tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/asia-1576/articlesAsia – The Conversation2024-03-20T19:55:20Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2261862024-03-20T19:55:20Z2024-03-20T19:55:20ZWhat Article 23 means for the future of Hong Kong and its once vibrant pro-democracy movement<p><em>Lawmakers in Hong Kong <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/19/hong-kong-article-23-security-law/">passed new security legislation</a> on March 19, 2024, handing authorities in the semi-autonomous city-state further power to clamp down on dissent.</em></p>
<p><em>The law, under <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/19/what-is-article-23-hong-kongs-new-draconian-national-security-law">Article 23</a>, has been decades in the making but was resisted for a long time by protesters who feared the legislation’s effect on civil liberties in Hong Kong, a special administrative region in China that has become increasingly under the thumb of Beijing.</em></p>
<p><em>To explain what the adoption of Article 23, which is set to be signed into law on March 23, 2024, means for the future of Hong Kong, The Conversation turned to Michael C. Davis, a <a href="https://jgu.edu.in/jgls/prof-michael-c-davis/">law professor</a> who taught constitutional law and human rights in Hong Kong for more than 30 years, most recently at the University of Hong Kong, and is the author of “<a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/freedom-undone/9781952636448">Freedom Undone: The Assault on Liberal Values in Hong Kong</a>.”</em></p>
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<h2>What is the background to Article 23?</h2>
<p>Article 23 has a lengthy backstory. It is an article in the <a href="https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/index/">Basic Law of Hong Kong</a> requiring the Hong Kong government to enact a local ordinance governing national security. The Basic Law itself is effectively the constitution of Hong Kong. Its promulgation by the central government was part of China’s obligation under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 – the treaty providing for Hong Kong’s return to China. Thirteen years later, in 1997, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-40426827">territory was transferred to Chinese rule</a> after more than a century under the British. </p>
<p>The Basic Law established a largely liberal constitutional order for post-handover Hong Kong. This included guarantees of the rule of law and basic freedoms, as well as a promise of ultimate universal suffrage. It was formally adopted by China’s National People’s Congress in 1990.</p>
<p>Basic Law Article 23 requires the Hong Kong government to “on its own” enact certain national security laws relating to treason, secession, sedition, subversion or theft of state secrets, and to regulate foreign organizations.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong government first put forward an Article 23 bill in 2003. But due to concerns over the implications for press and organizational freedoms, as well as expanded police powers, the proposed bill <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-68594448">met with widespread opposition</a>.</p>
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<img alt="A uniformed police officer puts his fingers in his ears in front of a sign that has the number 23 crossed out." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Noisy protests help defeat an earlier version of Article 23 in 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/police-officer-puts-his-fingers-in-his-ears-to-protect-news-photo/1258921548?adppopup=true">Peter Parks/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
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<p>A group of seven leading lawyers and two legal academics, including myself, challenged the proposed bill in a collection of pamphlets that highlighted its deficiencies under international human rights standards. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3178339/july-1-2003-500000-take-hong-kongs-streets-protest-against">half a million protesters</a> took to the streets of Hong Kong. </p>
<p>In the face of such opposition and the consequent withdrawal of support by a leading pro-goverment party, the bill was withdrawn. </p>
<p>Rather than come forward with a replacement bill that would address human rights concerns, the government opted to let Article 23 languish for two decades.</p>
<p>Then, in 2020, Beijing <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/hong-kong-national-security-law-10-things-you-need-to-know/">imposed a national security law</a> that gave Hong Kong authorities greater power. It led to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/one-year-hong-kong-arrests-117-people-under-new-security-law-2021-06-30/">arrest and repression of opposition figures</a> in Hong Kong, silencing the once-vibrant democracy movement. </p>
<p>With no effective opposition left and the threat of arrest for anyone who speaks out, the pro-Beijing Hong Kong government decided now was the time to ram through a more extreme version of the bill.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong government, with Beijing’s encouragement, was able to open up a short consultation on the new Article 23 legislative proposal with little or no opposition expressed. </p>
<p>The process was facilitated by a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/hong-kong-patriots-only-election-falls-flat-with-record-low-turnout-2023-12-11">patriots only” electoral system</a> imposed by Beijing in 2021 that has tightened Beijing’s grip over the Hong Kong legislature, leading to unanimous support for the bill.</p>
<h2>How will it affect civil liberties in Hong Kong?</h2>
<p>In tandem with the 2020 Beijing-imposed national security law, the new Article 23 legislation will have a dramatic effect on civil liberties.</p>
<p>The national security law – with its vague provisions on secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion – has already been used along with a colonial-era sedition law to arrest and silence dissent in Hong Kong. Many opposition figures <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/20/world/asia/hong-kong-democracy-leaders.html">are in prison or have fled into exile</a>. And those with dissenting views who remain have largely gone silent. </p>
<p>The draft bill expands on the national security law in key areas: the stealing of state secrets, insurrection, sabotage and external interference in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>It essentially embraces mainland China’s comprehensive national security regime, which has long focused on suppressing internal opposition, targeting numerous areas of local civil life, impacting organizational, press and academic freedoms.</p>
<p>Included in Article 23 is the adoption of the mainland’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/28/world/asia/china-state-secrets-law.html">broad definition of “state secrets</a>,” which can even include reporting or writing on social and economic development policies. </p>
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<p>The legislation expands the potential use of incarceration with both lengthy sentences upon conviction and longer holding of suspects before trial.</p>
<p>Article 23 also intensifies <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/30/hong-kong-article-23-new-national-security-laws-explained-what-do-they-mean">scrutiny of “foreign influence</a>” – making working with outsiders risky for Hong Kong citizens.</p>
<p>The draft legislation speaks disparagingly of activism under the guises of fighting for or monitoring human rights and is critical of “so-called” nongovernmental organizations.</p>
<p>All of this makes working with or supporting international human rights organizations perilous. </p>
<p>In short, in the space of two decades, Hong Kong’s liberal constitutional order has been transformed into a national security order with weak or no protections for basic freedoms.</p>
<h2>What is the wider context to Article 23?</h2>
<p>To understand this legislation, one must appreciate the Chinese Communist Party’s deep hostility to liberal values and institutions, such as the rule of law, civil liberties, independent courts, a free press and public accountability. Such liberal ideas are viewed as an existential threat to party rule. </p>
<p>This mindset has led to a dramatic expansion of the party’s <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/china-vows-to-safeguard-national-security-with-new-laws-at-conclave-/7520474.html">national security agenda</a> under current leader Xi Jinping. </p>
<p>Beijing has emphasized economic development in recent decades, staking its legitimacy on economic growth – betting that people will care more about their standard of living than about political freedoms. But as <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/15/china-needs-reforms-to-halt-significant-growth-declines-imf-chief.html">growth declines</a>, leaders’ concerns about security and dissent have grown, placing such security even above economic development.</p>
<p>This has led to the comprehensive national security concept now being imposed on Hong Kong. </p>
<p>With Beijing advancing an agenda that casts liberal, democratic ideas as a threat, a liberal Hong Kong on the country’s border became impossible for the Chinese Communist Party to ignore.</p>
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<img alt="A group of protesters shelter under umbrellas" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Protestors in Hong Kong use umbrellas as improvised shields in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protestors-using-improvise-shield-to-push-toward-police-news-photo/1191713262?adppopup=true">Kwan Wong/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Widespread <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48607723">protests in Hong Kong in 2019</a> both exacerbated this concern and offered an opportunity for Beijing to address the perceived threat under the <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202112/1240540.shtml">claim that protesters were advancing a so-called “color revolution</a>.”</p>
<p>Having long nurtured its loyalist camp to rule Hong Kong, these loyal officials became the instrument of the crackdown.</p>
<h2>What does the lack of protest now say about the pro-democracy movement?</h2>
<p>It tells us that the mainland national security regime imposed on Hong Kong has effectively intimidated the society, especially those with opposition views, into silence. </p>
<p>Hong Kong’s pro-democratic camp had <a href="https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.5563">historically enjoyed majority support, at around 60%</a> of the voters in the direct elections that were allowed for half of the legislative seats.</p>
<p>The introduction of loyalists-only elections led to a dramatically reduced turnout.</p>
<p>This and emigration patterns tend to show that the majority of Hong Kong people do not support this new illiberal order.</p>
<p>Be that as it may, with most of their pro-democratic leaders either in jail or exile, they dare not speak out against the new national security regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226186/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael C. Davis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the space of two decades, Hong Kong’s liberal constitutional order has been transformed into a security regime that grants citizens few civil libertiesMichael C. Davis, Professor of Law and International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2260362024-03-20T15:56:09Z2024-03-20T15:56:09ZMumpreneurs: a growing entrepreneurial force in Chinese society<p>While much ink has been poured over China’s economic growth in recent decades, the contributions of Chinese women often receive less attention. With the pressure of the <a href="https://www.ined.fr/en/publications/editions/population-and-societies/china-s-new-three-child-policy-what-effects-can-we-expect/">“three-child policy”</a>, being a mother isn’t a mere personal choice, it’s a part of national demographic strategy. To navigate their lives, many Chinese mothers are now turning to what has been referred to as “mumpreneurship”. A January 2024 search for “妈妈创业” (the term in Chinese) showed 69.9 million results on Baidu, China’s primary search engine, compared to just 2.6 million English results on Google.</p>
<p>The term <em>mompreneur</em> was coined in 1996 by Patricia Cobe and Ellen Parlapiano, two entrepreneurs who caught global attention with a <a href="http://www.mompreneursonline.com/">website</a> and <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/author/list/624570.Patricia_Cobe">books</a> on the theme. Unlike <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0016718510001284">female entrepreneurs</a>, mumpreneurs are motivated to achieve work-life harmony by merging the identities of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0266242611435182">motherhood and business ownership</a>. It’s typical to observe the boundaries of two roles blurring.</p>
<p><a href="https://journals.openedition.org/travailemploi/10041/">Prior research</a> indicates that the mumpreneurs movement has its roots in the United States in the 1990s, and that it saw further growth in France in the 2000s, as the Internet gained strength. The researchers defined it as a “feminised form of non-salaried work, in which independence is considered the ideal way to combine work and family.”</p>
<h2>Mumpreneurship in China</h2>
<p>Our ongoing research focuses on mumpreneurs in Chinese urban areas. We find that most are between the ages of 31 and 45, resourceful, educated and digitally savvy. Chinese women’s age at first birth is getting older, <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202302/1285983.shtml">30.36 in Shanghai in 2022</a>. According to a <a href="https://www.199it.com/archives/1418770.html">2022 Chinese Female Entrepreneurs Research Report</a>, women start their businesses at a young age, 36% before 30, 50% between 31 to 40.</p>
<p>Covid-19 has played a key role in driving the growth of mumpreneurship. Many parents are stepping back from the corporate life due to the economic downturn in China. Mumpreneurs are most commonly found in urban regions such as Beijing, Shanghai and Great Bay area, notably Shenzhen, where robust support networks and resources exist. Preferred sectors are children’s education and social services, HR consulting, psychotherapy consulting, and beauty-related industries. Businesses typically have small teams of no more than 10. Many of their leaders actively engage and enjoy the popularity on social media like TikTok and Xiaohongshu. One of our interviewees, DanDan, has pioneered a <a href="http://xhslink.com/ARVTnC">“divorced companion mumpreneurial business model”</a> (离婚搭子创业 in Chinese) in education and social-media marketing services that has received significant attention. She and her business partner have recently been invited to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vb7MlUvMNhs"><em>Super Diva</em></a>, a show spotlighting Chinese mothers from diverse backgrounds.</p>
<p>Contrary to the promise of work-life balance, Chinese mumpreneurs are driven and <a href="https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20231205A054G400">relentlessly self-improving</a> and are often sleep-deprived. Support can come from a range of source, including their partner, parents, paid services such as nannies, cleaners and drivers, and sometimes company employees. Office and family space are frequently within walking distance or even overlapping.</p>
<p>As in other Asian countries, K–12 education in China is highly competitive. Chinese mothers are often perceived to face triple expectation from the society, family, and themselves, while Chinese fathers can have more leniency. Our study reveals that when it comes to education, some Chinese mumpreneurs disagree with both 鸡娃 (Ji Wa) <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/09/06/1024804523/forget-tiger-moms-now-chinas-chicken-blood-parents-are-pushing-kids-to-succeed">Chicken Blood parenting</a> and traditional laissez-faire motherhood. Instead, they believe in a spiritual maternal role, working to strengthen the emotional and personal construction of their children. Annie, a mumpreneur who works in human resources, remarked:</p>
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<p>“I disagree with cramming, stressful, and result-oriented education. It’s essential for me to nurture my son’s capacity for happiness. It pains me to witness the prevalence of depression among Chinese children.”</p>
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<p>While mumpreneurs value motherhood, for them it doesn’t consistently rank as the top priority. Instead, there’s unanimous agreement on the importance of prioritising the “me” as an individual, encompassing financial, physical, and mental self-care. Additionally, there’s a recurring theme indicating that a woman’s awakening process is influenced by her education and the duration of her marriage. As for the role of “wife”, it’s often optional, and many mumpreneurs are single, divorced or cohabiting with partners to whom they are not married.</p>
<h2>A social movement</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www-annualreviews-org.em-lyon.idm.oclc.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052615-025801">rise of a social movement</a> is primarily facilitated by three key factors: more chances to influence politics, support networks, and shaping public opinion through messages. In China, the government has been making a strategic push to compensate for the country’s <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/china-demographics-challenges/">demographic challenges</a>, which will become increasingly acute in the coming years. The country’s “one-child policy” was established in 1980, and it took more than a quarter-century to transit to the “two-child policy”, enacted in 2016. Less than five years later, the “three-child policy” came into force in 2021.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">“China pushes three-child policy” (NBC News).</span></figcaption>
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<p>The increasing female power in China is another catalyst for the mumpreneurship movement. Since 1949, there has been remarkable progress in the economic, educational, and health status of Chinese women. The changing social perceptions could be sensed in the language used to describe them, from 大婶 (Aunty) to 爷 (Ye) meaning lord or master, and 女王 (Nu Wang) meaning queen. Women are being progressively liberated from the expectation of a life centred on supporting her family, children, and husband. Women in China are embracing more diverse values and contributing to a more inclusive society.</p>
<p>The support ecosystem for mumpreneurs has matured. These include the <a href="http://mqcy.cwdf.org.cn/">“@SHE Entrepreneur Plan”</a>, which is operated by the China Women’s Development Foundation. It has grown increasingly influential over the last 28 years and now covers more than 20 provinces. At the grassroots level, <a href="https://www.huxiu.com/article/37107.html">mumpreneur communities</a> are spreading with the help of social media. Interesting examples include Lamabang.net.com, Babytree.com (a sort of Facebook for parents and kids), ci123.com and 研究生 Yan Jiu Sheng (which highlights research on pregnancy).</p>
<p>Given their presence, our study mainly focuses on the mumpreneurs in urban areas. Given that the country’s spatial disparity, future research could explore mumpreneurship in rural areas. This may reveal differences in entrepreneurial motivation, motherhood definition, social capital and social networking.</p>
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<p><em>Special thanks to Chen Liu (DBA candidate from Durham University and EM Lyon Business School) and Hanrui Liu (MSc in international marketing and business development, EM Lyon Business School) for their contributions to the ongoing research project.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226036/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lisa Xiong ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>With the pressure of China’s “three-child policy”, many women are motivated to achieve work-life harmony by merging the identities of motherhood and business ownership.Lisa Xiong, Associate Professor in Strategy & Organization, EM Lyon Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2208982024-03-06T13:35:55Z2024-03-06T13:35:55ZPresident Yoon is lauded in West for embracing Japan − in South Korea it fits a conservative agenda that is proving less popular<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576051/original/file-20240215-17705-dcmnsd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C0%2C4486%2C2991&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Korea's Yoon Suk Yeol, left, and Fumio Kishida of Japan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/yoon-suk-yeol-south-koreas-president-left-and-fumio-kishida-news-photo/1248372073?adppopup=true">Kiyoshi Otal/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When South Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol broke out into an impromptu performance of <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/south-korea-president-yoon-sings-american-pie-white-house-dinner-biden-rcna81712">the song “American Pie”</a> at a gala White House dinner in 2023, it was more than just a musical interlude. It was symbolic of how on the big Indo-Pacific issues of the day, Washington and Seoul are singing from the same songbook.</p>
<p>But so, too, is Japan. And for South Korea’s <a href="https://twitter.com/richardaeden/status/1709999502373867817">karaoke-loving leader</a>, that means humming a different tune to predecessors on the international stage – and risking hitting a sour note back at home.</p>
<p>Yoon, who <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/10/world/asia/south-korea-yoon-president.html">took office in May 2022</a>, has embraced closer ties with Japan, South Korea’s former colonizer, as part of an alignment with <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/01/15/south-koreas-global-geopolitical-pivot/">U.S.-led security cooperation</a> in the Indo-Pacific region. It entails a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/05/south-korea-mood-north-korea-weapons/1d4d0884-c495-11ee-bbc9-9b5ca9b20779_story.html">more demanding stance toward North Korea’s</a> denuclearization and a watchful eye on China and its <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-chinese-warships-near-miss-in-taiwan-strait-hints-at-ongoing-troubled-diplomatic-waters-despite-chatter-about-talks-207099">increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea</a>. </p>
<p>The approach culminated in a historic Camp David summit in 2023 aimed at solidifying relations between <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-south-korea-japan-agree-crisis-consultations-camp-david-summit-2023-08-18/">South Korea and Japan</a>.</p>
<p>Such rapprochement with Japan has <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230712000396">won Yoon plaudits in the U.S</a>.</p>
<p>But it has done nothing to improve his popularity back home. In South Korea there is growing disapproval of Yoon’s leadership. Critics point to an illiberal streak in his <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3233552/south-korea-us-japan-ties-deepen-yoon-uses-anti-communist-rhetoric-decide-whos-friend-or-foe">rhetoric and policies</a>, which has included attacks on his critics and the media. It has, they contend, contributed to a <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-worrying-democratic-erosions-in-south-korea">worrying trend of democratic erosion</a> in Korea. Yoon’s <a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/south-korean-president-sees-support-slide-after-dior-bag-uproar-1.2029826">poll ratings are sinking</a> at a time when his conservative party seeks control of parliament in elections slated for April 10, 2024.</p>
<p>As scholars who study <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=eKMLsOoAAAAJ&hl=en">democratization and authoritarian politics</a> and <a href="https://search.asu.edu/profile/4857318">modern Korea</a>,
we are watching as these concerns grow in the run-up to the <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/South-Korea-opposition-wins-by-election-in-blow-to-Yoon">parliamentary elections</a>. That vote will prove a test of the popular support for Yoon, his domestic agenda and his vision for South Korea’s more outward-looking international role. </p>
<h2>Japan is ‘now our partner’</h2>
<p>Yoon struck a raw nerve in an Aug. 15, 2023, speech celebrating National Liberation Day in Korea, in which he <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230815002000315">affirmed the country’s partnership with neighboring Japan</a>. He said the country’s former colonial occupier is “now our partner, sharing universal values and pursuing common interests,” and emphasized that “as security and economic partners, Korea and Japan will cooperate with a forward-looking approach, contributing to global peace and prosperity.”</p>
<p>His remarks were <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-South-Korea-ties/Yoon-riles-foes-by-extending-olive-branch-to-Japan-in-speech">met with public outrage</a>, especially given their timing: National Liberation Day commemorates Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule, which lasted from 1910 to 1945. </p>
<p>The Japanese occupation was brutal, simultaneously exploiting Korean women – as evident in the use of so-called “<a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/09/guide-understanding-history-comfort-women-issue">comfort women</a>,” or military sexual slaves – and treating Koreans generally as second-class citizens, all the while pushing obligatory assimilation into Japanese civilization on the occupied population.</p>
<p>Attempts by the Japanese colonial regime at erasing a separate Korean identity and culture – this included banning the teaching of the Korean language and coercing Koreans to adopt Japanese names, along with the violent suppression of independence movements – left deep scars on the collective Korean psyche.</p>
<p>For many Koreans, watching their country join Japan in <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/">a trilateral partnership</a> with the U.S. is too much to accept. </p>
<h2>Emergence of pro-Japan voices</h2>
<p>Yoon and his conservative administration’s foreign policy goals are based not on nationalism but on what has been described as “<a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/07/05/yoon-vows-to-build-a-value-based-alliance-with-washington/">a value-based alliance” with Washington</a>. This stance is at odds with the nationalist focus often seen in the right-wing politics of other countries.</p>
<p>Indeed, in South Korea it is the political left that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2023.103039">increasingly identifies with a form of nationalism</a>. Meanwhile, the “New Right” in South Korea has correspondingly embraced an anti-nationalist stance, specifically <a href="https://read.dukeupress.edu/journal-of-asian-studies/article-abstract/80/4/889/320818/An-Old-Right-in-New-Bottles-State-without-Nation">attacking anti-Japanese sentiment</a>.</p>
<p>Since the early 2000s, Korean conservatives have increasingly distanced themselves from nationalism, particularly of the anti-Japanese variety. If, as theorists such as <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Nations_and_Nationalism.html?id=jl7t2yMfxwIC">Ernest Gellner</a> have argued, modern nationalism is based on the presumed unity of state and nation, political developments in Korea since 1980 have destabilized this relationship.</p>
<p>After the <a href="https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/gi-wook-shin-gwangju-and-south-korea%E2%80%99s-democracy">bloodshed of the Gwangju Massacre in 1980</a>, during which the state killed hundreds of its own citizens, leftist nationalists argued that the South Korean state was neither the representative or defender of the Korean nation.</p>
<p>Rather, they saw the South Korean state’s inheritance of institutions and personnel from the Japanese colonial government, alongside the hegemonic presence of the United States in Korea – <a href="https://www.hamptonthink.org/read/from-stolen-land-to-riches-us-neo-colonialism-in-south-korea">characterized as “neocolonial</a>” by some – as diluting the state’s nationalist credentials.</p>
<p>In contrast, conservatives defended the South Korean authoritarian state’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-asian-studies/article/abs/an-old-right-in-new-bottles-state-without-nation-in-south-korean-new-right-historiography/E9951071B74D329266F850B11874FC62">legitimacy and its legacies</a>. They argued that authoritarian rule was responsible for the rapid economic growth that allowed South Koreans to live in prosperity.</p>
<p>As part of their defense of Korea’s legacy and attack on a political left increasingly identified with nationalism, conservatives embraced an anti-nationalist stance, specifically <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Japan-South-Korea-rift/South-Korean-bestseller-attacking-anti-Japan-tribalism-stirs-debate">attacking anti-Japanese rhetoric</a>. This has involved downplaying the negative effects of Japan’s colonial rule in Korea between 1910 and 1945 and even rejecting the validity of Korean comfort women testimonies. One additional motivation for conservatives has been to justify the achievements of right-wing heroes such as former dictator Park Chung Hee. Park, who has been credited with jump-starting Korea’s economic growth, has been <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190307-enemy-within-shadow-japanese-past-hangs-over-korea">castigated by nationalists as a pro-Japanese collaborator</a> due to his having been <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674659865">trained in the Manchurian and Japanese military academies during the 1940s</a>.</p>
<p>Starting around the turn of the century, there has been a gradual increase in the frequency and intensity of pro-Japan voices. Far-right organizations, such as the <a href="https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/647783.html">Republic of Korea Mom’s Brigade</a>, have since the 2010s organized rallies in defense of Japanese colonialism. More recently, far-right groups have <a href="https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1026135.html">systematically disrupted</a> so-called <a href="https://thesoulofseoul.net/korean-comfort-women-wednesday-protests/">Wednesday Demonstrations</a> – a protest that has been continually held for over 30 years in front of the Japanese embassy in Korea to demand that Japan address the comfort women issue.</p>
<p>In a 2019 bestselling book, conservatives even attacked anti-Japanese nationalism as <a href="https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/911772.html">a form of “tribalism” on the left</a>. It is in this context of the growing prominence of pro-Japan voices that Yoon, in a 2023 <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/24/south-korea-president-yoon-biden-summit/">interview with The Washington Post</a>, expressed that he “could not accept the notion that Japan must kneel because of what happened 100 years ago.”</p>
<h2>Attacks on critics and fake news</h2>
<p>Yoon embodies this reorientation of Korean conservative ideology and foreign policy that rejects nationalism in favor of closer relations with Japan, especially in the context of alignment with the U.S. against the threat of North Korea and China. The approach has seen Yoon <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/U.S.-Congress-to-invite-South-Korea-s-Yoon-for-address-with-eye-on-China">embraced by American policymakers</a>.</p>
<p>Yet his popularity at home has fallen from an approval rating of above 50% in mid-2022 to <a href="https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-02-02/national/politics/President-Yoons-approval-rating-hits-ninemonth-low/1973331">29% at the beginning of February 2024</a>, although it has since picked up a little. </p>
<p>At first glance, his foreign policy seems to support liberal and democratic values. However, in domestic matters there has been growing concern that his rhetoric and policies reflect an <a href="https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1104533.html">illiberal character</a>.</p>
<p>Examples include <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/09/22/asia-pacific/politics/yoon-rally-conservative-base/">labeling his opponents as “communists</a>” and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/under-yoon-south-korea-defamation-cases-against-media-rise-/7388864.html">attacks on the media and “fake news</a>.”</p>
<p>This is perhaps unsurprising; the nature of Korean conservatism is <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2023.2301330?src=">deeply rooted in authoritarianism</a>. </p>
<p>The Biden administration is keen to present Yoon differently – as an ally, along with Japan, in the protection of Asia’s democracies. But this says more about a U.S. foreign policy that centers China as a threat than it does Yoon’s actual commitment to democratic freedoms.</p>
