tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/european-politics-6932/articlesEuropean politics – The Conversation2024-03-04T13:36:15Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231512024-03-04T13:36:15Z2024-03-04T13:36:15ZA far-right political group is gaining popularity in Germany – but so, too, are protests against it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578973/original/file-20240229-18-u1ukal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People in Hamburg, Germany, protest against right-wing extremism and the AfD party on Feb. 25, 2024. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/at-a-demonstration-against-right-wing-extremism-on-february-news-photo/2033875417?adppopup=true">Hami Roshan/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hundreds of thousands of people have been <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2024/02/19/we-are-the-firewall-thousands-protest-against-far-right-in-german-city-wolfsburg">protesting across cities in Germany</a> since early 2024, standing up against the Alternative for Germany party, a relatively new, far-right, nationalist party that is known as the AfD. </p>
<p>What has driven so many Germans to suddenly protest against a small, extremist political party?</p>
<p>The protesters in Germany are directly responding to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/turning-back-clock-germanys-afd-economy-2024-02-01/">AfD’s radical policy</a> positions and the fact that it is currently in second place <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/germany/">in the polls</a> for the upcoming federal election, which will take place on or before Oct. 26, 2025. </p>
<p>While the AfD did not win any parliament seats in its first federal election in 2013, the group’s popularity <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/german-election-far-right-afd-loses-nationally-but-wins-in-east/">has been rising</a>. The AfD held about 13% of the seats in parliament from 2017 through 2021 and was the third-largest party in parliament. Since 2021, it has held about <a href="https://www.bundestag.de/en/parliament/plenary/distributionofseats">11% of the seats</a>. </p>
<p>After the next federal election, the AfD could become the second-largest party. While this limited power would not let it enact any extreme policies that could potentially reduce freedom and respect for civil liberties in Germany, the AfD could use its position in parliament to disrupt the policymaking process, criticize establishment parties and attract new voters for future elections.</p>
<h2>What is the AfD and why is it so controversial?</h2>
<p>Several politicians and journalists formed the AfD in direct response to the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-eurozone-crisis-and-implications-for-the-united-states/">Eurozone crisis</a> of the 2010s. </p>
<p>That crisis was triggered by several European governments in the European Union, including Greece, Portugal and Ireland, that developed large budget deficits.</p>
<p>The European Union’s 27 member countries promise to be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/main-elements-fiscal-reforms-agreed-by-eu-governments-2023-12-20/">fiscally responsible</a>. Otherwise, poor public management in one country could trigger an economic crisis throughout the entire European Union.</p>
<p>This is what happened during the Eurozone crisis. Poor public management in some member-states led to a European-wide crisis. </p>
<p>To mitigate the crisis, other European governments had to bail out other governments. The AfD’s founding members were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/turning-back-clock-germanys-afd-economy-2024-02-01">outraged that Germany</a>, as a leading member of the European Union, would become in part responsible for financially rescuing them. </p>
<p>Over time, the AfD has not only become increasingly skeptical of the European Union, but it has also become very clearly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37274201">anti-immigration</a>. Compared to other countries in Europe, Germany has a relatively large immigrant population. As of March 2023, about <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-migration-immigration-9948d6e87835242f9f7867d7ef817287">23% of the people</a> who live in Germany either are immigrants or their parents are or were. Germany is also the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/us/countries/germany">largest host country</a> for refugees in Europe.</p>
<p>The true extent of AfD’s anti-immigration policies came to light in January 2024, when a German <a href="https://correctiv.org/en/top-stories/2024/01/15/secret-plan-against-germany/">investigative news report</a> revealed that high-ranking AfD members attended a secret meeting with neo-Nazi activists to discuss a “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/10/politicians-from-germany-afd-met-extremist-group-to-discuss-deportation-masterplan">master plan</a>.” </p>
<p>According to this plan, the German government would deport immigrants en masse to their countries of origin. This plan also included deporting <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/germany-afd-secret-meeting-deportation/">non-German-born citizens</a> of Germany. </p>
<p>The meeting was especially controversial because a few members of the Christian Democratic Union, one of Germany’s long-standing conservative parties, were also in attendance. </p>
<p>Once the investigative report became public, the AfD publicly <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-far-right-deportations-parliament-7a29129a6f50853791004d21ffea2a92">distanced itself</a> from the meeting and the plan. </p>
<p>Yet, it has been hard for the party leaders to convince the public that they do not support the supposed mass deportation policy, in part because high-ranking AfD members have suggested <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67948861">such policies</a> in the past. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A white, bald middle aged man points his finger and stands at a podium that has the words 'AfD' and German writing on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=537&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=537&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578974/original/file-20240229-24-3k65fj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=537&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Markus Frohmaier, a leader of the AfD political group in Germany, speaks to party members at a conference on Feb. 24, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/february-2024-baden-württemberg-rottweil-markus-frohnmaier-news-photo/2028779666?adppopup=true">Christoph Schmidt/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Germans’ response to the AfD</h2>
<p>Once news of the mass deportation meeting circulated in mid-January, hundreds of thousands of people throughout Germany <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/21/1225882007/tens-of-thousands-protest-in-germany-against-the-rise-of-the-far-right">began to protest</a> against the AfD and its anti-immigration policies. </p>
<p>Many of the protesters are also protesting to defend democracy and human rights in Germany. </p>
<p>Protesters have compared the AfD’s growing prominence to that of the Nazi party. They have been carrying signs that say the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nazis-no-thank-you-germans-take-streets-call-afd-ban-2024-01-17/">AfD is so 1933</a>,” “<a href="https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/2024-01-22/ty-article-magazine/.premium/will-germanys-far-right-party-be-banned-after-bombshell-fascist-mass-deportation-plan/0000018d-3112-d268-addd-3b7b21960000">No Nazis</a>” and “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/support-germanys-far-right-afd-reaches-six-month-low-after-protests-2024-01-30/">Deport the AfD</a> Now.” </p>
<p>They believe the only way to prevent the rise of a far-right party again in Germany is to protest the far-right movement before it becomes too popular.</p>
<p>Symbolically, the protesters are protesting under the slogan “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-afd-far-right-protests-bundestag-berlin-90d8497434a424ded198ce3d6d5fabb9">We are the firewall</a>” to illustrate how they are protecting Germany from the rise of far-right nationalists once again.</p>
<p>Some are also pushing for the German government to ban the AfD. Yet, while Germany has <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/germanys-laws-antisemitic-hate-speech-nazi-propaganda-holocaust-denial/">laws against extremist groups</a> that were developed after World War II, it is unclear whether such laws should be used to ban the party, as some observers <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/feb/08/germany-ban-far-right-afd-panel">caution that banning</a> the AfD might backfire and make it more popular.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large crowd of people stand close together with umbrellas and hold signs. One of them says 'No tolerance for intolerance.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579046/original/file-20240229-26-b9o5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Demonstrators in Hamburg protest right-wing extremism and the AfD on Feb. 25, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/at-a-demonstration-against-right-wing-extremism-on-february-news-photo/2033875510?adppopup=true">Hami Roshan/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>What the AfD can still accomplish</h2>
<p>While the AfD is currently posing an electoral threat to more mainstream parties in Germany, it is unlikely that it will take control over the German government any time soon. </p>
<p>Germany is a multiparty system; no single party can control German politics at any given time. Parties must share power when governing the country.</p>
<p>It is unlikely that any of the current establishment parties will work with the AfD to govern Germany, primarily because the AfD supports policies that are <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-election-what-do-the-terms-right-and-left-mean-if-both-cdu-and-spd-are-in-the-center/a-37601594">so far removed</a> from what typical German parties would find acceptable. </p>
<p>Additionally, the Christian Democratic Union is currently the most popular party, according to opinion polls. CDU members have previously emphasized that they <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-cdu-leader-rules-out-cooperation-with-far-right-afd/a-66642647">will not cooperate</a> with the AfD in any circumstance. </p>
<p>And other <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/centrists-alarmed-as-poll-shows-growing-support-for-german-far-right-party">establishment parties</a> and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/frank-walter-steinmeier/t-17345761">politicians have also</a> distanced themselves from the AfD.</p>
<p>Yet, while the AfD may not be able to make sweeping policy changes in the short run, it does pose an electoral threat to the establishment parties in Germany. As such, other German parties may start to alter their own policy platforms to appease some potential AfD voters. </p>
<p>The Christian Democratic Union is already proposing to send asylum seekers to other countries while their <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-conservatives-angela-merkel-migration/">applications are being processed</a>. However, their ability to make this policy change is unlikely, as it would require changes to European Union law.</p>
<p>In the long run, if the AfD is able to continue to grow in popularity at the local level, this may help it grow its voter base and become more successful in federal elections. </p>
<p>The AfD is more popular in states in <a href="https://theconversation.com/german-election-continuing-popularity-of-far-right-afd-has-roots-in-east-west-divide-167844">eastern Germany</a>, especially among voters who feel disenchanted with the reunification of communist East Germany and West Germany in 1990, and disenchanted with the drawbacks of Germany being a leading member of the European Union. </p>
<p>Some people fear that if the AfD continues to grow, it could undermine democracy in Germany, much like far-right populist parties have recently done in other <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/hungarys-democratic-backsliding-threatens-the-trans-atlantic-security-orde">democracies in Europe</a> and <a href="https://time.com/6245795/brazil-bolsonaro-lula-trump-insurrection/">in the rest of the world</a>.</p>
<p>And as democracy continues to decline in Europe and globally, protections for civil liberties and political rights will continue to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-global-freedom-declines-17th-consecutive-year-may-be-approaching-turning-point">decline as well</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223151/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julie VanDusky does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hundreds of thousands of people in Germany are taking to the streets to push back against the far-right, nationalist policies of the AfD, which currently holds 11% of the seats in parliament.Julie VanDusky, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boise State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244882024-02-28T14:24:04Z2024-02-28T14:24:04ZThe word ‘populism’ is a gift to the far right – four reasons why we should stop using it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578095/original/file-20240226-32-7wbj6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=44%2C53%2C5946%2C3898&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">microstock3D/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>From the storming of the US Capitol on the January 6 2021, to the similar uprising in Brazil in 2023, far-right politicians are infringing on democratic ideals across the world. If we are serious about meeting the challenge they pose, we must stop treating them as legitimate, democratic actors and instead see them as the threat they really are.</p>
<p>A very big part of this effort is also quite a simple step. We must stop referring to far-right politics as “populist”. </p>
<p>In recent years, serious research on populism has reached somewhat of a consensus which makes it clear that it is secondary, at best, in defining any kind of politics. The <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/02633957211007053">two main schools of thought</a> broadly disagree on whether populism is a thin ideology which involves a moralistic element (by pitting a “pure” people against “corrupt” elite) or whether it is simply a discourse that constructs a people as being against an elite, without any further specificity attached to those two groups.</p>
<p>Crucially, though, both agree that the populist element of any given movement comes second to politics and ideology. Parties of the left and right may both use populist rhetoric, but this tells us little about how they actually govern. </p>
<p>But populism has nevertheless become a buzzword. Countless academics have jumped on the bandwagon in search of funding and citations, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/whats-in-a-buzzword-a-systematic-review-of-the-state-of-populism-research-in-political-science/D9CD5E7E13DFA30FD05D41F32E6C122B">often failing to do due diligence to the literature on the topic</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Number of articles containing the words ‘populist’, ‘populism’ or ‘populists’ on Web of Science</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chart showing that the number of academic papers containing the word 'populism' has increased dramarically since 2017." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578097/original/file-20240226-32-sofnsh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A surge in academic papers referring to populism.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Aurelien Mondon/Alex Yates</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Beyond poor academic practice, the careless use of the word has also had a deleterious impact on wider public discourse. These four consequences should hopefully convince you to stop using the word “populist” to describe someone who is actually just a rightwing extremist.</p>
<h2>1. It masks the threat posed by the far right</h2>
<p>It should not come as a surprise that many far-right politicians, from France’s Jean-Marie Le Pen, to Italy’s <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41269-023-00327-1">Matteo Salvini</a>, have embraced the term “populism”. Even when it is used by their opponents as an insult, far-right politicians prefer the term to more accurate, but also more stigmatising terms, such as “extremist” or “racist”.</p>
<p>This could be witnessed, for example, in the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263395720955036">Guardian’s 2019 six-month-long series on “the new populism”</a>. More often than not, the word populism was used in this series to describe far more sinister politics than the simple opposition between the elite and the people. Political personalities such as Steve Bannon are far better described as far or extreme right. These terms are not only more precise, but make the threat they pose far clearer than the murky “populism”.</p>
<h2>2. It exaggerates the strength of the far right</h2>
<p>When we use the term “populist”, we often create a semantic link between the word and “the people”. So when we allow the far right to be described as populist, we are incorrectly implying that they are tapping into what the people want or that they speak for the “silent majority” – something Nigel Farage and others love to claim.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578295/original/file-20240227-16-jdy3wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578295/original/file-20240227-16-jdy3wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578295/original/file-20240227-16-jdy3wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578295/original/file-20240227-16-jdy3wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578295/original/file-20240227-16-jdy3wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578295/original/file-20240227-16-jdy3wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578295/original/file-20240227-16-jdy3wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Far-right parties and politicians are mounting election campaigns all over the world in 2024. Join us in London at 6pm on March 6 for a salon style discussion with experts on how seriously we should take the threat, what these parties mean for our democracies – and what action we can take. Register for your place at this <a href="https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/social-science-perspectives-on-the-far-right-tickets-838612631957?aff=theconversation"><strong>free public session here</strong></a>. There will be food, drinks and, best of all, the opportunity to connect with interesting people.</em></p>
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<p>The myth is further entrenched by the perception that the rise of “populism” is the result of choices made by people at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder – whether they are defined as the “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1070289X.2018.1552440?journalCode=gide20">white working class</a>”, the “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00380261231186021">left behind</a>” or the “losers of globalisation”. This ignores analysis which shows that much of the support for reactionary politics <a href="https://www.race.ed.ac.uk/whiteness-populism-and-the-racialisation-of-the-working-class-in-the-united-kingdom-and-the-united-states/">comes predominantly from affluent groups</a>.</p>
<p>Being allowed to claim to speak on behalf of the voiceless is particularly useful at a time of widespread distrust in mainstream politics, so we shouldn’t be surprised that far-right politicians like to be called populists. It allows them to falsely posit themselves as the alternative to the status quo.</p>
<h2>3. It legitimises far-right politics</h2>
<p>By being erroneously tied to “the people” via the word “populism”, far-right demands are mistaken for democratic demands. It is therefore now common to see mainstream parties absorbing the politics of the far right on the flawed assumption that these ideas are “what the people want”.</p>
<p>The rights of minoritised communities such as migrants, asylum seekers, racialised people, LGBTQ+ communities, women and/or disabled people have all been under various levels of threat by mainstream elite actors, whether through policy, political campaigning or news coverage. Often, the people threatening these rights benefit from the pretence that they are simply responding to public opinion. Supposedly <a href="https://www.identitiesjournal.com/blog-collection/rethinking-nativism-the-racist-discourse-of-rishi-sunak-and-giorgia-meloni-and-the-increasingly-blurred-lines-between-the-mainstream-and-the-far-right">“centre-right”</a> governments are, therefore, given carte blanche to adopt draconian immigration policies. After all, it is in the name of “the people”.</p>
<h2>4. It blocks democratic progress by distracting us</h2>
<p>Populist hype is generally accompanied by a rise of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/feb/14/anti-populism-politics-why-champions-of-civility-keep-losing">anti-populist discourse</a>, which portrays “populism” as an existential threat to liberal democracy. Thinly concealed behind this pejorative use of the term “populism” is at best a distrust, if not outright antipathy, towards “the people”. </p>
<p>By blaming “the people” for the problems in our democracies, elites are absolved from having to interrogate their own role in facilitating the crisis. They can also use the very real threat posed by the far right to justify the need to support the status quo by warning “we are bad – but they are worse”.</p>
<h2>What is to be done?</h2>
<p>Reducing the far right to a “populist” threat allows the mainstream off the hook. When combating the far right, we must be honest about the decisions that have led us to this reactionary moment. If the mainstream does not take responsibility, it has no chance of defeating the monster that it has helped to create. This applies particularly to those who have a privileged access to shaping public discourse such as the media, politicians and academics to a lesser extent.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/look-to-the-mainstream-to-explain-the-rise-of-the-far-right-218536">Look to the mainstream to explain the rise of the far right</a>
