tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/airport-security-22722/articlesAirport security – The Conversation2023-08-09T12:55:43Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2107782023-08-09T12:55:43Z2023-08-09T12:55:43ZAir travel is in a rut – is there any hope of recapturing the romance of flying?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540440/original/file-20230801-15-96mm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C0%2C4019%2C2685&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The high-risk adventure of air travel has been subdued, yet today's long flights can paradoxically feel torturous.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Christopher Schaberg</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Amelia Earhart broke a transcontinental speed record 90 years ago, in July 1933, by flying <a href="https://airandspace.si.edu/multimedia-gallery/web11183-2009640jpg">her signature red Lockheed Vega</a> from Los Angeles to New Jersey in just 17 hours, seven and a half minutes. Earlier that year, Earhart had flown as an observer on a Northwest Airways winter flight across the U.S., testing the possibilities of a “Northern Transcontinental” route. </p>
<p>Because those early airplanes couldn’t reach high altitudes, they weaved through dangerous peaks and the erratic weather patterns that mountain ranges helped create. One co-pilot <a href="https://www.deltamuseum.org/about-us/blog/from-the-hangars/2019/07/24/delta-stories-amelia-earhart">remembers the journey</a> as “seat-of-the-pants flying across the Dakota and Montana plains and through, over and around the Western mountain ranges.” </p>
<p>How does air travel today compare? </p>
<p>I’ve studied <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/02/engine-failure/552959/">airplane technology</a>, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/09/a-forgettable-passage-to-flight/279346/">airport design</a> and <a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/grounded">cultural attitudes</a> toward air travel, and I’ve noticed how aspects of flying seem to have calcified over time. </p>
<p>Long-distance flight <a href="https://theconversation.com/longing-for-the-golden-age-of-air-travel-be-careful-what-you-wish-for-34177">advanced rapidly between the 1930s and the early 1960s</a>, shaving off the number of hours in the sky by half. But over the past 60 years, the duration of such flights has remained roughly the same. Meanwhile, the ecosystem of air travel has grown more elaborate, often leaving passengers squirming in their seats on the tarmac before or after flight. </p>
<p>Coast-to-coast air travel is in a rut – but there are still efforts to improve this mode of transit.</p>
<h2>Just another ordinary miracle</h2>
<p>Transcontinental air journeys are clearly different 90 years after Earhart’s record-breaking exploratory flights: Travelers now take such trips for granted, and often find them to be pure drudgery. </p>
<p>In 2018, <a href="https://thepointsguy.com/reviews/united-757-200-first-class-ewr-sea/">travel blogger Ravi Ghelani reviewed in minute detail</a> a United Airlines flight from Newark, New Jersey, to Seattle – roughly the same northern route that Earhart explored in 1933. </p>
<p>But for Ghelani, seated in first class, it wasn’t the terrain or frigid temperatures that were the most cumbersome part of his adventure. It was a cheap complimentary blanket, which “barely qualified as one – it was very thin, very scratchy.” </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541779/original/file-20230808-21-f9i0u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Black and white photo of woman smiling and waving in front of an airplane." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541779/original/file-20230808-21-f9i0u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541779/original/file-20230808-21-f9i0u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541779/original/file-20230808-21-f9i0u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541779/original/file-20230808-21-f9i0u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541779/original/file-20230808-21-f9i0u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1015&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541779/original/file-20230808-21-f9i0u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1015&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541779/original/file-20230808-21-f9i0u2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1015&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Amelia Earhart grins in Newark, N.J., after completing her first nonstop flight across the U.S. in 1932.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/newark-new-jersey-a-wide-grin-covers-the-face-of-amelia-news-photo/104404070?adppopup=true">Keystone-France/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The dreaded blanket reappears in Ghelani’s summary of his trip: “My main qualm with this flight was the lack of a decent blanket – the tiny, scratchy blanket that was provided wasn’t cutting it for the six-hour flight.” </p>
<p>I can imagine Earhart rolling in <a href="https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/legend-amelia-earharts-disappearance">her watery grave</a>: “You zip across the continent in six hours and you complain about a scratchy blanket?”</p>
<p>Yet Ghelani’s account of a mundane cross-country flight reveals a truth: Commercial air travel just isn’t the adventure it was back in Earhart’s time.</p>
<p>As one captain of a major U.S. airline who regularly flies long routes told me, “Today jetliners fly across the country from Los Angeles to New York, or Boston to Seattle, full of passengers oblivious to the commonplace practice it has become.” </p>
<p>This pilot compared coast-to-coast flights to “iPhones, microwaves or automobiles” – just one more ordinary miracle of modern life. </p>
<h2>Little indignities multiply</h2>
<p>The high-risk adventure of air travel has been subdued, yet long flights today can paradoxically feel torturous. </p>
<p>As philosopher Michael Marder puts it in his 2022 book “<a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262543712/philosophy-for-passengers/">Philosophy for Passengers</a>”: “When crew members wish passengers a ‘pleasant journey,’ I hear a dash of cruel irony in their words. How pleasant can the passenger experience be when you are crammed in your seat, with little fresh air, too hot or miserably cold, and sleep deprived?” </p>
<p>I asked my colleague and <a href="http://airplanereading.org/story/55/frequent-flight">frequent flier</a> Ian Bogost about his experience of coast-to-coast trips, and his reply was illuminating: “The same trip seems to get longer every year, and less comfortable. There are reasons – consolidation, reduced routes, pilot and air-traffic labor shortages, decaying technical infrastructure – but it still feels like moving backwards.” In spite of widespread attempts to update aircraft and modernize terminals, the vast system of air travel can seem cumbersome and outdated. </p>
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<img alt="Glum-looking people in an airport terminal stand in a line that snakes out of the frame." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541783/original/file-20230808-19-5kb2r6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541783/original/file-20230808-19-5kb2r6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541783/original/file-20230808-19-5kb2r6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541783/original/file-20230808-19-5kb2r6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541783/original/file-20230808-19-5kb2r6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541783/original/file-20230808-19-5kb2r6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541783/original/file-20230808-19-5kb2r6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Passengers wait in line amid a series of cancellations at Newark (N.J.) International Airport in June 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-queue-for-their-flight-reschedule-inside-of-the-news-photo/1259132586?adppopup=true">Kena Betancur/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Recently at The Atlantic, reporter <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2023/07/clear-airport-security-lines-tsa-infrastructure/674809/">Amanda Mull wrote about</a> the biometric screening company Clear, describing this firm’s high-tech service to skip the ubiquitous toil of identity checks before flight, at the cost of surrendering some privacy and personal information. Mull concludes the reason more travelers will likely enroll in this service is that “traversing American airport security is simply that grim.” </p>
<p>For Mull, the adventure of contemporary air travel isn’t the destination, or even the journey itself – it’s what you must do to get through the airport. </p>
<p>Still, it’s worth noting that the majority of the human population has never boarded an airplane; flying cross-country remains <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/air-space-magazine/how-much-worlds-population-has-flown-airplane-180957719/">a relatively exclusive experience</a>. For most people, the closest they’ll get to a coast-to-coast flight is seeing a small white scratch across the sky, as another airliner makes its arc at 35,000 feet. </p>
<h2>2 futures of cross-country flight</h2>
<p>Coast-to-coast travel is no longer about breakneck speed or defying elemental odds, and Earhart’s quests to push the limits of aviation couldn’t be further from the bland routines of contemporary air travel. Nor does it involve people dressing to the hilt to step aboard a jetliner for the first time, with passengers stowing their fancy hats in spacious overhead bins. </p>
<p>Where are the new frontiers for transcontinental flight today? </p>
<p>One area of innovation is in a greener form of flight. Solar Impulse, a completely solar-powered plane, took two months to fly coast-to-coast in 2013. It averages a plodding 45 mph at cruising altitude. As <a href="https://apnews.com/ded34ccc19f24aeea67ba3da130a2be0">The Associated Press reported</a>: “Solar Impulse’s creators view themselves as green pioneers – promoting lighter materials, solar-powered batteries, and conservation as sexy and adventurous. Theirs is the high-flying equivalent of the Tesla electric sports car.” Solar Impulse was more recently <a href="https://aviationweek.com/aerospace/aircraft-propulsion/solar-powered-skydweller-completes-first-autonomous-flights?check_logged_in=1">reconfigured as a remotely piloted aircraft</a>, with new experiments in long-distance solar flight underway. </p>
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<img alt="Futuristic looking plane with long wingspan flies over bay and city." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541781/original/file-20230808-16-r1r69n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541781/original/file-20230808-16-r1r69n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541781/original/file-20230808-16-r1r69n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541781/original/file-20230808-16-r1r69n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541781/original/file-20230808-16-r1r69n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541781/original/file-20230808-16-r1r69n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541781/original/file-20230808-16-r1r69n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Solar Impulse 2 flies over the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco in 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/solar-impulse-2-a-solar-powered-plane-piloted-by-swiss-news-photo/523604684?adppopup=true">Jean Revillard/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The comparison of Solar Impulse to a Tesla is handy because a different extreme can be found in Elon Musk’s company SpaceX. As part of the relentless development of its biggest vehicle, “Starship,” SpaceX has advertised the possibility of “<a href="https://www.spacex.com/human-spaceflight/earth/">point-to-point</a>” travel on Earth: for example, flying on a commercial rocket from Los Angeles to New York in 25 minutes. Never mind the physical tolls of a normal <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-would-anyone-want-to-sit-on-a-plane-for-over-18-hours-an-economist-takes-the-worlds-longest-flight-122433">19-hour flight</a>; it’s hard to imagine what such a brief yet fast trip would feel like, not to mention what sort of class divisions and bleak industrial launch sites such jaunts would rely on.</p>
<p>Get there as fast as possible, using as much fuel as necessary; or glide lazily along, powered by the sun, saving the planet. These are two starkly different visions of coast-to-coast flight, one a dystopian nightmare and the other a utopian dream. </p>
<p>In the middle, there’s what most flying mortals do: wait in lines, board unceremoniously and be relieved if you get to your destination without too much discomfort or delay.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210778/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Schaberg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Over the past 60 years, the duration of flights has remained roughly the same, while passengers have been subjected to more indignities, longer waits and more cancellations.Christopher Schaberg, Director of Public Scholarship, Arts & Sciences at Washington University in St. LouisLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2090412023-07-16T20:00:42Z2023-07-16T20:00:42ZWhy do I have to take my laptop out of the bag at airport security?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537438/original/file-20230714-15-diyhpf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=69%2C688%2C5742%2C2884&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> </figcaption></figure><p>Anyone who has travelled by air in the past ten years will know how stressful airports can be.</p>
<p>You didn’t leave home as early as you should have. In the mad rush to get to your gate, the security screening seems to slow everything down. And to add insult to injury, you’re met with the finicky request: “laptops out of bags, please”.</p>
<p>But what does your laptop have to do with security?</p>
<h2>The day that changed air travel forever</h2>
<p>Airport security changed dramatically after the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11 2001. Before 9/11, you could pass through security with a carry-on bag full of everything you might need for your holiday, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/09/10/1035131619/911-travel-timeline-tsa">including a knife</a> with a four-inch blade. Indeed, that’s how the 9/11 attackers brought their <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/09/10/1035131619/911-travel-timeline-tsa">weapons on board</a>.</p>
<p>After 9/11, screening processes around the world changed overnight. In the US, private security contractors being paid a minimum wage were swapped out for a federalised program with highly trained security personnel. Anything that could be <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00654/full">considered a weapon</a> was confiscated.</p>
<p>Around the world, travellers were suddenly required to <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=6hBnJ-1hRp0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA86&dq=why+do+I+have+to+take+my+shoes+off+at+airport+security&ots=o6JIFHJzF1&sig=B6azb6xqN2uxM9CP-VZdfyt3Ag0#v=onepage&q=why%20do%20I%20have%20to%20take%20my%20shoes%20off%20at%20airport%20security&f=false">remove their shoes</a>, belts and outerwear, and take out their phones, laptops, liquids and anything else that could be used as part of an improvised explosive device.</p>
<p>This lasted for several years. Eventually, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212478013000944">more advanced</a> screening methods were developed to effectively identify certain threats. Today, some countries don’t require you to remove your shoes when passing through security.</p>
<p>So why must you still take your laptop out? </p>
<h2>Airport scanners have come a long way</h2>
<p>The machine your bags and devices pass through is an X-ray machine. </p>
<p>The main reason you have to remove your laptop from your bag is because its <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/traveller/reviews-and-advice/why-do-i-have-to-remove-my-laptop-from-my-bag-at-the-airport-xray-machine-20170320-gv1vqs.html">battery</a> and other mechanical components are too dense for X-rays to penetrate effectively – especially if the scanning system is old. The same goes for power cords and other devices such as tablets and cameras.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537439/original/file-20230714-21-x0ojbc.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537439/original/file-20230714-21-x0ojbc.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537439/original/file-20230714-21-x0ojbc.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537439/original/file-20230714-21-x0ojbc.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537439/original/file-20230714-21-x0ojbc.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537439/original/file-20230714-21-x0ojbc.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537439/original/file-20230714-21-x0ojbc.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537439/original/file-20230714-21-x0ojbc.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Due to the size and construction of components in your laptop, X-rays can’t penetrate them as well as other materials.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>With these items in your bag, security officials can’t use the screened image to determine whether a risk is present. They’ll have to flag the bag for a physical search, which slows everything down. It’s easier if all devices are removed in the first place.</p>
<p>A laptop inside a bag can also shield other items from view that may be dangerous. Scanning it separately reveals its internal components on the screen. In some cases you might be asked to turn it on to prove it’s an actual working computer.</p>
<p>With newer multi-view scanning technology, security officials can view the bag from multiple angles to discern whether something is being covered up, or made to look like something else. For instance, people have tried to <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212478013000944">mix gun parts</a> with other components in an effort to pass checked baggage screening. </p>
<p>Some airports have upgraded <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/traveller/inspiration/no-more-removing-liquids-and-gels-laptops-at-melbourne-airport-as-new-scanners-installed-20191002-h1ijdf.html">3D scanning</a> that allows travellers to pass their bags through security without having to remove their laptops. If you’re not asked to take out your laptop, it’s probably because one of these more expensive systems is being used.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, amping up the technology won’t remove the lag caused by airport screenings. Ultimately, the reason these are a major choke point is because of the speed at which staff scan the imagery (which dictates the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212478013000944">speed of the conveyor belt</a>).</p>
<p>Unless we find a way to automate the entire process and run it with minimal human supervision, you can expect delays.</p>
<h2>What about body scanners?</h2>
<p>But your bags aren’t the only thing getting scanned at airport security. You are too! </p>
<p>The tall frame you walk through is a <a href="https://science.howstuffworks.com/transport/flight/modern/airport-security3.htm">metal detector</a>. Its purpose is to uncover any weapons or other illegal objects that may be concealed under your clothes. Airport metal detectors use non-ionising radiation, which means they don’t emit X-rays. </p>
<p>The larger body scanners, on the other hand, are a type of X-ray machine. These can be <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212478013000944">active or passive</a>, or a combination of both.</p>
<p>Passive scanners simply detect the natural radiation emitted by your body and any objects that might be concealed. Active scanners emit low-energy radiation to create a scan of your body, which can then be analysed. </p>
<p>The kind of machine you walk through will depend on where in the world you are. For instance, one type of active body scanner that emits X-rays in what’s called “backscatter technology” was once <a href="https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/high-tech-gadgets/backscatter-x-ray.htm">used widely</a> in the US, but is no longer used. It’s also banned in <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do/travelsecure/passenger-screening">Australia</a> and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddisalvo/2011/11/15/europe-bans-airport-body-scanners-over-health-and-safety-concerns/">the European Union</a>, where only non-ionising technology can be used.</p>