<p>To a South Korea audience, however, Yoon’s position on Japan only adds to general concern over his <a href="https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1104533.html">illiberal tendencies</a> ahead of April’s vote – the first general parliamentary elections during Yoon’s tenure.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: The article was updated on March 7, 2024 to clarify Park Chung Hee’s World War II record.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220898/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Critics of the South Korean leader accuse him of eroding democracy at home while embracing a historic enemy on the international stage.Myunghee Lee, Assistant Professor, Michigan State UniversitySungik Yang, Assistant Professor of History, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2200142024-03-01T13:32:30Z2024-03-01T13:32:30ZIs the United States overestimating China’s power?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577660/original/file-20240223-28-5lgbn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C229%2C4144%2C2586&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Made it, Mao! Top of the World?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/illustration/dominate-the-world-royalty-free-illustration/1456554749?phrase=china+power&adppopup=true">DigitalVision Vectors via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Which country is the greatest threat to the United States? The answer, according to a large proportion of Americans, is clear: China. </p>
<p>Half of all Americans responding to a <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/07/27/americans-name-china-as-the-country-posing-the-greatest-threat-to-the-us/">mid-2023 survey</a> from the Pew Research Center cited China as the biggest risk to the U.S., with Russia trailing in second with 17%. Other surveys, such as from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/americans-feel-more-threat-china-now-past-three-decades">show similar findings</a>.</p>
<p>Senior figures in recent U.S. administrations appear to agree with this assessment. In 2020, John Ratcliffe, director of national intelligence under President Donald Trump, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-national-security-threat-no-1-11607019599">wrote that</a> Beijing “intends to dominate the U.S. and the rest of the planet economically, militarily and technologically.”</p>
<p>The White House’s current National Defense Strategy is not so alarmist, <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF">referring to China</a> as the U.S.’s “pacing challenge” – a reference that, <a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?c5038077/pacing-challenge">in the words</a> of Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, apparently means China has “the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the power to do so.” </p>
<p>As someone who has <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/about/staff/dan-murphy">followed China</a> for over a quarter century, I believe that many observers have overestimated the country’s apparent power. Recent <a href="https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/new-book-details-chinas-economic-rise-and-now-its-fall">challenges to China’s economy</a> have led some people to reevaluate just how powerful China is. But hurdles to the growth of Chinese power extend far beyond the economic sector – and failing to acknowledge this reality may distort how policymakers and the public view the shift of geopolitical gravity in what was once called “<a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/10/27/the-chinese-century-is-well-under-way">the Chinese century</a>.”</p>
<p>In overestimating China’s comprehensive power, the U.S. risks misallocating resources and attention, directing them toward a threat that is not as imminent as one might otherwise assume.</p>
<p>Let me be clear: I’m not suggesting that China is weak or about to collapse. Nor am I making an argument about China’s intentions. But rather, it is time to right-size the American understanding of the country’s comprehensive power. This process includes acknowledging both China’s tremendous accomplishments and its significant challenges. Doing so is, I believe, mission critical as the United States and China seek to put a floor underneath a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/15/opinion/balloon-china-taiwan-biden.html">badly damaged bilateral relationship</a>.</p>
<h2>Headline numbers</h2>
<p>Why have so many people misjudged China’s power? </p>
<p>One key reason for this misconception is that from a distance, China does indeed appear to be an unstoppable juggernaut. The high-level <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/us-china-relations-interview-graham-allison">numbers bedazzle observers</a>: Beijing commands the world’s <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/tracker/china-gdp/#:%7E:text=China%27s%20nominal%20GDP%20is%20the,States%20by%20a%20considerable%20margin.">largest or second-largest</a> economy depending on the type of measurement; it has a rapidly growing <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/the-military-balance/2024/editors-introduction/">military budget</a> and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeltnietzel/2021/08/07/us-universities-fall-behind-china-in-production-of-stem-phds/?sh=5d2ae6084606">sky-high numbers</a> of graduates in engineering and math; and oversees huge infrastructure projects – laying down nearly 20,000 miles of <a href="http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/zywj/CSTNENG/202209/P020220915789898685371.pdf">high-speed rail tracks</a> in less than a dozen years and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-20/beijing-replaces-a-huge-highway-overpass-in-only-43-hours">building bridges at record pace</a>. </p>
<p>But these eye-catching metrics don’t tell a complete story. Look under the hood and you’ll see that China faces a raft of intractable difficulties.</p>
<p>The Chinese economy, which until recently was thought of as unstoppable, is beginning to falter due to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/15/economy/deflation-explainer-us-china-economy/index.html">deflation</a>, a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-17/china-s-debt-to-gdp-ratio-rises-to-fresh-record-of-286-1">growing debt-to-gross domestic product ratio</a> and the impact of a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3253325/restructuring-specialists-boost-hong-kong-staff-china-property-crisis-stokes-demand">real estate crisis</a>. </p>
<h2>China’s other challenges</h2>
<p>And it isn’t only China’s economy that has been overestimated.</p>
<p>While Beijing has put in considerable effort building its soft power and sending its leadership around the world, China enjoys <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/07/27/chinas-approach-to-foreign-policy-gets-largely-negative-reviews-in-24-country-survey/">fewer friends</a> than one might expect, even with its willing trade partners. North Korea, Pakistan, Cambodia and Russia may count China as an important ally, but these relationships are not, I would argue, nearly as strong as those enjoyed by the United States globally. Even in the Asia-Pacific region there is a strong argument to say Washington enjoys greater sway, considering the especially close ties with <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3498451/japan-south-korea-us-strengthen-trilateral-cooperation/">allies Japan, South Korea</a> <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-australia-relationship">and Australia</a>. </p>
<p>Even though Chinese citizens report <a href="https://ash.harvard.edu/news/ash-center-researchers-release-landmark-chinese-public-opinion-study">broad support</a> for the Communist Party, Beijing’s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/how-beijing-accidentally-ended-the-zero-covid-policy/">capricious COVID-19 policies</a> paired with an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/04/chinas-xi-jinping-unwilling-to-accept-western-covid-vaccines-says-us-intelligence-chief">unwillingness to use foreign-made vaccines</a> have dented perceptions of government effectiveness. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A seated man sits at. desk while another man is seen on a TV screen." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579043/original/file-20240229-16-cm5y8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">President Joe Biden participates in a virtual meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-participates-in-a-virtual-meeting-with-news-photo/1353512956?adppopup=true">Alex Wong/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Further, China’s population is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/16/business/china-birth-rate.html">aging and unbalanced</a>. In 2016, the country of 1.4 billion saw about 18 million births; in 2023, that number dropped to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/16/business/china-birth-rate-2023.html">about 9 million</a>. This alarming fall is not only in line with trends toward a shrinking working-age population, but also perhaps <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/28/behind-china-collapse-birth-marriage-rates/">indicative of pessimism</a> among Chinese citizens about the country’s future.</p>
<p>And at times, the actions of the Chinese government read like an implicit admission that the domestic situation is not all that rosy. For example, I take it as a sign of concern over systemic risk that China detained a million or more people, as has happened with the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights">Muslim minority in Xinjiang province</a>. Similarly, China’s policing of its internet suggests <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/study-internet-censorship-reveals-deepest-fears-chinas-government">concerns over</a> collective action by its citizens. </p>
<p>The sweeping anti-corruption campaign Beijing has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/health-china-business-covid-economy-6618e65ef6148e0c75fce4dc2a28011f#">embarked on</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/sweeping-chinese-military-purge-exposes-weakness-could-widen-2023-12-30/">purges of the country’s military</a> and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/17/business/bao-fan-china-banker.html">disappearance</a> of leading business figures all hint at a government seeking to manage significant risk. </p>
<p>I hear many stories from contacts in China about people with money or influence hedging their bets by establishing a foothold outside the country. This aligns with research that has shown that <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/programs/growthpolicy/meg-rithmire-china-global-economy">in recent years</a>, on average as much money leaves China via “irregular means” as for foreign direct investment. </p>
<h2>A three-dimensional view</h2>
<p>The perception of China’s inexorable rise is cultivated by the governing Communist Party, which obsessively seeks to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-censorship-china">manufacture and control narratives</a> in state media and beyond that show it as all-knowing, farsighted and strategic. And perhaps this argument finds a receptive audience in segments of the United States concerned about its own decline.</p>
<p>It would help explain why a recent <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/americans-feel-more-threat-china-now-past-three-decades">Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey</a> found that about a third of American respondents see the Chinese and American economies as equal and another third see the Chinese economy as stronger. In reality, per capita GDP in the United States is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN-US">six times that of China</a>. </p>
<p>Of course, there is plenty of danger in predicting China’s collapse. Undoubtedly, the country has seen huge accomplishments since the People’s Republic of China’s founding in 1949: Hundreds of millions of people <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/01/17/509521619/whos-lifting-chinese-people-out-of-poverty">brought out of poverty</a>, extraordinary economic development and <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN">impressive GDP growth</a> over several decades, and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/21/china-global-influence-takeaways/">growing diplomatic clout</a>. These successes are especially noteworthy given that the People’s Republic of China is less than 75 years old and was in utter turmoil during the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion">disastrous Cultural Revolution</a> from 1966 to 1976, when intellectuals were sent to the countryside, schools stopped functioning and chaos reigned. In many cases, China’s successes merit emulation and include important lessons for developing and developed countries alike.</p>
<p>China may well be the “pacing challenge” that many in the U.S. believe. But it also faces significant internal challenges that often go under-recognized in evaluating the country’s comprehensive power.</p>
<p>And as the United States and China <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/biden-pushes-for-stable-u-s-relationship-with-china-during-summit-with-xi">seek to steady</a> a rocky relationship, it is imperative that the American public and Washington policymakers see China as fully three-dimensional – not some flat caricature that fits the needs of the moment. Otherwise, there is a risk of fanning the flames of xenophobia and neglecting opportunities for partnership that would benefit the United States.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Murphy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most Americans see China as the biggest threat to the US. But away from headline economic figures, China has a slew of challenges.Dan Murphy, Executive Director of the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2235132024-02-21T17:28:02Z2024-02-21T17:28:02ZThe 100-hour war between El Salvador and Honduras is famous for starting with a football match – the truth is more complicated<p>A recent football match in Hong Kong has flared geopolitical tensions. A sell-out crowd was left disappointed when Inter Miami’s Argentinian superstar, Lionel Messi, did not come onto the field. Their disappointment soon turned to anger as, just days later, Messi played in another game in Japan.</p>
<p>Chinese state media, Hong Kong politicians and frustrated fans interpreted the act as a sign of disrespect, suggesting that there were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2024/feb/08/lionel-messi-injury-return-japan-anger-china-benching-unfit">political reasons</a> for Messi’s absence. Two Argentina friendlies that were scheduled to take place in China in March <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/09/sport/china-cancels-argentina-match-messi-backlash-intl-hnk/index.html">have been cancelled</a>. Some Hong Kong officials have demanded an “explanation and apology” from the player, while fans <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/08/china/lionel-messi-china-backlash-hong-kong-japan-miami-intl-hnk/index.html">claimed</a> that Messi should no longer be welcome in China.</p>
<p>Football has flared up tensions before, with lasting political consequences. In 1990, a game between Zagreb’s Dinamo team and Belgrade’s Red Star <a href="https://www.croatiaweek.com/33-years-ago-today-the-most-famous-derby-never-played/">erupted into violence</a> between fans and the police. The violence is believed by some to have sparked the ensuing Croatian war of independence (1991–95). </p>
<p>But one case in particular holds the reputation for a war that was started over a series of football matches. </p>
<p>In 1969, El Salvador and neighbouring Honduras played each other three times in the qualifying stages of the 1970 Fifa World Cup. The two matches that took place in Tegucigalpa (June 8) and San Salvador (June 15) were marred by violence between fans. </p>
<p>On the same day as the third match, in Mexico City on June 29, the Salvadoran government cut diplomatic ties with Honduras. Military action began two weeks later with aerial bombardment and a ground invasion, before coming to an end after a ceasefire was negotiated four days later. For its brevity, the conflict is known as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27868774">100-hour war</a>.</p>
<p>Of course, it would be silly to look for the causes of war in an ugly tackle, or in questionable decisions by referees. More than silly, to reduce the causes of war to a football match is disrespectful to the memories of the thousands of civilians displaced and killed in the conflict. </p>
<p>For that reason, as pivotal as these matches might have been for that war, it is essential to understand the broader context in which such an escalation of conflict becomes possible.</p>
<h2>The war of the dispossessed</h2>
<p>El Salvador is a fraction of the size of Honduras. But, despite the difference in area, El Salvador has a much larger population. At the start of the 20th century, Salvadoran farmers began migrating to Honduras in large numbers, primarily because of the greater availability of land across the border.</p>
<p>By the 1960s, the issue of land ownership had fuelled social tension in Honduras against the large population of Salvadoran migrants. The National Federation of Farmers and Livestock Farmers of Honduras was created to promote a land reform aimed at <a href="https://html.rincondelvago.com/la-guerra-no-fue-de-futbol_eddy-jimenez-perez.html">expelling Salvadoran peasants</a> from Honduran land. </p>
<p>This allowed large property owners, including foreign companies like the US-based United Fruit Company, to increase their ownership share of arable land. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map of Central America." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Honduras is roughly five times as large as El Salvador.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/central-america-map-150994196">Rainer Lesniewski/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After a coup in 1963, the then Honduran president, General Oswaldo López Arellano, pursued the interests of these agrarian elites through the suppression of political opposition and systematic institutionalised violence. </p>
<p>Arellano’s brutal repression of peasant movements, with a specific nationalist sentiment mobilised against Salvadorans, <a href="https://catalogosiidca.csuca.org/Record/UCR.000022943/Description">caused the displacement</a> of thousands of rural workers in the years before those football matches. This is why <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/87/3/889/95948?redirectedFrom=fulltext">research</a> on the topic usually refers to the conflict as the “war of the dispossessed”. </p>
<h2>Escalating conflict</h2>
<p>The level of violence against Salvadorans led the government in San Salvador to formally accuse Honduras of genocide. The <a href="https://www.diariocolatino.com/una-guerra-breve-y-amarga/">communication</a> sent by the Salvadoran chancellor to inform Tegucigalpa of the severed diplomatic ties in 1969 clearly frames the conflict in these broader terms.</p>
<p>“In this republic [Honduras] there is still … homicide, humiliation and violation of women, dispossession, persecution, and mass expulsion that have targeted thousands of Salvadorans due simply to their nationality, in events that have no precedents in Central America, nor in America as a whole.”</p>
<p>The football matches simply added a mobilising element that contributed to escalating an already existing conflict. The number of displaced Salvadoran peasants after the conflict reached hundreds of thousands. After the ceasefire, El Salvador had to deal with this large population of refugees. </p>
<p>The conflict also increased the Salvadoran nationalistic sentiment and the political role of the armed forces, setting the stage for the political disputes in the 1970s that would culminate in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/El-Salvador/Civil-war">Salvadoran civil war</a> in 1979.</p>
<p>Many of the Salvadoran refugees already had experience of political organisation from the land disputes in Honduras and ended up joining the <a href="https://prism.librarymanagementcloud.co.uk/port/items/686599?query=el+salvador+civil+war&resultsUri=items%3Fquery%3Del%2Bsalvador%2Bcivil%2Bwar">Farabundo Martí Popular Forces of Liberation</a>. This was a faction of the Salvadoran Communist Party that later became a left-wing military organisation with support from Cuba and the Soviet Union.</p>
<h2>Messi will not start a war in China</h2>
<p>The idea that football started a war is misguided. The violence in those matches in 1969 would not have escalated without the broader sociopolitical context of violent dispossession. Lacking a similar context, the declarations of frustrated fans who expected to see Messi in Hong Kong will not escalate. </p>
<p>This is not to say that football lacks political relevance. The inflamed reaction by fans and Chinese authorities shows the effect that a political statement (or one perceived as such) by a celebrity can have on global politics. Messi himself recently published a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/sports/soccer/messi-sets-record-straight-over-hong-kong-absence-2024-02-19/">statement</a> on Weibo (China’s most popular microblogging site) denying any political motivation for not playing in Hong Kong. </p>
<p>Messi has avoided getting involved with politics, especially during Argentina’s heated general election in 2023. But others have done the opposite. Perhaps former Chelsea striker Didier Drogba <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/52072592">calling</a> for a ceasefire in Ivory Coast in 2007 can serve as an inspiring example of how footballers can use their popularity to influence global politics and even stop wars.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223513/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pedro Dutra Salgado does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Messi will not start a war in China, but this is not to say that football lacks political relevance.Pedro Dutra Salgado, Lecturer in International Relations, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2232872024-02-11T23:38:54Z2024-02-11T23:38:54ZPakistan’s post-election crisis – how anti-army vote may deliver an unstable government that falls into the military’s hands<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574783/original/file-20240211-22-hgfmzj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C567%2C5459%2C3083&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Like at this pro-PTI protest, the smoke has yet to clear following Pakistan's election.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-khans-pakistan-tehreek-e-insaf-party-run-from-news-photo/1995105733?adppopup=true">M Asim Khan/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68226228">Pakistan’s heavily anticipated general election</a> took place on Feb. 8, 2024, with citizens of the South Asian country hoping that it might prove a step toward ending the nation’s political uncertainty.</em></p>
<p><em>But several days later, it remains unclear what the result of the vote will yield. Both of the leading contenders <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/10/pakistans-khan-sharif-claim-election-win-despite-no-clear-majority">have claimed victory</a>, amid allegations of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/be2925f4-8cb6-41fc-ae07-b00a6493014d">vote rigging and disputed ballots</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation spoke with <a href="https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/faculty/ayesha-jalal">Ayesha Jalal, an expert on Pakistan’s political history</a> who teaches at Tufts University, about what the results of the election mean and what could happen next.</em></p>
<h2>Is it clear who will govern Pakistan next?</h2>
<p>The results as they stand mean that no party is in a position to form a government on its own. So a coalition government at the federal level is unavoidable.</p>
<p>And this is where things get tricky. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, or PTI – headed by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-19844270">jailed former prime minister and Pakistani cricket hero Imran Khan</a> – has emerged as the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/10/what-comes-next-2">largest party in the national assembly</a>, with around 93 candidates winning seats as “independents.” They had to run as independents because the party was <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-s-pti-barred-from-using-cricket-bat-electoral-symbol-/7439552.html">barred from using its electoral symbol</a>, a cricket bat, after a three-member bench of the supreme court ruled that PTI had failed to hold intraparty elections in line with its constitution.</p>
<p>But with a total of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-vote-counts-drags-after-election-marred-by-attacks-outages-2024-02-09/">265 seats in parliament</a>, that means the PTI is still well short of the number needed to form a government on its own.</p>
<p>The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, or PMLN, came in second with 78 seats, a tally that is likely to be boosted by the addition of PMLN-aligned independent members of parliament. The party – headed by Shahbaz Sharif, who took over from Khan as prime minister in 2022, and his brother, former three-time prime minister Nawaz Sharif – is thought to have the <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/pakistan-army-chief-backs-ex-pm-nawaz-sharifs-call-to-form-coalition-government/articleshow/107587628.cms?from=mdr">backing of the powerful Pakistani army</a>, but it did not perform as well as expected in the election.</p>
<p>The Pakistan People’s Party, or PPP, secured 54 seats, placing it third. This puts it in a position to help another party form a coalition at the federal level.</p>
<h2>With the most seats, is the PTI the front-runner to lead a coalition?</h2>
<p>The PTI has made it clear that it wants to form a government on its own and believes that its mandate was stolen. </p>
<p>Even before the final election results became known, the <a href="https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/imran-khans-party-claims-victory-in-170-seats-vows-to-form-government-report-5032101">PTI claimed it had won 170 or so seats</a> – enough for it to be able to form a government. But that appears to be without evidence.</p>
<p>This suggests the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/2/11/pakistan-election-results-live-wait-for-final-tally-three-days-after-vote">PTI isn’t ready to accept</a> that it did not get enough votes to form a government outright. The party instead is challenging the results, claiming that its vote was suppressed illegally, and the PTI has already formally registered complaints in 18 constituencies. </p>
<p>I believe it is more likely that a coalition will emerge between the other parties, led by the PMLN. But the question is whether that will satisfy an electorate that voted the PTI as the largest party in parliament.</p>
<h2>That doesn’t sound very stable. Is it?</h2>
<p>It isn’t. Pakistan is now entering an uncertain scenario, which is, in effect, a post-election political crisis.</p>
<p>Coalitions are not uncommon in Pakistan’s politics, but they are not easy to manage. They can <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/pakistans-new-government-struggles-consolidate-control">become unwieldy</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/AtlanticCouncil/status/1756069234101133713">weak</a> and <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/10/military-disrupts-pakistan-s-democracy-once-again-pub-89724">prone to manipulation</a>.</p>
<p>It also makes it far harder for any government to push through the kind of bold economic packages needed for the country to move forward and escape the deep structural problems that are ailing the economy, such as a <a href="https://www.theigc.org/blogs/taxing-effectively/why-does-pakistan-tax-so-little">limited tax base</a> and reliance on handouts from other countries. Tackling that requires hard, potentially unpopular decisions, which are more difficult when a government is split and has a limited popular mandate.</p>
<p>The country may need another national vote before too long to secure a more stable and workable government.</p>
<h2>The election has been called flawed in the West. Is that fair?</h2>
<p>By Pakistan’s standards, the actual polling went off relatively peacefully. There was a terrible attack in the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240118-baluchistan-explosive-region-on-iran-pakistan-borderland">restive province of Baluchistan</a> on the eve of the election that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68226516">killed 28 people</a>. But fears of widespread violence on the day of the election did not materialize.</p>
<p>And while there were undue <a href="https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-election-human-rights-commission-khan-3258e2131ac83e89c2c376b476caccec">curbs on political activity</a> in the <a href="https://www.apstylebook.com/search?query=runup&button=">run-up</a> to the elections, the election itself appears to be largely credible by Pakistani standards, as the country’s foreign ministry has been <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-02-10/pakistan-hits-back-at-criticism-of-election-conduct-and-insists-cellphone-curbs-were-necessary">quick to attest</a>. </p>
<p>The fact that the PTI, a party that is out of favor with Pakistan’s current senior military leadership, has done so well suggests there was no straightforward rigging across the board. There was harassment of PTI voters in some places, but it clearly wasn’t sufficient to make huge inroads into their overall vote.</p>
<p>One can’t compare Pakistan’s democracy with that of the U.S. or any other country. The problem with many outside observers of Pakistan’s politics is that they talk normatively – that is, they see Pakistan’s elections through the eyes of what is generally seen as the norm elsewhere.</p>
<p>But Pakistani politics are unique. The country is a military-dominated state, with generals that have long been involved in the country’s politics – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/04/world/asia/pakistan-election-imran-khan.html">and elections</a>.</p>
<p>But the alternative to managed elections, no matter how messy, is martial law. And a flawed democracy is better than the military jackboot.</p>
<p>More than that, the election itself took place relatively peacefully. There has been a great deal of criticism in the West about <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/8/inherently-undemocratic-pakistan-suspends-mobile-services-on-voting-day">cellphones and mobile internet services being blocked</a> on election day. That may seem like unacceptable interference in the electoral process to outside observers. But in Pakistan, there was <a href="https://france24.com/en/20121123-pakistan-suspends-mobile-phone-service-security-ashura-shiite-terrorism">real concern about cellphones</a> being used to detonate explosive devices.</p>
<h2>Will anyone be pleased with the election result?</h2>
<p>Ironically, while the PTI’s strong showing represents an anti-establishment vote – and, more specifically, an anti-army vote – the divided national mandate means the army high command has reason to be satisfied with the outcome.</p>
<p>A split national assembly and weak government plays into the military’s hands. Should the PMLN govern as the major party in a coalition, it will be in a position of relative weakness and will need the army’s support, especially if the PTI engages in widespread protests against the election results. </p>
<h2>Are there any positives from the election?</h2>
<p>Yes, insofar as the process of seeking the peoples’ support has been allowed to continue. But the negatives are seen by most to outweigh the positives and the 2024 elections are being viewed as equally – if not more – manipulated and controlled than the 2018 exercise. </p>
<p>The turnout this time around is <a href="https://www.nation.com.pk/10-Feb-2024/voters-turnout-remain-48-percent-in-election-fafen-report">estimated to be around 48%</a>, which is lower than in 2018 when it was 51%. The demographic breakdown is encouraging. The youth played a crucial role; 44% of voters were under the age of 35. And women, too, played a larger role in the vote – more women contested and also won seats.</p>
<p>And party politics aside, the result suggests that old tactics to intimidate and suppress voters largely didn’t work. The expectation was that the spate of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/main-criminal-cases-against-pakistans-imran-khan-2024-01-31/">legal verdicts against Khan</a> just weeks before the election and his continued imprisonment might curb his popularity and mean PTI supporters would stay home. That clearly didn’t happen.</p>
<p>But what they helped deliver may only help continue Pakistan’s political malaise as it heads into a new, uncertain period.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223287/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ayesha Jalal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The PTI, the party of jailed former prime minister Imran Khan, won the most seats of any one party – but fell short of reaching the threshold for a majority government.Ayesha Jalal, Professor of History, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2214572024-01-24T13:29:26Z2024-01-24T13:29:26ZDomestic woes put Kim Jong Un on the defensive – and the offensive – in the Korean Peninsula<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570985/original/file-20240123-29-kr6fby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C3595%2C2396&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on a screen at the Seoul Railway Station on Aug. 24, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-watch-a-television-broadcast-showing-a-file-image-of-news-photo/1634983526?adppopup=true">Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kim Jong Un has had a busy and bellicose start to 2024. </p>
