tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/burkina-faso-13315/articlesBurkina Faso – The Conversation2024-03-15T13:28:50Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259122024-03-15T13:28:50Z2024-03-15T13:28:50ZUndersea cables for Africa’s internet retrace history and leave digital gaps as they connect continents<p><em>Large parts of west and central Africa, as well as some countries in the south of the continent, were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/mar/14/much-of-west-and-central-africa-without-internet-after-undersea-cable-failures">left without internet services</a> on 14 March because of failures on four of the fibre optic cables that run below the world’s oceans. Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Ghana, Burkina Faso and South Africa were among the worst affected. By midday on 15 March the problem had not been resolved. Microsoft <a href="https://mybroadband.co.za/news/internet/528961-massive-undersea-cable-outage-fix-delayed-says-microsoft.html">warned its customers</a> that there was a delay in repairing the cables. South Africa’s News24 <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/nine-undersea-cables-make-the-internet-work-in-sa-four-are-currently-damaged-20240315">reported</a> that, while the cause of the damage had not been confirmed, it was believed that “the cables snapped in shallow waters near the Ivory Coast, where fishing vessels are likely to operate”.</em></p>
<p><em>Jess Auerbach Jahajeeah, an associate professor at the University of Cape Town’s Graduate School of Business, is currently writing a book on fibre optic cables and digital connectivity. She spent time in late 2023 aboard the ship whose crew is responsible for maintaining most of Africa’s undersea network. She spoke to The Conversation Africa about the importance of these cables.</em></p>
<h2>1. What’s the geographical extent of Africa’s current undersea network?</h2>
<p>Fibre optic cables now literally encircle Africa, though some parts of the continent are far better connected than others. This is because both public and private organisations have made major investments in the past ten years. </p>
<p>Based on <a href="https://www.submarinecablemap.com/">an interactive map</a> of fibre optic cables, it’s clear that South Africa is in a relatively good position. When the breakages happened, the network was affected for a few hours before the internet traffic was rerouted; a technical process that depends both on there being alternative routes available and corporate agreements in place to enable the rerouting. It’s the same as driving using a tool like Google Maps. If there’s an accident on the road it finds another way to get you to your destination. </p>
<p>But, in several African countries – including Sierra Leone and Liberia – most of the cables don’t have spurs (the equivalent of off-ramps on the road), so only one fibre optic cable actually comes into the country. Internet traffic from these countries basically <a href="https://blog.cloudflare.com/undersea-cable-failures-cause-internet-disruptions-across-africa-march-14-2024">stops when the cable breaks</a>. </p>
<p>Naturally that has huge implications for every aspect of life, business and even politics. Whilst some communication can be rerouted via satellites, satellite traffic accounts for <a href="https://blog.telegeography.com/2023-mythbusting-part-3">only about 1% of digital transmissions globally</a>. Even with interventions such as satellite-internet distribution service <a href="https://www.starlink.com/">Starlink</a> it’s still much slower and much more expensive than the connection provided by undersea cables. </p>
<p>Basically all internet for regular people relies on fibre optic cables. Even landlocked countries rely on the network, because they have agreements with countries with landing stations – highly-secured buildings close to the ocean where the cable comes up from underground and is plugged into terrestrial systems. For example southern Africa’s internet comes largely through connections in Melkbosstrand, just outside Cape Town, and <a href="https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/stations/africa/south-africa/mtunzini-cls">Mtunzini</a> in northern KwaZulu-Natal, both in South Africa. Then it’s routed overland to various neighbours. </p>
<p>Each fibre optic cable is extremely expensive to build and to maintain. Depending on the technical specifications (cables can have more or fewer fibre threads and enable different speeds for digital traffic) there are complex legal agreements in place for who is responsible for which aspects of maintenance.</p>
<h2>2. What prompted you to write a book about the social history of fibre optic cables in Africa?</h2>
<p>I first visited Angola in 2011 to start work for <a href="https://utorontopress.com/9781487524333/from-water-to-wine/">my PhD project</a>. The internet was all but non-existent – sending an email took several minutes at the time. Then I went back in 2013, after the <a href="https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/systems/brazil-africa/sacs">South Atlantic Cable System</a> went into operation. It made an incredible difference: suddenly Angola’s digital ecosystem was up and running and everybody was online. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-our-wi-fi-world-the-internet-still-depends-on-undersea-cables-49936">In our Wi-Fi world, the internet still depends on undersea cables</a>
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<p>At the time I was working on social mobility and how people in Angola were improving their lives after <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/angolan-civil-war-1975-2002-brief-history">a long war</a>. Unsurprisingly, having digital access made all sorts of things possible that simply weren’t imaginable before. I picked up my interest again once I was professionally established, and am now writing it up as a book, <a href="https://stias.ac.za/2022/03/when-a-cable-is-not-just-a-cable-fellows-seminar-by-jess-auerbach/">Capricious Connections</a>. The title refers to the fact that the cables wouldn’t do anything if it wasn’t for the infrastructure that they plug into at various points. </p>
<p>Landing centres such as Sangano in Angola are fascinating both because of what they do technically (connecting and routing internet traffic all over the country) and because they often highlight the complexities of <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad582-digital-divide-who-in-africa-is-connected-and-who-is-not/">the digital divide</a>. </p>
<p>For example, Sangano is a remarkable high tech facility run by an incredibly competent and socially engaged company, Angola Cables. Yet the school a few hundred metres from the landing station still doesn’t have electricity. </p>
<p>When we think about the digital divide in Africa, that’s often <a href="https://www.bmz-digital.global/en/datacolonialism-double-interview/">still the reality</a>: you can bring internet everywhere but if there’s no infrastructure, skills or frameworks to make it accessible, it can remain something abstract even for those who live right beside it.</p>
<p>In terms of history, fibre optic cables follow all sorts of fascinating global precedents. The 2012 cable that connected one side of the Atlantic Ocean to the other is laid almost exactly <a href="https://www.slavevoyages.org/blog/volume-and-direction-trans-atlantic-slave-trade">over the route of the transatlantic slave trade</a>, for example. Much of the basic cable map is layered over the routes of the <a href="https://notevenpast.org/to-rule-the-waves-britains-cable-empire-and-the-birth-of-global-communications/">copper telegraph network</a> that was essential for the British empire in the 1800s.</p>
<p>Most of Africa’s cables are maintained at sea by the remarkable crew of the ship Léon Thévenin. I <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2023-11-27-down-to-the-wire-the-ship-fixing-our-internet/">joined them</a> in late 2023 during a repair operation off the coast of Ghana. These are uniquely skilled artisans and technicians who retrieve and repair cables, sometimes from depths of multiple kilometres under the ocean. </p>
<p>When I spent time with the crew last year, they recounted once accidentally retrieving a section of Victorian-era cable when they were trying to “catch” a much more recent fibre optic line. (Cables are retrieved in many ways; one way is with a grapnel-like hook that is dragged along the ocean bed in roughly the right location until it snags the cable.)</p>
<p>There are some very interesting questions emerging now about what is commonly called <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/D/bo216184200.html?trk=public_post_comment-text">digital colonialism</a>. In an environment where data is often referred to with terms like “<a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/nishatalagala/2022/03/02/data-as-the-new-oil-is-not-enough-four-principles-for-avoiding-data-fires/?sh=23be1821c208">the new oil</a>”, we’re seeing an important change in digital infrastructure. </p>
<p>Previously cables were usually financed by a combination of public and private sector partnerships, but now big private companies such as Alphabet, Meta and Huawei are increasingly financing cable infrastructure. That has serious implications for control and monitoring of digital infrastructure. </p>
<p>Given we all depend so much on digital tools, poorer countries often have little choice but to accept the terms and conditions of wealthy corporate entities. That’s potentially incredibly dangerous for African digital sovereignty, and is something we should be seeing a lot more public conversation about.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225912/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jess Auerbach Jahajeeah receives funding from the Stellenbosch Institute of Advanced Study where she is an Iso Lomso Fellow, the National Research Foundation of South Africa and the UCT Vice Chancellor’s Future Leaders Program. </span></em></p>Fibre optic cables now literally encircle Africa, though some parts of the continent are far better connected than others.Jess Auerbach Jahajeeah, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Business, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2255172024-03-14T13:15:14Z2024-03-14T13:15:14ZBurkina Faso, Mali and Niger hint at a new west African currency: what it’ll take for it to succeed<p><em>On 11 February 2024, the head of Niger’s ruling military junta, General Abdourahmane Tiani, spoke of the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20240213-niger-hints-at-new-currency-in-step-out-of-colonialisation">possible creation of a common currency</a> with Burkina Faso and Mali. “The currency is a first step toward breaking free from the legacy of colonisation,” he said on national TV, referring to the CFA franc inherited from French colonisation.</em></p>
<p><em>Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, three former French colonies, have experienced military coups in recent years. They’re now all ruled by military regimes. They also formed a new defence alliance, known as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">Alliance of Sahel States</a> (AES).</em> </p>
<p><em>The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20240226-la-lev%C3%A9e-des-sanctions-contre-le-niger-un-net-changement-de-braquet-pour-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao">has condemned</a> these coups and imposed sanctions on the countries involved. In response, these countries decided to withdraw from Ecowas. However, they remain members of the <a href="https://www.umoatitres.org/en/commission-de-luemoa/">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a> (Uemoa). Uemoa has a common currency, the CFA franc, which is issued by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO).</em></p>
<p><em>The BCEAO and the Banque de France are bound by <a href="https://www.banque-france.fr/fr/banque-de-france/partenariats-afrique-france">cooperation agreements</a> that include the deposit of a portion of foreign exchange reserves at the Banque de France and France guaranteeing the CFA franc.</em></p>
<p><em>Thierno Thioune, an expert on <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352717047_Interdependance_entre_Politique_monetaire_et_politique_budgetaire_au_niveau_de_l4UEMOA?_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InByb2ZpbGUiLCJwYWdlIjoicHJvZmlsZSJ9fQ">monetary policies and unions between west African states</a>, analyses the potential implications and feasibility of launching a new currency for the AES member countries.</em></p>
<h2>What conditions must be met for a multilateral currency to work?</h2>
<p>To successfully launch and maintain a multilateral currency, several key factors must be considered.</p>
<p>First, macroeconomic and budgetary policies must be closely coordinated. Rigorous harmonisation of economic and budgetary policies between participating countries is imperative to guarantee the stability of the currency’s value and prevent trade imbalances. This will help maintain the confidence of economic players and promote regional growth.</p>
<p>Second, robust monetary management institutions must be established. Strong institutions responsible for currency management, like a common central bank, are essential. This central bank must have adequate authority to implement an independent and stable monetary policy. This will ensure the preservation of the currency’s value and address cyclical fluctuations. </p>
<p>Third, creating an integrated common market is vital. The unrestricted flow of goods, services, capital and labour is key to driving economic growth and enhancing regional cooperation. The current framework provided by the West African Economic and Monetary Union offers a significant advantage in this regard.</p>
<p>Finally, mechanisms to monitor and resolve crises need to be established. For instance, common reserve funds and <a href="https://www.abc-forex.net/contenu/swap-de-change/swap-devises.php">currency swap arrangements</a> could help address external and internal shocks that may affect the new currency. Currency swaps – when two parties exchange amounts in two different currencies for a certain period at a fixed rate – can be used to manage exchange rate risks and facilitate cross-border financing. </p>
<h2>Are these conditions met in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali?</h2>
<p>It’s difficult to say whether these conditions have been fully met in the three countries. It would mean having a firm understanding of whether these, among other, conditions have been met: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>harmonisation of government policies</p></li>
<li><p>macroeconomic stability through inflation control</p></li>
<li><p>limit on public debt</p></li>
<li><p>maintenance of a balanced current account.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>At this time, it’s hard to say whether these countries have done this. </p>
<h2>Does their monetary union membership make any difference?</h2>
<p>These three countries have been part of the West African Economic and Monetary Union since 1963. In theory, this should give them some experience in coordinating economic and monetary policies through the CFA franc. </p>
<p>They could have experience with infrastructure, like the Central Bank of West African States (which manages the single currency and monetary policy for member states), that would help them with the transition.</p>
<h2>What are the potential gains and risks of the initiative?</h2>
<p>Despite the risks involved, the initiative could bring several benefits. </p>
<p>Establishing a larger monetary zone can foster greater trade integration and improved resource allocation. </p>
<p>It could enhance the country’s “flexibility” in dealing with external partners. </p>
<p>By joining a new monetary union, these three countries could also benefit significantly from increased trade integration, independence from external partners, lower transaction costs and investor attractiveness. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, this initiative also entails risks, particularly with regard to their position within the West African Economic and Monetary Union and Ecowas. The latter could perceive the creation of a new currency as a threat to their regional influence. It could cause the fragmentation of existing economic blocs. In addition, the departure of the three countries could weaken the solidity of the West African Economic and Monetary Union and Ecowas in terms of economic and political influence. </p>
<p>There are also risks that the currency could quickly lose value. </p>
<p>The new currency could depreciate against the CFA franc. This could have substantial negative repercussions for exporters to other West African Economic and Monetary Union countries.</p>
<p>Second, without proper formal frameworks to control and manage the new currency, speculation and uncertainty regarding its value may emerge. This is why establishing robust institutions to support the management and supervision of the new currency is crucial.</p>
<h2>How will the new currency affect trade in the zone?</h2>
<p>The creation of a new currency by these three nations could, temporarily, have a negative impact on their trade with countries within the current bloc. It could even lead to some turbulence in trade with countries outside it.</p>
<p>The transition to a new currency typically introduces a level of uncertainty among economic actors and trading partners, as questions arise about the currency’s value, convertibility and stability. This adjustment phase can lead to a temporary slowdown in trade.</p>
<p>In addition, the introduction of a new currency often requires legislative and regulatory changes, especially regarding foreign exchange operations and customs duties. These can act as administrative and regulatory barriers and result in delays in commercial transactions.</p>
<p>During the transitional period, there may be fluctuations in exchange rates. This will lead to disparities between the old and new currencies. It can affect price competitiveness between exporters and importers and reduce the overall volume of trade.</p>
<p>The perceptions and attitudes of external partners matter when a new currency is announced. Some trading partners may exhibit reluctance or express doubts regarding its reliability and credibility. This could diminish their willingness to continue trading with member countries of the zone.</p>
<h2>Could the move isolate them?</h2>
<p>The creation of a new currency by these three countries may indeed raise questions about their potential isolation. However, such an initiative should not automatically lead to a diplomatic rupture or total marginalisation.</p>
<p>To avoid this, proactive communication, constructive cooperation and balanced, inclusive regional economic integration are key. This will help mitigate the risks of isolation for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in their monetary project.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thierno Thioune has received funding from the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF) and the Romanian Government for the "Eugen Ionescu" doctoral programme at the University "Dunarea De Jos" in Galati, Romania. CODESRIA also awarded him a prize as part of its thesis grant programme.</span></em></p>Several conditions must be met to ensure the successful launch and operation of a multilateral currency.Thierno Thioune, enseignant-chercheur, directeur du CREA, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de DakarLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2241702024-03-13T12:06:02Z2024-03-13T12:06:02ZCorrupt, brutal and unprofessional? Africa-wide survey of police finds diverging patterns<p>Africans generally have a low regard for the quality of policing on the continent. Perceptions of police misconduct, corruption and brutality are widespread, according to a new survey by <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>. The independent research network surveyed 39 countries between 2021 and 2023. </p>
<p>Our survey offers <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/PP90-PAP6-Africans-cite-corruption-and-lack-of-professionalism-among-police-failings-Afrobarometer-26jan24.pdf">new evidence</a> of how Africans experience and assess their police. It shows people often have to contend with demands for bribes from police officers. But assessments varied by country: in some, police were said to be helpful.</p>
<p>Afrobarometer currently surveys 39 of Africa’s <a href="https://au.int/en/member_states/countryprofiles2#">55 countries</a>.</p>
<p>As researchers at Afrobarometer, we have published on <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/pp88-brutality-and-corruption-undermine-trust-in-ugandas-police-can-damage-be-undone/">police professionalism</a> and other <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/pp37-are-africans-willing-pay-higher-taxes-or-user-fees-better-health-care/">government institutions</a> for several years. </p>
<p>Our analysis also reveals that negative perceptions of police professionalism and corruption go hand in hand with low public trust in the police, poor marks on government performance, and citizens’ sense of insecurity.</p>
<h2>Encounters with police</h2>
<p>While some citizens seek assistance from the police (to report a crime, for example), others might only encounter the police in less voluntary situations, such as at a checkpoint or traffic stop or during an investigation. Across the 39-country sample, only 13% of respondents said they had requested police assistance during the previous 12 months. Three times as many (40%) reported encountering the police in other situations.</p>
<p>Among respondents who asked for police assistance, more than half (54%) said it had been easy to get the help they needed. More than three-fourths found it easy in Burkina Faso (77%) and Mauritius (76%), though no more than half as many said the same in Malawi (37%), Madagascar (37%) and Sudan (33%). </p>
<p>Many respondents reported a police practice that was less than helpful: stopping drivers on the road without a valid reason. On average, 39% of Africans said the police “often” or “always” stopped drivers without good reason, in addition to 26% who said they “sometimes” did so (Figure 1). The practice is particularly widespread in Gabon (68% often/always) and Kenya (66%). In contrast, fewer than one in five respondents in Ethiopia (18%), Cabo Verde (16%) and Benin (16%) had this complaint.</p>
<p>Both seeking police assistance and being stopped on the road may be a prelude to being asked for money. Among respondents who said they had asked for police assistance during the previous year, 36% said they had had to pay a bribe, give a gift or do a favour to get the help they needed (Figure 2). This proportion reached astonishing levels in Liberia (78%), Nigeria (75%), Sierra Leone (72%) and Uganda (71%).</p>
<p>Similarly, among citizens who encountered the police in other situations, 37% said they had to pay a bribe to avoid a problem. Liberia (70%) again ranked worst, joined by Guinea (66%), Congo-Brazzaville (65%) and Uganda (64%).
