tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/democracy-promotion-37423/articlesDemocracy promotion – The Conversation2017-10-31T11:11:55Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/850262017-10-31T11:11:55Z2017-10-31T11:11:55ZIraq’s rushed and divisive constitution was always doomed to fail<p>Iraqi democracy hasn’t come far since 2003. The outside powers who invaded, occupied and eventually departed left the country with a political system democratic on paper, but profoundly flawed in practice – and that failure is not an accident of history. This is the inevitable effect of the rushed and poorly written <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html">Iraqi Constitution of 2005</a>.</p>
<p>Almost 12 years since it was ratified and approved, the constitution is, in short, an abject failure. It has failed to deliver on the promises of human rights, freedom and democratic integrity, the very values invoked to justify first the US-led invasion and then the construction of a new government. Its vagueness has been taken advantage of. Its lack of provisions has been manipulated, and sectarian divisions have been exacerbated, resulting in a fractured and chaotic country. </p>
<p>The constitution is a highly divisive text. The first ever official document in Iraq’s history to enshrine ethnic differences into law, its drafters hoped to achieve national unity by having all sects participate in government and public life. To do so, they created a system that allocates public sector roles based on sect and ethnicity. To this day, this principle permeates all Iraq’s institutions from the central government downwards.</p>
<p>The result is a climate of nepotism and clientalism, in which uneducated, unqualified and corruption-prone individuals take key posts that ultimately affect the lives of millions of Iraqis. These individuals are only making Iraq’s shortcomings worse, and paralysing its politics. They are not competing to advance the nation, but instead engaged in the sectarian warfare that pervades civic life from top to bottom. </p>
<p>These are the same corrosive forces, corrupt decisions and misguided policies that <a href="http://time.com/3900753/isis-iraq-syria-army-united-states-military/">contributed</a> to the rise of the so-called Islamic State in 2014 – and the parties responsible are rarely, if ever, held accountable.</p>
<h2>Hopes dashed</h2>
<p>One of the ways the constitution tried to balance the concerns of different groups was by giving regional governments a good deal of local control. As with other of its noble aims, some of the ways it tried to do this have backfired badly. </p>
<p>Under articles 115, 121 and 126 of the constitution, where regional and national legislation contradict each other on matters outside exclusive federal authority, the regional power has the right to amend the application of the national legislation within that region. In practice, these ambiguous provisions mean that when it comes to making and implementing policy, regional governments can do as they please. </p>
<p>The unpleasant implications are particularly visible in Kurdistan, which is host to an unaccountable, ruthless and very manipulative political class of two dominant parties. Just like the government in Baghdad, the authorities in Kurdistan variously obstruct, manipulate and regulate their political opposition as they see fit. And regardless of the suffering and tough ordeals that Iraqis living in the Kurdish region face, Baghdad is hard pressed to intervene until things reach a dangerous peak.</p>
<p>Sure enough, on September 25 2017, after 14 years of failed dialogue, the Kurdish Region of Iraq held a referendum for statehood through independence from Iraq. The vote will hardly settle the question of Kurdistan’s future, but that it was held at all is a sign that the federal system has failed.</p>
<p>What happened next was even worse. After more than 92% voted “yes” to statehood, the Iraqi prime minister, Haider Al-Abadi, called in the Iranian <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-iran-insight/irans-elite-guards-fighting-in-iraq-to-push-back-islamic-state-idUSKBN0G30GE20140803">Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps</a> and Iraq’s <a href="http://carnegie-mec.org/2017/04/28/popular-mobilization-forces-and-iraq-s-future-pub-68810">Popular Mobilisation Forces</a>, an umbrella group of militias, to take back the historically disputed Kurdish capital, Kirkuk, from Kurdish Peshmerga forces. </p>
<p>The offensive displaced hundreds of thousands of Sunnis and Kurds; many of their homes were looted and destroyed. The fighters who turfed them out carried both Iraqi and Shia flags, a sign that national security is increasingly left up to sectarianised religious militias. And even though Al-Abadi ostensibly deployed these forces to curb Kurdistan’s secessionist aims, his move will do more to divide Iraq than to protect the integrity of its borders. </p>
<h2>Silenced and crushed</h2>
<p>All the while, Iraqi political life remains in a sad state of violent repression. The constitution’s framers had high hopes for the security of civil society, but in vain. </p>
<p>While article 38 of the constitution protects freedom of speech, as far as the civilian population and journalists are concerned, it might as well never have been drafted. Those who dissent, in print or in the street, are targeted and often killed. Since 2005, numerous organisations have documented consistent violations of constitutional rights: <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/08/iraqi-authorities-must-not-block-peaceful-protests/">Amnesty International</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/iraq#5b498e">Human Rights Watch</a>, the <a href="https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265710.pdf">US Department of State</a>, the <a href="http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=itemlist&layout=category&task=category&id=161&Itemid=626&lang=en">UN Assistance Mission for Iraq</a> and the <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/IraqUNAMI-OHCHR_HR_Report2011_en.pdf">Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights</a> have all have reported extensively on violations of freedom of press, expression and peaceful assembly.</p>
