tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/ballistic-missiles-17019/articlesBallistic missiles – The Conversation2023-05-24T20:22:19Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2062712023-05-24T20:22:19Z2023-05-24T20:22:19ZChina’s hypersonic missiles threaten US power in the Pacific – an aerospace engineer explains how the weapons work and the unique threats they pose<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528043/original/file-20230524-24-c1ddtf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4546%2C3028&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Military vehicles carry an earlier version of China's hypersonic missile during a 2019 parade.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/China70Years/6cb5c67b8adf4d3b8d4a090bd6f5d1ff/photo">AP Photo/Ng Han Guan</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>China’s newest hypersonic missile, the <a href="https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/china/df-27/">DF-27</a>, can fly as far as Hawaii, penetrate U.S. missile defenses and pose a <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/chinas-hypersonic-missiles-aka-carrier-killers-are-holy-st-moment-us-military-1462794">particular threat to U.S. aircraft carriers</a>, according to news reports of an <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/04/13/china-hypersonic-missile-intelligence-leak/">assessment from the Pentagon</a>.</p>
<p>Chinese researchers claimed in a May 2023 research journal report that the country’s hypersonic missiles <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3221495/chinese-scientists-war-game-hypersonic-strike-us-carrier-group-south-china-sea">could destroy a U.S. carrier group “with certainty</a>.” This capability threatens to sideline U.S. aircraft carrier groups in the Pacific, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/chinas-hypersonic-missiles-aka-carrier-killers-are-holy-st-moment-us-military-1462794">potentially shifting the strategic balance of power</a> and leaving the U.S. with limited options for assisting Taiwan in the event China invades.</p>
<p>This shift in the balance of power highlights how the next-generation hypersonic missiles that China, Russia and the U.S. are developing pose a significant threat to global security. I am an <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=0vO6w7MAAAAJ&hl=en">aerospace engineer</a> who studies space and defense systems, including hypersonic systems. These new systems pose an important challenge due to their maneuverability all along their trajectory. Because their flight paths can change as they travel, defending against these missiles requires tracking them throughout their flight.</p>
<p>A second important challenge stems from the fact that they operate in a different region of the atmosphere from other existing threats. The new hypersonic weapons fly much higher than slower subsonic missiles but much lower than intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S. and its allies do not have good tracking coverage for this in-between region, nor do Russia or China.</p>
<h2>Destabilizing effect</h2>
<p>Russia has claimed that some of its hypersonic weapons can carry a nuclear warhead. This statement alone is a cause for concern whether or not it is true. If Russia ever operates this system against an enemy, that country would have to decide the probability of the weapon being conventional or nuclear. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/FyUTNRIuAqc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">How hypersonic missiles threaten to upend the relative stability of the current era of nuclear weapons.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the case of the U.S., if the determination were made that the weapon was nuclear, then there is a very high likelihood that the U.S. would consider this a first strike attack and respond by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/second-strike-capability">unloading its nuclear weapons on Russia</a>. The hypersonic speed of these weapons increases the precariousness of the situation because the time for any last-minute diplomatic resolution would be severely reduced.</p>
<p>It is the destabilizing influence that modern hypersonic missiles represent that is perhaps the greatest risk they pose. I believe the U.S. and its allies should rapidly field their own hypersonic weapons to bring other nations such as Russia and China to the negotiating table to develop a diplomatic approach to managing these weapons.</p>
<h2>What is hypersonic?</h2>
<p>Describing a vehicle as hypersonic means that it flies much faster than the speed of sound, which is 761 miles per hour (1,225 kilometers per hour) at sea level and 663 mph (1,067 kph) at 35,000 feet (10,668 meters) where passenger jets fly. Passenger jets travel at just under 600 mph (966 kph), whereas hypersonic systems operate at speeds of 3,500 mph (5,633 kph) – about 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) per second – and higher.</p>
<p>Hypersonic systems have been in use for decades. When John Glenn came back to Earth in 1962 from the <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/feature/60-years-ago-john-glenn-the-first-american-to-orbit-the-earth-aboard-friendship-7">first U.S. crewed flight around the Earth</a>, his capsule entered the atmosphere at hypersonic speed. All of the intercontinental ballistic missiles in the world’s nuclear arsenals are hypersonic, reaching about 15,000 mph (24,140 kph), or about 4 miles (6.4 km) per second at their maximum velocity.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.space.com/19601-how-intercontinental-ballistic-missiles-work-infographic.html">Intercontinental ballistic missiles</a> are launched on large rockets and then fly on a predictable trajectory that takes them out of the atmosphere into space and then back into the atmosphere again. The new generation of hypersonic missiles fly very fast, but not as fast as ICBMs. They are launched on smaller rockets that keep them within the upper reaches of the atmosphere. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a diagram showing earth, the atmosphere and space overlaid by three missile trajectories of different altitudes" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hypersonic missiles are not as fast as intercontinental ballistic missiles but are able to vary their trajectories.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gao.gov/blog/faster-speed-sound-u.s.-efforts-develop-hypersonic-weapons">U.S. Government Accounting Office</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Three types of hypersonic missiles</h2>
<p>There are three different types of non-ICBM hypersonic weapons: aero-ballistic, glide vehicles and cruise missiles. A hypersonic aero-ballistic system is dropped from an aircraft, accelerated to hypersonic speed using a rocket and then follows a ballistic, meaning unpowered, trajectory. The system Russian forces have been using to attack Ukraine, the <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kinzhal/">Kinzhal</a>, is an aero-ballistic missile. The technology has been around since about 1980. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/rcZwk9hmCN8?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">China and the U.S. are investing heavily in developing hypersonic missiles.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A hypersonic glide vehicle is boosted on a rocket to high altitude and then glides to its target, maneuvering along the way. Examples of hypersonic glide vehicles include China’s <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-17/">Dongfeng-17</a>, Russia’s <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/avangard/">Avangard</a> and the U.S. Navy’s <a href="https://www.ssp.navy.mil/six_lines_of_business/cps.html">Conventional Prompt Strike</a> system. U.S. officials have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a127f6de-f7b1-459e-b7ae-c14ed6a9198c">expressed concern</a> that China’s hypersonic glide vehicle technology is further advanced than the U.S. system.</p>
<p>A hypersonic cruise missile is boosted by a rocket to hypersonic speed and then uses an air-breathing engine called a <a href="https://hyperlab.nd.edu/research/scramjet-aerodynamics/">scramjet</a> to sustain that speed. Because they ingest air into their engines, hypersonic cruise missiles require smaller launch rockets than hypersonic glide vehicles, which means they can cost less and be launched from more places. Hypersonic cruise missiles are under development by China and the U.S. The U.S. reportedly <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/04/politics/us-hypersonic-missile-test/index.html">conducted a test flight</a> of a scramjet hypersonic missile in March 2020.</p>
<p><iframe id="PYZON" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/PYZON/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Defensive measures</h2>
<p>The primary reason nations are developing these next-generation hypersonic weapons is how difficult they are to defend against due to their speed, maneuverability and flight path. The U.S. is starting to develop a layered approach to defending against hypersonic weapons that includes a constellation of sensors in space and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/">close cooperation with key allies</a></p>
<p>With all of this activity on hypersonic weapons and defending against them, it is important to assess the threat they pose to national security. Hypersonic missiles with conventional, non-nuclear warheads are primarily useful against high-value targets, such as an aircraft carrier. Being able to take out such a target could have a significant impact on the outcome of a major conflict. </p>
<p>However, hypersonic missiles are expensive and therefore not likely to be produced in large quantities. As seen in the recent use by Russia, hypersonic weapons are not necessarily a silver bullet that ends a conflict.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-hypersonic-missiles-work-and-the-unique-threats-they-pose-an-aerospace-engineer-explains-180836">an article</a> that was originally published on April 15, 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206271/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Iain Boyd receives funding from the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Energy, NASA, and Lockheed-Martin. </span></em></p>China’s newest hypersonic missile, the DF-27, could sideline US aircraft carrier groups in the Pacific, while missiles in the works in China, Russia and the US threaten global security.Iain Boyd, Director, Center for National Security Initiatives; Professor of Aerospace Engineering Sciences, University of Colorado BoulderLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1938982022-11-03T17:34:00Z2022-11-03T17:34:00ZUkraine recap: Russia’s ‘modern siege tactics’ fail to break the people’s will to resist<p>First, let’s clear up some unfinished business from last week. We <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-recap-the-approach-of-general-winter-and-what-it-means-for-the-conflict-193423">reported here</a> that Russia’s defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, had been talking up the idea that Ukraine was planning to use a “dirty bomb” and specified a couple of facilities which he said were involved in the preparation of such a weapon. </p>
<p>The latest report from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/nov/03/russia-ukraine-war-live-news-blinken-hails-turkish-help-as-grain-export-deal-resumes">International Atomic Energy Agency</a>, which dispatched teams to those sites to check out Shoigu’s claims, is that there is no evidence to back his assertions, prompting Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, to tweet that the episode confirms Russia’s status as “the world’s top liar”.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1588174687909068803"}"></div></p>
<p>But what’s undeniable is that the citizens of Kyiv and other major cities in Ukraine are facing increasing privation as a result of the relentless bombing campaigns that have targeted civilian infrastructure, especially power stations and water storage and treatment facilities. It’s a form of <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putin-is-rewriting-the-rules-of-siege-warfare-this-winter-193425">modern siege warfare</a>, writes Robert Dover, professor of intelligence and national security at the University of Hull.</p>
<p>Dover says that Vladimir Putin is hoping that a byproduct of this strategy will be to increase the cost of reconstruction to a level that will dismay Ukraine’s western allies to the extent that it will undermine their support. And with the Republicans forecast to take control of the house in next week’s US mid-term elections, the fear is the isolationist lobby will demand cuts to President Joe Biden’s programme of military aid to Ukraine.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putin-is-rewriting-the-rules-of-siege-warfare-this-winter-193425">Ukraine war: Putin is rewriting the rules of siege warfare this winter</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><strong><em>This is our weekly recap of expert analysis of the Ukraine conflict.</em></strong>
<em>The Conversation, a not-for-profit newsgroup, works with a wide range of academics across its global network to produce evidence-based analysis. Get these recaps in your inbox every Thursday. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapTop">Subscribe here</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>So far, Ukraine has proved remarkably successful in shooting down missiles and drones that have been doing much of this damage. But it was reported that Iran is preparing to send another package of 1,000 weapons to Russia, including the Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar ballistic missiles, which have a far shorter range than the “kamikaze” drones Iran has reportedly supplied Russia with already. But they are much faster, their velocity being often measured in km/second rather than km/hour. They will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-new-missiles-is-iran-providing-to-russia-and-what-difference-will-they-make-193809">more difficult to defend against</a>, writes Daniel Salisbury, a senior research fellow at King’s College London, one of whose specialisms is modern weaponry.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/M2Rk3TaVZLU?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Salisbury weighs up the likely consequences for the war in Ukraine. He also notes that the conflict will allow Iran to showcase its arms programme far more prominently than conflicts in Yemen and elsewhere in the Middle East, where Iranian weaponry has been also deployed with devastating consequences.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-new-missiles-is-iran-providing-to-russia-and-what-difference-will-they-make-193809">Ukraine war: what new missiles is Iran providing to Russia and what difference will they make?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Deliberately targeting civilian populations to destroy morale is a tactic Russia has been involved in before in Syria in cities such as Aleppo and Homs, which were reduced to rubble. But in those cases the bombardment was accompanied by a ground offensive. Tim Luckhurst, a former BBC war correspondent – now the principal of South College, Durham University – researches newspaper coverage of the second world war and has written about the effect of the blitz in 1940 and 1941 on <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-lessons-from-the-blitz-suggest-russias-targeting-of-cities-could-backfire-193688">British civilian morale</a>, which appears to have been negligible. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-lessons-from-the-blitz-suggest-russias-targeting-of-cities-could-backfire-193688">Ukraine war: lessons from the Blitz suggest Russia's targeting of cities could backfire</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Making the world pay</h2>
<p>Another of Putin’s aims in targeting civilians is to try to drive them out of Ukraine to join the 8 million people and counting who have fled to safety in other countries. It has long been thought that one of the Russian leader’s consistent war aims, in Syria and now in Ukraine, is to weaponise refugees, sending millions of people west into Europe with the aim of destabilising countries there. </p>
<p>And there’s at least anecdotal evidence that this has had a degree of success – immigration continues to be a red-button issue in the UK and the recent election in Sweden resulted in a coalition government whose most urgent concern is to reduce immigration. But Michael Ben-Gad, a professor of economics at City, University of London, sees this exodus – which is comprised of women and children, and large numbers of relatively young, healthy and well-educated people – could be a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putins-bid-to-weaponise-refugees-is-failing-heres-what-that-means-for-europe-193497">positive boon for their host countries</a>, as migrants fitting this profile tend to improve productivity wherever they settle. Ben-Gad cautions, however, that Ukraine will need exactly these people when it comes time to rebuild its shattered economy.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putins-bid-to-weaponise-refugees-is-failing-heres-what-that-means-for-europe-193497">Ukraine war: Putin's bid to weaponise refugees is failing – here's what that means for Europe</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>One piece of good news this week is that Russia has reconsidered its threat to pull out of a grain deal after some intense diplomacy by Turkey, which helped negotiate the deal with the United Nations in July. The Kremlin announced its decision at the weekend to pull out of the dea – which has seen about 9.8 million tonnes of grain, oil and soya beans exported from Ukrainian ports in 400 shipments – following an attack on Russia’s fleet in Sevastopol harbour. Within days, and after Turkey said the shipments would continue with or without Russian acquiescence, the Kremlin announced a U-turn on that decision (although it didn’t put it quite like that).</p>
<p>Stefan Wolff, an expert in international security at the University of Birmingham, saw Russia’s plan to pull out of the deal as yet another “<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-another-round-of-pointless-and-dangerous-escalation-as-putin-blocks-grain-exports-193367">pointless and dangerous escalation</a>” which would inflict misery on millions as food shortages force grain prices up. It is a relief, then, that grain prices – which surged after Russia announced it would quit the deal – are back on a downward trajectory.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russia-u-turns-on-grain-deal-after-putins-attempt-at-escalation-fails-193367">Ukraine war: Russia U-turns on grain deal after Putin's attempt at escalation fails</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Russia’s swift U-turn enabled Ukraine’s spin doctors to portray Putin as “a laughing stock before the whole world”. We recently discussed what might happen were Putin to be overthrown as a result of the failure of Russia’s invasion. Matthew Sussex, a fellow in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at Australian National University, says that there’s no evidence yet that Putin could be ousted from power – and a distinct lack of viable successors. </p>
<p>But here he describes <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-russia-collapse-193013">three viable scenarios</a> under which the Russian Federation could collapse as a result of defeat in Ukraine.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/could-russia-collapse-193013">Could Russia collapse?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Hearts and minds</h2>
<p>If Putin can be said to have been humiliated by the recent U-turn over the grain deal, his opposite number in this conflict, the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is riding high in international esteem. Since February, Zelensky has become known as a symbol of defiant leadership. His regular speeches – delivered in his trademark military olive green – have won hearts and minds around the world.</p>
<p>Jessica Genauer, who lectures in international relations at Flinders University, believes the true power of Zelensky’s speeches lies ultimately in the very <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-struggle-between-normality-and-madness-why-volodymyr-zelenskys-speeches-have-captured-the-worlds-attention-193224">ordinariness of his manner and message</a>. His very ordinariness encourages listeners to identify with him – and through him, with fate of his country. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-struggle-between-normality-and-madness-why-volodymyr-zelenskys-speeches-have-captured-the-worlds-attention-193224">A struggle between normality and madness: why Volodymyr Zelensky's speeches have captured the world's attention</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a weekly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193898/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Some of the key articles from our coverage of the war in Ukraine over the past week.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1938092022-11-03T15:10:16Z2022-11-03T15:10:16ZUkraine war: what new missiles is Iran providing to Russia and what difference will they make?<p>It has been reported that Iran is preparing to transfer short-range ballistic missiles to Russia for use against targets in Ukraine, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/01/politics/iran-missiles-russia/index.html">allegedly as part of a shipment</a> of 1,000 additional weapons of unspecified type. Iran has allegedly already transferred a number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia. Many of these drones have been used in Ukraine, although the Islamic Republic <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/19/iran-denies-allegations-that-it-supplied-russia-with-drones.html">has denied</a> involvement.</p>
<p>I have researched <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-the-problem-with-russias-sanctions-busting-arms-industry-182358">Russia’s military industrial complex</a> under sanctions, as well as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2020.1778380">Iran’s procurement</a> for its own weapons programmes. This has led me to believe that the transfer of these systems, while allowing Russia to continue to inflict horrendous death and destruction against civilian populations and infrastructure in Ukraine, is unlikely to change the overall strategic balance. </p>
<p>Iranian “kamikaze” drones have been involved in <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-social-media-0cc944fef471a425a862728b3dd0d8bc">attacks on Kyiv</a> and other targets in recent weeks. Members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – a Iranian paramilitary unit – <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/iranian-revolutionary-guard-on-the-ground-aiding-russia-in-crimea-says-intelligence-report-12725990">have allegedly been sent to</a> Crimea to assist in operating the systems.</p>
<h2>Missiles for Moscow?</h2>
