tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/catalonia-elections-45635/articlesCatalonia elections – The Conversation2018-01-26T16:47:50Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/907112018-01-26T16:47:50Z2018-01-26T16:47:50ZWith an exiled president Skyping from Brussels, where now for Catalan independence?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203539/original/file-20180126-100929-38uo5u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/barcelona-spain-october-21-2017-500000-739211284">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Can a self-exiled leader remotely control the politics of a region, effectively ruling by Skype? That is what the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalonia-leader-carles-puigdemont-left-spain-brussels-rebellion-charges-eu-independence-latest-a8027366.html">ousted</a> Catalan president, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/world/europe/in-catalonia-independence-referendum.html">Carles Puigdemont</a>, is <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKlcEgTaJ1U">trying to do</a> from Brussels, where he escaped in October 2017 after an <a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/09/economist-explains-17">illegal referendum</a> and a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41780116">unilateral declaration of independence</a>. </p>
<p>Following the ambivalent declaration of October 27, the Spanish prime minister <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2017-12-19/profile-mariano-rajoy-brey-video">Mariano Rajoy</a> proceeded to <a href="https://www.independent.ie/world-news/spanish-pm-sacks-catalan-government-after-independence-vote-36266140.html">sack</a> the Catalan premier, disband parliament and call for snap elections on December 21 2017. Spain’s supreme court decided to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/02/spanish-court-question-catalonia-separatists-except-puigdemont">imprison</a> several Catalan politicians and civic leaders, who face charges of misuse of public funds, rebellion and sedition – a crime punishable by up to 30 years in prison.</p>
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<span class="caption">Exiled Catalan leader Carles Puigdemont.</span>
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<p>With 47.5% of the vote, the diverse secessionist coalition of Puigdemont did not win the popular vote on December 21, but they regained an absolute majority of seats, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/08/will-catalonias-separatists-win-in-december-the-voting-system-is-stacked-in-their-favor/?utm_term=.049e394fd741">assisted</a> by a rural bias in the election law. They could go ahead and form a government again, but the problem is that Puigdemont cannot be invested as head of the regional executive on January 31, when the Catalan parliament is expected to hold a first vote on his candidacy – Spanish authorities insist he will be arrested the moment he sets foot on Spanish soil.</p>
<p>The reason for his escape to Brussels was to allow the wannabe “Skype president” to maintain a voice (which the imprisoned Catalan politicians have lost) and internationalise the Catalan conflict for global audiences.</p>
<p>The strategy of internationalisation characterised the so-called “Catalan process” – a movement of civil society and government mobilisations aimed at holding a vote on Catalonia’s relationship with Spain. However, the strategy that began in 2012 has been unsuccessful – because domestic politics and international politics work very differently.</p>
<p>As we argue in a recent <a href="https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/monographs/monographs/secession_and_counter_secession_an_international_relations_perspective">report</a>, secessionist movements tend to focus on domestic politics and neglect the power play that distinguishes international affairs. This is surprising, as these movements want to be recognised as independent states, a status that can only be conferred by recognition from the international community.</p>
<h2>Big power play</h2>
<p>When it comes to constituting sovereign statehood, aspiring states need to pay significant attention to the calculations of interest-driven big powers. And a <a href="https://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/monografias/secession_and_counter_secession/what_s_law_got_to_do_with_it_democracy_realism_and_the_tina_turner_theory_of_referendums">study</a> of 34 successful referendums on independence since the 1990s by referenda expert Matt Qvortrup has suggested that the countries that matter most for supporting or opposing the birth of a new state are three of the permanent members of the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/sc/">UN Security Council</a>: the USA, France and the United Kingdom. </p>
