tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/democracy-protest-10790/articlesDemocracy protest – The Conversation2020-02-23T07:15:05Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1316822020-02-23T07:15:05Z2020-02-23T07:15:05ZDiscrediting elections: why the opposition playbook carries risks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315276/original/file-20200213-10976-1s6kkvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya's Supreme Court upholds President Uhuru Kenyatta's election victory following a re-run in 2017.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Daniel Irungu</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Malawi recently held its breath as the Constitutional Court took ten hours to painstakingly <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-bold-landmark-election-ruling-improve-malawian-democracy-131494">read out its verdict</a> on the highly controversial 2019 presidential elections. When it finally became clear that the judgment would nullify the election of President Peter Mutharika, jubilant opposition supporters took to the streets to celebrate.</p>
<p>Malawi became only the second country in Africa, after Kenya in 2017, and the <a href="https://metropoltv.co.ke/2020/02/04/malawi-joins-list-of-5-countries-to-annul-presidential-elections-globally/">fifth in the world</a>, to see a president’s victory overturned in the courts. What is striking about the two African cases is that the opposition did not conclusively prove that it had won the most votes. Instead, the judges <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/09/kenya-supreme-court-annul-elections-170902115641244.html">concluded</a> that widespread breaches of electoral regulations could also be interpreted as undermining key legal and constitutional principles.</p>
<p>The willingness of the judges to evaluate election petitions in this different way was partly shaped by effective opposition and civil society campaigns. These efforts combined <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/01/30/year-mass-malawi-protests-election-ruling/">public protests</a> with <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-08-17-00-analysis-across-africa-shows-how-social-media-is-changing-politics/">social media messaging</a> to highlight malpractices and discredit the electoral process.</p>
<p>Kenya and Malawi are not isolated cases. From <a href="https://apnews.com/6baa920e98ff4aafb3bfc23f1ace5508">Albania</a> to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/zimbabwe-election-latest-mnangagwa-chamisa-zanu-pf-mdc-protests-violence-win-a8475276.html">Zimbabwe</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-election/bangladesh-police-break-up-opposition-protest-as-election-nears-idUSKCN1NJ1ER">Bangladesh</a> to <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/uganda-bobi-wine-threatens-musevenis-three-decades-rule/a-48551669">Uganda</a>, opposition leaders have lost faith in the electoral process and observers. They are adopting increasingly combative approaches.</p>
<p>By pushing their – often valid – complaints onto the streets as much as in the courts, opposition leaders have learnt how to deprive governments of the popular goodwill and international credibility they need to govern effectively. But there is a danger. In doing so, they risk triggering a repressive backlash from governments desperate to retain power at any cost.</p>
<h2>The opposition playbook</h2>
<p>Opposition parties in most of the world’s newest and least established democracies enter elections knowing that they have little chance of winning. </p>
<p>Over half of elections in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and post-communist Europe saw significant irregularities <a href="https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/105146/azerbaijan-opposition-parties-protest-in-baku-march-31-update-2">between 2012 and 2016</a>. Worse still, few of these elections have seen decisive interventions by either the international community or the judiciary to protect democratic principles.</p>
<p>So it shouldn’t come as a surprise that more opposition parties are attempting to shift the battleground to the court of public opinion. As well as increasing the pressure on judges and ambassadors to act, effectively discrediting an election can harm the government’s reputation. This is true even if the official result is ultimately allowed to stand.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315281/original/file-20200213-11044-1p2xby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315281/original/file-20200213-11044-1p2xby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315281/original/file-20200213-11044-1p2xby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315281/original/file-20200213-11044-1p2xby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315281/original/file-20200213-11044-1p2xby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315281/original/file-20200213-11044-1p2xby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315281/original/file-20200213-11044-1p2xby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Opposition supporters shout anti-government slogans during a protest in Tirana, Albania in July 2019, after boycotting the local election.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE</span></span>
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<p>The complete version of this opposition playbook involves five main steps. But, in practice opposition parties tend to use only some, depending on the situation:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Lay the foundations</strong>. In recent elections in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-48763803">Albania</a> and <a href="https://www.yjc.ir/en/news/33506/many-opposition-candidates-pull-out-of-bangladesh-elections-citing-electoral-fraud">Bangladesh</a>, opposition leaders alleged that the process was being manipulated well ahead of the voting day. This encouraged journalists to look for evidence of irregularities, and generated popular expectations that the process would be problematic. One of the most effective ways to achieve this is to consistently challenge electoral preparations. Examples include alleging bias in the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2018/07/20/four-reasons-many-zimbabwe-dont-trust-electoral-commission-zec/">voter registration process</a>, and corruption in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election-idUSKBN19S2G7">procurement of ballot papers</a>.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Direct the blame</strong>. Allegations of wrongdoing are most effective when they are personalised. So, opposition parties typically seek to demonise prominent members of the electoral commission. For example, social media platforms are used to circulate rumours that senior electoral officials had been seen at the homes of ruling party officials, and were <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/01/texts-lies-and-videotape-kenya-election-fake-news/">known to have received bribes</a>. In countries like Kenya and Nigeria these rumours often go unsubstantiated, but are nonetheless widely believed by opposition supporters.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Claim victory</strong>. An election can only be discredited if it is plausible that the opposition actually won. Thus, canny opposition leaders spend a lot of time during the campaign and the counting of the votes claiming they have the <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/12/30/bangladesh-goes-polls-tight-security/">momentum and are destined to win</a>. This is usually followed by a press conference shortly after the ruling party’s victory has been declared to denounce the results, and claim that the opposition has evidence of systematic wrongdoing. This happened in Bangladesh, where a losing opposition leader slammed the process as <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/12/30/bangladesh-goes-polls-tight-security/">“farcical”</a>. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Protest early, protest often</strong>. Opposition parties often have a strong support base in capital cities. The greater access to information and more densely packed voters makes it easier for them to mobilise support. This makes it possible to hold large protests, especially if civil society groups are also active and influential. In Malawi, the Human Rights Defenders Coalition made it <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/01/30/year-mass-malawi-protests-election-ruling/">“the year of mass protests”</a> in the run-up to the Constitutional Court’s judgment. This kept the pressure on the judges to make sure they would not be tempted to brush complaints under the carpet.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Demand action</strong>. Having seen many dubious election results allowed to stand, opposition leaders are increasingly willing to call out judges and the international community. This often includes refusing to recognise the legitimacy of the president, explicitly criticising <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-02-04-observers-played-a-shameful-role-in-malawis-tippex-election/">international observers</a> who fail to condemn the elections, and insisting that foreign ambassadors intervene to promote democracy. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Risk of backlash</h2>
<p>Publicly discrediting elections can help to uncover and deter electoral incompetence and manipulation. But, it is a dangerous strategy. </p>
<p>In more authoritarian countries the outcome can be greater repression. For example, presidents and prime ministers have responded to post-electoral unrest by citing it as evidence that the opposition is a <a href="https://www.nyasatimes.com/mutharika-says-malawi-opposition-recruit-al-shabab-to-overthrow-government-by-force/">threat to national unity and political stability</a>. This claim may then be used to legitimise censorship and repression.</p>
<p>In Zimbabwe, more than 20 people died as a result of the government’s <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/zimbabwe-brutal-crackdown-continues-protesters-killed-raped-and-tortured-security">violent response to opposition and civil society protests</a> in the two years since the 2018 general elections. Similarly, in nearby Zambia, opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema’s refusal to recognise the legitimacy of President Edgar Lungu led to his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/hakainde-hichilema-pleads-guilty-treason-charges-170814175023908.html">arrest him on treason charges</a>.</p>