<p>The Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar ballistic missiles allegedly being prepared for transfer by Iran to Russia are based on different technology to these UAVs already transferred. The range of the missile systems is shorter than those of the UAVs (<a href="https://www.newsweek.com/iranian-ballistic-missiles-disaster-ukraine-air-force-russia-1756066">300km-700km</a> as opposed to alleged <a href="https://twitter.com/defencehq/status/1569961850011262978?lang=en-GB">2,500km range</a> of the Shahed-136 UAV, for example). </p>
<p>But ballistic missiles travel at much higher speeds (often measured in km/second rather than km/hour). This makes defending against these systems and the explosive warheads they carry much more challenging – if not impossible – for Ukrainian forces with current capabilities. </p>
<p>Ukraine has reported it has been able to intercept <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/23/world/europe/ukraine-russia-drones-iran.html">more than 70%</a> of the propeller-driven Iranian UAVs using a mixture of fighter aircraft, air defence systems and even small arms fire. They would not be able to achieve anything like this success rate against ballistic missiles. </p>
<p>The Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar have similar characteristics as those ballistic missiles <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/oct/28/russia-ukraine-war-live-news-updates-joe-biden-vladimir-putin-russian-nuclear-weapons-dirty-bomb-claim?page=with:block-635b8cf98f082fdc8beafd22">already fired</a> by Russia during the conflict to date, namely speed and ability to penetrate air defences.</p>
<h2>Why seek Iranian support?</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that Iran has transferred its missile technology to overseas customers. Since the 1980s the country has had a bilateral relationship with North Korea where technology has at some points <a href="https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2021/02/north-korea-iran-missile-cooperation">flowed in both directions</a>. It has also provided missiles to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/5/4/israel-confirms-airstrike-inside-syria">Hezbollah in Lebanon</a> and more recently to <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-and-houthi-war-against-saudi-arabia">Houthi rebels</a> in Yemen. </p>
<p>But, despite a long history of political and commercial relations with Tehran, Russia is a new market for Iranian missile technology, and an unusual one given Russia’s vast military industrial complex. But the conflict in Ukraine has continually <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russian-incompetence-surpassed-expectations-ukraine-ex-nato-commander-1744014">challenged orthodox views</a> of Russia’s perceived capabilities on the battlefield and in its weapons factories. </p>
<p>In seeking Iran’s support, Russia is likely trying to replenish stocks of missiles expended so far during the conflict, with <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-63247287">patterns of weapons use</a> suggesting that its arsenal may be depleted in certain areas. It is also trying to offset some of the challenges faced by the Russian defence industrial complex’s efforts to replenish stocks.</p>
<p>Russia’s weapons manufacturers are stretched to the limit by efforts to restock. The country also faces a wide-ranging arms embargo, which for many western states <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/Russia/EU-embargo-on-Russia">including the EU</a> dates back to the 2014 seizure of Crimea or before, and <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9483/">restrictions on the acquisition of dual-use technologies</a> tightened in February this year. </p>
<p>Russia has likely used illicit procurement networks – many run by Russian and before that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1983/07/25/world/a-trail-of-western-technology-is-followed-to-the-kgb-s-door.html">Soviet intelligence</a> – and long-practised tactics such as the use of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/abs/exploring-the-use-of-third-countries-in-proliferation-networks-the-case-of-malaysia/C8A766A657994027EF3B584E86FF72A4">front companies in third countries</a> to try to get around these restrictions. Western intelligence efforts have long tried to track these networks, occasionally obtaining insights into Russian technologies. </p>
<p>The insights provided by wreckage recovered from Ukraine, however, have been unprecedented. Remains of Russian weapons systems <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/silicon-lifeline-western-electronics-heart-russias-war-machine/">recovered from Ukrainian battlefields</a> – missiles, drones, electronic warfare and other land systems – have been found to be rich in western technology illicitly procured from the international market place. </p>
<p>The same is true for <a href="https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1584476545912971264?s=20&t=LCduSLJBXNaZgIhEpilFlQ">Iranian drones</a>, 300 of which have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/oct/28/russia-ukraine-war-live-news-updates-joe-biden-vladimir-putin-russian-nuclear-weapons-dirty-bomb-claim?page=with:block-635b8cf98f082fdc8beafd22">shot down in the past fortnight</a> according to Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky.</p>
<p>Besides Russia’s need for weaponry, there are clearly political and diplomatic considerations for Vladimir Putin. Russia is highly isolated, and international political support for Moscow is coming from <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/13/un-condemns-russias-annexations-in-ukraine-how-countries-voted">a shrinking circle of states</a>. So Russia has turned to Iran and a small number of other countries on the periphery of the international system such as North Korea, which is <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/02/politics/north-korea-russia-ammunition/index.html">allegedly transferring</a> artillery ammunition to replenish Russian stocks.</p>
<p>While providing political benefits for Russia and reducing its isolation, the deal also brings economic benefits for Iran, which has faced significant international sanctions over the past decades, due to its nuclear programme. For both countries, then, bilateral trade will highly beneficial. Russia is thought <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/05/27/world/un-security-council-split/">likely to veto</a> any further UN sanctions against Iran. </p>
<h2>What can be done?</h2>
<p>The proliferation of Iranian ballistic missiles into the European theatre is not good news. Use of weapons on the battlefield can provide vendors a useful opportunity to test systems in new operational contexts, and could potentially act as a marketing opportunity to showcase these systems to other potential customers. </p>
<p>There are no easy options for countering these arms transfers. This will be especially true if the missiles can be delivered by air <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-iran-sanctions-drones-russia/32031980.html">like the UAVs</a> supplied by Iran appear to have been. Direct flights provide no opportunities for interdiction. </p>
<p>The US <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-iran-over-kamikaze-russian-drones">and partners</a> have imposed asset freezes, restrictions on travel and other business activities against Iranian drone manufacturers and operators – and may take new and further measures. They have <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/02/politics/north-korea-russia-ammunition/index.html">stated they will continue</a> efforts to disrupt Iran’s networks. </p>
<p>We may also see the US <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/long-arm">return to extraterritorial tools</a> used in the past to get at parts of these transnational networks based overseas. This includes sting operations, civil asset seizures and information operations. Essentially, the “cat and mouse” game between the US and its allies and Russia and its suppliers will continue – but with new targets and heightened energy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193809/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Salisbury receives funding from the Leverhulme Trust for a three-year project on arms embargoes.</span></em></p>Iran has showcased these new weapons, with deadly result, in Yemen and Lebanon.Daniel Salisbury, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1924872022-10-18T12:39:37Z2022-10-18T12:39:37ZA game of numbers: How air defense systems work and why Ukraine is eager for more protection<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490222/original/file-20221017-15267-v9djq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2490%2C1658&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Israel's Iron Dome air defense system is the gold standard for defending against missiles and rockets.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/august-2022-israel-sderot-the-iron-dome-anti-missile-system-news-photo/1242342323">Ilia Yefimovich/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ukraine has received a broad array of military supplies from the U.S. and other allies. Recently, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made an urgent plea specifically for additional air defense resources from the West in response to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/10/11/world/russia-ukraine-war-news">increased air attacks by Russia</a>. </p>
<p>To understand Zelenskyy’s emphasis on air defense, it’s important to look at the types of air weapons that Ukraine faces and how air defenses work to counteract those threats. It’s also important to understand why this type of warfare is all about the number of assets each side has at its disposal.</p>
<h2>Increased air attacks</h2>
<p>On Oct. 10, 2022, Russia launched a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-10-10-22">large barrage of airborne weapons</a> against a variety of targets in Ukraine. The types of weapons involved in the attack included short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. </p>
<p>Ballistic missiles are accelerated by rockets from the ground or from aircraft, tend to follow a predictable path and are somewhat easier to track. Cruise missiles carry a propulsion system that allows them to maintain speed and fly more unpredictable flight paths, including trajectories that are close to the ground. They are much more difficult to detect, track and shoot down.</p>
<p>Then, on Oct. 17, Russia launched a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/10/17/world/russia-ukraine-war-news/first-came-the-buzzing-sound-then-the-deadly-blasts?smid=url-share">barrage of explosive drones at Ukraine’s capital city, Kyiv</a>. Explosive drones, known as loitering munitions, tend to be small weapons that are difficult to defend against. By circling overhead, they are able to surveil a region of interest, gathering information before identifying a specific target to attack. Russia has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/10/16/iran-russia-missiles-ukraine/">acquired explosive drones from Iran</a>, according to U.S. officials.</p>
<h2>Air defense systems</h2>
<p>The defense against all such air threats involves an integrated system of several elements. </p>
<p>Early warning radars located at Ukraine’s borders first detect the approach of missiles. These weapons are further tracked along their flight trajectories by a dispersed network of additional radars. The primary defensive countermeasure against ballistic and cruise missiles involves <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/tag/surface-to-air-missiles/">surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)</a>: You destroy a missile using a missile. This is no easy feat because the SAM must track, home in on and hit a high-speed target that may be changing direction.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a diagram showing the trajectory of a missile along with a radar system tracking the missile and a defensive missile intercepting the attacking missile" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490224/original/file-20221017-15359-y6n97j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The fundamental elements of a missile defense system.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328689008_Analysis_of_the_Optimal_Frequency_Band_for_a_Ballistic_Missile_Defense_Radar_System/download">Nguyen, Dang-An et al.</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the U.S., key strategic assets such as the White House are protected against aerial attack by the <a href="https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/what-we-do/missile-defense/air-and-missile-defense-systems/nasams">National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS)</a>. NASAMS was designed to counteract a variety of incoming threats, including cruise missiles, aircraft and drones. Each NASAMS contains 12 interceptor SAMs. No information is available publicly on its effectiveness. NASAMS is one of the options being considered by the U.S. to help support Ukraine.</p>
<p>Another notable example of an air defense system is the <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/land/2022/08/02/us-army-completes-second-iron-dome-interceptor-test/">Israeli Iron Dome</a>. The system is designed to defend against rockets and artillery shells launched from up to 155 miles (250 kilometers) away. Each Iron Dome missile battery consists of three to four missile launchers, each with up to 20 interceptor SAMs. </p>
<p>The system is reported to have a 90% kill rate for rockets launched against Israel. Veteran national security correspondent Mark Thompson described Iron Dome as possibly the <a href="https://nation.time.com/2012/11/19/iron-dome-a-missile-shield-that-works/">most effective missile defense system the world has seen</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490226/original/file-20221017-16860-xg96n2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a set of curving light trails in the evening sky above a city" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490226/original/file-20221017-16860-xg96n2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490226/original/file-20221017-16860-xg96n2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490226/original/file-20221017-16860-xg96n2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490226/original/file-20221017-16860-xg96n2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490226/original/file-20221017-16860-xg96n2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490226/original/file-20221017-16860-xg96n2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490226/original/file-20221017-16860-xg96n2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile system fired missiles to intercept rockets launched from the Gaza Strip toward Israel, in Ashkelon southern Israel, on Aug. 7, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXIsraelPalestinians/38e73b2d21514dc68885161f4df98111/photo">AP Photo/Tsafrir Abayov</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Both NASAMS and Iron Dome are reported to be effective against drones. However, SAMs are an expensive way to defend against such low-cost targets, and they could be overwhelmed by large numbers of drones. Directed energy weapons such as <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/drones/11505/the-7-most-significant-anti-drone-weapons">high energy lasers</a> are being developed and deployed to provide a potentially more cost-effective approach to neutralizing low-cost drones.</p>
<h2>A numbers game</h2>
<p>The significance of the plea by Zelenskyy for additional air defense systems can be understood in the context of a numbers game. Different air defense systems have a range of effectiveness against different aerial threats. However, none of the defense systems is 100% effective. </p>
<p>Moreover, an adversary can significantly reduce the effectiveness of air defense by launching salvos of multiple weapons simultaneously. Therefore, an attacker can always overwhelm a defender if the attacker has more attack missiles than the defender has defensive missiles. Conversely, a sufficient number of defensive systems may cause an attacker to stop firing altogether. It becomes a war of attrition, with the winner being the side with the most missiles.</p>
<p>Ukraine likely has sufficient air defenses to protect strategic military targets such as command and control centers and ammunition dumps. They do not have coverage of many other key assets such as transportation hubs and power and water facilities, the types of targets <a href="https://theconversation.com/crippling-civilian-infrastructure-has-long-been-part-of-russian-generals-playbook-putin-is-merely-expanding-that-approach-192226">Russian forces have been targeting</a> in recent days.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490225/original/file-20221017-15372-4wjwkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="an aerial view of an airfield with an array of box-like structures in the foreground and hangers in the background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490225/original/file-20221017-15372-4wjwkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490225/original/file-20221017-15372-4wjwkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490225/original/file-20221017-15372-4wjwkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490225/original/file-20221017-15372-4wjwkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490225/original/file-20221017-15372-4wjwkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490225/original/file-20221017-15372-4wjwkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490225/original/file-20221017-15372-4wjwkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Air defenses are generally effective at protecting relatively small areas, like this Patriot missile battery defending Rzeszow Airport in Poland.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/july-2022-poland-rzeszow-mim-104-patriot-short-range-anti-news-photo/1242099869">Christophe Gateau/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Should the West agree to provide significant numbers of air defense systems to Ukraine, it could significantly change the course of the conflict. At some point, Russia will have to confront the finite depth of its missile stockpile. The number of remaining Russian high-precision missiles is already <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/14/russia-missiles-infrastructure-war-ukraine/">reported to be running low</a>. </p>
<p>Without the ability to wear down and demoralize Ukraine through airstrikes, Russia would be faced with the much more daunting and drawn-out prospect of relying solely on ground forces to grind out its objectives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192487/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Iain Boyd receives funding from the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Energy, NASA, Lockheed-Martin, and L3-Harris. </span></em></p>What will it take for Ukraine to defend against the ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and explosive drones raining down on the country? The question is not so much what as how many.Iain Boyd, Professor of Aerospace Engineering Sciences, University of Colorado BoulderLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1911672022-09-28T12:32:01Z2022-09-28T12:32:01ZWhat are tactical nuclear weapons? An international security expert explains and assesses what they mean for the war in Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486650/original/file-20220926-22-i4bgaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4546%2C2726&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">This Russian short-range cruise missile, the Iskander-K, can carry nuclear warheads for several hundred miles.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraine/6671b4bbaa8b47119e6dc89d0a121409/photo">Russian Defense Ministry Press Service photo via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tactical nuclear weapons have burst onto the international stage as Russian President Vladimir Putin, facing battlefield losses in eastern Ukraine, has threatened that Russia will “<a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69390">make use of all weapon systems available to us</a>” if Russia’s territorial integrity is threatened. Putin has characterized the war in Ukraine as an <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1511161">existential battle against the West</a>, which he said wants to weaken, divide and destroy Russia. </p>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/21/biden-condemns-putins-irresponsible-nuclear-threats/">criticized Putin’s overt nuclear threats against Europe</a>. Meanwhile, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg <a href="https://twitter.com/Reuters/status/1572571639774343169">downplayed the threat</a>, saying Putin “knows very well that a nuclear war should never be fought and cannot be won.” This is <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/41fc6e5d-6e39-440d-97f2-cf7c517fc99b">not the first time</a> Putin has invoked nuclear weapons in an attempt to deter NATO.</p>
<hr>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/what-are-tactical-nuclear-weapons-an-international-security-expert-explains-and-assesses-what-they-mean-for-the-war-in-ukraine-191167&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation, narrated by Noa, <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/audio-narrated-99682">here</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>I am an international security scholar who has <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/cf/faculty-and-staff/faculty.cfm?pid=1022718">worked on</a> and researched <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-90978-3">nuclear restraint</a>, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Behavior-Nuclear-Nonproliferation-Security-International/dp/0820347299">nonproliferation</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818319000328">costly signaling</a> theory applied to international relations for two decades. Russia’s large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, which are not governed by international treaties, and Putin’s doctrine of threatening their use have raised tensions, but tactical nuclear weapons are not simply another type of battlefield weapon.</p>
<h2>Tactical by the numbers</h2>
<p>Tactical nuclear weapons, sometimes called battlefield or nonstrategic nuclear weapons, were designed to be used on the battlefield – for example, to counter overwhelming conventional forces like large formations of infantry and armor. They are smaller than strategic nuclear weapons like the warheads carried on intercontinental ballistic missiles.</p>
<p>While experts <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1654273">disagree about precise definitions</a> of tactical nuclear weapons, lower explosive yields, measured in kilotons, and shorter-range delivery vehicles are commonly identified characteristics. Tactical nuclear weapons vary in yields from fractions of 1 kiloton to about 50 kilotons, compared with strategic nuclear weapons, which have yields that range from about 100 kilotons to over a megaton, though much more powerful warheads were developed during the Cold War. </p>