<p>On Jan. 14, the North Korean leader presided over the test of a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-defines-south-korea-most-hostile-state-kcna-2024-01-09/">new solid-fuel hypersonic missile with intermediate range</a>.” Two days later, during a speech at the Supreme People’s Assembly meeting in Pyongyang, Kim declared South Korea “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/16/asia/north-korea-kim-unification-arch-intl-hnk/index.html">the North’s primary foe and invariable principal enemy</a>.” He also vowed to “<a href="https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/north-korea-to-destroy-inter-korean-links-redefine-borders-in-constitution/">purge unification language from the constitution</a>” and called for the destruction of “inter-Korean symbols,” such as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-tears-down-monument-symbolizing-union-with-south-report-2024-01-23/">Arch of Reunification monument</a>, which has since been torn down in Pyongyang.</p>
<p>Then Kim went a step further: He spoke of war. </p>
<p>Noting that while North Korea does not want conflict, the communist country nevertheless had no “<a href="https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/north-korea-to-destroy-inter-korean-links-redefine-borders-in-constitution/">intention of avoiding it</a>.” Kim went on to disclose the North’s plans to “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-calls-change-status-south-warns-war-2024-01-15/">occupy, subjugate and reclaim</a>” South Korea in the event of war. </p>
<p>Kim’s remarks served to escalate inter-Korean tensions in a way familiar to observers of relations on the peninsula, <a href="https://www.ubalt.edu/cpa/faculty/alphabetical-directory/nusta-carranza-ko.cfm">like myself</a>. Kim has a tendency to issue threats directed at the South <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/new-year-same-old-story-korean-peninsula-2024">at regular intervals</a>. </p>
<p>The difference, this time, was the backstory behind Kim’s threats. Understanding that shines a light on North Koreans’ awareness of deficiencies in their leadership – and on Kim’s desire to deflect from domestic problems.</p>
<h2>A train wreck</h2>
<p>On Jan. 16, 2024, <a href="https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/trainaccident-01162024092147.html">Radio Free Asia</a> published a news story about a train accident in North Korea. According to the outlet, a Hamkyung Province-bound passenger train departing from Pyongyang overturned due to a power shortage while traveling up a steep slope on Dec. 26, 2023.</p>
<p>North Korean passenger trains typically <a href="https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/trainaccident-01162024092147.html">consist of nine to 11 carriages</a>, with the first two carriages reserved for high-level government officials. In this accident, the last seven carriages – loaded with everyday Koreans – derailed, according to reports. It is believed that <a href="https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25222782#home">hundreds died as a result</a>.</p>
<p>The details of the accident remain murky because news in North Korea is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16255126">tightly controlled</a>. Some <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1NuHt88WV8">South Korean reports</a> suggest that it may have been a bus and not a train accident. But Kim was careful to point out the need to “<a href="https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25222782#home">improve safety of train rides</a>, during his Jan. 16 address, lending further weight to the train accident account.</p>
<h2>From crash to war threats</h2>
<p>The reported accident comes at a time of increased <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/19/north-korean-defectors-to-south-tripled-in-2023-seoul-says">awareness and discontent</a> among North Koreans that their leadership is not doing much to improve conditions, address the <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/North-Korea-struggles-with-food-shortage-despite-import-rebound">scarcity of resources</a> or enhance the safety of average citizens. This is particularly true for those who are not part of the <a href="https://www.bushcenter.org/freedom-collection/kim-seong-min-songbun">ruling elite</a>. </p>
<p>In various surveys conducted by human rights groups of <a href="https://nkdb.org/publication/?q=YToxOntzOjEyOiJrZXl3b3JkX3R5cGUiO3M6MzoiYWxsIjt9&bmode=view&idx=6613026&t=board">North Koreans who have fled to South Korea</a>, escapees mentioned both the dire living conditions of average North Koreans and the gap between their lives and those of high-level government officials.</p>
<p>The current crisis facing North Koreans may not be as acute as the <a href="https://www.38north.org/2023/01/food-insecurity-in-north-korea-is-at-its-worst-since-the-1990s-famine">period of severe famine</a> during the 1990s, during which an estimated
<a href="https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/7850/1/0000599140.pdf">600,000 to 1 million</a> people died.</p>
<p>But power shortages and food insecurity continue to blight North Koreans. The United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on North Korean Human Rights <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15387.doc.htm">highlighted in a 2023 report</a> conditions in which "some people are starving” and others are dying “"due to a combination of malnutrition, diseases and lack of access to health care.”</p>
<p>In such circumstances, the train accident may serve as a catalyst or focal point for discontent.</p>
<p>As social change scholar Jack Goldstone has noted, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780199858507.003.0002">societal unrest builds on</a> “some form of increasingly widespread popular anger at injustice” and when people feel “they are losing their proper place in society for reasons that are not inevitable and not their fault.”</p>
<h2>A master of deflection</h2>
<p>Worryingly for Kim, disquiet over both the train crash report and food and energy shortages comes as North Korea enters what experts have noted is “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-power-structure">a critical period of change</a>” in the state. Kim is faced with a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/music-ap-top-news-north-korea-international-news-kim-jong-un-32ef1db725824060bbed9074128d6875">younger generation</a> more used to market economics – typified by the “<a href="https://austriancenter.com/north-korea-black-markets-saving-lives/">jangmadang” black markets</a> – and with greater access to external information. This clashes with the regime’s official ideology of economic <a href="https://www.time.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/korea1.pdf">self-reliance, or “juche</a>,” and an isolationist approach that cuts off much of the outside world.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A missile is seen being fired into the air trailed by a plume of smoke." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspecting the launch of a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/at-seouls-yongsan-railway-station-shows-north-korean-leader-news-photo/1859975434?adppopup=true">Kim Jae-Hwan/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Kim is aware of this new frontier in governance. To confront it, he has readopted the “<a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/byungjin.htm">byungjin” policy</a> he first rolled out in 2013 — a two-pillared approach based on building up both the military and the economy in a bid to reduce chances for domestic discontent. </p>
<p>To successfully carry out this policy, Kim has had to become a master of deflection.</p>
<p>He is aware that the train incident comes amid <a href="https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/peoplecontrol-01162024091639.html">discontent and protest</a> over policies that have seen increased government surveillance and people’s homes raided over suspicion of anti-socialist tendencies.</p>
<p>As such, Kim appears to be deflecting domestic anger by signaling war and creating uncertainty for North Koreans’ future. This is similar to what <a href="https://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Economics/Seminarsevents/Guriev-Micro.pdf">scholars explain</a> is a characteristic of new-style dictators who “manipulate beliefs” about the state of the world to make it look like outside threats are greater than domestic problems.</p>
<h2>International playbook</h2>
<p>The truth is, for Kim this deflection appears to be working. The war rhetoric has resulted in U.S., Japan and South Korea conducting combined naval exercises involving <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/us-south-korea-japan-conduct-naval-drills-tensions-106434423">American aircraft carriers</a>. Meanwhile, North Korea sent its foreign minister to Russia to cultivate bilateral relations that involve North Korean <a href="https://www.voakorea.com/a/7444240.html">weaponry used in the war against Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>No one – North Korean news outlets, foreign journalists or world leaders – is mentioning the hundreds of people that likely died in the train accident, or those starving in the country.</p>
<p>Kim’s deflection also has an intended audience outside of North Korea itself: U.S. politicians and the South Korean public.</p>
<p>The Biden administration has <a href="https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1089850.html">adopted a more hawkish</a> stance toward North Korea, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/13/trump-north-korea-nuclear-weapons-plan-00131469">moving closer to allies</a> Japan and South Korea to ensure a coordinated approach to North Korea. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Biden’s likely challenger in the upcoming presidential vote is Donald Trump – who as president met Kim during a 2018 Singapore summit and has since touted the idea of allowing North Korea to keep its nuclear weapons while offering financial incentives to <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/13/trump-north-korea-nuclear-weapons-plan-00131469">stop making new bombs</a>.</p>
<p>Trump has stressed how much he has gotten to know the North Korean leader and the “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/09/trump-book-kim-jong-un-00086410">great relationship</a>” he has formed with him. There is a scenario where Kim’s belligerent rhetoric could be seized by Trump as evidence that Biden’s approach is not working.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, South Korea’s legislative <a href="https://www.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no=2024011601070130103001">elections are also impacted</a> by Kim’s deflection tactics. The declaration of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/16/asia/north-korea-kim-unification-arch-intl-hnk/index.html">South Korea as the “enemy</a>,” and the launch of missiles are designed, in part, to influence the South Korean public’s perception about security on the peninsula. </p>
<p>Evans Revere, a former State Department official, explains that Kim’s remarks are “<a href="https://www.voakorea.com/a/7443247.html">designed to exploit political divisions</a>” in South Korea. In this kind of environment of war rhetoric, voters could be persuaded to support political parties that stress engagement and are less likely to support current President Yoon Suk Yeol’s party’s <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/South-Korea-picks-hard-liner-as-new-North-Korea-point-man">hardline approach</a> to North Korean matters.</p>
<p>For Kim, a South Korean legislative body that is willing to tolerate his whims is more favorable than one critical of its regime, as is a friendlier man in the White House.</p>
<p>Kim Jong Un’s deflection certainly has more than one audience, but only one aim: to keep him in power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221457/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ñusta Carranza Ko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Amid signs of growing domestic disquiet over his repressive regime, North Korea’s leader is trying to deflect scrutiny by upping war rhetoric.Ñusta Carranza Ko, Assistant Professor of Global Affairs and Human Security, University of BaltimoreLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2213012024-01-19T13:40:58Z2024-01-19T13:40:58ZBeijing may have brokered a fragile truce in northern Myanmar – but it can’t mask China’s inability to influence warring parties<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570235/original/file-20240118-17-o51ffm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C6%2C4514%2C3002&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the rebel Ta'ang National Liberation Army standing guard in Shan state, Myanmar.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-photo-taken-on-december-13-2023-shows-members-of-news-photo/1851374184?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myanmar-ceasefire-breaks-down-01172024054526.html">shaky agreement to end fighting</a> in northern Myanmar has served to highlight concerns in Beijing over the ongoing unrest – and the limits of <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/12/chinas-influence-increases-amid-myanmars-instability">China’s power to influence</a> the <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-violence-in-myanmar-is-worsening-amid-fierce-resistance-and-international-ambivalence-203646">ongoing civil war</a>.</p>
<p>On Jan. 12, 2024, China announced that it had <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3248278/china-brokers-myanmar-ceasefire-urges-junta-and-rebel-militia-exercise-maximum-restraint">brokered a cease-fire</a> between the Myanmar military and a trio of ethnic armies, known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance.</p>
<p>There is, however, one caveat: The agreement only applies to the northern Shan state. The state has seen <a href="https://isdp.se/publication/return-to-war-militarized-conflicts-northern-shan-state">conflict since Myanmar’s independence in 1948</a>, and especially after <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/05/chinas-relations-burma">the once-Beijing-backed</a> Burma Communist Party established its headquarters there in 1968 and engaged the country’s army in a prolonged war.</p>
<p>It is also a region where opposition to Myanmar’s military government has had the most success in the current civil war. Since launching a fresh push against the Myanmar military on Oct. 27, 2023, the alliance has captured one town in Shan state <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/conflicts-in-numbers/33-towns-in-80-days-mapping-the-gains-of-myanmars-anti-junta-offensives.html">every three days</a>, according to media reports.</p>
<p>And despite the China-brokered agreement, <a href="https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20240115_33/">sporadic fighting has continued</a> in Shan state. Meanwhile, the truce has done nothing to end the civil war outside the state.</p>
<p>But that might not be the point: The agreement brokered by Beijing is, I believe, more about trying to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/09/myanmar-china-border-offensive-cyberscams-three-brotherhood-alliance/">safeguard the interests of China</a> than about ushering in elusive peace to Myanmar. Beijing has increasingly been concerned over the threat of Myanmar’s turmoil spilling over into China.</p>
<p>Indeed, a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b5f830f7-8aec-4862-832c-c68f81fac49f">statement by the Chinese foreign ministry</a> announcing the truce noted that both sides in the conflict had “committed to not harming the safety of Chinese border residents and personnel involved in projects in Myanmar.”</p>
<p>There are clear reasons why China would like to see peace in Myanmar. The destabilized northern region has become <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/19/china/myanmar-conflict-china-scam-centers-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html">a haven for Chinese criminal gangs</a> that traffic humans and drugs, and run online scams from across the border. Meanwhile, the war has <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-border-trade-falls-100-million-in-april-december-amid-clashes.html">blocked trade routes</a> and seen Chinese citizens in border towns increasingly put at risk.</p>
<p><iframe id="RWA6y" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/RWA6y/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Military under siege</h2>
<p>Regardless of China’s desire to see the truce hold, there appears little chance of that happening. Myanmar’s army has faced major losses since fighting began in 2021, sparked by a coup in which the country’s generals <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/myanmar-news-protests-coup.html">overthrew the democratically elected government</a>. Since then, a <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-violence-in-myanmar-is-worsening-amid-fierce-resistance-and-international-ambivalence-203646">fierce resistance movement</a> has emerged across Myanmar – one the generals have failed to subdue.</p>
<p>The recent truce has done little to end the violence, opposition successes or the threat to China. A day after the cease-fire was announced, one member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the Arakan Army, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67982635">captured Paletwa</a>, a border town with India in the west of Myanmar. Meanwhile, the Kachin Independence Army <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/myanmar-junta-loses-battalion-hq-fighter-jet-hundreds-of-troops-in-two-days.html">shot down a China-made fighter jet</a> – the third one in just a few weeks – and the Myanmar army lost control of one of its division headquarters in the cease-fire area.</p>
<p>In southeast regions of Myanmar bordering Thailand, the <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/in-person/interview/operation-1111-close-to-securing-all-of-kayah-state-for-myanmar-resistance.html">Karenni Nationalities Defense Forces</a> and allied fighters launched “Operation 1111,” expanding their territorial and administrative control in the region. And in the central plains, the People’s Defense Forces, an umbrella resistance group, continues to engage in guerrilla warfare against the military. </p>
<h2>Dwindling Chinese influence</h2>
<p>In the context of the sprawling civil war, China has found itself in uncharted territory. </p>
<p>In the past, China has been able to exert its influence over Myanmar’s politics. But the civil war has seen the emergence of new resistance groups, such as the People’s Defense Forces, most of whose members are younger than the soldiers in established armies. And they have no intention of entering any agreement with the Myanmar military – despite the entreaties of Beijing.</p>
<p>Moreover, these new groups have made strategic and logistic links beyond Myanmar’s borders, giving them access to smuggled arms and supplies.</p>
<p>As such, China’s influence over Myanmar is constrained. This is even more so given the ethno-nationalism underpinning much of the fighting in Myanmar. Chinese efforts to end the fighting do little to provide solutions to tie the disparate ethnic groups in Myanmar together. In fact, the one thing binding the ethnic groups that form the Three Brotherhood Alliance is the common goal of defeating the Myanmar army.</p>
<p>In addition, the safety of Chinese citizens in regions across the Myanmar border cannot be guaranteed by the cease-fire agreement with the military. The army’s inability to tackle criminal gangs in Shan state prior to civil war suggests that even without warfare, the region will continue to pose a threat to China.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, China’s relationship with, and influence over, groups in northern Myanmar has changed as a result of the civil war.</p>
<p>Take the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/tag/myanmar-national-democratic-alliance-army-mndaa/">Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army</a> (MNDAA), a resistance group in the Kokang region that borders China’s Yunnan province and shares linguistic and cultural ties with China. Since being formed in 1989, its support has switched back and forth from the Myanmar government to the resistance groups – as has China’s.</p>
<p>But the MNDAA cannot be viewed as a vassal state of China. </p>
<p>In 2019, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/16/what-is-myanmars-three-brotherhood-alliance-thats-resisting-the-military">MNDAA joined the Three Brotherhood Alliance</a> with the Arakan Army and Ta'ang National Liberation Army, groups with different cultural and linguistic backgrounds.</p>
<p>China’s diplomacy and influence over the Three Brotherhood Alliance is limited: A truce threatens the unity that the group has developed in opposition to the military.</p>
<p>And there is little incentive among the Three Brotherhood Alliance to stop fighting at a time when it appears to be on the front foot, and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65743887">morale among Myanmar’s soldiers is low</a>. </p>
<p>Entering the truce is in itself risky for the alliance, as it may threaten the group’s standing with other armed groups – many of whom China never dealt with until 2021.</p>
<h2>Losing faith in the military</h2>
<p>As such, Beijing’s power to influence Myanmar’s ethnic resistance groups is limited. But there is another reason why the truce Beijing brokered may not hold: Beijing’s desire to give any support to the military government has its limits, too.</p>
<p>China is losing patience with the Myanmar military, which has failed to crack down on criminal gangs that have targeted Chinese citizens. As many as <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/hundreds-thousands-trafficked-work-online-scammers-se-asia-says-un-report">120,000 people</a>, many of them Chinese citizens, have been trafficked into Myanmar by these organizations to help <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2024/1/18/24041696/cyberscams-myanmar-china-pig-butchering">operate online scams</a>.</p>
<p>China’s default position on Myanmar has traditionally been to support whoever is in power. And Beijing had a good relationship with the democratic government under Aung San Suu Kyi prior to the 2021 coup.</p>
<p>The corruption and non-governability of Myanmar’s border towns since then threaten the safety of Chinese citizens and undermines any faith China has in the military’s ability to deliver stability.</p>
<p>If Myanmar’s military cannot stabilize northern Myanmar, China is in a difficult situation. The status quo – with the Myanmar military in power, but unable to subdue resistance movements – will continue to present a threat to China.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221301/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tharaphi Than does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Beijing is losing patience with Myanmar’s military, as well as its influence with resistance groups.Tharaphi Than, Associate Professor of World Cultures and Languages, Northern Illinois UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2209262024-01-16T14:55:36Z2024-01-16T14:55:36ZWhy South Korea is banning the sale of dog meat<p>The South Korean dog meat trade will officially end in 2027 after a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/09/south-korea-votes-to-ban-production-and-sale-of-dog-meat">bill was passed</a> making the slaughter of dogs and the sale of dog meat for human consumption illegal in the country (though the consumption of dog meat will still be legal). People who violate this new law could be fined up to 30 million won (about £18,000) and be jailed for three years.</p>
<p>The news has been embraced in South Korea as a long-awaited victory by many animal protection organisations. But it has also been received very negatively by pro-dog-meat associations, as the livelihoods of dog meat farmers and retailers will be directly affected by this legislation. </p>
<p>Dog meat is the <a href="https://www.press.purdue.edu/9781612497075/">fourth-most consumed meat</a> in South Korea after pork, beef and chicken. However, the practice of eating dogs has been in sharp decline over the past few decades and has divided South Korean society for more than half a century. </p>
<p>For some, the trade represents resistance against cultural imperialism. For others, it is an obstacle to modernity. All the while, little attention is given to the fate of other animals whose death and commodification as meat are largely normalised and accepted.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A bowl of dog meat soup." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569279/original/file-20240115-23-jei9my.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569279/original/file-20240115-23-jei9my.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569279/original/file-20240115-23-jei9my.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569279/original/file-20240115-23-jei9my.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569279/original/file-20240115-23-jei9my.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569279/original/file-20240115-23-jei9my.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569279/original/file-20240115-23-jei9my.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bosintang is a traditional Korean soup that uses dog meat as its primary ingredient.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/boshintang-korean-soup-that-includes-dog-499106899">Fanfo/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Stigmatisation of a practice</h2>
<p>Dog consumption has a long history in Korea. Some Korean scholars point to the excavation of dog bones from Korean relics dating to the Neolithic age (roughly from 6000BC to 2000BC) as <a href="https://www.press.purdue.edu/9781612497075/">evidence</a> that dogs have been eaten since at least that period.</p>
<p>But an important moment of national and international friction around the practice occurred in the run-up to the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. The South Korean government at the time <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/D/bo3637968.html">banned the sale</a> of dog meat temporarily in the traditional markets of the capital and asked dog meat retailers to remove dog carcasses from their stalls to avoid offending foreigners. </p>
<p>This decision was <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10649867.2018.1547959">widely criticised</a> by part of South Korean civil society who saw it as a form of cultural imperialism reminiscent of colonial times when many Korean cultural traditions were erased or stigmatised. This episode aroused feelings of national pride and protection towards the consumption of dog meat.</p>
<p>It was followed by a stronger reaction during the 2002 Fifa World Cup (which was co-hosted by South Korea). Influential South Korean public and political figures <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/629658">took a public stance</a> in favour of dog meat as a national cultural symbol. </p>
<p>Tensions were further reignited before the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, a city in the country’s north-east. It was <a href="https://koreandogs.org/pc2018-sign-project/">reported</a> that the hiding of dog meat restaurant signs and dog carcasses had once again been introduced by the government. </p>
<h2>A practice in sharp decline</h2>
<p>However, there’s no denying that dog meat consumption in South Korea has slumped dramatically, particularly since 2000. In 2002, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07256868.2010.491272">3 million dogs</a> were slaughtered for consumption in South Korea per year. According to animal protection group, Kara, this had fallen to <a href="https://www.animals.or.kr/report/press/51382">just under 1 million</a> by the early 2020s – a third of what it was more than 20 years ago. </p>
<p>In recent decades, a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07256868.2010.491272">civil movement</a> led by animal protection charities has campaigned for the end of the trade. This movement has largely been supported by younger generations who, perhaps also influenced by the development of “pet culture”, are more inclined to challenge centuries of tradition than previous generations.</p>
<p>It could be argued that the COVID pandemic has also played a part in the sharp fall in dog meat consumption in recent years. Until the outbreak of COVID, live animals, including dogs, were often sold and slaughtered in traditional markets. Since then, municipal authorities have opened a dialogue with dog retailers to negotiate the demolition of dog slaughtering facilities. </p>
<p>Ongoing research conducted by one of us (Julien Dugnoille) alongside colleagues (Frédéric Keck and Miwon Seo-Plu) suggests that the pandemic may have facilitated a move away from the status quo on dog meat consumption. This shift has created a discussion around the end of the practice as a way to keep urban spaces free from the risk of diseases that can be spread between animals and humans.</p>
<h2>The perspective of the dog farmers</h2>
<p>Since 2014, some of these municipalities have agreed to compensate dog meat retailers for closing dog meat stalls in traditional markets. However, now that a full ban is coming into effect, dog meat farmers are requesting compensation schemes as this new law will directly affect their livelihoods.</p>
<p>The Korean Dog Meat Association has been <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/12/113_364963.html">arguing</a> that the bill represents an abuse of power that overlooks the perspective of many South Koreans, and that it infringes on the right to choose what one wants to eat. Last December, the Association demanded compensation for farmers of 2 million won per individual dog (about £1,200) and a grace period of ten years after the ban.</p>
<p>While the ban may be good news for Korean dogs, dog lovers and for animal protectionists, it adversely affects those whose livelihoods depend on the domestic trade and who have practised the profession for generations. </p>
<p>The change does not necessarily mean an end to the consumption of dog meat in South Korea. Dog meat consumption will continue to be lawful (presumably supplied by imported meat). </p>
<p>Still, this is a milestone for the Korean relation to dogs that cements the dog’s privileged status, in contrast to other animals whose commodification as meat remains normalised and invisible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220926/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julien Dugnoille received funding from the Korea Foundation and the Academy of Korean Studies to conduct part of the research on which this paper is based.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Knight does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new law has been introduced that officially brings dog meat to an end as a commodity in South Korea.Julien Dugnoille, Senior Lecturer in Anthropology, University of ExeterJohn Knight, Reader in Anthropology and Ethnomusicology, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2198102024-01-14T03:14:37Z2024-01-14T03:14:37ZIn re-electing its government, Taiwan has kept the status quo, but the victory hides a transformed political landscape<p>After months of intense campaigning, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) emerged victorious in the 2024 Taiwan presidential election, securing an historic third consecutive term. However, the party’s dominance has gone from absolute to relative; it secured only 40% of the presidential votes, and fell short of retaining the majority of legislative seats. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Kuomintang (KMT) failed to retake the presidency as well as the majority of legislative seats. The remaining seats are held by Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). </p>
<p>The Taiwan People’s Party, despite occupying third place in the Legislative Yuan with eight seats, achieved a remarkable 26% in the presidential race, punching above its weight considering its limited resources and recent formation. </p>
<p>These results signify a shift in Taiwan’s political landscape. The long-standing two-party system appears to be transitioning into a messy three-party dynamic. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwanese-election-may-determine-whether-beijing-opts-to-force-the-issue-of-reunification-217955">Taiwanese election may determine whether Beijing opts to force the issue of reunification</a>
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<h2>Why is there a third-party rise?</h2>
<p>While the Democratic Progressive Party’s third consecutive presidential term may seem like a victory, cracks in the foundation of Taiwan’s political landscape are widening. </p>
<p>The roots of this instability stretch <a href="https://www.ajpor.org/article/77478-still-aquamarine-china-factor-and-the-2020-election-revisited">back to 2020</a>, where anti-establishment sentiment simmered beneath the surface, even as the China factor dominated headlines. This time, the discontent is boiling over.</p>
<p>The Democratic Progressive government, once riding a wave of youthful support, now faces accusations of <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-amidst-the-division-a-third-wave-emerges/">power abuse</a> and, crucially, a failure to address the very issues that propelled them to power in 2016; skyrocketing housing prices, stagnant wages, and widening inequality. These woes fuelled the rise of the Taiwan People’s Party. </p>
<p>The Kuomintang, the other pillar of the old order, struggles to offer solutions. Their proposed <a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202310270021">subsidised interest rates</a> risk further inflating the housing bubble, alienating the young generation they desperately need to win. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Taiwan People’s Party proposes alternatives – public
housing, rent subsidies, and even property tax hikes – aimed at making housing truly affordable.</p>
<p>For decades, power has swayed between the Kuomintang and Democratic Progressive Party, yet voter satisfaction with