<p>Given the risks involved, it’s striking that discrediting an election very rarely means winning one. Even in Kenya, where Kenyatta’s initial victory in 2017 was nullified by the Supreme Court, the ruling party won after the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41757612">opposition boycotted the re-run</a>. It claimed that insufficient changes had been made to ensure it would be free and fair. </p>
<p>Showing that the process was flawed can hurt the government, but does not usually lead to its defeat – at least in the short-term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131682/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By pushing their usually valid complaints onto the streets and the courts, opposition leaders deny governments the popular goodwill and international credibility they need to govern effectively.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/356272014-12-24T06:20:08Z2014-12-24T06:20:08ZChina’s digital protesters aren’t confined to Hong Kong<p>As the last remaining <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-hong-kongs-democracy-protesters-overplayed-their-hand-34722">protesters</a> were being cleared from Hong Kong’s streets, many Westerners lamented the silencing of <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-democracy-protesters-care-about-their-own-future-not-the-mainlands-32769">what they saw</a> as China’s only pro-democracy voice. To them, the umbrella movement was a stand against the totalitarian regime run from Beijing, and was a predictor of future popular dissent that the Chinese authorities may face.</p>
<p>Yet many Western China-watchers forget that looking directly at political resistance within mainland China can be far more telling than what is taking place in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>One reason for this oversight is that in mainland China, dissent and protest do not always gather momentum on the streets. Instead, they start on the web.</p>
<h2>Tear down this wall</h2>
<p>China’s government is famed for the iron-fisted approach it takes to policing the internet, the so-called “<a href="https://theconversation.com/great-firewall-of-china-tasked-with-keeping-hong-kong-conflagration-in-check-32288">Great Firewall of China</a>”. From blocking foreign websites such as Facebook to censoring chat forums and paying people to <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com.au/chinas-50-cent-party-2014-10">discuss pro-Chinese Communist Party topics</a>, the CPP goes to great lengths to keep its citizens from accessing all sorts of politically sensitive digital information.</p>
<p>But of course, ideas are infinitely more difficult to suppress than an angry mob – and despite the government’s efforts, they are spreading fast.</p>
<p>China’s online community is growing at a breakneck pace. Whereas 8.5% of citizens were connected to the internet in 2005, <a href="http://wearesocial.net/tag/china/">45% are online today</a>. The advent of mobile phones in particular has rapidly expanded the country’s internet user base, since many people in the countryside cannot afford a computer or fixed internet service.</p>
<p>Crucially, the exploding population of internet users are connecting with each other via messaging boards and messaging services – and in such numbers that policing their speech is almost impossible.</p>
<h2>From the web to the streets</h2>
<p>QQ, an instant messaging service, is a popular forum for group chats. Searchable groups have been created on it for discussing every facet of daily life, and that includes points of political discontent. The vast number of discussions seen on QQ cannot realistically be constantly monitored, and their users are able to share frustrations with particular political policies – such as the “one child policy” – or with the political system as a whole.</p>
<p>The spread of internet access has <a href="http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/698/530">helped scale up expressions of political discontent</a> across mainland China. Only ten years ago, open protest might have been limited to local areas, on topics such as local government land-grabs. These sorts of protests were contained, scarcely challenged the political order, and targeted local government officials, not the central CCP.</p>
<p>But now, QQ forums have connected dissatisfied citizens across China, providing an outlet for their frustrations. And those frustrations are transitioning more and more into protests.</p>
<p>For example, on a forum I follow, I read about a protest held in Zhejiang province a month ago. It was mounted by parents angry at illegal fines for having two children, which were being charged despite the government’s <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/17/us-china-onechild-idUSBREA0G0J220140117">promise to relax the policy in the province</a>.</p>
<p>Just a few years ago, this protest would have remained confined to a local area, among parents who knew each other in their everyday lives. Yet the participants in this protest were quite clearly not only from Zhejiang province, but from neighbouring provinces as well. And judging by what I read and saw posted in photos on QQ, the success of the protest spurred parents in other provinces to hold their own provincial governments accountable for illegal fines.</p>
<p>Thanks to internet penetration, local political victories in one province can now have a knock-on effect in other provinces, driving national change.</p>
<h2>Big picture</h2>
<p>0f course, online discussions are not limited to incremental policy changes. Some QQ forums discuss broader human rights violations, or discontent with the political system at large. </p>
<p>One hot topic is the Chinese government’s role in Hong Kong. The umbrella movement is not only discussed, but also supported; some people openly mock the government’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-29681684">anti-Western rhetoric</a> about Hong Kong. Another hot topic is the CCP’s role in leading a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139">nationalist movement against Japan</a>, with many participants openly criticising the government for whipping up nationalism to distract the Chinese population from domestic issues.</p>
<p>And if recent protests such as those in Zhejiang are anything to go by, as China becomes more connected to the internet, there will be increasingly more opportunities for discontent to transition to the streets.</p>
<h2>Wake up</h2>
<p>Observers outside China have still not cottoned to this. Hong Kong’s umbrella movement captured the West’s imagination because it was steeped in Western values. But dissent in mainland China is multifaceted, and by no means is everyone involved demanding a liberal democracy. Many citizens simply want fairer policies, less <a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-down-a-big-tiger-wont-end-chinas-ingrained-corruption-29932">corruption</a>, and reduced <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21600798-chinas-reforms-work-its-citizens-have-be-made-more-equal-ending-apartheid">inequality between the countryside and cities</a>. </p>
<p>To understand how protest is really changing China, Western observers need to let go of democracy as their only metric for change – and to pay serious attention to the vibrant culture of dissent and debate going on in spite of the Great Firewall. </p>
<p>This, not more visible street protests such as those in Hong Kong, will be the real challenge for the CCP in years to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35627/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>S G does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the last remaining protesters were being cleared from Hong Kong’s streets, many Westerners lamented the silencing of what they saw as China’s only pro-democracy voice. To them, the umbrella movement…S G, Graduate Teaching Assistant in Politics, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/347222014-11-27T11:22:03Z2014-11-27T11:22:03ZHow Hong Kong’s democracy protesters overplayed their hand<p>Time is running out for Hong Kong’s protest movement. Beijing’s last shred of patience has worn thin; <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-30204699">police have cleared one of the protest zones</a> in the commercial neighbourhood of Mong Kok, arresting two leading student activists.</p>
<p>The action comes a fortnight after Chinese president Xi Jinping, in a joint press conference with Barack Obama on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Beijing, declared the Occupy Central group “<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/hongkong/11224941/Xi-Jinping-declares-Hong-Kong-protests-are-illegal.html">an illegal movement</a>”. His words left no doubt that Hong Kong’s anti-riot police would sweep away the remaining sit-ins once the world’s dignitaries had left the Chinese capital.</p>
<p>But the biggest blow to protesters was a recent <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1643998/overwhelming-majority-hongkongers-want-occupy-protests-end-survey">University of a Hong Kong survey</a>, which found that the overwhelming majority of Hong Kong citizens apparently think enough is enough: 83% are eager for the Occupy Central protests to end. </p>
<p>This dramatic loss of popular support could be extremely damaging for protest groups who try to remobilise the masses for similar shows of defiance further down the line, as they surely will.</p>
<p>So as far as this round of unrest goes, we are now moving decisively into the final act. As post mortems begin to address why the revolt has fizzled out, Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement activists may well come to regret overplaying their hand.</p>
<h2>Too far, too fast?</h2>
<p>The movement’s members won admiration around the world. But they might have found more scope for extracting concessions on universal suffrage from Beijing had they toned down some of their more radical demands, like the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29467239">call for the resignation</a> of Hong Kong’s current chief executive, CY Leung.</p>
<p>Such demands moved the debate away, at least in Beijing’s eyes, from the core issue of popular say in the choice of Hong Kong’s next chief executive. Instead Beijing came to see the Umbrella Movement as a challenge to its sovereignty over the former colony – an independence movement in the making.</p>