<p>For reference, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima was 15 kilotons, so some tactical nuclear weapons are capable of causing widespread destruction. The <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/13/politics/afghanistan-isis-moab-bomb">largest conventional bomb</a>, the Mother of All Bombs or MOAB, that the U.S. has dropped has a 0.011-kiloton yield.</p>
<p>Delivery systems for tactical nuclear weapons also tend to have shorter ranges, typically under 310 miles (500 kilometers) compared with strategic nuclear weapons, which are typically designed to cross continents. </p>
<p>Because low-yield nuclear weapons’ explosive force is not much greater than that of increasingly powerful conventional weapons, the U.S. military has reduced its reliance on them. Most of its remaining stockpile, about 150 <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/19263/get-to-know-americas-long-serving-b61-family-of-nuclear-bombs">B61 gravity bombs</a>, is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1654273">deployed in Europe</a>. The U.K. and France have completely eliminated their tactical stockpiles. Pakistan, China, India, Israel and North Korea all have several types of tactical nuclear weaponry. </p>
<p>Russia has retained more tactical nuclear weapons, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1654273">estimated to be around 2,000</a>, and relied more heavily on them in its nuclear strategy than the U.S. has, mostly due to Russia’s less advanced conventional weaponry and capabilities. </p>
<p>Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons can be deployed by ships, planes and ground forces. Most are deployed on air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs and depth charges delivered by medium-range and tactical bombers, or naval anti-ship and anti-submarine torpedoes. These missiles are mostly held in reserve in central depots in Russia. </p>
<p>Russia has updated its delivery systems to be able to carry either nuclear or conventional bombs. There is heightened concern over these dual capability delivery systems because Russia has used many of these short-range missile systems, particularly the Iskander-M, to bombard Ukraine.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/NKkng4V26Ck?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Russia’s Iskander-M mobile short-range ballistic missile can carry conventional or nuclear warheads. Russia has used the missile with conventional warheads in the war in Ukraine.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Tactical nuclear weapons are substantially more destructive than their conventional counterparts even at the same explosive energy. Nuclear explosions are <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Nuclear-Arms-Race-Technology-Society/dp/0070133476">more powerful by factors of 10 million to 100 million</a> than chemical explosions, and leave deadly radiation fallout that would contaminate air, soil, water and food supplies, similar to the disastrous Chernobyl nuclear reactor meltdown in 1986. The interactive simulation site <a href="https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/">NUKEMAP</a> by Alex Wellerstein depicts the multiple effects of nuclear explosions at various yields. </p>
<h2>Can any nuke be tactical?</h2>
<p>Unlike strategic nuclear weapons, tactical weapons are not focused on mutually assured destruction through overwhelming retaliation or nuclear umbrella deterrence to protect allies. While tactical nuclear weapons have not been included in arms control agreements, medium-range weapons were included in the now-defunct <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm">Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty</a> (1987-2018), which reduced nuclear weapons in Europe. </p>
<p>Both the U.S. and Russia reduced their total nuclear arsenals from about <a href="https://doi.org/10.2968/066004008">19,000 and 35,000 respectively</a> at the end of the Cold War to about <a href="https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB22%2010%20World%20Nuclear%20Forces.pdf">3,700 and 4,480 as of January 2022</a>. Russia’s reluctance to negotiate over its nonstrategic nuclear weapons has stymied further nuclear arms control efforts.</p>
<p>The fundamental question is whether tactical nuclear weapons are more “useable” and therefore could potentially trigger a full-scale nuclear war. Their development was part of an effort to overcome concerns that because large-scale nuclear attacks were widely seen as unthinkable, strategic nuclear weapons were losing their value as a deterrent to war between the superpowers. The nuclear powers would be more likely to use tactical nuclear weapons, in theory, and so the weapons would bolster a nation’s nuclear deterrence. </p>
<p>Yet, any use of tactical nuclear weapons would invoke defensive nuclear strategies. In fact, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis notably <a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180206/106833/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-MattisJ-20180206.pdf">stated in 2018</a>: “I do not think there is any such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon. Any nuclear weapon use any time is a strategic game changer.” </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/HRFAuIKkP7o?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">This documentary explores how the risk of nuclear war has changed – and possibly increased – since the end of the Cold War.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The U.S. has criticized Russia’s nuclear strategy of <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/nuclear-de-escalation-russias-deterrence-strategy/">escalate to de-escalate</a>, in which tactical nuclear weapons could be used to deter a widening of the war to include NATO. </p>
<p>While there is disagreement among experts, Russian and U.S. nuclear strategies focus on deterrence, and so involve large-scale retaliatory nuclear attacks in the face of any first-nuclear weapon use. This means that Russia’s threat to use nuclear weapons as a deterrent to conventional war is threatening an action that would, under nuclear warfare doctrine, invite a retaliatory nuclear strike if aimed at the U.S. or NATO.</p>
<h2>Nukes and Ukraine</h2>
<p>I believe Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine would not achieve any military goal. It would contaminate the territory that Russia claims as part of its historic empire and possibly drift into Russia itself. It would increase the likelihood of direct NATO intervention and destroy Russia’s image in the world. </p>
<p>Putin aims to deter Ukraine’s continued successes in regaining territory by preemptively <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/27/russia-ukraine-war-referendum/">annexing regions in the east of the country</a> after holding staged referendums. He could then declare that Russia would use nuclear weapons to defend the new territory as though the existence of the Russian state were threatened. But I believe this claim stretches Russia’s nuclear strategy beyond belief.</p>
<p>Putin has explicitly claimed that his threat to use tactical nuclear weapons <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/340dacce-10c8-45bc-a157-5aeb0a443b5e">is not a bluff</a> precisely because, from a strategic standpoint, <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-nonstrategic-nuclear-weapons-and-its-views-limited-nuclear-war">using them is not credible</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191167/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nina Srinivasan Rathbun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tactical nuclear weapons were designed to be used on the battlefield rather than for strategic defense, but that doesn’t mean there’s a plausible case for using them.Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, Professor of International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1808362022-04-15T12:12:31Z2022-04-15T12:12:31ZHow hypersonic missiles work and the unique threats they pose – an aerospace engineer explains<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457785/original/file-20220412-19-d9u5nq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2100%2C1760&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hypersonic missiles can change course to avoid detection and anti-missile defenses.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104467/x-51a-waverider/">U.S. Air Force graphic</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>An updated version of this article was published on May 24, 2023. <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-hypersonic-missiles-threaten-us-power-in-the-pacific-an-aerospace-engineer-explains-how-the-weapons-work-and-the-unique-threats-they-pose-206271">Read it here</a>.</em></p>
<p>Russia <a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-19-22/h_e258f4d62704c278417a897db16cac80">used a hypersonic missile</a> against a Ukrainian arms depot in the western part of the country on March 18, 2022. That might sound scary, but the technology the Russians used is not particularly advanced. However, next-generation hypersonic missiles that Russia, China and the U.S. are developing do pose a significant threat to national and global security.</p>
<p>I am an <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=0vO6w7MAAAAJ&hl=en">aerospace engineer</a> who studies space and defense systems, including hypersonic systems. These new systems pose an important challenge due to their maneuverability all along their trajectory. Because their flight paths can change as they travel, these missiles must be tracked throughout their flight. </p>
<p>A second important challenge stems from the fact that they operate in a different region of the atmosphere from other existing threats. The new hypersonic weapons fly much higher than slower subsonic missiles but much lower than intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S. and its allies do not have good tracking coverage for this in-between region, nor does Russia or China.</p>
<h2>Destabilizing effect</h2>
<p>Russia has claimed that some of its hypersonic weapons can carry a nuclear warhead. This statement alone is a cause for concern whether or not it is true. If Russia ever operates this system against an enemy, that country would have to decide the probability of the weapon being conventional or nuclear. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/FyUTNRIuAqc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">How hypersonic missiles threaten to upend the relative stability of the current era of nuclear weapons.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the case of the U.S., if the determination were made that the weapon was nuclear, then there is a very high likelihood that the U.S. would consider this a first strike attack and respond by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/second-strike-capability">unloading its nuclear weapons on Russia</a>. The hypersonic speed of these weapons increases the precariousness of the situation because the time for any last-minute diplomatic resolution would be severely reduced.</p>
<p>It is the destabilizing influence that modern hypersonic missiles represent that is perhaps the greatest risk they pose. I believe the U.S. and its allies should rapidly field their own hypersonic weapons to bring other nations such as Russia and China to the negotiating table to develop a diplomatic approach to managing these weapons.</p>
<h2>What is hypersonic?</h2>
<p>Describing a vehicle as hypersonic means that it flies much faster than the speed of sound, which is 761 miles per hour (1,225 kilometers per hour) at sea level and 663 mph (1,067 kph) at 35,000 feet (10,668 meters) where passenger jets fly. Passenger jets travel at just under 600 mph (966 kph), whereas hypersonic systems operate at speeds of 3,500 mph (5,633 kph) – about 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) per second – and higher.</p>
<p>Hypersonic systems have been in use for decades. When John Glenn came back to Earth in 1962 from the <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/feature/60-years-ago-john-glenn-the-first-american-to-orbit-the-earth-aboard-friendship-7">first U.S. crewed flight around the Earth</a>, his capsule entered the atmosphere at hypersonic speed. All of the intercontinental ballistic missiles in the world’s nuclear arsenals are hypersonic, reaching about 15,000 mph (24,140 kph), or about 4 miles (6.4 km) per second at their maximum velocity.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.space.com/19601-how-intercontinental-ballistic-missiles-work-infographic.html">ICBMs</a> are launched on large rockets and then fly on a predictable trajectory that takes them out of the atmosphere into space and then back into the atmosphere again. The new generation of hypersonic missiles fly very fast, but not as fast as ICBMs. They are launched on smaller rockets that keep them within the upper reaches of the atmosphere. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a diagram showing earth, the atmosphere and space overlaid by three missile trajectories of different altitudes" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458012/original/file-20220413-21-m1kfj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hypersonic missiles are not as fast as intercontinental ballistic missiles but are able to vary their trajectories.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gao.gov/blog/faster-speed-sound-u.s.-efforts-develop-hypersonic-weapons">U.S. Government Accounting Office</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Three types of hypersonic missiles</h2>
<p>There are three different types of non-ICBM hypersonic weapons: aero-ballistic, glide vehicles and cruise missiles. A hypersonic aero-ballistic system is dropped from an aircraft, accelerated to hypersonic speed using a rocket and then follows a ballistic, meaning unpowered, trajectory. The system Russian forces used to attack Ukraine, the <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kinzhal/">Kinzhal</a>, is an aero-ballistic missile. The technology has been around since about 1980. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="men in military uniforms watch technicians work on a missile beneath a military jet plane on a tarmac" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458013/original/file-20220413-18-1xe1o4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The type of hypersonic missile Russia has used in Ukraine, the Kinzhal aero-ballistic missile, is essentially a ballistic missile launched from aircraft. It is not as advanced as other types of hypersonic missiles that Russia, China and the U.S. are developing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaSyriaDrills/54c5b8e204184c24ae9694660b561aa3/photo">Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A hypersonic glide vehicle is boosted on a rocket to high altitude and then glides to its target, maneuvering along the way. Examples of hypersonic glide vehicles include China’s <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-17/">Dongfeng-17</a>, Russia’s <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/avangard/">Avangard</a> and the U.S. Navy’s <a href="https://www.ssp.navy.mil/six_lines_of_business/cps.html">Conventional Prompt Strike</a> system. U.S. officials have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a127f6de-f7b1-459e-b7ae-c14ed6a9198c">expressed concern</a> that China’s hypersonic glide vehicle technology is further advanced than the U.S. system.</p>
<p>A hypersonic cruise missile is boosted by a rocket to hypersonic speed and then uses an air-breathing engine called a <a href="https://hyperlab.nd.edu/research/scramjet-aerodynamics/">scramjet</a> to sustain that speed. Because they ingest air into their engines, hypersonic cruise missiles require smaller launch rockets than hypersonic glide vehicles, which means they can cost less and be launched from more places. Hypersonic cruise missiles are under development by China and the U.S. The U.S. reportedly <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/04/politics/us-hypersonic-missile-test/index.html">conducted a test flight</a> of a scramjet hypersonic missile in March 2020.</p>
<p><iframe id="PYZON" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/PYZON/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Difficult to defend against</h2>
<p>The primary reason nations are developing these next-generation hypersonic weapons is how difficult they are to defend against due to their speed, maneuverability and flight path. The U.S. is starting to develop a layered approach to defending against hypersonic weapons that includes a constellation of sensors in space and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/">close cooperation with key allies</a>. This approach is likely to be very expensive and take many years to implement.</p>
<p>With all of this activity on hypersonic weapons and defending against them, it is important to assess the threat they pose to national security. Hypersonic missiles with conventional, non-nuclear warheads are primarily useful against high-value targets, such as an aircraft carrier. Being able to take out such a target could have a significant impact on the outcome of a major conflict. </p>
<p>However, hypersonic missiles are expensive and therefore not likely to be produced in large quantities. As seen in the recent use by Russia, hypersonic weapons are not necessarily a silver bullet that ends a conflict.</p>
<p>[<em><a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters?nl=science&source=inline-science-corona-important">Get The Conversation’s most important coronavirus headlines, weekly in a science newsletter</a></em>]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180836/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Iain Boyd receives funding from the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Energy, NASA, Lockheed-Martin, and L3-Harris. </span></em></p>Russia’s use of hypersonic missiles in Ukraine has put the weapons in the news. Next-generation versions under development could dramatically alter national and global security.Iain Boyd, Director, Center for National Security Initiatives; Professor of Aerospace Engineering Sciences, University of Colorado BoulderLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1785092022-03-10T13:28:15Z2022-03-10T13:28:15ZWould Putin use nuclear weapons? An arms control expert explains what has and hasn’t changed since the invasion of Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450533/original/file-20220307-126059-i3fty9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4178%2C2345&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">This intercontinental ballistic missile was launched as part of Russia's test of its strategic forces in 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaNuclearDrills/b806e35f8e094dccaa4bea3e15b06463/photo">Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The prospect of a nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States seemed, until recently, to have ended with the Cold War. <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-23-22/h_d48db5391abae0b336a8217487043536">Threats</a> by Russian President Vladimir Putin to use the weapons to keep NATO out of the Ukraine conflict have revived those decades-old fears. </p>
<p>The threats come amid the fraying of nuclear arms control agreements between the two nuclear superpowers that had stabilized strategic relations for decades. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://nonproliferation.org/experts/miles-pomper/">arms control expert</a>, I see the war in Ukraine as an added strain but not a fatal blow to the system that has helped to keep the world from nuclear devastation. That system has evolved over decades and allows U.S. and Russian officials to gauge how close the other side is to launching an attack.</p>
<h2>Keeping an eye on each other</h2>
<p>Arms control treaties rely on each of the nuclear superpowers sharing information about deployed delivery systems – missiles or bombers that could be used to deliver nuclear warheads – and to permit the other side to <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/139906.htm">verify these claims</a>. The treaties usually include numerical limits on weapons, and implementation of a treaty typically begins with baseline declarations by each side of numbers and locations of weapons. Numbers are updated annually. The two sides also regularly notify each other of significant changes to this baseline through what are now called <a href="https://youtu.be/JWgkp5u7Kmg">Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers</a>. </p>
<p>A key element of all arms control treaties has been the two sides’ ability to use “<a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/139906.htm">national technical means</a>,” such as satellites, along with remote monitoring techniques such as <a href="https://technet.pnnl.gov/sensors/nuclear/products/armscontrol.stm">radiation detectors</a>, <a href="https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1205690/">tags and seals</a>, to monitor compliance. Remote monitoring techniques are designed to distinguish individual items such as missiles that are limited by treaty and to ensure that they are not tampered with. </p>
<p>The 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty introduced a major innovation: the use of on-site inspections. Before that treaty, the Soviets had resisted U.S. proposals to include such inspections in verification. But as Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev moved domestically to a process of <a href="http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1985-2/perestroika-and-glasnost/">glasnost</a> (openness), he embraced on-site inspections, and similar provisions have been included in subsequent treaties. They include both regular announced inspections and a certain number of annual unannounced short-term challenge inspections to guard against cheating. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450796/original/file-20220308-13-37peez.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a group of men look at a pair of disassembled missiles lying on the ground in a desert" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450796/original/file-20220308-13-37peez.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450796/original/file-20220308-13-37peez.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450796/original/file-20220308-13-37peez.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450796/original/file-20220308-13-37peez.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450796/original/file-20220308-13-37peez.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450796/original/file-20220308-13-37peez.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450796/original/file-20220308-13-37peez.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Soviet weapons inspectors examine two disassembled Pershing II missiles in the U.S. in 1989.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:INF_inspection_of_Pershing_II_missiles_in_1989_(1).JPEG">MSGT Jose Lopez Jr./Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The history of keeping nuclear arms in check</h2>
