tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/communist-china-45605/articlesCommunist China – The Conversation2022-05-24T12:46:37Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1767652022-05-24T12:46:37Z2022-05-24T12:46:37ZBiden on Taiwan: Did he really commit US forces to stopping any invasion by China? An expert explains why, on balance, probably not<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464882/original/file-20220523-25530-80lkyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C41%2C7000%2C4610&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pondering a shift in strategy on Taiwan? Possibly not.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/23/politics/biden-taiwan-china-japan-intl-hnk/index.html">Nicolas Datiche/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The White House has been left scrambling a little after President Joe Biden suggested on May 23, 2022, that the U.S. <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/23/politics/biden-taiwan-china-japan-intl-hnk/index.html">would intervene militarily</a> should China attempt an invasion of Taiwan.</em></p>
<p><em>The comment, which Biden made during a trip to Japan, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-61548531">was taken by</a> some observers <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/video/biden-signals-major-shift-warning-us-respond-militarily-84914670">as a deviation</a> from the official U.S. line on Taiwan, in place for decades. But officials in Washington <a href="https://nypost.com/2022/05/23/white-house-walks-back-biden-taiwan-defense-claim-again/">walked back that interpretation</a>, saying instead that it only referred to military assistance.</em></p>
<p><em>Meredith Oyen, an <a href="https://history.umbc.edu/facultystaff/full-time/meredith-oyen/">expert on U.S.-China relations</a> at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, helps explain the background to Biden’s recent comments and untangles what should be read into his remarks – and what shouldn’t.</em></p>
<h2>What did Biden say and why was it significant?</h2>
<p>Asked if the U.S. was willing to get involved “militarily” in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/23/biden-taiwan-china-defense/">Biden replied</a>, “yes.” A follow-up question saw the U.S. president add: “That’s the commitment we have made.”</p>
<p>By my count, this is the third time Biden has as president suggested that the U.S. will come to Taiwan’s aid militarily if the island is attacked. In 2021 he made similar remarks in an <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/20/us-position-on-taiwan-unchanged-despite-biden-comment-official-says.html">interview with ABC News</a> and then again <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/10/22/remarks-by-president-biden-in-a-cnn-town-hall-with-anderson-cooper-2/">while taking part in a CNN town hall event</a>.</p>
<p>But it is significant that this is the first time he has made the assertion while in Asia.</p>
<p>An important thing to note is that on each occasion he has made such a comment, it has been followed quite quickly by the White House walking back the remarks, by issuing statements along the lines of “what the president actually means is…” and stressing that this isn’t a shift away from the official U.S. policy on China or Taiwan. </p>
<p>However, the remarks and the clarifications have increased doubt over whether Biden is continuing the policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan.</p>
<h2>What does ‘strategic ambiguity’ mean?</h2>
<p><a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/why-strategic-ambiguity-trumps-strategic-clarity-taiwan/">Strategic ambiguity</a> has long been the U.S. policy toward Taiwan – really since the 1950s but certainly from 1979 onward. While it does not explicitly commit the U.S. to defending Taiwan in every circumstance, it does leaves open the option of American defensive support to Taiwan in the event of an unprovoked attack by China.</p>
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<p>Crucially, the U.S. hasn’t really said what it will do – so does this support mean economic aid, supply of weapons or U.S. boots on the ground? China and Taiwan are left guessing if – and to what extent – the U.S. will be involved in any China-Taiwan conflict.</p>
<p>By leaving the answer to that question ambiguous, the U.S. holds a threat over China: Invade Taiwan and find out if you face the U.S. as well. </p>
<p>Traditionally, this has been a useful policy for the U.S., but things have changed since it was first rolled out. It was certainly effective when the U.S. was in a much stronger position militarily compared to China. But it might be less effective as a threat now that <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-22/china-is-catching-up-to-the-u-s-when-it-comes-to-military-power">China’s military is catching up</a> with the U.S.</p>
<p>Leading voices from U.S. allies in Asia, <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/U.S.-should-abandon-ambiguity-on-Taiwan-defense-Japan-s-Abe">such as Japan</a>, believe that “strategic clarity” might be a better option now – with the U.S. stating outright that it would defend Taiwan if the island is attacked.</p>
<h2>So Biden’s comments could hint at this shift?</h2>
<p>There does seem to be a pattern: Biden says something seemingly very clear on defending Taiwan, and that then gets walked back. If no one in Washington was walking back the comments then it would seem like an intentional shift in policy by the Biden administration.</p>
<p>But the fact that the White House has always been quick to clarify the comments suggests to me that it isn’t necessarily intentional. It seems like Biden is simply trying to signal more support for Taiwan, and perhaps reassure U.S. allies in Asia. </p>
<p>But I’m a historian, not a strategist. It could be that this is some advanced chess game that I can’t figure out.</p>
<h2>What is the history of US relations with Taiwan?</h2>
<p>After the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev">victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949</a>, the defeated Republic of China government withdrew to the island of Taiwan, located just 100 miles off the shore of Fujian province. And until the 1970s, the U.S. recognized only this exiled Republic of China on Taiwan as the government of China.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="President Richard Nixon confers with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong as they sit in comfy chairs." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=188&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=188&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=188&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=237&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=237&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=237&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Nixon in China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/peking-china-president-richard-m-nixon-confers-with-chinese-news-photo/515401848?adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>But in 1971, the <a href="https://web-archive-2017.ait.org.tw/en/un-res-2758-voted-to-admit-communist-china.html">United Nations shifted recognition</a> to the People’s Republic of China on the mainland. In 1972, President Richard Nixon made a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/nixons-1972-visit-china-50">now-famous trip to China</a> to announce a rapprochement and sign the Shanghai Communique, a joint statement from communist China and the U.S. signaling a commitment to pursue formal diplomatic relations. A <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121325">critical section of that document</a> stated: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.”</p>
<p>The wording was crucial: the U.S. was not formally committing to a position on whether Taiwan was part of the China nation. Instead, it was acknowledging what the governments of either territory asserted – that there is “one China.” </p>
<h2>Where does US commitment of military support for Taiwan come from?</h2>
<p>After establishing formal diplomatic relations with China in 1979, the U.S. built an informal relationship with the ROC on Taiwan. In part to push back against President Jimmy Carter’s decision to recognize communist China, U.S. lawmakers passed the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479#:%7E:text=Taiwan%20Relations%20Act%20%2D%20Declares%20it,other%20people%20of%20the%20Western">Taiwan Relations Act in 1979</a>. That act outlined a plan to maintain close ties between the U.S. and Taiwan and included provisions for the U.S. to sell military items to help the island maintain its defense – setting the path for the policy of strategic ambiguity. </p>
<h2>What has changed recently?</h2>
<p>China has long maintained its desire for an eventual <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2021/10/09/chinas-xi-jinping-calls-peaceful-reunification-taiwan/6072388001/">peaceful reunification</a> of its country with the island it considers a rogue province. But the commitment to the principle of “one China” has become increasingly one-sided. It is an absolute for Beijing. But in Taiwan, however, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/07/why-is-unification-so-unpopular-in-taiwan-its-the-prc-political-system-not-just-culture/">resistance to the idea of reunification has grown</a> amid a <a href="https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/upload/44/doc/6963/Tondu202112.jpg">surge of support for moving the island toward independence</a>.</p>
<p>Beijing has become more aggressive of late in asserting that Taiwan must be “returned to China.” Domestic politics plays a role in this. At times of internal instability in China, Beijing has sounded a more belligerent tone on relations between the two entities separated by the Taiwan Strait. We have seen this over the last year with Beijing sending <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-taiwan-warplanes-fly-incursions-air-defense-zone/">military aircraft into Taiwan’s Air Defense Zone</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Chinese <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/Chapter_5--Hong_Kongs_Government_Embraces_Authoritarianism.pdf">assertion of increased authority over Hong Kong</a> has damaged the argument for “one country, two system” as a means of peaceful reunification with Taiwan.</p>
<h2>How has the US position shifted in the face of Beijing’s stance?</h2>
<p>Biden has definitely been more openly supportive of Taiwan than previous presidents. He <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-taiwan/taiwan-biden-ties-off-to-strong-start-with-invite-for-top-diplomat-idUSKBN29Q01N">officially invited a representative from Taiwan to his inauguration</a> – a first for an incoming president – and has repeatedly made it clear that he views Taiwan as an ally.</p>
<p>He also didn’t overturn the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/535">Taiwan Travel Act</a> passed under the the previous administration of Donald Trump. This legislation allows U.S. officials to visit Taiwan in an official capacity.</p>