<p>This perception has been extremely damaging to the activists’ calls for change. In fact, there’s much more to the protestors’ grievances than anti-Beijing sentiment, and Hong Kong’s history makes that perfectly logical. </p>
<p>Hong Kong has been showered with Chinese cash and favours since the handover in 1997, particularly in the wake of the global financial crisis – and yet Hong Kong has <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/06/19/hong-kongs-wealth-gap-gets-larger/">one of the most unequal distributions of wealth</a> in the world. As in London, a <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-29/singapore-popping-housing-bubbles-london-can-t-handle.html">property bubble</a> has priced out most middle-income earners and first-time buyers from the housing market.</p>
<p>The Occupy Central campaign has matured over the last two years partly through trade union activism to curb migration from mainland China, which has dampened wages for unskilled local workers. It’s also given voice to protests against property and infrastructure developments set to benefit the local plutocracy.</p>
<p>All this frustration and resentment at Hong Kong’s accelerated evolution has clouded and confused the protest leaders’ main cause: the right to genuine universal suffrage.</p>
<h2>Toxic nostalgia</h2>
<p>It was also unwise for protesters to let a sense of nostalgia for British colonial rule creep into their movement. This is a red rag to a bull as far as China goes, particularly when we consider that Hong Kong’s 1990s transformation from back-street textile sweatshop to financial mecca owed a great deal to China’s “open-door” economic policy.</p>
<p>It has also given China ammunition for its persistent claim that foreign governments, Britain included of course, are stoking the rebellion through their funding of local NGOs, which in turn are backing Hong Kong’s trade union movement. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29708917">A recent BBC report controversially suggested</a> that a few of the key Umbrella activists received training in Oslo two years ago on how to protest effectively – a report that Beijing no doubt views as vindication of their suspicions.</p>
<p>China’s leaders quickly spotted an uneasy overlap between the new strand of local patriotism professed by some Hong Kong protesters, and former Taiwanese premier <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14678192">Chen Shui-bian</a>’s attempt to rinse Taiwan of its Chinese heritage – a policy that almost sparked a disastrous war across the Taiwan Strait.</p>
<p>Given that Hong Kong under British rule was hardly a paragon of democratic transparency, until the 1970s at least, it should surprise no-one that the Chinese government finds nostalgia for the colonial era so deeply irritating.</p>
<p>In fact, before <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/news/2000/jun/02/guardianobituaries1">Murray MacLehose</a>, British governor of the territory between 1971 and 1982, turned the colony’s fortunes around and cemented the rule of law, Hong Kong’s civil service and police force were widely considered corrupt. It wasn’t until 1974 that Chinese became the official language and ethnic Chinese residents were appointed to senior posts in the civil service.</p>
<p>Ultimately, Beijing’s elite finds it unthinkable that any Hong Konger could think life was better under colonial rule, making it even less likely to offer any concessions. This is why a decision by breakaway groups within the protest movement to tactically push the envelope beyond the technicalities of universal suffrage appears to have backfired.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Niv Horesh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Time is running out for Hong Kong’s protest movement. Beijing’s last shred of patience has worn thin; police have cleared one of the protest zones in the commercial neighbourhood of Mong Kok, arresting…Niv Horesh, Professor of Modern Chinese History and Director of the China Policy Institute , University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/337472014-11-04T06:07:36Z2014-11-04T06:07:36ZBurkina Faso: where democracy has always run on protests and coups<p>Burkina Faso has suddenly grabbed the world’s attention with a remarkable popular uprising, in which hundreds of thousands of Burkinabé have forced the resignation of long-serving president <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13072777">Blaise Compaoré</a>. </p>
<p>Commentators immediately began to predict that the events could touch off a movement in other states where presidents have outstayed their welcome.</p>
<p>However, the idea that the actions will quickly be paralleled in other African countries does not give due credit to Burkina Faso’s very particular past and political culture. This uprising is part of a long history of mass public protests in a nation with a very strong and active civil society.</p>
<p>The recent events resonate with many of the country’s most significant political changes. Ever since it became independent in 1960, when it was called <a href="http://www.princeton.edu/%7Eachaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Republic_of_Upper_Volta.html">Upper Volta</a>, Burkina Faso’s politics have run along these lines. </p>
<p>In 1966, for example, when the then president, Maurice Yaméogo, announced a new austerity budget, trade unions responded by organising mass strikes. They were met with aggression and tear gas, but continued to take to the streets. When it was clear that the president was unmoved by their demands, the unions called for the military to take over. </p>
<p>Soon, army chief of staff Colonel Lamizana announced he had ousted Yaméogo. This was Burkina Faso’s first coup, celebrated by much of the civilian population. </p>
<p>Nearly ten years later, when Lamizana was still in office, mass demonstrations demanded a return to civilian constitutional rule. They were partially successful: Lamizana dissolved his government and formed a new one consisting mostly of civilians. Then, in 1980, general dissatisfaction with the political system once again led to mass demonstrations, which triggered a coup.</p>
<h2>Taking it to the streets</h2>
<p>Compaoré entered politics alongside army captain and revolutionary, Thomas Sankara, through a military coup in 1983, which had strong support of the civilian youth and working class. Sankara was president from 1983 until his assassination in 1987 at which point Compaoré took power. Accusations of his involvement in Sankara’s murder haunted him during his 27 years in office. In spite of the length of his presidency, he was never able to act as an absolute ruler.</p>
<p>Some of his most significant challenges came in the form of mass demonstrations. And crucially, Compaoré’s overall response to escalating protests was to give some form of concession – and by doing so, he could claim to be responding to the people. </p>
<p>Witness the mass demonstrations of 1998-1999, which followed alleged government involvement in the death of popular journalist and activist Norbert Zongo. The demonstrators’ demands for accountability escalated into calls for improvements of social conditions and checks on government power. This movement, armed with the slogan “<a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056249908704402?journalCode=crea20">trop c’est trop</a>” (enough is enough), lasted for months and gained momentum as it progressed. Even opposition leaders at the time were astonished by the turnout of tens of thousands of demonstrators. </p>
<p>To calm the growing anger, Compaoré created a council to advise on government reforms. One of their recommendations was to create presidential term limits, which were added to the constitution in 2000 – and it was the proposition to change those same limits that sparked the 2014 uprising.</p>
<p>Compaoré again faced a serious threat to his position in 2011 when <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/15/burkina-faso-capital-erupts-protest">mass demonstrations erupted across the country</a> after another suspicious death. As in 1998-1999, the movement quickly broadened to include grievances about the cost of living and the general poor economic state of the country. </p>
<p>Compaoré’s quarter century in office became a key topic of debate during that unrest, which like the 2014 uprising, also lasted months and spread throughout the country. Things in 2011 turned more violent than the 1998-1999 strikes and eventually Compaoré offered up some concessions – among them food subsidies and increased salaries for the civil service and military.</p>
<h2>The Burkinabé way</h2>
<p>Demonstrations are also a part of Burkinabé military culture. Burkina Faso has one of the highest rate of mutinies on the continent. In my own interviews with Burkinabé soldiers in Ouagadougou, I asked a soldier why the 2011 mass mutinies (which lasted for months) were not put down with force sooner. He explained that the routine of public protest ultimately resolved by negotiation were simply “the Burkinabé way”.</p>
<p>That diagnosis is borne out by history. Compaoré accepted demonstrations, both among the military and civilians, and was generally able to negotiate an end to them. He knew mass demonstrations would follow the vote to ratify the constitution but misjudged his ability to manage the situation. </p>
<p>Compaoré tried his old tricks during this crisis and quickly conceded to the demands to call off the vote to change the constitution. But the momentum had already moved beyond the issue of presidential term limits and onto calls for his removal from office.</p>
<p>The events that have led to Compaoré’s fall are extraordinary in their scale; they also show a remarkable level of civilian courage, with the demonstrators facing live fire from the security forces. Yet, the events should also be seen as a continuation of “the Burkinabé way”. The country’s society has a remarkable ability to mobilise for political change, drawing on extensive experience – and this is not something easily replicated in other states. </p>