<p>National security scholars such as <a href="https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1207805/heroes-of-arms-control-tom-schelling-and-mort-halperin/">Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin</a> developed the concept of arms control in the late 1950s and early 1960s amid an accelerating U.S.-Soviet arms race. Arms control measures were designed to increase transparency and predictability to avoid misunderstandings or false alarms that could lead to an accidental or unintended nuclear conflict. As the concept evolved, the goal of arms control measures became ensuring that defenders could respond to any nuclear attack with one of their own, which reduced incentives to engage in a nuclear war in the first place. </p>
<p>The approach gained traction after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis when the surprise deployment of Soviet nuclear-armed missiles less than 100 miles from the U.S. brought the world to the verge of nuclear war. Initial agreements included the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement (SALT 1), which put the first ceilings on U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. Subsequently, Gorbachev negotiated the <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2019-08-02/inf-treaty-1987-2019">INF</a> treaty and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which brought reductions in the two sides’ nuclear forces. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450545/original/file-20220307-85965-spshus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="two men in dark business suits sit on the same side of a table signing documents" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450545/original/file-20220307-85965-spshus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450545/original/file-20220307-85965-spshus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450545/original/file-20220307-85965-spshus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450545/original/file-20220307-85965-spshus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450545/original/file-20220307-85965-spshus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450545/original/file-20220307-85965-spshus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450545/original/file-20220307-85965-spshus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty in the East Room of the White House on Dес. 8, 1987.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/archives/photographs/large/c44067-5.jpg">Ronald Reagan Presidential Library</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The INF treaty for the first time banned an entire class of weapons: ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (311 and 3,418 miles). This included U.S. missiles capable of hitting Russia from the territory of U.S. allies in Europe or East Asia and vice versa. START I applied to strategic nuclear weapons, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) launched from one superpower’s homeland to attack the other’s territory. In 2010, President Barack Obama and then-Russian President Dmitri Medvedev signed the <a href="https://www.state.gov/new-start/">New START agreement</a>, which further reduced the two sides’ deployed strategic nuclear forces. And in 2021, President Joe Biden and Putin extended that treaty for five years. The treaties have supported dramatic cuts in the two countries’ nuclear arsenals.</p>
<h2>New challenges for an aging system</h2>
<p>Inspections under the INF treaty ended in 2001 after the last banned missiles were removed from deployment. Under the Obama and Trump administrations, the U.S. accused Russia of violating the treaty by developing, testing and deploying <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/russias-violation-of-the-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-inf-treaty/index.html">cruise missiles</a> that exceeded its 500-kilometer limit, an accusation Russia rejected. Backed by NATO allies, the Trump administration withdrew from the treaty in 2019. This left long-range strategic weapons as the only nuclear weapons subject to arms control agreements.</p>
<p>Shorter-range non-strategic nuclear weapons – those with a range of less than 500 kilometers, or roughly 310 miles – have never been covered by any agreement, a sore point with Washington and NATO allies because <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32572/46">Moscow possesses far more of them</a> than NATO does.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450543/original/file-20220307-51485-1hga5jy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="four large military vehicles in a snow-covered field at the edge of a forest, two of the vehicles with nearly vertical cylinders attached at the rear" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450543/original/file-20220307-51485-1hga5jy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450543/original/file-20220307-51485-1hga5jy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450543/original/file-20220307-51485-1hga5jy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450543/original/file-20220307-51485-1hga5jy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450543/original/file-20220307-51485-1hga5jy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450543/original/file-20220307-51485-1hga5jy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450543/original/file-20220307-51485-1hga5jy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russia’s Iskander missile system launches short-range ballistic missiles with either nuclear or conventional warheads from mobile platforms.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraineWarWeaponsExplainer/9ab44d4bdff84b6a8cde43b237b17dbc/photo">Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Arms control has been declining in other ways as well. Russia has embarked on an ambitious <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf">nuclear weapons modernization program</a>, and some of its exotic new strategic weapon systems fall outside of New START’s restrictions. Meanwhile, cyberattacks and anti-satellite weapons loom as new threats to arms control monitoring and nuclear command and control systems. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2020.1857911">Artificial intelligence</a> and <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/25/2002187108/-1/-1/0/59HYPERSONICWEAPONS.PDF">hypersonic missile</a> technology could shorten the warning times for a nuclear attack. Russia has been deploying missiles that can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads, sowing confusion. And Russia worries that U.S. missile defense systems, especially in Europe, threaten strategic stability by permitting the U.S. to carry out a nuclear first strike and then prevent an effective Russian nuclear response. </p>
<p>Before the Ukraine war, Biden and Putin had launched a <a href="https://russiamatters.org/analysis/us-russia-strategic-stability-dialogue-purpose-progress-challenges-and-opportunities">Strategic Stability Dialogue</a> to tackle these issues and lay the groundwork for negotiations on a replacement for New START before it expires in 2026. But the dialogue has been suspended with the outbreak of hostilities, and it is difficult to foresee when it might resume. </p>
<h2>Putin turns up the heat – but not to a boil</h2>
<p>Putin’s recent moves have further shaken the rickety strategic security architecture. On the eve of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-23-22/h_d48db5391abae0b336a8217487043536">he said</a> that “anyone who tries to interfere with us … must know that Russia’s response will be immediate and will lead you to such consequences as you have never before experienced in your history” and that Russia possesses “certain advantages in a number of the latest types of weapons.” </p>
<p>With the war underway, Putin announced an “<a href="https://tass.com/defense/1413219">enhanced combat alert</a>” of the country’s nuclear forces, which is <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/02/what-just-happened-putins-nuclear-forces-heres-what-experts-say/362501/">not a regular alert level</a> in Russia’s system comparable to the U.S.’s <a href="https://nuke.fas.org/guide/usa/c3i/defcon.htm">DEFCON status</a>. In practice, the enhanced combat alert consisted largely of adding staff to shifts at relevant nuclear weapon sites. The announcement was <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/03/concern-rising-putin-could-use-nuclear-weapons/362913/">designed to discourage NATO</a> from intervening and to intimidate Ukraine.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, U.S. national security officials <a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?518352-1/house-intel-panel-told-putin-endgame-ukraine&live=">expressed concern</a> that Russia could use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine if NATO forces were drawn into direct conflict with Russia. Use of the weapons is consistent with Russia’s military doctrine of “<a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/february/escalate-de-escalate">escalate to de-escalate</a>,” according to the officials.</p>
<p>Even in the face of Putin’s strategic nuclear saber rattling and concerns about Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons, however, the arms control framework has held sufficiently firm to preserve strategic stability. U.S. nuclear commanders have criticized Putin’s moves but <a href="https://www.armytimes.com/pentagon/2022/03/01/no-changes-coming-to-us-nuclear-posture-after-russian-threat/">have not sought to match them</a>. They do not see evidence that Putin has taken steps to escalate the situation, like placing non-strategic nuclear warheads on airplanes or ships or sending nuclear-armed submarines to sea. </p>
<p>So far, arms control has played its intended role of limiting the scope and violence in Ukraine, keeping a lid on a conflict that otherwise could become a world war. </p>
<p>[<em>The Conversation’s science, health and technology editors pick their favorite stories.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=science&source=inline-science-favorite">Weekly on Wednesdays</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178509/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Miles A. Pomper has led several research projects for CNS which have received funding from NATO member states, including the United States and several European allies. His research has also been supported by grants from foundations interested in arms control</span></em></p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats have the world on edge, but so far, long-standing arms control measures have helped keep the situation from getting out of control.Miles A. Pomper, Senior Fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, MiddleburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1144412019-04-01T06:02:11Z2019-04-01T06:02:11ZIndia destroys its own satellite with a test missile, still says space is for peace<p>On March 27, India announced it had successfully conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test, called “<a href="https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31179/Frequently+Asked+Questions+on+Mission+Shakti+Indias+AntiSatellite+Missile+test+conducted+on+27+March+2019">Mission Shakti</a>”. After the <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/having-tested-its-asat-capability-india-should-help-shape-global-space-norms-49384/">United States, Russia and China</a>, India is now the fourth country in the world to have demonstrated this capability. </p>
<p>The destroyed satellite was one of India’s own. But the test has caused concerns about the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-satellite-usa/u-s-studying-india-anti-satellite-weapons-test-warns-of-space-debris-idUSKCN1R825Z">space debris generated</a>, which potentially threatens the operation of functional satellites. </p>
<p>There are also political and legal implications. The test’s success may be a plus for Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who is now trying to win his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/27/modi-space-weapon-announcement-struggles-for-lift-off">second term in the upcoming election</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indias-whatsapp-election-political-parties-risk-undermining-democracy-with-technology-111699">India's WhatsApp election: political parties risk undermining democracy with technology</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But the test can be viewed as a loss for global security, as nations and regulatory bodies struggle to maintain a view of space as a neutral and conflict-free arena in the face of escalating technological capabilities. </p>
<p>According to the official press release, India destroyed its own satellite by using technology known as “kinetic kill”. This particular technology is usually termed as “<a href="https://www.ucsusa.org/press/2019/india-destroys-satellite-showing-need-international-agreement-space-security">hit-to-kill</a>”.</p>
<p>A kinetic kill missile is not equipped with an explosive warhead. Simply put, what India did was to launch the missile, hit the target satellite and destroy it with energy purely generated by the high speed of the missile interceptor. This technology is only <a href="https://swfound.org/media/206118/swf_global_counterspace_april2018.pdf">one of many with ASAT capabilities</a>, and is the one used by China in its <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/world-fury-at-satellite-destruction-20070120-ge416d.html">2007 ASAT test</a>. </p>
<h2>Power and strength</h2>
<p>Since the first satellite was launched in 1957 (the Soviet Union’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/60-years-in-orbit-for-grapefruit-satellite-the-oldest-human-object-in-space-93640">Sputnik</a>), space has become – and will continue to be – a frontier where big powers enhance their presence by launching and operating their own satellites. </p>
<p>There are currently <a href="https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database">1,957 satellites</a> orbiting Earth. They provide crucial economic, civil and scientific benefits to the world, from generating income to a wide range of services such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/were-drafting-a-legal-guide-to-war-in-space-hopefully-well-never-need-to-use-it-86677">navigation, communication, weather forecasts and disaster relief</a>. </p>
<p>The tricky thing about satellites is that they can also be used for military and national security purposes, while still serving the civil end: one good example is <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP474-1.html">GPS</a>. </p>
<p>So it’s not surprising big powers are keen to develop their ASAT capabilities. The name of India’s test, Shakti, means “power, strength, capability” in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shakti">Hindi</a>. </p>
<h2>Danger of space debris</h2>
<p>A direct consequence of ASAT is that it creates space debris when the original satellite breaks apart. Space debris consists of <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/5-8/features/nasa-knows/what-is-orbital-debris-58.html">pieces of non-functional spacecraft</a>, and can vary in size from tiny paint flecks to an entire “dead” satellite. Space debris orbits from <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-06170-1">hundreds to thousands of kilometres above Earth</a>.</p>
<p>The presence of space debris increases the likelihood of <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/space-junk-collision-statistics-government-tracking-2017-2018-4?r=US&IR=T">operational satellites being damaged</a>. </p>
<p>Although India downplayed the potential for danger by arguing that its test was conducted in the lower atmosphere, this perhaps did not take into account the creation of <a href="https://download.esa.int/esoc/downloads/BR-336_Space_Debris_WEB.pdf">pieces smaller than 5-10 cm in diameter</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, given the <a href="http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-debris/kessler-syndrome">potential self-sustaining nature of space debris</a>, it’s possible the amount of space debris caused by India’s ASAT will actually increase due to the collision. </p>
<p>Aside from the quantity, the speed of space debris is another worrying factor. Space junk can travel at up to <a href="https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20150019428.pdf">10km per second</a> in lower Earth orbit (where India intercepted its satellite), so even very small particles pose a realistic threat to space missions such as <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/research/news/rrm3">human spaceflight and robotic refuelling missions</a>.</p>
<h2>Regulatory catch-up</h2>
<p>As we’re seeing clearly now in <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-law-is-closing-in-on-facebook-and-the-digital-gangsters-112232">social media</a>, when technology moves fast the law can struggle to keep up, and this leads to regulatory absence. This is also true of international space law. </p>
<p>Five fundamental global <a href="http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html">space treaties</a> were created 35-52 years ago: </p>
<ul>
<li>Outer Space Treaty (1967) – governs the activities of the states in exploration and use of outer space</li>
<li>Rescue Agreement (1968) – relates to the rescue and return of astronauts, and return of launched objects</li>
<li>Liability Convention (1972) – governs damage caused by space objects</li>
<li>Registration Convention (1967) – relates to registration of objects in space </li>
<li>Moon Agreement (1984) – governs the activities of states on the Moon and other celestial bodies.</li>
</ul>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ive-always-wondered-could-someone-take-ownership-of-a-planet-or-a-moon-101464">I've Always Wondered: could someone take ownership of a planet or a moon?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These were written when there were only a handful of spacefaring nations, and space technologies were not as sophisticated as they are now.</p>
<p>Although these treaties are binding legal documents, they leave many of today’s issues unregulated. For example, in terms of military space activities, the Outer Space Treaty only prohibits the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space, not conventional weapons (including ballistic missiles, like the one used by India in Mission Shakti). </p>
<p>In addition, the treaty endorses that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. However, the issue is <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-not-clear-where-trumps-space-force-fits-within-international-agreement-on-peaceful-use-of-space-98545">how to interpret</a> the term “peaceful purposes”. India <a href="https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31179/Frequently+Asked+Questions+on+Mission+Shakti+Indias+AntiSatellite+Missile+test+conducted+on+27+March+2019">claimed</a>, after its ASAT test: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>we have always maintained that space must be used only for peaceful purposes.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>When terms such as “peaceful” seem to be open to interpretation, it’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-world-embraces-space-the-50-year-old-outer-space-treaty-needs-adaptation-79833">time to update laws and regulations that govern how we use space</a>.</p>
<h2>New approaches, soft laws</h2>
<p>Several international efforts aim to address the issues posed by new scenarios in space, including the development of military space technologies. </p>
<p>For example, McGill University in Canada has led the <a href="https://www.mcgill.ca/milamos">MILAMOS project</a>, with the hope of clarifying the fundamental rules applicable to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/were-drafting-a-legal-guide-to-war-in-space-hopefully-well-never-need-to-use-it-86677">military use of outer space</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/were-drafting-a-legal-guide-to-war-in-space-hopefully-well-never-need-to-use-it-86677">We're drafting a legal guide to war in space. Hopefully we'll never need to use it</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>A similar initiative, the <a href="https://law.adelaide.edu.au/woomera/home">Woomera Manual</a>, has been undertaken by Adelaide Law School in Australia. </p>
<p>Though commendable, both projects will lead to publications of “soft laws”, which will have no legally binding force on governments. </p>
<p>The UN needs to work much harder to attend to space security issues – the <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/">Disarmament Commission</a> and <a href="http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html">Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space</a> can be encouraged to collaborate on the issues regarding space weapons. </p>
<p>It is in everyone’s best interests to keep space safe and peaceful.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114441/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bin Li does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>On 27 March, India announced it had successfully conducted an anti-satellite missile test, Mission Shakti. India is now the fourth country in the world displaying this capability.Bin Li, Lecturer, University of NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1112512019-02-06T23:26:51Z2019-02-06T23:26:51ZThe collapse of the US-Russia INF Treaty makes arms control a global priority<p><em>UPDATE: The cold war-era Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty expired today, August 2, 2019.</em></p>
<p>On October 20 2018, US President Donald <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/20/trump-us-nuclear-arms-treaty-russia">Trump announced he intends to withdraw</a> from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) – an arms control treaty with Russia that contributed to the end of the Cold War. </p>
<p>Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/01/politics/us-russia-nuclear-arms-treaty-pompeo/index.html">confirmed this decision</a>, while Trump reiterated his <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/videos/politics/2019/02/06/trump-state-of-the-union-2019-russia-inf-nuclear-treaty-sot-vpx.cnn">commitment to withdrawing</a> from the treaty in his State of the Union address. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.rt.com/news/450395-russia-suspends-inf-treaty/">Russia followed suit</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-47134028">reports say</a> it is aiming to create new land-based missiles within the next two years. Reports also say the US is allocating funds for the research and development of such missiles. </p>
<p>So, what is the INF Treaty? And will its collapse lead to an increase of global nuclear tensions that marked the Cold War?</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/B9Ck_qri4H0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<h2>What is the INF?</h2>
<p>The INF Treaty took seven years to negotiate, contributed to the end of the Cold War and ushered in three decades of strategic stability. </p>
<p>US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the treaty on December 8, 1987 to give effect to their declaration that “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/12/11/joint-statement-by-reagan-gorbachev/cd990a8d-87a1-4d74-88f8-704f93c80cd3/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d53d121d75e8">a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought</a>”.</p>