<p>More than a decade after it was invaded in the name of spreading democracy, Iraq is a democratic state only on paper, and even the letter of the law is questionable. It’s time for the same outside forces that helped create this new order to help Iraq through this most critical period. In the meantime, the next generation of Iraqis are watching their hopes for a better country wither away.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85026/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bamo Nouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A decade and a half after it was invaded in the name of spreading democracy, Iraq turns out to have been set up to fail.Bamo Nouri, Research associate, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/775142017-05-24T13:00:38Z2017-05-24T13:00:38ZWoodrow Wilson’s influence on US foreign policy will outlast Donald Trump<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170591/original/file-20170523-5763-1nneqwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C43%2C942%2C716&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Woodrow Wilson.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Woodrow_Wilson_(1912).jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>US President Woodrow Wilson justified the US’s 1917 entry into World War I with the famous words: “The world must be made safe for democracy.” That was exactly a century ago and marked the beginning of the <a href="http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Wilsonianism.html">doctrine</a> known as “Wilsonianism” – broadly speaking, a conviction that the US has a vital interest in promoting liberal democratic norms abroad. </p>
<p>One way or another, Wilsonianism has had a prominent role in US foreign policy ever since its founder first articulated it. But now, exactly a century after the US entered World War I, another president is supposedly keen to put an end to it.</p>
<p>Throughout the latest US presidential campaign and during his first hundred-odd days in office, Donald Trump has repeatedly rejected traditional Wilsonian ideas of promoting US values and interests abroad. He <a href="http://www.sbnation.com/2017/2/5/14516156/donald-trump-interview-transcript-bill-oreilly-super-bowl-2017">openly questioned</a> the idea that the US is “innocent” of foreign policy misdeeds, and on a recent <a href="https://youtu.be/LEnvulC3X-I?t=16m57s">visit to Saudi Arabia</a> said he was “not here to lecture” other countries about what they do within their borders. </p>
<p>He’s also <a href="https://secure.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974">harshly criticised</a> previous US policies of “nation-building” aimed at expanding the community of democracies, and even publicly praised autocratic foreign strongmen such as Russia’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/30/donald-trump-russia-obama-sanctions">Vladimir Putin</a> and Turkey’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/world/middleeast/erdogan-turkey-trump.html">Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</a>. He also displays contempt for liberal democratic norms such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/richard-nixons-authoritarian-loathing-of-the-media-lives-on-in-donald-trump-73323">press freedom</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/06/new-trump-travel-ban-muslim-majority-countries-refugees">religious liberty</a>.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, Trump’s statements have elicited strong reactions within and outside the US, some commentators <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/03/donald-trump-is-making-the-world-safe-for-dictators/">accusing him</a> of “making the world safe for dictators”, while <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/01/standing-up-for-human-rights-under-president-trumps-administration/">human rights watchdogs</a> <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/12/world-report-2017-demagogues-threaten-human-rights">call him</a> a “real risk” (Amnesty International USA) and a “threat” (Human Rights Watch) to the post-World War II international human rights system.</p>
<p>But does the Trump presidency really spell the end of Wilsonianism in US foreign policy? I would argue otherwise. Yes, Trump has adamantly and consistently shunned traditional Wilsonian objectives, but Wilsonianism has been prematurely counted out before – including under both of Trump’s immediate predecessors.</p>
<p>When George W Bush first ran for president in 2000, he clearly seemed to prefer great-power realism to idealistic notions such as democracy promotion. His <a href="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29419">famous 2000 line</a>, “I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation-building”, was frequently interpreted as evidence of a <a href="http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2001020200">less-than-Wilsonian worldview</a>.</p>
<h2>Doctrines in flux</h2>
<p>It remains unclear whether Bush’s scepticism at the time was the expression of deeply held convictions or part of an effort to distance himself from the Clinton administration, which had put nation-building and democracy promotion high up its agenda. But whatever Bush’s real ideological attachments when he ran for the presidency, everything changed with the 9/11 attacks.</p>