<p>So there has been a shift to a degree. But the White House is keen not to overstate any change. At heart, there is a desire by the U.S. to not stray from the Shanghai Communique. </p>
<h2>So is an invasion of Taiwan likely?</h2>
<p>I don’t think we are anywhere near that yet. Any invasion across the Taiwan Strait would be militarily complex. It also comes with risks of backlash from the international community. Taiwan would receive support from not only the U.S. – in an unclear capacity, given Biden’s remarks – but also Japan and likely other countries in the region.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, China maintains that it wants to see reintegration through peaceful means. As long as Taiwan doesn’t force the issue and declare independence unilaterally, I think there is tolerance in Beijing to wait it out. And despite <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3462914-russias-war-on-ukraine-makes-chinas-attack-on-taiwan-more-likely/">some commentary to the contrary</a>, I don’t think the invasion of Ukraine has raised the prospects of a similar move on Taiwan. In fact, given that Russia is now bogged down in a months-long conflict that has hit its military credibility and economy, the Ukraine invasion may actually serve as a warning to Beijing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176765/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Biden’s suggestion that the US is prepared to intervene militarily if Taiwan was invaded was quickly walked back by White House officials.Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1692282022-02-01T13:13:46Z2022-02-01T13:13:46ZChina has no plan for who will succeed Xi Jinping – leaving the nation and the world in uncertainty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432508/original/file-20211117-23-xmkt5p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=160%2C24%2C8021%2C5470&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Since becoming China's top leader in late 2012, President Xi Jinping has centralized power to the point that it's unclear when he'll step down, or who might succeed him.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/large-screen-displays-chinas-president-xi-jinping-during-a-news-photo/1353609270?adppopup=true">Kevin Frayer/Getty Images AsiaPac via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since becoming China’s paramount leader in 2012, Xi Jinping has overseen enormous economic growth and solidified China’s standing as an economic and geopolitical superpower. He has also <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2018/0228/Xi-for-life-China-turns-its-back-on-collective-leadership">centralized his power</a> over domestic politics. In 2018, Xi oversaw the <a href="https://theconversation.com/xis-indefinite-grasp-on-power-has-finally-captured-the-wests-attention-now-what-92721">repeal of</a> the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-term-limit-explainer.html">two-term limit on holding presidential office</a>, which has opened a path for him to stay in power after 2023. </p>
<p>Xi is arguably the most powerful leader of China since <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674725867">Deng Xiaoping</a>, the architect of the economic reforms that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/12/19/40-years-ago-deng-xiaoping-changed-china-and-the-world/">transformed China</a> from a poor agrarian nation into a major economic powerhouse. Before Xi became the leader of China, the Chinese Communist Party had a <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china-in-xis-new-era-the-return-to-personalistic-rule/">system in place</a> for the peaceful transfer of power. This system was, for the most part, adhered to by <a href="http://en.people.cn/data/people/jiangzemin.shtml">Jiang Zemin</a> and <a href="http://en.people.cn/data/people/hujintao.shtml">Hu Jintao</a>, the two leaders who preceded Xi in office.</p>
<p>In the past, a lack of faith in a succession plan for the peaceful transition of power has led to <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-rise-of-the-xi-gang/">dissension within the ruling party</a>, domestic political interference by the <a href="https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-2.pdf">Chinese military</a> and tendencies toward a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">greater centralization of power</a> by Chinese leaders. Because of China’s <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/22/china-has-two-paths-to-global-domination-pub-81908">major role on the world stage</a>, the lack of a plan to succeed Xi is likely to affect other nations. It is causing uncertainty about issues including <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s41072-020-00076-w">potential trade disruptions</a>, foreign policy changes resulting from <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">domestic instability</a> and the potential for a <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/after-xi#sec44501">military coup</a>.</p>
<p>I’ve found in my <a href="https://people.rit.edu/aabgsh/">research</a> on Chinese <a href="https://rsaiconnect.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rsp3.12193">economics</a> and <a href="https://rsaiconnect.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rsp3.12123">politics</a> that knowing more about how peaceful transfers of power have taken place in the past in China is key to fully grasping what might happen if Xi Jinping <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-successor.html">does not name</a> a successor.</p>
<h2>How power is supposed to transition</h2>
<p>Since the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-Communist-Party">Chinese Communist Party</a> has held sole control of the government, and the general secretary, the top leader of the party, has ruled the nation. That role usually includes being chairman of the nation’s military, and holding the largely ceremonial title of “president.”</p>
<p>On paper, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/08/the-chinese-communist-partys-experiment-with-transparency/">here’s how</a> <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">power passes without struggle from one top leader to another</a>: At the National Congress, a meeting held every five years, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41250273">delegates elect</a> members to the party’s Central Committee. </p>
<p>This committee then elects the general secretary and a body called the Politburo Standing Committee to lead the nation for the next five years.</p>
<h2>How power really transitions</h2>
<p>Yet since the era of <a href="http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1900_mao_early.htm">Mao Zedong</a>, the founding father of Communist China and its ruler from 1949 to 1976, the nation’s top leader has typically <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-successor.html">wielded significantly more influence</a> over these processes than the written rules suggest.</p>
<p>For many years, Mao did not name a successor. But in the final months of his life, Mao <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-china-has-a-succession-problem/">named and then discarded</a> one successor after another. He was attempting to avert the ascension to top leadership of a powerful Communist Party leader named <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Deng-Xiaoping">Deng Xiaoping</a>, fearing that <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">Deng would overturn</a> the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion">Cultural Revolution</a>, Mao’s movement to forcefully eradicate all remnants of capitalist and traditional elements from Chinese society. </p>
<p>Mao’s chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, did become the nation’s top leader following Mao’s death in 1976. But he accomplished relatively little, and by 1977, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">pressure was on to oust him</a> in favor of Deng. By 1981, <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674725867">Deng had seized power</a>.</p>
<p>Deng instituted several <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674725867">social and economic reforms</a> that created the foundation for China’s blistering economic growth over the past few decades. In the process, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/09/24/whats-next-for-poverty-reduction-policies-in-china/">hundreds of millions of Chinese</a> citizens have progressed from poverty into the middle class, and China has become the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/insights/worlds-top-economies/">second-largest economy</a> in the world. </p>
<p>When Deng stepped down in 1989, he created his own succession crisis. Deng tagged a relatively obscure politician named <a href="http://en.people.cn/data/people/jiangzemin.shtml">Jiang Zemin</a> to succeed him but also declared that politician <a href="http://en.people.cn/data/people/hujintao.shtml">Hu Jintao</a> should succeed Jiang after two terms. Jiang and Hu became <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/01/world/analysts-see-tension-in-china-within-the-top-leadership.html">powerful rivals</a> for the next two decades.</p>
<p>Tensions with Jiang slowed Hu’s attempts to introduce reforms seeking economic growth in China’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">western and northeastern regions</a> instead of its more dynamic east coast. They also hurt Hu’s ability to carry out <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/01/world/analysts-see-tension-in-china-within-the-top-leadership.html">political changes</a> desired by China’s liberal intellectuals.</p>
<p>The Hu era came to an end in 2012 with a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">peaceful transfer of power to Xi Jinping</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Photos of four men" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A museum in Beijing displays portraits of Chinese leaders, from left, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ChinaUSLeadersVisits/bbfa65769f234c279a83bd49f66ecbe6/photo">AP Photo/Andy Wong</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>A potential ruler for life</h2>
<p>Xi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-party-term-limit.html">moved speedily</a> to <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT500/CT503/RAND_CT503.pdf">centralize power</a> to an extent not seen since Deng. He <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">purged political enemies</a> from influential party positions. He also positioned his <a href="https://www.soas.ac.uk/china-institute/events/seminars/02nov2020-what-is-xi-fighting-the-dynamics-of-corruption-in-post-mao-china.html">campaign against corruption</a> as critical to the <a href="https://www.soas.ac.uk/china-institute/events/seminars/02nov2020-what-is-xi-fighting-the-dynamics-of-corruption-in-post-mao-china.html">ongoing existence of the party</a> and the nation.</p>
<p>Expert observers believe it likely that Xi is intent on keeping the power he’s amassed, by remaining in office for an <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Xi-s-third-term-plans-in-focus-ahead-of-China-s-party-conclave">unprecedented third term</a> and possibly longer.</p>