<p>Mass demonstrations have always been part and parcel of Burkina Faso’s political culture, and we certainly haven’t seen the last of them. And if the country’s future leaders want to succeed, they will have to be able to handle more of the same.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33747/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maggie Dwyer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Burkina Faso has suddenly grabbed the world’s attention with a remarkable popular uprising, in which hundreds of thousands of Burkinabé have forced the resignation of long-serving president Blaise Compaor…Maggie Dwyer, Affiliate, Centre for African Studies, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/331002014-10-16T12:31:35Z2014-10-16T12:31:35ZBoundaries of illegality blur as Hong Kong protests rumble on<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/61972/original/ngp2pyg2-1413453187.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Occupy Central Roadblock in Mong Kok</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AOccupy_Central_Roadblock_in_Mong_Kok_20140929.jpg">Wing1990hk, via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>We often think of the distinction between legal and illegal as a matter of black and white – but with its <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-democracy-protesters-care-about-their-own-future-not-the-mainlands-32769">universal suffrage movement still underway</a>, Hong Kong is dealing with a much more complicated reality. </p>
<p>Throughout the saga of the protests, which have pitted tens of thousands of pro-democracy protesters against opposition from both government officials and anti-occupiers, many shades of suspected behaviour have been on display on all sides – and there seems to be little consensus over who, or what, counts as illegal any more.</p>
<p>The most obvious impropriety – and the one at the root of the current democracy protests – involves people and institutions misusing their legal powers in the service of improper political objectives. The barriers to democracy that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (<a href="http://www.thestandard.com.hk/breaking_news_detail.asp?id=52993">NPCSC</a>) has erected by using its power of interpretation under Hong Kong’s <a href="http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/basic_law.pdf">Basic Law</a> are a good example of this illegality, where the actions of a state institution violate both the letter and spirit of the law.</p>
<p>With brazen disregard for the explicit substantive and procedural limitations under which it’s supposed to operate, the NPCSC has used its power of interpretation to take decisions which in effect amend the Basic Law so as to serve the interests of the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<p>In a rule-of-law society like Hong Kong, courts are entrusted with the task of controlling this first type of illegality. The mechanism works in many situations, but in this high-stakes stand-off Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal is highly unlikely to take on the NPCSC, at least not for the time being. </p>
<p>This makes the NPCSC a law unto itself; under the current system, there are no real checks on its powers.</p>
<h2>Dodgy dealings</h2>
<p>The second type of illegality is when people comply with the letter of the law, but not with its spirit. Everyday examples in Hong Kong include open <a href="http://www.chinadailyasia.com/hknews/2014-03/25/content_15126771.html">discrimination against mainlanders</a>, as well as “<a href="http://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ibr/article/view/3926">creative compliance</a>” with corporate tax law. But a more potent instance is CY Leung’s <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/business/world-business/cy-leung-ugl-qa-20141008-10rwp8.html">highly controversial HK$50m contract</a> with the Australian company UGL. </p>
<p>Although Leung signed the contract before he was elected chief executive in March 2012, the contract required him to perform a number of obligations for two years from December 4 2011 (after his election campaign had already begun). In other words, the HK$50m was not a payment entirely for things done prior to taking office. In fact, half of the promised payment rested on DTZ’s senior management team continuing with DTZ after acquisition by UGL. So, the extent of payment to Leung in essence depended upon his ability to persuade DTZ management to continue after his resignation from DTZ. </p>
<p>Under the contract, Leung <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/08/hong-kong-chief-paid-4m-ugl-australia-reports">had to provide</a> until 3 December 2013 “such assistance in the promotion of the UGL Group and the DTZ Group as UGL may reasonably require, including but not limited to acting as a referee and adviser from time to time”. Even if he provided no such assistance to UGL as claimed, and hence avoided an explicit conflict of interest, the fact remains that he pocketed UGL’s money in return for a promise to do something at a time when he was planning to be in office.</p>
<p>While the “non-poach, non-compete” arrangement with UGL was a standard practice, it made no sense once Leung was elected the Chief Executive, as he could no longer have worked for one of UGL’s competitors or poached any staff from them. All in all, it’s hard to imagine why a company would pay HK$50m to someone for doing almost nothing. </p>
<p>One may also wonder whether this deal with UGL was one of the reasons why Leung did not accept the <a href="http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201205/31/P201205310256.htm">recommendation of an Independent Review Committee</a> to bring the office of Chief Executive within the purview of section 3 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance.</p>
<h2>Not going anywhere</h2>
<p>There have also been cases of people operating against the letter of law, but without necessarily violating the spirit of law. Most obviously, by blocking major streets and refusing to move, umbrella movement supporters and Occupy Central leaders are potentially committing a number of crimes. </p>
<p>Civil disobedience of course offers no legal defence against criminal charges. But considering that the protesters are pursuing a constitutional goal, have been peaceful and are willing to bear legal consequences of their actions, they clearly belong to a different category. </p>
<p>This is all the more true given there is hardly any viable institutional forum or space available to engage with the local government on the subject of democratic reforms.</p>
<p>Engagement with the central government, which <a href="http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/china">tramples human rights</a> of its own people as a matter of policy, also appears to be futile. Ultimately, the protesters have been pushed to occupy streets by governments to defend freedoms to which they should be entitled.</p>
<h2>Holier than thou</h2>
<p>Throughout the protests, Hong Kong has also witnessed actions which breach both the letter and spirit of law, but which are masked with attempts to cover their illegality by reference to a legitimate goal (say, protecting one’s business interests) or a “noble” cause such as supporting the police. The actions of diverse strands of the anti-occupy movement, including by the <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/hong-kong-police-triads-infiltrated-occupy-movement/">triads</a>, have followed this path.</p>
<p>Both the Occupy Central and anti-Occupy Central groups have used the pursuit of legitimate goals as a justification for illegal actions. Yet there are fundamental differences between the two. The Occupy supporters are relying on a collective constitutional goal, whereas their anti-Occupy counterparts merely invoke inconvenience or reduction in their business profit as a justification.</p>
<p>And while one can protest against protesters or against the cause they pursue, this right does not extend to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-29625053">indulging in unprovoked violence</a> or disturbing others’ pursuit of their rights.</p>
<p>Finding a way to distinguish between these different shades of illegality is crucial for all members of Hong Kong society. We have to stop comparing apples with oranges; if we keep doing so, judgements will be clouded – and unlawful, unethical responses will follow.</p>
<p>The sight of Hong Kong police beating a handcuffed democracy protesters in a dark corner illustrated this risk all too well. It is vital for the police not to bracket democracy protesters with hooligans, people selling fake designer bags, or triad members indulging in unlawful trade. </p>
<p>Also, unless both Beijing and the local government appreciate what Hong Kong people mean by universal suffrage and the rule of law, protests and social divisions will continue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33100/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Surya Deva does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We often think of the distinction between legal and illegal as a matter of black and white – but with its universal suffrage movement still underway, Hong Kong is dealing with a much more complicated reality…Surya Deva, Associate Professor, City University of Hong KongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/325342014-10-04T08:19:44Z2014-10-04T08:19:44ZHong Kong leaders in lockstep against divided protesters<p>Almost exactly a week after an infamous incident of police brutality against demonstrating students lit a fire under the Occupy Central campaign, the so-called umbrella movement is now facing another <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/04/world/asia/hong-kong-protests.html?_r=0">assault</a>.</p>
<p>Hong Kong chief executive, CY Leung, had tried to diffuse the situation and avoid further escalating protests with a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-29467239">last-minute announcement</a> of direct talks between the chief secretary, Carrie Lam, and representatives of the movement. But tensions continued to rise on the first day after the holiday break.</p>
<p>Initially, local residents and shop owners tried to remove street barricades in occupied areas, while a dwindling number of demonstrators tried hard to hold their ground. The arrival of larger groups of anti-Occupy activists (including masked young men) shouting insults and provoking brawls with protesters signalled the beginning of a different phase in the stand-off.</p>
<p>Several protesters were <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/hong-kong-protesters-call-off-talks-after-coming-under-assault-from-probeijing-crowds-20141004-10q6q2.html">injured</a> at the occupation site in Mong Kok, with incidents of sexual violence, threats and assaults on female protesters reported. The police were criticised for apparently failing to intervene in several instances.</p>
