tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/andrzej-duda-19296/articlesAndrzej Duda – The Conversation2023-02-14T20:18:17Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1999172023-02-14T20:18:17Z2023-02-14T20:18:17ZIsrael enters a dangerous period – public protests swell over Netanyahu’s plan to limit the power of the Israeli Supreme Court<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510154/original/file-20230214-14-bez1nv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=26%2C8%2C5773%2C3851&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Opposition deputies protest as the first stage of controversial judicial reform is approved by the Knesset Law Committee on Feb. 13, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/opposition-deputies-protest-inside-the-knesset-during-a-news-photo/1247106087?phrase=knesset&adppopup=true">Photo by Israeli Parliament (Knesset) / Handout/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Proposals by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing government to <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-02-12/ty-article-timeline/israels-democratic-emergency-what-you-need-to-know-ahead-of-a-crucial-week/00000186-4520-d80f-abff-6fa8e8570000">radically diminish the power and independence of Israel’s judiciary</a> sparked demonstrations across the country starting in January 2023. An estimated <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/masses-rally-across-country-against-judicial-overhaul-organizers-claim-over-200000/">200,000 Israelis took part in protests on Feb. 11</a> and another <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-02-13/ty-article-live/as-nationwide-strike-launches-across-israel-protesters-block-airport/00000186-495d-d80f-abff-6bdd90c30000">100,000 in front of the Parliament on Feb. 13</a>, the same day <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/13/israel-netanyahu-protests-judicial-reform/">a general strike took place to denounce the changes</a>. A <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-02-12/ty-article/.premium/18-former-israeli-supreme-court-justices-publish-statement-opposing-judicial-overhaul/00000186-424a-d80f-abff-6aca7f750000">statement signed by 18 former Supreme Court justices</a> asserted that Israeli democracy is at stake in the judicial reform being considered by lawmakers, which “severely threatens the essence of our system of government and our way of life in Israel.”</em> </p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked <a href="https://www.international.ucla.edu/israel/person/2520">political scientist and Israel expert Dov Waxman</a>, the director of the UCLA Y&S Nazarian Center for Israel Studies, for his insights into the current crisis.</em></p>
<h2>What’s your broad view of the situation in Israel?</h2>
<p>What’s remarkable about these protests is not only the size of them, but the fact that they’ve been able to maintain this size over many weeks and that they’re occurring across the country. </p>
<p>I don’t think there’s been any comparable protest movement in Israel’s history in terms of the size and the various social and economic groups that make up this protest. High-tech workers are not normally a segment of the population that are very politically engaged, and <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-01-24/ty-article/.premium/israeli-high-tech-employees-protest-netanyahu-govts-judicial-overhaul/00000185-e2ec-d093-ada5-ebff5a330000">they’ve been very active in these demonstrations</a>. <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-01-12/ty-article/.premium/hundreds-of-lawyers-ex-judges-protest-judicial-overhaul-across-israel/00000185-a5c2-d68c-a7c5-bdd204020000">Jurists have</a> demonstrated, but also Israeli security figures, including <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/masses-rally-across-country-against-judicial-overhaul-organizers-claim-over-200000/">a former chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces</a>.</p>
<p>These protests are driven by concerns over this judicial overhaul, but I think they speak to a broader anxiety, a fear among many Israelis about <a href="https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/pdfs/101-200/meb150.pdf">the future of democracy in Israel and the future of the country</a>. They fear this will essentially lead to Israel’s shift from being what they perceive to be a liberal democracy <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-02-06/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/a-chilling-lesson-for-israel-from-hungary-poland-and-turkey-democracy-dies-slowly/00000186-21ef-df0e-a9df-3fef24280000">to becoming an illiberal democracy that looks more like Hungary, Poland or Turkey</a> than the United States.</p>
<h2>You barely see Palestinians in these protests. It must be <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/deaths-in-jenin-and-east-jerusalem-draw-new-attention-to-netanyahu">quite an experience for them</a>, hearing Israel described so passionately as a democracy when they don’t have democratic rights.</h2>
<p>There’s been a debate within the protest movement and among its leaders over whether they should address issues beyond the judicial reforms, whether the protests should be linked to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. And the focus was very deliberately to exclude these other issues. If they’d have brought in the Palestinian issue, it would have driven away or deterred many Israelis and shrunk the protest movement.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A protester raises a 'Scales of Justice' symbol while other protesters hold a banner and placards during a demonstration" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A protester raises a ‘Scales of Justice’ symbol during a demonstration on Feb. 11, 2023, in Tel Aviv, where 130,000 people march against Israel’s right-wing government and its controversial legal reform.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protester-raises-a-scales-of-justice-symbol-while-other-news-photo/1247124896?phrase=Netanyahu&adppopup=true">Matan Golan/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>But of course, it is a blind spot. I can certainly understand why many Palestinians would be feeling that all of this sudden anxiety and concern for Israeli democracy ignores the fact that almost 50% of the population that Israel effectively rules over lacks equal rights <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/west-bank/freedom-world/2022">and lacks the ability to vote in Israeli elections</a>.</p>
<p>I think the fact that most Israelis don’t seem to connect these two issues suggests that they only see democracy as this internal domestic issue without any relevance to the Palestinian question. But the government’s desire to weaken the Supreme Court has to be understood against the context in which <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/12/29/1145952664/benjamin-netanyahus-new-israeli-government-will-make-west-bank-expansion-a-prior">significant elements of the government want to formally annex the West Bank</a>, <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/in-facts-and-figures/">where 2.9 million Palestinians live</a>. The Supreme Court would likely either overrule that decision or say that Palestinians living in the area have to be given equal rights. The reforms Netanyahu’s coalition wants <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/14/israel-judiciary-overhaul-democracy/">would allow lawmakers to, effectively, overrule such Supreme Court decisions</a>.</p>