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<p>The first step on this journey is using terms correctly. Calling the far right “populist” keeps us in our inertia. To activate the appropriate sense of urgency needed to defeat these trends, we must be honest about the kind of politics that we see in front of us. If the far right proudly wears the badge of “populism”, we must ask how it helps them. They know it grants them legitimacy. Why, then, should we play into the hands of extremists whose loathing of democracy has been repeatedly demonstrated?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224488/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alex Yates receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council South West Doctoral Training Partnership. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aurelien Mondon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Extremists benefit when we use euphemisms that confer on them an air of legitimacy.Aurelien Mondon, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of BathAlex Yates, Postgraduate Researcher in Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2213552024-01-18T16:49:32Z2024-01-18T16:49:32ZThe maths of rightwing populism: easy answers + confidence = reassuring certainty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570085/original/file-20240118-17-no0zv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=149%2C77%2C3426%2C1820&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock/Pictrider</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rightwing populists appear to be enjoying a <a href="https://theconversation.com/iowa-was-different-this-time-even-if-the-outcome-was-as-predicted-221094">surge</a> across the <a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-poised-to-score-big-at-next-european-elections-214702">western world</a>. For those who don’t support these parties, their appeal can be baffling and unsettling. They appear to play on people’s fears and offer somewhat trivial answers to difficult issues.</p>
<p>But the mathematics of human inference and cognition can help us understand what makes this a winning formula.</p>
<p>Because politics largely boils down to communication, the mathematics of communication theory can help us understand why voters are drawn to parties that use simple, loud messaging in their campaigning – as well as how they get away with using highly questionable messaging. Traditionally, this is the theory that enables us to listen to radio broadcasts and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Claude-Shannon#ref666143">make telephone calls</a>. But American mathematician <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norbert_Wiener">Norbert Wiener</a> went so far as to <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/153954.The_Human_Use_of_Human_Beings">argue</a> that social phenomena can only be understood via the theory of communication.</p>
<p>Wiener tried to explain different aspects of society by evoking a concept in science known as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/second-law-of-thermodynamics">second law of thermodynamics</a>. In essence, this law says that over time, order will turn into disorder, or, in the present context, reliable information will be overwhelmed by confusion, uncertainties and noise. In mathematics, the degree of disorder is often measured by a quantity called <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/entropy-physics">entropy</a>, so the second law can be rephrased by saying that over time, and on average, entropy will increase.</p>
<p>One of Wiener’s arguments is that as technologies for communication advance, people will circulate more and more inessential “noisy” information (think Twitter, Instagram and so on), which will overshadow facts and important ideas. This is becoming more pronounced with AI-generated disinformation. </p>
<p>The effect of the second law is significant in predicting the future form of society over a period of decades. But <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-023-43403-4">another aspect</a> of communication theory also comes into play in the more immediate term.</p>
<p>When we analyse information about a topic of interest, we will reach a conclusion that leaves us, on average, with the smallest uncertainty about that topic. In other words, our thought process attempts to minimise entropy. This means, for instance, when two people with opposing views on a topic are presented with an article on that subject, they will often take away different interpretations of the same article, with each confirming the validity of their own initial view. The reason is simple: interpreting the article as questioning one’s opinion will inevitably raise uncertainty.</p>
<p>In psychology, this effect is known as <a href="https://thedecisionlab.com/biases/confirmation-bias">confirmation bias</a>. It is often interpreted as an irrational or illogical trait of our behaviour, but we now understand the science behind it by borrowing concepts from communication theory. I call this a “<a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.797904/full">tenacious Bayesian</a>” behaviour because it follows from the <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-theorem/">Bayes theorem</a> of probability theory, which tells us how we should update our perspectives of the world as we digest noisy or uncertain information.</p>
<p>A corollary of this is that if someone has a strong belief in one scenario which happens to represent a false reality, then even if factual information is in circulation, it will take a long time for that person to change their belief. This is because a conversion from one certainty to another typically (but not always) requires a path that traverses uncertainties we instinctively try to avoid.</p>
<h2>Polarised society</h2>
<p>When the tenacious Bayesian effect is combined with Wiener’s second law, we can understand how society becomes polarised. The second law says there will be a lot of diverging information and noise around us, creating confusion and uncertainty. We are drawn to information that offers greater certainty, even if it is flawed. </p>
<p>For a binary issue, the greatest uncertainty happens when the two alternatives seem equally likely – and are therefore difficult to choose between. But for an individual person who believes in one of the two alternatives, the path of least uncertainty is to hold steady on that belief. So in a world in which any information can easily be disseminated far and wide but in which people are also immovable, society can easily be polarised.</p>
<h2>Where are the leftwing populists?</h2>
<p>If a society is maximally polarised, then we should find populists surging on both the left and right of the political spectrum. And yet that is not the case at the moment. The right is more dominant. The reason for this is, in part, that the left is not well-positioned to offer certainty. Why? Historically, socialism has rarely been implemented in running a country – not even the Soviet Union or China managed to implement it. </p>
<p>At least for now, the left (or centrists, for that matter) also seem a lot more cautious about knowingly offering unrealistic answers to complex problems. In contrast, the right offers (often false) certainty with confidence. It is not difficult to see that in a noisy environment, the loudest are heard the most. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-have-authoritarianism-and-libertarianism-merged-a-political-psychologist-on-the-vulnerability-of-the-modern-self-218949">Why have authoritarianism and libertarianism merged? A political psychologist on 'the vulnerability of the modern self'</a>
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<p>Today’s politics plays out against a backdrop of uncertainties that include wars in Ukraine and Gaza with little prospect of exit strategies in sight; the continued cost of living crisis; energy, food and water insecurity; migration; and so on. Above all, the impact of the climate crisis.</p>
<p>The answer to this uncertainty, according to rightwing populists, is to blame everything on outsiders. Remove migrants and all problems will be solved – and all uncertainties eradicated. True or false, the message is simple and clear. </p>
<p>In conveying this message, it is important to instil in the public an exaggerated fear of the impact of migration, so their message will give people a false sense of certainty. What if there are no outsiders? Then create one. Use the culture war to label the “experts” (judges, scholars, etc.) as the enemy of the people.</p>
<p>For populists to thrive, society needs to be divided so that people can feel certain about where they belong – and so that those on the opposing side of the argument can be ignored. </p>
<p>The problem, of course, is that there are rarely simple solutions to complex issues. Indeed, a political party campaigning for a tough migration policy but weak climate measures is arguably enabling mass migration on a scale unseen in modern history, because climate change will make <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/srccl/">many parts of the world uninhabitable</a>.</p>
<p>Wiener was already arguing in 1950 that we will pay the price for our actions at a time when it is most inconvenient to do so. Whatever needs to be done to solve complex societal issues, those who wish to implement what they believe are the right measures need to be aware that they have to win an election to do that – and that voters respond to simple and positive messages that will reduce the uncertainties hanging over their thoughts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221355/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dorje C Brody receives funding from the UK Engineering and Physical Science Research Council (EP/X019926/1).</span></em></p>In an uncertain world our natural instinct is to seek out answers that reassure, even when they don’t make sense.Dorje C. Brody, Professor of Mathematics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1969982023-12-11T14:18:15Z2023-12-11T14:18:15ZEU issues increasingly shaping national elections, research reveals, though left-right divide remains crucial<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510094/original/file-20230214-26-o5vnke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">europawahl</span> </figcaption></figure><p>The Treaty of Lisbon celebrates its 15th anniversary on 13 December. Looking back, <a href="https://www.sieps.se/globalassets/publikationer/2019/sieps-antologi-2019_2op-eng-web.pdf">experts agree that it played a big part in structuring the EU as we know it</a>. It reinforced the role of Commission President, to be elected by the European Parliament and share power with a newly created President of the European Council, the body that brings together EU heads of government. </p>
<p>So, the treaty strengthened both the Commission and the Council, effectively creating a dual executive for the EU. Following the treaty changes, the EU faced a succession of crises, including the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, Brexit, the COVID pandemic, and the invasion of Ukraine. These have reinforced the centrality of both institutions for EU decision-making. </p>
<p>This dual nature of the EU executive is a reminder that <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042214-044157">EU accountability vis-a-vis its citizens is <em>also</em> dual. </a>. The Commission, now elected by the Parliament signals the importance of the latter body for citizens’ ability determine EU policy. The renewed importance of the Council, as the intergovernmental executive body of the EU, underpins the role national elections play in holding the EU accountable. </p>
<p>Yet, when debates on the degree of democracy in the EU are held, or when institutional innovations are considered to increase the proximity between citizens and the EU, the focus tends to lie exclusively on the European Parliament (EP) elections, while national channels of accountability as a source of EU democratization tend to be disregarded. In order to counter that trend, <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-29187-6">our book</a> examines the EU’s national accountability channels, providing a detailed analysis of how the EU is debated in national media and parliaments. </p>
<h2>North and south under the microscope</h2>
<p>The research focuses on six countries – Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain from 2002-2021. Combining founding members of the EU with more recent entrants, these countries also differ in economic performance both before and after the Eurozone crisis.</p>
<p>The book notes an increasing importance of EU in the media and parliamentary debates. In terms of how they engage with the EU, these two arenas have inherently different logics. The media has a negativity bias. Therefore, as the media coverage of the EU issues grows, so does the negative tone toward it. In parliaments, the larger parties control debates, and they tend to act strategically. So, in countries such as Spain and Ireland with no eurosceptic party in Parliament, the EU is discussed to a greater extent by the larger parties. On the contrary, in countries where there is an eurosceptic party in parliament, the larger parties tend to discuss the EU less. This is probably to prevent the eurosceptic parties from gaining more visibility.</p>
<p>Both media and parliaments tend to focus on EU policies rather than notions of European belonging and identity. These findings are common to all countries, and suggest that both arenas are contributing to enable citizens to form opinions on EU policies rather than questioning EU membership. </p>
<p>Yet, differences do emerge between countries on how EU policies are debated. Namely, in Ireland, Spain and Portugal, EU policies are mostly discussed in the context of their effect on national policies. But in Germany, EU policies are discussed in a broader context.</p>
<p>So, the EU is being discussed mostly in terms of its policies. Citizens are therefore being provided with information about the EU which can then be used when making vote choices in legislative elections. </p>
<p>But is this occurring? Does Europe really matter in national elections? Our research, using different methods <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-29187-6_5">(experiments</a> and observational data), finds that this is indeed the case. If the EU matters, how does it compare to other factors which tend to explain vote choice? <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-29187-6_6">Despite the increasing importance of European factors, we found that traditional national left-right issues remain more significant defining factors of vote choice</a>. </p>
<p>But we found that the more EU policies were mentioned in the media, the more they impact how people vote. Regarding parliamentary debates, we find that the more eurosceptic parties discuss the EU in parliaments, the greater the importance that EU attitudes will have among these parties’ voters choice. </p>
<p>Therefore, our book establishes firmly the degree to which national governments are now selected across Europe partly on the basis of their stances on the EU. The national media environments, national parliamentary debates and legislative elections are not only important to legitimise governments at the national level, but also at the EU level. </p>
<p>The role that heads of government play in the European Council is not disconnected from voters choices back home when legislative elections are held. When discussing the quality of democracy with the EU and how it can be improved, it is necessary to take into account not only the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council, but also the quality of the national media, national parliaments and legislative elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marina Costa Lobo est Directrice et Professeure de Sciences Politiques à l'Institut de Sciences Sociales de l'Université de Lisbonne. Elle a reçu des financements de European Research Council, Consolidator Grant no.682125.</span></em></p>The Treaty of Lisbon celebrates its 15th anniversary on 13 December. Looking back, experts agree that it played a big part in structuring the EU as we know it. It reinforced the role of Commission President…Marina Costa Lobo, Professor in political science , Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme (FMSH)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2185362023-11-24T17:18:28Z2023-11-24T17:18:28ZLook to the mainstream to explain the rise of the far right<p>Javier Milei in Argentina. Geert Wilders in the Netherlands. These are the two latest “populist shocks” – the tip of the “populist wave” that comes crashing against the weakened defences of liberal democracies. </p>
<p>At the same time, former UKIP leader Nigel Farage benefits from the same “funwashing” on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2023/nov/19/im-a-celebrity-get-me-out-of-here-review-cakewalk-for-nigel-farage">I’m a Celebrity Get me out of Here!</a> as <a href="https://theconversation.com/pauline-hanson-built-a-political-career-on-white-victimhood-and-brought-far-right-rhetoric-to-the-mainstream-134661">Pauline Hanson</a>, leader of the most successful extreme right party in Australia in recent years, did when she was invited on Dancing with the Stars just a moment after her political career plummeted.</p>
<p>The contradiction in addressing the rise of far-right politics in public discourse could not be starker. And yet, it goes far deeper. </p>
<p>It should be obvious to anyone concerned about these politics and the threat they pose to democracy and certain communities, that humanising their leaders through fun reality TV shows or coverage of their hobbies rather than politics only serves to normalise them.</p>
<p>What is less obvious and yet just as damaging is the hyped coverage of the threat. Milei and Wilders are not “shocks”. The resurgence of reactionary politics is entirely predictable and has been traced for a long time. Yet every victory or rise is analysed as new and unexpected rather than part of a longer, wider process in which we are all implicated. </p>
<p>The same goes for “populism”. All serious research on the matter points to the populist nature of these parties being <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569317.2020.1844372">secondary at best</a>, compared to their far-right qualities. Yet, whether in the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263395720955036">media</a> or <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/whats-in-a-buzzword-a-systematic-review-of-the-state-of-populism-research-in-political-science/D9CD5E7E13DFA30FD05D41F32E6C122B">academia</a>, populism is generally used carelessly as a key defining feature. </p>
<p>Using “populist” instead of more accurate but also stigmatising terms such as “far-right” or “racist” acts as <a href="http://www.populismus.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/WP4-glynos-mondon-final-upload.pdf">a key legitimiser of far-right politics</a>. It lends these parties and politicians a veneer of democratic support through the etymological link to the people and erases their deeply elitist nature – what my co-author <a href="https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/sociology/people/aaron-winter">Aaron Winter</a> and I have termed <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/products/837-reactionary-democracy">“reactionary democracy”</a>.</p>
<p>What this points to is that the processes of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569317.2021.1949829">mainstreaming</a> and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09579265221095406">normalisation</a> of far-right politics have much to do with the mainstream itself, if not more than with the far right. Indeed, there can be no mainstreaming without the mainstream accepting such ideas in its fold. </p>
<p>In this case, the mainstreaming process has involved platforming, hyping and legitimising far-right ideas while seemingly opposing them and denying responsibility in the process.</p>
<p>While it would be naive to believe that the mainstream media tell us what to think, it is equally naive to ignore that it plays a key role regarding what we think about. As I argued <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/02633957221104726">in a recent article</a> on the issue of “immigration as a major concern”, this concern only exists when respondents think of their country as a whole. It disappears when they think about their own day-to-day lives. </p>
<p>This points to the mediated nature of our understanding of wider society which is essential if we are to think of the world beyond our immediate surrounding. Yet while essential, it relies on the need for trusted sources of information who decide what is worth priming and how to frame it.</p>
<p>It is this very responsibility that much of our media has <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/newe.12306">currently given up on or pretend they do not hold</a>, as if their editorial choices were random occurrences.</p>
<p>This could not have been clearer than when the Guardian launched a lengthy series on “the new populism” in 2018, headlining its opening <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/political-science/2018/nov/20/why-is-populism-suddenly-so-sexy-the-reasons-are-many">editorial</a> with: “Why is populism suddenly all the rage? In 1998, about 300 Guardian articles mentioned populism. In 2016, 2,000 did. What happened?”. At no point did any of the articles in the series reflect upon the simple fact that the decisions of Guardian editors may have played a role in the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263395720955036">increased use of the term</a>.</p>
<h2>A top-down process</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, blame is diverted onto conveniently “silent majorities” of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00380261231186021">“left-behind”</a> or a fantasised <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1070289X.2018.1552440?journalCode=gide20">“white working class”</a>.</p>
<p>We too often view the far right as an outsider – something separate from ourselves and distinct from our norms and mainstream. This ignores deeply entrenched structural inequalities and forms of oppression core to our societies. This is something I noted in a <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41269-022-00271-6">recent article</a>, that the absence of race and whiteness in academic discussion of such politics is striking. </p>
<p>My analysis of the titles and abstracts of over 2,500 academic articles in the field over the past five years showed that academics choose to frame their research away from such issues. Instead, we witness either a euphemisation or exceptionalisation of far-right politics, through a focus on topics such as elections and immigration rather than the wider structures at play. </p>
<p>This therefore leaves us with the need to reckon with the <a href="https://bath-ac-primo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/primo-explore/fulldisplay?docid=44BAT_ALMA_DS21135007360002761&context=L&vid=44BAT_VU1&lang=en_US&search_scope=CSCOP_44BAT_DEEP&adaptor=Local%20Search%20Engine&tab=local&query=any,contains,katy%20brown">crucial role</a> the mainstream plays in mainstreaming. Elite actors with privileged access to shaping public discourse through the media, politics and academia are not sitting within the ramparts of a mainstream fortress of good and justice besieged by growing waves of populism. </p>
