tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/afghan-war-25278/articlesAfghan War – The Conversation2024-01-11T13:25:21Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2205862024-01-11T13:25:21Z2024-01-11T13:25:21ZIran terror blast highlights success – and growing risk – of ISIS-K regional strategy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568725/original/file-20240110-15-hzt6wg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=60%2C160%2C6720%2C4285&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">More than 100 people were killed in the blast in Kerman, Iran, on Jan. 3, 2024.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kerman-iran-people-disperse-near-the-scene-where-explosions-news-photo/1898126156?adppopup=true">Mahdi/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-history-of-the-taliban-is-crucial-in-understanding-their-success-now-and-also-what-might-happen-next-166630">Taliban takeover of Afghanistan</a> in 2021, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">terror group Islamic State Khorasan Province</a>, or ISIS-K, has sought to internationalize its operational and recruitment campaign. Utilizing a sweeping propaganda campaign to appeal to audiences across South and Central Asia, the group has tried to position itself as the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/06/growing-threat-islamic-state-afghanistan-and-south-asia">dominant regional challenger</a> to what it perceives to be repressive regimes.</p>
<p>On Jan. 3, 2024, ISIS-K demonstrated just how far it had progressed toward these goals. In a brutal demonstration of its capability to align actions with extreme rhetoric, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a bomb attack in Kerman, Iran, which resulted in the deaths of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-leaders-vow-revenge-funeral-bomb-attack-victims-state-media-2024-01-05/">over 100 people</a>.</p>
<p>The blast, which was reportedly carried out by two <a href="https://twitter.com/khorasandiary/status/1743236790591324604">Tajik ISIS-K members</a>, occurred during a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/04/iran-kerman-attack-islamic-state-suspicion-border-afghanistan-pakistan">memorial service</a> for Qassem Soleimani, a Lieutenant General in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who was <a href="https://theconversation.com/qassem-soleimani-air-strike-why-this-is-a-dangerous-escalation-of-us-assassination-policy-129300">killed in a U.S. drone strike</a> in 2020. ISIS-K claimed the attack as an <a href="https://twitter.com/khorasandiary/status/1742948108697252211">act of revenge</a> against Soleimani, who <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Iran-Entangled.pdf">spearheaded</a> Iran’s fight against the Islamic State group and its affiliates prior to his death.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.clemson.edu/cbshs/about/profiles/index.html?userid=ajadoon">experts in ISIS-K</a> <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/team/dr-nakissa-jahanbani/">and Iran</a>, we believe the attack highlights the success of ISIS-K’s recruitment strategies and its growing ability to strike declared enemies and undermine regional stability.</p>
<h2>A growing threat</h2>
<p>The attack in Iran was not completely unexpected to those monitoring ISIS-K. A paper <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/">one of us co-wrote</a> in 2023 noted that that despite setbacks, including <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-envoy-taliban-kill-8-key-islamic-state-leaders-in-afghanistan/7266218.html">the loss of key personnel</a>, ISIS-K was expanding and intensifying its regional influence. It was achieving this by leveraging its ethnically and nationally diverse membership base and <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/The_Islamic_State_in_Afghanistan_and_Pakistan_Strategic_Alliances_and_Rivalries">ties to other militant groups</a>.</p>
<p>The Kerman blast <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/14/iran-blames-isil-for-shrine-attack-arrests-foreign-nationals">follows two other recent</a> attacks on the <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202308146240">Shahcheragh shrine in Shiraz</a>, Iran, in October 2022 and August 2023 – both purportedly involving Tajik perpetrators.</p>
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<p>The involvement of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/tajik-national-attack-iran-shrine/32547498.html">Tajik</a> nationals in the Kerman attack underscores Iran’s <a href="https://www.mei.edu/events/irans-isis-challenge-afghanistan">long-standing concerns</a> over ISIS-K’s recruitment strategies, which have seen the group swell its members by reaching out to discontented Muslim populations across South and Central Asian countries and consolidating diverse grievances into a single narrative.</p>
<h2>Strategic diversity</h2>
<p>This strategy of “<a href="https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/islamic-states-central-asian-contingents-their-international-threat">internationalizing</a>” ISIS-K’s agenda – its aim is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">establishment of an Islamic caliphate</a> in Central and South Asia – has been pursued with <a href="https://eurasianet.org/islamic-state-threatens-central-asian-and-chinese-ventures-in-afghanistan">renewed</a> vigor since 2021. This is in part due to a more permissive environment following the U.S. withdrawal and the subsequent collapse of the Afghan government.</p>
<p>This process of internationalizing ISIS-K’s agenda involves the group <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">targeting</a> regional countries directly, or their presence within Afghanistan. To date, this has seen interests from <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/31/world/asia/pakistan-bombing-isis.html">Pakistan</a>, <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/07/20/indias-cautious-return-to-afghanistan/">India</a>, <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/ISIS-K-threat-to-Uzbek-railway-dream-opens-doors-for-Taliban">Uzbekistan</a>, <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/tajikistan/">Tajikistan</a>, <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Terrorism/China-s-mining-ambitions-in-Afghanistan-haunted-by-militants#:%7E:text=In%20December%2C%20ISIS%2DK%20claimed,independent%20verification%20of%20this%20claim.">China</a> <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Terrorism/Russia-s-ISIS-K-problem-intensifies-after-Kabul-embassy-bombing">and Russia</a> targeted by terrorist attacks. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, strikes against <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/p/islamic-state-in-afghanistan-promises">Iran</a> have long been foreshadowed in ISIS-K propaganda.</p>
<p>In parallel, the group’s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/islamic-state-khorasans-expanded-vision-in-south-and-central-asia/">multilingual propaganda campaign</a> interwove a tapestry of local, regional and global grievances to recruit and mobilize supporters from a vast demographic spectrum, and potentially <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-birmingham-66113791">inspire supporters from afar</a>.</p>
<p>In other instances, this has seen the terror group <a href="https://www-tandfonline-com.libproxy.clemson.edu/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2023.2173581">partnering with</a> anti-government and sectarian militant networks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, collaborating with groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. </p>
<p>But moreover, ISIS-K is attempting to capture <a href="https://gnet-research.org/2023/05/22/the-state-of-play-islamic-state-khorasan-provinces-anti-india-propaganda-efforts/">the South</a> and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/islamic-state-in-afghanistan-looks-to-recruit-regional-tajiks-inflict-violence-against-tajikistan/">Central Asian</a> militant market for itself. By utilizing fighters representative of regional religious and ethnic populations and publicizing their attacks, ISIS-K is signaling its commitment to a comprehensive jihadist agenda.</p>
<h2>The Tajik connection</h2>
<p>The involvement of Tajik recruits in the Kerman attack can be understood within this broader context of ISIS-K’s intentional strategic diversification.</p>
<p>Concerns around Tajik nationals’ recruitment into ISIS-K have <a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/expeditionary-inspired-situating-external-operations-within-islamic-states-insurgency">existed</a> for a while, with the Taliban’s draconian treatment of Afghanistan’s minorities, including Tajiks, likely creating an unwitting <a href="https://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2022/11/17/human-rights-defenders-and-the-future-of-multi-ethnic-democracy-in-afghanistan/">recruitment boon</a> for the terror group.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/expeditionary-inspired-situating-external-operations-within-islamic-states-insurgency">Several Tajik nationals</a> were arrested in relation to a <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-april-2020-islamic-state-terror-plot-against-u-s-and-nato-military-bases-in-germany-the-tajik-connection/">plot against U.S. and NATO</a> targets in Germany in April 2020. More Tajik ISIS-K members were arrested by German and Dutch authorities in <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/german-dutch-authorities-arrest-9-suspected-of-planning-terror-attacks/7169306.html">July 2023</a> as part of an operation to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-netherlands-terror-group-arrests-20856495d2f7530df8cf4635b26d3fb6">disrupt a plot and ISIS-K fundraising</a>.</p>
<p>The attack in Iran represents a continuation of this process of <a href="https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/islamic-states-central-asian-contingents-their-international-threat">internationalizing</a> ISIS-K’s violent campaign.</p>
<p>But the bombing is significant for another reason: It takes ISIS-K’s fight directly to a symbol of Shia leadership.</p>
<p>A deadly attack against Iran, a formidable Shia state, lends ideological credence to ISIS-K’s words in the eyes of its followers. It also potentially facilitates the recruitment of individuals who are proponents of anti-Shia ideologies in the Muslim world.</p>
<p>More than any other Islamic State affiliate, ISIS-K is uniquely positioned to <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/nonstate-actors/terrorism-and-counterterrorism/islamic-state-in-khorasan-attempting-to-absorb-rival-groups/">exploit the vestiges</a> of the deeply embedded, decades-old Sunni-Shia divide in the region. </p>
<h2>Iran’s proxies and the Taliban</h2>
<p>This isn’t to say that the attack on Iran was purely opportunistic. ISIS-K has deep-rooted antipathy toward Iran due to Tehran’s religious, social and political involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan. </p>
<p>Iran’s involvement has been multifold, from <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/sectarian-violence-and-intolerance-pakistan">supporting political and militant groups</a> such as <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/marriage-of-convenience-the-evolution-of-iran-and-al-qaidas-tactical-cooperation/">al-Qaida</a> and the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/06/iran-and-afghanistans-long-complicated-history">Taliban</a> to <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/03/fatemiyoun-army-reintegration-afghan-society">recruiting fighters</a> from <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-afghan-and-pakistani-proxies-syria-and-beyond">Afghanistan and Pakistan</a> for operations against Sunni militants.</p>
<p>Additionally, during the two decades of war in Afghanistan, several Taliban factions reportedly <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf">received weapons and funding</a> through Iran’s Quds Force, which carries out missions outside Iran as an arm of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards/">paramilitary security institution</a> Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC. By 2018, leaders in Tehran <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1396/12/16/1667788/">viewed the Taliban</a> as a buffer against ISIS-K.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in fatigues stands on rubble, broken walls are behind him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Taliban fighter checks a destroyed ISIS-K safehouse on Feb. 14, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/699c02b437504085a34732c9264ae1d9?ext=true">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iran’s strategic interest in Afghanistan is also reflected in the career trajectories of the Quds Force’s top brass. Soleimani was the <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/beyond-soleimani-implications-irans-proxy-network-iraq-syria/">chief architect</a> behind Iran’s network of proxies, some of which were leveraged against ISIS.</p>
<p>His successor, Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, spent part of <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-esmail-qaani-new-chief-commander-irans-qods-force">his career</a> managing proxies in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia.</p>
<p>Iran’s recruitment and encouragement of Shia proxies has exacerbated tensions with ISIS-K.</p>
<p>During the Syrian civil war, the Quds Force <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Iran-Entangled.pdf">recruited, trained and deployed</a> the <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/how-the-return-of-iranian-backed-militias-from-syria-complicates-u-s-strategy/">Fatemiyoun and</a> <a href="https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Zeynabiyoun.pdf">Zeinabiyoun brigades</a>, composed of Afghan and Pakistani Shia fighters, respectively. There were <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/death-qassem-soleimani-what-expect-afghanistan-and-pakistan">concerns</a> among international observers that the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/afghans-fear-irgc-may-deploy-fatemiyoun-fighters-afghanistan">Fatemiyoun Brigade</a> may be deployed to Afghanistan after the U.S.’s withdrawal. Thus far, Iran appears to leverage the two brigades to <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4231.html">stabilize its partners</a> in areas <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/whither-irgc-2020s/">outside of Iran’s immediate vicinity</a>. Nevertheless, the Fatemiyoun Brigade retains the potential to be mobilized as a mobile force within Afghanistan, contingent upon Iran’s evolving strategic calculus.</p>
<h2>The perfect storm?</h2>
<p>The attack in Iran raises two critical issues with grave security implications: the growing regional reputation and capability of ISIS-K, and the extent to which Iran’s use of militant proxies in Afghanistan may encourage a regional backlash among Sunni extremists.</p>
<p>Improving <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/looking-legitimacy-taliban-diplomacy-fall-kabul">relations</a> between the Taliban and Tehran suggests that a collaborative stance against ISIS-K may be possible, driven by a mutual desire for stability.</p>
<p>But intervention in Afghanistan, or Iranian deployment of proxy militant forces in the region, could have widespread security repercussions, the type of which we have seen play out in the Iranian attack.</p>
<p>For Pakistan, too, it may fester a renewed cycle of <a href="https://twitter.com/abdsayedd/status/1743275054119497797">sectarian violence</a>, creating opportunities for militant groups active in the country like ISIS-K, <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan-after-the-talibans-afghanistan-takeover/">Tehrik-e-Taliban</a> and fighters involved in <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/nonstate-actors/pakistan-faces-rising-separatist-insurgency-in-balochistan/">the Baloch insurgency</a>.</p>
<p>For the U.S., Iran’s increased involvement in Afghanistan and the violent attack by ISIS-K likewise poses a strategic concern. It risks destabilizing the region and undermining <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/27/isis-islamic-state-al-qaeda-terrorism-strength-threat-afghanistan-africa-syria-iraq-biden/">efforts to constrain transnational</a> terrorism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views, conclusions, and recommendations in this article are the authors’ own and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amira Jadoon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The terrorist attack in Iran follows a concerted effort by the Islamic State affiliate to ‘internationalize’ its strategy.Amira Jadoon, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson UniversityNakissa Jahanbani, Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2155782023-10-16T12:33:13Z2023-10-16T12:33:13ZA reflexive act of military revenge burdened the US − and may do the same for Israel<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553706/original/file-20231013-15-slni2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C35%2C5982%2C3952&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Israeli tanks gather near the border with the Gaza Strip on Oct. 13, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/graphic-content-israeli-army-merkava-battle-tanks-deploy-news-photo/1722767899">Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the wake of the shocking invasion of southern Israel by Hamas militants on Oct. 7, 2023, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-gantz-agree-form-emergency-israel-government-statement-2023-10-11/">vowed to destroy Hamas</a>. </p>
<p>“We are fighting a cruel enemy, worse than ISIS,” Netanyahu proclaimed four days after the invasion, comparing Hamas with the Islamic State group, which was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/21/isis-caliphate-islamic-state-raqqa-iraq-islamist">largely defeated</a> by U.S., Iraqi and Kurdish forces in 2017. </p>
<p>On that same day, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant went further, stating, “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-gantz-agree-form-emergency-israel-government-statement-2023-10-11/">We will wipe this thing called Hamas</a>, ISIS-Gaza, off the face of the earth. It will cease to exist.” They were strong words, issued in the wake of the horrific terrorist attack that <a href="https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-hamas-war-gaza-strip/card/latest-death-toll-in-israel-and-gaza-eoVPFI8WcXN0mzIR73pY">killed more than 1,300 Israelis</a> and culminated in the kidnapping of more than 150 people, including several Americans. </p>
<p>And in a telling comparison, Israeli Ambassador to the U.N. Gilad Erdan compared the attack with the toppling of the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon in 2001, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/08/1204579022/u-s-calls-on-countries-with-influence-over-hamas-to-condemn-its-assault-on-israe">declaring</a>, “This is Israel’s 9/11.”</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://history.osu.edu/people/mansoor.1">scholar of military history</a>, I believe the comparison is interesting and revealing. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks by al-Qaida on the United States, President George W. Bush made a <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html">similar expansive pledge</a>, declaring, “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” </p>
<p>The U.S. response to 9/11 included the American invasion of Afghanistan in league with the Afghan United Front, the so-called Northern Alliance. The immediate goals were to force the Taliban from power and destroy al-Qaida. Very little thought or resources were put into what happened after those goals were attained. In his 2010 memoir, “<a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/200372/decision-points-by-george-w-bush/">Decision Points</a>,” former President Bush recalled a meeting of the war cabinet in late September 2001, when he asked the assemblage, “‘So who’s going to run the country (Afghanistan)?’ There was silence.”</p>
<p>Wars that are based on revenge can be effective in punishing an enemy, but they can also create a power vacuum that sparks a long, deadly conflict that fails to deliver sustainable stability. That’s what happened in Afghanistan, and that is what could happen in Gaza.</p>
<h2>A war of weak results</h2>
<p>The U.S. invasion toppled the Taliban from power by the end of 2001, but the war did not end. An interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai took power as an Afghan council of leaders, called a <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-loya-jirga-explainer/25174483.html">loya jirga</a>, fashioned a new constitution for the country. </p>
<p>Nongovernmental and international relief organizations began to deliver humanitarian aid and reconstruction support, but their efforts were uncoordinated. U.S. trainers began <a href="https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/Mar-Apr-2019/74-Afghanistan-Army/">creating a new Afghan National Army</a>, but <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW115-Afghanistan-National-Defense-and-Security-Forces-Mission-Challenges-and-Sustainability.pdf">lack of funding, insufficient volunteers and inadequate facilities</a> hampered the effort.</p>
<p>The period between 2002 and 2006 was the best opportunity to create a resilient Afghan state with enough security forces to hold its own against a resurgent Taliban. Because of a <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/easier-get-war-get-out-case-afghanistan">lack of focus, inadequate resources and poor strategy</a>, however, the United States and its allies squandered that opportunity.</p>
<p>As a result, the Taliban was able to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan">reconstitute its forces</a> and return to the fight. As the insurgency gained momentum, the United States and its NATO allies <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24910832">increased their troop levels</a>, but they could not overcome the weakness of the Kabul government and the lack of adequate numbers of trained Afghan security forces.</p>
<p>Despite a surge of forces to Afghanistan during the first two years of the Obama administration and the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden, the Taliban remained undefeated. As Western forces largely departed the country by the end of 2014, Afghan forces took the lead in security operations, but their numbers and competence proved insufficient to stem the Taliban tide. </p>
<p>Negotiations between the United States and the Taliban went nowhere, as Taliban leaders realized they could seize by force what they could not gain at the bargaining table. The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan">Taliban entry into Kabul in August 2021</a> merely put an exclamation point on a campaign the United States had lost many years before.</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The U.S. exit from Afghanistan in July and August 2021 was chaotic and dangerous, and it left the Afghan state at the mercy of the Taliban.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A goal that’s hard to achieve</h2>
<p>As Israel pursues its response to the Hamas attack, the Israeli government would be well advised to remember the past two decades of often indecisive warfare conducted by both the United States and Israel against insurgent and terrorist groups. </p>
<p>The invasion of Afghanistan ultimately failed because U.S. policymakers did not think through the end state of the campaign as they exacted revenge for the 9/11 attacks. An Israeli invasion of Gaza could well lead to an indecisive quagmire if the political goal is not considered ahead of time.</p>
<p>Israel has invaded Gaza twice, in 2009 and 2014, but quickly withdrew its ground forces once Israeli leaders calculated they had reestablished deterrence. This strategy – called by Israeli leaders “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/05/14/israel-gaza-history/">mowing the grass</a>,” with periodic punitive strikes against Hamas – has proven to be a failure. The newly declared goal of destroying Hamas as a military force is far more difficult than that.</p>
<p>As four U.S. presidential administrations discovered in Afghanistan, <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/easier-get-war-get-out-case-afghanistan">creating stability in the aftermath of conflict</a> is far more difficult than toppling a weak regime in the first place.</p>
<p>The only successful conflict against a terrorist group in the past two decades, against the Islamic State group between 2014 and 2017, ended with both Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq <a href="https://time.com/longform/mosul-raqqa-ruins-after-the-war-of-annihilation/">reduced to rubble</a> and thousands of men, women and children <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/05/iraq-syria-al-hol-return/">consigned to detention camps</a>.</p>
<p>Israel has the capacity to level Gaza and round up segments of the population, but that may not be wise. Doing so might serve the immediate impulse of exacting revenge on its enemies, but Israel would likely receive massive international condemnation from <a href="https://penelope.uchicago.edu/%7Egrout/encyclopaedia_romana/britannia/monsgraupius/calgacus.html">creating a desert in Gaza and calling it peace</a>, and thus forgo the moral high ground it claims in the wake of the Hamas attacks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Mansoor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US response to 9/11 included a declaration that America would destroy its enemies. The effort took decades, and thousands of lives on both sides, and never really succeeded.Peter Mansoor, Professor of History, General Raymond E. Mason Jr. Chair in Military History, The Ohio State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2056692023-05-22T15:22:13Z2023-05-22T15:22:13ZWomen’s secret war: the inside story of how the US military sent female soldiers on covert combat missions to Afghanistan<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526309/original/file-20230515-30399-k7swu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=21%2C220%2C3573%2C2171&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US marines with a female engagement team in southern Helmand province, Afghanistan, in May 2012.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/654340/aerohunter-aif-iso-rct-5">Cpl. Meghan Gonzales/DVIDS</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A US Army handbook from 2011 opens one of its chapters with a line from Rudyard Kipling’s poem <a href="https://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poem/poems_youngbrit.htm">The Young British Soldier</a>. Written in 1890 upon Kipling’s return to England from India, an experienced imperial soldier gives advice to the incoming cohort:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When you’re wounded and left on Afghanistan’s plains, And the women come out to cut up what remains …</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-u-s-army-commanders-guide-to-female-engagement-teams/">handbook</a>, distributed in 2011 at the height of the US’s counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, invoked Kipling and other imperial <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/11/magazine/professor-nagl-s-war.html">voices</a> to warn its soldiers that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Neither the Soviets in the early 1980s nor the west in the past decade have progressed much beyond Kipling’s early 20th-century warning when it comes to understanding Afghan women. In that oversight, we have ignored women as a key demographic in counterinsurgency.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Around this time, a growing number of US military units were – against official military policy – training and posting all-women counterinsurgency teams alongside their male soldiers.</p>
<p>Women were still banned from direct assignment to ground combat units. However, these female soldiers were deployed to access Afghan women and their households in the so-called “battle for hearts and minds” during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War">Afghanistan war</a>, which began on October 7 2001 when the US and British militaries carried out an air assault, followed by a ground invasion, in response to the September 11 attacks.</p>
<p>And these women also played critical roles in gathering intelligence. Their sexuality – ironically, the basis of the excuse the US military had long given for avoiding integrating women into combat units – was now seen as an intelligence asset, as the army handbook made clear:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Like all adolescent males, young Afghan males have a natural desire to impress females. Using this desire to interact with and impress females can be advantageous to US military forces when done respectfully to both the female soldier and the adolescent Afghan males. Female soldiers can often obtain different and even more in-depth information from Afghan males than can male soldiers.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Whether collecting intelligence or calming victims of a US special forces raid, female soldiers – often despite a lack of proper training – played a central yet largely invisible role in the Afghanistan war. Their recollections of what they experienced on these tours call into question official narratives both of women breaking through the “brass ceiling” of the US military, and the war having been fought in the name of Afghan women’s rights and freedom.</p>
<p>Since the US’s final withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-single-women-and-widows-are-struggling-to-find-their-next-meal-under-taliban-restrictions-198279">rollback of women’s rights</a> has concluded a brutal chapter in a story of competing feminisms over the past two decades of war.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C71%2C1997%2C1257&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="US female marines crouching with their weapons" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C71%2C1997%2C1257&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Members of a US marine female engagement team in combat training before a tour, October 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/480702/fet-practices-live-fire">Cpl. Meghan Gonzales/DVIDS</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Female counterinsurgency teams in Afghanistan</h2>
<p>Between 2010 and 2017, while conducting research at six US military bases and several US <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/war-college">war colleges</a>, I met a number of women who spoke of having served on special forces teams and in combat in Afghanistan and Iraq. This was surprising as women were then still technically banned from many combat roles – US military regulations only <a href="https://www.history.com/news/u-s-military-lifts-ban-on-women-in-combat">changed in 2013</a> such that, by 2016, all military jobs were open to women.</p>
<p>Fascinated by their experiences, I later interviewed 22 women who had served on these all-female counterinsurgency teams. The interviews, alongside other observations of development contractors on US military bases and the ongoing legacies of US imperial wars, inform my new book <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501767746/at-war-with-women/">At War with Women: Military Humanitarianism and Imperial Feminism in an Era of Permanent War</a>.</p>
<p>By 2017, enough time had lapsed that the women could speak openly about their deployments. Many had left the military – in some cases disenchanted by the sexism they confronted, or with the idea of returning to an official job in logistics having served on more prestigious special forces teams.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong><em>This article is part of Conversation Insights</em></strong>