<h2>Israeli President Isaac Herzog says the state is on the brink of a ‘<a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/02/12/israeli-president-powder-keg-about-to-explode-over-judicial-overhaul-plan">constitutional and social collapse</a>.’ Is he overstating it?</h2>
<p>I initially thought that warnings of impending civil war or civil strife were exaggerated and unnecessarily alarmist. But given how quickly events are moving in Israel, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/13/world/middleeast/israel-judicial-protests-netanyahu.html">the scale of these demonstrations, the massive public strike that took place Monday</a> and the rhetoric that’s coming from both sides, I think now those warnings are well founded. Israel is really entering a very dangerous period. </p>
<p>At least half of the Israeli public see this as a life-or-death issue for Israeli democracy, an existential issue. <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-730852">When the stakes are so high, the possibility for violence increases</a>, whether it’s among the protesters or counterprotesters.</p>
<h2>What could adoption of these proposals mean to Israel’s relationships with other countries?</h2>
<p>I don’t think it’s likely to greatly affect Israel’s relations with other states because it’s national interests, not democratic values, that fundamentally underpin these relationships.</p>
<p>I do, however, think it is affecting Israel’s relationship with Jews around the world, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/169-liberal-us-jewish-leaders-sign-letter-expressing-concern-over-israeli-government/">and potentially America’s unquestioning support for Israel</a>. If the perception takes hold that Israel is no longer a democracy or not a liberal democracy, that could further weaken support for Israel in Congress and in the Democratic Party. It might even make it harder for them to continue to approve U.S. aid for Israel.</p>
<p>There’s always been a yawning gap between the public perception of Israel outside of the country, <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691168999/trouble-in-the-tribe">especially the view held by many Jewish Americans</a>, and the reality of Israel. The mythic image of Israel was incredibly powerful but never really accurate. Reality has gradually undermined this image. And this judicial overhaul threatens to further undermine the image of Israel as a fellow liberal democracy.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man marching in a protest wearing a military uniform raises his fist." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">An Israeli reserve soldier raises his fist as he marches during a demonstration on Feb. 13, 2023, in Jerusalem to protest proposed judicial reform.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-israeli-reserve-soldier-raises-his-fist-as-he-marches-news-photo/1247124493?phrase=israel%20protest&adppopup=true">Eyal Warshavsky/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)</a></span>
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<h2>Is there a case to be made for Israeli judicial reform?</h2>
<p>Since the 1990s, Israel’s high court has become very involved in Israeli politics, something it did not do in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. It has intervened, overridden and disqualified many government decisions and laws. So the perception, particularly by those on the right, that this is an activist court, that it has been too active, is reasonable.</p>
<p>I don’t think it’s as liberal as its critics present it to be. The court has not intervened very much when it comes to protecting the rights of, say, Palestinians in the West Bank. So this perception among the right that the court has really restrained Israeli governments isn’t actually accurate. </p>
<p>I think many people would accept that there could be an argument for some kind of judicial reform, at least passing a law to clarify the role and powers of the Supreme Court. But what’s being presented in this reform is actually a revolutionary attempt to essentially take away the independence and power of the Supreme Court. This goes well beyond improving the present system. </p>
<p>Almost identical measures have been implemented in other countries by authoritarian, populist leaders – by <a href="https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2021/11/30/democratic-backsliding-in-poland-and-eastern-europe/">Orban in Hungary, Duda in Poland and Erdogan in Turkey</a>. You don’t need a wild imagination to see what’s driving this or where this is going – Israel will become an illiberal, or majoritarian, democracy, like Hungary, Poland and Turkey.</p>
<p>I think people have genuinely been taken aback by the speed with which the government’s pushing these huge changes through the Knesset, or Parliament. One interpretation is that they’ve done this so quickly knowing that they will eventually have to make a compromise – basically a shock-and-awe campaign.</p>
<p>But the other way of looking at this speed is that, no, they’re not interested in compromising. That’s why they’ve done this so quickly, and they’re going to push this through. We will likely know soon which one it is. It’s kind of like a game of chicken. I think they will in the end come up with some sort of compromise.</p>
<h2>Does that compromise make anyone happy?</h2>
<p>No, but that’s the nature of compromise.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199917/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dov Waxman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Huge pro-democracy demonstrations in Israel have taken place for almost two months in protest of new rules for the Supreme Court that Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing government is rushing into law.Dov Waxman, Rosalinde and Arthur Gilbert Foundation Professor of Israel Studies, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1979652023-01-18T15:43:24Z2023-01-18T15:43:24ZUkraine war: why Poland is piling pressure on allies to increase military support for Kyiv<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505110/original/file-20230118-13-kokk6q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Poland's president Andrzej Duda.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Alamy</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Polish president Andrzej Duda has been <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/davos-world-economic-forum-poland-lithuania-pressure-germany-tanks-ukraine-war-russia-andrzej-duda-gitanas-nauseda/">putting pressure on</a> Nato allies to support Ukraine with more tanks at the World Economic Forum in Davos.