<p>They are participating in an arena where power is deeply unevenly distributed, where the structural inequalities the far right wants to strengthen are also often core to our systems and where the rights of minoritised communities are precarious and unfulfilled. They have therefore a particular responsibility towards democracy and cannot blame the situation we all find ourselves in on others – whether it be the far right, fantasised silent majorities or minoritised communities. </p>
<p>Sitting on the fence is not an option for anyone who plays a role in shaping public discourse. This means self-reflection and self-criticism must be central to our ethos. </p>
<p>We cannot pretend to stand against the far right while referring to its politics as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/22/hillary-clinton-europe-must-curb-immigration-stop-populists-trump-brexit">“legitimate concerns”</a>. We must stand unequivocally by and be <a href="https://manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9781526157966/">in service of</a> every one of the communities at the sharp end of oppression.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218536/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aurelien Mondon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Extremists are not ‘capturing’ our systems – they are part of them.Aurelien Mondon, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2164942023-11-20T17:32:12Z2023-11-20T17:32:12ZNostalgia in politics: pan-European study sheds light on how (and why) parties appeal to the past in their election campaigns<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556651/original/file-20231030-29-e0kxju.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=71%2C71%2C3336%2C2118&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Unsplash/Jon Tyson</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Have you ever felt nostalgic when thinking about the past? Then you are not alone. According to <a href="https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/eupinions_Nostalgia.pdf">survey research</a>, around two-thirds of the European public feel nostalgic.</p>
<p>Nostalgia is defined as a predominantly positive emotion associated with recalling memories of important events, usually experienced with people who are close to us. And these feelings may not be limited to personal experiences: in politics, nostalgia may refer to a longing for a more prosperous past or lost cultural traditions.</p>
<p>Take the Italian far-right party, Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy), which currently leads the country’s coalition government. The party’s 2022 <a href="https://www.businesspost.ie/analysis-opinion/aidan-regan-meloni-capitalises-on-cultural-nostalgia-in-a-bid-to-make-italy-great-again/">manifesto</a> contained numerous nostalgic references. </p>
<p>One standout claim was that the “natural resources and artistic heritage of the nation are an inheritance to be guarded and enhanced”. Another was that “the elderly represent our history: a heritage of experiences, skills, talents that have helped to the birth and growth of our nation”. </p>
<p>Such statements draw upon a shared pride in the nation’s past to knit together a compelling narrative.</p>
<p>Increasingly, there is evidence that nostalgic feelings can affect our political views. Recent studies on the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12593">Netherlands</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000666">Turkey</a> support these findings. </p>
<p>Nostalgic citizens are less satisfied with the government and more likely to vote for radical right parties. In a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123423000571">new publication</a>, we examined the extent to which political parties capitalise on nostalgic rhetoric in their campaigns by analysing <a href="https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/L198GI">1,650 election manifestos</a> published by parties across 24 European democracies between 1946 and 2018. </p>
<p>Election manifestos, by definition, mostly contain promises for the future. They are a list of pledges a party promises to implement should it be part of a future government. But we also discovered that on average, about 10% of a party manifesto is dedicated to <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/715165">discussing the past</a>.</p>
<h2>Central and Eastern Europe: nostalgia reigns</h2>
<p>We found that parties in central and eastern Europe and southern Europe are more nostalgic than those in northern and western Europe. The average manifesto in central and eastern Europe included 44 nostalgic sentences per 1,000 sentences, while in western and northern Europe, the average manifesto contains fewer than half that.</p>
<p>It’s also notable that many of the most nostalgic parties across the continent are classified as nationalist by researchers at the <a href="https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/">Manifesto Project</a>. Examples of highly nostalgic nationalist parties include All for Latvia, the Estonian People’s Union, Golden Dawn in Greece, Sweden Democrats and the French National Rally (formerly the National Front). </p>
<p>That said, although nationalists are most prone to nostalgia, nostalgic rhetoric is evident across the political spectrum and was found in eight out of ten manifestos in some form or another. </p>
<hr>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/contested-memory-in-giorgia-melonis-italy-how-her-far-right-party-is-waging-a-subtle-campaign-to-commemorate-fascist-figures-211465">Contested memory in Giorgia Meloni's Italy: how her far-right party is waging a subtle campaign to commemorate fascist figures</a>
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<p>It also appears to be cultural conservatism rather than economic conservatism that makes a party more likely to use nostalgia. Nostalgic rhetoric addresses cultural issues much more frequently than economic topics. </p>
<p>This is revealing about nostalgia as a device. Parties seem to strategically employ nostalgic references and choose to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/715165">focus on either the past, present or future</a> when talking about a given topic depending on the wider political context. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231197456">Other research</a> shows that parties tend to frame education, economic and environmental policy with a future-related focus, while security, immigration and defence policy are more often referred to with an emphasis on the past.</p>
<h2>Why it matters</h2>
<p>There is nothing inherently wrong with nostalgia, but the use of nostalgia in political campaigning is, by definition, strategic. And its prevalence in the documents we examined suggests parties clearly see it as a useful tool.</p>
<p>But a focus on the past should not replace a critical evaluation of a party’s plans for the future. A nostalgic sentiment, such as “our historic market towns, cathedral cities, and unspoiled countryside are the envy of the world”, is not an electoral pledge. </p>
<p>Its use could therefore be seen as a device to obfuscate when a party lacks concrete solutions or proposals for the future of the nation they seek to govern. Given our propensity towards nostalgia, it could also be used as a narrative device that might provide cover for parties seeking to introduce potentially controversial policies. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000121">Research</a> on policies such as gun control, immigration and social justice show voters can be swayed in directions they might not normally take if they are presented with nostalgic messaging at the same time. </p>
<p>If socially conservative parties have identified it as a powerful rhetorical device, perhaps socially progressive parties could find a way to use it for more positive reasons as well. Since a significant portion of society has nostalgic feelings, such messages are unlikely to disappear from political discourse anytime soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216494/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Müller receives funding from the Science Foundation Ireland and the Swiss National Science Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>This research has been funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany's Excellence Strategy – EXC 2126/1-390838866.</span></em></p>Nationalist parties are the most likely to be found dreaming of a glorious past in their campaign literature, especially in central and eastern Europe.Stefan Müller, Assistant Professor and Ad Astra Fellow, School of Politics and International Relations, University College DublinSven-Oliver Proksch, Professor of Political Science and Chair for European and Multilevel Politics, Cologne Center for Comparative Politics, University of CologneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2126362023-09-24T15:30:31Z2023-09-24T15:30:31ZDebate: Why France needs the Fifth Republic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549370/original/file-20230920-17-pboaim.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2048%2C1361&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">French citizens celebrate Emmanuel Macron's victory in the country's 2017 presidential elections. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/number7cloud/34527195605">Lorie Shaull/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>France’s current constitution is its fifth, and it’s built for stability – literally. Established in 1958 after the government collapsed in the throes of the Algerian War, the new constitution featured a president with considerable powers. That made the country’s governments more stable – a welcome change from the Third and Fourth Republics – but it’s also left opposition parties consistently frustrated.</p>
<p>There have long been calls for greater proportionality in the National Assembly – then-President Francois Mitterrand <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/politique/proportionnelle-en-1986-cetait-un-coup-politique-de-mitterrand-20210220_XQE5EOMTNRALTHP64S72N7LPHM/">heeded them in 1986</a>, albeit in an attempt to prevent defeat in the legislative elections. In the last decade they’ve grown louder, however, with parties on the left and right insisting that the composition of the assembly should more closely mirror the results of presidential elections.</p>
<p>In 2022, both the far right (Rassemblement National) and the far left (La France Insoumise) successfully sent a staggering number of representatives to the assembly. However unprecedented, this result only confirmed that any political party needs local anchorage and time to climb the constitutional ladder. But for La France Insoumise, the Fifth Republic – regardless of the stability it has brought to the country – should be abolished and replaced by a new constitution that, to put it in a nutshell, <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2013/05/04/01002-20130504ARTFIG00271-la-vie-republique-en-six-principes.php">strangely resembles that of the Third Republic</a>.</p>
<h2>Taming executive power, ensuring political stablity</h2>
<p>In a lecture titled “France: Politics, Power, and Protest” given at University College Dublin, I strove to explain to undergraduate students that the successive régimes stemmed from both a willingness to tame the executive power and a quest to ensure political stability. The Third Republic (1870–1940) modernised the country and implemented state laws that schooled multiple generations into becoming citizens. It was not without flaws: between 1876 and 1940, <a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.149663/page/n203/mode/2up?view=theater&q=103+cabinets">101 cabinets came and went</a>, essentially due to parliamentary instability and a total absence of authority within the executive power.</p>
<p>France’s defeat in 1940 finished off the Third Republic and eventually led to the Vichy Régime. The Fourth Republic only lasted from 1946 to 1958, yet paved the way for European integration. The war in Algeria convinced the authorities of the time, in particular Charles de Gaulle, that a new system of governance was needed, and the <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/why-france-its-fifth-republic-180962983/">Fifth Republic was born</a>.</p>
<p>Out of self-respect perhaps, the French Revolution has always been taught to secondary and high-school pupils as an ethnocentric turning point, completely disconnected from foreign experiences. Before and in the aftermath of the revolution, however, an entire generation of would-be revolutionaries looked toward the United States. Concepts such as checks and balances, bicameral system, and the centralisation of the decision-making process in the hands of the legislative power intrigued minds in Europe. Prominent French intellectuals regularly met with the thinkers behind these concepts. Thomas Jefferson, who served as minister plenipotentiary for France (1785–1789), was befriended by Condorcet and Mirabeau. In this way, acquaintances and networks between American and French élites <a href="https://quod.lib.umich.edu/w/wsfh/0642292.0035.012/--alien-origins-of-the-french-revolution-american-scottish?rgn=main;view=fulltext">fed the revolution</a>.</p>
<p>Later, Alexis de Tocqueville’s <em>Democracy in America</em>, published in 1835, confirmed in French political thought the image of the United States as an appropriate governmental system where the separation of powers – an idea heavily influenced by the thinking of political philosopher Montesquieu – to ensure personal liberties to American citizens.</p>
<h2>Looking to Germany and the UK</h2>
<p>Today, when <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/16/opinion/france-elections-melenchon-macron.html">finding fault with France’s institutions</a>, the systems of neighbouring countries such as Germany and Britain are often brought up. The comparison is not apt, however, for British and German parliamentary systems <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2022/07/12/une-recomposition-politique-sur-le-modele-allemand-ne-peut-se-realiser-sur-des-bases-factices_6134410_3232.html">do not meet France’s standards for process and governance</a>. And while such systems succeed in Britain and Germany, France’s history has shown that it is a nation that regards political compromise as a sign of institutional weakness.</p>
<p>Further, it would be inconceivable for French taxpayers to accept the existence of a shadow president and watch a prime minister elected by indirect universal suffrage touring the capitals of Europe and negotiating bills and policies. Nothing today, save for unpopular reforms presented to parliament and <a href="https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/pres-de-trois-francais-sur-quatre-sont-mecontents-d-emmanuel-macron-22-04-2023-2517400_20.php">Emmanuel Macron’s general unpopularity</a> can justify overthrowing France’s constitution. On that point, Macron’s <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2023/03/17/french-pension-reform-macron-s-isolation-revealed-by-recourse-to-article-49-3_6019685_5.html">repeated use of the article 49.3</a> to ram the government’s retirement reform has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/06/vive-la-revolution-but-is-france-ready-to-establish-a-sixth-republic">comforted advocates of a “Sixth Republic”</a>, who feel that the current constitution gives too much power to a single individual.</p>
<p>France’s current constitution consolidates the state, secures constitutional representations, and permits a coalition between the government and the president in times of crisis. It permits the executive power to react quickly, summon the National Assembly, and implement political responses when needed. Most importantly, it guarantees to the president the constitutional ability to act in the domestic sphere while leading the foreign policy of the country. All the mechanisms consolidate the three branches of power while permitting the president to participate both in domestic politics and represent France on the international scene.</p>
<p>But is this too much power? In 1964, then-<em>député</em> François Mitterrand published an essay declaring his opposition to the Fifth Republic, arguing that the institutions had been framed for a single leader, Charles de Gaulle. The title of Mitterrand’s book spoke for itself: <a href="https://www.mitterrand.org/le-coup-d-etat-permanent-465.html"><em>The Permanent Coup d’État</em></a>. When he was elected president in 1981, however, he accepted the role of presidential monarch after having so <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-60th-anniversary-of-frances-fifth-republic-out-of-breath-105747">vehemently criticised it</a>.</p>
<h2>The flip side of power</h2>
<p>Power is a precious gift, to be used with caution. While the Fifth Republic certainly confers great power to its presidents, and so draws <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230413-france-to-witness-12th-nationwide-day-of-protests-against-macron-s-pension-law">political hatred and violence against them</a> (rather than against the assembly), this system guarantees political stability. Calling for the establishment of new institutions at a time of social crisis and spreading populism is not productive. The optics also aren’t good: the image projected is that of modern revolutionaries, handsomely paid by the very institutions they wish to overthrow, cheering the idea that Emmanuel Macron could precipitate the fall of the Fifth Republic.</p>
<p>The strength of the Fifth Republic is that presidents can articulate a vision for the country. They can guide, define priorities, and pave the way for big projects. That was the case in 1975 when President Valérie Giscard d’Estaing and Minister for Health Simone Veil furthered women’s rights by legalising abortion. So too was Mitterrand’s <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20210918-french-public-divided-over-death-penalty-40-years-after-its-abolishment">abolition of the death penalty in 1981</a> and Francois Holland’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22579093">legalisation of same-sex marriage</a> in 2013.</p>
<p>Any French president is entitled to follow their political conscience. It is then up to parliament to debate the vision and initiatives and to the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2022/05/02/what-can-the-french-president-do-with-or-without-a-parliamentary-majority_5982224_8.html">Constitutional Council to validate the final text</a>.</p>
<p>Citizens across France certainly <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-brief-history-of-the-long-standing-mistrust-between-the-french-people-and-the-elites-165569">distrust Emmanuel Macron</a>, but this need not entail an automatic rejection of the nation’s institutions. What France needs now is political stability and time to address issues that other European countries also face. And the present constitution positions the nation’s leadership for precisely that. France has tried many régimes in the past, and the Fifth Republic is effective – it is appropriate for the times in which we live and for democracy, and allows broad political representation and legitimacy. While it certainly places significant power into the hands of a single person, the constitution ensures that it is still up to the people to decide who shall govern their lives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212636/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emmanuel Destenay ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Opposition forces in France are using the president’s unpopularity to push for a new constitution. It’s a dangerous game.Emmanuel Destenay, Research Fellow, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2051002023-05-15T15:43:20Z2023-05-15T15:43:20ZA political mountain to climb: why the Alps are such a commonly used metaphor in European thought<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525702/original/file-20230511-37636-r2hri4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=59%2C47%2C3926%2C2187&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/sacra-di-san-michele-unusual-views-1617051133">Shutterstock/Federico Cappone</a></span></figcaption></figure><blockquote>
<p><em>È qui, su queste montagne, in queste valli … che la Repubblica celebra oggi le sue radici con la festa della Liberazione</em>.</p>
<p>It is here on these mountains, in these valleys, that the Republic today celebrates the day of its Liberation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>With <a href="https://www.repubblica.it/editoriali/2023/04/26/news/25_aprile_festa_della_liberazione-397603402/?ref=RHLF-BG-I397631762-P2-S1-T1">these words</a> and evocative references, Italian president Sergio Mattarella recently marked the 78th anniversary of the end of the fascist dictatorship in Italy. He was speaking during a visit to <a href="https://www.ideawebtv.it/2023/04/25/mattarella-e-qui-che-la-repubblica-celebra-oggi-le-sue-radici-celebra-la-festa-della-liberazionea-video/">Cuneo</a>, in the north of the country. </p>
<p>This was the first time Italy has celebrated the date under the leadership of prime minister Giorgia Meloni and Fratelli d’Italia, a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/apr/23/the-guardian-view-on-giorgia-meloni-normalising-the-radical-right">party</a> that finds its <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/06/why-giorgia-meloni-wont-distance-herself-from-italys-fascist-past/">roots in Mussolini’s fascism</a> and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/04/25/in-italy-the-memory-of-anti-fascism-is-being-abused_6024177_4.html">often flirts with its ideas today</a>. Mattarella used his status as a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/sergio-mattarella-italy-captive-president/">unity figure</a> to elevate anti-fascism above party politics and to uphold it as a constitutive element of a democratic state.</p>
<p>He quoted eminent Italian legal expert and a founding father of the Italian constitution, Piero Calamandrei:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you want to go on pilgrimage to the place where our constitution was born, go to the mountains where partisans fell.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The location of Mattarella’s speech was evidently significant even before he uttered these words. As early as <a href="http://cuneo.anpi.it/cuneo">1947</a>, the Piedmontese province of Cuneo was recognised as one of the most symbolic sites of the Italian resistance against the Italian fascist and the German Nazi regimes.</p>
<p>And Mattarella’s decision to specifically mention mountains is no coincidence. He was following a long tradition of using such imagery to make a political point. During my research for an <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-emotions-of-internationalism-9780198848325?cc=gb&lang=en&">academic monograph</a> on this topic, I found that communists, Catholics and fascists alike have deployed images of mountains – and particularly the Alps – in their rhetoric, each ascribing them with their own meaning.</p>