<br><em>The Insights team generates <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218">long-form journalism</a> derived from interdisciplinary research. The team is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects aimed at tackling societal and scientific challenges.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>In 2013, Ronda* supported a mission deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second-largest city. She was one of only two women living on a remote base with the Operational Detachment Alpha – the primary fighting force for the <a href="https://www.americanspecialops.com/special-forces/">Green Berets</a> (part of the US Army’s special forces).</p>
<p>For Ronda, one of the most rewarding aspects of this deployment was the image she carried of herself as a feminist example for Afghan women. She recalled:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Just letting the girls see there’s more out there [in the wider world] than what you have here, that was very empowering. I think they really appreciated it. In full kit I look like a dude, [but] that first instance when you take off your helmet and they see your hair and see you are female … A lot of times they have never seen a female before who didn’t just take care of the garden and take care of the kids. That was very empowering.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=118%2C107%2C3443%2C2091&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Female soldiers talking to a local woman in front of a helicopter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=118%2C107%2C3443%2C2091&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 2012, the US military presented its female counterinsurgency teams as feminist emblems while keeping their combat roles hidden.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/654343/aerohunter-aif-iso-rct-5">Cpl. Meghan Gonzales/DVIDS</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Amanda, who had been on a similar mission to Uruzgan province in southern Afghanistan a year earlier, also described inspiring local women – in her case, via stories she shared through her interpreter of life in New York City, and what it was like to be a female soldier. Amanda lived alongside the male soldiers in an adobe hut with a thatched roof, and was unable to shower for the full 47 days of the mission. But she recalled going out into the village with pride:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You see the light, especially in the females’ eyes, when they see other females from a different country – [it] kind of gives them perspective that there is more to the world than Afghanistan.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Publicly, the US military presented its female counterinsurgency teams as feminist emblems, while keeping their combat roles and close attachment to special forces hidden. A 2012 army <a href="https://www.dvidshub.net/news/86128">news article</a> quoted a member of one female engagement team (FET) describing the “positive responses from the Afghan population” she believed they had received:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I think seeing our FET out there gives Afghan women hope that change is coming … They definitely want the freedom American women enjoy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, the US military’s mistreatment of its female workforce undermines this notion of freedom – as do the warped understandings of Afghan culture, history and language that both male and female soldiers brought with them on their deployments. Such complexity calls into question US military claims of providing feminist opportunities for US women, and of acting in Afghan women’s best interests.</p>
<p>As a logistics officer, Beth had been trained to manage the movement of supplies and people. She said she was ill-prepared for the reality she confronted when visiting Afghan villages with one of the cultural support teams (CSTs), as they were also known, in 2009.</p>
<p>Beth’s pre-deployment training had included “lessons learned” from the likes of Kipling and Lawrence of Arabia. It did not prepare her to understand why she encountered such poverty when visiting Afghan villages. She recalled:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Imagine huts – and tons of women, men and children in these huts … We had to tell these women: ‘The reason your children are getting sick is because you’re not boiling your water.’ I mean, that’s insane. Look at when the bible was written. Even then, people knew how to boil their water – they talked about clean and unclean, kosher, and that they know what’s going to rot. How did Jesus get the memo and you didn’t?</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A female Afghan role-player wraps a headscarf around a female soldier while a third female soldier looks on." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Afghan role-player with soldiers during female engagement training at a US Army base.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jennifer Greenburg</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘Ambassadors of western feminism’</h2>
<p>By observing lessons in military classrooms, I learned how young US soldiers (men and women) went through pre-deployment training that still leaned on the perspectives of British colonial officers such as <a href="https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/who-was-lawrence-of-arabia">T.E. Lawrence</a> and <a href="https://www.rusi.org/podcasts/talking-strategy/episode-2-c-e-callwell-small-wars-and-integrated-sea-land-operations">C.E. Callwell</a>. There was a tendency to portray Afghan people as unsophisticated children who needed parental oversight to usher them into modernity.</p>
<p>US military representations of Afghan women as homogeneous and helpless, contrasting with western women as models of liberation, also ignored Afghan and Islamic feminist frameworks that have <a href="http://signsjournal.org/podcast/jennifer-fluri-discusses-the-gender-politics-of-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-with-sandra-mcevoy/">long advocated for women’s rights</a>. The notion of US female soldiers modelling women’s rights was often linked with representations of Afghan people as backward and needing models from elsewhere.</p>
<p>To skirt the military policy that in the mid-2000s still banned women from direct assignment to ground combat units, female soldiers were “temporarily attached” to all-male units and encouraged not to speak openly about the work they were doing, which typically entailed searching local women at checkpoints and in home raids.</p>
<p>Rochelle wrote in her journal about her experiences of visiting Afghan villages: “Out the gate I went, [with] headscarf and pistol …” Like Beth’s use of a biblical reference to explain the Afghan villages she confronted, Rochelle placed Afghanistan far backward in time. In one diary entry about a village meeting, she reflected:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For years, I have always wondered what it would be like to live in the Stone Age – and now I know. I see it every day all around me. People walking around in clothes that haven’t been washed, ones they have worn for years. Children with hair white from days of dust build-up. Six-year-old girls carrying around their baby brothers. Eyes that tell a story of years of hardship. Houses made of mud and wooden poles, squares cut out for windows. Dirty misshapen feet.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A cultural considerations matrix." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Cultural considerations’ training material.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">USAID</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When Rochelle was not accompanying the male patrols, she was visiting girls’ schools and holding meetings with Afghan women about how her unit could help support income-generating opportunities for women, such as embroidery or selling food. Her logic, that this would reduce Taliban support and recruitment, echoed <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/policy/countering-violent-extremism">USAID programmes</a> that still today claim targeted economic opportunity can “counter violent extremism”.</p>
<p>Amelia, a female soldier attached to a special forces mission, spoke of how she was an asset because:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We were not threatening, we were just there. For Afghan men, we were fascinating because we were these independent women in a different role than they see for most women there. And we were non-threatening to them, so they could talk to us openly.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Strikingly, Amelia admitted that she and other female soldiers played a similar role for their American counterparts too:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For the [male] marines, just having us there helped kind of calm things down. We would do things to try to give back to them – like we baked for them frequently. That was not our role and I don’t want anyone to think that we were a “baking team”, but we would do things like that and it really helped. Like a motherly touch or whatever. We would bake cookies and cinnamon buns. It really helped bring the team together and have more of a family feeling.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Amelia’s clear apprehension at her unit being seen as the “baking team” speaks to how they were incorporated into combat through reinforcement of certain gender stereotypes. These women used “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2018/11/arlie-hochschild-housework-isnt-emotional-labor/576637/">emotional labour</a>” – the work of managing, producing and suppressing feelings as part of one’s paid labour – both to counsel the male soldiers with whom they were stationed, and to calm Afghan civilians after their doors had been broken down in the middle of the night.</p>
<p>But the women I met also revealed a culture of sexist abuse that had been exacerbated by the unofficial nature of their combat roles in Afghanistan and Iraq. Soldiers who <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2394531-marine-corps-force-integration-plan-summary.html">did not want women in their midst</a> would joke, for example, that CST actually stood for “casual sex team”. Such treatment undermines the US military’s representations of military women as models of feminist liberation for Afghan women.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier stands in front of a mock Afghan village, holding his rifle." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A provincial reconstruction team deploying to Afghanistan patrols a mock Afghan village on a US military base.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jennifer Greenburg</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘It was the best and the worst deployment’</h2>
<p>Beth’s first deployment to Afghanistan in 2009 was to accompany a small group of Green Berets into an Afghan village and interact with the women and children who lived there. One of her strongest memories was figuring out how to shower once a week by crouching under a wood palate and balancing water bottles between its slats.</p>
<p>Beth’s role was to gather information about which villages were more likely to join the US military-supported <a href="https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_22.pdf">internal defence forces</a> – a cold war counterinsurgency strategy with a <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1993/12/06/the-truth-of-el-mozote">history</a> of brutalising countries’ own citizens. To elicit feelings of security and comfort in those she encountered when entering an Afghan home or searching a vehicle, she described adjusting her voice tone, removing her body armour, and sometimes placing her hands on the bodies of Afghan women and children.</p>
<p>But this “kinder and gentler” aspect of her work was inseparable from the home raids she also participated in, during which marines would kick down the doors of family homes in the middle of the night, ripping people from their sleep for questioning, or worse.</p>
<p>Women like Beth were exposed to – and in a few cases, killed by – the same threats as the special forces units to which they were unofficially attached. But the teams’ hidden nature meant these women often had no official documentation of what they did.</p>
<p>If they returned home injured from their deployment, their records did not reflect their attachment to combat units. This meant they were unable to prove the crucial link between injury and service that determined access to healthcare. And the women’s lack of official recognition has since posed a major barrier to being promoted in their careers, as well as <a href="https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/5ddda3d7ad8b1151b5d16cff/5e67d54e8c296ffede3c4f62_Reference-Guide-2017.pdf">accessing</a> military and veteran healthcare.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Female soldier saluting" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lack of official recognition posed a barrier to some women being promoted in their military careers.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/american-soldiers-salute-us-army-military-1711680580">Bumble Dee/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While Beth said she was “lucky” to have come home with her mental health and limbs intact, many of her peers described being unable to sleep and suffering from anxiety, depression and other symptoms of <a href="https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/common/common_veterans.asp">post-traumatic stress disorder</a> (PTSD) as a result of their continued exposure to stressful combat situations such as night raids.</p>
<p>Six months into her deployment, Beth’s female partner was riding in a large armoured vehicle when it ran over an explosive device. “Luckily”, as Beth put it, the bomb exploded downwards, blowing off four of the vehicle’s wheels and sending a blast through the layer of rubber foam on which her partner’s feet rested. She was medevacked out of the combat zone with fractured heels, along with six other men.</p>
<p>Technically, Beth was always supposed to have a female partner when working for a cultural support team, but no replacement came. Her mission changed and she became the only woman assigned to support a group of marines stationed on a remote base. There were only a handful of other women on the base, and Beth lived alone in a repurposed shipping container sandwiched between housing for 80 men.</p>
<p>Beth said the marines spread false rumours about her. Other women I spoke with indicated that there was a widespread culture of degrading women like Beth in the US military at this time – just as its leaders were publicly disavowing the military’s epidemic of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/oct/11/military-sexual-assault-survivors-epidemic">sexual assault and rape</a>.</p>
<p>As Beth described her treatment on the second part of her deployment in Afghanistan, her eyes widened. She struggled to find the words that eventually came out:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It was the best and the worst deployment. On some level, I did things that I will never do again – I met some great people, had amazing experiences. But also, professionally, as a captain in the Marine Corps, I have never been treated so poorly in my life – by other officers! I had no voice. Nobody had my back. [The marines] didn’t want us there. These guys did not want to be bringing women along.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Beth described how one of the male soldiers lied to her battalion commander, accusing her of saying something she didn’t say – leading to her being removed from action and being placed under a form of custody:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I got pulled back and sat in the hot-seat for months. It was bad. That was a very low point for me.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>‘Women as a third gender’</h2>
<p>A narrow, western version of <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-liberal/">feminism</a> – focused on women’s legal and economic rights while uncritical of the US’s history of military interventions and imperialistic financial and legal actions – helped <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3318265">build popular support for</a> the Afghanistan invasion in 2001. On an individual level, women like Beth made meaning of their deployments by understanding themselves as modern, liberated inspirations for the Afghan women they encountered.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A female soldier cleans the wound of a child" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A female engagement team member treats a child during a medical aid mission, October 2010.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/337619/female-engagement-team-finds-strength-behind-burka">Staff Sgt. Whitney Hughes/DVIDS</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But in reality, the US military did not deploy women like Beth with the intention of improving Afghan women’s lives. Rather, special forces recognised Afghan women as a key piece of the puzzle to convince Afghan men to join the internal defence forces. While male soldiers could not easily enter an Afghan home without being seen as disrespecting women who lived there, the handbook for female engagement teams advised that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Afghan men often see western women as a “third gender” and will approach coalition forces’ women with different issues than are discussed with men.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And a 2011 Marine Corps Gazette <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=hqiRxoTLeb8C&pg=PA305&lpg=PA305&dq=Julia+Watson+Marine+Corps+Gazette+2011+%E2%80%9CFemale+Engagement+Teams:+The+Case+for+More+Female+Civil+Affairs+Marines,%E2%80%9D&source=bl&ots=tXO3YJJjBW&sig=ACfU3U0XPU65h1cNLncfpbRLhvXAU4VjRQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjFxObLxaT9AhUPQkEAHbs8A_sQ6AF6BAgGEAM#v=onepage&q=Julia%20Watson%20Marine%20Corps%20Gazette%202011%20%E2%80%9CFemale%20Engagement%20Teams%3A%20The%20Case%20for%20More%20Female%20Civil%20Affairs%20Marines%2C%E2%80%9D&f=false">article</a> underlined that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Female service members are perceived as a “third gender” and as being “there to help versus there to fight”. This perception allows us access to the entire population, which is crucial in population-centric operations.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The use of “third gender” here is surprising because the term more often refers to gender identity outside of conventional male-female binaries. In contrast, military uses of such language reinforced traditional gender expectations of women as caregivers versus men as combatants, emphasising how women entered what were technically jobs for men by maintaining these gender roles.</p>
<p>The female counterinsurgency teams were intended to search Afghan women and gather intelligence that was inaccessible to their male counterparts. Beth had volunteered for these secretive missions, saying she was excited to go “outside the wire” of the military base, to interact with Afghan women and children, and to work with US special operations.</p>
<p>Initially, she was enthusiastic about the tour, describing her gender as an “invaluable tool” that allowed her to collect information which her male counterparts could not. She went on home raids with the marines and would search women and question villagers.</p>
<p>Technically, the US military has strict rules about who is allowed to collect formal intelligence, limiting this role to those trained in intelligence. As a result, Beth explained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Just like any other team going out to collect information, we always steer clear of saying “collect” [intelligence]. But essentially that’s exactly what we were doing … I won’t call them a source because that is a no-no. But I had individuals who would frequent me when we were in particular areas … [providing] information we were able to elicit in a casual setting instead of running a source and being overt.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>‘A completely different energy’</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Recruitment poster for a female engagement team." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=771&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=771&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=771&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=969&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=969&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=969&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Female engagement team recruitment poster, 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">US Army</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Cindy deployed with a US Army Ranger regiment to Afghanistan in 2012. Having recently graduated from one of the military academies, an advertisement caught her eye: “Become a part of history. Join the US Army Special Operations Command Female Engagement Team Program.”</p>
<p>She was drawn in by the high physical bar and intellectual challenge of jobs in special operations from which the military technically excluded her. Describing the process of being selected for the female unit as a “week from hell”, Cindy said she was proud of “being where it’s hardest” and “the sense of duty, obligation”.</p>
<p>While she was completing her training, Cindy’s friend from airborne school was killed by an explosion in October 2011, while accompanying an Army Ranger team on a night raid of a Taliban weapons maker’s compound in Kandahar. This was Ashley White-Stumpf, subject of the bestselling book <a href="https://gaylelemmon.com/ashleyswar">Ashley’s War</a>, which is now being adapted into a film starring Reese Witherspoon. She was the first cultural support team member to be killed in action, and her funeral brought this secret programme into a very public light.</p>
<p>Her death cast a shadow on the excitement Cindy had initially felt. To confuse matters, the dangers that White-Stumpf (and now Cindy) faced were publicly invisible, given that women were banned from being officially attached to special forces combat units. When female soldiers did appear in public relations photographs, it was often handing out soccer balls or visiting orphanages.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="US soldiers unveil a monument to their dead colleague" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Soldiers unveil a memorial to 1st Lt. Ashley White-Stumpf, September 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/1023069/nc-national-guard-soldiers-honor-fallen-comrade-with-memorial">Staff Sgt. Kelly Lecompte/DVIDS via Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet once deployed, Cindy was attached to a “direct action” unit – the special forces portrayed in action movies kicking down doors, seizing documents and capturing people. This meant that while special forces carried out their mission, her job was:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>To interact with women and children. To get information, or [find out] if there were nefarious items that were hidden under burkas and things of that nature.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>She explained how “you have different tools as a woman that you can use that I don’t think a man would be successful in” – offering the example of a little boy in a village who her team thought knew something. A <a href="https://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/specialty-careers/special-ops/army-rangers.html">ranger</a> was questioning the little boy, who was terrified of how, in her words, this male soldier “looked like a stormtrooper, wearing his helmet and carrying a rifle”. In contrast, Cindy explained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For me to kneel next to the little kid and take off my helmet and maybe put my hand on his shoulder and say: “There, there” – I can do that with my voice, [whereas] this guy probably could not or would not. And that kid was crying, and we couldn’t get anything out of him. But you can turn the tables with a completely different energy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Cindy told me proudly how it took her just 15 minutes to identify the correct location of the Taliban activity, when her unit had been in the wrong location. She, like many of the women I spoke to, painted a picture of using emotional labour to evoke empathy and sensitivity amid violent – and often traumatic – special operations work.</p>
<h2>‘I’ve had so much BS in my career’</h2>
<p>The women I interviewed were operating in the same permissive climate of sexual harassment and abuse that later saw the high-profile murders of the servicewoman <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/crime/vanessa-guillens-fort-hood-murder-motive-b2086929.html">Vanessa Guillén</a> at Fort Hood military base in Texas in 2020, and the combat engineer <a href="https://msmagazine.com/2023/04/13/ana-fernanda-basaldua-ruiz-fort-hood-sexual-harrassment-murder-vanessa-guillen/">Ana Fernanda Basaldua Ruiz</a> in March 2023.</p>
<p>Before their deaths, both Latinx women had been repeatedly sexually harassed by other male soldiers and had reported incidents to their supervisors, who failed to report them further up the chain of command. Such cases overshadowed any excitement about the recent <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2023/01/26/women-combat-military-special-forces/">ten-year anniversary</a> of women formally serving in ground combat roles in the US military.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Protesters carry a poster in memory of murdered US soldier Vanessa Guillén" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters march in support of the murdered US soldier Vanessa Guillén, July 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/new-york-yorkunited-states07102020peaceful-march-vanessa-1778387528">Jewjewbeed/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mollie deployed to Afghanistan as part of a female engagement team in 2009. Her career up to then had been chequered with discriminatory experiences. In some cases, there were subtle, judgmental looks. But she also described overt instances, such as the officer who, when told of her impending arrival on his unit, had responded bluntly: “I don’t want a female to work for me.”</p>
<p>Mollie said she saw the FET as a way to showcase women’s skill and value within a masculinist military institution. She felt tremendous pride for the “20 other strong women” she worked with, whose adaptability she was particularly impressed with:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>During the FET, I saw such great women. It frustrates me that they have to put up with this [sexism] … I’ve had so much BS like that throughout my career. Seeing how amazing these women were in high-stress situations – I want to stay in and continue to fight for that, so junior marines don’t have to put up with the same sorts of sexist misogynist comments that I did.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Mollie said the experience on the FET changed her, describing herself emerging as an “unapologetic feminist” responsible for more junior servicewomen. This encouraged her to re-enlist year after year. But for other women, deploying in capacities from which they were normally excluded, only to then return to gender-restricted roles, was a good reason to quit after their contract was up. As was, for many, the continued background of resistance and abuse from male colleagues.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3162.html">2014 study</a> of the US military found that “ambient sexual harassment against service women and men is strongly associated with risk of sexual assault”, with women’s sexual assault risk increasing by more than a factor of 1.5 and men’s by 1.8 when their workplace had an above-average rate of ambient sexual harassment. In 2022, the US military admitted that the epidemic of sexual assault within military ranks had <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2022/09/01/the-militarys-sexual-assault-problem-is-only-getting-worse/">worsened</a> in recent years, and that existing strategies were not working.</p>
<h2>‘Magnitude of regrets’</h2>
<p>Amid the chaotic withdrawal of US and international forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, marines threw together another female engagement team to search Afghan women and children. Two of its members, maintenance technician Nicole Gee and supply chief Johanny Rosario Pichardo, died in a <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/single-suicide-bomber-killed-us-troops-afghans-isis/story?id=82676604">suicide bomb attack</a> during the evacuation that killed 13 soldiers and at least 170 Afghans.</p>
<p>Media <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/08/28/female-marines-killed-in-kabul/">coverage</a> remembered Gee cradling an Afghan infant as she evacuated refugees in the days leading up to the attack, underscoring how female soldiers like her did high-risk jobs that came into being through gender expectations of women as caregivers.</p>
<p>Writing to me in 2023, ten years after her deployment to Afghanistan, Rochelle reflected that the departure of US soldiers could be “a whirlwind of emotions if you let it”. She added: “My anger lies with the exit of our own [US forces]. The magnitude of regrets, I hope, lay heavy on someone’s conscience.”</p>
<p>The experiences of Rochelle and other female soldiers in Afghanistan complicate any simplistic representations of them as trailblazers for equal rights in the US military. Their untreated injuries, unrecognised duties, and abusive working conditions make for a much more ambivalent blend of subjugation and pathbreaking.</p>
<p>And even as their position helped formalise the role of US women in combat, this happened through the reinforcement of gender stereotypes and racist representations of Afghan people. In fact, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5tql5uPP0qE">Afghan women had long been mobilising</a> on their own terms – largely unintelligible to the US military – and <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-03-16/the-persecution-of-female-protestors-in-afghanistan-the-taliban-ran-me-over-and-tried-to-kill-me.html">continue to do so</a>, with extraordinary bravery, now that the Taliban is back in control of their country.</p>
<p>It is devastating, but not surprising, that the military occupation of Afghanistan did not ultimately improve women’s rights. The current situation summons feminist perspectives that challenge war as a solution to foreign policy problems and work against the forms of racism that make people into enemies.</p>
<p>Following the withdrawal from Afghanistan, US Army female engagement teams have been reassembled and deployed to train foreign militaries from <a href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/5693812/fearless-females-unite-empower-one-another">Jordan</a> to <a href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/3252982/24th-meu-female-engagement-team-trains-with-romanian-troops">Romania</a>. As we enter the third decade of the post-9/11 wars, we should revisit how these wars were justified in the name of women’s rights, and how little these justifications have actually accomplished for women – whether in the marine corps barracks of Quantico, Virginia, or on the streets of Kabul, Afghanistan.</p>
<p><em>*All names and some details have been changed to protect the identities of the interviewees.</em></p>
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<p><em>For you: more from our <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Insights series</a>:</em></p>
<ul>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-my-20-years-in-afghanistan-taught-me-about-the-taliban-and-how-the-west-consistently-underestimates-them-167927?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">What my 20 years in Afghanistan taught me about the Taliban – and how the west consistently underestimates them
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<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/can-wars-no-longer-be-won-126068?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Can wars no longer be won?