<p>The treaty prohibited the development, testing and possession of ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles with a range of 500km to 5,500km, whether armed with nuclear or conventional warheads.</p>
<p>A joint statement from Reagan and Gorbachev <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/12/11/joint-statement-by-reagan-gorbachev/cd990a8d-87a1-4d74-88f8-704f93c80cd3/?amp;utm_term=.d53d121d75e8&noredirect=on&utm_term=.56d20493420e">noted</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>This treaty is historic both for its objective – the complete elimination of an entire class of US and Soviet nuclear arms – and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It entered into force on June 1 1988. By its implementation deadline of June 1 1991, <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty">859 US and 1,752 Soviet</a> missiles had been destroyed.</p>
<p>Reflecting the dominant Cold War architecture of nuclear arms control, the INF Treaty was bilateral. US National Security Adviser <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903918104576500273389091098">John Bolton</a>, writing in 2011 as a private citizen, conceded the treaty had successfully “addressed a significant threat to US interests”. The threat was a surprise Soviet/Russian nuclear attack in Europe using missiles in the 500-5,500km range. </p>
<p>But the arms control architecture began fraying when US President George W. Bush <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/international/bush-pulls-out-of-abm-treaty-putin-calls-move-a-mistake.html">pulled out of</a> the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2001. Signed in 1972, the ABM controlled systems designed to counter “strategic” ballistic missiles, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).</p>
<p>With the INF Treaty now dead and another arms control treaty, <a href="https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/">New Start</a>, set to expire in 2021, the world will be left without any limits on the two major nuclear arsenals for the first time since 1972. </p>
<h2>What now, for Europe?</h2>
<p>Since 2014, under the Obama administration, Washington has accused Russia of deploying nuclear-capable ground-launched missiles with a 2,000km range (the SSC-8) in Europe that are <a href="https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf">non-compliant with INF Treaty obligations</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/obamas-nobel-winning-vision-of-world-without-nuclear-weapons-is-still-distant-67566">Obama's Nobel-winning vision of 'world without nuclear weapons' is still distant</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The US decision to pull out of the treaty will deepen the strains in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Baltic countries insist Russia’s violations of the INF Treaty demand robust diplomatic and military counter-measures. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/oct/21/uk-backs-trumps-nuclear-treaty-withdrawal-blames-russia-for-breakdown">UK has lined up firmly behind Washington</a>, blaming Russia for the breakdown. </p>
<p>But Germany’s foreign minister, Heiko Maas, urged Washington to consider the consequences of withdrawal for Europe and for the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45931231">future of nuclear disarmament</a>. And the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/22/eu-us-nuclear-arms-race-inf-treaty-bolton-moscow">EU foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini</a>, said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The INF contributed to the end of the Cold War and constitutes a pillar of European security architecture.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>NATO stands to lose more from the INF Treaty collapse than Russia. Russia will be able to move ahead rapidly with the development and deployment of short and medium-range ground-launched nuclear-capable missiles. But, unlike in the 1980s, the US would face difficulty in finding allies in Europe prepared to station such missiles on their territory. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1091354782999166982"}"></div></p>
<p>Also, would the host countries have a voice or veto on launching them and in choosing targets?</p>
<h2>What about the Asia-Pacific?</h2>
<p>In addition to alleged Russian violations, the US exit is motivated by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/us/politics/russia-nuclear-arms-treaty-trump-administration.html">China’s growing challenge</a> to US dominance in the Pacific. China and North Korea have been developing missile-delivery capabilities.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-may-not-yet-have-a-long-range-missile-but-its-progress-is-worrying-73115">North Korea may not yet have a long-range missile, but its progress is worrying</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>“To reduce the threat from INF-range missiles,” Bolton <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903918104576500273389091098">concluded</a> back in 2011, “we must either expand the INF Treaty’s membership or abrogate it entirely so that we can rebuild our own deterrent capabilities.” Trump has done the latter.</p>
<p>As a non-signatory, China is unconstrained by INF Treaty limits. About <a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HarrisJrH-20180214.pdf">95% of its missiles</a> are in the prohibited range. This enables it to target US ships and bases from the mainland by relatively inexpensive conventional means. </p>
<p>Without INF restrictions, the US could develop and station ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missiles across the Asia–Pacific, which would force Beijing to divert significant military resources to defend its homeland.</p>
<p>China’s nuclear stockpile has remained relatively stable over many years despite the fluctuations in the Russian and US numbers. It is below 300, compared to nearly 7,000 and 6,500 <a href="https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/">Russian and US warheads</a>, respectively. </p>
<p>This signifies a policy of deliberate restraint in China despite substantial growth in economic and technological capability since its first nuclear test 55 years ago.</p>
<p>The collapse of the INF Treaty and deployment of China-specific US missiles could compel China to institute counter-measures – such as rapidly expanding its warhead numbers and missile-delivery systems – to protect vital security interests, including nuclear assets deep in its interior. </p>
<p>China’s response in turn may trigger re-adjustments to India’s doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and could produce matching re-adjustments by Pakistan. The <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pakistan-has-more-nuclear-warheads-india-credible-deterrence/articleshow/64641056.cms">nuclear arsenals of both these countries</a> is presently limited to under 150 each. </p>
<p>In a worst-case scenario, China, India and Pakistan could engage in a sprint to parity with the US with a rapid expansion of warhead numbers and missile-delivery capabilities, and perhaps even move to keeping a stock of nuclear weapons on high alert just like Russia and the US. </p>
<p>However, economic and technological limitations will constrain India and Pakistan’s ability to engage in an open-ended nuclear arms race.</p>
<h2>Expanding arms control</h2>
<p>The sensible alternative would be to begin urgently multilateralising the Cold War bilateral structure of nuclear arms control regimes. This means involving more countries than just Russia and the US in arms control treaties, and in particular involving China. Chinese nuclear expert <a href="https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/11/07/why-china-is-worried-about-end-of-inf-treaty-pub-77669?">Tong Zhao’s conclusion</a> holds for the whole world, not just China: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>… the era of relying on the US-Russia bilateral arms control structure is at its end. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Multilateralising the arms control negotiating process and resulting structure will avoid a free-for-all nuclear arms race and instead anchor strategic stability in arms control agreements.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, thanks to Donald Trump and John Bolton, we shall continue to live in interesting times.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111251/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ramesh Thakur is affiliated with the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (<a href="http://www.a-pln.org">www.a-pln.org</a>), a nuclear policy advocacy group of which he is the co-convenor. </span></em></p>The US has withdrawn from a major arms control treaty with Russia, and Russia followed suit. So, what was the treaty, and what happens now?Ramesh Thakur, Professor of International Relations, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/903492018-01-18T23:20:15Z2018-01-18T23:20:15ZChina the winner after pointless Canada-U.S. meeting on North Korea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202450/original/file-20180118-158536-jb9h54.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=82%2C498%2C3731%2C1933&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland and U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson speak following a meeting on the security and stability on the Korean Peninsula in Vancouver. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Jonathan Hayward</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This week’s foreign ministers’ <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/north-korea-summit-vancouver-freeland-tillerson-1.4489166">meeting on security and stability on the Korean Peninsula</a> in Vancouver may have done global tensions more harm than good. If so, China will wait patiently to collect its geo-political winnings.</p>
<p>And for Canada, the main legacy of the forum may be increasingly thorny relations with the world’s emerging superpower.</p>
<p>When the Vancouver conference concluded earlier this week, the takeaway was Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland and U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson imploring all United Nations members — including the absent Russia and China — to fully implement the UN Security Council’s latest stringent sanctions designed to squeeze the North Korean economy with
“<a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/3967120/vancouver-north-korea-meeting-nuclear-threat/">maximum pressure</a>.”</p>
<p>As Tillerson emphasized: “The purpose of the maximum pressure campaign is intended to cause North Korea to engage as a credible negotiating partner in addressing a pathway to a denuclearization of the peninsula.” </p>
<p>Of course, the people who will feel the deepest pain of this maximum pressure are the most vulnerable of North Korea’s population. Malnourished children will have less to eat, and the sick and elderly will lose access to life-saving medicines.</p>
<h2>Jong-un unlikely to quit nukes</h2>
<p>It’s unlikely that North Korea’s economy will be seriously destabilized by <a href="http://www.38north.org/2018/01/khewitt011618/">international sanctions</a> this time. What is the more likely outcome? It’s hard to imagine Kim Jong-un surrendering his nuclear weapons. That would undercut his hold on power and ultimately lead to his appearance before the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity. </p>
<p>A more plausible response would be a more frenzied brandishing of his nuclear arsenal, threatening the unthinkable in order to save himself from the humiliation of a trial in The Hague followed by a lifetime of incarceration.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202452/original/file-20180118-158531-j5096k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202452/original/file-20180118-158531-j5096k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202452/original/file-20180118-158531-j5096k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202452/original/file-20180118-158531-j5096k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202452/original/file-20180118-158531-j5096k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202452/original/file-20180118-158531-j5096k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202452/original/file-20180118-158531-j5096k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A man watches a TV screen showing what the North Korean government calls the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, South Korea, in November.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Canada, meanwhile, has more to calculate than global diplomacy. The Chinese Communists are not as forgiving and broad-minded. </p>
<p>If Beijing finds that the Canadian conference leads to “hostile” foreign naval vessels patrolling East Asian waters, intercepting ships smuggling Chinese oil and other sanction-bucking commodities into North Korea, then the legacy of Vancouver will be its chilling effect on Canada-China relations. So much for Canada being favoured by Chinese trade concessions.</p>
<p>But an international armada enforcing sanctions may never materialize, as few nations want to incur China’s wrath by participating in such interdiction on the High Seas. </p>
<p>Which means North Korea will continue to get most of the oil and other commodities it needs, and China and Russia will continue to prop up Pyongyang because it serves their purposes to do so.</p>
<p>North Korea will also continue to relentlessly refine its weapon capability to, before long, achieve the undisputed ability to explode a nuclear device over any city in the United States. </p>
<p>And when that capability is proven, the global game changes dramatically. At a minimum, American allies will doubt if the United States can truly defend them if North Korea can launch a ballistic missile on U.S. territory.</p>
<h2>Beijing a better bet?</h2>
<p>These allies would start to see Beijing as a better bet in terms of their own security. Last weekend’s chaotic <a href="https://theconversation.com/life-death-and-politics-in-hawaii-125-years-of-colonial-rule-90273">false alarm in Hawaii</a> showed that the U.S. has made few preparations against such an outcome.</p>
<p>China seems content to wait patiently for the Korean crisis to come to a head before offering to collaborate in changing the Pyongyang regime and dismantling the nuclear weapons on Chinese terms. </p>
<p>Already, Beijing is demanding that the U.S. <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/05/china-stages-drills-warning-us-south-korea-amid-nuclear-tensions/">cease all joint military exercises with South Korea</a> as the price of another round of Chinese-mediated dialogue with North Korea. The next demand would be that the U.S. withdraw its troops based in South Korea and Japan. Then comes abrogation of America’s commitment to defend Taiwan.</p>
<p>China is confident the U.S. will not exercise its only other option when the Vancouver meeting’s “maximum pressure” fails to bring North Korea to heel — <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-case-for-using-military-force-against-north-korea-89747">reviving the Korean War by initiating military action</a> to cow the North Koreans into submission. </p>
<p>God willing, the horrendous slaughter that would ensue will give pause to even the “<a href="http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/06/politics/donald-trump-white-house-fitness-very-stable-genius/index.html">very stable genius</a>” in Washington.</p>
<p>There are various ways this could end for Canada.</p>
<p>We are now tied to the fate of Tillerson, though he may be on the way out if hawkish White House hardliners gain the upper hand when the secretary of state’s approach to Pyongyang proves ineffective. If so, Canada’s relations with Trump’s White House may also be a casualty of the Vancouver meeting.</p>
<p>China is playing very high-stakes poker on the Korean Peninsula, but the game serves Beijing’s ardently nationalistic geo-political ambitions if it gets the U.S. out of its East Asian backyard. </p>
<p>For China, this is no longer a matter of if, but when and how.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90349/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Burton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China is succeeding in a high-stakes poker game on the Korean Peninsula. Did Canada and the U.S. just play into Chinese hands?Charles Burton, Associate Professor of Political Science, Brock UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/901442018-01-16T14:24:08Z2018-01-16T14:24:08ZHawaii’s missile alert gaffe: why good human-machine design is critical<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202106/original/file-20180116-53324-h0aggm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/intercontinental-ballistic-missile-launching-across-ocean-715050727?src=vyHFsqbe9i-fMIG3aQJYWg-1-13">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A ballistic missile warning alarm that was wrongly triggered in Hawaii recently rams home the importance of the way interfaces are designed to prevent such major bloopers from happening in the first place.</p>
<p>It’s an unfortunate reality that we need to prepare for national emergencies due to war or natural disasters. Civil defence organisations, set up to coordinate and respond to such emergencies, are an important part of any modern state. Such entities – often a mix of state apparatus and voluntary organisations – play a critical role in terms of triggering alerts, coordinating response across law enforcement and emergency services, disseminating information and aiding response efforts to minimise impact and restore order. </p>
<p>Clearly, they are important systems for alerting nations to risks when disaster strikes. But such systems can go wrong. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202085/original/file-20180116-53310-mi12nj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202085/original/file-20180116-53310-mi12nj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1065&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202085/original/file-20180116-53310-mi12nj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1065&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202085/original/file-20180116-53310-mi12nj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1065&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202085/original/file-20180116-53310-mi12nj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1338&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202085/original/file-20180116-53310-mi12nj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202085/original/file-20180116-53310-mi12nj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1338&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The false missile alert sent to residents of Hawaii.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.epa.eu/politics-photos/defence-photos/false-missile-alert-sent-to-residents-of-hawaii-photos-54007786">EPA-EFE</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Hawaii on January 13 an employee of the US state’s <a href="http://dod.hawaii.gov/hiema/">Emergency Management Agency</a> set off a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/01/14/hawaii-missile-alert-how-one-employee-pushed-the-wrong-button-and-caused-a-wave-of-panic/?utm_term=.643ce65f4116">false alarm</a> that seemed only too real to anyone seeing the stark warning of a “Ballistic Missile Threat Inbound to Hawaii”. It was sent to social media channels and mobile phones, followed by the chilling message: “Seek Immediate Shelter. This is not a drill.” The false alarm continued for 38 minutes and caused widespread panic. </p>
<p>Human error was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/15/hawaii-missile-false-alarm-design-user-interface">reportedly</a> behind the false alarm, after an employee chose the incorrect option from a <a href="https://twitter.com/CivilBeat/status/953127542050795520">drop-down menu</a>. The options of an actual alarm and a drill were provided in the same menu. One offered to trigger a “DRILL – PACOM (CDW) STATE ONLY”, while the other very similar sounding option was described as “PACOM (CDW) STATE ONLY”.</p>
<p>Triggering the alarm also brought up a confirmation dialogue box – the only prompt that could have prevented the errant message from being sent. The operator clicked on it to confirm that he did want to send out the alert and, in the panic that ensued, Hawaiians thought they only had minutes to live before a ballistic missile attack.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"952681703658569728"}"></div></p>
<h2>Design for error</h2>
<p>Poor interface design clearly fails to address human errors. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=human-computer+interaction">Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) systems</a>, examples of which are found ranging from aircraft cockpit design to interactive medical devices, have been studied <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1117770/">extensively</a>. </p>
<p>The underlying science tries to address optimal interaction between human and machine, in an effort to minimise gaffes such as the Hawaiian incident. A couple of design principles serve as pertinent reminders on this occasion. </p>
<p>Human error is to be expected – it’s not the case of if but when. Every step of the way mechanisms should be built in to prevent mistakes. Strong audiovisual cues could be used to make a notable distinction between genuine alerts and drills. Different menu styles could also be provided where alerting sequences could be different to drill sequences. </p>
<p>Simplicity of design should, however, trump all design elements to avoid complexity which in turn can also be problematic for the person behind the controls. </p>
<h2>Two-person rule</h2>
<p>Beyond the interface design, operational protocols could also be devised requiring two people to issue an alert. This prevents one person making a false choice, inadvertently or deliberately, and ensures that the probability of an error is significantly reduced. However, this may introduce an unnecessary delay or an added cost burden in case of genuine alerts where both operators need to be present at all times. </p>
<p>While years of research into HCI and safety-critical systems have served us well, be it <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00140139.2016.1262578">aviation safety</a> or <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4466322/">healthcare and patient safety</a>, the possibility of human error remains. The unfortunate mistake that led to the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/9231855/Air-France-Flight-447-Damn-it-were-going-to-crash.html">Air France AF447 accident in 2009</a>, in which the pilot doggedly pulled on the control stick in a fatal climb even though the aircraft was repeatedly warning it had stalled, is a reminder that accidents do still happen despite advances in design. A cockpit scenario albeit has a radically different context to an early warning alert system. </p>
<p>Our interaction with technology is becoming more and more complex. Early warning systems are very welcome but the Hawaii mishap serves as an opportunity for a radical redesign, with a better understanding of their impact on the population: how do people respond to mass panic? How do we communicate alerts to reduce panic and promote orderly movement? It is also an opportunity for scientists to reexamine the social dynamics in an emergency situation. </p>