<p>Xi’s authoritarian rule has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-works-to-stifle-dissent-amid-concerns-about-chinas-economy-11551609000">stifled domestic dissent</a>, resulted in the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/xi-jinping-successor-sun-zhengcai-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-2018-5">jailing</a> of many of his political rivals, led to the widespread <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang">persecution of Uyghurs</a> in Xinjiang and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/19/world/asia/taiwan-china-identity.html">alienated the Taiwanese people</a> – whom the Communists wish would reunify with China.</p>
<p>Expert China watchers are now assessing the risks of a potential <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/after-xi">leadership challenge or a coup</a> to oust Xi, which could be resisted by Xi’s own supporters. Observers believe this could lead to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/27/7-things-you-need-to-know-about-lifting-term-limits-for-xi-jinping/">public turmoil and repression</a> of the sort seen in Tiananmen Square in 1989, when <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48445934">peaceful student-led protests</a> were <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/tiananmen-square-tank-man-china/">harshly put down</a> by troops armed with assault rifles and accompanied by tanks.</p>
<p>To prevent this, Xi has expanded the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/03/how-has-tiananmen-changed-china/">existing security regime</a> into an elaborate <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/chinas-paper-tiger-surveillance-state/">surveillance state</a> in which digital technologies and artificial intelligence are used to maintain the government’s <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/china-ai-surveillance/614197/">totalitarian control</a>.</p>
<h2>Global reach</h2>
<p>Finally, the Chinese succession problem could also become a global problem. China has the world’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/business-12445925">second-largest economy</a>. Uncertainty stemming from domestic political instability is likely to hurt <a href="https://hbr.org/2006/11/hedging-political-risk-in-china">global markets and interest in investing in China</a>. This could mean <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp/files/ifdp1260.pdf">financial stress</a> in China, trade disruptions and the <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/asia-pacific/china-supply-chain.html">rerouting of supply chains</a> out of China. Nations closely tied to China would also see their <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp/files/ifdp1260.pdf">trade and financial pictures change for the worse</a>.</p>
<p>China has become a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/09/04/what-the-pentagons-new-report-on-china-means-for-u-s-strategy-including-on-taiwan/">potent military power</a>. A domestic power crisis may lead to a chaotic transfer of leadership, whether or not the People’s Liberation Army <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/china-s-looming-succession-crisis">stages a coup</a>. </p>
<p>Globally, China’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/us-china-tensions-explained.html">relations with the U.S.</a> and its present desire for <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2021/10/09/chinas-xi-jinping-calls-peaceful-reunification-taiwan/6072388001/">peaceful reunification with Taiwan</a> may both change. In addition, China may be less able to manage <a href="https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2011/09/CPA_memos_Managing_Instability_China_Periphery.pdf">unstable neighbors</a> like North Korea, Myanmar, Kazakhstan and Pakistan.</p>
<p>In 1980, at age 75, Deng Xiaoping <a href="https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/on-the-reform-of-the-system-of-party-and-state-leadership/">said</a>, “We must take the long-term interest into account and solve the problem of the succession in leadership.” Unfortunately, this has not happened. Since instability in China is likely to have global impacts, Xi and the Chinese Communist Party have an obligation to establish a credible system for an orderly transfer of power.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amitrajeet A. Batabyal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the past, the lack of a succession plan for China has led to political unrest in the country. If it happens again, it will also affect the world.Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, Arthur J. Gosnell Professor of Economics, Rochester Institute of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1675862021-10-26T12:19:39Z2021-10-26T12:19:39ZHow China combined authoritarianism with capitalism to create a new communism<p>After the 1989 fall of communism in the Soviet bloc, five self-declared communist states remain today: China, Cuba, Laos, <a href="https://leonidpetrov.wordpress.com/2009/10/12/dprk-has-quietly-amended-its-constitution/">North Korea</a> and Vietnam. <a href="https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/belarus-overthrow-campaign-aims-to-destroy-last-traces-of-soviet-socialism/">Belarus</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-12/bankrupt-by-socialism-venezuela-hands-over-control-of-companies">Venezuela</a> can also be added to the mix as they fulfil the criteria of a communist state – even though they do not officially invoke the ideology. So, at present, the number stands at seven. The question is, now that capitalism is the engine of China’s economy, what is communism today? And if the number of communist states is poised to <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/20-02832-Elements-of-China-Challenge-508.pdf">grow in the near future</a>, as some predict, what does this prospect mean for democracy?</p>
<p>My interest in communism goes beyond my work as a historian – it’s personal. I was born and raised in communist Poland in the 1970s and 1980s. It was a grey country where people seemed to have lost all hope. All essentials, including shoes and coffee, were rationed. But <a href="https://gdansk.ipn.gov.pl/pl2/aktualnosci/138991">rationing cards</a> did not mean you would get what you wanted, or even needed. Queuing for hours (sometimes even days) to buy anything that had just been delivered to a shop was <a href="https://twojahistoria.pl/2018/10/11/po-papier-toaletowy-mozna-bylo-stac-nawet-kilka-dni-kolejki-sklepowe-za-prl-u/%22%22">a regular occurrence</a>.</p>
<p>I have no doubt that my upbringing shaped my life and inspired my career. My research has examined modern central and eastern Europe, <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Eurasian-Empires-as-Blueprints-for-Ethiopia-From-Ethnolinguistic-Nation-State/Kefale-Kamusella-Beken/p/book/9781003158097">nationalism</a> and the politics of language – particularly <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Politics-and-the-Slavic-Languages/Kamusella/p/book/9780367569846">in the region’s</a> totalitarian and <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Ethnic-Cleansing-During-the-Cold-War-The-Forgotten-1989-Expulsion-of-Turks/Kamusella/p/book/9780367588564">authoritarian regimes</a> during the past two centuries.</p>
<p>During my youth in the 1980s, bartering became more common, while scarce goods could only be bought with US dollars. You could exchange a summer dress two sizes too large for a T-bone steak (<em>kotlet</em>), or a record player that you did not need for a large can of baby formula. Only vinegar seemed to be in constant supply on the near-empty shop shelves – perhaps accounting for the sour faces and almost permanent lack of smiles. Western scholars came up with an apt term to describe this existence. They called it the “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26265933">economy of scarcity</a>” – the impact of central planning on production and the population.</p>
<p>And it wasn’t just a lack of food. Freedom was scarce, too. Poland, like all Soviet bloc countries, was kept under a “double lock” – meaning it was even difficult to travel to another <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2831436">socialist country</a>, be it neighbouring Czechoslovakia or East Germany. You needed to apply for a particular kind of passport to travel to the “people’s democracies” (that is, Soviet bloc countries) in Europe. And after coming back home from your travels, this precious document had to be returned to a local militia headquarters (the police was then known by this militarised sobriquet). </p>
<p>If you wanted to visit a European capitalist country, like West Germany, you needed a another <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2009/nov/08/the-passport-herta-muller-review">kind of passport</a>. But only a single member of any family would be allowed to go to the “rotten capitalist west” (as it was often referred to). So the rest of your family remained as the state’s hostages to ensure you wouldn’t dare to defect. I never once saw the passport that permitted travel to <a href="https://jerzykusmider.com/1972/02/01/1972-77-paszporty-i-podroze-z-prl/">all the countries of the world</a>, which allowed the lucky few to travel to the US or Australia.</p>
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<p><strong><em>This story is part of Conversation Insights</em></strong>
<br><em>The Insights team generates <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218">long-form journalism</a> and is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects to tackle societal and scientific challenges.</em> </p>
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<p>To me, and many others, my home country felt like one big prison. <a href="https://culture.pl/en/article/playing-with-censorship-how-polish-artists-dealt-with-the-communist-regime">Stringent censorship</a> of publications, films and television aimed to convince us that life in Poland and the Soviet bloc was much better than in New York or Paris. But <a href="https://www.rp.pl/kraj/art12865001-propaganda-sukcesu-i-nienawisci">few believed the propaganda</a>. People clandestinely listened to Radio Free Europe and Voice of America (despite the state attempting to jam them). And during the 1980s, it became easier to buy banned books in the form of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1520346">samizdat</a> (uncensored, underground publications).</p>
<p>Among the youth, the dream was to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/300_Miles_to_Heaven">escape this prison</a> and enjoy a “normal life” in a “normal country”. In a place with no rationing cards and well-stocked supermarkets, where working a single job you would be able to afford a decent standard of living, an apartment and summer holidays in the Canaries. The slang Polish name for this Spanish archipelago, “Kanary”, became <a href="https://expressbydgoski.pl/mialam-marzenia-tony-je-realizowal/ar/13863640">colloquial shorthand for the unattainable</a>.</p>
