</p>
<p>This triggered great jubilation in his home country of Ethiopia that he had served with <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/20170524-ethiopien-tedros-nouveau-patron-oms-afrique-onu">distinction</a> as health and foreign minister. But now, the mood in Addis Ababa has turned toxic. As Tedros stood poised to <a href="https://healthpolicy-watch.news/who-board-supports-tedros-nomination-as-us-lays-down-financing-conditions/">renew</a> his mandate at WHO, the Ethiopian government launched a blistering attack on him, <a href="https://newbusinessethiopia.com/politics/ethiopia-files-complaint-against-who-chief-tedros-adhanom/">accusing</a> him of gross misconduct by interfering in the country’s internal affairs.</p>
<p>Ethiopia’s endorsement is not needed to re-elect Tedros as his first-term performance stands on its own merits, and no candidates oppose him. Nevertheless, Ethiopia is determined to <a href="https://healthpolicy-watch.news/ethiopias-dispute-with-tedros-may-spill-into-vote-for-new-director-general/">embarrass him</a>, as a distracting political manoeuvre on the global stage.</p>
<p>What has drawn such ire? Addis was acutely embarrassed when Tedros <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2022/01/12/We-are-witnessing-hell-in-Tigray-it-s-an-insult-to-humanity-WHO-s-Tedros">drew attention</a> to the catastrophic health and humanitarian situation in Tigray: a “hell” that is an “insult to humanity”. </p>
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<p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-explained.html">civil war</a> includes ethnically-directed war crimes against civilians and a blockade on medicines and food into Tigray. The egregious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights conventions have been likened to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/26/ethiopia-genocide-warning-signs-abiy-ahmed">genocide</a>.</p>
<p>Colouring the picture is Tedros’s own Tigrayan identity and history as a prominent member of Ethiopia’s previous administration dominated by the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518491">Tigray People’s Liberation Front</a>. This is now the bitter enemy of current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. </p>
<p>Tedros’s own family and friends have been targeted in the conflict. This is quite unprecedented for a UN agency head but not unknown among other senior staff. I was myself subjected to death threats as head of the United Nations in Sudan for <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WEUWU8JwnDI&t=9s">speaking</a> against its government committing <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur">crimes against humanity in Darfur</a>. The intimidation touched my family, and continued even after I left Khartoum for the relatively safe haven of Geneva.</p>
<p>Tedros is well-known worldwide because of his strong health leadership, especially in relation to Ebola and COVID-19. As a prominent global influencer, what he says matters.</p>
<h2>Speak up or stay silent?</h2>
<p>The vilification of the elected head of a United Nations agency raises disturbing wider issues. Should the leaders of international organisations speak up or stay silent when they see gross abuses by member states against agreed norms and laws they are duty-bound to uphold?</p>
<p>The WHO is a multilateral development agency but its health work is substantially humanitarian. And never more so than in our pandemic age. Tedros’s dilemma is well-known to all humanitarians. They are damned by governments if they speak up for victims of their abuse or oppression. They are also damned by rights advocates if they don’t, because giving “voice to the voiceless” is a cardinal element of their mission. </p>
<p>But what should be voiced loudly and what can only be whispered privately? They are allowed to beg for resources for the hungry and sick, but not to challenge the inhumanities that generate suffering. Because that violates the bedrock <a href="https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM-humanitarianprinciples_eng_June12.pdf">humanitarian principles</a> of “neutrality” and “impartiality”. And in the case of multilaterals, it trespasses into the no-go zone of national sovereignty, the last defence of states violating the international norms they have signed.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/comply-or-leave-the-dilemma-facing-humanitarian-agencies-165787">Comply or leave: the dilemma facing humanitarian agencies</a>
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<h2>Old rules don’t work</h2>
<p>The humanitarian space is rapidly shrinking in war theatres such as <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia">Ethiopia</a>, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-access-snapshot-january-february-2021">Yemen</a>, and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/report-myanmar-junta-restricting-lifesaving-humanitarian-aid/">Myanmar</a>. The old rules and associated civilities don’t work. </p>
<p>The defence shield of a multilateral system of frameworks and institutions such as the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/un-security-council-fails-support-global-ceasefire-shows-no-response-covid-19">UN Security Council</a>, Human Rights Council, International Criminal Court or the <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/what-tigray-portends-the-future-of-peace-and-security-in-africa/">African Union</a> and African Court on Human and People’s Rights is punctured by the geopolitics of powerful states with impunity to disregard or undermine them. </p>
<p>Idealists hold on to the <a href="https://www.proquest.com/openview/5fa9ea0c701964ce9ea7267ff8297c6e/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y">myth</a> that humanitarianism is a non-political enterprise. Yet it is shamelessly manipulated and blatantly shackled to partisan objectives, as graphically shown by current <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/22/afghanistan-aid-taliban-kabul-un-starvation-insecurity/">Afghanistan</a> and <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/podcast/2021/11/10/politicisation-of-aid-in-Ethiopia-rethinking-humanitarianism">Ethiopian</a> experiences. The political economy of humanitarian work is undergoing a tectonic shift as authoritarian superpowers and their dependent client states in Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia challenge the dispensations of a <a href="https://institute.global/policy/authoritarian-challenges-liberal-order">retreating liberal order</a>.</p>
<p>Humanitarian bodies – multilateral and civil society – don’t know how to respond to the wicked new world. Ethiopia provides a telling illustration. Before Dr Tedros put his head above the parapet, Addis had already <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/humanitarian-suspensions-and-politicization-aid-ethiopia">suspended</a> humanitarian agencies such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, MSF and Al Maktoum Foundation, and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-expels-seven-senior-un-officials-2021-09-30/">expelled</a> UN humanitarian staff.</p>
<p>Nowadays, humanitarians may only operate in Ethiopia if they submit to the will of the national authorities. The new rules are “see no evil, hear no evil, speak of no evil”. Even this could be swallowed if it meant that the desperate victims of famine and disease received help. But that is not happening and, instead, humanitarians risk getting co-opted into the total war on Tigray through their enforced passivity.</p>
<h2>Shrinking impact</h2>
<p>In past difficult circumstances, aid workers took inspiration from the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/who-we-are/movement">Red Cross Red Crescent Movement</a> that includes the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent Societies, and national societies in almost every country. They pioneered the modern humanitarian enterprise, giving us the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions">Geneva Conventions</a> and the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/4046-the_fundamental_principles_of_the_international_red_cross_and_red_crescent_movement.pdf">fundamental humanitarian principles</a>. But their collective impact shrinks worldwide as their noble vision collides with the realities of a harsher world. </p>
<p>Perhaps this explains why, unlike the voices of courageous leaders of some UN agencies such as <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/tigray-ethiopia-famine-rapes-tipping-point/">OCHA</a>, <a href="https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/children-feared-dead-and-injured-recent-attacks-refugee-and-internal-displacement">UNICEF</a> and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27448">OHCHR</a> that have rung out over Ethiopia, the leaders of ICRC and IFRC are strangely muted. The Ethiopian Red Cross, which once championed humanity through many previous cycles of violence, is heavily constrained by its controlling government. Despite their self-restraint, there is little to suggest that the Red Cross in Ethiopia has any privileged access to the most needy and vulnerable, especially in Tigray.</p>
<p>Under such circumstances, if speaking up or not doesn’t make a difference to whether or not humanitarians can succour the vulnerable, what should they do? The question should be posed to the recipients. Research is limited but <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/50406030-no-stranger-to-kindness">experience</a> indicates that potential beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance are not naive.</p>
<p>They are aware of what agencies cannot do if they are denied access by vengeful or cruel authorities. Under such circumstances, they are desperate not to be abandoned or forgotten, even if they can’t be practically helped. They still get huge comfort and courage when caring people of influence speak up because they can’t speak for themselves or won’t be heeded.</p>
<p>Tedros found himself between the devil of a situation in Tigray and the deep blue sea of his constraints as a top international civil servant. His compassion and conscience provided the rock from which he spoke for humanity, without fear or favour. Other leaders in responsible positions must do the same. Over the longer term, that may perhaps save more lives and even humanitarianism itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175441/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mukesh Kapila has held senior humanitarian and global health roles in the past in the UK Government and at the United Nations, World Health Organization, and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. </span></em></p>Humanitarians are stuck in a dilemma: challenging practices that cause suffering could risk access to the vulnerable people they serve.Mukesh Kapila, Professor Emeritus in Global Health & Humanitarian Affairs, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1528442021-01-20T13:57:34Z2021-01-20T13:57:34ZEthnic conflict could unravel Ethiopia’s valuable garment industry<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377733/original/file-20210108-21-1ujeina.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Garment factory at the Hawassa Industrial Park in Hawassa, southern Ethiopia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by EYERUSALEM JIREGNA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ethiopia has long been considered one of Africa’s economic <a href="https://www.nomadafricamag.com/ethiopia-africas-wunderkind/">wunderkinds</a>. Until recently, it had relative political stability in comparison to other countries on the continent. And, with an average GDP growth rate of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=ET">10% in the past decade</a> and a government that <a href="http://www.unido.or.jp/files/Ethiopia-Investment-Policies-and-Incentives-and-Opportunities.pdf">instituted policies friendly to foreign investors</a>, the country was able to attract <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Asian-investment-is-turning-Ethiopia-into-textile-hub">South and East Asian clothing manufacturers</a>. These sell to international brands, such as Decathlon and H&M.</p>
<p>But, for the past two months, violent conflict in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region fuelled by ethnic power politics has threatened the country’s stability. According to the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2021">International Crisis Group</a>, the violence has likely killed thousands of people, including many civilians, displaced more than a million people internally, and led some 50,000 to flee to Sudan. </p>
<p>The scale of the conflict could scare off foreign investment in the country’s garment industry. This <a href="https://www.academia.edu/28903445/Ethiopian_Industrial_Development_Strategic_Plan_2013_2025_FDRE_Ministry_of_Industry">sector is hugely important to Ethiopia</a>, which aimed to propel its agricultural economy toward a more prosperous future built on providing clothing to consumers in the West.</p>
<p>While the Ethiopian textile and garment industry <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---sro-addis_ababa/documents/publication/wcms_737627.pdf">is still small</a> – its export share is not more than 10% of total exports, and its products only represent 0.6% of total GDP – the sector was <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---sro-addis_ababa/documents/publication/wcms_737627.pdf">expected</a> to grow by around 40% a year in the next few years.</p>
<p>In March 2019, I assessed Ethiopia’s garment industry alongside two colleagues from the New York University’s Stern Center for Business and Human Rights. We wanted to see whether Ethiopia – as the new frontier of garment manufacturing – had learnt from mistakes in other sourcing countries. We <a href="https://issuu.com/nyusterncenterforbusinessandhumanri/docs/nyu_ethiopia_final_online?e=31640827/69644612">analysed</a> the industry’s prospects and the working conditions with a close look at the flagship <a href="http://www.investethiopia.gov.et/about-us/how-we-can-help?id=466">Hawassa Industrial Park</a>. This is a vast and still only partly filled facility, which currently employs 25,000 workers about 225km south of the capital of Addis Ababa.</p>
<p>What we found was sobering.</p>
<p>Manufacturers told us about the many challenges of doing business in Ethiopia. These included bureaucratic and logistical hurdles and the problems that come with an unskilled workforce that had no prior experience of working in an industrial setting. </p>
<p>Workers reported that they could barely survive with their base monthly wage as low as US$26. The government’s eagerness to attract foreign investment led it to promote the lowest base wage in any garment-producing country.</p>
<p>In addition to this already-strained business context, the <a href="https://issuu.com/nyusterncenterforbusinessandhumanri/docs/nyu_ethiopia_final_online?e=31640827/69644612">report</a> we published points to what we saw as the greatest challenge of all: ethnic tensions.</p>