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<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/the-inside-story-of-the-cia-v-russia-from-cold-war-conspiracy-to-black-propaganda-in-ukraine-188550?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">The inside story of the CIA v Russia – from cold war conspiracy to ‘black’ propaganda in Ukraine
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<p><em>To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK"><strong>Subscribe to our newsletter</strong></a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205669/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Greenburg has received funding from the National Science Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, the Association of American Geographers, Stanford University, the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, and the Department of Geography and the Graduate Division at the University of California, Berkeley. She is the author of At War with Women: Military Humanitarianism and Imperial Feminism in an Era of Permanent War (Cornell University Press).</span></em></p>Women who served in unofficial combat and intelligence roles during the Afghanistan war offer brutally honest accounts of their experiences.Jennifer Greenburg, Lecturer in International Relations, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1982732023-01-26T13:23:47Z2023-01-26T13:23:47ZPrince Harry’s kill count revelation could spark important discussions about war’s effects on soldiers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506197/original/file-20230124-8245-bm9pg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Prince Harry's new book "Spare" is stirring discussion about whether he should have revealed the number of warfighters that he killed.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/prince-harry-presents-12-pilots-from-course-17-02-of-the-news-photo/932885722?phrase=prince%20harry%20pilot&adppopup=true">Anwar Hussein / Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>When Prince Harry revealed in his new book, “<a href="https://princeharrymemoir.com/">Spare</a>,” that he killed 25 Taliban fighters as an Apache helicopter pilot, he compared their deaths to “chess pieces removed from the board.” His comments have drawn ire from critics, such as Anas Haqqani, a member of the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/04/haqqani-network-taliban-relationship-afghanistan-pakistan-terrorism/">Haqqani Network</a>, which is an Afghan Sunni Islamist militant organization and part of the Taliban government of Afghanistan. Haqqani shot back that those slain fighters “<a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/implications-prince-harry-saying-killed-235502482.html">were not chess pieces, they were humans; they had families who were waiting for their return</a>.” But others have questioned whether Prince Harry should have spoken about his body count at all.</em></p>
<p><em>Here, <a href="https://www.usafa.edu/facultyprofile/?smid=14215">L. William Uhl</a>, an assistant professor of philosophy at the United States Air Force Academy, provides insight on what airmen are taught and told when it comes to the sensitive topic of taking lives in the line of duty.</em></p>
<h2>1. How often do airmen have to discuss the kills they did in battle?</h2>
<p>Reporting kills is actually a routine part of an airman’s duty. It comes up as part of what is called battle damage assessment. This assessment is necessary to determine how much of the enemy’s physical and functional capabilities remain.</p>
<p>Some airmen’s annual performance reports will include the number of enemy combatants they have killed. These numbers become part of these airmen’s permanent records and are used to demonstrate how they have contributed to their units’ missions. It is possible to determine how many have been killed, for example, if certain weapon imaging systems are used or enemy combatants are out in the open. </p>
<p>Prince Harry himself says, “So, my number: Twenty-five. It wasn’t a number that gave me any satisfaction. But neither was it a number that made me feel ashamed. Naturally, I’d have preferred not to have that number on my military CV [curriculum vitae], on my mind, but by the same token I’d have preferred to live in a world in which there was no Taliban, a world without war.” </p>
<p>It is one thing to destroy a facility and not dwell on the people inside, another to witness one or more deaths directly or through some form of imaging.</p>
<h2>2. With whom should airmen discuss their kills?</h2>
<p>After airmen deploy to combat areas, they are required to talk to counselors when they redeploy home. But I know from experience that sometimes they cannot wait until then.</p>
<p>While I was deployed to Baghdad International Airport in 2004 – one year after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein – Iraqi insurgents ambushed a convoy returning to Baghdad from Balad. During the firefight, American forces lost one captain but managed to kill some of the insurgents. A friend who was a chaplain told me that from the time these troops had returned to base, many had sought him out for counseling, even into the wee hours of the morning. They struggled with the realization that they had killed people in the performance of their duties. </p>
<h2>3. Is there any reason not to disclose the number of kills during or after one’s service?</h2>
<p>Richard Kemp, a former British Army colonel, has said that Prince Harry’s providing the number of kills could <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/implications-prince-harry-saying-killed-235502482.html">provoke attacks from the Taliban and their followers</a> on the United Kingdom. Tobias Ellwood, a member of Parliament and a former British Army captain, said that “there is the <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/implications-prince-harry-saying-killed-235502482.html">unwritten assumption</a> that nobody publicly discusses kill counts for the principal reason that it can have security repercussions.” They are responding not only to Prince Harry’s notoriety as a member of the royal family but also to his connections with the British military and the <a href="https://www.royal.uk/invictus-games">Invictus Games</a>, the charity he launched to help wounded British service members recover from their injuries. </p>
<p>Few, if any, American service members will rise to Prince Harry’s level of notoriety. Nevertheless, while in service or after leaving the service, those who wish to publish their memoirs in one form or another should contact the public affairs office of their military branch for guidance. Memoirs about wars fought many decades ago, such as World War II, Korea or Vietnam, will most likely not raise as many security concerns as accounts about more recent conflicts.</p>
<p>Discussing numbers of people killed or thought processes about killing can elicit strong reactions from anyone, but especially from those who consider the United States and its allies to be the enemy. Without realizing it, active-duty service members and former service members who have left active duty since Desert Storm may put lives at risk by revealing information about current operations, weapon system capabilities or deployment locations.</p>
<h2>4. How do service members view such disclosures?</h2>
<p>When teaching my cadets about the moral issues of killing in war, I find that these young future officers wrestle with taking on the daunting responsibility: most people their age will never have to reckon with killing if called upon to do so. </p>
<p>In class I teach about what Michael Walzer refers to as “naked soldiers” in his book “<a href="https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/michael-walzer/just-and-unjust-wars/9780465052707/">Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations</a>.” The book recounts five examples from World War I, the Spanish Civil War and World War II. In each example, a soldier refrained from killing an enemy soldier because he realized that the enemy soldier was just like him: another human being.</p>
<p>Upon discussing this book, many of my cadets have told me about conversations they have had with relatives who have seen combat. In most cases, my cadets say their relatives leave out the specifics of having killed or don’t talk about their combat experience at all.</p>
<p>In the first few years after the 9/11 attacks, some military units would show, for various purposes, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zEbs_0WM2P8">videos</a> that were set to heavy metal music and contained footage from the weapon’s point of view as it was about to impact the target. I would say that these videos were a way of not only expressing Americans’ anger about the 9/11 attacks but also of motivating airmen to take the fight to the enemy.</p>
<p>Cadets I have recently taught have said that while they understood the purposes of the videos they have seen, they were bothered knowing that as these munitions zeroed in on their targets, people were only a few moments away from dying.</p>
<p>Each semester, cadets enrolled in our core philosophy course attend a lecture on an issue related to <a href="https://ethics.org.au/ethics-explainer-just-war/#:%7E:text=Just%20war%20theory%20is%20an,of%20different%20forms%20over%20time.">just war theory</a>, a framework of ethics used to determine when it is permissible to go to war. In 2019, Karl Marlantes, a Marine lieutenant during the Vietnam War, spoke about what it was like for him to kill a young Vietnamese soldier at close range. He also spoke about what he has done “<a href="https://groveatlantic.com/book/what-it-is-like-to-go-to-war/">to make peace with his past</a>.” I still recall the dead silence from the audience as they listened to Marlantes’ account. </p>
<h2>5. Should Harry get some sort of consideration because of the public or media interest in his life?</h2>
<p>Many people have criticized “Spare” because they believe that Prince Harry has revealed details about not only his own life but also royal family life that probably should remain undisclosed. In many instances, I tend to agree. But I also think that, given his notoriety, he addresses a very important question: How do service members maintain their moral integrity and well-being after having taken lives in the performance of their duties?</p>
<p>In “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/15/us/drones-airstrikes-ptsd.html">The Unseen Scars of Those Who Kill via Remote Control</a>,” Dave Philipps discusses the stress that drone pilots experience. These pilots may observe targets for a long time before finally receiving the order to kill them. What bothers many of these pilots is that they come to see these targets as ordinary human beings with families. The difference is when their shifts are over, these pilots go home to their own families and do the very same activities they observed their targets doing with theirs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I am an active-duty Air Force officer assigned to the United States Air Force Academy.</span></em></p>A US Air Force professor of philosophy weighs in on Prince Harry’s decision to disclose his ‘body count’ from his service in Afghanistan.L. William Uhl, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, United States Air Force AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1787012022-03-14T12:21:41Z2022-03-14T12:21:41ZThe promise and folly of war – why do leaders enter conflict assuming victory is assured?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451699/original/file-20220312-20-1nbmy6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C223%2C4125%2C2521&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">V is for victory? Or vanquished? </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-speaks-during-his-press-news-photo/1233489401?adppopup=true">Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Amid a staunch and passionate defense that has slowed the Russian advance to Kiev and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/02/united-nations-russia-ukraine-vote">global condemnation</a>, Vladimir Putin’s motivation for invading has been subject to speculation: Just what does he hope to achieve by war in Ukraine?</p>
<p>Some have argued that Putin was responding to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/28/nato-expansion-war-russia-ukraine">NATO expansion</a> or was driven by a compelling sense of <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2022/2/23/22945781/russia-ukraine-putin-speech-transcript-february-22">Russian nationalism</a>. Others maintain he saw an opportunity to revive Cold War <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/world/europe/ukraine-russia-eastern-europe.html">Soviet influence</a> in Eastern Europe. Still others claim he is simply <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/3/2/putins-imperial-delusions-will-haunt-russia">delusional</a>, an oligarch divorced from reality.</p>
<p>But what if Putin’s decision to invade was based partly on a commonly held assumption that offensive wars of choice, more often than not, will deliver?</p>
<p>It’s worth evaluating if this war is as much about <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia">local and regional questions</a> over who controls the eastern Ukraine Donbas region as it is about an unquestioning faith that using armed force is the surest path to achieving one’s political aims. </p>
<p>Some U.S. foreign policy analysts, like the University of Chicago’s <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine">John Mearsheimer</a>, contend that American support of NATO’s eastward expansion is just as important in explaining the current crisis in Ukraine.</p>
<p>But as a <a href="https://history.sdsu.edu/people/daddis">military historian</a> who served in the U.S. Army for 26 years, I believe a more fundamental question is why policymakers, not just in Russia, have so much faith in war when even small miscalculations can lead so easily to disaster.</p>
<h2>War’s promise</h2>
<p>War’s promise has enticed political and military leaders for millenia. The Athenian historian <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Landmark_Thucydides/pjt3ZGU61wIC?hl=en&gbpv=1">Thucydides</a> spoke of Greek city-states motivated to war by honor and profit – as well as fear of their enemies.</p>
<p>Roughly 2,200 years later, America’s <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/whirlwind-9781620401729/">Founding Fathers</a> saw war as the surest way to break from British imperial control, to forge a new identity free from external influence and to create a sovereign nation. It would take a major civil war less than 100 years later to decide – though surely not settle – similar questions for African Americans enslaved by those same revolutionaries and their descendants.</p>
<p>The spoils of war can be great: independence, increased power, and land and resources.</p>
<p>And yet for every military success, the historical record offers ample instances that should give pause. <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_First_Total_War/Q7hTNQAACAAJ?hl=en">Napoleon</a>, for example, may have been on the precipice of near total European control in the early 1800s. But the same instrument of mass armies that brought him to such heights assured his downfall when wielded by a coalition of rival continental powers.</p>
<p>In two world wars a century later, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/germany-hitler-and-world-war-ii/890B562782C3A8161FDB65EA51E1BF3C">German leaders</a> envisioned a new world order delivered by grand military victories. The results, however, left tens of millions dead across the globe and a twice-defeated Germany seeking redemption and relevance during the Cold War.</p>
<p>During those post-World War II decades, French military forces would face defeat in <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/dien-bien-phu#:%7E:text=On%20May%207%2C%201954%2C%20the,pulled%20out%20of%20the%20region">Indochina</a> and <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Algeria/3efpuozCiWYC?hl=en">Algeria</a>, the Americans a similar fate in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/29/opinion/ken-burns-vietnam-lessons.html">South Vietnam</a>, and the Soviets in <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-abstract/11/4/46/13115/Decision-Making-and-the-Soviet-War-in-Afghanistan">Afghanistan</a>. Wagering on war clearly wasn’t always a safe bet.</p>
<h2>The lure of armed victory</h2>
<p>What makes war seemingly worth these inescapable risks? Perhaps it is the conviction that armed victory is the ultimate decider within any international political arena.</p>
<p>In the <a href="https://uncpress.org/book/9780807859582/a-failed-empire/">Cold War era</a>, Soviet leaders from Josef Stalin to Leonid Brezhnev relied on war, and the threat of war, to compete globally with the United States. In practical terms, brutal Soviet military incursions into <a href="https://uncpress.org/book/9781469667485/hungarys-cold-war/">Hungary</a> in 1956 and <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780739143063/The-Prague-Spring-and-the-Warsaw-Pact-Invasion-of-Czechoslovakia-in-1968">Czechoslovakia</a> in 1968 seemed the most efficient means of keeping Eastern European satellites within the Warsaw Pact orbit. It appears that Putin reviewed his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/02/24/putin-military-success-ukraine-invasion-riskiest-yet/">recent successes</a> in Chechnya, Georgia and Syria as a harbinger of victory in Ukraine.</p>
<p>But flexing military muscles comes at a cost. The placement of Soviet missiles in <a href="https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393540819">Cuba</a> in the early 1960s brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. The costs of maintaining an enormous Cold War army and navy enfeebled an already unstable <a href="https://uncpress.org/book/9781469630175/the-struggle-to-save-the-soviet-economy/">Soviet economy</a>. And, without question, the long war in <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Afgantsy/q9doAgAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1">Afghanistan</a> contributed to the ultimate demise of the Soviet empire as the Cold War itself drew to its close.</p>
<h2>Motivations for war</h2>
<p>So, what perspectives can we gain from this devotion to war’s promise?</p>
<p>First, the moral aspects of choosing war matter. As philosopher Michael Walzer contends, there often is a thin line between offensive wars of choice and criminal <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Just-Unjust-Wars-Historical-Illustrations/dp/0465052711/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1FE4634JGUHTP&keywords=Walzer+just+war&qid=1646603938&sprefix=walzer+just+war%2Caps%2C125&sr=8-1">acts of aggression</a>. I believe more Americans need to spend time considering where these lines may be drawn; there’s a great deal of <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/76408/afghanistan-war-obama-bacevich">moral illiteracy</a> about the causes of America’s wars and its conduct in fighting them.</p>
<p>Writing about the justness of the U.S. war in Iraq, journalist Matt Peterson wrote in <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/iraq-war-ethics/556448/">The Atlantic</a> that “There’s a broader sense of moral confusion about the conduct of America’s wars.” Putin’s assault on Ukraine serves as a reminder that people should examine more deeply their nation’s stated reasons – and stated justifications – for going to war.</p>
<p>The assumption that war is a transformative force that engenders political and social change also has not always proved true. When the George W. Bush administration decided to invade Iraq in 2003, key advisers saw an opportunity to <a href="https://www.press.jhu.edu/books/title/10192/limits-us-military-capability">transform Iraqi governance and society</a>. Yet local leaders proved far more resistant to external change than these policymakers foresaw, which was also the case in the Afghan and Vietnam wars. In Ukraine, Putin seems also to have miscalculated the strength of local opposition.</p>
<h2>The costs of war</h2>
<p>Indeed, many modern conflicts have illustrated that victory is not quickly and cheaply achieved. At the end of his presidency, <a href="https://www.littlebrown.com/titles/evan-thomas/ikes-bluff/9780316224161/">Dwight D. Eisenhower</a> counseled about the hidden costs of a military-industrial complex feeding an enduring state of war. His fears appear to have been realized. The <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2021/ProfitsOfWar">Costs of War</a> project at Brown University calculated that the Pentagon has spent “over $14 trillion since the start of the war in Afghanistan, with one-third to one-half of the total going to military contractors.” That war <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-business-afghanistan-43d8f53b35e80ec18c130cd683e1a38f">killed</a> at least 47,000 Afghan civilians and more than 6,000 American service members and contractors.</p>
<p>All this raises a reasonable question over whether the benefits of these wars have been worth the tremendous financial and human costs.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 150,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-150ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>As the world follows the unfolding tragedy in Ukraine, I believe it important to consider the enduring, yet faulty promise of war.</p>
<p>Athenian history might be a good place to start. As <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Landmark_Thucydides/pjt3ZGU61wIC?hl=en&gbpv=1&bsq=common%20mistake%20in%20war">Thucydides</a> cautioned, “It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong end, to act first, and wait for disasters to discuss the matter.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178701/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory A. Daddis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A military historian and U.S. Army veteran explains how wars are not easy to win – something political leaders often forget when looking at the calculus of conflict.Gregory A. Daddis, Professor and USS Midway Chair in Modern U.S. Military History, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1666302021-08-26T12:14:11Z2021-08-26T12:14:11ZThe history of the Taliban is crucial in understanding their success now – and also what might happen next<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417618/original/file-20210824-23-1rlqfnm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C2859%2C1934&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Taliban came to the fore during Afghanistan's civil war that followed the Soviet pullout of 1989. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/prob-taliban-fighter-atop-shell-littered-peak-nr-radical-news-photo/50437123?adppopup=true">Robert Nickelsberg/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The rapid takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban left many surprised. To Ali Olomi, a <a href="https://www.abington.psu.edu/person/dr-ali-olomi">historian of the Middle East and Islam</a> at Penn State University, a key to understanding what is happening now – and what might take place next – is looking at the past and how the Taliban came to prominence. Below is an edited version of a conversation he had with editor Gemma Ware <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-origins-of-the-taliban-podcast-166699">for our podcast, The Conversation Weekly</a>.</em></p>
<iframe src="https://embed.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/612751f4cddf5c0012151f3b" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="190px"></iframe>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-561" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/561/4fbbd099d631750693d02bac632430b71b37cd5f/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>How far back do you trace the Taliban’s origins?</h2>
<p>While the Taliban <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvk12qf0">emerged as a force in the 1990s</a> <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/08/19/1028472005/afghanistan-conflict-timeline">Afghan civil war</a>, you have to go back to the <a href="https://adst.org/2016/04/the-saur-revolution-prelude-to-the-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan/">Saur Revolution of 1978</a> to truly understand the group, and what they’re trying to achieve.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A group of fighters hold their guns aloft." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417805/original/file-20210825-15-ydfpam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417805/original/file-20210825-15-ydfpam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=767&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417805/original/file-20210825-15-ydfpam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=767&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417805/original/file-20210825-15-ydfpam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=767&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417805/original/file-20210825-15-ydfpam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=964&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417805/original/file-20210825-15-ydfpam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=964&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417805/original/file-20210825-15-ydfpam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=964&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghan revolutionaries raise their guns during the Saur Revolution.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kabul-democratic-republic-of-afghanistan-workers-of-kabul-news-photo/522609532?adppopup=true">TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Saur Revolution was a turning point in the history of Afghanistan. By the mid-1970s, Afghanistan had been <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2013/07/afghanistan-in-the-1950s-and-60s/100544/">modernizing for decades</a>. The two countries that were most eager to get involved in building up Afghan infrastructure were the United States and the Soviet Union – both of which hoped to have a foothold in Afghanistan to exert power over central and south Asia. As a result of the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Chapter-1-3.pdf">influx of foreign aid</a>, the Afghan government became the primary employer of the country – and that led to endemic corruption, setting the stage for the revolution.</p>
<p>By that time, differing ideologies were fighting for ascendancy in the nation. On one end you had a group of mainly young activists, journalists, professors and military commanders influenced by Marxism. On the other end, you had Islamists beginning to emerge, who wanted to put in place a type of a Muslim Brotherhood-style Islamic state.</p>
<p>Daud Khan, the then-president of Afghanistan, originally allied himself with the young military commanders. But concerned over the threat of a revolutionary coup, he started to suppress certain groups. In April 1978, <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/afghan-president-is-overthrown-and-murdered">a coup deposed Khan</a>. This led to the establishment of the People’s Republic of Afghanistan, headed by a Marxist-Leninist government.</p>
<h2>How did a leftist government help ferment the Taliban?</h2>
<p>After an initial purge of the ruling Communist Party members, the new government turned toward suppressing Islamist and other opposition groups, which led to a nascent resistance movement.</p>
<p>The United States saw this as an opportunity and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/07/history-trump-cia-was-arming-afghan-rebels-before-soviets-invaded/">started to funnel money to Pakistan’s intelligence services</a>, which were allied with Islamists in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>At first, the United States funneled only limited funds and just gave symbolic gestures of support. But it ended up allying with an Islamist group that formed part of the growing resistance movement known as the mujahedeen, which was a loose coalition more than a unified group. Alongside the Islamist factions, there were groups led by leftists purged by the ruling government. The only thing they all had in common was opposition to the increasingly oppressive government. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of mujahadeen fighters rest on a mountain." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417808/original/file-20210825-23-vit9gp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417808/original/file-20210825-23-vit9gp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417808/original/file-20210825-23-vit9gp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417808/original/file-20210825-23-vit9gp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417808/original/file-20210825-23-vit9gp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417808/original/file-20210825-23-vit9gp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417808/original/file-20210825-23-vit9gp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mujahedeen fighters in the mountains in the Kunar province in May 1980.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/AFGHANMUJAHEDEENREBELS/19d78f7105f2da11af9f0014c2589dfb/photo?Query=Afghan%20Soviet%20War&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=328&currentItemNo=326">AP Photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This opposition intensified in 1979, when then-Afghan leader <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1979/09/19/archives/exafghan-leader-is-reported-killed-a-pakistani-broadcast-says.html">Nur Mohammad Taraki was assassinated</a> by his second-in-command Hafizullah Amin, who took over and turned out to be a wildly repressive leader. Soviet <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/us/politics/afghanistan-trump-soviet-union.html">fears of the U.S. capitalizing on the growing instability</a> contributed to the Soviet Union invasion in 1979. This resulted in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/07/history-trump-cia-was-arming-afghan-rebels-before-soviets-invaded/">U.S. funneling further money to the mujahedeen</a>, who were now fighting a foreign enemy on their land. </p>
<h2>And the Taliban emerged from this resistance movement?</h2>
<p>The mujahedeen waged a guerrilla-style war against Soviet forces for several years, until exhausting the invaders militarily and politically. That and international pressure brought the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. </p>
<p>After the <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/afghanistan-russia-programs/2019-02-27/soviet-withdrawal-afghanistan-1989">Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989</a>, chaos reigned. Within three years, the new government collapsed and the old mujahedeen commanders turned into warlords – with different factions in different regions, increasingly turning on one another. </p>
<p>Amid this chaos, one former Islamist mujahedeen commander, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/de3dcdff7ba34d4b8c0f25993daee804">Mullah Mohammad Omar</a>, looked to Pakistan – where a generation of young Afghans had grown up in refugee camps, going to various madrassas where they were trained in a brand of strict Islamic ideology, known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/talibans-religious-ideology-deobandi-islam-has-roots-in-colonial-india-166323">Deobandi</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A grainy image of former Taliban leader Mullah Omar" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417806/original/file-20210825-25-q7x4wz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417806/original/file-20210825-25-q7x4wz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=758&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417806/original/file-20210825-25-q7x4wz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=758&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417806/original/file-20210825-25-q7x4wz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=758&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417806/original/file-20210825-25-q7x4wz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417806/original/file-20210825-25-q7x4wz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417806/original/file-20210825-25-q7x4wz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Taliban founder Mullah Omar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mullah-omar-chief-of-the-taliban-is-shown-in-this-headshot-news-photo/1168032?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>From these camps he drew support for what became the Taliban – <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/world/taliban-meaning-what-mean-english-name-how-started-afghanistan-explained-1156589">“taliban” means students</a>. The bulk of Taliban members are not from the mujahedeen; they are the next generation – and they actually ended up fighting the mujahedeen.</p>
<p>The Taliban continued to draw members from the refugee camps into the 1990s. Mullah Omar, from a stronghold in Kandahar, slowly took over more land in Afghanistan until the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/afghan_taliban.html">Taliban conquered Kabul in 1996</a> and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. But they never took full control of all of Afghanistan – the north remained in the hands of other groups.</p>
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<h2>What was behind the Taliban’s success in the 1990s?</h2>
<p>One of the keys to the Taliban success was they offered an alternative. They said, “Look, the mujahedeen fought heroically to liberate your country but have now turned it into a war zone. We offer security, we will end the drug trade, we will end the human trafficking trade. We will end the corruption.”</p>
<p>What people forget is that the Taliban were seen as welcome relief for some Afghan villagers. The Taliban’s initial message of security and stability was an alternative to the chaos. And it took a year before they <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-kabul-1d4b052ccef113adc8dc94f965ff23c7">started to institute repressive measures</a> such as restrictions on women and the banning of music.</p>
<p>The other thing that cemented their position in the 1990s was they <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf">recruited local people</a> – through force sometimes, or bribery. In every village they entered, the Taliban added to their ranks with local people. It was really a decentralized network. Mullah Omar was ostensibly their leader, but he <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf">relied on local commanders</a> who tapped into other factions aligned with their ideology – such as the <a href="https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/print_view/363">Haqqani network</a>, a family-based Islamist group that became crucial to the Taliban in the 2000s, when it become the de facto diplomatic arm of the Taliban by leveraging old tribal alliances in order to convince more people to join the cause.</p>
<h2>How crucial is this history to understand what is happening now?</h2>
<p>An understanding of what was going in the Saur Revolution, or how it led to the chaos of the 1990s and the emergence of the Taliban, is crucial to today.</p>
<p>Many were surprised by the <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/timeline-talibans-lightning-fast-takeover-afghanistan-1619740">quick takeover of Afghanistan</a> by the Taliban after President Biden announced a withdrawal of U.S. troops. But if you look at how the Taliban came to be a force in the 1990s, you realize they are doing the same thing now. They are saying to Afghans, “Look at the corruption, look at the violence, look at the drones that are falling from U.S. planes.” And again the Taliban are offering what they say is an alternative based on stability and security – just as they did in the 1990s. And again they are leveraging localism as a strategy.</p>
<p>When you understand the history of the Taliban, you can recognize
these patterns – and what might happen next. At the moment, the Taliban are telling the world they will allow women to have an education and rights. They said the exact same thing in the 1990s. But like in the 1990s, their promises always have qualifiers. The last time they were in power, those promises were replaced by brutal oppression.</p>
<p>History isn’t just a set of dates or facts. It’s a lens of analysis that can help us understand the present and what will happen next.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166630/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ali A. Olomi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A historian explains how the Taliban emerged out of the decades of chaos that followed the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan in 1978.Ali A. Olomi, Assistant Professor of History, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1662382021-08-18T12:12:53Z2021-08-18T12:12:53ZWhy did a military superpower fail in Afghanistan?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416612/original/file-20210817-14-ayw47j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C24%2C5337%2C3473&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. troops in Afghanistan had better equipment, training and funding than the Taliban.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/AfghanistanIntelligenceLosses/b1ccd011a2344e99ae058df2c746c19c/photo">AP Photo/Rahmat Gul</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The speed and efficiency with which Taliban forces were able to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/16/taliban-timeline/">complete the occupation of most of Afghanistan</a>, as well as the quick collapse of the Afghan government, has led to <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-weighs-address-nation-afghanistan-crumbles-n1276885">criticism of President Joe Biden’s decision</a> to end U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and of the withdrawal’s logistics.</p>