Seychelles and Cabo Verde performed best on both counts (1%-4%).</p>
<p>Considering how many Africans personally experience having to bribe the police, it may not be surprising that on average across 39 countries, the police were more widely seen as corrupt than civil servants, officials in the presidency, or any other public institutions or leaders the surveys asked about. Almost half (46%) of respondents said that “most” or “all” police officials were corrupt.</p>
<h2>Police brutality</h2>
<p>One of the harshest criticisms levelled against some police officers was that they used excessive force in their interactions with the people they were meant to serve and protect. </p>
<p>As Figure 3 shows, almost four in 10 respondents (38%) said the police “often” or “always” used excessive force in managing protests or demonstrations. Another 27% said they “sometimes” did so. Only 29% said the police were “rarely” or “never” guilty of brutality in their handling of protesters. The perception of frequent police brutality against protesters was most common in Gabon (64% often/always) and was widespread in some countries that are scheduled to have national elections this year, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/three-dead-senegal-protests-over-delayed-presidential-election-2024-02-11/">Senegal</a> (60%), Guinea (51%) and Tunisia (45%).</p>
<h2>Police professionalism</h2>
<p>Do these popular perceptions add up to a police force that is seen as professional?</p>
<p>Only one-third (32%) of respondents said the police in their countries “often” or “always” operated in a professional manner and respected the rights of all citizens, while 32% said they “sometimes” and 34% said they “rarely” or “never” did (Figure 4).</p>
<p>In just five countries did more than half of the respondents think their police usually acted professionally: Burkina Faso (58%), Morocco (57%), Niger (55%), Benin (54%) and Mali (54%). Senegal ranked sixth, at just 50%. Fewer than one in five respondents saw police as usually professional in Sierra Leone (19%), Eswatini (19%), Kenya (18%), Congo-Brazzaville (17%) and Nigeria (13%).</p>
<h2>Significance of findings</h2>
<p>These findings raise questions about the quality of policing on the African continent, highlighting notably negative experiences and evaluations of the police in many – but not all – countries. For example, in Burkina Faso, Morocco and Benin, police scored relatively well across multiple performance indicators. </p>
<p>More broadly, our findings point to broad cross-country patterns of how police professionalism, integrity and respectful conduct are correlated with more positive citizen attitudes towards the police. </p>
<p>African governments looking to change the unfavourable public perceptions of the police – and of government performance in the fight against crime – might take a closer look at which dimensions of police performance matter in their country, and which better-performing police forces might have solutions to share.</p>
<p><em>All graphics have been redacted from showing 39 countries to 10 because of space constraints.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224170/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr. Matthias Krönke works for Afrobarometer. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr. Thomas Isbell works in International Development Cooperation. He is affiliated with Afrobarometer. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Makanga Ronald Kakumba is a researcher in the Afrobarometer Analysis Unit. He is affiliated with Uhasselt University. </span></em></p>Negative perceptions of police professionalism and corruption go hand in hand with low public trust in the police, poor marks on government performance, and citizens’ sense of insecurity.Matthias Krönke, Researcher, University of Cape TownThomas Isbell, Consultant, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238672024-02-22T12:01:17Z2024-02-22T12:01:17ZLearning in two languages: lessons from francophone Africa on what works best<p>Children living in multilingual communities often learn in a language at school that does not match the language they speak at home. This mismatch makes it challenging for them to participate in classroom discussions and learn to read. In turn, this contributes to poor learning outcomes, grade repetition, and dropping out of school.</p>
<p>Bilingual education programmes that include mother tongue languages have become increasingly popular for improving learning outcomes. Bilingual education is associated with better <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1366728908003386">language and literacy skills</a>, reduced grade repetition and school dropout rates across the <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/10986/10331">globe</a>. Including mother tongue languages in education also places value on children’s cultural identities, improving confidence, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09500789808666737">self-esteem</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-012-9308-2">learning</a>. </p>
<p>But simply providing bilingual education does not guarantee better learning results. This is the conclusion of a recent <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050.2023.2290482">paper</a> we published in which we reviewed bilingual programmes in six francophone west African countries: Niger, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon. </p>
<p>We found mixed results, across and within countries and programmes.</p>
<p>We identified two sets of factors that constrain or contribute to the quality of bilingual education. These were: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>implementation factors, such as teacher training and classroom resources</p></li>
<li><p>socio-cultural factors, such as perceptions of mother tongue languages in education.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Our findings emphasise the need to consider the local context when applying bilingual education programmes. </p>
<h2>Bilingual education in francophone west Africa</h2>
<p>Our research team conducted research in Côte d’Ivoire from 2016 to 2018. We measured children’s language and reading skills in both their mother tongue and in French, and compared outcomes between children attending French-only or bilingual Projet École Intégrée schools. </p>
<p>Children in French-only schools outperformed their peers from bilingual schools on the language and reading <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/edu0000723">assessments</a>. Teachers revealed they had better teaching resources and felt better prepared in French-only schools. </p>
<p>We were interested in whether bilingual education programmes in other francophone countries in the region had had similar experiences. In 2022, we searched academic databases for literature in English and French that discussed programme implementation and measured learning and schooling outcomes within bilingual education programmes. We reviewed nine programmes from six countries: Niger, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Cameroon. </p>
<p>These countries are former French colonies or territories. French is the official or working language and often the language of instruction in school. However, these countries are highly multilingual. About 23 living <a href="https://www.ethnologue.com/">languages</a> are spoken in Niger, <a href="https://www.languagesoftheworld.info/geolinguistics/linguistic-diversity-in-africa-and-europe.html">39</a> in Senegal, <a href="https://www.languagesoftheworld.info/geolinguistics/linguistic-diversity-in-africa-and-europe.html">68</a> in Mali, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1280625/number-of-living-languages-in-africa-by-country/">71</a> in Burkina Faso, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1280625/number-of-living-languages-in-africa-by-country/">78</a> in Côte d’Ivoire and <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1280625/number-of-living-languages-in-africa-by-country/">277</a> in Cameroon. </p>
<p>Our review showed that children can benefit from learning in two languages. This is true whether they are two official languages like in Cameroon’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10993-019-09510-7">Dual Curriculum Bilingual Education</a> (French and English) schools, or in a mother tongue and French, like in Mali’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/447544">Community Schools</a>. Children can also benefit regardless of whether they are gradually introduced to a language throughout primary school or whether both languages are introduced at the same time.</p>
<p>But a lack of resources, and a failure to take into account local conditions, affected the outcomes. The programmes that resulted in positive schooling and learning outcomes recognised and targeted common school-related and community-related challenges.</p>
<h2>Teacher training and resources</h2>
<p>One common school-related challenge was teachers not having teaching materials in all languages of instruction.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000161121">Pédagogie Convergente</a> programme in Mali, for example, ensured teachers had materials in both French and the mother tongue. Children had better French and maths scores. </p>
<p>But some teachers from the same programme did not always have teaching <a href="https://books.google.ca/books/about/Patterns_of_French_literacy_development.html?id=MoNnAAAAMAAJ&hl=en&redir_esc=y">materials</a> in mother tongue languages. And some children struggled with literacy and writing skills. </p>
<p>Another common challenge was teachers not feeling prepared to teach in all languages, as teacher training often occurred in an official language, like French. The <a href="https://www.adeanet.org/clearinghouse/sites/default/files/docs/interieur_11_burkina_fre.pdf">Programme d’éducation bilingue</a> in Burkina Faso, for example, made an effort to train teachers in the mother tongue language so they felt confident following the bilingual curriculum. </p>
<p>Children in bilingual Burkina Faso schools had higher than average <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050802149275">pass rates</a> on the primary certificate exam, <a href="https://www.memoireonline.com/06/22/12997/m_Le-rapport-des-enseignants-aux-langues-nationales-en-tant-que-mdiums-et-matires-den.html">repeated grades less</a>, and stayed in school more than children in traditional French schools. </p>
<p>Both examples are in contrast to the bilingual schools in Côte d’Ivoire, where teachers lacked materials and training in mother tongue languages. In turn, children demonstrated worse language and reading skills compared to their peers in French-only schools.</p>
<h2>Socio-cultural factors</h2>
<p>We identified common community-related challenges, particularly related to community buy-in and perceptions of mother tongue instruction. </p>
<p>For example, families with higher socioeconomic status were worried that Niger’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050208667760">Ecole Experimentale</a> schools would hinder children’s French proficiency and compromise their entry into secondary school. </p>
<p>Programmes such as the <a href="https://ared-edu.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/DC-Senegal-Workshop-Findings_04.2019-FINAL-ENG.pdf">Support Program for Quality Education in Mother Tongues for Primary Schools</a> in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050.2020.1765968">Senegal</a> worked to combat negative perceptions by educating families about the benefits of bilingual education. Children in the Senegalese programme outperformed their peers in traditional French schools in all school subjects.</p>
<p>The same programmes sometimes experienced different outcomes depending on the community. For example, although children in Burkina Faso’s bilingual schooling showed favourable outcomes, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-021-09885-y">parents</a> felt that French programmes were better suited for continuing to secondary school. </p>
<h2>What does this mean for bilingual education?</h2>
<p>Efforts to provide teachers with the resources they needed, and efforts to foster community support, were both consistently linked with positive schooling and learning outcomes in our review. </p>
<p>However, these efforts might work better in some communities compared to others, due to different resource constraints and socio-cultural differences. Studies that found poorer outcomes also found common challenges present. Therefore, bilingual education has the potential to facilitate positive learning outcomes if efforts are made to overcome common challenges based on communities’ needs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223867/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Bilingual education can improve learning outcomes but it’s important to consider local context.Kaja Jasinska, Assistant Professor, Applied Psychology and Human Development, University of TorontoMary-Claire Ball, PhD student, Developmental Psychology and Education, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2228262024-02-21T12:29:46Z2024-02-21T12:29:46ZFree movement in west Africa: three countries leaving Ecowas could face migration hurdles<p>For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, a recent decision to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">withdraw</a> from the <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (Ecowas) has thrown up questions about how they will navigate regional mobility in future. </p>
<p>Ecowas covers a variety of sectors, but migration is a major one. The bloc’s protocols since 1979 have long been seen as a <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97322-3_2">shining example</a> of free movement on the continent. They gave citizens the right to move between countries in the region without a visa, and a prospective right of residence and setting up businesses.</p>
<p>As multidisciplinary scholars we have previously researched <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/en/political-economy-west-african-migration-governance-wamig-2">migration governance in west Africa</a>, at the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2084452">regional level</a>, and in particular contexts like <a href="https://ecdpm.org/work/what-does-regime-change-niger-mean-migration-cooperation-eu">Niger</a>. </p>
<p>We argue that Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if their departure from Ecowas curtails mobility. But it is likely that informal mobility will continue anyway. </p>
<h2>Why free movement matters</h2>
<p>In September 2023, the three countries created a <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">mutual defence pact</a>, named <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sahel-coups-niger-tchiani-mali-burkina-faso-insecurity-e96627c700aa4fcf8d060dd9d2d16667">the Alliance of Sahel States</a>. This indicated their solidarity in dealing with insecurity. </p>
<p>Yet they also depend on neighbouring countries in the region, which puts these three countries in a difficult position.</p>
<p>The three countries that announced their withdrawal from Ecowas are connected in a web of mobility. Notably, Niger, seen as a key transit country for refugees and other migrants on their way to Europe, received <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/migration-and-society/3/1/arms030107.xml">major funds and support</a> from the European Union to prevent onward migration to Libya and beyond. </p>
<p>One central measure was <a href="https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/2015/fr/123771">Loi 2015-36</a>, a law which punished people transporting migrants with fines and prison sentences. The law was <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/european-dominance-of-migration-policy-in-niger-31383/">mostly developed</a> by external actors and had detrimental effects on the <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/multilateral-damage.pdf">local economy</a>. It also made migration journeys across the Sahara desert even <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc4138add1-visit-niger-report-special-rapporteur-human-rights-migrants">more dangerous</a>. </p>
<p>In November 2023, the law, which <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/sites/default/files/medam_niger_jegen.pdf">arguably violated</a> the principles of free movement under Ecowas, was repealed by the Nigerien coup leaders. </p>
<p>Mali is another major transit country in the region, as well as a country of origin for regional migration. It has a complicated history of <a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/72355">migration cooperation</a> with Europe. </p>
<p>Of less relevance to Europe, but more for regional dynamics, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-39814-8_11">Burkina Faso</a> is at the centre for <a href="https://www.mideq.org/en/migration-corridors/burkina-faso-cote-divoire/">regional migration</a>, often seasonal. Labour migration supports Côte d'Ivoire’s cocoa industry. After withdrawal from Ecowas, such labour migration may be difficult unless people resort more to informal migration. </p>
<p>As we have shown in our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2084452">previous research</a>, informal mobility has always existed along with formal mobility governance. Official border crossing points are often not used, despite the legal requirement to do so. </p>
<p>Hence, leaving Ecowas may increase corruption and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/imig.12766">problems of harassment</a> at formal border crossings as well as <a href="https://mixedmigration.org/resource/human-rights-migrants-smuggling-mali-niger/">increased use of mobility facilitators</a>, or “passeurs”. These are people who negotiate passage through formal border crossings and organise journeys through other routes. </p>
<p>The legal gaps that the current situation creates could be very expensive for businesses and individuals. People may in the near future require visas. And for those who have migrated regionally, the right to stay in a country of residency may soon be under threat. </p>
<h2>An immediate exit</h2>
<p>Days after they <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">announced</a> their withdrawal from <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/">Ecowas</a>, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.ewn.co.za/2024/02/08/burkina-mali-and-niger-reject-one-year-period-to-quit-ecowas">insisted</a> they were not bound by <a href="https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Revised-treaty-1.pdf#page=53">rules stipulating</a> a one year notice period before their final exit. </p>
<p>The announcement about leaving Ecowas outside the normal regulations was dramatic, but not unexpected. Military governments that took power in a series of coups in August 2020 and May 2021 in <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/mali-un-coup-dans-le-coup">Mali</a>, September 2022 in <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup/">Burkina Faso</a> and July 2023 in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">Niger</a> rule the three countries.</p>
<p>Ecowas has exerted political and economic pressure on the three countries to return to constitutional rule, through sanctions and the <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/policy-briefs/military-intervention-niger-imperatives-and-caveats">threat</a> of military intervention. </p>
<p>In Niger, for example, Ecowas <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-bazoum-coup-sanctions-ecowas-c7bdfd06559f1cfbfb856bea5b11a55f">closed</a> official border crossings, cut off more than <a href="https://punchng.com/niger-nigeria-cuts-power-supply-ecowas-vows-to-confront-junta/">70% </a> of electricity, and suspended financial transactions with other countries in the region. </p>
<p>International assets <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/31/nigers-planned-51-mln-bond-issuance-cancelled-due-to-sanctions">were frozen</a> and international aid halted. Even before the coup, <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/thousands-children-niger-risk-severe-nutritional-crisis-border-closures-leave-trucks-stranded#:%7E:text=Furthermore%2C%20prior%20to%20the%20political,least%20one%20form%20of%20malnutrition.">3.3 million people</a> in Niger experienced acute food insecurity. </p>
<p>The Ecowas sanctions made daily life even worse and in all likelihood added to the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate">popularity</a> of the coup leaders. </p>
<p>Similar sanctions were applied in Mali. The population has suffered as a result and the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-arent-sanctions-preventing-coups-in-africa">effectiveness</a> of the sanctions is questionable. </p>
<p>Sanctions in Burkina Faso included <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-arent-sanctions-preventing-coups-in-africa">travel bans</a> against members of the military government.</p>
<h2>Potential ways ahead</h2>
<p>For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, there are several considerations when it comes to regional mobility in their post-Ecowas era. These may include exploring the provisions of the <a href="https://www.uemoa.int/en">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a>; a return to bilateral agreements with individual neighbours; or relying on the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">African Union Protocol on Free Movement</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Monetary union:</strong> The three countries are still part of the <a href="https://www.uemoa.int/en">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a> (Waemu), a union around the common currency, the CFA franc.</p>
<p>The regional monetary union also has provisions for free movement of people and goods across its member countries. With this option, access to seaports, a major issue for all three landlocked countries, is ensured through other members of the monetary union, including, for example, Senegal. </p>
<p>On the downside is the fact that a major argument for leaving Ecowas was the perceived role of external influence over the regional bloc. The strong anti-imperialist discourse of the military governments does not bode well for the regional monetary union either. The union is the institutional framework for regional monetary policy over which France <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745341798/africas-last-colonial-currency/">continues</a> to exert significant influence. </p>
<p>Burkina Faso has already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-may-quit-west-african-currency-union-not-mali-2024-01-31/">announced</a> its intention to leave the monetary union too. </p>
<p>The West Africa Economic and Monetary Union also excludes major trading partners like Nigeria – of major importance to landlocked <a href="https://www.inter-reseaux.org/en/publication/51-special-issue-nigeria/nigerias-role-in-nigers-food-security/">Niger</a> for food supplies. Trade and commerce between Nigeria and Niger provides a lifeline and is among the most intense areas of cross-border activity in west Africa. </p>
<p>For these reasons, the regional monetary union option seems an unlikely alternative.</p>
<p><strong>Bilateral agreements:</strong> Another option for the three countries could be a return to bilateral agreements with individual countries to facilitate free movement. This can be likened to what former Ecowas member <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00083968.2014.936696">Mauritania</a>, which left in <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2000/12/28/mauritania-pulls-out-ecowas">2000</a>, did. </p>
<p>However, at the moment, given the sanctions, this option is off the cards, and could take many years to work out. </p>
<p><strong>African Union protocol:</strong> At a continental level the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">African Union Protocol on Free Movement</a> may offer a distant way forward. So far only <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-sl-PROTOCOL_TO_THE_TREATY_ESTABLISHING_THE_AFRICAN_ECONOMIC_COMMUNITY_RELATING_TO_FREE_MOVEMENT_OF_PERSONS-1.pdf">32 countries</a> have signed it and four have ratified it, among them Mali and Niger (Burkina Faso is a signatory). </p>
<p>One way to move forward would be for countries to ramp up ratifications of this document, to ensure that cooperation on free movement can continue whatever happens to Ecowas. </p>
<p>Of course, other countries within Ecowas could also unilaterally open up for visa-free entry like <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/03/rwanda-announces-visa-free-travel-for-all-africans//">Rwanda</a> or Kenya have done, though the process has had its <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/09/kenya-backlash-over-new-visa-free-entry-policy-many-describe-as-hectic//">hiccups</a>. </p>
<p>Such visa arrangements are also unlikely to include the rights of residence and establishment guaranteed under the Ecowas framework.</p>
<p>Given the current political context, an institutionalised option seems unlikely in the near future. The most likely option would be that migration will simply continue – informally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222826/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Franzisca Zanker received funding from the Mercator Stiftung for a research project "The Political Economy of West African Migration Governace" in 2019 which provided relevant background for this piece.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanda Bisong is a policy officer at the ECDPM, Maastricht, The Netherlands.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leonie Jegen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if they cannot migrate to and from neighbouring countries in Ecowas.Franzisca Zanker, Senior research fellow, Arnold Bergstraesser InstituteAmanda Bisong, PhD candidate, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLeonie Jegen, PhD Candidate, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227202024-02-07T13:27:05Z2024-02-07T13:27:05ZEcowas: why withdrawal of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso signals fresh trouble for the Sahel<p><em>On 27 January 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-mali-burkina-faso-say-they-are-leaving-ecowas-regional-block-2024-01-28/">announced</a> their plan to withdraw from membership of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), despite repeated efforts at reconciliation.</em></p>
<p><em>Diplomacy scholar Nicholas Westcott explains how the decision may be the latest symptom of a deepening crisis in the Sahel, the area south of the Sahara desert stretching from Mauritania in the west to Chad in the east.</em></p>
<h2>Why does their decision pose a threat to the region?</h2>
<p>The coastal states in Ecowas fear <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f9c0ca66-8c32-4906-9e22-f2d3fc0e8c67">contagion</a> from both jihadism and political disorder in the Sahel. If the three Sahelian countries leave Ecowas, that risk increases. So does the risk of potential hostility to Malian and Burkinabe migrants in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Stopping free movement between these three countries and the rest of west Africa would have serious economic consequences for all concerned.</p>
<p>Other governments in the region also fear damage to their own democracies – if not from coups, then from anti-western populists. </p>
<p>Guinea already has a military government. Others such as Cameroon, Togo and Sierra Leone may be vulnerable. </p>
<p>With elections ahead in <a href="https://ec.gov.gh/electoral-system/">Ghana</a>, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/6/senegal-parliament-delays-election-to-december-15-after-chaotic-vote">postponement</a> of the election in Senegal, this year will test democracy in the region.</p>
<p>This schism in Ecowas is also a risk for Africa’s partners in Europe and the US. Recent research in the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/advance-article/doi/10.1093/afraf/adad034/7564826?searchresult=1">African Affairs journal</a> showed that resentment of the increased French military presence was a key reason for the Nigerien military backing the coup led by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66430115">General Abdourahmane Tchiani</a> rather than elected <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-you-need-know-about-nigers-ousted-president-2023-08-14/">president Mohamed Bazoum</a>. </p>
<p>Other western countries risk being tarred with the same neocolonial brush unless they reform international institutions to reflect African concerns. They need to expedite the changes necessary to ensure that the multilateral system works for the benefit of small poor countries.</p>
<p>If this doesn’t happen, China’s narrative that the existing system works only to the benefit of “the west” will gain traction on the continent.</p>
<h2>What are the drivers?</h2>
<p>All countries in west Africa face a multilayered crisis. This has been brought on by years of sluggish growth following the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/great-recession.asp">2008 financial crisis</a>, <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1">COVID</a> and the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine">Ukraine war</a>, the impact of climate change and population growth. </p>
<p>Elected governments are finding it increasingly difficult to satisfy the expectations of their citizens. This is particularly true of the growing number of unemployed young people who have become disillusioned with democracy and are open to violent regime change, whether through jihad or a coup d’etat. </p>
<p>It is almost a re-run of the 1970s when drought, corruption and development failures led to a rash of coups in the region. People who cannot make a living legitimately will find other ways to do so.</p>