Taiwanese democracy languishes <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/753202">below 50%</a>. </p>
<p>This stark statistic betrays a profound representation crisis, an outcry against the established parties, often due to a perceived failure to tackle core issues. </p>
<p>The Taiwan People’s Party, riding this wave of disillusionment, attracts those who yearn for a political shift, focusing on domestic woes. It emerges as a beacon of hope for those who have lost faith in the two-party system. </p>
<h2>Why did the DPP win again?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/5070525">Pre-election polls</a> painted a clear picture: more than 60% craved a change, a break from the Democratic Progressive Party’s grip on power. </p>
<p>But the tide of discontent splintered, dividing voters between the established Kuomintang and the rising force of the Taiwan People’s Party. </p>
<p>Youth flocked to the newcomer, while the Kuomintang found favour among older
demographics. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-taiwans-election-just-a-month-away-the-china-threat-looms-large-216069">With Taiwan's election just a month away, the China threat looms large</a>
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<p>To unseat the government, a united front seemed logical. Yet, cooperation crumbled, replaced by escalating animosity between the opposition parties. This fractured landscape handed the ruling party an advantage: a divided opposition meant their own victory was practically guaranteed.</p>
<p>The Kuomintang, desperate to tip the scales, resorted to <a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202401060021">strategic voting</a>, aiming to marginalise the Taiwan People’s Party.</p>
<p>Negative campaigns against the Taiwan People’s Party intensified after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/war-with-china-is-not-an-option-taiwan-ruling-party-vp-candidate-says-2023-11-23/">failed negotiation attempts</a> on November 23. With Taiwan’s traditional media heavily aligned with either the Kuomintang or the government, the Taiwan People’s Party faced an uphill battle for airtime. </p>
<p>Instead of ceding the stage, they went digital. They launched their own YouTube channel, and their supporters spearheaded online and offline campaigns and created alternative news channels. This counteroffensive transformed the fight into a three-pronged clash. </p>
<p>The battle became more than just a contest between the establishment and the anti-establishment. It morphed into a clash between traditional media and
the burgeoning power of social media. </p>
<p>The Taiwan People’s Party’s digital insurgency challenged the long-held dominance of traditional media and carved out a space for their voices to be heard. </p>
<p>While the outcome of the election may be set, the digital battleground shows a new force has emerged in Taiwan’s political landscape.</p>
<h2>The future of the cross-strait relations</h2>
<p>On the international front, continuity seems to be the watchword. </p>
<p>The established relationship with the US, nurtured by President Tsai Ing-wen, is likely to continue under the guidance of Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao. Her esteemed record as former ambassador to the US inspires confidence in maintaining strong ties.</p>
<p>However, cross-strait relations with China face a potential storm. </p>
<p>With both the President and Vice President openly supporting Taiwan’s independence in the past, China perceives them as a united <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202311/1302696.shtml">“independence duo”</a>. This stance may trigger harsh responses, from further curtailing trade via terminating the free trade agreement to heightened military tensions. </p>
<p>The path forward requires navigating a delicate balance of upholding Taiwan’s democratic values while recognising the complex geopolitical realities. The future of Taiwan’s cross-strait relationship hinges on how well this balance is upheld. The governing Democratic Progressive Party will be judged on how they walk the tightrope.</p>
<p>The Taiwan People’s Party’s emergence may seem to add another layer of complexity, with its potentially divergent views on cross-strait policy. The party believes demonstrating goodwill can lower the temperature and avoid harsher measures like trade restrictions or military escalation. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-china-preparing-for-a-war-over-taiwan-or-has-the-west-got-it-wrong-here-are-the-indicators-220348">Is China preparing for a war over Taiwan, or has the west got it wrong? Here are the indicators</a>
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<p>Yet, unlike the Kuomintang’s focus on <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/01/11/could-taiwan-be-the-next-ukraine-00135009">appeasement</a>, the Taiwan People’s Party advocates for <a href="https://www.tpp.org.tw/en/our_platform-detail.php?id=20">strengthening national defence </a>to deter aggression and ensure peaceful coexistence with China. </p>
<p>Therefore, while the immediate outlook for cross-strait relations may be turbulent, the robust growth of Taiwan’s democracy offers a glimmer of hope for a future where pragmatism holds sway.</p>
<p>Taiwan’s election has presented a paradox: a familiar victory yet a
fundamental shift in the political landscape. </p>
<p>While the immediate future may be uncertain, the rise of the Taiwan People’s Party and the continued US support offer hope for a more open and responsive
democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219810/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kai-Ping Huang receives funding from National Sceince and Technology Council, Taiwan for a research proposal on negative campaigns. </span></em></p>The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has retained government, but it wasn’t a straightforward race. The campaign revealed much about Taiwan’s changing politics.Kai-Ping Huang, Associate Professor, National Taiwan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2179552024-01-09T13:44:22Z2024-01-09T13:44:22ZTaiwanese election may determine whether Beijing opts to force the issue of reunification<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568309/original/file-20240108-19-kmxh2e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6000%2C3988&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Posters of presidential candidate William Lai and his running mate, Hsiao Bi-khim.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/posters-of-presidential-candidate-lai-ching-te-and-his-news-photo/1905136679?adppopup=true">Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the votes are being tallied in <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2024/1/6/24026992/taiwan-china-president-war-xi-jinping-asia-semiconductors-chips">Taiwan’s presidential election</a>, it won’t be only the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/taiwan/">23.6 million inhabitants of the island</a> eagerly awaiting a result – in Beijing and Washington, too, there will be some anxious faces.</p>
<p>The vote of Jan. 13, 2024, is seen as a litmus test for the future of cross-strait relations, coming at a time when the status quo over Taiwan – a territory <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-taiwan-a-country-or-not-213638">Beijing claims as an integral part of “one China</a>” – is being challenged. If Taiwan’s incumbent, independence-oriented party stays in power, Chinese leader Xi Jinping might feel he has no choice but to force the issue of reunification.</p>
<p>Conversely, if the opposition – which agrees with Beijing that Taiwan and the mainland are part of “one China” but not about who governs it – wins, Beijing might feel it has more space to be patient on the issue.</p>
<p>In the run-up to the vote, Beijing has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-says-taiwan-is-hyping-up-military-threat-its-own-gain-2023-12-28/">ramped up military exercises</a> in and around the Taiwan Strait in an apparent warning to Taiwanese voters. On Jan. 6, in one of the most recent incidents, China <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/taiwan-chinese-balloons-harassment-threat-air-safety-106154165">sent a series of balloons</a> over the island, which the Taiwan government cited as a threat to air travel and an attempt at intimidation.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in his <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202312/t20231231_11215608.html">annual New Year’s address</a>, Xi stated that “China will surely be reunified,” raising fears internationally that he intends to pursue the issue militarily if necessary. </p>
<p>For Washington, too, the outcome of the vote <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/2/us-watching-taiwan-elections-closely-as-beijing-reiterates-claim-to-island">will have implications</a>. The United States has cultivated strong ties with the current leadership of Taiwan. But recent tensions in the strait have raised the risk of war. U.S. actions deemed provocative by Beijing, such as the 2022 <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-puts-the-white-house-in-delicate-straits-of-diplomacy-with-china-188116">visit of then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan</a>, have resulted in China upping its military threats in the strait. And this has raised speculation that China’s patience is growing thin and its timeline for reunification is growing shorter. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/but-can-the-united-states-defend-taiwan/">questions about the U.S. capacity</a> to respond to any Chinese aggression over Taiwan have risen; the specter of war in a third region of the world – after Ukraine and Israel – <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/top-us-general-warns-everyone-should-worried-about-war-china-1849085">worries national security leadership</a> in Washington.</p>
<h2>Independence on the ballot?</h2>
<p>The presidential election in Taiwan has come down to a three-way race. The front-runner is <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-analyzing-william-lais-foreign-policy-positions">current Vice President William Lai</a>, who is the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party. The DPP views Taiwan as a sovereign country and does not seek reunification with China.</p>
<p>Lai’s challengers are New Taipei City mayor Hou Yu-ih, of the Kuomintang (KMT), and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei running for the center-left Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). The KMT embraces the idea of future reunification with China under a democratic government. The TPP criticizes both DPP and KMT platforms on cross-strait relations as too extreme and seeks a middle ground that maintains the status quo: A Taiwan that is de facto sovereign, but with strong economic and cultural ties with China. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman makes a heart shape with her arms, behind her are people carrying flags and placards." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Supporters of Kuomintang at a campaign rally in Taichung, Taiwan, on Jan. 8, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-listen-kuomintang-presidential-candidate-hou-yu-news-photo/1910638618?adppopup=true">Man Hei Leung/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Taiwan law mandates that no polls are published in the 10 days before the election. As of Jan. 3, when the final polls were published, <a href="https://www.economist.com/interactive/2024-taiwan-election">averages had Lai leading</a> with 36%, with Hou at 31% and Ko at 24%.</p>
<p>Lai has consistently led in the polls, prompting the KMT and TPP to earlier <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwans-opposition-parties-decide-joint-presidential-ticket-2023-11-15/">consider running on a joint ticket</a>. But the two parties <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67471139">failed to agree on terms</a>, and the coalition attempt imploded. </p>
<p>This may prove crucial, as joining forces may have represented the best chance of a KMT candidate being elected – an outcome that may have cooled tensions with Beijing.</p>
<h2>Taiwanese democracy</h2>
<p>The island of Taiwan has been governed as the “Republic of China” since 1949, when the KMT <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev">lost a civil war to the Chinese Communist Party</a>. The CCP set up the People’s Republic of China on the mainland, and the KMT retreated to Taiwan.</p>
<p>For decades, both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China diverged on every possible policy except one: Both governments agreed that there was <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-the-one-china-policy/">only one China</a>, and that Taiwan was a part of China. They each sought to unite Taiwan and the mainland – but under their own rule.</p>
<p>Although that remains the goal in Beijing today, for Taiwan the outlook has started to change. </p>
<p>The change began with <a href="https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/-democratic-transition-and-consolidation-in-taiwan_122745967872.pdf">Taiwanese democratization</a> – a process that began in the early 1990s after decades of autocratic rule. After gradually rolling out direct elections for the legislature, governors and mayors, the island held its <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/24/world/taiwan-s-leader-wins-its-election-and-a-mandate.html">first democratic election for president in 1996</a>. Despite Beijing holding military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in an attempt to interfere with the vote, the KMT-affiliated incumbent won against a DPP candidate with strong ties to the Taiwan independence movement.</p>
<p>Four years later, the DPP’s candidate won and started the first of two consecutive terms. In 2008, a <a href="https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.3423">KMT candidate returned to power</a>. But since 2016, Taiwan has been led by Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP. </p>
<h2>Uneasy consensus</h2>
<p>Cross-strait tensions tend to rise when the DPP is in office and calm somewhat when the KMT is in power. This isn’t because the KMT agrees with Beijing over the status of Taiwan – the party has always been clear that unification could happen only under its own government and never under the leadership of the Communist Party in Beijing. But the KMT affirms the idea that eventual unification with China is its goal for Taiwan. </p>
<p>In 1992, representatives of the KMT and the CCP met in Hong Kong and reached the “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart/">1992 Consensus</a>.” Despite the name, the two sides do not fully agree on what it meant. The KMT affirmed the idea of one China but noted disagreement on what the government of that China should be; the People’s Republic of China interpreted it as affirming one China under CCP rule. </p>
<p>Still, the 1992 Consensus became the basis of a series of policies strengthening cross-strait ties, and it made KMT-led governments easier for the PRC to tolerate.</p>
<h2>Pro-independence sentiment</h2>
<p>Though speculation about the geopolitical fallout and China’s reaction to the election has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-election-poses-early-2024-test-us-aim-steady-china-ties-2024-01-05/">dominated coverage</a> <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/china-tells-taiwan-vote-right-side-history-election-could-determine-cross-strait-relations">of the vote</a> <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/article/3247604/global-impact-taiwan-heads-polls-what-does-islands-presidential-election-mean-cross-strait-and-us">around the world</a>, for Taiwan voters, independence is one of several critical issues the island faces. The <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-are-the-key-issues-in-taiwans-2024-presidential-election/">economy frequently rises even above cross-strait issues</a> in importance, with many voters expressing concern over the rapid rise of housing prices, stagnating salaries, slow economic growth and how the incumbent party handled the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>On the issue of independence itself, Taiwanese polls have shown a creep toward pro-independence sentiment. As of September 2023, <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/09/02/2003805648">nearly half of Taiwanese voters</a> said they preferred independence (48.9%) for the island, while 26.9% sought a continuation of the status quo. A shrinking minority – now just 11.8% – said they hoped for future reunification.</p>
<p>If the DPP remains in power, Beijing may feel the pressure to force the issue of reunification. Xi has called for the Chinese military to be capable of <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2023/Apr/24/2003205865/-1/-1/1/07-AMONSON%20&%20EGLI_FEATURE%20IWD.PDF">a successful cross-strait invasion by 2027</a>, though a forceful reunification effort might include a combination of economic blockade and military pressure. </p>
<p>If that were to be the case, U.S. commitments to Taiwan – along with U.S. credibility among its Asian allies – could be on the line. President Joe Biden has repeatedly said that he is <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-again-indicates-that-us-will-defend-taiwan-militarily-does-this-constitute-a-change-in-policy-190946">prepared to defend the island militarily</a> against an attack from mainland China.</p>
<p>Already in 2024, the U.S. is having to contend with two significant conflicts that are demanding its attention. How Taiwanese voters mark their ballot – and how policymakers in Beijing respond – may determine whether a third war is more or less likely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A candidate from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party looks set to win the presidency despite Beijing’s pressure and rhetoric.Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2169772024-01-03T13:43:29Z2024-01-03T13:43:29ZThe Lotus Sutra − an ancient Buddhist scripture from the 3rd century − continues to have relevance today<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566359/original/file-20231218-23-ldln3o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1%2C0%2C1189%2C601&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Lotus Sutra scroll praising the manifold mercies of the bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/44849">Universal Gateway chapter of the Lotus Sutra/Calligrapher: Sugawara Mitsushige/The Metropolitan Museum of Art Collection</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>State legislatures across the United States have introduced <a href="https://www.equalityfederation.org/tracker/cumulative-anti-transgender">over 400 bills to limit transgender Americans’ rights</a>. Many of these bills’ sponsors, such as the Christian nonprofit Alliance Defending Freedom, cite Christian values as well as the values of the other <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/rag/11/1/article-p67_5.xml">Abrahamic faiths</a> – Judaism and Islam – to justify their anti-trans positions. </p>
<p>The Alliance Defending Freedom claims that Christians, Jews and Muslims view gender as binary and defined only by biology, though these religions’ <a href="https://therevealer.org/beloved-transgender-children-and-holy-resistance/">diverse followers</a> actually hold a <a href="https://theconversation.com/muslims-protesting-against-lgbtq-pride-are-ignoring-islams-tradition-of-inclusion-209949">range of views</a> on <a href="https://therevealer.org/turning-to-the-talmud-to-find-gender-diversity-that-speaks-to-today/">LGBTQ+ issues</a>. Historically, these religions were often more accepting of varied gender identities before <a href="https://publicseminar.org/2018/07/gender-as-colonial-object/">colonialism imposed binary gender</a> as a universal concept. </p>
<p>Religious <a href="https://www.ihs.gov/lgbt/health/twospirit/">values from multiple</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/for-indonesias-transgender-community-faith-can-be-a-source-of-discrimination-but-also-tolerance-and-solace-193063">traditions</a> have supported <a href="https://therevealer.org/many-paths-to-freedom-transgender-buddhism-in-the-united-states/">transgender identity</a>. <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/buddhist-masculinities/9780231210478">As a scholar of Buddhism and gender</a>, I know that several Buddhist texts treat gender as fluid. One such text is the Lotus Sutra, one of the most popular Buddhist scriptures in East Asia. Its core message is that everyone, no matter their gender or status, has the potential to become a Buddha. </p>
<p>The Lotus Sutra conveys its <a href="https://tricycle.org/magazine/greater-awakening/">message of universal Buddhahood</a> in several stories that depict transformations between male and female bodies. For example, a dragon girl instantly transforms into the masculine body of a Buddha, proving that female bodies are not barriers to awakening.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, the Lotus Sutra describes how the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.013.167">bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara</a>, known as Guanyin in Mandarin and Kannon in Japanese, takes on male or female forms depending on the needs of the audience. </p>
<h2>The dragon girl’s gender transformation</h2>
<p>To understand the story of the dragon girl, it is important to understand how Buddhas’ bodies were defined as masculine in early Buddhism. Most people are familiar with the historical figure Siddhartha Gautama as “the Buddha,” but Buddhists believe that <a href="https://tricycle.org/beginners/buddhism/why-do-buddhists-talk-about-many-buddhas/">several “Buddhas,”</a> or enlightened teachers, have been born throughout history. All of these Buddhas are said to possess 32 marks that distinguished their bodies from regular bodies. </p>
<p>One of these marks was a sheathed penis, which meant that Buddha bodies were male by definition. In addition, Buddhist texts identified five roles, including Buddha, that were off-limits to women. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-lotus-sutra/9780231081610">Lotus Sutra</a>, the Buddha’s disciple, Shariputra, refers to these limitations when he rejects the idea that the dragon girl could quickly attain Buddhahood: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“You suppose that in this short time you have been able to attain the unsurpassed way. But this is difficult to believe. Why? Because the female body is soiled and defiled, not a vessel for the Law. How could you attain the unsurpassed bodhi? … Moreover, a woman is subject to the five obstacles. First, she cannot become a Brahma heavenly king. Second, she cannot become the king Shakra. Third, she cannot become a Mara demon king. Fourth, she cannot become a wheel-turning sage king. Fifth, she cannot become a Buddha. How then could your female body attain Buddhahood so quickly?”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, the dragon girl proves Shariputra wrong by instantly attaining Buddhahood, transforming her young, female, nonhuman body into the male body of a Buddha. Women in premodern East Asia <a href="https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rec3.12270">found inspiration</a> in the dragon girl’s story because it showed that their own female bodies were not barriers to enlightenment. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A scroll with golden etching on a black background depicting a scene from the life of the Buddha." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557848/original/file-20231106-21-qgdfq9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557848/original/file-20231106-21-qgdfq9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=655&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557848/original/file-20231106-21-qgdfq9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=655&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557848/original/file-20231106-21-qgdfq9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=655&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557848/original/file-20231106-21-qgdfq9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=824&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557848/original/file-20231106-21-qgdfq9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=824&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557848/original/file-20231106-21-qgdfq9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=824&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This scroll from the ‘Devadatta’ chapter of the Lotus Sutra depicts the 8-year-old daughter of the Dragon King emerging from her palace beneath the sea to offer a precious, radiant jewel to the Buddha on Eagle Peak.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/44851">The Metropolitan Museum of Art</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The bodhisattva’s gender fluidity</h2>
<p>Another inspiration from the Lotus Sutra can be found in the Chapter of Universal Salvation, which focuses on the <a href="https://south.npm.gov.tw/english/ExhibitionsDetailE003110.aspx?Cond=c176e479-7c87-462c-9b58-9b3900ca851e&appname=Exhibition3112EN">bodhisattva of compassion, Avalokiteshvara</a>. A bodhisattva is an advanced spiritual being who postpones enlightenment to help people in the world. </p>
<p>According to this chapter, Avalokiteshvara will adopt any form to save people. Avalokiteshvara can become a monk, nun, layman, laywoman, rich man, rich man’s wife, young boy, young girl, human or nonhuman, depending on the audience’s needs. </p>
<p>In China, this passage provided scriptural support for Avalokiteshvara’s perceived <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/kuan-yin/9780231120296">transformation from a male to female figure</a>. Indian Buddhist texts described Avalokiteshvara as male, but in China people came to see Avalokiteshvara as female. </p>
<p>Though scholars have not found one single explanation for this transformation, the Lotus Sutra passage offers justification for Avalokiteshvara’s gender fluidity. Images of Avalokiteshvara from China, Japan and Korea can depict the bodhisattva as masculine, feminine or androgynous.</p>
<h2>The Lotus Sutra and transgender inspiration</h2>
<p>Due to the Lotus Sutra, Avalokiteshvara has become an inspiration and icon for transgender, gender-fluid and nonbinary people in and beyond East Asia. At Japan’s <a href="https://matcha-jp.com/en/9828">Shozenji Temple</a>, head nun Soshuku Shibatani, who underwent gender reassignment surgery, has said, “The Kannon Bodhisattva has no gender identity,” using Avalokiteshvara’s Japanese name. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://blog.stheadline.com/article/detail/1116787/%E9%9D%9E%E7%94%B7%E9%9D%9E%E5%A5%B3">blog post</a> from Taiwan quotes from the Lotus Sutra in describing Avalokiteshvara as a nonbinary figure who transcends any single gender identity. </p>
<p>However, Avalokiteshvara’s role as a transgender icon is not universally accepted. Another <a href="https://n.yam.com/Article/20130509462739">Taiwanese blogger</a> reported that a friend of theirs argued with their description of the bodhisattva as transgender. In April 2022, an Avalokiteshvara statue in The Burrell Collection in Glasgow, Scotland, labeled as a transgender icon, <a href="https://www.museumsassociation.org/museums-journal/news/2022/04/glasgow-life-defends-trans-label-in-burrell-collection-after-politicisation-row/">resulted in protests</a>. The anti-trans group For Women Scotland argued that the label unnecessarily politicized the statue. </p>
<p>Despite these objections, more and more people have found inspiration in Avalokiteshvara as a transgender, nonbinary or gender-fluid figure. Just as the Lotus Sutra’s story of the dragon girl inspired Buddhist women in premodern East Asia, Avalokiteshvara’s gender fluidity offers inspiration to people today. </p>
<p><em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/authwall?trk=bf&trkInfo=AQHFNdxAPOLqfAAAAYyDQhP4XlW43CSxFWDpq9-1rWWyWub3I-5Wq7BJL_wg5vkC0-EEWdyTHjmNbcHqNfYuNJ4krmD_PiPpjOatEpoVecRRhBp70u5VgTWb2HOF7POqNQMpnmg=&original_referer=&sessionRedirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.linkedin.com%2Fin%2Fmarissa-posani-8473432a6%2F">MJ Posani</a>, an undergraduate student at the University of Tennessee, contributed to the research for this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216977/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Megan Bryson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For many Buddhists today, both in East Asia and across the world, the Lotus Sutra offers religious support for various gender identities.Megan Bryson, Associate Professor of Religious Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2184242023-12-13T22:00:39Z2023-12-13T22:00:39ZHow ‘benevolent sexism’ undermines Asian women with foreign accents in the workplace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564585/original/file-20231208-31-f8j7mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=286%2C24%2C5177%2C3612&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">To address barriers that racialized women with non-native accents experience in the Canadian workplace, we need to understand what kinds of bias they face.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/how-benevolent-sexism-undermines-asian-women-with-foreign-accents-in-the-workplace" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Immigrants are critical to the Canadian economy, but their talents are under-utilized due to language and accent discrimination, as immigrants often come from non-English or French speaking countries. </p>
<p>Workers with non-native or foreign accents <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/the-accent-effect-toronto-3-1.4409181">are often discriminated against at work</a>, yet our understanding of this phenomenon is limited because <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/job.2591">research on this topic has predominantly focused on men</a>.</p>
<p>However, more than half of Canadian immigrants are women — a statistic that could rise because of <a href="https://smithstonewalters.com/2023/11/08/canada-publishes-immigration-targets-for-2024-2026/">Canada’s ambitious immigration target</a> of half a million permanent residents by 2025. </p>
<p><a href="https://uwaterloo.ca/women-work-and-the-economy/sites/default/files/uploads/files/ircc_knowledge_synthesis_august_23_2021.pdf">Critically, 84 per cent of women immigrants are racialized</a>. To address barriers that racialized women with non-native accents experience in the Canadian workplace, we need to understand what kinds of bias they face. This will help organizations support women immigrants in fully utilizing their talents.</p>
<h2>Accent bias at work</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/03616843231165475">Our recent research</a> examined whether the experiences of women with accents differ from men in the workplace. We did this by exploring how women with non-native English accents — specifically Mandarin — fare in the Canadian job market. </p>
<p>Speaking with a non-native accent involves maintaining speech sounds of one’s native language even after other aspects of speaking English are perfected. That is, speaking with a non-native accent is different from competency or fluency in English. </p>
<p>We used the stereotype content model to conduct our research. This model suggests that all people are judged on two traits: warmth and competence. Warmth is linked to co-operation, while competence is associated with higher status. </p>
<p>Individuals in high-status roles are seen as competent, while those in low-status roles are perceived as less competent. Women are traditionally stereotyped as warm, while men are seen as competent.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An Asian woman in business attire working on a laptop at a desk in a communal office space" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564586/original/file-20231208-21-qlp1dh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564586/original/file-20231208-21-qlp1dh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564586/original/file-20231208-21-qlp1dh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564586/original/file-20231208-21-qlp1dh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564586/original/file-20231208-21-qlp1dh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564586/original/file-20231208-21-qlp1dh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564586/original/file-20231208-21-qlp1dh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Eighty-four per cent of women immigrants are racialized in Canada.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In three separate studies, participants were asked to decide whether they would consider hiring potential candidates for a job opening within their own organization or another organization. Participants were given audio recordings of the candidates in which some of the speakers had accents, while others did not.</p>
<p>Our research revealed that Asian women with a Mandarin accent were seen as more friendly, trustworthy and sincere than Asian women applicants with no accent. We found this bias present in both a volunteer student position and a paid marketing co-ordinator position. These amplified warmth perceptions translated into higher ratings of hireability.</p>
<p>There were no differences in warmth perceptions between Asian men applicants with and without accents. This is because men are not usually expected to show high levels of warmth.</p>
<h2>‘Benevolent sexism’</h2>
<p>On the surface, warmth bias may appear advantageous for Asian women with accents. However, it’s crucial to understand that gendered warmth stereotypes, despite <em>appearing</em> positive, are problematic. </p>