<p>On the face of it, the governments in Hong Kong and Beijing are reacting passively to the demonstrations since early this week. Both have already admitted that they are playing a waiting game, hoping that the movement will just fizzle out, and that Hong Kong’s non-protesting people will quickly feel inconvenienced. The unpleasant weather conditions and fatigue of many protesters have already significantly reduced the number of protesters.</p>
<p>So pressure on the government is easing – and no concessions, or only minor ones at best, should be expected at the moment. And at the same time, the authorities are pursuing more active strategies in their attempts to break the spirit and ruin the reputation of the umbrella movement. </p>
<h2>Every trick in the book</h2>
<p>The events of October 3 indicate that forces associated with the establishment are trying to tarnish the Occupy movement with an image of chaos and disorder. The <a href="http://online.wsj.com/articles/hong-kong-protests-chinese-media-offer-critical-but-limited-coverage-1411982493">pro-establishment media</a> make references to “radicals” or “extremists” and the violence has turned the previously peaceful, harmonious and creative atmosphere into a hostile one, deterring citizens from joining in. </p>
<p>To make matters worse, triad members have seemingly been deployed and are acting as <em>agents provocateurs</em> to cause further violence – which could be used as a pretext for a forceful crackdown.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, pro-establishment lawmakers and anti-Occupy forces are united in their show of support for the government and the police force. So far, no pro-establishment figures have broken ranks. Unlike what happened in 2003, when James Tien’s defection led to the shelving of an anti-subversion law, relative moderates and senior figures from the pro-establishment camp have been very careful in their public remarks. They have merely <a href="http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/09/30/2003600905">called for calm</a> and some form of negotiations.</p>
<p>Most of all, the authorities know the value of splitting your enemy.</p>
<h2>Divide and conquer</h2>
<p>Consultations have been used in Hong Kong in the past to divide the pan-democrats, as the in 2010 constitutional reform negotiations. The talks offered by Carrie Lam with movement representatives, now cancelled after the outbreak of violence, seemed to follow this strategy. </p>
<p>At the onset of the protest, she suggested an extended consultation period –but all post-1997 consultations on constitutional reform have been so biased, and their impact on the eventual outcome so minimal, that they have been virtually meaningless. </p>
<p>Indeed this has also to be said about key consultations on universal suffrage in the 1980s, famously rigged by the British colonial administration. If consultations are unlikely to bring about a breakthrough and the Hong Kong government believes it cannot deviate from the framework set out by the National People’s Congress, then the hidden agenda might indeed be to divide moderates from the more radical factions in the movement.</p>
<p>Given the extent of differences between the various groups of the movement, this might be entirely possible. </p>
<p>The initial student strike was <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/30/hong-kong-pro-democracy-protest-leaders-occupy">organised</a> by the Hong Kong Federation of Students and Scholarism, a more radical student organisation. The Occupy Central movement which joined later is composed of diverse groups devoted to principles of deliberative democracy, headed by senior scholars with little practical experience in social movement actions. </p>
<p>The student organisations do not agree on all their tactics and goals, and Occupy Central had originally planned only a relatively small-scale protest. They are joined by thousands of participants who wanted to show their solidarity with attacked students and fight for universal suffrage, but do not necessary belong to any of the groups. </p>
<p>It is therefore conceivable that government negotiations and possible acceptance of any form of agreement will cause internal conflict. It will require extraordinary management savvy by all leading figures of the umbrella movement to avoid this.</p>
<p>The coming days will show whether these strategies will actually work. Many commentators are pessimistic about the movement’s chances of success – but it would be presumptuous to make further forecasts at this point. </p>
<p>After all, no one predicted the umbrella movement in the first place. Hong Kong’s people have already surprised the world many times in just a few days – why should we expect them to stop now?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32534/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Malte Phillipp Kaeding does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Almost exactly a week after an infamous incident of police brutality against demonstrating students lit a fire under the Occupy Central campaign, the so-called umbrella movement is now facing another assault…Malte Phillipp Kaeding, Lecturer in International Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/323392014-09-30T19:28:43Z2014-09-30T19:28:43ZHong Kong protests: Beijing is now face to face with universal suffrage promise<p>After days on the streets, thousands of Hong Kong residents are still occupying several major streets of their city. Already nicknamed as the “umbrella movement” because of protesters’ use of umbrellas to shield against the police’s pepper spray, this is the fruit of indifference from both Beijing and the local government to the genuine universal suffrage demands made by a significant section of Hong Kong society.</p>
<p>The immediate trigger for this massive movement was a decision by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC), delivered on August 31, that set a spark to years of frustration among pro-democrats.</p>
<p>The NPCSC stipulated that while next the chief executive of Hong Kong could be elected in 2017 by “one person, one vote”, the nominating committee set up under Article 45 of Hong Kong’s <a href="http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html">Basic Law</a> must first nominate two or three candidates who “love China” and that each candidate must have the endorsement of more than half the nominating committee’s members. </p>
<p>The NPCSC also determined that the committee would meet the legal requirement of being “broadly representative” if it is modelled on the existing Election Committee – which comprises 1,200 members, a majority of whom are pro-Beijing.</p>
<p>To justify this decision, the chief executive and other pro-Beijing leaders often invoke the “rule of law”. But the legality of the latest NPCSC decision itself is suspect, since its powers too are limited by the Basic Law. Insisting on screening of CE candidates for “patriotism” or specifying an upper limit on the number candidates is clearly in conflict with the Basic Law as it stands.</p>
<h2>Sticking point</h2>
<p>So far the protesters have shown tremendous restraint. Apart from causing some inconvenience to commuters, they have not posed any threat to people, government officials or public property.</p>
<p>The present chief executive, CY Leung, has refused to meet with the protesters, despite multiple requests. This is quite paradoxical because during his election campaign and early days in office, Leung took pride in his ability to connect with people from diverse backgrounds. His intransigence may mean he is simply no longer free to make concessions – his hands have been tied by Beijing, which has very firm ideas about what kind of universal suffrage it can live with in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>Hong Kong’s business tycoons also fear that a chief executive elected by true universal suffrage might adopt more expansive welfare policies, and might in turn harm their monopolistic business interests. </p>
<p>The protesters are therefore up against the powerful cartel of Beijing, the local government and Hong Kong’s business tycoons. They also face at least four challenges internal to the movement: fear, futility, factionalism, and fatigue. </p>
<h2>Divide and conquer?</h2>
<p>So far, Hong Kong’s authorities have tried to use force to scare the protesters away, using tear gas and pepper spray on the night of September 28. This strategy backfired; the crowds were not cowed, and more people came out in support of peaceful protesters, and against unnecessary use of violence by the police.</p>
<p>The chief executive and pro-Beijing political leaders have also tried to employ the “futility” logic to discourage people from joining Occupy Central because the NPCSC would never agree to reverse its decision. </p>
<p>While there is an element of truth in this suggestion, it clearly has not dissuaded people from joining the movement. Many believe that that if they could prevail in the protests of 2003 and again in 2012 (shelving the introduction of a national security law and national education in school curriculum, respectively), this time need not be different.</p>
<p>In the past, the government has managed to turn factionalism among pro-democrats to their advantage. Since any change to the election process requires a two-thirds majority in the Legislative Council and the local government does not have the required number, it may try to dangle a few concessions to some Council members or blackmail them to support the current proposal otherwise 5m potential voters would not pardon them during the next election.</p>
<p>But for the time being, “fatigue” may be the strategy adopted by the HKSAR government – it might be hoping that most of the people on the streets would return to their universities and offices, leaving behind a small number of die-hards who can be dealt with easily.</p>