<p>But the criticisms, while valid, may be beside the point. I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=xBQYKHwAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">studied conflicts like those in Afghanistan</a> for more than 20 years. My experience has taught me that there are more fundamental problems with the United States’ strategy in the 20-year war, of which the current chaos is only the latest manifestation. They stem from an approach in which military seizures of territory are intended to fight international extremist movements and ideologies, in Afghanistan and elsewhere. </p>
<h2>Nation-building is not a military strategy</h2>
<p>U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan, and in Iraq, was initially justified by a need to dismantle immediate and serious national security threats: <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/28/world/operation-enduring-freedom-fast-facts/index.html">al-Qaida</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/3/20/why-did-bush-go-to-war-in-iraq">fears of weapons of mass destruction</a>.</p>
<p>However, those short-term goals were quickly replaced by a longer-term goal of preventing future threats from those countries, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-nation-building/">such as new extremist groups</a>. That led the U.S., with other nations, to occupy both nations and attempt to provide stability and security so that the people of those countries could set up their own governments.</p>
<p>It may be attractive to think that promoting democracy in occupied foreign countries is a morally justified and effective path for restoring security and stability. But political reform is more successful when it originates from the local societies and political cultures. In Tunisia, for example, local political movements were able to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/22/ten-years-in-tunisian-democracy-remains-a-work-in-progress/">transform their government</a>, a success due in part to a lack of foreign involvement.</p>
<p>In Afghanistan, international groups like the U.N., alongside nonprofits and independent aid agencies, spent <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/un-and-ngos-will-stay-and-deliver-aid-millions-afghans-need">millions of dollars</a> and untold hours of work trying to build democracy, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/afghanistan-new-constitution">write a constitution</a>, create a bill of rights and otherwise create a new political society.</p>
<p>But this external approach, based on military occupation, was “<a href="https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-3/Prism%20Vol%205%20No%203.pdf#page=17">doomed to fail</a>,” according to official assessments published in 2009 by the Center for Complex Operations at the U.S. military’s National Defense University. That assessment said “<a href="https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-3/Prism%20Vol%205%20No%203.pdf">nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a debacle</a>” and recommended the military resume its historic focus on preparing for war. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24541769">Military organizations are not equipped or trained to engage effectively in civilian-centered missions</a> such as fostering national identity, forming political institutions or instilling democratic practices of accountability. Promoting stability is different from promoting democracy, and stability can in fact be present even under very undemocratic governments.</p>
<p>The history of military interventions in places such as the West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon, Somalia and Iraq shows that when local leaders are dependent on foreign military forces to maintain power, it’s hard to build popular legitimacy, govern effectively and build a shared national identity. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416613/original/file-20210817-26-gltwwh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people in camouflage uniforms carry rifles while standing in a formation behind the Afghan flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416613/original/file-20210817-26-gltwwh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416613/original/file-20210817-26-gltwwh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416613/original/file-20210817-26-gltwwh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416613/original/file-20210817-26-gltwwh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416613/original/file-20210817-26-gltwwh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416613/original/file-20210817-26-gltwwh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416613/original/file-20210817-26-gltwwh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">As recently as May 2021, Afghan military personnel were completing specialized combat training.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/afghan-special-force-commando-unit-officers-and-soldiers-news-photo/1233206951">Haroon Sabawoon/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The misuse of military power in counterterrorism</h2>
<p>Boots-on-the-ground military forces aren’t good at nation-building or democracy-fostering. Nor are they good at information warfare – fighting effectively in the battlefield of ideas.</p>
<p>Terrorism, at its essence, is a form of symbolic but deadly violence used to communicate a political message. The conflict is not just over who controls which pieces of land, but rather <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2012.706505">whose narrative is most influential</a>. </p>
<p>In Afghanistan, decades of Western military superiority failed to uproot the <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2011/03/30/accounting-for-the-resilience-of-the-taliban/">Taliban’s ideological narrative</a> regarding the corrupted nature of Afghan leaders and their allies and their betrayal of Islamic traditions and practices. Nor could that superiority strengthen a unified national identity that might at least partially erode tribal attachments, which were <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf">exploited so successfully by the Taliban</a>. </p>
<p>And even when their forces were driven off targeted territory, both the Islamic State group and al-Qaida developed <a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-defeats-the-islamic-state-remains-unbroken-and-defiant-around-the-world-128971">new bases and strongholds</a> <a href="https://www.voanews.com/europe/global-coalition-fears-islamic-state-expansion-africa">far from the fighting</a>. They did this not exclusively by military force, but also through the power of their ideas and by providing an alluring alternative ideological narrative. </p>
<h2>The correct conclusions from Afghanistan</h2>
<p>After 20 years, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan has failed to establish any coherent and sustainable political structure with popular legitimacy. Based on that experience, and the experiences in other countries in other circumstances, there is no reason to think that a continued troop presence would change that.</p>
<p>Locally based political movements that seek democracy and civil liberties – in Afghanistan or elsewhere – can benefit from U.S. support, but not from military force. Forcing societies to embrace democratic practices can lead to political instability, conflict and a decline in citizens’ safety.</p>
<p>In my view, the clear conclusion from all the evidence is that military intervention should be focused on military objectives, and should not diverge into political or social engineering.</p>
<p>[_<a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-important">Get The Conversation’s most important politics headlines, in our Politics Weekly newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166238/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arie Perliger receives funding from the National Institute of Justice and the United Nations.</span></em></p>It may be attractive to think that promoting democracy in occupied foreign countries is an appropriate moral and effective path for restoring security and stability. But it’s not accurate.Arie Perliger, Director of Security Studies and Professor of Criminology and Justice Studies, UMass LowellLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1650592021-08-16T19:12:34Z2021-08-16T19:12:34ZAfghans’ lives and livelihoods upended even more as US occupation ends<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416071/original/file-20210813-13-o5t0pw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C14%2C4792%2C3003&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Forced from their homes by fighting between the Taliban and Afghan government forces, thousands of families seek refuge in a Kabul park.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/thousands-of-displaced-families-suffer-hardships-in-a-park-news-photo/1234621883">Haroon Sabawoon/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United States invaded Afghanistan in late 2001 with the goal of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/afghanistan-war-us.html">destroying al-Qaida and its Taliban hosts</a> and, supposedly, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23524156">establishing a democratic Afghan state</a> and helping Afghan women and children.</p>
<p>Twenty years later, the U.S. and its coalition of 40 or so allies have shuttered their bases and withdrawn, with few exceptions, their last troops. The <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/16/middleeast/taliban-control-afghanistan-explained-intl-hnk/index.html">Taliban have taken over most of the country</a>, including its capital, Kabul.</p>
<p>More than 5,000 American <a href="http://icasualties.org/">soldiers</a> and <a href="https://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallnation.htm">contractors</a> were killed over that time. Another <a href="http://icasualties.org/">1,200 coalition soldiers</a> also died. Al-Qaida is not defeated; it’s still in Afghanistan and overall has considerably <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48056433">more members and operates in many more territories</a> around the world than it did in 2001. A careful reading of the February 2020 <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">peace agreement</a> between the Trump administration and the Taliban, an agreement that the Biden administration <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55775522">is apparently adhering to</a>, reveals that the Taliban made almost no concessions in return for the U.S. withdrawal.</p>
<p>As a longtime <a href="http://sinno.com/publications---data.html">researcher of Afghanistan’s conflicts</a>, I have observed how Afghans’ lives and livelihoods have been affected by the failed 20-year Western occupation of their country.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Children sit on carpets outside a brick building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416073/original/file-20210813-27-a98d4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Children are among the thousands of Afghans who have fled their homes, seeking refuge either elsewhere in Afghanistan or in other countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/internally-displaced-afghan-families-who-fled-from-the-news-photo/1234651269">Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The state the US left behind</h2>
<p>When the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in late 2001, the Taliban were on the verge of controlling much of the country, which was then home to 21 million people. Their regime was brutal, but it managed to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11451718">clamp down on extreme lawlessness and to stabilize</a> a country that, by then, had endured 22 years of horrendous war against Soviet occupiers and among rival Afghan factions.</p>
<p>Until its demise in mid-August 2021, the Afghan government in Kabul was weak, corrupt, divided and vulnerable. It attempted to rule over a population of 38 million with <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/afghanistan">some of the most corrupt state institutions on Earth</a>. The regime established by the U.S. and its allies was <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/120.5.1811">so dysfunctional</a> that Afghan courts were known to judge for the party that paid the most, police forces extorted impoverished civilians on a regular basis, and little was done by civil servants <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf">without a bribe</a>. Many <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501746420/warlord-survival/">state officials were also predatory warlords</a> who recruited their followers to the civil service with the expectation that they would enrich themselves through bribes.</p>
<p>Foreign-backed Afghan political factions, such as the <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/us-withdraws-afghanistan-hazara-status-civil-war/">Hazara Fatemiyoun group</a> organized by Iran, had infiltrated all levels of government. And in a desperate attempt to limit the gains of the Taliban, the Afghan government began <a href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-taliban-business-race-and-ethnicity-99ce5fbb7b9a176b4662fbd04c7cb142">directly paying independent warlords</a> for their support, even as many were involved in the drug trade and abusing civilians.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Men carrying rifles gather outside a building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416074/original/file-20210813-13-10tt6jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Private militias run by independent warlords have taken sides in the conflict between the Taliban and the Afghan government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/afghan-militia-gather-with-their-weapons-to-support-news-photo/1233885666">Hoshang Hashimi/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Afghans’ lives and livelihoods</h2>
<p>At least 100,000 Afghan civilians were <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/02/1057921">killed or injured</a> in the conflict between the U.S.-led coalition and Afghans resisting its occupation of their country. This number should be considered an undercount, as many Afghan casualties were buried quickly following Islamic customs, and records were not kept. Probably as many Afghan combatants have <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/FP_20200825_afganistan_index.pdf">also lost their lives</a>, and many more have been crippled or gravely wounded. Life expectancy in Afghanistan today is a mere <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/08/world/asia/us-misleads-on-afghanistan.html">48 years</a>.</p>
<p>Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/56779160">6 out of 10 Afghans</a> living in poverty and a <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=AF">GDP per capita of some $500 per year</a>, less than 1% of that in the U.S. Much property has been destroyed, and the war economy has forced many Afghans into deeper poverty, all while enriching drug barons and regime-linked warlords. Opium and heroin abuse <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/UNODC-DRUG-REPORT15-ONLINE-270116_1.pdf">skyrocketed in Afghanistan</a> over the 20-year occupation, with millions of Afghans turning to the drugs to escape their harsh reality.</p>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/afghanistan.html">2.5 million registered Afghan refugees</a> in Pakistan, Iran and beyond. <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2020/Displacement_Vine%20et%20al_Costs%20of%20War%202020%2009%2008.pdf">Three million more Afghans are internally displaced</a>. These numbers are
very likely to skyrocket in the wake of the dramatic Taliban victories of mid-August 2021.</p>
<p>Many displaced Afghans, whether inside Afghanistan or outside its borders, lack the basics for minimal survival and are vulnerable to disease and exploitation. Among all the refugees in the world, only those from Palestine and Syria outnumber those from Afghanistan, and Afghans have been among the largest nationality groups <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44660699">seeking refuge in Europe</a>.</p>
<p>Rural Pashtun, the ethnic group that provides the Taliban with most of its manpower, were among those who suffered the most during the war because the bulk of the fighting took place in their areas. </p>
<p>Some urban Pashtun and members of minorities, particularly the historically disadvantaged Hazara ethnic group, took advantage of economic and educational opportunities made available by Western aid agencies and worked for foreign militaries and organizations. These beneficiaries of the foreign presence are now <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/06/19/1004991965/afghan-interpreters-who-await-visas-after-helping-the-u-s-now-fear-for-their-liv">some of the most vulnerable people</a> in Afghanistan, as the Taliban may consider them to be traitors.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Armed men on motorcycles ride down a street" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416072/original/file-20210813-15-1n6o5mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Taliban soldiers patrol the Afghan city of Ghazni on Aug. 12, 2021, after capturing it from government forces.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXAfghanistan/066f2a220b9d4da2899ead9882b87f36/photo">AP Photo/Gulabuddin Amiri</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Tens of thousands of Afghans who worked for the U.S. military, for example, are pleading with Washington <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/24/us/politics/afghan-interpreters-visas.html">to be allowed to come to the U.S. with their families</a>. The Biden administration admitted some, but many more are <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/08/02/biden-visa-program-afghan-interpreters-502085">still waiting to be relocated</a> in the U.S.</p>
<p>The situation of women and children in Afghanistan has not improved much. The rate of maternal mortality, with 1.6 women dying for every 100 births, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/08/world/asia/us-misleads-on-afghanistan.html">has hardly budged</a> since the Taliban ruled in the late 1990s. On the other hand, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/56779160">more women joined the labor force</a> and <a href="https://wenr.wes.org/2016/09/education-afghanistan">more children, particularly girls</a>, have had access to primary education in the past 20 years. Still, only 1 in 10 Afghan children finish high school.</p>
<p>In many rural areas, the situation of women and girls has gotten worse: Not only did they not receive quality aid or education, but they had to contend with <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/17/afghanistan-girls-struggle-education#">extreme poverty, threats of violence and the insecurity of war</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of soldiers stands alongside armored vehicles with a Russian flag flying overhead." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416075/original/file-20210813-6624-1e84rz7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian troops were among a multinational force that conducted military exercises along Afghanistan’s northern border as the Taliban gained ground.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaTajikistanDrills/2f3d66f0d62d4708a2b3871bc9682dba/photo">AP Photo/Didor Sadulloev</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What will the future hold?</h2>
<p>The U.S. occupation caused Afghans to experience an additional 20 years of war and suffering. Ironically, the U.S. is leaving Afghanistan in a state very similar to when it invaded.</p>
<p>The Taliban are back <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/08/16/world/taliban-afghanistan-news">in control of much of Afghanistan</a>, including most of Kabul. Their erstwhile opposition, the militias and warlords of the <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/northern-alliance-or-united-islamic-front-salvation-afghanistan-uifsa">now-defunct Northern Alliance</a> are weaker than they were in 2001, just before the U.S. invasion.</p>
<p>Some members of minority groups, particularly the Hazara and those who cooperated with the foreign occupation, are likely to suffer. Urban Afghans will also have to contend with severe Taliban social strictures that affect women and girls in particular. Migration out of Afghanistan will rise as urbanites and minorities flee for their lives. On the other hand, the Taliban are likely to impose their strict law enforcement and establish courts that aren’t run by corrupt officials, which should deter crime.</p>
<p>As of now, the Taliban have expressed the desire to <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/afghan-soldiers-seek-taliban-amnesty-081333126.html">provide amnesty to state officials, soldiers</a> and other workers. If that happens, and if it is maintained, it would likely shore up Taliban support among the public. </p>
<p>If the U.S., as it often reflexively does against challengers in the international system, chooses to impose <a href="https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-oxio/e33.013.1/law-oxio-e33?prd=OPIL&result=3&rskey=4oKcce">harsh sanctions on Afghanistan</a> the way the U.S. and U.N. did in the 1990s, then it would contribute to even more suffering.</p>
<p>It is also possible that resistance to Taliban rule may develop over coming months and years in the north and in the center of the country. If civil war resumes, then I believe Afghans will experience even more exploitation, heart-wrenching poverty, death and suffering.</p>
<p>[<em>Understand key political developments, each week.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-understand">Subscribe to The Conversation’s politics newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165059/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdulkader Sinno does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When the US invaded Afghanistan in late 2001, Afghans had endured 22 years of war. The Taliban were on the rise. Little has changed after an additional 20 years of war and suffering.Abdulkader Sinno, Associate Professor of Political Science and Middle Eastern Studies, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1650582021-08-13T12:28:36Z2021-08-13T12:28:36ZIn Afghanistan, the US again gets to choose how it stops fighting<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415722/original/file-20210811-23-2zz46b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5991%2C3997&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The U.S. military is handing the keys over to Afghan forces.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.usace.army.mil/Media/News-Archive/Story-Article-View/Article/477816/corps-of-engineers-transfers-om-to-afghans/">Joe Marek/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As headlines proclaim the “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/30/politics/afghanistan-war-ending-biden-war-on-terror/index.html">end</a>” of “<a href="https://whyy.org/episodes/ending-americas-longest-war/">America’s longest war</a>,” President Joe Biden’s withdrawal of the remaining U.S. military personnel from Afghanistan is being covered by some in the news media as though it means the end of the conflict – or even means peace – in Afghanistan. It most certainly does not.</p>
<p>For one thing, the war is not actually ending, even if the <a href="https://www.sandboxx.us/blog/former-cia-officer-explains-how-us-operations-in-afghanistan-will-continue/">U.S. participation in it is dwindling</a>. Afghan government forces, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-57682290">armed and equipped with U.S. supplies</a> – at least for the moment – will <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/08/us/politics/taliban-afghanistan-united-states.html">continue to fight the Taliban</a>. </p>
<p>Disengagement from an armed conflict is common U.S. practice in recent decades – since the 1970s, the country’s military has simply left Vietnam, Iraq and now Afghanistan. But for much of the country’s history, Americans won their wars decisively, with the complete surrender of enemy forces and the home front’s perception of total victory. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415723/original/file-20210811-23-1q1088z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A painting of a battle, with U.S. forces on the right, led by Andrew Jackson, and British forces invading by sea from the left" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415723/original/file-20210811-23-1q1088z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415723/original/file-20210811-23-1q1088z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=224&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415723/original/file-20210811-23-1q1088z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=224&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415723/original/file-20210811-23-1q1088z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=224&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415723/original/file-20210811-23-1q1088z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415723/original/file-20210811-23-1q1088z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415723/original/file-20210811-23-1q1088z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A clear U.S. victory in the Battle of New Orleans in 1815 let Americans think they had won the War of 1812.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://history.house.gov/Blog/2015/January/1-8-Second-Battle-New-Orleans/">Library of Congress</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A history of triumph</h2>
<p>The American Revolution, of course, was the country’s first successful war, creating the nation. The War of 1812, sometimes called the <a href="http://www.americaslibrary.gov/aa/madison/aa_madison_war_1.html">Second War of Independence</a>, failed in both its goals, of ending the British practice of <a href="https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2012/summer/1812-impressment.html">forcing American mariners into the Royal Navy</a> and conquering Canada. But then-Major General Andrew Jackson’s overwhelming <a href="https://www.battlefields.org/learn/war-1812/battles/new-orleans">triumph at the Battle of New Orleans</a> allowed Americans to think they had won that war.</p>
<p>In the 1840s, the U.S. defeated Mexico and <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/mexican-american-war/mexican-american-war">seized half its territory</a>. In the 1860s, the United States <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/american-civil-war/american-civil-war-history">defeated and occupied</a> the secessionist Confederate States of America. In 1898 the Americans <a href="https://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/ojeda.html">drove the Spanish out</a> of Cuba and the Philippines.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-i/u-s-entry-into-world-war-i-1">America’s late entry into World War I</a> tipped the balance in favor of Allied victory, but the postwar acrimony over America’s refusal to enter the League of Nations, followed by the Great Depression and the rise of fascism, eventually <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/foreword">soured Americans on the war’s outcome</a> as well as any involvement in Europe’s problems.</p>
<p>That disillusionment led to the strident campaigns to prevent the U.S. from intervening in World War II, with the slogan “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/America-First-Committee">America First</a>.” When the U.S. did enter the war after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt demanded the “<a href="https://fdr.blogs.archives.gov/2017/01/10/the-casablanca-conference-unconditional-surrender/">unconditional surrender</a>” of both Germany and Japan.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/world-discovered-nazi-death-camps-020933983.html">discovery of the Nazi death camps</a> gave the war its profound justification, while the Japanese surrender on the battleship Missouri in 1945 became a symbol of <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/from-colony-to-superpower-9780199765539?cc=us&lang=en&">unparalleled American power and victory</a>. It was perhaps captured best by the words of the American general who accepted that surrender, Douglas MacArthur: “<a href="https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurfarewelladdress.htm">In war there is no substitute for victory</a>.” </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415725/original/file-20210811-15-e1pt2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black and white image of officials signing a document aboard a warship" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415725/original/file-20210811-15-e1pt2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415725/original/file-20210811-15-e1pt2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415725/original/file-20210811-15-e1pt2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415725/original/file-20210811-15-e1pt2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415725/original/file-20210811-15-e1pt2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415725/original/file-20210811-15-e1pt2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415725/original/file-20210811-15-e1pt2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After the Japanese surrender aboard the USS Missouri in August 1945, the U.S. occupied Japan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.loc.gov/item/2013648116/">U.S. Navy, via Library of Congress</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Lasting connections</h2>
<p>After World War II, the United States kept substantial military presences in both Germany and Japan, and encouraged the <a href="https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/06/06/the-lessons-from-us-aid-after-world-war-ii">creation of democratic governments</a> and the <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/mouse-that-roared/oclc/1112131683">development of what ultimately became economic powerhouses</a>.</p>
<p>The U.S. stayed in those defeated nations not with the express purpose of rebuilding them, but rather as part of the post-war effort to <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/17601.htm">contain the expanding influence</a> of its former ally, the Soviet Union.</p>
<p>Nuclear weapons on both sides made <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/how-wars-end-why-we-always-fight-the-last-battle/oclc/758535136">all-out war between the superpowers</a> unthinkable, but more limited conflicts were possible. Over the five decades of the Cold War, the U.S. fought at arm’s length against the Soviets in Korea and Vietnam, with outcomes shaped as much by domestic political pressures as by <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/fearing-the-worst/9780231192743">foreign policy concerns</a>. </p>
<p>In Korea, the war between the communist-backed North and the U.S.- and U.N.-backed South ended with a 1953 <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/armistice-ends-the-korean-war">armistice that ended major combat</a>, but was not a victory for either side. U.S. troops <a href="https://www.usfk.mil/">remain in Korea</a> to this day, providing security against a possible North Korean attack, which has helped allow the South Koreans to develop a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/South-Korea/Labour-and-taxation#ref34970">prosperous democratic country</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415728/original/file-20210811-21-1bz0lgd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A view of a line of people climbing to a rooftop where a helicopter waits" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415728/original/file-20210811-21-1bz0lgd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415728/original/file-20210811-21-1bz0lgd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415728/original/file-20210811-21-1bz0lgd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415728/original/file-20210811-21-1bz0lgd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415728/original/file-20210811-21-1bz0lgd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415728/original/file-20210811-21-1bz0lgd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415728/original/file-20210811-21-1bz0lgd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The evacuation of Saigon in 1975 after the North Vietnamese victory was an iconic embarrassment for the U.S.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/employee-helps-vietnamese-evacuees-onto-an-air-america-news-photo/517431890">Bettmann via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A humbling loss</h2>
<p>In Vietnam, by contrast, the U.S. ended its involvement with a treaty, the <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/paris-peace-accords-signed">Paris Peace Accords of 1973</a>, and pulled out all U.S. troops. Richard Nixon had vowed early in his presidency that he would not be “<a href="https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/remembering-vietnam-online-exhibit-episodes-9-12">the first American president to lose a war</a>,” and used the treaty to proclaim that he had achieved “<a href="https://qz.com/689961/watch-peace-with-honor-richard-nixons-1973-speech-on-the-end-of-us-involvement-in-vietnam/">peace with honor</a>.”</p>
<p>But all the peace agreement had really done was create what historians have called a “<a href="https://kansaspress.ku.edu/978-0-7006-1190-4.html">decent interval</a>,” a two-year period in which South Vietnam could continue to exist as an independent country before North Vietnam rearmed and invaded. Nixon and his chief foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, were <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780809095377">focused on the enormous domestic pressure</a> to end the war and get American prisoners of war released. They hoped South Vietnam’s inevitable collapse two years later <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780809095377">would be blamed on the Vietnamese themselves</a>.</p>
<p>But the speed of the North Vietnamese victory in 1975, symbolized by <a href="https://diplomacy.state.gov/u-s-diplomacy-stories/fall-of-saigon-1975-american-diplomats-refugees/">masses seeking helicopter evacuations</a> from the roof of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, revealed the embarrassment of American defeat. The <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780809095377">postwar flight</a> of millions of Vietnamese made “peace with honor” an empty slogan, hollowed further by the <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/pol-pot">millions murdered in Cambodia</a> by the Khmer Rouge, who overthrew the U.S.-supported government as troops withdrew from Southeast Asia.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415729/original/file-20210811-13-3aol8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A military vehicle sits between a fence and a roll of barbed wire" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415729/original/file-20210811-13-3aol8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415729/original/file-20210811-13-3aol8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415729/original/file-20210811-13-3aol8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415729/original/file-20210811-13-3aol8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415729/original/file-20210811-13-3aol8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415729/original/file-20210811-13-3aol8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415729/original/file-20210811-13-3aol8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The U.S. is leaving Bagram Airfield, the country’s largest base, and other military installations in Afghanistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/general-view-of-bagram-airfield-the-biggest-us-military-news-photo/1233781771">Sayed Khodaiberdi Sadat/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The choice to withdraw</h2>
<p>President George H.W. Bush thought the decisive American victory in the Persian Gulf War in February 1991 “<a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1991-book1/html/PPP-1991-book1-doc-pg195-2.htm">kicked the Vietnam syndrome</a>,” meaning that Americans were overcoming their reluctance to use military force in defense of their interests.</p>
<p>However, Bush’s 90% popularity at the end of that war faded quickly, as Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein remained in power and the U.S. economic recession took the spotlight. One bumper sticker in the 1992 presidential campaign said, “<a href="https://topbumperstickers.com/saddam-hussein-has-a-job-do-you/">Saddam Hussein has a job. Do you?</a>” </p>
<p>In 2003 President George W. Bush sought to avoid his father’s mistake. He sent troops <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/war-in-iraq-begins">all the way to Baghdad</a> and ousted Saddam, but this decision embroiled the United States in a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War">frustrating counterinsurgency</a> war whose popularity rapidly declined. </p>
<p>Barack Obama campaigned in 2008 in part on contrasting the bad “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/17/barack-obama-veterans-speech">war of choice</a>” in Iraq with the good “war of necessity” in Afghanistan, and then <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-announces-end-of-iraq-war-troops-to-return-home-by-year-end/">withdrew from Iraq</a> in 2011 while <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War/The-Obama-surge">boosting American forces in Afghanistan</a>. However, the <a href="https://www.state.gov/about-us-the-global-coalition-to-defeat-isis/">rise of the Islamic State group</a> in Iraq required Obama to send American forces back into that country, and the Afghanistan surge <a href="https://www.wired.com/2012/09/surge-report-card/">did not yield anything</a> approaching a decisive result.</p>