<p>China would never take the lead because of its own secessionist troubles in Tibet. Russia on the other hand might be supportive to legitimise its separatist machinations in Crimea and to weaken the European Union, but has been on the receiving end of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12274023">secessionist aspirations</a> in the Caucasus. In any case Russian support would not be sufficient, barring the consent of Western powers.</p>
<p>In the absence of a universal legal right to secession under international or domestic law, there is no clear guidance for sorting out which nations merit statehood and which do not. Realpolitik, not ideals, ends up deciding who becomes a sovereign state.</p>
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<span class="caption">Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy.</span>
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<p>Catalan secessionists did not get the international recognition they were craving. And it was not for a lack of trying. Catalonia <a href="http://thediplomatinspain.com/en/government-closes-catalan-embassies-except-brussels/">opened</a> several “embassies” in European capitals and in New York, whose main purpose was to gather support for Catalan independence aspirations. To no avail. International politicians increasingly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/02/catalan-government-emergency-meeting-spain-independence">shunned</a> Catalan leaders and did not grant them photo opportunities. </p>
<p>Secessionist movements within Europe face a different environment than those outside the EU when it comes to international recognition. The 2004 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-catalonia-eu/spooked-by-catalonia-eu-rallies-behind-madrid-but-warily-idUSKCN1BW1OC">Prodi doctrine</a> (named after former EU Commission president Romano Prodi) holds that any territory that breaks away from an EU member state would be outside the union and would need to re-apply for membership – a process that normally takes many years, even in the absence of vetoes from member countries.</p>
<p>The theoretical <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402382.2016.1149993">threat of EU exclusion</a> – brushed aside by secessionists during their campaign – has been enough to prompt more than <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/firms-quit-catalonia-amid-its-political-upheaval-2017-12?IR=T">3,000 companies to move</a> their headquarters out of Catalonia since the illegal referendum of October 1. The economic rationale for remaining in the EU as part of Spain has proved to be a powerful argument for unionist forces in Catalonia. On the other hand, the fiscal gains that separatists promised if the relatively rich Catalonia broke away look increasingly dubious.</p>
<p>When it comes to EU membership, bilateral agreements are more successful than unilateral steps. In the case of a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), a Catalan application to the EU would be vetoed by the Spanish executive. Other member states that may also want to discourage claims to self-determination in their own territories, such as France (Corsica), Italy (Lega Nord) and Belgium (Flanders), could also oppose it.</p>
<p>The exception to this rule would be provided by the Scottish case, which held a binding <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/10/scottish-independence-guide-referendum-uk-yes-no">referendum</a> agreed with the UK. The Westminster government pledged not to veto Scotland’s accession to the EU, if there was a pro-independence majority in the 2014 plebiscite.</p>
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<span class="caption">Catalonia faces fierce opposition over independence from Spain’s unionists.</span>
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<h2>The realpolitik</h2>
<p>Puigdemont’s nomination as regional president will not attract international support. His unilateral power-play has seemingly run its course, and it is only a matter of time before he returns to Catalonia to face legal proceedings. </p>
<p>Besides, the European Union has repeatedly stressed the need for strict adherence to the rule of law. It is apprehensive about a possible <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/is-selfdetermination-contagious-a-spatial-analysis-of-the-spread-of-selfdetermination-claims/84F1FDF9EB18EB98F902C85C0E05C2B4">contagion effect</a> if Catalonia succeeds in declaring independence without first seeking an agreement with Spain.</p>
<p>However, merely rallying the consent of fellow nation states and engaging in a purely legalistic discourse at home as the Spanish government has done might not be sustainable in the long run, either. The grievances of a large part of the Catalan population are real and will remain a problem if they are allowed to fester.</p>
<p>Rather than insisting on recentralisation or offering Catalonia more autonomy, Spain will need to find a more positive political and national narrative. The way out might be more <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/federalism">federalism</a> that gives regions a real say in Madrid.</p>