<p>In Hawassa, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/11/07/Ethiopia-ethnic-autonomy-Sidama-Abiy">ethnic tension</a> erupted in July 2019 and caused disruptions to the industrial park. The new conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region could be the tipping point for foreign investors in the garment industry. Manufacturers had told us that further political instability in the country could jeopardise all future business.</p>
<p>The collapse of this sector would be disastrous. Tens of thousands of people would lose their jobs and the investments made in this enterprise wasted. In addition, foreign investors and the Ethiopian government need to understand that its collapse could have a symbolic knock-on effect in the region – Ethiopia’s garment sector is often seen as a pioneering experiment proving that structural transformation in Africa is possible.</p>
<h2>Unmet promises</h2>
<p>Garment manufacturers were already struggling to do business. We found that workers, unhappy with their working conditions and pay, were increasingly willing to protest by stopping work or even quitting. Attrition was high, and production was low.</p>
<p>There are also problems with raw materials, almost all of which need to be imported into Ethiopia from India or China. The <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-10-26/ethiopia-plans-to-rent-out-belgium-sized-land-area-to-produce-cash-crops">government advertised</a> the availability of more than 3 million hectares for cash crops, including cotton cultivation in 2010. In fact, only about 60,000 hectares were being used by 2019 to grow cotton, and that figure is falling as local farmers switch to sugar, sesame, and other more lucrative cash crops.</p>
<p>Ethnic tensions disrupted factory operations further. When Abiy Ahmed took over as Prime Minister in 2018, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48803815">his reforms</a> – which aimed to create a more ethnically inclusive government – unsettled the ruling coalition and opened a political space for ethnic tensions to resurface. For instance, in Hawassa, a group of the Sidama people – who are the majority ethnic group in the Hawassa state – <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/11/07/Ethiopia-ethnic-autonomy-Sidama-Abiy">pushed</a> for independence in 2019. </p>
<p>The political uncertainty due to ethnic tensions translates into economic uncertainty for investors. </p>
<p>In Hawassa, security concerns emerged for local workers and foreign staff. Night shifts had to be cancelled so that workers could get home safely before nightfall. Political demonstrations at the park’s fence and within the park disrupted production. Sidama people also mobilised within factories and demanded more jobs for their people resulting in <a href="https://www.just-style.com/news/workers-strike-at-ethiopias-hawassa-industrial-park_id135778.aspx">short strikes</a> and occasional <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-politics/unrest-over-autonomy-bid-kills-four-in-ethiopias-hawassa-city-idUSKCN1UE15Q">park-wide closings</a>.</p>
<p>Such disruptions are a wild card beyond the control of investors, which may set back further investments.</p>
<h2>By a thread</h2>
<p>When the COVID-19 pandemic broke out in early 2020, the sector was hanging by a thread. In June 2020, the International Labour Organisation published a <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---sro-addis_ababa/documents/publication/wcms_751045.pdf">report</a>, which described reduced orders and a situation for workers even more perilous than before.</p>
<p>By the end of 2020, many of the over 60,000 garment workers in Ethiopia had lost their jobs or were too afraid to return to work, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-garment-workers-feature-trfn/pay-cuts-and-forced-overtime-covid-19-takes-heavy-toll-on-ethiopias-garment-workers-idUSKBN28W1B5">fearing they would catch the coronavirus</a>.</p>
<p>The current ethnic conflict could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back. For instance, the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/china-and-ethiopia-part-4-mekelle-industrial-park/">industrial park in Mekelle</a> built for 20,000 workers – and with an occupancy in 2020 of around 3,500 workers – is currently closed. The current internet and phone blackout in the Tigray region now also makes any communication between buyers and the factories impossible.</p>
<p>A worsening human rights situation creates reputational and operational risks for investors and buyers. It increases uncertainty over the ability to complete orders and ship them on time. It also increases security risks for staff and workers. This may all cause long-lasting damage to investor confidence and the opportunity for sustainable economic development.</p>
<h2>What must change</h2>
<p>To assure investors, buyers, and international stakeholders, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed needs to end the blackout in the Tigray region, better protect journalists and civilians, and allow for independent human rights monitors to assess conditions. </p>
<p>At this critical moment, clothing companies and manufacturers invested in Ethiopia need to double down on their commitments to business in Ethiopia. This means they need to stay in the country and speak up to support human rights. </p>
<p>Once ethnic tensions are defused, more work will still need to be done by both the government and foreign manufacturers to strengthen the sector. This includes developing a domestic supply chain and establishing a minimum wage that ensures decent living conditions for workers.</p>
<p>But first, the future of the industry must be secured.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152844/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dorothee Baumann-Pauly does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The new conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region could be the tipping point for foreign investors in the garment industry.Dorothee Baumann-Pauly, Adjunct Professor and Director of the Geneva Center for Business and Human Rights, Université de GenèveLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1389672020-06-04T14:25:03Z2020-06-04T14:25:03ZVisibility study of Nairobi, Kampala and Addis Ababa reveals big air pollution problems<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336097/original/file-20200519-152315-1idv4k4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man pulls a cart through the early morning smog in Nairobi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">TOBIN JONES/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The global coronavirus pandemic is having a devastating effect on economies worldwide. However, one of the few positive consequences of travel restrictions and industrial downturn has been a temporary <a href="https://eartharxiv.org/edt4j/">reduction in air pollution</a>. This has made <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/23/coronavirus-photos-show-effect-of-air-pollution-drops-from-global-lockdown.html">skies cleaner and clearer</a>. </p>
<p>In Kenya’s capital, Nairobi, residents have documented this, reporting that they can now see two prominent mountains – Mount Kenya and Mount Kilimanjaro – from the city. It’s a view they haven’t enjoyed for decades. </p>
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<p>Similar <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/travel/article/himalayas-visible-lockdown-india-scli-intl/index.html">examples</a> have been seen in other cities around the world where short-term visibility – our ability to see blue skies – has improved due to the coronavirus lockdown effect. </p>
<p>So why have Mount Kenya and Mount Kilimanjaro not been seen for years? This is because visibility is mainly influenced by small airborne particles, often called particulate matter. These are generated through anthropogenic causes – such as traffic emission, power plants, factories, and crop burning – or natural causes – such as forest-fires, sea salt, dust, and volcanic eruptions. The particles scatter sunlight, thereby reducing visibility. So the more particles, the more pollution. </p>
<p>The evidence shows that the air pollution levels in <a href="https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/18/15403/2018/">Nairobi</a>, as with other East African urban areas, are currently at <a href="https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/69477/WHO_SDE_PHE_OEH_06.02_eng.pdf?sequence=1">unhealthy levels</a>. But there are very few studies and a <a href="https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/18/15403/2018/">lack of systematic and regulatory grade measurements of air pollution</a> in East African cities. The existing data only tells us about the current air quality – there’s no historical data to compare it with.</p>
<p>It’s important to know how much more air pollution there is because it can have significant impacts on our respiratory, cardiovascular, metabolic, and neurological systems. To this end, A Systems Approach to Air Pollution <a href="https://www.asap.uk.com/">(ASAP)</a> brings together leading UK and East African academics to provide a framework for improved air quality management. </p>
<p>We recently carried out <a href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ab8b12">a study</a> to fill the gap in information in three East African cities: Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Kampala. The study period was from 1974 to 2018. </p>
<p>We found that air pollution levels in Nairobi increased by 182% over the study period, Kampala by 162% and Addis Ababa by 62%. </p>
<p>This new data set provides a much-needed air pollution baseline for the three cities. They can now assess how effective current and future efforts to reduce air pollution are. </p>
<h2>Visibility data</h2>
<p>For our study, we used visibility data to predict how much particle pollution there was. Visibility measurements are routinely recorded at airports and other locations, and so we were able to use this data for our research. </p>
<p>Before the 1990s visibility <a href="https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/17/2085/2017/">was usually</a> measured manually. Afterwards light sensitive instruments were used, such as <a href="https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/17/2085/2017/">visiometer sensors</a>. Crudely, visiometer sensors <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/mie-scattering-theory">measure how much</a> light is scattered by particles and thus <a href="https://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/www/IMOP/publications/CIMO-Guide/Prelim_2018_ed/8_I_9_en_MR_clean.pdf">dictates visibility</a>.</p>
<p>We found that, over the last 45 years, Nairobi has experienced the most loss in visibility (60%) – for instance the average visibility dropped from about 35km to 14km from the 1970s to 2010s. Next with the most loss in visibility was Kampala (56%), followed by Addis Ababa (34%).</p>
<p>From this data we were able to calculate the air pollution levels. Simply put, visibility depends on how many particles there are, so we are able to model this into how much pollution there is. Crudely, the more particles, the lower the visibility – which means the more pollution. </p>
<p>This visibility approach is also translatable to other regions worldwide and can be particularly useful for locations that lack high quality, long term air quality monitoring. </p>
<h2>Visibility approach</h2>
<p>Over the past 50 years, clear sky average visibility has <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/323/5920/1468?casa_token=2uA46plzCsYAAAAA:oFMWlrdfpfRNosBuuJ_5pUGl0zuStqk7wnImc3yiHqwMZZgjGrrgLsDvUx8tDq78rxrfUqZ9W2Oetis">reduced all over the world</a>. This is indicative of <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/323/5920/1468?casa_token=2uA46plzCsYAAAAA:oFMWlrdfpfRNosBuuJ_5pUGl0zuStqk7wnImc3yiHqwMZZgjGrrgLsDvUx8tDq78rxrfUqZ9W2Oetis">changes in particle, gas emissions and climatic conditions</a>. </p>
<p>In the case of these three African cities, the study linked increased particulate matter pollution to increased rates of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2004/01/2004a_bpea_sachs.pdf">fuel use</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0269749116312933?casa_token=Lwf-fvxTp04AAAAA:edJbTbQotKoiDs1I2bMtHuMQ_lkk-7zRsVnP3h-As3oGZN9OEiYHUba0GxPCJX7Y29a_f-MN7Ac">motorisation</a> and <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60775/1/NCE%20Cities%20Paper01.pdf">socio-economic development</a>. This influences the city’s air quality because of large-scale construction, energy use, and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275117312933">increased vehicle emissions</a>. In <a href="https://www.ceicdata.com/en/kenya/road-transport-number-of-motor-vehicles-registered/road-transport-no-of-motor-vehicles-registered">Kenya</a>, for instance, there was a notable increase (200%) in the number of vehicles on the roads over the past decade. </p>
<p>Besides East Africa, many cities in <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1352231012008291">India</a>, and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1352231012004724?casa_token=ICu0inBk7qQAAAAA:ezSuDhTZs9Np9vNjA-xioqG2sIrhhfaSK_JlZIiJK_aukEKFlC5lgTslhfSJyqckcSvr88dnvB8">China</a> are also facing visibility degradation due to increased air pollution levels, while visibility significantly improved in <a href="https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2010JD014603">European cities</a>. Improved long-term visibility in European cities is the result of <a href="https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/air-quality-in-europe-2015">decreasing air pollution</a> there, possibly due to the results of successful air quality policies.</p>
<h2>Air pollution</h2>
<p>We hope this approach will be used to assess future air quality improvement interventions in the region. </p>
<p>Air pollution is an important environmental problem and a major public health concern due to its significant adverse toxicological impact on human health. Globally, the <a href="https://www.who.int/airpollution/data/cities/en/">World Health Organisation</a> estimates that 7 million people die prematurely each year due to exposure to harmful levels of air pollution. More than <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/27-09-2016-who-releases-country-estimates-on-air-pollution-exposure-and-health-impact">90% of deaths</a> occur in low and middle income countries.</p>
<p>Our evidence shows that while urban growth is an inevitable product of national development, there is a critical need for actions to be taken that ensure that urban development does not take place at the expense of good air quality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138967/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francis Pope received funding from the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) for this work. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ajit Singh and William Robert Avis do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We found that air pollution levels in Nairobi increased by 182% over the study period, Kampala by 162% and Addis Ababa by 62%.Ajit Singh, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of BirminghamFrancis Pope, Professor, University of BirminghamWilliam Robert Avis, Research Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1194952019-07-08T08:59:29Z2019-07-08T08:59:29ZAddis Ababa’s street hustlers helped build the city – now they’re being pushed out<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282868/original/file-20190705-51258-9ayw69.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=25%2C0%2C4255%2C2843&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Street life, Addis Ababa. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/addis-ababa-ethiopia-march-132014-streets-187152011?src=OXtnxKUd6DcZN5wMrkCGXg-1-53&studio=1">milosk50 / Shutterstock.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The population of Africa is booming, but as long as productivity and employment remain unsteady, <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/africa-regional-studies/publication/african-cities-opening-doors-to-the-world">“global experts” and economists contend</a>, African cities could descend into conflict and disorder. </p>