This is the latest attempt by Duda to rally other countries, and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/davos2023/card/poland-s-duda-appeals-to-germany-to-support-leopard-tank-export-to-ukraine-oDp18n82PnQNMVo7XTcM">particularly Germany</a>, to support Ukraine with heavy armaments.</p>
<p>Duda had already announced that Poland intends to send a company of 14 German-made Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, but needed permission from Germany to re-export them. German vice-chancellor Robert Habeck confirmed he would support such a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-leopard-tank-ukraine-war-germany-vice-chancellor-robert-habeck/">request</a>. Britain has also agreed to provide 14 Challenger II tanks.</p>
<p>This is a decisive shift in policy, because up to this point Nato countries had refused to provide armoured vehicles or tanks. Ukrainian authorities have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/092b8894-4441-4747-bfd4-5b21a0c68709">stated</a> they need 300 western battle tanks to enable them to free the occupied territory.</p>
<p>Ever since Russia began to mass troops near the Ukrainian border in preparation for the invasion, Poland as a frontline state has played a pivotal <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/11/poland-democracy-illiberalism-europe-ukraine-russia-war-eu-nato/">role</a>. Due to its geographical position, bordering both Ukraine and Belarus, Poland has become a major route for western supplies to Ukraine as well as a safe haven for Ukrainian refugees. </p>
<p>Poland and Ukraine have interlinked histories. Both emerged as Slavic successor states from parts of the Russian empire and parts of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The countries had a turbulent <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25778367">history</a>, with ethnic, political and cultural differences and territorial issues giving rise to armed conflict in <a href="https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/polish-ukrainian_conflict_over_eastern_galicia">1918-19</a>.</p>
<p>The interwar period saw the integration of Ukraine in the Soviet Union, while Poland became an independent state. The territorial boundaries between them have shifted over time, and some parts of western Ukraine have traditionally been part of Poland. <a href="https://euromaidanpress.com/2021/10/10/more-than-one-ukrainian-in-four-speaks-polish-new-survey-finds/">Polish</a> is still <a href="http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CP%5CO%5CPolishlanguageinUkraine.htm">widely understood in Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>Since the end of the Soviet period, Poland has been a strong supporter of Ukrainian independence and democracy. Polish national security strategy includes support for Ukraine’s further involvement in European security arrangements (and its membership of Nato). This is important for Poland to counterbalance the influence of the Russian Federation.</p>
<h2>Poland’s risks</h2>
<p>Poland is a Nato state in an exposed position within the Ukraine war, which partly explains why it is so proactive in providing military support for Ukraine, and is pushing other allies to do more. On November 15 2022, after a large number of Russian missile attacks on Ukraine and its energy infrastructure, a missile hit an area in the south-east of Poland, killing two men. It was most likely caused by a stray Ukrainian air defence missile, but the event illustrated the potential risks Poland is <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-polish-missile-scare-has-given-nato-fresh-resolve-to-continue-its-support-for-kyiv-194761">facing</a>.</p>
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<img alt="Map of Ukraine and its neighbours." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505109/original/file-20230118-9531-6eubyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>In response to this incident, the German government offered to supply Patriot air defence systems to Poland, but the Polish defence minister Mariusz Blaszczak suggested that these systems should be provided for Ukraine instead. The German government agreed to consult within the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/germany-poland-patriot-delivery-ukraine/32148907.html">alliance</a>.</p>
<p>Several hundred German soldiers will be stationed in Poland, accompanying the arrival of Patriot systems for Poland and Ukraine. Around 90-100 Ukrainian soldiers are expected to be trained by Germans based in Poland to operate one Patriot <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/poland-to-host-german-troops-receive-patriot-anti-aircraft-systems/">battery</a>. As Poland’s foreign minister Zbigniew Rau stated: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Every Pole is an expert on understanding what fighting for freedom, democracy and existential survival means. This is the case since, in our part of the world, the notion of independence means freedom from <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/poland-and-war-ukraine-conversation-zbigniew-rau-polands-minister-foreign-affairs">Russia</a>.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>From the Polish perspective, the best way to prevent escalation is to provide Ukraine with the means to defeat Russian aggression. Unlike the rather restrained language of the US administration, the Polish government is quite clear in stating: “Imperialism must be stopped and defeated. Otherwise, it will be a constant threat to the free <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/poland-and-war-ukraine-conversation-zbigniew-rau-polands-minister-foreign-affairs">world</a>.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-and-poland-why-the-countries-fell-out-in-the-past-and-are-now-closely-allied-184906">Ukraine and Poland: why the countries fell out in the past, and are now closely allied</a>
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<p>In January 2022, Poland announced that it would provide Ukraine with weapons, ammunition and humanitarian aid, and since then has provided US$3 billion (£2.4 billion) worth of aid (including US$1.8 billion of military <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/poland-and-war-ukraine-conversation-zbigniew-rau-polands-minister-foreign-affairs">assistance</a>). On February 17 2022, a Polish-British-Ukraine trilateral pact was announced to improve cybersecurity and collaborate on energy <a href="https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-60173211">security</a>.</p>
<h2>Poland’s supplies for Ukraine</h2>
<p>As the military conflict unfolded, Poland became the second-largest supplier of weapons – sending missiles, drones, tanks and other military <a href="https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/poland-plays-a-key-role-in-aiding-ukraine#:%7E:text=Poland%20remains%20one%20of%20the,estimated%20at%201.7%20billion%20USD.">supplies</a> to Ukraine, as well as being a key route for the supply of weapons from the US and other Nato countries. Poland was even prepared to send MiG-29 fighter planes, although this was not approved by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-polands-failed-deal-to-supply-mig-29s-shows-natos-fear-of-escalation-178860">US</a>. </p>
<p>However, Ukraine now needs more capable air defences due to the large-scale missile and drone attacks against infrastructure and civilians. </p>
<p>The US is gradually changing its policy, and has signalled that it will permit Ukrainian drone attacks inside Russian <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ukraine-drone-warfare-russia-732jsshpx">territory</a>. It also decided to provide Patriot systems to Ukraine, according to announcements in late December <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/patriot-ukraine-what-does-it-mean">2022</a>. The training period to operate these systems has been reduced to three months. </p>
<p>Military analyst at the Brookings Institution Michael O’Hanlon explained: “Going step by step has helped Ukraine patch up vulnerabilities, to be sure. But it hasn’t furthered the goal of formulating a strategy to end the war, or defining the capacity that will be ultimately <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/16/biden-ukraine-weapons-russia-tanks/">needed to do so</a>.” </p>