<p>In Italy, for instance, communist workers’ groups such as the Club Alpino Operaio and the Unione Operaia Escursionisti Italiani organised mountain stays for workers they wished to keep away from drinking and other vices. In an alpine setting, they thought it would be easier to instil solidarity among proletarians across borders. </p>
<p>Fascists used the Alps as grounds on which to improve the health of the nation. Like the Nazis in Germany, they opened <a href="http://www.lecolonie.com/Colonia_montana_PNF_Genova_Rovegno_en.htm">summer camps and colonies for children</a> to increase their physical strength and to boost their fascist education. </p>
<p>Catholics also organised hiking trips and camping stays for young people, stressing that class differences could be erased and moral and religious values be upheld more easily in an alpine environment.</p>
<h2>Literary trope</h2>
<p>From the 19th century, books such as Johanna Spyri’s Heidi depicted mountains as healthy and conducive to friendship. But after the first world war, the Alps came to represent the <a href="https://www.histecon.magd.cam.ac.uk/frontiers/landscape_memory.html">violent fighting that took place on them</a>. Indeed, as global warming melts the ice, <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/141017-white-war-first-world-war-italy-austro-hungarian-mountains-history">some relics</a> of the carnage that unfolded there continue to emerge. </p>
<p>More than other geographical features such as seas or lakes, mountains came to represent higher political ideals. As famously noted by German critic <a href="https://archive.org/details/fromcaligaritohi00krac">Sigfried Kracauer</a>, Bergfilm (or “mountain films”) by directors such as <a href="https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0266691/">Arnold Fanck</a> and his mentee <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/leni-riefenstahl">Leni Riefenstahl</a> pitted individuals against nature and immortalised the Alps as the embodiment of national “purity”. That aesthetic would go on to be appropriated by the Nazi regime. </p>
<p>For other movements, the Alps expressed the imperative of avoiding another conflict after the first world war and ensuring permanent peace. The “Alpinist” Pope Achille Ratti (1857–1939), who reigned as Pope Pius XI from 1922 to 1939, in 1923 proclaimed Bernard of Menthon the patron saint of the mountains, and <a href="https://archive.org/details/scrittialpinisti00pius/page/n11/mode/2up">wrote</a> about the Alps as a preferred place for peaceful interaction among people.</p>
<p>The League of Nations, whose main site was in Geneva, often emphasised its proximity to the mountains. In its publicity, it often used alpine imagery to present itself as strong, clean and noble.</p>
<h2>Political metaphor</h2>
<p>Such references and associations are not simply decorative. Indeed, as my research shows, historically they proved quite powerful. The League’s choice of alpine imagery and overall “emotional style” proved long-lasting, though in the late 1930s it backfired as it allowed the institution to be stereotyped as distant and ill-equipped to deal with a gritty, real world.</p>
<p>In modern times, localist movements like the Italian political party the Lega Nord, or Northern League, have appropriated mountain foods such as <a href="http://www.iitaly.org/magazine/dining-in-out/articles-reviews/article/polenta-vs-cous-cous-legally-banning-ethnic-food">polenta</a> as a means to question both national and European institutions. In their rhetoric, this quintessentially alpine dish serves as a marker of local identity and the embodiment of natural and artisan production. It is the opposite of the artificial, industrial, cosmopolitan goods coming in via global trade.</p>
<p>Meloni’s own Fratelli d’Italia organised a large gathering <a href="https://www.fratelliditaliasenato.it/stati-generali-della-montagna/">in the Italian Apennines</a> in 2020, a kind of general assembly aimed at developing specific measures to protect and support the mountain regions, including their “traditions” and “identity”.</p>
<p>The party later <a href="https://www.fratelli-italia.it/2021/02/17/giorgia-meloni-la-montagna-merita-rispetto-non-speranza-video/">campaigned against closing</a> Italy’s ski resorts during the pandemic, <a href="https://www.fratelli-italia.it/2021/02/17/giorgia-meloni-la-montagna-merita-rispetto-non-speranza-video/">arguing</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><em>La montagna è parte fondamentale dell’identità italiana e non può essere umiliata.</em></p>
<p>Mountains are a fundamental part of Italian identity and cannot be humiliated.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The use of the term “humiliated” is reminiscent of fascist rhetoric and slogans that often equated compromise with humiliation and often glorified pride – or <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20160229/trump-causes-storm-by-tweeting-quote-from-italys-mussolini">“living a day as a lion”</a> – as a marker of moral fortitude and strength. “Italian identity” refers to the fascist use of mountains as natural borders, as well as to the policies of forced <a href="https://www.eurac.edu/en/blogs/eureka/when-conflict-is-written-in-stone">Italianisation of the populations living within them</a>.</p>
<p>Seen against this backdrop, Mattarella’s choice to point out the symbolic value of mountains and to reclaim their significance in the history of Italian anti-fascism thus acquire new significance. By adopting a strong emotional style, the Italian president put forth an alternative version of pride and a bold response to growing far-right movements. </p>
<p>As in the <a href="https://www.doppiozero.com/beppe-fenoglio-montagna">writings by Beppe Fenoglio</a>, one of Cuneo’s landmark resistance fighters and writers, mountains in Mattarella’s narrative serve as a space to uphold the country’s moral fabric and a vantage point from which to ponder how to save the world in trouble down below.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205100/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ilaria Scaglia received funding for part of this research through a Volkswagen–Mellon Postdoctoral Fellowship for Research in Germany (2016–2017). She sits on the board of the Coordinating Council for Women in History (CCWH).</span></em></p>For the Italian president, the region is where his nation’s constitution was born.Ilaria Scaglia, Senior Lecturer in History, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2051492023-05-11T11:36:26Z2023-05-11T11:36:26ZEurovision 2023: why the stage itself is the silent star of the contest<p>This week, Liverpool stages one of the <a href="https://eurovision.tv/mediacentre/release/183-million-viewers">world’s largest live televised events</a>, the Eurovision Song Contest. I grew up watching it as an annual family get-together. </p>
<p>Now, as a lecturer in theatre and scenography – the study and practice of how set, sound, light and costume work together in an event – I have come to appreciate the immense logistical effort this entertainment behemoth requires. </p>
<p>More fascinatingly though, it is an extraordinary example of media and performance history, providing a yearly snapshot of pan-European <a href="https://theconversation.com/eurovision-even-before-the-singing-starts-the-contest-is-a-fascinating-reflection-of-international-rules-and-politics-204934">national identities and politics</a>.</p>
<p>While the contest’s rules state that <a href="https://eurovision.tv/about/rules">it is a non-political event</a>, it undeniably puts international relations on display. But while looking at different countries’ acts and voting patterns offers interesting insights, there is a silent star of the event that often goes unnoticed – the stage.</p>
<h2>Staging a nation</h2>
<p>Since the contest’s inception in 1956, there has been no serious discussion about the way Eurovision is an exercise in staging nation, nationality and nationalism in the literal sense – namely how these ideas inform the scenography.</p>
<p>2023 marks the first time Eurovision will be hosted in the runner-up’s country due to war, with the UK hosting on behalf of Ukraine. </p>
<p>The host’s stage set-up must be everything and nothing at the same time. It needs to provide a flexible, adaptable canvas for the wide-ranging individual acts of up to 44 countries. At the same time, it must offer a memorable and distinct experience to measure up to previous iterations of the competition. </p>
<p>The stage also needs to embody that year’s chosen theme, while meeting the extensive requirements of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), which organises the event, in order to allow the competition to run efficiently.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/kDPBB09eiXs?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Inside Liverpool Arena as the Eurovision 2023 build got underway.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>2023’s theme is “united by music”. After the UK’s difficult departure from the EU, it now faces the challenge of staging itself as part of a united European community. Meanwhile, it also needs to give space to Ukraine to do the same. </p>
<p>The Liverpool stage’s designer, Julio Himede, has repeatedly offered the <a href="https://recessed.space/00097-Julio-Himede-Eurovision">image of a hug</a> – of open arms welcoming Ukraine and the world – as central to the stage’s spatial configuration.</p>
<p>The early days of Eurovision were a much smaller affair than nowadays. When the UK first hosted in 1960 at the Royal Festival Hall in London, it seated just 2,500 people. That’s less than a quarter of this year’s 11,000 at the Liverpool arena.</p>
<p>And if you have been watching the semi-finals, you’ll already have a good sense of the sheer scale of this year’s stage. At 450m², it is almost as big as a basketball court. With an integrated lighting design through video-capable floor and ceiling tiling and huge LED screens, the only apt descriptor is “spectacular”.</p>
<p>For Eurovision, the concepts, symbols and metaphors underpinning the design have to work in tandem with the creative vision of each delegation, as well as the 45 second turnover between acts in the live show.</p>
<p>The design concept also has to be one that acknowledges the particular situation of this year’s contest and simultaneously unites the identities of Ukraine and the UK. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the image of the hug that underpins the sweeping curve of the main stage space aims to offer a more universal theme, rather than one which is culturally specific. Viewers will notice the “open arms” of the stage are echoed in the arrangement of the “green room”, where the national delegations are located during the show.</p>
<p>In this sense, Eurovision is a prime example of a “soft power” approach to international relations, which works by persuasion or influence, rather than the “hard power” of economic sanctions or military intervention. </p>
<h2>The UK after Brexit</h2>
<p>This year, it will be fascinating to see how much space the UK will give to Ukraine, not only last year’s winner but a nation in need of international recognition and support. And to what extent the UK will use this event, post-Brexit, to stage itself as a welcoming part of Europe.</p>
<p>The UK does have a history of highly successful <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/stage/theatreblog/2012/jul/31/olympic-opening-ceremony-agitprop-theatre">agit-prop</a> events, which have engaged audiences emotionally to shape public opinion. Think back to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/stage/theatreblog/2012/jul/31/olympic-opening-ceremony-agitprop-theatre">2012 London Olympics opening ceremony</a>, which strove to inspire <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642529.2014.909674">a sense of national identity</a>. </p>
<p>In 2023, the UK sees itself in the middle of global instability and national tension over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/mar/16/hostile-authoritarian-uk-downgraded-in-civic-freedoms-index">mounting authoritarianism</a> and <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/society/articles-reports/2023/02/07/yougov-cost-living-segmentation">widening social divisions</a>. Once again, it has the chance to use an international stage to put forward an idealised narrative.</p>
<p>In any such example, the stage underpins the entire event. It is essential to the atmosphere for the live audience and fundamental to its appearance on television. </p>
<p>There is no doubt that Eurovision 2023 is a staging extravaganza and will test the UK’s capability to shake off its <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/britain-is-the-sick-man-of-europe-again/">“sick man of Europe”</a> image. It is a stage which offers the UK the opportunity to adjust its global image in line with the contest’s welcoming theme. </p>
<p>It will be interesting to see whether the image of open arms for the world is sincere or cynical.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205149/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lara Maleen Kipp does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>2023 sees the UK host the Eurovision Song Contest on behalf of Ukraine. But what role does the stage itself have to play in the musical spectacle?Lara Maleen Kipp, Lecturer in Theatre and Scenography, Aberystwyth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2021852023-03-22T16:51:02Z2023-03-22T16:51:02ZFrench governments’ long record of bypassing parliament: a brief history of article 49.3<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516697/original/file-20230321-18-67e3xp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C93%2C4484%2C2886&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">file hhkleh</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Emboldened by <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-macrons-move-to-force-through-pension-reform-all-eyes-are-now-on-frances-trade-unions-201713">united trade unions</a>, the tug of war between the street and the government over Emmanuel Macron’s pension reform had mostly taken on the form of strikes and demonstrations since mid-January.</p>
<p>However, the government’s decision to bypass the lower chamber by invoking article 49.3 of the French constitution on Thursday 16 March has now sharply pitted Macron’s relative majority against opposition parties. On Monday 20 March, it <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2023/03/20/macron-survives-no-confidence-vote-over-french-pension-reform_6020075_5.html">survived a critical no-confidence vote</a> by a mere 9 votes, precipitating the adoption of the bill and prompting thousands to pour into the streets in spontaneous protests.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, an <a href="https://www.ifop.com/publication/les-francais-et-la-reforme-des-retraites-ifop-lexpress/">ever-growing majority of French people</a> and protesters reject legislation, which would increase the minimum retirement age from 62 to 64.</p>
<p>Far from constituting an exception, 16 March marks the 100th time under France’s Fifth Republic that executive chose to draw on special powers to force through an unpopular measure. President Macron used the article once in his first term (2017-2022), and 11 times since the start of his second term, in June 2022. Introduced in the Fifth Republic’s Constitution in 1958 authored by Michel Debré, article 19 paragraph 3 of France’s Constitution – known widely as “49.3” – was intended to “rationalise” the parliamentary system and resolve crises and deadlocks by handing over the reins to the executive.</p>
<p>Regardless of their affiliation, successive French governments over the last 20 years have almost systematically resorted to it to pass projects that profoundly modify the country’s welfare system or labour regulations – even if it means backing down afterwards under pressure from the street.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516988/original/file-20230322-18-7gocox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516988/original/file-20230322-18-7gocox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=593&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516988/original/file-20230322-18-7gocox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=593&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516988/original/file-20230322-18-7gocox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=593&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516988/original/file-20230322-18-7gocox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516988/original/file-20230322-18-7gocox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516988/original/file-20230322-18-7gocox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An occupied square in Toulouse during the May 1968 movement.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:11-12.06.68_Mai_68._Nuit_d%27%C3%A9meutes._Manif._Barricades.D%C3%A9g%C3%A2ts_(1968)_-_53Fi1037.jpg?uselang=fr">André Cros/Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>May 68 was also a parliamentary crisis</h2>
<p>A key reference in the history of protest movements over the past 50 years, the crisis of May 68 did not just take place in the lecture halls and in the streets. It also inspired opposition to Gaullism, the political thought spawned by the leader of French resistance during World War II and former president Charles de Gaulle (1959-1969).</p>
<p>Worn out by 10 years in office, de Gaulle hung to power by a threadbare majority, be it in public opinion or the national assembly. On 24 April 1968, a vote of no-confidence on public broadcasting reforms failed to succeed for lack of 8 votes. As the executive grappled with how it ought to respond to the demands of students and employees, the opposition issued a new <a href="https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/15/evenements/2018/mai-68-s-invite-dans-l-hemicycle-les-seances-du-14-et-22-mai-1968">no-confidence vote</a>, which was discussed in a <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-parlements1-2008-1-page-134.htm">climate of extreme tension</a> on 21 and 22 May.</p>
<p>Then the leader of the non-communist left, François Mitterrand (who went on to become president from 1981 to 1995), spoke of a regime crisis which undermined the “system” in power and called for a political “alternative” that he was ready to embody. Although critical of the government’s management of the crisis, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (president from 1974 to 1981) and his Independent Republican group stood by the executive. The no-confidence vote failed, with 233 deputies voting in favour – 11 short of the 244 required.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516997/original/file-20230322-28-6asp9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Michel Debré, prime minister from 1959 to 1962, and President Charles de Gaulle." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516997/original/file-20230322-28-6asp9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516997/original/file-20230322-28-6asp9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1827&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516997/original/file-20230322-28-6asp9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1827&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516997/original/file-20230322-28-6asp9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1827&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516997/original/file-20230322-28-6asp9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=2295&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516997/original/file-20230322-28-6asp9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=2295&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516997/original/file-20230322-28-6asp9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=2295&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Above: Michel Debré, prime minister from 1959 to 1962, was the author of the constitution of France’s Fifth Republic. Below: then-president Charles de Gaulle.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikipedia</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The parliamentary win didn’t suffice to restore the legitimacy of the government, however, amid unrelenting student and workers’ protests. On 30 May, de Gaulle therefore followed the advice of his prime minister, Georges Pompidou, by triggering new <a href="http://juspoliticum.com/article/L-Executif-sous-tension-Les-enseignements-de-Mai-68-1333.html">parliamentary elections</a> after having toyed for a time with the idea of a referendum over the reform.</p>
<p>Tapping into fears of revolutionary disorder, the Gaullists secured an unprecedented majority in the legislative elections of <a href="https://www.persee.fr/doc/rfsp_0035-2950_1968_num_18_5_393112">23 and 30 June 1968</a>. But the victory was then, once again, precarious, and all too tied to that particular context. In reality, the civil unrest of 1968 dealt a severe blow to the government, prompting de Gaulle to resign 10 months later following the failure of the April 1969 constitutional referendum on government decentralisation.</p>
<h2>Mass protests</h2>
<p>Mass demonstrations rocked the executive again in 1984. Led by Pierre Mauroy (prime minister under François Mitterand from 1981 to 1984), the predominantly socialist government faced virulent opposition over the Savary bill, which aimed to create a unified and secular national-education system.</p>
<p>The government had the majority needed to adopt the text, which was part of 110 proposals put forward by Mitterrand in 1981. However, it succumbed to the use of article 49.3 on 23 May 1984 to push the bill after a first reading in the National Assembly.</p>
<p>Pressure on the street and in public opinion was such that Mitterrand eventually announced the withdrawal of the bill on 12 July 1984, resulting in the resignations of Education Minister Alain Savary and Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy.</p>
<p>Two years later, Jacques Chirac took the same decision amid large-scale protests against the Devaquet bill, which sought to allow universities to select students and introduce competition within higher education. </p>
<h2>1995: The mother of all protests against French pension reform</h2>
<p>Between 1988 and 1993, socialist governments only enjoyed relative majorities in the national assembly. But when they resorted to article 49.3 or faced no-confidence votes that sometimes nearly toppled them, it was never in a context of mass or radical protests over reforms.</p>
<p>This changed in November-December 1995 with <a href="https://theconversation.com/pension-reform-in-france-macron-and-demonstrators-resume-epic-tussle-begun-over-30-years-ago-198354">opposition to an austerity package known by the name of the then prime minister</a>, Alain Juppé. Intended to tighten to public finances ahead of France’s adoption of the euro currency, the reforms would have – among others – raised employees’ contribution to retirement funds and aligned specialised retirement regimes with that of the general public.</p>