<p>These stereotypes are rooted in “<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/psychology/benevolent-sexism">benevolent sexism</a>.” These beliefs <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.70.3.491">pigeonhole women into socially acceptable roles</a> by offering women who conform to a sense of affection, idealization and protectiveness. Women who do not conform may face social costs that can negatively affect their career progression.</p>
<p>This kind of sexism is socially acceptable, endorsed by both men and women and rarely seen as problematic. Yet, past research consistently shows that such attitudes undermine women at work. For instance, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206310365902">managers with benevolent sexist tendencies do not assign challenging assignments to women</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/10422587231178865">investors with similar beliefs are more likely to fund pitches from men</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, we found these seemingly positive effects of amplified warmth evaluations are only observed in industries traditionally considered feminine, such as fashion and cosmetics. In contrast, there are no such positive effects in industries perceived as masculine, like oil and gas. </p>
<p>This warmth bias contributes to occupational gender segregation, funnelling women towards lower-paying and lower-prestige industries and jobs. At the same time, women are being steered away from industries where they are already severely under-represented.</p>
<h2>Addressing bias at work</h2>
<p>At the government level, non-native accents need to be explicitly recognized as a discriminatory factor affecting the job prospects and well-being of immigrants. Workers with accents are aware of and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0021886318800997">negatively affected by accent discrimination</a>. </p>
<p>Despite this awareness, accents are not an explicit protected category under the Canadian Human Rights Act, although they are related to the protected category of national or ethnic origin. This lack of protection undermines the legitimacy of accent discrimination. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An Asian woman giving a presentation to a group of people using a whiteboard" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564587/original/file-20231208-17-1pyf3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564587/original/file-20231208-17-1pyf3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564587/original/file-20231208-17-1pyf3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564587/original/file-20231208-17-1pyf3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564587/original/file-20231208-17-1pyf3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564587/original/file-20231208-17-1pyf3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564587/original/file-20231208-17-1pyf3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">To foster positive attitudes toward accents, racialized women with accents should be in visible and high-status roles in the workplace.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At the corporate level, race and gender biases are commonly addressed in equity and diversity initiatives, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/pragyaagarwaleurope/2018/12/30/bias-is-your-accent-holding-you-back/">but accent bias is often overlooked</a>. To fight accent bias, more awareness needs to be raised about accents and how they affect racialized women in the workforce. Recruitment and hiring processes also need to be more objective by focusing on assessing job-relevant knowledge, skills and abilities.</p>
<p>Organizations and managers should foster positive employee attitudes toward accents by emphasizing the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbescoachescouncil/2019/09/13/the-benefits-of-cultural-diversity-in-the-workplace/">benefits of a multicultural workforce</a>. Equally important is ensuring there are racialized women with accents in visible and high-status roles. </p>
<p>This stands in contrast to a popular solution of “accent reduction.” <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/07/31/accent-reduction-racist-or-empowering-a-look-at-the-controversy.html">Accent reduction programs stigmatize accents</a> by suggesting they need to be corrected. Instead of focusing on what workers with accents can do to “fit in,” organizations need to focus on removing systemic barriers that workers with accents face.</p>
<p>Our research serves as a reminder to not evaluate workers based on stereotypes. Even purportedly positive stereotypes can undermine the careers of racialized women.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218424/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ivona Hideg's research has received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samantha Hancock's research has received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Winny Shen's research has received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). </span></em></p>Recent research explores how women with non-native English accents — specifically Mandarin — fare in the Canadian job market.Ivona Hideg, Associate Professor and Ann Brown Chair in Organization Studies, York University, CanadaSamantha Hancock, Assistant Professor, DAN Department of Management & Organizational Studies, Western UniversityWinny Shen, Associate Professor of Organization Studies, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2105392023-12-05T13:17:24Z2023-12-05T13:17:24ZHow sacred images in many Asian cultures incorporate divine presence and make them come ‘alive’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559865/original/file-20231116-23-care6q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C19%2C3264%2C2423&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A gilded statue of the Buddha at Wat Phanan Choeng Temple in Thailand.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/wat-phanan-choeng-temple-this-highly-respected-royalty-free-image/1217280251?phrase=eye-opening+Buddhist+ritual&searchscope=image%2Cfilm&adppopup=true">Kittipong Chararoj/ iStock via Getty Images Plus</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Walking into a favorite restaurant here in Knoxville, Tennessee, I was immediately greeted by a golden statue of Buddha, its sparkling gemstone eyes meeting my own as I made my way through the door. The aromas of Thai curries beckoned, but as I was led to a table, I kept thinking about those glinting eyes.</p>
<p>Sacred objects are everywhere: Statues and paintings of gods fill museum galleries and catalog pages alike. You might also see them gracing a neighbor’s yard or upon an altar in your friend’s home.</p>
<p>Some dazzle in bejeweled splendor. Others may appear more humble, their luster softened through generations of hands passing them down. Oftentimes, it can feel as though sacred images are looking back.</p>
<p>I <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/michael-naparstek-1457307">research the ways in which objects express the power of divine presence</a> in Asian religious contexts. Studying different perspectives on sacred objects helps us think beyond religious contexts and allows us to rethink how objects and images play an active role in our lives.</p>
<h2>Sacred visual culture</h2>
<p>Hindu practice is defined by “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/darshan">darśan” – a ritual act of interacting with the divine</a> through the visual experience. Scholar <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/dianaeck/home">Diana Eck</a> describes this interaction in her seminal study of Indian visual culture, “<a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/darsan/9780231112659">Darśan</a>,” in the following way: “to stand in the presence of the deity and to behold the image with one’s own eyes, to see and be seen by the deity.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A couple, with a young child in the woman's lap, sitting before the Hindu God Ganesha, with folded hands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559867/original/file-20231116-17-nxv3h6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A family prays to the Hindu god Ganesha.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/family-praying-royalty-free-image/548295807?phrase=hindu+worship&adppopup=true">IndiaPix/IndiaPicture via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-theravada-buddhism-a-scholar-of-asian-religions-explains-205737">Theravada Buddhist</a> rituals in Southeast Asia include all-night chanting sessions to recharge statues’ power. As scholar of Theravada Buddhism <a href="https://www.swarthmore.edu/Humanities/dsweare1/">Donald Swearer</a> notes in “<a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691114354/becoming-the-buddha">Becoming the Buddha</a>,” monastics and laypeople in northern Thailand will gather to recite Buddhist sutras while holding cords attached to an image of the Buddha, forming an intricate web of connection between the image and the Buddhist community. </p>
<p>The benefits gained from these chants is understood to enter the statue, recharging its karmic power and reanimating it to once again interact with the community.</p>
<p><a href="https://asiasociety.org/education/buddhism-japan">Japanese Buddhist</a> statues <a href="https://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/fellows-book/behold-the-buddha-religious-meanings-of-japanese-buddhist-icons/">contain multiple items ritually placed</a> within their wooden cavities: bones of saints, robes from eminent monastics and even silk-fashioned replicas of visceral organs like lungs and kidneys. As art historian <a href="https://oberlin.academia.edu/JamesDobbins">James Dobbins</a> notes, certain Buddhist rituals are performed in order to transform the body of a statue into a living body. </p>
<p>In cases like this, inanimate objects are believed to transform into not only sacred things, but also active, living beings who can see, hear, taste and respond to the concerns of those who worship them.</p>
<h2>‘Eye-opening’ ritual</h2>
<p>There are many different ways to enliven an image, and each ritual tradition carries its own unique process. However, the most well-known across Asia is commonly referred to as the “<a href="https://pluralism.org/news/eye-opening-ceremony-buddhist-statues-draws-hundreds-connecticut">eye-opening” ceremony</a>. The term “eye-opening” gets its name from the culmination of an intense ritual process wherein the monk paints in the pupils of the image, thus opening its eye to see. </p>
<p>In Sri Lanka, Buddhist monks perform a version known as the netra-pinkama, which loosely translates to “meritorious action of the eyes.” </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/gt5jY93AD2w?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The netra-pinkama ritual.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.ox.ac.uk/research/research-in-conversation/how-live-happy-life/professor-richard-gombrich#:%7E:text=Richard%20Gombrich%20is%20the%20Emeritus,of%20the%20Clay%20Sanskrit%20Library.">Richard Gombrich</a>, a scholar of Buddhism and Sanskrit, <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2051829">noted in his study of Buddhism in Sri Lanka</a> that “Before consecration, a statue is treated with no more respect than one would give the materials of which it is composed. … The very act of consecration indicates that a statue is being brought to life.” </p>
<p>Enlivening an image is not a task undertaken lightly, as it is believed in some cases that any demonic spirits loitering around could interrupt the process, thereby resulting in an ineffective ritual or even a malevolent icon. Both the temple grounds and the ritual specialists must undergo purification rites before beginning. The whole process is filled with strict procedures and avoidance of taboos – a common theme among consecration rituals across Asian religious traditions. </p>
<p>Perhaps most importantly, the monk must refrain from looking directly into the icon’s eyes, and thus uses a mirror to look over their shoulder in order to paint in the icon’s pupils.</p>
<p>In Taiwan, statues and paintings of Buddhist, Daoist and local gods will undergo a similar kind of practice known as “kaiguang,” meaning “<a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674504363">opening the radiance</a>.” Monks, Daoist masters and even the artists who carve the statues may perform the rite on behalf of the individuals or temple communities that commission the image.</p>
<p>Once completed, shops will wrap a piece of red paper around to cover the statue’s eyes to ensure that the first thing that the image sees is the face of the one who requested it. The power of sacred vision is such that it must literally be kept under wraps.</p>
<h2>Living images</h2>
<p>Once its eyes have been opened, the image becomes a living thing capable of performing powerful deeds. As such, people may behave much differently – making offerings of incense and taking pains to follow social etiquette lest they offend. The care with which these objects are treated once they have been “activated” suggests that there is a lot more here than meets the eye. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/darsan/9780231112659">Eck’s observation attests</a>, being seen is critical to understanding what images do. By seemingly looking back at us, sacred images remind us that we are not alone in this world. In so doing, they also send a message that the world is not there for our eyes only, but that other viewpoints are just as powerful as our own.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210539/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Naparstek does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Through the power of rituals, inanimate objects can be understood to transform into agents who can see, hear, taste and respond to the concerns of those who worship them.Michael Naparstek, Lecturer in Religious Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2146262023-12-01T13:38:17Z2023-12-01T13:38:17ZColonized countries rarely ask for redress over past wrongs − the reasons can be complex<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562470/original/file-20231129-20-sljkib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=29%2C17%2C3901%2C2404&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Indian visitors look at a painting depicting the Amritsar Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/indian-visitors-look-at-a-painting-depicting-the-amritsar-news-photo/120271580?adppopup=true">Narinder Nanu/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The king of the Netherlands, Willem-Alexander, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/07/01/1185647423/dutch-king-apologizes-for-the-monarchys-role-in-global-slave-trade">apologized in July 2023</a> for his ancestors’ role in the colonial slave trade. </p>
<p>He is not alone in expressing remorse for past wrongs. In 2021, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/style/article/benin-art-returned-scli-intl/index.html#:%7E:text=Twenty%2Dsix%20works%20of%20art,countries%20to%20recover%20looted%20artifacts.">France returned 26 works of art seized by French colonial soldiers</a> in Africa – the largest restitution France has ever made to a former colony. In the same year, Germany officially apologized for its 1904-08 genocide of the Herero and Nama people of Namibia <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/germany-officially-calls-colonial-era-killings-namibia-genocide-2021-05-28/">and agreed to fund reconstruction and development projects in Namibia.</a>.</p>
<p>This is, some political scientists have observed, the “<a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=pPXpiXQ45osC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false">age of apology</a>” for past wrongs. Reams of articles, particularly in Western media, are devoted to former colonizer countries and whether they have enacted redress – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/16/learning/should-museums-return-looted-artifacts-to-their-countries-of-origin.html">returned museum artifacts</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/27/world/americas/colonial-reparations.html">paid reparations</a> or <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/12/20/some-european-countries-have-apologised-for-their-colonial-past-is-it-enough">apologized for past wrongs</a>. </p>
<p>Yet this is rarely the result of official requests. In fact, very few former colonies have officially – that is, government to government – pressed perpetrators to redress past injustices. </p>
<p>My analysis found that governments <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad118">in 78% of such cases</a> have not asked to be compensated for historical acts of injustice against them. As a <a href="https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/profile/manjari-chatterjee-miller/">scholar of international relations</a> who has studied the effect of <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=22642">colonialism on the present-day foreign policy of countries affected</a>, I found this puzzling. Why don’t more victim states press for intercountry redress? </p>
<p>The answer lies in the fact that colonial pasts and atoning for injustices are controversial – not just in what were perpetrator countries, but also in their victims. What to ask redress for, from whom and for whom are complicated questions with no easy answers. And there are often divergent narratives within victim countries about how to view past colonial history, further hampering redress. </p>
<h2>Focus on perpetrator country</h2>
<p>There is a disproportionate amount of attention paid to whether perpetrator countries – that is, former colonizers who established extractive and exploitative governments in colony states – offer redress. They are <a href="https://hub.jhu.edu/magazine/2015/summer/germany-japan-reconciliation/">lauded when they enact redress</a> and <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/japans-apologies-on-comfort-women-not-enough/">shamed when they do not</a>.</p>
<p>The processes pertaining to redress within victim countries – the former colonies – gets less attention. This, I believe, has the effect of making these countries peripheral to a conversation in which they should be central.</p>
<p>This matters – success or failure of redress can <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/99/4/1693/7198184">depend on whether victim countries officially push for it</a>.</p>
<p>Take the experiences of two formerly colonized countries that I studied in depth in relation to the question of redress: India and Namibia. </p>
<h2>The Indian experience: Different narratives</h2>
<p>It’s <a href="https://globalchallenges.ch/issue/10/decolonisation-and-international-law/">difficult for a country</a>, particularly a poor developing nation, to take a former colonizer, usually a much richer country, to the International Court of Justice to ask for redress for the entire experience of colonialism. </p>
<p>But most former colonies have never officially asked for some form of redress – be it apology, reparations or restitution, even for specific acts of injustice. </p>
<p>India is an example of the difficulty in building consensus for official redress. Take the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/13/opinion/1919-amrtisar-british-empire-india.html">Jallianwala Bagh massacre of 1919</a>, in which British troops killed hundreds of peaceful protesters, including women and children.</p>
<p>The Indian government has never officially <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/india-should-not-ask-britain-to-apologise-for-the-amritsar-massacre/">asked for an apology</a> from the United Kingdom over the incident. </p>
<p>Part of the problem is different groups within India have different narratives about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/29/british-empire-india-amartya-sen">the 200 years of British colonial rule</a>. No one disputes that the Raj was exploitative and violent. But which acts of violence to emphasize? How much responsibility should be assigned to the British? And should any positive attributes of the Raj be highlighted? These are all debated.</p>
<p>Such points of divergence are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad118">reflected in India’s federal and state-issued history textbooks</a>, according to my analysis.</p>
<p>The bloody <a href="https://theconversation.com/global/topics/india-pakistan-75-125381">Partition of India in 1947</a> and the subsequent creation of Pakistan, for example, are blamed on the British in federal and many state textbooks. But it merits just a small paragraph in Gujarati textbooks, where it is blamed entirely on the Muslim League, the founding party of Pakistan. In the state of Tamil Nadu, Partition is mentioned without any description of either the horrors that followed or where responsibility lay.</p>
<p>Different narratives also appear in the Indian Parliament. When the issue of redress came up in 1997 – the 50th year of Indian independence and just before <a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/interactive/immersive/queen_elizabeth_70_years_on_throne/">Queen Elizabeth II visited India</a> – politicians agreed that India’s emergence from what politician Somnath Chatterjee described as “<a href="https://eparlib.nic.in/handle/123456789/430">a strangulating and dehumanizing slavery under a colonial imperialist power</a>” was worth celebrating. But on the issue of whether Elizabeth should apologize for the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, there was little agreement. Calls from some politicians for an apology were drowned out by others who jabbed at the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, pointing out its allies had <a href="https://eparlib.nic.in/handle/123456789/479">never apologized for assassinating Mahatma Gandhi</a>.</p>
<p>As of this writing, the U.K. has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/apr/10/theresa-may-expresses-regret-for-1919-amritsar-massacre">expressed regret for the massacre</a> but never apologized, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/13/world/asia/jallianwala-bagh-massacre-india-britain.html">infuriating many Indians</a>.</p>
<h2>The long journey for Namibian redress</h2>
<p>Namibia is an uncommon case of redress where the government has officially pushed for an apology and reparations from its former colonizer, Germany. But even then it was a painful, complex and <a href="https://theconversation.com/genocide-negotiations-between-germany-and-namibia-hit-stumbling-blocks-89697">time-consuming process</a> dogged by many of the themes that have prevented India and others from seeking formal redress.</p>
<p>Between 1884 and 1919, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/namibia-a-timeline-of-germanys-brutal-colonial-history/a-57729985">Namibia was a German colony</a>, with some communities systematically dispossessed of their traditional lands. In 1904, one of these communities, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/herero-revolt-1904-1907">the Herero</a>, rebelled, followed in 1905 by the Nama. In response, German troops slaughtered thousands in a bloodbath that is today <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2022/11/6/reckoning-with-genocide-in-namibia">widely acknowledged to be a genocide</a>. Survivors, including women and children, were herded into horrific concentration camps and subjected to forced labor and medical experiments. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of men stand with chains around their necks" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562474/original/file-20231129-17-m04tz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562474/original/file-20231129-17-m04tz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562474/original/file-20231129-17-m04tz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562474/original/file-20231129-17-m04tz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562474/original/file-20231129-17-m04tz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=581&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562474/original/file-20231129-17-m04tz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=581&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562474/original/file-20231129-17-m04tz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=581&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Captured Herero fighters in 1904.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/gefangene-hereros-1904-05identisch-mit-nr-in-lz-8-news-photo/545965213?adppopup=true">Ullstein Bild via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The struggle to hold Germany accountable began decades ago, with individuals from the Herero and Nama communities calling for accountability and reparations. Germany rebuffed them repeatedly, precisely because the Namibian government did not take up their call. Only in 2015, after the Namibian government officially requested redress, did Germany acquiesce.</p>
<p>In May 2021, Germany <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/germany-officially-calls-colonial-era-killings-namibia-genocide-2021-05-28/">finally agreed to recognize the genocide</a>, apologize and establish a fund of US$1.35 billion toward reconstruction and development projects in Herero- and Nama-dominated areas. </p>
<p>Why did it take so long? For the Herero and Nama, the genocide and loss of traditional lands were always forefront. But for others in Namibia – notably, the dominant political party, the South West Africa People’s Organization, or SWAPO, which consists largely of members of the Ovambo ethnic community – uniting Namibians to come together in a national, anti-colonial struggle for independence was <a href="https://academic.oup.com/hgs/article-abstract/26/3/394/575370?redirectedFrom=fulltext">deemed more important</a> than focusing on the wrongs suffered by any one community.</p>
<p>After independence, the ruling SWAPO <a href="https://frw.studenttheses.ub.rug.nl/762/1/05029.pdf">prioritized nation-building and unity</a> and cultivated ties with the German government, hoping for foreign aid and economic development. Complicating matters, the Ovambo had not lost their own traditional lands to colonialism in the same way as the Herero and Nama.</p>
<p>For years, government-approved school history textbooks used in Namibian schools reflected the SWAPO narrative. One Ovambo former school history teacher told me that Namibian children learned about the “war of national resistance” and how exploitative colonialism had necessitated that war. But the word “genocide” was never used, and there were no mentions of the suffering of affected communities.</p>
<p>Around 2010, Namibian activists, NGO workers and government officials from all communities began to search for common ground to reconcile the different narratives. Some attempts failed. A 2014 museum exhibition on the genocide collapsed after its financier, the Finnish embassy, withdrew funding – allegedly under pressure, one Namibian expert told me, from the German government. But others succeeded. The <a href="https://nan.gov.na/home">National Archives of Namibia</a> launched a project to collect academic papers on divergent narratives of the liberation struggle and colonial history. </p>
<p>As reconciling narratives progressed, history textbooks were revised to honor not just SWAPO’s version of history, but also highlight the brutalities suffered by the Herero and Nama. They included frank discussions of genocide and colonial atrocities. Against this backdrop, the Namibian government officially initiated a request for redress from Germany. Both governments appointed teams to find a resolution, resulting in the 2021 reparation fund.</p>
<p>Redress between countries is rare. Successful redress even more so. But the example of Namibia shows that it can be done when the governments of victim countries initiate redress. By focusing only on perpetrator states, we miss an opportunity to examine their victims as agents of change, and thereby perpetuate redress as an unusual phenomenon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214626/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Manjari Chatterjee Miller is affiliated with the Council on Foreign Relations.</span></em></p>Fewer than a quarter of once-colonized countries make official government-to-government requests for an apology or reparations.Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations/Associate Professor of International Relations, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2179782023-11-17T13:59:33Z2023-11-17T13:59:33ZDon’t be fooled by Biden and Xi talks − China and the US are enduring rivals rather than engaged partners<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560070/original/file-20231116-24-lu1i3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C7187%2C4474&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rolling out the red carpet for presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXAPECBidenXI/ad7b12a415724dab8637d4c538ea63af/photo?Query=Xi%20biden&mediaType=photo,video,graphic,audio&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=476&currentItemNo=1">Doug Mills/The New York Times via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>There were <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVnxZGcTXnQ">smiles for the camera, handshakes</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/16/china-praises-warm-xi-biden-meeting-in-change-of-rhetoric">warm words</a> and the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/15/politics/biden-xi-meeting/index.html">unveiling of a couple of agreements</a>.</p>
<p>But beyond the optics of the first meeting in over a year between the leaders of the world’s two biggest economies, not an awful lot had changed: There was nothing to suggest a “reset” in U.S. and China relations that in recent years have been <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/the-china-threat">rooted in suspicion</a> <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA290-3.html">and competition</a>.</p>
<p>President Joe Biden hinted as much just hours after the face-to-face talks, confirming that he still <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-calls-xi-dictator-after-carefully-planned-summit-2023-11-16/">considered his Chinese counterpart</a>, Xi Jinping, a “dictator.” Beijing hit back, with foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning telling reporters Biden’s remark was “extremely wrong and irresponsible political manipulation.”</p>
<p>As a scholar of U.S.-China relations, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-delusions-detente-rivals">I believe the relationship</a> between the two countries can be best described as an “enduring rivalry” – a <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2600766">term used by political scientists</a> to denote two powers that have singled each other out for intense security competition. Examples from history include <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/1/timeline-india-pakistan-relations">India and Pakistan</a>, <a href="https://www.worldhistory.org/article/1520/the-hundred-years-war-consequences--effects/">France and England</a>, and the West and the Soviet Union. Over the past two centuries, such rivals have accounted for only 1% of the world’s international relationships but <a href="https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/handle/2022/26044">80% of its wars</a>. History suggest these rivalries <a href="https://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/0472111272-08.pdf">last around 40 years</a> and end only when one side loses the ability to compete – or when the two sides ally against a common enemy. Neither scenario looks likely any time soon in regards to China and the U.S.</p>
<h2>How enduring rivalries end</h2>
<p>China “is a communist country … based on a form of government totally different than ours,” <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2023/nov/16/china-responds-to-biden-calling-xi-jinping-a-dictator-video">Biden said after his meeting</a> with Xi.</p>
<p>That comment gets to the heart of why diplomacy alone cannot reset the U.S.-China relationship. Washington and Beijing are not rivals due to any misunderstanding that can be sorted out through talks alone. Rather, they are rivals because of the opposite reason: They understand each other only too well and have come to the conclusion that their respective world outlooks cannot be reconciled.</p>
<p>The same is true for many of the issues that divide the two countries – they are framed as binary win-lose scenarios. Taiwan can be governed from Taipei or Beijing, but not both. Similarly, the East China and South China seas can be international waters or Chinese territory; Russia can be crippled or supported.</p>
<p>For the United States, its Asian alliances are a force for stability; for China, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3231201/china-watching-closely-us-japan-south-korea-aim-de-facto-asian-nato">they’re hostile encirclement</a>. And both countries are right in their respective assessments.</p>
<p>Diplomacy alone is insufficient to resolve a rivalry. At best, it can help manage it. </p>
<h2>When the US calls, who picks up?</h2>
<p>Part of this management of the U.S-China rivalry involves finding areas of agreement that can be committed to. </p>
<p>And on Nov. 15, Biden and Xi announced deals over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/15/business/economy/biden-xi-fentanyl.html">curbing China’s production of the deadly drug fentanyl</a> and the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-china-military-relations-339980a0d494bcde92905411838808a4">restoring of high-level, military-to-military dialogue</a> between the two countries.</p>