<p>A new phase of the conflict is beginning. For Poland, it is crucial that Ukraine defeats Russian aggression. Otherwise the security of Europe as a whole, and Poland in particular, would be at risk.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197965/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth received funding from the Nuclear History Program, a NATO Research Fellowship, the Volkswagen Stiftung and the Leverhulme Trust</span></em></p>Poland’s robust arguments for more weapons for Ukraine is partly sparked by its own vulnerable position.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/917742018-02-16T14:23:53Z2018-02-16T14:23:53ZPoland is trying to rewrite history with this controversial new holocaust law<p>Anyone suggesting that Poland was complicit in the Holocaust could face fines or even imprisonment of up to three years under a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/10/polands-jews-fear-future-under-new-holocaust-law-nazi-atrocities">controversial new law</a> approved by president Andrzej Duda. The law makes it illegal to accuse the Polish nation of having taken part in the atrocities and the systematic mass murder of the Jews committed by the Germans during World War II.</p>
<p>Initially, the law was designed to criminalise the use of the phrase “Polish death camp” for extermination camps such as Auschwitz Birkenau. With this, Polish politicians wanted to make clear that the it was the Germans who set up the extermination camps – on German-occupied Polish soil. But while that is true, the law has much broader implications.</p>
<p>Members of parliament warned that the draft bill that had been prepared two years ago needed to be clarified to avoid ambiguity. However, the government kept the language vague, leaving a law that could enable it to classify a broad range of content as a danger to the “dignity of the Polish nation”.</p>
<p>The governing populist party “<a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/poland-1452">Law and Justice</a>” (PiS) has, for some time, sought to enforce its own nationalist, “feel-good” version of the country’s past. At the core of this version lies a narrative of World War II in which the Poles are represented only as victims. In this version of history there is no room for ambivalence. There is no discussion of the moments when Poles partly assisted in German atrocities.</p>
<h2>Rewriting history</h2>
<p>Holocaust scholarship has come a long way in the face of great difficulties. It has always been closely interconnected with the recognition of the suffering of victims. Having started with systematic research on the perpetrators’ actions, plans and motivation, the perspective of the victims, their traumatic experiences and struggle for survival were slowly integrated into the narrative. Scholars increasingly included testimonies, memoirs and diaries to make the voices of the victims heard.</p>
<p>A milestone was reached when scholars felt able to move away from simplified categories of German perpetrators and Jewish victims. They shone light on the complicity of non-German citizens in German occupied territories. Scholars such as <a href="https://history.princeton.edu/people/jan-tomasz-gross">Jan Tomasz Gross</a> and <a href="https://uniweb.uottawa.ca/?lang=en#/members/546">Jan Grabowski</a> played a key role in studying Poland. With the help of testimonies from Holocaust survivors, Gross revealed in 2000 that Polish citizens took part in a 1941 massacre in the small town of <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/7018.html">Jedwabne</a>, helping German occupiers to murder their Jewish neighbours.</p>
<p>Historians analyse primary sources to try to understand events in the context of their creation. The integration of new material, in combination with new methodological approaches leads to the rethinking of previous interpretations, and the broadening of our perspective on the past. This is how academia pushes the boundaries of knowledge further.</p>
<p>The Polish law gives the government the right to restrict different interpretations of the past. It aims to rewrite that history according to nationalist political aspirations. It will question academic achievements in the field of Holocaust studies and represents a danger to academic freedom, openness and critical reflection.</p>
<p>The law is an insult to Holocaust survivors and the recognition of their suffering – which was, and still is, a painful process on the individual as well as on the collective level. It could allow powerful political institutions to anchor their narratives on the past and silence those who were not given a voice during the Holocaust. </p>
<p>Allowing politically motivated, whitewashed versions of history to take hold is the first step in legitimising Holocaust denial. Only by confronting the difficult and painful aspects of the past can we understand how to prevent events like the Holocaust happening in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Svenja Bethke is a Lecturer of Modern European History and a member of the Stanley Burton Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at the University of Leicester. She has previously reveiced funding from the Hans Böckler Foundation, Germany, the German Historical Institute in Warsaw and the Institute for Jewish Research (YIVO), New York.</span></em></p>Criminalising suggestions that Poland was complicit in German atrocities during World War II denies history and will hinder scholarship.Svenja Bethke, Lecturer in Modern European History, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/912832018-02-12T11:42:44Z2018-02-12T11:42:44ZNew ‘Holocaust law’ highlights crisis in Polish identity<p>On Jan. 26, the eve of International Holocaust Remembrance Day, the Polish parliament voted in favor of a bill <a href="http://time.com/5128341/poland-holocaust-law/">making it illegal</a> to accuse Poland of complicity in Nazi crimes. </p>
<p>This caused immediate outrage around the world and nowhere more so than in a country that has been, until now, a close ally of Poland: Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the bill as “<a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-polish-pm-talk-agree-to-iron-out-row-over-holocaust-legislation/?">distortion of the truth, the rewriting of history and the denial of the Holocaust.</a>” </p>
<p>And yet, 10 days later, Poland’s president, Andrzej Duda, signed the bill into <a href="http://ms.gov.pl/pl/informacje/news,10368,nowelizacja-ustawy-o-ipn--wersja-w-jezyku.html">law</a> <a href="http://www.president.pl/en/news/art,669,president-decides-to-sign-anti-defamation-bill.html">retorting that</a> “the historic truth is that there was no systematic institutionalized participation among Poles [in the Holocaust].”</p>
<p>What is happening? Why, over 70 years since the end of the Second World War, is this argument taking place? </p>
<p>I am a sociologist who has studied <a href="http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo3752795.html">controversies around the memory of the Holocaust in Poland.</a> For me, this dispute is more than a crisis in Polish-Jewish relations. It is, above all, a crisis in Poland’s national identity. </p>
<h2>The memory of World War II in Poland</h2>
<p>This is not the first time the Poles have legislated against what they see as defamation of Poland’s record in World War II, but it is certainly the most wide-reaching. Under this new law, the punishment for people claiming that “the Polish Nation or the Republic of Poland is responsible or co-responsible for Nazi crimes committed by the Third Reich” carries a <a href="https://ipn.gov.pl/en/about-the-ipn/documents/327,The-Act-on-the-Institute-of-National-Remembrance.html">possible prison sentence of up to three years.</a></p>
<p>The timing of the vote was no accident. The government used the occasion of International Holocaust Remembrance Day as a platform to denounce the misnomer “Polish death camps” that some - including <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2&v=Rd-v24pAg7s">former President Barack Obama</a> - have used to refer to Nazi concentration camps in occupied Poland. </p>
<p>The Polish government, along with other Polish organizations, has been fighting the use of that expression in foreign media for several years, and with considerable success. Most American newspapers and other major media outlets have <a href="https://www.imediaethics.org/ap-updates-its-stylebook-on-concentration-camps-polish-foundations-petition-for-change-has-300000k-names/">updated their stylebooks</a> to stop those words being used.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, given the growing controversy, the German minister of foreign affairs took it upon himself to <a href="https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/Newsroom/bm-holocaust-legislation-poland/1432942">declare</a> that the Germans bore the entire responsibility for the extermination camps. But then he added that “the actions of individual collaborators do not alter that fact.” </p>