<p>Now, Biden has decided to end America’s war in Afghanistan. Public opinion polls indicate <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/562897-partisan-split-seen-in-new-poll-on-withdrawal-from-afghanistan">widespread support</a> for this, and <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/biden-unmoved-afghan-exit-taliban-172431943.html">Biden seems determined</a>, despite the advice of the military and predictions of civil war. The fact that <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-pledges-withdraw-troops-afghanistan-christmas-taliban-cheer-n1242590">President Donald Trump also wanted to pull out of Afghanistan</a> would seem to indicate there is little domestic political risk. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, history offers another possibility. A rapid takeover of the country by the Taliban, with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/taliban-has-not-changed-say-women-facing-subjugation-in-areas-of-afghanistan-under-its-extremist-rule-164760">subsequent persecution of women</a> and domestic opponents of the regime, may well produce a backlash among millions of Americans who follow foreign policy only episodically and when dramatic events occur. </p>
<p>Just as the brutality of Islamic State executions led U.S. forces back into Iraq, a Taliban takeover could make the Biden withdrawal of the relatively small American force seem an <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/russia-central-asia/article/3138126/ex-president-karzai-says-us-failed-afghanistan-total">unforced error and an expression of American weakness</a>. </p>
<p>As much as it might seem that Americans today want to stop their “<a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/american-endless-wars/">endless wars</a>,” the humiliation, repression and carnage involved in a Taliban triumph may well cast a <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/joe-biden-vietnam-war-afghanistan-withdrawal-george-w-bush-11626729633">profound and damaging shadow</a> over the entire Biden presidency.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Alan Schwartz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For much of the country’s history, Americans won their wars decisively, with the complete surrender of enemy forces and the home front’s perception of total victory.Thomas Alan Schwartz, Professor of History, Vanderbilt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1647602021-07-27T12:02:41Z2021-07-27T12:02:41ZTaliban ‘has not changed,’ say women facing subjugation in areas of Afghanistan under its extremist rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412912/original/file-20210723-15-i2h67t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4000%2C2598&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Afghan citizens at a March 2021 rally in Kabul to support peace talks between the Taliban and the government. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/afghan-women-youths-activists-and-elders-gather-at-a-rally-news-photo/1232002648">Haroon Sabawoon/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Taliban insurgents continue their deadly war to seize control of Afghanistan after the departure of United States and NATO forces. As they close in on major cities that were once government strongholds, like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/15/world/asia/taliban-afghanistan.html">Badakhshan and Kandahar</a>, many Afghans – and the world – fear a total takeover.</p>
<p>Afghan women may have the most to fear from these Islamic militants. </p>
<p>We are academics who interviewed 15 Afghan women activists, community leaders and politicians over the past year as part of an <a href="https://www.wluml.org/afghancampign/">international effort to ensure that women’s human rights</a> are defended and constitutionally protected in Afghanistan. For the safety of our research participants, we use no names or first names only here. </p>
<p>“Reform of the Taliban is not really possible,” one 40-year-old women’s rights activist from Kabul told us. “Their core ideology is fundamentalist, particularly towards women.” </p>
<h2>From subjugation to Parliament</h2>
<p>The Taliban ruled all of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. Everyone faced restrictions under their conservative interpretation of Islam, but those imposed on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/24/opinion/liberating-the-women-of-afghanistan.html">women were the most stringent</a>. </p>
<p>Women couldn’t leave their homes without a male guardian, and were required to cover their bodies from head to toe in a long robe called a burqa. They could not visit health centers, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/09/world/afghanistan-s-girls-fight-to-read-and-write.html">attend school or work</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412914/original/file-20210723-23-fu4db3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two Afghan women wearing different styles of Burqas, pass by an armed fundamentalist Taliban militia soldier." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412914/original/file-20210723-23-fu4db3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412914/original/file-20210723-23-fu4db3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412914/original/file-20210723-23-fu4db3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412914/original/file-20210723-23-fu4db3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412914/original/file-20210723-23-fu4db3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412914/original/file-20210723-23-fu4db3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412914/original/file-20210723-23-fu4db3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kabul under Taliban rule, October 1996.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/two-afghan-women-wearing-different-styles-of-burqas-pass-by-news-photo/114936599">SAEED KHAN/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2001, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, toppled the Taliban regime and worked with Afghans to establish a democratic government.</p>
<p>Officially, the U.S. war in Afghanistan was about hunting down Osama bin Laden, mastermind of the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks. The Taliban had sheltered bin Laden in Afghanistan. But the U.S. <a href="https://www.usfca.edu/sites/default/files/arts_and_sciences/international_studies/saving_muslim_women-_feminism_u.s_policy_and_the_war_on_terror_-_university_of_san_francisco_usf.pdf">invoked women’s rights</a> as a justification for the occupation, too. </p>
<p>After the Taliban was driven out, women entered public life in Afghanistan in droves. That includes the fields of law, medicine and politics. Women make up <a href="https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=10&year=2020">more than a quarter of parliamentarians</a>, and by 2016 more than <a href="https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/building-trust-in-government-afghanistans-national-solidarity-program">150,000 women had been elected to local offices</a>.</p>
<h2>Rhetoric versus reality</h2>
<p>Last year, after 20 years in Afghanistan, the U.S. signed an accord with the Taliban agreeing to withdraw American troops if the Taliban severed ties with al-Qaida and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/05/around-the-halls-brookings-experts-discuss-the-implications-of-the-us-taliban-agreement/">entered into peace talks with the government</a>.</p>
<p>Officially, in these talks, Taliban leaders emphasize that they wish to <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-constitution-offers-glimpse-into-militant-group-s-vision-for-afghanistan/30577298.html">grant women’s rights “according to Islam.”</a></p>
<p>But the women we interviewed say they believe the Taliban still reject the notion of gender equality. </p>
<p>“The Taliban may have learned to appreciate Twitter and social media for propaganda, but their actions on the ground tells us that they have not changed,” Meetra, a lawyer, shared with us recently. </p>
<p>The Taliban included no women in its own negotiating team, and as their local fighters are taking over districts, women’s rights are being rolled back.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2021/0715/Back-to-the-darkness-Afghan-women-speak-from-Taliban-territory">schoolteacher</a> whose district in northern Mazar-e-Sharif province recently fell to the Taliban told us that, “In the beginning, when we saw the Taliban interviews on TV, we hoped for peace, as if the Taliban had changed. But when I saw the Taliban up close, they have not changed at all.” </p>
<p>Using mosque loudspeakers, Taliban fighters in areas under their control often announce that women must now wear the burqa and have a male chaperone in public. They burn public schools, libraries and computer labs. </p>
<p>“We destroy them [and] put in place our own religious schools, in order to train future Taliban,” a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/reporters/20210611-afghanistan-a-journey-through-taliban-country?ref=fb_i">local fighter from Herat told the channel France 24</a> in June 2021.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://theculturetrip.com/asia/afghanistan/articles/the-rise-of-fundamentalist-madrassas-in-northern-afghanistan/">Taliban-run religious schools for girls</a>, students learn the “appropriate” Islamic role of women, according to the Taliban’s harsh interpretation of the faith. That consists largely of domestic duties. </p>
<p>Such actions demonstrate to many in Afghanistan that the Taliban <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-taliban-today-164221">disagree with the basic principles of democracy</a>, including gender equality and free expression. Taliban negotiators are demanding Afghanistan adopt a <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-constitution-offers-glimpse-into-militant-group-s-vision-for-afghanistan/30577298.html">new Constitution that would turn it into an “emirate”</a> – an Islamic state ruled by a small group of religious leaders with absolute power. </p>
<p>That’s an impossible demand for the Afghan government, and peace talks have stalled.</p>
<h2>A history of equality</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/islam-and-feminism-are-not-mutually-exclusive-and-faith-can-be-an-important-liberator-77086">Many Muslim countries</a> have <a href="https://theconversation.com/muslim-women-are-using-sharia-to-push-for-gender-equality-158371">steadily increasing gender equality</a>. That includes Afghanistan, where women have been struggling for and gaining new rights for a century.</p>
<p>In the 1920s, <a href="https://time.com/5792702/queen-soraya-tarzi-100-women-of-the-year/">Queen Soraya</a> of Afghanistan participated in the political development of her country alongside her husband, King Amanullah Khan. An advocate for women’s rights, Soraya introduced a modern education for women, one that included sciences, history and other subjects alongside traditional home economics-style training and religious topics.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412916/original/file-20210723-19-1jltxm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="King Amanullah Khan and Queen Soraya Tarzi Hanim arrive at a railway station." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412916/original/file-20210723-19-1jltxm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412916/original/file-20210723-19-1jltxm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412916/original/file-20210723-19-1jltxm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412916/original/file-20210723-19-1jltxm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412916/original/file-20210723-19-1jltxm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412916/original/file-20210723-19-1jltxm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412916/original/file-20210723-19-1jltxm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Queen Soraya Tarzi Hanim and King Amanullah Khan, here in 1928, worked together to develop Afghanistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/emir-king-of-afghanistan-01-06-1892-amanullah-khans-news-photo/876358664">ullstein bild/ullstein bild via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the 1960s women were among the drafters of <a href="https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1372&context=nyls_law_review">Afghanistan’s first comprehensive Constitution</a>, ratified in 1964. It recognized the equal rights of men and women as citizens and established democratic elections. In 1965, four women were elected to the Afghan Parliament; several others became <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691643434/afghanistan">government ministers</a>. </p>
<p>Afghan women protested any attacks on their rights. For instance, when religious conservatives in 1968 tried to pass a bill banning women from studying abroad, <a href="http://www.afghandata.org:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/azu/3788/azu_acku_pamphlet_hq1735_6_d87_1981_w.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">hundreds of schoolgirls organized</a> a demonstration in Kabul and other cities. </p>
<p>Afghan women’s status continued to improve under Soviet-backed socialist regimes of the late 1970s and 1980s. In this era, Parliament further strengthened girls’ education and outlawed practices that were harmful to women, such as offering them as brides to settle feuds between two tribes or forcing widows to marry the brother of their <a href="http://www.afghandata.org:8080/xmlui/handle/azu/3837?show=full">deceased husband</a>. </p>
<p>By the end of the socialist regime in 1992, women were full participants in public life in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>In 1996 the rise of the Taliban interrupted this progress – temporarily.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412917/original/file-20210723-27-bn3hoy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Young men and women stroll in Kabul park." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412917/original/file-20210723-27-bn3hoy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412917/original/file-20210723-27-bn3hoy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412917/original/file-20210723-27-bn3hoy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412917/original/file-20210723-27-bn3hoy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412917/original/file-20210723-27-bn3hoy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412917/original/file-20210723-27-bn3hoy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412917/original/file-20210723-27-bn3hoy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Daily life in Kabul in 1988, one year before civil war broke out.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/daily-life-in-kabul-one-year-before-the-civil-war-and-at-news-photo/542346650">Patrick Robert/Sygma via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Resilient republic</h2>
<p>The post-Taliban era demonstrated Afghan women’s resilience after a grueling setback. It also highlighted the public’s desire for a more democratic, responsive government. </p>
<p>That political project is still in its infancy today. The U.S. withdrawal now threatens the survival of Aghanistan’s fragile democratic institutions.</p>
<p>The Taliban cannot win power at the ballot box. Only around 13.4% of respondents in a <a href="https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/2019_Afghan_Survey_Full-Report.pdf">2019 survey by The Asia Foundation</a> expressed some sympathy with the group. </p>
<p>So the Taliban are forcing their authority over the Afghan people using warfare, much as they did in the 1990s. Many women hope what comes next won’t repeat that history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164760/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Homa Hoodfar is affiliated with Women Living Under Muslim Laws as a board member</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>
Mona Tajali serves on the executive board of Women Living Under Muslim Laws. </span></em></p>Burqas and male chaperones for women were features of the Taliban’s extremist rule of Afghanistan in the 1990s. Those policies are now back in some districts controlled by these Islamic militants.Homa Hoodfar, Professor of Anthropology, Emerita, Concordia UniversityMona Tajali, Associate Professor of International Relations and Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Agnes Scott CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1642212021-07-22T12:07:18Z2021-07-22T12:07:18ZAfghanistan after the US withdrawal: The Taliban speak more moderately but their extremist rule hasn’t evolved in 20 years<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411284/original/file-20210714-13-1i7h63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C1911%2C1279&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In early 2021, some Taliban fighters surrendered their weapons to support peace talks with the Afghan government. Today the Islamic extremist group is battling government forces to control the country. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/photos/taliban-fighters?agreements=pa%253A91269&family=editorial&page=2&phrase=Taliban%2520fighters&sort=newest">Xinhua/Emran Waak via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Taliban are rapidly gaining territory in Afghanistan as the United States withdraws its forces from the war-torn country. The militant group now <a href="https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2021/06/taliban-takes-control-of-30-districts-in-past-six-weeks.php">holds at least one-third of Afghanistan’s 364 districts</a>. </p>
<p>For two decades the Afghan government has relied heavily on American military power to defend against the bloody insurgency of the Taliban, a radical Islamic organization that seized control of the country in 1996. </p>
<p>During the Taliban’s five-year rule – which was almost universally shunned by other governments but supported <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-02.htm">militarily and politically by Pakistan</a> – women were prohibited from working, attending school or leaving home without a male relative. Men were forced to grow beards and wear a cap or turban. Music and other entertainment was banned. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A street hairdresser in Kabul cuts a man's beard in November 2001." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Getting a trim in Kabul, November 2001.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/119720452">Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Anyone not abiding by this code risked being publicly lashed, beaten or humiliated. Women who disobeyed these rules were <a href="http://rawa.org/beating.htm">sometimes killed</a>.</p>
<p>Twenty years have passed since the 2001 United States invasion that quickly toppled the Taliban regime. Most Taliban fighters today are under 30. Some weren’t even born in 2001. </p>
<p>What does the group stand for today?</p>
<h2>The Taliban then and now</h2>
<p>The 2001 Taliban defeat was celebrated by Afghans inside and outside of Afghanistan. </p>
<p>Children started to fly kites and to play games – both previously banned. Couples played music at their weddings, and women left their homes for work without fear of being beaten by Taliban enforcers. Many men shaved their beards. Afghanistan opened to the world. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ac3UA_48Va0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Kite-flying resurged in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Neither the Taliban nor violence disappeared as the climate of fear dispersed, but Afghans resumed some semblance of normal life. </p>
<p>Today, younger members of the Taliban, a group once known for eschewing technology, have adopted social media, TV and radios to promote their extremist version of Islamic law. The rhetoric of their older leaders has changed since 2001, too – at least on the international stage. </p>
<p>During peace negotiations and on visits abroad, the Taliban’s leadership has expressed both a belief that women have <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/taliban-say-islamic-system-only-way-to-afghan-peace-womens-rights/ar-AALet6z">rights under Islamic laws</a> and a desire to reduce violence in Afghanistan. The group has also pledged to protect <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/afghan-taliban-offers-protect-infrastructure-projects-142805475.html">such public infrastructure as government buildings, roads and schools</a>, which it has often attacked. </p>
<p>In very few areas of Afghanistan that the Taliban have controlled for many years, local members of the group have allowed girls to <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/why-the-taliban-agreed-to-let-more-girls-in-afghanistan-go-to-school/ar-BB1cwf4I">go to school after community leaders negotiated with local Taliban leaders</a>.</p>
<h2>A new emirate</h2>
<p>But in newly captured areas their policies are more hard line. </p>
<p>According to various reports by the Afghan stations Radio Liberty and Radio Salam Watandar, Taliban rulers in Afghanistan’s North and Northeast have asked families to <a href="https://swn.af/taliban-in-takhar-every-family-brings-a-girl-to-our-marriage/">marry off one girl per family to their fighters</a>; said women should not <a href="https://da.azadiradio.com/a/31350025.html">leave home without a male relative</a>; and ordered men to pray in mosques and grow beards. </p>
<p>The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, an Afghan government agency, says <a href="https://bakhtarnews.af/taliban-destroyed-public-infrastructures-in-116-districts-nadery/">public infrastructure has been destroyed</a> and social services halted in many Taliban-controlled areas, leaving 13 million people without public services. </p>
<p>All evidence suggests the <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/have-the-taliban-changed/">Taliban still believe</a> in restoring their old system of emirate, in which an unelected religious leader, or emir, was the ultimate decision-maker. No one could challenge his verdicts because he was believed to have a divine authority from God.</p>
<p>“What has changed? Absolutely nothing,” Ahmad Rashid, a Pakistani journalist who <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ahmed-rashid-afghanistan-chaos-will-suck-in-neighboring-countries/a-58163020?maca=en-Twitter-sharing">has covered Afghanistan for 20 years</a>, told Germany’s Deutsche Welle newspaper in July 2021. “The Taliban don’t believe in democracy. They just want the collapse of the government so they can reconquer Afghanistan and reimpose their system.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Bearded men in white robes and head coverings walk closely together in a hotel-like setting" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Taliban co-founder Abdul Ghani Baradar, center, after signing the Taliban’s accord with the U.S. in Qatar in February 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/1204139101">Giuseppe Cacace/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A dubious negotiating partner</h2>
<p>The U.S. troop withdrawal follows a controversial February 2020 U.S.-Taliban accord initiated by former President Donald Trump. </p>
<p>In the deal, the U.S. agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan – fulfilling a long-standing Taliban goal – if the Taliban ceased violence against American forces, severed ties with al-Qaida and other terror groups and entered <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-peace-talks-begin-but-will-the-taliban-hold-up-their-end-of-the-deal-146081">peace talks with the Afghan government</a>. </p>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden has <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/07/08/1014178656/as-u-s-troops-leave-afghanistan-biden-is-set-to-explain-what-happens-now">defended his decision to leave Afghanistan</a>, but there is good reason to doubt the Taliban’s commitment to peace. </p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://unama.unmissions.org/surge-civilian-casualties-following-afghanistan-peace-negotiations-start-un-report">recent United Nations report</a>, 5,459 Afghans have been killed since the 2020 U.S.-Taliban deal was signed, and the Taliban were responsible for 62% of those deaths. </p>
<p>In my decades of first working for the Afghan government and then <a href="https://www.unomaha.edu/international-studies-and-programs/about-us/directory/sherjan-ahmadzai.php">studying Afghanistan as an academic</a>, I have found no reliable historical evidence of the group’s abiding by any domestic agreement it signed with any party in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>It has <a href="http://www.hazara.net/mazari/mazari.html">killed opponents</a> at meetings allegedly called to discuss a truce and denied schooling to girls after committing to educate them. </p>
<p>The Taliban have so far kept their promise to the U.S. not to attack withdrawing American forces. But ongoing talks with the Afghan government have not resulted in a cease-fire or power-sharing agreement for Afghanistan.</p>
<p>“Why were the Taliban going to compromise once the [U.S. troop] exit date was given?” asked Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan at a July 2021 conference on <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1635387">security in Central and South Asia</a> I attended. </p>
<p>“Why would they listen to us when they are sensing victory?”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A dozen or more men with large weapons stand in front of a home with arched windows" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Armed men gather in Herat to support Afghanistan security forces fighting the Taliban on July 9, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/afghan-militia-gather-with-their-weapons-to-support-afghanistan-picture-id1233885751">Hoshang Hashimi / AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Terror connections</h2>
<p>Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan hosted many terrorists who perpetrated attacks on American interests worldwide. </p>
<p>The terrorists included al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden, who planned <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/afghan-taliban#text_block_16833">the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania</a> and the Sept. 11, 2001, World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. Bin Laden was killed by U.S. forces in his home <a href="https://www.npr.org/series/135908383/osama-bin-laden-dead">in Pakistan in 2011</a>, but al-Qaida cells <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-al-qaida-is-still-strong-17-years-after-9-11-102966">continue to operate in Southwest Asia and beyond</a>. </p>
<p>And the Taliban <a href="https://theprint.in/defence/why-us-pullout-from-afghanistan-has-indian-security-forces-worried-about-kashmir/696519/">still associate with the group</a> – a violation of their 2020 accord with the U.S. According to a May 2021 U.S. government report, the Taliban <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/18/2002654296/-1/-1/1/LEAD%20INSPECTOR%20GENERAL%20FOR%20OPERATION%20FREEDOM'S%20SENTINEL.PDF">“maintain close ties” with al-Qaida</a>. </p>
<p>Recent reports from <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/paks-terror-groups-join-taliban-war-india-wary-101625942135382.html">Indian security agencies</a> say Pakistan-based terrorist groups are partnering with the Taliban to fight Afghan forces inside Afghanistan, too.</p>
<p>Journalist Ahmad Rashid says with the U.S. gone, the Taliban won’t likely strike a deal as long as the Pakistani military continues to give <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ahmed-rashid-afghanistan-chaos-will-suck-in-neighboring-countries/a-58163020?maca=en-Twitter-sharing">their leaders and their families refuge in Pakistan</a>. The Taliban top brass is safe, while young Taliban fighters wage their insurgency in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>[<em>Insight, in your inbox each day.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=insight">You can get it with The Conversation’s email newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sher Jan Ahmadzai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two decades have passed since the US invasion of Afghanistan toppled the Taliban’s Islamic extremist regime. Despite efforts to update its image, the group still holds hard-line views.Sher Jan Ahmadzai, Director, Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska OmahaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1642062021-07-09T12:06:17Z2021-07-09T12:06:17ZAfghanistan: two decades of Nato help leaves a failed and fractured state on the brink of civil war<p>Afghanistan is falling apart. With US and Nato troops leaving the country earlier than planned, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-government-could-collapse-six-months-after-u-s-withdrawal-new-intelligence-assessment-says-11624466743">experts are warning</a> that the Taliban could take control of the country within six months. Currently the insurgents control the strategically important province of Helmand, and control or contest territory <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan">nearly every province</a> in the war-torn country. </p>
<p>As many as 188 of Afghanistan’s 407 districts are <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/07/taliban-afghanistan-us-withdrawal-conflict-ghani-peace-negotiations/">directly under Taliban rule</a>. With up to 85,000 <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11451718">full-time fighters</a>), the insurgents have already forced thousands of troops belonging to the US-trained Afghan army <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-57720103">to surrender</a> or flee.</p>
<p>In response to the Taliban’s onslaught, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/22/world/asia/vulnerable-afghans-forming-militias.html">local militias are fighting back</a>. Most notable among them is a coalition of militias in northern Afghanistan called the Second Resistance, led by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/world/asia/afghanistan-massoud-cia.html">Ahmad Massoud</a> (the son of Northern Alliance commander <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ahmad-Shah-Masoud">Ahmad Shah Massoud</a>, who was assassinated in September 2001). </p>
<p>The Second Resistance has several thousand fighters and militia commanders who have fought against the Taliban, mostly of Tajik origin. Massoud insists that the Taliban will <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/afghan-militias-forced-to-fight-taliban-blame-americas-abandonment">not have the same success</a> in fighting his coalition due to far greater resolve of his soldiers compared to the Afghan military. But henceforth he will have to operate without the help of Nato troops. </p>
<p>But it’s not just seasoned veterans that are forming militias. Ethnic Shia Hazaras, thousands of whom were massacred between 1996 and 2001 by the Sunni Taliban, have tended to lack militias of their own. But after a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/13/anger-as-afghanistan-mourns-death-of-car-blast-victims">wave of attacks in May</a> that killed 85 people (mostly female students), Hazaras are also now <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/13/anger-as-afghanistan-mourns-death-of-car-blast-victims">rushing to mobilise</a>.</p>
<p>But while these tribal militias might be able to defend themselves, this was far from the objective of the US-led coalition. The goal was to <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm">help build a national Afghan army</a> that could become the sole legitimate fighting force. In spite of these intentions, this clearly never happened.</p>
<p>Much of the problem was that the US never fully grasped how to best support the Afghan military. The Americans relied on a model of trying to arm the Afghan army, training them and providing them with aerial support. But this model was not sustainable or practical for the Afghan military. </p>
<p>Afghanistan <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/afghan-militias-forced-to-fight-taliban-blame-americas-abandonment">does not have the revenues</a> to rely on sophisticated weaponry and technology. This remains a problem even though the US provides Afghanistan with almost <a href="https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/AFG">US$5 billion (£3.6 billion) in aid</a> per year – with US president, Joe Biden, asking for an <a href="https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/white-house-proposes-slight-boost-aid-afghan-forces">additional US$300 million</a> to support Afghan forces.</p>
<h2>2001: a failed mission?</h2>
<p>US efforts to engage in state building after it invaded in December 2001 was a more challenging objective than the Bush administration understood. For centuries, <a href="https://www.history.com/news/why-its-so-difficult-to-win-a-war-in-afghanistan">history has shown</a> that Afghanistan has been difficult to conquer – and impossible to govern. The country always struggled to create a unified national military to ward off invaders and maintain internal stability. Instead it has relied on local tribal militias <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781403981172_10">led by warlords</a> that could be immediately called to action to defend their territory. Efforts in the past (such as under <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Amanullah-Khan">Amanullah Khan</a> in 1923) to enforce conscription into the Afghan army <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/an-intimate-war-2/">resulted in revolt</a>.</p>
<p>As I discovered while researching a book on <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/failed-states-and-institutional-decay-9781441113429">failed states</a>, in addition to having little experience with a national military, other state institutions in Afghanistan were also almost nonexistent. This was not just because the country had faced decades of invasion and civil war, but also because it is is a nation in name only. </p>
<p>The various Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Turkmen, Baluch and Uzbek groups in Afghanistan <a href="http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_87/documentos/ABUBAKAR_SIDDIQUE.pdf">never accepted a central regime</a>. This complicated any effort after Afghanistan gained independence in August 1919 to create unified security institutions to fend off various violent non-state actors that threatened stability in the country.</p>
<p>The Taliban, which overthrew the Afghan government in 1996, was the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan">only group</a> able to exercise control over the country after the 1992-1996 civil war. But, in October 2001, after the 9/11 attacks and the Taliban’s refusal to turn in Osama bin Laden, US and British forces launched airstrikes against targets in Afghanistan. By early December, the Taliban had abandoned their stronghold in Kandahar and ceded their last territory in Zabul and a new president, Hamid Karzai, was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-28257108">sworn in</a> within two weeks as interim leader.</p>
<h2>Taking control</h2>
<p>But the Taliban never accepted a western presence and launched an insurgency in 2002. Over two decades, the Taliban has become the most <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf">effective fighting group in the country</a>, building a professional and resilient organisation that has learned to rely on a sophisticated communication apparatus. Its structure has been flexible enough to withstand the death of its leadership, after <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-33703097">Mullah Omar died in 2013</a>.</p>
<p>During that time – and despite the presence of Nato troops in the country – thousands of civilians have continued to die in terror attacks and raids. In 2019 and 2020 alone, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan <a href="https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/executive_summary_-_afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_annual_report_2020_english.pdf">has documented</a> more than 17,000 civilians killed or injured – the majority of which are blamed on the Taliban. Although the Taliban is currently in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/09/iran-and-russia-move-to-fill-diplomatic-vacuum-in-afghanistan">peace talks with the Afghan government</a> in Tehran, it has <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/311-taking-stock-talibans-perspectives-peace">little or no credibility</a> when it comes to compromise or adhering to agreements.</p>
<p>So, after spending US$2 trillion and involving over 130,000 Nato troops for over 20 years, the US and its western allies are almost <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-57746335">back to square one</a>. Meanwhile almost 50,000 Afghan civilians <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/afghanistan-47-600-civilians-killed-in-20-years-of-deadly-war/2219156">have died</a> – and most Afghan citizens <a href="https://www.adb.org/countries/afghanistan/poverty#:%7E:text=In%20Afghanistan%2C%2047.3%25%20of%20the,die%20before%20their%205th%20birthday">still live in poverty</a>. The one concrete achievement of the 20 years of occupation – reversing the Taliban’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/17/afghanistan-girls-struggle-education">ban on female education</a> – could be in jeopardy as well.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164206/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Afghanistan is descending into anarchy as Nato troops withdraw, leaving the country desperately fighting off a Taliban insurgency.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1601372021-05-07T12:42:36Z2021-05-07T12:42:36ZFaces of those America is leaving behind in Afghanistan<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399027/original/file-20210505-19-12r3lst.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C2%2C659%2C488&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The people of Afghanistan that the author encountered live very different lives from Americans.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>U.S. troops are <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/04/29/politics/us-afghanistan-withdrawal-begun/index.html">already heading home from Afghanistan</a>, ending a two-decade-long war that saw as many as 100,000 American troops there. The withdrawal of the remaining few thousand is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/13/us/politics/afghanistan-troops-withdrawal.html">slated to be complete</a> by the symbolic date of Sept. 11, 2021.</p>