<p>When it comes to international recognition of new states, secessionist movements need to expand the domestic support base and convince international powers that secession will not affect them negatively. It is unclear how a Skype president with scant regard for legal norms can help Catalonia become a full member of the international community.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90711/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After the most recent elections, Catalonia’s secessionist coalition is free to form a government. But their president is still exiled in Belgium.Diego Muro, Lecturer in International Relations, University of St AndrewsEckart Woertz, Senior research fellow, Barcelona Centre of International Affairs (CIDOB)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/867152017-11-02T14:41:40Z2017-11-02T14:41:40ZCatalonia: a lawyer explains the charges brought against Carles Puigdemont<p>For many weeks the situation in <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/catalonia-3828">Catalonia</a> had been extremely delicate. The Catalan government took the nuclear option when it issued a <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-declares-independence-and-spain-enters-uncharted-territory-86489">unilateral declaration of independence</a>. For the Spanish government the retaliation was simple: using the <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-crisis-shows-spains-constitution-is-no-longer-fit-for-purpose-86281">constitution</a> to take direct control of some competences of the Catalan government and parliament – usually devolved from Madrid. Cold war logic might have suggested that the potential reciprocal damage that each party could inflict on the other would lead them to avoid using either nuclear option. But this did not happen. Keep weapons out of reach of children.</p>
<p>Now, the Catalan authorities who issued the unilateral declaration of independence face criminal charges in Spain – adding another layer of uncertainty and confusion.</p>
<p>The Spanish public prosecutor has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/30/spanish-prosecutor-calls-for-rebellion-charges-against-catalan-leaders">filed a lawsuit</a> before the Supreme Court and the Audiencia Nacional (a Spanish high court) against members of the former Catalan government and parliament. The charges are the crimes of rebellion, sedition and embezzlement.</p>
<p>Several Catalan parliamentarians have attended court in Madrid to hear the charges but ousted president Carles Puigdemont has not so far been among them. He is believed to be in Brussels. The president of the supreme court has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/02/spanish-court-question-catalonia-separatists-except-puigdemont">warned</a> that an arrest warrant could be issued to bring Puigdemont in. </p>
<p>The first two of the above mentioned charges are particularly important. They are the most politically charged matters. The offence of rebellion refers to the act of violently and publicly uprising with the aim of fully or partially repealing, suspending or amending the constitution, or of declaring independence on behalf of part of the national territory. The maximum punishment for this offence is 25 years in prison.</p>
<p>The unilateral declaration of independence of the Catalan Parliament is the core element of the claimed offence in this case. This was clearly a public uprising to declare independence for part of the territory.</p>
<h2>Jail time</h2>
<p>The only question is whether this particular uprising could be described as “violent”. Whether or not this was an offence of rebellion hinges on that point. That’s why the Spanish public prosecutor also accused the former Catalan authorities of the offence of sedition. That refers to those individuals not covered by the felony of rebellion who rise up tumultuously to prevent the application of laws. </p>
<p>In case the courts consider that the unilateral declaration of independence did not exactly fit the requirements for the application of the felony of rebellion, it is very likely that they will consider that at least an offence of sedition took place. Those who commit sedition can be punished with up 15 years of imprisonment. This adds to the potential offence of embezzlement, punished with up to eight years of imprisonment and the temporary deprivation of the exercise of the right of passive suffrage – the right to stand as a candidate in elections. </p>
<p>All this will probably add more trauma to the trauma. The idea of independence has already polarised Catalan society to dramatic levels. The potential imprisonment of the former Catalan authorities might further fuel that division. </p>
<p>The trial might also play a prominent role in the Catalan elections to be held on December 21. The political framing of the judicial proceedings will be among the major topics for political discussion during the campaign, and it’s unclear whether the former Catalan authorities now facing charges will choose to stand as candidates in the elections. If they are found guilty by a court after they have been elected, they will automatically lose their seats in parliament.</p>