<p>And therein lies the rub. </p>
<p>Many Poles find it difficult to accept they could have played a role in the Holocaust. That is because, unlike many other nations, the Polish state did not collaborate with the Nazis. Considered an inferior race by the Nazis, Poles were targeted for cultural extermination to facilitate <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10008219">German expansion to the East.</a> Polish elites were systematically murdered. Tens of thousands of Poles were imprisoned in concentration camps or were forced into slave labor.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205808/original/file-20180210-51703-jb6r5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205808/original/file-20180210-51703-jb6r5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205808/original/file-20180210-51703-jb6r5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205808/original/file-20180210-51703-jb6r5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205808/original/file-20180210-51703-jb6r5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205808/original/file-20180210-51703-jb6r5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205808/original/file-20180210-51703-jb6r5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Old Town burns during the Warsaw Uprising, August 1944.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Warsaw_1944.jpg">Museum of Warsaw</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/timothy-snyder/bloodlands/9780465002399/">Poland’s losses in World War II were enormous</a>: Approximately 6 million Polish citizens were killed in the war, over half of whom were Jewish. Warsaw was left in ruins, and its 1944 uprising alone cost the lives of about 150,000 citizens.</p>
<p>The dominant Polish narrative of World War II is, therefore, about victimhood, which fits squarely into its broader national mythology of martyrdom. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205809/original/file-20180210-51706-1zv14k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205809/original/file-20180210-51706-1zv14k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=733&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205809/original/file-20180210-51706-1zv14k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=733&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205809/original/file-20180210-51706-1zv14k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=733&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205809/original/file-20180210-51706-1zv14k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=921&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205809/original/file-20180210-51706-1zv14k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=921&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205809/original/file-20180210-51706-1zv14k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=921&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855)</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Adam_Mickiewicz_wed%C5%82ug_dagerotypu_paryskiego_z_1842_roku.jpg">Unknown</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Repeatedly invaded by its powerful neighbors, the Polish state disappeared from the European map for over a century – from 1795 to 1918. Poland’s national bard, the 19th century poet <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Adam-Mickiewicz-Polish-poet">Adam Mickiewicz</a>, described his country as a “Christ among nations.” In this telling Poles are a chosen people, innocent sufferers at the hands of evil oppressors. </p>
<p>“Revelations” of crimes committed against Jews by Poles tarnish this narrative and shake Polish national identity to its core. </p>
<h2>Narrative shock</h2>
<p>The fact is, however, as <a href="http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=807010">historians have shown,</a> crimes committed against Jews by Poles were much more prevalent and widespread than most people realized. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most controversial and impactful research is that of the Polish-born Princeton University professor, <a href="https://history.princeton.edu/people/jan-tomasz-gross">Jan T. Gross.</a> </p>
<p>In his 2000 book <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/7018.html">“Neighbors,”</a> Gross recounts in painful detail the violent murders of Jews by their ethnically Polish neighbors in the small town of Jedwabne on July 10, 1941. </p>
<p>The book marked a watershed in the public debate about Polish-Jewish relations. </p>
<p>On July 10, 2001, roughly a year after the publication of Gross’ book, the Polish government acknowledged the murders and erected a monument at the site where several hundred Jews were forcibly brought to a barn and burned alive. Although the <a href="http://www.polin.pl/en/news/2016/07/09/jedwabne-timeline-of-remebrance">monument’s inscription</a> fails to explicitly indicate that it was ethnic Poles and not Germans who committed the crime, the <a href="http://www.radzilow.com/jedwabne-ceremony.htm">official apology by then-President Aleksander Kwaśniewski</a> was unequivocal. “Here in Jedwabne,” he said, “citizens of the Republic of Poland died at the hands of other citizens of the Republic of Poland.” </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205810/original/file-20180210-51731-r4a5rq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205810/original/file-20180210-51731-r4a5rq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205810/original/file-20180210-51731-r4a5rq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205810/original/file-20180210-51731-r4a5rq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205810/original/file-20180210-51731-r4a5rq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205810/original/file-20180210-51731-r4a5rq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205810/original/file-20180210-51731-r4a5rq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205810/original/file-20180210-51731-r4a5rq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Jedwabne memorial.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Genevieve Zubrzycki</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Such was the shock the story of Jedwabne caused that it is possible to distinguish between Poland “before and after” the appearance of Gross’ book. As leading <a href="https://www.questia.com/library/103152942/contested-memories-poles-and-jews-during-the-holocaust">Catholic journalist Agnieszka Magdziak Miszewska</a> put it: “Facing up to the painful truth of Jedwabne is … the most serious test that we Poles have had to confront in the last decade.” </p>
<h2>Law and Justice’s politics of history</h2>
<p>It is that test, arguably, that the ruling Law and Justice party is failing. </p>
<p>In the battle over Polish collective memory, the party has been promoting the stories of <a href="http://www.yadvashem.org/righteous/statistics.html">the Poles who rescued Jews</a> – and who are honored by Israel as the “Righteous Among Nations” – by creating <a href="http://muzeumulmow.pl/en/">museums</a> and monuments in their name. </p>
<p>Through the new “Holocaust Law,” the government is, in effect, trying to repress knowledge of crimes committed against Jews by Poles. The defense of the law, however, goes one step further. In a remarkable case of what I would describe as manipulating the message, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki issued a video <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXcm7k3FpJc">statement</a> claiming that it is the Poles who are the guardians of historical truth and fighters against hatred.</p>
<p>And yet, the same politicians remain silent when their supporters express anti-Semitic and anti-refugee views. On Feb. 5, for example, demonstrators impatient for President Duda to sign the Holocaust law <a href="http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114883,22987105,narodowcy-przed-palacem-prezydenckim-zdejmij-jarmulke-podpisz.html">gathered in front of the Presidential Palace</a> chanting anti-Semitic slogans and demanding that he “remove [his] yarmulke and sign the law!” </p>
<p>The president did sign the law, but he also sent it to the country’s constitutional court for examination. </p>