<p>I know this land well from my journeys across more than half of its provinces as a <a href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">professor of Afghan history</a> and as a former <a href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/pdfs/Steve%20Coll_Directorates_ch%2014-Williams.pdf">employee of the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center</a> <a href="https://mepc.org/journal/mullah-omars-missiles-field-report-suicide-bombers-afghanistan">tracking the movement</a> of Taliban and al-Qaida suicide bombers. I also <a href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/us_army_afg/field_us_army_afg.html">advised the military</a> on Afghan terrain, tribes, politics and history.</p>
<p>While on my solo missions for the CIA and U.S. Army beyond the safety of our base’s walls, in what my team described as the “red zone,” I also did something that none of my U.S. Army comrades – who traveled in convoys and were restricted by <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-military-rules-of-engagement-in-afghanistan-questioned-1454349100">formal rules of engagement</a> – could do. I freely photographed the fascinating Afghan people around me as they went about their lives in an active war zone.</p>
<p>Lately, I worry about the fate of the people in these photos and others I have taken. Their world may be destroyed if, or when, the fast-advancing Taliban reconquer the last remaining government-controlled zones. </p>
<p>These images show glimpses of the potentially doomed people and ways of life the U.S. is leaving behind as the troops depart.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Armed men ride horses through rocky ground" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398158/original/file-20210430-15-1wit0yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Uzbek Mongol cavalry commander General Abdul Rashid Dostum, nicknamed ‘The Taliban Killer,’ rides his prized war stallion Surkun in 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The warlord</h2>
<p>In this photograph from 2003, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek Mongol cavalry commander, rides his prized war stallion Surkun. </p>
<p>Dostum, a legendary military leader who fought alongside the Soviets in the 1980s to extend modernity to Afghanistan and has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42908396">faced accusations of war crimes against the Taliban which he denies</a>, is a friend and the focus of my 2013 book, “<a href="https://www.chicagoreviewpress.com/last-warlord--the-products-9781613748008.php">The Last Warlord: The Afghan Warrior who Led US Special Forces to Topple the Taliban Regime</a>.” In 2001 he rode Surkun into combat alongside horse-mounted U.S. Special Forces Green Berets to overthrow his northern Turkic-Mongol people’s historic foes, the ethnic Aryan Pashtun Taliban regime.</p>
<p>Hundreds of his riders were killed in the <a href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/pdfs/930854297(3).pdf">desperate mountain campaign against their Taliban enemies</a>, as seen in the 2019 Hollywood blockbuster “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1413492/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">12 Strong: The True, Declassified Story of the Horse Soldiers of Afghanistan</a>,” which was in part <a href="https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/168036">based on my book</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A young girl and her brother sit under a fabric tent" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398162/original/file-20210430-14-1em1aa7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A young Afghan girl sits with her younger brother in 2007.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The girl</h2>
<p>This cherubic nine-year-old girl at left was charged with babysitting her little brother while her parents worked in the fields in a remote desert region. I have no idea what her fate was, but many impoverished girls like her do not get the opportunity to get an education and are married off in arranged marriages when they are young.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of Afghans smile around a guest" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398173/original/file-20210430-22-1kxb7f3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 2005, I (center) received warm welcomes all across northern Afghanistan, where the people were generally friendly toward Americans.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The hosts</h2>
<p>I was always amazed at the warm welcomes I received while traveling among the Uzbek-Mongol, Persian-Tajik and Hazara-Shiite Mongol tribes of northern Afghanistan, who are closely allied with the U.S. I was regularly invited into their simple homes, where my hosts would eagerly offer me lamb or goat, often after slaughtering their only source of meat for an honored guest. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two chickens fight in the center of a crowd of people, watching the action closely" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398165/original/file-20210430-15-uw1ha6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chicken fights were a popular – if bloody – form of entertainment in Kabul in 2005, but they were banned by the Taliban.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The chicken fighters</h2>
<p>On most Friday afternoons during my time in Kabul, there were chicken fights, like this one in the Garden of Babur, a popular park built around the marble grave of Babur, the founder of India’s magnificent Moghul Empire. At the fights, men bet on which chicken would win, but the pastime was banned by the Taliban as “un-Islamic” as all such “sinful” games distracted from the worship of God. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of Afghan middle school girls" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398174/original/file-20210430-23-fbv3b5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After the Taliban were driven out of their area, these Afghan girls, pictured in 2005, were allowed to attend school.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The schoolgirls</h2>
<p>After five years of being denied the right to an education by the Taliban, these middle school girls in the town of Sheberghan in 2005 were excited to return to school. One girl, third from the right, was crying: She had just told me the story of how the Taliban had killed her parents.</p>
<p>She fretted, “The day the Americans leave the Taliban will return and execute us girls if we try to learn to read and write, which is forbidden for females by their law.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man and two boys stand in front of cliffs showing a large void where a Buddha statue used to be" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398188/original/file-20210430-15-1s8y0h5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Behind the boys and me is a massive cutout in the cliff, where a standing Buddha statue used to be, before the Taliban destroyed it.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The guardians of the Buddhas</h2>
<p>In the idyllic Vale of Bamiyan, at 8,000 feet above sea level in the remote Hindu Kush mountains, the Hazara Mongols for centuries cherished two massive statues of the Buddha, carved into the cliffs in the sixth century. In 2001, the Sunni <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/world/asia/afghanistan-bamiyan-buddhas.html">Taliban destroyed the statues</a>, defying international outcry, in a direct insult to the repressed Shiite Hazaras.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A bearded man in a turban stands with an adult camel and a camel calf in front of a tent." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398172/original/file-20210430-17-1ukn8sn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Kuchis, Aryan Pashtuns, wandered the soaring mountains and vast deserts of Afghanistan, living their entire lives in tents without electricity or any modern conveniences.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The nomads</h2>
<p>As I traversed the soaring mountains and vast deserts of this ancient land that time seemingly forgot, I frequently encountered welcoming and curious Aryan Pashtun nomads known as Kuchis. These wanderers invariably invited me to join them for a simple meal in exchange for my stories about a different world known as America, a land that these humble people, who live out their entire lives in tents without electricity, could not imagine.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man with a rifle stands in front of a restaurant window" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398170/original/file-20210430-18-1udoa9p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After Kabul was freed from Taliban rule, American-style restaurants started cropping up.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<h2>The burger and pizza chef</h2>
<p>An Afghan who worked on a U.S. base and came to love all things American opened this pizza and burger restaurant in Kabul which, like many businesses, featured an armed guard out front. Other American-style restaurants opened up after the Taliban were driven from Kabul, including the remarkably delicious KFC – Kabul Fried Chicken.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of bearded men stand behind a barred door." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=895&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=895&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=895&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398176/original/file-20210430-14-h7e1f7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Taliban fighters captured by General Dostum were imprisoned in the northern deserts of Afghanistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">Brian Glyn Williams</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>The Taliban</h2>
<p>I interviewed several dozen Taliban members, who had been captured by General Dostum’s forces, in a fortress-like prison in the northern deserts of Afghanistan. One of the captives told me a common Taliban mantra: “You Americans may have the watches, but we have the time… We will outlast you.”</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Glyn Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As American troops leave Afghanistan, a scholar of the country’s history and culture reexamines his photos of the nation’s people.Brian Glyn Williams, Professor of Islamic History, UMass DartmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1237132019-09-25T12:03:44Z2019-09-25T12:03:44ZAfghanistan: failure of US-Taliban peace talks looms over elections<p>While Kabul was asleep early on the morning of September 8, Donald Trump abruptly <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-49624132">cancelled peace negotiations</a> with the Taliban. In a statement 17 hours later, the insurgent group said that the US would “lose the most”. But for Ashraf Ghani, the Afghan president bidding for a second term in office at elections on September 28, it was a massive relief. For his sidelined administration, a peace deal with the Taliban would mean losing everything.</p>
<p>A peace agreement between the US and the Taliban, which had been “<a href="https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/us-and-taliban-reach-agreement-principle-khalilzad">agreed in principle</a>” was due to be signed in Doha. But the US president called it off, also cancelling a planned visit by Taliban leaders to Camp David. He tweeted that no deal would be achieved unless a <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1170469621348098049?s=20">ceasefire was reached first</a>. This poured cold water over the heads of those Taliban who had already started beating the drum of victory. </p>
<p>In Afghanistan, Trump’s decision was cheered by opponents of the potential peace deal but raised concerns among many other Afghans who hoped the days of war were numbered, regardless of how imperfect the peace deal would be.</p>
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<p>What made the recent negotiations significantly different from previous peace efforts was the US government’s willingness to negotiate with an insurgent group that has claimed responsibility for the deaths of at least <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-47391821">2,300 American soldiers</a>. The Taliban’s longstanding condition for any peace talks has been to negotiate directly with the US, which played a significant role in toppling their regime in 2001.</p>
<h2>Growing suspicion</h2>
<p>After the initial rounds of the US-Taliban peace <a href="https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/afghan-taliban-representatives-us-officials-meet-uae">started in December 2018</a>, the Ghani administration began to become suspicious about its role in the negotiations. As the peace talks approached their endpoint, the administration faced mounting insecurity, realising that the US, its patron, was giving it a cold shoulder. The main reason the US sidelined the Kabul administration appeared to be the Taliban’s strong opposition to the government, which the group labels both a “puppet” and “illegitimate”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-as-taliban-and-us-near-peace-deal-its-far-too-soon-to-commit-to-returning-refugees-121788">Afghanistan: as Taliban and US near peace deal, it's far too soon to commit to returning refugees</a>
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<p>The Taliban’s rigid stance against the Afghan government added to the intricacy of the job of US peace envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad. He was left with two choices: either support the current political status quo – the National Unity Government and the upcoming presidential election – or take a risky path with the Taliban on board which could potentially lead to a new political settlement.</p>
<p>Ghani was left pushing for the presidential election, in which he believed he had an upper hand. But the US, which had brokered the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-29299088">formation of the unity government</a> in the aftermath of a contested presidential run-off in 2014, clearly had a different priority: the peace process. Its reasoning is that without peace and stability, Afghanistan cannot embrace growth and economy development.</p>
<p>While the US never took a public stance against the election, it was <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghan-presidential-candidates-face-election-uncertainty-campaign-controversy-and-danger/30083700.html">reported</a> that Khalilzad, in private meetings with Afghan elites, had implicitly hinted that the vote could be cancelled and an interim government would be formed. At this point many Afghans started believing that the elections would not happen – including the vast majority of the presidential candidates.</p>
<p>However for Ghani’s team, given that the administration was being sidelined in the peace talks, holding election was a matter of life or death. To reconcile peace with elections on his own terms, in November 2018, Ghani <a href="https://president.gov.af/en/SP/789012781234">presented a new set</a> of peace proposals with a five-year implementation period – equal to a five-year presidential term that he hopes will be his own. The move was criticised and discredited by other presidential hopefuls. </p>
<p>But Ghani is not the sole leader of the Afghan government. Abdullah Abdullah, his main electoral opponent on September 28, is Afghanistan’s current chief executive who claims nearly 50% of the government based on the National Unity Government deal. During Khalilzad’s July trip to Kabul, Ghani was initially reluctant to sign <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-taliban-set-finalize-agreement-ahead-intra-afghan/story?id=64682102">an agreement</a> related to the US-Taliban peace deal, but then the US envoy approached Abdullah for it. All of a sudden, Ghani changed his mind. </p>
<h2>Fate of elections</h2>
<p>In August, with the US-Taliban peace talks on the verge of conclusion and elections just a month away, an average of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49726088">74 people were killed every day</a> in the country, according to the BBC. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49662640">One-fifth of these were civilians</a>, including children. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistans-suffering-has-reached-unprecedented-levels-can-a-presidential-election-make-things-better-121558">Afghanistan’s suffering has reached unprecedented levels. Can a presidential election make things better?</a>
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<p>One of the reasons why Trump pulled out of the agreement was a Taliban attack in Kabul on September 6 in which a US soldier and 11 others were killed. But the Taliban had <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49642655">never agreed</a> to end its violent campaign against foreign forces until a peace deal was signed. The withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and a verifiable Taliban guarantee to fight terrorism were the main topics of the “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49642655">dead</a>” peace talks.</p>
<p>It’s still possible that the talks with the Taliban will resume, with Trump pushing for a “better” deal ahead of the US presidential election in 2020. Both <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49729612">the Taliban</a> and Pakistan have been <a href="https://www.voanews.com/usa/pakistans-pm-urges-trump-restart-peace-talks-afghan-taliban">urging the US</a> to resume the peace negotiations. </p>
<p>For his part, Abdullah has taken the US’s side by prioritising peace. He has said <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-election-abdullah/top-challenger-of-afghan-president-says-ready-to-quit-elections-for-peace-idUSKCN1VJ0UQ?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews">over and over</a> that if he wins the election and the next day, the Taliban shows genuine willingness for peace, he would step down – in stark contrast to Ghani. </p>
<p>With polling day approaching, a group of Kabul elites, including the former president Hamid Karzai, still think the presidential <a href="https://www.apnews.com/0219011cc97741a8b700faf86daebe91/gallery/f68a8fcf1c614e389566f130ccb34bd6">election threatens peace</a>. They feel disenfranchised from the state resources and privileges and see a negotiated political settlement as an opportunity to renegotiate the distribution of power and resources. </p>
<p>For its part, the Taliban labelled the upcoming elections <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-afghanistan-taliban-election/taliban-threaten-afghan-election-hail-progress-on-pact-with-u-s-idUKKCN1UW0MO">a “sham”</a>. The poll has high stakes and may be fairly destabilising, given the likelihood of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2016.1246142">threats of violence</a>, accusations of fraud and breakdown of the political order. It will be very difficult for Afghanistan to have a transparent, free and fair election – at least in the current climate. Still, without elections it’s hard to secure a sustainable peace and stability. </p>
<p>The halted peace talks and upcoming election have one critical point in common: they both operate with a “winner-takes-all” political logic. To ensure a sustainable peace and stability in Afghanistan, it is of paramount importance to design an inclusive set-up in which the distribution of power and resources align with the realities of the country’s power structures. </p>
<p>Otherwise, the costs of excluding key groups with the capacity for violence, including the Taliban, will prolong even further a war that has taken a huge death toll.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123713/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kaweh Kerami does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Afghans head to the polls on September 28, peace still remains elusive.Kaweh Kerami, PhD Researcher, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1217882019-08-23T13:11:06Z2019-08-23T13:11:06ZAfghanistan: as Taliban and US near peace deal, it’s far too soon to commit to returning refugees<p>Signals emerging from ongoing peace talks between the US and the Afghan Taliban indicate a peace agreement could be imminent. Although the eighth round of peace talks, taking place in Doha, ended on August 13 <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/taliban-talks-peace-afghanistan-190510062940394.html">without an agreement</a>, both sides appear to be working through the final technical details of an agreement. </p>
<p>In the meantime, the Afghan Taliban <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/world/asia/americans-killed-afghanistan-taliban.html">continues to fight</a> its 18-year-long war against the US and NATO forces supporting the current Afghan government of President Ashraf Ghani. </p>
<p>US President Donald Trump has vowed to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/17/trump-hints-america-close-to-deal-with-taliban-others-question-peace">reach an agreement</a> on a road map to a comprehensive settlement of the Afghan conflict, as has his envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad. Suhail Shaheen, spokesman for the Taliban’s political office in Qatar, via his <a href="https://twitter.com/suhailshaheen1/status/1162811450110414853">Twitter account</a>, has also indicated that an agreement is near.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1163925466698452993"}"></div></p>
<p>The Trump administration is <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/16/trump-afghanistan-peace-1668390">desperate to</a> begin <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/taliban-talks-peace-afghanistan-190510062940394.html">withdrawing</a> its forces from Afghanistan, but the details of a withdrawal timeline are yet to be finalised.</p>
<p>In July, the seventh round of peace talks facilitated by <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2019/06/20/germany-qatar-inter-afghanistan-peace-talks/">Qatar and Germany</a> in Doha concluded with a <a href="https://twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/status/1148388647357636608">joint statement</a>, a declaration of intent highlighting a road map for the peace deal. In the document, the US accepted the Taliban’s demand for the implementation of Islamic sharia law in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>In return, the Taliban agreed not to let anyone use Afghan soil to carry on terrorist attacks against other countries, and to respect the civil and political rights of Afghan citizens. However, the Taliban has refused to negotiate with the current Afghan government until the US withdraws it forces from Afghanistan, insisting it is illegitimate and a puppet of the US and NATO forces. </p>
<h2>The fate of refugees</h2>
<p>In the joint statement, the US and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-germany-taliban/germany-in-push-to-resurrect-afghan-talks-with-taliban-idUSKCN1SW0C9">Germany</a> also obliged the Taliban to accept back all Afghan refugees who have claimed asylum in other countries. </p>
<p>After Pakistan and Iran, EU countries are the major destination for Afghan refugees. The EU has long been trying to <a href="https://theconversation.com/kabul-is-still-not-safe-but-the-eu-is-deporting-people-there-anyway-66933">return</a> Afghan refugees, despite continued war throughout the country. In 2016, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/afghanistan-refugees-forty-years/">nearly 10,000 people</a> were returned from EU countries to Afghanistan. </p>
<p>In October 2016, the EU signed an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/oct/03/eu-european-union-signs-deal-deport-unlimited-numbers-afghan-asylum-seekers-afghanistan">agreement</a> with the Afghanistan government to return all asylum seekers whose asylum applications have been rejected and are not willing to go back. The agreement was signed despite the fact that the US and Afghan forces <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/us-stops-taliban-territory-tracking-in-afghanistan/a-48559989-0">lacked control</a> over 45% of Afghan territory, and despite international law prohibiting the return of refugees to places where their lives or freedoms could be at risk, or where they could be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment.</p>
<p>If a ceasefire agreement is announced in the coming months, more negotiations will be needed to finalise what kind of role the Taliban will play in the future governance of Afghanistan, if any.</p>
<p>Under the joint statement, the Taliban pledged to respect the civil, political, economic, educational and cultural rights of all Afghan citizens including women, in accordance with the framework of Islamic sharia law. The details on how it will do this remain unclear. </p>
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<p>Going by the Taliban’s past record in power, any return of refugees to areas of Afghanistan under Taliban control could undermine the fundamental rights and freedoms of the refugees. In particular, it would have a significant chance of causing inhuman and degrading treatment of women, religious and ethnic minorities, and former employees of the Afghan armed forces. </p>
<p>The Taliban has a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36236567">history</a> of conducting informal trials, extrajudicial killings, segregation of women, and suppression of religious and ethnic minorities. The <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html">1951 Refugee Convention</a> regarding the status of refugees prohibits the return, or refoulement, of refugees to territories where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, politics, or membership of a particular social group. </p>
<h2>Protecting human rights</h2>
<p>Before making any plan to return refugees to areas of Taliban control, or to an Afghanistan where the Taliban are in government, the EU must ensure a minimum standard is established for the protection of human rights in the country. This could be partially achieved by codifying sharia law and human rights into the Afghanistan legal system, and by creating an independent judicial system outside the influence of the Taliban. </p>
<p>Such measures could stop laws from being used as tools to take personal revenge or to cause injustice, and could also discourage <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/the-disturbing-trend-of-taliban-justice-in-afghanistan/a-37950678">informal public trials</a> and executions at the hands of the Taliban. But due to political differences in Afghan society and the likely opposition of introducing sharia law into the legal system, achieving these measures remains very unlikely in the near future. </p>
<p>If the EU plans to return more Afghan refugees following a peace agreement between the US and the Taliban, it must ensure the agreement assures the protection of all Afghans. Without a roadmap that does this, it would be against international law to send asylum seekers and refugees back to Afghanistan.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121788/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tasawar Ashraf does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A ceasefire with the Taliban won’t make it safe to send more refugees back to Afghanistan.Tasawar Ashraf, PhD Candidate, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1107342019-02-04T12:59:32Z2019-02-04T12:59:32ZAfghanistan: the tensions inside the Taliban over recent US peace talks<p>When members of the Taliban’s Political Commission in Doha <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-open-afghan-peace-talks-with-us-in-qatar/4752262.html">sat down</a> with US peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad on January 21, talks were expected to last only a couple of days. Instead, the two sides talked for six days. By the end of the week, many Afghans hoped there might even be a ceasefire announcement.</p>
<p>Eventually, an exhausted Khalilzad flew to Kabul, to brief the Afghan government and political leaders that there <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-draft-khalilzad/u-s-peace-envoy-khalilzad-heads-to-afghanistan-after-significant-progress-in-talks-with-taliban-idUSKCN1PK0KK">was progress</a> but no final deal. Members of the Taliban told researchers working with me that the negotiators were cautiously optimistic. They had concluded that a peace deal might actually be attainable. </p>
<p>But, in the following days, contradictory narratives circulated among the Taliban about what peace might look like, and the price they were prepared to pay for it. These narratives provided a timely reminder that preparing an armed movement to embrace an end to violent conflict is an immense political challenge, for the leaders of that movement, for mediators and for the battlefield enemies.</p>
<h2>A victory narrative</h2>
<p>The Taliban fighters in Afghanistan are predominantly millennials and <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2017/11/22/The-Talibans-massive-social-media-presence-thats-being-ignored">many carry</a> phones and post on Facebook. They took up the positive tone and celebrated the prospect that the war would end and peace would come. Theirs was an uncomplicated message, with no political caveats. This was a remarkable development as, until now, Taliban popular discourse had typically portrayed “peace” as a foreign conspiracy to undermine the legitimate jihad.</p>
<p>As an indicator of the Taliban mood, on the day after Khalilzad’s departure, an audio of a <em>tarana</em>, or ballad, was widely circulated on WhatsApp. It articulates a narrative of victory, envisaging a Taliban army, in their signature white turbans, sweeping across the country. </p>
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<p>What a day will it be, the day that we are in the heart of Kabul,<br>
And like a flock of white-feathered birds, our convoy will be drawn up before the gates of Kabul.<br>
What a time it will be, the day when we have all become one,<br>
When we are independent and free and are as one against the foreigners, when we have become as one against the foreigners. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Taliban veterans described to me a gulf in perceptions, with uninformed juniors thinking the war is about to end, while senior figures know that there is no deal.</p>
<p>According to the Taliban victory narrative, by agreeing to negotiate with the Taliban, the Americans have accepted that they have been defeated in Afghanistan and just want to extricate their troops safely. Because the Afghan government in Kabul is entirely dependent on external support, the Taliban can easily topple it. Hardliners push this victory narrative to argue they don’t even need any further negotiations, as the Americans are bound to leave anyway. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in their official internal briefings to the fighters, circulated as audio messages over WhatsApp that I have heard, Taliban spokesmen maintained a calculated ambiguity, compatible with both the victory narrative and that of negotiated peace. The spokesmen confirmed in these messages that the Taliban delegation had discussed withdrawal of foreign troops, which is the main Taliban demand. But they denied reports that there had been any agreement on a ceasefire or to include the Afghan government in talks, both of which contradict the victory narrative. And they confirmed that talks would resume after consultation with the Afghan Taliban’s leadership, based in Pakistan. </p>
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<h2>How to compromise</h2>
<p>The dilemma underlying these contrasting Taliban narratives concerns the legitimacy and necessity of compromise at the end of a war. The potential peace deal taking shape in Afghanistan would involve a ceasefire, a negotiation about the future of governance among the Afghan parties and an incremental withdrawal of US troops. For the Taliban, even this simple framework represents a compromise. Until now, they have pledged to fight until the last foreign troops leave, refused to negotiate with the Afghan government and ruled out any power-sharing arrangement. </p>
<p>After the Doha round of talks in January, the Taliban negotiators seem ready to contemplate some degree of compromise, but have had to refer to the leadership – whose decision-making is deliberately opaque. My ongoing research into Taliban political culture indicates that the leadership has assembled a long list of arguments against the very notion of a negotiated settlement. </p>
<p>They feel compromise is unnecessary because the US will inevitably <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/us/politics/afghanistan-troop-withdrawal.html">withdraw its troops</a> before the 2020 US election, with or without a deal. The Taliban leadership is also concerned that hint of a compromise would undermine the jihadi spirit which motivates their troops. Compromise could split the movement or make it impossible to resume the conflict if a deal fell apart. They also fear appearing to betray the blood of the martyrs sacrificed in the hope of total victory. </p>
<p>The Taliban has championed the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/01/rhetoric-ideology-and-organizational-structure-taliban-movement">idea of an emirate</a> as a political system vesting all power and authority with their supreme leader. Power-sharing would amount to a renunciation of this idea of emirate. Less spoken about, but historically a key consideration for the Taliban leadership, is the issue of jihadi solidarity. Any deal would mean renunciation of the al-Qaeda relationship. Almost two decades ago, the then Taliban emir, Mullah Omar, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jul/28/terrorism">refused</a> to give up Osama bin Laden to the Americans. Breaking solidarity with al-Qaeda and fellow mujahideen would still be a bitter pill for a Taliban leader. </p>
<h2>Different pressures</h2>
<p>The leadership’s final argument is one around pressure. The Taliban embraced talks because they felt <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-taliban-talks-uae-no-afghanistan-reps-pakistan-saudi-arabia-khalilzad/">under political pressure</a> from Pakistan and countries in the region to sit down. The leadership may calculate that, by showing up for talks, they have done enough to mitigate that pressure and that blaming the US for the lack of a deal may be an acceptable outcome.</p>
<p>Whether there is now any real progress towards peace depends, in large part, on how these arguments are resolved within the Taliban movement. That the leadership has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan/taliban-appoints-new-political-leader-to-join-u-s-taliban-peace-talks-idUSKCN1PI1G7">acknowledged</a> that its representatives are engaged in serious talks is a significant step forward. But the leadership itself has not yet embraced compromise, nor has it taken any steps to prepare the movement for a settlement short of total victory. </p>
<p>The default position for the Taliban leadership would be to let talks drag on for a while and then double down on the strategy of jihad until victory by launching a spring offensive. However, what has changed since Khalilzad launched his peace initiative in October 2018 is that more Taliban have come to contemplate an end to the war and even some senior figures have concluded that this can only be achieved by compromise. </p>
<p>Afghanistan is still probably a long way away from a peace deal. But the shift in Taliban calculus is a helpful foundation for the next stage of peacemaking.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110734/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Semple receives funding from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and is Chair of Talk for Peace, an NGO promoting peace dialogue.</span></em></p>A Taliban perspective on recent peace talks for Afghanistan.Michael Semple, Visiting Research Professor, Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation and Social Justice, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1092232019-01-07T11:40:55Z2019-01-07T11:40:55ZNo, Trump is not like Obama on Middle East policy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252516/original/file-20190104-32145-gcg5gj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Donald Trump speaks at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Trump-Iraq/99d8b761c3dd40c69de1f9190a589ce8/6/0">(AP Photo/Andrew Harnik</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Jan. 6, National Security Advisor John Bolton walked back President Donald Trump’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/politics/trump-syria-turkey-troop-withdrawal.html">announcement</a> that the U.S. would quickly withdraw U.S. troops from Syria, saying that such a withdrawal might actually take <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/06/world/middleeast/bolton-syria-pullout.html">months or years</a>.</p>
<p>Trump’s announcement came more than two weeks earlier. Soon after, <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2018/12/21/report-trump-eyes-major-withdrawal-of-troops-from-afghanistan/">Trump also directed the Pentagon</a> to halve the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>Whatever the fate of either order, pundits and politicians are having a field day comparing Trump’s Middle East policy to that of Barack Obama.</p>