<p>All of these are major political issues, but ones that courts are not expected to take into account. The judicial logic, strictly speaking, is one of application of law to the case, ideally without regard to political considerations. And from a legal perspective it’s very difficult to argue that the unilateral declaration of independence did not involve any criminal offence – be it either rebellion or sedition. The shocking result is that we might soon see a former president of the Catalan government facing a jail sentence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86715/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pablo José Castillo Ortiz is currently funded by the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Sheffield to carry out a Strategic Secondment at Elcano Royal Institute in Madrid. </span></em></p>After declaring independence, regional leaders stand accused of rebellion, sedition and embezzlement. But what does that mean?Pablo José Castillo Ortiz, Lecturer in Spanish Law, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/866312017-10-31T14:23:21Z2017-10-31T14:23:21ZCatalonia: the prospect of an election has everyone nervous<p>Mariano Rajoy, the prime minister of Spain, has called a potentially explosive regional election in Catalonia on December 21. This follows his decision to trigger Article 155 of the Spanish constitution to impose <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-declares-independence-and-spain-enters-uncharted-territory-86489">direct rule</a> over Catalonia, dissolving its parliament in the process.</p>
<p>Catalan leaders rejected the validity of this move and, by association, the election itself. They argue that Madrid has no right to intervene in their declaration of independence from Spain in the wake of a disputed referendum on October 1. </p>
<h2>Rajoy’s gamble</h2>
<p>Rajoy’s decision to send Catalan voters back to the polls is not without risk. His own political fate is now inextricably linked to the Catalan standoff.</p>
<p>He may have calculated that in calling an election, he is presenting supporters of independence with a dilemma. If they participate in the vote, are they tacitly acknowledging his right to trigger Article 155 in the first place? Just as those opposed to Catalan independence chose to boycott the unofficial referendum on the grounds that their participation would lend it further legitimacy, some pro-independence activists may similarly wish to stay at home on December 21. Splits within the Catalan independence camp will be worth looking out for in the run up to the election. </p>
<p>Rajoy must also be carrying out a risk assessment. A clear majority for pro-independence parties in December would perhaps make his position untenable. Alternatively, his authority will be reinforced should those parties opposed to independence emerge victorious. </p>
<p>Now ousted Catalan president Carles Puigdemont’s centre-right Catalan European Democratic Party (PDeCAT) and former deputy president Oriol Junqueras’s Republican Left (ERC) have, for now, indicated that they will take part in the election. However, Puigdemont’s parliamentary majority also depended on support from ten representatives of the far-left, anti-capitalist Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP). The CUP has been uncompromising in its support of independence and it has played an influential role in ensuring that Puigdemont was not tempted to backslide towards a more pragmatic stance on the matter by entering into negotiations with Madrid.</p>
<p>The CUP also played a key role in forcing the resignation of Artur Mas, Puigdemont’s predecessor as president. Given its rejection of the central government’s authority, it is by no means certain that the CUP will put forward candidates for the December elections.</p>
<p>One of the central government’s concerns is that the shift towards independence witnessed in Catalonia since 2012 has served to weaken the more moderate, centre-right PDeCAT. The party dominated Catalan regional politics for the greater part of four decades. Seeking to retain popularity during a time of severe austerity and <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/former-catalan-president-jordi-pujol-to-be-stripped-of-his-titles-after-admitting-to-more-than-30-9636343.html">corruption scandals</a>, the PDeCAT has found the reductionist narrative of Madrid “robbing” Catalonia politically useful.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the PDeCAT has struggled with the dilemmas inherent in its belated adoption of a pro-independence stance. Prior to its shift towards advocating outright independence in 2012, the party, in its previous incarnation as Convergence and Union (CiU), found a subtler approach towards Madrid to be more productive. It may fear that elements within its middle-class support base will be horrified by the current crisis.</p>