<p>Pie in the sky, our parents warned us. Their advice was to be quiet, to do what we were told by teachers or overseers – and to never say what we thought. After all, refusing to toe the Communist Party’s line, not praising Poland’s socialism – let alone opposing the system – might cost you <a href="https://twojahistoria.pl/2018/04/21/punkty-za-pochodzenie-za-komuny-to-wladze-decydowaly-o-tym-komu-wolno-bylo-isc-na-studia/">a coveted place at a university</a>, the loss of an apartment, or land you in prison. In the 1950s, at the height of Stalinism, people were even executed for such <a href="https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=747569">ideological misdemeanours</a>. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/KGr-5kAb5ww?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">For people who did succeed to escape the regime, the journey was fraught with complications.</span></figcaption>
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<p>But, unexpectedly, the cold war between the western democracies and the communist Soviet bloc came to an <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8429237.stm">end in 1989</a>, followed, two years later, by the collapse of the <a href="https://oneworld-publications.com/the-last-empire.html">Soviet Union</a> itself. This communist superpower simply and peacefully (at least in Europe) vanished into thin air, causing communism as a political and economic system to disappear from much of the world. </p>
<p>We were free. The last General Secretary of the Soviet Union <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/10/17/would-the-soviet-union-have-collapsed-without-mikhail-gorbachev/">Mikhail Gorbachev</a> was the good fairy, who made our heartfelt dream come true. The Soviet leader decided that starving his own people in order to keep up with the west in the arms race was no way forward. The subsequent systemic transition, in the span of a decade and a half, enabled former Soviet bloc states, from Poland and Hungary to Romania and Bulgaria, to accede to NATO and the European Union. </p>
<p>With my newfound freedom, I continued my education in South Africa and the Czech Republic. I researched in Italy, the US and Japan, before finding university positions in Ireland and Scotland.</p>
<p>But in the case of the 15 countries that emerged from the defunct Soviet Union, only the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became truly western and democratic. Most, Russia included, became autocracies – even if they stuck to the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/josep-borrell-eu-belarus-alexander-lukashenko/">pretence of parliamentary elections</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/85300">Georgia</a>, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/moldova-pro-eu-election-center-right-pas-parliament/">Moldova</a> and especially <a href="https://neweasterneurope.eu/2021/09/23/what-is-the-final-destination-for-ukraines-nato-eu-path/">Ukraine</a> are tantalisingly close to becoming genuine democracies with the prospect of EU and NATO membership. Yet, Turkmenistan is almost <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/turkmenistan-what-life-is-like-inside-secretive-dictatorship-2019-10?r=US&IR=T">as oppressive as North Korea</a>, while <a href="https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/azerbaijan">Azerbaijan</a> and <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/notorious-uzbek-dictator-is-dead-but-his-regime-will-live-on-1.2779275">Uzbekistan</a> are seen as textbook examples of repressive and <a href="https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/20160404-azerbaijan-hidden-wealth/">kleptokratic</a> dictatorships.</p>
<p>But at present, not a single post-communist or post-Soviet state declares itself to be communist.</p>
<h2>China leads the autocracies</h2>
<p>With the economic and political demise of Soviet-style communism, most of the communist regimes supported by the Soviet Union across the world, like <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Eurasian-Empires-as-Blueprints-for-Ethiopia-From-Ethnolinguistic-Nation-State/Kefale-Kamusella-Beken/p/book/9781003158097">Ethiopia</a>, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668139808412601?journalCode=ceas20">Afghanistan</a> and <a href="https://wachtyrz.eu/tomasz-kamusella-moscows-first-hybrid-war/">South Yemen</a> also collapsed. Communist Cuba is a lone exception to this trend. The Caribbean island has been a permanent thorn in the side of the US since 1961.</p>
<p>Present-day communism, then, is led by China – the world’s second largest economy. Beijing has been proudly communist since 1949 and is now <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/China-US-Competition-Report-2021.pdf">taking on the US</a>, which still <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/aug/18/america-never-be-back-democratic-leadership-biden-afghanistan">leads</a> – though falteringly – the globe’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46971250">shrinking camp of democracies</a>. Since 2010, an increasing number of states have <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/democracy-crisis">parted with democracy</a>.</p>
<p>Over the past decade, democracy has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2021/apr/13/do-not-disturb-review-the-disturbing-death-of-a-rwandan-dissident">quickly reversed</a> in <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518608">post-genocide Rwanda</a>. The same also happened in <a href="https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2020/12/10/a-new-brand-of-autocratic-consolidation-a-case-study-in-ethiopia/">Ethiopia</a> after the <a href="https://neweasterneurope.eu/2021/03/31/tigray-a-very-central-european-war/">civil war in Tigray</a> (2020-present day), while the Arab Spring’s democratic gains <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190944650.001.0001/oso-9780190944650-chapter-012">have been squashed</a> across the Middle East. As in <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/russia-under-putin-can-electoral-autocracy-survive/">Putin’s Russia</a>, electoral autocracies were installed in <a href="https://verfassungsblog.de/bulgaria-covid-19-as-an-excuse-to-solidify-autocracy/">Bulgaria</a> (2009), <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/world/europe/hungary-orban-democracy-far-right.html">Hungary</a> (2010), <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637944/EPRS_BRI(2019)637944_EN.pdf">Serbia</a> (2014), <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13608746.2018.1479945">Turkey</a> (2015), <a href="https://ruleoflaw.pl/letter-to-ursula-von-der-leyen-rule-of-law-poland/">Poland</a> (2016) and <a href="https://europeum.org/data/articles/eumonzigaapril-2020.pdf">Slovenia</a> (2020).</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/424756/original/file-20211005-24-1xlchja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/424756/original/file-20211005-24-1xlchja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/424756/original/file-20211005-24-1xlchja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/424756/original/file-20211005-24-1xlchja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/424756/original/file-20211005-24-1xlchja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/424756/original/file-20211005-24-1xlchja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/424756/original/file-20211005-24-1xlchja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">On July 1, 2019, China’s Communist Party celebrated its 100th birthday.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.alamy.com/young-communist-party-members-take-part-in-party-building-activities-in-jianshui-county-yunnan-china-image328963340.html?pv=1&stamp=2&imageid=18256E0F-CBE1-4D1C-AE0D-217D24E098D5&p=15094&n=0&orientation=0&pn=1&searchtype=0&IsFromSearch=1&srch=foo%3dbar%26st%3d0%26pn%3d1%26ps%3d100%26sortby%3d2%26resultview%3dsortbyPopular%26npgs%3d0%26qt%3dcommunist%2520china%26qt_raw%3dcommunist%2520china%26lic%3d3%26mr%3d0%26pr%3d0%26ot%3d0%26creative%3d%26ag%3d0%26hc%3d0%26pc%3d%26blackwhite%3d%26cutout%3d%26tbar%3d1%26et%3d0x000000000000000000000%26vp%3d0%26loc%3d0%26imgt%3d0%26dtfr%3d%26dtto%3d%26size%3d0xFF%26archive%3d1%26groupid%3d%26pseudoid%3d75935%26a%3d%26cdid%3d%26cdsrt%3d%26name%3d%26qn%3d%26apalib%3d%26apalic%3d%26lightbox%3d%26gname%3d%26gtype%3d%26xstx%3d0%26simid%3d%26saveQry%3d%26editorial%3d%26nu%3d%26t%3d%26edoptin%3d%26customgeoip%3dGB%26cap%3d1%26cbstore%3d1%26vd%3d0%26lb%3d%26fi%3d2%26edrf%3d0%26ispremium%3d1%26flip%3d0%26pl%3d">From www.alamy.com</a></span>
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<p>China’s population of 1.4 billion means that a fifth of all humankind lives under its communist regime. The other three self-declared communist states – Laos, North Korea and Vietnam – all border China. A new communist – and Sinic (Chinese influenced) – bloc, indeed.</p>
<p>So, after the two decades of decline in the wake of the 1989 collapse of the Soviet bloc, is the turbocharged Chinese-style communism 2.0 – which embraces capitalism – going to take over?</p>
<h2>The rise and fall of democracy</h2>
<p>The looser post-cold war definition of communism marries capitalism with socialism, as understood in the former Soviet Union. The overarching principle of socialism (seen as communism in the west) <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Soviet_Life/aTxZVaRV740C?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=From%20each%20according%20to%20his%20ability%2C%20to%20each%20according%20to%20his%20contribution&pg=RA2-PA12&printsec=frontcover&bsq=From%20each%20according%20to%20his%20ability%2C%20to%20each%20according%20to%20his%20contribution">says</a>: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his contribution.” In practice, this unorthodox mix of Soviet-style socialism and capitalism means an authoritarian, or even totalitarian, regime under a single party’s full and (these days) AI-enhanced control. This control extends over the now capitalist-style economy, too. Through this mono-party, the invariably male leader single-handedly rules.</p>
<p>Often a cult of personality is developed for him and the deal is sweetened with a modicum of a welfare state. In most cases these states advertise themselves as being communist. Others, like <a href="https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/belarus-overthrow-campaign-aims-to-destroy-last-traces-of-soviet-socialism/">Belarus</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-12/bankrupt-by-socialism-venezuela-hands-over-control-of-companies">Venezuela</a> may not actually call it “communism” and a different name may be given to this ideology.</p>
<p>For example Bolivarianism in Venezuela, national unity in <a href="https://president.gov.by/be/belarus/god-narodnogo-edinstva">Belarus</a> or Juche in North Korea. The mono-party political system makes the Communist Party into the state and its leader into the de-facto dictator. Unchecked collectivism, or the ruling dictator’s self-serving and populist rhetoric of prioritising masses (referred to as “nation or people”) over individuals, “justifies” his rule and the system. In places like Belarus and China, this has led to dissenters being <a href="https://apnews.com/article/belarus-europe-dcae4d9b7e050323800d098c62bd91c9">repressed</a> and <a href="https://euobserver.com/enlargement/124847">concentration camps</a> being built to remove them from “healthy society”. </p>