<p>Jihadism and banditry have <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-survey/2023/from-global-jihad-to-local-insurgencies/">increased</a> despite western efforts to combat them. Western support has thus lost credibility, even if the real failure is primarily political and economic. </p>
<h2>Why have regional bodies like Ecowas not been able to help?</h2>
<p>Faced with the juntas’ threat of secession, African regional organisations, in this case Ecowas and the African Union, face a dilemma. Do they to stick to their principles and exclude states that have experienced unconstitutional changes of government until they re-establish governments accountable to their citizens? Or do they compromise their principles to preserve at least nominal unity, and allow authoritarian governments back into the club? </p>
<p>Reconciliation efforts by Togo, through its <a href="https://lpsf.africa/lpsf-2023/">Peace and Security Forum</a> in Lomé last November, and by Nigerian Islamic leaders have not borne fruit. Nevertheless, it’s possible that the departure announcement is a bargaining chip to get more lenient terms for their reintegration into Ecowas. </p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-communique-on-burkina-faso-mali-niger/">responded</a> by saying that it had not yet received formal notification, which means, according to the regulations, that the countries can only leave in a year’s time. This provides all parties with negotiation time. The <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240130/communique-withdrawal-three-ecowas-member-states">AU</a> has also urged negotiation to keep Ecowas together. For its part, Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-notifies-west-african-bloc-ecowas-decision-leave-2024-01-29/">response</a> has been less accommodating.</p>
<h2>What lies behind the military regimes’ announcement?</h2>
<p>Regime survival has become their overriding objective. Their explicit intention seems to be to undermine the principle that African nations should apply standards to each other. The fact that African governments themselves signed up to these principles is as irrelevant to the insurrectionists, who want to retain power, as it is to the jihadists, who want to seize it. </p>
<p>They have set out the following <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">justifications</a> for their withdrawal:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Ecowas provided no support against the jihadists</p></li>
<li><p>Ecowas has imposed “illegal” sanctions that are harming the people </p></li>
<li><p>Ecowas has fallen under the influence of foreign governments.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These arguments are weak. They reflect an attempt to look like defenders of the poor and opponents of western influence.</p>
<p>It seems to be working. Populations are being <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/burkina-faso/313-armer-les-civils-au-prix-de-la-cohesion-sociale">mobilised and armed</a> to fight the jihadists.</p>
<p>The juntas appear to be donning the mantle of <a href="https://www.thomassankara.net/facts-about-thomas-sankara-in-burkina-faso/?lang=en">Thomas Sankara</a>. The revered former president of Burkina Faso, who seized power himself, is seen as a hero for his opposition to corrupt elites and French influence, his modesty and principles, and his concern for the ordinary Burkinabe. </p>
<p>It also plays conveniently into a narrative that both <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/09/21/china-wants-to-be-the-leader-of-the-global-south">China</a> and Russia are promoting: that current global institutions have been set up to defend neocolonial western interests, that adherence to “western values” (such as democracy and human rights) denies countries their right to develop in their own way; and that only China and Russia are true defenders of the interests of the global south.</p>
<p>Russia is putting its guns where its mouth is. There are an estimated <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/russian-mercenaries-behind-slaughter-in-mali-village-un-report-finds">1,000</a> Russian troops in Mali – formerly Wagner, now state-run and re-branded the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russian-troops-deploy-burkina-faso-2024-01-25/">Africa Corps</a> – and the first 100, with more to follow, have arrived in Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>Others are being recruited for Niger. Their official justification may be anti-terrorist duties, but their real purpose is to protect the regime from further threats of mutiny, coup or invasion. </p>
<p>The danger is that the Sahelian states could become unaccountable regimes, protected by Russia in return for gold, and living off the illicit trafficking of people and goods across the Sahara. </p>
<p>The migrant trade is already <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/54581/niger-migrants-return-to-the-route-towards-the-mediterranean">thriving again in Agadez</a>, the key transit point in northern Niger to the Mediterranean coast. And nothing worries European countries more than a dramatic increase in African migration. So they will be watching developments with concern.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Westcott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their intention to leave Ecowas. This may be a pointer to a deeper crisis in the Sahel region.Nicholas Westcott, Professor of Practice in Diplomacy, Dept of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223882024-02-05T09:27:55Z2024-02-05T09:27:55ZMali, Burkina Faso and Niger want to leave Ecowas. A political scientist explains the fallout<p><em>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have sent Ecowas, west Africa’s main political union of 15 countries, a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">formal notice</a> of their withdrawal from the bloc. The three countries are governed by military rulers who <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/coups-africa-even-ecowas">have overthrown</a> democratically elected leaders since 2021.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation Africa’s Godfred Akoto Boafo asked political scientist <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">Olayinka Ajala</a> about the implications of the withdrawal.</em></p>
<h2>Why are Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso withdrawing?</h2>
<p>The three countries have given <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240129-mali-and-burkina-faso-withdraw-from-ecowas">three main reasons</a>.</p>
<p>First is what they call the “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">illegal, illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible sanctions</a>” imposed on them for truncating their democracies. </p>
<p>Second is the failure of Ecowas to assist them in their “existential fight against terrorism and insecurity”. </p>
<p>The juntas have also argued that Ecowas has deviated from the founding principles of the organisation and is now <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68122947">controlled by foreign powers</a>. </p>
<p>In 2001, Ecowas adopted a protocol on democracy and good governance which included a mechanism for unconstitutional changes of government. <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/ecowas2001protocol.pdf">Article 1a</a> of the protocol maintains a “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”. </p>
<p>Ecowas cited this clause as its reason for suspending the three countries and for imposing sanctions against them.</p>
<p>Ecowas has made it clear that it won’t work with the regimes. Its statements make it clear that it has taken a strong stance because it wishes to deter military coups in other countries within the bloc. </p>
<p>The regional bloc is also clearly frustrated at the lack of interest the three countries have shown in returning to democratic rule. It has asked for a clear and definite transition timetable, especially for Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<h2>What impact will the withdrawal have on Ecowas?</h2>
<p>The main impact will be on trade and economic development. Ecowas is primarily an economic community and the loss of any member will affect trade and economic development.</p>
<p>The three countries collectively account for 8% of the <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/economic-community-west-african-states">US$761 billion</a> Ecowas gross domestic product (GDP). In 2022, the total trade volume from the Ecowas region totalled <a href="https://punchng.com/mali-b-faso-niger-exit-may-weaken-277bn-ecowas-trade-report/">US$277.22 billion</a>. </p>
<p>The concern is that the exit of these countries could affect the flow of goods and services in the bloc. </p>
<p>Leaving the bloc could have other knock-on effects too:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The economic collapse of the countries. These countries have strategic importance, especially in food security. Niger is a key source of onions while Burkina Faso exports tomatoes to the sub-region.</p></li>
<li><p>This would lead to an exodus of citizens to other Ecowas countries, further threatening the stability of the bloc. </p></li>
<li><p>Concerns that the three countries will enter into bilateral relationships with countries that might not be favourable to other Ecowas countries. For example, there are already concerns about Niger’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">alliance with Russia</a> after it severed ties with France. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What impact will it have on each of the countries?</h2>
<p>The main impact on the countries will be on the movement of people, goods and services. </p>
<p>Under Ecowas, members enjoy unrestricted movement of citizens within the bloc. Citizens of Ecowas countries can live and work in any country in the bloc. For instance, there are more than 5 million citizens of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger living and working in Côte d'Ivoire alone. Ghana, Togo and Republic of Benin also host large numbers of Nigeriens. </p>
<p>The citizens of all three landlocked countries would no longer be able to travel to other Ecowas states without impediments. Niger also shares a border of over 1,600km with seven states in Nigeria and <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-01-30/analysis-west-africas-brexit-moment-spells-trouble-for-the-region">80% of its trade</a> is done with Nigeria. </p>
<p>The sanctions imposed on Niger by Ecowas are <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate">already affecting</a> citizens of the country. Hardship is likely to increase after the exit if Nigeria decides to police its borders. </p>
<p>Also, depending on how Ecowas agrees to relate to the countries in future, there could be restrictions on goods and services which would further affect the economies of these countries. </p>
<h2>What impact will it have on security in the region?</h2>
<p>The security arrangement might not be affected in the short term. But it could be in the long term. There is already limited security cooperation between the three countries and other Ecowas members. For instance, they have all withdrawn from the G5 Sahel, resulting in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/6/chad-mauritania-pave-way-to-dissolve-g5-anti-rebel-alliance#:%7E:text=The%20G5%20was%20created%20in,major%20issue%20across%20the%20Sahel.&text=The%20two%20remaining%20members%20of,other%20three%20founding%20countries%20left.">collapse of the organisation</a>. </p>
<p>Although the lack of security support from Ecowas was stated as one of the reasons for exiting Ecowas, a total collapse of existing security infrastructure would affect not only the three countries but also other relatively stable states such as Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Benin. The three states have joined forces to form the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/military-led-sahel-states-rally-thousands-support-alliance-2023-12-30/">Alliance of Sahel States</a>, but without support from regional groups such as Ecowas, they will struggle to curtail insurgencies. </p>
<p>Currently, Mali has over 1,000 members of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner group), supported by Russia. There are <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-01-31/wagner-forces-under-a-new-flag-russias-africa-corps-burkina-faso">100 in Burkina Faso</a>. After months of Burkina Faso insisting it would not engage foreign mercenaries, the first contingent arrived in January 2024 and more are expected soon. Niger also recently agreed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">military cooperation</a> with Russia. </p>
<p>This indicates the three countries still require external assistance to combat insecurity. The problem is that Russia is fighting a huge war in Ukraine and might not be able to support the three countries as much as they would require. If the three countries fail to combat insurgence through the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States, the threat will spread to other countries in the bloc and beyond. </p>
<p>Ecowas leaders have indicated that they are willing to have a dialogue with the three countries. I think Ecowas granting some concessions to prevent them from exiting would be in the interest of the bloc and all the citizens of Ecowas countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The decision by the three countries could change the dynamics of Ecowas.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216162024-01-23T13:29:43Z2024-01-23T13:29:43ZEducation has a huge role to play in peace and development: 5 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570556/original/file-20240122-20-g5icoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children's education is frequently disrupted in conflict-fraught areas.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniel Beloumou Olomo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nelson Mandela was a famous advocate for the value of education. In 1990, the man who would become South Africa’s first democratically president four years later <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/24/us/the-mandela-visit-education-is-mighty-force-boston-teen-agers-are-told.html">told a high school in Boston</a>: “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.”</p>
<p>The United Nations agrees. In 2018 its General Assembly adopted a resolution that proclaimed 24 January as the <a href="https://www.unesco.org/en/days/education">International Day of Education</a>. It’s an annual opportunity to shine a spotlight on the role that education can and should play in promoting peace and development. This year the theme is “learning for lasting peace” – a critical focus in a world that, the UN points out, is “seeing a surge of violent conflicts paralleled by an alarming rise of discrimination, racism, xenophobia, and hate speech”.</p>
<p>To mark the occasion, we’re sharing some of the many articles our authors have contributed since we launched in 2015 that examine the intersection of education and conflict – and how to wield this powerful “weapon” for positive change.</p>
<h2>Education under attack</h2>
<p>Education systems in a number of African countries <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/GCPEA_NSAG_ScopingPaper.pdf">have been identified</a> by international advocacy groups as “very heavily affected” by conflict. These include Sudan, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Central Sahel, which includes Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, is another region of high concern. In 2020 alone (and before COVID lockdowns), 4,000 schools in the Central Sahel <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/Central-Sahel-Paper-English.pdf">closed because of insecurity</a>. </p>
<p>Craig Bailie <a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">explains</a> what drives armed groups to attack schools in the Central Sahel, leaving hundreds of thousands of students high and dry.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">Education is both the victim and the best weapon in Central Sahel conflict</a>
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<h2>Long-term effects</h2>
<p>Education systems, of course, do not exist in a vacuum. Where conflict meets long-term governance failures, poor resourcing and other societal issues, schooling comes under even more pressure. Ethiopia, for instance, has not only had to reckon with <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">internal conflict since 2020</a>; it’s also grappling with deeply rooted systemic crises.</p>
<p>Tebeje Molla and Dawit Tibebu Tiruneh <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">unpack</a> how these crises are colliding to leave Ethiopian children and teenagers floundering.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">Ethiopia’s education system is in crisis – now’s the time to fix it</a>
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<h2>Rebuilding is possible</h2>
<p>That’s not to say education systems can’t bounce back after conflict. During Somalia’s civil war in the late 1980s more than 90% of schools were destroyed. In the wake of the war the north of the country declared itself as the Republic of Somaliland. </p>
<p>Tobias Gandrup and Kristof Titeca <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">examine how</a>, together, the state, NGOs and the diaspora have succeeded in rebuilding the education system.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">How schools are kept afloat in Somaliland</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Solutions exist</h2>
<p>Researchers also have a role to play in strengthening education systems. All over the continent, projects that aim to keep children learning even amid devastating conflicts are being developed, rolled out and tested.</p>
<p>One example comes from north-eastern Nigeria, which has been beset by Boko Haram attacks. Margee Ensign and Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob <a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">used</a> a combination of radio and tablet computers to improve the literacy and numeracy skills of 22,000 children forced out of school.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">Disasters interrupt schooling regularly in parts of Africa: here's a solution</a>
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</em>
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<h2>In the classroom</h2>
<p>Conflicts seem inevitable in a world racked by many “wicked problems” like climate change, inequality and poverty. But what’s taught in Africa’s classrooms could play a role in solving them. The ability to think critically, and to engage with facts rather than fiction, is key. </p>
<p>To this end, Ayodeji Olukoju <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">explains</a> why it was so important that Nigeria reintroduced history as a school subject in 2019, a decade after scrapping it from the curriculum. Understanding history, he argues, helps to explode myths and stereotypes, leading to a more cohesive society.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">What studying history at school can do for Nigerians</a>
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</p>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221616/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Education can spur peace and development. Here are five essential reads on the topic.Natasha Joseph, Commissioning EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2191302024-01-08T13:58:09Z2024-01-08T13:58:09ZScramble for the Sahel – why France, Russia, China and the United States are interested in the region<p>The Sahel, a region <a href="https://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569">3,860km wide located south of the Sahara Desert</a> and stretching east-west across the African continent, has been a focus of attention around the world recently. </p>
<p>In the last decade, issues such as <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15365.doc.htm#:%7E:text=drivers%20of%20insecurity.-,From%201%20January%20to%2030%20June%202023%2C%20the%20region%20recorded,displaced%20persons%20exceeding%206%20million.">terrorism</a>, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1132332#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CIndeed%2C%20the%20central%20Sahel%20continues,in%20Ukraine%2C%E2%80%9D%20she%20added.">insecurity</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137072">trafficking</a> have characterised the region. </p>
<p>Military takeovers have been a major source of concern in the region and beyond in the last few years. Since 2020, the region has had <a href="https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/understanding-crisis-democracy-west-africa-and-sahel">four successful coup d’états</a> and three failed ones. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://acleddata.com/2023/08/03/fact-sheet-military-coup-in-niger/">coup in Niger</a> particularly attracted attention. This is because Niger was seen as a “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/west-africa/nigers-coup-and-americas-choice">darling of the west</a>” and a model for democratic governance in the region. </p>
<p>Despite the challenges facing the region, the scramble for the Sahel remains intense. </p>
<p>The main actors in this scramble are the <a href="https://european-union.europa.eu/index_en">European Union</a>, France, Russia, China and the United States.</p>
<p>The EU relies on Sahelian countries, especially Niger, to stop mass illegal immigration into the bloc. Niger is a major transit country in the region. Niger had security and defence partnerships with the EU until recently when the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/niger-ends-security-and-defence-partnerships-with-the-eu/">country unilaterally cancelled the deals</a>. This is a source of concern to the EU. </p>
<p>Why are these foreign powers interested in the Sahel?</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">scholar</a> in international relations and having <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/Olayinka-Ajala-2181806326">researched</a> the region for over a decade, I see the main reasons as follows: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>availability of natural resources</p></li>
<li><p>strategic location of the region in Africa</p></li>
<li><p>economic interests of the countries involved in the scramble</p></li>
<li><p>defence and security cooperation in the form of arms sales.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Foreign powers all have their reasons to be involved in the scramble for the Sahel.</p>
<h2>France</h2>
<p>Most of the countries in the Sahel region were colonised by France. Unlike Britain, France has maintained strong links with former colonies. They cooperate in the economy, defence and resource extraction, to mention a few areas. </p>
<p>France has the <a href="https://www.ieri.be/en/publications/wp/2019/f-vrier/france-still-exploiting-africa">first right</a> to buy any natural resources discovered in all its former colonies. Although the relationship between France and its former colonies appeared cordial, recent coups in Francophone countries and <a href="https://theconversation.com/france-in-africa-why-macrons-policies-increased-distrust-and-anger-212022">anti-France sentiments</a> across Africa have revealed the opposite. </p>
<p>The coups have been followed by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/huge-protests-niger-call-french-forces-leave-after-coup-2023-09-02/">large demonstrations</a> against France and in support of the putschists. </p>
<p>Despite these cracks, France is keen to maintain its grip on these countries, especially pertaining to military cooperation and resource extraction. France was reluctant to pull its military out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger despite the countries severing military partnerships. It continues to extract natural resources in these countries.</p>
<h2>Russia</h2>
<p>The relationships between Russia and many Sahelian countries were established during the cold war and colonial era. More recently, the emphasis by western countries on <a href="https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-72-the-impact-of-counter-terrorism-measures-on-muslim-communities.pdf">human rights</a>, especially during counterterrorism operations, has pushed Sahelian countries closer to Russia.</p>
<p>While western allies demand the rule of law, democracy, and human rights in return for security and economic support, Russia portrays itself differently. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/2022-Russian-invasion-of-Ukraine">invasion</a> of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 also increased Russia’s interest in the Sahel because it is keen to maintain allies in Africa. </p>
<p>Russia has <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">openly backed</a> military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warned</a> against any military intervention in Niger when the military took power. Furthermore, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, the controversial private military company which is controlled by Russia, cooperates with some countries in the Sahel. Niger has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231204-niger-s-junta-ends-key-security-agreements-with-eu-turns-to-russia-for-defence-deal">cancelled defence agreement with the EU</a> and switched to Russia. All of these factors explain Russia’s interest in the Sahel. </p>
<h2>China</h2>
<p>Like Russia, China portrays itself as an alternative to the traditional ally (France) of Sahelian countries. With a mantra of “<a href="https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=94683">non-interference</a>” and “<a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/praxis/files/2020/05/1.-Condon.pdf">respecting sovereignty</a>”, China has entrenched itself as a “partner” of countries in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The Sahel region is rich in natural resources such as oil, uranium, natural gas and lithium. Chinese state-owned enterprises <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">operate</a> in Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>For instance, Mali potentially has <a href="https://www.mining-technology.com/features/top-ten-biggest-lithium-mines/?cf-view">one of the largest</a> lithium reserves in the world and China’s Ganfeng Lithium has <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">invested</a> heavily in the country. In addition, despite China’s development in military hardware, most of the weapons are untested. China is keen to use the conflicts in the Sahel to <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/WF_93_Rajosefa_The_Future_of_Strategic_Competition_in_the_Sahel_Region.pdf">test</a> its arms products. </p>
<h2>The United States</h2>
<p>In 2019, the US opened its <a href="https://intellinews.com/us-in-danger-of-losing-control-of-its-extensive-drone-base-in-niger-289069/#:%7E:text=The%20Agadez%20drone%20base%2C%20officially,by%20the%20US%20Air%20Force.">largest drone base</a> in Africa in Agadez-Niger. A year before that, I had <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">written</a> about the security implications of the base for the region. </p>
<p>Unlike France and China, which both have extensive economic interests in the Sahel, the US has a strong military interest. Niger, in particular, is strategically located and the US can easily fly surveillance and reconnaissance drones from the country to cover the Sahel, west and central Africa. </p>
<p>As France is being militarily dislodged by its former colonies in the region, the US has been trying to fill the void to prevent Russia and China from establishing further military presence. </p>
<p>The US took several months to label the military takeover in Niger a coup so as not to lose strategic military cooperation and dominance. </p>
<p>The year 2023 has been particularly challenging for the countries in the Sahel. With issues ranging from economic instability to insecurity, the region remains fragile. Despite the instability and fragility, the scramble for the region remains intense with traditional allies such as France losing its grip and other powers stepping up. </p>
<p>The Sahel is one to keep an eye on in 2024 and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Foreign powers’ interest in the Sahel is driven by its natural resources and strategic location for security and illegal migration control.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2173052023-11-16T14:46:31Z2023-11-16T14:46:31ZThere are too few toilets in Africa and it’s a public health hazard – how to fix the problem<p>Imagine you are miles from the nearest restroom, and nature’s call is urgent – a situation that might raise a mild panic during a hike or at a music festival. Now, picture that same scenario, not as a one-off inconvenience, but as a daily reality. This is the case for about <a href="https://tropmedhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s41182-022-00416-5">half a billion</a> people globally. </p>
<p>In African countries, the issue of open defecation often goes unaddressed by society and policymakers despite its negative impact on health, economic development, dignity and the environment. </p>
<p>Led from Queen’s University Belfast, a team of multidisciplinary researchers aimed to evaluate how prevalent the practice is in African countries and which social factors are driving it. We also aimed to establish which communities were in most urgent need of interventions. </p>
<p>We used demographic and health surveys, alongside World Bank data. In a <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10668-023-03992-6">recent paper</a> we set out our findings. </p>