<p>Another type of scanner emits lower-energy <a href="https://science.howstuffworks.com/backscatter-machines-vs-millimeter-wave-scanners.htm">millimetre waves</a>, instead of X-rays, to image the passenger. Millimetre wave frequencies are considered to be non-ionising radiation.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537440/original/file-20230714-27-gwwiup.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537440/original/file-20230714-27-gwwiup.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537440/original/file-20230714-27-gwwiup.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537440/original/file-20230714-27-gwwiup.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537440/original/file-20230714-27-gwwiup.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537440/original/file-20230714-27-gwwiup.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537440/original/file-20230714-27-gwwiup.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537440/original/file-20230714-27-gwwiup.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Millimetre wave scanners usually produce a 3D scan of a person.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/air-travel-exposes-you-to-radiation-how-much-health-risk-comes-with-it-78790">Air travel exposes you to radiation – how much health risk comes with it?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>AI in our airports</h2>
<p>AI seems to be all around us lately, and our airports are no exception. Advancements in AI systems stand to transform the future of airport security.</p>
<p>For now, human reviewers are required to identify potential threats in scanned images. However, what if an advanced <a href="https://thinkspace.csu.edu.au/artiificialintelligenceinsecuritycheck/article/">AI was trained</a> to do this using a database of images? It would do so in a fraction of the time.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-the-safest-seat-on-a-plane-we-asked-an-aviation-expert-198672">What's the safest seat on a plane? We asked an aviation expert</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Some airports are already using advanced <a href="https://www.in-security.eu/index.php/editorial/the-future-of-airport-security-faster-smarter-safer">computed tomography</a> (CT) <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/jun/21/3d-body-scanners-at-australian-airports-what-are-they-and-how-do-they-work">scanners</a> to produce high-definition 3D imagery. In the future, this technology could be further enhanced by AI to detect threats at a much faster rate. </p>
<p>Hypothetically, CT scans could also be used for both humans and their baggage. Could this allow travellers to walk through a body scanner while carrying their bags? Possibly.</p>
<p>Until then, you should probably try your best to leave the house on time.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Correction: this article previously said X-ray backscatter technology is widely used in US airports, when in fact it is no longer used.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209041/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Doug Drury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some countries no longer require you to remove your shoes when passing through security – but taking out your laptop is still mostly required.Doug Drury, Professor/Head of Aviation, CQUniversity AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2079262023-06-22T20:06:58Z2023-06-22T20:06:58ZWhy can’t I use my phone or take photos on the airport tarmac? Is it against the law?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533331/original/file-20230622-27-61n5mz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5392%2C3581&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/london-may-27-2018-people-by-1111827515">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mobile phones are not allowed to be used while on a plane because they can interfere with the aeroplane’s navigation instruments and <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-the-real-reason-to-turn-on-aeroplane-mode-when-you-fly-188585">cause various safety and social issues</a>.</p>
<p>As soon as the plane lands, we’re permitted to turn off flight mode, but at some airports we can’t get much of a signal. That’s because airports are known as mobile signal “<a href="https://thepointsguy.com/news/slow-connection-airport-tarmacs/">dead zones</a>” due to a lack of mobile towers – they can’t be placed at the airport itself due to height restrictions.</p>
<p>Any nearby mobile towers would be located away from the airport’s runway systems to avoid interfering with the aeroplane’s flight path, especially take-off and landing direction. Most airports put up indoor repeater antennas within the airport terminal; these help increase the mobile signal strength coming from the nearest mobile tower somewhere near the airport.</p>
<p>But you won’t be allowed to make calls while walking away from the plane, anyway.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-the-real-reason-to-turn-on-aeroplane-mode-when-you-fly-188585">Here's the real reason to turn on aeroplane mode when you fly</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Why can’t I use my phone on the tarmac?</h2>
<p>As we are taxiing in, the <a href="https://www.qantas.com/au/en/qantas-experience/onboard/communication.html">cabin crew</a> remind us not to smoke outside of designated areas at the terminal and not to use our mobile phones until we are inside the terminal building.</p>
<p>If you exit the plane down the rear stairs, why aren’t you allowed to use your phone once away from the aeroplane, if you can get a signal? Surely it won’t affect navigation.</p>
<p>The answer is manifold, and regulations aren’t the same across the world.</p>
<p>In Australia, a <a href="https://www.casa.gov.au/operations-safety-and-travel/travel-and-passengers/onboard-safety-and-behaviour/using-your-electronic-devices-flights">government regulation</a> prohibits the use of mobile phones on the tarmac – the aeroplane movement and parking area of the airport.</p>
<p>You won’t be fined if you whip your phone out while walking to the terminal, but the airline may admonish you for not following the rules. However, if you decide to (<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/victoria/woman-arrested-after-running-onto-tarmac-at-melbourne-airport-20151125-gl7bkq.html">run around on the tarmac</a>, you could get arrested by federal police.</p>
<p>The airport tarmac is very busy not just with aircraft, but also baggage carts, catering trucks, aeroplane waste removal trucks, and fuel trucks. Getting passengers off the tarmac and into the terminal building quickly and safely is a priority for the staff.</p>
<p>If you are distracted while walking to the terminal building because you’re talking on your phone, it can be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jan/25/alabama-airport-worker-killed-jet-engine-safety-warnings">highly dangerous and even deadly</a> if you end up too close to an operating plane. An operating jet engine is extremely hot and has a strong exhaust. Additionally, the front of the engine has a low-pressure area called an <a href="https://www.ukfrs.com/guidance/search/aircraft-systems-and-construction">ingestion zone</a> that can suck in a person. Ground staff are trained to stay at least ten metres away from this area. However, this information is not shared with the passengers.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533338/original/file-20230622-19-4wmz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Long view photo of a snowy grey tarmac with an air canada plane and several fuel and other support trucks around it" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533338/original/file-20230622-19-4wmz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533338/original/file-20230622-19-4wmz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533338/original/file-20230622-19-4wmz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533338/original/file-20230622-19-4wmz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533338/original/file-20230622-19-4wmz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533338/original/file-20230622-19-4wmz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533338/original/file-20230622-19-4wmz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The tarmac is busy with crew, various support and fuel vehicles, and airplanes themselves, with plenty of hazards for a passenger who wanders into the wrong area.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/OIf5dPuecMg">David Preston/Unsplash</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A myth about fuel</h2>
<p>You may have heard that mobile phones are a fire hazard near fuel, and aeroplanes are, of course, refuelled on the tarmac.</p>
<p>However, the chances of fuel catching fire during this process are extremely low, because the refuelling truck is <a href="https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/safe-aircraft-refuelling/">bonded and “grounded” to the plane</a>: the operator attaches a wire to the aircraft to move built-up static electricity to the ground to prevent any chance of a spark. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533350/original/file-20230622-18-ot2mup.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A sign at a petrol station showing smoking and mobile phones are prohibited" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533350/original/file-20230622-18-ot2mup.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533350/original/file-20230622-18-ot2mup.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533350/original/file-20230622-18-ot2mup.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533350/original/file-20230622-18-ot2mup.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533350/original/file-20230622-18-ot2mup.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533350/original/file-20230622-18-ot2mup.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533350/original/file-20230622-18-ot2mup.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Warning about mobile phones at petrol stations are inaccurate.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/warning-sign-gas-petroleum-industrial-prevention-2084569294">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There have been stories in the press about mobile phones sparking <a href="https://www.verizon.com/about/news/vzw/2014/12/fact-or-fiction-using-a-cell-phone-at-the-gas-station-can-cause-a-fire">fires at petrol stations in Indonesia and Australia</a>, but these turned out to be inaccurate. There is <a href="https://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/AboutTheCodes/30A/FI%20-%20NFPA%2030A-2015%20Para%208.3.1%20-%20Attachments%2014-19.2017-04-04.pdf">no evidence a phone can spark a fire at a fuel pump</a>, despite the warning labels you might see.</p>
<p>Either way, the chances of a mobile phone causing this on the tarmac with a refuelling truck that is grounded to the aeroplane are extremely low, not least because the passenger permitted areas and refuelling areas are completely separated.</p>
<h2>Why are we told not to take photos on the tarmac?</h2>
<p>This rule varies from airport to airport depending on their <a href="https://www.tsa.gov/travel/frequently-asked-questions/can-i-film-and-take-photos-security-checkpoint">security processes</a>.</p>
<p>Such restrictions are carryovers from the changes to airport security following the <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/jlecono50&i=739">September 11 2001 terrorist attacks</a>. The now federalised security teams, TSA (Transportation Security Administration) in the United States and the Department of Home Affairs in Australia, change their processes frequently to prevent having any identifiable patterns that could be used to create a security breach.</p>
<p>The increased security measures also mean new technologies were introduced; airport security sections do not want photos taken of how they operate. </p>
<p>The airport security process is a major choke point in the flow of passenger movement due to the screening process. If a passenger is perceived to be slowing the process down by taking photos or talking on their phone, they will be reminded to turn off their device and/or stop taking photos of security personnel and equipment.</p>
<p>If you refuse to follow the rules of the screening process, you will be <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do/travelsecure/passenger-screening">denied entry</a> into the airport terminal gate area and miss your flight. Can you also get arrested for using your phone? Depends on the airport and country. I, for one, do not want to find out.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207926/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Doug Drury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lingering on the tarmac once you get off a plane through the rear door is unadvisable for many reasons – here’s why the staff want your phone in your pocket.Doug Drury, Professor/Head of Aviation, CQUniversity AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1855622022-07-11T12:30:45Z2022-07-11T12:30:45ZD.B. Cooper, the changing nature of hijackings and the foundation for today’s airport security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473071/original/file-20220707-16-frr26z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=180%2C212%2C3291%2C2024&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The hijacking of U.S. aircraft – like the three hijacked in 1970 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – made it impossible for American policymakers to ignore the threat.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/terrorists-blow-up-one-of-three-hijacked-airplanes-after-news-photo/514880334?adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Though many Americans may associate airport security with 9/11, it was a wave of hijackings in the late 1960s and early 1970s that laid the foundation <a href="https://theconversation.com/an-entire-generation-of-americans-has-no-idea-how-easy-air-travel-used-to-be-166082">for today’s airport security protocols</a>.</p>
<p>During that period, a hijacking occurred, on average, <a href="https://today.ku.edu/2019/06/10/first-soviet-hijacking-triggers-insights-cold-war-boundaries">once every five days globally</a>. The U.S. dealt with its own spate of mile-high crimes, convincing reluctant government officials and airport executives to adopt the first important airport security protocols. </p>
<p>The subject of <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt21063148/?ref_=nv_sr_srsg_0">a new Netflix docuseries</a>, hijacker D.B. Cooper emerged as something of a folk hero during this era. While other more violent hijackings might have played a bigger role in prompting early airport security measures, it was the saga of Cooper that captured the imagination of the American public – and helped transform the perception of the overall threat hijackings posed to U.S. air travel and national security. </p>
<h2>Incidents become impossible to ignore</h2>
<p>The first airplane hijacking happened in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/hijacking">1931 in Peru</a>. Armed revolutionaries approached the grounded plane of pilot Byron Richards and demanded that he fly them over Lima so they could drop propaganda leaflets. Richards refused, and a 10-day standoff ensued before he was eventually released.</p>
<p>That remained a somewhat isolated incident until the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_hijackings">late 1940s and 1950s</a>, when several people hijacked airplanes to escape from Eastern Europe to the West. In the context of the Cold War, Western governments granted these hijackers <a href="https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/hijacking-and-right-asylum-aerial-piracy-and-international-law-p">political asylum</a>. Importantly, none of the airplanes hijacked were flown by U.S. carriers.</p>
<p>Beginning in the early 1960s, however, hijackers began targeting U.S. airlines. Most of these individuals were <a href="https://www.tsi-mag.com/the-cuban-hijackings-their-significance-and-impact-sixty-years-on/">Cubans</a> living in the U.S. who, for one reason or another, wished to return to their native land and were otherwise blocked due to <a href="https://www.thecubareader.com/blog/the-strange-story-of-the-us-cuba-hijacking-accord">the U.S. embargo</a> against Cuba.</p>
<p>U.S. officials responded by <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/49/46502">officially and specifically making hijacking a federal crime</a>. Though the new law didn’t stop hijackings altogether, the crime remained relatively rare. When they did occur, they usually didn’t involve much violence.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/15042-take-me-to-cuba-the-skyjacking-craze-of-the-1960s">Officials wanted to downplay hijackings as much as possible</a>, and the best way to do this was to simply give the hijacker what they wanted to avert the loss of life. Above all, airline executives wanted to avoid deterring people from flying, so they resisted the implementation of anxiety-inducing security protocols.</p>
<p>That changed in 1968. On July 23 of that year, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/on-this-day-el-al-flight-426-hijacked-by-pflp-674735">hijacked an El Al flight</a> from Rome to Tel Aviv. Though that 39-day ordeal ended without any loss of life, it ushered in a new era of more violent – often politically motivated – hijackings of international airlines. </p>
<p>From 1968 to 1974, U.S. airlines experienced <a href="https://www.vox.com/2016/3/29/11326472/hijacking-airplanes-egyptair">130 hijackings</a>. Many fell into this new category of politically motivated hijackings, including what has become known as the <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/c/tl/dawsons-field-hijackings/">Dawson’s Field hijackings</a>. In September 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked four aircraft, including three belonging to U.S. carriers, and forced them to land at Dawson’s Field in Libya. No hostage lives were lost, but the hijackers used explosives to destroy all four aircraft.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Charred tail fin of destroyed plane." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473061/original/file-20220707-10739-9fzsly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473061/original/file-20220707-10739-9fzsly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473061/original/file-20220707-10739-9fzsly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473061/original/file-20220707-10739-9fzsly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473061/original/file-20220707-10739-9fzsly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473061/original/file-20220707-10739-9fzsly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473061/original/file-20220707-10739-9fzsly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Remains of a Pan Am plane that Palestinian hijackers blew up at Dawson’s Field in Libya in 1970.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/photo-dated-07-september-1970-of-the-debris-left-over-from-news-photo/97635079?adppopup=true">AFP/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Additionally, and more worrying to U.S. officials, two different groups of hijackers, <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-sep-23-mn-48746-story.html">one in 1971</a> and <a href="https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2016/06/06/detroit-skyjacker-airplane-explanation/85314438/">another in 1972</a>, threatened to crash planes into nuclear power plants. </p>
<h2>Cooper inspires copycats</h2>
<p>Amid this dramatic rise in the number of hijackings, on Nov. 24, 1971, a man known to the American public as <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/db-cooper-hijacking">D.B. Cooper</a> boarded a Northwest Orient 727 flight from Portland, Oregon, to Seattle. Shortly after takeoff, he showed a stewardess the contents of his briefcase, which he said was a bomb. He then instructed the stewardess to take a note to the cockpit. In it, he demanded US$200,000 in $20 bills and four parachutes. </p>
<p>Upon arrival in Seattle, Cooper allowed the other passengers to deplane in exchange for the money and the parachutes. Cooper then ordered the pilot to fly to Mexico but low and slowly – <a href="https://www.biography.com/crime-figure/db-cooper">no higher than 10,000 feet (3,048 meters) and under 200 knots (230 mph, 370 kph)</a>. Somewhere between Seattle and a fuel stop in Reno, Nevada, Cooper and the loot disappeared out the back of the aircraft via the 727’s <a href="https://saverocity.com/taggingmiles/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2016/07/727-Aft-Stairs.jpg">aft stairwell</a>. No one knows for sure what happened to him, though some of the money was recovered in 1980.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Decomposed bills arranged in a grid." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473058/original/file-20220707-16-ucwl40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473058/original/file-20220707-16-ucwl40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473058/original/file-20220707-16-ucwl40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473058/original/file-20220707-16-ucwl40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473058/original/file-20220707-16-ucwl40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473058/original/file-20220707-16-ucwl40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473058/original/file-20220707-16-ucwl40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The serial numbers on these $20 bills found in 1980 matched those given to Cooper in 1971.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-badly-decomposed-20-dollar-bills-were-shown-to-newsmen-news-photo/515123698?adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Cooper wasn’t the first person to hijack an American airliner and demand money. That dubious honor belongs to <a href="https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,909374,00.html">Arthur Barkley</a>. Frustrated with his inability to get government officials to take seriously his dispute with the IRS, on June 4, 1970, Barkley hijacked a TWA aircraft, demanding $100 million and a hearing before the U.S. Supreme Court. Barkley’s efforts failed, and he ended up confined to a mental institution. </p>
