tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/caucasus-8890/articlesCaucasus – The Conversation2023-11-09T13:33:20Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2164182023-11-09T13:33:20Z2023-11-09T13:33:20ZChechnya’s boss and Putin’s foot soldier: How Ramzan Kadyrov became such a feared figure in Russia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557870/original/file-20231106-21-s35xj5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=346%2C829%2C6657%2C3812&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vladimir Putin and Ramzan Kadyrov have a personal relationship based on mutual dependence.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-pool-photograph-distributed-by-sputnik-agency-news-photo/1694572246">Mikhail Metzel/Pool/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The leader of the Russian republic of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, recently <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/chechnya-anti-semitic-riots-kadyrov-shoot-to-kill/32662418.html">authorized police</a> to shoot to kill pro-Palestinian protesters who might take to the streets of Chechnya. The orders came in the wake of an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/02/world/europe/mob-riot-dagestan-airport-telegram.html">antisemitic riot</a> that broke out on Oct. 29, 2023, in the neighboring Russian republic of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20593383">Dagestan</a>. </p>
<p>It is not that Kadyrov doesn’t support the Palestinian cause; <a href="https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-10-10-23/h_c7672da9df53b8772328fb478e38b568">he does</a>. Rather, the order demonstrates that he has a tight grip on the previously rebellious republic and is able to exert his omnipotent power – a power that extends far beyond the borders of Chechnya, a predominantly Muslim republic in the North Caucasus. </p>
<p>Kadyrov is both feared and venerated throughout Russia, and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/chechen-warlord-kadyrov-putin-dirty-work-ukraine-11671204557">even more so</a> since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since then, his power and influence have <a href="https://jordanrussiacenter.org/news/ramzan-kadyrov-and-chechnyas-political-stability-amid-the-war-in-ukraine/">increased significantly</a> within the Russian political sphere. This is due to his contributions to the war effort, including the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-chechnya-ukraine-war-recruitment-kadyrov-shaming/32124093.html">recruitment of volunteers</a>.</p>
<p>At the same time, he continually <a href="https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/clw7lrjzx81o">flouts the rule of law</a>. In September 2023, for example, Kadyrov posted a video to his Telegram channel showing his 15-year-old son, Adam, beating <a href="https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/clw7lrjzx81o">Nikita Zhuravel</a>, a 19-year-old imprisoned for allegedly burning the Quran in front of a mosque. Kadyrov praised Adam for possessing the “adult ideals of honor, dignity and defense of his religion.” Russian federal authorities did not condemn the beating of the defenseless prisoner.</p>
<p>How did the leader of a small North Caucasian republic become such a feared figure in Russia? </p>
<p>As scholars of <a href="https://independent.academia.edu/AnyaFree">Russian history</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Qkj6TgoAAAAJ&hl=en">Chechen politics</a>, we argue that Kadyrov’s power and political legitimacy are based on brute force, lack of accountability, a personal relationship with Putin and the use of Islam for political gain. </p>
<h2>Ruthless rise to power</h2>
<p>Ramzan Kadyrov’s late father, Akhmat Kadyrov, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2004/may/10/guardianobituaries.russia">was a mufti</a>, or Islamic legal scholar, in Chechnya in the 1990s. He and his son Ramzan were also staunch supporters of Chechen independence. However, Akhmat Kadyrov’s political and religious disagreement with the Chechen pro-independence government after the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/10/world/europe/photos-chechen-war-russia.html">first Chechen war</a> from 1994 to 1996 drew him into the orbit of Vladimir Putin.</p>
<p>Shortly after the beginning of the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/the-second-chechen-war-in-photos/30185257.html">second Chechen war</a>, which lasted from 1999 to 2009, Putin – who increased his power and popularity due to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/03/vladimir-putin-ukraine-war-chechnya">his aggressive role in the conflict</a> – installed Akhmat as the leader of the republic. </p>
<p>When <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/10/world/chechnya-bomb-kills-president-a-blow-to-putin.html">Akhmat was assassinated</a> in 2004, Ramzan was 27 years old – three years too young to legally assume the role as leader in Chechnya. He used these years to consolidate his power and ensure his political ascension. To achieve this, he worked on eliminating his political rivals, including those who were <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/movladi-baisarov-killed-in-moscow-2/">once close to his father</a>. <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/1074746.html">Some were silenced</a>, while others were exiled <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/06/kadyrov-yamadayev-chechnya-dubai-kremlin">or murdered</a>. </p>
<p>Ramzan was appointed to lead the republic in 2007 when he turned 30. At that time, Russia was conducting a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/download/7.pdf">counterterrorism operation</a> in Chechnya using its federal forces. Kadyrov worked diligently to take control of all security-related matters in the republic and eventually succeeded in building a formidable armed force devoted to him personally.</p>
<h2>Violent suppression of dissent</h2>
<p>This highly professional paramilitary force, colloquially known as the “<a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/state-resilience-fragility/authoritarianism/the-kadyrovtsy-putins-force-multiplier-or-propaganda-tool/">Kadyrovtsy</a>,” is formally integrated into the interior ministry and national guard. </p>
<p>These troops serve as a private army that <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/08/31/walking-minefield/vicious-crackdown-critics-russias-chechen-republic">suppresses dissent within the republic</a> and eliminates Kadyrov’s opponents beyond its borders. Members of Kadyrov’s inner circle have been linked to assassinations of the Russian opposition leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/nemtsov-murder-chechen-theories-shouldnt-take-heat-off-putin-38736">Boris Nemtsov</a>, journalist <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/1071891.html">Anna Politkovskaya</a>, human rights activist <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/Estemirovas_Death_Raises_Questions_About_Kadyrovs_Power/1778269.html">Natalya Estemirova</a> and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/1778554.html">others</a>. Kadyrov has denied any involvement.</p>
<p>Kadyrovtsy also fought in the Syrian civil war as part of <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-chechnya-ground-troops-syria/3634787.html">Russia’s military support</a> for Syrian president Bashar Assad. They have been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2014/05/140529_donetsk_chechens_ivshina">present in Ukraine</a> since the start of hostilities in the Donbas region in 2014 and assumed a larger role <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/18/the-real-role-of-pro-russian-chechens-in-ukraine">following the 2022 invasion</a>. This has boosted Kadyrov’s position within the closest circle of Putin’s supporters. </p>
<h2>Zealous loyalty to Putin</h2>
<p>Putin’s ascendance to power in 1999 marked the beginning of the end of the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2014/12/11/chechnya-russia-and-20-years-of-conflict">Chechen struggle for independence</a>. Under Putin’s rule, however, Kadyrov and his associates have achieved an unprecedented level of autonomy in the increasingly centralized Russian state. </p>
<p>This autonomy is largely due to the personal relationship between Putin and Kadyrov. Soon after Akhmat Kadyrov’s death, Ramzan famously arrived at the Kremlin <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/30907">wearing a tracksuit</a>, and Putin sincerely comforted the grief-stricken young man. That meeting laid the foundation for a strong patron-client relationship based on Kadyrov’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/putins-foot-soldier-kadyrov-threatens-critics/a-19000569">personal devotion to Putin</a> and the two leaders’ mutual dependence. </p>
<p>In return for Kadyrov’s zealous loyalty and his largely successful efforts in <a href="https://ibs.colorado.edu/johno/pub/NCaucasus.pdf">suppressing the North Caucasian insurgency</a>, Putin ceded nearly complete control of Chechnya. He also provided <a href="https://www.proekt.media/en/investigation-en/kadyrov-krotov-eng/">large economic subsidies to Chechnya</a>, enabling Kadyrov to rebuild the republic destroyed by two wars. In the process, Kadyrov became a very wealthy man himself and <a href="https://www.proekt.media/en/investigation-en/kadyrov-krotov-eng/">enriched his close associates</a>. </p>
<h2>Islam as a political tool</h2>
<p>Kadyrov grew up in a religious family that adhered to the North Caucasian traditional form of Islam called <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sufism">Sufism</a>. Under Kadyrov, Sufism in Chechnya flourished and became the only acceptable form of Islam. </p>
<p>Within Chechnya, Kadyrov uses religion to galvanize supporters and demonstrate his political power. He promotes Islamic values by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-chechnya-mosque/russias-chechnya-inaugurates-what-it-says-is-europes-largest-mosque-idUSKCN1VD1I1">building mosques</a> and <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hayesbrown/13-pictures-of-life-inside-chechnyas-religious-training-scho">religious schools</a>. He also dictates religious public conduct for the population, including <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/03/10/you-dress-according-their-rules/enforcement-islamic-dress-code-women-chechnya">a strict dress code</a>. </p>
<p>This public re-Islamization of the region after a long period of secular communist rule is convenient for Putin as well. It enables the Russian president to demonstrate respect for Islam and gain trust within the Muslim world. </p>
<p>Kadyrov, meanwhile, also uses Islam to <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ramzan-kadyrov-chechen-strategist-russias-middle-east-policy">boost his profile on the international stage</a> and bolster his political standing in Russia. On Oct. 25, 2023, during Israel’s bombardment of Gaza in the wake of Hamas’ attack on Israel, he expressed <a href="https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4042">his full support</a> for the Palestinian struggle and offered to send his “units” for a peacekeeping mission.</p>
<p>Kadyrov also argues that Chechen units in Ukraine are participating in a <a href="https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3033">holy jihad</a> against the “Western Satanist ideology.” He regularly <a href="https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4087">posts videos</a> from Chechen mosques where attendants pray for victory in Ukraine and liberation of the Palestinians.</p>
<h2>‘I am the boss!’</h2>
<p>Kadyrov has managed to construct an increasingly hierarchical and oppressive political system, one that revolves around the <a href="https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2021/11/28/14256193.shtml">cult of personality of his late father</a> and Ramzan himself. He presides over Chechnya – which waged two wars against Russia in the past 30 years in pursuit of independence – with impunity.</p>
<p>“I am the boss! I am at the steering wheel!” Kadyrov boldly <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uFoxpC-cNxw">proclaimed in 2011</a>, a mere four years after Putin installed him as the republic’s president. Since then, he has repeatedly <a href="https://www.kavkazr.com/a/pohischeniya-pytki-kuljt-lichnosti-itogi-2021-goda-v-chechne/31628535.html">defied human rights and the rule of law</a>. His supporters have engaged in <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/chechnya-abductions-20-civilians-kadyrov-russia/32215422.html">abductions</a>, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-chechnya-prison-kadyrov/32246562.html">torture</a> and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/caucasus-report-kadyrov-envoy-implicated-extortion/26706398.html">extortion of money</a> from the Chechen population. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/ru/report/2016/08/30/293356">Russian law seems powerless</a> to hold Kadyrov accountable, a fact the Chechen strongman underscored in 2015. In response to a covert operation by the Russian police in Chechnya, Kadyrov ordered Chechen law enforcement to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/23/chechnya-leader-ramzan-kadyrov-security-forces-fire-on-russian-troops">shoot anyone</a> – even federal forces – who entered the republic without prior notice.</p>
<p>In addition to his near-absolute power within Chechnya, Kadyrov wields unprecedented authority in Russia at large. Chechen security forces operate with apparent impunity, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/21/chechen-police-abduct-woman-retaliation-against-her-sons">kidnapping people</a> from across the Russian Federation. Victims include <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/08/russia-new-anti-gay-crackdown-chechnya">members of the LGBTQ community</a>, whom Kadyrov deems <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kadyrov-dismisses-us-too-weak-be-russia-enemy-hbo-interview-bashes-gays/28617697.html">“nonhuman” and “devils.”</a></p>
<p>At a time of <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/prigozhin-is-gone-but-the-causes-of-russias-growing-instability-persist-b944c2c">rising instability</a> within Russia, which is entangled in the disastrous war in Ukraine, Kadyrov maintains his strong grip on power in his republic. While other regional leaders are <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88810">temporary managers</a>, regularly replaced from Moscow, Kadyrov’s power is deeply entrenched.</p>
<p>Kadyrov sees any public display of discontent as a challenge to his authority, and he is ready to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/04/journalist-rights-lawyer-brutally-attacked-chechnya">brutally suppress it</a>, as he threatens to do with any pro-Palestinian protests. While he remains loyal to Putin, he has his own agenda and cannot afford to be seen as weak. His outrageous public breaches of the law, as well as societal and political norms, present a unique challenge – and, at times, liability – for the Putinist political system, of which Kadyrov is a pillar.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216418/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The leader of Chechnya rules with brute force, impunity and near autonomy. Why doesn’t Vladimir Putin rein him in?Anya Free, Faculty Associate of History, Arizona State UniversityMarat Iliyasov, Visiting Scholar at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2110972023-08-23T16:34:48Z2023-08-23T16:34:48ZFifteen years after the war in Georgia, the dilemmas of the European Union in the South Caucasus<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543565/original/file-20230820-23-u53jap.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C1908%2C1273&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Georgia is a highly strategic region for the European Union.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2008/08/30/autopsie-d-un-conflit_1089640_3214.html">Fifteen years ago</a> this month, while all eyes were set on Beijing for the opening of the 29th Olympic Games of the modern era, war broke out between <a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/russie-21217">Russia</a> and Georgia over South Ossetia. Officially part of Georgia since the country gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, it remained occupied by Moscow, as did the Black Sea coastal region of Abkhazia. Georgia’s then-president, Mikhail Saakachvili, attempted to regain control of these territories, which represent 20% of Georgia’s surface area, but to no avail. At the instigation of Nicolas Sarkozy, then president of France, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/union-europeenne-ue-20281">European Union</a> took on the role of mediator.</p>
<p>Russia is still exerting pressure to penetrate further into the territory today through what is known as the technique of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-hybrid-aggression-against-georgia-use-local-and-external-tools">“frontierisation”</a>. It aims to make a territorial conquest irreversible by transforming a simple administrative demarcation line into an international border. The process, which Russia has used extensively in the past, particularly in Central Asia, is <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-hybrid-aggression-against-georgia-use-local-and-external-tools">being deployed in Georgia and Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>Russia’s objectives in the South Caucasus are similar to those that led to its <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">invasion of Ukraine</a> in 2022. The overall ambition is to maintain or re-establish Russia’s control over the political, military and economic resources of what it has long regarded as its sphere of influence. The region is essential for Moscow in terms of trade and access to energy along a <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-%20%20%20rise-of-multimodal-transportation-among-russia-iran-and-india/">north-south corridor linking Russia to Iran and India</a>.</p>
<p>Georgia is torn, both within the government and public opinion, between pro-Western sentiments and the prospect of EU membership on the one hand, and the need to maintain ties with neighbouring Russia on the other. This divide has been further exacerbated by the arrival in Georgia in 2022 of around <a href="https://theconversation.com/russians-flee-the-draft-as-the-reality-of-the-war-in-ukraine-hits-home-191491">100,000 Russian citizens</a> fleeing their country, a situation that is boosting the Georgian economy but is also a source of uncertainty and anxiety.</p>
<p>The countries of the South Caucasus are once again at the heart of a complex game in which the military, economic and political interests of the major powers clash and intermingle. Despite sharing common interests, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan face very different situations and challenges in their relations with the Russian Federation and Turkey, whose influence is growing in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.</p>
<h2>A crossroads of influence</h2>
<p>Turkey’s military support for Azerbaijan was decisive in the war against Armenia (supported by Russia), which wanted to maintain its control over the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/nagorno-karabakh-26628">Nagorno-Karabakh region</a>. Turkish support serves Erdogan’s ambitions in Central Asia: to rebuild historical, cultural, linguistic, economic and political links with Turkic-speaking countries. The Organisation of Turkic States, founded in 2009 by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey, welcomed Uzbekistan in 2019 and can be seen as a <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/does-the-organization-of-turkic-states-worry-china-and-russia/">challenge to the hegemony of Russia and China in the region</a>.</p>
<p>Azerbaijan, even as it balances the interests of Turkey and Russia, has also been a partner of the European Union since 2022. The <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2022/07/19/">strategic energy partnership</a> signed in Baku in July of that year supports the doubling of the capacity of the <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-azerbaijan-enhance-bilateral-relations-including-energy-cooperation-2022-07-18_en">Southern Gas Corridor</a> from 2027.</p>