<p>At a time when the world is increasingly uncertain and our dependence on technology is so high, a redesign of poor warning systems is critical.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90144/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Siraj Ahmed Shaikh receives funding from EPSRC. </span></em></p>Poorly designed critical warning systems need a radical overhaul to prevent a repeat of Hawaii’s errant ‘ballistic missile threat’ alert.Siraj Ahmed Shaikh, Professor of Systems Security, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/845562017-09-22T19:53:25Z2017-09-22T19:53:25ZChina’s leverage over ‘Rocket Man’ is key to avoiding nuclear war in East Asia<p>U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un are playing a dangerous game of brinkmanship while also trading personal insults.</p>
<p>Most recently, Trump <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/world/trump-un-north-korea-iran.html?_r=0">blasted the “Rocket Man”</a> in his inaugural speech to the United Nations, promising to “totally destroy” North Korea if it threatens the U.S. or its allies. The Trump Administration also <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/north-korea-sanctions-trump-china-banks-announcement-latest-a7960106.html">added new sanctions</a> aimed at strangling its ability to work with banks. </p>
<p>Kim, for his part, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/22/asia/north-korea-dotard/index.html">resorted to calling</a> Trump “mentally deranged” and a “dotard,” while his foreign minister <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/22/552861261/north-korea-says-pacific-test-of-nuclear-warhead-is-possible">threatened to test</a> a hydrogen bomb in the Pacific. </p>
<p>With <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/08/08/north-korea-trump-ratchet-up-tension-with-threats-fire-hours-apart.html">tensions escalating</a>, it is important to be realistic about how we can get out of this mess. </p>
<p>In short, any nonmilitary solution will rely on China choosing to apply its massive economic leverage over the North Korean regime. In a positive sign, <a href="http://www.npr.org/2017/09/21/552708231/china-cuts-off-bank-business-with-north-korea-as-trump-announces-new-sanctions">China’s central bank recently told Chinese financial companies</a> to stop doing business with North Korea.</p>
<p>Overall, however, it appears that China has increased its trade with North Korea in recent years while doing fairly little to forestall North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. China’s foremost objective seems to be promoting greater stability from its volatile neighbor, in part because it fears being faced with a massive humanitarian crisis should the regime collapse.</p>
<p>But while the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/07/05/the-messy-data-behind-chinas-growing-trade-with-north-korea/?utm_term=.41435ab3f758">poor quality of the data</a> hinders a detailed analysis, a quick look shows just how much leverage China has, if it wishes to use it. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"882560030884716544"}"></div></p>
<h2>North Korea’s primary patron</h2>
<p>In general, exports from one country to another <a href="http://www.cepii.fr/pdf_pub/wp/2013/wp2013-27.pdf">can be mostly explained</a> by the distance between them and the sizes of their markets, a pattern that holds for China and North Korea.</p>
<p>Geographically, they share a long border, which makes China a natural, though not inevitable, partner for trade. As a case in point, North Korea also shares a long border with South Korea, but these countries have almost no trade between them. In addition, North Korea shares a small border with Russia, with whom it has little, though ever-increasing, trade. </p>
<p>China’s large market, proximity and – most importantly – willingness to trade with North Korea has led to a situation in which North Korea has become highly dependent on trade with what has become its primary patron. <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/prk/">About half</a> of North Korean exports and imports go directly to and from China and most of the rest of its trade is handled indirectly by Chinese middlemen. </p>
<p><iframe id="NLI0n" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/NLI0n/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>North Korea’s dependence on its neighbor has grown alongside China’s increasing economic dominance of East Asia, which gained momentum 15 years ago when China <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm">joined the World Trade Organization</a>. Since then, both Chinese gross domestic product as well as its annual trade with North Korea have increased nearly tenfold, to around <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/country/china">US$11 trillion</a> and <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/prk/">$6 billion</a>, respectively. </p>
<p>North Korea <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/chn/prk/show/2015/">imports nearly everything</a> from China, from rubber tires to refined petroleum to pears, with no single category dominating. Meanwhile, <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/prk/show/2015/">coal constitutes about 40 percent</a> of North Korean exports to China. </p>
<p><iframe id="hI27G" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/hI27G/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Time to use that leverage?</h2>
<p>However, recent events – such as the use of front companies by Chinese firms to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-usa-idUSKCN11W1SL">evade sanctions</a> imposed on North Korea and China’s <a href="http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/01/05/2017010501412.html">reluctance to cut off</a> energy supplies to the country – have led to some uncertainty about the extent to which China is willing to use this economic leverage to rein in North Korea’s military ambitions. </p>
<p>On one hand, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/18/world/asia/north-korea-china-coal-imports-suspended.html">China previously claimed</a> to have stopped coal imports from North Korea as part of recent efforts to punish the regime for missile tests and the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/20/asia/kim-jong-nam-death-timeline/index.html">suspected assassination of Kim Jong-nam</a>, the estranged half-brother of North Korean leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-makes-kim-jong-un-tick-77143">Kim Jong Un</a>. This was an important signal of China’s willingness to support U.S. concerns about the missile program since oil represents <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/prk/">about a third</a> ($930 million) of North Korea’s import revenue. </p>
<p>On the other hand, there is evidence that coal shipments in fact <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2017/07/05/trump_tried_to_make_china_to_do_his_bidding_against_north_korea_and_is_shocked.html">never ceased</a>. And, in any case, China <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/07/05/the-messy-data-behind-chinas-growing-trade-with-north-korea/?utm_term=.41435ab3f758">may have increased</a> its imports of iron ore from North Korea to offset the lost coal revenues. </p>
<p>This is consistent with the idea that China carefully considers the resources and revenue that are available to the North Korean regime at any moment, and uses trade as a lever to control them. In this way, China walks a fine line between providing too many resources, and thus allowing the regime to prosper, and not enough resources, such that North Korea is in danger of collapsing. Ultimately, trade may be used as a lever to do some light scolding, but China’s overwhelming concern is preventing North Korea’s collapse.</p>
<p>Further evidence that China has tight control over the North Korean economy comes from <a href="https://c4ads.org/reports/">a recent report</a> from <a href="https://c4ads.org">C4ADS</a>. The research group found close, and often common, ownership ties between most of the major Chinese companies who do business with North Korea. This suggests that trade with North Korea is highly centralized and thus easily controlled.</p>
<h2>Russia: North Korea’s other ‘friend’</h2>
<p>China is not the only country that North Korea trades with, though the others currently pale in comparison. Other top export destinations include India ($97.8 million), Pakistan ($43.1 million) and Burkina Faso ($32.8 million). In terms of imports, India ($108 million), Russia ($78.3 million) and Thailand ($73.8 million) currently sell the most to North Korea. </p>
<p>Russia in particular may soon complicate <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/nikki-haley-says-u-s-will-propose-tougher-sanctions-against-north-korea/">U.S. efforts to isolate the regime</a>. While still small, <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/06/05/russia-boosts-trade-north-korea-china-cuts/102389824/">Russian trade with North Korea increased</a> 73 percent over the first two months of 2017 compared with the same period of the previous year. </p>
<p>But whereas China is legitimately worried that an economic crisis in North Korea could lead to a flood of refugees or all-out war, Russia likely sees engagement with North Korea in much simpler terms, namely as an additional way to gain geopolitical advantage relative to the U.S.</p>
<h2>A way out?</h2>
<p>Nearly all experts agree that there is no easy way to “solve” the North Korea problem. However, one plausible approach is to encourage South Korea and Japan to begin to develop nuclear weapons programs of their own, and to only discontinue these programs if China takes meaningful steps to use its trade with North Korea to reign in the regime. </p>
<p>Threatening to introduce new nuclear powers to the world is clearly risky, however stable and peaceful South Korea and Japan currently are. But China is highly averse to having these economic and political rivals acquire nuclear capabilities, as it would threaten China’s ongoing pursuit of regional control. In short, this is a sensitive pressure point that could be used to sway the Chinese leadership.</p>
<p>One way or another, China must become convinced that the costs of propping up the North Korean regime through trade are higher than the costs of an increased probability that the regime will collapse.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-china-could-use-trade-to-force-north-korea-to-play-nice-with-the-west-80609">an article</a> originally published on July 6, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84556/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Wright does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The latest salvo of insults and threats between President Trump and North Korea’s Kim brought the region a little bit closer to war. China, North Korea’s closest trading partner, may be the only way out.Greg Wright, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, MercedLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/818732017-08-02T01:09:06Z2017-08-02T01:09:06ZFacing the threat from North Korea: 5 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/180625/original/file-20170801-15290-hbgbnm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People watch news on missile launch in Pyongyang, North Korea.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Jon Chol Jin</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Editor’s note: The following is a roundup of archival stories related to North Korea.</em></p>
<p>North Korea has launched <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/northkorea-missiles-southkorea-idUSL3N1KJ4UL">repeated tests</a> of ballistic missiles, which it claims are now advanced enough to carry a nuclear warhead as far as the United States. Although experts have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/world/asia/north-korea-missile-test-video.html?_r=0">cast doubt</a> on the veracity of these claims, the international community has sounded the alarm. South Korea in particular is taking steps, with support from the U.S., to defend itself against the threat.</p>
<p>To better understand this intensifying conflict, we turned to stories in our archive.</p>
<h2>Basics</h2>
<p><strong>1.</strong> Especially for younger generations, the origins of this conflict are not always clear. We asked East Asia scholar <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/ji-young-lee-321792">Ji-Young Lee</a> of American University <a href="https://theconversation.com/4-things-to-know-about-north-and-south-korea-80583">to take us way back in this Q&A</a> and explain how Korea got divided into North and South in the first place. Along the way she unpacks some myths about the effect the North Korean regime has had on its people:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Still, not all North Koreans are interested in defecting. According to anthropologist Sandra Fahy, interviewees said they left the North reluctantly driven primarily by famine and economic reasons, rather than political reasons. A majority of them missed home in the North.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>2.</strong> By now, most people are familiar with the man at the helm in North Korea – Kim Jong Un. But his motives still mystify world leaders. Foreign policy expert <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/stephen-benedict-dyson-137046">Stephen Dyson</a> of the University of Connecticut writes a brief history of how the U.S. has sought insight into <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-makes-kim-jong-un-tick-77143">the minds of other strongmen – from Hitler to Khrushchev</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“History tells us that to influence Kim, we must empathize (note: not sympathize) with him. To figure out what makes him tick, Trump and his advisers must first understand how we look to the North Korean leader, peering at us from his very particular vantage point.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Options</h2>
<p><strong>3.</strong> What options are on the table for dealing with the threat from North Korea? A good first step would be increasing U.S. cooperation with Asian allies on security issues, writes <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/flynt-l-leverett-328790">Flynt Leverett</a>, a former National Security Council and State Department staffer and professor at Pennsylvania State University. But will Trump’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-and-the-dangers-of-trumps-diplomacy-free-asia-strategy-74494">focus on trade get in the way</a>?</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“For Trump and ‘inner circle’ advisers like Steve Bannon, the top concern is economic. Trump and his team see U.S. trade deficits, concentrated in Asia, as draining America’s wealth and threatening its national security…Overall, Trump’s Asia strategy is unlikely to boost Sino-U.S. cooperation on regional security.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>4.</strong> Another option that the international community has resorted to for years is imposing sanctions to limit the regime’s ability to develop nuclear weapons. But these sanctions have had, it seems, limited effect. <a href="https://theconversation.com/to-curb-north-koreas-nuclear-program-follow-the-money-65462">John Park</a> at Harvard University interviewed former North Korean business managers who bought components for the regime’s nuclear and missile programs. His findings suggest that <a href="https://theconversation.com/to-curb-north-koreas-nuclear-program-follow-the-money-65462">sanctions must be revisited</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“As sanctions have become tougher, these local Chinese middlemen have charged higher fees to reflect the elevated risk of doing business with North Korean clients. Instead of hindering procurement activities, we found that sanctions have actually helped to attract more capable middlemen, who are drawn by the larger payday.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>5.</strong> And after a cyberattack linked to North Korea penetrated the global banking system last year, analysts are urging U.S. leaders to <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-cyberspace-offensives-pose-challenge-in-us-china-relations-75803">take the online threat just as seriously</a>. As <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/frank-j-cilluffo-156337">Frank Cilluffo</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/sharon-l-cardash-156339">Sharon Cardash</a> from George Washington University write:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“North Korea keeps its military capabilities secret, and is particularly cautious about revealing its cyberwarfare capabilities. South Korea’s Defense Ministry estimates that North Korea’s ‘cyber army’ is 6,000 strong. That’s as big as the U.S. military’s Cyber Mission Force is planned to be.”</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81873/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Refresh your knowledge on the origins of North Korea’s nuclear threat and the options world leaders have to deal with it.Danielle Douez, Associate Editor, Politics + SocietyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/816422017-07-28T09:30:10Z2017-07-28T09:30:10ZJames Bond, North Korea and the shadow of intercontinental ballistic missiles<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179974/original/file-20170727-31972-13rwchl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Moonraker movie poster from 1979 created by Dan Gouzee.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.bondmovies.net/moonraker.html">United Artists/bondmovies.net</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fears over North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/07/21/north-korean-travel-ban-marks-return-to-cold-war-era-restrictions-on-u-s-citizens-abroad/?utm_term=.b96e88f07c30">mounting tensions</a> with America are a chilling reminder of the Cold War and an era that many assumed was in the past. </p>
<p>Yet these disturbing echoes continue to resonate – perhaps because the themes are so embedded in popular culture and, in this case, popular fiction. Even that very British hero James Bond has something to say to diplomats dealing with the worsening situation with Pyongyang.</p>
<p>July 27 marked the anniversary of the signing of the armistice that <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10165796">ended the Korean war</a> in 1953 – although the war between North and South has never officially ceased. Sixty-four years on the after effects continue with North Korea now <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-40502361">possessing an intercontinental ballistic missile</a> (ICBM). Desire for a missile that can deliver a nuclear warhead to far-away continents returns to the 1950s Cold War pursuit of a nuclear warhead that could travel faster than any bomber aircraft. America, Britain, China, France and the USSR all chased this goal, that combined space race and Nazi-era weapons technology.</p>
<p>The USSR won both, firing the <a href="http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/russia-tests-an-intercontinental-ballistic-missile">world’s first ICBM</a> in 1957 and getting the first human to space and back with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/from-the-archive-blog/2011/may/29/gagarin-first-space-travel-1961">Yuri Gagarin</a> in 1961. Joseph M Siracusa argues in <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B003E1BGL4/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1">his book</a>, that the nuclear missile seemed to offer immunity from nuclear attack as “no nuclear power may use military force against another nuclear power”. Other countries seeking the security of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17026538">Mutually Assured Destruction</a> (MAD) have followed, with the nuclear “club” since growing in size to an official, possibly inaccurate, number of <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/the-nine-countries-that-have-nuclear-weapons-a6798756.html">nine members</a>. </p>
<h2>Bond and the bomb</h2>
<p>That 1950s obsession with the long-range ballistic missile found its way into fiction. To be popular, spy fiction must reflect the fears of society and governments. During the Cold War, <a href="http://www.ianfleming.com/james-bond/">Ian Fleming’s James Bond</a> was there to examine those fears. Two years before the first ICBM was fired by the USSR, Fleming made Britain’s desire for such a weapon the centre of his 1955 Bond novel, <a href="http://www.ianfleming.com/products/moonraker/profile/">Moonraker</a>.</p>
<p>Fleming – who was once described by Sean Connery as a “<a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/2015/03/snobbery-with-violence/">tremendous snob</a>” – was also capable of bringing racism into his novels. In <a href="http://www.ianfleming.com/products/goldfinger/profile/">Goldfinger</a>, published six years after the messy end of the Korean war, Fleming, perhaps still smarting from a conflict that Britain and American <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1285708.stm">came out of quite badly</a>, has the eponymous villain tell Bond: “Koreans are the cruellest, most ruthless people in the world”. So, of course, Goldfinger employs a Korean by the name of Oddjob as his chief henchman. </p>
<p>Fleming was born in London, went to Eton and tried to find work in the diplomatic service after learning French, German and Russian before finally landing a job at Reuters news agency. He worked there for three years and honed his trademark sparse writing style. At the onset of World War II, Fleming joined the navy and with his talent for languages went into <a href="http://www.ianfleming.com/timeline/war-declared/">Naval intelligence</a>. Fleming credited that time with helping inform his Bond books.</p>
<h2>Cold War echoes</h2>
<p>The Cold War haunts Fleming’s novels. In 1955 Britain was less than a decade out of World War II and was now in the throes of a long and troubling stalemate with the USSR. The legacy of war was everywhere. Rationing had only just ended in 1954 and the meals, drink, drugs and lifestyle described in the Bond books were unimaginable to the majority of the public. This was a time of dreary poverty, National Service, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/spies_cambridge.shtml">the Cambridge spies</a> and high-profile defections to the USSR, such as <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/10790144/Kim-Philby-had-no-regrets-about-betraying-Britain-to-the-Soviet-Union-recordings-reveal.html">Kim Philby</a>. The war in Korea had ended only two years before. In 1954 the French were defeated in their Indochinese colony (Vietnam) by Ho Chi Minh’s nationalist army, setting the scene for America’s entry into the Vietnam War which lasted until 1975.</p>