<p>Suddenly, <a href="http://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-op-nye30mar30-story.html">Wilsonianism was back</a>, at least at the rhetorical level. Bush’s <a href="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58745">second inaugural address</a> is especially full of references to Wilsonian themes. He said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A similar dynamic played out during Barack Obama’s first term. In his early days, many observers and thinkers <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-henry-kissinger-obama-is-like-a-chess-player-a-634400.html">surmised</a> that Obama was turning his back on Wilsonianism as a pillar of US foreign policy. They pointed to his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x1dSPrb5w_k">willingness to engage personally</a> with non-democratic governments; his administration’s <a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/lawmaker-news/34687-cantor-slams-obama-for-silence-on-iranian-election">slow and principally rhetorical</a> response to the Iranian government’s crackdown on democratic protests in 2009; and the fact that he chose not to make democracy promotion a headline item of his renowned <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html">2009 Cairo Speech</a>, in which he set out a vision for the US’s place in the world.</p>
<p>But as with Bush, there are alternative explanations besides ideology. </p>
<p>The new president obviously had a strong interest in putting some distance between his administration and Bush’s, especially when it came to democracy promotion – an idea that had been badly tainted by Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq and other War on Terror policies. And as they did with Bush, events caught up with Obama. </p>
<p>Regardless of his personal philosophy, the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/mohamed-bouazizi-arab-spring-worth-dying-151228093743375.html">outbreak of the Arab Awakening</a> in late 2010 and its apotheosis in spring 2011 unquestionably brought Wilsonian themes back to the forefront of Obama’s foreign policy. In <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa">May 2011</a>, Obama went so far as to say:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our support for [Wilsonian] principles is not a secondary interest – today I am making it clear that it is a top priority that must be translated into concrete actions, and supported by all of the diplomatic, economic and strategic tools at our disposal. Let me be specific. First, it will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy …</p>
<p>Now, even as we promote political reform, even as we promote human rights in the region, our efforts can’t stop there. So the second way that we must support positive change in the region is through our efforts to advance economic development for nations that are transitioning to democracy. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Then came Trump. He campaigned hard as an anti-establishment candidate, specifically was anti-Hillary Clinton. Perhaps because Clinton is a former secretary of state, Trump riffed on his supposedly extreme contrast with her into his <a href="https://secure.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974">foreign policy rhetoric</a>: “We must abandon the failed policy of nation-building and regime change that Hillary Clinton pushed in Iraq, Libya, Egypt and Syria.”</p>
<p>During the campaign, his pronouncements were often discussed as the words of a <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/trump-isolationism-alarm-nationalism-liberalism-allies-realism-445630">radical isolationist</a> – but any commitments he had may yet wither in the face of events.</p>
<p>As did many of their predecessors, both Bush and Obama ultimately invoked Wilsonian themes to attract domestic and international support for specific actions. Is it really unreasonable to think that if (or when) he’s faced with an acute international crisis, Trump will do the same? Yes, he may yet turn out to be a genuine threat to Wilsonianism – but its sheer endurance across so many presidencies implies that even this idiosyncratic, volatile commander-in-chief might not kill it off.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77514/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eugenio Lilli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The 28th president’s ideology has never really gone away.Eugenio Lilli, Lecturer American politics and foreign policy, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/750402017-04-10T00:36:42Z2017-04-10T00:36:42ZWhat Trump’s foreign aid cuts would mean for global democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164305/original/image-20170406-16654-1co12v5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The government-funded International Republican Institute, a nonprofit, supports democratic efforts like this voter education campaign in Burma.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.democracyspeaks.org/blog/burma%E2%80%99s-elections-opportunity-build-lessons-learned">International Republican Institute</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump’s proposed budget would slash State Department spending by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/state-departments-28-percent-cuts-hit-foreign-aid-un-and-climate-change/2017/03/15/294d7ab8-0996-11e7-a15f-a58d4a988474_story.html?utm_term=.ebf7618d704e">28 percent</a>, drastically reducing U.S. foreign aid flows.</p>
<p>Will he prevail? Senator Lindsey Graham, a South Carolina Republican, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39289416">has said bluntly</a> “It’s not going to happen.” But the White House’s proposal is emblematic of an ongoing, broader foreign policy shift. </p>
<p>Specifically, Trump’s <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/01/05/prospects-for-u.s.-democracy-promotion-under-trump-pub-66588">actions and comments</a> suggest a <a href="https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/democracy-promotion-trump-administration/">deep skepticism</a> regarding support for democracy abroad. Consequently, democracy assistance – a relatively small but often pivotal type of foreign aid on which the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department <a href="http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/categories/Democracy-Human-Rights-Governance">plan to spend</a> US$2.72 billion in 2017 – seems likely to be hit hard.</p>