<p>Georgia is also a transit zone for goods trains from China and Central Asia bound for the European Union, via the Trans-Caspian rail corridor, an important alternative to the northern corridor, which crosses Russia and Belarus. The fastest route is the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) rail link, which then leads to the Turkish ports or the undersea <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marmaray_Tunnel">Marmaray train tunnel</a>.</p>
<p>The ports of Georgia, Poti and Batumi, and potentially the new port of Anaklia, offer the possibility of a direct link to Central and Eastern Europe via the Black Sea. Since purchasing the first of these terminals in April 2011, Netherlands-based APM Terminals has been negotiating with the Georgian government for a <a href="https://www.portseurope.com/apm-terminals-negotiates-poti-port-expansion-with-government/">$250 million investment</a>, including the construction of a deepwater port capable of handling <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panamax">Panamax vessels</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="ootxI" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/ootxI/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>It will be a new gateway to Europe, serving the needs of businesses in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as their trading partners in Central Asia. It will also offer the shortest connection to the EU’s <a href="https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/infrastructure-and-investment/trans-european-transport-network-ten-t_en">Trans-European Transport Network</a> (TEN-T), with regular container-shipping lines linking the ports of Poti or Batumi in Georgia to the ports of Constanta (Romania), Odessa (Ukraine) and Varna (Bulgaria).</p>
<p>EU agencies and financial institutions, such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), are also financing projects in Georgia’s energy, transport, agro-industry and finance sectors.</p>
<h2>A fragile partnership</h2>
<p>Georgia is thus a key partner for the European Union in terms of energy and transport policy, as well as trade and economic cooperation with the countries of the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. EU countries are already among Georgia’s main trading partners, accounting for 17.7% of Georgian exports in 2021, followed by China (16.6%), Russia (13.3%), Azerbaijan (12.7%) and Turkey (8.7%).</p>
<p>Despite these encouraging economic prospects, the EU’s response in June 2022 to Georgia’s membership application was a simple recognition of the country’s <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/european-perspective-georgia_en?s=221">“European perspective”</a>“, while Ukraine and Moldova were granted official candidate status. The European Commission’s opinion on Georgia’s application for membership defined <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/12%20Priorities.pdf">twelve priorities</a> that the country must meet in order to obtain candidate status. These include strengthening the independence of the anti-corruption authority, promoting gender equality and working toward the "de-oligarchisation” of the country.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540197/original/file-20230731-98364-f6wqkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540197/original/file-20230731-98364-f6wqkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540197/original/file-20230731-98364-f6wqkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540197/original/file-20230731-98364-f6wqkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540197/original/file-20230731-98364-f6wqkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540197/original/file-20230731-98364-f6wqkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540197/original/file-20230731-98364-f6wqkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540197/original/file-20230731-98364-f6wqkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Bidzina Ivanichvili (to the right of Herman Van Rompuy) chose Brussels for her first official visit as prime minister in 2012.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/europeancouncil/8178732872">European Council</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>The policy of rapprochement with Russia pursued by the ruling party, the “Georgian Dream” founded by the oligarch and former prime minister Bidzina Ivanichvili, has led to the EU’s priorities being implemented as slowly as possible. The EU member states must decide whether or not to grant Georgia the status of candidate country before the end of 2023, and thus face a <a href="https://www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/questions-d-europe/0674-georgie-terrible-dilemme-pour-l-europe">“terrible dilemma”</a> in the words of the Robert Schuman Foundation. </p>
<p>Not to give the candidate status to Georgia in an attempt to punish the current government would only serve to discourage public opinion, which is predominantly pro-European, and leaders such as President Salome Zurabishvili, a former diplomat. The demonstrations in March 2023 against the Russian-inspired <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230308-thousands-protest-in-tbilisi-against-georgian-foreign-agents-law">“foreign agents” law</a> showed the division of the country and the fragility of the situation. Were the bill to pass, organisations that receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad would have to register as “foreign agents”, or face fines. </p>
<p>Josep Borrell, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, said at the time that its adoption could have “serious repercussions on [EU-Georgian] relations”. Of that there can be no doubt.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jean-Paul Michel Larçon ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Georgia is a strategic region for the European Union, but if the EU strictly enforces membership requirements, could Tbilisi edge closer to Moscow?Jean-Paul Michel Larçon, Emeritus Professor Strategy and International Business, HEC Paris Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1613752021-05-24T18:56:43Z2021-05-24T18:56:43ZNagorno-Karabakh: in the aftermath of war, Armenia faces an unpalatable choice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402420/original/file-20210524-21-zc61kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3645%2C2467&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Armenian troops suffered a crushing defeat in the Second Karabakh War in 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bumble Dee via Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than six months have passed since the “second Karabakh war”, as it is now called, came to an abrupt end last year with Armenia all but defeated. The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-54882564">ceasefire hastily signed on November 9</a> – after Azerbaijan took the historically significant fortress town of Shushi/Shusha in the mostly Armenian-inhabited enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh – may have brought active hostilities to an end, but <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict/getting-ceasefire-peace-nagorno-karabakh">left many questions unanswered</a>.</p>
<p>For the first time since the earliest days of the conflict, Russian forces were introduced into those parts of the region still under ethnic Armenian control – marked orange on the map below – to guard the peace between the two sides. Under the terms of the agreement, Armenian forces also withdrew from territories adjacent to parts of the contested region – the dark green coloured areas on the map. The blue areas of the map show the territories that were recaptured by Azerbaijan.</p>
<p>As a result, the frontline between the two adversaries shifted all the way to the old, Soviet-era boundary between the two states, with the two sides facing off against each other across the eastern border of Armenia’s southernmost province of Syunik for the first time in over two decades.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402413/original/file-20210524-19-1hn8hzw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of the Caucasus region showing de facto borders after the ceasefire, explained above." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402413/original/file-20210524-19-1hn8hzw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402413/original/file-20210524-19-1hn8hzw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402413/original/file-20210524-19-1hn8hzw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402413/original/file-20210524-19-1hn8hzw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402413/original/file-20210524-19-1hn8hzw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402413/original/file-20210524-19-1hn8hzw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402413/original/file-20210524-19-1hn8hzw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The lie of the land after the ‘second Karabakh war’ in November 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Curious Golden via Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This border issue has become particularly salient in recent weeks. Several reported incursions of Azerbaijani forces into internationally recognised Armenian territory have added to Armenian society’s insecurities in the immediate aftermath of the 2020 war. Even during the war, fears of Azerbaijani encroachment into Armenian territory prompted the government of Nikol Pashinyan to ask for the stationing of <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/10/28/small-outpost-is-russias-first-visible-aid-to-armenia-a71892">several hundred Russian servicemen</a> in the province as a “tripwire”. </p>
<p>Those fears have now been exacerbated by repeated references to southern Armenia as the “<a href="https://eurasianet.org/armenian-azerbaijani-militaries-hold-exercises-amid-heightened-tensions">historical territory of Azerbaijan</a>” at the highest levels of Azerbaijan’s government. The idea that the encroachments in Syunik are somehow connected with these utterances, and Azerbaijan’s vocal insistence on a <a href="https://armenianweekly.com/2021/03/13/aliyev-once-again-threatens-armenia-with-war/">fully-fledged “transportation corridor”</a> across the province has raised tensions even further.</p>
<h2>Political turmoil</h2>
<p>In the run-up to Armenia’s <a href="https://apnews.com/article/europe-parliamentary-elections-armenia-elections-19c7d6d6502086bfce8b879fab1ce05b">upcoming snap parliamentary elections</a>, these fears have now reached fever pitch. Following Pashinyan’s resignation on April 25, Armenia’s nationalist opposition is interested in maximising the perception of his government as incompetent and weak. Opposition social media channels are amplifying this point by posting <a href="https://www.azatutyun.am/a/31265125.html">leaked documents</a> and floating allegations of secret territorial concessions to Azerbaijan.</p>
<p>It doesn’t help that most Armenian voters have already lost faith in any assurances given by the government, thanks to what is seen as a <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/12/armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh.html">disastrous and mendacious communications strategy</a> during the war. Ahead of the election on June 20, it will be hard to convince the Armenian people to accept any attempts to agree permanent mechanisms aimed at resolving the border conflict. This was pointed out in no uncertain terms in a recent statement by <a href="https://transparency.am/en/news/view/3276?fbclid=IwAR3HBxJrIEsmrU-m6x8Qh4sJeVrmzY8V6Jl71J880MYMGLjh7X2Enho-jrY">a coalition of civil society organisations</a> not associated with the nationalist opposition.</p>
<p>Much of the latest movement on the border may have to do with Azerbaijan maximising its positions in preparation for upcoming negotiations on a final settlement of the conflict. It may effectively be grabbing bargaining chips through “salami tactics” while the balance of power is still massively in its favour – rather than attempting to gain control of Syunik, or forcing the opening of a transportation corridor, as feared by some in Armenia. </p>
<p>Azerbaijan wants Armenia to face it across the negotiating table as weakened and insecure as possible, facing a series of accomplishments whose reversal would command a correspondingly high price. Recent statements by Azerbaijan’s president, <a href="https://tass.com/world/1292155">Ilham Aliyev</a>, have made clear that any peace agreement would be conditional on Armenia’s acceptance of Nagorno-Karabakh as an integral part of Azerbaijan. Armenia’s response that a comprehensive agreement would primarily involve <a href="https://tass.com/world/1292493">determining the enclave’s political status</a> leaves both sides as far apart as ever, even before the onset of negotiations.</p>
<h2>Russia’s role</h2>
<p>The recent episode has also highlighted Armenia’s dependence on alliances that could, at best, be described as “fickle”. For more than two decades, subsequent Armenian governments were all too happy to effectively outsource much of the country’s national security to Moscow. To a lesser extent, Armenia also relied on the <a href="https://www.evnreport.com/understanding-the-region/fact-sheet-what-is-the-collective-security-treaty-organization">Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)</a> of post-Soviet states in the name of maintaining an increasingly untenable status quo. </p>
<p>But the CSTO has revealed itself as the empty box many suspected it to be, both during the war, and during the recent border episodes. Official appeals by Armenia citing several CSTO provisions prompted barely a whimper from what is essentially a Moscow-sponsored facade of an alliance. A high-ranking Russian diplomat stressing that its doors were <a href="https://en.azvision.az/news/144565/news.html">also open to Azerbaijan</a> for good measure. </p>
<p>And, while Russia did oblige Armenia by stationing troops in Syunik, it was noticeably lukewarm in its support for the Armenian position in the recent stand-off with Azerbaijan. Despite Russia’s <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/1086156.html">bilateral mutual defence treaty with Armenia</a>, Moscow’s statements were even more restrained than those of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-may-14-2021/">United States</a> or <a href="https://theinformant.co.nz/macron-calls-for-the-immediate-withdrawal-of-azerbaijani-forces/">France</a>.</p>
<p>The Armenian electorate thus faces an unpalatable choice: an incumbent who was responsible for the worst military defeat in over a century, or a mostly nationalist opposition composed of former leaders whose only recipe for the future is more of the same – and an even greater dependence on Moscow. Meanwhile, much-needed new ideas following the November 2020 disaster are few, and will likely take much time and effort to emerge from the ashes of war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161375/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevork Oskanian does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Facing political turmoil, a weak and unpopular prime minister and indifferent allies in Moscow, Armenia faces an unpalatable choice.Kevork Oskanian, Honorary Research Fellow, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1522292020-12-23T15:25:25Z2020-12-23T15:25:25ZThe Caspian Sea is set to fall by 9 metres or more this century – an ecocide is imminent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376234/original/file-20201221-23-1e59mcp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C5982%2C2991&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Anton Balazh / shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Imagine you are on the coast, looking out to sea. In front of you lies 100 metres of barren sand that looks like a beach at low tide with gentle waves beyond. And yet there are no tides. </p>
<p>This is what we found when we visited the small harbour of Liman, on the Caspian Sea coast of Azerbaijan. The Caspian is actually a lake, the largest in the world, and it is experiencing a devastating decline in its water level that is about to accelerate. By the end of the century the Caspian Sea will be <a href="https://rmets.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/joc.6362">nine metres to 18 metres lower</a>. That’s a depth considerably taller than most houses.</p>
<p>It means the lake will lose at least 25% of its former size, uncovering 93,000 sq km of dry land. If that new land were a country, it would be the size of Portugal.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376052/original/file-20201220-15-mmc94t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of the Caspian Sea." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376052/original/file-20201220-15-mmc94t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376052/original/file-20201220-15-mmc94t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=816&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376052/original/file-20201220-15-mmc94t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=816&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376052/original/file-20201220-15-mmc94t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=816&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376052/original/file-20201220-15-mmc94t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1026&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376052/original/file-20201220-15-mmc94t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1026&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376052/original/file-20201220-15-mmc94t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1026&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Caspian borders five countries and is about the size of Germany or Japan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rainer Lesniewski / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As we found in our <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s43247-020-00075-6">new research</a>, the crisis may well result in an ecocide as devastating as the one in the Aral Sea, a few hundred kilometres to the east. The Caspian’s surface is already dropping by <a href="https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2017GL073958">7cm every year</a>, a trend likely to increase. In five years it might be about 40cm lower than today and in ten years almost one metre lower. Maritime countries worldwide are coming to terms with one metre or so of sea level rise by the end of the century. The Caspian Sea faces a drop of that size – except it will happen within a decade.</p>
<p>Climate change is the culprit. The Caspian Sea waters are isolated, its surface is already around 28 metres below global oceans. Its level is the product of how much water is flowing in from rivers, mostly the mighty Volga to the north, how much it rains, and how much evaporates away. </p>
<p>At the end of the century the Volga and other northern rivers will still be there. However, a projected temperature rise of about 3°C to 4°C in the region will drive evaporation <a href="https://rmets.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/joc.6362">through the roof</a>.</p>
<h2>Future misery despite past crises</h2>
<p>The Caspian Sea has a history of violent rises and falls. In Derbent, on the Caucasus coast of Russia, submerged ancient city walls testify to how low the sea was in medieval times. Around 10,000 years ago the Caspian was about 100 metres lower. A few thousand years before that it was about 50 metres higher than today and even overspilled into the Black Sea. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376520/original/file-20201223-23-w636hm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Caspian Sea depth." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376520/original/file-20201223-23-w636hm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376520/original/file-20201223-23-w636hm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376520/original/file-20201223-23-w636hm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376520/original/file-20201223-23-w636hm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376520/original/file-20201223-23-w636hm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=673&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376520/original/file-20201223-23-w636hm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=673&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376520/original/file-20201223-23-w636hm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=673&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Depth map of the Caspian Sea: the areas in red and yellow may disappear entirely.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Caspian-sea-border-and-bathymetry_fig1_316597844">Allahdadi et al (2004)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet people who lived beside the sea were able to overcome the swings. No human infrastructure was around to be destroyed and many animal species simply moved up and down with the sea levels, as they had done over the past 2 million years or so. But this <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0025326X19302310?via%3Dihub">time is different</a>. The fall will affect the Caspian’s unique and already stressed animal and plant life, along with human societies along the coasts. </p>