<p>Moonraker was Fleming’s third novel featuring secret agent, Commander James Bond. In this book Hugo Drax – on the surface a millionaire war hero – promised to make Britain great again by creating an ICBM before any other country has one. Drax plans to use the kind of Nazi rocket technology that had sent the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20140905-the-nazis-space-age-rocket">V2 rocket</a> to bomb Britain during the war and would be the next big advance in nuclear warhead delivery. Drax publishes an open letter to the Queen promising that Britain will become a first-rate power with an ICBM and becomes a national hero as Britain will be ahead of the Americans and the Russians.</p>
<p>But Bond’s boss, M, who like Drax is a member of the <a href="http://www.007james.com/locations/blades.php">London club Blades</a>, does not trust Drax because he thinks he cheats at cards. Bond humbles the villain at a card game and quietly exposes him as a cheat. The pair meet again when Bond goes to Drax’s plant where the IBCM is being made. Our hero eventually discovers that Drax and his men are indeed Nazis, backed by the USSR, who plan to fire the ICBM at London. His evil plans are, of course, foiled by Bond.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/yfJ-UJ-Oz7E?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Not all fiction of the period ends with heroes saving the day. In Neville Shute’s atmospheric <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Beach-Nevil-Shute/dp/1520805209/ref=pd_lpo_sbs_14_img_0?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=9JKCZJX1EVDR438JATN3">On the Beach</a>, nuclear conflict occurs by accident and survivors go to Australia where the last humans will exist until the nuclear cloud reaches them. <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Nuclear-Weapons-Short-Introduction-Introductions-ebook/dp/B003E1BGL4/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=">Siracusa asserts</a> that the Cold War demonstrated “two ironclad, unwritten rules: first, no nuclear power may use military force against another nuclear power and, second, a nuclear power using military force against a non-nuclear nation, may not use nuclear weapons”. As more nations continue in the quest for nuclear bombs, we can only hope those rules still apply because Bond won’t be there to save the day.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81642/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Gardner works for Anglia Ruskin University. </span></em></p>The tensions between North Korea and the US over its long range ballistic missile programme echo a well-known James Bond plot.John Gardner, Professor of English Literature, Anglia Ruskin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/805832017-07-05T20:11:08Z2017-07-05T20:11:08Z4 things to know about North and South Korea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176959/original/file-20170705-21675-xudwrd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People watch news of missile test on a public TV screen in North Korea.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Jon Chol Jin</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Editor’s note: Professor Ji-Young Lee of American University answers four questions to help put issues related to North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities into context.</em></p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Why is there a North and a South Korea?</strong></p>
<p>Before there was a South and North Korea, the peninsula was ruled as a dynasty known as Chosŏn, which existed for more than five centuries, until 1910. This period, during which an independent Korea had diplomatic <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/chinas-hegemony/9780231179744">relations with China and Japan</a>, ended with imperial Japan’s annexation of the peninsula. Japan’s colonial rule lasted 35 years.</p>
<p>When Japan surrendered to the Allies in 1945, the Korean peninsula was split into two zones of occupation – the U.S.-controlled South Korea and the Soviet-controlled North Korea. Amid the growing Cold War tensions between Moscow and Washington, in 1948, two separate governments were established in Pyongyang and Seoul. Kim Il-Sung, leader of North Korea, was a former guerrilla <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-real-north-korea-9780199390038?cc=us&lang=en&">who fought under Chinese and Russian command</a>. <a href="http://www.uhpress.hawaii.edu/p-8995-9780824831684.aspx">Syngman Rhee</a>, a Princeton University-educated staunch anti-communist, became the first leader of South Korea.</p>
<p>In an attempt to unify the Korean peninsula under his communist regime, <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/5740.html">Kim Il-Sung invaded the South</a> in June 1950 with Soviet aid. This brought South Korea and the United States, backed by United Nations, to fight against the newly founded People’s Republic of China and North Korea. An armistice agreement ended hostilities in the Korean War in 1953. Technically speaking, however, the two Koreas are still at war.</p>
<p><strong>Beyond the political divide, are Koreans in the North and South all that culturally different? If so, how?</strong></p>
<p>Koreans in the South and North have led separate lives for almost 70 years. Korean history and a collective memory of having been a unified, independent state for over a millennium, however, are a powerful reminder to Koreans that they have shared identity, culture and language. </p>
<p>For example, in both Koreas the history of having resisted Japanese colonialism is an important source of nationalism. Both North and South Korean students learn about the <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-real-north-korea-9780199390038?cc=us&lang=en&">1919 March 1 Independence Movement</a> in school.</p>
<p>Consider, too, the Korean language. About 54 percent of North Korean defectors in South Korea say that they have <a href="http://www.nkrf.re.kr/nkrf/archive/archive_01/kolas/kolasView.do?key=70048046&kind=DAS&q2=">no major difficulty understanding</a> Korean used in South Korea. Only 1 percent responded that they cannot understand it at all. </p>
<p>However, the divergent politics of North and South Korea have shaped differences in Koreans’ outlook on life and the world since the split. South Korea’s vibrant democracy is a result of the mass movement of students, intellectuals and middle-class citizens. In <a href="http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0109.xml">North Korea</a>, the state propaganda and ideology of Juche, or “self-reliance,” were used to consolidate the Kim family’s one-man rule, while reproducing a certain mode of thinking designed to help the regime survive.</p>
<p><strong>What have we learned from North Korean defectors who settled in South Korea?</strong></p>
<p>As of September 2016, an estimated 29,830 North Korean defectors are <a href="http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=3892">living in South Korea.</a> From them, we’ve learned the details of people’s everyday life in one of the world’s most closed societies. For example, despite crackdowns, more North Koreans are now watching South Korean TV dramas. </p>
<p>In North Korea, repression, surveillance and punishment are pervasive features of social life. The state relies heavily on coercion and terror as a means of sustaining the regime.</p>
<p>Still, not all North Koreans are interested in defecting. According to <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/marching-through-suffering/9780231171342">anthropologist Sandra Fahy</a>, interviewees said they left the North reluctantly driven primarily by famine and economic reasons, rather than political reasons. A majority of them missed home in the North. </p>
<p>However, Thae Yong-ho, a former North Korean diplomat who defected to the South in 2016, believes that Kim Jong-un’s North Korea could face a popular uprising or elite defection as North Koreans have increasingly become <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QTvNBfdjuJI">disillusioned with the regime.</a></p>
<p><strong>What is the history of U.S. relations with South Korea, and where do they stand now?</strong></p>
<p>The purpose of the U.S.-South Korea alliance has changed little since its formation in 1953. This has much to do with continuing threats from North Korea. </p>
<p>However, despite differences in their approach to North Korea, President George W. Bush and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun took a major step toward transforming the Cold War alliance into a “<a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/07/joint-declaration-commemoration-60th-anniversary-alliance-between-republ">comprehensive strategic alliance</a>.” Under President Barack Obama and South Korean Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, many believed the U.S.-South Korea alliance was at its best. Under their leadership, Washington and Seoul agreed to expand the alliance’s scope to cover nontraditional threats, like terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other global challenges like piracy and epidemic disease, while coordinating and standing firm against North Korea’s provocations. </p>
<p>Now, with Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump as new presidents of South Korea and the United States, there is a greater degree of uncertainty. Among other things, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-we-may-terminate-us-south-korea-trade-agreement/2017/04/27/75ad1218-2bad-11e7-a616-d7c8a68c1a66_story.html?utm_term=.7220866a5910">Trump criticized</a> the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, while insisting Seoul pay for THAAD, a U.S. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/world/asia/trump-south-korea-thaad-missile-defense-north-korea.html?_r=0">missile defense system deployed in South Korea</a>. Moon, whose parents fled the North during the Korean War, is likely to put inter-Korean reconciliation as one of his top priorities. This may collide with the current U.S. approach of imposing sanctions against North Korea. </p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of an article originally published on <a href="https://theconversation.com/4-things-to-know-about-north-and-south-korea-77441">May 14, 2017</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80583/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ji-Young Lee received funding from the Academy of Korean Studies (Competitive Research Grant, 2013), for a book project on historical international order in Asia.</span></em></p>North and South Korea explained in four questions and answers.Ji-Young Lee, Assistant Professor, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/779082017-07-05T11:17:02Z2017-07-05T11:17:02ZHow Trump’s unpredictability changes the game on North Korea<p>Given that North Korea can already produce a nuclear weapon, it is vital to keep it from developing an intercontinental ballistic missile. On this measure, the rest of the world has so far failed – and that was made clearer than ever on July 4 2017, when Pyongyang claimed to have successfully tested an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/04/world/asia/north-korea-missile-test-icbm.html">intercontinental ballistic missile</a> for the first time. </p>
<p>If reports of the missile’s performance are accurate, Kim Jong-un may soon have the ability to hit US territory for the first time. Donald Trump previously <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/816057920223846400">said</a> this will never be allowed – and, sure enough, the US and South Korea responded to the test with a missile drill of their own in the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-40503558">Sea of Japan</a>. </p>
<p>Trump has been banging this drum on and off since his presidency began – albeit very inconsistently. Heralding the end of <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/obamas-strategic-patience-strategy-toward-north-korea-is-over-but-trump-could-make-the-region-safer-a7675161.html">Barack Obama’s policy</a> of “strategic patience”, he has ostensibly hardened the US’s stance on North Korea, saying that there is chance of a “major, major conflict” if the country does not curb its nuclear ambitions. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"880892632142143490"}"></div></p>
<p>In April 2017, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-north-korea-nuclear-latest-war-a7710521.html">pressed</a> to say whether another nuclear test would trigger military action from the US, Trump said “we’ll see”. But in the same interview, Trump has gone on the record saying he would be “honored” to meet the North Korean president, Kim Jong-un, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2017/apr/30/trump-kim-jong-un-is-a-pretty-smart-cookie-video">praising</a> his counterpart as a “pretty smart cookie” and apparently empathising with him, noting that it must have been “hard” for Kim to take the reins at such a young age. </p>
<p>Observers saw this as yet another sign of Trump’s <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/the-many-north-korea-policies-of-rex-w-tillerson/524736/">ineptitude and incoherence</a>. But looked at another way, his apparently garbled messages could have value as a sort of extreme carrot-and-stick methodology, simultaneously threatening devastating military action and offering the ultimate diplomatic prize of a meeting with the US president himself. </p>
<p>This approach has so far yielded mixed results. </p>
<h2>Oil and coal</h2>
<p>On the plus side, the US’s behaviour of late may in fact be helping pressure China to properly reconsider its policy towards the north. As it said in a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/russia-china-korea-missile-test-unacceptable-170704145934120.html">statement jointly issued with Russia</a> after the latest test, Beijing considers Pyongyang’s weapons development “unacceptable” and would like to see the two Koreas negotiate in the interests of peace and stability.</p>
<p>The importance of China’s role should not be underestimated. Despite its <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-pushes-back-trumps-north-korea-rhetoric-20245">protestations to the contrary</a>, it is the only country with any significant leverage over Pyongyang: if it stops <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-china-oil-idUSKBN17F17L">selling North Korea oil</a> and <a href="https://www.38north.org/2017/04/ysun040517/">buying its coal</a>, the North Korean economy would collapse. </p>
<p>This was previously thought of as a line China would never cross – but things could be changing. China has signalled that it is willing to consider slaying this sacred cow. In April 2017, in a <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1041998.shtml">Global Times editorial</a>, China issued an unprecedented public threat: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If the North makes another provocative move this month, the Chinese society will be willing to see the UNSC adopt severe restrictive measures that have never been seen before, such as restricting oil imports to the North.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>North Korea’s state media <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/north-korean-state-media-lashes-main-ally-china-170504041539856.html">responded</a> by chiding China, telling Beijing not to “test the limits of [North Korea’s] patience”, further adding that China had “better ponder over the grave consequences to be entailed by its reckless act of chopping down the pillar of [North Korean-Chinese] relations”. A Chinese riposte, again <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1045325.shtml">via the Global Times</a>, condemned North Korea’s statement as “hyper-aggressive” and “filled with nationalistic passion”. Pyongyang, it said, is “grappling with some form of irrational logic over its nuclear programme”. </p>
<p>The irony is surely not lost on China-watchers. As Beijing’s patience gets stretched to the limit, it may be forced to finally bring put some real pressure on its naughty neighbour.</p>
<h2>Tug of war</h2>
<p>Kim Jong-un and his progenitors have always relied on unpredictability as their main diplomatic and political tactic – but, with Trump in office, they no longer have a monopoly on quixotic behaviour. Mysteries about the administration’s North Korea policy abound. Did the US’s Carl Vinson aircraft carrier <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/world/asia/aircraft-carrier-north-korea-carl-vinson.html">sail to the Korean peninsula or not?</a> Why was the entire Senate <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-usa-senate-idUSKBN17Q1LR">called to the White House</a> in April for a North Korea briefing? Will Trump order surgical strikes on North Korea? And what do his latest tweets mean?</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"882061157900718081"}"></div></p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"882062572081512449"}"></div></p>
<p>It is par for the course for Kim Jong-un to broadcast war rhetoric because he has normalised it to such an extent that the international community expects it, but it’s quite another matter for the president of the US to follow suit. </p>
<p>Trump’s behaviour is ratcheting up the tension on a number of fronts. While the South Korea-Japan-US triangle is holding together, the early deployment of their joint <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-us-america-anti-missile-thaad-defense-system-south-north-korea-spying-donald-trump-military-a7713251.html">Terminal High Altitude Area Defence</a> (THAAD) missile system has provoked an outsize reaction from China. When the THAAD deployment began in earnest in early 2017, China responded by cracking down on <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-china-lotte-idUSKBN16D03U">Lotte Mart</a>, a South Korean discount retailer that agreed to furnish land for the placement of THAAD; many of its Chinese outlets were suddenly shut on vague pretexts. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, South Korea remains close to the US and Japan – the newly elected president, Moon Jae-in, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/south-korea-confident-north-peace-talk-moon-jae-in-meet-donald-trump-washington-a7819066.html">visited Trump in Washington</a> days before the July 4 test, where he sounded assured that Trump would not scotch his plans for some kind of diplomatic dialogue. </p>
<p>Trump also seems to have overestimated the personal rapport he built with Xi during their <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-39517569">meeting at Mar-a-Lago, Florida</a>, insisting that this translates into direct results with regards to reining in North Korea. For all the talk of oil and coal restrictions, the results they were meant to generate have not come to fruition. Xi, correspondingly, may have underestimated how much pressure he needs to apply on the Kim regime to <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/877234140483121152">keep Trump happy</a>.</p>
<p>With this latest missile breakthrough, Kim probably hoped to surprise the world yet again and continue bending it to his will. But he may have underestimated just how much Trump’s own penchant for the unexpected and contempt for losing has changed the calculus among the countries with a stake in stopping Pyongyang’s progress.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77908/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dylan M.H Loh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Intentionally or not, Trump’s approach to North Korea makes more sense than many people think.Dylan M.H Loh, Graduate Research Fellow and PhD Candidate, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/731152017-02-16T04:40:15Z2017-02-16T04:40:15ZNorth Korea may not yet have a long-range missile, but its progress is worrying<p>North Korea said this week it had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/12/north-korea-shoots-missile-500km-in-show-of-force-to-trump-says-south">successfully test-fired</a> a new type of medium- to long-range ballistic missile. The test came more than a month after North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un <a href="http://www.ncnk.org/resources/news-items/kim-jong-uns-speeches-and-public-statements-1/kim-jong-uns-2017-new-years-address">stated</a> in 2016:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We conducted the first H-bomb test, test-firing of various means of strike and nuclear warhead test successfully to cope with the imperialists’ nuclear war threats… briskly developed state-of-the-art military hardware, and entered the final stage of preparation for the test launch of intercontinental ballistic missile.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>What Kim Jong Un means by “intercontinental” is anyone’s guess. Presumably “inter” means some other continent than the Eurasian continent, assuming such a missile is fired from land in North Korea.</p>
<p>Not long after, a US Pacific Command <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defense-northkorea-idUSKBN14V2TT">announcement</a> led specialists to suspect North Korea might be planning to fire a long-range missile over the top of first Japan and then Hawaii. This was viewed as barely credible, however, because to date, North Korea has not demonstrated anything resembling a long-range missile capability.</p>
<p>So was the missile tested by North Korea on <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-nk-idUSKBN15R10O">12 February</a> intercontinental? Was it a new missile? And is it something to worry about?</p>
<h2>Was it an ICBM?</h2>
<p>An intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) travels at least 5100 km away from its firing point. It has two or more stages that fire separately, and carries one or more re-entry vehicles containing nuclear warheads that plunge back to earth at about 8 to 10 km per second.</p>
<p>The Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty between the former Soviet Union, now Russia, and the United States defined “intermediate” as a missile with a range between 1,000 and 5500 km. This means anything with a greater range than 5500 km is considered by convention to be “long range.”</p>
<p>To reach parts of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, the nearest continent to North Korea, a North Korean missile must fly between 4900 (Aleutians) to 5100 (Alaska) km. That is, it could do so in less than 5500 km, so Kim wasn’t setting the bar very high with his January statement. Most US and Russian ICBMs can hit targets more than 10,000 km away. </p>
<p>The most recent test was launched from a land-based mobile transporter with an arm that raises the missile to the firing angle (“erector” - no kidding). This missile used solid propellant. Most North Korean missile firings in this range were liquid fuelled, which takes many hours to prepare. </p>
<p>North Korea <a href="http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2017-02-13-0001">said the missile was new</a>, naming it the Pukguksong-2. But it appears identical to the KN-11 submarine-launched missile (Pukguksong-1) tested twice to date. The Pukguksong-2 seems to have taken the solid propellant developed for the submarine launch and applied it to a land-fired version of the same missile. </p>
<p>The missile was launched more or less vertically from far northwestern North Korea and splashed down in coastal waters east of the country in the East Sea of Korea (Sea of Japan). </p>