<p>The idea that Cooper might have succeeded, however, clearly inspired several imitators. While it remains uncertain whether Cooper lived to enjoy the fruits of his escapade, none of his imitators did. They included <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/richard-floyd-mccoy-jr">Richard McCoy, Jr.</a>, <a href="https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/article_1aac5de6-6eb4-5245-a126-7adf324d5eb2.html">Martin J. McNally</a> and <a href="https://www.wfmz.com/features/historys-headlines/historys-headlines-skyjack-of-1972/article_940d5703-8e18-528b-80c4-443b3607b6b0.html">Frederick Hahneman</a>, all of whom successfully parachuted out of the aircraft once they received their ransom payments, only to be eventually caught and punished.</p>
<h2>Tightening the screws</h2>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Man in suit walks with arms and legs handcuffed." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473067/original/file-20220707-14-z1nker.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473067/original/file-20220707-14-z1nker.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=836&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473067/original/file-20220707-14-z1nker.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=836&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473067/original/file-20220707-14-z1nker.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=836&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473067/original/file-20220707-14-z1nker.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1051&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473067/original/file-20220707-14-z1nker.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1051&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473067/original/file-20220707-14-z1nker.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1051&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Four months after D.B. Cooper’s daring extortion, Richard McCoy, Jr. hijacked a plane, received $500,000 and parachuted out of the aircraft. Two days later, he was apprehended.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/newsmen-try-to-elicit-comment-from-accused-hijacker-richard-news-photo/515402276?adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In response to the spate of more violent and costly hijackings, the U.S. government established the <a href="https://www.ibm.com/blogs/systems/a-brief-history-of-airline-security-hijackings-and-metal-detectors/">first anti-hijacking security protocols</a>. Most of them aimed to prevent hijackers from getting on aircraft in the first place. The measures included a hijacker profile, metal detectors and X-ray machines. Specific to Cooper, airlines retrofitted aircraft with a devise known as a <a href="https://www.wikimotors.org/what-is-a-cooper-vane.htm">Cooper vane</a> that made it impossible to open aft stairwells during flight. </p>
<p>The protocols put in place in the 1970s also laid the foundation for the expansive security measures taken after 9/11. A series of court cases upheld the constitutionality of these early measures. For example, <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/328/1077/1428246/">United States v. Lopez</a>, decided in 1971, upheld the use of the hijacker profile. </p>
<p>More importantly, in <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/454/769/438142/">United States v. Epperson</a>, a federal court ruled in 1972 that the government’s interest in preventing hijackings justified the requirement for passengers to pass through a magnetometer at the airport. And in 1973, the Ninth Circuit Court, in <a href="https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-davis-51">United States v. Davis</a>, declared that the government’s need to protect passengers from hijackings rendered all searches of passengers for weapons and explosives as reasonable and legal. </p>
<p>These rulings upholding early anti-hijacking measures helped create <a href="https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/post-9-11-challenges-aviation-security-homeland-security-law-and">the strong legal grounds</a> for the rapid adoption of the more rigorous security protocols – including detailed identification checks, random pat-downs and full body scans – adopted after 9/11. </p>
<p>The mystery surrounding the fate of Cooper may have afforded him an outsized place in American popular culture, but his crime should also be remembered as one in a consequential wave of hijackings that finally forced the U.S. government, airline executives and airport officials to adopt the first versions of the security measures travelers take for granted today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185562/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janet Bednarek does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From 1968 to 1974, US airlines experienced 130 hijackings. But it was Cooper’s hijacking-as-extortion plot that captured the public’s imagination – and inspired a copycat crime wave.Janet Bednarek, Professor of History, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1594052021-05-19T15:12:27Z2021-05-19T15:12:27ZWhy we need to seriously reconsider COVID-19 vaccination passports<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401456/original/file-20210519-21-1olrz49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5400%2C3023&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vaccine passports may soon be required for travelling amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Like biometrics, they'll likely become a permanent part of our daily lives — and there's barely been any debate about them.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo/Rick Bowmer)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2003, Canada’s immigration and citizenship minister, Denis Coderre, declared that “<a href="https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/48843828/biometrics-public-policy-forum">the biometrics train has left the station</a>,” making reference to <a href="https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/biometrics">new technologies</a> like facial recognition and retina scans. </p>
<p>Coderre’s statement demonstrated the perceived inevitability, along with the innocent embrace, of new <a href="https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/biometrics">biometric technologies</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401468/original/file-20210519-17-1y8hpoe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Coderre gestures while speaking." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401468/original/file-20210519-17-1y8hpoe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401468/original/file-20210519-17-1y8hpoe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=848&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401468/original/file-20210519-17-1y8hpoe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=848&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401468/original/file-20210519-17-1y8hpoe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=848&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401468/original/file-20210519-17-1y8hpoe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1066&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401468/original/file-20210519-17-1y8hpoe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1066&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401468/original/file-20210519-17-1y8hpoe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1066&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Denis Coderre at a news conference in Ottawa in 2002.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(CP PHOTO/Fred Chartrand)</span></span>
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<p>It’s eerily similar <a href="https://www.macleans.ca/opinion/vaccine-passports-are-inevitable-and-canada-should-prepare/">to contemporary statements about vaccine passports</a>. And, much like the rollout of biometrics, the solutions promised by these technologies outweigh the public’s appetite for debate. So what’s changed in the past 20 years, and why should we care?</p>
<p>Proposed vaccine passports are moving forward with little scrutiny due to their promise to solve many <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/7850798/covid-vaccine-passport-canadians-support-poll/">travel-related challenges</a> during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. The emergence of biometrics and surveillance in <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Security-Risk-and-the-Biometric-State-Governing-Borders-and-Bodies/Muller/p/book/9780415484404">post-9/11 border security</a> tells a similar story. </p>
<p>Currently, vaccine passports <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/canada-will-align-policy-on-vaccine-passports-with-international-allies-trudeau-1.5413894">are presented as a relatively simple technological solution to our current travel woes</a>. However, like biometrics, vaccine passports will likely become permanent parts of our daily lives. That means meaningful public debate and discussion about their merits and problems is essential. </p>
<h2>‘Function creep’</h2>
<p>There is growing scholarly trepidation with “<a href="https://iep.utm.edu/surv-eth/#H10">function creep</a>” — the way technologies are gradually used for much more than their originally intended purposes. </p>
<p>These concerns dovetail with related fears about the rapid erosion of privacy. They should not be ignored, nor should they be considered trade-offs for political promises of safer and more efficient travel. Regardless of how effective vaccine passports may be, concerns about their use demand public conversation. </p>
<p><a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.677563">Intensified security at borders and in airports</a> was believed to be a necessary evil of the post-9/11 world. Biometrics and surveillance provided a “sorting” function that improved travellers’ experiences. They promised to streamline interactions with reinforced border security. This positive dividend overlooked the wider social sorting functions of these technologies. </p>
<p>Largely ignored was the way travellers and populations were categorized along lines of race, gender and class. Similarly, in the face of nationwide lockdowns, the promise of a return to safe and efficient travel quiets criticism. </p>
<h2>Personal privacy</h2>
<p>Such technologies also challenge how we negotiate personal privacy. They contribute to <a href="https://www.publichealthontario.ca/-/media/documents/ncov/phm/2021/03/covid-19-environmental-scan-immunity-passports.pdf?la=en">enhanced law enforcement powers</a>, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0969-4765(20)30009-6">are increasingly presented</a> as acceptable trade-offs for <a href="https://www.kotatv.com/2021/04/27/vaccine-passports-lets-travel/">rediscovered mobility</a>. </p>
<p>The pandemic, together with related government responses, have exposed the inequities in our society. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-covid-19s-third-wave-were-far-from-all-in-this-together-159178">With COVID-19's third wave, we're far from 'all in this together'</a>
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</em>
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<hr>
<p>As a result, we should be troubled by the open embrace of vaccine passports. The lessons of the past two decades of surveillance in society have shown us that identification technologies such as biometrics have consequences that <a href="https://thetyee.ca/News/2021/04/28/RCMP-Secret-Facial-Recognition-Tool-Looked-Matches-Terrorists/">go well beyond their intended use</a>.</p>
<p>Contemporary vaccine passports will bear little resemblance to the handwritten vaccination cards of the past. Instead, they will likely reside on our smartphones. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398686/original/file-20210504-15-1fqgcki.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A person holds a phone that says COVID-19 Digital Immune Passport." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398686/original/file-20210504-15-1fqgcki.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398686/original/file-20210504-15-1fqgcki.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398686/original/file-20210504-15-1fqgcki.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398686/original/file-20210504-15-1fqgcki.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398686/original/file-20210504-15-1fqgcki.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398686/original/file-20210504-15-1fqgcki.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398686/original/file-20210504-15-1fqgcki.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vaccine passports will probably live on our smartphones.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wuestenigel/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<h2>Responsibility rests with us</h2>
<p>That means the responsibility for them rests squarely with the citizen. Decidedly different than the responses to security challenges after 9/11, vaccine passports are not products of large transnational corporations.</p>
<p>Instead, regular citizens with programming skills who engage in “participatory democracy” on GitHub, an internet platform that hosts software development through volunteer programming, <a href="https://github.com/vaccine-passport/docs">are proposing solutions</a>. In the months following the first media mentions of vaccine passports, more than 40 related projects <a href="https://github.com/search?q=covid+passport">were launched on GitHub</a>. </p>
<p>The majority of them are apps that use a smartphone’s algorithms to collect sensitive data such as name, date of birth, vaccine brand, dosage and mailing addresses. As one volunteer <a href="https://github.com/alexandrutatarciuc/Covid19PassportApp">programmer writes</a>: “I decided to stop enduring the effects of the pandemic and start to act.” </p>
<p>A trend is emerging: programming-savvy citizens who code for corporations by day now do so for public safety by night. The political significance of this cannot be understated.</p>
<p>The next generation of entrepreneurs are technologically savvy. These citizen-programmers imagine a future where safety, mobility, freedom and the dream of the return to pre-pandemic normalcy may intersect. But this intersection will be on the smartphone. </p>
<h2>Post 9/11 consequences</h2>
<p>The consequences of biometrics and surveillance rolled out in response to the security challenges of the post-9/11 world <a href="https://hedgehogreview.com/issues/fear-itself/articles/fear-surveillance-and-consumption">had widespread consequences</a>. Similarly, leveraging smartphones as the vehicle for vaccine passports will be fraught with rights and civil liberties violations. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A police officer's hand rests on his gun as politicians speak in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401469/original/file-20210519-23-hr6ivt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401469/original/file-20210519-23-hr6ivt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401469/original/file-20210519-23-hr6ivt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401469/original/file-20210519-23-hr6ivt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401469/original/file-20210519-23-hr6ivt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401469/original/file-20210519-23-hr6ivt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401469/original/file-20210519-23-hr6ivt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A police officer stands by as federal government officials answer questions during a news conference on airport security a month after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(CP PHOTO/Aaron Harris)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/surveillance-studies-9780190297817?cc=ca&lang=en&">Research over the past two decades</a> into surveillance is clear — it threatens individual freedoms and amplifies social differences. Social sorting technologies like biometrics not only verify that “you are who you say you are,” they also assess risk and <a href="https://www.surveillanceincanada.org/">categorize each of us in the process</a>. </p>
<p>Proposed to solve problems related to enhancing secure and efficient travel, the consequences of vaccine passports are much broader. Surveillance and biometrics assign worth and opportunity. They also assign differential access to goods, services and places. </p>
<p>Vaccine passports provide the opportunity to add health data to our mobile personal data devices. While the promise of improved pandemic travel will likely be kept, there will also be a series of policy challenges, privacy concerns and troubling consequences of social sorting.</p>
<h2>Real debate is needed</h2>
<p>The absence of meaningful debate about turning to consumer technology as a vehicle for vaccine passports is serious. In the early 2000s, <a href="https://www.ifsecglobal.com/access-control/truth-is-the-key-addressing-criticism-of-biometrics/">questioning the reliance on biometrics and surveillance</a> was often regarded as suspicious, speculative and even anti-modern.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/before-we-introduce-vaccine-passports-we-need-to-know-how-theyll-be-used-156197">Before we introduce vaccine passports we need to know how they'll be used</a>
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<p>Today, public criticism and deliberation about vaccine passports is also overlooked and even discredited. Concerns over vaccine passports <a href="https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-05-12/how-digital-vaccine-passports-became-a-rally-cry-for-anti-mask-movement">are sometimes conflated with anti-mask and anti-vaccination sentiments</a>. </p>
<p>Safe and efficient travel is the coveted prize. However, failure to have fulsome public conversations about the long-term societal impact of vaccine passports will leave our privacy and civil liberties exposed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159405/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Muller receives funding from King's University College Internal Research Grant and Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tommy Cooke does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>COVID-19 vaccine passports are being presented as a relatively simple technological solution to our current travel woes. But meaningful public debate about their merits and problems is essential.Tommy Cooke, SSHRC Postdoctoral Researcher, Digital Privacy, Queen's University, OntarioBenjamin Muller, Associate Professor in Political Science and Sociology, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1537152021-02-07T12:57:34Z2021-02-07T12:57:34ZCOVID-19 has fuelled automation — but human involvement is still essential<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382786/original/file-20210205-13-9tjr7d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1920%2C1284&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Automated systems require knowledge, human supervision and intervention from the human operator whenever something goes wrong.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Pixabay)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the way we work and interact with machines — and people — in the workplace. The surge in <a href="https://slack.com/intl/en-ca/blog/collaboration/report-remote-work-during-coronavirus">remote working</a> brought on by the pandemic has magnified the need for unmanned work operations. More automation, however, does not always make the workplace more efficient.</p>
<p>Industries that have heavily relied on manual operations, like <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54431056">warehouses</a> or <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/toronto-officials-update-covid-886-february-1-1.5896069">meat packers</a>, are <a href="https://time.com/5876604/machines-jobs-coronavirus/">now introducing more automated or tele-operated systems</a>. Unlike traditional, manually operated machines, in tele-operation the human operator sits in a remote location away from the machine they control. </p>
<p>Despite some of the unquestionable benefits of automation, however, these trends are in part an attempt to address the <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2021/01/22/coronavirus-covid-19-updates-toronto-canada-jan-22.html">high rates of COVID-19 among factory workers</a>.</p>