<p>The bill provoked unrest on a scale unseen since 1968, even though the government held a large majority in the two assemblies. As in 1986, the government ended up withdrawing its bill on 15 December 1995 without consulting the national assembly.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517003/original/file-20230322-18-6q37kh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517003/original/file-20230322-18-6q37kh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517003/original/file-20230322-18-6q37kh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517003/original/file-20230322-18-6q37kh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517003/original/file-20230322-18-6q37kh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517003/original/file-20230322-18-6q37kh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517003/original/file-20230322-18-6q37kh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators wave banners and a puppet at the effigy of Prime Minister Alain Juppé, on December 12, 1995.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Derrick Ceyrac/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Socialist president François Hollande (2012-2017), too, made copious use of the article. To his great displeasure, the then Economy Minister Emmanuel Macron saw his framework bill deregulating work – including plans to extend night and Sunday work – shoehorned into law without a vote. Likewise, the labour law put forward by the Myriam El Khomri was forced through on the first reading (on 10 May 2016) and upon final adoption (on 21 July).</p>
<h2>Passing a law is not the end of the story</h2>
<p>Under Macron’s first mandate (2017-2022), Prime Minister Édouard Philippe resorted to article 49.3 once on 29 February 2020 to push through the pension bill which, at the time, intended to replace France’s special retirement regimes with a universal system. The government enjoyed the necessary majority to pass the text, but it wanted to bring a swift close to protests which, one year after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-frances-gilets-jaunes-protesters-are-so-angry-108100">“gilets jaunes” movement</a>, undermined its political and electoral base. </p>
<p>On 16 March 2020, Macron nevertheless justified pausing deliberations over the reform on the grounds of the Covid-19 pandemic. Since taking up office, his uncompromising stance toward social demands has provoked the uproar of trade unions and undoubtedly contributed to the evolution of his electorate toward the moderate right.</p>
<p>Elisabeth Borne’s government is not the first to use its authority in parliament to pass controversial reform and to try to put an end to a turmoil which, if it were to continue, would hurt the government’s reputation.</p>
<p>However, a parliamentary victory acquired through Article 49.3 or the rejection of a no-confidence vote is not enough to regain legitimacy – Charles de Gaulle himself experienced this in May 1968. Several laws adopted in this way were not promulgated. Thus, in no way does the vote on Monday 20 March bring an end to a particularly delicate episode for the presidency of Emmanuel Macron.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202185/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mathias Bernard ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Far from an exception, 16 March marked the 100th time under the Fifth Republic that France’s president chose to use a special constitutional measure to force through unpopular measures.Mathias Bernard, Historien, Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1912782022-09-27T08:51:42Z2022-09-27T08:51:42ZGiorgia Meloni’s win in Italy proves even a seemingly successful government can fall victim to populism<p>In a historic win, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy took 26% of the national vote in Italy’s latest election – the first time a far-right party will take the lead in government since the second world war. Meloni will become prime minister at the head of a coalition – although the make up of that government is yet to be decided.</p>
<p>While this outcome was expected, it is still astonishing. In the 2018 elections, Meloni’s party took a mere 4.3% of the vote. But her fortunes rapidly changed. By February 2021, when former European Central Bank president Mario Draghi was forming a national unity government, 16.5% of the voting public was already saying they intended to vote for Brothers of Italy – the only major political party not supporting Draghi. Although respected internationally, Draghi’s government was perceived by many Italians as being the ultimate expression of the power held by the world’s financial elites. Meloni voiced this populist concern on many occasions, and her strategy has paid off. </p>
<p>When the Draghi government <a href="https://theconversation.com/italian-government-collapse-the-political-chess-moves-behind-mario-draghis-resignation-187648">fell apart</a> in July 2022, after barely a year and half in office, Brothers of Italy had reached 25% while the League was down from 25% to 12.4%. </p>
<p>By staying outside of the coalition, Meloni gave herself the opportunity to freely criticise the government and present her party as the only true opposition. More than a nostalgic vote for a distant fascist past, the Italian electorate’s support for Meloni reflects a discontent with the current economic and social situation. </p>
<p>Distance from the Draghi government also paid off for the <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/08/26/understanding-the-populism-of-the-five-star-movement-and-its-continuity-with-the-past/">Five Star Movement</a>. The populist party currently led by Giuseppe Conte was floundering on 10% in July 2022 (having polled as high as 33% in 2018) but has rebuilt to somewhere more like 15%. During the electoral campaign, the Five Star Movement revived some popular policy measures, such as a guaranteed “citizen’s income”, which Draghi had criticised. They made a particularly strong showing in the south, thanks to policies of this kind.</p>
<p>Parties that explicitly or implicitly (in the League’s case) opposed the Draghi government together took more than 50% of the vote while parties running on the “Draghi agenda” (Azione) or pledging their support to the Draghi government (the Democratic Party and More Europe) reached less than 30%. </p>
<p>The revolt against Draghi’s government is all the more interesting since he was not pushing for austerity measures but rather drafting reforms and investment measures financed by the EU. The populist narrative of protecting the ordinary people from the financial elite still proved a successful tactic.</p>
<h2>What a Meloni government will look like</h2>
<p>Meloni is Italy’s first female prime minister. With the exception of Scandinavia, most other female prime ministers in Europe have also come from right-wing parties. This is somewhat ironic, given how it is often parties of the left who pride themselves on advancing gender equality and women’s empowerment. Ironically, the Brothers of Italy’s victory led to the replacement of a 75-year-old man belonging the establishment (Draghi) with a 45-year-old woman (Meloni). </p>
<p>Nevertheless, forming a government will not be easy for Meloni. While the electoral results established her as the clear head of the coalition, a lack of expertise and experience will make populating ministerial posts a challenge. The highest level expert advisers in Italy are more commonly associated with moderate political parties, so finding people will be less easy for an insurgent party like Brothers of Italy. Who to put in charge of foreign affairs and economics are particularly pressing questions. Former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi has already offered his support. </p>
<p>Meloni will have a chance to take a hardline approach on domestic policy and will certainly endeavour to be tougher on migration and on social rights, as her electorate appears to be demanding. But she will struggle to do much by way of radical economic change. The Draghi government already drafted a detailed plan of reforms and investments that will have to be carried out in order to secure EU financing. Although the Brothers of Italy is a statist, corporatist and nationalist party which tends to mistrust globalisation, Meloni can’t afford to put too much distance between herself and the European Union. </p>
<p>She may follow the style of many Italian politicians before her by double dealing. There’s an old saying that Italian politicians hold two press conferences in Brussels: one on the top floor for business and EU partners, and another in the basement, for the public who blames Brussels for any reform measure.</p>
<p>And given the complex international landscape, Meloni will find foreign policy just as difficult to manage. </p>
<p>On campaign posters, Meloni asked Italians “<em>Pronti?</em>” (ready?) – the same question Draghi posed to members of the Italian parliament about his reform plans before it all fell apart. While her election has been received as a radical shift, the new prime minister would be wise to not overestimate how ready people are for change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191278/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vincenzo Galasso does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Italy’s next prime minister promises a lot on the campaign trail but the reality of government will prove a shock.Vincenzo Galasso, Professor of Economics, Bocconi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1904672022-09-12T16:18:28Z2022-09-12T16:18:28ZSwedish election: triumph for the nationalist right leaves establishment parties in a quandary<p>The nationalist, anti-immigration Sweden Democrats are the major gainers of the 2022 Swedish national elections.</p>
<p>Votes are still being counted but preliminary results show the party has gained 3.1% on its 2018 result. This makes it the second largest party in Sweden, trailing only the the left-wing Social Democrats. And while the Social Democrats may be the largest individual party, the broader results currently make a right-wing coalition a more likely prospect. </p>
<p>Importantly, the Sweden Democrats have become the largest party of the right, which will leave other, more established parties on that side of the political spectrum in a difficult position when negotiations over forming a government begin. </p>
<h2>The coalition game</h2>
<p>In Sweden, the parties stand individual candidates but, knowing that <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8BskCwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=swedish+electoral+alliances&ots=o9YdW6iarj&sig=Kw1hU74f6g6cJdFoe93Vnodh9eU#v=onepage&q=swedish%20electoral%20alliances&f=false">coalitions are the norm</a>, they generally make pre-electoral alliances. Smaller parties inform the voters of their post-election plans during the campaign, including which other parties they see as their potential governing partners. They also make it clear which parties they would not consider acceptable partners.</p>
<p>Sweden Democrats have historically been left out of such alliances. That, however, may have to change. </p>
<p>Since the 1970s, Sweden has been ruled by <a href="https://sweden.se/life/democracy/swedish-government">minority governments</a> (with a few notable exceptions, such as during 2006-2010). The coalition in power needs the support of other parties in the parliament to pass through legislation, in exchange for concessions on core issues to these parties. </p>
<p>When looking at the election results, the most important element is the viability of the coalition and the willingness of non-coalition members to support the new cabinet when laws are passed in the parliament.</p>
<h2>A place for the nationalist right in government?</h2>
<p>With votes still being tallied, the race between the conservative alliance Moderaterna and the centre-left alliance Social Democrats is incredibly tight. There are fewer than 50,000 votes between them. It does, however, look likely that the right-wing coalition will secure the majority of seats in the Riksdag (parliament) once postal votes and votes coming in from Swedish nationals living abroad have been counted.</p>
<p>The question, now, is whether the Moderaterna bloc will create a minority government excluding the Sweden Democrats (as they implied they would during the campaign) or whether they will be forced by the results of the popular vote to award the right-wingers a ministerial post. If they do, they risk losing the support of the Liberal party, which agreed to join a governing coalition only if the Sweden Democrats remain outside the cabinet.</p>
<p>Moderaterna is under extra pressure here since it performed less well in 2022 than it did in the <a href="https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/democracy/general-elections/general-elections-results/">election held in 2018</a> and has been overtaken by the Sweden Democrats. In fact, all the parties belonging to the conservative alliance have lost votes since 2018. </p>
<p>The Sweden Democrats also performed better this year than in 2018, making them the only right-wing party to have made gains. This makes it all the harder to justify excluding them from a coalition. </p>
<p>It is too early to call these elections, as negotiations will likely continue to weeks or even months. In 2018, it took until December to swear in a government and this year’s result may deliver similarly protracted negotiations. </p>
<p>What we do know is that the left-wing Social Democrats did not receive clear support from Swedish voters. The recent <a href="https://www.statista.com/topics/7088/crime-in-sweden/#topicHeader__wrapper">prevalence of violent crime and gang activity</a> were top concerns in this election, and Moderaterna has made law and order a core campaign issue for decades. </p>
<p>And even though the message has not been explicitly framed as such, many voters make an association between crime and the question of migrant integration. This, of course, has been encouraged by the Sweden Democrats, the very people who have done so well in the vote. </p>
<p><em>This article has been amended to correct an instance where the Sweden Democrats were referred to as the Social Democrats</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190467/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anamaria Dutceac Segesten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Sweden Democrats have become the second largest party nationally, making it harder to argue against including them in government.Anamaria Dutceac Segesten, Senior Lecturer in European Studies, Lund UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1876482022-07-26T11:03:09Z2022-07-26T11:03:09ZItalian government collapse: the political chess moves behind Mario Draghi’s resignation<p>Political instability in Italy is nothing new – the country has had 67 governments in less than 75 years. Its politicians are often shortsighted, moved by special interests and career concerns, rather than by the common good. This is what’s behind the collapse of the most recent government – the prime minister, Mario Draghi, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italian-pm-draghi-meets-president-expected-resign-2022-07-21/">resigned</a> after failing to secure the support of his unity coalition.</p>
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<p>To some, sending Draghi packing may appear irrational – his 17-month-old government was backed by all but one of the country’s main political parties. A period of inflation and a war on Europe’s eastern border doesn’t seem an ideal time for political instability. But this development is hardly irrational, or surprising. </p>
<p>The current Italian parliament was elected in 2018. Its first government was led by a coalition of the two parties that received the most votes – the Five Star Movement and the League. The former is a relatively new populist movement, co-founded by comedian Beppe Grillo. Cashing in on social discontent, the party won support in the south of Italy by running on a combination of anti-elite messaging and promises to increase public spending. The League is an established right-wing populist party with most of its political constituency in the north. </p>
<p>These two parties had a similar stance on some key issues: anti-immigration, pro-early retirement and the establishment of a basic income. They joined forces to appoint Giuseppe Conte, an unelected professor of law, as prime minister.</p>
<p>This populist coalition broke down in summer 2019 when the League opted out and was replaced by the centre-left Democratic Party. The new government was <a href="https://theconversation.com/giuseppe-conte-how-italys-prime-minister-survived-the-collapse-of-his-own-government-122809">still led by Conte</a>, but now held his position thanks to the support of the Five Star Movement and the Democratic Party. But this government was brought down during the pandemic in February 2021 and was replaced by a national unity government led by <a href="https://theconversation.com/mario-draghi-is-italys-addiction-to-technocratic-leaders-a-cause-for-concern-155336">Mario Draghi</a>, an independent and former president of the European Central Bank. This government was supported by all major parties, with the exception of the far-right Brothers of Italy.</p>
<p>There are two other factors contributing to the current political climate. First, the parliament that came out of the 2018 election was substantially different from previous ones. The Five Star Movement obtained one-third of the overall seats, bringing to parliament many MPs with little or no political experience and from low-income jobs. The selection of these political amateurs as candidates was done through a private online platform. </p>
<p>Second, the first Conte government passed a constitutional law, later confirmed by a referendum in September 2020, reducing the number of members in the Italian parliament from 630 to 400 in the lower house and from 315 to 200 in the senate. With the next political election, initially scheduled for 2023, the parliament will <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-54244025">shrink by one-third</a>. This has exacerbated each MP’s individual career concerns.</p>
<h2>Political movement and government collapse</h2>
<p>With elections scheduled for March 2023 at the latest, some parties have started to reposition themselves towards their electorate. After nearly four and a half years in parliament, MPs have also secured their parliamentary pension rights and may therefore be prepared to take more political risks. </p>
<p>Conte, having established himself as leader of the Five Star Movement, was the first to make a move. He criticised Draghi’s government for being shy on social measures and presented him with a series of policy requests – essentially an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f5fd0ed1-254e-4dee-8959-783a1d3883b4">ultimatum for the government</a> to have the continued support of the Five Star Movement.</p>
<p>Faced with internal division and declining support in the polls, Conte was clearly trying to mobilise the Movement’s base supporters. He did not expect this to be a risky move, as Draghi’s government held a large majority in the parliament. </p>
<p>Draghi refused to accept an ultimatum and resigned, despite having a majority in the parliament. The Italian president, Sergio Mattarella, refused his resignation, sending him back to the senate for a confidence vote, which coalition partners decided to boycott. Draghi <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/07/20/1112599869/italy-prime-minister-draghi-coalition-unravels">won the vote</a>, but lost enough support from his coalition to make his resignation inevitable. This time the president accepted and dissolved the parliament.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, parties firmly to the right of the political spectrum have also been repositioning ahead of the next election. Conte’s ultimatum gave the League (led by Matteo Salvini) and the more moderate Forza Italia (led by Silvio Berlusconi) an unexpected opportunity to drop their support for the government. </p>
<p>Salvini and Berlusconi are now expected to join their parties together for a snap election, which, following the collapse of Draghi’s government, will take place on September 25. Given recent polling trends, they are believed to have a better shot at coming on top against the far-right Brothers of Italy in an early election, rather than next spring. The Brothers of Italy was the only party not in Draghi’s coalition, and has been rising in the polls at the expense of the other two right-wing parties.</p>
<p>By withdrawing their support, Salvini and Berlusconi managed to send Draghi’s government home, and send Italy into its first summertime electoral campaign. Current polls predict a right-wing coalition government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/24/italy-summer-snap-elections-far-right-brothers-of-italy-giorgia-meloni">led by Giorgia Meloni</a> – potentially the first female prime minister in Italian history. In all relevant issues, from economics to social policy to foreign relations, such a government would be a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/giorgia-meloni-valdimir-putin-italy/">major change</a> from the liberal, market-oriented, Nato-centric view of the Draghi government. Not quite the scenario Conte had in mind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187648/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vincenzo Galasso does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The latest political chaos in Italy is the result of a series of political manoeuvres by varying parties.Vincenzo Galasso, Professor of Economics, Bocconi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1872092022-07-25T13:53:23Z2022-07-25T13:53:23ZEU sues Hungary over anti-gay law – what it could mean for LGBT rights in Europe<p>The <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_2689">European commission is taking</a> legal action against Hungary at the European court of justice (ECJ), escalating a longstanding dispute over the country’s anti-LGBT laws. This is an unprecedented step for the EU, but it isn’t a sure win for LGBT rights in Europe – and even has the potential to endanger them.</p>
<p>Hungary (under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s leadership) and the EU have been at odds for years over the wider issue of the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/how-viktor-orban-broke-the-eu-and-got-away-with-it-hungary-rule-of-law/">rule of law</a>. This intensified in 2021 when Hungary adopted a new law banning the depiction or promotion of LGBT-related material to minors. Commission president Ursula von der Leyen <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2021/06/23/hungary-s-anti-lgbt-law-is-a-shame-says-ursula-von-der-leyen">called it</a> “a shame” that goes “against all the fundamental values of the European Union”. </p>