<p>Around <a href="https://www.thelocal.es/20151116/business-leader-says-1000-firms-have-left-catalonia-over-separatist-drive">1,000 companies</a> are moving their headquarters out of Catalonia amid the recent instability, which may also further dent support for the avowedly pro-business PDeCAT. It’s possible that its radical left bedfellows the ERC will emerge as the dominant pro-independence force in the December election.</p>
<h2>The pro-Spain camp</h2>
<p>The parties in favour of Catalonia remaining within Spain are confronting their own set of dilemmas. Rajoy’s Popular Party (PP) has always struggled in Catalonia, where moderate, centre-right voters have instead been drawn to the CiU/PDeCAT. The Catalan branch of the Socialist Party, the PSC, has experienced its own quandaries on the issue of independence.</p>
<p>And Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias has recently had to <a href="https://www.thespainreport.com/articles/1250-171030121434-pablo-iglesias-orders-take-over-of-podemos-catalonia-after-anticapitalist-sector-recognises-catalan-republic">admonish</a> leading figures within the Catalan incarnation of his party for flouting the agreed party line by unambiguously supporting independence. Podemos supports Catalalonia’s right to hold a legal referendum but does not want it to break away from Spain. Iglesias did not back Puigdemont’s unilateral declaration of independence and has called for further dialogue between the two sides. He is in a difficult position in that his party may lose support in the region to the unambiguously pro-independence CUP, whose clarity on the issue throws into relief the uncomfortable hedging which has characterised Podemos’s position. </p>
<p>Albert Rivera’s centre-right Ciutadans (Citizens), whose raison d’être is opposition to Catalan independence, has the luxury of an unambiguous stance on the issue and may be well-placed to do well in December.</p>
<h2>Keeping it calm</h2>
<p>It is to be hoped that the election campaign will be a peaceful one. Madrid is at least aware that repeating the scenes of police violence which marred the October referendum would play into the hands of Puigdemont and attract yet more international consternation.</p>
<p>Whatever the result of the election, though, it’s unlikely to put an end to Spain’s worst political crisis in four decades. For that, what may be needed is reform of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/catalonia-referendum/541611/">Catalonia’s Autonomy Statute</a>, which may enable Catalonia to obtain a more favourable financial settlement akin to that enjoyed by the Basque Country. An imaginative re-writing of the 1978 constitution may even be necessary. Only then can Catalan grievances be addressed and some degree of normality be re-established.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86631/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Kennedy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An ousted leader, a divided electorate and the risk of further violence pile on the tension ahead of the December vote.Paul Kennedy, Lecturer in Spanish and European Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/482622015-09-28T10:39:52Z2015-09-28T10:39:52ZCatalan election: a leap into the unknown<p>Parties in favour of Catalan independence have <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34372548">obtained an overall majority in terms of seats</a> at the regional elections, which attracted an unusually <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/11894762/Catalan-election-Record-breaking-turnout-expected-in-most-important-ballot-in-generations.html">high turnout (77.44%)</a>. </p>
<p>Although the pro-independence alliance <a href="https://juntspelsi.cat/">Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes)</a> fell six seats short of the 68 needed for a majority in the 135-seat parliament, it will secure an overall majority with the addition of the ten seats won by the far-left pro-independence <a href="http://cup.cat/">Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP)</a>. </p>
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<p>Artur Mas, the regional president and key figure behind Catalonia’s shift towards independence, indicated that <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/28/us-spain-catalonia-idUSKCN0RQ0RN20150928">the result vindicated his strategy</a>. But even though they can now assemble a parliamentary majority, the two parties just failed to win a combined 50% of the vote, and those opposed to independence are nevertheless likely to argue that their opponents don’t have a mandate to press on with their secessionist plans. </p>
<p>They will still do so – but they face a number of challenges. </p>
<h2>Trouble ahead</h2>