<p>Despite some of the unquestionable benefits of automation, however, simply adopting a technology-driven approach aimed at replacing all manual operations with robots is not a viable fix.</p>
<h2>Human-machine interaction</h2>
<p>For decades, what’s known as <a href="https://www.hslab.org/what">human factors</a>, a discipline at the intersection of cognitive science, engineering and kinesiology, has investigated the human-machine interaction in the workplace, with the goal of understanding the benefits and unintended consequences of automation. Among the phenomena being investigated is what’s known as the paradox of automation.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/01/automation-paradox/424437/">paradox of automation</a> — also known as the paradox of technology — occurs when introducing automated system will add to, not reduce, the workload and responsibilities of the human operator. </p>
<p>This is because automated systems often require more knowledge, human supervision and intervention from the human operator whenever something goes wrong.</p>
<p>Case in point is airport security screening. This industry has undergone an <a href="https://developer.ibm.com/patterns/blockchain-implement-automated-airport-security-control-system/">automation revolution</a> for many decades now. Yet data shows that the failure rate in this industry is still <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/tsa-failed-to-detect-mock-explosives-and-weapons-95-of-the-time-during-airport-security-tests-2015-6">as high as 95 per cent</a>. Why?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Travellers wearing face masks while pass through an airport security checkpoint." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382773/original/file-20210205-18-cj101z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382773/original/file-20210205-18-cj101z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382773/original/file-20210205-18-cj101z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382773/original/file-20210205-18-cj101z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382773/original/file-20210205-18-cj101z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382773/original/file-20210205-18-cj101z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382773/original/file-20210205-18-cj101z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Travellers wear face masks while passing through a security checkpoint at Denver International Airport in December 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/David Zalubowski)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The answer to this question is less about the technology, and more about the fact that system developers too often ignore or overlook the human factor. </p>
<p>In other words, a technology-centred approach is adopted over a <a href="https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/human-centred-design-can-help-reduce-accidents-like-the-recent-ethiopian-airlines-boeing-737-crash">human-centred one</a>.</p>
<p>Ignoring or undervaluing human factors in automation does not only make systems impossible to use but, more importantly, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10447318.2018.1561792">hinders safety</a>. </p>
<h2>Recognize boundaries</h2>
<p>A solution to this is developing systems that help automate manually intensive operations, as well as account for known boundaries in human cognition like the inability to <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/science/maria-konnikova/multitask-masters">multi-task effectively</a> or sustain attention on a given task for long periods of times.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man sits in front of a desktop computer with a mural of gears in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382782/original/file-20210205-24-1e556nl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=402%2C5%2C1072%2C1270&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382782/original/file-20210205-24-1e556nl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382782/original/file-20210205-24-1e556nl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382782/original/file-20210205-24-1e556nl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382782/original/file-20210205-24-1e556nl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382782/original/file-20210205-24-1e556nl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382782/original/file-20210205-24-1e556nl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Automated systems must account for human boundaries, but not cut them out entirely.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Pixabay)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Like many other <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/1779122/decade-disruption-9-11-inspired-innovation">innovations borne out of challenging times in human history</a>, the push for more automation and tele-operation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic must come with the promise of more efficient and safer workplace operations. </p>
<p>But instead of fully and solely relying on what’s technologically possible, system developers must put human beings at the centre of designing automation instead of relegating them to its periphery.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153715/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francesco N. Biondi is an Assistant Professor at the University of Windsor and co-funder of the Human Systems Lab (hslab.org). He also consults on Human Factors cases involving human-machine interaction and automation. He receives funding from the federal and provincial governments, and via industry collaborations.</span></em></p>Like other innovations borne out of challenging times in history, the push for more automation and tele-operation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic must mean more efficient and safer workplaces.Francesco Biondi, Assistant Professor, Human Kinetics, University of WindsorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1085832019-01-17T11:39:06Z2019-01-17T11:39:06ZIn ‘airports of the future’, everything new is old again<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253743/original/file-20190114-43510-1xlmqst.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=44%2C0%2C4940%2C3290&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Just because an airport looks impressive doesn't mean it functions well.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey-New-Airport/bfe0a294298143d29ce49dc1387dcd2b/27/0">AP Photo/Emrah Gurel</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/02/travel/new-airport-istanbul-beijing.html">massive new airports</a> open across Asia and the Middle East, U.S. airports are <a href="https://www.ajc.com/blog/airport/delta-now-using-facial-recognition-hartsfield-jackson-international-terminal-plans-expand-technology-detroit/avJxkBSmoD4MBNQ6zaSuWL/">enhancing security checkpoints with technological gadgets</a> to screen passengers and luggage more quickly. All these projects are often touted as “<a href="https://www.cntraveler.com/story/inside-the-airport-of-the-future">airports of the future</a>,” in which air travel will be faster, more efficient and more enjoyable than ever before.</p>
<p>However, as a scholar of the <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9783319311944">history of U.S. airports</a>, I’m most interested to see that all these shiny improvements are still struggling to solve the <a href="https://theconversation.com/longing-for-the-golden-age-of-air-travel-be-careful-what-you-wish-for-34177">problems that have vexed airport managers and passengers</a> since at least the late 1950s. Even at the dawn of the <a href="https://airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/america-by-air/online/jetage/index.cfm">jet age</a>, airlines had trouble moving people and bags through airports – and they still do. It’s unclear that bigger airports serving ever more passengers will have an easier time than their smaller, less crowded predecessors. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253735/original/file-20190114-43538-pagvk4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253735/original/file-20190114-43538-pagvk4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253735/original/file-20190114-43538-pagvk4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253735/original/file-20190114-43538-pagvk4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253735/original/file-20190114-43538-pagvk4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253735/original/file-20190114-43538-pagvk4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=355&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253735/original/file-20190114-43538-pagvk4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=355&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253735/original/file-20190114-43538-pagvk4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=355&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chicago’s O'Hare, one of the nation’s busiest airports, stretches across an area one-third the size of Manhattan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:OHare_terminal_map.jpg">Jay8g/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A long way to walk</h2>
<p>When commercial jet airliners came to the U.S. in the late 1950s, they were <a href="https://theconversation.com/50-years-of-the-boeing-747-how-the-queen-of-the-skies-reigned-over-air-travel-99814">larger and faster than previous planes</a>, needing longer runways and more space to park and maneuver on the tarmac. They carried more passengers, which meant boarding gates had to be bigger. This led to the now-familiar design called “<a href="https://science.howstuffworks.com/transport/flight/modern/airport4.htm">pier-finger terminals</a>,” with a main terminal screening passengers and collecting checked luggage, beyond which lay long stretches of boarding gates, spaced far enough apart for planes to fit side by side. <a href="http://archive.aviationweek.com/issue/19630715">Atlanta, Chicago and Miami</a> airports all were criticized for <a href="http://archive.aviationweek.com/issue/19630805">making passengers walk nearly half a mile</a> from ticketing to their gates.</p>
<p>Eero Saarinan, designer of classic jet-age terminals at Dulles and Kennedy airports, proposed two different answers. At Dulles, outside Washington, D.C., he called for <a href="https://www.washingtonian.com/2016/11/21/mobile-lounge-dulles-airport-people-movers/">large, bus-like vehicles</a> to move passengers from the terminal directly to their airplanes. Called “<a href="https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/the-lonely-ballad-of-the-mobile-lounge">mobile lounges</a>,” they’re now being phased out in favor of another system billed as more future-oriented: an <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/25/AR2010012502837.html">underground train</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Efyvx_BckD8?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">People-moving ‘mobile lounges’ at Dulles International Airport.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In his TWA terminal at JFK Airport outside New York City, Saarinan planned for <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2016/09/28/airport-moving-walkways-history/91187032/">moving sidewalks</a> to help people cover the distance. The final construction didn’t end up including them, but many large airports adopted the idea.</p>
<p>Those approaches did reduce the number of steps passengers had to take. But as terminals grew in size and airline routes became more complex, passengers had to change planes more often. That has required trains or trams to help people travel longer distances within terminals, or even to other concourses.</p>
<p>Checked luggage has to travel farther, too. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Denver officials thought they had the ultimate futuristic solution with an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/27/us/denver-airport-saw-the-future-it-didnt-work.html">automatic bag handling system</a>. After repeated failures, though, the machines were shut down and baggage handling was put back in human hands. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253742/original/file-20190114-43541-1cfq6hu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253742/original/file-20190114-43541-1cfq6hu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253742/original/file-20190114-43541-1cfq6hu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253742/original/file-20190114-43541-1cfq6hu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253742/original/file-20190114-43541-1cfq6hu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253742/original/file-20190114-43541-1cfq6hu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253742/original/file-20190114-43541-1cfq6hu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253742/original/file-20190114-43541-1cfq6hu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Loading baggage by hand is more reliable than automated systems.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/USAIRWAYS/a0c08412416a499198d3ffdea061d82c/39/0">AP Photo/Gene J. Puskar</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After decades of attempts, the best way to ensure you and your bags arrive at the same place at the same time is carrying them on the plane yourself. Of course, that means you have to drag heavier bags even farther through sprawling airports.</p>
<h2>Planning for the unexpected</h2>
<p>After the 2001 terrorist attacks, new security screenings created long lines and increased the amount of time people spent at the airport before flights. The need for additional security and waiting space challenged designs that had seemed forward-thinking even in the late 1990s. </p>
<p>For instance, a terminal <a href="http://www.flyreagan.com/dca/history-reagan-national-airport">completed in 1997 at Reagan National Airport</a> outside Washington, D.C., included shops and restaurants, as well as a seamless link to the region’s public transit system. That whole layout is <a href="https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Reagan-National-Airport-Readies-for-1-Billion-Renovation-Project-416881363.html">being revamped now</a>, at a cost of US$1 billion, to enhance the travel experience and to accommodate growing passenger numbers.</p>
<p>As more people fly more often, the pace of growth and unexpected events have often overwhelmed the best intended designs and plans. After more than 60 years of trying, it’s an open question whether the ultimate airport of the future – one where passengers and their bags move quickly through a space that’s enjoyable to be in – could ever exist at all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108583/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janet Bednarek does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Big lines and long distances to walk have plagued airports since the dawn of the jet age. New designs and technologies haven’t helped much, even if they’re visually impressive.Janet Bednarek, Professor of History, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1062712018-11-15T14:33:16Z2018-11-15T14:33:16ZAirport security threats: combating the enemy within<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/245774/original/file-20181115-194497-7yk83r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/cctv-camera-surveillance-operating-crowded-people-188792162">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/from-the-archive-blog/2011/sep/06/9-11-attacks-guardian-archive">9/11</a> al-Qaeda attacks on the US, most travellers have got used to the sight of fortified airports around the world. Few people these days are surprised to see barriers and other physical protection measures around them, as well as the presence of armed police patrols.</p>
<p>An airport is an enormous, complex operation, and while on the surface one that is more physically secure is reassuring for travellers – and acts as a bulwark against a possible terror attack – there is also a hidden threat from inside the airport environment. This threat has no boundaries and exists across all airports and countries. Here, the “insider” has the ability to overcome many of these overt security measures if they want to target and threaten passengers or the wider population.</p>
<p>As soon as the term insider is used, people think of terrorism in the context of the “<a href="https://www.askthe.police.uk/content/Q929.htm">radicalised</a>” or “terrorist” insider. But the subject is far more complex: insiders can include individual criminals, organised crime gangs, disgruntled employees or even unwitting members of staff who, through failure to follow proper security processes, leave airports vulnerable to external threats.</p>
<h2>Terrorists, smugglers, gangs and thieves</h2>
<p>Probably one of the best-known UK terrorist insiders in recent times is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/feb/28/british-airways-bomb-guilty-karim">Rajib Karim</a>. Karim was a British Airways software engineer who had been radicalised, and plotted to place a bomb on board a BA plane. His plot was subsequently foiled, and he was sentenced to 30 years in prison for terrorist activities.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, there have also been terrorist insider successes. On October 31, 2015, Russian Metrojet <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/01/metrojet-ordered-suspend-all-flights-egypt-air-crash-russia-sinai">flight 9268 crashed</a> over the Sinai Peninsula after taking off from Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. A bomb hidden in a drinks can is believed to have caused the aircraft to crash, and a group associated with <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29052144">Islamic State</a> claimed the attack, which killed 224 people. It is <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/2016/06/03/egyptair-metrojet-flight-9268-airport-security-462784.html">suspected</a> the bomb may have been placed onboard by an airport employee at Sharm el-Sheikh airport.</p>
<p>The most common examples of insider threat lie with individual members (or groups) of staff who commit low-level crime in the airport. This can range from smuggling drugs to theft from bags as they are processed through the handling system. Organised crime networks also see airports as a legitimate route to traffic drugs from South America to the rest of the world.</p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/1330-139-years-for-heathrow-airport-insider-cocaine-smuggling-group">recent case at Heathrow</a> involved corrupt baggage handlers who were part of a criminal network planning to smuggle at least £16m worth of drugs into the UK from Brazil. The gang was caught after a surveillance operation and sentenced to more than 139 years in prison. </p>
<p>But it’s not only drugs that are smuggled through airports. In the US, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-georgia-state-crime-guns-idUSKBN0K11FD20141223">firearms smuggling plot</a> by five men, including an employee and an ex-employee of Delta Airlines, was foiled by authorities. These individuals were involved in the trafficking of over 150 firearms (including assault weapons) from Atlanta to New York. This plot took advantage of a security vulnerability which involved access passes which were available to the insiders, and enabled the transportation of firearms by the group of employees.</p>
<h2>Dealing with threats</h2>
<p>While it is important to highlight past examples of insider activity within the aviation sector, it is also essential that suspicious behaviours and indicators are recognised. Research has been carried out to identify <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/PE/Documents/4---2017-AEP_Aviation-Insider-Paper.pdf">behavioural indicators</a>, and use this as a predictive technique to detect current and future insider threats.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/F9M4APFamJE?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
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<p>Suspicious acts by employees may include nervous or secretive behaviour, turning up for work in uniform on days off, showing interest in security matters outside their normal scope, and undertaking hostile reconnaissance for future exploitation of airport weaknesses.</p>
<p>Insider threat has now been recognised as a <a href="http://www.crf-usa.org/america-responds-to-terrorism/a-clear-and-present-danger.html">clear and present danger</a> within the international aviation sector and organisations such as the <a href="https://www.iata.org/about/Pages/index.aspx">International Air Transport Association</a> (IATA) has produced <a href="https://www.iata.org/policy/Documents/insider-threats-position.pdf">guidelines</a> on how to manage this threat. The threat from <a href="https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Americas-Airports-The-Threat-From-Within.pdf">insider activity</a> within the aviation sector has also been recognised by governments and law enforcement agencies.</p>