<p>Our main ones were that in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Niger, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burkina Faso and Chad, a large number of people engaged in open defecation. </p>
<p>We found that as few as ten countries could account for 247 million Africans defecating in the open by 2030 if critical and emergency actions are not taken.</p>
<p>The biggest driver is lack of access to proper sanitation facilities. The poorest individuals, particularly in rural areas, are more likely to resort to open defecation than people in urban areas. In regions with the most critical need, the poorest are 43 times more likely than the wealthy to resort to open toileting. </p>
<p>We recommend tackling poverty, and intervening in regions and communities that urgently need improved sanitation infrastructure and programmes. West Africa needs special attention since many of its communities are in the critical category.</p>
<h2>A systematic approach</h2>
<p>Sanitation has far-reaching implications for food safety. Contaminated water sources and unsanitary conditions can spread waterborne diseases, which can contaminate food and put millions at risk. Addressing open defecation is a step in ensuring the safety and hygiene of the food chain.</p>
<p>The link between poor sanitation and health is well <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/sanitation">documented</a>. But our study casts this relationship in a new, alarming light: the likely role of open defecation in antimicrobial resistance. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/antimicrobial-resistance">Antimicrobial resistance</a> is the ability of microbes, such as bacteria, viruses and fungi, to resist the effects of medications that were once used effectively against them. It is a looming crisis, threatening to make antibiotics ineffective. Common infections could once again become deadly. </p>
<p>Our research suggests a probable link between open defecation and antimicrobial resistance. When people defecate outdoors, resistant bacteria from human waste can contaminate water and food. This <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jtm/taad069">often leads</a> to faecal-oral diseases and urinary tract infections.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gutter-to-gut-how-antimicrobial-resistant-microbes-journey-from-environment-to-humans-189446">Gutter to gut: How antimicrobial-resistant microbes journey from environment to humans</a>
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<p>However, there is a need for more research to clarify the relationship, its implications and prevention. A clear recommendation from our research is that data about antimicrobial resistance should be integrated into health surveys.</p>
<p>While the full breadth of the study’s findings is huge, its conclusions are clear: open defecation is a challenge in Africa that requires actions. Our research doesn’t just ring the alarm bell; it provides a blueprint for change, identifying specific regions where the practice is most prevalent and where interventions could have the greatest impact.</p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>Addressing open defecation across a continent as vast and diverse as Africa is no small feat. We made a number of recommendations in the study.</p>
<p><strong>A pragmatic three-tier priority system</strong> </p>
<p>This will categorise regions based on the urgency of need for intervention: critical, high, and medium. Regions marked as critical are those with the highest prevalence of open defecation (more than 80% of the population) and the least access to sanitation facilities. These areas need immediate attention with the deployment of resources and sanitation infrastructure. The high priority regions have some access to sanitation. Here, the strategy is a combination of infrastructure development and community education. For medium priority areas (40%-59%), where some sanitation infrastructure may exist, the focus should be on sustainable practices, behavioural change and maintenance of existing facilities.</p>
<p>The system above is just to cut the high rates and inequalities among communities in a country. There is also a lot to do in communities with an open defecation rate of less than 40%. The goal is to reinforce positive behaviour and ensure facilities are maintained and improved. </p>
<p>Policy support, such as incentives for building private toilets or community sanitation blocks, may also help. This tiered strategy hinges on continuous assessment and reallocation of resources. Interventions should respond to the changing landscape as regions improve or decline. </p>
<p><strong>Support sanitation projects and policies</strong></p>
<p>Advocacy is important to increase awareness and donations to organisations that build toilets and provide sanitation programmes in affected areas. </p>
<p><strong>Educate and spread awareness</strong></p>
<p>Learning about the cultural and socio-economic factors that contribute to this practice must be encouraged and the knowledge shared with others. Campaigns that focus on the importance of sanitation for health and the environment are key.</p>
<p><strong>Encourage sustainable sanitation practices</strong></p>
<p>This includes using toilets properly, not littering, and understanding local challenges. The use of compostable toilets and other sustainable waste management practices where traditional toilets are not feasible must be encouraged.</p>
<p><strong>Foster global partnerships for sanitation</strong></p>
<p>Global partnerships can amplify efforts to end open defecation. Collaborations between governments, NGOs, private sector stakeholders and international organisations must be encouraged. Pooling resources and sharing knowledge can lead to more effective and sustainable solutions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217305/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The struggle with open defecation is a silent emergency, undermining the continent’s efforts towards sustainable development goals.Omololu Fagunwa, Research Fellow, Queen's University BelfastHelen Onyeaka, Associate Professor, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2164502023-11-15T14:30:06Z2023-11-15T14:30:06ZHealth risks at home: a study in six African countries shows how healthy housing saves children’s lives<p>Housing is a critical social determinant of health. The World Health Organization (WHO) <a href="https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/276001/9789241550376-eng.pdf?sequence=22">defines healthy housing</a> as a shelter that supports physical, mental and social wellbeing. </p>
<p>The WHO has developed <a href="https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/276001/9789241550376-eng.pdf?sequence=1">guidelines</a> outlining the attributes of healthy housing. These include structural soundness, as well as access to a local community that enables social interactions. Healthy housing protects inhabitants from the effects of disasters, pollution, waste and extreme heat or cold. It provides a feeling of home, including a sense of belonging, security and privacy. </p>
<p>Health risks in the home environment are important to think about because of the amount of time people spend there. In countries where unemployment levels are high or where most work is home based, people spend <a href="https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/276001/9789241550376-eng.pdf?sequence=23">more than 70% of their time indoors</a>. Children especially spend a large amount of time at home, which exposes them to any health risks in the home environment.</p>
<p>We are researchers from the African Population and Health Research Center with an interest in urbanisation and population dynamics. We recently set out to <a href="https://bmcpediatr.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12887-023-03992-5">study the link between housing and children’s health</a>. We found that healthy housing generally lowered the chances of children falling ill with three diseases that we tracked: diarrhoea, acute respiratory illnesses and fever. </p>
<p>The impacts of housing quality extend beyond health and can have significant implications for education and subsequent economic outcomes, particularly for children. </p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/can-rapid-urbanization-in-africa-reduce-poverty-causes-opportunities-and-policy-recommendations/">Rapid urbanisation and population growth</a> in Africa have pushed many people into informal settlements. Sub-Saharan Africa has <a href="https://blogs.afdb.org/fr/inclusive-growth/urbanization-africa-191">65%</a> of the world’s slum dwellers. This population generally lives in poor housing that lacks access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene services. The structures are overcrowded. They tend to have leaking roofs and damp walls, floors and foundations. They may also have indoor pollution, compromising the health of millions of people.</p>
<p>We set out to <a href="https://bmcpediatr.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12887-023-03992-5">evaluate</a> the relationship between healthy housing and the likelihood of children falling sick across six African countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa.</p>
<p>We studied the incidence of diarrhoea, acute respiratory illness and fever among children under the age of five. These three conditions can have severe consequences for child health and wellbeing. </p>
<p>Diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections are <a href="https://academic.oup.com/inthealth/advance-article/doi/10.1093/inthealth/ihad046/7210800">leading causes</a> of disease and deaths in children aged below five worldwide. Diarrhoea accounted for <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-health/diarrhoeal-disease/">9%</a> of all deaths among children under five in 2019. Acute respiratory illnesses caused about <a href="https://www.who.int/data/gho/indicator-metadata-registry/imr-details/3147">20%</a> of deaths among children in this age group. The burden of under-five deaths linked to diarrhoea and respiratory illnesses like pneumonia is <a href="https://childmortality.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/UN-IGME-Child-Mortality-Report-2022.pdf#page=4">higher</a> for children in developing countries than those in developed regions. </p>
<p>We selected the six countries in our study because they provided data on the three diseases we tracked. They also allow for a comparative analysis across African countries. Our study used the latest available demographic and health survey data at the time of our research: Burkina Faso (2010), Cameroon (2011), Ghana (2014), Kenya (2014), Nigeria (2018) and South Africa (2016). We sampled data on 91,096 children aged under five.</p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>Our study found that healthy housing was <a href="https://bmcpediatr.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12887-023-03992-5/tables/2">generally associated with reduced odds</a> of contracting the three illnesses we considered: diarrhoea, acute respiratory illness and fever. Our definition of healthy housing considered several attributes, including sanitation, drinking water sources and housing characteristics. </p>
<p>Homes that protect occupants from the elements, ensure access to adequate space and reduce overcrowding help keep children healthy. Homes that use cleaner cooking and lighting fuels reduce household air pollution, which leads to lower chances of respiratory infections.</p>
<p>Children living in healthy housing had fewer incidences of fever in all countries apart from South Africa. Here, children living in the healthiest homes are twice as likely to have fever than those living in unhealthy homes.</p>
<p>Fever is an indication of an underlying infection that could be viral or bacterial. Such infections are common in South Africa. In addition, the main causes of fevers among children under five are <a href="https://www.hindawi.com/journals/grp/2023/1906782/">diarrhoea and acute respiratory illnesses</a>. Among the countries included in the analysis, South Africa had the highest proportion of young mothers (aged below 25) and never-married mothers. This increases the chances that these mothers are engaged in work outside the home, leading to the early introduction of complementary feeding. This has been shown to increase the incidence of diarrhoea. These results call for addressing the causes of diarrhoea and respiratory illnesses by, for instance, ensuring South African homes have access to clean drinking water, adequate sanitation and clean energy for cooking.</p>
<p>While healthy housing is crucial, it’s not the sole determinant of a child’s health. Other factors, such as a sense of community, environmental exposure, parental education, income levels, healthcare access, and maternal and child-level factors <a href="https://bmcpediatr.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12887-023-03992-5/tables/3">also contribute to the overall health status of children</a>. For instance, we found that children in Burkina Faso who were not breastfed had higher chances of getting diarrhoea than those who were breastfed despite the condition of their housing. This tracks with studies that have documented that breastfeeding has a <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fped.2023.1086999">protective role</a> over gastrointestinal and respiratory tract infections among children. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>From our findings, parents can improve the wellbeing of their children by implementing simple strategies. This includes ensuring they use clean energy for cooking to reduce indoor air pollution and consequently reduce the incidence of acute respiratory illnesses. Similarly, using clean drinking water, hand washing and improving sanitation can help reduce cases of diarrhoea. </p>
<p>Bold but nuanced policy and programme government-level interventions can also help address the incidence of diseases affecting children under five in Africa. This requires efforts that go beyond just addressing the issue of housing to working with complementary sectors, like health, urban planning, environment and education.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216450/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hellen Gitau received funding from Wellcome Trust for this Complex Urban System for Sustainability and Health study. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Blessing Mberu received funding from Wellcome Trust for this Complex Urban System for Sustainability and Health study. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kanyiva Muindi received funding from Wellcome Trust for this Complex Urban System for Sustainability and Health study. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samuel Iddi received funding from Wellcome Trust for this Complex Urban System for Sustainability and Health study.</span></em></p>The impact of housing quality extends beyond health to education and subsequent economic outcomes, particularly for children.Hellen Gitau, Research officer, African Population and Health Research CenterBlessing Mberu, Head of Urbanisation and Wellbeing, African Population and Health Research Center, African Population and Health Research CenterKanyiva Muindi, Associate Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research CenterSamuel Iddi, Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research CenterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122772023-09-12T14:15:03Z2023-09-12T14:15:03ZJihadist groups threaten the conservation of a key west African world heritage site - new study<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547012/original/file-20230907-19-qmm5ol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C16%2C5367%2C4177&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An African antelope at the Mekrou river in the W National Park, Niger.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kob-bovidae-w-national-park-mekrou-river-niger-africa-news-photo/492759701?adppopup=true">DeAgostini/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Burkina Faso, Benin and Niger share a biosphere reserve known as the <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/fr/list/749">WAP complex (W-Arly-Pendjari)</a>, which spreads across the borders of the three countries. The first part of this 3 million hectare <a href="https://en.unesco.org/mab">Unesco</a> world heritage site was declared in 1996 and it was extended in 2002. It’s intended to protect species that are highly threatened in the region, including elephants and cheetahs, as well as important <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/fr/ramsar/">wetlands</a>.</p>
<p>The three states signed an agreement in 2008 to manage the reserve’s natural resources together, for the purposes of local, national and regional development. </p>
<p>The territory has been afflicted by violence and insecurity for some ten years. This trouble has spilled over from the “three borders” area shared by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, where armed Islamist groups have been operating. </p>
<p>Due to the steady encroachment of non-state armed groups, the conflict is threatening to engulf the reserve. Forest resources are being <a href="https://www.afrik21.africa/en/benin-impact-of-the-massacre-of-5-rangers-in-the-w-national-park-in-northern-benin/">plundered</a> and people who live near the protected areas are being displaced.</p>
<p>As part of a study of causes of migration in and from the region, I <a href="https://nai.uu.se/news-and-events/news/2022-10-14-counter-terrorism-has-to-be-transborder-and-address-root-causes.html">investigated</a> the local impact of armed groups, focusing on <a href="https://en.unesco.org/biosphere/africa/w-transboundary">W Park</a>, part of the WAP complex. I interviewed local people about the implications of poaching activities and the use of violence in forest reserves.</p>
<p>My opinion is that an “economy of armed groups”, which can be called a “jihadism of protected areas”, is being set up. It is dangerously disrupting environmental protection.</p>
<p>The armed groups have opened trafficking routes and launched attacks on local communities. They have taken over activities such as gold panning, hunting and fishing and targeted forest eco-guards. All this has had a direct impact on people and led to deteriorating social conditions. Authorities need to coordinate national responses to safeguard the reserve and restore social cohesion among local communities.</p>
<h2>Serious threat to protected forest areas</h2>
<p>The transboundary area came under multiple pressures decades ago, such as harvesting wood, hunting, poaching, fishing, collecting medicinal plants and illegal mining. The level of exploitation was threatening the ecosystems. In response, the countries adopted a regional approach to coordinate national policies. Local people were to participate in the common management of resources. This approach was outlined in the 2000 <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/TAPOA.pdf">Tapoa Declaration</a> and again in 2008.</p>
<p>But another form of pressure has also grown. Today, armed groups seriously <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/2222">threaten</a> the future of the reserve, its conservation and the sustainability of its activities and development. They have “colonised” this natural geographical area, living inside the remote uncontrolled protected areas and exploiting resources. <a href="https://apanews.net/2023/06/10/benin-deploys-3000-troops-in-the-north-to-fight-terrorism/">They often commit abuses on unprotected populations</a>. </p>
<p>The armed groups are not the sole causes of this current situation. Based on my field research in the region over the years, I argue that it is also the result of the political management by the three states.</p>
<p>Contributing to the political and social instability are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>land grabs in the areas surrounding protected forest areas</p></li>
<li><p>a pastoralism crisis which increases competition with crop farmers</p></li>
<li><p>inconsistency in the distribution and regulation of forest resources between local residents and state representatives </p></li>
<li><p>a poorly integrated approach to the biosphere. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>War entrepreneurship</h2>
<p>Since 2018, the Katiba Ansar-ul Islam and the Katiba Serma have been the two <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/National-Parks.pdf">armed groups most visible in northern Benin, south-eastern Burkina Faso and western Niger</a>. A kind of “war entrepreneurship” is being set up. It <a href="https://www.afrik21.africa/en/benin-impact-of-the-massacre-of-5-rangers-in-the-w-national-park-in-northern-benin/">draws</a> on natural resources (wood, rare plants, illegal fishing, gold panning), but also causes forced migration in already vulnerable populations. Protected areas have become sanctuaries for recruiting local fighters and planning attacks. According to most of the people I interviewed, the armed groups also consider the forest eco-guards as predators who have oppressed the local populations since the colonial era. Some guards have been killed, others recruited into the armed groups.</p>
<p>The armed groups rely on income from forest products exploitation, illegally extracted gold and <em>zakat</em> – taxes demanded from locals. They also force local people to pledge allegiance to their cause and make them move from their places to remote areas such as the protected reserves. There, migrants also exploit the natural resources. </p>
<p>What has developed is a parallel political economy in areas controlled by armed groups. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Among the initiatives to combat non-state armed groups, our policy report suggested the following solutions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>make forest villages inaccessible to two-wheeled motorcycles, the main means of transport for armed groups</p></li>
<li><p>set up forest tunnels or corridors where people can hide when under threat </p></li>
<li><p>re-adopt an integrated and inclusive approach to forest ecology, animal protection and cross-border security </p></li>
<li><p>strengthen social cohesion between communities in Burkina Faso, Benin and Niger by defusing the driving factors of insurgency and restoring mutual trust.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212277/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Papa Sow receives funding from the Nordic Africa institute, Uppsala, Sweden. </span></em></p>Trans-border collaboration is required to recover protected areas that transverse Niger, Burkina Faso and Benin Republic from armed groups.Papa Sow, Senior Researcher, The Nordic Africa InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127152023-09-07T13:28:04Z2023-09-07T13:28:04ZWhy mothers and babies will suffer more as Africa grows hotter<p><em>As Africa gets hotter, mothers and babies are most at risk. Why is this and what can be done about it? Matthew Chersich, a specialist in climate change and maternal health, explains the reasons to health editor Nadine Dreyer.</em></p>
<h2>What makes pregnant women particularly vulnerable to extreme heat?</h2>
<p>Many women in Africa have little or no protection against extreme heat events, with pregnancy being an particularly vulnerable period. High ambient temperatures may overwhelm the capacity of the maternal thermoregulatory mechanisms to dissipate heat in pregnancy.</p>
<p>Foetal metabolism generates considerable heat in the mother’s body. Then there is the strain from additional weight gain in pregnancy, fat deposits that retain heat, and the major exertion of labour and childbirth. </p>
<p>The foetus remains around 0.5°C warmer than the mother and thus if a mother has heat stress or a fever, the foetal temperature quickly reaches dangerous levels. </p>
<p>The most dangerous period is likely during <a href="https://obgyn.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/ijgo.14381#:%7E:text=Extreme%20heat%20can%20overwhelm%20thermoregulatory,%2C%20preterm%20birth%2C%20and%20stillbirth.">childbirth</a>, when women generate remarkable levels of heat from the labour process. If this occurs during a heatwave it can increase complications, such as prolonged labour, increased emergency caesarean sections and maternal haemorrhage.</p>
<h2>What makes babies particularly vulnerable?</h2>
<p>Infants are dependent on their carers for protecting them against heat exposure. Some practices, such as over-swaddling, pose considerable risks as global temperatures rise. </p>
<p>Dehydration is also a major concern for young children, due to water loss through sweating or from gastroenteritis, which increases as food- and water-borne pathogens replicate more frequently and survive longer during warm weather.</p>
<p>Mothers may also supplement breastfeeding with water. In many areas, water is unsafe because of poor infrastructure. </p>
<p>Infants may breastfeed for shorter periods during hot weather as feeding can be uncomfortable for baby and mother in the heat. </p>
<p>In one of our studies in <a href="https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/12/10/e061297">Burkina Faso</a>, breastfeeding duration was about 25 minutes shorter on hot days compared to cold days.</p>
<h2>It is possible to quantify the effect of climate change on pregnant women and newborn babies?</h2>
<p>We are able to calculate the relative risk of adverse birth outcomes, such as preterm birth, which increases about <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10087975/">1.15 fold during heatwaves</a>. The key gap in the field is quantifying the absolute number of additional adverse outcomes that are occurring because of climate change. </p>
<p>Those figures would help people to appreciate the implications of climate change for maternal and child health. There are real concerns that extreme heat may reverse the previous gains made in maternal and child health, from childhood vaccines, for example.</p>
<p>In some of our work we estimated how many additional child deaths occurred in Africa from heat exposure. We showed that there were between 7,000 and 11,000 deaths from heat exposure in children in Africa annually that could be attributed to climate change. Unless we curb carbon emissions dramatically, <a href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ac7ac5">heat-related child mortality</a> in Africa may reach over 38,000 a year in 2049. </p>
<p>A study of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0013935122009239">pregnant women in Johannesburg</a> showed that rates of severe hypertensive disorders in pregnancy increase by as much as 80% when temperatures exceed 23°C in early pregnancy. </p>
<h2>Do different health issues affect mothers and children?</h2>
<p>While the harms of exposure to extreme heat in pregnancy are well known, we do not yet have easy ways of calculating how much of that additional burden of disease is due to climate change, as opposed to natural variations in temperature. The methods for doing so are improving rapidly, however. </p>
<p>What is clear is that if South Africa experiences the kinds of temperatures that were seen in Europe and North America in 2023, there will be many thousands of additional pregnancy complications, all of which will be directly attributable to climate change.</p>
<h2>What are some practical solutions?</h2>
<p>There are a number of relatively simple, low cost <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/full/10.18772/26180197.2022.v4n3a7#:%7E:text=Then%2C%20during%20actual%20heatwaves%2C%20interventions,also%20may%20have%20high%20e%EF%AC%83cacy.">“cooling” interventions</a> which could be implemented at scale if countries in the global north kept to their funding commitments. </p>
<p>Each year high-income countries make major promises about climate financing, but have yet to deliver. They committed US$100 billion a year in the 2015 Paris Agreement and have delivered only a <a href="https://www.greenclimate.fund/about/resource-mobilisation/irm">tiny fraction</a> of that amount. </p>
<p>Low-cost interventions include painting roofs of houses or health facilities with white reflective paint, fans with evaporative cooling, providing cool water for women during labour and making “cooling centres” where women could go during a heatwave.</p>
<h2>What can pregnant women and communities do to reduce risks?</h2>
<p>On a local level there are behavioural changes that can benefit maternal health. Many pregnant women continue physical work even late in pregnancy, including walking long distances to collect water and firewood. A <a href="https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/abs/10.1289/isee.2021.O-SY-049">project</a> in Burkina Faso and Kenya tested a community-mobilisation intervention that aimed to reduce heavy workloads during pregnancy and early motherhood. Results of the project are promising.</p>
<p>Major changes must be made to built environments. The temperatures in many informal settlements are <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32832385/">higher indoors</a> than they are outdoors, which can be devastating for expectant mothers. Higher night-time temperatures are especially concerning. Many healthcare facilities are similarly ill-equipped to provide pregnant women with cooler environments. </p>
<p>All the interventions mentioned above can provide some degree of protection against the current level of heat exposure women face, but will be poorly effective against the kinds of temperatures that we will experience in five to 10 years’ time. </p>