<p>From their perspective, activities like street hustling are seen to embody chaos and delinquency. Hustlers are assumed to be young, sometimes criminal, unemployed, and enmeshed in the informal economy of the streets, living in informal settlements or “slums” and illegally occupying urban land that could be used more productively. </p>
<p>These portrayals have a long history, rooted in <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/urban-planning-and-the-postcolonial-state-in-africa-a-research-overview-1/D36553C687C744BFE5F77DC70023AA53">colonial attitudes</a> toward informal workers and economic policies that have long overlooked the value street hustlers have created in modern African cities. </p>
<p>A successful hustler is embedded in the city’s social relations. To get by, hustlers connect people, provide services and enable economic exchange, in both licit ways (such as retail, brokering transactions and providing electricity, water, transport and sanitation) and illicit ways (retrieving and fencing stolen goods).</p>
<p>Of course, the street economy is not all roses. Hustling can be predatory and criminal. But this not the whole story, as <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501736261/the-act-of-living/">my own research</a> on street lives in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa taught me. </p>
<h2>Smartness in the city</h2>
<p>Hustling has a special place in Addis Ababa, especially in Arada – a historic part of the city centre. Since the mid-20th century, Arada has conveyed a sense of smartness and urban sophistication, which generations of residents have nurtured and cultivated.</p>
<p>In the 1950s and 60s, intellectuals, artists, government officials and members of the city’s emerging middle class described themselves as “Arada” to make sense of how the city, with its bars, restaurants, cinemas and theatre, shaped their lifestyles, sensibilities, and social lives. To this day, being Arada signifies a proud local history of cultural and intellectual production among the city’s middle classes. </p>
<p>At the same time, hustlers and sex workers – poor men and women who lived side by side with the middle classes – also claim to be Arada. For them, the hustler’s ability to navigate the city and get by against the odds was a sign of smartness. Being Arada has been a way for these people to assert their presence in the city and achieve a sense of self-worth and respect. </p>
<h2>Hit with evictions</h2>
<p>Both the intellectualism of the elites and the street smarts of hustlers and sex workers transformed the neighbourhood of Arada into a social and cultural hotspot. But today, the very people who gave the neighbourhood its meaning and value are under attack. In the past decade, the Addis Ababa city government has initiated waves of evictions targeting inner city areas, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/apr/08/demolition-derby-the-human-cost-of-addis-ababas-rapid-growth">including Arada and neighbouring Arat Kilo</a>.</p>
<p>Government officials I interviewed over the years are adamant that the cleared areas were unfit to live in, with dilapidated housing, poor sanitation and health conditions. The evictions are for development, they say – they make room for private investment and regeneration. </p>
<p>But in all likelihood, evicted residents won’t be able to return to the city centre. Those who can afford a down payment of <a href="https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/govt-revises-selling-price-condominium-houses">between 25,000 and 180,000 birr</a> (roughly US$850 to US$6,200), and monthly instalments of <a href="https://unhabitat.org/wpdm-package/the-state-of-addis-ababa-2017-the-addis-ababa-we-want/">2,000 to 3,000 birr</a> (US$70 to US$100) over 15 to 25 years, will relocate to the outskirts of Addis Ababa, where the government has been building large tracts of “affordable housing”. Those who cannot afford it – <a href="https://unhabitat.org/wpdm-package/the-state-of-addis-ababa-2017-the-addis-ababa-we-want/">20% of the city’s residents</a> – will need to look for a cheap place to rent elsewhere.</p>
<p>Commercial spaces, high-end apartments, leisure facilities and office blocks will replace inner city residences, alongside a few blocks of “affordable housing” for a lucky few. The old trope of the African city as a site which needs to be ordered and contained has struck again. And this time, it has hit longstanding residents hardest.</p>
<h2>Location, location, location</h2>
<p>For elite economists, developers, investors and policy makers, hustlers have no place in the new, beautified vision of Addis Ababa, and places such as Arada – with their dilapidated housing and informal economies – have no economic value. In fact, these very actors stand to profit from the cultural meaning and value generated by the residents that they evict from these historic areas. </p>
<p>One of these investors is Jonny (not his real name), an Ethiopian businessman in his fifties who I interviewed as part of my research. While holding a drink at the lounge bar at the Hilton, he showed me pictures of furnishings he had ordered from China. He was building a hotel in a newly cleared inner city area. It is an exciting business opportunity, he told me: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It was an old house, in an old area. Very beautiful, very beautiful.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The real estate motto “location, location, location” has as much to do with the historical and cultural significance of a place, as its proximity to local amenities or spectacular city views. But while developers like Jonny can now pursue their dreams, the people who made the area desirable in the first place are being pushed out.</p>
<h2>Urban exiles</h2>
<p>“They want to get rid of the poor,” said Ibrahim, a former hustler and current car attendant in his late thirties, as we walked around what remained of nearby neighbourhood Arat Kilo after a wave of evictions in 2012. Others clearly agreed. Just a few days after the evictions, graffiti appeared on the remaining buildings: “<a href="https://addisfortune.net/articles/jealous-city/">Since they were jealous of us, they tore down ours</a>,” one message read. Some parts of Arada are still standing, but residents worry that sooner or later, it will be their turn. </p>
<p>In research interviews, government officials emphasised to me that evictees are compensated, and that being offered place in the government’s affordable housing programme is a change for the better. </p>
<p>But Eden, a mother of two who lives in a new built housing complex on the eastern outskirts of Addis Ababa, did not agree: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We live in these new houses, but there is not much change! Now we have to pay thousands for the mortgage. Then your salary is cut, first by taxes and then by transport costs – it is not fair!</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Evictions in Addis Ababa will continue regardless, this time also with the involvement of international investment. In November 2018, Abu Dhabi-based real estate developer Eagle Hills and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed <a href="https://www.arabianbusiness.com/construction/408367-uae-developer-enters-ethiopia-with-la-gare-mega-project">launched <em>La Gare</em></a>, a new development with shopping malls, luxury hotels and over 4,000 high-end residences. La Gare will replace Kirkos, one of the oldest neighbourhoods in the inner city. </p>
<p>This April, Abiy Ahmed announced another milestone in his plans for the regeneration of Addis Ababa. His riverside project - “Beautifying Shegher” - will be <a href="https://press.et/english/?p=5020#">supported by the Chinese government</a>: a 12-kilometre redevelopment of densely populated parts of the Ethiopian capital. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-silk-road-urbanism-is-changing-cities-from-london-to-kampala-can-locals-keep-control-114125">China's 'Silk Road urbanism' is changing cities from London to Kampala – can locals keep control?</a>
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<p>As Ethiopia’s <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/12/04/na120418-ethiopia-remarkable-progress">economy continues to grow</a>, development is in demand and inner city residents, including hustlers, expect it. But it should not be pursued at the expense of the very people who helped create value and meaning in the city. This value must be recognised: historically and politically but – above all – morally and monetarily. </p>
<p><em>The names of individuals interviewed as part of the research project have been changed.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119495/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This research was funded by the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique (FRS - FNRS), the Fondation Wiener-Anspach and the Wenner-Gren Foundation. </span></em></p>Development should not be pursued at the expense of the very people who helped to create value and meaning in the city.Marco Di Nunzio, Lecturer in the Anthropology of Africa, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1181352019-06-05T12:39:01Z2019-06-05T12:39:01ZMore work lies ahead to make Africa’s new free trade area succeed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277925/original/file-20190604-69059-1afywat.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The port of Mombasa in Kenya, which was the first country, with Ghana, to ratify the African Continental Free Trade Agreement in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At a time when the global trade regime is under attack, the African Union (AU) is celebrating the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which came into effect <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20190429/afcfta-agreement-secures-minimum-threshold-22-ratification-sierra-leone-and">on 30 May</a>. </p>
<p>After being ratified by the required minimum 22 nations, all the member states of the AU are now legally bound to allow African goods to be traded without restraint throughout the continent. </p>
<p>This is an impressive achievement. AfCFTA not only covers the entire continent, but has proceeded at a record pace. It was <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/34055-ext_assembly_dec_1x_e26_march.pdf">signed on 21 March 2018</a>. Its entry into force underlines African leaders’ commitment to pan-African economic integration – a <a href="https://archive.org/details/africamustunite00nkru/">goal as old as African independence</a> in the 1960s. </p>
<p>Intra-regional trade has long been minimal in Africa, standing at <a href="https://www.tralac.org/news/article/13489-african-trade-statistics-yearbook-2017.html">13% for intra-imports and 17% for intra-exports</a> over the last seven years. Earlier continental trade initiatives, such as the <a href="http://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/14129">1980 Lagos Plan of Action</a> and the <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/aec.htm">1991 African Economic Community</a>, have lagged far behind their ambitions. </p>
<p>However, the practical implications of the continental free trade area are <a href="https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/will-free-trade-be-africas-economic-game-changer">not immediate</a>. Significant work is required to deliver tangible results. Negotiations on tariffs, time lines and the seat of the AfCFTA Secretariat are still ongoing. And without effective public policies, liberalising trade risks having negative implications for many people on the continent.</p>
<h2>African trade to date</h2>
<p>Establishing regional economic communities across the continent has produced a complex pattern of overlapping but inconsequential <a href="https://ecdpm.org/publications/political-economy-africas-regional-spaghetti-bowl-synthesis-report/?utm_source=ECDPM+Newsletters+List&utm_campaign=bb4d47f899-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_05_27_01_19&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_f93a3dae14-bb4d47f899-388797801">trade regimes</a>. The only functioning <a href="https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/customs-union/">customs union</a> on the continent remains the 109 year-old <a href="https://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=394">Southern African Customs Union</a>, an imperial relic that is dominated by South Africa.</p>
<p>The last large-scale attempt to liberalise trade in Africa - the <a href="https://www.tralac.org/resources/by-region/comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite-fta.html">Tripartite agreement</a> covering most of eastern and southern Africa - was launched in 2015. Only four out of 27 countries ratified it, and the agreement was yet another hyped but ultimately stillborn initiative.</p>
<p>After a disappointing track record of African trade agreements, the AU is convinced that AfCFTA is finally the silver bullet. Indeed, there are some encouraging signs that the stars are aligning favourably.</p>
<p>At a time when the World Trade Organisation has proclaimed the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46395379">worst crisis in global trade since 1947</a>, and in a context of China and the US waging <a href="https://www.ft.com/us-china-trade-dispute">trade disputes</a>, African governments are collectively swimming against the stream.</p>
<p>The AU leadership has been eager to push a <a href="https://au.int/agenda2063/overview">long-term integration agenda</a> and an <a href="http://ipss-addis.org/research/policy_periodicals/the_au_reform_agenda-_what_areas_of_reform_are_mos.php">institutional reform agenda</a>. But it has struggled with what Rwandan President Paul Kagame, in his role as AU chairperson in 2018, <a href="http://www.rci.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/78/News/FInal%20AU%20Reform%20Combined%20report_28012017.pdf">called</a> a “crisis of implementation”.</p>
<p>The reform process aims to focus the AU on fewer priorities and to make the <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">AU Commission</a> more efficient in steering integration. It also seeks to make the AU central budget financially independent from international partners. This plan has struck a chord with many member states and the AU Commission. Creating a continental free trade area fits well into the strategy.</p>