<p>Everyone has an opportunity to do more to combat the aviation insider threat, through a “community approach” at airports. This involves everyone from operators, airlines and third party contractors, to law enforcement working in collaboration and sharing key information (such as Project Servator, which seeks to “detect, deter and disrupt” criminal activity, including terrorism). Addressing personnel security weaknesses in airports which could allow hostile insiders to gain work there, is essential. And, of course, this approach also includes the general public who are encouraged to report anything suspicious to the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-counter-terrorism-security-office">counter-terrorist</a> hotline or airport authorities.</p>
<p>Pre-employment screening, vetting and ongoing security management of employees can all be improved. Training programmes for management and supervisors are essential for airports, and will provide them with skills to identify, manage and resolve these threats. The value of managing the insider risk should not be underestimated. By acknowledging and identifying the threat and developing measures to combat it, we can make our airports safer places for all passengers and the staff who service them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106271/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David BaMaung works for Camor, a specialist aviation security company.</span></em></p>From terrorism to drug smuggling and theft, the hostile insider is an often overlooked threat to airport security and safety.David BaMaung, Honorary professor human resource development, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1043142018-10-07T18:51:46Z2018-10-07T18:51:46ZTravelling overseas? What to do if a border agent demands access to your digital device<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239434/original/file-20181005-52691-12zqgzn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">New laws enacted in New Zealand give customs agents the right to search your phone.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/young-business-woman-walking-airport-terminal-1191018481?src=zjpK9WjS-B00bny445xlwQ-1-90">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>New laws enacted in New Zealand this month give border agents the right to demand travellers entering the country hand over passwords for their digital devices. We outline what you should do if it happens to you, in the first part of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/tourism-and-technology-60904">series</a> exploring how technology is changing tourism.</em></p>
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<p>Imagine returning home to Australia or New Zealand after a long-haul flight, exhausted and red-eyed. You’ve just reclaimed your baggage after getting through immigration when you’re stopped by a customs officer who demands you hand over your smartphone and the password. Do you know your rights? </p>
<p>Both Australian and New Zealand customs officers are legally allowed to search not only your personal baggage, but also the contents of your smartphone, tablet or laptop. It doesn’t matter whether you are a citizen or visitor, or whether you’re crossing a border by air, land or sea. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-protect-your-private-data-when-you-travel-to-the-united-states-73909">How to protect your private data when you travel to the United States</a>
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<p>New <a href="http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2018/0004/latest/whole.html">laws</a> that came into effect in New Zealand on October 1 give border agents:</p>
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<p>…the power to make a full search of a stored value instrument (including power to require a user of the instrument to provide access information and other information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a person to access the instrument).</p>
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<p>Those who don’t comply could face prosecution and NZ$5,000 in fines. Border agents have similar <a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1901124/s186.html">powers</a> in Australia and elsewhere. In Canada, for example, hindering or obstructing a border guard could cost you up to <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2018/08/03/border-guards-phone-search_a_23495655/">C$50,000 or five years in prison</a>. </p>
<h2>A growing trend</h2>
<p>Australia and New Zealand don’t currently publish data on these kinds of searches, but there is a growing trend of device search and seizure at US borders. There was a more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/business/border-enforcement-airport-phones.html">fivefold</a> increase in the number of electronic device inspections between 2015 and 2016 – bringing the total number to 23,000 per year. In the <a href="https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-releases-statistics-electronic-device-searches-0">first six months</a> of 2017, the number of searches was already almost 15,000. </p>
<p>In some of these instances, people have been threatened with arrest if they didn’t hand over passwords. Others have been <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/alain-philippon-phone-password-case-powers-of-border-agents-and-police-differ-1.2983841">charged</a>. In cases where they did comply, people have <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-14/airport-searches-of-your-phone-and-computer/9866134">lost sight of their device</a> for a short period, or devices were confiscated and returned days or weeks later.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/encrypted-smartphones-secure-your-identity-not-just-your-data-91715">Encrypted smartphones secure your identity, not just your data</a>
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<p>On top of device searches, there is also canvassing of social media accounts. In 2016, the United States introduced an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/26/us-customs-social-media-foreign-travelers">additional question</a> on online visa application forms, asking people to divulge <a href="https://www.esta-online.com/blogs/esta-social-media-question">social media usernames</a>. As this form is usually filled out after the flights have been booked, travellers might feel they have no choice but to part with this information rather than risk being denied a visa, despite the question being optional. </p>
<h2>There is little oversight</h2>
<p>Border agents may have a legitimate reason to search an incoming passenger – for instance, if a passenger is suspected of carrying illicit goods, banned items, or agricultural products from abroad. </p>
<p>But searching a smartphone is different from searching luggage. Our smartphones carry our innermost thoughts, intimate pictures, sensitive workplace documents, and private messages. </p>
<p>The practice of searching electronic devices at borders could be compared to police having the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017C00192">right to intercept private communications</a>. But in such cases in Australia, police require a <a href="https://works.bepress.com/kmichael/51/download/">warrant</a> to conduct the intercept. That means there is oversight, and a <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/encrypted-communications/australia.php">mechanism</a> in place to guard against abuse. And the suspected crime must be proportionate to the action taken by law enforcement.</p>
<h2>What to do if it happens to you</h2>
<p>If you’re stopped at a border and asked to hand over your devices and passwords, make sure you have educated yourself in advance about your rights in the country you’re entering. </p>
<p>Find out whether what you are being asked is optional or not. Just because someone in a uniform asks you to do something, it does not necessarily mean you have to comply. If you’re not sure about your rights, ask to speak to a lawyer and don’t say anything that might incriminate you. Keep your cool and don’t argue with the customs officer. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-secure-is-your-data-when-its-stored-in-the-cloud-90000">How secure is your data when it's stored in the cloud?</a>
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<p>You should also be smart about how you manage your data generally. You may wish to switch on two-factor authentication, which requires a password on top of your passcode. And store sensitive information in the cloud on a secure European server while you are travelling, accessing it only on a needs basis. Data protection is taken more seriously in the European Union as a result of the recently enacted <a href="https://eugdpr.org/">General Data Protection Regulation</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/servicesagreement">Microsoft</a>, <a href="https://www.apple.com/privacy/manage-your-privacy/">Apple</a> and <a href="https://policies.google.com/terms?hl=en&gl=ZZ">Google</a> all indicate that handing over a password to one of their apps or devices is in breach of their services agreement, privacy management, and safety practices. That doesn’t mean it’s wise to refuse to comply with border force officials, but it does raise questions about the position governments are putting travellers in when they ask for this kind of information.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104314/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katina Michael receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC). She is affiliated with the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the Australian Privacy Foundation (APF).</span></em></p>Searching a smartphone is different from searching luggage. Our smartphones carry our innermost thoughts, intimate pictures, sensitive workplace documents and private messages.Katina Michael, Professor, School for the Future of Innovation in Society & School of Computing, Informatics and Decision Systems Engineering, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1001052018-07-24T11:43:57Z2018-07-24T11:43:57ZAlcohol: why we should call time on airport drinking<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228029/original/file-20180717-44097-19qqml9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Just one?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/whiskey-on-ice-airport-selective-color-710866525?src=iLtsmiib5tAmqDHMJ4UJ3g-1-31">SeaRick1/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the alcohol industry continues <a href="http://www.ias.org.uk/Alcohol-knowledge-centre/The-alcohol-industry/Factsheets/How-big-is-the-alcohol-industry.aspx">to make healthy profits</a>, Britain is left counting the increasing cost of its unhealthy relationship with booze. From <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/nhs-latest-alcohol-addiction-hospital-admissions-record-high-support-services-rehab-cut-jeremy-hunt-a8200876.html">overstretched accident and emergency departments</a> to a <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/causesofdeath/bulletins/alcoholrelateddeathsintheunitedkingdom/registeredin2016">steady incidence</a> of alcohol-related disease, the cost is massive. The most recent figures reveal that alcohol-related harms <a href="https://www.alcoholconcern.org.uk/alcohol-statistics">cost the NHS around £3.5 billion</a> annually. </p>
<p>And the problems don’t end there. Often the erratic and antisocial behaviour of intoxicated people will have an impact on others. This becomes apparent when walking down any UK high street on a Saturday night, as you dodge obstacles from aggressive drinkers to broken glass.</p>
<p>Alcohol issues aren’t limited to towns and cities, either. Recently, budget airline Ryanair once again <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44521649">called for airports</a> to introduce “preventative measures to curb excessive drinking”, following a flight that had to land unexpectedly when three passengers became disruptive. Airports are places where high security and order are paramount to safety so, really, no alcohol should be allowed whatsoever.</p>
<h2>Drunk on board</h2>
<p>In recent years, there have been several high profile incidents involving drunk passengers on planes – as well as countless other unreported events. In fact, figures show 387 people were arrested <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/airports-drunk-passengers-booze-banned-not-what-airports-want-a7893081.html">for being drunk at airports</a> between February 2016 and February 2017 – up from 255 the previous year. And a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40877229">BBC Panorama investigation</a> has found that more than half of cabin crew have seen disruptive drunken passenger behaviour at UK airports. </p>
<p>Problems linked to alcohol consumption in airports and on planes include passengers being too drunk to board, or being out of control on planes. Those who do not board have their bags removed, causing delays for other passengers, while those who board drunk can cause disorder and endanger passenger safety – especially pertinent in the confines of an aeroplane where other passengers can become scared.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228026/original/file-20180717-44085-7c7rth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228026/original/file-20180717-44085-7c7rth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228026/original/file-20180717-44085-7c7rth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228026/original/file-20180717-44085-7c7rth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228026/original/file-20180717-44085-7c7rth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228026/original/file-20180717-44085-7c7rth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228026/original/file-20180717-44085-7c7rth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Cheers?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/hands-raised-toasting-beer-inside-airplane-369338090?src=LI72WA8pnWAu3pscgwyzoA-1-0">cunaplus/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Drunk behaviour is not just disruptive to other passengers, however. Air travel involves a tightly integrated, complex set of processes and the effects of drunk passengers can impact this infrastructure. The number of professionals required for the safe management of drunks can divert resources away from normal service, potentially affecting security and the safety of other travellers.</p>
<p>Drunk people have reportedly tried to <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/transport/easyjet-forced-to-make-emergency-landing-after-drunk-brit-tries-to-open-door-at-30000ft-a3199001.html">open plane doors</a> and <a href="http://www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/news/13637259.Holiday_flight_from_Newcastle_diverted_as_drunk_woman_tried_to__smash_windows_/">smash windows</a> while in flight. The extent of drunkenness has caused planes in flight to divert so that the intoxicated and disorderly can be offloaded, again affecting all other passengers’ safety and convenience. </p>
<h2>Licensing rules</h2>
<p>The government is examining how alcohol is sold in airports, but they <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-ban-alcohol-airports-pub-bar-drunk-air-rage-britain-government-a8145236.html">stop short of banning</a> it altogether. Instead, restrictions have been proposed to end rules which allow airport bars and pubs to operate outside UK licensing laws. Limiting the number of drinks a passenger can have, both before and during flights, would almost certainly bring this number of alcohol-related incidents down, and result in fewer delays and a more secure and pleasant trip for passengers and staff.</p>
<p>It’s not about being puritanical. Choice is important and many choose to make alcohol an important part of many activities, including their holidays. At the same time, choices have been made to ensure the safety of air passengers and to keep flights running on time. Airport and aeroplane staff, given the choice, would probably prefer not to mop up vomit from those who have drunk too much – or worse, potentially put themselves in harm’s way to protect other passengers.</p>
<p>During air travel, travellers are contained in secure areas, with no choice over their fellow passengers. Removing the irrationality of intoxication from such an activity is not the tyranny of the majority, it is simply asking people to temporarily abstain until they reach their chosen destination. Many passengers choose not to drink and, given the choice, families would likely prefer that their children are not exposed to disorderly drunks.</p>
<p>No one has the right to cause harm to others and it is trivial to expect abstinence while passengers make their way to their destination, whether it is an alcohol-fuelled excursion, a family holiday or a business trip. For those who use alcohol to cope with anxiety, there are more effective and safer alternatives. For those who cannot go without alcohol there are many services available to help with dependence.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the needs of the many must outweigh the desires of a minority who want to “start their holiday early”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100105/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon C Moore receives funding from ESRC, MRC, ARUK, NIHR. </span></em></p>The UK’s alcohol problems aren’t limited to high streets – so why are airports allowed to flout the rules?Simon C Moore, Professor of Public Health Research, Co-Director of Crime and Security Research Institute and Director of Alcohol & Violence Research Group, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/967842018-05-22T03:57:29Z2018-05-22T03:57:29ZWhy random identification checks at airports are a bad idea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219864/original/file-20180521-51115-ti95m9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Random ID checks announced last week by the Turnbull government will erode trust between police and the public.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Ellen Smith</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last week, the federal government <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-15/airport-security/9761874">announced</a> new powers allowing police to stop people at airports and demand identification. When asked to justify such random checks, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull replied simply: “dangerous times.” At a later press conference he added, “the justification for changing the laws … is the safety of the Australian people”.</p>
<p>While one can concede the perennial danger of a domestic terror attack is with us constantly, the evidence is not clear that random identification checks at airports, or anywhere else for that matter, will prevent or deter a terrorist act.</p>
<p>Before looking at the evidence, we need to review just who is tasked with the policing roles at airports, and what powers currently exist. </p>
<p>Security at Australian airports is managed primarily by the private security staff who are contracted to operate the scanners and random explosives testing machines with which we are now very familiar. But the power to arrest people is the preserve of the Australian Federal Police (AFP). They can be seen, from time to time, patrolling the walkways and corridors of our air terminals.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/trust-is-the-second-casualty-in-the-war-on-terror-94420">Trust is the second casualty in the war on terror</a>
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<p>Under the law, an AFP officer can only request identification if he or she suspects a person has committed, is in the act of committing, or is about to commit a serious offence. A serious offence is one punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of 12 months or more. The power does not extend to asking people at random to produce identification. A citizen being asked, for no good reason, to produce identification is a practice more aligned with authoritarian regimes than with parliamentary democracies.</p>
<p>AFP Commissioner Andrew Colvin has said he <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/afp-commissioner,-andrew-colvin,-talks-about/9773282">supports the change</a> because such powers would allow his officers to determine whether or not there was, indeed, something to worry about. If there is something to worry about, then the AFP officer would, presumably, act accordingly by removing the person.</p>
<p>But this begs a number of questions: why would an officer simply remove someone from the terminal and not arrest them? If the inquiry is such that a real concern about a potential threat has been raised, why wouldn’t the powers that currently exist simply kick in? </p>
<p>And what happens to the businesswoman who has been drawn to police attention by a loud, curt word to a security staff member but who has left her driver’s licence home and is about to miss her plane? It is all very odd.</p>
<p>This would be all well and good if there was any evidence that the new random identification checks would achieve what they set out to achieve. Sadly, the evidence points in the opposite direction. </p>