<p>Like the pre-1989 communist states, all these countries’ ruling regimes are <a href="https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/891142">anti-western</a> in their official rhetoric, and often in their actions too. This anti-western aggression was another important defining feature of the communist states of the 20th century.</p>
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<p>But will this number rise or fall in the 21st century? During the two decades following the fall of communism in Europe, democracy as the doctrine of human and political rights steadily <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/14/more-than-half-of-countries-are-democratic/">spread across the world</a>. Dictators felt pressured to keep up at least the appearance of working electoral democracy in their countries. Amnesty International and Freedom House <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/amnesty-international-welcomes-release-political-prisoners?">successfully shamed</a> autocrats into mending their notorious ways and freeing political prisoners.</p>
<p>But after 2010, this trend was <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/democracy-retreat">incrementally reversed</a>. Symbolically, in this year the Chinese writer and pro-democracy dissident <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liu_Xiaobo">Liu Xiaobo</a> was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Beijing felt offended by the west and took steps to suppress Liu, his family and friends. The authorities denied Liu cancer treatment and he died prematurely seven years later.</p>
<p>Liu’s ashes were scattered in the sea to prevent the establishment of a grave for a person many saw as a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liu_Xiaobo#Death_and_funeral">democratic hero and martyr</a>. That would have been a focal point for China’s democrats, who might have gone on pilgrimages to pay respect to Liu’s unwavering loyalty to liberty and democracy. </p>
<p>Then, in 2020, the pandemic created an ideal opportunity for Beijing to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-hongkong-democracy-a-idUSKBN2AX1IF">dismantle democracy in Hong Kong</a>, and a place that was once a beacon of political and economic freedom fell. Autocrats of all stripes <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/democracy-crisis">took note</a>. </p>
<h2>‘To get rich is glorious’</h2>
<p>But isn’t the whole idea of capitalism and profit anathema to the central tenets of communism? And if so, how did these two opposites attract? In the wake of then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms, a great discovery of applied politics was made in China: that you can have capitalism without democracy. Spotting a gap in the market of ideas, Deng decreed that “<a href="https://theconversation.com/to-get-rich-is-glorious-how-deng-xiaoping-set-china-on-a-path-to-rule-the-world-156836">to get rich is glorious</a>”, meaning that capitalism was <a href="https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/mobilized_contention/files/merkel_-_is_capitalism_compatible_with_democracy.pdf">ideologically neutral</a> and could serve the needs of a communist regime. </p>
<p>The current marriage of capitalism and communism is a lesson for democrats not to trust in their wishful thinking. Instead, the often touted hypothesis about <a href="https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1966&context=masters_theses">capitalism’s democratising effects</a> must be put to the test. It is clear that capitalism does not make authoritarian or totalitarian Belarus, China, Laos or Vietnam any less authoritarian or more pro-democratic or pro-western. Cuba, North Korea and Venezuela ditched capitalism once before, when they became communist, in 1948 and 1959 and 1999 respectively, and they are reluctant to re-embrace it. But China’s enthusiasm for undemocratic capitalism since 2004 – known as the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130824150344/http:/fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf">Beijing consensus</a> in the west – may compel them to follow suit soon.</p>
<p>China’s economic success, if it lasts for several generations, may lead to the fortification of nascent communism 2.0, with capitalism as an integral part of this ideology. <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/editors-blog/2011/1104/The-China-paradox-communist-capitalism">Communist-capitalism</a> is not an oxymoron any more, as long as the ruling communist party <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/nov/04/jack-ma-ant-group-is-tamed-social-media-reacts-after-china-blocks-ipo">keeps entrepreneurs subservient</a> to its ideology and governance.</p>
<p>So what are the specific characteristics of the new communist 2.0 state? Perhaps, the self-declaration of being a communist state is the most obvious and that this features in the constitution. Even if some states give it a different name.</p>
<p>Civic and human rights are seriously limited and often denounced as a “<a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1157205.shtml">western ploy</a>”. For instance, no individual right to vote <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/english/27743.htm">exists in China</a>, while the state actually <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/health-and-wellness/crimes-against-humanity-is-china-killing-political-prisoners-for-their-organs-20191105-p537md.html">owns citizens’ bodies</a> to do with them <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-may-2-2019-1.5118724/china-s-one-child-policy-was-enforced-through-abortion-and-sterilization-says-documentary-director-1.5118738">as it pleases</a>. </p>
<p>A similar level of abuse is observed in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/07/beatings-killings-gulags-north-korea-rights-abuses-likely-to-be-ignored-at-summit">North Korea</a> and <a href="https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/torture-of-political-prisoners-continues">Vietnam</a>. And growing repression has also been observed in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/15/belarus-systematic-beatings-torture-protesters">Belarus</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/08/cuba-amnesty-international-names-prisoners-of-conscience/">Cuba</a>.</p>
<p>Recently, the west woke up to the dangers that its liberal and democratic values may face and the fact that capitalism alone cannot guarantee freedom and <a href="https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2019-05/kapitalismus-demokratie-ungleichheit-globalisierung-english">human rights</a>. The fear that the age of communist China’s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/is-china-a-new-colonial-power/">imperialism</a> has already arrived motivated Australia, the UK and the US, for example, to form a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/sep/15/australia-nuclear-powered-submarines-us-uk-security-partnership-aukus">new military pact</a>. Imperfectly – and probably to Beijing’s delight – AUKUS agreement excludes the EU.</p>
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<h2>Technological totalitarianism</h2>
<p>In China, the traditional features of totalitarianism have become irretrievably combined with the system’s appetite for hi-tech conditioning and <a href="https://theintercept.com/2021/01/29/china-uyghur-muslim-surveillance-police/">surveillance</a>. For example, the total control of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/04/understanding-chinas-preventive-repression-in-xinjiang/">Xinjiang’s Muslims</a> is made possible through the region’s mass database of the population’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/13/chinese-authorities-collecting-dna-residents-xinjiang">DNA and irises</a>. </p>
<p>Technology and AI are communism 2.0’s largely bloodless methods for extending total control over the population, making sure that every individual <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/china-social-credit-system-explained">toes the party’s line</a>. This compliance is also enabled by the emerging military surveillance <a href="https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/president-expands-ban-on-chinese-3921080/">industrial complex</a>, which is going to be at the core of successful <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/editors-blog/2011/1104/The-China-paradox-communist-capitalism">communist-capitalism</a>.</p>
<p>More control means more job openings in this complex, directly translating into economic growth, that in turn will go back into financing that control – totalitarianism’s perfect feedback loop, with no way out. And so repression becomes recognised as the engine of the economy; a guarantee of prosperity for most (though not all).</p>
<p>The seismic shift from Soviet-style communism 1.0, based on heavy industry, to China’s AI-supported communism 2.0 can be observed to different degrees across those seven communist states. North Korea remains an outlier and a squarely communism 1.0 state. To this day, Pyongyang refuses to follow the communism 2.0 path, despite Beijing’s quiet nudges in that direction (although there are <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/26/the-incredible-rise-of-north-koreas-hacking-army">signs</a> that could be changing). Cuba and Venezuela, meanwhile, are also closer to communism 1.0, still making non-pragmatic choices informed by idealism and ideology. At the other end of the spectrum, Belarus, Laos and Vietnam are using whatever works economically (as long as the ruling party controls production and profits). They are China’s conscientious pupils, bent on implementing communism 2.0.</p>
<h2>Democratic alternatives</h2>
<p>Unless the world’s democracies come up with attractive and effective solutions to socioeconomic ills such as unemployment, falling living standards and income, and inaccessible medical care, then I am afraid that communism 2.0 is going to win hands down. In this scenario, the number of communist states is bound to grow and individual and political freedoms will diminish. </p>
<p>China’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a> (BRI) is exactly the type of ambitious project that the world’s democracies acutely lack at this moment in time. The plan is to link and build a coordinated network of railway, road and maritime corridors to span all of Africa, Asia and Europe for the seamless export of products from China and the easy import of raw materials to this communist powerhouse.</p>
<p>Not only does the BRI already facilitate China’s <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/belt-and-road-colonialism-chinese-characteristics">exploitation of Eurasia and Africa</a>, but it also functions as the main conveyor belt for <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/protect-the-party-chinas-growing-influence-in-the-developing-world/">spreading communism 2.0 globally</a>.</p>