<p>In July 2021, the <a href="https://lgbti-ep.eu/2021/07/15/press-release-european-commission-launches-3-infringement-procedures-against-hungary-and-poland-on-lgbtiq-issues/">commission launched official infringement procedures</a> against Hungary for failing to implement and comply with EU law. Later in the year, it also froze Hungary’s <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-european-commission-rule-law-mechanism-hungary-funds/">access to the COVID recovery fund</a>. Unsatisfied with Hungary’s responses, the commission has now escalated the matter and referred the matter to the ECJ. This is the first time the EU has taken a member state to court over LGBT rights.</p>
<p>In recent decades, Europe has seen an increase in the use of homophobia to <a href="https://illinois.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.5406/illinois/9780252037726.001.0001/upso-9780252037726-chapter-001">score political points</a>. Examples include the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/an-anti-gay-marriage-tea-party-french-style"><em>manif pour tous</em></a> demonstrations against same-sex marriage in France, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/01/croatia-vote-ban-gay-marriage-referendum">Croatia’s referendum</a> to constitutionally define marriage as a heterosexual union. Hungary’s law has also inspired other countries, like <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/romania-lgbtq-rights-bill-gay-propaganda-law/31915661.html">Romania</a>, to try and ban so-called homosexual propaganda.</p>
<p>The outcome of this case could have far-reaching consequences for LGBT rights in Europe. In effect, the commission is asking the court to enshrine LGBT rights as part of the EU’s fundamental values, on a par with other principles such as freedom of movement.</p>
<h2>The EU and LGBT rights</h2>
<p>Perhaps by taking legal action, the commission is enacting its own <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/lesbian-gay-bi-trans-and-intersex-equality/lgbtiq-equality-strategy-2020-2025_en">LGBTIQ equality strategy</a>, launched in 2020. However, the commission’s claims frame the case as a breach of <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_2689">the EU’s internal market rules</a>, rather than LGBT rights. This should not come as a surprise – the EU has very few direct laws on LGBT rights. By framing the case around core EU rules, the commission has a stronger chance of succeeding. In the past, the court has ruled on LGBT rights <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62016CJ0673">by invoking other fundamental EU principles</a>.</p>
<p>The EU claims that by enacting this law, Hungary is violating both the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/aid-development-cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-rights-eu/eu-charter-fundamental-rights_en">EU charter of fundamental rights</a> and Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.</p>
<p>Here is where the case becomes interesting. Although the charter of fundamental rights has clauses that explicitly protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation, it only applies to Hungary when it is implementing EU directives. Article 2, on the other hand, has much broader applicability, but does not refer to LGBT rights at all. By submitting this court case to the ECJ, the commission is not only asking the court to determine when EU rules have primacy over member state rules but also to clarify that the rather <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21599165.2020.1724965">ambiguously defined European values</a> explicitly include LGBT rights.</p>
<h2>How the case could play out</h2>
<p>There are three possible outcomes of this case.</p>
<p>First, the ECJ could rule (for the first time) that the values outlined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union also include LGBT rights. This would be the more activist ruling – going beyond established case law for a more political statement. Hungary would then be required to adjust the law and remove its discriminatory nature. More widely, this would also be a watershed moment in European LGBT politics – it would not only provide a strong mandate for the commission to take bolder steps on LGBT rights, but it might also lead to more challenges of discriminatory laws across Europe. </p>
<p>Second, in a (unlikely) doomsday scenario, the ECJ could side with Hungary. This would provide nearly free rein for anti-LGBT actors in Hungary, and across the EU more widely, to enact more homophobic laws. This would leave the gains made in the last 50 years for LGBT people in Europe on shaky ground. </p>
<p>Finally, in the most likely scenario, the ECJ would deliver a ruling that sits somewhere in between. Based on previous case law, we might expect that the ECJ would rule that the Hungarian law violates EU rules, but only to the extent where the law has cross-border implications. In this scenario, the ECJ ruling would signal to Hungary (and other countries) that is it acceptable to discriminate against homosexuality, as long as they are smart in their wording. </p>
<p>Such a ruling would not clearly and unequivocally clarify that LGBT equality is a fundamental EU value, but rather leave LGBT rights as a secondary principle, subject to the more established EU principles of the internal market and freedom of movement. This would create ambiguity as to when homophobic laws are a matter of
member state policy, or when the EU has to (or can) intervene, giving homophobic governments license to enact more laws like Hungary’s.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Koen Slootmaeckers is advisory board member of LGBTI Equal Rights Association for Western Balkans and Turkey.</span></em></p>The EU commission is taking legal action against Hungary may not be a sure win for LGBT rights in Europe.Koen Slootmaeckers, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1872132022-07-22T12:30:41Z2022-07-22T12:30:41ZItaly heading to snap election as unity coalition crumbles: Explaining the nation’s fragmented party system<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475512/original/file-20220721-14568-doah2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C0%2C3074%2C2057&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mario Draghi: prime minister of a unity government in disunity.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/italian-premier-mario-draghi-reacts-to-lawmakers-applauses-news-photo/1242028476?adppopup=true">Riccardo De Luca/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italian-pm-draghi-meets-president-expected-resign-2022-07-21/">resigned for a second time</a> in a week on July 21, 2022, after his earlier attempt to step down was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-president-rejects-draghi-resignation-tells-him-address-parliament-2022-07-14/">rejected by the country’s president</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>This time, President Sergio Mattarella responded by <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/21/europe/mario-draghi-italy-resignation-intl/index.html">dissolving parliament</a>. A new election is set for late September. In the meantime, Mattarella asked Draghi to carry on as caretaker leader. His resignation comes a day after Draghi <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/20/italian-pm-draghi-wins-confidence-vote-but-unity-govt-in-tatters">won a vote of confidence in parliament</a>, but in a way that signaled that the broad ruling coalition was fractured beyond repair.</em></p>
<p><em>It’s a lot to unpack. So The Conversation called on Carol Mershon, an <a href="https://politics.virginia.edu/people/profile/cam6m">expert on Italian politics at University of Virginia</a>, to explain the situation and what may come next.</em></p>
<h2>What is going on in Italian politics?</h2>
<p>It’s been an interesting few days. Mario Draghi, who was not elected to Parliament <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/02/03/caught-between-populism-and-technocracy-what-mario-draghis-invitation-to-form-a-government-tells-us-about-italian-democracy/">but was invited to form a government in February 2021 by the president</a>, resigned twice. Draghi has been serving as a nonpartisan prime minister leading a broad coalition of parties that made up a unity government. But that coalition has crumbled. First, members of the populist 5-Star Movement <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220714-italy-s-five-star-movement-to-boycott-confidence-vote-threatening-government-collapse">refused to vote on a government bill </a> over concerns that cost of living relief measures were insufficient, prompting Draghi’s first resignation.</p>
<p>That led to a vote of confidence on July 20. Draghi <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/07/20/1112599869/italy-prime-minister-draghi-coalition-unravels">won the ballot in the Senate</a> with 95 votes in favor and 38 against. But it was by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italian-pm-draghi-wins-confidence-vote-three-parties-snub-motion-2022-07-20/">no means a ringing endorsement</a>. The Senate has 315 seats – which means that many lawmakers opted to vote “present not voting, "abstain,” or were just absent for the vote. Thus, Draghi resigned again.</p>
<h2>Why did Draghi step down if he won the confidence vote?</h2>
<p>Although Draghi technically survived the confidence vote, it was not the sort of result he needed to stay on as prime minister. In addition to 5-Star, other members of the ruling coalition, including the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/21/italy-far-right-brothers-of-italy-mario-draghi">rightist parties Forza Italia and League</a>, were in dissent.</p>
<p>Draghi has long emphasized that as a nonparty leader, he needs the support of a broad coalition, especially at a time when the country is facing serious economic and social challenges. He leads a unity government – and without unity among the parties, it would be hard for him to govern.</p>
<p>Both the withdrawal of backing by parties and the fracturing of the parties themselves, with <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20220622/italian-government-rocked-by-five-star-party-split/">some members of parliament leaving coalition partners</a>, suggest that the coalition is now past the point of being able to operate in unity.</p>
<h2>How many parties are in the coalition? Do they broadly share the same politics?</h2>
<p>As with much in Italian politics, that isn’t a straightforward question to answer. When the Draghi government was <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/mario-draghi-forms-italian-government/">launched in February 2021</a>, it had cabinet ministers from six parties – the populist 5-Star Movement, the right-wing League and Forza Italia, Democrats and its splinter party, Italy Alive, and finally the progressive Article One. But six became seven when former <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20220622/will-italys-five-star-movement-split-throw-the-government-into-crisis/">5-Star members created another party</a>, Together for the Future. Then, if you count junior ministers in the coalition, three more parties were included.</p>
<p>Now you have more splintering of parties and departures of members as politicians maneuver for advantage with an election on the horizon, making it even more difficult to say just how many parties are in the coalition. </p>
<p>Coalition governments are not uncommon in Italy; in fact, they are the norm. But the one under Draghi was particularly broad, going from progressive parties to far right groups.</p>
<h2>Why so many parties? And why coalitions?</h2>
<p>Italy has a <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2082607">fragmented party system</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2082607">I have done research that shows</a> the average number of parties represented in Italy’s parliament between 1946 and 1992 was 12 – more than most democracies. Since then, the country has gone through a <a href="https://www.mironline.ca/italys-surprisingly-long-and-tortured-history-with-electoral-reform/">series of electoral reforms</a>, but the multiparty system has stayed in place.</p>
<p>There are three factors behind Italy’s fragmented parliament. First, Italian post-World War II elections have always had a <a href="https://electionwatch.unimelb.edu.au/articles/understanding-italys-electoral-system-its-complicated">strong component of proportional representation</a> – that is to say, the number of seats each party has is proportional to the number of votes it receives. So in Italy, a party that gets 5% of the national vote can reasonably expect to get 5% of the seats. Compare that to the U.K. system, in which a party that gets 5% of the national votes would likely get zero seats.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An aerial shot shows the Italian parliament with circular seating." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475537/original/file-20220721-9531-j9kmwd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475537/original/file-20220721-9531-j9kmwd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475537/original/file-20220721-9531-j9kmwd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475537/original/file-20220721-9531-j9kmwd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475537/original/file-20220721-9531-j9kmwd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475537/original/file-20220721-9531-j9kmwd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475537/original/file-20220721-9531-j9kmwd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One parliament, many parties.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/general-view-shows-the-italian-senate-during-the-news-photo/1409899407?adppopup=true">Antonio Masiello/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Under Italy’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Italy/Political-process">proportional representation</a> laws, a party cannot manufacture a majority of parliamentary seats out of a plurality of votes. And with so many parties, it is very unlikely that any one party can muster up a majority outright. So instead, the largest non-majority party must find alliances to form a coalition government.</p>
<p>Second, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45402390">electoral law reforms of 1993</a> created an incentive for Italian politicians to form or found new parties. After those reforms and the disintegration of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40930577">once-dominant Christian Democratic Party</a> – which until that point had been the largest party in every post-war Italian government – political entrepreneurs found they could get noticed more by forming new parties, or splintering off from existing parties. We are seeing some of this now with <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20220622/italian-government-rocked-by-five-star-party-split/">high-profile departures from 5-Star</a>. It tends to happen when politicians are looking to position themselves for the next election.</p>
<p>Third, the creation of new parties was also encouraged by the breakdown of traditional politics in Italy. It used to be the case that what voters cared about was where a party stood on two areas: left-right politics, and whether they were secular or religious.</p>
<p>That has changed. Now, voters are motivated by not only left-right politics but also a range of factors, such as whether a party is pro- or anti-European Union, or whether it is tolerant of immigration or is anti-immigration. So you get parties like 5-Star that are anti-immigrant and anti-EU, but don’t fit so neatly on the left-right political axis.</p>
<h2>Are coalitions prone to failure?</h2>
<p>Not necessarily. Italy has experienced a number of relatively stable coalitions. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-government-prime-minister/factbox-five-facts-about-italys-romano-prodi-idUSL2161119120080122">Romano Prodi’s coalition government</a> lasted from 1996 to late 1998. It faced a lot of problems during that period, but Prodi managed to keep that coalition going. And back in the 1980s, the coalition put together by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/20/world/bettino-craxi-italian-prime-minister-who-was-tainted-by-corruption-dies-at-65.html">socialist Benedetto Craxi</a> lasted four years. Craxi’s coalition faced a brief hiccup – it fell apart, then was quickly reconstructed – but was composed of the same parties.</p>
<p>And if you scan the European horizon, coalitions are a fairly common form of government. A coalition is the norm in Germany, and they are fairly common in Scandinavian countries as Norway. And they are often long-lived.</p>
<p>I don’t think coalitions are inherently unstable. Draghi is a relatively popular figure, but his coalition faced a host of challenges ranging from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/ten-years-draghi-faces-debt-crisis-words-wont-solve-2022-07-14/">economic problems</a> and Italy’s response to the pandemic, to an <a href="https://www.rescue.org/country/italy">immigration crisis</a> that will not go away. The tipping point was a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-draghi-wins-confidence-vote-5-star-boycotts-motion-2022-07-14/">fight over the government’s response to a cost of living crisis</a> – 5-Star had been pushing Draghi to do more to support hard-pressed Italians. And Draghi has said he <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-12/italy-s-draghi-says-he-won-t-lead-government-if-five-star-leaves">won’t govern without the support of 5-Star</a>, the largest party in Italy’s parliament when parliamentary elections were last held in 2018.</p>
<h2>So what happens next?</h2>
<p>Elections are now expected in late September. Until then, it looks like Draghi will continue as prime minister in a caretaker capacity. In the meantime, it is likely that there will be some more splintering within the parties represented in parliament as politicians maneuver for electoral advantage. Yet politicians at this point also have to consider the risk of seeming irresponsible and fickle, with the parliamentary election sure to occur quite soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187213/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carol Mershon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Italian parliament has been dissolved following the resignation of Prime Minister Mario Draghi. What happens next, and why is Italy’s politics so fragmented?Carol Mershon, Professor of Politics, University of VirginiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1837212022-05-30T03:37:02Z2022-05-30T03:37:02ZAlbanese should adopt a collaborative, European approach to governing – not the take-it-or-leave-it Anglo style we’re used to<p>The Australian Labor Party is <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/elections/federal/2022/results?filter=all&sort=az&state=all">edging towards</a> 76 seats and possible majority government after the electorate abandoned the Coalition at the federal election. </p>
<p>But regardless of whether it can reach a majority or not, Labor needs to learn the right lessons from the Morrison government – as well as from its last two terms in power between 2007 and 2013.</p>
<p>These experiences could point to adopting either a more take-it-or-leave-it antagonistic approach to politics, prevalent in the Anglosphere countries of the US, UK and Australia, or a more European, collaborative style.</p>
<p>Politics is the art of compromise – nobody gets exactly what they want. But adopting a European approach to parliamentary negotiations could usher in an enduring golden era of stable and progressive government, with more generous and compassionate national politics.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/labor-likely-to-get-a-friendly-senate-and-secures-house-of-representatives-majority-183931">Labor likely to get a friendly Senate and secures House of Representatives majority</a>
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<h2>The take-it-or-leave-it Anglo approach</h2>
<p>The first term of Labor’s previous government between 2007 and 2010 was dominated by Kevin Rudd’s prime ministership and his attempts to pass his climate change legislation.</p>
<p>The Greens considered the package too generous to polluters and ineffective in addressing climate change, so they blocked it in the Senate where they held the balance of power.</p>
<p>Despite <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/ten-years-on-labor-blames-greens-for-failed-carbon-price-scheme-20191201-p53fpv">Labor’s rhetoric</a> that the Greens are therefore largely to blame for Australia’s subsequent history of climate inaction, the reality is far more <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-the-10-year-anniversary-of-our-climate-policy-abyss-but-dont-blame-the-greens-128239">complicated</a>.</p>
<p>Bob Brown, then leader of the Greens, <a href="https://www.themonthly.com.au/today/paddy-manning/2019/15/2019/1573787713/2009-forever">wrote to Rudd</a> after the first vote on the legislation in late 2009 seeking talks but received no reply. The Greens then put a compromise plan to Labor after the second vote, but it was again <a href="https://twitter.com/timhollo/status/1201287549391536129">rebuffed</a>.</p>
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<p>Despite these overtures, in <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-04-27/rudd-deflects-blame-for-emissions-backflip/412154">April 2010</a> Rudd announced his government had abandoned the legislation, which was the beginning of the end for his tenure as prime minister.</p>
<p>In retrospect, perhaps the Greens should have just passed the bill. But the government’s take-it-or-leave-it approach was extremely unhelpful in progressing the legislation. This approach is somewhat typical of the aggressive style of parliamentary politics in Anglosphere countries.</p>
<p>Most Anglosphere parliaments, including Australia’s House of Representatives, have single-member electorates, which generally results in having two combative parties that take turns in governing.</p>
<p>This is very different to the more cooperative European models of government.</p>
<h2>The collaborative European approach</h2>
<p>After the 2010 election, Julia Gillard’s Labor entered <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-09-08/labors-minority-government-explained/2253236">minority government</a> in a power-sharing agreement with Adam Bandt of the Greens and two independents in the lower house. </p>
<p>This approach was more reminiscent of European politics, where most parliaments have multi-member electorates. In these electoral systems (also employed in Australia’s Senate) small parties have a greater chance of entering parliament and the large parties rarely achieve a majority.</p>
<p>It’s therefore common for European parties to enter post-election negotiations to form ad hoc coalitions or power-sharing arrangements.</p>
<p>This happened in Germany in 1998, when the left-leaning Social Democrat Party formed a national governing <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/from-radical-opposition-to-mainstream-party-the-rise-of-the-greens/a-6236876">coalition</a> with the German Greens, with the latter supplying the foreign minister.</p>