<p>It’s by no means clear that CUP, which has been highly critical of Mas, will support his leadership. A far-left party, CUP has little in common with the centre-right Mas other than its desire for independence. The party has relentlessly attacked his <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19733995">economic austerity programme</a>, while criticising the numerous <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/11832001/Catalan-leaders-party-HQ-raided-by-police-in-corruption-probe.html">corruption allegations</a> which have damaged the credibility of the president’s party, <a href="http://convergents.cat/">Democratic Convergence of Catalonia</a>. </p>
<p>CUP also indicated during the campaign that it considered a majority of the popular vote a prerequisite for any formal move towards independence.</p>
<p>Negotiations within the pro-independence camp in the post-election period are therefore likely to be protracted. Even if he wins CUP’s support, Mas will have to provide some actual detail on how his independence strategy will be implemented – especially on his proposed 18-month “transition period”. Then there are the recent <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/11892227/Catalans-warn-forced-EU-exit-would-be-blow-to-European-free-movement.html">warnings from EU heads of government</a>, including Germany’s Angela Merkel and the UK’s David Cameron, that an independent Catalonia cannot expect to be automatically accepted as a new EU member state.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether the Spanish general election, which takes place in December, will return a government more sympathetic to the notion of Catalan independence. Although <a href="https://theconversation.com/andalusia-election-results-spell-trouble-for-spains-established-political-parties-39204">Mariano Rajoy’s People’s Party</a> is currently on course to win the election, it is unlikely that it will be able to secure a clear majority. The ascendant <a href="http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4875&title=Ciudadanos-A-third-way-or-a-Trojan-horse-for-the-left">centre-right party Ciudadanos (Citizens)</a> has eaten into the PP’s national vote over the last two years, and in the Catalan polls – running under its Catalan name, Ciutadans – it won more votes than any other party opposed to independence. </p>
<p>Indeed, the PP obtained less than half of the votes obtained by Ciutadans, although the PP has never been a dominant force in Catalonia due to the competition provided by centre-right Catalan nationalism. Whether the PP will be able to call on the support of Ciudadanos after the general election will be one of the key issues once the polls close.</p>
<h2>Missing out</h2>
<p>Unlike Ciudadanos, the other newcomer on the Spanish political scene, <a href="https://theconversation.com/meet-podemos-the-party-revolutionising-spanish-politics-33802">Podemos (We Can)</a> had a <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalan-independent-vote-separatists-win-absolute-majority-a6669756.html">disappointing</a> Catalan election. Despite the party’s attempts to emphasise its appeal beyond traditional left-right boundaries, it ended up running under the shared banner of <a href="http://www.catalannewsagency.com/politics/item/party-review-catalunya-si-que-es-pot-catalonia-yes-we-can-a-new-alternative-left-wing-coalition">Sí que es Pot</a> (Yes We Can) in alliance with the Catalan equivalent of <a href="http://www.izquierda-unida.es/">Izquierda Unida (United Left)</a> and the <a href="http://www.expatica.com/es/news/country-news/How-Outraged-protesters-took-charge-of-Spanish-capital_475931.html">environmentalists of Equo</a>. </p>
<p>Ultimately, Sí que es Pot paid the price for its ambiguous stance on Catalan independence. Describing itself as not being within the pro-independence camp while simultaneously advocating Catalans’ “right to decide”, it was unable to siphon off votes from CUP, which benefited from Sí que es Pot’s lacklustre campaign. Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias has been left to console himself with having obtained more votes than the PP.</p>
<p>Finally, the Socialist PSOE’s Catalan sister party, the <a href="http://www.catalannewsagency.com/politics/item/party-review-catalan-socialist-party-psc-is-against-catalonia-s-independence-and-declares-that-a-nation-is-not-a-state">PSC</a>, could take heart from the fact that its endorsement of the PSOE’s outright rejection of independence did not cost it even more seats. Relief, rather than satisfaction, characterised the Socialists’ response to the election – although the result hardly bodes well for the PSOE at the general election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48262/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Kennedy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Catalonia’s pro-independence parties now have the chance to assemble a parliamentary majority, but they’ll have to overcome their own differences first.Paul Kennedy, Lecturer in Spanish and European Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.