<p>Random stopping, questioning and demanding identification carries with it the risk of racial and social profiling, which brings with it public disquiet, if not anger. A white, well-dressed person is <a href="https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9780387768731">far less likely to be stopped at random</a> and asked to explain themselves than, say, a non-white person wearing religious dress or in shabby attire. </p>
<p>If that type of profiling occurs over and over, police quickly lose their “legitimacy”. According to <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1477370811411462">research</a>, people are more likely to obey the law if they believe the police are behaving legitimately: that is, in a fair and procedurally correct manner, not an arbitrary one. If we want to foster good public perceptions of police, we should encourage police practices designed to engage rather than those likely to enrage.</p>
<p>Allied to this is the abundant <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15614260500293986?tab=permissions&scroll=top">evidence</a> that the most effective anti-terror intelligence-gathering comes from members of the community providing information to police. If that community loses confidence in the police, then the well-spring of potentially significant information quickly dries up.</p>
<p>Legitimacy theory states that policing will be most effective when police officers set out to explore and understand the intrinsic and internal motivations that shape a citizen’s desire to cooperate voluntarily with them. The testing of this theory is now well underway in Australia and the results are favourable. As <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1068316X.2014.951649">Barkworth and Murphy write</a>: </p>
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<p>By engaging with the public in a polite, respectful, and empathetic manner, police officers will be able to reduce negative sentiments and emotion directed at them, thereby increasing people’s willingness to comply with them both immediately and in the future.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/body-worn-cameras-will-help-reduce-police-use-of-force-but-the-problem-runs-much-deeper-94399">Body-worn cameras will help reduce police use of force, but the problem runs much deeper</a>
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<p>In other words, random identification checks, should they be implemented, have the potential to build resentment. Resentment slows down the rate of information flow. No new policy or practice will ever work if it fails to win hearts and minds.</p>
<p>This is a policy that has very little to commend it. Indeed, we need to ensure we do not sacrifice our freedom to go about our business without interruption in the pursuit of a goal that is at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive.</p>
<p>Policymakers need to keep this in mind as they review and evaluate the implementation of any new practice. They must ensure it does what it sets out to do, in a manner that is justifiable – on criminological and legal grounds – and acceptable to those to whom it applies.</p>
<p>To paraphrase former Prime Minister Robert Menzies, the greatest tragedy that could overcome a country would be for it to implement a policy in defence of liberty and to lose its own liberty in the process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96784/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rick Sarre is affiliated with the ALP and receives funding from the Australian Research Council</span></em></p>We need to ensure we do not sacrifice our liberty in the pursuit of a goal that is at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive.Rick Sarre, Adjunct Professor of Law and Criminal Justice, University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/776602017-05-17T00:03:09Z2017-05-17T00:03:09ZWhy banning laptops from airplane cabins doesn’t make sense<p>Recent reports suggest that terrorists can now create bombs so thin that they cannot be detected by the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-05-16/race-to-prevent-airline-terror-turns-to-laptops-thin-bombs">current X-ray screening</a> that our carry-on bags undergo. </p>
<p>In an effort to protect against such threats, the U.S is <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-europe-flight-laptop-ban-20170512-story.html">considering banning laptops and other large electronic devices</a> in the passenger cabins of airplanes flying between Europe and the United States. This would extend a ban already in place on flights from eight Middle Eastern countries. </p>
<p>Given the significant disruption such a policy would cause tens of thousands of passengers a day, a logical question any economist might ask is: Is it worth it? </p>
<p>It is tempting to think that any level of cost and inconvenience is sensible if it reduces the risk of an attack even a little. But risks, inherent in flying and <a href="http://traveltips.usatoday.com/air-travel-safer-car-travel-1581.html">even driving</a>, can never be avoided entirely. </p>
<p>So when weighing policies that are designed to make us safer, it is important to consider both their costs and potential effectiveness.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, whether the benefits justify the costs is <a href="https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/04/counterterroris.html">too often not the yardstick used</a> by officials determining whether to pursue these types of policies. Instead, as law professors who have researched how the government’s travel policies affect civil liberties, we have found that it is more likely that political considerations motivate the adoption of restrictive policies, which in the end <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2647779">actually do little to protect citizens’ security</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169622/original/file-20170516-11941-l4ex1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169622/original/file-20170516-11941-l4ex1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169622/original/file-20170516-11941-l4ex1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169622/original/file-20170516-11941-l4ex1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169622/original/file-20170516-11941-l4ex1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169622/original/file-20170516-11941-l4ex1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169622/original/file-20170516-11941-l4ex1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Placards at Casablanca Mohammed V International Airport inform passengers that laptops and other electronic devices must be checked on flights to the U.S. and the U.K.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abdeljalil Bounhar/AP Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Expanding a ban</h2>
<p>The current laptop policy regarding some flights from the Middle East was put in place in March apparently as a result of <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/15/politics/trump-russia-classified-information/">intelligence</a> that ISIS militants were <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-revealed-highly-classified-information-to-russian-foreign-minister-and-ambassador/2017/05/15/530c172a-3960-11e7-9e48-c4f199710b69_story.html">training</a> to get laptop bombs past security screeners and onto planes. The U.K. adopted a similar rule.</p>
<p>The Department of Homeland Security <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-15/brace-for-chaos-if-u-s-expands-airline-laptop-ban">wants to extend</a> that ban to transatlantic flights. This would cause major disruption and “<a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-europe-flight-laptop-ban-20170512-story.html">logistical chaos</a>.” Approximately 65 million people a year fly between Europe and the United States. </p>
<p>Business travelers are concerned about the loss of productivity and the risk that a checked laptop with sensitive information could be damaged, stolen or subjected to intrusive search. Families worry about traveling without electronic distractions to soothe tired and uncomfortable children. Airlines <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/05/15/trumps-expected-widening-laptop-ban-has-european-airlines-worried.html">expect a loss of business</a> as people opt out of transatlantic travel altogether. </p>
<p>Past policies such as limiting the liquids that can be carried on and requiring passengers to remove shoes are a case in point. They have increased burdens on both travelers – who must pay to check baggage and face added inconvenience – and taxpayers – who bear the costs of every policy change – <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/01/tsa-business-security-theater-not-security/357599/">while likely doing little to nothing</a> to improve security.</p>
<h2>Benefits and costs</h2>
<p>Regulators throughout the government typically must rely on <a href="http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3470">a cost-benefit analysis</a> to determine levels of acceptable risk, weighing the potential safety gain of a new policy against its costs and added risks.</p>
<p>But when dealing with a fear of terrorism, it is common to find policies that are <a href="http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/JATMfin.pdf">not cost effective</a>. And if we subjected the laptop bans (the original and expansion) to a cost-benefit analysis, they would likely fail. The costs are high, the potential security gains are small, and the policy adds hazards of its own. </p>
<p>To make its case, the government seems to be relying on several purported benefits of stowing laptops in the luggage hold. First, checked bags undergo <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-05-16/race-to-prevent-airline-terror-turns-to-laptops-thin-bombs">additional screening for the presence of explosives</a>. Second, it is possible that luggage in the cargo area could provide <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-05-16/race-to-prevent-airline-terror-turns-to-laptops-thin-bombs">some insulation</a> from an explosion. Finally, bombs placed in the cargo area require a <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/03/21/airplane-bombs-carryon-cargo-electronics-ban/99447258/">sophisticated timing device</a>, unlike simpler explosives that could be set off manually. </p>
<p>But these benefits appear dubious as support for a laptop ban. Carry-on luggage could go through expanded screening, for example, while the notion that checked luggage might make an explosion more survivable is speculative – and such gains might in any case be offset by the dangerous <a href="https://cosmosmagazine.com/chemistry/airline-laptop-ban-good-policy-or-poor-science">greater vibration found in cargo</a> cabin. Lithium batteries have, after all, been forbidden from the cargo compartment for a reason – and <a href="https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/hazmat_safety/more_info/?hazmat=7">must instead be carried on</a> – to avoid the risk of fire.</p>
<p>And of course, this does little to protect against the risk of an explosive device in the cargo cabin. It just moves the risk to an isolated area of the plane.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169625/original/file-20170516-11937-1791yxm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169625/original/file-20170516-11937-1791yxm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169625/original/file-20170516-11937-1791yxm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169625/original/file-20170516-11937-1791yxm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169625/original/file-20170516-11937-1791yxm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169625/original/file-20170516-11937-1791yxm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169625/original/file-20170516-11937-1791yxm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lithium batteries were considered the likely cause of a UPS cargo plane crash in 2010 near Dubai that killed both crew members.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kamran Jebreili/AP Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Moving the devices to the hold could actually make such devices harder to detect if they slip past airport screening. The exploding lithium batteries in Samsung devices, for example, show how even ordinary fire risks can be greater when passengers are not there to <a href="http://gizmodo.com/samsung-galaxy-2-spews-smoke-and-sparks-on-flight-to-si-1786998437">notice a smoking battery</a> in a bag in the overhead compartment.</p>
<p>Similarly, the presence of observant passengers can help thwart terrorist activity when it does occur, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/16/justice/michigan-underwear-bomber-sentencing/">as happened with the underwear bomber</a>. One should keep in mind that one of the greatest airline tragedies of all times, the attack on Pan Am flight 103 that exploded over Lockerbie and claimed 270 lives, was caused by a bomb that went off in a suitcase in the <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-lockerbie-bombing-pictures-photogallery.html">cargo hold</a>.</p>
<p>On the economic side, the financial costs of the policy change would likely be very high. Based on statistics from the U.S. Department of Commerce, travel industry professionals estimate that the cost of lost productivity alone for business travelers unable to work on flights between the U.S. and Europe is estimated to be <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/u-s-laptop-ban-cost-economy-500000000-year-173629493.html">as great as $500 million</a> a year.</p>
<p>The potential <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/03/29/trumps-travel-ban-could-cost-18b-us-tourism-travel-analysts-say/99708758/">loss of tourism revenue</a> may be even greater, as families avoid vacationing in the United States and business travelers <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-15/brace-for-chaos-if-u-s-expands-airline-laptop-ban">choose to meet by teleconference instead of in person</a>. </p>
<h2>Questionable politics</h2>
<p>So if the laptop ban would be ineffective – or worse yet, even make airline travel <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/christinenegroni/2017/05/10/in-airplane-laptop-ban-us-discounts-faa-concerns-about-in-flight-fires/#78432a794ace">less safe</a> – and be very costly, why would the government consider it? </p>
<p>The answer is likely politics. And that is because people <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rzeckhau/overreaction_risks.pdf">overestimate the likelihood</a> of being harmed by a terrorist attack, which lends extreme actions like the laptop ban public support, while they underestimate the risks of more ordinary occurrences like <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/death-risk-statistics-terrorism-disease-accidents-2017-1">car accidents</a> or <a href="http://www.pennlive.com/news/2017/03/harrisburg_fire_write-through.html">defective batteries</a>. </p>
<p>From 1975 to 2015, <a href="https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/terrorism-immigration-risk-analysis">fewer than 84 Americans a year</a> died due to terrorism, and that includes the attacks on 9/11. Meanwhile, in 2015 alone a total of <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/2015-brought-biggest-us-traffic-death-increase-50-years-427759">38,300 people died</a> in traffic-related accidents in the U.S. And lithium batteries have been blamed for <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lithium-battery-fire-risk-samsung-galaxy-note-7/">dozens of aircraft fires</a> and <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/exploding-batteries-in-mh370-cargo-hold-2015-10">may have been what brought down</a> Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, which <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/malaysia-airlines-flight-370-likely-crash-location-reaffirmed-with-new-analysis/">disappeared</a> in 2014 with more than 200 passengers and crew. </p>
<p>At the same time, officials on whose watch an attack or other disaster occurs <a href="http://sobelrs.people.cofc.edu/All%20Pubs%20PDF/Hurricane%20Katrina%20Public%20Choice%20Analysis.pdf">receive disproportionate blame</a>, something that does not carry over to more ordinary risks. People fear terror attacks <a href="https://qz.com/898207/the-psychology-of-why-americans-are-more-scared-of-terrorism-than-guns-though-guns-are-3210-times-likelier-to-kill-them/">more than the common threats</a> that are actually more likely to cause them harm. Politicians may respond to their voters’ concerns, and may even share the same <a href="http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2017/01/why-americans-are-so-scared-of-terrorism.html">cognitive biases</a>. </p>
<p>As a result, government decision makers have an incentive to overvalue measures taken to prevent terror attacks, even at the expense of increasing more ordinary – <a href="https://www.wired.com/2016/10/samsung-isnt-one-lithium-ion-problems-just-ask-nasa/">yet more likely</a> – safety risks. </p>
<p>While there may not be much we can do about Americans’ misconceptions about the risk of terrorism, public policy on an issue as important as airline safety should not blindly follow them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77660/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cassandra Burke Robertson is a board member of the 11/9 Coalition, a nationwide, non-partisan, grassroots organization working for the protection of civil liberties and the rule of law.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Irina D. Manta is the founding president of the 11/9 Coalition, a nationwide, non-partisan, grassroots organization working for the protection of civil liberties and the rule of law.</span></em></p>The U.S. is considering expanding a ban it imposed in March on several Middle Eastern countries to all flights from Europe. A close look suggests the meager benefits just aren’t worth the high costs.Cassandra Burke Robertson, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Professional Ethics, Case Western Reserve UniversityIrina D. Manta, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Intellectual Property Law, Hofstra UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/750762017-03-23T17:00:53Z2017-03-23T17:00:53ZBanning laptops at secure airports won’t keep aircraft safe from terror attacks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162211/original/image-20170323-4965-1ivg61p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Introducing new security measures for the airline industry is rarely done lightly by governments. Certainly it’s underpinned by the responsibility to ensure passenger safety. But it’s not clear how effective the recent ban on laptops and large electronic devices in aircraft cabin baggage on flights from certain Middle Eastern airports to the US and UK will be.</p>
<p>There is evidence that airport baggage scanners in many developing world airports aren’t sophisticated enough to detect the latest explosive devices that can be hidden in electronic devices. But limiting the restrictions to just ten specific airports leaves open significant other risks that could be exploited.</p>
<p>The laptop ban is reportedly due to “evaluated intelligence” about attempts to smuggle explosive devices in <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/03/21/qa-aviation-security-enhancements-select-last-point-departure-airports-commercial">various consumer items</a>. This is almost certainly linked to the attack on the Daallo Airlines Flight from Mogadishu, Somalia in February 2016, when an explosive device hidden in a laptop was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-35521646">detonated shortly after take-off</a>.</p>
<p>Since this incident, there has been concern that the bomb-making capabilities of terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab, ISIS and Al-Qaeda may have become sophisticated enough to <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-evolving-challenges-for-explosive-detection-in-the-aviation-sector-and-beyond">bypass airport X-ray machines</a>.</p>
<p>However, CNN terror analyst <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-evolving-challenges-for-explosive-detection-in-the-aviation-sector-and-beyond">Paul Cruikshank has argued</a> that the “layered state-of-the-art detection systems that are now in place at most airports in the developed world make it very hard for terrorists to sneak bombs onto planes”. He believes that, due to the levels of technology in place, it is unlikely that any explosive device would go undetected in the screening process used in many international airports.</p>