<p>This strategy is also likely to fail. A significant section of Hong Kong population has become deeply engaged with the democracy movement. In fact, the umbrella movement has now evolved as a platform to assemble all people dissatisfied with the local government, Beijing, the CPC and business tycoons. So, a wide spectrum of people – from <a href="http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/986482-rally-near-un-calls-for-end-to-persecution-of-falun-gong/">Falun Gong</a> to the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jun/09/hong-kong-gay-marriage-british-consulate">LGBT community</a>, persecuted <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/05/china-christianity-wenzhou-zhejiang-churches">Christians</a>, <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/08/12/hong-kongs-high-cost-of-living-deters-would-be-parents/">middle-class people</a> unable to buy even a tiny flat and locals unhappy with <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/4/26/china-hong-kong-.html">too many mainland tourists</a> – have all found a home in the movement.</p>
<p>Hitting protesters hard with Tiananmen-style force remains an option. From the government’s point of view, it worked in Beijing in 1989. But it may well not serve them so well in Hong Kong in 2014. While some hardliners in Beijing might be pushing to “<a href="http://www.tchrd.org/2012/04/china-launches-strike-hard-campaign-in-tibetan-areas/">strike hard</a>”, the combination of the deep distrust of local people, a free press, an independent judiciary and the presence of social media surely suggests that any such attempt would end up as a public disaster.</p>
<p>There is an obvious distinction between a foreign attempt to export democracy and a genuine groundswell of popular demand for it. Since the situation in Hong Kong falls in the second category, silencing protesters by violence would only bring a temporary respite. In the long run, a political solution will have to be found out to bridge the gap between expectations of pro-democracy groups and Beijing loyalists.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>As things stand, the most realistic option is for the local government to engage the protesters in an open dialogue – but first, it must regain their trust and confidence. By offering an unconditional apology for the police violence and by promising not to act under dictate from Beijing, Leung could at least bring protesters to the negotiating table. </p>
<p>For their part, the protesters are demanding that the NPCSC first withdraws its August 31 decision. That is both unrealistic and very unlikely, but there might be a way out: after a fresh round of open dialogue with protesting democrats, Leung could submit another report to the NPCSC requesting it to revise the decision in view of the “actual situation” in Hong Kong. Doing so would be both legally sound and politically viable.</p>
<p>Both sides should be willing to make some compromises. However, Leung must initiate the conversation and also try to convince the NPCSC to revisit its unwritten policy of screening out pan-democrats from contesting the election. </p>
<p>After all, under the Basic Law, the chief executive has a responsibility not only to the Chinese government, but also to the people of Hong Kong, who are now making their voices heard as never before.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32339/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Surya Deva does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After days on the streets, thousands of Hong Kong residents are still occupying several major streets of their city. Already nicknamed as the “umbrella movement” because of protesters’ use of umbrellas…Surya Deva, Associate Professor, City University of Hong KongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/322882014-09-30T09:10:07Z2014-09-30T09:10:07ZGreat Firewall of China tasked with keeping Hong Kong conflagration in check<p>From 1997, when Hong Kong was officially “returned” to China after Britain’s long lease, the tiny island was bound to remain something of an anomaly. </p>
<p>The difference is palpable the moment you travel from mainland China through the passport checkpoint. In Hong Kong, most people speak in English; they drive (reasonably well) on the left, and they don’t stare at foreigners. There’s even a <a href="http://park.hongkongdisneyland.com/hkdl/en_US/home/home?name=HomePage">Disneyland</a>. On the mainland, none of these things apply.</p>
<p>And similarly, as has been proved in recent days, Hong Kong is a place where <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/29/world/asia/china-hong-kong-protests/">tens of thousands of protesters</a> can gather on the streets for days, in full view of the world’s media, and force the Chinese government to respond to their demands.</p>
<p>So far, by Chinese standards, the mainland’s reaction to the protests has been relatively patient and restrained: after some clashes where pepper spray and tear gas were used, protesters have been asked to disperse quietly, and riot police have been withdrawn. </p>
<p>Mainland China knows it cannot afford to allow pro-democracy protests to gather steam in the far reaches of its empire. It has a history of ruthlessly crushing any such events, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/4/newsid_2496000/2496277.stm">not least in Beijing in 1989</a> – and it has ample means at its disposal to stop word of any unrest from spreading in the first place.</p>
<h2>Nothing to see here</h2>
<p>China has developed remarkably effective tools for ensuring that potentially destabilising events can be simply kept off the computer screens and televisions of its massive population. The Chinese state invests huge amounts of money every year to ensure this massive machinery works.</p>
<p>Very little detailed news of the disturbance in Hong Kong at present will be making it onto the nightly news bulletins or even into public consciousness on the mainland. If a news story, even on the BBC or CNN, sails too close to the outright promotion of democracy, it is merely and abruptly switched off. This is a perennial annoyance both for expat residents and for Chinese citizens trying to keep abreast of international affairs: a blank screen, sometimes repeatedly and for long periods.</p>
<p>With broadcasting still a state monopoly in China and the political content carefully controlled for all print and online publications, news of Hong Kong’s unhappiness is unlikely to have troubled anyone in the mainland over their breakfast. Even on the flights into mainland China from Hong Kong, newspapers and magazines are routinely gathered up by cabin staff to avoid contamination of mainland minds and passengers are warned against concealing illicit news products.</p>
<p>Every source of news is carefully monitored and managed. An army of state employees monitors internet chat rooms and news sites, removing any contributions that might work against the Chinese state and its policies. Severe penalties are visited on citizens deemed to be stirring up dissatisfaction – and they can be easily tracked.</p>
<p>Of course, there are ways around China’s “<a href="http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-03-20/secretive-web-activists-give-chinese-a-way-around-censorship">Great Firewall</a>” – the censorship system that blocks any discussion or mention of anything so unsavoury as democracy. But these methods often cost money, usually foreign currency, putting it out of the reach of most of China’s population.</p>
<p>Still, mainland China knows the eyes of the world are upon it, even if its own citizens can’t see the rest of the world – putting it under tremendous pressure.</p>
<h2>No wriggle room</h2>
<p>Beijing’s fear is that caving in to the demonstrations could be the first step on a slippery slope to Chinese dissolution; leniency might encourage similar demands for autonomy and rights in other parts of China – such as in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-29373158">Xinjiang</a> in the far West, and in <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2014/0912/Tibet-s-Dalai-Lama-hints-he-could-be-the-last-in-his-line-and-Beijing-isn-t-having-it">Tibet</a> – and Beijing will simply not allow that. There is too much at stake for them personally, as well as for the entire post-Mao Chinese project.</p>
<p>Part of the context too is the population huddled across in Taipei. If <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/07/china-taiwan-relations-0">Taiwan</a> is reincorporated into China, as Beijing insists, how will pro-democracy protests be handled there? What happens in Hong Kong now will have a profound impact on attitudes toward Taiwan’s future.</p>
<p>For the time being, Beijing is apparently keeping its head down, just hoping all of this is going to go away. After all, it’s typhoon season; with a little luck, a storm will wash in from the China Sea and disperse the protesters naturally. </p>
<p>But the thousands of people who have spent the last few days in the streets of Hong Kong have shown their own determination to protect the rights promised to them back in 1997. They may not be moved by a mere tropical downpour. A dramatic face-off is still underway, and there is still no knowing where it might end.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32288/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Hadland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From 1997, when Hong Kong was officially “returned” to China after Britain’s long lease, the tiny island was bound to remain something of an anomaly. The difference is palpable the moment you travel from…Adrian Hadland, Senior Lecturer in Communications, Media and Culture, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/318632014-09-29T15:15:01Z2014-09-29T15:15:01ZProtests a warning to China of dangers posed by Hong Kong wealth gap<p>The <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/29/us-hongkong-china-idUSKCN0HN03Q20140929">pro-democracy protesters in the streets</a> of Hong Kong, once again confront Beijing with the age-old conundrum of how to balance authoritarian control and the demands of a complex modern society. </p>
<p>For Beijing, this conundrum is particularly acute as the Communist Party has long lacked the ability to mobilise popular opinion after the discrediting of the mass, populist campaigns of the Maoist era. For Hong Kong, the conundrum offers another insight into the failure of its legislative council to adequately respond to pressing social issues and emerging threats to Hong Kong’s role as a gateway to China.</p>
<p>Recent developments <a href="https://theconversation.com/alibaba-investors-gamble-on-rise-of-ecosystem-internet-in-record-breaking-ipo-31807">including Alibaba’s decision to launch its IPO in New York</a>, uncertainty over the direction of political reforms and the emergence of new financial centres on the Chinese mainland have all cast doubt over Hong Kong’s future as a business and financial gateway to mainland China. On the surface these events might appear to signal the end of Hong Kong’s special advantage as a gateway to China. </p>