<h2>Why AfCFTA is different</h2>
<p>Adherence to AfCFTA has become a competition for the title of “who is the best pan-Africanist”. This peer pressure to jump on the train <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Nigeria-now-close-to-signing-African-trade-pact/2560-5133532-a9cs0m/index.html">before it leaves the station</a> is behind the agreement’s rapid ratification.</p>
<p>The free trade area aspires to a membership of 55 highly diverse countries. This seems arbitrary from an economic point of view. However, it corresponds to and will likely benefit from an increasingly recognised and institutionalised “continentalist” interpretation of Africa. </p>
<p>AfCFTA is also vague enough to appeal to advocates of both trade liberalisation and economic protectionism. At this stage it is still possible for it to become either a stepping stone towards global integration, or a barrier against businesses from outside the continent.</p>
<h2>Obstacles to overcome</h2>
<p>In practice, trade in Africa did not change overnight on 30 May. Three key obstacles must still be overcome. If they’re not, the deal may follow the same path as the ill-fated agreements that have gone before it.</p>
<p>Firstly, AfCFTA has put the cart before the horse. Although it is now in force, many of the actual rules <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Keys_to_success_for_AfCFTA.pdf">still need to be agreed upon</a>. The process of negotiating rules of origin, tariff schedules, and service sector concessions will be long and cumbersome.</p>
<p>African states often lack the expertise or capacity to conduct such negotiations. International partners like the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/africa-europe-alliance-eu-supports-african-continental-free-trade-area-eu50-million_en">European Union</a> and <a href="https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/AfCFTA%20Factsheet%20%20EN%2002112019.pdf">Germany</a> have flocked to the AU Commission in large numbers to support AfCFTA.</p>
<p>Their support will likely be fragmented through the deployment of consultants and technical assistance. This does not bode well for the ownership of AfCFTA by AU member states and the AU Commission.</p>
<p>Secondly, AfCFTA is facing challenges regarding its governance. The details of its secretariat are yet to be thrashed out. What we do know is that the secretariat will be a <a href="https://www.tralac.org/documents/events/tralac/2800-tralac-annual-conference-presentation-the-afcfta-secretariat-beatrice-chaytor-auc-march-2019/file.html">semi-autonomous organ of the AU</a>, and that six countries are <a href="https://www.viportal.co/kenya-leads-quest-to-host-acfta-secretariat/">competing to host it</a>.</p>
<p>The likely geographical distance from AU headquarters in Ethiopia will complicate coordination with the continental body’s policy agenda. Budget cuts to the AU’s Department of Trade and Industry further hamper the transitory facilitation of AfCFTA.</p>
<p>Finally, the free trade area will invariably pose economic challenges in AU member states. The promise of free trade agreements is to create wealth through increased competition, the equalisation of wages and the substitution of domestic labour with imported goods. </p>
<p>International experience shows that the gains tend to be <a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/firms-trade/integrated-and-unequal-effects-trade-inequality-developing-countries">unequally distributed</a>, especially if a free trade area involves a large amount of diverse economies. Entire economic sectors and communities can be heavily affected by the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/448862/REA_FreeTradeAgreements.pdf">downsides</a>: wage cuts, unemployment and environmental degradation.</p>
<p>Questions abound. How will governments manage AfCFTA’s winners and losers when existing social protections are weak, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-voice-of-africas-informal-economy-should-be-heard-52766">informal markets dominate</a> many sectors? Will governments still respect the agreement even if it hurts some of their businesses and state companies? And how will they deal with the loss of customs revenue? Nigeria’s <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2019/05/27/settle-problem-home-dont-bring-african-union-obasanjo-tells-nigeria/">internal disputes</a> and <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/05/30/muhammadu-buhari-has-big-ambitions-for-nigerian-manufacturing">protectionism</a> are a case in point</p>
<p>The road ahead to an effective free trade agreement that delivers results to Africans is still long.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118135/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Africa’s new continental free trade area, the AfCFTA, is a remarkable achievement. However, decisive diplomatic, technical and social action is needed for it to succeed.Frank Mattheis, Senior research fellow, University of PretoriaUeli Staeger, PhD researcher, International Relations/Political Science, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1076752018-12-02T09:44:27Z2018-12-02T09:44:27ZTaking Africa’s democratic temperature as a dozen countries prepare for polls<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247701/original/file-20181128-32180-15epy30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Elections, and observer processes are a big priority in Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/6124051652/in/photolist-akancs-8mSagA-an1fUo-cL6KV5-Thx7Mf-9Z4FLs-8mRHm3-fjNXKj-6pqC1Q-7TECcV-7TECci-bU3m84-6h8Vwe-bo9sEL-6pqDGN-eF6DxB-4RuJch-9JG8Yy-52Tnxd-6he2Fj-ayfYsU-5m3orW-9JDiYp-yUF2J3-8muuvR-8mP4va-5kY7Ma-aGQLMe-eFKQnc-aDbz5M-8qKc2R-7TECbM-9JDkWM-9FMELA-6pkkLf-nekXcc-9XzUDt-mhtT8X-5HdCsH-eF5XEp-6hfvuc-6j6JjX-9vQJrY-p7MRfr-aWdBRB-7THSNG-6hfQfP-fa865-9p5LqF-dni4cx">UN Photo/Flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than a <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2019.php">dozen national elections</a> will be held across Africa next year. All 55 members of the African Union (AU) are obligated to hold regular and ostensibly democratic elections. They must also invite teams of AU election observers to publicly monitor, assess and <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance">report the results</a>. </p>
<p>Is all this electoral activity helping to entrench democracy as the foundation for national and regional security, development and integration? Or have elections become the means for demagogues to grab power – or, more typically, for powerful elites and authoritarian rulers to entrench themselves? </p>
<p>Democratic theory prescribes credible elections as a necessary, but insufficient means, to consolidate real democracy. Real democracy typically abets peace and security. National circumstances vary. But three additional conditions are also vital. They are freedom of expression, the right of assembly, and an independent nonpartisan judiciary to resolve disputes and ensure the rule of law predominates. </p>
<p>Most deadly conflicts in Africa occur within – not between – <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1904/RAND_RR1904.pdf">sovereign states</a>. Recognising this, the AU has made observing and assessing democratic elections an <a href="http://www.achpr.org/instruments/guide-elections/">integral part</a> of its operations. This often happens alongside observers from regional economic communities.</p>
<p>As observations improve, so do opportunities to gauge whether electoral violence and other severe human rights abuses threaten regional peace and security. </p>
<p>In mid-November, there were three important developments at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. These promise to improve Africa’s long-term prospects for collective self-reliance and democratic peace. And this will happen regionally, nationally and locally. </p>
<p>The first was a streamlining of the continental body’s operations. The second was a move to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of member countries. The third was a renewed commitment to improve the depth, duration, and diligence of African election observation missions. </p>
<h2>Three Changes</h2>
<p>President Paul Kagame of Rwanda has been the chair of the AU this year. He has driven a set of administrative and financial reforms to improve its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/35132-doc-ext-assembly-2xiannex_-_administrative_reform_roadmap_e.pdf">efficiency and effectiveness</a>.</p>
<p>Headline reforms include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Reducing the number of AU Commission portfolios, </p></li>
<li><p>Introducing merit-based hiring and promotion procedures, and </p></li>
<li><p>Reducing dependence on foreign donors. This has been achieved by revising the scale of member state contributions and penalties for nonpayment. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The key structural reform will be combining the portfolios of Political Affairs and Peace and Security. This makes sense strategically. It will ensure that the lion’s share of AU resources supports both urgent peacemaking needs and creates conditions conducive to developing politically capable states. Failures on either front could jeopardise the AU’s strategic plan for the <a href="http://archive.au.int/assets/images/agenda2063.pdf">socio-economic transformation of the continent</a>.</p>
<p>Two other developments complement these shifts.</p>
<p>One is the Assembly’s decision to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20181118/11th-extraordinary-summit-summary-key-decisions">key governance areas on the continent</a>. This promises substantial improvements in the role and functioning of the <a href="https://www.aprm-au.org/">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>. The mechanism was established in 2003. It aims to encourage member states to critically and regularly assess their progress in governance and socio-economic development. </p>
<p>After much initial excitement, the mechanism devolved into a largely technical and widely ignored exercise. Its governing Forum of Heads of State sought to infuse it with greater political clout and relevance in 2016. It mandated its new director, Professor Eddy Maloka, to produce an Africa-wide comparative assessment of governance challenges facing AU member states. </p>
<p>This will be presented to the next regular AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/oped/comment/The-key-outcomes-of-the-African-Union-Summit/434750-4648608-sdx3oaz/index.html">February 2019</a>. </p>
<p>The final change involves beefing up election monitoring. Ten years ago the AU entered into a formal partnership with the <a href="https://eisa.org.za/">Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa</a>. The parties agreed on 16 November to seek ways to extend and improve the partnership. </p>
<p>The institute is based in Johannesburg. It boasts an all-African staff from more than a dozen nations. It has helped AU missions on several fronts. This has included the training and application of:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a common set of observation principles and democratic election standards, and </p></li>
<li><p>more comprehensive, rapid and technologically advanced tools and training of AU observers. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The partnership has also helped the AU to acquire a leadership role among domestic and international election observer groups pursuing greater electoral transparency and accountability. This is true even within Africa’s most troubled states. </p>
<h2>Is democracy dying?</h2>
<p>These efforts would seem to run counter to the question “Is Democracy Dying?”, which has become a preoccupation in the era of US President Donald Trump. African politics, too, are vulnerable to demagoguery, debauchery and divisiveness. More notable is the proliferation of progressive forces at all levels of African politics. They are exposing and combating corruption and other egregious abuses of power. </p>
<p>Progress is slow, erratic, and dangerous for democracy advocates and activists to pursue. Yet in a year when <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018">Freedom House’s latest global survey</a> concludes democracy is in decline, Africa may well be bucking the trend. </p>
<p>The Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s 2018 <a href="http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/">Index of African Governance</a> found that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…governance on our continent, on average, is slowly improving … approximately three out of four African citizens live in a country where governance has improved over the last ten years.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite Africa’s many problems, it continues to sustain a wide variety of democratic experiments. Extensive surveys by <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, the non-partisan research network, show the majority of Africa’s citizens still prefer democracy to the alternative. This is a reality the African Union increasingly recognises and is attempting to support.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107675/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau serves on the EISA Board without compensation and in that capacity was a member of the team that met with AU officials on 16 November 2018. </span></em></p>Surveys shows that the majority of Africans prefer democracy, despite its flaws, to the alternatives.John J Stremlau, Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/974712018-06-06T14:01:36Z2018-06-06T14:01:36ZAfrican cities must address social and economic issues when upgrading slums<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220966/original/file-20180530-120511-vb5d25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People feel a real sense of community in slums like Kibera in Nairobi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/DAI KUROKAWA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In sub-Saharan Africa, <a href="https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2016/">over 55%</a> of the urban population are estimated to live in areas categorised as slums and informal settlements. These slums and informal settlements are largely the physical manifestations of urban inequality, socially and economically. They embody the exclusion of poor urban households from cities’ formal economy and its environmental amenities like green spaces. </p>
<p>People living in these areas are also <a href="http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/87/12/09-073445/en/">more vulnerable</a> to the impacts of extreme weather events associated with climate change. </p>
<p>Waste collection is poor, so pollution levels are high. This means that slums have a negative effect on natural ecosystems. Their presence can cause environmental degradation and deplete natural resources such as timber. </p>