<p>But the fentanyl announcement is <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/01/asia/china-us-fentanyl-trump-intl/index.html">very similar to the one</a> Xi gave to then-President Donald Trump in 2019. The U.S. administration <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-fentanyl/trump-accuses-chinas-xi-of-failing-to-halt-fentanyl-exports-to-u-s-idUSKCN1US1WI/">later accused China</a> of reneging on the agreement.</p>
<p>Similarly, committing to restarting high-level dialogue is one thing; following up on it is another. History is dotted with occasions when having an open line between Beijing and Washington hasn’t meant a whole lot in times of crisis. In 2001, when a U.S. surveillance aircraft collided with a Chinese jet over Hainan Island, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/01/us-china-military-hotline-508140">Beijing didn’t pick up the phone</a>. Likewise, during the Tiananmen Square massacre, then-President George H.W. Bush urgently tried to call his counterpart Deng Xiaoping but was unable to get through.</p>
<p>Moreover, focusing on what was agreed to in talks also highlights what wasn’t – and is unlikely to ever be – agreed to without a substantial shift in power that forces one side to concede to the other. </p>
<p>For example, China wants the U.S. to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-reports-21-chinese-air-force-planes-entered-its-air-defence-zone-2023-03-02/">stop selling arms to Taiwan</a>. But Washington has no intention of doing this, as it knows that this will make the disputed island more vulnerable to Beijing. Washington would like China to end its military displays of strength over the Taiwan Strait; Beijing knows doing so risks seeing Taiwan drift toward independence.</p>
<p>American policymakers have long said what they want is <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/what-america-wants-china-hass">China to “change</a>” – by which it means to liberalize its system of governance. But the Chinese Communist Party knows that doing so means self-liquidation – every communist regime that has allowed space for alternative political parties has unraveled. Which is why American attempts to engage China are often met with suspicion in China. As former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin commented, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-delusions-detente-rivals">engagement and containment policies have the same aim</a>: to end China’s socialist system.</p>
<p>For similar reasons, Xi has shunned attempts by the U.S. to bring China further into the rules-based international order. The Chinese leader saw what happened when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev <a href="https://time.com/5512665/mikhail-gorbachev-glasnost-perestroika/">tried to integrate the Soviet Union</a> into the Western order in the late 1980s – it only hastened the demise of the socialist entity.</p>
<p>Instead, Xi calls for a massive military buildup, the reassertion of Chinese Communist Party control and an economic policy <a href="https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis//2020/11/china-economic-technological-self-reliance">based on self-reliance</a>.</p>
<h2>Actions speak louder …</h2>
<p>The encouraging words and limited agreements hammered out in the latest meeting between Xi and Biden should also not distract from the actions that continue to push the U.S. and China further apart.</p>
<p>China’s show of force in the Taiwan Strait has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/13/china-biden-xi-meeting-apec-taiwan/">sustained for three years now</a> and shows no sign of abating. Meanwhile, Beijing’s navy continues to <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-is-the-south-china-sea-such-a-hotly-contested-region-143435">harass other nations in the South China Sea</a>.</p>
<p>Similarly, Biden has continued the U.S. path toward military alliances aimed at countering China’s threat. It recently entered a <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3498451/japan-south-korea-us-strengthen-trilateral-cooperation/">trilateral agreement between the U.S., Japan and South Korea</a>. And that came two years after the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/AUKUS/">establishment of AUKUS</a>, a security partnership between the the U.S., Australia and the U.K. that has similar aims.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the U.S. administration will continue to tighten the screws on China’s economy through <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/president-biden-has-banned-some-us-investment-china-heres-what-know">investment restrictions</a>. Biden is well aware that easy flowing money from Wall Street is helping China weather choppier economic waters of late and is keen to turn off the tap.</p>
<h2>The point of diplomacy</h2>
<p>This isn’t to say that diplomacy and face-to-face talks are pointless. They do, in fact, serve a number of interests.</p>
<p>For both men involved, there is a domestic upside. For Biden, playing nice with China projects the image of a statesman – especially at a time when, due to U.S. positions on Ukraine and the Middle East, he is facing <a href="https://jacobin.com/2021/04/joe-biden-keir-starmer-warmonger-internationalism-foreign-policy">accusations from the political left of being a “warmonger</a>.” And encouraging Beijing to tread softly during the U.S. election year may blunt a potential line of attack from Republicans that the administration’s China policy is not working.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Xi is able to showcase his own diplomatic skills and present China as an alternative superpower to the U.S. and to potentially <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-xi-draws-standing-ovation-from-u-s-business-leadersand-some-doubts-13fc3ad2">cleave the Western business community</a> – and perhaps even major European nations – from what he would see as the U.S. anti-China coalition.</p>
<p>Moreover, summits like the one in San Francisco signal that both the U.S. and China are jointly committed to at least keep talking, helping ensure that a rocky relationship doesn’t descend into anything more belligerent – even it that doesn’t make them any friendlier.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217978/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Beckley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s good to talk − just don’t expect it to result in a reset in relations between Beijing and Washington.Michael Beckley, Associate Professor of Political Science, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2087112023-11-14T13:24:12Z2023-11-14T13:24:12ZDreams of a ‘broken up’ Russia might turn into a nightmare for the West – and an opportunity for China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559164/original/file-20231113-22-oegm61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C5130%2C3394&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Breaking up is hard to do.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/old-torn-atlas-map-of-eurasia-royalty-free-image/589011984?phrase=russian+federation+map&adppopup=true">Glasshouse Images/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Do names on a map matter? When they are in border territories, the answer is probably “yes.”</p>
<p>Earlier in 2023, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/13560">ordered that new maps must use</a> the former Chinese names of its lost territories in what is now Russia’s Far East. Vladivostok, home to <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mf-pacific.htm">Russia’s Pacific fleet headquarters</a>, became Haishenwai; <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/1/22/all-you-need-to-know-about-islands-at-heart-of-russia-japan-feud">Sakhalin Island</a> became Kuyedao. Then in late August, the ministry <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/09/04/china-is-redefining-its-borders-with-its-neighbors-including-russia_6122600_4.html">released a map</a> that showed the disputed Russian territory of Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island within China’s borders.</p>
<p>These map moves come amid <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/russia-disintegrate/">growing chatter</a> <a href="https://cepa.org/article/russias-collapse-good-news-for-everyone/">and even calls</a> in Western foreign policy circles for the disintegration of the Russian Federation into a multitude of smaller states. The thinking is, being split into smaller states would blunt Russia’s challenge to the West and its ability to carry on a war in Ukraine.</p>
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<p>As a <a href="https://www.csi.cuny.edu/campus-directory/susan-smith-peter">scholar of Russian regional identity and history</a>, I believe the prospect of a broken-up Russia is unlikely, to say the least. But talk of Russia’s disintegration and the change in map names taps into themes worth exploring: Is there much appetite for independence in the far regions of the Russian state? And if there were to be breakaway regions in the Far East, would that be to the benefit of the West – or to China?</p>
<h2>Rise of the ‘breakup boosters’</h2>
<p>Those calling for, or predicting, the disintegration of the Russian Federation have grown in numbers since the start of the Ukraine war. In the book “<a href="https://jamestown.org/product/failed-state-a-guide-to-russias-rupture-published/">Failed State: A guide to Russia’s Rupture</a>,” political scientist Janusz Bugajski argues that the territories of the Russian Federation will in time declare independence – like during the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. This, he and others argue, would be <a href="https://cepa.org/article/russias-collapse-good-news-for-everyone/">good for everyone</a> outside Russia. A rump Russian state would have “reduced capabilities to attack neighbors,” Bugajski argues.</p>
<p>The Washington Post’s David Ignatius <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/08/08/putin-russia-ukraine-war-strategy/">has a gloomier view</a> of Russian disintegration, writing in August that it would provide “a devil’s playground” that could pose a danger to the West.</p>
<p>Either way, a growing number of analysts are of a mind that, in <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4149633-what-if-russia-literally-splits-apart/">the words of Russia scholar Alexander J. Motyl</a>, it is “time to start taking the potential disintegration of Russia seriously.”</p>
<p>Having <a href="https://jordanrussiacenter.org/event-recaps/civil-society-in-19th-century-russia/#.Wtn8oNPwZOE">worked on the history of Russian regionalism</a> for two decades, I see serious obstacles to territories declaring independence. It is certainly true that centralized authority has been to the detriment – both economically and culturally – to some of the Russian Federation’s 83 regions. But there is a lack of mass public support for autonomy – that is, the ability to decide local and regional matters within a larger state – let alone full-blown independence.</p>
<p>Not all regions in Russia are the same. In some, such as <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kazans-new-spirit-lasting-social-effects-tatarstans-sovereignty-movement">Tatarstan</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20593383">Dagestan</a>, autonomy has a genuine mass appeal.</p>
<p>But most Russian regions that favor greater autonomy are in locations that would make it difficult for them to declare independence outright because they would still be surrounded by the Russian Federation. </p>
<p>Those in a locations more suited to independence – say, those that have borders with neighboring countries – often face other difficulties, such as being close to China.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An industrial city is seen in the background behind a fence with Chinese writing on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558104/original/file-20231107-267335-88jqnm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C108%2C6037%2C3916&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558104/original/file-20231107-267335-88jqnm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558104/original/file-20231107-267335-88jqnm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558104/original/file-20231107-267335-88jqnm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558104/original/file-20231107-267335-88jqnm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558104/original/file-20231107-267335-88jqnm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558104/original/file-20231107-267335-88jqnm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A view of Russia, from China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-china-russia-border-with-the-russian-city-of-news-photo/1247976467?adppopup=true">Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Russia’s Far East, there is concern among would-be breakaways that independence could lead to the possibility of an interventionist China either taking over or at <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/03/china-eyes-russias-far-east-resources-patriots-want-more/">least exerting its influence</a>.</p>
<h2>Problems of geography</h2>
<p>“Breakup boosters” – the term I use to describe those advocating for Russia’s disintegration – assume that regions in the Russian Federation all have aspirations for independence.</p>
<p>But an analysis of Russian regions by <a href="https://politics.wfu.edu/faculty-and-staff/adam-lenton/">Adam Lenton of Wake Forest University</a> found a highly variable level of support for autonomy across Russian regions.</p>
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<p>The data shows that in many of the regions that have exiled independence leaders and are talked about of being potential breakaways, the public doesn’t support that goal.</p>
<p>The data shows support for autonomy rather than independence. Autonomy would make the Russian Federation a real federation.</p>
<p>The region with by far the most support for autonomy is <a href="https://iaunrc.indiana.edu/about/our-region/countries/tatarstan.html">Tatarstan</a>, a subnational republic led by Turkic-speaking Tatar people 447 miles south of Moscow. But arguing that this should lead to independence makes little sense – it would be completely surrounded by a hostile Russian Federation. An independent foreign and defense policy in such circumstances would be almost impossible.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-quest-for-more-autonomy-risks-and-opportunities-for-tatarstan-123570">Tatars have themselves argued</a> against independence on this ground.</p>
<p>The regions of the North Caucasus have some of the highest scores, plus a foreign border with Georgia making it potentially a better candidate for independence. But the region has a bitter experience with attempts to break away. Chechnya’s attempt at independence failed after a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/03/12/1085861999/russias-wars-in-chechnya-offer-a-grim-warning-of-what-could-be-in-ukraine">long and bloody war</a>.</p>
<p>In Siberia, the region of Tuva has high levels of support for autonomy. But it is in China’s backyard – and this would make it geographically vulnerable.</p>
<h2>Russia’s Far East, China’s backyard</h2>
<p>Russia’s Far East includes the Amur region along the border with China and Vladivostok. These were taken from China by Russia during the mid-19th century, when <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/imperial-visions/357FDB8B13B986153598DC402F85FF17">Russian general Nikolai Murav’ev-Amurskii</a> used Russia’s greater firepower and more modern army to defeat China.</p>
<p>But the status of territories in the region remained contentious. In 1969, China and the Soviet Union fought a seven-month <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/index2.html">undeclared war</a> over border issues. </p>
<p>After 1991, China and Russia went through several rounds of talks and treaties to ensure that the border between them was ratified by both parties, with <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110812092950/http:/bestpravo.ru/fed2004/data03/tex14451.htm">the last treaty</a> taking place in 2004. Even so, not all groups within China accept the results.</p>
<p><a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300166651/china-and-russia/">Textbooks in China</a> still mention the loss of 1.5 million square kilometers to Russia and note that Mao Zedong, the founder of the People’s Republic of China, said he would “present the bill,” meaning that Russia would have to pay what Mao perceived as the theft of territory.</p>
<p>The fear among <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-war-future-politics-vladimir-putin-federation/">some Russians</a> – and those in the West – is that China could turn Russia’s Far East into its satellite, using it as a source of raw materials such as diamonds and gold, as well as oil and gas. And with economic hegemony comes political influence.</p>
<p>China <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/21/economy/china-economy-troubles-intl-hnk/index.html">faces challenges</a> that make increasing its influence in Russia’s Far East particularly attractive now, including what experts see as a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/01/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-martin-wolf.html">structural economic crisis</a> and a <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/I/bo61544815.html">rural education gap</a>. Territorial expansion could provide economic growth while serving as a distraction from domestic issues.</p>
<p>But the breakup of the Russian Federation could also pose a security threat to China. The experience of Xinjiang serves as a warning. The region, which has been the focus of China’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights">persecution of the Muslim Uyghur people</a>, had twice been a breakaway region under the protection of former Soviet leader Josef Stalin.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party will be fearful that any unrest in areas of the Russian Federation that are close to Xinjiang might spill over.</p>
<p>Given all this, the argument from breakup boosters that no one, other than President Vladimir Putin, would lose if the Russian Federation disintegrated is, I believe, simply not sustainable.</p>
<p>And rather than hastening the disintegration of the Russian Federation, polls suggest that the war in Ukraine is having a unifying effect. Many Russians who were <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2023/06/03/the-only-thing-worse-than-war-is-losing-one">originally against the war have become</a> reluctant supporters of it – in part because of propaganda that has emphasized the threat from the West to Russia’s territorial integrity. Since 2021, <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-05/russias-military-doctrine">Russia’s military doctrine</a> has highlighted this threat, stating that one of the main issues facing the nation was groups “aimed at violating the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.”</p>
<p>The calls in the West for the breakup of the Russian Federation might suggest to the Russian public that Putin’s territorial fears could become a reality. Moreover, dreams of a broken Russian Federation might distract those in the West from the very real problem of helping Ukraine protect its own territorial integrity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208711/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Smith-Peter receives funding from the Fulbright Program, SRCC, and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I volunteer for Razom for Ukraine. </span></em></p>Hawkish foreign policy wonks have called for a breakup of Russia. But would that fall into Beijing’s hands?Susan Smith-Peter, Professor of Russian History, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2132062023-10-31T12:33:18Z2023-10-31T12:33:18ZFrom India and Taiwan to Tibet, the living assist the dead in their passage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556195/original/file-20231026-27-b64ql7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1024%2C679&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hindu devotees prepare to scatter ashes of the deceased into the sea as part of Ngaben, a mass cremation ceremony, in Surabaya, Indonesia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/hindu-devotees-prepare-to-scatter-ashes-of-the-deceased-news-photo/1243611860?adppopup=true">Juni Kriswanto/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many people see death as a rite of a passage: a journey to some new place, or a threshold between two kinds of being. Zoroastrians believe that there is <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803133541542">a bridge of judgment</a> that each person who dies must cross; depending on deeds done during life, the bridge takes the deceased to different places. Ancient Greek sources depict the deceased <a href="https://www.hellenic.org.au/post/the-final-journey-crossing-the-styx">crossing the river Styx</a>, overcoming obstacles with the help of coins and food.</p>
<p>But the dead cannot make this transition alone – surviving family or friends play key roles. Ritual actions the living perform on behalf of the dead are said to help the deceased with their journey. At the same time, these actions give the living a chance to grieve and say goodbye. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://miamioh.edu/profiles/cas/liz-wilson.html">a scholar of South Asian religions</a> specializing in death and dying, I have seen how much surviving family depend on these rituals for peace of mind. Traditions vary widely by region and religious tradition, but all of them help mourners feel that they have given one last gift to their loved one.</p>
<h2>Fire, water and food</h2>
<p><a href="https://openfolklore.org/content/make-sesame-rice-please-appetites-dead-hinduism-1">Some Hindu death rituals</a> have roots in ancient Vedic rites as old as 1,500 B.C.E. The survivors’ goal is to ensure that a dead person separates from the realm of the living and makes a safe transition to a blessed afterlife or rebirth.</p>
<p>Death rites <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/28709299">typically use fire, water and food</a> in a sequence of three stages.</p>
<p>Stage one is cremation, the fiery incineration of a corpse on a stack of wood infused with flammable oils. Cremation is considered the dead person’s willing, final gift to the god of fire, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-57894855">traditionally officiated by the oldest son</a> of the deceased.</p>
<p>Stage two is the immersion of cremated remains in a flowing body of water, such as the Ganges River. There are many sacred rivers in India where the ashes of a loved one can be immersed, and Hindus <a href="https://www.clevelandart.org/art/1966.119">regard them as goddesses</a> who carry off impurities and sins, assisting the soul on its journey.</p>
<p>Many Hindus believe the ideal place to immerse a loved one’s ashes is in the sacred city of Varanasi, in northern India, where the Ganges flows in a broad stream. Families carry corpses in festive processions to the cremation site, hopeful that their rituals will help loved ones move to another state of existence.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Though the Ganges is considered the holiest river, many rivers are viewed as sacred.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Stage three is entrance into the realm of the ancestors. Ancient Hindu belief depicts relatives who have died living in a realm where they are maintained by offerings given by their living descendants, whom they assist with fertility and wealth.</p>
<p>Hindu beliefs and practices are extremely diverse. In many communities, however, descendants perform rites that offer nourishment to the dead person, <a href="https://scroll.in/article/1032342/devdutt-pattanaik-on-the-3000-year-old-hindu-ritual-of-feeding-the-dead">represented in the form of a ball of rice</a>. Through these offerings, which can be performed after the death or during certain holidays and anniversaries, the deceased spirit is said to gradually become an embodied ancestor, reborn thanks to the ritual labor of their offspring. </p>
<h2>Colorful processions</h2>
<p>Buddhist death rituals differ considerably from culture to culture, yet one commonality is the amount of human effort that goes into sending off the dead. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Nine men in black outfits with brightly colored patterns on them hold a huge puppet of a dragon outside a building with Chinese characters on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556237/original/file-20231026-22-sh2stu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dragon dancers perform during a funeral for Taiwanese TV star Chu Ke-liang in New Taipei City on June 20, 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/dragon-dancers-perform-outside-a-funeral-hall-during-a-news-photo/698172402?adppopup=true">Sam Yeh/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Chinese and Taiwanese culture, it is thought best to send off the deceased with a well-attended funeral procession, full of pageantry for deities and mortals alike. Many people rent “Electric Flower Cars,” trucks that serve as moving stages for performers – even pole dancers are not uncommon. Fifty jeeps with pole-dancing women graced <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38528122">the funeral procession of a Taiwanese politician</a> who died in 2017. </p>
<p>Though pole dancers are a newer phenomenon, Taiwanese funerals and religious processions have long showcased women and young people, including female mourners hired to wail. Scholars such as <a href="https://www.harvard-yenching.org/person/chang-hsun/">anthropologist Chang Hsun</a> suggest that a combination of such traditions <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZCRmmSdYwDc">led to the inclusion</a> of women dancing and singing in some modern funeral processions. </p>
<p>By the 1980s, scantily clad women were a fixture of rural Taiwanese funeral culture. In 2011, <a href="https://sc.edu/study/colleges_schools/artsandsciences/anthropology/our_people/directory/moskowitz_marc.php">anthropologist Marc L. Moskowitz</a> produced a short documentary called “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZCRmmSdYwDc">Dancing for the Dead: Funeral Strippers in Taiwan</a>” about the phenomenon. </p>
<p>Funeral performances show tremendous freedom and innovation; one sees drummers, marching bands and Taiwanese opera singers. Paper objects in the shape of things the deceased is believed to use in the afterlife are burned, from microwaves to cars. Likewise, specially printed money called “ghost money” is burned to provide the deceased with funds.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a yellow monk's robe and someone wearing black stand behind what looks like a dollhouse, as the monk rings a bell." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556448/original/file-20231029-27-6pbk83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A paper model of a villa, used as an offering for the dead during a ceremony in New Taipei City, Taiwan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-picture-taken-on-march-16-2019-shows-a-relative-news-photo/1134772913?adppopup=true">Sam Yeh/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Guiding the dead</h2>
<p>In Tibet, Buddhists believe that the vital energy of a person who has died stays with the body <a href="https://theasiadialogue.com/2016/05/04/tibetan-death-rituals/">for 49 days</a>. During this time, the dead person receives instruction from priests to help them navigate the journey ahead.</p>
<p>This journey toward the next stage of being involves a series of choices that will determine the realm of their rebirth – including rebirth as an animal, a hungry ghost, a deity, a being in hell, another human being or immediate enlightenment. </p>
<p>Priests whisper instructions into the ear of the dead person, who is believed to be capable of hearing so long as they retain their vital energy. Being told what to expect after death allows a person to face death with equanimity.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black and white photo shows a man seated in prayer on top of a mountain, as other people work in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556238/original/file-20231026-25-lx55xi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Tibetan Buddhist priest chants prayers and repeats passages from religious scrolls while his helpers make a funeral pyre.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/lamaist-priest-chants-prayers-and-repeats-passages-from-news-photo/646273502?adppopup=true">Hulton Deutsch/Corbis via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The instructions given to the dead are described in a sacred text called the “Bardo Thodol,” often translated in English as “<a href="https://theconversation.com/guide-to-the-classics-the-tibetan-book-of-the-dead-172962">The Tibetan Book of the Dead</a>.” “Bardo” is the Tibetan term for an intermediate or in-between state; one might think of the bardo of death as a train that stops at various destinations, opening doors and giving the passenger opportunities to depart. </p>
<p>Tibetan Buddhists believe that these instructions allow the deceased to make good choices in the 49-day interim between their death and the next life. Different rebirth realms will appear to the person, taking the form of colored lights. Based on the karma of the deceased, some realms will seem more alluring than others. The person is told to be fearless: to let themselves be drawn toward higher realms, even if they appear frightening.</p>
<p>For several days before burial, the deceased is visited by friends, family and well-wishers – all able to work out their grief while assisting the dead in a postmortem journey.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213206/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liz Wilson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Across cultures, death rituals give mourners a chance to grieve. But they also offer one last opportunity to help the deceased as they transition to the next stage of existence.Liz Wilson, Professor of Comparative Religion, Miami UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2085902023-09-22T12:28:07Z2023-09-22T12:28:07ZAsian women are still a minority in diplomatic positions: this is how we can fix this<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534261/original/file-20230627-7336-wfx2kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C44%2C4992%2C3682&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women in diplomacy.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.freepik.com/free-vector/illustration-international-diverse-people_3207233.htm#query=women%20across%20country&position=7&from_view=search&track=ais">Freepik</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://investinginwomen.asia/knowledge/global-gender-gap-report-2022/">2022 Global Gender Gap Report</a> showed Asian countries have managed to narrow the gender gap in economic, education and health sectors. But when it comes to political participation, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0192512120935517">the gap persists</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_1">Studies</a> have shown in most Asian countries, women are still marginalised in the field of international relations. They are underrepresented in <a href="https://www.sfpa.sk/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/ulicna-intempl-final-kopie-kopie.pdf">ambassadorial positions</a> and their low involvement <a href="https://dcollection.ewha.ac.kr/public_resource/pdf/000000201749_20230919130428.pdf">during negotiation processes</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://ieomsociety.org/proceedings/2022malaysia/495.pdf">Studies</a> about representation of women in modern diplomacy also assert that in general, Asian women continue to be the minority in this field, with very low percentage.</p>
<p>Despite <a href="https://www.sfpa.sk/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/ulicna-intempl-final-kopie-kopie.pdf">some progress</a> and <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_11">efforts</a> to achieve gender parity, Asian women are still <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_11">in constant conflict</a> with cultural dynamics that hamper their advancement in foreign affairs.</p>
<p>Here’s how we fix it. </p>
<h2>Women are not represented</h2>
<p>As of 2023, the global share of women serving as cabinet ministers globally is just 22.8%, according to the <a href="https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/infographics/2023-03/women-in-politics-2023">the Inter-Parliamentary Union</a>. Asian countries (Central and Southern Asia) rank the second lowest of the world regions or at <a href="https://www.ipu.org/news/press-releases/2023-03/women-in-power-in-2023-new-data-shows-progress-wide-regional-gaps">10.1%</a>.</p>
<p>Most of the women (84%) in the cabinet ministers in Asia are assigned in ministries or institutions related to women’s issues, gender equality and children. Meanwhile, the number of women serving in traditionally <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/history-of-education-quarterly/article/abs/lady-astors-campaign-for-nursery-schools-in-britain-19301939-attempting-to-valorize-cultural-capital-in-a-maledominated-political-field/C7F81D3D2296C8AC47F4208908401E5D">male-dominated fields</a>, such as defence, energy and transportation, remains small – less than 12%. </p>
<p>Globally, out of 193 countries, the portion of women who serve in ministerial positions at the ministries of foreign affairs is only around 20%.</p>
<p>In Asia, the proportion of women as ambassadors and permanent representatives in United Nations (UN) organisations is just <a href="https://www.agda.ac.ae/docs/default-source/2023/women-diplomacy.pdf?sfvrsn=6189673b_3">12%</a>, far less than the global average of 20.54%. The Maldives has the greatest ratio of female ambassadors among Asian countries – at 50%, while Cambodia with 25% share is the lowest in Asia.</p>