<p>Fired in anger, and fully developed, this missile could have a <a href="http://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/north-koreas-february-missile-launch">range of roughly 1000 to 1200 km</a> when carrying a nuclear warhead and fired with a normal rather than a near vertical trajectory. This is far short of a Kim’s January promise of an “intercontinental” missile range. </p>
<p>But it is far enough to hit Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia – as well as anything on the oceans surrounding South Korea, such as an aircraft carrier.</p>
<h2>Why is it alarming?</h2>
<p>Missile powers like the United States conduct scores of development tests before they actually field the missile as part of their operational nuclear forces. One test does not mean such a force can be fielded with confidence or that it is reliable. </p>
<p>The missile did not blow up on the ground or in the air, however, as with many past North Korean missile tests. So they are learning by doing. </p>
<p>It’s important to note that the successful application of the KN-11 propellant in a land-based missile would enable North Korea to field a far more credible and operational mobile land-based missile force. This could move around and hide in caves, then “pop-up” to fire when ordered. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/y4LNpHYvonQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The missile seems identical to one tested twice before.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The second important implication of this test is that the submarine version is also likely to be tested again soon. When that is fielded, it will be able to deploy missiles aboard submarines in the West Sea of Korea, known to most people as the Yellow Sea. </p>
<p>This part of the ocean is shallow and very difficult to track submarines due to its poor and confused acoustics. American anti-ballistic missile and radar system called THAAD is to be deployed soon in South Korea. But these are not capable of tracking missiles coming from many angles offshore, which means Kim Jong Un will have simply gone around the THAAD if he ends up deploying missiles in the Yellow Sea.</p>
<h2>What now?</h2>
<p>How long will it take for North Korea to develop medium-range, land-based and submarine-based, solid-propellant missiles that can hit anywhere in South Korea – or aircraft carrier battle groups sailing offshore? Nobody knows for sure, but a reasonable guess is three to five years, or longer. An operating ICBM would take much longer.</p>
<p>Naturally the medium-range missile prospect worries anyone in range – Japan, Russia, China, and above all, South Korea. South Koreans take solace any attack on them would lead to the annihilation of Kim’s regime by the US and the South Korean military. But they also worry it could suffer an existential blow in the course of retaliating for a North Korean strike or being caught in the crossfire of an inadvertent nuclear war. </p>
<p>Three days before the North Korean test, the United States <a href="http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/02/09/air-force-test-launches-minuteman-missile-from-california/">fired a Minuteman 3 missile</a> from Vandenberg California to Kwajalein Atoll in the Western Pacific, 6700 km away. This was the same type of test the US <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/us-missile-test-north-korea-089700">delayed in April 2013</a> because it might have been misinterpreted by North Korea as an attack.</p>
<p>Two days after the North Korean test, the US fired a <a href="http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2017/02/14/bright-object-seen-across-bay-area-sky/">US Trident missile test</a> from a submarine offshore Vandenberg to the same test site.</p>
<p>It’s not likely Kim’s February 12 test was a response to the fear one of these tests was a sneak attack on him. More likely, Kim’s test was timed to coincide with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/13/mar-a-lago-north-korea-missile-crisis-trump-national-security">Trump-Abe meeting</a>. </p>
<p>But unlike the North Korean missiles that have been declared illegal by the UN Security Council, there’s nothing illegal about American missile tests. They are intended to reinforce American nuclear threats to its adversaries, including North Korea. </p>
<p>Achieving consistency as to whom can threaten whom with nuclear annihilation is apparently a hobgoblin in the minds of small powers. Readers can make up their own minds.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73115/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Hayes receives funding from Ploughshares Fund, MacArthur Foundation and many others (listed at <a href="http://www.nautilus.org">www.nautilus.org</a>) </span></em></p>Although North Korea’s recent missile test is unlikely to have been an ICBM, they are likely to have a medium range missile that could hit South Korea in a few years.Peter Hayes, Director, Nautilus Institute, Professor of International Relations and Honorary Professor at the Centre for International Security Studies, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/408972015-05-27T04:27:12Z2015-05-27T04:27:12ZAustralia can have ballistic missile defence – doesn’t mean we should<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82906/original/image-20150526-24745-17qkh4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Should Australia seek a ballistic missile defence capability, like that of the United States?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">US Department of Defense</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One capability that could yet again be <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2013/December/Ballistic_missile_defence_and_Australia">contemplated</a> in the lead-up to Australia’s next <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/">defence white paper</a>, and the planned 10-year defence capability plan that will follow, is <a href="http://www.mda.mil/system/system.html">ballistic missile defence</a>. </p>
<p>It would not be difficult for Australia to acquire ballistic missile defence. It is currently manufacturing three Hobart-class destroyers – the first of which has <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-23/crowds-gather-for-launch-of-air-warfare-destroyer-hmas-hobart/6491948">just been launched</a> and is scheduled to be <a href="http://www.ausawd.com/library/AWD%20Big%20Picture_0.pdf">operational in 2016</a>. </p>
<p>These vessels will be equipped with the <a href="http://www.ausawd.com/content.aspx?p=63">Aegis combat system</a>, which can be retroactively upgraded to incorporate ballistic missile defence capabilities. So, should Australia seek ballistic missile defence? What are the costs and benefits involved?</p>
<h2>Arguments for acquisition</h2>
<p>One of the arguments for Australia to acquire ballistic missile defence is to protect against a possible attack from North Korea. While the North Korean nuclear program is concerning, and it does – in theory – possess ballistic missiles capable of reaching Australian territory, the Aegis system is incapable of providing the defence required. </p>
<p>The only missiles capable of <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/ballistic-missile-defence-how-soon,-how-significant,-and-what-should-australias-policy-be/SI71_BMD.pdf">reaching Australia</a> are those with intercontinental range, which reach altitudes of more than 1000km, and re-enter the atmosphere at hypersonic speeds. This is well beyond the reach of Aegis. </p>
<p>Another argument for Australian ballistic missile defence is the protection of its forces and allies in the region. This is the exact role the Aegis system was designed for. In this scenario, the central consideration is not whether Australia would directly benefit from ballistic missile defence, but instead if other countries would – and how much they would value this contribution. </p>
<p>However, Australia can only offer a limited numbers of vessels. This means that the acquisition of additional ballistic missile defence capabilities amounts to little more than tokenism. And given the lack of vessels, and the need for them to also fulfil the air defence role they were initially conceived for, they would be able to provide defence against only the most limited of ballistic missile attacks. </p>
<p>This weakness is even more acute when it is considered that the ballistic missile defence interceptors are unable to be <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/ballistic-missile-defence-how-soon,-how-significant,-and-what-should-australias-policy-be/SI71_BMD.pdf">reloaded at sea</a>. Vessels are required to return to port to reload.</p>
<h2>Costs of acquisition</h2>
<p>There are significant costs for Australia if it chooses to equip the Hobart class with ballistic missile defence. </p>
<p>The first cost is financial. The unit cost of an SM-6, the most advanced air defence missile currently produced, is approximately <a href="https://www.bga-aeroweb.com/Defense/Standard-Missile.html">US$3 million per missile</a>. However, the SM-3 interceptor required for ballistic missile defence would cost an estimated <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2013/December/Ballistic_missile_defence_and_Australia">US$20-$24 million per missile</a> for the most recent model.</p>
<p>The system would need to be thoroughly tested before becoming operational. This is an expensive proposition – a single test of the Aegis system conducted by the US in 2012 cost approximately <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2013/December/Ballistic_missile_defence_and_Australia">US$112 million</a>.</p>
<p>The other cost that must be accounted for is the decrease in air defence capability offered by the Hobart class if equipped with ballistic missile defence. The payload of air defence missiles will have to be decreased to account for the ballistic missile defence interceptors. The adequacy of the Hobart class to carry out its original mission will be somewhat compromised, while providing no meaningful benefit to Australia’s security in return.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79892/original/image-20150430-6263-lz7yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79892/original/image-20150430-6263-lz7yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79892/original/image-20150430-6263-lz7yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79892/original/image-20150430-6263-lz7yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79892/original/image-20150430-6263-lz7yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79892/original/image-20150430-6263-lz7yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79892/original/image-20150430-6263-lz7yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Spanish F100 Destroyer will be the basis for the Hobart Class.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Horatio J. Kookaburra/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Strategic implications</h2>
<p>There are also the strategic implications to consider in addition to the costs. The most acute implication for Australia is how acquiring ballistic missile defence will affect its relationship with China. </p>
<p>One of the advantages of Australian ballistic missile defence is the increased capability Australia can offer the US. But China will undoubtedly view this as a negative development. </p>
<p>China is already wary of encirclement as a result of the US <a href="http://harvardkennedyschoolreview.com/rebalance-to-the-asia-pacific/">rebalance to the region</a>, and is also concerned about US ballistic missile defence capabilities – particularly Aegis. An Australian capability may well increase China’s concerns, or indicate that Australia is “choosing” between its relationship with China and its relationship with the US.</p>
<p>The other strategic implication that must be considered is the reduction in the effectiveness of China’s nuclear deterrence due to the proliferation of missile defences in the region. This is made more acute when it is considered that China heavily relies on short-range theatre ballistic missiles for the delivery of nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>In order to maintain the relevance of its deterrent, China may adopt a more aggressive nuclear policy or drastically increase the size of its nuclear arsenal to overwhelm missile defences – or both. This would increase the security threat in the Asia-Pacific. It may pressure other states that feel threatened by an increased Chinese nuclear arsenal to contemplate nuclear weapons of their own. </p>
<p>Alternately, it may push them to further invest in ballistic missile defence. This could lead to a constant cycle of security competition within the region.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the argument for Australia to acquire ballistic missile defence does not stack up. Not only will the financial costs drain money away from other programs that may provide the defence force with greater capabilities, it will also decrease the intended capabilities of the Hobart class, while offering little benefit in return.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40897/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Dwyer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ultimately, the argument for Australia to acquire ballistic missile defence does not stack up.James Dwyer, PhD Candidate, Politics and International Relations Program, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/416672015-05-18T04:22:43Z2015-05-18T04:22:43ZNorth Korea’s submarine missile firing raises the nuclear stakes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81960/original/image-20150518-25437-qlb52j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A submarine missile-launching capacity brings the threat closer to the shores of the target country.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ooocha/3070084856/in/photolist-5FhZdE-5FdGcp-5FhZgw-5FdGfF-ra2PS7-rqCqQB-9vfmoc-9rCGpF-ovXapg-owvWmB-otBaMj-oe9zcG-raS453-raS3Tm-rpgRnG-rqHCxK-rqQsw2-r8X5jC-rqEcp4-r8Lf14-r8d6PP-rnkYxw-qsDnpq-rnT6o3-r8fmWs-qtx1yo-rpYz4r-qvwZ4r">Flickr/Marion Doss</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>North Korea’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/11/update-1-south-korea-expresses-concern-over-norths-submarine-missile-test-0">recent test</a> of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) marks a dangerous turning point for its nuclear program. An SLBM capability will give North Korea an almost invulnerable <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_strike">second-strike capability</a>, which will limit the options for the United States and allies such as South Korea and Japan to manage North Korean threats. This may then embolden North Korea to undertake more aggressive behaviour, demonstrating the seriousness of this development.</p>
<h2>The test: success or failure?</h2>
<p>This latest test reveals that North Korea has developed a preliminary capability of performing submerged launches of missiles. <a href="http://www.koreatimesus.com/pentagon-denounces-n-k-s-submarine-missile-test-as-blatant-violation-of-u-n-resolutions/">According to South Korean officials</a>, the missile flew only about 150 metres from the point of launch. This has led some to speculate that the test resulted in failure. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, this conclusion reflects a dangerous misunderstanding of the test and of North Korea’s intentions regarding its nuclear deterrent. This misunderstanding is a result of the assumption that this was a flight test of the missile. The purpose of a flight test is to determine whether a missile is capable of reaching its design objectives of speed, altitude, range, payload etc. </p>
<p>However, this was most likely not the purpose of this test. Rather, North Korea was almost certainly conducting an ejection test of the missile. This sort of test enables any issues to be thoroughly ironed out before conducting a proper flight test.</p>
<p>SLBMs are ideally fired while the submarine is submerged, to avoid detection pre-launch. To accomplish this, the missile must first be ejected from the submarine, before the rocket motor ignites (which would destroy the submarine if this occurred while the missile was still inside). </p>
<p>The purpose of an ejection test is to determine whether the ejection system and the rocket motors are sufficient to launch a missile from underneath the ocean surface. This latest test achieved this objective. Thus, the missile flying only around 150 metres is irrelevant.</p>
<p>Of course, this does not indicate that North Korea is ready to deploy SLBMs operationally. What is does does reveal is that its missile program is <a href="http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/05/11/North-Koreas-sub-launched-missiles-This-wont-end-well.aspx">perhaps developing more rapidly</a> than previously thought.</p>
<h2>Why SLBMs alter the nature of the threat</h2>
<p>This test is the latest indication that North Korea is not content with a crude and limited nuclear arsenal. Rather, it is seeking to become a legitimate nuclear power, <a href="http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/05/10/if-the-chinese-are-anxious-about-north-korean-nukes/">with a large, functional and survivable nuclear arsenal covering a range of uses</a>, from front-line battlefield use to strategic deterrence. Given North Korea’s belligerent and often dangerous behaviour, this is a concerning development.</p>
<p>An SLBM capability raises the stakes in regard to the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program, not only to states in the region such as Japan and South Korea, but also to the US. Indeed, even <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-warns-north-korean-nuclear-threat-is-rising-1429745706">China is growing concerned</a> about the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81959/original/image-20150518-25400-ckbwsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81959/original/image-20150518-25400-ckbwsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81959/original/image-20150518-25400-ckbwsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=904&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81959/original/image-20150518-25400-ckbwsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=904&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81959/original/image-20150518-25400-ckbwsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=904&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81959/original/image-20150518-25400-ckbwsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1136&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81959/original/image-20150518-25400-ckbwsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1136&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81959/original/image-20150518-25400-ckbwsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1136&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Submarine-launched missiles are particularly dangerous because of the difficulty in detecting them until they are fired.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/compacflt/5507069274/in/photolist-9oDaQf-6LuV2X-5FhZgw-5mLv6e-5FhZuL-5FdGcp-9NANWq-8kT1rP-8kT1mk-8kT1pe-5FhZdE-5mQJFU-aDXAzA-eCWsjQ-5mQJuo-5mQKoG-5mQHKN-5mLtUR-qHvva2-5FdGzK-5mLu8x-4PQK61-6ijtC3-5FfRyG-smP96d-8kpbVJ-6iKv1J-6iFjAt-a54zXw-6iFke6-7zPKZL-6iFjUa-5FdGfF-5FbyHx-6iKByY-6iKAbb-6iFqfH-6iKwcL-6iKEu1-5mQJby-5mQJrG-6iKADC-6iKvZY-6iKA47-6iKCZ9-6iFnr8-6iFkrx-6iKyHs-6iFptV-6iFsdi">Flickr/US Pacific Fleet</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The reason that North Korean SLBMs would be particularly dangerous is that they are nearly invulnerable to pre-emptive strikes. That is the entire point of North Korea seeking such a capability. While North Korea’s submarines are inferior to modern Western designs, making them <a href="http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/05/12/North-Korea-missile-test-Seoul-must-now-focus-on-sub-hunting.aspx">relatively easy to detect and track</a>, even a single submarine that manages to escape detection would pose a significant threat. </p>
<p>The dangers are further enhanced when it is considered that North Korean subs may be able to approach close to the coastline of a target country before launching their missiles. This would drastically reduce the warning time for missile defences to detect and engage the incoming missiles.</p>
<p>Furthermore, unlike North Korea’s current and rather crude land-based missiles, it would be almost impossible to detect pre-launch preparations. The first warning of an impending North Korean ballistic missile attack originating from a submarine would be when radar detects the missile in the air.</p>
<h2>How might the US and its allies respond?</h2>
<p>The increased threat posed by the above scenario will only serve to harden the resolve of the US and its allies. This may well increase the chances of US-led pre-emption, before this option becomes unviable. If the North does manage to deploy nuclear-armed SLBMs, the value of the pre-emptive strike option is substantially diminished, as North Korea would possess the means to launch a guaranteed nuclear retaliation in response to any hostile action against it.</p>
<p>Additionally, the possibility of enhanced North Korean aggression if it feels more comfortable that at least some of its warheads are secure from pre-emptive strikes may push South Korea to adopt US-designed missile defence systems. Seoul is <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/18/world/asia/south-korea-tells-china-not-to-meddle-in-decision-over-missile-system.html?ref=topics">considering the purchase</a> of terminal high-altitude area defence (THAAD) systems. The pressure created by increased North Korean capabilities may lead South Korea to conclude that it needs to deploy these systems. </p>
<p>If this occurs, it may well lead to an offensive and defensive arms race on the Korean peninsula, with North and South Korea vying to gain an advantage. This would only succeed in decreasing security and increasing the likelihood of conflict on the peninsula. That is a deeply worrying thought when one of the actors is a nuclear-armed state with a history of belligerent behaviour.</p>
<p>This test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile was not a failure, but an indication that the North Korean nuclear program is rapidly advancing. If North Korea manages to successfully field SLBMs, then it will possess a virtually invulnerable second-strike capability, decreasing the ability of the US and its allies to engage successfully in pre-emptive strikes should the need arise. </p>
<p>Given this, the US and South Korea may well be encouraged to pre-emptively attack North Korea’s nuclear and strategic assets before this option becomes unavailable. The hardening of US resolve may well backfire for North Korea, which may ironically decrease its security through attempting to increase the credibility of its deterrent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41667/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Dwyer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>North Korea does not yet have the capacity to launch a nuclear missile from a submarine. Its recent test, however, suggests it is making progress to a game-changing second-strike capability.James Dwyer, PhD Candidate, Politics and International Relations Program, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.