<p>In other words, slums represent an intertwining of the socio-economic and environmental problems of urbanisation. But many government attempts to upgrade slums in Africa focus largely on the environmental issues and ignore the social and economic dynamics. Studies in <a href="http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/9/12/2273">Addis Ababa</a> and <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/661163">Nairobi</a> have shown that people moved from slums into new housing experience a loss of community connection and in some cases cannot afford life outside the slum.</p>
<p>This was echoed in <a href="http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/handle/10539/22349">research I conducted</a> in an area called Cosmo City outside Johannesburg, South Africa. People who had been moved there from an informal settlement felt less safe and were battling financially. </p>
<p>My findings, and those from Kenya and Ethiopia, suggest that a community oriented approach is necessary. Merely moving people without taking their social and economic concerns into consideration is not the way to deal with the issue of urban slums.</p>
<h2>Case studies</h2>
<p>The Ethiopian government’s current approach is to clear slums and develop new housing in their stead. Households are relocated from shacks in slums to newly developed high-rise apartments. A <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/urbanplanning/article/view/1239">recent study</a> examined the environmental and social aspects of this clear-and-redevelop approach in Arat Kilo slum and the Ginfle high-rise apartments in Addis Ababa.</p>
<p>The study found that the move had some environmental benefits. It marginally reduced the amount of resources consumed by households, particularly water and energy (apart from gasoline). There was also a small reduction in the quantity of solid, liquid and gaseous waste generated. </p>
<p>But the high-rise apartments were strikingly less liveable. The study found that while 80% of those interviewed felt happy living in the slum, only 50% were happy in the high-rise flats. And 95% felt secure in the slum – but only 7% felt the same way in the new apartments. Trust also declined: 97% said they’d trusted their neighbours in Arat Kilo but only 34% trusted their neighbours in the new apartments.</p>
<p>Kenya’s government takes a similar approach to Ethiopia’s through its <a href="http://housingandurban.go.ke/kenya-slum-upgrading-programme-kensup/">Slum Upgrading Programme</a>. It constructs high-rise blocks of flats to replace slums. </p>
<p>Over the years, since 2010, portions of Kibera – which is Nairobi’s largest slum have been cleared and households relocated. Most recently, Kibera residents have been moved into 822 housing units within 21 blocks of 4-storey buildings in Soweto East, a zone of the slum. There are plans to develop another 2072 housing units on cleared parts of Kibera in the next few years.</p>
<p>But about half of those who officially received houses in the new apartments in Soweto East <a href="https://www.one.org/international/blog/why-residents-of-kibera-slum-are-rejecting-new-housing-plans/">no longer reside</a> there. These units have either been given away, sold or rented out. </p>
<p>One beneficiary told the study’s author that she still buys her groceries in the slum because it’s cheaper. She also spends her weekends in slum, visiting her friends and neighbours there. She has lived in the apartment for about three years and doesn’t know any of her neighbours.</p>
<p>This all suggests that Kenya and Ethiopia’s governments are ignoring social and economic factors when relocating people from slums.</p>
<p>In South Africa, where I recently conducted <a href="http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/handle/10539/22349">a study</a>, qualifying households within informal settlements are relocated to new fully subsidised houses on a serviced plot in newly established areas. </p>
<p>Beginning from 2005, almost 3000 households were relocated from Zevenfontein informal settlement to a new housing development called Cosmo City. The two areas are about 11 kilometres apart. I found that the residents loathed some aspects of the new neighbourhood. One woman told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Zevenfontein was better than Cosmo City because here money speaks… There, I can fetch wood from the bush and come to cook. Here, being unemployed is a challenge because you use electricity… Some people will say that Cosmo City is better because there is electricity here but the crime is too high. One is not free.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Her concerns were echoed by other people I interviewed. </p>
<h2>Community engagement</h2>
<p>Only the Addis Ababa case study showed some environmental benefits. All three examples came with social and economic downsides for residents. It is important for any upgrading of slums and informal settlements to not only improve environmental quality, but also to boost people’s overall quality of life. </p>
<p>One way to achieve this is for every slum upgrading project to be fair, inclusive, empowering and to include those it will affect. Productive community involvement is crucial. Empowering poverty alleviation programs are necessary as well as those which harness social capital in existing and new communities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97471/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olumuyiwa Adegun receives funding from Guest Researchers’ Scholarship, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala. Sweden. </span></em></p>Moving people without taking their social and economic concerns into consideration isn’t the way to deal with urban slums.Olumuyiwa Adegun, Lecturer, Department of Architecture, Federal University of Technology, AkureLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/956592018-05-17T14:11:49Z2018-05-17T14:11:49ZWhy Addis Ababa shouldn’t criminalise children who beg on its streets<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217762/original/file-20180504-166910-1czz8dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Street-connected children use begging as a livelihood strategy</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock/SunshineSeeds</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over half of Ethiopia’s 100 million <a href="https://qz.com/1109739/ethiopia-is-one-of-the-fastest-growing-economies-in-the-world/">inhabitants</a> are Orthodox Christians and a third practice Islam. Begging, in the form of almsgiving, is supported by the religious teachings of Christianity and Islam and is very common in the capital, Addis Ababa. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08039410.2009.9666438">My study</a> involved talking to boys and girls on the streets of Addis Ababa to explore what they beg for, how and why. </p>
<p>I found that begging was key to the survival of street children. It supports them and their impoverished families. It’s a transient livelihood, and how long they stay as beggars is based on household income, gender and changing experiences. </p>
<p>As Addis Ababa develops into a modern city, anti-begging rhetoric is on the rise. Beggars are increasingly being treated like public nuisances and criminals, targeted in police street-clearance projects. </p>
<p>Ethiopia has experienced rapid economic development with an average growth rate of 10% since 2004, making it one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. The government has set the <a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/AfDB%20and%20Ethiopia%20-%20Partnering%20for%20Inclusive%20Growth.pdf">ambitious</a> target of becoming a middle-income country by 2025. However, inequality between the rich and poor is widening.</p>
<p>Instead of criminalising beggars, Ethiopia should use social protection programmes and policies to support children who beg. Studies <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277557927_Control_protection_and_rights_A_critical_review_of_Peru's_Begging_Bill">show that</a> banning begging is not the best option as it’s a quick fix that doesn’t actually address children’s needs, or that of their families. </p>
<p>Instead, interventions should be implemented that take the structural causes of poverty and inequality into account. For instance, employment creation, support for disabled parents, housing and social cash transfer schemes. </p>
<h2>Why children beg</h2>
<p>Poverty is a major reason why children are forced to work on the streets. Family disintegration, abuse and neglect by parents, and the lack of social services are big factors. Other reasons include the failure of rural livelihoods, including displacement due to drought, famine and war; harmful traditional practices (for example, early marriage) or the loss of a parent. The survey revealed that almost half (46%) of the children sampled were living with step-parents because their biological parents had died, divorced or separated. </p>
<p>There are two general categories of children that beg. “Full-time” child beggars who use begging as a source of livelihood and “part-time” child beggars who practice it only intermittently. </p>
<p>Full-time beggars include children that are born to parents with disabilities. Because there is no social support system for these people, they will often depend on their families for survival. In this scenario, begging is a source of livelihood and children learn how to beg when they accompany their disabled parents. </p>
<p>But not all children earn their whole income from begging. Without a steady income, begging can act as a supplement to other activities. For example Genet, a 13-year year old girl, sells lottery tickets and sometimes begs with her blind mother. She said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We live in rented shack paying 950 birr per month (about USD$20). I have a big interest in education, but the money we earn is so meagre that life is precarious. If we don’t pay house rent on time our landlords expel us, and insult us. Finding money for rent is always a problem.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Then there are children that see begging as a job. It is perceived as an activity which needs skills and the ability to do business. They don’t use the term begging to describe what they do. Instead refer to it as <em>s'ik'alla</em> or simply business. The etymology of s’ik’alla is an Arabic term “shigul”, meaning “work”. They see it as a legitimate and a way of generating money based on effort. </p>
<p>In recent years, however, the income families receive from working informally on the streets, has come under pressure. Activities like street vending or shoe-shining are seen as something that need to be formalised and contribute to the national economy by paying tax. Begging falls outside of both “formal” and “informal” economic activities. </p>
<h2>Government policies</h2>
<p>The city of Addis Ababa has embarked on new attempts to formalise many informal street vendors through job-creation schemes. But street children and young people aren’t included. </p>
<p>There’s a need to understand why children beg. Begging is not just about a lack of food or shelter. It’s about a number of social deprivations, including a lack of access to housing. </p>
<p>The children pointed out a number of priorities that would support them. They want a good education and skill and capital to startup businesses. They wish for the police to stop beating them. They wish to be supported to get education through flexible schooling. And nearly all street children who beg stated that they would like to be provided with affordable housing.</p>
<p>There are some lesson Ethiopia can draw from <a href="https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/7223/Have-cash-transfers-succeeded-in-reaching-the-poor-in-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean_COMPLETE.pdf?sequence=1">Latin American</a> countries that have used cash transfer schemes to support the poor. The government also needs to start focusing on redistribution of wealth rather than just rapid economic growth. Urban housing policies should ensure poor families have access to decent shelter. There should also be social security schemes to assist, especially households whose members are unemployed because of disability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95659/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatek Abebe is associate professor of childhood studies at Norwegian University of Sciences and Technology. Funding for this research is obtained from the Research Council of Norway, and Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, Norway. </span></em></p>As Addis Ababa develops into a modern city, beggars are increasingly being treated like public nuisances and criminals.Tatek Abebe, Associate Professor in Childhood Studies, Norwegian University of Science and TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/865662017-11-01T13:36:30Z2017-11-01T13:36:30ZHow to turn a volcano into a power station – with a little help from satellites<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192679/original/file-20171031-18735-1gapo0c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Erta Ale in eastern Ethiopia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/erta-ale-shield-volcano-eastern-ethiopia-651968962?src=qtB_MW4J7_7YV2kH-EHpZw-1-65">mbrand85</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ethiopia tends to conjure images of sprawling dusty deserts, bustling streets in Addis Ababa or the precipitous cliffs of the <a href="https://www.simienmountainsnationalpark.org/">Simien Mountains</a> – possibly with a distance runner bounding along in the background. Yet the country is also one of the most volcanically active on Earth, thanks to Africa’s <a href="http://www.nationalgeographic.com.au/videos/geologic-journey/african-rift-the-great-rift-valley-1301.aspx">Great Rift Valley</a>, which runs right through its heart. </p>
<p>Rifting is the geological process that rips tectonic plates apart, roughly at the speed your fingernails grow. In Ethiopia this has enabled magma to force its way to the surface, and there are over 60 known volcanoes. Many have undergone colossal eruptions in the past, leaving behind immense craters that pepper the rift floor. Some volcanoes are still active today. Visit them and you find bubbling mud ponds, hot springs and scores of steaming vents. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192438/original/file-20171030-18725-yn0y3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192438/original/file-20171030-18725-yn0y3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192438/original/file-20171030-18725-yn0y3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192438/original/file-20171030-18725-yn0y3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192438/original/file-20171030-18725-yn0y3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192438/original/file-20171030-18725-yn0y3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192438/original/file-20171030-18725-yn0y3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192438/original/file-20171030-18725-yn0y3a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Steam rising at Aluto volcano, Ethiopia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">William Hutchison</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This steam has been used by locals for washing and bathing, but underlying this is a much bigger opportunity. The surface activity suggests extremely hot fluids deep below, perhaps up to 300°C–400°C. Drill down and it should be possible access this high temperature steam, which could drive large turbines and produce huge amounts of power. This matters greatly in a <a href="https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2014.pdf">country where</a> 77% of the population has no access to electricity, one of the lowest levels in Africa. </p>