<p>But despite this, its role as a globalising force for Chinese business and financial sectors has remained. Financial stability in the Special Administrative Region (SAR) remains a non-negotiable concept. Hong Kong successfully weathered one of the world’s worst financial crises and offers an interesting model for mainland China in addressing its own fragile and dysfunctional financial sector. </p>
<p>And, as we have seen this week, the social challenges now facing Hong Kong which politicians have failed to address, including the widespread inequalities of wealth, provide a powerful forewarning to the mainland on the dangers such issues pose. </p>
<h2>Weathering storms</h2>
<p>Threats to Hong Kong’s position are not new. During the Cold War era it was assumed that PRC’s intervention in the Korean War would spell an end of Hong Kong’s entrepôt status. The subsequent <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Vcg3cN4NbdsC&pg=PA214&lpg=PA214&dq=Hong+kong+embargo+on+US$+dollar+transactions&source=bl&ots=5D2GDHG0VA&sig=ds93wFk4zMEz4vTe1xEj-7FEP9Y&hl=en&sa=X&ei=AHYhVPT4IcO07Qap74DICw&ved=0CEsQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=Hong%20kong%20embargo%20on%20US%24%20dollar%20transactions&f=false">embargo on US dollar transactions</a>, which only ended in 1972, threatened Hong Kong’s free market, especially its involvement in the sterling trade. </p>
<p>A succession of <a href="http://www.hkimr.org/uploads/publication/207/ub_full_0_2_131_wp200609_text.pdf">banking crises during the 1960s</a> and the revelation of high levels of official corruption threatened its reputation as a financial centre. The relocation of HSBC to London in advance of the 1997 handover, despite the reassurances of Deng Xiaoping, also threatened to derail Hong Kong’s post-1997 future as a financial centre.</p>
<h2>Staying power</h2>
<p>Yet Hong Kong has proved remarkably resilient in responding to these challenges. After the US embargo, Hong Kong’s free market emerged as one of the PRC’s only points of safe access to international markets. The public backlash against official corruption witnessed changes that saw Hong Kong emerge as a model of clean governance and business integrity in the region. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60301/original/vrwkfmk6-1411993452.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60301/original/vrwkfmk6-1411993452.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60301/original/vrwkfmk6-1411993452.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60301/original/vrwkfmk6-1411993452.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60301/original/vrwkfmk6-1411993452.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60301/original/vrwkfmk6-1411993452.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60301/original/vrwkfmk6-1411993452.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60301/original/vrwkfmk6-1411993452.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Safe harbour?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/rogerwagner/3911717052/in/photolist-dfm4Sb-6gQcDq-okpoof-9suCsU-2FEXcB-6XEzcs-bgb7qr-4ueZvY-oC3xwY-k4MPe-HG36W-fquwkN-fxh1Kk-H7iJj-6hm1Px-8nbeAZ-eBpCQg-9eQ3N6-6YSLyY-ekxtRE-6h9u6j-9Banc4-eirwVt-5yBUVa-ek6vsB-5ANtbL-6hqbEm-2sgNDL-ebbeeS-eDFXmt-7GZbnZ-bLfvu-ouiXk6-nYS2oM-8mtz8y-BjCR3-f8mdJk-zrmeE-drJtq-6hwKZk-8aN1y4-bSNimn-aeZtwk-mDk4i7-eigZkw-cegFVq-dX2gUr-ooiyFV-eYU997-nL8BCA">Roger Wagner</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During the 1970s, PRC banks in Hong Kong provided the first tentative efforts at promoting the Renminbi as currency of trade settlement, following the <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/about/histend.htm">collapse of Bretton Woods</a>. Since 1993 Hong Kong has been the destination of choice for the IPOs of some of China’s largest business and banks, including the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-15/agricultural-bank-of-china-sets-ipo-record-with-22-1-billion-boosted-sale.html">IPO Agricultural Bank of China in 2010</a>, which represented the world’s largest bank IPO. </p>
<p>Against this, the development of free trade zones and financial centres in neighbouring Qianhai and in Shanghai has to date been disappointing. And while Guangdong’s GDP surpassed that of Hong Kong in 2003, this has not witnessed financial centres such as Qianhai moving up to displace Hong Kong. </p>
<p>History indicates that the success of major financial centres such as London and New York was due to quality and liquidity. The slow pace of development in the Shanghai Free Trade Zone succinctly illustrate the both the caution of Chinese financial reforms and the time it will take to achieve full capital account convertibility, allowing capital to move freely in and out of mainland China.</p>
<p>It is no accident that Hong Kong has provided the institutional interface for the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14765284.2013.789677#.VClmMhbp-Ac">internationalisation of the Renminbi</a>. For these reasons, it is unsurprising that the Chinese leadership continue to view Hong Kong as vital to the development and prosperity of southern China and for advancing the country’s financial reforms. </p>
<h2>Social problems</h2>
<p>Perhaps more importantly, Hong Kong offers the mainland an alternative governance model to that of the Anglo-Saxon world. When it came to banking, Hong Kong did not play the Anglo-Saxon game, thus avoiding the worst excesses of the Anglo-Saxon model. This offers the Chinese leadership a powerful example of the value of strong prudential controls over bank behaviour.</p>
<p>Similarly, allowing state enterprises to list shares on Hong Kong’s stock exchange has exposed these enterprises to international governance standards without relinquishing control. A recently announced pilot programme to connect the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchange offers an incremental and controlled way of reforming the Mainland’s capital markets. </p>
<p>But Hong Kong’s development also offers cautionary lessons on the political and social dangers of tolerating widespread poverty alongside high levels of affluence. Hong Kong’s reluctance to address these issues and its apparent obsession with fiscal austerity despite having ample fiscal resources appears at odds with rising social expenditures and concern with for these issues on the mainland. </p>
<p>Beijing’s role in the selection of political candidates may be the focus for now, but for Hong Kong a more pressing concern is how to maintain its reputation for business and financial probity and deal with the consequential domestic wealth inequality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31863/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Damian Tobin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The pro-democracy protesters in the streets of Hong Kong, once again confront Beijing with the age-old conundrum of how to balance authoritarian control and the demands of a complex modern society. For…Damian Tobin, Lecturer in Chinese Business and Management, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/275522014-06-04T05:04:37Z2014-06-04T05:04:37Z‘Tiananmen Square is being cleansed with blood’: horror of that night lives on after 25 years<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50152/original/rh2vsvfq-1401831198.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Peaceful protest was soon to turn bloody</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lars Laamann</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the early evening of Saturday, June 3 1989, cycling with a couple of friends along the canal to the north of the Yonghegong temple, I witnessed a remarkable display of traditional Beijing folk music. A group of old men in worn, blue-grey “Mao suits” singing along to the wistful sounds of their erhu strings and sheng pipes, created an ominous atmosphere in the humid twilight of the evening. </p>
<p>“What do they know that we don’t know yet?”, I jokingly asked my companions. The answer arrived within hours – also by means of music, although this time to the shrieks and crackles of the Internationale being broadcast at maximum volume around the campus of <a href="http://english.bnuz.edu.cn/">Beijing Normal University</a>, where I was a student that year. </p>
<p>The hymn of the socialist international movement had become the song symbolising the student movement of 1989 and all of us immediately knew that the latter was in trouble when we were abruptly awoken from our slumber. Metallic tannoys announced that tanks had entered Tiananmen Square (天安門廣場), urging all students and lecturers to defy the soldiers. Thus ended the most recent spontaneous, non-orchestrated mass movement China’s capital had seen since May 1919.</p>
<p>Among the many contributions which are bound to appear on the 25th anniversary of the military intervention against these popular protests, most are likely to focus on the continuing denial by the Chinese authorities that anything ever did take place: crackdown, protests or indeed the reasons behind the latter. </p>
<p>Baffling as this may seem, this does bring back memories of perusing the daily press in the weeks leading up to the June 4 bloodshed, following the imposition of martial law a fortnight earlier. Echoing the new Party line, an “extremely small number” (極小數) of dangerous troublemakers had usurped the main thoroughfares of central Beijing in order to oppose the Communist authorities. The People’s Liberation Army had been called in to contain and reverse the ensuing “chaotic disorder” (暴亂), the June 4 operation constituting the crowning glory of its heroic fighters. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50153/original/znkpnhvr-1401831276.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50153/original/znkpnhvr-1401831276.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50153/original/znkpnhvr-1401831276.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50153/original/znkpnhvr-1401831276.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50153/original/znkpnhvr-1401831276.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=557&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50153/original/znkpnhvr-1401831276.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=557&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50153/original/znkpnhvr-1401831276.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=557&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">No inkling of the savagery that was to be unleashed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lars Laamann</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Equally disorienting were the simultaneous reports in the Western media which, in the pre-internet era, were only sporadically available in China. The students who had taken to the street were apparently engaged in a struggle for “freedom” and “democracy” – both symbolised by the statue so evocatively placed opposite the Mao Zedong portrait adorning the Gate of Celestial Peace, the very Tiananmen. </p>