<p>We know almost nothing about what could be done to prevent mass mortality events at temperatures around 50-55°C in settings where air conditioning is not feasible and the population is not accustomed to those temperatures.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212715/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Chersich receives funding from the Wellcome Trust, US National Institutes of Health and the European Union </span></em></p>Africa has made good progress towards reducing maternal mortality and newborn deaths over the past decade. But climate change is reversing the gains.Matthew Cherisch, Associate Professor at the Wits Reproductive Health & HIV Institute, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2120222023-09-05T15:07:08Z2023-09-05T15:07:08ZFrance in Africa: why Macron’s policies increased distrust and anger<p>French west Africa has experienced <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">five coups</a> in the past three years. Underpinning most of these coups is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66406137">hostility</a> towards France, a former colonial authority. Mohamed Bazoum of Niger’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-underlies-the-coup-in-niger/">downfall</a> in July 2023 comes after coups in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/7/mali-military-promises-return-to-civilian-rule-in-march-2024">Mali</a> in August 2020, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/06/chad-deby-coup-leader-democracy/">Chad</a> in April 2021, <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup/">Burkina Faso</a> in September 2022 and Gabon in September 2023.</p>
<p>The perpetrators of these coups have, among their <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/coups-in-west-africa-is-france-to-blame/">justifications</a>, mentioned the overbearing influence of France and its president, <a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-in-africa-a-cynical-twist-to-repair-the-colonial-past-while-keeping-a-tight-grip-189175">Emmanuel Macron</a>, in their affairs. The influence of France in military affairs and maintenance of dominance in business has been a key cog of the Macron agenda. Unlike other former colonial powers, France still has military <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/06/06/france-will-further-cut-back-military-presence-in-africa_6029304_7.html">bases</a> in Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Gabon. </p>
<p>At the same time, Macron has put forward <a href="https://www.nation.sc/archive/259549/macron-embraces-african-entrepreneurship">entrepreneurship</a> as the best form of development assistance. This strategic pivot away from personal relationships with African leaders is rooted in Macron’s <a href="https://jacobin.com/2021/03/emmanuel-macron-neoliberalism">neoliberal beliefs</a>. This is a political approach that favours free-market capitalism, deregulation and a reduction in government spending. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://www.uu.nl/staff/fplgerits">historian</a> who has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2019.1576170">researched</a> the relationship between France and its former colonies.</p>
<p>In Africa, Macron’s neoliberal turn has stripped France of the long-standing myth that it was somehow a more benevolent coloniser because of the cultural links it established with African elites. Macron’s approach has only increased distrust and anger because a large military presence has not been replaced by a <a href="https://www.president.go.ke/new-financial-order-will-help-the-world-overcome-poverty-and-climate-change/#:%7E:text=President%20William%20Ruto%20has%20said,the%20hands%20of%20the%20few.%E2%80%9D">new international economic order</a>, but with <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-emmanuel-macron-africa-reset-strategy-francafrique/">small-scale business deals and start-ups</a>. This is not what Africans <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/43?ln=en">wanted</a>, but it is what they got.</p>
<h2>Neoliberal values are French values</h2>
<p>Rather than a remaking of the economic and financial infrastructure, Macron has pushed entrepreneurship as development assistance: promoting start-ups and training Africa’s youth. <a href="https://www.afd.fr/fr">Agence Française de Dévelopment</a> (France’s main institution for policy implementation) is still investing in education, agriculture and infrastructure. But what Macron wants observers to notice is that increasingly, French development aid in Africa has to be run by French businesses. </p>
<p>French corporations are no longer making money in secret, as in the era of <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/macron-and-the-future-of-francafrique-6781/">Françafrique</a>. This was a period when French presidents supported African dictators to maintain influence. Rather, Macron’s speeches put forward business activities and neoliberal values as French values that benefit the continent. </p>
<p>This reliance on French culture and values can be seen as a continuation of a strategy that started with the French colonial project. Macron’s values, however, are the values of neoliberalism. At home he has pushed through a pension plan to limit French state debt. Abroad, he wants French development policy to be driven by private initiatives. </p>
<p>In light of that strategy, it becomes clear that sentiments among Africans have not become more anti-French. Rather, by elevating economics to a core value of his relationship to Africa, Macron has played into a widely accepted African worldview in which underdevelopment is the product of dependency on Europe and neocolonial exploitation.</p>
<p>Every visitor who talks to cab drivers or vendors in Dakar figures out quite quickly that the French are seen as colonisers first, possible friends second. What has changed is that Macron has unknowingly confirmed African suspicions about his intentions: he never wanted to change economic structures. Instead Africans get bread crumbs in the form of start-up money. </p>
<h2>The free market as the dividing line in west Africa</h2>
<p>Entrepreneurship is not universally loved on the continent. The belief in the free market as an engine for development has redrawn the battle lines in west Africa. Countries within the regional body Ecowas like Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal – which have had high economic growth in the past decade – are clashing with Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso – which have experienced deepening poverty. </p>
<p>While other African countries like Kenya are confronted with similar debates about how to stimulate development – Kenyan president William Ruto famously believes in the “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220913-william-ruto-kenya-s-hustler-in-chief-president">hustler nation</a>” – climate change and terrorism have led to a more combustible mix in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The juntas that have come to power therefore do not only present themselves as caretakers who are trying to do the job politicians will not do. They are also claiming they want a new ideological direction for their countries. <a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/insight/ibrahim-traore-why-burkina-fasos-leader-attracts-attention-14479334">Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso</a> has styled himself to be the successor to Thomas Sankara, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66282417">Assimi Goïta</a> has cast himself as a reformer not a revolutionary. </p>
<p>In the past, the fires of African instability and anti-French sentiment were fanned by the French underdelivering on their – sometimes cynical – promises of big structural change. Today, instability is being fed by the opposite. It is African leaders who demand big structural change, but are met with small business efforts to maintain French influence on the cheap.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212022/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Gerits does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The French president has struggled to maintain the influence his country gained in Africa through colonialism.Frank Gerits, Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, South Africa and Assistant Professor in the History of International Relations, Utrecht UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127072023-09-04T14:40:57Z2023-09-04T14:40:57ZRussia in Africa: Prigozhin’s death exposes Putin’s real motives on the continent<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-says-prigozhin-plane-crash-may-have-been-caused-deliberately-2023-08-30/">apparent assassination</a> of Yevgeny Prigozhin in the crash of his private jet between Moscow and St. Petersburg represents an inflection point in Russian-African relations. Prigozhin, as leader of the notorious Wagner Group, had been the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/prigozhin-built-an-empire-in-africa-can-it-survive-him-b566755c">point man</a> for Russia in Africa since Wagner first began operations on the continent in 2017. More than a single entity, the Wagner Group is an amalgamation of shell companies deploying paramilitary forces, disinformation and political interference in Ukraine, Syria and Africa. Its leaders have been <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/prigozhin-wagner-plane-crash-last-days-2c44dd5c">sanctioned by 30 countries</a> for the group’s destabilising activities.</p>
<p>Prigozhin was believed to be <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/why-putin-wanted-prigozhin-dead">living on borrowed time</a> after he led a short-lived insurrection – part of a power struggle with the Russian military leadership – in June. While he quickly backed down, the action embarrassed Russian president Vladimir Putin and triggered chatter that Putin’s perceived weakness would embolden other challengers to his authority.</p>
<p>Prigozhin advanced Russian influence in Africa by propping up politically isolated and unpopular authoritarian leaders. As a result of Wagner’s support, these leaders were <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2022/03/21/how-russia-is-pursuing-state-capture-in-africa-ukraine-wagner-group/">beholden to Russian interests</a>. Wagner’s backing took a variety of irregular forms, like paramilitary forces, disinformation campaigns, election interference, intimidation of political opponents, and arms for resources deals. Prigozhin <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/27/yevgeniy-prigozhin-wagner-support-russia/">referred</a> to this interlocking set of influence operations as “The Orchestra”, which he conducted.</p>
<p>Wagner deployed forces to Libya, the Central African Republic, Mali and Sudan. It has also been interfering in domestic politics and information narratives in some <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/russia-interference-undermine-democracy-africa/">two dozen African countries</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://africacenter.org/experts/joseph-siegle/">I research</a> the role of governance in advancing security and development as well as the influence of external actors in Africa, including Russia. Democratic transitions and institutions of democratic accountability are among my interests.</p>
<p>The breadth of Russian political interference in Africa points to <a href="https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/marshall-center-books/russias-global-reach-security-and-statecraft-assessment/chapter-10-russia-and-africa-expanding-influence-and">Russia’s strategic objectives for the continent</a>. It aims to secure a foothold in North Africa and the Red Sea, undermine western influence, normalise authoritarianism and displace the UN-based international system.</p>
<p>None of these objectives are about making Africa more prosperous or stable. Rather, the continent is primarily a theatre to advance Russia’s geostrategic interests.</p>
<p>Attempting to maintain the lucrative and influential operations of the Wagner Group in Africa after Prigozhin’s death will make it hard for Russia to deny that it uses irregular and illegal actions to extend its influence.</p>
<h2>Maintaining Wagner without Prigozhin</h2>
<p>The Wagner model has seen Russian influence expand rapidly in Africa. That’s despite Russia <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/russia-tries-break-isolation-engaging-africa-37131">investing very little on the continent</a>. Most of Wagner’s costs have been covered through cash and mineral concessions provided by host regimes. By some accounts <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/architects-of-terror/">revenues from mining operations</a> in the Central African Republic and Sudan generate billions.</p>
<p>It is no surprise that Russia would want to keep the Wagner enterprise going. Tellingly, on the day of Prigozhin’s plane crash, deputy defence minister <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/russian-deputy-defense-minister-meets-with-libyan-commander/2975834">Yunus-Bek Yevkurov was in Libya</a> to reassure warlord Khalifa Haftar of Russia’s ongoing support. Yevkurov later visited the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-says-leader-discussed-possible-military-cooperation-with-russian-2023-08-31/">military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso</a> to deliver the same message.</p>
<p>The question will be whether the Russian military has the capacity. Russia needs soldiers in Ukraine. So, it may not have experienced fighters to spare in Africa. It is also an open question whether Wagner troops will agree to sign contracts with the Russian defence ministry, given the way their leader was dispatched.</p>
<p>The Russian government would also need to recreate the multidimensional dealings that made Wagner’s operations effective in shoring up client regimes. For years, Russia has promoted <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/report/russian-hybrid-warfare">hybrid warfare</a> – the fusion of conventional and subversive tools. Synchronising this across multiple African contexts will require greater dexterity than the Russian security bureaucracy is likely capable of, however.</p>
<p>Finally, Russia has benefited from the plausible deniability that Wagner has provided while doing Putin’s bidding. In every context in which Wagner forces have been deployed, they have been <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1133007">credibly accused of human rights abuses</a> including rape, torture and extrajudicial killings. In Mali, Wagner is linked to more than 320 incidents of human rights abuses and <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/#s6">hundreds of civilian deaths</a>. Wagner has also been accused of driving away local communities where it has secured mining concessions, effectively annexing African territory.</p>
<p>By directly taking over the mantle of Wagner operations in Africa, the Russian government can no longer claim ignorance or impotence to do anything about these unlawful and destabilising actions. Russia has largely escaped serious reputational costs for Wagner’s thuggish activities in Africa. But this will change when it owns the repressive tactics Wagner has deployed.</p>
<h2>Reassessments in Africa</h2>
<p>What of Wagner’s African clients? Leaders of these regimes have come to power through extraconstitutional means. They restrict opposition voices and media. They are isolated internationally. Simply put, they cannot survive without Moscow’s support. So, we should not expect a change in receptivity from the military juntas in Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso, the co-opted leadership in the Central African Republic, or the Libyan warlord, Haftar.</p>
<p>What will be telling is the reaction from other governments on the continent. Some will continue to see value in flirting with Russia as a way of hedging against international criticism.</p>
<p>Russia’s reach in Africa may be exceeding its grasp, however. There is a growing awakening on the continent of <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-africa-summit-provides-a-global-stage-for-moscow-to-puff-up-its-influence-209982">how little Russia actually brings to Africa</a> in terms of investment, trade, jobs creation or security. Its deployment of mercenaries, disinformation, political interference and arms for resources deals mean it actually amplifies instability on the continent.</p>
<p>The symbolism of this was vividly brought home in the days before the <a href="https://summitafrica.ru/en/">Russia-Africa Summit</a> at the end of July. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-putin-grain-turkey-syria-ac5c945990c2c53eeca37e642ab6c5a7">Russia pulled out of the Black Sea grain deal</a> that had enabled 33 million tonnes of grain to get from Ukraine to Africa and other parts of the world. The deal had eased supply chain restrictions caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Not only did Russia scuttle the deal: it <a href="https://www.eurasiantimes.com/india-china-turkey-urge-russia-to-resume-black-sea-grain/">bombed the Ukrainian ports</a> that were exporting the grain, wasting 180,000 tonnes in the process. The contempt Putin showed for African interests by this action was hard to ignore.</p>
<p>This disregard, coupled with recognition that Russia offers relatively little to Africa, contributed to <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-africa-summit-vladimir-putin-ukraine-war-wagner-group/">only 17 African heads of state</a> attending the St. Petersburg summit. By comparison 43 African heads of state attended the Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi in 2019.</p>
<p>The way that Prigozhin was eliminated must also give African leaders pause. </p>
<p>Putin speaks often of his desire to create a new international order. Russia’s lawlessness at home and abroad is bringing into sharp focus what his world order would look like. And that’s not a vision many African leaders share.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212707/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Siegle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia is not interested in helping Africa to prosper or achieve stability, but as a theatre for advancing the Kremlin’s geostrategic interests.Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, University of MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854482023-08-20T09:27:05Z2023-08-20T09:27:05ZCivilian support for military coups is rising in parts of Africa: why the reasons matter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543212/original/file-20230817-25-4iakmh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The clamour for coups among citizens is rising</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the night of <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/142678/togo-who-killed-sylvanus-olympio-the-father-of-togolese-independence/">13 January 1963</a>, Togo’s President Sylvanus Olympio was shot dead by rebels in the first military coup staged in Africa. A long list, as shown below, was to come. From the 1960s to the end of the millennium, there were an average of four military coups a year on the continent. By the end of the 1990s this phenomenon seemed to have faded away. </p>
<p>But since August 2020 six African nations have suffered seven coups or attempted coups. </p>
<p>First came <a href="https://theconversation.com/malis-predictable-coup-leaves-an-unclear-path-to-civilian-rule-144774">Mali</a>, in August 2020. The military took advantage of social unrest and insecurity caused by the activities of violent extremists. Mali had two coups or attempts in a nine-month span. </p>
<p>In April 2021, <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-signs-of-a-true-transition-in-chad-a-year-after-idriss-debys-death-181203">Chad</a> followed the same path. In March 2021, there was a coup attempt in Niger, and in September 2021 it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/guinea-coup-highlights-the-weaknesses-of-west-africas-regional-body-167650">Guinea’s</a> turn. A month later, it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">Sudan</a>. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/jihadism-and-military-takeovers-in-west-africa-burkina-faso-coup-highlights-the-links-193972">Burkina Faso</a>, an attack in November 2021 led to the coup in January 2022. </p>
<p>More recently, a coup was <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">launched in Niger</a>, deposing President Mohamed Bazoum. Two days later, General Abdourahamane Tchiani declared himself the leader of Niger. </p>
<p>All together, that’s more than <a href="https://defishumanitaires.com/en/2019/11/27/the-sahel-is-a-demographic-bomb/">100 million people</a> being ruled by the military after power was seized violently. All are in the Sahel. This has alerted governments in the region.</p>
<p>Researchers, analysts and journalists have pointed to mismanagement, incompetence, corruption, economic crisis and state weakness as the main factors propelling military coups all over the world and, of course, in Africa. State weakness is a factor in the recent instances in Africa. They have happened partly because of governments’ failure to stem the spread of groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State all over the Sahel. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">Niger coup: why an Ecowas-led military intervention is unlikely</a>
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<p>But there are two intertwined characteristics that differentiate Africa from the rest of the world. One is the public support of many citizens on the streets when there is a coup. The other is the society’s rising support for military rule as a form of government. Popular support for military rule has grown in the last 20 years.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589346.2022.2072582">research</a> explored the reasons for this. I used survey data to examine whether support for nondemocratic rule was mainly due to poor institutional and economic performance or to an existing so-called authoritarian personality and culture in the region. This type of personality refers to values existing in certain societies that make them more prone to embrace authoritarian forms of government. </p>
<p>This distinction is relevant because if the reason for military rule support is cultural, then societies will continue to endorse authoritarian regimes. If the reason is institutional performance, then as long as incumbent governments perform efficiently, both politically and economically, democratic support will overcome authoritarian support.</p>
<h2>Citizen discontent</h2>
<p>I carried out a quantitative analysis using <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a> survey data gathered from 37 African countries, both from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis looked for underlying factors propelling the rise in support for military rule. </p>
<p>Respondents were asked about the extent of their support for military rule as a form of government plus a number of other potential explanatory questions such as perception of corruption, governing and opposition parties performance, economy evaluation and socio-demographic issues like their level of education.</p>
<p>The data shows that from 2000 to the present, the level of support for military rule as a form of government has doubled, from 11.6% of people supporting “much” or “very much” military rule as a form of government to 22.3%. Of the 37 countries <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">analysed</a>, there were 11 where support for military dictatorship was decreasing and 26 where this figure was on the rise. The latest <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/young-africans-show-tolerance-for-military-intervention-a-wake-up-call-afrobarometer-ceo-tells-german-leaders/#:%7E:text=Afrobarometer%20findings%20from%2028%20African,if%20elected%20leaders%20abuse%20power.">Afrobarometer data</a> shows that support for democracy has fallen in the last year. Out of 38 countries, only four show decreasing support for military rule since 2000, whereas 34 show higher support for higher military rule than in 2000.</p>
<p><a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">Support</a> for military rule was higher in “partly free” and “not free” countries than in “free” countries. (They were categorised according to the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world">Freedom House</a> index.) </p>
<p>But there were some exceptions. In <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">South Africa</a>, which is a constitutional democracy with regular elections, one in three South Africans supported military rule as a form of government. In democratic Namibia the level of support showed that one in four Namibians supported military rule.</p>
<h2>Reasons to support military rule</h2>
<p>The analysis points to three conclusions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>In sub-Saharan Africa, the legitimacy of military rule is mainly based on institutional performance and economic management. These are weakened by jihadist organisations rapidly expanding throughout the region. State institutions are not able to tackle their expansion throughout the region.</p></li>
<li><p>In North Africa, institutional performance plays a role but authoritarian personality plays a larger role in the support for military rule.</p></li>
<li><p>Education seems to be an antidote against authoritarianism. Those with higher level of education, according to survey data, show higher level of democratic endorsement.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The study’s findings suggest that people in sub-Saharan Africa are fed up with their governments for many reasons, including security threats, humanitarian disasters and lack of prospects. Waiting for the next elections to take place to change government does not seem to them to be a good option. Opposition parties do not seem to enjoy a better image. For the survey respondents, the solution appears to be to welcome the military to intervene.</p>
<p>If citizens perceive that politicians don’t care about them, this will invite the military to continue overthrowing civil governments, with society publicly legitimising their intervention in politics. </p>
<p>If military, political and economic solutions are not found, military coups in the region will increase and people will continue gathering on the streets to welcome them. Niger’s recent coup may not be the last one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185448/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlos García Rivero is Research Fellow at the Centre for International and Comparative Politics, at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. </span></em></p>Citizen expectations of governments are not being met by most elected leaders.Carlos García Rivero, Associate Professor, Universitat de ValènciaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2113532023-08-11T15:39:27Z2023-08-11T15:39:27ZMilitary coups in Africa: here’s what determines a return to civilian rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542141/original/file-20230810-25-hyb3hk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Niger's July 2023 coup celebrate in the capital, Niamey. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Balima Boureima/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Slightly more than two years after Niger’s first peaceful handover of power from one civilian president to another, the military seized power in July 2023. The coup – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13943662">the fourth in Nigerien history</a> – follows on the heels of recent military interventions in Africa. Mali (August 2020 and May 2021), Chad (April 2021), Guinea (September 2021), Sudan (October 2021) and Burkina Faso (January and September 2022). </p>
<p>Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the number of military coups has <a href="https://arresteddictatorship.com/coups/">declined sharply</a>. However, francophone west Africa now accounts for <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">approximately two-thirds of all military coups</a> that have occurred since then. </p>
<p>As a political scientist analysing African politics, I have <a href="https://people.clas.ufl.edu/selischer/">studied</a> military coups and their outcomes for the last decade and a half. In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">recent article</a>, Justin Hoyle, a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Florida, and I demonstrate that since 1989, military coups across the world have resulted in two outcomes. </p>
<p>First is the withdrawal of the junta from executive power. This means the junta doesn’t participate or interfere in post-coup elections. While it is necessary for the transition to democracy, it isn’t sufficient in itself. This scenario played out in the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/110/439/295/164122">Nigerien coup of 2010</a> and the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00472330701651929">Thailand coup of 2006</a>. </p>
<p>Second is electoral rigging by the junta in favour of its own candidate. This scenario establishes a regime in which coup leaders entrench themselves in executive power.</p>
<p>Examining how military coups unfold is crucial to understanding a country’s path back to democracy. It also provides insights into the effect of coups on the <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691217000/shock-to-the-system">quality of democracy</a>.</p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>We <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">studied</a> five countries and 12 post-coup transitions: Egypt (coups in 2011 and 2013), Mauritania (coups in 2005 and 2008), Niger (1996, 1999 and 2010), Fiji (2000 and 2006) and Thailand (1991, 2006 and 2014). </p>
<p>Overall, we examined slightly more than a third of all military coups between 1989 and 2017.</p>