<p>In some areas the coastline is about to retract hundreds of metres a year or more. Can you imagine building new piers and harbours that fast? By the time they are ready, the sea will have moved kilometres or tens of kilometres further away. Coastal promenades will soon be landlocked. The beaches of today will be the sand ridges stranded in barren plains of tomorrow. </p>
<p>The drop will also affect lowland rivers and deltas around the Caspian Sea. Once-fertile plains will become too dry for watermelon and rice farming to continue.</p>
<h2>Unique Caspian life in peril</h2>
<p>The town of Ramsar, on the Iranian coast, gave its name to a <a href="https://www.discoverwildlife.com/people/what-is-the-ramsar-convention-everything-you-need-to-know/">global wetland convention</a>. But as the sea recedes, the town is becoming landlocked and the surrounding wetlands will be gone within decades.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376251/original/file-20201221-17-1n72aba.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A Turkmenistan stamp featuring a seal" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376251/original/file-20201221-17-1n72aba.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376251/original/file-20201221-17-1n72aba.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376251/original/file-20201221-17-1n72aba.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376251/original/file-20201221-17-1n72aba.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376251/original/file-20201221-17-1n72aba.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376251/original/file-20201221-17-1n72aba.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376251/original/file-20201221-17-1n72aba.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Officially listed as endangered, Caspian seal numbers have declined more than 90% over the past century.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">tristan tan / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The shallower “shelves” of the northern and eastern Caspian are major food supplies for fish and birds, yet the entire northern and eastern shelves will transform in dry barren lands. This will devastate fish species, the Caspian seal and a richness of molluscs and crustaceans species unique to the sea. These Caspian inhabitants have already suffered badly in the past century from <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0025326X19302310?via%3Dihub">pollution, poaching and invasive species</a>. About 99% of Caspian seal pups are raised on the winter ice of the north Caspian. Yet both the winter ice and indeed the whole north Caspian will disappear. </p>
<p>Remaining biodiversity hotspots in depths between <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0380133019302424?via%3Dihub">50 metres and 150 metres</a> will be affected as rivers dump nutrients into the deeper central basins combined with rising temperatures. This will decrease oxygen levels and developing ecological dead zones could affect the remaining refuges of Caspian species. A genuine ecocide is around the corner.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376568/original/file-20201223-15-az199e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing coastline in Liman, Azerbaijan, in 1995 and today." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376568/original/file-20201223-15-az199e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376568/original/file-20201223-15-az199e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376568/original/file-20201223-15-az199e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376568/original/file-20201223-15-az199e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376568/original/file-20201223-15-az199e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376568/original/file-20201223-15-az199e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376568/original/file-20201223-15-az199e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Caspian coastline is already receding.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Frank Wesselingh / Google Earth</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The situation cries for action, but possibilities are limited. Rising global CO₂ levels, the main driver of climate conditions causing the Caspian crisis, can only be dealt with global agreements. In Soviet times, large scale water diversions from Siberian rivers were proposed to deal with the shrinking Aral Sea to the east. But such large works – in the case of the Caspian Sea, <a href="https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/the-growing-need-to-reverse-declining-caspian-sea-levels">a canal from the Black Sea</a> might be considered – come with huge ecological and geopolitical risks. </p>
<p>Yet action is necessary to safeguard the Caspian Sea’s unique plants and animals and the livelihood of the people who live around it. The stranded small harbour in Liman is further from the sea every year. If no action is taken, it will be left alone in more than one way.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152229/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Wesselingh was coordinator of the Innovative Training Network "Drivers of Pontocaspian Biodiversity Rise and Demise" that received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 642973.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matteo Lattuada participated in the Innovative Training Network "Drivers of Pontocaspian Biodiversity Rise and Demise" that received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 642973</span></em></p>Climate change means more water is evaporating than is flowing in.Frank Wesselingh, Senior Researcher, Naturalis Biodiversity Center, Utrecht UniversityMatteo Lattuada, PhD Candidate, Department of Animal Ecology & Systematics, University of GiessenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1493502020-11-13T13:43:01Z2020-11-13T13:43:01ZGenocide claims in Nagorno-Karabakh make peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan unlikely, despite cease-fire<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369190/original/file-20201112-13-15vuilx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C29%2C3235%2C2079&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soldiers patrol the mountainous, disputed border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, on Nov. 8.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/servicemen-walk-towards-the-armenian-border-the-fighting-news-photo/1229530009?adppopup=true">Stanislav Krasilnikov\TASS via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan/russian-peacekeepers-deploy-to-nagorno-karabakh-after-ceasefire-deal-idUSKBN27Q11R">Russian-brokered cease-fire</a> between Armenia and Azerbaijan this week halted fighting over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory, where long-standing hostilities <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54314341">reerupted on Sept. 27</a>. </p>
<p>The deal leaves Azerbaijan, which was <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Nagorno-Karabakh">given Nagorno-Karabakh by the Soviets in 1923</a>, largely in control of the majority-Armenian territory. Leaders in Nagorno-Karabakh, located in Western Azerbaijan close to Armenia, continue to demand independence. </p>
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<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/10/nagorno-karabakh-armenia-pm-signs-deal-to-end-war-with-azerbaijan-and-russia">Thousands have died</a> and an estimated 100,000 have been displaced in Nagorno-Karabakh since September. As the cease-fire took effect on Nov. 10, Azerbaijanis danced in the streets. But <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54882564">angry Armenians</a> stormed the Armenian parliament and office of the prime minister. </p>
<p>Both sides in the conflict have <a href="https://azertag.az/en/xeber/Azerbaijans_Foreign_Ministry_releases_statement_on_Armenia_missile_attack_on_Barda-1627027">claimed that fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh</a> isn’t just about territorial control – it <a href="https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/31/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-Al-Arabiya/">is a fight to prevent genocide</a>, a fight for their lives. These grave accusations, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2020/11/11/shortly-before-ceasefire-experts-issue-a-genocide-warning-for-the-situation-in-nagorno-karabakh/?sh=53240f94d005">while yet unproven</a>, may make a lasting resolution to the conflict much harder.</p>
<h2>Freedom fighting and genocide claims</h2>
<p>Violence first broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh in the 1980s, when the region’s ethnic Armenian leaders sought to gain independence from Azerbaijan. There has been intermittent fighting since then, including a bloody war in the 1990s that ended in another <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-05-17-mn-58811-story.html">Russia-brokered cease-fire</a> giving Azerbaijan legal control of the region. </p>
<p>But Armenian leaders in Nagorno-Karabakh declared themselves an independent republic, and have repeatedly tried to secede. </p>
<p>In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14623528.2012.649893">research on self-determination</a>, I find that genocide is often invoked by secessionist regions as a last-ditch effort to secure outside intervention in their conflict. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">United Nations</a> defines genocide as the destruction or partial destruction of a “national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” It is a war crime under international law, and countries are supposed to “prevent and punish” it under a 1948 U.N. agreement.</p>
<p>Secessionist leaders often try to rally <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/secessionist-minorities-and-external-involvement/58E0E7DB76EB90039C0581F608304078">foreign powers around their cause</a> with arguments based on geopolitical strategy, economic self-interest, religious bonds or shared ideology. Those reasons broadly explain why <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/kurdish-factor-iran-iraq-relations">Iran supports</a> the <a href="https://unpo.org/article/14519">Iraqi Kurds</a> in their quest for greater autonomy, and why the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/sympathy-for-the-palestinians/">Arab states back</a> the Palestinians’ efforts at statehood. </p>
<p>But when all else fails, freedom fighters will highlight their own repression in the starkest of terms to gain international assistance. In war a global campaign for victimhood is the weapon of the weaker side – and genocide claims are the most powerful weapon in this arsenal. </p>
<p>According to my research, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14623528.2012.649893">more than two-thirds of members</a> in the <a href="https://unpo.org/">Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization</a>, a nongovernmental organization composed of autonomy-minded minority groups like the Kurds, have alleged genocide.</p>
<h2>Genocide makes peace hard</h2>
<p>Genocide may be, as one scholar puts it, the “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.2307/1389562?journalCode=spxb">embodiment of radical evil</a>,” but as a war crime it is incredibly difficult to prove. </p>
<p>Under international law, accusers must show perpetrators acted with the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part,” specified groups. <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2003/22.html#The%20requirement%20of%20proving%20the%20specific%20intent%20to%20commit%20genocide_T">Demonstrating intent</a> is a tall order. </p>
<p>Armenia knows this as well as any nation. The 1915 Armenian genocide by Turkey is recognized by fewer than <a href="https://www.armenian-genocide.org/recognition_countries.html">three dozen countries</a>. In terms of both law and politics, declaring a deadly military campaign to be genocide – <a href="https://theconversation.com/preventing-genocide-in-myanmar-court-order-tries-to-protect-rohingya-muslims-where-politics-has-failed-130530">versus just the atrocities of a bloody conflict</a> – is tricky indeed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Rubble of a cement home and photo of a boy with flowers around it" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A house destroyed in an Oct. 17 rocket attack on Gyandzha, outside the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, that killed a young boy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/photograph-of-the-deceased-russian-boy-artur-mayakov-is-news-photo/1229548313?adppopup=true">Gavriil Grigorov\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Genocide allegations, on the other hand, are more easily come by. But according to my research they don’t bode well for peace. </p>
<p>Genocide claims turn “the other side” into an enemy bent on the destruction of an entire people. Once the public sees a conflict in these terms, history shows, leaders understandably balk at the prospect of <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:49KT-6910-00KJ-D1GC-00000-00&context=1516831">sitting down at the negotiating table</a> with that enemy. </p>
<p>Genocide claims also reduce the likelihood of effective outside mediation by winnowing away the pool of “honest brokers” – that is, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27798500?seq=1">objective intermediaries</a>. Opposing parties can and do reject would-be peacekeepers based on their acknowledgment of – or refusal to acknowledge – genocide accusations, my research finds. </p>
<p>In archived coverage of the <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:605K-2V91-DYRH-01PW-00000-00&context=1516831">South Ossetian</a> region of Georgia, for example, local leaders in the 2000s insisted various European and American troops could not serve as peacekeepers since they had not defended Ossetians from an alleged 1992 genocide. </p>
<h2>Nagorno-Karabakh and genocide</h2>
<p>Genocide claims in the Georgia cases did eventually lead to international intervention and separation from Georgia, but not through peaceful negotiations. Instead, South Ossetia, like another <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18175030">breakaway Georgian state called Abkhazia</a>, gained de facto independence after a brutal Russian military assault on Georgia in 2008. </p>
<p>This mirrored what occurred in Kosovo nearly a decade earlier when Serbian <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/04/kosovos-push-for-serbian-genocide-tribunal-likely-to-fail/">atrocities</a> prompted Western intervention. Western powers recognized Kosovo’s independence in 2008, but <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18328859">Serbia</a> continues to contest Kosovo’s separation.</p>
<p>In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, genocide claims on both sides are nothing new. In archival research I found media reports showing that Armenian leaders have repeatedly <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJD-NCK0-0013-F32T-00000-00&context=1516831">reminded foreign powers of the 1915 Armenian genocide</a> when pressing for <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJ4-DBK0-0007-W0Y8-00000-00&context=1516831">outside intervention</a> in their conflict with Azerbaijan.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Parade of cars with men waving Azerbaijani flags out the windows" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C14%2C4929%2C3261&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Azerbaijanis celebrate the end of the military conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh on Tuesday.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/local-people-celebrate-the-end-of-the-military-conflict-news-photo/1229566072?adppopup=true">Gavriil Grigorov\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Azerbaijanis, for their part, retort it is their citizens who should fear genocide. During a 1992 Armenian military campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenians committed what is now called the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17179904">Khojaly massacre</a>, when at least 613 civilians were reportedly killed. As <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:49NB-0J80-01S8-D0TP-00000-00&context=1516831">newspapers from the era</a> reveal, Azerbaijani leaders declared then that without international intervention, Armenians would finish the job.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>It is impossible to determine whether genocide has in fact occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh without in-depth investigations. But the accusations alone may overpower any truce. And as Armenians’ angry reaction to the recent cease-fire demonstrates, peace between the two nations is fragile at best.</p>
<p><em>A photo caption in this story has been changed to reflect that a rocket attack killed a young boy outside the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149350/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Grodsky does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Each side in the bloody Nagorno-Karabakh conflict accuses the other of war crimes. Such allegations attract foreign attention and possibly intervention, but rarely lead to a peaceful solution.Brian Grodsky, Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1474022020-10-07T11:28:15Z2020-10-07T11:28:15ZNagorno-Karabakh: why Iran is trying to remain neutral over the conflict on its doorstep<p>Fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-54418901">intensified</a> in early October over Nagorno-Karabakh, the disputed region in the South Caucasus at the centre of a conflict that has lasted for more than three decades. </p>
<p>The South Caucasus is sandwiched between Russia to the north, Iran to the south and Turkey to the west. Out of these three regional powers, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/turkey-territorial-disputes-azerbaijan-ankara-armenia-9a95d9690569623adedffe8c16f3588d">Turkey’s vocal and military support</a> for Azerbaijan has bolstered Baku’s confidence to refuse mediation in the conflict. Meanwhile, Moscow – which has historically been an important mediator in this conflict – is also committed to protect Armenia under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, a regional security alliance. </p>
<p>Iran, however, has adopted an official neutral stance and has repeatedly offered to mediate over the past three decades. It’s doing the same today, with Iranian <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/europe/nagorno-karabakh-armenia-azerbaijan-iran-peace-plan-b819259.html">officials stating</a> they are working on a peace plan. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nagorno-karabakh-are-armenia-and-azerbaijan-sliding-towards-all-out-war-147066">Nagorno-Karabakh: are Armenia and Azerbaijan sliding towards all-out war?</a>
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<h2>Mediation efforts</h2>
<p>The first war over Nagorno-Karabakh broke out in the late 1980s, resulting in Azerbaijan losing 20% of its territory to Armenia. </p>
<p>Tehran made an extensive effort to broker <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25739638.2017.1404259">a ceasefire in 1992</a>, only to see it violated by the Armenian militia within hours, discrediting Iran’s role as a mediator.</p>
<p>Although another ceasefire was eventually brokered in 1994, numerous rounds of negotiations, as well as regional and international mediation, most notably by the OSCE Minsk group, have not led to peace – or even a partial resolution of the dispute. While conflict has repeatedly flared up along the front line since then, for <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35949991">example in 2016</a>, the current escalation, which began on September 27, is by far the most serious. </p>