<p>To the Western reporter, the obvious parallels were visible in the organised discontent which had gripped most European satellite states of the Soviet Union by then, personified by <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/picture_gallery/05/europe_solidarity_in_poland0/html/3.stm">Poland’s Solidarnosc</a>. Entire populations held hostage by Communism were looking West, and China’s youth were perceived to be doing precisely this.</p>
<p>Presuming the protesters had a political message, what would this have been? All started, on 15 April 1989, with the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/books/first/l/liang-tiananmen.html">death of Hu Yaobang</a>, the paragon Party leader admired by China’s intellectuals as a defender of their freedoms and social status. While the <a href="http://csis.org/blog/china-economic-reform-timeline">market reforms unleashed by Deng Xiaoping</a> since 1980 had produced considerable wealth for farmers and salesmen, anybody tied to a state-determined salary not only fell behind in terms of relative income, but actually saw their livelihoods reverse due to the significant inflation of the late 1980s. </p>
<p>The head teacher responsible for us overseas students put it into simple terms: “A teacher’s salary is not enough for two packets of cigarettes. All we earn goes up in smoke!” And, as a married family man, he was lucky. His younger, unattached peers had to share dormitory accommodation, patiently queuing for simple lunches with their chopsticks and metal bowls. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50155/original/my29j3xm-1401831592.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50155/original/my29j3xm-1401831592.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50155/original/my29j3xm-1401831592.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50155/original/my29j3xm-1401831592.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50155/original/my29j3xm-1401831592.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50155/original/my29j3xm-1401831592.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50155/original/my29j3xm-1401831592.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Student protests were encouraged by the university.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lars Laamann</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In other words, the movement which erupted in support of the departed leader was one of aspirational social justice. An idealistic movement by educationalists who were left feeling marginalised in a society where material wealth mattered more and more. </p>
<h2>Student protest becomes mass movement</h2>
<p>The authorities, initially satisfied with the open support for the Communist Party and its leaders, became increasingly disconcerted when the demonstrations in support of the Communist ideals failed to come to an end. Again, the universities were the driving force; art classes being turned into banner painting sessions, history lessons used in order to explain the contradictions within the current political system, while our language classes became essential tools for translating the latest slogans we had seen and for deciphering the public posters which could be seen in designated spaces belonging to our vast campus. </p>
<p>As the weeks took their course, more and more people from other walks of life joined in; first the journalists and artists, then shop attendants and drivers and finally industrial workers who had downed their tools in order to take part in the mass demonstrations which were organising themselves, without any central planning whatsoever, in defiance of laws aimed at curtailing the public right to take to the streets. </p>
<p>Social justice was a call sufficiently broad for most urban workers to identify with. And suddenly there was another point being publicly made, if expressed privately long before: Communist cadres were seen as leading particularly privileged lives, profiting from the market reforms in unforeseen ways. In other words, the movement quickly became one against official corruption.</p>
<p>There was a final element which most of the Western media ignored and which none of the official responses dealt with. The 1989 mass movement took great delight in the frivolous freedoms which the collapse of everyday public order brought along. Spontaneous street concerts, often to the tunes of the nascent Chinese rock music scene, shops handing out small cakes and water to demonstrating bypassers, that motorbike caravan which would worm its way through the whole of central Beijing, to the delighted cheers of tens of thousands, portrait painting and art performances testing the limits of public guidelines and of social conservatism. </p>
<p>And those ubiquitous meat stick sellers with their little barbecue trolleys, appearing from nowhere, often directly after a scuffle with the police. Nobody enjoyed the lifting of the uniform order more than our fellow Chinese students, who would smuggle us into their dormitories, sneaking past the door guards wrapped up to our noses into big overcoats for heady discussions about the future and a degree of frankness which I had never encountered before during my time in China. In other words, the movement of the spring of 1989 was also one calling for personal, almost hedonistic freedoms.
Its crushing came as a surprise to us all. </p>
<h2>Ferocious crackdown</h2>
<p>Soldiers had habitually returned to their base camps, having been persuaded by the students guarding the main traffic intersections that there was no revolutionary movement on the streets of the capital after all. But the latest troops recruited into Beijing were of different origin (Shenyang, we were told) and therefore more difficult to communicate with. Yet they looked placid and, certainly, the Chinese People’s own Liberation Army would hardly be shooting their own comrades. That this most unlikely scenario eventually emerged, with astonishing ferocity, took all of us by surprise. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50154/original/zy2kfj99-1401831420.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50154/original/zy2kfj99-1401831420.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50154/original/zy2kfj99-1401831420.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50154/original/zy2kfj99-1401831420.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50154/original/zy2kfj99-1401831420.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50154/original/zy2kfj99-1401831420.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50154/original/zy2kfj99-1401831420.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Early on the mood among troops was calm.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lars Laamann</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In disbelief I turned on the TV set in order to watch the early morning news programme, but the only announcement to be broadcast was a somber sign reading “Tiananmen Square is being cleansed with blood” (血洗天安門廣場) – a final act of defiance by the TV producers who knew that any freedom to broadcast independently of the political authorities would evaporate in the wake of the crackdown. As class representative, my task was to ensure that all my fellow students were safely accounted for. But since nobody could have predicted the date nor the degree of danger they would be faced with, several students had proceeded to the Square, as on most other nights, in order to inhale the carnivalesque atmosphere. </p>
<p>These students I was now looking out for, locating nearly all “missing sheep” in and around the area where the military had struck. Teargas-induced irritations apart, nobody was hurt, but this could not be said for many others in the Square. Blood stained the pavements, the tarmac was ploughed up by tank chains, rows of parked bicycles had been flattened by heavy vehicles and buses – arranged into impenetrable blocks in order to deter the progress of the military – were burning, billowing out black, reeking smoke. Pedal-powered three-wheelers kept carting wounded protesters but occasionally also soldiers to Beijing’s hospitals. </p>
<p>Friends working in one of these hospitals disclosed news which I experienced as particularly shocking, namely that the blood of the soldiers they had treated contained high levels of amphetamines – the ultimate explanation as to why the soldiers who carried out the atrocities of June 4 were so trigger-happy. Was there a “massacre”? Beyond any doubt, regardless of whether the <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/15/world/asia/tiananmen-square-fast-facts/">dead were measured by the hundreds or thousands</a>. When I later – through the zoom lens of a press photographer’s camera positioned in a tall building near Jianguomen – watched a pile of corpses being set alight, right next to the Martyrs’ Column in the heart of the Square, I knew that the Party would want to keep the scale of what had happened in the morning of June 4 1989 a secret. The jolly pensioners whose wondrous sounds I had listened to just a few hours earlier suddenly had a prophetic air to them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27552/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lars Laamann has received funding from the ESRC. He is affiliated with Hope not Hate and a member of the Institute of Linguists.</span></em></p>In the early evening of Saturday, June 3 1989, cycling with a couple of friends along the canal to the north of the Yonghegong temple, I witnessed a remarkable display of traditional Beijing folk music…Lars Laamann, Lecturer on the History of China, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.