<p>Those Poles opposed to the law – and there are many, judging by the number of <a href="http://www.polin.pl/en/news/2018/01/29/statement-of-the-director-of-polin-museum-concerning-a-proposed">organizations</a> and <a href="http://www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/7,103085,22984827,list-polskich-ambasadorow-obecna-polityka-jaroslawa-kaczynskiego.html">public figures</a> denouncing it and the number of <a href="https://oko.press/apel-stu-naukowcow-dziennikarzy-artystow-politykow-o-wycofanie-zmian-ustawie-o-ipn-tedy-droga-odzyskania-zbiorowej-godnosci/">petitions circulating</a> – hope that it will be deemed unconstitutional because it represses freedom of speech and could significantly curtail academic research. </p>
<p>Regardless of the ultimate outcome, however, the government’s politics of history will continue to be waged on many other fronts. What is at stake, in my view, is nothing less than the definition of Polish national identity. This is why, for all the international outrage, the controversy about the Holocaust law is hottest inside Poland, among Poles who are now debating what it means to be Polish and where Poland is going.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91283/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Geneviève Zubrzycki does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Seventy years after the end of World War II, a battle is taking place over Polish collective memory.Geneviève Zubrzycki, Professor of Sociology, Director of the Weiser Center for Europe and Eurasia, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/816302017-07-27T11:24:32Z2017-07-27T11:24:32ZPoland in peril: a legal expert on why democracy is threatened and what that means for Europe<p>Poland is on a collision course with the EU, facing unprecedented sanctions over the national government’s plan to effectively seize control of its courts and judges. </p>
<p>After three decades of steady progress away from commmunism and one-party rule, the governing Law and Justice party (PiS) is pushing for reforms to Poland’s judicial system which could seriously compromise the freedom of citizens. The measures could paralyse the courts, leaving constitutional rights open to abuse from the state.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2161_en.htm">European Union</a> has already started legal action against Poland for infringing EU law and is now making an even more serious threat. In a statement published on July 26, it warned that unless the Polish government backs down from its reform plans within a month, the European Commission “stands ready to immediately trigger the Article 7 procedure”. This is the mechanism through which a member state’s EU voting rights can be suspended on the grounds that it has failed to meet the shared values of the EU – in this case, respecting the rule of law. Triggering <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Al33500">Article 7</a> against Poland would be an unprecedented move against a member state.</p>
<p>The dispute centres around three bills presented by the government to the national parliament which would significantly curtail the freedom of the nation’s judges. One of these, the judicial bill, gives the justice minister the power to fire every single judge on the Supreme Court and to decide which of them gets reappointed. The bill was passed by the senate, but, in a dramatic turn of events, president <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/24/poland-president-to-veto-controversial-laws-amid-protests">Andrzej Duda</a>, stepped in at the last minute to veto it.</p>
<p>It’s not clear why Duda blocked the bill, particularly since he is generally close to the PiS, but his decision may reflect the growing public backlash. Citizens have been on the streets of Warsaw, Krakow and other major cities protesting the bills. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the president has signed one of the three bills. This grants the government the power to appoint the presidents of the lower courts. The presidents of the courts decide upon the allocation of cases. If the government fills courts with politically malleable judges, then these cases can be filtered to specific courts in order to secure a favourable outcome.</p>
<p>Duda, a lawyer himself, has also sent the third bill back to parliament. This aims to enable the government to control who sits on the <a href="http://www.krs.pl/en/home">National Council of the Judiciary</a> – the body that nominates judges. Under this bill, the minister of justice would also have the right to select and dismiss judges.</p>
<h2>Sliding into authoritarianism</h2>
<p>This is just the latest in a series of attacks on democratic processes in Poland. The first targeted the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/18/poland-is-on-road-to-autocracy-says-high-court-president">Polish Constitutional Tribunal</a> – the body which assesses whether laws are compatible with the constitution. In 2015, the new PiS government refused to swear in judges nominated to this tribunal by its rival pro-European Civic Platform party, which had formed part of the outgoing government.</p>
<p>Since then, the PiS has moved to make the tribunal’s work increasingly difficult. It has refused to publish the tribunal’s rulings in the official gazette – a procedure needed to ensure those rulings are binding. It has also changed the rules so that the tribunal needs a two-thirds majority to make a ruling – and at least 13 of the 15 judges have to rule on every decision – making it incredibly difficult for the court to reach decisions on anything.</p>
<p>This effectively leaves the government free to interpret the Polish constitution as it sees fit. It might therefore clamp down on the free press, allow its critics to be locked up, or restrict freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.</p>
<h2>Brussels sanctions?</h2>
<p>After the collapse of communism, many Central and East European countries managed a “return to Europe”. The renewed relationship was a victory for democracy and the rule of law over the old systems of governance.</p>
<p>While there are grounds for reforming the Polish judiciary, democracy is always a work in progress. The proposed changes have little to do with reform. They are more squarely aimed at incapacitating the courts – beginning with the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court. </p>
<p>The Polish government has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/26/poland-hits-back-eu-blackmail-judicial-reforms">accused</a> the European Commission of interfering with its national sovereignty by threatening to suspend its voting rights – perhaps seeking to tap into the “take back control” rhetoric that proved so successful in the UK ahead of the Brexit vote. But the sovereignty argument is misleading and dishonest. Sovereignty should not be about destroying the very institutions that uphold the rule of law.</p>
<p>This doesn’t just matter in Poland. The fact that cracks are appearing in countries that were thought to have been moving towards the rule of law shows that liberal democracy remains fragile. Having made so much progress to reform the practices of its communist past, Poland seems to be sliding back to authoritarianism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81630/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Agata Fijalkowski has received funding for her research on post-communist Europe from the British Academy, the Socio-Legal Studies Association, Lancaster University Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences and Lancaster University Law School.</span></em></p>The European Union is threatening to suspend the state’s voting rights if it pursues legislation to restrict its judiciary.Agata Fijalkowski, Senior Lecturer, Lancaster Law School, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/806532017-07-06T22:55:23Z2017-07-06T22:55:23ZIs Trump actually popular in Poland?<p>As Donald Trump began speaking in Warsaw at noon on July 6, I was sitting in my apartment a few blocks away. </p>
<p>Police helicopters kept buzzing past my building, and nearly all the main streets were blocked off. A government-sponsored “picnic” was being staged in a field near the National Stadium to celebrate Trump’s visit, and supporters of the ruling party <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/05/poland-trump-supporters-picnic-us-president">had been bused in</a>. That sort of artificial display of enthusiasm is necessary because Trump is definitely not popular here.</p>