<p>Iran is in no real position to mediate now, particularly given its own <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/world/middleeast/iran-and-azerbaijan-wary-neighbors-find-less-to-agree-on.html">turbulent relationship with Baku</a>, as well as international sensitivity over Iran’s increased regional influence. The only reason Iran repeats its offer of mediation is to confirm to Armenia and Azerbaijan – and their respective ethnic minorities and supporters inside Iran – that Tehran remains neutral. Such <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/5/iran-nk">neutrality is important</a> for Iran’s own domestic stability.</p>
<h2>Historic ties</h2>
<p>Until the early 19th century, Georgia, Armenia and the territories of the present-day Republic of Azerbaijan (known then as Arran) were under Persian control. Iran then lost these territories to Russia following its defeats in two wars. </p>
<p>The 1918 collapse of Russia’s Tsarist empire and the weakening of Moscow’s hold on Arran provided the opportunity for nationalist parties. Supported by the Ottoman Empire, <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Azerbaijan_Since_Independence.html?id=4aZzCQAAQBAJ&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y">they created the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic</a>, which was integrated into the Soviet Union in 1920. </p>
<p>While, prior to 1918, there had been no political entity on the north of the Aras river with the name Azerbaijan, the people of Arran shared Turkic ethnicity and language with those in the north-western provinces of Iran, historically called Eastern and Western Azarbaijan. </p>
<p>This makes today’s 9 million population of Azerbaijan brethren of <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/sep/03/iran-minorities-2-ethnic-diversity#:%7E:text=Azeris%20are%20Iran's%20largest%20ethnic,closer%20to%20Turkish%20than%20Persian">16% of Iran’s population</a> – another 20 million people. Iran is also home to <a href="https://financialtribune.com/articles/people/8808/a-look-at-the-vibrant-iranian-armenian-community">more than 100,000</a> highly respected and well-integrated Armenians. They have strong and at times useful connections to the global Armenian diaspora, which has <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-armenian-diaspora-forged-coalitions-to-push-for-genocide-recognition-126703">influential lobbies</a> in western countries, especially the US.</p>
<p>With such an ethnic mix, any official support by Tehran for either Armenia or Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabach conflict could deepen the social faultlines to the point of conflict. It would also add to the various social dilemmas that the Iranian state is already facing, arising from <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-48119109">economic hardship</a> caused by US sanctions, rampant corruption and mismanagement, as well as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/01/world/middleeast/iran-protests-deaths.html">public dissatisfaction</a> with the state’s repressive policies.</p>
<p>At a time when social cohesion is in tatters, taking sides could easily result in widening ethnic divisions that could put Iran’s political and territorial integrity at risk. </p>
<h2>Wary of Baku</h2>
<p>As I have explained in <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Irans-Foreign-Policy-in-the-South-Caucasus-Relations-with-Azerbaijan-and/Kouhi-Esfahani/p/book/9781138309081">my own research</a>, with a shared Shia religion and civilisational background, Iran could have been Azerbaijan’s natural ally – especially as Armenia is a non-Muslim country. But Azerbaijan’s constant expansionist approach towards Iranian territories since its independence makes such an alliance highly unlikely, no matter who rules Iran. </p>
<p>Azerbaijan has made <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326403901_The_clash_of_nationalisms_Iranian_response_to_Baku's_Irredentism">significant investments</a>
in promoting separatist ideas among Turkic Iranians and maintained an appetite for integrating the Iranian provinces of Eastern and Western Azarbaijan into the republic. This has been one of the main reasons why Iran’s ruling Shia theocracy is reluctant to take Azerbaijan’s side, despite the fact that the majority of Azerbaijan’s population is also Shia.</p>
<p>Baku’s partnerships with the US and Israel, as well as its secular government with an adamant resistance to any influence from Iran, also increase the Islamic Republic’s hesitance to support Azerbaijan. </p>
<p>Armenia, on the other hand, has not demonstrated any expansionist policies towards Iranian territories. Nor has it developed relations with Iran’s nemeses – the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia – to a degree that undermines its cordial relations with Tehran. Still, it would be counter-intuitive for Iran’s Shia theocracy to overtly ally with a Christian republic against another Shia majority country. </p>
<p>This is why the best option for protecting Iran’s security and stability is for Tehran to maintain its neutral stance while supporting international initiatives to resolve the conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marzieh Kouhi-Esfahani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As fighting continues between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, neighbouring Iran has offered to mediate.Marzieh Kouhi-Esfahani, Teaching Fellow, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1470662020-09-29T12:12:23Z2020-09-29T12:12:23ZNagorno-Karabakh: are Armenia and Azerbaijan sliding towards all-out war?<p>Nagorno-Karabakh is a place name few in the West will recognise. But this small, unrecognised mountainous state with a population of about 150,000, is now the site of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-54323553">deadly ongoing clashes</a> between Armenia and Azerbaijan. </p>
<p>Nagorno-Karabakh, known in Armenian as Artsakh, has been the object of a protracted conflict between two peoples of the South Caucasus since before the fall of the Soviet Union. The territory’s mostly Armenian inhabitants declared independence from Azerbaijan in late 1991, with Armenia’s support. Attempts by Azerbaijan to reimpose its authority <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Black_Garden.html?id=jycTCgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">led to a fight for ownership</a> which turned into the bloodiest of the many conflicts that followed the fall of the Soviet Union. </p>
<p>Between 1991 and 1994, both sides sacrificed over 30,000 people, and ethnically cleansed each other from areas under their control. </p>
<p>A ceasefire was finally signed in 1994, leaving the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, and a swathe of land surrounding it in Armenian hands. Tortuous negotiations continued over several decades, <a href="https://www.osce.org/mg">led by Russia, France and the US</a>. But there was very little progress towards a final resolution. </p>
<p>Since September 27, the two adversaries appear to have relapsed into war, with heavy <a href="https://eurasianet.org/armenia-and-azerbaijan-hurtle-toward-war">battles reported</a> along the sections of the front line near the territory. These most serious clashes since 1994 have left <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/un-chief-calls-on-armenia-azerbaijan-to-cease-hostilities-as-death-toll-reaches-at-least-65/30861933.html">at least 65 dead</a> at the time of writing. Both sides are using a wide range of military equipment, including heavy tanks, long-range artillery and drones. </p>
<p>As both countries <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4f7cd48e-93d9-40d5-a6d3-aceb10d31de6">declared martial law</a> and decreed mobilisations, the rhetoric in the Armenian capital Yerevan and Azerbaijani capital Baku has been uncompromising. </p>
<p>In Armenia, this is seen as nothing less than a struggle for survival. A recurring theme in both official circles and the country’s media has been the possible extermination of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. <a href="https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1029252">Links</a> are made with the 1915 Armenian genocide by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-100th-anniversary-of-the-armenian-genocide-40434">Ottoman Empire</a>, especially in light of Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan. </p>
<p>In Azerbaijan, on the other hand, the war has been presented as an opportunity to right the wrongs of 1991-94 by bringing the territory back under Azerbaijani control, allowing hundreds of thousands of displaced people to return home. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Map showing territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh under Armenian control." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360518/original/file-20200929-16-1mbh3z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360518/original/file-20200929-16-1mbh3z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360518/original/file-20200929-16-1mbh3z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360518/original/file-20200929-16-1mbh3z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360518/original/file-20200929-16-1mbh3z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360518/original/file-20200929-16-1mbh3z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360518/original/file-20200929-16-1mbh3z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh under Armenian control.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nagorno-Karabakh#/media/File:Location_Artsakh_en.png">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Route to renewed conflict</h2>
<p>This latest fighting has a number of drivers. In the short term, Azerbaijan’s authoritarian president, Ilham Aliyev, was under pressure to correct setbacks suffered by the Azerbaijani forces during <a href="https://eurasianet.org/fighting-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-widens">earlier clashes</a> on the border with Armenia in July. The setbacks led to <a href="https://eurasianet.org/pro-war-azerbaijani-protesters-break-into-parliament">spontaneous demonstrations</a> in Baku by citizens calling for the resignation of the armed forces’ chief of staff, and an all-out war against the Armenian side. </p>
<p>As a result, Azerbaijan’s longtime foreign minister was replaced. Azerbaijan has also upgraded its already close relationship with its traditional ally, Turkey, which has made <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkey-reiterates-support-to-azerbaijan-against-armenia/1919117">public assertions of unconditional support</a>. Along with its stated <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkey-reiterates-support-to-azerbaijan-against-armenia/1919117">readiness to engage in intensified military co-operation</a>, this has probably bolstered Aliyev’s confidence. </p>
<p>Seen over the longer term, this escalation must be viewed in terms of the intractable nature of the negotiations surrounding the conflict. Azerbaijan has shown <a href="https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijani-president-calls-into-question-negotiations-with-armenia">increased frustration</a> with the ongoing negotiations in recent years, especially after unmet expectations for a breakthrough following <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/armenias-velvet-revolution-9781788317184/">Armenia’s 2018 Velvet Revolution</a>. </p>
<p>The absence of a definitive solution has also allowed Armenia to present its control of the unrecognised Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh as the new normal. It has also gradually hardened its public position that the <a href="https://eurasianet.org/for-armenians-theyre-not-occupied-territories-theyre-the-homeland">lands surrounding the territory</a> are also Armenian.</p>
<p>Azerbaijan has invested <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CN?locations=AZ">billions of petro-dollars</a> in state-of-the art military hardware, and sunk plenty of social capital into the promise of regaining control over Nagorno-Karabakh. This puts Aliyev under increasing pressure to force some movement on the matter.</p>
<h2>Turkey and Russia</h2>
<p>This is undoubtedly a highly dangerous phase in the conflict. The unequivocal support by Turkey for Azerbaijan could draw it into the confrontation, especially if Azerbaijan were seen to be losing ground. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/28/syrian-rebel-fighters-prepare-to-deploy-to-azerbaijan-in-sign-of-turkeys-ambition">Reports of Turkey hiring Syrian rebel fighters</a> to serve in Azerbaijan would, if confirmed, also be perceived as highly provocative by Moscow in light of the proximity of the restless North Caucasus, inviting a potential response. </p>
<p>Hostilities could also spill into <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Naxcivan-republic-Azerbaijan">Nakhichevan</a>, a part of Azerbaijan separated by a band of Armenian territory, whose status is subject to a Turkish guarantee under a Soviet-era treaty. Unlike a confrontation in Nagorno-Karabakh, a direct attack on Armenia proper – from Nakhichevan or elsewhere – could trigger Russia’s defence commitments under the <a href="https://en.odkb-csto.org">Collective Security Treaty Organization</a>, with potentially very serious repercussions beyond the region itself.</p>
<p>With the stakes high, the UN is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/29/un-to-hold-emergency-talks-on-azerbaijan-armenia-conflict">holding an emergency meeting</a> on the issue. Separate diplomatic contacts between the belligerents and Russia, Turkey and others are already underway. But even if that were successful in achieving a ceasefire, this would still leave the more important, longer-term problem: how to resolve an issue which strikes at the core of the identities of both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. </p>
<p>Over the past decades, these two peoples have developed views of history that are exclusive and exclusionary in the extreme. Anyone striving for peace will have to change history before being able to write the future. And that would be quite a circle to square.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147066/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevork Oskanian does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Renewed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is rooted as much in the past as it is the present.Kevork Oskanian, Honorary Research Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1158222019-05-31T17:38:51Z2019-05-31T17:38:51ZEnvironmental reporting can help protect citizens in emerging democracies<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277256/original/file-20190530-69055-1j71ysn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Caucasus mountains in Svaneti, northwest Georgia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Svaneti,_georgia.jpg">Polscience/Wikimedia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>What happens when an illegally logged tree falls or poachers kill endangered brown bears in the forest, but there’s no journalist to report it?</p>
<p>That’s the situation in the Republic of Georgia, which faces challenges that include poaching, deteriorating air quality, habitat disruption from new hydropower dams, illegal logging and climate change. The effects cross national borders and affect economic and political relationships <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Environmental-Crises-in-Central-Asia-From-steppes-to-seas-from-deserts/Freedman-Neuzil/p/book/9781138824843">in the Caucasus and beyond</a>. </p>
<p>I researched environmental journalism in the Republic of Georgia as a Fulbright Scholar there in the fall of 2018. I chose Georgia because many of its environmental and media problems are similar to those confronting other post-Soviet countries nearly 30 years after independence. As I have found in <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=bEOS7t8AAAAJ&hl=en">my research</a> on mass media in other post-Soviet nations, journalists risk provoking powerful public and corporate interests when they investigate sensitive environmental issues.</p>
<p>But when the media don’t cover these problems, Georgians go uninformed about issues relevant to their daily lives. Eco-violators operate with impunity, and the government and Georgia’s influential private sector remain opaque to the public. At a time when government hostility to journalists is <a href="https://rsf.org/en/2019-world-press-freedom-index-cycle-fear">rising in many countries</a>, Georgia illustrates how environmental damage, pollution and ill health can spread, and go unpunished, when powerful interests are unaccountable to the public.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277261/original/file-20190530-69095-qbgh73.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277261/original/file-20190530-69095-qbgh73.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277261/original/file-20190530-69095-qbgh73.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277261/original/file-20190530-69095-qbgh73.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277261/original/file-20190530-69095-qbgh73.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277261/original/file-20190530-69095-qbgh73.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277261/original/file-20190530-69095-qbgh73.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277261/original/file-20190530-69095-qbgh73.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Georgia’s habitats range from alpine peaks to river floodplains and the Black Sea coast.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Physical_Map_of_Georgia_(en).svg">Giorgi Balakhadze/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>An unstable mediascape</h2>
<p>Levels of press freedom, autonomy and media sustainability have fluctuated since Georgia became independent in 1991. The latest constitutional change greatly strengthened Parliament and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46376344">eliminated direct election of the president</a>, whose office is primarily ceremonial. </p>
<p>The governing <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian_Dream">Georgian Dream coalition</a> has become increasingly anti-press over the past two years. <a href="https://cmds.ceu.edu/sites/cmcs.ceu.hu/files/attachment/basicpage/1435/mimgeorgiaregulationcorrected.pdf">Georgia’s mediascape</a> is fairly diverse but dominated by its two largest television channels. The 2019 World Press Freedom Index ranks Georgia <a href="https://rsf.org/en/georgia">60th out of 180 countries</a>, a substantial improvement from 100th in 2013. However, it notes that media owners still often control editorial content, and threats against journalists are not uncommon.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/kd7Q6nr3r20?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">As Georgia transitions from former Soviet state to independent society, it is strengthening its institutions, reaching out to Europe and keeping a wary eye on Russia.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Shallow, uninformed coverage</h2>
<p>In addition to my own observations during 3 ½ months based in Tbilisi with visits to other cities, my findings draw on input from 16 journalists, media trainers, scientists and representatives of advocacy groups and multinational agencies whom I interviewed or who spoke to my media and society class at Caucasus University.</p>
<p>Source after source bemoaned what they saw as generally shallow, sparse, misleading and inaccurate coverage of environmental topics. In their view, the legacy of Soviet journalism as a willing propaganda tool of the state lingered. Tamara Chergoleishvili, director general of the magazine and news website <a href="http://www.tabula.ge/en">Tabula</a>, put it bluntly: “There is no environmental journalism… There is no professionalism.” </p>
<p>One major complaint was that journalists lacked knowledge about science and the environment. “If you don’t understand the issue, you can’t convey it to the public,” said Irakli Shavgulidze, chair of the governing board of the nonprofit <a href="https://www.eco-web.com/reg/04762.html">Center for Biodiversity Conservation & Research</a>. </p>