<p>Adoptions of the Chinese model’s signature mix of welfare state policies with growing authoritarian tendencies and a single party’s aspiration to seize all power have been observed in present-day Europe since 2015, be it in <a href="https://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/09/27/bulgarias-autocratic-model/">Bulgaria</a>, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/05/hungary-and-poland-arent-democratic-theyre-authoritarian/">Hungary, Poland</a> or <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2019)637944">Serbia</a>. Unsurprisingly, these countries’ pro-authoritarian leaders are enamoured with Chinese <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2020/10/08/serbia-has-rolled-out-the-red-carpet-to-china-but-at-what-cost">economic and political success</a>. They hope to establish privileged links and collaboration with the communist superpower and they may not be the last western states to fall under its spell.</p>
<p>To curry favour with Beijing, Europe’s aspiring autocracies are busy dismantling democracy and putting curbs on political rights and freedoms at home. Since 2015, Poland has repeatedly been risking tens of billions of Euros in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/08/brussels-vows-swift-response-poland-ruling-against-eu-law">developmental aid from the EU</a> by rejecting the basic principle of EU legal primacy. Facing growing censure, in 2017, incredulously, the Polish prime minister said that it did not matter, because in such a case China would offer Poland <a href="https://wyborcza.biz/biznes/7,177151,22265746,unia-chinska-zamiast-unii-europejskiej-pekin-wpompuje-w-polske.html">more money than Brussels</a>.</p>
<p>I fear that, after my childhood in communist Poland, I may have to live out my old age under a communist 2.0 regime of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/apr/15/the-road-to-unfreedom-russia-europe-america-timothy-snyder-review-tim-adams">renewed oppression</a>. However colourful and hi-tech its <a href="https://fortune.com/2018/11/29/communist-china-billionaires-jack-ma/">façade</a> may be, the enforcement of the ruling party’s line in this possible future will be swifter and more totalitarian than in the Soviet bloc’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/artificial-intelligence-is-a-totalitarians-dream-heres-how-to-take-power-back-143722">pre-cyberspace past</a>. </p>
<p>Vast databases of citizens’ DNA and irises will make personal identifications impossible to fake, while ubiquitous online, mobile and CCTV monitoring will <a href="https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201014-totalitarian-world-in-chains-artificial-intelligence">liquidate privacy</a> and any possibility of organised dissent.</p>
<p>In the state’s gaze, each person will stand naked with no choice but to do the autocrat’s bidding or <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/22/why-are-people-disappearing-china">be vanished</a> and die, forgotten by all, out of sight in a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/11/11/china-secret-black-jails-hide-severe-rights-abuses">“black jail”</a> or in an officially non-existent <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/China_hidden_camps">concentration camp</a>.</p>
<p>Even the memory of such an ideological miscreant will be <a href="https://www.hongkongwatch.org/all-posts/2021/6/3/beijings-move-to-wipe-out-the-memory-of-tiananmen-square-damages-right-to-peaceful-assembly">erased from people’s minds</a>, thanks to the rise of the state-controlled “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/18/russia-growing-internet-isolation-control-censorship">sovereign internet</a>”. As George Orwell predicted in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nineteen_Eighty-Four">1984</a>: “<a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/1984/kotPYEqx7kMC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=wiki%20orwell%201984&pg=PP1&printsec=frontcover&bsq=Who%20controls%20the%20past%20controls%20the%20future">Who controls the past, controls the future</a>.”</p>
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<p><em>For you: more from our <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Insights series</a>:</em></p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tomasz Kamusella does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What does communism 2.0 mean for democracy?Tomasz Kamusella, Reader in Modern History, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/919702018-02-20T22:32:00Z2018-02-20T22:32:00ZCanada-China trade deal: Is Ottawa selling out our democratic values?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206888/original/file-20180219-75961-1v94f9s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Prime Minister Justin Trudeau takes part in an eye-dotting ceremony to awaken the lion as he is given a tour of the Chen Clan Academy in Guangzhou, China in December 2017.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/27/c_136929491.htm">According to the Xinhua News Agency</a>, a senior Chinese official had a favourable reception last month when he visited Ottawa to try to reframe the stalled trade talks with Canada.</p>
<p>China’s official state news agency said that Song Tao — who heads the Communist Party Central Committee’s International Liaison Department — briefed Canadian officials on Beijing’s plan to displace the United States as the world’s superpower.</p>
<p>It intends to do so by “building of a community with a shared future for mankind,” which Xinhua added is “not only important to China but bears profound interest for the rest of the world.”</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206891/original/file-20180219-75961-1gl6y5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206891/original/file-20180219-75961-1gl6y5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/206891/original/file-20180219-75961-1gl6y5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/206891/original/file-20180219-75961-1gl6y5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/206891/original/file-20180219-75961-1gl6y5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/206891/original/file-20180219-75961-1gl6y5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/206891/original/file-20180219-75961-1gl6y5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Song Tao, right, the head of China’s ruling Communist Party’s International Liaison Department, talks with a fellow attendee before the start of the opening session of China’s 19th Party Congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing in October 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein)</span></span>
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<p>If the Xinhua report is accurate, Canada is blithely considering a Chinese Communist proposal to sell out the liberal values that define global institutions like the United Nations and World Trade Organization in favour of a made-in-China model that will serve Beijing’s authoritarian nationalist aspirations.</p>
<p>It’s time to realize that decisions being made now are going to radically change the values of global diplomacy and justice for the next century or more. </p>
<p>Based on my past experience as a counsellor at the Canadian embassy in Beijing, I argue strongly that Canada needs to seriously rethink its approach to China in order to meet the challenge of China’s rise.</p>
<p>A good start is to recognize the yawning need for regulations that monitor Western civil servants and politicians who, after they retire from government, go into lucrative businesses and consultancies funded by China-related sources.</p>
<h2>Conflict of interest?</h2>
<p>When former officials enrich themselves with Beijing’s money once they’re no longer managing China-related policy, it raises huge questions about whether they’d been compromised in defending Canada’s national interests vis-à-vis China while in office.</p>
<p>A post-retirement second career, trading on their China-related “friendships” cultivated in government service, is simply not appropriate.</p>
<p>Multi-ethnic nations like Canada should of course encourage citizens of Chinese origin to seek political office — we need legislatures that reflect our diversity. </p>
<p>But the sole legitimate function of a politician is to serve the purposes of their nation of citizenship. <a href="http://www.ejinsight.com/20160503-beijing-seeks-loyalty-from-ethnic-chinese-with-foreign-passports/">Ethnic Chinese politicians with divided loyalties</a> who spend a lot of time in China for vaguely defined purposes should not have a voice in policy-making that might benefit the Chinese Party State in Canada.</p>
<p>And, obviously, Canadian political parties should not be accepting funding from foreign sources, indirectly or otherwise. </p>
<p>Most Western nations’ think tanks that advise on China relations <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/us/politics/foreign-powers-buy-influence-at-think-tanks.html">routinely accept funding from PRC-related sources</a>. </p>
<p>And our media often provide an influential platform to apologist pundits whose grants and China travel are on Beijing’s dime through “exchanges.” </p>
<h2>Canada must counter Chinese subversion</h2>
<p>There’s no doubt Canada urgently needs a lot more expertise on China so we can better realize our interests within that country, but we should pay for it ourselves.</p>
<p>We also need to get more resources to our police and security agencies to counter Chinese subversion. Any accredited diplomat who menaces or <a href="http://nationalpost.com/news/world/confidential-report-reveals-how-chinese-officials-harass-activists-in-canada-there-is-a-consistent-patternhttp:/nationalpost.com/news/world/confidential-report-reveals-how-chinese-officials-harass-activists-in-canada-there-is-a-consistent-pattern">harasses people in Canada</a> — including ethnic Chinese democracy activists or members of the Tibetan and Uyghur communities — in ways that are incompatible with their diplomatic status should be declared persona non grata and sent home. </p>
<p>Likewise, Chinese state security agents who <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/chinas-fox-hunt-in-canada-strains-trust-that-an-extradition-treaty-is-possible/article32042306/">enter Canada under false pretenses</a> for the same purposes should be tracked down and criminally charged.</p>
<p>Getting serious about defending against subversion is another important national security concern. Ottawa must expend more energy combating Chinese political, military and economic espionage, and put more resources into identifying people who transfer Canadian secrets and restricted technologies to agents of the Chinese state.</p>
<h2>Celebrate democracy</h2>
<p>Beyond our own borders, democracy in Taiwan and Hong Kong should be celebrated, but we shun their progressive leaders who share our values because China tells us to — or else. </p>