<p>A similar arrangement resulted from German national elections last year, with the addition of the liberal Free Democrats to create a three-party coalition. The Greens again <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220519-green-ministers-outshine-scholz-as-stars-of-german-government">supplied</a> the foreign minister, as well as the economy minister.</p>
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<p>In South Australia, Labor has adopted aspects of this approach by strategically offering independents in regional and traditionally conservative seats – and even a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2004/s1160740.htm">Nationals MP</a> – ministries in its governments, even if Labor doesn’t require their votes. This collegiality has been continued by the recently elected <a href="https://indaily.com.au/opinion/2022/03/24/richardson-political-wheels-in-motion-as-labors-saviour-returns-to-the-fold/">Malinauskas government</a>, even though it has a governing majority. This canny strategy will have contributed to Labor being in power for 20 out of the previous 24 years by the end of this term.</p>
<p>The Gillard government’s minority position forced it to adopt this more European-style consultative posture and it resulted in the most <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/datablog/2018/dec/23/turnbull-scores-lower-than-abbott-gillard-and-rudd-on-productivity-in-parliament">productive parliament</a> in Australia’s history, measured by acts passed per day.</p>
<p>It legislated a price on carbon, which, if it hadn’t been repealed by the Abbott government, would have resulted in 72 million tonnes less carbon emissions according to <a href="https://australiainstitute.org.au/post/key-gillard-era-reform-carbon-price-would-have-saved-72-million-tonnes-of-emissions/">research in 2020 by the Australia Institute</a>.</p>
<h2>Which style will Albanese take?</h2>
<p>Labor must learn the right lessons from its last stint in office. </p>
<p>It will face a parliament unlike any previous government, with a significantly enhanced third force comprising the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-05-28/greens-win-brisbane-seat-electorate-federal-election/101104170">Greens</a>, the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/may/23/teal-independents-who-are-they-how-did-they-upend-australia-election">teals</a>” and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-05-23/the-crossbenchers-after-election-teal-greens-independents/101088236">other independents</a>.</p>
<p>Labor could entrench a progressive majority in parliament for the foreseeable future by rejecting the antagonistic, duopolistic Anglo approach to parliamentary politics that characterised Labor’s first term of government last time around. Instead, it should shift towards the more negotiated, collaborative Euro approach of its second term from 2010 on. </p>
<p>Negotiating in good faith with the crossbench will show teal electorates their MPs are making real progress in the halls of power on the issues they were elected to pursue – primarily climate change, an integrity commission and gender inequality. These electorates would therefore be more likely to vote teal again in future.</p>
<p>Single member electorates make it difficult for independents or small parties to win elections, but once they’re in they can be hard to dislodge, as the experience of Adam Bandt, Andrew Wilkie, Rebekha Sharkie, Bob Katter, Cathy McGowan and Helen Haines demonstrates.</p>
<p>If the teal seats continue to elect independents, the Coalition will struggle to regain majority government again.</p>
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<p>Whether Labor manages to achieve a governing majority in the lower house or not, it will still need support from the Greens and progressive independent David Pocock in the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/elections/federal/2022/results/senate">Senate</a> to pass legislation.</p>
<p>Fortunately, Albanese seems to have the temperament that would favour a Euro approach. On election night, he promised to promote “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/albanese-wins-a-clear-mandate-for-inclusive-but-cautious-change-20220522-p5anj5.html">unity and optimism, not fear and division</a>”.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, both <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/albanese-seeks-to-sideline-the-greens-with-no-deals-on-policy-20220526-p5aon6">Albanese</a> and <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/labor-holds-firm-against-green-climate-ambition-20220523-p5ant5">other senior Labor members</a> have already been out in force since the election stating they have a mandate from the electorate to deliver their election policies, including a 43% cut in carbon emissions from 2005 levels by 2030 – but no more. This is despite the ALP receiving less than 33% of the primary vote.</p>
<p>Most of the teal independents have policies of a <a href="https://www.themonthly.com.au/blog/elle-marsh/2022/24/2022/end-liberal-reign-kooyong">60%</a> reduction in carbon emissions by 2030. And the Greens, who received almost 12% of the primary vote, want a 75% cut. A significant chunk of the electorate therefore voted for much <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/labor-s-climate-super-majority-targets-miners-emitters-drivers-20220522-p5anhy">stronger action on climate change</a>. </p>
<p>Labor would do well to compromise with the crossbench in those areas where common ground can be found to build and consolidate an enduring progressive future for Australia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183721/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The new prime minister seems to have the temperament that would favour a collaborative approach. He could usher in a golden era of stable government, with more generous and compassionate politics.Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, International Studies, University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1782022022-03-01T16:05:05Z2022-03-01T16:05:05ZGermany’s €100-billion army fund: a remarkable change in post-war policy in response to the Ukraine crisis<p>If you’d asked experts just a fortnight ago what the key features of Germany’s approach to foreign and defence policy were, there would have been several strands. Alignment with the west, and of course membership of the EU and Nato would have been a feature. Striving for strong transatlantic links would be another, not least because the country was bruised by its regular, public and bellicose criticism from former president Donald Trump.</p>
<p>But a third strand would have been extreme caution, in its dealings with the EU but especially in defence policy matters. Germany has long preferred to avoid committing troops to joint operations or indeed sending weapons into situations of active conflict. It has instead focused on diplomatic and economic contributions.</p>
<p>Almost overnight, these established tenets of German foreign policy have been demolished. On Sunday, in a <a href="https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-chancellor-of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-and-member-of-the-german-bundestag-27-february-2022-in-berlin-2008378">powerful speech to the German parliament</a>, Chancellor Olaf Scholz took the country in a different direction, stating that the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Vladimir Putin’s war “in cold blood” was a “watershed” moment for Europe.</p>
<p>The most significant element of Scholz’s response is an immediate and massive boost to defence spending. A €100 billion fund is being proposed for the renewal of Germany’s (increasingly dilapidated) armed forces. </p>
<p>Scholz is committing to take Germany’s defence spending up to 2% of GDP (compared to the current level of 1.4%, noisily criticised as inadequate by Donald Trump but also more quietly resented by Germany’s other Nato partners). Armed drones will be purchased, and a commitment to buy new planes to carry US nuclear weapons as part of “nuclear sharing” was made.</p>
<p>Germany will also supply defensive weapons to Ukraine (having been heavily criticised for not doing so just days before, and indeed even <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-blocks-estonian-arms-exports-to-ukraine-report/a-60520988">blocking</a> the export of such weapons from Estonia). And, having procrastinated, Germany will now support the exclusion of Russian banks from the Swift payment network. It will also invest immediately to reduce reliance on Russian energy.</p>
<p>Scholz had been criticised for Germany’s sluggish response to the Russian threat. As recently as December he had been <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/german-government-row-over-nord-stream-2/">calling</a> the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany a “private sector project” – the implication being that it needn’t be stopped. But his speech to the Bundestag went further than even <a href="https://twitter.com/jana_puglierin/status/1497895908456996868">seasoned observers</a> thought possible.</p>
<h2>Historical reticence</h2>
<p>Germany’s foreign policy caution, notably towards Russia, of course runs far deeper than its reliance on Russian energy supply. Today’s Germany is acutely conscious of its history as the aggressor in two world wars in the 20th century, and as perpetrator of the Holocaust. Its invasion of multiple neighbouring countries led to utter destruction, as well as very different borders, and the determination to avoid war.</p>
<p>Its relations with Russia are shaped by that heavy burden of history too. Over 2 million Russian lives were lost in the first world war, and over 20 million from Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union (including Ukraine) in the second. </p>
<p>After the second world war, Germany was divided, with eastern Germany initially called the “Soviet Zone of Occupation”, before becoming the “German Democratic Republic”, a communist state and part of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact group of countries. The two halves of Germany were separated by an internal border most powerfully symbolised by the Berlin Wall. </p>
<p>In this period, dialogue with Russia seemed to pay dividends: in the 1970s, under Chancellor Willy Brandt, relations thawed and more contact was permitted between the two Germanies. Extensive negotiation with the USSR enabled agreement on German reunificiation to be reached in 1990.</p>
<p>Ukraine itself is a case in point in illustrating the way Germany approached foreign policy, given its history. Back in 2014, Germany helped get the (now obsolete) Minsk agreements between Russia and Ukraine over the line, and since then has <a href="https://www.bundeskanzler.de/bk-en/news/support-ukraine-2004148">paid substantial sums</a> in development and other assistance. While being somewhat ready to challenge Russian aggression, it saw itself as a mediator in a division of labour, leaving sharper military tasks to other countries, and trying always to keep lines of dialogue with Russia open.</p>
<h2>Domestic support</h2>
<p>While the changed policy on military spending represents a dramatic shift, Germany’s mainstream political parties are broadly united on the matter. Scholz’s SPD has in fact been the most cautious of the German government’s three coalition partners when it comes to Russia but the party is supportive of the chancellor’s decision. </p>
<p>Liberal and Green coalition partners had in any case been pushing for a firmer line on Russia, but it is striking that fiscally hawkish liberal finance minister <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germanys-lindner-says-europe-will-be-able-shield-its-economies-against-inflation-2022-02-25/">Christian Lindner</a> has backed the increased defence spending being paid out of new debt– and that the Greens have not demurred at arms exports. The Christian Democratic opposition has quibbled at the financing of defence spending, while endorsing the principles.</p>
<p>Public opinion has also shifted: a <a href="https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/russlands-angriff-auf-die-ukraine-zwei-drittel-befuerchten-in-umfrage-einen-dritten-weltkrieg/28116150.html">snap poll</a> shows 78% of Germans support the arms exports and investment in the armed forces. Germans are shocked at Putin’s behaviour, and it also feels close to home: 69% fear that Nato will be drawn into the conflict. Yet views are more divided on whether Ukraine should be allowed into Nato or the EU, and rejection of that remains particularly strong in eastern Germany. </p>
<h2>A step change for Europe and the world</h2>
<p>With the situation fluid, the longer-term implications of Germany’s changed position are not yet clear. Putin’s attack on Ukraine seems to have united Nato and also brought about much stronger EU foreign policy co-ordination, both in terms of sending defensive weapons to Ukraine and deciding on sanctions against Russia. As Scholz put it, “Rarely have we and our partners been so resolved and so united.”</p>
<p>Together, these changes might lead to greater assertiveness towards other potential aggressors on Germany’s part, rather than staying in its comfort zone of diplomatic engagement and economic support – the additional military capacity, while aimed primarily at the Russian threat, could have wider uses. Either way, this decision from newly installed chancellor Scholz has, in one move, completely transformed Germany’s global role.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178202/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ed Turner receives funding from the German Academic Exchange Service and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.</span></em></p>The settled foundations of German foreign policy have been overturned in an instant following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.Ed Turner, Reader in Politics, Co-Director, Aston Centre for Europe, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1754122022-02-02T22:01:26Z2022-02-02T22:01:26ZUS troops head to Eastern Europe: 4 essential reads on the Ukraine crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444128/original/file-20220202-27-1rpv0cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4728%2C2689&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A US soldier at a training area in Germany.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/soldier-stands-at-a-tank-type-m1a2-sep-which-are-decorated-news-photo/530688706?adppopup=true">Christof Stache/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>American troops <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/02/world/ukraine-russia-news">are heading to Eastern Europe</a> in the latest countermove by the U.S. to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/28/us/politics/russia-ukraine-invasion-pentagon.html">Russia’s military buildup</a> on the country’s border with Ukraine.</p>
<p>The development, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/02/politics/us-troops-europe-russia/index.html">announced on Feb. 2, 2022</a>, will see around 3,000 additional U.S. service personnel deployed to NATO member states Germany, Poland and Romania.</p>
<p>U.S. officials framed the move as one that would reassure countries in the NATO military alliance of U.S. support in the face of a possible invasion of Ukraine, which is not a member. But it is likely to anger President Vladimir Putin, who has demanded that NATO <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/russia-central-asia/article/3164305/russia-wants-nato-troops-out-bulgaria-and-romania">pull back troops</a> from Eastern European countries that were once members of the Soviet Union. Putin has accused the West of ignoring Russia’s security concerns and trying to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-announces-plan-boost-army-foreign-leaders-rally-2022-02-01/">lure the country into a war</a>.</p>
<p>Behind the rhetoric and troop movement is a very real – and complex – crisis. The Conversation’s bank of experts has been on hand to explain what is at stake, and why Ukraine has become a flashpoint between Russia and the West.</p>
<h2>1. What it means to have US boots on the ground</h2>
<p>The deployment of thousands of American troops to Eastern Europe wasn’t unexpected. The Pentagon had already said that it was prepared to send up to 8,500 additional members of its armed services to the region.</p>
<p>It marks a reversal of a trend in Europe that has seen America’s military presence dwindle over the past few decades, say <a href="https://www.boisestate.edu/sps-politicalscience/faculty/michael-a-allen/">Michael Allen of Boise State University</a> and two scholars from Kansas State University, <a href="https://www.k-state.edu/polsci/faculty-staff/martinezmachain-carla.html">Carla Martinez Machain</a> and <a href="https://www.k-state.edu/polsci/faculty-staff/Flynn.html">Michael Flynn</a>.</p>
<p>The three scholars note that <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-military-presence-in-europe-has-been-declining-for-30-years-the-current-crisis-in-ukraine-may-reverse-that-trend-175595">U.S. troop numbers in Europe</a> stood at a high of over 400,000 in the 1950s. But this dropped sharply after the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.</p>
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<div class="placeholder-container" style="--aspect-ratio-percent:75.06631299734748%;--background-color:#a1665e"><img alt="" class=" ls-is-cached lazyloaded" data-src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&w=754&fit=clip" data-srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&w=754&fit=clip"></div>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">US military deployments to European states, 1989-2021.</span>
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<p>In the post-Soviet era, U.S. troop presence in Europe has been a delicate matter, the scholars note: “The U.S. and Russia have historically been cautious in not placing troops in places that would be considered a provocation. They generally avoid each other’s sphere of influence, even when responding to the other’s deployments. Yet the NATO allies in Eastern Europe, many of which were once Soviet satellite states, provide a gray area that both the U.S. and Russia may view as within their own sphere of influence.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-military-presence-in-europe-has-been-declining-for-30-years-the-current-crisis-in-ukraine-may-reverse-that-trend-175595">The US military presence in Europe has been declining for 30 years – the current crisis in Ukraine may reverse that trend</a>
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<hr>
<h2>2. What it means to be a NATO member</h2>
<p>The reason U.S. troops are heading to Germany, Poland and Romania, and not to Ukraine itself, is that the former Soviet country isn’t a member of NATO. As <a href="https://www.clarkson.edu/people/alastair-kocho-williams">Alastair Kocho-Williams at Clarkson University</a> writes, this <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-nato-and-why-does-ukraine-want-to-join-175821">isn’t out of a lack of desire on Ukraine’s part</a>.</p>
<p>“Membership with NATO would significantly increase Ukraine’s international military backing, allowing for NATO military action within Ukraine and alongside members of its military. This guarantee of military might would act as a firm deterrent to Russian aggression,” Kocho-Williams writes.</p>
<p>In fact, NATO’s principle of “collective defense” – under which an attack on one member is considered an attack on all – is, the U.S. says, the very reason American troops are heading to Poland and Romania. It is out of the NATO commitment to protect members – the implication being that an invasion of Ukraine could possibly mean that NATO states bordering Russia could be next.</p>
<p>But Kocho-Williams cautions that allowing Ukraine to join the military alliance now may pose a problem. “The threat of an imminent conflict between Ukraine and Russia would commit NATO to take military action against Russia,” he writes.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-nato-and-why-does-ukraine-want-to-join-175821">What's NATO, and why does Ukraine want to join?</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>3. How the Russian media might view this troop move</h2>
<p>The U.S. stated aim in deploying troops to Eastern Europe – to reassure NATO members – was <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/biden-orders-us-troop-deployments-reassure-nato-allies/story?id=82622507">reported faithfully</a> by the American media. It is unlikely that Russian newspapers and TV news broadcasts will present it in the same way.</p>
<p>Cynthia Hooper at College of the Holy Cross says that <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-just-a-panic-attack-russian-media-blames-us-for-escalating-ukraine-crisis-175482">the Russian media</a> have portrayed the U.S. as being “hysterical” in its insistence that Putin is hell-bent on invasion. Writes Hooper, “Joe Biden, Russian reporters claim, is building up a false sense of threat from Moscow to deflect attention away from domestic problems.”</p>
<p>Whether the Russian public is buying this line from state-controlled media is, however, another matter. For many, there are bigger things to worry about. Hooper quotes a Russian friend who told her that people “are sick and tired of those endless political TV shows about the Ukraine; they are absolutely indifferent to international issues.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-just-a-panic-attack-russian-media-blames-us-for-escalating-ukraine-crisis-175482">It's just a 'panic attack' – Russian media blames US for escalating Ukraine crisis</a>
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<h2>4. Will deployment deter Putin?</h2>
<p>The question is whether the U.S. troop buildup in Eastern Europe will succeed where international agreements have failed; will it deter Putin from transgressing Ukraine’s border?</p>
<p>In 2014, Russia <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-crisis-in-Crimea-and-eastern-Ukraine">annexed the Crimean peninsula</a>. It was an illegal military land grab – and one that contravened the Budapest Memorandum, a 1994 commitment in which Russia, the U.S. and the U.K. pledged to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.”</p>
<p>[<em>Over 140,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>Part of the the problem, as <a href="https://www.law.indiana.edu/about/people/bio.php?name=feinstein-lee-a">Lee Feinstein of Indiana University</a> and <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/person/mariana-budjeryn">Mariana Budjeryn at Harvard Kennedy School</a> note, is that <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-got-a-signed-commitment-in-1994-to-ensure-its-security-but-can-the-us-and-allies-stop-putins-aggression-now-173481">the memorandum is not legally binding</a>. Even if it were, it might not have been enough to stay Putin’s hand.</p>
<p>“International law matters, but it does not determine what states do.