<p>Geothermal power has recently become a serious proposition thanks to geophysical surveys <a href="http://www.rg.is/static/files/about-us/rg-corbettigeothermalpower.pdf">suggesting that</a> some volcanoes could yield a gigawatt of power. That’s the <a href="https://energy.gov/eere/articles/how-much-power-1-gigawatt">equivalent of</a> several million solar panels or 500 wind turbines from each. The total untapped resource is <a href="http://theargeo.org/fullpapers/COUNTRY%20UPDATE%20ON%20GEOTHERMAL%20EXPLORATION%20AND%20DEVELOPMENT%20IN%20ETHIOPIA.pdf">estimated to be</a> in the region of 10GW. </p>
<p>Converting this energy into power would build on the geothermal pilot project that began some 20 years ago at Aluto volcano in the lakes region 200km south of Addis Ababa. Its infrastructure is currently being upgraded to increase production tenfold, from 7MW to 70MW. In sum, geothermal looks like a fantastic low-carbon renewable solution for Ethiopia that could form the backbone of the power sector and help lift people out of poverty. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/z5sdGyKqtkA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<h2>Scratching the surface</h2>
<p>The major problem is that, unlike more developed geothermal economies like Iceland, very little is known about Ethiopia’s volcanoes. In almost all cases, we don’t even know when the last eruption took place – a vital question since erupting volcanoes and large-scale power generation will not make happy bedfellows. </p>
<p>In recent years, the UK’s Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) has been funding <a href="https://www.geos.ed.ac.uk/riftvolc/ProjectRiftVolc.html">RiftVolc</a>, a consortium of British and Ethiopian universities and geological surveys, to address some of these issues. This has focused on understanding the hazards and developing methods for exploring and monitoring the volcanoes so that they can be exploited safely and sustainably. </p>
<p>Teams of scientists have been out in the field for the past three years deploying monitoring equipment and making observations. Yet some of the most important breakthroughs have come through an entirely different route – through researchers analysing satellite images at their desks. </p>
<p>This has produced exciting findings at Aluto. Using a satellite radar technique, we <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2016GC006395/full">discovered that</a> the volcano’s surface is <a href="http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Observing_the_Earth/Highlights/Africa_s_ups_and_downs#">inflating and deflating</a>. The best analogy is breathing – we found sharp “inhalations” inflating the surface over a few months, followed by gradual “exhalations” which cause slow subsidence over many years. We’re not exactly sure what is causing these ups and downs, but it is good evidence that magma, geothermal waters or gases are moving around in the depths some five km below the surface. </p>
<h2>Taking the temperature</h2>
<p>In our <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037702731730118X">most recent paper</a>, we used satellite thermal images to probe the emissions of Aluto’s steam vents in more detail. We found that the locations where gases were escaping often coincided with known fault lines and fractures on the volcano. </p>
<p>When we monitored the temperature of these vents over several years, we were surprised to find that most were quite stable. Only a few vents on the eastern margin showed measurable temperature changes. And crucially, this was not happening in synchronicity with Aluto’s ups and downs – we might have expected that surface temperatures would increase following a period of inflation, as hot fluids rise up from the belly of the volcano.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192440/original/file-20171030-18700-1tm2a02.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192440/original/file-20171030-18700-1tm2a02.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192440/original/file-20171030-18700-1tm2a02.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192440/original/file-20171030-18700-1tm2a02.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192440/original/file-20171030-18700-1tm2a02.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192440/original/file-20171030-18700-1tm2a02.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192440/original/file-20171030-18700-1tm2a02.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192440/original/file-20171030-18700-1tm2a02.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A productive geothermal well on Aluto.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">William Hutchison</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It was only when we delved into the rainfall records that we came up with an explanation: the vents that show variations appear to be changing as a delayed response to rainfall on the higher ground of the rift margin. Our conclusion was that the vents nearer the centre of the volcano were not perturbed by rainfall and thus represent a better sample of the hottest waters in the geothermal reservoir. This obviously makes a difference when it comes to planning where to drill wells and build power stations on the volcano, but there’s a much wider significance. </p>
<p>This is one of the first times anyone has monitored a geothermal resource from space, and it demonstrates what can be achieved. Since the satellite data is freely available, it represents an inexpensive and risk-free way of assessing geothermal potential. </p>
<p>With similar volcanoes scattered across countries like Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, the technique could allow us to discover and monitor new untapped geothermal resources in the Rift Valley as well as around the world. When you zoom back and look at the big picture, it is amazing what starts to come into view.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86566/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Hutchison receives funding from the NERC and from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Juliet Biggs receives funding from the NERC. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tamsin Mather receives funding from the NERC. </span></em></p>Satellite research in Ethiopia is opening up a new frontier in the hunt for geothermal power.William Hutchison, Research Fellow, University of St AndrewsJuliet Biggs, Reader in Earth Sciences, University of BristolTamsin Mather, Professor of Earth Sciences, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/859422017-11-01T13:19:51Z2017-11-01T13:19:51ZWhy the private sector’s hype about the African middle class isn’t helpful<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192424/original/file-20171030-18683-10ovx28.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Oluwole Urban Market near Marina in Lagos. Being middle class is more than just being a consumer.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Akintunde Akinleye</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African middle class is of huge interest to business. This was confirmed again recently by well attended seminars in South Africa’s big cities to discuss
<a href="http://www.uctunileverinstitute.co.za/">“African Lions: groundbreaking study on the middle class in sub-Saharan Africa”</a>. </p>
<p>The study was motivated by the African Development Bank’s <a href="http://www.uctunileverinstitute.co.za/research/africa/">diagnosis</a> that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>(the African middle class) has grown by over 240% in just over a decade, and the bank defines 15 million households as now being middle class.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The narrow focus of the study is guided by a particular interest and echoes a poorly informed narrative about the structure of societies in Africa. It is void of any class related analysis and offers little bearing on reality. People are seen only as consumers with no political relevance. </p>
<p>The study was done by the University of Cape Town’s Unilever Institute of Strategic Marketing and the global market research company <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en">IPSOS</a> over 18 months in ten cities – Abidjan, Accra, Addis Ababa, Douala, Dar es Salaam, Kano, Lagos, Nairobi, Luanda and Lusaka. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/english-releases/sub-saharan-middle-class-worth-over-400-million-per-day-300467335.html">It defines</a> as middle class someone who has a daily income of between USD$4 and USD$70. He or she also has a disposable income; is employed or is running a business or studying at college; and has some secondary school education. According to this criteria, a whopping 60% of the urban population surveyed fall into this definition of middle class. </p>
<p>The researchers conclude that those who qualify as middle class have an average income of USD$12 a day and an average household income of USD$17 a day. Of these, a third had a full time job, while many ran mainly informal businesses.</p>
<p>According to the study, an estimated 100 million people outside South Africa have an aggregated spending power of more than USD$400 million a day. </p>
<p>It’s clear that the research is motivated by economic interests, targeting the so-called middle class as the object of desire for retailers. As the head of the institute <a href="http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print-version/sub-saharan-africa-middle-class-represents-r13tr-a-month-market-2017-05-19">explained</a>, the core of the interest in the estimated ZAR1.3 trillion-a-month market was</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a better understanding of the consumer landscape on the continent, (by exploring) aspirations, media consumption, buying patterns, brand relationships and much more (of such middle class).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similar interests by the private sector exist in business circles beyond the continent. Large companies paid US$1160 and small ones US$510 to gain insights into the investment opportunities at a recent <a href="http://marketing.business-sweden.se/acton/media/28818/mea-summit-september-2017">“Middle East and Africa Summit”</a> in Stockholm. The second day was devoted to sub-Saharan Africa, which was described as having</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a bulging middle class hungry for inclusion and more sophisticated consumer demands.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Such approaches perpetuate the original hype over the discovery of the emerging middle classes in the global South, defined in terms of higher living standards. They are measured on consumption and lifestyle related to Western products and status symbols. But no insights are offered into how being middle class could be understood in a social context. This would include status and awareness as well as the political choices people make. </p>
<p>This would require a different, analytically much more ambitious grasp of the economic and political realities in African cities and indeed wider societies.</p>
<h2>The fight back</h2>
<p>In the meantime, scholars in a variety of academic disciplines have started to critically explore the middle class notion. They properly investigate its meaning and definition. This is important because a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2016.1245183">middle class debate</a> reduced purely to the exploration of consumer habits can only be used for self-serving purposes. </p>
<p>In contrast, the new scholarly efforts put an African middle class debate into more meaningful perspectives. They offer a deeper analysis of cultural factors and identities, consciousness, social positioning and relations to other groups as well as institutions and the state. They are on their way to a proper class analysis and the policy options and implications by the social group or groups in formation. </p>
<p>The challenge is to look beyond the superficial number crunching that defines a middle class in purely income and expenditure figures, void of any further analysis of other <a href="http://witspress.co.za/catalogue/the-rise-of-africas-middle-class/">relevant factors</a>.</p>
<p>Such apolitical perspectives tend to put an ideological smokescreen around socio-economic processes. These rest on the assumption that relatively high economic growth rates suggest “progress” and “development”. Meanwhile, little changes in the daily lives of most people. Crumbs from the table of the haves don’t lift them out of a fragile socio-economic habitat bordering on poverty. Many urban and rural people continue to exist in utter destitution.</p>
<h2>Social change</h2>
<p>Engaging with such challenges, exploring how being middle class could be understood and mobilised for social change, would require a different analytical grasp of the socio-economic and political realities in African societies.</p>
<p>Presumably, such different research findings would most likely not be of interest to the business. But, the more socio-politically motivated analyses might contribute towards raising awareness of the class structures perpetuated. These are not fundamentally changed by a growing number of consumers, who are able to buy goods in the shopping malls and enjoy a “Western” lifestyle.</p>
<p>Rather, the advocacy and promotion of social justice and equality based on truly transformative social policies with deeper redistributive effects, could in the long run create a much larger and more sustainable market.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85942/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber is the editor of The Rise of Africa’s Middle Class: <a href="http://witspress.co.za/catalogue/the-rise-of-africas-middle-class/">http://witspress.co.za/catalogue/the-rise-of-africas-middle-class/</a></span></em></p>Scholars have started to investigate what it really means to be middle class in Africa.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/731602017-02-23T21:08:07Z2017-02-23T21:08:07ZHow the African Union’s planned overhaul may affect its ties with China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157337/original/image-20170217-10209-qf69g4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The 28th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) held its <a href="https://www.au.int/web/en/summit/28">28th Summit</a> in Addis Ababa recently. The meeting was markedly different to previous ones because the organisation showed it was serious about finding practical, lasting solutions to contemporary continental problems.</p>