<p>“On this issue…there is more continuity between Trump and Obama than would make either administration comfortable,” Richard N. Haas, president of The Council on Foreign Relations, told The New York Times in an article headlined “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/politics/trump-syria-withdrawal-obama.html">A Strategy of Retreat in Syria, with Echoes of Obama</a>.” </p>
<p>The next day, The Hill repeated the sentiment in an article whose headline holds nothing back: “<a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/422295-trumps-middle-east-policy-looks-a-lot-like-obamas-thats-not-a-good">Trump’s Middle East Policy looks a lot Like Obama’s – that’s not a good thing</a>.” </p>
<p>Even Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC), whose support for Trump is matched only by his disdain for Obama’s Middle East policy, <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2018/12/19/lindsey_graham_withdrawal_from_syria_is_an_obama-like_mistake.html">called Trump’s plan</a> “an Obama-like mistake.”</p>
<p>As someone who has <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-new-middle-east-what-everyone-needs-to-know-9780190653996">studied and written about the Middle East</a> for more than 30 years, this comparison immediately struck me as wrong. </p>
<p>While both presidents have advocated decreasing America’s footprint in the region, I believe their policies are comparable only on the most superficial level. Understanding why enables us to see the fundamental flaw underlying the current policy. </p>
<h2>Trump vs. Obama: Afghanistan</h2>
<p>Obama and Trump have taken contrasting approaches to the Afghanistan war, America’s longest. Both favored troop withdrawal – but with different intentions. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252515/original/file-20190104-32133-lf51ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252515/original/file-20190104-32133-lf51ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252515/original/file-20190104-32133-lf51ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252515/original/file-20190104-32133-lf51ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252515/original/file-20190104-32133-lf51ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252515/original/file-20190104-32133-lf51ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252515/original/file-20190104-32133-lf51ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252515/original/file-20190104-32133-lf51ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">President Barack Obama, center, is briefed by Marine General Joseph Dunford, commander of the US-led International Security Assistance Force, right, and US Ambassador to Afghanistan James Cunningham, May 25, 2014, Afghanistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Obama-Afghanistan/7653e0cd75a146dcb75729601e3bf97d/2/0">AP Photo/ Evan Vucci</a></span>
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<p>In June 2011, Obama <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/06/22/afghanistan.troops.drawdown/index.html">announced a multi-year timetable</a> for a withdrawal, after an initial surge. His goal was to let the Afghan government know that the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan was not open-ended. The Afghans had to get their house in order, then take over the fight before the U.S. left for good.</p>
<p>It was, in effect, an announcement of the “Afghanistanization” of the war, similar in intent to Richard Nixon’s policy of “<a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/this-day-in-politics-089554">Vietnamization</a>.” In 1969, Nixon proposed replacing U.S. combat troops with South Vietnamese troops in order to extricate the United States from a seemingly endless war. This was Obama’s goal in Afghanistan as well. By the end of his second term, however, circumstances there persuaded him to <a href="http://time.com/4394955/afghanistan-barack-obama-troops-pullout/">slow the withdrawal</a>. </p>
<p>When Trump announced his policy toward Afghanistan during the first year of his presidency, he <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/after-gains-in-afghanistan-resurgent-taliban-is-in-no-rush-for-peace-talks/2018/12/03/a4a86cc0-f334-11e8-99c2-cfca6fcf610c_story.html?utm_term=.cc912bac71a8">mocked Obama’s plan</a>. According to Trump, “Conditions on the ground, not arbitrary timetables, will guide our strategy from now on.” </p>
<p>And instead of “Afghanistanization,” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/world/asia/trump-speech-afghanistan.html?mcubz=1&_r=0">Trump originally supported</a> increasing the use of force to compel the Taliban, whom the U.S. and its allies are fighting in Afghanistan, to come to the bargaining table. </p>
<p>The Taliban had other ideas.</p>
<p>Rather than being backed into a corner, the Taliban recently made battlefield gains and is defying U.S. efforts to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/after-gains-in-afghanistan-resurgent-taliban-is-in-no-rush-for-peace-talks/2018/12/03/a4a86cc0-f334-11e8-99c2-cfca6fcf610c_story.html">negotiate a settlement</a>. It was in this context that Trump decided that “conditions on the ground” were ripe for a partial U.S. withdrawal.</p>
<h2>Trump vs. Obama: The greater Middle East</h2>
<p>Obama’s Afghanistan policy was part of a broader approach his administration took toward the Middle East. </p>
<p>As I have <a href="https://www.thecairoreview.com/q-a/a-long-view-of-the-middle-east/">argued elsewhere</a>, Obama believed that the United States had expended far too much blood and treasure in the Middle East under his predecessor, George W. Bush. For Obama, the region’s deep-seated problems made it more trouble than it was worth.</p>
<p>Obama believed that an economically ascendant Asia, not the Middle East, will be the epicenter of global competition in the 21st century. His goal, then, was to get the United States out of the Middle East and “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/">pivot to Asia</a>.” </p>
<p>Obama wanted to calm the waters in the Middle East, then shift the burden of policing it to America’s partners there, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, as the United States had done <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/08/dont-knock-offshore-balancing-youve-tried-it-obama-middle-east-realism-liberal-hegemony/">during the Cold War</a>. Hence, his policies were aimed at the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region, forging an Iran nuclear deal and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/15/a-defense-of-obamas-middle-east-balancing-act-syria-russia-iran-nsc/">restarting negotiations</a> between Israel and the Palestinians. This strategy could have enabled the United States to focus its attention on Asia.</p>
<p>Unfortunately for Obama, the chaos created by the Arab uprisings of 2010-11, the resistance of U.S. partners in the region to what they believed was American disengagement and poor execution <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/">stymied his grand strategy</a>.</p>
<p>Unlike Obama, Trump does not have a Middle East strategy, grand or otherwise. He has impulses.</p>
<p>Trump’s move to withdraw troops from Syria came as a spur-of-the-moment decision during a phone call with <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-syria-us-troops-pullout-turkish-president-erdogan-2018-12">Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</a>. After Erdoğan asked Trump why the United States still had troops there, Trump reportedly replied, “You know what? It’s yours. I’m leaving.” </p>
<p>This <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/20/trump-defends-syria-withdrawal-1070943">surprised his national security team</a>, which assumed that the United States was still committed to fighting Islamic State militants in Syria alongside the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces, which the United States will now abandon.</p>
<p>Does this mean that Trump is prepared to jettison the global war on terror, not to mention the Saudi-led coalition to stop the spread of Iranian influence in the region? At one time, both seemed <a href="http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse233-EN.pdf">bedrock policies</a> of the Trump administration. Now, not so much. </p>
<p>With U.S. forces gone from Syria, so is <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Saudis-publicly-oppose-US-exiting-Syria-while-Israel-objects-quietly-547648">a check on Iranian ambitions</a> to expand its military presence and political influence there – much to the horror of officials not only in the United States, but in Saudi Arabia and Israel as well. Adding insult to injury, Trump followed his “I’m leaving” statement <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/iran-can-do-what-they-want-in-syria-trump-says-1.6805949">with another</a> that was just as impulsive. In a conversation with reporters, he said: “Iran is pulling people out of Syria, but they can frankly do whatever they want there.” </p>
<p>None of this is to say that America’s open-ended commitments in Afghanistan and Syria and the global war on terror do not deserve rethinking. </p>
<p>I and numerous other observers have been calling for that for years. </p>
<p>But while we are doing that rethinking, it is important to remember <a href="https://twitter.com/centcom/status/842446796198682624">an aphorism</a> that is often repeated in military circles: “Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” It is a useful guide to the difference between the Obama and Trump approaches to the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109223/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James L. Gelvin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Obama’s plan to withdraw from Afghanistan had several facets and was part of a wider strategy in the Middle East.James L. Gelvin, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/911302018-05-10T10:47:31Z2018-05-10T10:47:31ZNo, the war in Afghanistan isn’t a hopeless stalemate<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217586/original/file-20180503-182160-h6gt49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Afghan Northern Alliance fighters in 2001. Almost two decades later, the war continues.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/David Guttenfelder</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The war in Afghanistan has become so protracted that it warrants the epithet the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/29/opinion/afghanistan-troops-trump-taliban.html">Groundhog Day War</a>.”</p>
<p>Fighting has gone on for nearly 17 years, with U.S. troops in Afghanistan seven years longer than the Soviets were. </p>
<p>The U.S. leadership claims to have a strategy for victory even as warm weather brings in yet another “fighting season” and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/30/asia/afghanistan-kabul-blasts-intl/index.html">new rounds of deadly violence in Kabul</a>. </p>
<p>Sixteen years and seven months of violence, loss, sacrifice and significant investment, without victory, is alarming – but is it without hope?</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=DAQkOF8AAAAJ&hl=en">scholar of Afghanistan and strategy</a> and a soldier who has served four tours in the country, I’d like to explore both the apparent stalemate and the reasons for harboring hope of an eventual resolution.</p>
<h2>The ‘Groundhog War’</h2>
<p>In terms of fighting battles and taking ground, momentum in the war in Afghanistan has ebbed back and forth from the coalition formed by the U.S., NATO and Afghan troops to the Islamist insurgents who call themselves the Taliban, or “the students.”</p>
<p>The two sides see gains and losses each year, until colder weather diminishes their ability to fight until the following spring. As the weather warms up, the pattern repeats itself. This story is told by 10 years of U.S. Department of Defense reports on Afghanistan that are required every six months by Congress. </p>
<p>Of course, it’s impossible to identify simple reasons for the failure to win something as complex as a war. Early on, the coalition and its Afghan partners lacked a strategy and a willingness to help rebuild the country after decades of war among Afghans, Russians, the Mujihadeen – and ultimately the Taliban – made Afghanistan one of the most damaged and destitute countries on the planet. </p>
<p>The Bush administration reviled the notion of nation-building, focusing instead on targeting individuals for killing and capturing. For the first several years, the U.S. relied too heavily on warlords, tolerated venal Afghan leadership and employed air power indiscriminately, thus inadvertently killing civilians. All of this aggrieved many Afghans. </p>
<p>Still, none of those missteps were decisive. Rather, I would argue that the war has dragged on for one overarching reason – Pakistan’s support for the Taliban.</p>
<p>The proof is in years of those Department of Defense reports.</p>
<h2>A place to run and hide</h2>
<p>The November 2013 report stated that Pakistan provides physical sanctuary to the Taliban leadership and that sanctuary is “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf">a major factor preventing their decisive defeat</a>.” It reported, Taliban “insurgents that attack Coalition forces continue to operate from Pakistan.” What’s more, most of the materials required to sustain the conflict, and “emanating from Pakistan,” remained significant.</p>
<p>Nothing had changed three years later when, at the end of 2016, yet another report noted that the Taliban – including the senior leadership of the lethal Haqqani clan that excels at high-profile terrorist attacks – had retained <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Afghanistan-1225-Report-December-2016.pdf">sanctuary inside Pakistan</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/1225-Report-Dec-2017.pdf">December 2017 report affirmed</a> “the externally supported Haqqani Network remains the greatest threat to Afghan, U.S., and Coalition forces.” </p>
<p>In testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, <a href="https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/17-18_03-09-17.pdf">General Joe Votel, the commander of U.S. Central Command</a> expressed concerns about the Haqqani network, saying it “poses the greatest threat to Coalition forces operating in Afghanistan.” </p>
<p>Of course, Pakistan’s <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2018/0209/Afghanistan-In-midwinter-attacks-a-brutal-Pakistani-reply-to-Trump">security establishment consistently and eloquently denies all this</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217995/original/file-20180507-46344-qcaipy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217995/original/file-20180507-46344-qcaipy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217995/original/file-20180507-46344-qcaipy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217995/original/file-20180507-46344-qcaipy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217995/original/file-20180507-46344-qcaipy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217995/original/file-20180507-46344-qcaipy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217995/original/file-20180507-46344-qcaipy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghan protesters hold a banner that reads ‘ISI clear enemy,’ during a demonstration in Kabul in 2011. ISI stands for Inter-Services Intelligence, part of the Pakistani Army.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Musadeq Sadeq</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Too much tactics</h2>
<p>A corollary explanation for the stalemate is America’s tendency to focus on strikes and operations without necessarily linking those operations to the ultimate desired outcome: peace and stability. </p>
<p>This was the case 30 years ago when the U.S. was <a href="https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/6/20/the-wages-of-war-without-strategy">supporting the Mujahideen</a> during the Soviet-Afghan War, and it was the case with <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Wrong_Enemy.html?id=7LADnwEACAAJ">Rumsfeld’s Pentagon</a> from the beginning years of the war in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>After the ill-conceived invasion of Iraq, Afghanistan turned into a secondary and underresourced effort for the U.S. with a limited number of special operations and conventional forces conducting strikes and raids to kill or capture key leaders. There was a dearth of troops and resources committed to address the challenge of stabilizing the country.</p>
<p>The biannual defense department reports tell this story too. They tend to quantify the number of tactical actions – rather than assessing their effectiveness. While strikes that kill or capture enemy leaders do disrupt and damage the Taliban, their effects are fleeting, not decisive. They do not bring strategic momentum.</p>
<h2>Not hopeless</h2>
<p>However, with the change in policy last August, there is cause for hope.</p>
<p>The stated policy of the current administration is to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/full-transcript-donald-trump-announces-his-afghanistan-policy/537552/">win in Afghanistan</a>. This contrasts to the previous policy, which was simply <a href="https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/17-10-03-political-and-security-situation-in-afghanistan">not to lose</a>.</p>
<p>But what would winning look like?</p>
<p>A win, according to a definition worked out during my tours as an adviser to senior military leaders, would be a durable Afghan state, with the government, the security forces and the population aligned against a marginalized Taliban. </p>
<p>Another reason for hope is that this new strategy is based on conditions on the ground being met, not <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/1225-Report-Dec-2017.pdf">arbitrary timelines</a>. The strategy calls for an increase of about 3,500 U.S. forces – to a total of over 14,000 – to advise and assist the Afghan security forces. NATO countries are also contributing additional troops, bringing the total number of Coalition troops in Afghanistan to <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/1225-Report-Dec-2017.pdf">more than 21,000</a>. </p>
<p>This modest increase in troops isn’t enough to break the strategic stalemate. However, it will support growing the Afghan Special Security Forces, building the capacity of the Afghan Air Force and improving the other security forces by employing more advisers with tactical units that do the fighting. That should allow the Afghan security forces to win more battles against the Taliban and gather marked operational momentum that will complement efforts to alter Pakistan’s harmful strategic proclivities. </p>
<p>Perhaps most notably, the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/1225-Report-Dec-2017.pdf">new strategy avows</a> that “we must see fundamental changes in the way Pakistan deals with terrorist safe-havens in its territory” for the strategy to gain momentum.</p>
<p>Of course, just stating that there is a new strategy does not necessarily mean the strategy is working. In mid-January 2018, America’s U.N. ambassador, Nikki Haley, stated that Afghanistan <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2018/01/17/us-ambassador-nikki-haley-says-trump-policy-in-afghanistan-is-working/">peace talks are closer than ever before</a>.
Days later, the Haqqani network <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/23/politics/kabul-hotel-attack/index.html">attacked the Kabul Intercontinental Hotel</a>, killing at least 30 people. Less than a week later, the Haqqani network murdered more than 100 people by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-blast-usa-haqqani/u-s-sees-haqqani-network-behind-ambulance-bombing-in-kabul-idUSKBN1FI2L0">detonating an explosive-laden ambulance</a> in a crowded section of Kabul. Two more <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/at-least-31-afghans-killed-in-kabul-by-suicide-bomber-official-says/2018/04/22/30174d76-4615-11e8-9072-f6d4bc32f223_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.308c16c10840">complex</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/30/kabul-explosions-hit-city-centre-attack">suicide attacks</a> followed in April. And in early May, Islamist militants attacked a voter registration site in Khost Province, killing over 17 and wounding more than 30. Khost is <a href="http://www.foreigndesknews.com/world/asia/more-than-50-casualties/?utm_source=Newsletter+Opt-in+Subscribers&utm_campaign=aef7d49d34-The_Foreign_Desk03_05&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_ddc9d9dcfa-aef7d49d34-217119785">next to the Haqqani sanctuary in Pakistan</a>.</p>
<p>Since 9/11, the United States has explicitly stipulated that Pakistan must cease support to extremist and terrorist groups. Diplomacy and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/us/politics/us-aid-pakistan-terror.html">US$33 billion in aid since 2002</a> have not brought a change in Pakistan’s conduct. Some have suggested that <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/04/trump-administration-pakistan-aid-325401">withholding aid from Pakistan</a> is a step in the right direction. Withholding funds is not nearly good enough to compel accountability, nor to punish Pakistan for years of odious actions. Pakistan has not stopped its support of terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan in any fundamental way. It is time to consider responding with punitive, lethal measures aimed at institutions in Pakistan that directly advise and fund the Taliban and the Haqqani network.</p>
<p>Some may wonder why it’s necessary to persist in this war – and not just bring the U.S. involvement in it to an end.</p>
<p>Practically speaking, Afghanistan represents an excellent base for combating Islamist terrorists in that region of the world. </p>
<p>But there is also an ethical argument for seeing the war through to a successful end. Afghanistan has been the good war of the post-9/11 wars. The United States went to war there for the right reasons – defeating al-Qaida, the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, and removing the Taliban regime that provided sanctuary to al-Qaida. Although imperfectly carried out, the coalition also attempted to fight a just war by avoiding the killing of civilians. It would be fair to argue that it is a moral imperative that the U.S. not quit on a commitment to its Afghan allies in a war against externally directed murderous Islamists.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert M. Cassidy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A strategy to shut down Taliban safe havens in Pakistan could bring the war to an end.Robert M. Cassidy, Chamberlain Project Teaching Fellow, Wesleyan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/955302018-04-24T11:50:33Z2018-04-24T11:50:33ZEyewitness: a deadly bombing in Kabul<p>It’s the day after <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/afghanistan-deaths-attack-id-voter-registration-centre-kabul-180422063114761.html">yet another explosion</a> in the Afghan capital, Kabul, this time at a voter registration centre. Another 69 innocent Afghans <a href="http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan-43864238">confirmed killed</a> (so far) and another 120 injured. My colleague Reza Hussaini and I are sat in our office, each scrolling through Facebook posts, trying to avoid the most graphic and bloody photos of the bombing.<br>
We are working together on a <a href="https://blogs.city.ac.uk/sociology/2018/04/16/dr-liza-schuster-presents-on-migration-policy-making-in-and-about-afghanistan-at-kabul-university/">project</a> examining Afghanistan’s migration decisionmaking, policymaking and migration culture. For months, we’ve been asking what makes someone go, what makes someone stay, and why people change their minds about going or staying.</p>
<p>Over the past 18 months, we’ve been interviewing families from different ethnic groups at regular intervals. All feel the same insecurity; all worry whether those who go to work or to school will return in the evening. But the fear is particularly sharp in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/06/afghanistan-hazaras-160623093601127.html">Hazara</a> community, a primarily Shia minority group who have been specifically targeted.</p>
<p>The voter registration centre bombing happened in the neighbourhood of Dashte Barchi, which I know very well. When I first came to Kabul six years ago, it was the area where I felt most at ease, with no outward signs of insecurity. Visiting the area recently for the first time in months, I was shocked by the number of heavily armed police and police vehicles, especially surrounding Marafat school, which was hosting an annual school celebration. My companion, a Hazara, confessed to feeling afraid, wondering if there would be an attack.</p>
<p>Reza, like three other members of my team, is Hazara himself, and Barchi is the heart of their community. He tells me that since the April 22 bombing, the phone has not stopped ringing, as friends call to ask what to do now.</p>
<h2>Fight or flight?</h2>
<p>Some are calling for a demonstration, but most say there’s no point. “It doesn’t have any effect, the government doesn’t care about us. It will just bring us together as another target for another attack.”</p>
<p>Some suggest now is the time to leave, that they have already sacrificed so many of their people and cannot sacrifice any more. Some reject that: “No, that is exactly what these people want,” said one. “They want to drive us across the borders.” Others argue that the so-called Islamic State (IS) is targeting Shia Muslims because they don’t want the Hazara to participate in this year’s elections.</p>
<p>Still others argue that “we need to arm ourselves again – we need to defend ourselves”. They take to social media to declare that the time for crying is done, and now is the time to channel those emotions into anger and fight. But fight against whom? IS, which has been active in Afghanistan <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-stopping-islamic-states-afghan-operation-means-tackling-the-taliban-63088">for some years</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/22/dozens-dead-in-kabul-bombing-at-voter-registration-centre-afghanistan">claimed this attack</a>, but some are blaming the government, arguing that since it’s unable or unwilling to provide security, they will have to take matters into their own hands.</p>
<p>The fear in this community is palpable. Most of this year’s bombings have targeted the Hazara; in 2017, there were four major attacks on the Hazara community in Kabul, but there have been three in the past six weeks alone.</p>
<p>Later in the afternoon, I attend a performance based on our research by the Theatre Department at Kabul University. The performance is not as tight or as focused as it should be. At the final curtain call, one of the students tries to pay tribute to those who died but collapses, unable to speak.</p>
<p>I look out into the audience and wonder how many are deciding to leave their homes – and how many will be able to stay.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95530/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liza Schuster's research is funded by the ESRC-GCRF. She is affiliated with AMASO (Afghanistan Migration Advice and Support Organisation) </span></em></p>An attack on a voter registration killed at least 57 people, and left scores more deciding where to go now.Liza Schuster, Reader in Sociology, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/866632017-11-14T22:01:58Z2017-11-14T22:01:58ZWhy Russia is back in Afghanistan<p>Three decades after a humiliating military defeat in Afghanistan, Russia has returned to the scene. This adds Afghanistan to a long list of hotspots – from <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-russia-needs-troops-from-the-caucasus-in-syria-and-how-they-bolster-moscows-eastern-image-81281">Syria</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-has-a-serious-stake-in-libyas-uncertain-future-79371">Libya</a> to <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/russia-comes-venezuelas-rescue-us-imposes-more-sanctions-707644">Venezuela</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-peace-plan-follows-a-familiar-path-but-there-are-potholes-in-the-east-63167">Ukraine</a> – where Moscow’s low-cost, high-impact foreign policy is challenging the West. In Afghanistan, the Kremlin is covertly supporting the Taliban and other groups, and hosting regional talks with Pakistan, Iran and China. And whereas Moscow was strongly opposed to the Taliban throughout Afghanistan’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Afghanistan/Civil-war-mujahideen-Taliban-phase-1992-2001">civil war in the 1990s</a>, it seems a U-turn is underway.</p>
<p>Afghan and US officials both <a href="http://www.mei.edu/content/io/iran-and-russia-team-taliban-undermine-us-led-mission-afghanistan">claim</a> that since 2015, Russia has been providing funding and arms to Taliban groups. A <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/25/asia/taliban-weapons-afghanistan/index.html">CNN report</a> in July 2017 claimed Russian arms were being transferred to Taliban fighters. A <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russia-funds-taliban-in-war-against-nato-forces-hvfl3cgrg">report in the Times of London</a> citing Taliban sources concluded that Russia was channelling funds to the Taliban via cross-border fuel trading. Russia has strongly denied the allegations, but admits diplomatic contacts with the Taliban, arguing that since they are both fighting the regional branch of the so-called Islamic State (IS) they have <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/afghanistan-iran-russia-taliban/3624592.html">common interests</a>. </p>
<p>Officials in Moscow believe that whereas the Taliban is focused primarily on the domestic conflict inside Afghanistan, IS poses a transnational threat to Central Asian states and even to Russia itself. <a href="http://time.com/4739488/isis-iraq-syria-tunisia-saudi-arabia-russia/">Thousands of Russian citizens</a> have travelled to Syria to fight with IS or with other militant groups. They have been joined by fighters from Central Asia, many of them radicalised while working in Russia, and Central Asian citizens were directly involved in <a href="https://theconversation.com/has-uzbekistans-repressive-government-helped-radicalise-its-emigrants-and-exiles-86887">recent IS-linked terror attacks</a> in Russia, Sweden, Turkey and the US.</p>
<p>The Russian government’s thinking on the threat from IS sometimes hints at conspiracy theories, among them the notion that IS is an American project aimed at destabilising Russia. In June, Russia’s foreign ministry <a href="http://ariananews.af/russia-questions-reports-of-unidentified-helicopters-sighted-in-afghanistan/">complained</a> that “unidentified helicopters” were resupplying IS fighters, and implied that they were linked to US forces. Zamir Kabulov, Russia’s experienced special envoy to Afghanistan, <a href="https://rg.ru/2016/04/20/terakt-v-stolice-afganistana-unes-zhizni-28-chelovek.html">claimed</a> in 2016 that IS fighters were not focused on the Afghan conflict, but “are being prepared for a war against Central Asia, against the interests of Russia”.</p>
<p>What such claims make clear is that Russia’s policy is not just a response to security concerns, but is part of a wider geopolitical strategy.</p>
<h2>Eyes on the endgame</h2>
<p>For a relatively limited investment, Afghanistan offers an ideal opportunity for Russia to make headway in its geopolitical competition with the West. Russian officials <a href="http://aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/exclusive-interview-with-russian-diplomat-zamir-kabulov/717573">suggest</a> that US bases in Afghanistan are part of a plan to dominate the region and threaten Russia through Central Asia. But Afghanistan is also seen as a weak spot in the US’s regional strategy, where American forces and funding are struggling to prop up a weak central government against a growing insurgency. </p>
<p>An active Afghan policy also helps extend Russia’s role in Central Asia and win back lost influence in Soviet republics such as <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-turkmenistan-berdymukhammedov-talks/28769176.html">Turkmenistan</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/has-uzbekistans-repressive-government-helped-radicalise-its-emigrants-and-exiles-86887">Uzbekistan</a>. The region’s secular dictatorships are nervous about any spillover of violence from Afghanistan, and when they’re under threat, they tend to look towards Moscow for support.</p>
<p>A role in the Afghan endgame also gives Moscow increased leverage in its relationship with China. Russia wants to ensure it is not marginalised by China’s <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/245-central-asias-silk-road-rivalries">Belt and Road Initiative</a>. Its best hope to maintain influence is to make itself the dominant security and diplomatic power across a broad region that it calls <a href="http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Birth-of-a-Greater-Eurasia-18591">Greater Eurasia</a>.</p>
<p>In December 2016, Russia hosted talks in Moscow on Afghanistan with both Pakistan and China; two <a href="https://thewire.in/124530/afghanistan-taliban-talks-russia/">further rounds of talks</a> in February and April 2017 were widened to include India, Iran, the Central Asian states, and the Afghan government. (The US refused to participate.) Russia has also revived the <a href="http://eng.sectsco.org/">Shanghai Co-operation Organisation</a>’s “Contact Group” with Afghanistan, hosting <a href="http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/shanghai-cooperation-organization-sco-afghanistan-contact-group-meeting">a meeting</a> of officials from the organisation’s member states in Moscow in October.</p>
<p>These talks have yet to yield a single major breakthrough, but they provide a possible template for future regional efforts to address the conflict. The US, meanwhile, has failed to develop a viable regional policy platform around Afghanistan. The US-led Quadrilateral Contact Group, which <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/1532600/quadrilateral-meeting-begins-oman-hope-peace-afghanistan/">resumed talks in Oman</a> in October 2017 after more than a year’s hiatus, shows little sign of achieving any breakthrough.</p>
<p>Russia’s dealings with the Taliban could yet backfire. Many rebels are unhappy at the prospect of close links with Moscow, while the weakness of Russia’s economy puts a limit on just how much influence it can wield abroad. But if Moscow can keep up its current strategy of on-the-ground engagement coupled with regional diplomacy, it is sure to have a role in the endgame.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86663/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Lewis has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council project 'Rising Powers and Conflict Management in Central Asia'.</span></em></p>Russia is pursuing influence in Central Asia and competing with the US. Afghanistan offers it a chance to do both.David Lewis, Senior Lecturer, Politics, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/828292017-08-22T04:49:18Z2017-08-22T04:49:18ZTrump changes his mind on Afghanistan, but will upping the ante win the war?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182909/original/file-20170822-22198-ii8sv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Joshua Roberts</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump has upped the ante in America’s longest-running war, but it is not clear whether an all-guns-blazing strategy will bring the long-running conflict any nearer to a conclusion.</p>
<p>In a clear departure from approaches applied by his predecessors, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, Trump proclaimed a new mission in Afghanistan in which he served notice on Pakistan that it would be required to participate more vigorously in the war against the Taliban.</p>
<p>This was a pointed reference to long-standing US disquiet about Pakistan turning a blind eye to Taliban leaders who have taken refuge in its remote regions.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/world/asia/trump-speech-afghanistan.html?mcubz=1">In his nationally televised address</a> – the first of his presidency – Trump provided no details of an additional troop deployment, nor did he describe how a change of strategy might play out. However, he indicated much more authority in the conduct of the war would be vested in generals on the ground to enable them to take the fight to the enemy.</p>
<p>Trump’s warning to Pakistan to co-operate in efforts to stabilise Afghanistan or bear the consequences represented a striking departure from a less-confrontational approach of past presidents.</p>
<p>His speech sets the scene for a more aggressive American war-fighting strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia more generally.</p>
<p>Apart from announcing the US would take the fight to the Taliban with Pakistan expected to pull its weight, perhaps the most important component of the Trump speech was his declaration that his country’s nation-building days are over. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are a partner and a friend, but we will not dictate to the Afghan people how to live or how to govern their own complex society. We are not nation-building again. We are killing terrorists.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This suggests a departure from the approach adopted by the US and its allies since 2001, in which enormous effort has been committed to helping Afghanistan establish a civil society.</p>
<p>Whether Trump was declaring an end to – or lessening of – these efforts remains to be seen. But it would seem to be counterproductive to abandon welfare and educational programs aimed at combating Taliban influence on the ground.</p>
<p>A more aggressive American war-fighting effort will inevitably pose challenges for participants in NATO-led operations in Afghanistan, including Australia.</p>
<p>Australia recently increased its Afghanistan commitment – Australian service personnel in Afghanistan number 270 – to train and mentor Afghan forces, but officials have made it clear this will not involve frontline roles.</p>