<p>Canadian leaders should continue to meet with the Dalai Lama periodically, as a legitimate expression of our concern over the situation of Tibetans in China. We must apply our human rights standards equally to all peoples regardless.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206894/original/file-20180219-75974-1x9zlji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206894/original/file-20180219-75974-1x9zlji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/206894/original/file-20180219-75974-1x9zlji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/206894/original/file-20180219-75974-1x9zlji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/206894/original/file-20180219-75974-1x9zlji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=570&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/206894/original/file-20180219-75974-1x9zlji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=570&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/206894/original/file-20180219-75974-1x9zlji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=570&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this 2004 photo, the Dalai Lama laughs as he talks with Justin Trudeau before speaking to approximately 25,000 people in Toronto.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(CP PHOTO/Adrian Wyld)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Finally, it is shocking that <a href="http://business.financialpost.com/investing/aecon-a-stepping-stone-for-beijing-fears-rise-as-ottawa-decides-on-1-5b-deal">there is even a debate</a> over whether Beijing, through the China Communications Construction Company, should be allowed to purchase Canada’s largest publicly traded construction company, Aecon Group. </p>
<p>This in itself reveals serious flaws in Canada’s China policy. Aecon helped build the CN Tower, Vancouver’s Skytrain, the St. Lawrence Seaway and is about to work on the <a href="http://www.aecon.com/Media_Room/%7E1375-Aecon-joint-venture-awarded-2-75-billion-contract-for-the-execution-phase-of-the-Darlington-nuclear-refurbishment-project">Darlington nuclear power plant</a>. </p>
<p>The growing public outcry against the sale has led the federal government to announce recently that it will <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-orders-national-security-review-of-aecon-sale-to-china-owned-construction-firm/article37937182/">order a full national security review</a>. </p>
<p>But we’ll never know what the review reveals since it will be assessed by cabinet in secret. </p>
<p>If Ottawa, bowing to Chinese government pressure, allows this sale anyway, expect the new version of Aecon to enter unrealistically competitive bids on critical Canadian infrastructure projects. </p>
<p>What’s more? Expect the Chinese military to have the blueprints of all past and future Aecon projects in perpetuity for their own use, or to share with their North Korean allies.</p>
<p>The Aecon purchase is just one small piece, but a large indicator, of a grander, co-ordinated Chinese Communist plan. Let’s come to our senses and just say “no.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91970/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Burton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A high-ranking Chinese official was reportedly just in Canada getting China-Canada trade talks back on track. If true, that means Canada is blithely selling out liberal values.Charles Burton, Associate Professor of Political Science, Brock UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/863262017-11-13T03:30:09Z2017-11-13T03:30:09ZSimon Leys, navigator between worlds – a unique Australian intellectual<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192757/original/file-20171101-32611-1le3omm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Simon Leys intervened on a broad range of topics: Mother Teresa, the continuing relevance of George Orwell, conservative values, and the role of the university in the pursuit of truth.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Black Inc</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For many Australians who studied Chinese language in the 1970s and 1980s (including this reviewer), Pierre Ryckmans (also known by his nom-de-plume, Simon Leys), was an inspirational teacher with a legendary mastery of Chinese and a passionate love of traditional Chinese art and literature. </p>
<p>To ardent Maoists of the 1960s and 70s he was the bête-noire of sinology — one of the few China-watchers who turned his barbed wit and invective against the high tide of adulation for the Chinese leader that swept through leftist circles in the West. In the calmer days of the 1980s and 90s, we in Australia knew him as a powerful if controversial public intellectual, who intervened on a broad range of topics: Mother Teresa, the continuing relevance of George Orwell, conservative values, and the role of the university in the pursuit of truth.</p>
<p>Ryckmans wrote numerous books about Chinese art and politics, but also an acclaimed novel, <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/482227.The_Death_of_Napoleon">The Death of Napoleon</a>. He lived for over 40 years in Australia and taught Chinese language and culture to generations of Australian students at the ANU and the University of Sydney between 1971 and 1994. Married to a woman from Taiwan, Ryckmans raised four children in Australia. A keen mariner, he enjoyed sailing around Sydney harbor in his leisure time. He passed away in Sydney in 2014 at the age of 79.</p>
<p>However, in many ways, Ryckmans was unique as an “Australian” intellectual. When he was invited to present the Boyer Lectures in 1996 he sought to persuade his listeners through a deep set of meditations that, “Truth is not a conclusion, but a premise”. The best publicized quote from the lectures was this throwaway line: “Only a moron would wish to attend the Olympic Games.” This did not go down too well with the sports-mad Australian public.</p>
<p>Those who want to understand more about this most unusual Australian public intellectual will welcome Philippe Paquet’s Simon Leys: Navigator Between Worlds. However, the reader should be warned in advance that this is a vast omnibus of a work, reminiscent of “the loose baggy monsters” type of epic novel, as characterized by Henry James. </p>
<p>Paquet, described here as “a Belgian journalist, historian and sinologist” is the author also of a biography of Madame Chiang Kai-shek. His biography of Leys was published in French by Gallimard in 2010. It has now been translated by Julie Rose, a distinguished translator of French literature. The volume consists of 664 pages, 27 chapters, an epilogue, chronology, copious endnotes, a bibliography of works published by Ryckmans/Leys and an Index. Do not expect a traditional biography so much as a meandering exploration of intellectual currents in the Francophone world of the last half century through the medium of a Belgian Francophone intellectual.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192173/original/file-20171027-13349-x9pjy7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192173/original/file-20171027-13349-x9pjy7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192173/original/file-20171027-13349-x9pjy7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192173/original/file-20171027-13349-x9pjy7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192173/original/file-20171027-13349-x9pjy7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192173/original/file-20171027-13349-x9pjy7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192173/original/file-20171027-13349-x9pjy7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The biography is designed for the intellectually curious. While chapters are in approximate chronological order, Paquet darts off in multiple directions in search of thematic inspiration. A chapter on Ryckman’s early life in Brussels, for example, will include lengthy musings on Belgian artists, English author Evelyn Waugh, Christopher Hitchens’s attack on Mother Teresa, Simon Weil, euthanasia, and even an anecdote about Ryckmans’s surprising eloquence in a NSW court when facing charges of speeding in a narrow lane without his driving licence (“he made such a stirring speech in his defence that the judge dismissed the charges against him on the spot”). </p>
<p>The list of acknowledgements includes very few individuals from Australia. The author relies heavily on correspondence and interviews with Ryckmans over a number of years but appears not to have sought the views of Australia-based colleagues and others who came to know him during his 40-year sojourn here. Australian sinologists will only find tantalizing glimpses of the Ryckmans they knew in Canberra and Sydney but will learn a great deal about Ryckmans/Leys, the world-famous Francophone intellectual.</p>
<h2>A dual nature</h2>
<p>Paquet perceptively pins down the significance of the dual nature of the author, Leys/Ryckmans. The name Simon Leys was adopted initially when Ryckmans worked as a diplomat in Beijing at the same time that he was courting world-wide controversy as the author of trenchant works exposing the brutality of life under Mao. The best known are <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/482226.The_Chairman_s_New_Clothes?from_search=true">The Chairman’s New Clothes: Mao and the Cultural Revolution</a> and <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/482223.Chinese_Shadows?from_search=true">Chinese Shadows</a>. However, Leys, the global intellectual, increasingly took over from Pierre Ryckmans, the sinologist. </p>
<p>As Leys, the author felt free to range far and wide, pursuing intellectual interests way beyond Chinese politics and civilization. His passion for sailing led to his translation into French of the multi-volume book of Richard Dana, <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/author/show/192314.Richard_Henry_Dana_Jr_?from_search=true">Two Years Before the Mast</a>. The absolute power of the captain as “the only master on board after God” and the abject subjection of the seamen captured Leys’s imagination, and perhaps inspired his deep abhorrence of despotism in any form.</p>
<p>When questioned about the broad-ranging nature of his interests, Leys responded that he was </p>
<blockquote>
<p>someone who wants to cultivate himself without being classed among sinologists even if their scientific work is indispensable… What interests me is following my own bent in all the things I’m curious about. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Harvard’s John King Fairbank, a towering figure in sinology in the United States, who was often the target of Ryckmans’s trenchant criticism, once described Leys as “definitely a Western avatar of the former ruling class of Chinese men of letters whose aesthetic ideals he obviously shared”.</p>
<p>Ryckmans the professor retired in 1994, sick at heart with the commercialisation of the university experience. It was, he said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>a bazaar where a thousand wares are spread haphazardly, while the scholars themselves are turned into peddlars, touts and pimps, desperately competing to hustle for a few more suckers.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He was uncompromising on the true role of a university. It should not be dedicated to utilitarian purposes but serve society as an institution “where scholars seek truth, pursue and transmit knowledge for knowledge’s sake — irrespective of the consequences, implications and utility of this endeavor”. The goal of a true university is thus not to award degrees but to provide “a place where a chance is given to men to become what they truly are”. </p>