<p>If it is, U.S. foreign policy under Trump will look fundamentally different than it has under previous presidents dating back at least to Ronald Reagan. What’s more, my research suggests that the shift spells trouble for democracy around the world. </p>
<p>Although U.S. democracy assistance is not perfect, drastic budget cuts would sever a lifeline to pro-democracy activists around the world. </p>
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<p></p><hr><p></p>
<h2>What is democracy aid?</h2>
<p>Democracy assistance is a type of foreign aid the U.S. government funds in nearly 100 countries with the explicit goal of supporting democracy. Whether it consists of encouraging women to run for office in <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/results-data/success-stories/increasing-access-women-politics">Kyrgyzstan</a> or building the capacity of local civil society organizations in <a href="http://www.ned.org/region/middle-east-and-northern-africa/tunisia-2015/">Tunisia</a>, this form of assistance always aims to enhance some aspect of democracy. It supports transitions to democracy and shores up existing democratic institutions.</p>
<p>Democracy assistance began in the 1980s. Until that point, the U.S. government supported overseas political parties and dissidents covertly and on an ad hoc basis. In 1983, the United States established the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a quasi-private foundation dedicated to supporting democracy abroad. As the Cold War ended, USAID and the State Department also began funding democracy assistance consistently.</p>
<p>These institutions, which I examine in “<a href="http://www.cambridge.org/cr/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/international-relations-and-international-organisations/taming-democracy-assistance-why-democracy-promotion-does-not-confront-dictators">The Taming of Democracy Assistance</a>,” my book on the topic, often don’t deliver money or services directly. Instead, they fund a variety of American and international nonprofits (and a few for-profit organizations). Ideally, funding democracy assistance via nonprofits and other nongovernmental entities helps insulate it from U.S. government influence. Of course, that is not always so simple in practice.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164132/original/image-20170405-14636-6zl5cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164132/original/image-20170405-14636-6zl5cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164132/original/image-20170405-14636-6zl5cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164132/original/image-20170405-14636-6zl5cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164132/original/image-20170405-14636-6zl5cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164132/original/image-20170405-14636-6zl5cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164132/original/image-20170405-14636-6zl5cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164132/original/image-20170405-14636-6zl5cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Democracy assistance flows into nonprofits and other institutions often known by their abbreviations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.fpri.org/article/2013/06/reforming-the-democracy-bureaucracy/">Foreign Policy Research Institute</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Democracy assistance rarely grabs headlines. Some of its critics argue that it involves <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/01/us-intervention-russia-elections-imperialism-latin-america/">meddling</a> in other countries’ elections (allegedly with both a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/20/putin-is-waiting-to-see-whether-trump-will-fund-pro-democracy-programs/">right-wing</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/28/soros-gop-letter-open-society-macedonia-albania/">left-wing</a> bias), implying an equivalence to Russia’s actions during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Taming-Democracy-Assistance-Promotion-Dictators/dp/1107642205/ref=mt_paperback?_encoding=UTF8&me=">My research</a> suggests otherwise.</p>
<p>Democracy assistance efforts are indeed sometimes partisan, but have grown markedly less so since the Cold War ended. Indeed, as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/09/democracy-promotion-is-failing-heres-why/?utm_term=.2ab6410c5296">I explained on the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog</a>, it has become rare for these programs to promote radical political change today. In some cases, democracy assistance has even reinforced authoritarian regimes, as was the case when international aid offered <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/03/reforming-the-democracy-bureaucracy/">support for a parliament in Azerbaijan</a> that was not freely elected. </p>
<h2>What’s at stake?</h2>
<p>Despite these flaws, eliminating democracy assistance projects could wreak damage to democracy three ways. </p>
<p>First, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40060164">scholarly</a> <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00635.x/pdf">evidence</a> on U.S. democracy assistance finds that it is, on average, associated with increases in countries’ overall levels of freedom. Second, <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00501.x/abstract">research</a> also suggests that democracy assistance can help countries maintain peace after civil conflict. Third, specific types of democracy assistance – such as support for international and domestic <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100592790">election</a> <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9748.html">observers</a> – have proven successful at deterring electoral fraud.</p>