<p>But security threats must still be addressed and, given that many airports in the developing world do not have this level of screening, there is no doubt that banning electronic devices from the cabin goes some way towards addressing this threat. Yet perhaps the ban implemented across ten airports, including major hubs in Doha, Istanbul and Dubai (which has the world’s third busiest airport), does not go far enough.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162213/original/image-20170323-4938-8ent8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162213/original/image-20170323-4938-8ent8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162213/original/image-20170323-4938-8ent8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162213/original/image-20170323-4938-8ent8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162213/original/image-20170323-4938-8ent8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162213/original/image-20170323-4938-8ent8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162213/original/image-20170323-4938-8ent8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nowhere to hide … with the right equipment.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Only outbound direct flights to the US and UK run by specifically named airline operators are bound by the restrictions. All the airports on the list are in countries that are either at risk from terrorism or are seen as a particular focus of terrorist activity.</p>
<p>But a number of the above airports operate the highly sophisticated state-of-the-art detection systems that Cruikshank refers to. If the ban is implemented at these airports, then what of those many airports in the developing world which do not have state-of-the-art machines, or benefit from highly qualified staff? And the threat of terrorism exists in other parts of the Middle East, Africa and Asia, where there is support for Al Qaeda, ISIS and other terrorist networks.</p>
<p>We also need to consider potential terrorist behaviour. We can’t ignore the fact that terrorists may simply take an alternative route to the US or UK that isn’t subject to these restrictions. In this case, the vulnerability just shifts somewhere else.</p>
<h2>Unresolved risks</h2>
<p>It would also be very naïve to assume that simply forcing customers to pack their electronic devices into hold baggage would be safer than taking them in the cabin. If a bomb would go undetected in carry-on luggage, there is a strong chance it wouldn’t be found if it were <a href="https://www.asi-mag.com/cargo-screening-technological-options/">screened for the cargo hold</a>. </p>
<p>Another key security risk area is not just the technology used in airports but the vulnerabilities within it. If terrorist groups are intent on attacks on aircraft, they can do so from any airport in the world by recruiting sympathisers <a href="http://link.springer.com/journal/12198/7/4/page/1">among airport staff</a>. As happened during the Somali attack <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/08/somalia-plane-blast-airport-worker-handed-device-to-bombing-suspect">last year</a>, some airports may place their staff under less scrutiny than others, allowing access to restricted areas where devices could be placed on aircraft.</p>
<p>There is no doubt that terrorists will continually try and find ways to avert detection and bypass security. But shifting the vulnerability is not the solution. Only by the whole of the international aviation industry working together will the threat be minimised.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75076/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michaela Preddy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ban on electronic devices in cabin luggage overlooks the airports that would be least likely to detect a bomb.Michaela Preddy, Lecturer in Airport Security Management and Policing, School of Forensic and Applied Sciences, University of Central LancashireLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/600442016-07-01T03:36:37Z2016-07-01T03:36:37ZJust how safe are Australia’s airports?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124224/original/image-20160526-22054-63pnjr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Australia has been cognisant of the challenges aviation security poses.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Britta Campion</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This week’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36658187">terror attack at Turkey’s largest airport</a> and recent attacks in <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/isis-plane-attack-egypt-terrorists-downed-russian-metrojet-flight-from-sharm-el-sheikh-islamic-state-a6893181.html">Egypt</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35869985">Belgium</a> have highlighted the aviation sector’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks. It is still a preferred target of terrorist groups, which see airports as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/brussels-attacks-a-throwback-to-pre-9-11-terrorism-56705">“soft target”</a>.</p>
<p>Australia’s <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Rural_and_Regional_Affairs_and_Transport/Aviation_security/Terms_of_Reference">Senate</a> called last December for a committee to report on aviation security. But, with the federal election called for July 2016, the committee lapsed. It never tabled its final report. </p>
<p>Questions remain, however. How vulnerable is Australia’s aviation industry? And what can be done to enhance its security?</p>
<h2>A snapshot of Australia’s airports</h2>
<p>Australia has <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2016C00112">nine “designated” major airports</a>. While much of the focus for security is on these airports, there are <a href="https://www.airports.asn.au/public/airport-facts">664 aerodromes</a> in Australia. And there are <a href="https://crimecommission.gov.au/node/137">almost 2,000</a> operational airports and landing strips in Australia.</p>
<p>In 2015, 60 million passengers travelled on <a href="https://bitre.gov.au/publications/ongoing/domestic_airline_activity-annual_publications.aspx">Australian domestic commercial aviation</a>. There were <a href="https://data.gov.au/dataset/overseas-arrivals-and-departures/resource/cac19306-1af0-4d18-b0fa-3d2b22d45715">33.9 million overseas arrivals and departures</a> in Australia for the year 2014-15. </p>
<p>Of these, some 7 million were tourists. They <a href="http://www.tourism.australia.com/images/Statistics/TASI10375_International_Tourism_Snapshot_Mar_2016.pdf">contributed A$36.6 billion</a> to Australia’s economy. One estimate has put the <a href="http://www.atag.org/component/downloads/downloads/207.html">economic contribution of the aviation sector</a> at $32 billion, with another $44 billion in associated economic benefits such as tourism.</p>
<p>These figures give some idea of the aviation industry’s size and importance to Australia. Qantas provided this summary of its annual operations <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Rural_and_Regional_Affairs_and_Transport/Aviation_security/Submissions">to the committee</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Using 308 aircraft and approximately 33,000 permanent and part-time employees located across the globe, Qantas operates over 450,000 flights, carries in excess of 48 million passengers and 600,000 tonnes of freight annually.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124451/original/image-20160530-7673-1dt24rf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124451/original/image-20160530-7673-1dt24rf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=690&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124451/original/image-20160530-7673-1dt24rf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=690&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124451/original/image-20160530-7673-1dt24rf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=690&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124451/original/image-20160530-7673-1dt24rf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=867&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124451/original/image-20160530-7673-1dt24rf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=867&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124451/original/image-20160530-7673-1dt24rf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=867&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Auditor General/Author</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The current threat environment</h2>
<p>Australia’s current <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/National-Terrorism-Threat-Advisory-System.aspx">National Terrorism Threat Level</a> is probable. This means individuals or groups have developed both the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=197415cf-cefb-4cd6-bf1f-f91b5476f54e&subId=302778">a submission</a> to the Senate committee, ASIO indicated that civilian aviation will remain a high-value terrorist target for the foreseeable future. Terrorists have adapted to changes in security measures.</p>
<p>It is not just passengers that pose a threat. <a href="https://crimecommission.gov.au/node/137">The Australian Crime Commission</a> (ACC) has identified the aviation industry as a crime pathway and noted that criminals will infiltrate the sector to exploit vulnerabilities. This is the “trusted insider” threat, where an individual or group with the aviation industry can carry out or assist in facilitating a criminal or terrorist act. This threat has only increased with the rise of radicalisation within Australia.</p>
<p>The ACC advice is focused on profit-driven criminal activity. However, the same pathways can be used for terrorist activity. This is especially so given the acceptance of a <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/crime-gangs-breed-terror-says-accs-chris-dawson/news-story/f7d93f7148b79da451c6b2e553cb3bb5">clear linkage between crime gangs and terrorist groups</a>.</p>
<p>In 2015, the federal government announced a <a href="http://australianaviation.com.au/2015/10/government-to-develop-new-security-training-program-for-regional-airports/">regional aviation security awareness</a> training package for regional airports.</p>
<h2>Securing Australia’s airports</h2>
<p>Securing Australia’s aviation industry has two distinct yet mutually related aspects. The first is securing land-based infrastructure – that is, airports. The second involves security of the air transport itself. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/aviation">Australian Federal Police</a> (AFP) prevents and responds to crime at nine of Australia’s major airports (Hobart being the exception) by providing officers to perform a range of functions including community policing, counter-terrorism, investigations and intelligence.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.border.gov.au/australian-border-force-abf/protecting/airports-and-seaports">Australian Border Force</a> (ABF) has officers stationed at eight major airports. It assists other agencies to achieve effective border management by focusing on targets in counter-terrorism and organised crime. In 2014, the ABF created dedicated counter-terrorism teams that were placed at the eight airports it services.</p>
<p>In its submission to the committee, the AFP identified seven incidents in 2014 that involved suspicious packages or breaches of secure areas. </p>
<p>In 2014, the Commonwealth <a href="https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net616/f/AuditReport_2013-2014_23.pdf">auditor-general</a> tabled a report on policing at Australian international airports. It noted:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>On average, in each year over the last three financial years, the AFP has dealt with 21,146 incidents and made 2,621 apprehensions and 312 arrests across the ten airports. The number of arrests has increased by 42.6% over the three-year period from July 2010 to June 2013. The offences ranged from offensive and disorderly behaviour to matters relating to aviation and aircraft security. </p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124460/original/image-20160530-7695-ystgm2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124460/original/image-20160530-7695-ystgm2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124460/original/image-20160530-7695-ystgm2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124460/original/image-20160530-7695-ystgm2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124460/original/image-20160530-7695-ystgm2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124460/original/image-20160530-7695-ystgm2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124460/original/image-20160530-7695-ystgm2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Auditor General/Author</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As part of the response to a range of dynamic criminal and security threats, joint airport investigation teams and joint airport intelligence groups operate at various designated airports. They are made up of staff from various government departments for a more co-ordinated response.</p>
<h2>The cost of security</h2>
<p>The AFP has previously indicated that, in 2012-13, the provision of aviation security cost it $155 million.</p>
<p>In 2013-14, Qantas spent approximately $260 million on security. It invested in training, equipment, research and technology as key aspects of its security response.</p>
<p>In a survey of its members, the Australian Airports Association <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=34e50f4c-e370-4425-b5c1-b8c53dbd16e5&subId=303020">identified</a> that 20 airports – five capital city airports, four major airports, ten regional airports and two small regional airports – over five years had spent approximately $166 million on security.</p>
<h2>Future challenges</h2>
<p>Australia has been cognisant of the challenges aviation security poses. </p>
<p>In 2005, an <a href="http://www.allthings.com.au/Catalogue/cctv%20security%20surveillance%20ip%20network%20dome%20camera%20articles/SecurityPolicingReview.pdf">independent review</a> of airport security and policing made recommendations for improved security. These included the creation of joint intelligence networks between agencies, and a culture of proactive and ongoing threat and risk assessment for the aviation industry.</p>
<p>In 2009, <a href="https://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Documents/FederalAuditofPoliceCapabilities/Federal%20Audit%20of%20Police%20Capabilities.pdf">another review</a> recommended a new model of policing for Australia’s major airports. The AFP took over control of airports from state police services.</p>
<p>It is testament to the resilience of our security system that Australia has not suffered a successful terrorist attack on its aviation industry, but constant review is needed to ensure that our responses keep pace with the changing threat environment.</p>
<p>That the Senate committee did not get to complete its work is an opportunity lost. The new parliament needs to complete this inquiry to ensure the aviation industry’s security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60044/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Terry Goldsworthy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>That Australia has not suffered a successful terrorist attack on its aviation industry is testament to the resilience of our security system.Terry Goldsworthy, Assistant Professor in Criminology, Bond UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/578532016-04-15T15:39:29Z2016-04-15T15:39:29ZTelling people apart: new test reveals wide variation in how well we recognise faces<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118928/original/image-20160415-11155-uustgq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Face blind or super-recogniser?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gunter Loffler</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s three o’clock and you are picking up your son from school. The bell rings. A class of six-year-olds charges out of the building. And you have absolutely no idea which child is your son. They all look exactly the same. </p>
<p>This is not a scene from a low-budget horror movie, but how it feels to have <a href="http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/prosopagnosia/Pages/Introduction.aspx">face blindness</a>. It is actually remarkable that most of us are so good at discriminating between faces, since they are all approximately the same – two eyes above a nose above a mouth. Our visual system has had to become highly sensitive to very subtle differences between them. It’s not foolproof, which is why we often see faces in inanimate objects. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118776/original/image-20160414-2614-1ifb50a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118776/original/image-20160414-2614-1ifb50a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118776/original/image-20160414-2614-1ifb50a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118776/original/image-20160414-2614-1ifb50a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118776/original/image-20160414-2614-1ifb50a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118776/original/image-20160414-2614-1ifb50a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118776/original/image-20160414-2614-1ifb50a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118776/original/image-20160414-2614-1ifb50a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Just another pepper?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/blakespot/9234512598/in/photolist-f52hSs-3UVrAQ-cCts85-m1NfMs-aK5NU-8QFSiU-8QCLjR-hereTa-4WTKBh-riWetH-4WPp58-8QFN9q-8WtAk3-dpodsB-dNZ8yB-2EKKV9-daoQY3-o7qbF4-akE7zb-fddzUt-oNrap5-ditkH2-3EymNn-8QCL54-pm6tf9-aCReoA-8Pqijw-domNA1-8QCHAX-afrwGG-ayNRvF-8QFRwq-d5ZfMN-aA1YTS-aATYA8-gbDrp6-eZAL2F-92nY8n-bqEZVx-oQt1oT-2GCX7x-aXNNV6-pRmBoU-7c4e4u-pTsbJP-pSY1LP-7fzVDB-pTAjMy-5xufaN-dpHoJL">Blake Patterson</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Face blindness, also known as prosopagnosia, affects <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ajmg.a.31343/full">as many as</a> one in 50 people – upwards of one million in the UK alone. Some are born with the condition, while others develop it after a stroke or serious head injury. Either way, sufferers can have otherwise normal vision. </p>
<p>Since faces and their expressions allow us to read someone’s emotions and judge their state of mind, face-blind people are at <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022399908001578">high risk</a> of social embarrassment, isolation, anxiety and depression. They have to develop strategies to cope, such as recognising people by their hair, height, clothes, posture, gait or voice. And still they can be vulnerable – if a friend gets a new hairstyle, for example, they can become unrecognisable. </p>
<p>Though the condition is not curable, it can be very reassuring to be diagnosed and have the nature of the condition explained. Once the person has told those around them, it often makes them less anxious about being labelled arrogant or rude. It means healthcare workers can show patients new strategies to compensate, such as trying to deal with individuals rather than groups of people, and interacting with the same person each time where possible – sticking to the same GP, for instance. </p>
<p><a href="http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/03/29/brain.awu062.full">Some reports also suggest</a> that intensive training may help improve their facial recognition, though this has not been widely available to date. Then there are legal implications, since someone with face blindness will not be much help at an identity parade. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118931/original/image-20160415-26305-o2ukqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118931/original/image-20160415-26305-o2ukqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118931/original/image-20160415-26305-o2ukqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118931/original/image-20160415-26305-o2ukqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118931/original/image-20160415-26305-o2ukqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118931/original/image-20160415-26305-o2ukqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118931/original/image-20160415-26305-o2ukqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118931/original/image-20160415-26305-o2ukqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘It was …erm’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-259572743/stock-vector-line-up-police.html?src=csl_recent_image-1">Arkela</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A testing problem</h2>
<p>It’s actually not easy to test face perception well. Some tests use photographs, but the viewer can get clues from things like clothing or facial expressions. Other tests rely on memorising faces, but again that could be a result of memory rather than face blindness. These tests tend to be much better at dividing the world into people with good and bad face recognition than grading the wide spectrum that likely exists. They also take between ten and 15 minutes, which is not ideal for health professionals. </p>
<p>We <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0042698915003624">recently developed</a> a new test that avoids these shortfalls. It uses simplified face images that <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0042698902003620">have been synthesised</a> from ordinary photographs. Unlike photographs, however, they can be very precisely modified to make the faces more or less different from one another. It takes only four minutes from start to finish. </p>
<p>Participants are tested on their ability to tell the odd one out among four faces on a computer screen, cycling through 30 different sets over the duration.