<p>Specifically the decision to “deeply” reform the continental body was given new life and uniquely, <a href="http://www.gsdpp.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/78/News/FInal%20AU%20Reform%20Combined%20report_28012017.pdf">a report to bring this about</a> was drafted by Rwandan President Paul Kagame. This formed part of a process that kicked off at the <a href="http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2016-07-16/201763/">mid-2016 summit</a>. Then Kagame – supported by a pan-African advisory team – was given the task of coming up with reform proposals. Importantly, it was recognised that previous attempts at institutional reform had been ineffective. </p>
<p>The report’s recommendations can be summed up as “less is more”. They include the need for fewer strategic priorities and addressing bureaucratic bottlenecks. They also call for a better division of labour between the AU and member states, regional economic organisations and continental organs and institutions. The need to lessen the AU’s dependence on external funding also featured prominently.</p>
<p>In relation to Africa’s external relations – and in the interest of political and operational efficiency – it was recommended that partnership summits such as the <a href="http://www.focac.org/eng/">Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</a> and Japan’s <a href="https://ticad6.net/">Tokyo International Conference on African Development</a> convened by external parties should be reviewed “with a view to providing an effective framework” for AU relations. </p>
<p>Besides partnership summits, external engagement in Africa is mainly carried out at the country level. To make sure that the African agenda isn’t externally driven, the report recommended that a central body be created to map, monitor and implement projects. And it recommends a change to Africa’s bilateral engagements. </p>
<p>What remains to be seen are whether the factors that prompted the reform of Africa’s partnerships have been addressed and how and when the changes will be implemented.</p>
<h2>Changes to forum meetings</h2>
<p>Normally partnership summits are attended by a host of African leaders. At the sixth China-Africa forum meeting in South Africa in <a href="http://www.saiia.org.za/news/focac-background-and-2015-focus-priorities">December 2015</a>, 48 African leaders were in attendance. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157338/original/image-20170217-10213-1ridpps.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157338/original/image-20170217-10213-1ridpps.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=735&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157338/original/image-20170217-10213-1ridpps.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=735&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157338/original/image-20170217-10213-1ridpps.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=735&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157338/original/image-20170217-10213-1ridpps.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=924&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157338/original/image-20170217-10213-1ridpps.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=924&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157338/original/image-20170217-10213-1ridpps.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=924&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rwandan President Paul Kagame.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Ruben Sprich</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Kagame report proposes a much smaller delegation made up of the troika (the current, former and incoming AU chairs), the chairperson of the AU Commission and the chairperson of the regional economic communities.</p>
<p>These changes may have implications for Africa’s relations with China. Since 2000 China and African state representatives have been meeting on a triennial basis through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Importantly in 2018 the <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1323159.shtml">seventh</a> forum is expected to take place in Beijing. </p>
<p>A handful of representatives meeting China on behalf of the continent is a commendable approach. For years commentators have been advocating for a more unified African voice in engaging external partners, who were at an advantage, as the African side scrambled to forge a common position. Arguably, more can be achieved with fewer voices and with greater consistency and continuity. </p>
<p>The AU and China have already been collaborating more closely. The former became a full forum member in 2011 and China deployed a permanent mission to the AU in early 2015. China also built the impressive <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/african-union-unveils-new-headquarters-built-china-402088">new headquarters</a> for the AU in Addis Ababa and has also committed to supporting the body’s <a href="https://southernafrican.news/2015/12/04/china-helps-africa-with-its-agenda-2063-vision/">Agenda 2063</a>. </p>
<p>It’s still not entirely clear what the impact of the new format on the actual forum ministerial meetings and summits will be. Will it replace the consultation with the African ambassadors in Beijing and host country of the forum ministerial or summit, who together with the Chinese forum secretariat have traditionally managed the forum process? </p>
<p>If so, would this effectively create joint secretariat based in Addis Ababa? This might be a much more appropriate forum given that the city is also the seat of Africa’s key summits and meetings. Consultations with heads of state – or internal African canvassing of views on what Africa wants from China – would also be much easier.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157332/original/image-20170217-10232-zemrho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157332/original/image-20170217-10232-zemrho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=260&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157332/original/image-20170217-10232-zemrho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=260&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157332/original/image-20170217-10232-zemrho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=260&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157332/original/image-20170217-10232-zemrho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157332/original/image-20170217-10232-zemrho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157332/original/image-20170217-10232-zemrho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The opening ceremony of the Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China -Africa Cooperation in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But to realise any of this the chronic failures of the lack of capacity, poor accountability, fragmentation and low levels of trust need to be addressed urgently. Whether this proposal will be ready for 2018 is another issue. For now, forum activities and projects remain funded – and thus largely driven – by China.</p>
<p>Until the details of how this new type of partnership would operate are known, some outstanding nuances should be considered.</p>
<p>First is the symbolic use of summitry. Platforms like the forum are stages where actors showcase their identities, affiliations and role in the world. The symbolism of the long-standing China-Africa friendship, reflected by images of China’s President Xi Jinping brushing shoulders with several African heads of state at the sixth forum, could be potentially scrapped.</p>
<p>Second are China’s bilateral relations with African states. Some nations hold a longer history of relations with China, than the AU. Summits also double up as a reason to make bilateral visits where an impressive laundry list of agreements are often signed. It remains to be seen how bilateral relations (the level at which forum agreements are actually implemented), will be affected by such a new arrangement.</p>
<p>Certainly a better organised AU would fill an important gap in the region’s relations with China. The question is whether the changes will be put into effect. In Kagame’s <a href="http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2017-02-06/207735/">words</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>to fail Africa again would be unforgivable.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73160/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yu-Shan Wu is affiliated with the South African Institute of International Affairs </span></em></p>The African Union is changing the way it does business. Its new reforms, led by Rwandan President, Paul Kagame, call for fewer strategic priorities and addressing bureaucratic bottlenecks.Yu-Shan Wu, Senior Researcher, Foreign Policy, South African Institute of International Affairs, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/637792016-08-14T21:06:17Z2016-08-14T21:06:17ZWhy the Oromo protests mark a change in Ethiopia’s political landscape<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133938/original/image-20160812-16324-1o53k9g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopian migrants, all members of the Oromo community living in Malta, protest against the Tigray-minority government</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The Oromo in Ethiopia are campaigning for a new political and economic arrangement in the country. The Conversation Africa’s Samantha Spooner asked Professor <a href="https://works.bepress.com/asafa_jalata/">Asafa Jalata</a> about their demands.</em> </p>
<p><strong>Who are the Oromo people?</strong></p>
<p>The Oromo are the single largest ethno-national group in northeast Africa. In Ethiopia alone they are estimated to be 50 million strong out of a total population of 100 million. There are also Oromo communities living in Kenya and Somalia. </p>
<p>Ethiopia is said to <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html">have about</a> 80 ethno-national groups. The Oromo represent 34.4% while the Amhara (Amara) 27%. The rest are all less than 7% each. </p>
<p>The Oromo call themselves a nation. They have named their homeland “<a href="http://www.oromodictionary.com/aboutOromo">Oromia</a>”, an area covering 284,538 square kms. It is considered to be the richest area of northeast Africa because of its agricultural and natural resources. It is often <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?id=DbBm2WpVwUkC&pg=PA38&dq=oromia+breadbasket&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj5rLeQn8HOAhWF1BoKHaRtAVsQ6AEIJTAA#v=onepage&q=oromia%20breadbasket&f=false">referred to</a> as the “breadbasket” of the region. 60% of Ethiopian economic resources are <a href="http://www.gcftaskforce.org/content/training_program/2014/ethiopia1/documents/presentations/Ethiopia_JNR_and_the_Emerging_Oromia_Program.pdf">generated</a> from Oromia.</p>
<p>The capital city of Ethiopia is located in the heart of Oromia. What the world knows as Addis Ababa is also known to the Oromo as their capital, “Finfinnee”. When the Abyssinian warlord, <a href="http://www.academia.edu/5768951/The_Abyssinian_Regional_Expansion_during_the_Reign_of_Emperor_Menelik_II_1889_1913_By">Menelik</a>, colonised the Oromo during the last decades of the 19th century he established his main garrison city in Oromia and called it Addis Ababa. </p>
<p>Despite being the largest ethno-national group in Ethiopia, the Oromo <a href="https://books.google.com/books?isbn=9004265481">consider themselves</a> to be <a href="https://books.google.com/books?isbn=9004265481">colonial</a> subjects. This is because they have been denied equal access to their country’s political, economic and cultural resources. It all started with their colonisation by, and incorporation into, Abyssinia (the former Ethiopian empire) during the <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Scramble_for_Africa">Scramble for Africa</a>. </p>
<p>Today, comprising <a href="http://www.ciaworldfactbook.us/africa/ethiopia.html">just</a> 6% of the population, Tigrayans dominate and <a href="http://zethiopia.com/index/?p=362">control</a> the political economy of Ethiopia with the help of the West, particularly the US. This relationship is strategic to the US who <a href="http://www.tesfanews.net/u-s-policy-ethiopia-a-failing-state/">use</a> the Tigrayan-led government’s army as their <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33671340">proxy</a> to fight terrorism in the Horn of Africa and beyond. </p>
<p><strong>The Oromo community has been demonstrating since November last year. What triggered the protests?</strong></p>
<p>The Oromo demonstrations have been underway for over eight months, first surfacing in Ginchi (about 80 kms southwest of the capital) in November 2015. It began when elementary and secondary school students in the small town began protesting the privatisation and confiscation of a small <a href="http://www.ayyaantuu.net/the-oromo-movement-the-effects-of-state-terrorism-and-globalization-in-oromia-and-ethiopia/">soccer field</a> and the selling of the nearby <a href="http://ethioforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Assefa-Jalata-piece.pdf">Chilimoo forest</a>. </p>
<p>The sentiment <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201512161676.html">quickly spread</a> across Oromia. The entire Oromo community then joined the protests, highlighting other complaints such as the so-called <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/293119265/The-Integrated-Master-Plan-of-Addis-Ababa-and-the-Nearby-Oromia-towns">Integrated Addis Ababa Master Plan</a> and associated land grabbing. The master plan was intended to expand Addis Ababa by 1.5 million hectares onto surrounding Oromo land, evicting Oromo farmers.</p>
<p>Last year’s demonstrations were the product of over 25 years of accumulated grievances. These grievances arose as a result of the domination by the minority Tigrayan ethno-national group. Because of this dominance the Oromo people have <a href="http://genocidewatch.net/2016/02/01/land-grabbing-in-ethiopia/">become aliens</a> in their own country, lost ownership of their land and have become impoverished. </p>
<p>What was different about these demonstrations was that, for the first time, all Oromo branches came together in coordinated action to fight for their national self-determination and democracy. </p>
<p><strong>Which part of the Oromo community is organising the rallies?</strong></p>
<p>It is believed that underground activist networks, known as Qeerroo, are organising the Oromo community. The Qeerroo, also called the Qubee generation, first emerged in 1991 with the participation of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in the transitional government of Ethiopia. In 1992 the Tigrayan-led minority regime pushed the OLF out of government and the activist networks of Qeerroo gradually blossomed as a form of <em>Oromummaa</em> or Oromo nationalism. </p>
<p>Today the Qeerroo are made up of Oromo youth. These are predominantly students from elementary school to university, organising collective action through social media. It is not clear what kind of relationship exists between the group and the OLF. But the Qeerroo clearly articulate that the OLF should replace the Tigrayan-led regime and recognise the Front as the origin of Oromo nationalism. </p>
<p><strong>What are their demands?</strong></p>
<p>Their immediate demands are for the Ethiopian government to halt the so-called Addis Ababa Master Plan, land grabbing, corruption, and the violation of human rights. </p>