<p>Trump’s new strategy might require Australia to review this decision. It should hasten slowly.</p>
<p>Trump acknowledged that since becoming president he had undergone a change of heart on Afghanistan, having previously urged withdrawal on the basis that the US was involved in an unwinnable war.</p>
<p>In deliberations that brought a shift in his position, Trump cited three main factors. These were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The US needed to honour the sacrifice of its soldiers who had fallen in Afghanistan.</p></li>
<li><p>Withdrawal would risk creating a fresh vacuum for terrorists.</p></li>
<li><p>The US faced a broader terrorist threat in Afghanistan and South Asia that required its continued presence.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These conclusions are not much different from those reached by Bush and Obama as the rationale for keeping American troops engaged. What is different is the policy’s hyer-aggressive tone. Trump declared:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our troops will fight to win. From now on victory will have a clear definition. Attacking our enemies, obliterating ISIS, crush al-Qaeda, preventing the Taliban from taking over Afghanistan, and stopping mass terror attacks against America before they emerge.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>All this will be easier said than done. In the 19th century, Britain was unable to pacify Afghanistan, in the 20th century Soviet efforts were rebuffed, and now in the 21st century America and its NATO allies have struggled.</p>
<p>The reality is that despite <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/afghanistan">16 years of NATO involvement</a>, spending one trillion dollars and the deaths of more than 2,200 Americans, 10% of Afghanistan remains under Taliban control – and another one-third is contested.</p>
<p>In 2016, 11,418 civilians died in the continuing war, and 660,000 fled their homes. Conflict was up sharply last year from the year before. The Afghan regular army continues to be bedevilled by poor morale and desertions.</p>
<p>All this suggests the Taliban, and other terrorist groups, including Islamic State and al-Qaeda, are deepening their engagement in the country.</p>
<p>None of this augurs well for a renewed push for victory by US-led NATO forces whose main mission has been to hold the country together in the hope an effective leadership emerges. This has been slow to eventuate.</p>
<p>Trump and his generals, including three of his closest advisers – chief-of-staff John Kelly, Defence Secretary James Mattis, and national security adviser H.R. McMaster – would be well aware of the challenges. But in US efforts to either beat the Taliban into submission, or force it to the negotiating table, they have clearly persuaded Trump there is no choice but to intensify America’s combat operations.</p>
<p>We should expect significantly increased loss of life and inevitable collateral damage, including non-combatant casualties. This will be the reality.</p>
<p>The question will then become whether the new Trump doctrine of using overwhelming force against Islamic terrorists buried in their local communities will have proved the best investment of American resources.</p>
<p>All this remains problematic. What’s not in question is that the US has a commander-in-chief who can be expected to exhibit less squeamishness than his predecessors about the risks involved in waging a war whose success will be difficult to measure.</p>
<p>What should not be forgotten is that despite the deployment of 140,000 American troops in 2011 as part of a surge aimed at enabling a beleaguered Afghan regime to stand on its feet, the Taliban quickly reasserted itself once US forces were drawn down.</p>
<p>Trump and his advisers would not need reminding that Americans are sick of these wars, and their cost in lives and money. Trump campaigned against further such commitments. Now he’s changed his mind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82829/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
President Donald Trump has upped the ante in America’s longest-running war, but it is not clear whether an all-guns-blazing strategy will bring the long-running conflict any nearer to a conclusion. In…Tony Walker, Adjunct Professor, School of Communications, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/778812017-06-08T11:20:51Z2017-06-08T11:20:51ZThe war against the Taliban is still unwinnable<p>Spring in war-ravaged Afghanistan is the season when soldiers, suicide bombers, renegades and warlords emerge from the temporary truce imposed by the bitter winter to face each other once again. This spring has been no different. </p>
<p>In this year’s <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/04/28/taliban-announce-spring-offensive-1-week-after-afghanistan-massacre.html">“spring offensive”</a>, there already have been hundreds of casualties in clashes between government soldiers and Taliban insurgents. At least seven people were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/03/kabul-explosions-afghanistan-people-killed-funeral-salim-ezadyar">killed and more than 119 wounded</a> in three separate explosions at a high-profile funeral in Kabul – the third attack in four days in the Afghan capital. The funeral was for one of several protesters killed days earlier at a large demonstration calling for the resignation of the government after a large truck bomb killed <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/31/huge-explosion-kabul-presidential-palace-afghanistan">scores of civilians</a>.</p>
<p>Thn there was the horrific <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/taliban-attacks-key-military-base-north-afghanistan-170421134021613.html">massacre by the Taliban of 140 soldiers</a> in a training compound in Mazar-e-Sharif. Added to that have been the numerous everyday attacks on government troops and foreign military across the country. Once dismissed as a lone force, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11451718">the Taliban</a> is now allied to over ten other terrorist fronts. They are all united by one aim: to demobilise the external forces and oust the national government. All this makes us wonder what is in store for Afghanistan?</p>
<p>While a nervous and helpless Afghan government looks on, there has been a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-38924389">reaction of sorts</a> from NATO – which has been in the country since the ousting of the Taliban regime in 2001. General John Nicholson, the commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, has called for a “few thousand” more troops to break the stalemate in the war with the Taliban. He stressed extra troops were needed to help train the Afghan military. The soldiers, he said, could be American or from other NATO nations.</p>
<p>The Trump administration is also considering a proposal to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/08/us/politics/donald-trump-afghanistan-troops-taliban-stalemate.html?_r=0">increase the US troop presence in Afghanistan</a>. But all this begs much bigger questions – is this mad scramble for more troops just a sticking plaster? And is there an actual endgame in sight?</p>
<h2>Taliban ‘governance’ and PR</h2>
<p>Having been kept out of the political decision-making process, the Taliban is now floating its own system of governance and security. It has specified a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39742802">“twin-track political and military approach”</a> to what it considers Afghanistan’s current ills. The Taliban has already put in place a programme that focuses on infrastructural development and reconstruction in areas under its control. Interestingly, it seeks to replicate that model across the country by ousting the current government machinery. And it wants to do so by using a well-oiled propaganda machine that stresses the Taliban is there “to help those deceived by the enemy see the truth of its struggle”.</p>
<p>The Taliban has revamped its internal policies and politics. It wants to step away from its earlier mainstream image as a merciless war organism and to appear as a credible alternative to an ineffective and corrupt government in Kabul. It has embraced what one might call a veneer of statecraft. According to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-war-idUSKBN15G40M">US government estimates</a>, by the end of 2016 the government in Kabul had uncontested control of only 57% of the country (a drop from 72% in the 2015). The Taliban, meanwhile, controls nearly a third of Afghanistan.</p>
<p>The Taliban faces a number of opponents – Afghan government soldiers, rival factions and warlords, and the coalition forces from outside. The real the problem for the Taliban, however, is not the indigenous Afghan opposition but the outsiders. It feels it can easily overpower the internal opposition. Any possible challenge to its gameplan, therefore, comes from the coalition forces. </p>
<p>Consequently, it has already made it clear that it will target “foreign forces, their military and intelligence infrastructure”. The Taliban rarely mince their words. Their hideous and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/10/afghanistan-harrowing-accounts-emerge-of-the-talibans-reign-of-terror-in-kunduz/%E2%80%8B">merciless offensives</a> often prove their point. The masters of unconventional warfare, their gory terror tactics have not even spared <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/07/AR2010080700822.html">doctors and humanitarian</a> aid workers.</p>
<h2>Futility of committing more troops</h2>
<p>The UK has been asked by NATO – the alliance of which it is a founding member and pivotal partner – to send more troops into this quagmire. One ought to stress here that a near total British troop withdrawal from Afghanistan took place in 2015. </p>
<p>At the moment, Britain has a small troop presence in Afghanistan, numbering some 500. They offer training facilities to the Afghan National Army and are “deployed to provide security around the capital Kabul”. A large tract of territory that <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/23/pictures-looking-back-british-troops-sangin-afghanistan/">British forces had wrested</a> from the Taliban in the past is now back in Taliban control.</p>
<p>So what is the point of sending new NATO troops to a territory where the conflict is spiralling out of control? Is it worth it? How long can one prevent this rising tide of Taliban offence?</p>
<p>A minuscule troop increase will not make any dent in the strategic crises facing the Afghan state. The Taliban has always considered outside forces as high-value targets and any new additions will be targeted. If the last 16 years of external military engagement is anything to go by, Afghanistan is completely unpredictable and untrustworthy terrain. </p>
<p>Britain has already lost <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10634173">456</a> of its brave soldiers to this conflict. If one were to do a realistic audit, the British military engagement in Afghanistan has been a story of one step forward and two steps back. It is time we woke up to the reality. It is time for clear introspection and hard thinking. There needs to be some military pragmatism. </p>
<p>So let us be very clear: Afghanistan is an unwinnable war and Britain cannot go on sacrificing more troops just because it is a committed member of a military alliance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77881/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amalendu Misra receives funding from British Academy. </span></em></p>Britain cannot sacrifice more troops in an unwinnable war just because it is a member of NATO.Amalendu Misra, Senior Lecturer, Department: Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/760702017-06-01T01:57:24Z2017-06-01T01:57:24ZPrivate defense companies are here to stay – what does that mean for national security?<p>Share prices of many military and intelligence contractors have risen sharply since President Donald Trump’s election. </p>
<p>Investors are betting that an increase in defense spending will provide a windfall for these firms. For instance, <a href="http://www.generaldynamics.com/our-business/combat-systems/land-systems">General Dynamics</a>, a large contractor that develops combat vehicles and weapons systems for the U.S. military, saw its stock price jump by more than <a href="https://www.google.com/finance?q=NYSE%3AGD&ei=ZcMtWYm4JIO0jAHxy6egDg">30 percent in the months after the election</a>. Likewise, Kratos Defense and Security Services, a smaller firm that builds <a href="http://www.kratosusd.com/capabilities/unmanned-tactical-systems">drones</a> for the U.S. Air Force, saw its shares soar <a href="https://www.google.com/finance?q=Kratos&ei=ZcMtWYm4JIO0jAHxy6egDg">more than 75 percent</a> between November 2016 and May 2017. </p>
<p>This trend may be short-lived. Congress still must decide whether <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/us/politics/trump-budget-winners-losers.html?_r=0">Trump’s proposed 10 percent increase in defense spending</a> is practical given current budget constraints.</p>
<p>What is certain is that for-profit military and intelligence firms will remain an integral part of U.S. national defense. My <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2017.1243912">research</a> focuses on the changing nature of the private defense industry. Military contracting <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67440">is still big business</a>, although media coverage of private military firms has diminished since the withdrawal of the U.S. from Iraq in 2011. Today, contractors’ work ranges from assisting in drone missions to analyzing signals intelligence to <a href="http://www.jobs.net/jobs/dyncorp/en-us/job/Afghanistan/Advisor-Embedded-Police/J3J6Y7686BZTPSFRY48/">training police forces</a> in fragile countries like Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Like it or not, government agencies responsible for national security are dependent on private defense firms. These companies are primarily responsible to shareholders rather than the American people. How can they be held accountable to the nation’s interests?</p>
<h1>New frontiers</h1>
<p>In recent years, private military companies have adapted to changing demands from U.S. defense agencies. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military relied heavily on contractors to support counterinsurgency operations. However, high-profile incidents of alleged human rights abuses by the company CACI at <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/us-appeals-court-reinstates-abu-ghraib-prison-abuse-case-against-caci/2016/10/21/e53c43a6-97b5-11e6-bc79-af1cd3d2984b_story.html?utm_term=.6e0a02269e7a">Abu Ghraib Prison</a> in Iraq and Blackwater at <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdict.html">Nisour Square</a>, Iraq brought to light the difficulty the American military faces monitoring private defense companies. </p>
<p>At the same time, Americans have since become averse to nation-building campaigns in <a href="https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/americans-support-limited-military-action-syria-against-isis">failing states</a>. So, private defense firms have shifted away from supporting “boots on the ground.” Instead, they are increasingly assisting military and intelligence agencies with counterterrorism and cybersecurity.</p>
<p>While the American people generally want to avoid deploying troops to conflict zones, they still demand protection from terrorism. The Pentagon, CIA and other defense agencies receive assistance in these areas from private companies with expertise in drone warfare, special forces operations and analysis of electronic surveillance of potential terrorist threats. These traditionally were duties of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/19/5/1055/505530/We-Can-t-Spy-If-We-Can-t-Buy-The-Privatization-of">public employees</a>.</p>
<p>Cybersecurity is another area in which private military companies see <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/09/29/raytheon-wins-1-billion-cybersecurity-contract-to-battle-attacks-on-u-s-agencies/?utm_term=.f3154e7c2d4d">increasing demand</a>. Information gleaned from hacking government agencies, world leaders and political campaigns can be used by rogue states like Russia and nonstate actors like WikiLeaks to harm American interests.</p>
<p>Governments and multinational corporations realize that protecting classified information and intellectual property is of paramount importance. They are willing to pay top dollar to private defense firms to keep their secrets safe.</p>
<h2>Serving the public interest?</h2>
<p>Most defense analysts now acknowledge that the question is not whether to privatize, but <a href="http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/DAED_a_00100?journalCode=daed#.WRJ6HxiZO1s">where to draw the line</a>. If the U.S. government is going to work extensively with contractors, it requires a more <a href="https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cwc/20110929213815/http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/">robust oversight system</a>. Government agencies and courts also need assurances they can hold defense firms accountable if they break the law overseas. </p>
<p>During the Iraq War, this was a point of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2010.480906">serious contention</a>. It was unclear what legal jurisdiction applied to employees of private defense firms. The uncertain legal status of contractors caused significant tension between the U.S. and the government of Iraq and hampered <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/01/world/middleeast/01contractors.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=04E8524B4347957ED094B882F7D70C09&gwt=pay">American counterinsurgency efforts</a>. </p>
<p>Here are three ways Congress could increase accountability for private defense firms as the industry becomes more enmeshed in national security.</p>
<p>First, Congress could create an independent regulatory agency to report on contractors’ performance. While major firms in the industry insist they can <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-public-policy/article/effectiveness-of-selfregulation-by-the-private-military-and-security-industry/4E7881E8C544004B3F6A8FB5310DD1EE">regulate themselves</a>, an independent oversight agency could more adequately assess how defense contractors perform. </p>
<p>Second, as things stand now, the U.S. government often overlooks bad behavior and renews contracts with companies that have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/opinion/will-anyone-pay-for-abu-ghraib.html?_r=0">less than stellar records</a>. Instead, the government could more severely penalize firms that do not fulfill the terms of their agreements.</p>
<p>Third, government employees often transition from public service into lucrative positions at <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pentagon-nominees-ties-to-private-firms-embody-revolving-door-culture-of-washington/2017/01/19/3524e8f4-dcf9-11e6-918c-99ede3c8cafa_story.html?utm_term=.3650925cd8bf">billion-dollar defense corporations</a>. Stricter rules to limit this “revolving door” would make government employees more willing to penalize firms.</p>
<p>Private defense contractors will likely be a major part of U.S. national defense for the foreseeable future. Diligent oversight and regulation of companies in this rapidly evolving industry, I believe, are necessary to ensure that these firms advance the public good of American security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76070/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Mahoney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For-profit corporations are deeply embedded in US national security infrastructure – and they’re not going anywhere.Charles Mahoney, Professor of Political Science, California State University, Long BeachLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/759592017-04-07T21:38:26Z2017-04-07T21:38:26ZStrikes against Syria: Did Trump need permission from Congress?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164526/original/image-20170407-22688-txrbeb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Donald Trump after speaking at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, Florida.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Alex Brandon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Launching <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-launches-missiles-syrian-base-after-chemical-weapons-attack-n743636">59 cruise missiles</a> at a Syrian military airfield in response to a Syrian chemical weapons attack that killed dozens of civilians raises important questions. Does the president have, or should he have, the authority to use military force without the explicit consent of Congress? </p>
<p>The U.S. Constitution makes the president the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, while granting Congress the power to declare war. The framers of the Constitution <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/book/39876">intended</a> through the latter provision to make Congress the principal decision-maker regarding the initiation of military campaigns. But they also <a href="https://works.bepress.com/johnyoo/44/">sought</a> to allow presidents some leeway with respect to the handling of crises. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164523/original/image-20170407-31640-1rvbwh5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164523/original/image-20170407-31640-1rvbwh5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164523/original/image-20170407-31640-1rvbwh5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164523/original/image-20170407-31640-1rvbwh5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164523/original/image-20170407-31640-1rvbwh5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164523/original/image-20170407-31640-1rvbwh5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164523/original/image-20170407-31640-1rvbwh5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164523/original/image-20170407-31640-1rvbwh5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">George W. Bush after the House reached agreement on a resolution authorizing use of military force against Iraq.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During the first century and a half of U.S. history, most wars involving the United States – including the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American War, World War I and World War II – were <a href="https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm">backed</a> by a congressional declaration of war. More recently, Congress <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42699.pdf">authorized</a> the Persian Gulf War and the post-Sept. 11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although Congress did not formally declare war in these three cases, an authorization of the use of force has held the same legal standing as a declaration of war.</p>
<p>But in the past 70 years, it has become quite common for American presidents to order combat operations without an explicit congressional endorsement. Presidents have maintained that their commander-in-chief power under the Constitution gives them the right to do so. Members of Congress have been split on this question. </p>
<p>In the wake of the recent missile strikes against Syria, congressional leaders of both parties <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/trump-syria-congress-reaction-republicans-democrats-236975?lo=ap_d1">endorsed</a> the strikes, while other lawmakers <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/congress-greets-syria-strike-with-mix-of-applause-and-anger/2017/04/07/b7aeb7ce-1b8c-11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html?hpid=hp_rhp-top-table-main_congress-1155a%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.e7baa0f11de9">argued</a> Trump needed congressional approval. </p>
<p>Who’s right?</p>
<h2>A precedent for presidents</h2>
<p>President Harry Truman began the post-World War II trend away from congressional approval in 1950, when he <a href="https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/korean-conflict">deployed the military</a> to repel North Korea’s invasion of South Korea. Truman argued that congressional authorization was <a href="https://www.learner.org/workshops/primarysources/coldwar/docs/onkorea.html">unnecessary</a> since the intervention had been endorsed by the United Nations Security Council. </p>
<p>Fifteen years later, Congress gave a green light to military action against Vietnamese Communist forces by passing the <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/gulf-of-tonkin-resolution">Gulf of Tonkin Resolution</a>. However, President Richard Nixon declined to withdraw all U.S. troops from Vietnam when Congress repealed this resolution in 1970.</p>
<p>In 1973, Congress attempted to restrain presidents from engaging in prolonged conflicts without congressional assent by enacting – over Nixon’s objection – a law called the <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/war-powers.php">War Powers Resolution</a>. The law stipulates that the president can only keep military forces deployed in “hostilities” for up to 60 days – with the possibility of a 30-day extension – without a congressional war declaration or use of force authorization. </p>
<p>No subsequent U.S. president has accepted the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, and presidents have continued to order military operations without congressional approval. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan <a href="http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/united-states-invades-grenada">deployed troops</a> to Grenada to overthrow a repressive Marxist regime. In 1995 and 1999, President Bill Clinton ordered air strikes against Bosnian Serb and Serbian forces to prevent ethnic cleansing in <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/decision-to-intervene-how-the-war-in-bosnia-ended/">Bosnia</a> and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/book/winning-ugly/">Kosovo</a>, respectively. None of these operations were authorized by Congress.</p>
<p>In 2011, President Barack Obama ordered <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/politics/hillary-clinton-libya.html?_r=0">air strikes</a> against the military and government of Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi. This air campaign lasted about seven months, even though Congress had not endorsed it. The Obama administration <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-administration-libya-action-does-not-require-congressional-approval/2011/06/15/AGLttOWH_story.html?utm_term=.85e2d6b87351">argued</a> that the operation was not bound by the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day limit because the absence of U.S. troops on the ground in Libya meant the U.S. had not entered into hostilities. </p>
<p>Obama also launched the U.S. military campaign against the Islamic State (IS) without gaining direct congressional assent for the campaign. In this case, the administration <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/world/americas/obama-sees-iraq-resolution-as-a-legal-basis-for-airstrikes-official-says.html">maintained</a> that the campaign was covered by Congress’ 2001 authorization targeting individuals responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks and its 2002 authorization of the use of force against Iraq.</p>
<h2>Congress’ end of the bargain</h2>
<p>Congress, for its part, has contributed to the lack of constitutional clarity concerning some military operations by declining to vote on whether to authorize them. For <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43760.pdf">three years</a>, legislation has been pending before Congress that would provide direct authorization for the use of force against IS. Yet, congressional leaders have not brought this legislation to the floor of the House or Senate. In such contexts, the argument for a president acting unilaterally becomes all the more reasonable.</p>
<p>In the end, the United States will be best served if the president is granted discretion to deploy the military without congressional approval when quick action is needed to address a grave security threat or imminent humanitarian disaster. But Congress should weigh in directly on any deployments that might be long-lasting and carry major costs. By following this model, American leaders would stay true to the basic vision of the founders, while recognizing important distinctions among military operations in their urgency, importance and risks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75959/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jordan Tama does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Are Trump’s missile strikes against Syria constitutional? An expert on Congress and foreign policy provides a brief history of how the separation of war powers has blurred over time.Jordan Tama, Assistant Professor of International Relations, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/724372017-02-20T10:10:20Z2017-02-20T10:10:20ZHow Afghans became second-class asylum seekers<p>When it comes to being a refugee, your nationality really matters. Syrian asylum seekers are routinely prioritised over Afghan ones in what has become a deadly and dangerous hierarchy for Afghans seeking sanctuary in the West. </p>
<p>I have witnessed this at first hand in interviews for my ongoing research on asylum policy. An executive officer at the Swedish Board of Migration told me that Syrian asylum applications, unlike Afghan ones, are “easier” to process, which explains why the asylum process is much longer for Afghans than it is for Syrians. That same officer indicated that the Swedish government asked the Board of Migration to prioritise “easy” cases. A source familiar with American refugee policy also explained to me that “the US chooses Syrians and Iraqis over Afghans”.</p>
<p>In 2015, there were <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.html">2.7m</a> Afghan refugees, the world’s second largest group after Syrians. Numbering <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_quarterly_report">62,100</a> in 2016 in Europe, Afghans were also the second largest group of asylum seekers.</p>
<p>European migration agencies produce <a href="http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/sites/www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/files/aldfiles/CASE%20OF%20H.%20AND%20B.%20v.%20THE%20UNITED%20KINGDOM.pdf">legally authoritative</a> country guidance reports that assess the level of violence in a country. For the past decade or so these reports have consistently portrayed either all or some provinces of Afghanistan as “safe”. That assessment justifies deportations of Afghans, since internal migration to these “safe provinces” removes the threat of violence or persecution. </p>
<p>The insidious implication here is that many Afghans are not forced to leave their homes but are rather voluntary migrants. Yet while migration agencies make these assessments, foreign ministries of countries <a href="https://www.svd.se/1000-tals-kan-utvisas-till-konfliktharjat-afghanistan">such as Sweden</a> and the <a href="https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/afghanistan-travel-warning.html">US</a> deem all provinces of Afghanistan to be unsafe. These travel warnings are meant to guide citizens of Sweden and the US who are considering travelling to Afghanistan.</p>
<p>With double standards such as these it is no wonder that Afghan asylum seekers are seeing low approval rates and increasing deportation rates. In <a href="https://www.svd.se/1000-tals-kan-utvisas-till-konfliktharjat-afghanistan">Sweden</a>, for example, only a quarter of adult Afghan asylum seekers, and half of unaccompanied minors, were granted asylum in the first seven months of 2016. From 2012 to 2014 the number of Afghans granted asylum <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refugees_Asylees_2014.pdf">in the US</a> was below 500 a year. </p>
<h2>What are Afghans fleeing from?</h2>
<p>Since 1979, Afghanistan has ranked between four and five out of five on the <a href="https://haschke.shinyapps.io/PTS-App/">political terror scale</a>, a measurement developed by political scientist Mark Gibney. Level five is the <a href="http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Documentation.html">highest</a>, interpreted as a condition where: “Terror has expanded to the whole population.” The mass flight of Afghans from their homes has occurred in the context of human rights abuses on a massive scale.</p>
<p>We are a long way from the Cold War-era when Afghan asylum seekers in the West were welcomed as heroes of anti-communism. The <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/12/20111211135052458863.html">prospects of Afghan asylum seekers have worsened</a> since 9/11. Since then, the number of Afghan asylum seekers to the US has drastically dropped as a result of policies influenced by the War on Terror which mistrust refugees from many Muslim countries. </p>
<p>But just like their Cold War counterparts, national asylum policies today differentiate Afghans based on group preferences and political agendas. A state will give a national or sub-national group preferential treatment if it serves the interests of its foreign policy. In the 1980s, Afghan asylum seekers in the US obtained asylum more easily than other groups facing comparable persecution because they discredited communism. Today, they have a harder time than other groups fleeing from similar circumstances because they are associated with Islamist terrorism. </p>
<p>Such treatment seriously undermines the <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/4ec262df9/1951-convention-relating-status-refugees-its-1967-protocol.html">1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol on the status of refugees</a>. But in the framework of the convention, individual states always have final say on refugee and asylum policy. Afghans have been downgraded from “first-class” asylum seekers during the Cold War to “second-class” ones during the War on Terror without breaking the convention.</p>
<p>But there is context here. It was Western powers led by the US and the UK who played a significant part in creating the conditions that forced Afghans to flee their country. The historian Robert D. Crews <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/04/americas-afghan-refugee-crisis/?wp_login_redirect=0">writes</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is an overstatement to conclude that American policies led to the rise of the Taliban, but it is fair to say that the mujahedeen party leaders and their families who received US backing during the anti-Soviet jihad continue to dominate Afghan politics to this very day. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the aftermath of 9/11, he argues, the Americans “bear considerable responsibility” for the creation of the authoritarian and corrupt Afghan government, which is illegitimate in the eyes of many Afghans. </p>
<p>Yet, the US and other Western countries that sent troops to Afghanistan have placed the burden of responsibility for the mass exodus on internal Afghan affairs. Among the justifications invoked are <a href="http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-11-17/news/0111170061_1_northern-alliance-pashtuns-shiite-hazaras">pseudo-anthropological claims</a> that Afghans are a tribal people prone to wage wars. By portraying Afghanistan as a war-torn country, Western states are evading welcoming its refugees.</p>
<h2>The Afghan interpreters</h2>
<p>The deprioritised status of Afghan asylum seekers is perhaps most glaring in the case of the Afghan interpreters who worked for Western governments. In 2009, the US <a href="https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/immigrate/afghans-work-for-us.html">created</a> special immigrant visas for Afghans who were employed by or on behalf of the US government. <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/10/1/afghan-translatorsprotest.html">Not a single visa was processed until 2011</a>. A Human Rights First <a href="http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/afghan-special-immigrant-visa-program">fact sheet</a> states that the programme: “Was designed to provide 7,500 visas over five years. Extensions were passed in 2014 and 2015 that made 7,000 more visas available.” Many Afghan interpreters who worked for US forces remain in asylum limbo in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>The hesitation to admit Afghans who were directly persecuted because they worked for foreign governments is also found in countries such as <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/serbia/11878114/The-Afghan-Nato-interpreters-forced-to-walk-through-Europe-for-refugee-status.html">Sweden, Britain and Germany</a>. It was <a href="http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/migrationsverket-erkanner-fel-om-afghanska-tolkar/">recently revealed</a>, for example, that a lawyer from the Swedish Board of Migration attempted to influence a migration court to deny asylum to three Afghan interpreters. It remains unclear why the attorney attempted to discredit the asylum seekers, but her actions were deemed highly inappropriate by the Board of Migration. </p>
<p>The plight of Afghans shows that both international human rights as well as national asylum law can be shaped around specific groups of refugees and asylum seekers. When that happens, we see how contradictory political agendas can determine who receives priority in being granted asylum. Seen in this light, Donald Trump’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-order-barring-refugees-flies-in-the-face-of-logic-and-humanity-72061">recent attempt to block</a> all Syrian refugees from coming to the US may be extreme, but not surprising.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72437/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Admir Skodo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are double standards underlying the difficulties faced by Afghan asylum seekers in the West.Admir Skodo, Researcher in History, Lund UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.