<p>Right now, only <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-58682-3_2">17 Asian nations</a> that currently have ever had female foreign ministers. In Southeast Asia, it is only Philippines, Timor Leste, Myanmar and Indonesia.</p>
<p>During President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo term, Indonesian female ambassadors made up <a href="https://theconversation.com/data-bicara-keterwakilan-perempuan-indonesia-sebagai-duta-besar-kurang-dari-6-strategi-pengarusutamaan-gender-perlu-diperkuat-197033">13.46%</a> from the <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/page/29/kedutaan_konsulat">total 95 embassies and three permanent missions</a>, that is higher than the previous administration which stood at 9.55%.</p>
<h2>The challenges</h2>
<p>There are three challenges behind the low representation of women in Asian foreign affairs. </p>
<p><strong>First</strong>, the dearth of representation of women in international affairs is inextricably linked to <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/16/here-s-why-closing-foreign-policy-gender-gap-matters-pub-68325">the notion</a> in most Asian nations that males still dominate this field. Historically, diplomacy has been a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article/13/3/521/2625550">male-dominated domain</a> with <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_7">very few provisions</a> for women.</p>
<p><strong>Second</strong>, in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00219096231176738">most Asian countries</a>, there are still <a href="https://download.e-bookshelf.de/download/0010/5370/59/L-G-0010537059-0024446644.pdf">unequal cultural and structural power relations</a> inside internal organisations. <a href="https://www.diplomacy.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/IC-and-Diplomacy-FINAL_Part16.pdf">Patriarchal views and gender preconceptions</a> about the function of female ambassadors still exist.</p>
<p><strong>Third</strong>, female diplomats are also affected more disproportionately because they <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article/abs/work-and-family-balance-in-top-diplomacy-the-case-of-the-czech-republic/CA79AA24B75D006C2D0A601966A65F32">carry double burden</a> in balancing work and personal life.</p>
<p>While they hold public positions, most of them still carry domestic responsibilities. It is still more difficult for women, compared to men, to deal with frequent job rotations, long working hours and placements abroad.</p>
<h2>Promoting gender-responsive policies</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.nyu.edu/washington-dc/dc-dialogues/women-in-and-of-the-world/broad-influence--how-women-are-changing-the-way-america.html">Research</a> has shown that if women achieved critical mass –somewhere between 20-30% – within an organisation they can <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-a-critical-mass-of-women-can-change-an-institution">wield power and influence</a> in public life and the workforce. </p>
<p>But it is not enough to only ensure women receive fair representation in organisations. After achieving critical mass, the next step is to include a gender perspective in foreign policy approaches, formulation and implementation.</p>
<p>In recent years, several governments in Asia <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/Brief-Feminist-foreign-policies-en_0.pdf">have recognised</a> the needs of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article/16/2/143/5781199">gender mainstreaming</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26760832">feminist foreign policy</a>.</p>
<p>Indonesia, for example, has issued <a href="https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/163046/permenlu-no-21-tahun-2020">a ministerial regulation</a> that facilitates gender-related concerns in ministries, including facilities for female employees.</p>
<p>Other Asian countries are also beginning to implement gender-responsive foreign policy. Several Asian countries have developed <a href="https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2020/10/women-peace-and-security-in-asia-pacific-20-years-on-progress-achieved-and-lessons-learned">National Action Plans</a> on women, peace and security. These include Indonesia (2014), the Philippines (2010 and 2017), South Korea (2014) and Timor Leste (2016). </p>
<p>Sending more female ambassadors to regional and global forums is another way for achieving gender balance and equality.</p>
<p>Efforts have been started but much more is needed. All stakeholders must keep echoing the necessity of gender equality in the work place through better and wider <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10357718.2021.1893653?journalCode=caji20">attempts to normalise gender equality</a> in foreign policy institutions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208590/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Para penulis tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi di luar afiliasi akademis yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Although there have progress to achieve gender equality, women are still under-represented in diplomacy in Asia.Athiqah Nur Alami, Researcher at Research Center for Politics, Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional (BRIN)Ganewati Wuryandari, Professor, Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional (BRIN)Mario Surya Ramadhan, Researcher, Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional (BRIN)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2088452023-07-27T15:32:54Z2023-07-27T15:32:54ZChina, Russia and the delicate balance Asian countries seek to strike<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536109/original/file-20230706-21-ppd51o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=51%2C7%2C4837%2C3246&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin (left) shake hands with Chinese Presiden Xi Jinping.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/hangzhou-china-sept-4-2016-chinese-634594754">plavi011/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chinese President Xi Jinping <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/peace-plans-pipelines-what-came-out-putin-xi-talks-2023-03-22/">visited Moscow</a> to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin earlier this year, just a few days after the International Criminal Court released an <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and">arrest warrant against Putin</a> for alleged war crimes in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Unfazed by the warrant, both state leaders emphasised the importance of the Russia-China relationship to form a <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/world/asia-pacific/chinas-xi-pledges-to-promote-multipolar-world-in-meeting-with-putin/amp">multipolar world order and stop Western domination</a>. “Multipolarity” has been seen as enabling <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137434203_1">an equal distribution of political, economic and military power and influence</a> among several countries or centres of power.</p>
<p>Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, followed by Western sanctions against Russia, China has become an even more important economic partner for Russia, with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china-customs-says-trade-with-russia-hit-new-high-2022-2023-01-13/">two-way trade between them in 2022 </a> reaching US$190 billion, up <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3214285/what-trade-investment-relationship-between-china-and-russia">from US$147 billion in 2021 </a>. China can also help Russia expand its influence elsewhere in Asia. </p>
<h2>Dynamic region</h2>
<p>Russia <a href="https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/">formally views Asia</a> as a dynamic region with great economic and demographic power. The fact that large countries in Asia such as China, India, and Indonesia did not impose <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/countries-have-sanctioned-russia">sanctions against Russia</a> nor <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/05/22/asias-ambivalence-towards-sanctioning-russia/">reduce cooperation with it after Ukraine war</a> indicates how independent the region has become from Western influence – and that has increased Asia’s value for Russia.</p>
<p>Some in Asia see Russia <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9256.12053">as an alternative</a> in the middle of US-China power competition in the region. Although its influence <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1943-0787.2012.01334.x">has yet to be as strong as the US and China</a>, Russia could provide <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/aspp.12421">numerous opportunities</a> for some Asian states. Among them are defence cooperation through arms exports and joint military exercises with Asian countries, and energy cooperation. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211467X21000675">Increasing Russia’s oil and gas exports to Asia</a> is an example of the latter. </p>
<p>Russia already has a number of energy projects in Asia, such as <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Energy/Pertamina-moves-forward-on-24bn-Rosneft-project">oil refineries in Indonesia and Vietnam</a>, and the construction of <a href="https://rosatom.ru/production/design/stroyashchiesya-aes/">nuclear power plants in China, India and Bangladesh</a>. </p>
<p>Russia has also actively participated in various Asian forums, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+). It has routinely developed <a href="https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ASEAN-Russia-CPA-2016-2020-Final1.pdf">aspects of security cooperation, such as counterterrorism and cyber security</a>.</p>
<h2>Things in common</h2>
<p>Historically, the current close relations between Russia and China are a consequence of both countries’ diplomatic reconciliation since the end of the Cold War. In 1996, the then Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin signed a <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/200011/t20001115_678982.html">“strategic partnership for a multipolar world”</a> and this line has been continued by their successors.</p>
<p>More recently, Russia and China have been critical of the promotion of <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-02-10/reality-check">Western liberal democracy</a>, which they see as a threat to their systems. The two powers are <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/93/6/1357/4211176?redirectedFrom=PDF">actively developing relations</a> with the other parts of the world, such as Africa and Latin America, in order to build an alternative to challenge Western hegemony, promoting themselves as “an interesting model” in comparison to the West. </p>
<p>Both <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668136.2014.988998">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/jlp.16028.wan">China</a> cite their respective cultures, traditions and histories as bases for their patriotic values. Therefore, they say they always uphold “respect towards cultural heritage and diversity of every country” as part of their principles in foreign policies. </p>
<h2>China’s role</h2>
<p>In Russia’s pivot to Asia strategy, China plays an important role as a political, economic and <a href="https://books.google.co.id/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AdvJAAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=china+diplomatic+power&ots=jtReri2iIf&sig=kSLZLD2Qi5tD7BSBVpaLEQVGqnc&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=china%20diplomatic%20power&f=false">diplomatic power</a> in the region. Not only is China <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1296249/russia-arms-exports-by-country/">one of Russia’s largest markets for military arms</a> but it has become a huge consumer of Russia’s oil and gas products, thanks in large part to the <a href="https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/russia-announces-progress-china-power-siberia-2-gas-pipeline.html">Siberia pipeline</a></p>
<p>Russia has also linked some international integration projects with China. The Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa bloc (BRICs), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are all seen as having a part to play in the Russian concept of a <a href="https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/russias-greater-eurasian-partnership-strategy-aims-and-prospects">Greater Eurasian Partnership</a>.</p>
<p>Given the challenges both countries face, and their scale in terms of geography and population, the Russia-China relationship is of huge international significance. And it is becoming of increasing importance to other Asian countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208845/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Jordan tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Following deteriorating relations with the West, Russia has shifted focus to Asia, and hold China to help expand its influence.Jonathan Jordan, Research Fellow, Indonesian Institute of Advanced International Studies (INADIS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2089112023-07-18T12:29:26Z2023-07-18T12:29:26ZChina needs immigrants<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537900/original/file-20230717-245914-r0vcf2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=14%2C44%2C4977%2C3263&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Too few children means China needs to look outside the country for new blood.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/little-girl-walk-with-her-parents-on-the-city-street-in-news-photo/958880156?adppopup=true">Zhang Peng/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>China is entering a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-chinas-shrinking-population-is-a-big-deal-counting-the-social-economic-and-political-costs-of-an-aging-smaller-society-198056">severe demographic crisis</a>. </p>
<p>For several centuries, the Asian nation has been the most populous country in the world. But it is now shrinking. In 2022, the country registered <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/16/business/china-birth-rate.html">more deaths than births</a>, and it will soon be surpassed by India in total population size – indeed, many demographers <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/24/india-overtakes-china-to-become-worlds-most-populous-country">believe this has already occurred</a>.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jAfhO2YAAAAJ&hl=en">a scholar who has studied</a> China’s demography for almost 40 years, I know the likelihood is this falling population will lead to an <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-chinas-shrinking-population-is-a-big-deal-counting-the-social-economic-and-political-costs-of-an-aging-smaller-society-198056">economic slowdown</a>, with a greater number of dependents and fewer workers to support them. Yet attempts to reverse the trend through policy that <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/china-comes-up-with-20-recommendations-to-encourage-families-to-have-more-children-572313">encourages couples to have more children</a> have proved ineffective. China will need to turn to other measures to solve its population problem. In short, China needs immigrants.</p>
<h2>More babies or more immigrants?</h2>
<p>The scale of the demographic task facing policymakers in Beijing is vast.</p>
<p>In 2022, the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/01/17/1149453055/china-records-1st-population-fall-in-decades-as-births-drop">Chinese government reported</a> 10.41 million deaths in the country and 9.56 million births. This was the first time China has seen more annual deaths than births since the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/03/giving-historys-greatest-mass-murderer-his-due/">Great Leap Forward</a> of 1958 to 1962 – during which a severe famine resulting from bad economic policies contributed to 30 million to 40 million more deaths than would have been expected.</p>
<p>If present trends continue, China is expected to lose more than a third of its 1.4 billion population. Some projections have the country dropping to a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/15/population-in-more-than-20-countries-to-halve-by-2100-study">population of 800 million by the year 2100</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="4GUP2" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/4GUP2/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The impact of this change will be felt across Chinese society. The country is already aging. The <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/median-age-china-surpassed-united-states">median age in China is now 38</a> compared to 28 just two decades ago. In contrast, India today has <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/india-population/">a median age of 28</a>. People of age 65 and over <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/02/09/key-facts-as-india-surpasses-china-as-the-worlds-most-populous-country/">now comprise 14% of China’s population</a> compared to 7% of India’s.</p>
<p>Once a nation’s population is in decline, there are only two ways to reverse the trend: encourage people to have more children or get people from outside the country to move in.</p>
<p>Many Chinese leaders believe that they can increase China’s population by changing the nation’s fertility policies. In 2015, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/29/china-abandons-one-child-policy">government abandoned the one-child policy</a>, permitting all couples in China to have two children. In 2021, the two-child policy was abandoned <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/31/world/asia/china-three-child-policy.html">in favor of a three-child policy</a>. The hope was these changes would result in sizable increases in the national fertility rate, which now stands at 1.2 – well below the level of 2.1 children per woman of childbearing age that is needed to replace the population. </p>
<p>But these policy changes have not led to fertility increases in China, and there is little reason to think they will result in any dramatic uptick in the years ahead. This is because most of China’s fertility reduction, especially since the 1990s, has been voluntary and more a result of modernization than fertility control policies. Chinese couples are having fewer children <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/6/9/despite-three-child-policy-many-in-china-cant-afford-more-kids">due to the higher living costs and educational expenses</a> involved in having more than one child.</p>
<h2>Entering the ‘low fertility trap’</h2>
<p>The total fertility rate in China might go up over the next decade by 0.1 or 0.2 at best, in my opinion. But demographers largely agree that it will never go up by 1.0 or 2.0 – the kind of increase needed if China is to reach the replacement level.</p>
<p>And then there is what demographers refer to as the “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/17/europe/italy-record-low-birth-rate-intl-cmd/index.html">low fertility trap</a>.” This hypothesis, advanced by demographers in the early 2000s, holds that once a country’s fertility rate drops below 1.5 or 1.4 – and China’s is now at 1.2 – it is very difficult to increase it by a significant amount. The argument goes that fertility declines to these low levels are largely the result of changes in living standards and increasing opportunities for women.</p>
<p>As a result, it is most unlikely that the three-child policy will have any influence at all on raising the fertility rate.</p>
<p>Which leaves immigration. China right now has few residents who were born in a foreign country – there are <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/05/04/china-needs-foreign-workers-so-why-wont-it-embrace-immigration">now only around 1 million foreign-born residents</a> in China, or less than 0.1% of the population.</p>
<p>In fact, China has the smallest number of international migrants of <a href="https://qz.com/1163632/china-still-has-the-smallest-share-of-incoming-migrants-in-the-world">any major country in the world</a>. Compare its 0.1% of immigrants with <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/15/us/where-immigrants-come-from-cec/index.html">near 14% in the U.S.</a> and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-immigrants-made-up-over-18-of-2022-population/a-65383249">18% in Germany</a>. Even Japan and South Korea – which historically have not been high-immigration countries – have higher percentages of foreign-born population, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/23/japan-immigration-policy-xenophobia-migration/">2% in Japan</a> and <a href="https://inmykorea.com/how-many-foreigners-in-korea/#:%7E:text=Currently%2C%20foreign%20residents%20make%20up,increase%20to%204.3%25%20by%202040.">3% in South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>It isn’t just the low numbers of immigrants that is a problem. China also faces the problem of growing numbers of its population moving to other countries, including the U.S. In 2017, for example, an <a href="https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017_Highlights.pdf">estimated 10 million people moved from China</a> to live and work in other countries.</p>
<h2>Overcoming racial purity</h2>
<p>China must change its immigration policies if it is to reverse its demographic trend. </p>
<p>Currently, foreign-born people cannot attain Chinese citizenship unless they are children of Chinese nationals. Also, foreigners are only allowed to purchase one piece of property in China, and it must be their residence.</p>
<p>But changing immigration policy will likely require a change in mindset. </p>
<p>In a recent story in The Economist, the <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/05/04/china-needs-foreign-workers-so-why-wont-it-embrace-immigration">reporter notes that Chinese</a> “officials boast of a single Chinese bloodline dating back thousands of years.” And that taps into a seemingly <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/racism-is-alive-and-well-in-china/">deep-rooted belief in racial purity</a> held by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/world/asia/china-sperm-communist-party.html">many leaders in</a> the Chinese Communist Party. In 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/2/4/ksac070/6947853">told Donald Trump</a>, then America’s president: “We people are the original people, black hair, yellow skin, inherited onwards. We call ourselves the descendants of the dragon.”</p>
<p>The best way to maintain this racial purity, <a href="https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1005267">many in China believe</a>, is to limit or prohibit migration into China.</p>
<p>But relaxing immigration policy will not only boost numbers, it will also offset any drop in productivity caused by an aging population. Immigrants are typically of prime working age and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/immigrants-outperform-native-born-americans-two-key-measures-financial-success-n1020291">very productive</a>; they also tend to <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/10/26/5-facts-about-immigrant-mothers-and-u-s-fertility-trends/">have more babies</a> than native-born residents.</p>
<p>The U.S. and many European countries have relied for decades on international migration to <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2017/03/08/immigration-projected-to-drive-growth-in-u-s-working-age-population-through-at-least-2035/">bolster their working-age population</a>. For immigration to have any reasonable impacts in China, the numbers of people coming into China will need to increase tremendously in the next decade or so – to around 50 million, perhaps higher. Otherwise, in the coming decades, China’s demographic destiny will be one of population losses every year, with more deaths than births, and the country will soon have one of the oldest populations in the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208911/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dudley L. Poston Jr. does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese politicians have looked toward policies to encourage couples to have more children to offset population decline. It hasn’t worked.Dudley L. Poston Jr., Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2050652023-07-11T19:24:49Z2023-07-11T19:24:49ZLast seen 90 years ago, strange worm species is found crawling in Malaysia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536803/original/file-20230711-29-zqck7d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=152%2C54%2C1388%2C891&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The first specimen of _Bipalium admarginatum_ was found by George Verdon in the jungle of a tropical island.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">George Verdon</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>George Verdon had a biological enigma on his hands. He’d stumbled across an animal while out for a run which was proving difficult to identify… In all fairness, this run had been through an island jungle on the Malay peninsula, so the chance of finding something weird was significantly higher than usual, but nevertheless this particular animal was resisting his attempts to work out what it was.</p>
<p>It was about 10 cm long and looked like a worm. It also had stark stripey warning colours and for a moment almost looked like a tiny juvenile snake. However, when looking at the head – hammerheaded and flattened and apparently eyeless – it was clearly something different.</p>
<p>As a professional wildlife filmmaker, George has seen a lot of strange animals, but was lost with this one. After some Internet research, he found that there were some scientists crazy enough (us…) to study these weird creatures.</p>
<p>For the last 10 years, we have undertaken to characterise the land flatworms which invade European countries, such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/obama-nungara-how-a-flatworm-from-argentina-jumped-the-atlantic-and-invaded-france-131186"><em>Obama nungara</em></a>, now found in more than 70 departments in France, or the giant species <a href="https://theconversation.com/yes-giant-predatory-worms-really-are-invading-france-97106"><em>Bipalium kewense</em></a>. George got in touch in August of 2019, sending us an e-mail with some photos and asking if we knew any more about it. </p>
<p>Upon comparison with the scientific literature, it turned out to be a species that hadn’t been seen in the 90 years since it was first discovered: <em>Bipalium admarginatum</em>. It hadn’t been recorded since it was first described in 1933 by de Beauchamp, on an island not far away from George’s sighting. Naturally, we were excited, and asked George if he had collected the specimen he had seen. For some reason we don’t understand, he had been out for a jog without a field kit, and had subsequently let the animal glide back into the leaf litter. We asked him if he could dive back into the jungle to find a few specimens, and gave instructions on how best to find and catch them.</p>
<h2>Macaques, and quadruple gin and tonic… without tonic</h2>
<p>Returning to the scene of the sighting armed with collecting vials, larval forceps, and the help of Liv Grant (a friend and colleague), George found more of the species. This was only half of the challenge, as they turned out to be in the territory of macaques, who were not feeling hospitable. Liv took up the task of fending off the marauders while George hastily collected, and the two quickly retreated.</p>
<p>So far so good, but how to preserve them? The instructions we gave were to put the animals in pure ethanol, but tropical islands are notoriously lacking when it comes to laboratory supplies. Or so we thought… George found a solution: a quadruple gin and tonic, minus the tonic, the lime, the ice, and the umbrella. After putting the specimens into a vial with the gin, George brought them to Michelle Soo, at the UCSI University of Kuala Lumpur, who took charge of verifying the discovery.</p>
<h2>Complete mitochondrial genome</h2>
<p>The next step was to attempt a molecular analysis of the animal. This is important for characterising it and understanding its relationship with other species of the genus <em>Bipalium</em>. Normally this is only done <a href="https://peerj.com/articles/4672/">on specimens well preserved in absolute ethanol</a>. Romain Gastineau, at the University of Szczecin in Poland, tried anyway… and thanks to next-generation sequencing techniques, we were able to characterise the complete mitochondrial genome of <em>Bipalium admarginatum</em>, despite the original harvest in the gin. </p>
<p>Only about 10 complete mitogenomes are known in this family, all the others having been obtained from specimens harvested under perfect conditions and <a href="https://peerj.com/articles/12725/">impeccable ethanol in a laboratory</a>. It deserved a <a href="https://doi.org/10.11646/zootaxa.5277.3.11">publication</a>, which we undertook. We were even able to convince the scientific journal <a href="https://doi.org/10.11646/zootaxa.5277.3.11">to add a summary in the Malay language</a>, in order to convince the country’s citizens to collect any bizarre worms they will encounter. Hopefully we will receive other specimens, there are so many extraordinary species to discover and rediscover.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205065/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jean-Lou Justine a reçu des financements du Muséum National d'Histoire Naturelle, Paris.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leigh Winsor, Michelle Soo et Romain Gastineau ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur poste universitaire.</span></em></p>A strange worm found in the jungle, then harvested and preserved in… gin, provides a better understanding of the evolution and genetics of flatworms.Jean-Lou Justine, Professeur, UMR ISYEB (Institut de Systématique, Évolution, Biodiversité), Muséum national d’histoire naturelle (MNHN)Leigh Winsor, Adjunct Senior Research Fellow, James Cook UniversityMichelle Soo, Assistant Professor, Deputy Dean of the Department of Biotechnology, UCSI UniversityRomain Gastineau, Professeur assistant (Institut des sciences de la mer et de l'environnement), University of SzczecinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2079592023-07-03T11:51:47Z2023-07-03T11:51:47ZThe Global South is on the rise – but what exactly is the Global South?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534689/original/file-20230628-19-ibxriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C0%2C5472%2C3637&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The world turned upside down</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/illustration/global-south-royalty-free-illustration/1456945486?phrase=%22global+south%22&adppopup=true">iStock / Getty Images Plus</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The unwillingness of many leading countries <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/beijing-new-york-city-billionaires-comparison-2021-4#:%7E:text=new%20billionaire%20capital.-,For%20the%20first%20time%20ever%2C%20Beijing%20is%20home%20to%20more,City's%2099%20billionaires%2C%20per%20Forbes.">in Africa</a>, <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/india-remaining-neutral-russias-invasion-ukraine/story?id=97891228">Asia</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/12/world/americas/brazil-ukraine-weapons.html">and Latin America</a> to stand with NATO over the war in Ukraine has brought to the fore once again the term “Global South.”</p>
<p>“Why does so much of the Global South support Russia?” <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/03/29/why-does-so-much-of-the-global-south-support-russia-not-ukraine">inquired one recent headline</a>; “Ukraine courts ‘Global South’ in push to challenge Russia,” <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/23/ukraine-courts-global-south-in-push-to-challenge-russia">declared another</a>.</p>
<p>But what is meant by that term, and why has it gained currency in recent years?</p>
<p>The Global South refers to various countries around the world that are <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2015/01/04/372684438/if-you-shouldnt-call-it-the-third-world-what-should-you-call-it">sometimes described as “developing</a>,” “less developed” or “underdeveloped.” Many of these countries – although by no means all – are in the Southern Hemisphere, largely in Africa, Asia and Latin America.</p>
<p>In general, they are poorer, have higher levels of income inequality and suffer lower life expectancy and harsher living conditions <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/global-south-countries">than countries in the “Global North</a>” — that is, richer nations that are located mostly in North America and Europe, with some additions in Oceania and elsewhere.</p>
<h2>Going beyond the ‘Third World’</h2>
<p>The term Global South appears to have been first used in 1969 by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/us/carl-oglesby-antiwar-leader-in-1960s-dies-at-76.html">political activist Carl Oglesby</a>. Writing in the <a href="https://aesop-planning.eu/images/uploads/special_issue_final-theories-gloabl-south.pdf">liberal Catholic magazine Commonweal</a>, Oglesby argued that the war in Vietnam was the culmination of a history of northern “dominance over the global south.”</p>
<p>But it was only after the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union#:%7E:text=On%20December%2025%2C%201991%2C%20the,the%20newly%20independent%20Russian%20state.">1991 breakup of the Soviet Union</a> – which marked the <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/second-world-countries">end of the so-called “Second World</a>” – that the term gained momentum.</p>