The computer monitors show how well the participant is scoring on each set of faces and adapts the difficulty level using an algorithm. Those scoring well get increasingly more similar faces, while strugglers get less similar faces until the test converges on precisely how sensitive someone is. </p>
<p>If you look at the two sets of faces below, for instance, the left set is much easier to differentiate. About 95% of typical adults would be able to spot that the face on the bottom is the odd one out. In the set on the right, only about 25% of typical adults are able to choose the left-hand face correctly. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118799/original/image-20160414-2617-l0ovbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118799/original/image-20160414-2617-l0ovbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118799/original/image-20160414-2617-l0ovbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=304&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118799/original/image-20160414-2617-l0ovbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=304&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118799/original/image-20160414-2617-l0ovbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=304&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118799/original/image-20160414-2617-l0ovbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118799/original/image-20160414-2617-l0ovbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118799/original/image-20160414-2617-l0ovbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Can you spot the odd one out from each group?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gunter Loffler</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What we found</h2>
<p>We tested 52 young adults with no known face-perception difficulties or eyesight or neurological problems. Some turned out to be highly sensitive to small face differences, while others much less so. This confirms that face perception can vary substantially between individuals who are not face-blind. </p>
<p>We then tested a female patient who did have lifelong difficulties with face recognition. When she took some of the established face tests, her score was statistically just outside normal. But the Caledonian face test scored her several times poorer than the norm – even the poorest person in our main group was approximately twice as good at telling faces apart. </p>
<p>In short, our test potentially offers two kinds of benefits. First, it offers a much more sensitive way of detecting face blindness than the current alternatives. Not only could this help healthcare workers decide what level of intervention is necessary, it can be a tool for the intensive training we mentioned earlier: because the test faces are constantly altered by the algorithm, participants can use the test a number of times without becoming familiar with them. </p>
<p>Being able to differentiate between the face-recognition abilities of “normal” people is useful as well. It may help identify people who are particularly good with faces. The police are beginning to use these so-called “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-34544199">super-recognisers</a>” to review CCTV footage to connect different crimes, while they could also be helpful at border control, for example. Differentiating abilities could also lend more or less weight to different identification witnesses in court cases, of course. </p>
<p>The test is also quick to administer and suitable for use by optometrists, GPs, psychologists and neurologists. It is ready to be used with adults up to the age of 50, while we’re currently doing more work into face recognition in older people. We are optimistic that a major step forward in this field could now be within reach.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57853/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As many as one in 50 people are face blind, meaning they can’t tell one face from another.Gunter Loffler, Professor of Optometry, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityAndrew J Logan, Lecturer in Optometry, University of BradfordGael Gordon, Senior Lecturer, Vision Sciences, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/567362016-03-23T06:16:40Z2016-03-23T06:16:40ZBrussels airport attacks are not just a matter of airport security<p>The deadly <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/brussels-attacks">terror attack in Brussels</a> has again raised the issue of safety and security at airports. But expanding the “security bubble” around airports might not be the best response.</p>
<p>Europe barely had the time to recover from the horror of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/paris-attacks-2015">Paris attacks last November</a> before another of its capital cities was hit at its heart, presumably by ISIS terrorists.</p>
<p>In a devastated Brussels, investigations are running at full speed and authorities are already flooded with questions about the vulnerability of their critical infrastructure.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, this refrain seems to resurface every time a terrorist attack achieves its goals.</p>
<p>Traditionally, governments respond to these events by setting higher security standards. In this sense, modern airports epitomise the significant improvements that have been achieved in security over the past decades, especially after the September 11 attacks in the US in 2001. </p>
<h2>Screening</h2>
<p>Security screening has proved to be an effective deterrent against acts of terror such as hijacking and bombing. Following a procedure that is typical of security risk management, the security bubble around the vulnerable element – in this case, the airplane – has been progressively expanded in order to keep malicious individuals out.</p>
<p>The sterile area in a modern airport is among the most secure places on Earth. However, the terminal buildings can still be threatened, such as when the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6257194.stm">Glasgow airport was hit</a> by a vehicle ramming attack in 2007. </p>
<p>In the aftermath, more stringent regulations were put into place to prevent vehicles from getting too close to the terminal buildings. Thus the security bubble was further expanded.</p>
<p>Even so, in 2011 <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12268662">two suicide bombers managed to kill</a> more than 30 people at Moscow’s Domodedovo airport by walking into the baggage claim area and activating their Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). This was an act strikingly similar to what just happened in Brussels.</p>
<h2>Increase security?</h2>
<p>What should be our response to the latest attack? In the next few days we will probably hear more requests for strengthened airport security. Some might argue for a further expansion of the security bubble in order to cover the check-in area or entrance of the terminal buildings. </p>
<p>Would that be an effective solution? I don’t think so, for three main reasons.</p>
<p>First, the costs associated with the implementation of such a security system would largely outweigh the benefits; the bigger the area, the more expensive its protection. </p>
<p>Second, the associated operational disruptions would require some time (and a lot of patience) to be contained. When the perceived threats are low, people tend to consider security measures as an annoyance rather than a safeguard. Most of time, security awareness is not an ingrained mindset.</p>
<p>Third, and most important, the effectiveness of this new security system would still be questionable. Expanding the bubble would just move its boundaries outwards, with no guarantee that a new attack won’t happen on its edge. </p>
<p>For example, if security were increased before reaching the check-in at the airport, that might cause crowds to gather outside the main doors, and this would present a new target for terrorist attack.</p>
<p>So expanding the bubble would be just another symmetric response to an issue that has proven highly asymmetric.</p>
<p>This last point, in particular, emphasises that the Brussels’ airport attacks are not just a matter of airport security. They involve the need to reconsider our perception of modern security risks.</p>
<h2>Where people gather</h2>
<p>Airport security works very well these days. The problem is that, especially in some countries, any gathering involving more or less large crowds is a vulnerable target for terrorist attack.</p>
<p>Sport events, public transport, concerts, and even the queue in front of a museum, constitute a potential target for malicious individuals.</p>
<p>This requires governments to adopt a different approach to security. Security management needs to be performed at an asymmetric level, penetrating our societies and engaging terrorists at the individual level. </p>
<p>Random security checkpoints, enhanced intelligence networks and additional investments in street-level security technologies are some examples of asymmetric countermeasures that should be strengthened.</p>
<p>Technology, in particular, seems to be a powerful ally in our fight against terrorism. Especially when technological development is associated with the reduction of security costs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/56736/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ivano Bongiovanni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The deadly terror attack in Brussels raises the issue of safety and security at airports. But this is more about our approach to risk in any areas where people are known to gather.Ivano Bongiovanni, PhD Candidate in Airport Safety and Security; Sessional Academic in Strategic Management, Queensland University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/505952015-11-19T03:22:20Z2015-11-19T03:22:20ZSinai crash offers lessons on weaknesses in Australian airport security<p>Russian investigators say they are now certain the crash of a passenger plane which killed 224 people in Egypt’s Sinai desert last month, was the result of a bomb.</p>
<p>While preliminary, the finding indicates the global airport security regime is going to face a new, disturbing scenario. Are Australian airports ready for this challenge?</p>
<h2>Attack through the backdoor</h2>
<p>Draconian airport security measures have been in place throughout the world ever since the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Yet, as often happens in crisis management, the measures were mainly reactive and took the form of harsher security restrictions. This was suitable for the threat represented by terrorists that, like Al-Qaeda, executed their actions in a scenario where frontal attacks were still possible.</p>
<p>But as head-on attacks become a less viable option for terrorists, they seek different ways to circumvent security measures. In most airports, trying to directly access the aircrafts through the landside area (that is, terminal and general public zones) has become almost impossible. </p>
<p>Instead, a more practical option would be to elude the security checkpoints in the airside area (such as ramp, parking bays, hangars, perimeter), where there may be higher vulnerability. Due to its extension, the airside area is more difficult to patrol. Modern airports are getting bigger and host an increasing number of aviation-related activities. </p>
<p>In this mix of frantic operations, it is not hard to imagine how malicious individuals may take advantage of a gate left open or a weakness in the external perimeter. </p>
<h2>What about Australian airports?</h2>
<p>My upcoming research (forthcoming publication) was conducted in three international airports in Australia. I interviewed 30 managers and officers involved in safety and security operations and assessed four potential components of organisational vulnerability in the airside area of airports.</p>
<p>First, operationally, the airside is almost a separate world, with its plethora of operators and ground handlers belonging to different organisations, frequently in competition. Security checks exist on paper, but their implementation on occasion may clash with a certain climate of complacency, as witnessed during the interviews:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What we’ve got here is you’ve got a culture in Australia, but – you know what? It’ll never happen here… Until we look at Sydney <em>[Lindt siege]</em>, and even then it’s like, “Oh, we weren’t really tested,” so we got a real sort of lackadaisical.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Here, motivation of the security screeners is crucial and the airside security checkpoints, due to the isolated position and the low number of accesses, are often a boring business. Monotonous tasks and duties may push operators to lower their attention threshold: ID cards may not be checked, items screened or staff access points monitored.</p>
<p>Second, tactically, surveillance may not be adequate. Airport management is between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, they must ensure efficiency and effectiveness, by avoiding impeding the hectic ground operators contracted by the airlines. On the other hand, they must guarantee safety and security, by applying the regulations. This dilemma may suggest airport management turn a blind eye on certain safety and security violations. </p>
<p>Third, strategically, some business models implemented in Australian airports may jeopardise the integrity of the aerodromes. The low cost philosophy imposes constant fine-tuning and reduces redundancy in safety and security systems. Several safety and security managers indicated that the number of passenger marshals staffed by certain airlines is not adequate, with one respondent commenting:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Again, it comes back to this low-cost mentality of cutting staff. They have woefully inadequate staff out there. There is very limited control over passenger movement. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Furthermore, economic pressure exerted on contractors and tougher turnaround times contribute in creating a more challenging organisational climate. </p>
<p>Airlines ride the wave of the competition among contractors and further employ sub-contractors, making supervision by airport management a more difficult task. Controls are watered down through the organisational layers.</p>
<p>Fourth, politically, international legislation needs to be harmonised. At the moment, a clear-cut global list of items prohibited on board aircrafts does not exist. </p>
<p>The 9/11 momentum produced a series of guidelines upon which the different countries have built their national legislation. But there is no legally binding international regulation covering airport security. </p>
<p>The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has always had a limited role, leaving the specific legislation to the different countries. Each country has therefore adopted their own regime, which also depends on their perceived threat level. </p>
<p>Airlines travelling to Australia impose different lists of prohibited items. Airport security legislation allows interpretation, which impacts on the performance of the security screeners.</p>
<h2>Legislative and management weaknesses</h2>
<p>Legislative and managerial weaknesses exist in Australian airports. There have been a number of significant aviation security events since 9/11, such as failed shoe bomb attempt in the 2001 on American Airlines Flight 63, the foiled 2006 plot to blow up several Transatlantic flights in 2006, and the 2009 case of the underwear bomber on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, whose explosives failed to go off. </p>
<p>These cases saw measures adopted such as Explosive Trace Detection tests (ETDs), Liquids, Aerosols and Gels restrictions (LAGs), and the implementation of full body scanners.</p>
<p>But these reactive measures have focused on protecting the landside. While Australia’s track record in aviation security is almost immaculate, much remains to be done. </p>
<p>An important vulnerability remains airport security regulations for general aviation, which are much more tolerant than regular public transport. This is particularly an issue when general aviation and regular public transport share the same infrastructures.</p>
<h2>Lessons for the future</h2>
<p>Globally, the current airport security regime is not enough to face terrorist groups that are more asymmetric than ever. Australia’s isolation may be a powerful shield against aviation threats. Yet, some of the organisational conditions, managerial practices and business models embraced in our airports may be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. </p>
<p>By leveraging economic or ideological pressure, modern terrorists may be able to access international aerodromes, by buying the silence and the complacency of insiders.</p>
<p>This scenario requires a joint international response, aimed at harmonising the international legislation, enhancing supervision on airline operations, imposing stringent criteria in the recruitment of contractors, performing random security checks on staff members, enforcing a joint safety and security climate and stressing results over bureaucratic compliance.</p>
<p>The Sinai air crash has resounded a clear warning bell. The current regime of airport security may not be adequate anymore in protecting us from enemies who may decide to use the backdoor to jeopardise global civil aviation.</p>
<p><em>This piece has been altered since publication. An example has been removed as it did not form part of the author’s research.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ivano Bongiovanni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Legislative and managerial weaknesses that exist in Australian airports mean we should not be complacent.Ivano Bongiovanni, PhD Candidate in Airport Safety and Security; Sessional Academic in Strategic Management, Queensland University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.