<p>This visit has sparked familiar stories about Poland being <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/welcome-trump-poland-taps-old-communist-party-playbook-n776186">the most pro-American country</a> in Europe. CNN ran a story depicting Poland and its neighbors as <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/06/opinions/trump-poland-charles-crawford/index.html">inherently friendly</a> to Trump’s brand of far-right nationalism. </p>
<p>I’ve been <a href="http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-1444332198.html">writing about Polish history</a> for nearly 30 years, so I wasn’t at all surprised by this. It fits with the often repeated argument that the former Soviet bloc countries <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/03/poland-was-never-as-democratic-as-it-looked-law-and-justice-hungary-orban">were never truly ready</a> to accept the liberal democratic norms of the more “civilized” West. </p>
<h2>The familiar stereotypes</h2>
<p>Poland’s de facto authoritarian ruler, <a href="http://www.politico.eu/list/politico-28-class-of-2017-ranking/jaroslaw-kaczynski/">Jarosław Kaczyński</a>, said last week that other European countries “<a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/polish-leader-nations-envy-trump-visit-warsaw-48390099">envy Poland</a>” because Trump decided to visit here. Polish president Andrzej Duda – who is, in reality, less powerful than Kaczyński – said that the American president’s support will <a href="http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/andrzej-duda-wizyta-donalda-trumpa-wzmacnia-pozycje-polski/ktxvjy4">strengthen Poland’s position internationally</a>.</p>
<p>It is hard for me to imagine how this could be true. Given the deep distrust of Trump among European leaders, and the <a href="https://global.handelsblatt.com/politics/the-trump-effect-on-europe-in-one-poll-663416">overall</a> <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/trumps-trip-europe-record-low-popularity-and-unprecedented-protests-set-meet-631680">contempt</a> with which he is viewed across the continent, the only possible outcome of Trump’s visit is to further Poland’s isolation within the European Union.</p>
<p>Here’s the problem as I see it: The Polish government is giving ammunition to entrenched stereotypes about Poles as backward, undemocratic, bigoted and uncultured. And the Western press, while <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/world/europe/trump-poland-law-justice-party.html?emc=edit_tnt_20170706&nlid=38712302&tntemail0=y&_r=0">extremely critical</a> of Kaczyński’s assault on European norms, creates a feedback loop for his claim that he represents the <a href="http://natemat.pl/207479,to-my-jestesmy-partia-wolnosci-kaczynski-zrzuca-uczestnikom-marszu-wolnosci-oderwanie-od-rzeczywistosci">true Poland</a>. </p>
<p>He does not. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177201/original/file-20170706-28396-956w1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177201/original/file-20170706-28396-956w1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=766&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177201/original/file-20170706-28396-956w1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=766&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177201/original/file-20170706-28396-956w1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=766&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177201/original/file-20170706-28396-956w1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=962&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177201/original/file-20170706-28396-956w1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=962&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177201/original/file-20170706-28396-956w1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=962&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Warsaw bus stop ad reads: ‘This is not a cap; it is an invitation to Canada’ on March 3, 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brian Porter-Szücs</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the 2015 elections, Kaczyński won <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/27/poland-law-justice-party-wins-235-seats-can-govern-alone">38 percent of the vote</a>. He was able to transform that support into a parliamentary majority only because the left and center-left were fragmented among several small parties. In Poland, parties getting fewer than 5 percent receive no delegates. Their votes are distributed among the larger parties. </p>
<p>The popularity of the ruling party hasn’t risen since the election. For most of the past year it has slid <a href="http://ewybory.eu/sondaze/">even lower</a>. If we add in a second right-wing party called “<a href="https://ruchkukiza.pl/">Kukiz 15</a>” that generally supports the government’s policies, the right is still supported by less than half of the Polish population.</p>
<p>Even to assert that Donald Trump is more popular in Poland than elsewhere in Europe is misleading. During the U.S. elections, a survey asked Poles whom they would prefer to see in the White House. Only <a href="http://www.newsweek.pl/swiat/na-kogo-w-wyborach-prezydenckich-w-usa-zaglosowaliby-polacy-sondaz,artykuly,397751,1.html">20 percent</a> chose Trump. After the election, a “whopping” <a href="http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/sondaz-polacy-o-wyborze-trumpa/exmpng">13 percent</a> felt that Trump’s victory would be good for Poland. Yes, these figures are indeed higher than the <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/29/politics/pew-poll-obama-trump-clinton/index.html">9 percent</a> popularity rating that he enjoys in Europe overall, but they hardly paint a picture of Poland as a friendly place for the U.S. president. </p>
<p>Placed in an American context, Trump’s approval rating is higher <a href="http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/05/31/donald-trump-california-approval-poll/">in California</a> than it is in Poland. </p>
<p>In general, Poles are more conservative than most West Europeans, but that’s relative. The American right should not hold any delusions: Their worldview might be echoed in the government offices of Warsaw under the current leadership, but their support is only marginally greater along the Vistula than it is along the Thames, the Seine or the Rhine.</p>
<p>The current Polish government is trying to pull the country away from Europe. Reinforcing anti-Polish attitudes in the western part of the continent might help them succeed. But let’s not forget that those attitudes are based on stereotypes that do not reflect the totality, or even the majority, of today’s Poland.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80653/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Porter-Szücs has received funding from the American Council for Learned Societies, the Fulbright Association, the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, and the United States Institute of Peace </span></em></p>A historian who studies Poland witnesses the president’s visit to Warsaw, and casts a skeptical eye at the crowd that took in the president’s speech.Brian Porter-Szücs, Professor of History, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/457922015-08-07T05:29:24Z2015-08-07T05:29:24ZPoland’s new hawkish president could be shape of things to come from Warsaw<p>Where next for Poland? That is the big question following the <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/polands-conservative-president-andrzej-duda-takes-office-32914946">swearing in</a> of Andrzej Duda for a five-year term as the new president. </p>
<p>The 43-year-old lawyer’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32862772">shock victory</a> in May’s presidential election has shaken up Polish politics. It means that for the first time since 2010, Poland’s president is from a different party to the prime minister. Duda represents the right-wing <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/Law-and-Justice">Law and Justice party</a>, while prime minister Ewa Kopacz is from the centrist <a href="http://www.platforma.org/en/about-us">Civic Platform</a>. </p>
<p>Duda’s victory <a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15850/duda-s-surprise-presidential-win-in-poland-raises-populist-specter">prompted speculation</a> about whether there would be a significant shift in Polish international relations. Up to a point, is the short answer. Real executive power lies with the prime minister, but the Polish president is not simply a ceremonial figure. According to the <a href="http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm">constitution</a>, the president has informal oversight and a coordinating role over foreign policy. </p>