<p>Until then, the more common term for developing nations – countries that had yet to industrialize fully – was “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3180660">Third World</a>.”</p>
<p>That term was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/01/obituaries/alfred-sauvy-expert-on-demographics-92.html">coined by Alfred Sauvy</a> in 1952, in an analogy with France’s historical three estates: the nobility, the clergy and the bourgeoisie. The term “First World” referred to the advanced capitalist nations; the “Second World,” to the socialist nations led by the Soviet Union; and the “Third World,” to developing nations, many at the time still under the colonial yoke.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/mar/28/peter-worsley">Sociologist Peter Worsley</a>’s 1964 book, “<a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/T/bo4432964.html">The Third World: A Vital New Force in International Affairs</a>,” further popularized the term. The book also made note of the “Third World” forming the backbone of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-non-aligned-movement-in-the-21st-century-66057">Non-Aligned Movement</a>, which had been founded just three years earlier as a riposte to bipolar Cold War alignment.</p>
<p>Though Worsley’s view of this “Third World” was positive, the term became associated with countries plagued by poverty, squalor and instability. “Third World” became a synonym for banana republics ruled by tinpot dictators – a <a href="https://cyber.harvard.edu/digitaldemocracy/mezzana.htm">caricature spread by Western media</a>.</p>
<p>The fall of the Soviet Union – and with it the end of the so-called Second World – gave a convenient pretext for the term “Third World” to disappear, too. Usage of the term fell rapidly in the 1990s.</p>
<p>Meanwhile “developed,” “developing” and “underdeveloped” <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2015/01/04/372684438/if-you-shouldnt-call-it-the-third-world-what-should-you-call-it">also faced criticism</a> for holding up Western countries as the ideal, while portraying those outside that club as backwards.</p>
<p>Increasingly the term that was being used to replace them was the more neutral-sounding “Global South.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Graph shows a line depicting usage of the term 'Third World' which bulges in the mid 1980s." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534696/original/file-20230628-21-vgi7ot.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534696/original/file-20230628-21-vgi7ot.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=223&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534696/original/file-20230628-21-vgi7ot.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=223&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534696/original/file-20230628-21-vgi7ot.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=223&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534696/original/file-20230628-21-vgi7ot.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=281&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534696/original/file-20230628-21-vgi7ot.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=281&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534696/original/file-20230628-21-vgi7ot.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=281&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chart shows the usage over time of ‘Global South,’ Third World,‘ and 'Developing countries’ in English language sources.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=Global+South%2CThird+World%2CDeveloping+countries&year_start=1945&year_end=2019&corpus=en-2019&smoothing=3">Google Books Ngram Viewer</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Geopolitical, not geographical</h2>
<p>The term “Global South” is not geographical. In fact, the Global South’s two largest countries – China and India – lie entirely in the Northern Hemisphere. </p>
<p>Rather, its usage denotes a mix of political, geopolitical and economic commonalities between nations.</p>
<p>Countries in the Global South were mostly at the receiving end of imperialism and colonial rule, with African countries as perhaps the most visible example of this. It gives them a very different outlook on what <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2016/11/23/dependency-theory-a-useful-tool-for-analyzing-global-inequalities-today/">dependency theorists</a> have described as the relationship between the center and periphery in the world political economy – or, to put it in simple terms, the relationship between “the West and the rest.” </p>
<p>Given the imbalanced past relationship between many of the countries of the Global South and the Global North – both during the age of empire and the Cold War – it is little wonder that today many opt <a href="https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2023/02/27/non-alignment-is-back-in-the-global-south-albeit-in-a-different-incarnation/">not to be aligned with any one great power</a>.</p>
<p>And whereas the terms “Third World” and “underdeveloped” convey images of economic powerlessness, that isn’t true of the “Global South.”</p>
<p>Since the turn of the 21st century, a “<a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/shaping-the-asia-pacific-economic-order-2/">shift in wealth</a>,” as<a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/554911468179972438/pdf/96467-PUB-PUBLIC-Box391437B-9781464803550-EMBARGOED-19May2015-930am.pdf"> the World Bank has referred</a> to it, from the North Atlantic to Asia Pacific has upended much of the conventional wisdom on where the world’s riches are being generated.</p>
<p>By 2030 <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/us-economy-to-fall-behind-china-within-a-year-standard-chartered-says-2019-1">it is projected</a> that three of the four largest economies will be from the Global South – with the order being China, India, the United States and Indonesia. Already the GDP in terms of purchasing power of the the Global South-dominated BRICS nations – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2023/03/27/the-brics-has-overtaken-the-g7-in-global-gdp/">surpasses that of the Global North’s G7 club</a>. And there are now <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/beijing-new-york-city-billionaires-comparison-2021-4#:%7E:text=new%20billionaire%20capital.-,For%20the%20first%20time%20ever%2C%20Beijing%20is%20home%20to%20more,City's%2099%20billionaires%2C%20per%20Forbes.">more billionaires in Beijing</a> than in New York City. </p>
<h2>Global South on the march</h2>
<p>This economic shift has gone hand in hand with enhanced political visibility. Countries in the Global South are increasingly asserting themselves on the global scene – be it <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-longterm-partnership-with-us-fades-saudi-arabia-seeks-to-diversify-its-diplomacy-and-recent-deals-with-china-iran-and-russia-fit-this-strategy-202211">China’s brokering of Iran and Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement</a> or Brazil’s <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/24/americas/brazil-lula-ukraine-peace-coalition-intl-latam/index.html">attempt to push a peace plan</a> to end the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>This shift in economic and political power has led experts in geopolitics like <a href="https://www.paragkhanna.com/">Parag Khanna</a> and <a href="https://mahbubani.net/">Kishore Mahbubani</a> to write about the <a href="https://www.paragkhanna.com/book/the-future-is-asian-commerce-conflict-and-culture-in-the-21st-century/">coming of an “Asian Century</a>.” Others, like political scientist <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/experts/2031">Oliver Stuenkel</a>, have began <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2017/04/29/making-the-most-of-a-post-western-world">talking about a “post-Western world</a>.”</p>
<p>One thing is for sure: The Global South is flexing political and economic muscles that the “developing countries” and the “Third World” never had.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207959/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jorge Heine is a Wilson Center Global Fellow and a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for China and Globalization and a former Chilean ambassador to China, to India and to South Africa.</span></em></p>Terms like ‘Third World’ and ‘developing nations’ have long fallen out of fashion.Jorge Heine, Interim Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2087082023-06-30T22:35:33Z2023-06-30T22:35:33ZCambodia PM Hun Sen will shut down opposition on election day – even if he can no longer threaten voters on Facebook<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535079/original/file-20230630-14093-3ojj3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C25%2C5746%2C3879&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cambodian PM Hun Sen takes a selfie -- but where will he post it now? </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/cambodias-prime-minister-hun-sen-takes-selfies-with-a-news-photo/1258807502?adppopup=true">Rang Xhhin Sothy/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen will no longer be able to use his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/30/world/asia/cambodia-hun-sen-meta-facebook.html">Facebook page</a> to air threats of violence against opposition supporters – but that doesn’t mean he can’t still suppress their vote as the country <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/30/world/asia/cambodia-hun-sen-meta-facebook.html">prepares for a general election</a>.</p>
<p>On June 30, 2023, the Facebook page of Hun Sen – who has ruled the country as leader of the Cambodian People’s Party for almost four decades – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-66062752">appeared to have been deleted</a>. It wasn’t immediately clear whether <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-66062752">Hun Sen had removed the page</a> or Meta had taken it down. But it follows a <a href="https://www.oversightboard.com/news/656303619335474-oversight-board-overturns-meta-s-decision-in-cambodian-prime-minister-case/">recommendation by the oversight board</a> of Facebook’s parent company to “immediately suspend Hun Sen’s Facebook page and Instagram account for six months” over a video in which he calls on political opponents who allege vote-rigging to choose between the “legal system” and “a bat.” In the video posted on Facebook on Jan. 9, Hun Sen also threatens to “gather CPP people to protest and beat (opposition) up.”</p>
<p>The decision comes as a slap in the face for Hun Sen, who <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/cambodias-prime-minister-hun-sen-huge-facebook-fan-100535327">had regularly posted on Facebook</a> to his 14 million followers. But as an <a href="https://thunderbird.asu.edu/about/people/staff-faculty/sophal-ear">expert on Cambodian politics</a>, I know it will do little to affect the result of the general election scheduled for July 23, 2023. Cambodia has had Hun Sen as prime minister <a href="https://apnews.com/article/cambodia-hun-sen-hun-manet-prime-minister-0095b3362ca2d5af4f14dd77c76ef351">for 38 years</a>. And recent events have only tightened Hun Sen’s grip on power.</p>
<h2>Many parties, no opposition</h2>
<p>Voters heading to the polls will again be presented with a lack of real choice – as has been the case in the six national parliamentary ballots held since <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44966916">nominally democratic elections were restored</a> in 1993.</p>
<p>It isn’t that there won’t be many parties that voters will be able to choose among on July 23. In fact, there will be numerous parties on the ballot, along with the ruling Cambodian People’s Party. In the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/29/cambodia-hun-sen-re-elected-in-landslide-victory-after-brutal-crackdown">2018 national election</a> there were 19 parties other than the CPP.</p>
<p>The problem for democracy watchers is that the list of parties allowed to run does not include the main opposition party, the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/tag/cambodia-national-rescue-party-cnrp/">Cambodia National Rescue Party</a>. The CNRP was conveniently <a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2017-12-06/cambodia-supreme-court-dissolves-main-opposition-party/">dissolved on Nov. 16, 2017</a>, by order of the Cambodian Supreme Court – which has as its head a permanent committee member of Hun Sen’s CPP.</p>
<p>Further, the Candle Light Party – the last vestige of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/cambodia-opposition-party-election-hun-sen-63659ff8f2de992d84d2be748afbab8b">real, credible opposition in Cambodia</a> – was not permitted to register for the forthcoming election for bureaucratic reasons. The missing paperwork that prevented registration is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/cambodia-election-candlelight-party-deny-registration-7436b0572eefb9b5be3fa724d3cb2fcb">believed by CLP supporters</a> to have been taken during a police raid on opposition headquarters years ago.</p>
<p>These measures build on decades in which Hun Sen and his ruling CPP have <a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/141921/how-hun-sen-killed-democracy-in-cambodia">removed real choice</a> from Cambodian ballots. And for Hun Sen and the CPP it has been effective: In the last election, held in 2018, the CPP <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/30/cambodians-spoil-ballots-to-protest-poll-critics-labelled-a-sham">garnered 77% of the vote</a> and took all 123 seats in the National Assembly.</p>
<h2>Khmer Rouge commander to autocratic leader</h2>
<p>Hun Sen rose to power after being installed as deputy prime minister and foreign minister by the Vietnamese forces that <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/pol-pot-overthrown">liberated Cambodia in 1979</a> from the Khmer Rouge – a murderous regime in which <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/01/12/30-years-hun-sen/violence-repression-and-corruption-cambodia">Hun Sen served as a commander</a> – and then occupied the country for a decade.</p>
<p>With his country still under Vietnamese occupation, Hun Sen became prime minister in 1985 after his predecessor, Chan Sy, died in office. Since then, he has used the power of incumbency – along with a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/09/05/un-office-says-hun-sen-forces-executed-40/20d602e8-9078-41eb-8c34-2e385e86bcc7/">large dose of brute force</a> – to remain in office. </p>
<p>Even when the CPP <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/06/11/phnom-penh-rejects-results-of-election/c43a7f1e-abcf-4ebd-b3b2-fe757f96f930/">lost the popular vote in 1993</a>, Hun Sen was able to elbow his way into a prime ministership-sharing position as “second prime minister” with equal power to the “first prime minister,” Prince <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/former-cambodian-prime-minister-prince-norodom-ranariddh-has-died-information-2021-11-28/">Norodom Ranariddh</a>, in a deal engineered by Ranariddh’s father, King Norodom Sihanouk.</p>
<p>After falling out with his co-premier, Hun Sen <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/07/27/cambodia-july-1997-shock-and-aftermath">orchestrated a coup in 1997</a> and replaced Norodom Ranariddh. In <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00049910050007032">an election the following year</a>, Hun Sen resumed the role of sole prime minister and embarked on a campaign of repression – arranging for political enemies to be <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/01/12/30-years-hun-sen/violence-repression-and-corruption-cambodia">arrested, jailed and sometimes exiled</a>.</p>
<p>He let his guard down in 2012 by allowing opposition leaders Kem Sokha and Sam Rainsy to <a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/lcwaN0008472/">form the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party</a>. The CNRP came within a whisker of defeating the CPP in the 2013 election – some might even argue that it did, but for who <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-election-count/cambodia-election-crisis-deepens-as-opposition-rejects-results-idUSBRE97B02I20130812">controlled the counting of the votes</a>.</p>
<p>Since then, attempts to mount opposition to the CPP have been further blunted by the fact that Cambodia’s economy and society have undergone remarkable change – allowing Hun Sen to <a href="https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/prime-minister-hun-sen-shares-message-of-economic-growth--covid-response-success-with-north-american-diaspora-301546659.html">claim credit</a> as <a href="https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501245617/cambodias-economy-resilient-despite-external-factors-says-pm-hun-sen/">a sound manager of the economy</a>. Until the COVID-19 pandemic, Cambodia’s annual gross domestic product growth averaged nearly 8% <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cambodia/overview">from 1998 through 2019</a>. Meanwhile, gross national income based on an average individual’s purchasing power <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=KH">has also grown sixfold</a> since 1995, from US$760 to $5,080.</p>
<p>It has come at a cost though. Economic and infrastructure growth has been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/cambodia-protests/cambodian-farmers-rise-up-over-land-grabbing-idINSGE62I07I20100319">on the back of a land grab</a> that has disadvantaged rural farmers. I heard of one farmer who described economic development as meaning “they build a road and steal my land.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two men in hard hats shake hands" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535086/original/file-20230630-37566-mwecug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535086/original/file-20230630-37566-mwecug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535086/original/file-20230630-37566-mwecug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535086/original/file-20230630-37566-mwecug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535086/original/file-20230630-37566-mwecug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535086/original/file-20230630-37566-mwecug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535086/original/file-20230630-37566-mwecug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen shakes hands with China’s ambassador to Cambodia, Wang Wentian.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/cambodias-prime-minister-hun-sen-shakes-hands-with-chinas-news-photo/1258495631?adppopup=true">Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And frequently that road has been Chinese-built with loans that the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/cambodia-seeks-more-loans-from-beijing-amid-fears-of-debt-trap-/6943062.html">Cambodian people and their progeny will have to repay</a>. </p>
<h2>From autocracy to nepotocracy?</h2>
<p>Yet, Hun Sen is unwilling to open his record to the scrutiny of voters or a free press.</p>
<p>In advance of the July 23 vote, the government has cracked down on independent media. One of the last truly independent outlets, the Voice of Democracy, was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64621595">shuttered by Hun Sen</a>. Its crime? To publish a story reporting that the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/hun-sen-s-eldest-son-emerges-as-likely-successor-in-cambodia/7118136.html">prime minister’s son and heir apparent</a> signed, on behalf of his father, an official government donation to Turkey after the earthquake. Only the prime minister is allowed to sign off on foreign aid packages, and Hun Sen said the report had damaged the government’s reputation.</p>
<p>The source had been a senior government official. Yet, Voice of Democracy was nonetheless blamed and told to apologize, which it did, but then was still shuttered.</p>
<p>While Hun Sen has been successful in controlling the media and suppressing opposition in Cambodia, he is unable to prevent international scrutiny and sanction.</p>
<p>Cambodia’s anti-democratic rule and human rights abuses have been <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20230310IPR77236/human-rights-breaches-in-iran-tunisia-and-cambodia">condemned by the European Union</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-cambodia-politics-idAFKBN1DE2LY">the White House</a> and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/cambodia-un-experts-condemn-verdict-against-opposition-leader-kem-sokha">the United Nations</a>.</p>
<p>Even prior to the most recent crackdown on opposition parties and independent press, the U.S. had <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0475">placed some Cambodian generals on the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability list</a>, used to sanction “perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world.” The EU, for its part, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_1469">cut by 20% the number of Cambodian goods eligible for zero duty imports</a> over human rights concerns – a move that will cost Cambodia an estimated 1 billion euros ($1.1 billion) in annual revenue.</p>
<p>But such moves have done little to nudge Cambodia toward democratic practices – and neither will Facebook’s decision to deprive him of a social media account.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208708/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophal Ear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Social media account of Cambodia’s long-serving leader was deleted amid a spat with Facebook over videoed threats of violence against opposition supporters.Sophal Ear, Associate Professor in the Thunderbird School of Global Management, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2071072023-06-27T12:23:02Z2023-06-27T12:23:02ZSouth Korea has the lowest fertility rate in the world – and that doesn’t bode well for its economy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534163/original/file-20230626-5418-k0jzlq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C11%2C7842%2C4032&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An aging population, a tired economy.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-elderly-lady-rests-near-her-street-stall-as-pedestrians-news-photo/1251981087?adppopup=true">Anthony Wallace/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Around <a href="https://www.livescience.com/worlds-population-could-plummet-to-six-billion-by-the-end-of-the-century-new-study-suggests">the world</a>, nations are looking at the <a href="https://www.economist.com/podcasts/2023/06/20/what-does-a-shrinking-population-mean-for-china">prospect of shrinking</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wellness/2023/02/14/aging-boomers-more-older-americans/">aging populations</a> – but none more so than <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/22/s-korea-breaks-record-for-worlds-lowest-fertility-rate-again">South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>Over the last 60 years, South Korea has undergone the most rapid fertility decline in recorded human history. In 1960, the nation’s total fertility rate – the number of children, on average, that a woman has during her reproductive years – stood at just under six children per woman. In 2022, that figure was 0.78. South Korea is the only country in the world to register a fertility rate of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/19/1163341684/south-korea-fertility-rate">less than one child per woman</a>, although others – <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/22/1155943055/ukraine-low-birth-rate-russia-war">Ukraine</a>, <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-low-fertility-rate-population-decline-by-yi-fuxian-2023-02">China</a> and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/births-in-spain-drop-to-lowest-level-on-record/2614667">Spain</a> – are close.</p>
<p><iframe id="FNa7q" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/FNa7q/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jAfhO2YAAAAJ&hl=en">a demographer</a> who over the past four decades has conducted extensive research on Asian populations, I know that this prolonged and steep decline will have huge impacts on South Korea. It may <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230102000602">slow down economic growth</a>, contributing to a shift that will see the country <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/29/south-korea-s-demographic-crisis-is-challenging-its-national-story-pub-84820">end up less rich and with a smaller population</a>.</p>
<h2>Older, poorer, more dependent</h2>
<p>Countries need a total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman to replace their population, when the effects of immigration and emigration aren’t considered. And South Korea’s fertility rate has been consistently below that number since 1984, when it dropped to 1.93, from 2.17 the year before.</p>
<p>What makes the South Korean fertility rate decline more astonishing is the relatively short period in which it has occurred.</p>
<p>Back in 1800, the U.S. total fertility rate was <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1033027/fertility-rate-us-1800-2020/">well over 6.0</a>. But it took the U.S. around 170 years to consistently drop below the replacement level. Moreover, in the little over 60 years in which South Korea’s fertility rate fell from 6.0 to 0.8, the U.S. saw a more gradual decline from 3.0 to 1.7.</p>
<p>Fertility decline can have a positive effect in certain circumstances, via something demographers refer to as “<a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/fact-sheet-attaining-the-demographic-dividend/">the demographic dividend</a>.” This dividend refers to accelerated increases in a country’s economy that follow a decline in birth rates and subsequent changes in its age composition that result in more working-age people and fewer dependent young children and elderly people.</p>
<p>And that is what happened in South Korea – a decline in fertility helped convert South Korea from a very poor country <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/miracle-maturity-growth-korean-economy">to a very rich one</a>.</p>
<h2>Behind the economic miracle</h2>
<p>South Korea’s fertility decline began in the early 1960s when the government adopted an <a href="https://countrystudies.us/south-korea/47.htm">economic planning program</a> and a <a href="https://doi.org//10.3349/ymj.1971.12.1.55">population and family planning program</a>.</p>
<p>By that time, South Korea was languishing, having seen its <a href="https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/ijoks/v5i1/f_0013337_10833.pdf">economy and society destroyed</a> by the Korean War of 1950 to 1953. Indeed by the late-1950s, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. In 1961, its annual per capita income <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198796954.003.0006">was only about US$82</a>. </p>
<p>But dramatic increases in economic growth began in 1962, when the South Korean government introduced a five-year economic development plan. </p>
<p>Crucially, the government also introduced a population planning program in a bid to bring down the nation’s fertility rate. This included a goal of getting <a href="https://doi.org//10.3349/ymj.1971.12.1.55">45% of married couples</a> to use contraception – until then, very few Koreans used contraception.</p>
<p>This further contributed to the fertility reduction, as many couples realized that having fewer children would often lead to improvements in family living standards. </p>
<p>Both the economic and family planning programs were instrumental in moving South Korea from one with a high fertility rate to one with a low fertility rate.</p>
<p>As a result, the country’s dependent population – the young and the elderly – grew smaller in relation to its working-age population.</p>
<p>The demographic change kick-started economic growth that continued well into the mid-1990s. Increases in productivity, combined with an increasing labor force and a gradual reduction of unemployment, produced average annual growth rates in gross domestic product <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/KOR/south-korea/gnp-gross-national-product">of between 6% and 10% for many years</a>.</p>
<p>South Korea today is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true">one of the richest countries</a>
in the world with a <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=KR">per capita income of $35,000</a>.</p>
<h2>Losing people every year</h2>
<p>Much of this transformation of South Korea from a poor country to a rich country has been due to the demographic dividend realized during the country’s fertility decline. But the demographic dividend only works in the short term. Long-term fertility declines are often <a href="https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2022/12/the-long-term-decline-in-fertility-and-what-it-means-for-state-budgets">disastrous for a nation’s economy</a>. </p>
<p>With an extremely low fertility rate of 0.78, South Korea is losing population each year and experiencing more deaths than births. The once-vibrant nation is on the way to becoming a country with lots of elderly people and fewer workers.</p>
<p>The Korean Statistical Office reported recently that the <a href="https://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblId=DT_1B8000F&language=en">country lost population</a> in the past three years: It was down by 32,611 people in 2020, 57,118 in 2021 and 123,800 in 2022.</p>
<p>If this trend continues, and if the country doesn’t welcome millions of immigrants, South Korea’s present population of 51 million <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/biz/2023/06/602_335593.html">will drop to under 38 million</a> in the next four or five decades.</p>
<p>And a growing proportion of the society will be over the age of 65.</p>
<p>South Korea’s population aged 65 and over comprised under 7% of the population in 2000. Today, <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-south/#people-and-society">nearly 17% of South Koreans</a> are older people.</p>
<p>The older people population is projected to be 20% of the country by 2025 and could reach an unprecedented and astoundingly high 46% in 2067. South Korea’s working-age population will then be smaller in size than its population of people over the age of 65.</p>
<p>In a bid to avert a demographic nightmare, the South Korean government is <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/south-korea-families-770-month-183500253.html">providing financial incentives</a> for couples to have children and is boosting the monthly allowance already in place for parents. President Yoon Suk Yeol has also <a href="https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/03/28/national/politics/Korea-birth-rate-Yoon-Suk-Yeol/20230328184849297.html">established a new government team</a> to establish policies to increase the birth rate.</p>
<p>But to date, programs to increase the low fertility rate have had little effect. Since 2006, the South Korean government has already <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/03/asia/south-korea-worlds-lowest-fertility-rate-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">spent over $200 billion</a> in programs to increase the birth rate, with virtually no impact.</p>
<h2>Opening the trapdoor</h2>
<p>The South Korean fertility rate has not increased in the past 16 years. Rather, it has continued to decrease. This is due to what demographers refer to as the “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23025482">low-fertility trap</a>.” The principle, set forth by demographers in the early 2000s, states that once a country’s fertility rate drops below 1.5 or 1.4, it is difficult – if not impossible – to increase it significantly. </p>
<p>South Korea, along with many other countries – including France, Australia and Russia – have developed policies to encourage fertility rate increases, but with little to no success. </p>
<p>The only real way for South Korea to turn this around would be to rely heavily on immigration.</p>
<p>Migrants are <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2020/06/19/blog-weo-chapter4-migration-to-advanced-economies-can-raise-growth">typically young and productive</a> and usually have more children than the native-born population. But South Korea has a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/16/upshot/comparing-immigration-policies-across-countries.html">very restrictive immigration policy</a> with no path for immigrants to become citizens or permanent residents unless they marry South Koreans.</p>
<p>Indeed, the foreign-born population in 2022 was just over 1.6 million, which is around <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220414000692">3.1% of the population</a>. In contrast, the U.S. has always relied on immigration to bolster its working population, with foreign-born residents now <a href="https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigrants-in-the-united-states">comprising over 14%</a> of the population.</p>
<p>For immigration to offset South Korea’s declining fertility rate, the number of foreign workers would likely need to rise almost tenfold.</p>
<p>Without that, South Korea’s demographic destiny will have the nation continuing to lose population every year and becoming one of the oldest – if not the oldest – country in the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207107/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dudley L. Poston Jr. does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Korea’s fertility rate fell below the level needed to sustain a population in the mid-1980s – and it never recovered. It is now below one child per woman during her reproductive years.Dudley L. Poston Jr., Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.