<p>Their extended demands are about achieving self-determination and sovereignty by replacing the Tigrayan-led regime with a multi-ethno-national democratic government. These demands gradually emerged to create solidarity with other ethno-national groups, such as the Amharas, who also have grievances with the regime. </p>
<p><strong>How has the government reacted to the protests?</strong></p>
<p>The government reaction has been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/21/ethiopia-no-let-crackdown-protests">violent and suppressive</a>. Despite Oromia being the largest regional state in Ethiopia, it has been under <a href="https://oromianeconomist.com/2016/03/23/martial-law-in-oromia-the-state-is-now-under-8-military-divisions-controlled-by-fascist-tplf-warlords-from-tigray/">martial law</a> since the protests began. The government has been able to use this law to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/16/such-brutal-crackdown/killings-and-arrests-response-ethiopias-oromo-protestsholding%20them%20in%20prisons%20and%20concentration%20camps">detain</a> thousands of Oromos, holding them in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/16/such-brutal-crackdown/killings-and-arrests-response-ethiopias-oromo-protests">prisons</a> and concentration camps. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/ethiopia0505/2.htm">Security structures</a> called tokkoo-shane (one-to-five), garee and gott have also been implemented. Their responsibilities include spying, identifying, exposing, imprisoning, torturing and killing Oromos who are not interested in serving the regime.</p>
<p>There have also been deaths and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/16/such-brutal-crackdown/killings-and-arrests-response-ethiopias-oromo-protests">reports</a> of thousands of Oromos who have been maimed as a result of torture, beatings or during the suppression of protests. For example, during the Oromia-wide day of peaceful protest on July 6 the regime army, known as Agazi, massacred <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37015055">nearly</a> 100 Oromos. According to Amnesty International, 400 Oromos were <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/ethiopia-hundreds-killed-excessive-force-oromo-protests-says-hrw-470800">killed</a> before July 6. But in reality nobody knows exactly how many Oromos have been victims of violence. </p>
<p><strong>What impact have these protests had on the country?</strong></p>
<p>The Oromo protest movement has started to change the political landscape of Ethiopia and shaken the regime’s foundations. <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2016/08/06/ethiopias-unprecedented-nationwide-oromo-protests-who-what-why/">Erupting</a> like “a social volcano”, it has sent ripples through the country with different groups changing their attitudes and standing in solidarity with the Oromo. The support of the Ahmaras has been particularly significant as they are the second largest ethno-national group in Ethiopia. </p>
<p>For the first time in history, the plight of the Oromo people has also received worldwide attention. International media outlets have reported on the peaceful protests and subsequent government repression. </p>
<p>This has brought about diplomatic repercussions. In January the European Parliament <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&refer">condemned</a> the Ethiopian government’s violent crackdown. It also called for the establishment of a credible, transparent and independent body to investigate the murder and imprisonment of thousands of protesters. Similarly, the UN Human Rights Experts <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16977&LangID=E">demanded</a> that Ethiopian authorities stop the violent crackdown. </p>
<p>Not all global actors are taking a strong stance. Some are concerned about maintaining good relations with the incumbent government. For example, the US State Department expressed <a href="http://ethiopia.usembassy.gov/statement-by-the-u.s.-embassy.html">vague concern</a> about the violence associated with the protest movement. In sharp contrast they signed a security partnership with the Ethiopian government. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the momentum of the Oromo movement looks set to continue. The protests, and subsequent support, have seen the further development of activist networks and Oromo leadership, doubling their efforts to build their organisational capacity. </p>
<p><strong>Is this the first time that the Oromo have demonstrated their grievances in this way?</strong></p>
<p>No. The Oromo have engaged in scattered instances of resistance since the late 19th century when they were colonised. </p>
<p>In the 1970s the Oromo started to engage in a national movement under the leadership of OLF. The front was born out of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mecha_and_Tulama_Self-Help_Association">Macha-Tulama Self-Help Association</a>, which was banned in the early 1960s and other forms of resistance such as the Bale Oromo armed resistance of the 1960s. Successive Ethiopian regimes have killed or sent Oromo political and cultural leaders into exile.</p>
<p><strong>How do you believe their grievances can be resolved?</strong></p>
<p>Critics believe the Tigrayan-led minority regime is unlikely to resolve the Oromo grievances. Oromo activists believe that their national struggle for self-determination and egalitarian democracy must intensify. </p>
<p>I am sure that, sooner or later, the regime will be overthrown and replaced with a genuine egalitarian democratic system. This is because of the size of the Oromo population, abundant economic resource, oppression and repression by the Tigrayan-led government, the blossoming of Oromo political consciousness and willingness to pay the necessary sacrifices.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63779/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asafa Jalata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For the first time, all Oromo branches have come together to fight for their national self-determination and democracyAsafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global and Africana Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/469402015-09-03T04:44:03Z2015-09-03T04:44:03ZWhy South Sudanese adversaries signed a peace deal that they do not want<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/93620/original/image-20150902-4362-328yr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Sudan's President Salva Kiir signs a peace agreement in the capital Juba, on August 26, 2015. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Jok Solomun</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On paper, the South Sudanese government led by <a href="http://www.presidentkiir.com/">President Salva Kiir</a> and its armed opposition, commanded by former vice president <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/2013/12/profile-south-sudan-riek-machar-20131230201534595392.html">Riek Machar</a>, have agreed to declare permanent <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/02/south-sudan-fresh-ceasefire-deal-rebels">ceasefire</a>.</p>
<p>They also agreed to establish a transitional government, collaboratively work towards a permanent constitution and legislatively establish reconciliation and peace-building institutions. All these are stipulated in a <a href="http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515">peace agreement</a> that both the government and the rebels have reluctantly agreed to sign.</p>
<p>But, fighting has <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article56230">already resumed</a> and senior military officers have publicly shared their <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article56176">disapproval</a> of the deal. Given the well-known problems of <a href="http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/652668-prof-mamdani-speech-on-s-sudan-part-ii.html">underdeveloped military discipline</a> and command structure in both armed groups, the imminent disruption of this peace agreement’s implementation is highly probable.</p>
<p>It does not help that neither party says this was a reasonable compromise. Kiir said the agreement looked like a roadmap for <a href="http://www.pressexaminer.com/kenyan-leader-in-juba-to-witness-signing-of-south-sudan-s-peace-pact/56534">regime change</a>. Machar argued that the agreement gave Kiir’s government the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2015/s4301160.htm">“lion’s share” of everything</a>. Press reports speculate that Machar’s two generals, Peter Gatdet and Gathoth Gatkuoth, fell out with him because of <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/08/deal-agreeing-peace-south-sudan-150820063821726.html">differences over the deal</a>. Forces loyal to the two generals remain an unpredictable presence.</p>
<p>So why did the government and the opposition, who are unhappy with the content of the agreement, sign it anyway? And what are the potential consequences of this induced peace accord?</p>
<h2>Understanding the conflict</h2>
<p>To answer that, we have to take note of one thing about the conflict. It resulted from power struggles within the ruling political party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot147">(SPLM)</a>. The party-level issues have been addressed in a separate deal called the <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article54068">Arusha Proccess</a>, which restored the situation as it was before.</p>
<p>The peace process, led by the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (<a href="http://southsudan.igad.int/">IGAD</a>), has largely been about restoring the status quo at the level of government, but it repeatedly failed over the last 20 months. Each failure seemed to trigger more intense military action and wide spread human rights violations of an <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jun/30/south-sudan-army-raped-then-burned-girls-alive-un-rights-investigators">outrageous nature</a>.</p>
<p>It was unsurprising, therefore, when US President Barack Obama expressed extreme frustration on his <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/frustrated-barack-obama-intervenes-in-south-sudan-conflict-20150728-gim4e2.html?skin=text-only">recent visit</a> to the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa. Obama met with African leaders to discuss the South Sudanese conflict but deliberately excluded the parties to the conflict. The logic of this arrangement was made abundantly clear by the State Department. Obama was not there as a mediator, but as a coalition <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/opinion/a-new-approach-for-south-sudan.html">builder for peace</a>. </p>
<p>The coalition Obama was trying to build worked because IGAD Plus, a brainchild of the <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/">International Crisis Group</a>, consisting of IGAD countries plus the African Union, the US, China, the UK, Norway and the EU, took centre stage. Obama’s consultation with the “key stakeholders” (excluding South Sudanese) arrived at August 17 as the deadline for a peace agreement authorising <a href="http://www.ipsnews.net/2015/07/obama-seeks-august-deadline-for-end-to-south-sudan-war/">permanent ceasefire</a> within days.</p>
<h2>A quick-fix ceasefire</h2>
<p>This firm call for ceasefire has broad support in South Sudan and internationally. However, the deadline only gave everyone involved in negotiations about three weeks to resolve a 20-month-old conflict that has pre-independence roots. </p>
<p>How much time did the parties and the mediators have to really negotiate? My guess is not enough. Sustainable conflict resolution requires at least three things:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>First, that the parties to conflict feel like the content of the peace agreement they sign is a reasonable, properly negotiated compromise;</p></li>
<li><p>Second, as a consequence of this (illusory or otherwise) they should be able to own it and sell it to their constituencies with phrases like, “this is a bad agreement but we signed it because…”; and</p></li>
<li><p>Third, the agreement itself should not pose obvious and publicly resisted threats to those who are supposed to sign and implement it. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The peace agreement that Machar and Kiir reluctantly signed violates all of these fundamental aspects of long-term resolution of violent conflict. So why did they sign it anyway?</p>
<p>There are three main drivers: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>This particular war has no moral foundation and the people of South Sudan are tired of violence. Both parties are aware of this and want a way out of the cycles of violence; </p></li>
<li><p>War hurts the interests of all the “friends of South Sudan” – the US, China, the UK, Norway and the EU – and they can generate a lot of pressure;</p></li>
<li><p>The conduct of war has been increasingly raising difficult questions nobody wants to answer.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>An uncertain future</h2>
<p>These are immediate concerns that potentially contributed to the necessity of this quick way out of the conflict. The two most problematic provisions are institutions for implementing peace and reconciliation, namely the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5FAwdVtt-gCelBQZVAxbjhUc1FmSHo3VnNaT09Ldm1GNEhz/view">(JMEC)</a> and the <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5FAwdVtt-gCelBQZVAxbjhUc1FmSHo3VnNaT09Ldm1GNEhz/view">Hybrid Court</a> for South Sudan. The JMEC will oversee the implementation of the agreement and the HCSS will prosecute human rights violators.</p>
<p>Both will be legislated and funded by the <a href="https://www.google.co.za/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&rlz=1C1CHWA_enZA634ZA634&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Transitional+National+Assembly+of+South+Sudan&start=10">Transitional National Assembly of South Sudan</a> but will assume supremacy over the national executive, legislature and judiciary. They will be led by non-South Sudanese with diplomatic immunity which means, once they are instituted, South Sudanese sovereignty will be curtailed. Kiir’s supporters have branded this a <a href="http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ID/17264/Default.aspx">“trusteeship”</a>. These provisions have the potential to turn public opinion against the agreement.</p>
<p>Another potential spoiler of peace lies in one provision of the hybrid court. The court will be empowered to indict anyone and such indictments would be tantamount to disqualification for pursuing any elected office towards the end of the transitional period. These provisions have the potential to undermine the agreement and therefore need to be revised to give peace a real chance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46940/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Run does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Sudanese government and its armed opposition are both unhappy with the ceasefire they signed. Senior military officers have also publicly voiced their disapproval of the induced deal.Peter Run, Academic Tutor, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.