<p>Another concern was that journalists often failed to connect environmental topics with other issues such as the economy, foreign relations, energy and health. Sophie Tchitchinadze, a <a href="http://www.ge.undp.org/content/georgia/en/home.html">United Nations Development Programme</a> communications analyst and former journalist, said the Georgian media was just starting to view itself as “an essential part of economic development and equally important to social issues.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277262/original/file-20190530-69071-m4a7sh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277262/original/file-20190530-69071-m4a7sh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277262/original/file-20190530-69071-m4a7sh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277262/original/file-20190530-69071-m4a7sh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277262/original/file-20190530-69071-m4a7sh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277262/original/file-20190530-69071-m4a7sh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277262/original/file-20190530-69071-m4a7sh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277262/original/file-20190530-69071-m4a7sh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tourists swim and sunbathe in the Black Sea resort town of Batumi. Georgia’s government has attracted top foreign investors to build hotels and develop tourist sites.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Welcome-to-Georgia/d119327caf8343a396090f0f84ed54ff/66/0">AP Photo/Maria Danilova, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Transparent in principle, not in practice</h2>
<p>Lack of access to information was also a common complaint, despite transparency laws entitling the public and press to government documents.</p>
<p>For example, when <a href="http://www.cactus-media.ge/">Tsira Gvasalia</a>, Georgia’s leading environmental investigative journalist, reported on the nation’s only gold mining company, she was unable to obtain full information on possible government actions from the local prosecutor, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture or the courts. “The company has a close connection with the government,” she noted.</p>
<p>Georgian citizens weren’t much help either. In the small mining town of Kazreti, Gvasalia saw thick layers of dust on roads and bus stops from uncovered trucks transporting ore to the company’s processing facility. When she asked residents how pollution affected their everyday lives, people were “very careful. Once I mentioned the name of the company, everybody went silent. … Everyone worked for the company,” she said. </p>
<h2>Who sets the priorities?</h2>
<p>In my sources’ view, environmental coverage was not a priority for Georgian journalists and media owners, especially at the national level. Lia Chakhunashvili, a former environmental journalist now associated with the nonprofit <a href="https://www.irex.org/">International Research & Exchanges Board</a>, observed that covering the environment “is not as glamorous as being a political reporter or on TV all the time or having parliamentary credentials.”</p>
<p>“If the environmental sector becomes a priority for the government, journalists will try to cover it better,” Melano Tkabladze, an environmental economist with the <a href="http://www.cenn.org/">Caucasus Environmental NGO Network</a>, predicted.</p>
<p>What coverage exists is weakened by misinformation, disinformation and “fake news.” Much of it originates from Russia, which <a href="https://www.history.com/news/russia-georgia-war-military-nato">briefly invaded Georgia in 2008</a> to support two breakaway provinces seeking independence, and vehemently opposes Georgia’s efforts to join NATO and the European Union. </p>
<p>Tabula’s Chergoleishvili asserted that Georgian journalists could not distinguish fake news from legitimate sources. As an example, Gvasalia described planted reports on Facebook that claimed a hydroelectric project would “elevate local people” and provide “great social benefit.” “Seventy percent of this needs to be double-checked,” she warned.</p>
<h2>Cultivating better reporting</h2>
<p>Although Georgia’s media sector remains politically and economically vulnerable, I see two encouraging signs. First, young journalists are increasingly interested in covering the environment. Second, Georgian leaders strongly desire to <a href="http://agenda.ge/en/news/2018/1888">join the European Union</a>, where multinational eco-issues such as curbing climate change and building a pan-European energy market are priorities. This step would be significant for Georgia, given the trans-border nature of environmental problems, the country’s progress toward energy self-sufficiency and its strategic location. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1097908923196153857"}"></div></p>
<p>In the meantime, more support for independent fact-checking could improve Georgian environmental coverage. Some already occurs: For example, <a href="https://factcheck.ge/en">FactCheck.ge</a>, a nonpartisan news website based in Tbilisi, critiqued a claim in 2016 by Tbilisi’s then-mayor, who had campaigned on a promise of bolstering the city’s green spaces, that the city had <a href="https://www.factcheck.ge/en/story/21363-a-half-million-trees-have-already-been-planted-in-tbilisi-this-is-absolutely-real-information">planted a half-million trees</a>.The larger truth, it reported, was that many planted saplings were extremely small and closely packed. A large fraction had already dried up and were unlikely to survive. </p>
<p>Another partial solution would be for environmental nonprofits to offer the Georgian media more press tours, trainings and access to experts. However, eco-NGOs also have agendas and constituencies, so this type of outreach can’t substitute for informed professional journalism.</p>
<p>Covering the environment is challenging and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-covering-the-environment-is-one-of-the-most-dangerous-beats-in-journalism-105477">can be dangerous in any country</a>. But fostering environmental journalism in emerging democracies like Georgia is one way to hold government officials and powerful businesses accountable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115822/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Freedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How does reporting on the environment promote democracy? A US journalism professor describes conditions in the republic of Georgia, where the media isn’t equipped to cover issues like pollution.Eric Freedman, Professor of Journalism and Chair, Knight Center for Environmental Journalism, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/812812017-08-01T13:52:11Z2017-08-01T13:52:11ZWhy Russia needs troops from the Caucasus in Syria – and how they bolster Moscow’s ‘eastern’ image<p>During the early years of the Cold War, the Soviet Union made a great push to reach out to the developing world, and particularly to the Middle East and Asia. It established particularly close ties with Nasser’s Egypt and later with Syria, but didn’t do so well with others; the Chinese leadership in particular <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14682745.2010.481426">doubted</a> whether the USSR really empathised with the Global South and its anti-colonial struggle. Russia, it argued, was essentially a former colonial power, or at the very least a white European country incapable of understanding the developing world’s problems.</p>
<p>Moscow duly tried to prove the opposite by cultivating its own “eastern” identity. It sent its “easterners” on conspicuous missions abroad: Armenians and Azerbaijanis worked in solidarity committees and friendship societies, while Uzbeks and Tajiks served as ambassadors in the Middle East or played a key role as soldiers during the invasion of Afghanistan. </p>
<p>These plans to win over Middle Eastern and Asian allies were rendered moot when the USSR crumbled. But today, Russia’s push to claim an eastern identity seems to be underway once again – and nowhere more so than in Syria.</p>
<p>As media attention has shifted to efforts to oust the so-called Islamic State from its Syrian stronghold, Raqqa, the Syrian regime is struggling to govern the areas of Syria it has recaptured with the help of Russia and other backers. Particularly troublesome is Aleppo, the country’s largest city and former business hub, which was brought back under Damascus’s full control in December 2016. Enter Russia, whose help has already turned the tide in the Syrian regimes’s favour. </p>
<p>Russian military police are now helping to beef up security in Aleppo and other areas. They are drawn in part from the Russian Northern Caucasus, in particular from the predominantly Muslim republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia. In December 2016, a Chechen battalion was <a href="https://youtu.be/oEpYOAo0LCQ">dispatched</a> to Aleppo, returning from its tour in March 2017; in February 2017, <a href="https://ria.ru/syria/20170213/1487860594.html">Ingushetia</a> sent a group of soldiers to provide security to Russian military facilities. Finally, in April, another detachment of Chechen troops boarded a plane to Syria, deemed to stay there <a href="http://polit.ru/news/2017/04/19/chechen_army">until August</a>.</p>
<p>To listen to the state-backed media, this would seem like proof that Russia’s “eastern” identity is as self-assured as ever. Outlets such as RT stress that these military policemen are particularly welcomed in Syria, where they are supposedly greeted as fellow Sunni Muslims, while <a href="https://www.rt.com/news/375551-chechen-soldiers-patrolling-aleppo/">Russian experts</a> claim that they can more easily empathise and communicate with the local community. </p>
<p>While there might be some truth to these claims, there are rather “harder” interests behind Russia’s Syrian strategy – both on the side of the federal government in Moscow and on the side of the Caucasian republics involved. </p>
<h2>Quid pro quo</h2>
<p>The Syrian conflict is not overly popular in Russia. Ever since Russian troops directly intervened, <a href="http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD175.pdf">media coverage</a> at home has been huge, with every effort made to portray the intervention as a humanitarian and anti-terrorist mission. But at best, the Russian public is largely uninterested – and apathy could quickly sour into outright opposition if a significant number of Russian lives were lost on the ground. </p>
<p>Sending military forces from the peripheral republics minimises this risk. Most Russians see the republics and their populations as a huge social, political, and economic burden; if Chechen or Ingush lives were lost, this would hardly have an effect on public opinion in Moscow or St. Petersburg. </p>
<p>The republics also have something special to offer: experienced troops who have operated before in theatres characterised by terrorist threats and are particularly well prepared for the Syrian arena. On top of this, as political scientist Aleksey Makarkin told Russian business channel <a href="http://www.rbc.ru/politics/13/02/2017/58a1c09e9a79475806d0095d">RBK</a>, both Chechnya and Ingushetia are desperate to attract and keep Russia’s attention. Being among the poorest republics, they badly need central government support, especially since the Kremlin has increasingly <a href="http://afpc.org/publication_listings/viewArticle/3561">diverted funds to Crimea</a>.</p>
<p>But there’s something else going on, too – and Chechnya in particular has specific interests in mind. </p>
<h2>Playing it safe</h2>
<p>As Russian newspaper <a href="https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2016/12/20/127616-v-chechne-formiruyut-dva-batalona-dlya-otpravki-v-siriyu">Novaya Gazeta</a> reported, it seems the Chechen government’s military strategy includes an element of retribution: the soldiers it’s sending to the Middle East to join the pro-regime effort are drawn from families who have already seen a member leave to fight on the other side. </p>
<p>One military commander seemed to back this up in an ambiguous TV interview: while highlighting the <a href="https://youtu.be/DM7POPWmYn8?t=1m55s">all-Russian</a> and multi-faith identity of his troops, he also stressed that they were sent to Syria to <a href="https://youtu.be/DM7POPWmYn8?t=15m30s">redeem the Chechens’ reputation</a>.</p>
<p>In effect, the republic has its own small foreign policy, and so long as it sticks mostly to Moscow’s line, both parties have something to gain: Russia can use Chechnya’s semi-independent operations to open a second <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/originals/2014/01/chechnya-mideast-diplomacy-muslim-outreach-ramzan-kadyrov.html">diplomatic channel</a> to the wider Middle East, while Chechnya can strengthen its position vis-a-vis the central government and Middle Eastern countries, and <a href="https://www.levada.ru/2017/05/31/16053/">improve</a> its status among disdainful Russians. In one recent PR stunt, Chechen diplomacy helped to <a href="https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2913468">free</a> a Russian girl held by Turkish authorities after she attempted to cross into Syria.</p>
<p>Whether all this will pay off for Russia, its republics, and Syria remains to be seen. While Russian military police might have strengthened security for now, Aleppo is still under the sway of various militias and paramilitaries, who’ve filled the void left by regular armed forces when they moved on to Syria’s other front lines. The Damascus government is <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/06/22/aleppo-militias-become-major-test-assad">stepping up its efforts</a> to crack down on these groups, but they remain a problem.</p>
<p>The Russian discourse around these police missions bears a remarkable resemblance to the Soviet Union’s approach to the Middle East, including its exploitation of Soviet Muslims to pursue its goals there. As in the past, rather than an exuberant embrace of an eastern identity, this is a political manoeuvre. </p>
<p>In contrast to Soviet times, however, the republics are pursuing their own agendas much more openly, especially Chechnya, which genuinely fosters a Muslim identity under the leadership of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/23/putins-closest-ally-and-his-biggest-liability">Ramzan Kadyrov</a>. Still, for Russia as a whole and for Chechnya in particular, what looks like a geopolitical play for other countries’ sympathies or mere identity politics is in fact a matter of dicey domestic considerations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81281/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philipp Casula receives funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation. </span></em></p>By sending troops from the North Caucasus to Syria, Russia is returning to its old habits.Philipp Casula, Visiting scholar in Russian Studies, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/783732017-05-30T14:12:34Z2017-05-30T14:12:34ZReport reveals the full brutality of anti-gay purges in Chechnya<p>Human Rights Watch (HRW) has published a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/05/26/they-have-long-arms-and-they-can-find-me/anti-gay-purge-local-authorities-russias">report on the unlawful rounding up</a> of more than 100 Chechen men suspected of homosexuality. The case gained global media attention and considerable public support. Hundreds of people in <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/chechnya-gay-men-concentration-camps-russia-embassy-lgbt-protests-activists-torture-murder-kill-a7682681.html">Europe</a>, <a href="http://www.washingtonblade.com/2017/04/24/nyc-activists-protest-gay-chechnya-arrests/">America</a> and <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/calls-for-australia-to-offer-refuge-to-chechnya-gay-purge/8531270">Australia</a> protested against “gay concentration camps” and “gay genocide” in Chechnya, while thousands signed the petitions of <a href="https://www.change.org/p/russia-prosecutor-general-investigate-mass-murder-and-torture-of-lgbt-people-in-chechnya">Russian LGBTQ activists</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/actions/stop-abducting-and-killing-gay-men-chechnya">Amnesty International</a>. Three French LGBTQ organisations <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2017/05/16/des-associations-lgbt-accusent-la-tchetchenie-de-genocide-devant-la-cpi_5128402_3210.html">filed an official complaint to the International Criminal Court</a> against Chechnya’s leader, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/chechnya-ramzan-kadyrov-gay-citizens-massacre-chechen-leader-do-not-exist-russia-vladimir-putin-a7675906.html">Ramzan Kadyrov</a>. </p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2017/04/17/130797-sk-nachal-proverku-informatsii-ob-ugrozah-zhurnalistam-novoy-gazety">Chechen spokesmen threatened</a> journalists covering the purge and foreign governments began <a href="http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/queerspiegel/treffen-in-sotschi-merkel-ermahnt-putin-wegen-verfolgung-von-schwulen-in-tschetschenien/19746172.html">condemning it</a>, the Russian government opened <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/26/russia-investigates-gay-purge-in-chechnya">an official investigation</a>. Western countries, meanwhle, have started <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39974512">accepting Chechen refugees</a>. </p>
<p>In this context, the HRW report is of utmost importance. It begins with a detailed account of how, with the Kremlin’s support and permission, Kadyrov has built a tyrannical, autocratic regime that violates dissenters’ human rights in various ways. Abduction-style detentions, enforced disappearances, torture, extrajudicial executions and collective punishment practices are used against all manner of people whom Kadyrov branded “undesirable”: local dissidents, independent journalists, Salafi Muslims, people who use drugs and alcohol, and suspected homosexuals.</p>
<p>The body of of the report is based on HRW’s interviews with eight victims of the purge who fled Chechnya. They described being kept in unofficial detention facilities, where they endured horrific torture and humiliation. Their evidence is supported by <a href="https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/04/01/71983-ubiystvo-chesti">investigative materials</a> published in Novaya Gazeta, Russia’s main anti-Kremlin newspaper, and other Russian media outlets. </p>
<h2>Hunted down</h2>
<p>As the report recounts, there have been <a href="https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/04/04/72027-raspravy-nad-chechenskimi-geyami-publikuem-svidetelstva">two waves of anti-gay repressions</a> in Chechnya. The first began on February 20 in the town of Argun with the arrest of a man under the influence of a controlled substance. When searching his phone, the police found explicit content and the contact details of dozens of homosexual men. They used this information to begin a chain of arrests and abductions.</p>
<p>The second wave of anti-gay violence was provoked by <a href="http://oc-media.org/north-caucasian-cities-say-no-to-pride-parades/">letters</a> sent to the authorities of four key Caucasus cities, Nalchik, Cherkessk, Maykop and Stavropol by a Yekaterinburg-based representative of LGBTQ group GayRussia. Those letters asked for permission to hold gay pride parades in the four cities (which was naturally withheld). When they were made public, a serious backlash began, prompting the “gay hunt” – which, according to HRW’s interviewees, was encouraged and possibly organised by the Chechen authorities, including the speaker of the Chechen parliament, Magomed Daudov. </p>
<p>The purpose of the hunt was to identify as many homosexual men as possible, to arrest and detain them, and to elicit more names by means of physical and psychological torture. When the detainees were returned to their families, their sexual identity was disclosed to their relatives. The forced outings led to more violence, threats of honour killings and victims being forced to flee the republic.</p>
<p>Several Russian activists have commented on both the anti-gay purge itself and on the HRW report. <a href="https://lgbtnet.org/en/content/do-not-be-afraid-and-do-not-be-silent-igor-kochetkov-gives-speech-during-rainbow-flashmob">Igor Kochetkov</a>, chair of Russian LGBT Network – which has helped <a href="http://www.npr.org/2017/05/09/527540962/russian-lgbt-network-steps-up-efforts-to-get-gay-men-out-of-chechnya">evacuate</a> purge victims – confirmed to me that the evidence reported by HRW is accurate and that a joint report on the case will be published <a href="https://lgbtnet.org/en">by the network</a> and Novaya Gazeta at the end of June. </p>