<p>The president ratifies international agreements – so he or she can block treaties negotiated by the government; and, as the country’s highest representative, can – for example – participate in meetings of the EU Council. Duda will also exercise powerful influence through his foreign visits and high-profile speeches – beginning with <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/06/poland-president-andrzej-duda-stronger-nato-presence-counter-russia">his calls</a> on August 6 for a greater NATO presence in eastern Europe. </p>
<p>This all means that the current government is going to have to live with a powerful figure with a very different agenda – at least until the parliamentary election on <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2015/07/18/poland-to-hold-general-election-on-october-25/">October 25</a>. After that point, Duda’s views could well be the dominant Polish position. </p>
<h2>International interests</h2>
<p>The current government takes what it argues is a constructive approach towards the main EU powers, especially Germany. It claims that this has effectively promoted the country’s international interests – in contrast to the Law and Justice government that it succeeded in 2007, led by <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Jaroslaw-Kaczynski">Jarosław Kaczyński</a>. Civic Platform <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/31/donald-tusk-european-council-president-poland">presents the</a> appointment last autumn of the then Polish prime minister Donald Tusk as president of the EU Council as the crowning achievement of this strategy.</p>
<p>Law and Justice supports Polish EU membership, but is anti-federalist and at times verges on eurosceptic. It opposes further European integration and defends Polish sovereignty, especially in relation to morality and culture – where it rejects what it sees as an EU liberal-left consensus. The party argues that Poland needs to better advance its national interests within the EU and its critique of German-led closer integration has intensified since the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/debt-crisis">eurozone crisis</a>. </p>
<p>During the presidential campaign, Duda called for the country to recalibrate its relationship with Germany. He also wanted to revisit the decision-making split between Brussels and member states to strengthen national sovereignty in areas like climate policy, claiming EU policies were damaging Polish industry. </p>
<p>The current government has toned down its earlier enthusiasm for adopting the euro, yet it remains committed to fulfilling the criteria for eurozone accession as quickly as possible. Law and Justice opposes adoption until Poland’s economy is more closely aligned with the rest of the EU and then not without a referendum. Since the eurozone crisis, it has increasingly given the impression that it couldn’t envisage any point in the foreseeable future where this could be in Polish interests. </p>
<p>At least some of this positioning is just rhetoric, however. A Law and Justice administration would be more assertive about an independent foreign policy and sound more eurosceptic, but radical steps against EU integration are unlikely. When last in government in 2005-07, it often tended to be integrationist in practice. Neither has the party ever opposed Polish adoption of the euro in principle. In reality, the two Polish parties’ European battles have been less about the substance of integration and more about who is more competent to represent Polish interests abroad. </p>
<h2>Russian policy</h2>
<p>Both parties support the idea of Poland at the forefront of efforts to maintain and extend EU sanctions against Russia and increase NATO presence in central Europe. Yet Law and Justice claims the current government has been constrained by its unwillingness to move too far beyond the EU consensus and counter-balance the over-conciliatory instincts of some major European powers, particularly Germany. </p>
<p>As Duda indicated at his swearing-in speech, Law and Justice wants to use the <a href="http://www.gmfus.org/events/wales-warsaw-priorities-nato-2016-summit">2016 NATO Warsaw summit</a> to secure a greater military presence in the country, preferably including permanently stationed US forces or military bases. They want defensive weaponry to be located on NATO’s eastern flank, <a href="http://openeurope.org.uk/blog/what-does-dudas-win-mean-for-poland-europe-and-the-uk/">something opposed by</a> Germany as too provocative towards Russia. During his election campaign, Duda also called for a stronger Polish presence in international negotiations over Ukraine and Russia and mooted Polish military aid to Ukraine through NATO. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91031/original/image-20150806-5245-1i7xnih.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91031/original/image-20150806-5245-1i7xnih.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91031/original/image-20150806-5245-1i7xnih.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=627&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91031/original/image-20150806-5245-1i7xnih.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=627&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91031/original/image-20150806-5245-1i7xnih.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=627&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91031/original/image-20150806-5245-1i7xnih.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=787&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91031/original/image-20150806-5245-1i7xnih.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=787&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91031/original/image-20150806-5245-1i7xnih.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=787&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former president Lech Kaczyński.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Prezydent_Lech_Kaczyński_04.jpg#/media/File:Prezydent_Lech_Kaczyński_04.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Duda identifies with the so-called “<a href="http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21604684-first-time-half-millennium-poland-thriving-says-vendeline-von-bredow">Jagiellonian policy</a>” of by the late Lech Kaczyński, the president 2005-10, which envisages Poland as regional leader and a broad military and political coalition of east-central European states to counter Russian expansionism. Duda is likely to try and breathe new life into this project, though this won’t be easy given that some states including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia <a href="http://www.gmfus.org/publications/region-disunited-central-european-responses-russia-ukraine-crisis">have questioned</a> the rationale even behind existing EU sanctions. </p>
<h2>The way ahead</h2>
<p>If Civic Platform remains in government after the October election, Poland faces up to four years of political cohabitation. Law and Justice <a href="http://rpubs.com/benstanley/26691">is currently</a> 10% ahead in the polls but is unlikely to secure an outright majority, and has no obvious coalition partners among the current parliamentary parties. </p>
<p>Despite the politics and rhetoric behind many of the two parties’ divisions on foreign policy, Poland’s most recent period of cohabitation between the two parties, in 2007-10 during the Lech Kaczyński presidency, was certainly not pretty. It saw an ongoing power struggle, including embarrassing battles over the EU. Notably the president delayed Polish ratification of the Lisbon treaty for 18 months in 2008-09. </p>
<p>The alternative is that Duda does find himself working with a government with whom he shares a common programme. If that happens, Poland will be more assertive in pushing forward its interests at the international level, independent of the major EU powers. We will see which of these two futures comes to pass after October 25. As things stand, Poland’s approach to the world has just become considerably less predictable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/45792/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aleks Szczerbiak does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Andrzej Duda’s Law and Justice party is more anti-Russian and eurosceptic than its main rival.Aleks Szczerbiak, Professor of Politics and Contemporary European Studies, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.