<p>Out of a total of 32 post-coup environments, we found that in half of all cases, juntas withdrew from executive power in the coup’s aftermath.</p>
<p>However, even with the military’s withdrawal from power, the transition period to civilian rule was highly volatile. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, counter-coup attempts by a rival faction within the armed forces intending to remain in power occurred rather frequently. This was the case most recently in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2015/09/17/441222504/presidential-guard-announces-takeover-of-burkina-faso">Burkina Faso in 2015</a>. </p>
<p>Although many coups result in the withdrawal of juntas from executive power, many of the cases from our study were near-misses – the country could’ve ended up under <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/military-coups-are-key-to-understanding-contemporary-autocracies/">military authoritarian rule</a>.</p>
<p>We examined four key variables and their influence on coup outcomes. These are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the internal coherence of the armed forces</p></li>
<li><p>the ability of civil society organisations and political parties to mobilise against the junta</p></li>
<li><p>the deployment of donor leverage </p></li>
<li><p>trade dependency on regional and western partners. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Of these, we argue that the two that matter the most are: the internal cohesion of the military and the vibrancy of civil society groups. </p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>In our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">analysis</a>, we found that the single most important variable that accounts for different coup outcomes is the internal coherence of the military.</p>
<p>When there’s internal coherence, militaries generally feel <a href="https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article-abstract/12/2/192/2367607">inclined</a> to <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691217000/shock-to-the-system">withdraw</a> from executive power. This is because holding on to power <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-213418">challenges</a> their internal cohesion.</p>
<p>Internal cohesion <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">is based on</a> the factors that triggered the coup. If a coup occurs in response to threats to the country’s territorial integrity, to the preservation of public order, or to the military’s material or reputational benefits, the junta will have the backing of the military at large. This is because the benefits of seeking power outweigh the risks of not being in power. </p>
<p>If a coup occurs for reasons outside these, the junta either won’t seek power or will face resistance from within the military and withdraw. We found this confirmed in all the coups that we analysed.</p>
<p>Another relevant yet less significant variable is the positioning of civil society toward the junta. </p>
<p>Where civil society groups manage to rally the population to demand a return to democratic civilian rule, juntas depart from power. The most prominent example of this was in <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=de&lr=&id=xSZwAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=egypt+2011+nepsted&ots=r-G56kRRmg&sig=YmiQioJNNM-ECTabvUcrsIT2w_c#v=onepage&q=egypt%202011%20nepsted&f=false">Egypt after the 2011 coup</a>. </p>
<p>Interestingly, we didn’t find that aid dependency or membership in an international organisation with anti-coup rules exerted any discernible influence on juntas. This means that domestic variables – and in particular the drivers of the coup – influence political aftermaths.</p>
<h2>What it all means</h2>
<p>For the current transitions in parts of Africa, these findings are troubling. </p>
<p>In Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad, militaries overthrew their governments because of threats to their countries’ territorial integrity or to the military’s material benefits. The juntas in these countries can rely on the backing of the military at large. This decreases the likelihood of a return to civilian rule. </p>
<p>The implications of our findings for Niger and Guinea are less straightforward, however. Here, coups were staged by a sub-section of the military, even though such a move wasn’t in line with the interests of the armed forces at large. Our research findings suggest a more volatile dynamic for these two post-coup states.</p>
<p>At this stage, no one can predict how the motives of Niger’s presidential guard will shape future action. Much will depend on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66430115">coup leader Abdourahmane Tchiani’s</a> ability to convince the military that a coup was the right thing to do politically. </p>
<p>Generally, military coups bode ill for democratic processes. In instances where juntas withdraw from power, democracies don’t emerge. When juntas rig post-coup elections, they <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/military-coups-are-key-to-understanding-contemporary-autocracies/">become entrenched in power</a> in the medium to long-term. This has devastating consequences for the political and civil rights of their populations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211353/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sebastian Elischer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Examining how military coups unfold is crucial to understanding a country’s path back to democracy.Sebastian Elischer, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111362023-08-08T12:28:33Z2023-08-08T12:28:33ZNiger coup: why an Ecowas-led military intervention is unlikely<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541537/original/file-20230807-34367-f6znll.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Niger's coup leaders waving at a crowd of supporters in Niamey on August 6, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Balima Boureima/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hopes are fading for a quick resolution of Niger’s coup or the potential use of force by the <a href="https://ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (Ecowas) to free Nigerien president Mohammed Bazoum and restore him to power.</p>
<p>Ecowas leaders gave the Nigerien military junta <a href="https://ecowas.int/final-communique-fifty-first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">an ultimatum</a> to cede power within seven days of 30 July or face a military intervention.</p>
<p>The deadline of 6 August came and went, and the putschists remained. Ecowas meets again on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/7/ecowas-calls-for-second-emergency-summit-to-discuss-niger-coup">10 August</a> to discuss the situation in Niger. However, hopes of a Nigeria-led Ecowas military intervention in Niger now appears dim. </p>
<p>The first indication that it would be difficult to immediately restore democracy in the country surfaced when <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/6/thousands-in-niger-rally-in-support-of-coup-leaders">demonstrations</a> in support of the coup started. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-coup-mohamed-bazoum-military-junta-sahel-88ccaa2f004db44601e59475199c5fbe">attack</a> on the French embassy in Niamey was followed by a daily protest in support of the coup. The size of the protest increased daily. </p>
<p><a href="https://indepthnews.net/niger-coup-reflects-anti-french-sentiment-in-the-region/">Anti-France sentiments</a> also increased, with more people supporting the junta. </p>
<p>Niger shares a border with <a href="https://www.worlddata.info/africa/niger/index.php">seven countries</a> in the region, four of which are members of Ecowas. Of those four, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230801-burkina-faso-and-mali-say-intervention-in-niger-would-be-declaration-of-war">Mali and Burkina Faso</a> have been suspended due to similar coups d'etat. </p>
<p>Both countries have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/1/burkina-faso-and-mali-warn-against-foreign-intervention-after-niger-coup">threatened</a> to support Niger if Ecowas tries to use force. The remaining two countries in the bloc bordering Niger are Nigeria and Benin. Outside Ecowas, Chad and Algeria have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230806-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-pressure-mounts-on-niger-coup-leaders-as-ecowas-deadline-approaches">both ruled out</a> participating in any military action and Libya has its own challenges. </p>
<p>The likelihood of a military intervention further diminished when Nigerian legislators <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/318122/nigerias-senate-rejects-military-intervention-in-niger-as-ultimatum-to-coup-leaders-expires/">rejected</a> the idea. They argued for the use of “other means” than force. Nigeria is the largest country in the Ecowas bloc and <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/118585-nigeria-ecowas-largest-donor-continually-outsmarted-by-smaller-west-african-countries.html">principal financier</a> of the bloc. </p>
<p>It will be difficult for Ecowas to carry out military intervention without the full support of Nigeria. As a scholar of <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">politics and international relations</a> I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329456894_US_Drone_Base_in_Agadez_A_Security_Threat_to_Niger">researched</a> the implications of foreign military bases in Niger. I have also previously <a href="https://isij.eu/article/interorganizational-cooperation-and-fight-against-terrorism-west-africa-and-sahel">analysed the role Nigeria plays</a> in regional organisations such as Ecowas and the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Taskforce</a> in the region. </p>
<p>My view is that the unwillingness of Nigeria’s politicians to support military intervention, coupled with growing local support for the junta in Niger, will make the use of force almost impossible. This leaves Ecowas with little or no option than to pursue a diplomatic resolution. </p>
<h2>Why military intervention is unlikely</h2>
<p>There are three main reasons why the use of force is becoming more unlikely.</p>
<p>First, the increasing popularity of the putschists in the country is a cause for concern. The growth of protests in support of the coup is an indication of a wider acceptance than previously envisaged.</p>
<p>Hundreds of youths <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/deadline-arrived-nigers-junta-reinstate-president-residents-brace-102053037">joined</a> military personnel to stand guard at the entrance to Niamey. Some of these youths vowed to join the military to fight any incursion.</p>
<p>Second, politicians in Nigeria and Ghana fear that any military intervention would result in human catastrophe, which would further destabilise the region. Politicians from Nigeria <a href="https://north-africa.com/nigerian-president-tinubu-under-pressure-to-avoid-war-with-northern-neighbor-niger/">argue</a> that any war in Niger will have a serious impact on northern Nigeria, a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2020.1811662">region that is already strained</a> by insurgency. </p>
<p>Apart from Islamist terror organisation, <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html">Boko Haram</a>, which has ravaged the north-eastern part of the country, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2020.1811662">clashes</a> between farmers and pastoralists have also destabilised other parts of northern Nigeria. </p>
<p>Seven Nigerian states share borders with Niger. An attack on Niger would lead to a large influx of refugees into Nigeria. This has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66420693">created anxiety</a> in northern Nigeria. President Bola Tinubu, who took office only recently, will find it difficult to ignore the senators from the region who <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/614494-niger-coup-nigerian-senators-reject-tinubus-request-for-troops-deployment.html">rejected</a> any military intervention.</p>
<p>Third, Niger has fought terrorism in the region and has been a reliable partner. The country is a member of the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> and the <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Counter-terrorism-projects/G5-Sahel">G5 Sahel</a>, two key organisations tasked with countering terrorism and fighting trafficking in the region. </p>
<p>A military intervention in Niger which could result in a full blown war would embolden terrorist groups. It will also result in soldiers previously fighting side by side against terrorist groups now fighting against each other.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/islamic-state-west-africa-province">Islamic State West Africa Province</a>, an Isis affiliate, already operating in the region, an attack on Niger could create a situation similar to what happened in Syria. Isis took advantage of the fighting in Syria to establish a caliphate in 2014.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Since military intervention to restore democracy in Niger is unlikely, diplomacy remains the only solution. </p>
<p>The de facto leader General Abdourahamane Tiani was on the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/318026/10-things-to-know-about-niger-coup-leader-general-abdourahamane-tiani/">verge of being removed</a> as leader of the presidential guard before the coup d'etat. Many high-ranking military officers in the country are involved in the mutiny and it is almost impossible they will be able to work with Bazoum again. They could be <a href="https://www.pgaction.org/ilhr/adp/ner.html">tried for treason</a>, which is punishable by death in Niger.</p>
<p>As I have <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721#:%7E:text=In%20addition%20to%20insecurity%20and,labelled%20as%20having%20foreign%20origins.">explained</a> elsewhere, the mutiny was partly a result of the large presence of foreign military troops in the country. It has further weakened the relationship between the Nigerien military and France. </p>
<p>The military junta has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/niger-coup-leaders-end-military-cooperation-with-france-deepening-concerns-over-anti-western-turn-e7fae57e">cancelled</a> military cooperation with France. </p>
<p>If Bazoum is released and restored as president, he will have to remove several military leaders who participated in the coup or renegotiate Niger’s military alliance with France. Both options are fraught with difficulties. </p>
<p>The most likely diplomatic option is for Ecowas to negotiate a short transition window with the military junta. This will include a quick return to democratic rule. </p>
<p>This will calm the tension and give some assurance to partners within and outside the region. With the level of support the junta has received from the Nigerien public and outside the country, Ecowas negotiators must be open to making concessions. </p>
<p>Third party countries with lower stakes in Niger must lead these negotiations and France must be willing to change its relationship with the country to one of mutual benefit. At the moment, Nigeriens see France as an exploiter and are keen to end their long-held relationship. </p>
<p>In all, there’s no easy solution to the impasse in Niger.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211136/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A combination of Nigerian and Nigerien factors dim prospects of Ecowas military intervention in Niger.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111392023-08-07T15:30:39Z2023-08-07T15:30:39ZNiger: with a key deadline passed, Nigeria must take decisive steps to prevent a civil war in its neighborhood<p>The deadline set by the <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/economic-community-west-african-states#:%7E:text=The%2015%20members%20of%20the,%2C%20Sierra%20Leone%2C%20and%20Togo.">Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas)</a> for the elected president of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum – who was deposed in a coup on July 26 – to be reinstated to office <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/niger-coup-junta-closes-airspace-as-deadline-to-reinstate-ousted-president-passes-12935276">has passed</a>. West Africa is now bracing to see how Ecowas, which has threatened to take all steps, including military intervention, will react.</p>
<p>The situation is complicated by the fact that several member states of Ecowas, including Mali and Burkina Faso, both of which have also had recent military coups, have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230807-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-niger-junta-closes-airspace-as-ecowas-deadline-expires">publicly supported the coup plotters</a>.</p>
<p>The military junta, led by the former leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tiani, is understood to have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-coup-niger-military-force-e0e1108b58a9e955af465a3efe6605c0">asked for assistance</a> from the Russian-owned mercenary Wagner Group.</p>
<p>Niger’s coup bears serious consequences for regional peace, security, and stability in west Africa, especially as it affects Nigeria and the already <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66322914">troubled Sahel region</a>. Niger, which has been described as the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/how-military-coup-niger-threatens-stability-west-africa-2023-07-27/">only hope</a>” for stability in the Sahel, is struggling to contain two insurgencies in the south of the country involving jihadi groups which have spilled over from Mali and Nigeria.</p>
<p>In its response to the coup, a <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/news/first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">summit held in Nigeria by Ecowas</a> issued a seven-day ultimatum to the coup leaders calling on them to relinquish political power. But thus far the military junta has shown no signs of backing down and is supported by a significant number of Niger’s population. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ecowas countries" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Strife-torn neighbourhood: the Ecowas group of west African countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ecowas.png">Scantyzer1/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The options now before Ecowas are to extend the deadline to give mediation and diplomatic efforts a chance, or to proceed with the threatened military intervention. The Nigerian Senate <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/08/06/coup-nigerian-senate-rejects-tinubus-proposal-for-military-intervention-in-niger-republic/">voted against military action</a> on August 5 and public opinion appears to favour further mediation.</p>
<p>Having called on the Wagner Group for assistance in the event of an Ecowas military intervention, it appears likely that Niger’s coup leaders will look to Moscow to fill the gaps resulting from the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-loses-aid-western-countries-condemn-coup-2023-07-29/">suspension of humanitarian and security aid</a> by western powers. This would further entrench Russia’s influence in the region. </p>
<h2>Jihadi insurgency threats</h2>
<p>Despite Niger being seen in the west as a “poster-child” for stability in the region following the peaceful transition of power in elections in 2021, parts of the country are afflicted by ongoing violence. In the southwestern Tillabéri region, which borders Mali and Burkina Faso, more than 2,500 people have been killed and 100,000 displaced by fighting involving a number of armed insurgent groups.</p>
<p>Elsewhere in southern Niger there is overspill from violence in northern Nigeria involving jihadist groups, including Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel">Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP)</a>.</p>
<p>As with elsewhere in the Sahel, Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries are keen to <a href="https://theconversation.com/mapping-the-contours-of-jihadist-groups-in-the-sahel-168539">exploit the turmoil</a> to help Moscow increase its influence in the region at the expense of the former colonial power, France, as well as the US. Both have had peacekeeping troops in the region. </p>
<p>To add to the instability, there are estimated to be as many <a href="https://dailytrust.com/matawalle-there-are-30000-armed-bandits-across-the-north/">30,000 “bandits”</a>, mainly operating in and around northern Nigeria. While described as “terrorists” by the Nigerian government, these are generally driven by economic and criminal, enterprises. There is already a <a href="https://unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs//the-complex-dynamics-of-small-arms-in-west-africa-en-329.pdf">flourishing trade</a> in illegal small arms and light weapons in the region, made easier by the porous border between Niger and its neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>The net result of this violence is an explosion in the number of refugees and displaced people, which would only increase were civil war to break out in Niger. This would put intense pressure on Nigeria’s already strained social and medical infrastructure. Niger is already hosting an estimated <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/ner">influx of 30,000 refugees</a> from the conflict in Mali who would be likely to flee into Nigeria were violence to spread in Niger.</p>
<h2>All eyes on Nigeria’s response</h2>
<p>Nigeria, which currently holds the chair of Ecowas, has taken some decisive steps intended at reversing the coup in Niger, such as backing the Chadian leader who is acting as a mediator. </p>
<p>It has also <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230801-coup-d-%C3%A9tat-au-niger-une-d%C3%A9l%C3%A9gation-de-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao-avec-le-sultan-de-sokoto-leader-religieux-influent-attendue-%C3%A0-niamey">dispatched a team of mediators</a> which includes the former military leader of Nigeria, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdusalam-Abubakar">General Abdulsamali Abubakar</a>, and the Sultan of Sokoto, <a href="https://themuslim500.com/profiles/muhammadu-saadu-abubakar-iii/">Sa'adu Abubakar</a>, who leads the Sokoto Caliphate, a Sunni Muslim community of West Africa.</p>
<p>Military action from Ecowas would come at a heavy cost to Nigeria, whose economy is in the process of a <a href="https://businessday.ng/news/article/world-bank-imf-others-back-tinubus-economic-reforms/">long-overdue programme of economic reform</a> and cannot afford to fund such a military intervention. The cost of previous Ecowas interventions, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone, has largely been borne by Nigeria. Ecowas must ensure that all options for a negotiated peace settlement are fully explored and at most should deploy a contingent of special operations forces on high alert to Nigeria’s border with Niger.</p>
<p>So despite the passing of the Ecowas deadline, member states must take great care not to allow the situation to descend into a civil war which could draw in the rest of the Sahel on either side. That would have calamitous consequences for the region and major implications for global security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>All eyes are on Nigeria where west African countries are discussing the possibility of military intervention to reverse the coup.Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2109902023-08-03T15:15:11Z2023-08-03T15:15:11ZNiger coup: west African union has pledged to intervene – but some members support the plotters<p>When the Nigerian president, <a href="https://businessday.ng/columnist/article/questionable-mandate-tinubu-lacks-legitimacy-to-govern-nigeria/">Bola Tinubu</a>, was elected as chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) on July 10, he asserted that the organisation would no longer be a “<a href="https://pmnewsnigeria.com/2023/07/10/tinubu-asks-ecowas-leaders-to-stop-being-toothless-bulldogs-against-coup-plotters/">toothless bulldog</a>”. Tinubu insisted that Ecowas would work collectively to <a href="https://leadership.ng/ecowas-must-rise-against-coup-detat-tinubu/">combat terrorism and promote democracy</a> in west Africa, explaining:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We must stand firm on democracy. There is no governance, freedom and rule of law without democracy. We will not accept coup after coup in west Africa again. Democracy is very difficult to manage but it is the best form of government.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Within a month, however, the democratically elected leader of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/26/africa/niger-presidency-attempted-coup-intl/index.html">overthrown by his own palace guard</a>.</p>
<p>As Tinubu noted when taking on the leadership of Ecowas, <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/01/a-deeper-look-into-the-west-african-coup-wave/">coups and counter-coups</a> have become commonplace within the region in recent years. Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso (twice in eight months) have all experienced military takeovers that have ousted their elected governments. Now the same fate has befallen Niger, where the election of Bazoum in April 2021 was considered to be a rare case of successful and democratic transition of power in west Africa. </p>
<p>The coup – which installed the former leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, as leader – has been roundly condemned by the US, France, the EU and the United Nations. The US, which has has had troops in Niger for more than a decade advising the country’s military on counter-terrorism, said it would “take measures” to restore democratic government in the country. </p>
<p>On July 30, Ecowas issued a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ecowas-threatens-use-of-force-against-niger-junta/a-66398008">seven-day ultimatum</a> vowing to use force to dislodge the junta should they not restore Bazoum to the presidency. </p>
<p>Ecowas has also <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/7/29/23812389/niger-coup-africa-ecowas-tchiani-bazoum">closed its countries’ borders</a> with Niger, instituted a no-fly zone, and frozen the country’s assets and those of those involved in the coup and their families. In addition, Nigeria has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66383119">discontinued electricity supplies to Niger</a>, leading to blackouts in its major cities. But the junta has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-reopens-borders-with-several-neighbours-week-after-coup-2023-08-02/">pledged not to back down</a> despite these “inhumane sanctions”.</p>
<h2>What is Ecowas?</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/002190961557095">Ecowas</a>, a 15-member regional group formed in 1975 and comprising mainly former British and French colonies, aims to “<a href="https://ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">promote cooperation and integration</a>” among members in the form of an economic union. Over the years, it has expanded its remit to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">include a security role</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ecowas nations" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ecowas: a community of west African nations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Scantyzer1 via Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1990, the group’s military wing, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog), was deployed in a peacekeeping role in the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13533319408413509">civil war in Liberia</a>, enjoying initial success but ultimately failing to prevent the outbreak of further hostilities that lasted through most of the 1990s – only ending with the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2005.</p>
<p>In neighbouring Sierra Leone, Johnny Paul Koroma, an army major, led a military coup on May 25 1997, overthrowing the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Ecomog troops stationed in Liberia were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45194480">deployed to restore peace and democracy there</a>, but were unable to prevent a bitter civil war <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094419">breaking out</a>, requiring intervention from UN peacekeepers and British troops.</p>
<p>In both Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire, Ecowas has again intervened to ensure the democratic transition of power when it appeared that the incumbent leaders would not respect election results.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">How The Gambia is testing West Africa's resolve to protect democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Stretching military capacity</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen whether Ecowas will follow through with its pledge to intervene if Bazoum is not restored to office in Niger. But conditions are very different in the region now from when the organisation successfully led the interventions described above.</p>
<p>West Africa is riddled with violence associated with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2021.1888082?casa_token=cDR2sgiLEKoAAAAA%3ASTrfRYVK_ZnNjGov4jaEa82EoITfidvU_FtyHW-zZfPFxLZDo-6oJ_-_oEBSBR-V1RhMeA6lFg">jihadi terrorism</a> involving Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram. There are also regular <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2022.2129015">outbreaks of violence</a> between herders and farmers over land in the face of droughts and scarcity of resources. These issues have <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-islamic-state-affiliate-attempts-to-assassinate-nigerian-president">stretched the military capacity</a> of Ecowas member states, many of whom have their own problems to deal with.</p>