<p>Prominent LGBTQ activist Igor Yasin, who started a <a href="https://www.change.org/p/russia-prosecutor-general-investigate-mass-murder-and-torture-of-lgbt-people-in-chechnya">change.org petition</a> demanding Russia’s prosecutor general investigate the situation, told me that the report only repeats already known facts and pointed out that in Chechnya human rights violations go well beyond homophobia and affect the whole population.</p>
<p>This view is shared by the head of Russia’s <a href="http://pytkam.net/eng">Committee for the Prevention of Torture</a>, Igor Kalyapin, who pointed out that in Chechnya, the whole population is <a href="https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/here_and_now/v_chechne_vse_naselenie_ne_zashisheno-434057/">defenceless</a> in the face of state brutality, not just gay men. He expressed to me his concern that a narrow investigation into the purges may lead to nothing, as nobody will dare come forward. </p>
<p>The HRW report concludes with recommendations to Russia’s government and international organisations on how to cope with the aftermath of the Chechnya purge and prevent further anti-LGBTQ discrimination in Russia – condemning what’s happened, making sure detention centres are shut down and so on. But as things stand, the signs are not good. </p>
<p>Stanislav Dmitrievsky, head of Oslo-based human rights NGO the <a href="http://www.nhc.no/no/nyheter/2010/Establishing+the+Natalia+Estemirova+Documentation+Center+in+Oslo.9UFRjK4R.ips">Natalia Estemirova Documentation Centre</a>, explained to me that Kadyrov’s brutal, violent Chechnya has often been the first place where oppressive practices pop up before they spread across the wider post-Soviet sphere. If that precedent holds, these brutal and unprecedented anti-gay purges may not be confined to Chechnya for long.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78373/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olga Andreevskikh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Chechen government must be made to answer for its role in an appalling campaign of anti-gay persecution.Olga Andreevskikh, PhD Candidate, School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/758692017-04-06T18:13:46Z2017-04-06T18:13:46ZRussia’s domestic terrorism threat is serious, sophisticated and complex<p>The April 3 bombing on the St Petersburg metro was the highest-profile terror attack on Russian soil since a suicide bombing at Moscow’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12268662">Domodedovo airport</a> in January 2011. According to Russia’s <a href="http://nac.gov.ru/hronika-sobytiy/v-metro-sankt-peterburga-proizoshel-podryv-neustanovlennogo.html">National Antiterrorism Committee</a>, at least 14 people were killed and 49 injured by an improvised explosive device; further casualties were prevented when a <a href="http://www.news24.com/World/News/st-petersburg-bomber-also-set-second-bomb-20170404">second device</a> was disarmed at another station. Days later, another bomb was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/06/explosive-device-st-petersburg-residential-building-russia">found and defused</a> in a residential building.</p>
<p>The prime suspect is reportedly Kyrgyzstan-born Russian citizen <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-blast-metro-investigation-idUSKBN1770ZT">Akbarzhon Jalilov</a>, who was identified on CCTV and died in the attack. </p>
<p>The use of explosives and the success of the attack despite heightened security measures – President Putin was in St Petersburg at the time, and national newspapers <a href="http://izvestia.ru/news/675917">Izvestiya</a> and <a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3261184">Kommersant</a> both reported that the security services had advanced warning that an attack was planned – makes it unlikely he acted alone. Indeed, Russian authorities have detained <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/06/explosive-device-st-petersburg-residential-building-russia">three people</a> suspected of being involved in the bombing. </p>
<p>Still unclear, then, is whether the attackers had the help of an organised group – and there are many organisations that could be considered plausible instigators. </p>
<p>An obvious candidate is the so-called Islamic State (IS), which has drawn <a href="https://www.gazeta.ru/army/news/9721685.shtml">plenty of recruits</a> from across the country. Some of them have remained in Russia, and the group is now set on inspiring attacks globally as its strongholds in Iraq and Syria come under pressure. It has also claimed multiple attacks in Russia to date, as well as targeting Russian interests abroad – most notably <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/isis-plane-attack-egypt-terrorists-downed-russian-metrojet-flight-from-sharm-el-sheikh-islamic-state-a6893181.html">downing a Russian passenger jet</a> over Egypt in October 2015.</p>
<p>But IS is far from the only terrorist group that attracts Russian-speaking recruits. North Caucasians and Central Asian radicals have <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23761199.2016.1215055">joined</a> a range of al-Qaeda-affiliated and independent radical Islamist groups fighting in Syria and Iraq, many of whom are hostile to Russia.</p>
<p>Furthermore, although it has been under heavy pressure from the Russian state in recent years, the North Caucasus continues to deal with low-level insurgent violence. The most senior surviving insurgent leader, Chechnya’s <a href="http://www.rferl.org/a/north-caucasus-insurgent-leaders-rewards/28091381.html">Aslan Byutukayev</a>, is a former head of the reconstituted Riyadus Salikhin group that, as part of the Caucasus Emirate, was responsible for multiple suicide attacks, including that on <a href="http://ria.ru/spravka/20120710/696130713.html#ixzz2rJAvOjWQ">Domodedovo airport</a>.</p>
<p>Pressure on the domestic insurgency has driven a number of key rebel commanders out of the region. Many have relocated to Turkey; after the metro attack, news agency Rosbalt <a href="http://www.rosbalt.ru/piter/2017/04/04/1604461.html">claimed</a> investigators were pursuing their involvement as one of two main theories, citing increased activity among these leaders. The other main grouping under suspicion, it said, is far-right nationalism: groups in St Petersburg are known to have close links with their Ukrainian counterparts, and have used explosives in previous attacks.</p>
<p>To make things more complicated, not all of these groups are mutually exclusive. Most of the rebels still active in the North Caucasus are <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23761199.2016.1215055">aligned with IS</a>, while multiple groups have links running through Turkey. That there are so many potential culprits at work gives some indication of the scale of the threat Russia faces.</p>
<h2>Sophisticated attackers</h2>
<p>Another particularly telling aspect of the St Petersburg attack is its relative sophistication. Since the inception of IS, groups led by or affiliated to it have used a range of methods, including sophisticated car and truck bomb attacks. Turkey has lately been hit by several co-ordinated incidents that caused considerable casualties, including the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-airport-massacre-will-further-imperil-a-nation-on-the-verge-of-crisis-61836">Ataturk airport attack</a> in June 2016 and the Istanbul nightclub attack on New Year’s Day 2017. </p>
<p>Elsewhere, IS has targeted airliners and used co-ordinated suicide attacks and marauding shooter attacks, as well as mass hostage-taking with suicidal intent, as happened in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/paris-attacks-there-is-no-simple-explanation-for-acts-of-terror-50704">2015 Paris attacks</a>. But the group has also claimed responsibility for unsophisticated attacks using mundane weapons such as knives, as well as <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-and-why-vehicle-ramming-became-the-attack-of-choice-for-terrorists-75236">lorries and cars</a>. These are low-cost, easily accessible tools that can cause havoc easily, and IS is apparently relying on them more and more – presumably in a bid to outmanoeuvre counter-terrorism strategies.</p>
<p>IS has claimed responsibility for several attacks on Russian soil, which have mostly been at the unsophisticated end of the spectrum. An <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-islamic-state-idUSKCN10T25S">August 2016 incident near Moscow</a> and a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-chechnya-shooting-idUSKBN1470L3?il=0">December 2016 attack in Grozny</a> both saw policemen attacked with hand-held weapons. A 4 April attack on police in Astrakhan, claimed by IS two days later, appears to have followed a <a href="http://izvestia.ru/news/678047">similar pattern</a>. A number of the IS-linked <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-dagestan-idUSKCN0Y50Q4">attacks</a> occurred in the restive North Caucasus republic of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20593383">Dagestan</a>, a focal point of regional violence where it’s hard to distinguish between targeted terrorist acts and day-to-day instability.</p>
<p>The St Petersburg attack, on the other hand, was more sophisticated: The perpetrator was clearly able to build at least one viable explosive device – even if the second <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-blast-bomb-experts-idUSKBN17720F">failed to detonate</a> – and possibly received training in making them. He was also able to do what he did despite the fact that the authorities apparently had intelligence of some sort about this specific attack, and despite widespread awareness that a terrorist incident of some sort was likely – as with London, a question of when rather than if. </p>
<p>All this goes to show that Russia faces some very serious domestic terrorism threats. The group or groups behind them are clearly able to inspire, enable and/or support attackers from afar; the question is whether they can provide the training and equipment required for mass-casualty attacks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75869/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Youngman is an ESRC-funded doctoral student at the University of Birmingham</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cerwyn Moore is an academic based in POLSIS, College of Social Sciences, at the University of Birmingham and ‘Actors and Narratives’ Programme Director in the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, an independent ESRC centre with funding from the UK security and intelligence agencies. He declined to provide a profile picture.</span></em></p>From the Islamic State to North Caucasian rebels and far-right nationalists, Russia is facing overlapping extremist threats.Mark Youngman, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of BirminghamCerwyn Moore, Senior lecturer in International Relations and Programme Director for the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/575352016-04-20T10:18:38Z2016-04-20T10:18:38ZWhat the people of Nagorno-Karabakh think about the future of their homeland<p>The disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakah has been caught in a tug-of-war between Armenia and Azerbaijan for decades. Internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, it’s home to an estimated 120,000 people, primarily ethnic Armenians, who want to separate from Azerbaijan. It’s been a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2014.915543">de facto</a> independent state since a fragile ceasefire was brokered in 1994, and low-level violence has flared up every spring ever since. </p>
<p>But while much remains unclear about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-war-in-nagorno-karabakh-could-spread-and-become-a-major-problem-for-europe-57241">alarming fighting</a> that began on April 2 this year, the scale of what’s happened is without precedent. </p>
<p>This year’s warfare has involved advanced weapons systems such as drones, helicopters, tanks, and artillery, including indiscriminate <a href="https://rbth.com/defence/2014/08/25/the_grad_system_a_hot_hail_of_cluster-fired_rockets_39283.html">Grad</a> rockets. <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/global-powers-scramble-contain-neglected-armenian-azerbaijani-conflict">Territory</a> appears to have changed hands for the first time since the ceasefire. While combat has subsided, a full-scale war, with the potential for a wider conflict involving Russia and Turkey, remains a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-war-in-nagorno-karabakh-could-spread-and-become-a-major-problem-for-europe-57241">serious risk</a>.</p>
<p>There have been plenty of efforts to stop it coming to this. The <a href="http://www.osce.org/mg">Minsk Group</a>, co-chaired by Russia, the US, and France, and charged with finding a peaceful solution, has put forward the “<a href="http://www.osce.org/mg/51152">basic principles</a>” of a framework agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh’s future, proposing international security guarantees in the form of peacekeepers, the return of territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control, an interim status for Karabakh (a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18270325">distinct sub-region</a> of the territory) pending determination of its final status, and a right of return for the displaced and refugees. </p>
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<p>Though peace talks have stalled in recent years, many <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/12/18/nagorny-karabakh-conflict-and-future-of-madrid-principleshttp://example.com/">observers</a> agree that these principles provide the outlines of a politically workable settlement. But the recent violence makes it clear just how far from a solution we are.</p>
<p>The international response to the violence has been to “<a href="http://tass.ru/en/world/867439">strongly condemn</a>” it and call for a return to the negotiating table. Much speculation has turned on the <a href="http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2016/04/03/whats-behind-the-flare-up-in-nagorno-karabakh/">regional politics</a> behind the renewed fighting and the dim prospects for peace – but what gets lost in these discussions are the voices of those whose lives would be most directly affected by any potential settlement. </p>
<p>This includes populations on either side of the line of control, including Azeris and Armenians displaced during the war, and perhaps most crucially, the population of Nagorno-Karabakh itself, where public opinion is one of the most serious obstacles in the way of a diplomatic breakthrough. </p>
<p>In the last few years, scholars have conducted representative <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15387216.2015.1012644#.VwOqPUeRZrY">public opinion surveys</a> that help us understand local attitudes on questions of war, peace, and reconciliation in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/will-war-erupt-in-nagorny-karabakh-here-are-the-5-things-you-need-to-know/?wpmm=1&wpisrc=nl_cage">Nagorno-Karabakh</a>. Here, we draw on <a href="http://gtr.rcuk.ac.uk/project/F5945879-82E3-49AD-B7D3-C9255BD8FB73">Kristin Bakke’s ESRC-funded</a> survey from Karabakh in 2013 – to our knowledge the most recent scholarly survey of the region – and it paints a gloomy picture.</p>
<h2>Pessimism runs deep</h2>
<p>The people of Nagorno-Karabakh have mixed attitudes towards the mediators trying to resolve the situation. Of the 1,000 survey respondents, only 56% trusted the ability of Russia, the US, and France to come up with a good solution. They strongly believed that <a href="http://www.politybooks.com/book.asp?ref=9780745653426">Armenia</a> is genuinely interested in a peaceful settlement, but were less convinced that Azerbaijan wants one. And crucially, the vast majority believed that Nagorno-Karabakh, which is currently not directly represented at the talks, needs to be party to any decision on a permanent settlement.</p>
<p>Almost 63% of the respondents were justifiably worried about renewed warfare. When asked: “If there was a new war with Azerbaijan, who, in your view, would best be able to defend you and your close relatives?”, 46% pointed to the <a href="http://en.168.am/2016/04/08/5551.html">NK Defense Army</a>, the pillar of Karabakh’s state-building efforts, 30% to the Armenian armed forces, and 12% to Russia.</p>
<p>Western fears of an entrenched Russian presence in the South Caucasus need to be balanced against the real need for security guarantees. The largely symbolic presence of <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/78216">six OSCE monitors</a> is clearly inadequate; Russia, with its close links to both Armenia and increasingly Azerbaijan, is far from neutral, but it’ll be a vital broker in any peace settlement and in keeping the peace on the ground in the meantime.</p>
<p>Perhaps the most trenchant obstacle to any peace deal comes in people’s attitudes to territory. Our interviews with officials in Nagorno-Karabakh’s tight political, military, and civil society circles revealed serious misgivings about conceding territory, a sentiment echoed in the survey. </p>
<p>The population holds a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21622671.2013.842184">very expansive definition</a> of Nagorno-Karabkah’s territory, and many are unprepared to make territorial concessions of any kind.</p>
<p>This means that leaders in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh need to do more to prepare the public for the return of territories as the basis for a workable settlement, just as their counterparts in Azerbaijan need to prepare Azeris for painful concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh’s political status. Instead, leaders on both sides have exploited the conflict to consolidate their hold on power.</p>
<h2>Final Status</h2>
<p>When asked about their preferred status for Nagorno-Karabakh, more than half wanted unification with Armenia, and 38% wanted independence. Very few favoured an “interim” status with a referendum to decide the territory’s final status later, or thought the status should remain as is.</p>
<p>The vast majority of respondents (80%) agreed with this statement: “Because of the past, Nagorno-Karabakh can never be associated with Azerbaijan again.”</p>
<p>Set against the population’s reluctance to contemplate a return of occupied territories outside Nagorno-Karabakh, this suggests an unwillingness to accept that any gains on formalising status will likely come at a price – even though the majority acknowledge that the final borders will have to be decided by a peace agreement.</p>
<p>Almost 20 years after the war came to an end, the 2013 survey revealed that forgiving perpetrators of violence would still be difficult for a large majority (64%). Renewed violence, as we now have seen, compounds the difficulty of reconciliation.</p>
<p>The right of return to one’s former place of residence is an immensely complicated issue on both sides. Many families have experienced violence and displacement. Voices of moderation on either side pushing for greater contacts between communities are marginalised and often repressed.</p>
<p>Whatever the diplomatic obstacles to a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, to say nothing of the tangled geopolitical rivalries between the US and Russia (and increasingly Turkey and Russia), a lot more needs to be done to win over the people who have to live with whatever settlement is reached.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57535/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristin M. Bakke has received research funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). She is affiliated with the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lee J. M. Seymour's research has been funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).</span></em></p>After more than 20 years of tenuous ceasefire, Nagorno-Karabakh is once again the centre of a violent conflict. And its people haven’t exactly had their say.Kristin M Bakke, Senior Lecturer in Political Science and International Relations, UCLLee J. M. Seymour, Associate Professor of Political Science, Université de MontréalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/572412016-04-04T15:22:22Z2016-04-04T15:22:22ZHow war in Nagorno-Karabakh could spread – and become a major problem for Europe<p>Every now and then, the West is reminded of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom it knows nothing (as <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/history/mwh/ir1/chamberlainandappeasementrev8.shtml">Neville Chamberlain once said</a>). Nagorno-Karabakh is such a place, a tiny enclave that has caused strife between neighbouring Azerbaijan and Armenia even before they gained independence from the Soviet Union. </p>