<p>Since Ryckmans retired, the university sector has become Australia’s third largest “export industry” and Vice-Chancellors enjoy the salaries and reputations of bank barons. </p>
<p>An intellectual interested primarily in self-cultivation and the pursuit of truth would barely survive at any university in Australia. For these reasons Simon Leys: Navigator Between Worlds deserves to be widely read and savored for its insights and wisdom.</p>
<p><em>Simon Leys: Navigator Between Worlds by Philippe Paquet, translated from the original French by Julie Rose, is published by La Trobe University Press, in conjunction with Black Inc.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86326/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anne Elizabeth McLaren does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Pierre Ryckmans - also known by his nom-de-plume, Simon Leys - was an inspirational teacher, the bête-noire of sinology and an outspoken public intellectual. A new biography tells his story.Anne Elizabeth McLaren, Professor of Chinese Studies, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/865782017-10-31T14:08:49Z2017-10-31T14:08:49ZThe Mary, Queen of Scots cover up – and why hidden paintings keep being found<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192482/original/file-20171030-18720-1ehljr2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Behind the mask. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Galleries of Scotland</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>An exciting discovery for British history buffs: an unfinished portrait believed to be of Mary, Queen of Scots <a href="https://www.nationalgalleries.org/press-office">has been</a> revealed under a 16th-century painting using X-ray photography. The hidden portrait is a special find by painting conservator <a href="http://courtauld.ac.uk/people/caroline-rae">Caroline Rae</a>, yet it is not unique. In having her features painted over, Scotland’s doomed queen finds herself in excellent company. </p>
<p>The portrait in question is of Sir John Maitland, the first Lord Maitland of Thirlestane (1543-1595), and normally hangs in a gallery in London. At the time it was painted in 1589, two years after Mary’s death, Maitland was one of the most powerful men in Scotland, having attained the office of Lord Chancellor. The work is attributed to <a href="https://www.nationalgalleries.org/art-and-artists/artists/adrian-vanson">Adrian Vanson</a> (or Van Son), an artist from the Low Countries who later became court painter to James VI, Mary’s son. </p>
<p>The X-ray revealed that Vanson originally had very different plans for this portrait. Instead of Maitland’s face with its characteristic moustache and goatee, we can see the face of a woman, slightly tilted and turned in the opposite direction. The outlines of a square-necked gown and a wired lace ruff are clearly visible; the ghostlike appearance of someone who perhaps needed to be forgotten. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192485/original/file-20171030-18735-e2xtwa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192485/original/file-20171030-18735-e2xtwa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192485/original/file-20171030-18735-e2xtwa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192485/original/file-20171030-18735-e2xtwa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192485/original/file-20171030-18735-e2xtwa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192485/original/file-20171030-18735-e2xtwa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=685&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192485/original/file-20171030-18735-e2xtwa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=685&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192485/original/file-20171030-18735-e2xtwa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=685&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Can you tell what it is yet?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Galleries of Scotland</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mary Stuart <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/people/mary_queen_of_scots/">was executed</a> for plotting the murder of Elizabeth I of England. Her image was identified from the few authentic portraits in existence, including <a href="http://collections.vam.ac.uk/item/O62538/portrait-miniature-hilliard-nicholas/">two miniatures</a> by the English painter Nicholas Hilliard. </p>
<p>If it is Mary, the painting may well have been begun around the time of her execution. This would be surprising but not unlikely: it is easy to imagine portraits of her still being in demand in Scotland but at some point being judged too dangerous. Whether asked to do so by a patron or at his own initiative, Vanson would have been reusing the panel to cover up the politically sensitive evidence. </p>
<h2>Cover ups and more cover ups</h2>
<p>The history of art is full of examples of covered up or destroyed portraits. Often politically motivated, they are sometimes known by the Latin expression <em>damnatio memoriae</em> – the condemnation of memory. In ancient Rome the senate sometimes sanctioned the destruction of the images of previous emperors on coins and life-size sculptures, whereby often only the heads would be replaced – a cheap solution. </p>
<p>There are other good examples from around Mary’s time. The Italian bishop Bernardo de’ Rossi commissioned a painting of the Madonna and Child that included his own portrait, having recently survived an attempt on his life. But at a later date his family had his image painted over in favour of an infant St John the Baptist. No one looking at the painting nowadays would guess that it once contained the bishop. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192479/original/file-20171030-18735-4os3v3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192479/original/file-20171030-18735-4os3v3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192479/original/file-20171030-18735-4os3v3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=327&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192479/original/file-20171030-18735-4os3v3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=327&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192479/original/file-20171030-18735-4os3v3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=327&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192479/original/file-20171030-18735-4os3v3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192479/original/file-20171030-18735-4os3v3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192479/original/file-20171030-18735-4os3v3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Madonna and Child (1503), Lorenzo Lotto.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Later in the 16th century Bianca Capello, grand duchess of Tuscany, fell victim to a campaign of <em>damnatio memoriae</em>: after her premature and possibly violent death her brother in law, Ferdinando de’ Medici, saw many of her portraits destroyed.</p>
<p>There are also more recent examples. The Soviet Union <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/people-who-were-erased-from-history-2013-12?IR=T">was notorious</a> for erasing unwanted figures from the photographic record, long before the existence of Photoshop. Stalin had the head of his secret police, Nikolai Yezhov, airbrushed after his execution in 1940, for instance. The Nazis and Chinese communists also have form in this respect. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192480/original/file-20171030-18683-f3lut0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192480/original/file-20171030-18683-f3lut0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192480/original/file-20171030-18683-f3lut0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=236&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192480/original/file-20171030-18683-f3lut0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=236&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192480/original/file-20171030-18683-f3lut0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=236&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192480/original/file-20171030-18683-f3lut0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192480/original/file-20171030-18683-f3lut0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192480/original/file-20171030-18683-f3lut0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nikolai Yezhov vanishes from Stalin’s left …</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Artists sometimes covered up initial compositions for more mundane reasons than politics, of course. Vincent van Gogh is <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/news/two-for-the-price-of-one-van-gogh-confirmed-with-another-underneath-7578001.html">well known</a> for having recycled canvases to save money. Three years ago, researchers ascribed similar motivations to Pablo Picasso after finding a portrait of a man with a bow tie underneath his famous <a>Blue Room</a>. No less spectacular was the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/aug/04/x-ray-reveals-mysterious-face-hidden-beneath-degas-portrait-of-a-woman">discovery</a> last year of Edgar Degas’s favourite model under his Portrait of a Woman. </p>
<p>While art historians have been using X-rays to analyse the authorship of paintings for over a hundred years, it has always been limited by the fact that, depending on the chemical composition of the paint, it does not make everything visible, and only results in the characteristic black-and-white image. </p>
<p>This makes the results difficult to interpret, although it can still produce important results, as we see with this latest discovery. Yet recent advances in X-ray technology have helped to overcome this problem in certain cases: a technique called <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/srep29594">X-ray fluorescence</a> makes it possible to see under-paintings in high-resolution full colour. This is what was used to uncover the image in the Degas painting, for example. </p>
<p>While specialised knowledge and highly costly equipment are required, it is probably only a matter of time before more fascinating discoveries are offered up by old masters. Who knows what else might be revealed from the Maitland painting if it was subjected to similar techniques. A tantalising prospect, especially for what such finds may tell us about artistic process and changing historical fortunes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elsje van Kessel receives funding from the Leverhulme Trust.</span></em></p>An old Scottish master has revealed its secret after 430 years. What next from art detectives?Elsje van Kessel, Lecturer in Art History, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.