<p>A good example of how U.S. democracy assistance has successfully helped advance democratic transitions comes from <a href="http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/">Serbia’s nonviolent student movement</a> in 2000. There, the brutal dictator Slobodan Milošević – guilty of war crimes associated with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia – was brought down by a popular movement supported with training from U.S. nonprofits.</p>
<p>Cutting democracy assistance would also represent a major break in U.S. foreign policy. </p>
<p>The origins of American democracy promotion date back at least <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/03/20/is-this-the-end-of-americas-role-as-a-defender-of-freedom/?utm_term=.b012dc37ef98">a century</a>. On April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson made his famous speech telling Congress, “<a href="http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/4943/">The world must be made safe for democracy</a>.” Leaders from both major U.S. political parties have sought ever since to promote democracy overseas with the logic that it is the right thing to do as well as the smart thing to do.</p>
<p>Among other things this credo stems from the belief that democracy fosters peaceful relations between nations.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164168/original/image-20170405-14629-drx8hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164168/original/image-20170405-14629-drx8hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164168/original/image-20170405-14629-drx8hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164168/original/image-20170405-14629-drx8hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164168/original/image-20170405-14629-drx8hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164168/original/image-20170405-14629-drx8hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164168/original/image-20170405-14629-drx8hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Participants in this Mayan ceremony in Guatemala’s Quiche province wanted to discourage illegal campaign activity in the 2015 elections held there.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usaid_guatemala/25972702773/in/photolist-rFugD6-8tXmuY-qJzNuY-rFtFJ3-rp8B94-rp2bv9-8tUgrV-nEXPPM-notn2f-notaYb-oiw6MP-dkxUEf-bonPyC-notaZU-o23NEz-oiwfPB-oik74w-o23Lmr-o22ArG-okhdYr-o22KQF-o22NvE-pvXTmU-dU8fwo-dU2C2K-eVUz6m-eVUz9U-eVUz6y-9hH2Zm-Fz7TEe-qJzNvu-rp195h-qJN5UX">Sara Barker/National Democratic Institute</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Of course, the United States counts among its allies many authoritarian states like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/opinion/the-us-should-not-be-egypts-accomplice.html?_r=0">Egypt</a> and <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/20/opinions/us-saudi-bad-marriage-opinion-miller/">Saudi Arabia</a>. In such cases, past U.S. presidents have mixed pro-democracy rhetoric with anti-democracy policies. Yet President Trump is abandoning even the pro-democracy rhetoric, and activists are worried. </p>
<p>As one Egyptian journalist <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/borzoudaragahi/egypts-rulers-are-hailing-president-trump-democracy?utm_term=.wizm611a0#.xw6RBMMLw">recently said</a> about this situation, “It’s not a big space, but the rhetoric gives us some space.”</p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>If the U.S. democracy assistance project survives the Trump administration but spending declines sharply, a <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538101841/Does-Democracy-Matter?-The-United-States-and-Global-Democracy-Support">recent study</a> suggests two lessons about how it could spend the remaining funds most effectively. </p>
<p>First, this kind of aid works best in countries that are already partly free. In such settings, domestic actors are likely to be seeking international support and aid is less likely to be co-opted by authoritarian governments. </p>
<p>Second, democracy assistance programs tend to be the most successful in countries where the U.S. government can back them up with diplomacy. By this logic, it makes more sense to support democracy assistance in Tunisia, where democratically elected leaders <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/13/khemaies-jhinaoui-tunisia-foreign-minister-hopes-f/">cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism</a>, than it does in Egypt, where the United States maintains a <a href="http://www.vox.com/world/2017/4/3/15160358/trump-egypt-abdel-fattah-el-sisi-white-house">close relationship</a> with the military dictatorship of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.</p>
<p>Research on U.S. democracy assistance suggests that continuing to aid democracy abroad is consistent with a century-long tradition in U.S. foreign policy and that it can advance democracy worldwide. However, even with continued support, American democracy promoters face clear challenges. These challenges include problems with the <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/27/look-homeward-democracy-promoter/">state of democracy</a> in the United States that have been building for several years as well as <a href="http://www.resurgentdictatorship.org/">growing restrictions</a> on civil society activity and foreign aid around the world. </p>
<p>Even barring steep spending cuts, democracy assistance is likely to have a difficult next four years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75040/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Bush is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. </span></em></p>U.S. democracy assistance is not perfect. But drastic cuts to that slice of the federal budget would sever a lifeline to pro-democracy activists around the world.Sarah Bush, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Temple University, Temple UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.