<p>While recognised as part of Azerbaijan by the international community, the ethnic Armenians living in the Nagorno-Karabakh region <a href="https://theconversation.com/nationalism-sparks-a-summer-of-deadly-violence-in-the-caucasus-30933">fought an independence war to a standstill in 1994</a>. It is now essentially an independent republic supported by Armenia, and while the fragile truce that has held from 1994 on has been regularly breached, the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35949991">latest bout of fighting</a> is the most serious escalation of violence to date. </p>
<p>Recent political developments have made the opportunity to calm hostilities more difficult than in the past. In the absence of any democratic legitimacy in either country, those in power have turned Nagorno-Karabakh into the centrepiece of incompatible and entirely uncompromising nationalist narratives. </p>
<p>Armenia’s leadership lives and dies by its ability to hold on to the territory, and so has a clear interest in maintaining the status quo. Azerbaijan’s government on the other hand, under pressure to “liberate” the region, has become <a href="http://en.apa.az/xeber_president_ilham_aliyev_____the_activities__238623.html">disillusioned with the deadlocked negotiations</a>, and the recent fall in oil prices has hit Azerbaijan’s economy hard. With President Ilham Aliyev’s regime’s stability based on oil revenues, stoking nationalist sentiment is a likely means to compensate. Combined with Armenia’s recent <a href="https://armenianow.com/karabakh/70098/armenia_army_military_russia_weapons_azerbaijan_karabakh">more assertive military posture</a>, there is already great potential for further escalation. </p>
<p>Worse, the situation has moved on since the <a href="http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/nagorny-karabakh-conflict-origins-dynamics-and-misperceptions">first Karabakh war up until 1994</a>. While this is still the bloodiest post-Soviet inter-state conflict with its <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/background-nagorno-karaback/26514813.html">estimated 30,000 deaths</a>, the forces in the South Caucasus are no longer simply hastily assembled groups of Armenian and Azerbaijani militiamen. Both sides have poured <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/south-caucasus/b071-armenia-and-azerbaijan-a-season-of-risks.aspx">billions into their militaries</a>, with oil-rich Azerbaijan in particular <a href="http://www.tol.org/client/article/23254-azerbaijan-military-spending.html">acquiring high-tech weaponry</a>. Both sides are now <a href="http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/infographics/27651411.html">armed to their teeth</a> with up-to-date weapons systems capable of targeting infrastructure and cities far from the frontlines: both <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66061">Baku</a> and <a href="http://news.az/articles/society/91074">Yerevan</a> can be reached by the belligerents’ ballistic missiles. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/117330/original/image-20160404-27115-1n4qbuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/117330/original/image-20160404-27115-1n4qbuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/117330/original/image-20160404-27115-1n4qbuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/117330/original/image-20160404-27115-1n4qbuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/117330/original/image-20160404-27115-1n4qbuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/117330/original/image-20160404-27115-1n4qbuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/117330/original/image-20160404-27115-1n4qbuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/117330/original/image-20160404-27115-1n4qbuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The boundaries of the Nagorno-Karabakh fixed in 1994.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nagorno-Karabakh_Occupation_Map.jpg">Clevelander</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The consequences of escalation for the region would be far more wide-ranging than seen in the past. Now, there are contradicting and rigid interests and alliances that are much more dangerous than in the 1990s, when the Caucasus was still a largely isolated, post-Soviet backwater. Today the European Union sees the “<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/imports-and-secure-supplies/gas-and-oil-supply-routes">Southern Gas Corridor</a>” and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline as vital for its energy security. With the latter an obvious target in the event of a prolonged Karabakh war, both existing and prospective energy transportation routes would be severely disrupted. EU ally Georgia would also be faced with near-impossible choices, squeezed between strategic partnerships with the EU and Azerbaijan, its hitherto friendly relations with Armenia, and the latter’s alliance with Russia.</p>
<p>More worryingly, today great powers and regional players such as Russia and Turkey could be drawn into the conflict through their relations with Armenia or Azerbaijan. The <a href="http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index_aengl.htm">Collective Security Treaty Organisation</a> could see its first serious test of credibility in the event that war spills over beyond Karabakh into Armenian territory. Moscow would be faced with an unpalatable choice between having the credibility of its alliance commitments weakened into irrelevance, or having to intervene directly. Turkey might find itself entering the fray if hostilities spread to the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan, separated from Azerbaijan by Armenia and sharing a short border with Turkey, where clashes in 1992 led to a <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-21/news/mn-337_1_karabakh-conflict">sharp war of words between Moscow and Ankara</a>.</p>
<p>It might all still seem very unlikely at this stage, but the political elements are falling into place that could see the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict quickly grow from a geopolitical sideshow to a major regional problem. Seen through the lens of the conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the concerted effort required for a diplomatic solution now looks more implausible than ever. Armenia’s president has already threatened to <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-nagorno-karabakh-fighting-independenc-idUKKCN0X118S">recognise the enclave’s independence</a> in case of further escalation, while <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/04/azerbaijan-and-armenia-clashes-continue-for-third-day">Azerbaijan has raised the spectre of all-out war</a> in response to “continued provocations”.</p>
<p>The South Caucasus could be the next breakdown in European security that has held since the Cold War, adding yet another element of instability to the growing disorder of today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57241/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevork Oskanian does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Caucasus are more important and more connected today than in the 1990s, and a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan could create chaos for Europe.Kevork Oskanian, Research Fellow in International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/532552016-02-11T13:04:34Z2016-02-11T13:04:34ZRussia and Iran are fighting together – but are they as close as they seem?<p>After years of isolation, Iran is slowly <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-irans-hardliners-still-threaten-the-nuclear-deal-53236">coming back in from the cold</a> after the deal to curb its nuclear programme. And as it starts to reassert itself more openly in the world order, it’s rekindling a stormy affair with an old flame: Russia.</p>
<p>The two countries have discussed opening a joint bank, co-operation in space research, and undertaking preparations for establishing a free trade area between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Iran under Putin’s direct order. They’ve also joined forces in fighting anti-government groups in Syria, where they both view shoring up the Assad government as perhaps the least worst way to stabilise the conflict there. </p>
<p>All seems rosy then. But not so fast: these are two countries with a long history of acrimony and suspicion, and based on all historical precedent, they could well find themselves at odds again soon.</p>
<h2>Difficult history</h2>
<p>Over the last four centuries, the two countries’ relations have fluctuated between adversarial rivalry and friendly partnership. For ordinary Iranians, Russia is a reminder of defeat. National pride is still wounded from the loss of the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=dUHhTPdJ6yIC&pg=PT262&lpg=PT262&dq=Caucasian+Khanates+persian&source=bl&ots=LsP5D74OHa&sig=WOEvN3iAm4O8QKWiNUP_ROIyK-Y&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjW1vak0O_KAhWC1BoKHQRwDrU4ChDoAQgjMAI#v=onepage&q=Caucasian%20Khanates%20persian&f=false">Caucasian Khanates</a>, significant territories on the northern parts of the Aras River which were ceded to Russia after <a href="http://www.iranchamber.com/geography/articles/persia_became_iran.php">what was then Persia</a> was defeated in two Russia-Persian wars in the 19th century. </p>
<p>To older generations of Iranians, Russia is also a reminder of occupation; as a consequence of Russia’s <a href="http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/soviets-announce-withdrawal-from-iran">initial refusal</a> to withdraw the Red Army from Iran, which both Moscow and the Allies had occupied during World War II to create a route to send supplies for the Soviet Union’s war effort.</p>
<p>Throughout this long history, in addition to ideological influences of Russian political trends over Iranian elites, Russia has exerted a gravitational pull on Iran’s foreign policy calculations. It was a big factor in Iran’s decision to claim neutrality for two centuries – a policy that ended in 1955, when Tehran took the plunge to join the pro-Western/anti-Soviet <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2801487.stm">Baghdad Pact</a>, modelled after NATO, which provided incentive for member countries to commit to mutual co-operation and protection, as well as non-intervention in one another’s affairs. </p>
<p>Equally, Moscow has always been an important factor in the way other countries approach Iran. Throughout the 19th century, Persia was affected by Anglo-Russian conflict of interests; that pressure eventually resulted in the separation of <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=TqULT1zn-LQC&pg=PT57&lpg=PT57&dq=Herat+buffer+zone+india&source=bl&ots=_zjhBkq3uD&sig=rqJBXtl1kf0DzX_u-zVx3wK7X1Y&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjGguqd0e_KAhWGvBoKHWhUDvwQ6AEIKTAD#v=onepage&q=Herat%20buffer%20zone%20india&f=false">Herat</a> from Persia, to work as a buffer zone which would keep the British-controlled India away from the Russians’ agitations and possible encroachment. And throughout the Cold War, Iran was valued as a major bulwark against the Soviet’s potential expansion to the Middle East and a check on its influence there.</p>
<p>The 1979 Islamic Revolution introduced a strongly ideological dimension to the two countries’ relations. The Soviet Union initially welcomed the revolution, hoping that the anti-imperialist and anti-American bent of the new government could flatter Soviet interests in the region. But that calculation soon proved wrong.</p>
<p>With the revolutionary government’s “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1990-09-01/neither-east-nor-west-iran-soviet-union-and-united-states">neither east, nor west</a>” policy, relations turned cold, particularly due to Moscow’s provision of extensive military assistance to Iraq during its 1980-1988 war with Iran. Things got even worse when top-rank members of Iran’s Soviet-supported Tudeh party were <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=tJVggCw553QC&pg=PA81&lpg=PA81&dq=Tudeh+party+arrested+1983&source=bl&ots=puUo-1Y_W9&sig=0d-rNYa2R7LyZj0ZhJOdMlyEzmg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjqprOgku3KAhWCuhQKHQCwAw4Q6AEIKTAC#v=onepage&q=Tudeh%20party%20arrested%201983&f=false">arrested</a> and 18 Russian diplomats were <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/1986-10-22/news/mn-6863_1_soviet-diplomat">deported</a> in 1983. There were no significant improvements till the end of Iran-Iraq war, when reciprocal high-level diplomatic visits initiated something of a thaw.</p>
<h2>Marriage of convenience</h2>
<p>Russia and Iran have been mostly friendly ever since, though their relations are still subject to a good deal of flux. Iran continuously has tried to respect Russia’s sensitivities, particularly regarding its regional policies: it held back on recognising the former Soviet Republics’ independence before the official dissolution of the USSR, refused to get involved in the Chechnya conflict, and has consistently kept its relations with the former Soviet republics within the confines of Moscow’s worldview.</p>
<p>Tehran’s regional and international isolation has been pushing it towards Moscow, in the hope that the Russians would shield Iran from further pressure. That strategy paid off at times, particularly during the saga over Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme: in 2005, Moscow <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-Iran">tried to mediate</a> between Tehran and the West while sticking to the line that there was no definitive proof that Iran’s nuclear activities were being militarised.</p>
<p>But just as Iran must always factor Russia into its dealings with the West, Russia always factors its relations with the West into its dealings with Iran. </p>
<p>Whenever Russia’s relations with Western countries have warmed up, it has generally taken a tougher line with Iran. This was made plain in 2011 when it publicly <a href="http://english.cri.cn/6966/2011/08/25/168s655083.htm">refused to supply Iran with S-300 surface-to-air missiles</a>. On the other hand, when in trouble with the West, Russia warms towards Iran. Now that it’s struggling under sanctions imposed over its role in the Ukraine crisis, the S-300 missiles have reportedly <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/russian-military-weapons-iran-s-300-missile-defenses-delivered-tehran-ahead-sanction-2198251">been delivered to Iran after all</a>.</p>
<p>So for all that Iran is Russia’s biggest trade partner in the Middle East, and for all that they seem to have found a common cause in <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/russia-iran-syria-151123190302311.html">backing the Syrian government</a>, the two countries will never be mutually devoted partners. Alongside their long history of mutual suspicion, they are still rivals for security influence and energy resources in Central Asia and the Caucasus. They also still have great differences over the Caspian Sea, even as they work together to <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/russia-and-iran-lock-nato-out-of-caspian-sea/">keep it beyond NATO’s influence</a>.</p>
<p>So what the world sees between the two countries is something much more complicated than a strategic partnership. It’s an on-off marriage of convenience – albeit one that tends to heat up when it suits the partners.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53255/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marzieh Kouhi-Esfahani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia and Iran have always treated each other well when it suits them, but in hard times, their relationship can get very rocky indeed.Marzieh Kouhi-Esfahani, PhD student, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/512972015-11-25T22:06:08Z2015-11-25T22:06:08ZRussia, Turkey and the US: between the terrible and the catastrophic<p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34907983">downing</a> of Russia’s plane by Turkish military forces over the skies of the Syrian-Turkish border has added yet another layer of complexity to the vortex of conflict in the Middle East. </p>
<p>Most of the prior concern had focused on the prospect of the US clashing with Russia over the skies of Syria. But an October <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/20/us-mideast-crisis-russia-usa-idUSKCN0SE2HK20151020#6JbPCBG1Rqryo2yT.97">agreement</a> between the two countries had seemed to address that worry. That reassuring move took everyone’s focus away from a possible Turkish-Russian clash. </p>
<p>But with 20-20 hindsight, a clash was almost inevitable. </p>
<p>Here’s why. </p>
<h2>Statesmen and leaders?</h2>
<p>Russia and Turkey are headed by two of the most brash, abrasive and swashbuckling leaders in the modern world. </p>
<p>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin have both spent most of the last decade working hard to secure their dominance at home. Both have had to deal with major internal security problems – from the separatist <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20971100">Kurdish Workers Part</a> (or PKK) in Turkey and from <a href="http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/a-threat-to-the-west-the-rise-of-islamist-insurgency-in-the-northern-caucasus">Islamist insurgents</a> in Russia’s Northern Caucasus, a movement fueled by a Sunni <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=FLJoBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA74&lpg=PA74&dq=wahhabi+influence+over+caucasus&source=bl&ots=oPzbg3Jx50&sig=nPwQsP72NPzNwkNjw9yUn4kJ1nE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi2kfWgrazJAhUJdz4KHVC6BbEQ6AEIPTAE#v=onepage&q=wahhabi%20influence%20over%20caucasus&f=false">Wahhabist</a> ideology exported from Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>Both Erdoğan and Putin have responded to these persistent problems with the use of force at home coupled with assertive policies abroad. </p>
<p>In each case, loud pronouncement of their respective country’s importance in the world is intended as a nationalist call to obscure economic problems and <a href="http://humanrightsturkey.org/2015/02/24/amnesty-on-turkeys-worsening-human-rights-record-11-key-issues/">worsening</a> <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/02/us-un-rights-russia-idUSKBN0MT18L20150402">human rights records</a>. </p>
<p>In pursuing these comparable agendas, both presidents count on reliable, largely unquestioning deputies: Dmitry Medvedev serves as Putin’s prime minister and Ahmet Davutoğlu as Erdoğan’s. This allows each president to characterize themselves as figureheads, above the fray of everyday politics. </p>
<p>In effect, they portray themselves as statesmen and leaders, keen on establishing a regional sphere of influence.</p>
<p>For Putin, this extends not only to the boundaries of the old Soviet Union – most obviously in Ukraine – but beyond to include old Soviet allies in the Middle East. </p>
<p>For Erdoğan, the historical ties spread from the <a href="https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/problems-foreign-powers-find-balkans">Balkans</a> to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levant">Levant</a> – an area extending all the way to Jordan. </p>
<p>These two sets of ambitions notably overlap in Syria.</p>
<h2>History rears its head</h2>
<p>This potential clash of individual egos and ambitions is augmented by a persistent clash of cultures and identities that has spanned hundreds of years. </p>
<p>Turkey’s <a href="http://www.umich.edu/%7Eturkish/links/ottemp_brhist.html">Ottoman Empire</a> ruled over Eastern Orthodox Slavs in the Balkans from the 15th century until its final dissolution less than a century ago. Turks still see themselves as the guardians of Muslims, reflected in their admirable willingness to host over <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.html">one-and-a-half million</a> refugees fleeing the Syrian War. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103244/original/image-20151125-23861-1mrhx99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103244/original/image-20151125-23861-1mrhx99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103244/original/image-20151125-23861-1mrhx99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103244/original/image-20151125-23861-1mrhx99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103244/original/image-20151125-23861-1mrhx99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103244/original/image-20151125-23861-1mrhx99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103244/original/image-20151125-23861-1mrhx99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fighting in the Turkish Russo War.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Boj_u_Ivanovo-Chiflik.jpg">Pavel Kovalevsky</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Russians historically considered themselves the protector of the Balkans’ Orthodox Christians and often fought wars with the Ottomans, notably in the <a href="http://www.library.yale.edu/slavic/microform/russoturkishwar.html">Turkish-Russo</a> War of 1877-1878. </p>