<p>And then there’s the prospect of the involvement of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">the Wagner Group</a>. The coup junta is reported <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/02/africa/niger-coup-mali-wagner-intl-afr/index.html">to be engaged in discussions</a> with this Russia-backed mercenary army, which has been active across the region. Several countries where the Wagner Group is involved <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/613369-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-declare-support-for-niger-coup-as-soldiers-arrest-politicians.html">have declared their backing</a> for the coup, rejected the Ecowas sanctions, and pledged support for the coup leaders if Ecowas intervenes militarily.</p>
<p>As in Burkina Faso and Mali, there is also growing <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/africa/protesters-attack-french-embassy-niger-west-african-governments-threat-rcna97181">anti-French sentiment</a> on the streets of Niger. This is being fuelled by the Wagner Group’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who has hailed the coup as a blow against colonialism – a message which resonates with many in Niger, where France maintains a 1,500-strong peacekeeping force to combat jihadist terrorism. </p>
<h2>Unpopular leader</h2>
<p>Much has been made by Bazoum’s opponents of his membership <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/02/19/who-is-nigerien-presidential-candidate-mohamed-bazoum/">of a minority ethnic Arab group</a>, which led to him being dubbed as “foreign” during Niger’s election campaign. His election was also condemned in some quarters as cronyism, as he was the handpicked successor of the outgoing president Mahamadou Issoufou. Bazoum’s decision to ban members of his government from <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202206160312.html">having more than one wife</a> has also ruffled powerful feathers.</p>
<p>All these factors will complicate any decision by Ecowas to use force to restore Bazoum to power. But Nigeria, under the leadership of Tinubu, appears determined to take this opportunity to prove that Ecowas still wields muscle in the region.</p>
<p>His chief of staff, General Christopher Musa, has assembled Ecowas defence ministers for a <a href="https://leadership.ng/just-in-ecowas-defence-chiefs-meet-in-abuja-over-niger-coup/">two-day summit in Abuja</a>. Representatives from Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, The Gambia, Cote D’Ivoire, Cabo Verde, and Senegal attended, while Niger, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau were not represented.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia and the west – which harbours fears about Moscow’s intentions in the region – are both watching closely to see whether yet another west African country will descend into the pit of instability and violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olumba E. Ezenwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The coup in Niger has the potential to further destabilise the whole of west Africa.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2083272023-07-04T13:26:56Z2023-07-04T13:26:56ZBelgium’s AfricaMuseum has a dark colonial past – it’s making slow progress in confronting this history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533840/original/file-20230624-80593-c4qk77.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">DRC Prime Minister Jean-Michel Lukonde (L) at Belgium's AfricaMuseum in 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jasper Jacobs via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/belgiums-africamuseum-has-a-dark-colonial-past-its-making-slow-progress-in-confronting-this-history-208327&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Racist displays and stories remain on display in several western European museums. They include grotesque objects depicting African people as “savage” and “wild”. Narratives of a “continent without history” and fantasies of European superiority are still told in ethnographic museums, like the <a href="https://www.humboldtforum.org/en/">Humboldt Forum in Berlin</a> and the <a href="https://www.quaibranly.fr/en/">Musée du quai Branly in Paris</a>.</p>
<p>These museums have been criticised by scholars and activists since the 1970s. Their handling of objects looted during the colonial period, especially from Africa, is seen as an indicator of the political relations between Europe and African nations. </p>
<p>Criticism ranges from the illegitimate acquisition of the objects to the often-racist representation of the African continent and its inhabitants. It also includes the lack of participation by African and diasporic actors.</p>
<p>After initial hesitation, Belgium, a former colonial power, <a href="https://theconversation.com/retracing-belgiums-dark-past-in-the-congo-and-attempts-to-forge-deeper-ties-184903">opened itself</a> to debate about reparations, justice and a common future with its African partners in the late 1990s. </p>
<p>This change in attitude was accelerated by mounting pressure from the <a href="https://www.rosalux.eu/en/article/1796.black-lives-matter-in-belgium-june-july-2020.html">Black Lives Matter movement in Belgium</a>. International advances by other former colonial powers like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/27/world/americas/colonial-reparations.html">France, Germany and Great Britain</a> in the restitution debate also created impetus. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.africamuseum.be/en/discover/history">AfricaMuseum</a> in the Tervuren suburb is at the centre of these debates in Belgium. It’s an institution in the process of repairing its troubled history. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An long shot of a beige building with its reflection showing in a pool of water" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The main building of the AfricaMuseum in Tervuren built in the 1900s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As a white and privileged researcher who focuses on colonial memory, racism and anti-colonial movements in Europe, my perspective on the AfricaMuseum is divided. For more than 10 years, the museum has been part of <a href="http://iwk-jena.uni-jena.de/julien-bobineau/">my cultural studies research</a>. In my view, the museum is marked by a dusty past and has shown little evidence of post-colonial self-reflection. On the other hand, there are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-65827002">serious efforts</a> to change. </p>
<h2>Colonial looting</h2>
<p>The AfricaMuseum’s forerunner was initiated in 1897 by the Belgian king <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Leopold-II-king-of-Belgium">Leopold II</a> (1835-1909). It was a colonial human zoo within the Brussels World’s Fair. A Congolese village was recreated in Tervuren “exhibiting” 60 Congolese residents. Seven of them didn’t survive the exhibition, which lasted several months. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A sculpture of a man drumming while another one holds up a spear ready to attack another man who is lying on the ground. They are in the centre of a room that has knives and swords on display on the walls" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Racist depictions of Africans in the museum in the 1920s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1910, the space opened as the Museum of the Belgian Congo and presented ethnographic collections. The colonial institution initially served the purpose of legitimising the <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/King-Leopolds-Ghost-Heroism-Colonial/dp/1447211359">brutal colonial rule</a> in the Congo Basin. It promoted the so-called “civilising mission” in Africa among the Belgian population. </p>
<p>It presented an alleged European superiority, underlined with pseudo-scientific methods and a racist representation of African cultures. </p>
<p>The exhibited objects were mostly looted from colonised territories by Belgian officials, the military and private persons. </p>
<p>There was <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/39892/pdf">little awareness</a> of these material and immaterial injustices in Belgium until the late 1990s. To this day, some <a href="https://www.memoiresducongo.be/en/">conservative positions</a> glorify the Belgian colonial period as a justified and philanthropic undertaking. </p>
<p>Even after the Democratic Republic of Congo’s independence on 30 June 1960, the museum retained its original concept under the name Royal Museum for Central Africa. It exuded a peculiar kind of colonial “nostalgia”. As late as 2001, the US anthropologist Jean Muteba Rahier described the museum as <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/39892/summary">a colonial place frozen in time</a>. </p>
<p>In 2013, the museum was <a href="https://www.africamuseum.be/en/discover/renovation">closed for extensive renovations</a>. It reopened as the AfricaMuseum in December 2018, with the then director Guido Gryseels <a href="https://www.exhibitionsinternational.be/documents/catalog/objects/PDF/9789085867814_01.pdf#page=4">saying</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>… the museum has distanced itself from colonialism as a form of government and accepts responsibility for the part it played in the past in disseminating stereotypes about Africa.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Today, the AfricaMuseum holds over 125,000 ethnographic objects. It has 300,000 geological specimens, 8,000 musical instruments and nearly 10 million biological exhibits. It also holds sound and film recordings. A few human remains are among the museum’s collections. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Wooden sculptures on display behind a glass case." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Congolese sculptures on display at the AfricaMuseum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Julien Bobineau</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The origin and exact circumstances of the acquisition of these objects remain largely unexplained. It can be assumed that most of the collection was illegally looted during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Belgian-Congo">colonial period</a>. </p>
<h2>Recognising African heritage</h2>
<p>Closely related to the question of restitution is a revision of the way Africa and Africans are represented in ethnographic museums. The AfricaMuseum attempted to address this in its 2013-2018 renovation. </p>
<p>Yet, some objects remain placed in a context that allows for a pejorative view of Africa. This is evidenced by the combination of the depiction of Congolese culture and the natural history of humankind in one space.</p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/arts/emmanuel-macron-africa.html">French president Emmanuel Macron</a> triggered more debate over restitution while in Burkina Faso in 2017, the AfricaMuseum focused on addressing the origin of its objects. Reparation and representation of African and diasporic voices became a priority. </p>
<p>This was supported by <a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/117289/parliament-approves-commission-on-belgiums-colonial-past">political debates</a> in the Belgian parliament in 2021 and 2022. They led to the formulation of <a href="https://restitutionbelgium.be/">ethical principles for restitution</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.africamuseum.be/en/about_us/restitution">A new law was passed</a> that provides a framework for the return of looted objects. This is a starting point for a redefinition of Belgian-Congolese relations. </p>
<h2>Early results</h2>
<p>Belgium has since sent the Democratic Republic of Congo a <a href="https://www.africamuseum.be/de/about_us/restitution">draft bilateral restitution treaty</a>. It proposes, for example, a joint commission to coordinate scientific investigations into the origin of objects in Belgium’s possession. </p>
<p>In June 2021, the ownership rights of almost <a href="https://heritagetribune.eu/belgium/africa-museum-set-to-start-gradual-return-of-looted-artefacts-to-congo/">800 looted objects</a> from the AfricaMuseum were transferred to the Congolese state – though they still haven’t fully returned to Kinshasa. </p>
<p>In February 2022, Belgian prime minister Alexander De Croo presented Congolese prime minister Jean-Michel Lukonde with a list of more than <a href="https://observer.com/2022/03/restitution-ceremony-at-belgiums-africamuseum-precedes-eu-au-summit/">84,000 artefacts</a> from the Congo. Those artefacts have been in Belgium’s possession since colonisation and are now to be examined with a view to possible restitution.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>The restitution of looted objects from former colonies in Africa is an essential component of a post-colonial reparation. </p>
<p>Some European politicians, museum directors and scholars have pointed to an alleged lack of storage facilities in Africa. This argument shouldn’t count. </p>
<p>The vast majority of artefacts were seized from their original context and only transformed into “art objects” in European museums. In Germany, for example, debate flared up this year as to whether restituted Benin bronzes should become the private property of the royal family of Benin – the legitimate owners – <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-05-19/legitimate-concerns-or-neocolonialism-germany-expresses-worry-about-the-fate-of-the-benin-bronzes-following-their-restitution-to-nigeria.html">or be exhibited in Nigerian museums</a>. This shouldn’t be Germany’s concern.</p>
<p>To put restitution into practice, four things are needed now:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>humility on the European side</p></li>
<li><p>a deeper willingness for cooperation</p></li>
<li><p>funds</p></li>
<li><p>transparent and open dialogue. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The new Belgian path shows that this seems possible, though there’s still a long way to go.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208327/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julien Bobineau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The restitution of looted objects from former colonies in Africa is an essential component of post-colonial reparation.Julien Bobineau, Assistant Professor, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität JenaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2050832023-05-17T13:24:05Z2023-05-17T13:24:05ZTeen mothers and depression: lack of support from partners and violence are big drivers in Malawi and Burkina Faso<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526211/original/file-20230515-15365-5il9n2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ann Rodchua/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Up to <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-health/adolescent-health/">one in four</a> African girls have their first child before the age of 18. Becoming a mother at such a young age can lead to mental health problems like depression. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3876179/">Research</a> suggests that pregnant and parenting teenagers have poorer mental health than adult mothers. </p>
<p>Several factors make teenage mothers vulnerable to mental illness. For example, in conservative societies pregnant, unmarried adolescent girls are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17441692.2020.1751230">shamed</a> and excluded. Parenting is stressful. Early and unintended pregnancy can add to the pressure. Moreover the loss of childhood can overwhelm and distress adolescent girls. </p>
<p>Adolescent mothers from poor homes and communities are at even <a href="https://europepmc.org/backend/ptpmcrender.fcgi?accid=PMC3876179&blobtype=pdf">higher risk</a> of depression. These girls experience social inequality, chronic stress, violence and food insecurity. When teenagers become mothers, their adversities are compounded. </p>
<p>Several studies have looked at <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0890856718319063">drivers of depression</a> among adolescents in general. But there is scant attention to the mental wellbeing of pregnant and parenting adolescent girls in Africa. Scant research means limited programme or intervention focus. Limited attention means there is a missed opportunity to address poor mental health in this group. Pregnant and parenting adolescents face different challenges from their peers who are not pregnant or parenting.</p>
<p>Our recent <a href="https://reproductive-health-journal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12978-023-01588-x">study</a> estimates the level of probable depression among pregnant and parenting girls in Burkina Faso in West Africa and Malawi in southern Africa. We chose these countries because they showed potential for policy change around adolescent sexual and reproductive health. </p>
<p>We used the <a href="https://www.hiv.uw.edu/page/mental-health-screening/phq-9">Patient Health Questionnaire-9</a>, the tool used in diagnosing depression. But only a clinician can ultimately decide if an individual has depression. We thus classify those in this study who met the clinical criteria for depression as probably depressed. </p>
<p>We explored the factors associated with a higher likelihood of depression. We found that depression was highest among girls who experienced sexual, emotional and physical violence from their partners; whose partners denied paternity or refused to provide any support; who received no support from their community; who described their neighbourhood as unsafe. </p>
<p>Our study showed that the prevalence of probable depression in Burkina Faso was 18.8%. In Malawi it was 14.5%. But cases of depression were undiagnosed and untreated. This could have dire implications for the health and wellness of the girls and their babies. </p>
<h2>Our study</h2>
<p>We interviewed 980 adolescent girls in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, and 669 girls in Blantyre, Malawi in 2021. We asked them how often they had faced the following problems over the last two weeks: having little interest or pleasure in doing things; feeling down or hopeless; having insomnia or oversleeping; fatigue; loss of appetite or over-eating; having low self-esteem; trouble concentrating; restlessness or slowness; and negative self-thoughts, including self-harm. </p>
<p>We also collected information on the girls’ families, partners and neighbourhoods. </p>
<p><strong>Burkina Faso:</strong></p>
<p>Birth status was the only individual factor associated with probable depression in Burkina Faso. Girls who had already given birth were 35% less likely to report depression compared to girls currently pregnant. This group of girls might have had time to develop coping mechanisms after experiencing the disappointment of early and unintended pregnancy. </p>
<p>Girls exposed to intimate partner violence were twice as likely to report depression compared to those who were not. </p>
<p>One key result of our study in Burkina Faso was that paternity denial was a major risk factor for depression among young girls. Paternity denial brings shame to the girl. It also means she receives no support from her partner in taking care of the child, unlike her married counterparts. Acceptance of paternity can help girls deal with the disappointment of becoming pregnant too early and the fear of facing shame and child upbringing alone. Girls whose partners denied paternity were blamed for sleeping around and their children were deemed illegitimate. The pressure from parents on the girls to identify the person responsible for their pregnancy could result in girls’ prolonged sadness and loss of interest in living.</p>
<p>Consistent with previous <a href="https://bmcwomenshealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12905-018-0581-5">research</a>, we found that girls who got support from their parents and partners were shielded from depression. Having access to support within the community was related to a lower likelihood of depression. Also, having goodwill from neighbours and the community was linked to a lower likelihood of depression.</p>
<p><strong>Malawi:</strong> </p>
<p>Having secondary education level was substantially linked to a lower likelihood of reporting depression in Malawi. The explanation for this is likely that girls with some secondary education may be more optimistic about future job prospects than girls with no or simply elementary education. Other research done in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2156869314564399">Malawi</a> has shown education as having a protective effect against depression. Generally, higher education in Malawi is associated with more favourable employment possibilities than having no schooling or only primary schooling. </p>
<p>Exposure to intimate partner violence was associated with a higher risk of depression. </p>
<p>Here, too, we found that girls who got support from their parents and partners were shielded from depression. Young mothers need a lot of support to navigate their new role as parents. Childcare can be tedious even for adults, and requires a lot of money, which these girls lack. Having access to adequate support from parents and partners can lessen the burden of childcare and help girls build their resilience, determination and self-esteem. Girls who considered their neighbourhood to be safe were less likely to report depression. </p>
<h2>Thinking ahead</h2>
<p>Depression is common among pregnant or parenting adolescent girls. </p>
<p>Because depression can harm a girl’s health, routine depression screenings at prenatal and postpartum visits are crucial. </p>
<p>Health systems should be strengthened by governments and developmental partners to develop and provide therapy that addresses all areas of vulnerabilities linked to depression in pregnant and parenting girls.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205083/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Idowu Ajayi receives funding from SIDA and IDRC. He is affiliated with African Population and Health Research Center. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elita Chamdimba is affiliated with Centre for Social Research, UNIMA and University of Strathclyde. </span></em></p>In addition to motherhood these girls experience social inequality, chronic stress, violence, and food insecurity. When teenagers become mothers, their adversities are compounded.Anthony Idowu Ajayi, Associate research scientist, African Population and Health Research CenterElita Chamdimba, Research fellow, Centre for Social Research, University of MalawiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2014022023-03-19T12:18:56Z2023-03-19T12:18:56ZAlgorithms are moulding and shaping our politics. Here’s how to avoid being gamed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515106/original/file-20230314-26-owl3zr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bakhtiar Zein/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2016, evidence <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">began to mount</a> that then-South African president Jacob Zuma and a family of Indian-born businessmen, the Guptas, were responsible for widespread “state capture”. It was alleged that the Gupta family influenced Zuma’s political appointments and benefited unfairly from lucrative tenders. </p>
<p>The Guptas began to look for a way to divert attention away from them. They enlisted the help of British public relations firm Bell Pottinger, which drew on the country’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/business/bell-pottinger-guptas-zuma-south-africa.html">existing racial and economic tensions</a> to develop a social media campaign centred on the role of “white monopoly capital” in continuing “economic apartheid”.</p>
<p>The campaign was driven by the power of algorithms. The company created over 100 fake Twitter bots or automated Twitter accounts that run on bot software – computer programs designed to perform tasks and actions, ranging from rather simple ones to quite complex ones; in this case, to simulate human responses for liking and retweeting tweets. </p>
<p>This weaponisation of communications is not limited to South Africa. Examples from elsewhere in Africa abound, including Russia <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/local-support-for-russia-increased-on-facebook-before-burkina-faso-military-coup-a51df6722e59">currying favour</a> in Burkina Faso via Facebook and <a href="https://investigate.africa/wp-content/themes/ancir/dist/assets/reports/Kenya_Keyboard_Warriors_24_04_2021.pdf">coordinated Twitter campaigns</a> by factions representing opposing Kenyan politicians. It’s seen beyond the continent, too – in March 2023, researchers identified <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/on-twitter-thousands-of-pro-trump-bots-are-attacking-desantis-haley">a network of thousands of fake Twitter accounts</a> created to support former US president Donald Trump.</p>
<p>Legal scholar Antoinette Rouvroy calls this <a href="https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/algorithmic-governmentality-and-the-death-of-politics/">“algorithmic governmentality”</a>. It’s the reduction of government to algorithmic processes as if society is a problem of big data sets rather than one of how collective life is (or should be) arranged and managed by the individuals in that society. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/aa/article/view/6111">a recent paper</a>, I coined the term “algopopulism”: algorithmically aided politics. The political content in our personal feeds not only represents the world and politics to us. It creates new, sometimes “alternative”, realities. It changes how we encounter and understand politics and even how we understand reality itself.</p>
<p>One reason algopopulism spreads so effectively is that it’s very difficult to know exactly how our perceptions are being shaped. This is deliberate. Algorithms are designed in a sophisticated way to <a href="https://mediarep.org/bitstream/handle/doc/14481/Democratization-of-Artificial-Intelligence_163-173_McQuillan_Political-Affinities_.pdf">override human reasoning</a>. </p>
<p>So, what can you do to protect yourself from being “gamed” by algorithmic processes? The answers, I suggest, lie in understanding a bit more about the digital shift that’s brought us to this point and the ideas of a British statistician, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Thomas-Bayes">Thomas Bayes</a>, who lived more than 300 years ago. </p>
<h2>How the shift happened</h2>
<p>Five recent developments in the technology space have led to algorithmic governmentality: considerable improvements in hardware; generous, flexible storage via the cloud; the explosion of data and data accumulation; the development of deep convoluted networks and sophisticated algorithms to sort through the extracted data; and the development of fast, cheap networks to transfer data. </p>
<p>Together, these developments have transformed data science into something more than a mere technological tool. It has become a method for using data not only to predict how you engage with digital media, but to <a href="http://www.ladeleuziana.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Gray.pdf">preempt your actions and thoughts</a>.</p>
<p>This is not to say that all digital technology is harmful. Rather, I want to point out one of its greatest risks: we are all susceptible to having our thoughts shaped by algorithms, sometimes in ways that can have real-world effects, such as when they <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2020-01-14-how-the-nigerian-and-kenyan-media-handled-cambridge-analytica/">affect democratic elections</a>.</p>
<h2>Bayesian statistics</h2>
<p>That’s where Thomas Bayes comes in. Bayes was an English statistician; <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s43586-020-00001-2">Bayesian statistics</a>, the dominant paradigm in machine learning, is named after him.</p>
<p>Before Bayes, computational processes relied on frequentist statistics. Most people have encountered this method in one way or another, as in the case of how probable it is that a coin will land heads-up and tails-down. This approach starts from the assumption that the coin is fair and hasn’t been tampered with. This is called a null hypothesis. </p>
<p>Bayesian statistics does not require a null hypothesis; it changes the kinds of questions asked about probability entirely. Instead of assuming a coin is fair and measuring the probability of heads or tails, it asks us instead to consider whether the system for measuring probability is fair. Instead of assuming the truth of a null hypothesis, Bayesian inference starts with a measure of subjective belief which it updates as more <a href="https://reallifemag.com/chances-are/">evidence – or data – is gathered in real time</a>.</p>
<p>How does this play out via algorithms? Let’s say you heard a rumour that the world is flat and you do a Google search for articles that affirm this view. Based on this search, the measure of subjective belief the algorithms have to work with is “the world is flat”. Gradually, the algorithms will curate your feed to show you articles that confirm this belief unless you have purposefully searched for opposing views too. </p>
<p>That’s because Bayesian approaches use prior distributions, knowledge or beliefs as a starting point of probability. Unless you change your prior distributions, the algorithm will continue providing evidence to confirm your initial measure of subjective belief. </p>
<p>But how can you know to change your priors if your priors are being confirmed by your search results all the time? This is the dilemma of algopopulism: Bayesian probability allows algorithms to create sophisticated filter bubbles that are difficult to discount because all your search results are based on your previous searches.</p>
<p>So, there is no longer a uniform version of reality presented to a specific population, like there was when TV news was broadcast to everyone in a nation at the same time. Instead, we each have a version of reality. Some of this overlaps with what others see and hear and some doesn’t. </p>
<h2>Engaging differently online</h2>
<p>Understanding this can change how you search online and engage with knowledge. </p>
<p>To avoid filter bubbles, always search for opposing views. If you haven’t done this from the start, do a search on a private browser and compare the results you get. More importantly, check your personal investment. What do you get out of taking a specific stance on a subject? For example, does it make you feel part of something meaningful because you lack real-life social bonds? Finally, endeavour to choose reliable sources. Be aware of a source’s bias from the start and avoid anonymously published content. </p>
<p>In these ways we can all be custodians of our individual and collective behaviour.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chantelle Gray does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The political content in our personal feeds not only represents the world and politics to us. It creates new, sometimes “alternative”, realities.Chantelle Gray, Professor in the School of Philosophy, North-West UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2015932023-03-16T12:22:40Z2023-03-16T12:22:40ZTunisia: President’s offensive statements targeted black migrants - with widespread fallout<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514908/original/file-20230313-20-ic1z6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President of Tunisia, Kais Saied (R) meets Guinea-Bissau's President Umaro Sissoco Embalo in Tunis on 8 March 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tunisian Presidency / Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Presidence.tn/posts/pfbid02gkXqJK8EByDtaRHhJQeSmEBMhHutAcGa3az5V3NEFzr9Rdsqm11qsmusGA53zra4l">statement</a> by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kais-Saied">Tunisian President Kais Saied</a> that “urgent measures” were needed “against illegal immigration of nationals from sub-Saharan Africa” which were causing “violence and crime” set off a nation-wide violent backlash against migrants. </p>
<p>The statement, which followed a national security meeting, and the subsequent backlash against migrants, were followed by international condemnation, including from within Africa.</p>
<p>Estimates of migrants in Tunisia vary, from <a href="https://theconversation.com/tunisias-president-is-targeting-migrants-to-divert-attention-from-serious-domestic-problems-a-classic-tactic-201404#:%7E:text=Immigrants%20in%20Tunisia%20account%20for,These%20basic%20figures%20are%20important.">21,000</a> formally documented migrants, to <a href="http://www.ins.tn/publication/rapport-de-lenquete-nationale-sur-la-migration-internationale-tunisia-hims">59,000</a>, including <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/tunisia.html">9,000</a> registered refugees and asylum-seekers. </p>
<p>The president noted in his inflammatory statement that the “incessant flow” and “hordes of illegal migrants” were aimed at changing the demographics of the country “threatening its Arabic and Islamic character”. </p>
<p>The offensive statement – and consequent reprisals – are deeply shocking and have already had repercussions. In Tunisia, where anti-immigrant sentiment is on the rise, far-right groups have been <a href="https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/the-ghost-people-and-populism-from-above-the-kais-saied-case/">bolstered</a> in their aggressive stance towards immigrants. Thousands of immigrants have fled. Those that remain face attacks on their <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/11/tunisia-and-libya-un-experts-condemn-collective-expulsion-and-deplorable">dignity</a>.</p>
<p>Tunisia has been condemned by the African community, the strongest measure being taken by the African Union. It <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/6/african-union-cancels-tunisia-meeting-after-migrant-attacks">cancelled</a> its meeting scheduled for Tunis, the Tunisian capital. Four West African countries - Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast - either evacuated their citizens or called for caution. </p>
<p>There have also been <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2023/03/354346/calls-for-boycotting-tunisian-products-intensify-in-african-countries">calls</a> by sub-Saharan African countries for a boycott of Tunisian products. Tunisian civil society groups, human rights activists, and artists also <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/02/26/tunisian-civil-society-groups-denounce-anti-migrant-rhetoric//">condemned</a> the attacks on migrants.</p>
<p>This is yet another outcome of the migration policies imposed by the European Union on Tunisia. It also adds to a gradual isolation and alienation of the country from its neighbours on the continent in a time of political and socio-economic crisis. </p>
<p>Within Tunisia, the recent attacks on migrants contribute to further polarisation within the different factions of the society, especially between NGOs mobilising against anti-migrant racism and the perpetual spread and appeal of populist and conspiracy-theory parties.</p>
<h2>Anti-migrant violence</h2>
<p>The migrants and refugees in the country come from different parts of the world, including Syria. But most are from countries in sub-Saharan Africa, West Africa in particular. Reasons for their stay <a href="https://theconversation.com/tunisias-president-is-targeting-migrants-to-divert-attention-from-serious-domestic-problems-a-classic-tactic-201404">vary</a> but include study, work and for many the transit onward to Europe when the opportunity arises.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/39955/refugees-demand-evacuation-from-tunisia">Racist incidents</a> against sub-Saharan refugees and migrants and <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20230304-discours-antimigrants-en-tunisie-une-fa%C3%A7on-de-faire-oublier-les-probl%C3%A8mes-du-pays">hate speech</a> are not new in Tunisia. Nevertheless, what followed this particularly inflammatory speech by President Saied was a large scale “security” campaign of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/3/sub-saharan-africans-recount-tunisia-hell-amid-crackdown">random and arbitrary arrests</a> by the security forces of hundreds of sub-Saharan migrants. They have been detained in illegal centres. </p>
<p>This <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/tunisia/2023/03/02/african-migrants-in-tunisia-plead-for-help-amid-rise-in-racially-motivated-attacks/">systematic and racist violence</a> has affected a range of men, women, children and even infants from immigrant families. It included physical attacks, migrants being fired from their jobs, <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2023-03-02-african-migrants-evicted-and-fired-amid-crackdown-in-tunisia/">kicked out</a> of their accommodation and even schools and daycare centres. </p>
<p>Fear was widespread and hundreds of migrants <a href="https://meshkal.org/black-people-attacked-evicted-in-tunisia-after-presidents-racist-stat/">camped</a> in front of the <a href="https://www.iom.int/">International Organisation for Migration</a> and <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/">United Nations High Commission for Refugees</a> offices in the cold, seeking protection. </p>
<p>Online anti-migrant discussion and hate speech have risen recently. The far-right Tunisian Nationalist Party grew from a few thousand subscribers in January to more than <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/02/23/in-tunisia-president-kais-saied-claims-sub-saharan-migrants-threaten-country-s-identity_6016898_124.html">50,000</a> by the end of February, alarming in the speed that the appeal to this party took on. </p>
<p>Even prior to the statement by the president, the group had succeeded in raising more than <a href="https://nawaat.org/2023/02/14/parti-nationaliste-tunisien-racisme-autorise-par-letat/">a million signatures</a> in a petition to expel undocumented sub-Saharan migrants. This shows his populist attempt to respond to an already widely spread xenophobic sentiment. </p>
<p>The anti-migrant violence comes in an overall context of failure to deal with the deep economic and social crises in Tunisia. These have worsened since Saied’s authoritarian <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/07/26/kais-saieds-power-grab-in-tunisia/">power grab</a> on the 25 July 2021. </p>
<p>This has not only involved a frequent link to conspiracy theories in public narratives, but has also created an environment of <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/10/11/food-shortages-and-rising-food-prices-hit-tunisia/">high unemployment</a>, amid shortages in basic products and soaring food prices. </p>
<p>Tunisian society has been polarised. Fear and <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/tunisia-hate-speech-black-africans-social-media">hate speech</a> have spread online, and there has been an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/24/tunisia-forces-arrest-senior-opposition-figure-as-crackdown-escalates">increasing crackdown</a> on civil society and political opposition. </p>
<h2>Scapegoating</h2>
<p>The anti-migrant backlash is politically useful in this environment: scapegoating migrants can divert from the continuous failure to address many of these domestic issues, as seen in other contexts such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15562948.2021.2007318">South Africa</a>. </p>
<p>Migrants are constructed as “a burden” to an already poor infrastructure and economy, a danger to the public, and <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Presidence.tn/posts/pfbid02gkXqJK8EByDtaRHhJQeSmEBMhHutAcGa3az5V3NEFzr9Rdsqm11qsmusGA53zra4l">pawns of foreign funded parties</a> in Tunisia to colonise it again. The statement and crackdown on migrants is aimed at gaining more popularity, especially after the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/18/low-voter-turnout-clear-message-to-saied-democratic-bloc-leader">low elections</a> turn out in 2022.</p>
<h2>Reactions</h2>
<p>Dozens of civil society groups, human rights activists and artists signed a <a href="https://ltdh.tn/%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85/?fbclid=IwAR3bBFnDiFmz5NSk6oyFTfiW5mhGh6uBDRO_HY572RUi1f_ioHqrQaisThM">collective statement</a> calling for a rally against Saied’s comments and the aftermath it caused. Hundreds of people have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/26/what-you-need-to-know-about-tunisia-anti-racism-protests">protested</a> on the streets, chanting “Down with fascism, Tunisia is an African country.” </p>
<p>Countries within the region were quick to respond. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/3/sub-saharan-africans-recount-tunisia-hell-amid-crackdown">Guinea </a> was the first to repatriate around 50 of their nationals for their own safety and dignity. Mali flew home around three times as many a few days later. </p>
<p>Cote d’Ivoire also <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-64813850">offered</a> to fly back their own citizens. The Burkina Faso ambassador in Tunis expressed his solidarity in this “difficult situation”. There have been <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2023/03/354346/calls-for-boycotting-tunisian-products-intensify-in-african-countries">calls</a> to boycott Tunisian products, especially in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal and Mali. </p>
<p>The African Union (AU) <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230224/chairperson-african-union-commission-strongly-condemns-racial-statements">released a statement</a> a day after the offensive remarks. It strongly criticised Tunisia and urged it to avoid “racialised hate speech”. A previously planned AU meeting in Tunis for mid-March was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/6/african-union-cancels-tunisia-meeting-after-migrant-attacks">cancelled</a>. </p>
<p>These responses remind us of the reaction in 2017 to the release of <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/14/africa/libya-migrant-auctions/index.html">CNN footage</a> of African migrants and refugees being auctioned off in slave markets in Libya. A major outrage unfolded across the continent and reactions included Burkina Faso <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-burkina-libya-idUKKBN1DK2IC">recalling</a> its ambassador to Libya. </p>
<p>Countries including Nigeria <a href="https://www.medam-migration.eu/publications/research-papers/2019-research-papers/the-political-economy-of-migration-governance-in-nigeria-14227/">airlifted</a> thousands of their citizens out of Libya. </p>
<p>Governments have been reluctant to accept returns from Europe. But attitudes towards <a href="https://www.medam-migration.eu/publications/policy-papers/policy-briefs/challenges-in-eu-african-migration-cooperation-west-african-perspectives-on-forced-return-14152/">returns from the region</a> are different.</p>
<p>It is difficult to know what the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/11/tunisian-foreign-policy-under-kais-saied-pub-88770">foreign policy aims</a> are of Tunisia under Saied. </p>
<p>On 8 March, <a href="https://africa.cgtn.com/2020/02/27/umaro-embalo-officially-becomes-president-in-guinea-bissau/">President Cissoko Emballo</a> from Guinea Bissau visited Tunisia, also in his role as chairperson of the Economic Community of West African States. During the visit, Saied backtracked from his insidious remarks, arguing his statement was misinterpreted. Not only were members of his family married to “Africans” and he had friends who were “Africans”, but in response to President Emballo, he conceded “I am indeed [<a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/03/09/tunisian-president-denies-racism-accusation-after-migrant-crackdown/">African</a>], and a proud African”. </p>
<p>A range of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/tunisia-migrants-racism-africa-eu-saied-2733a73f42816094fe55be4a4868f806">new measures</a> were quickly announced including a hotline to report human rights violations, psychological assistant for migrants and a waiver of fees for residency permit violations if migrants agree to return to their country of origin. </p>
<p>But the state-sponsored violence has <a href="https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/tunisia-presidents-racist-speech-violence-against-black-africans/">continued</a>. </p>
<h2>The fallout</h2>
<p>For countries and people in the region, this is just another dimension of the unpopular <a href="https://comparativemigrationstudies.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40878-019-0141-7">externalisation policies</a> imposed on them by the European Union. The goal is reduce migration to Europe.</p>
<p>Making Tunisia unlivable for sub-Saharan migrants plays into the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/233150241700500103">deterrence</a> strategy being pursued by the European Union. But the attacks are likely to affect Tunisia’s standing on the continent. Diplomatic relations will be adversely affected by the racist attacks.</p>
<p>Civil society groups are already <a href="https://journalismecitoyens-org.over-blog.com/2023/03/racisme-un-groupe-de-travail-exige-la-suspension-de-la-tunisie-de-l-union-africaine.html">demanding</a> the suspension of Tunisia from the African Union. </p>
<p>The outlook for individual migrants is bleak. They will continue living in an atmosphere of fear and danger. And for the wider Tunisian population the xenophobic attacks will only create more division at a time when soaring living costs and multiple international and domestic crises make solidarity - including on the continent - essential. </p>
<p>Tunisia needs allies to overcome these multiple crisis. Increasing isolation will not help. </p>
<p><em>Nermin Abbassi, a graduate student of political sciences at the University of Cologne and research assistant contributed to this article</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201593/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Franzisca Zanker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In Tunisia, scapegoating migrants diverts from the continuous failure of government to solve deep economic and social crisis.Franzisca Zanker, Senior research fellow, Arnold Bergstraesser InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2009412023-03-07T10:23:47Z2023-03-07T10:23:47ZMilitant Islamist violence in Africa surges – deaths up nearly 50%, events up 22% in a year<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513135/original/file-20230302-16-w2o9n4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Burkina Faso servicemen hold portraits during the burial of soldiers killed in an Al-Qaeda attack in Gaskinde in October 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Olympia de Maismont/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/militant-islamist-violence-in-africa-surges-deaths-up-nearly-50-events-up-22-in-a-year-200941&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Militant Islamist violence in Africa set <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/fatalities-from-militant-islamist-violence-in-africa-surge-by-nearly-50-percent/">new records for violent events and fatalities</a> this past year. This continues a relentless decade-long upward trend. </p>
<p>In a recent Africa Center for Strategic Studies <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/fatalities-from-militant-islamist-violence-in-africa-surge-by-nearly-50-percent/">analysis</a>, we found that there were 6,859 episodes of violence involving militant Islamist groups in Africa in 2022. This is a 22% increase from 2021. Fatalities linked to these events shot up 48% to 19,109 deaths. This reflects a sharp rise in deaths per event. </p>
<p>Notably, the spike in violence was marked by a 68% increase in fatalities involving civilians – from 4,307 in 2021 to 7,220 in 2022. This figure is significant: these militant groups are not focused on winning hearts and minds so much as intimidating local populations into compliance.</p>
<p>The threat is also accelerating. Both violent events and fatalities have almost doubled since 2019. In 2019 there were 3,520 events and 10,336 fatalities. </p>
<p>This analysis draws from data compiled by the <a href="https://acleddata.com/about-acled/">Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project</a> (ACLED) – a non-profit data collection and crisis mapping organisation. It aggregates violent events from local and international news sources, as well as UN, government and NGO reports. The Africa Center then corroborates the data through independent sources. These include the jihadist monitoring group <a href="https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/">SITE Intelligence</a>, the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/">International Crisis Group</a> and <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants">Stanford University’s Mapping Militants Project</a>. </p>
<p>Having monitored the <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/sahel-and-somalia-drive-uninterrupted-rise-in-african-militant-islamist-group-violence-over-past-decade/">trends of Africa’s militant Islamist groups</a> for many years, we are concerned by this spike. A more comprehensive and contextualised response is needed. This must integrate the efforts of local communities with those of national, regional and international actors. </p>
<h2>Violence concentrated in Sahel and Somalia</h2>
<p>The militant Islamist threat is not monolithic but comprised of over a dozen different militant groups. Each has distinct leadership, objectives, organisational structure, funding and supply of weapons. </p>
<p>They are motivated by a host of factors. These include: religious ideology, money, revenge against real and perceived government abuses, criminality, ethnic polarisation and political ambition. </p>
<p>The threat is concentrated in five theatres: the Sahel, Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, northern Mozambique and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. </p>
<p>The Sahel and Somalia accounted for 77% of all such violent events in the past year. This is a growing trend. In 2020 the Sahel and Somalia accounted for 58% of events, in 2021 for 73%. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>The Sahel – specifically Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – experienced the most rapid expansion of militant Islamist violence of any theatre over the past year. It accounted for 7,899 deaths, more than 40% of the continental total of fatalities. The groups driving this violence are the Macina Liberation Front, Ansaroul Islam, Ansar Dine and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.</p>
<p>Militant Islamist <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/five-zones-militant-islamist-violence-sahel/">violence in the Sahel has also spread geographically</a>. From northern Mali, violent events have shifted to the more populated regions of central and southern Mali. This includes the capital, Bamako, which has <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mali-militant-islamist-insurgency-bamako-doorstep/">seen attacks on an increasingly regular basis</a> after years of relative insulation.</p>
<p>Militant Islamist violence has similarly spread rapidly into northern, western, and eastern Burkina Faso. Today, Burkina Faso experiences more violent events than any other country in the Sahel.</p>
<p>Once seen as highly unlikely, there is now a real chance that Bamako and Ouagadougou – the capital cities of Mali and Burkina Faso, respectively – could fall under militant control. Both countries have struggled with a breakdown in governance and an <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mali-military-junta-scuttles-security-partnerships-while-militant-violence-surges/">acceleration of militant Islamist violence following coups</a> starting in 2020.</p>
<p>The erosion of security in Burkina Faso, in turn, threatens bordering countries, especially Togo and Benin. Both nations saw double digit increases in the number of violent events involving militant Islamist groups in the past year.</p>
<p>In Somalia, fatalities linked to al-Shabaab shot up from 2,606 in 2021 to 6,225 in 2022. This 133% increase was accompanied by a 29% rise in violent events. This reflects an escalation in both the pace and lethality of violence. The tempo of fighting significantly accelerated after President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud called for an <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-s-president-vows-total-war-against-al-shabab/6714508.html">all-out offensive</a> against al-Shabaab. Driven from areas it once controlled, al-Shabaab has reverted to retaliations against soft targets. One example is the October 2022 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-president-least-100-people-killed-car-bombs-2022-10-30/">twin bombings in Mogadishu</a> that killed over 100 people.</p>
<p>The Lake Chad Basin region (northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and southeastern Niger) saw a levelling out of violence from Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) in the past year. However, this obscures a 33% increase in violence against civilians. There’s also been a geographic spread of attacks from northeastern Nigeria to regions in the west and centre.</p>
<p>In northern Mozambique, violent events linked to Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama’a (ASWJ) rose by 29% in 2022. They had initially dropped when forces from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Rwanda intervened in 2021. Dislodged from the coastal cities of Palma and Mocimboa da Praia, ASWJ has shifted its attacks to districts further west and south. ASWJ is notorious for mounting a higher share of violent attacks against civilians than seen in any other region in Africa.</p>
<p>North Africa is the one region that has seen a demonstrable drop in activity over the past year. There’s been a 32% decline in violent events. In 2022 there were 162 events, compared to 238 events in 2021. Roughly 90% of the 2022 incidents, resulting in 276 fatalities, were in Egypt involving the Islamic State in Sinai. </p>
<h2>Time for a rethink</h2>
<p>These developments underscore that the overall trajectory of militant Islamist violence is trending in the wrong direction. African militant groups are becoming increasingly resilient, particularly in the Sahel and Somalia. </p>
<p>In both regions, these groups have been operating for years. They’ve established the capacity to recruit, train, supply and deploy their forces. Vitally, they’ve also become adept at generating revenue. This occurs through a combination of looting, extortion, control of mining sites and trade route domination. In most cases, this equates to becoming more criminally rather than ideologically motivated. This operational and financial resiliency suggests that these groups are unlikely to fade away anytime soon.</p>
<p>The flipside of this reality is that these militant groups thrive in regions with weak governments. They are a symptom of fragility rather than a demonstration of militant strength. When confronted with an effective and capable statutory force, they take heavy losses and are forced to retreat. </p>
<p>This points to the <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR291z1/RAND_RR291z1.pdf">central role that governance plays</a> in defeating an insurgency. Experience shows that effective counterinsurgency requires: government legitimacy, political will, control of corruption, investment in development activities and the mitigation of human rights abuses, among other factors. This makes sense. Successful counterinsurgency entails gaining the trust and support of local populations. </p>
<p>The ineffectiveness of the military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso are illustrative of this. In addition to intimidating dissenters and forsaking government services, the Malian junta, by partnering with the notorious Russian paramilitary Wagner Group, has become party to <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1133007">serial human rights abuses</a>. <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/">Four out of five people killed by the Wagner Group</a> alongside the Malian junta were <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/massacres-executions-and-falsified-graves-wagner-groups-mounting-humanitarian-cost-mali">civilians</a>. Meanwhile, militant violence is accelerating.</p>
<p>In addition to reestablishing legitimate governance processes, <a href="https://africacenter.org/publication/strengthening-sahelian-counterinsurgency-strategy/">effective counterinsurgency efforts</a> will require:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>sustaining pressure on militant groups, including holding territory retaken</p></li>
<li><p>protecting civilians</p></li>
<li><p>building support with and providing services to local populations</p></li>
<li><p>cutting off revenue flows for militant groups.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Regional security forces</h2>
<p>Experience from countering militant Islamist groups in Africa has also highlighted the vital role played by regional security forces. </p>
<p><a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/joup/25/3/article-p236_002.xml#:%7E:text=amisom%20was%20designed%20to%20support,Shabaab%20and%20other%20militia%20groups">AMISOM/ATMIS</a> in Somalia, <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/regional-security-support-vital-first-step-peace-mozambique">SADC</a> in Mozambique and the <a href="https://trainingforpeace.org/publications/a-quest-to-win-the-hearts-and-minds-assessing-the-effectiveness-of-the-multinational-joint-task-force/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> in the Lake Chad Basin have all been instrumental in mitigating the threats faced, supporting overstretched government forces. </p>
<p>The juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso, meanwhile, have done just the opposite. They have alienated the G-5 Sahel, <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma">MINUSMA</a> and European Union forces. This has resulted in a <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mali-military-junta-scuttles-security-partnerships-while-militant-violence-surges/">dramatic downsizing of security partner support</a> at the very time that militant Islamist activity is accelerating.</p>
<p>Effective counterinsurgency operations are hard. Moreover, success is not guaranteed. Even when legitimate governments <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR291z1/RAND_RR291z1.pdf">demonstrate political will</a>, it takes six years on average to prevail in a counterinsurgency. </p>
<p>African countries facing insurgencies and their regional partners should be prepared for a long slog to reverse the deteriorating trends of militant Islamist group violence. The alternative is an ever more emboldened and enriched Islamist militancy with expansive ambitions on neighbouring countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200941/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The spike in violence was marked by a 68% increase in fatalities involving civilians.Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, University of MarylandWendy Williams, Associate Research Fellow, Africa Center for Strategic StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.