<p>The two countries went on to fight on opposite sides in the First World War. And in World War II, Turkey signed a <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=4oQNJvu6NpgC&pg=PA38&lpg=PA38&dq=Turkish+non+aggression+pact+with+germany&source=bl&ots=soaZ2Dox4G&sig=Aol5vKK7J_gyo5DEi80bEZoKXto&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjQ4uuPsazJAhUEOT4KHVazD-0Q6AEIQjAG#v=onepage&q=Turkish%20non%20aggression%20pact%20with%20germany&f=false">nonaggression</a> pact with Nazi Germany and maintained it until the closing months of the war. </p>
<p>To Americans, this may all seem like ancient history. After all, the <a href="http://www.pbs.org/kera/usmexicanwar/">US-Mexican</a> war ended in 1848, and today relations between the US and Mexico are complex, but not hostile. Trade and tourism boom as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/11/21/mexico-has-its-own-immigration-problem-american-retirees/">millions</a> live in each other’s country.</p>
<p>Contact and trade between Russia and Turkey is far more limited, despite Turkey being a <a href="https://www.rt.com/business/323400-russia-business-turkey-jet/">tourist destination for many Russians</a>. </p>
<p>In both areas of the world – the Middle East and Eastern Europe – where the ethnic composition of populations has remained relatively stable, and the religious practices have, if anything, <a href="http://www.pewforum.org/2014/02/10/russians-return-to-religion-but-not-to-church/">strengthened</a> in the last decade, old enmities are easily resurrected. </p>
<p>It is what the University of Delaware’s Stuart Kaufmann, in describing the Balkan War of the early 20th century, called <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100693720">“Modern Hatreds.”</a></p>
<p>With this in mind, it is easy to see how the reputed <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/20/us-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey-russia-idUSKCN0T91MO20151120">Russian bombing of ethnic Turkmen villages</a> on the Syrian-Turkish border – the events that precipitated the downing of the Russian plane – can be portrayed as consistent with that historic hostility.</p>
<p>And when you add the historical dimension to two populist leaders vying to consolidate their support at home, the situation can easily become incendiary – and escalate. </p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>In his most famous work, Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes famously describes the state of nature as “<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/">a war of all against all</a>.” There is, he says, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; and which is worst of all, continuall feare [sic], and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Sounds just like the Middle East. </p>
<p>Just when we mistakenly conclude that things can’t get worse in Syria, we discover that they can. An already complicated theater of war threatens to take on a novel dimension as states begin to directly fight each other, rather than what it has been to date: an assortment of states fighting against an assortment of moderate and extremist militias. </p>
<p>Predictably, Putin has come out of his corner swinging. </p>
<p>He has described Turkey’s action as “<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/12015465/Turkey-shoots-down-Russia-jet-live.html">"a planned provocation”</a> and has vowed to send <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/russian-pilot-rescued-syrian-commando-unit-101718676.html">air defense missiles</a> to Syria, clearly implying that Turkish planes will be the targets while, obviously, risking that coalition aircraft, most likely American ones, will become the victims. Earlier he paved the way for sending <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/world/europe/nato-russia-warplane-turkey.html?_r=0">150,000 troops</a> to Syria, purportedly to fight ISIS but more likely to buttress the Syrian government’s forces. </p>
<p>Erdoğan, for his part, has been <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/world/europe/turkey-syria-russia-military-plane.html">quick to call</a> on NATO forces to defend his country under Article 5 of the agreement that states that an attack on one member is an attack on all members. Having poked the Russian bear, he is now asking for the bear to be threatened with being gang tackled as a deterrent measure. </p>
<p>This risks the United States being dragged into a military confrontation with Russia, a prospect that America’s always-cautious president, Barack Obama, has carefully avoided in Ukraine. </p>
<p>What’s more, Obama is ill-placed to mediate between the two sides. He has not enjoyed good relations with either the Russian or the Turkish presidents. And he cannot legitimately portray himself as an honest broker, given US ties to Turkey through NATO. </p>
<p>It will take all his diplomatic skills, and those of Secretary of State John Kerry, to sufficiently sooth the egos of both sides to avoid a plunge into an even greater quagmire.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, as our attention focuses on this new dimension, the old problems persist. </p>
<p>ISIS is still killing people in Syria and now in Europe. Refugees keep fleeing and dying at sea and in camps. And we appear no nearer a diplomatic solution. </p>
<p>America has to stick to its priorities and offer both sticks and carrots to all sides as it builds towards them. If Barack Obama thought negotiating an arms agreement with the Iranians was hard, he “ain’t seen nothing yet.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51297/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The downing of Russia’s plane by Turkish military forces over the skies of the Syrian-Turkish border has added yet another layer of complexity to the vortex of conflict in the Middle East. Most of the…Simon Reich, Professor in The Division of Global Affairs and The Department of Political Science, Rutgers University - NewarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/309332014-08-28T05:30:59Z2014-08-28T05:30:59ZNationalism sparks a summer of deadly violence in the Caucasus<p>The world has been brutally reminded of the unresolved conflict in <a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13995/nagorno-karabakh-s-summer-of-violence">Nagorno-Karabakh</a>, an enclave in the South Caucasus which Armenia and Azerbaijan have locked horns over for more than 25 years. While the situation is clearly at a low ebb, the facts of what is happening are far from clear.</p>
<p>The two sides’ accounts of the violence are, as ever, directly contradictory. In the absence of third-party monitoring, the only certainty seems to be that dozens of Azeri (or Azerbaijani) and Armenian soldiers have lost their lives in tit-for-tat exploratory and retaliatory raids, while civilians around the line of contact have been plagued by an upsurge in <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/caucasus-report-karabakh-war-dance/26521123.html">shelling and sniper fire</a>. </p>
<p>Mediation between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan by <a href="http://iwpr.net/report-news/putin-mediates-azeri-armenian-talks">Russia’s Vladimir Putin</a> appears to have calmed the situation on the ground for now. Any such calm, though, can only be temporary. </p>
<p>Azerbaijan’s government has repeatedly stated its readiness to change the status quo <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/azerbaijan-president-threatens-war-armenia-twitter">by force if necessary</a>, and the Armenian side is not in any mood to compromise on its central demand – and the conflict’s main bone of contention - the “Nagorno-Karabakh people’s <a href="http://www.mfa.am/en/artsakh/">right to self-determination”</a>.</p>
<p>But rather than being the product of some inevitable, eternal enmity between Armenians and Azeris, this conflict is the result of competing narratives that emerged in modern times – and which were reinforced at the fall of the Soviet Union. </p>
<h2>The official story</h2>
<p>The pressure to establish at least an impression of democracy after the Soviet era forced both Azerbaijan and Armenia to invest in strong nation-building ideologies. The competing nationalisms that resulted are deeply embedded in the region’s two centuries of Russian and Soviet imperial rule.</p>
<p>For instance, while the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/ref/timestopics/topics_armeniangenocide.html">1915 genocide</a> was at worst suppressed and at best minimised in the official narratives of Soviet Armenia, the Russians and the Bolsheviks were invariably portrayed as the saviours of the Armenian nation from annihilation at the hands of Persians and Turks. </p>
<p>Soviet Azerbaijan’s official history, meanwhile, often emphasised both the country’s Caucasus Albanian heritage (especially when a line had to be drawn between the Turkic Azeris and Turkey) and its Persian cultural inheritance – for instance, when Stalin began coveting Iranian Azerbaijan after World War II.</p>
<p>The audience for these new histories was not just the local population, but also late-Soviet Moscow, where all decisions affecting the Union Republics were made. In the strange and intensely ideological Soviet empire, only the dictats of Marxism-Leninism stood in the way of the unbridled nationalism this thinking could have unleashed.</p>
<p>But the the liberalisation of the final years of Soviet rule fuelled the output of this revisionist history. Moscow held sway over the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh, and a flurry of history-writing in both republics saw them fight to bolster their claims to the territory.</p>
<h2>Breaking free</h2>
<p>At the same time, the Gorbachev-era policy of <a href="http://russiapedia.rt.com/of-russian-origin/glasnost/">Glasnost</a> (“openness”) gave oxygen to both sides’ nationalist zeal. Some Armenian claims portrayed the Caucasus’s Azeris as Central Asian, Turkic interlopers; some Azeri historians tried to completely expunge the Armenians from the history of the region.</p>
<p>As nationalism became the ideology of choice for elites on both sides of the divide, unbridled revisionist histories and sometimes plainly nonsensical claims were eagerly adopted by these newly independent states – and propagated by their media, by textbooks, and by institutions of higher education.</p>
<p>Today, instead of doing justice to this region’s immense complexity, these countries’ official histories still traffic in selective, self-serving readings of “facts”, and ultimately unfalsifiable assumptions on how “historical ownership” of a given territory is established. </p>
<p>These deeply nationalist official histories have helped push their respective nations’ identities to directly contradictory and mutually exclusive extremes, each side dehumanising the other. The upshot is a mess of absurd nationalist claims made with equally absurd confidence.</p>
<h2>Give me liberty …</h2>
<p>Consider how, just as in many other nationalist conflicts, the concept of “liberation” is liberally applied by both sides. For many Armenians, the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh are “<a href="http://armenpress.am/eng/news/516841/book-on-liberated-territories-presented.html">liberated</a>”, a term that blithely justifies the ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Azeris with nothing more than a nod to the tortured history. </p>
<p>Azerbaijan’s president has himself similarly stated his willingness to “liberate” Nagorno-Karabakh in the future, pointedly inviting any ethnic Armenian “guests” disagreeing with Azeri rule <a href="http://archive.president.az/print.php?item_id=20080101021742200&sec_id=135">to leave</a>.</p>
<p>The absurdity of designating historically imagined territories as in need of “liberation” is ignored in both cases. But this is what happens when nationalist history becomes a guide for moral action. It ends up normalising the idea of ethnic cleansing by basing what should be on a contrived notion of what used to be – and by prioritising that historical abstraction over everything (and everyone) else. </p>
<p>In the end, it’s quite simple: one cannot liberate territories, one can only liberate people. But of course, authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes don’t particularly like to see the concept of “freedom” extended towards individual citizens.</p>
<h2>People before nations</h2>
<p>The Karabakh dispute desperately needs to be refocused on the rights and integrity of humans, rather than “nations” and artificially sacralised territories. But this is a distant prospect indeed; the South Caucasus’s elites still draw too much power from the nationalism they whipped up to bolster their legitimacy decades ago.</p>
<p>After all, in pseudo-democracies, nationalism just helps keep things together. It diverts attention from the difficult things and people that matter; most of all, <a href="http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Regions-and-countries/Azerbaijan/Crackdown-on-human-rights-in-Azerbaijan-155040">as recent events in Azerbaijan have shown</a>, it provides a valuable tool for demonising regime opponents as traitors. And as the two presidents well know, any leader trying to move away from the consensus would risk the ire of new a political opposition pushing a reinvigorated nationalist myth.</p>
<p>National histories will always be full of internal contradictions, omissions, and double standards – but allowing nationalism to proceed unchecked this conflict deteriorate further. These official histories are emperors with no clothes. It is time for their distortions to be directly and aggressively addressed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/30933/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevork Oskanian does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The world has been brutally reminded of the unresolved conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave in the South Caucasus which Armenia and Azerbaijan have locked horns over for more than 25 years. While the…Kevork Oskanian, Research Fellow in International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/229132014-02-12T14:37:11Z2014-02-12T14:37:11ZSochi is the scene of a terrible crime against Circassian people<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/41364/original/vqv334p4-1392204756.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Circassian history lives on, but not at the Winter Olympics.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Misha Japaridze/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Sochi Olympics shines a spotlight on the forgotten history of the Caucasus, but one group of people has not made news headlines in the same way as neighbouring Chechnya or Dagestan. The Circassian people are natives of Sochi and the surrounding area that has been transformed for the Winter Games. Their world has evolved through a series of tragic events, including genocide, exile and territorial division.</p>
<p>The Circassians suffered defeat at the hands of the Imperial Russian military 150 years ago. Many were killed and even more deported. Then, during Soviet times their land was divided during Stalin’s experiment with nationalities and Circassians were grouped together with other ethnic groups not related to them. Today, less than 10% of the Circassian population remains on its native soil in the Caucasus.</p>
<h2>The Circassian question</h2>
<p>The Sochi Olympics touch a nerve among Circassians for several reasons. By an irony of history, the 2014 Olympic Games will mark the 150th anniversary of the Circassian defeat at the hands of Russia. After more than a century of fighting, hundreds of thousands of Circassians were killed by imperial forces. The memory of this defeat is kept keenly alive in the Circassian community. Every year on 21 May, Circassians around the world light 101 candles and observe a minute of silence in memory of the 101-year war. </p>
<p>Sochi itself was the site of the war’s last battles and its port was the place from which the Circassians were deported to the Ottoman Empire. Krasnaya Polyana, the area that will be the centre of the 2014 Olympic Games skiing events, marked the spot on 21 May 1864 where a parade of Russian troops celebrated the end of the war. Sochi itself was named after the Circassian ethnic group Shache, which lived there until 1864. It was also the last capital of independent Circassia.</p>
<p>More critical Circassian activists demand that the Sochi Olympics be completely cancelled. On 4 October 2007, several Circassian organisations in the US appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin to cancel the Sochi Olympics and recognize the Circassian Genocide. They are still waiting for a response.</p>
<p>Anti-Kremlin Circassian activists launched the “<a href="http://nosochi2014.com/">No Sochi 2014 Campaign</a>” in 2007. Since Russia was awarded the games, Circassians in the US and Turkey have demonstrated in front of the Russian consulates in New York and Istanbul demanding their cancellation. Their message to the world is, “If you let the 2014 games go on as planned in Russia, you’ll be skiing on the graves of our oppressed ancestors.”</p>
<p>At the very least, most Circassians want elements of their culture to be included in the Olympics and support the games on that condition. Those in Russia have organised many appeals to the organisers to include Circassian elements in the games. The Parliament of Adygeia spoke out in March 2010 with unusual criticism of Russian federal policy. They declared: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>To our great sorrow the state and civil structures completely ignore the history and culture of the Circassians, the indigenous people of the Black Sea shore. The Circassian element was completely ignored during the solemn transition of the Olympic Fire from Vancouver to Sochi.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In response, the Russian Olympic Committee agreed that Circassian elements should be included at Sochi. The promise was not kept.</p>
<h2>Evolving tactics</h2>
<p>Circassians inside and outside of Russia have been increasingly united since the fall of communism. As well as seeking recognition of the genocide that took place in 1864 at the hands of the tsarist military near Sochi, they want unification of Circassian republics within Russia and repatriation of the expelled population.</p>
<p>The Circassian national movement is constantly evolving in response to new challenges. While it is far from achieving its three strategic goals, it has made modest progress. The 1990s saw neighbouring local parliaments of Kabardino-Balkaria, Adygeia, and Abkhazia all recognise the Circassian genocide. Also, for the first time a foreign state, Georgia, recognized the Circassian genocide in 2011. However, the Russian state constantly denies it, leaving considerable work to be done.</p>
<p>Sochi is the scene of terrible crimes in Circassian history. This should not be forgotten as the fun and games of the Olympics unfold. Equally it is a chance for the Circassian community to come together and highlight their grievances to a world whose eyes are on region. Wandering for a long time, Circassians have remained relatively quiescent. But it’s possible that this period of quiet is coming to an end with Sochi providing cause to mobilise around Circassian history and identity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/22913/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Sochi Olympics shines a spotlight on the forgotten history of the Caucasus, but one group of people has not made news headlines in the same way as neighbouring Chechnya or Dagestan. The Circassian…Sufian Zhemukhov, Heyward Isham Visiting Scholar in Russian and East European Studies, George Washington UniversityRobert Orrtung, Associate Research Professor of International Affairs, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.