Strong deterrence, diplomacy and international solidarity can influence Russian decision-making. … Ultimately, however, the de-escalation decision is Russia’s to make,” Feinstein and Budjeryn write. All the U.S. can do is make clear to the Kremlin the consequences of its actions.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-got-a-signed-commitment-in-1994-to-ensure-its-security-but-can-the-us-and-allies-stop-putins-aggression-now-173481">Ukraine got a signed commitment in 1994 to ensure its security – but can the US and allies stop Putin's aggression now?</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175412/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
What’s the significance of the US beefing up its military presence in Europe? The Conversation provides a roundup of articles addressing the crisis in Ukraine.Matt Williams, Senior International EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1701372021-10-20T11:50:15Z2021-10-20T11:50:15ZPéter Márki-Zay: Hungarian opposition’s ‘non-political’ candidate may not be enough to beat Orbán<p>Hungary’s parliamentary elections in spring 2022 will give illiberal Prime Minister Viktor Orbán a chance to continue his Fidesz government for a fourth term. An unlikely opposition candidate could disrupt these plans. </p>
<p>Orbán will face Péter Márki-Zay, mayor of the Hungarian county town of Hódmezővásárhely. Márki-Zay’s win in the opposition primaries came as a surprise. The former manager of an electricity company is married with seven children, and does not align himself with any political party. He has lived in Canada and the US, and <a href="https://hvg.hu/360/20180225_MarkiZay_Peter_a_HVG_Portreban_Soha_nem_azonosultam_sem_a_baloldallal_sem_a_Jobbikkal">has spoken about</a> his admiration for how former US president Barack Obama financed his campaign with small donations.</p>
<p>He entered the race without any party affiliation, beating Budapest mayor Gergely Karácsony and European Parliament vice-president Klára Dobrev. Dobrev won the first round of primaries and has the support of a major opposition party, Democratic Coalition. </p>
<p>However, she is also the wife of former prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány – a socialist – which tarred her campaign. Her rivals argued that the electorate demanded a new candidate without any association with existing parties and politicians in Hungary. </p>
<p>Márki-Zay’s victory at the 2018 mayoral byelection in Hódmezővásárhely was a surprise as well. A self-described right-wing Christian candidate and an opponent of Orbán’s Fidesz, he consolidated the opposition vote to win in Hódmezővásárhely – where Fidesz strongman János Lázár served as mayor from 2002-12 and an MP after 2014. </p>
<p>Márki-Zay’s win set the stage for the 2019 local elections in Budapest, where putting forward a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/populism-brexit-orban-hungary-budapest-mayor-boris-johnson-a9155226.html">joint candidate</a> was a successful tactic for the opposition in defeating Orbán.</p>
<h2>Political landscape</h2>
<p>A major fault line in Hungarian politics has been Budapest – representing left-liberal politics – versus the rest of the country. Liberal politics resonate in county towns as well, but with less momentum and regularity. </p>
<p>Hódmezővásárhely is an interesting town to this extent. It is located in the county of Csongrád, where former Fidesz parliamentary group leader Lázár is MP – a testament to the popularity of the governing party. </p>
<p>It is situated in between two major left-liberal centres of power, Budapest and Szeged. Both of these have seen civil action in support of refugees crossing into Hungary, and protests against Orbán’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/hungarian-anti-lgbtq-law-is-a-political-tactic-for-orban-162811">anti-LGBTQ+ law</a>. Szeged is the only town where the left has continuously held control since 2006, but its mayor failed to transform his success in local politics to become a national rival to Orbán. </p>
<p>Márki-Zay’s biggest success as mayor appears to have been <a href="https://telex.hu/belfold/2021/10/18/hodmezovasarhely-marki-zay-peter-miniszterelnok-jelolt-palyafutas">decreasing the debt</a> of the city. Opposition mayors tend to portray debt accumulated under their predecessors as a result of endemic corruption, but ultimately voters expect investment in infrastructure, rather than austerity. </p>
<p>In a way, having a non-Fidesz but a conservative and Christian mayor has benefited Hódmezővásárhely, even though the mayor himself has not delivered much. To consolidate support for Fidesz, Lázár has promised Hódmezővásárhely the <a href="https://lazarjanos.hu/konzultacio/">biggest tramline extension</a> for a century in Hungary.</p>
<h2>Non-political politics</h2>
<p>Rather than focusing on big projects and substantial political goals and slogans, Márki-Zay takes pride in being non-partisan. He is the founder of the <a href="https://mindenkimagyarorszaga.hu/about-us/">Everybody’s Hungary movement</a>, which “welcomes every decent Hungarian who is interested in change”. </p>
<p>Its primary goal is to present joint candidates against Fidesz mayors in mayoral elections, but it does not propose any policy platforms to show the electorate why their candidates should be elected over Fidesz ones. </p>
<p>Its vague platform purports to fight corruption and nepotism with new political faces in county towns, but among its founders are some old, rightwing intellectuals, economists and politicians. The movement echoes earlier dissident reformist circles from the 1980s, promoting a clean new beginning that moves away from old politics. </p>
<p>Yet claiming to not have any politics is still a political position – and not a very promising one. To have any chance of defeating Orbán, Márki-Zay needs to present alternative policies and projects to those of Fidesz, and will have to rely on a party machine for campaigning support. </p>
<p>He has already suggested establishing a <a href="https://444.hu/2021/10/18/marki-zay-hetedik-parlamenti-frakciot-hozna-letre-a-mozgalmanak">new parliamentary faction</a> for his own movement after the election, with “civil [society] candidates without any party affiliation”. </p>
<p>It looks as if Márki-Zay has already realised that not having any party association will <a href="https://index.hu/velemeny/2021/10/18/mraz-agoston-ot-ok-amiert-marki-zay-legyozheto/">hinder his chances</a> in the election. Yet no candidate is “civil” once elected an MP, and some opposition parties already <a href="https://444.hu/2021/10/19/a-jobbik-es-a-parbeszed-reagaltak-marki-zay-peter-felvetesere-a-hetedik-parlamenti-frakciorol">expressed scepticism</a> about whether they could jointly support candidates from another faction beyond the six parties already in the opposition bloc.</p>
<p>Can having no politics bring political success to Márki-Zay? There is a legacy of successful dissidence movements in the region that displaced ex-communists, but fell apart at subsequent elections. The region’s current politics are much more complex, and vague anti-corruption platforms cannot meet the challenges of Europeanisation, climate change, nationalism and identity politics. </p>
<p>Márki-Zay attempted to take a stance on the contentious issue of <a href="https://theconversation.com/hungarian-anti-lgbtq-law-is-a-political-tactic-for-orban-162811">LGBTQ+ rights</a>, with an April 2021 press conference alongside his family. His suggestion that he was ready to <a href="https://index.hu/belfold/2021/08/11/marki-zay-peter-melegkozosseg-fidesz/">stand with gay Hungarians</a>, (including those in Fidesz) raised the ire of Orbán’s party, but signalled Márki-Zay’s appeal for both conservative and liberal voters.</p>
<p>Márki-Zay will certainly affect the course of Hungarian politics. This ex-manager of an electricity company and avid follower of American politics cannot be underestimated as a political tactician, but whether his strategy will be enough to beat Orbán is less certain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170137/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Umut Korkut receives funding from EC Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme funded DEMOS: Democratic Efficacy and Varieties of Populism project under grant agreement No 822590. He also is the lead for the EC Horizon 2020 project D.Rad: De-radicalisation in Europe and beyond: Detect, Resolve, Re-integrate. </span></em></p>The surprise winner of the opposition primaries does not align himself with any political party.Umut Korkut, Professor in International Politics, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1634472021-06-29T10:08:07Z2021-06-29T10:08:07ZGibraltar reform is a small – but important – step for abortion rights in Europe<p>Gibraltar has voted to change the territory’s strict abortion ban, which held that abortion was punishable by “imprisonment for life” for the pregnant person and anyone who helped them get an abortion.</p>
<p>Just over half of Gibraltar’s 23,343 eligible voters took part in the referendum on June 24, with 62% <a href="https://www.parliament.gi/referendum/results/">voting in favour</a> of reforms to make abortion legally available. The success of the referendum will mean important changes for people in Gibraltar who urgently need access to <a href="https://www.facebook.com/101130911320938/posts/527372748696750/?d=n">safe, legal and local abortion</a>.</p>
<p>Originally <a href="https://www.gibraltar.gov.gi/press-releases/hm-government-of-gibraltar-announces-a-referendum-on-whether-to-commence-the-bill-to-amend-the-law-relating-to-termination-of-pregnancies-5282019-5118">planned for March 2020</a>, the vote was delayed by the pandemic until June 2021. The referendum asked voters whether to approve a <a href="https://www.gibraltarlaws.gov.gi/legislations/crimes-amendment-act-2019-4693">set of reforms</a> to Gibraltar’s Crimes Act, to allow abortion in the following circumstances:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>where termination is needed to prevent “grave permanent” injury to mental or physical health</p></li>
<li><p>where there is a substantial risk of fatal foetal abnormality</p></li>
<li><p>where the pregnancy would risk the life of the pregnant person</p></li>
<li><p>and where the pregnancy involves risk to the mental or physical health of the person, greater than the risk if the pregnancy were terminated (no later than 12 weeks into the pregnancy).</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Permitting abortion in the case of risk to health, risk to life, and fatal foetal abnormality are relatively common abortion allowances. The last requires more explanation: it permits abortion, up to 12 weeks, based on doctors’ assessment of the relative risk of ending or continuing the pregnancy. </p>
<p>This is the same test established in <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1967/87/contents">the Abortion Act of 1967</a> that regulates abortion in England, Scotland and Wales. That law permits abortion where two doctors certify that “the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman” up to 24 weeks. </p>
<p>In practice, doctors in Britain interpret this provision broadly and use it to permit abortion on request, because carrying pregnancy to full term is almost always more medically risky than ending it. In 2019, 98% of abortions in England and Wales were <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/891405/abortion-statistics-commentary-2019.pdf">performed on this ground</a>.</p>
<p>An important note: this is not the same as permitting abortion on request, because it requires abortion seekers to give reasons that comport with the existing legal reasons to end a pregnancy. It also <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Beyond_Control.html?id=sYYhAQAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">gives doctors the authority</a> to refuse if they judge that the reasons do not satisfy the legal test. </p>
<p>By contrast, Ireland’s <a href="http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2018/act/31">new abortion law,</a> passed in 2018, allows abortion on request up to 12 weeks, without the requirement that the abortion seeker provides reasons to explain their decision. As lawyers Fiona de Londras and Mairead Enright <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/documents/college-artslaw/law/news/commentary-on-gibraltar-command-paper.pdf">have noted</a>, Gibraltar’s new regulations maintain some of the shortcomings of the outdated 1967 Abortion Act.</p>
<h2>Abortion travel</h2>
<p>Gibraltar’s unique political geography has made travel to access abortion especially complicated for residents, but the new law will make safe services available locally for many people. Historically, some have travelled by car or bus to Spain, where abortion is legal up to 14 weeks, while others have gone to England where abortion is legal to 24 weeks, but only if they had the money and documentation to make the long journey. The COVID-19 pandemic, of course, made this infinitely more difficult.</p>
<p>The number of abortion travellers is notoriously difficult to estimate, because anti-abortion stigma means people may conceal their identity or nationality. Nonetheless, based on <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/abortion-statistics-for-england-and-wales">UK government data</a>, over the last ten years, the number of people from Gibraltar who obtained abortions in England or Wales has varied between zero and six annually. Similar national-level data on Gibraltarian abortion seekers in Spain is <a href="https://www.mscbs.gob.es/profesionales/saludPublica/prevPromocion/embarazo/tablas_figuras.htm#Tabla7">not available</a> but a Spanish clinic very close to the border with Gibraltar reported 21 Gibraltar <a href="https://www.gbc.gi/news/no-more-shame-says-29-requests-abortion-pills-have-been-sent-gibraltar-between-january-and-june-year">residents sought treatment</a> there in 2019. </p>
<p>As happens elsewhere in Europe, people in Gibraltar who cannot or do not want to travel for abortion obtain safe but illegal medication online. A <a href="https://www.gbc.gi/news/no-more-shame-says-29-requests-abortion-pills-have-been-sent-gibraltar-between-january-and-june-year">Gibraltarian pro-choice campaign group</a> reported 29 pill requests in the first half of 2020, when abortion travel was especially impacted by the pandemic.</p>
<p>Abortion has been highly stigmatised among Gibraltar’s small community of 33,000, according to <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2021/06/23/us-gibraltar-abortion-vote">Mara Clarke from the Abortion Support Network</a>, a charity that supports people from Gibraltar (and other countries) travelling for abortion. Some of the network’s clients reported that they feared even being seen buying a pregnancy test in a pharmacy because word might get back to their friends and family. Clarke says being able to “speak openly and publicly” to healthcare providers about abortion in Gibraltar will be transformative.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>Gibraltar joins Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the Isle of Man among the European states and territories that have recently liberalised their abortion laws. Reforms in these places are a significant improvement for the reproductive health and rights of people living there. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, some of the limitations of Gibraltar’s reforms illustrate the familiar pattern of “two steps forward and one step back” on abortion rights. For Gibraltarians who need an abortion after 12 weeks, and do not fall into the very narrow circumstances outlined in the law, they will continue to be forced to travel abroad.</p>
<p>After this long-overdue reform in Gibraltar, abortion rights advocates will continue to push for liberalisation in Malta, which <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/11/like-ireland-on-steroids-maltas-abortion-taboo-leaves-women-in-despair">maintains a total abortion ban</a>, and Poland, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/polands-abortion-ruling-amounts-to-a-ban-but-it-will-not-end-access-148819">recently tightened</a> its already highly restrictive law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163447/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sydney Calkin receives funding from the Leverhulme Trust. She is a volunteer with the Abortion Support Network.</span></em></p>The success of a referendum to relax Gibraltar’s strict abortion ban will mean safer access for many people.Sydney Calkin, Lecturer in Political Geography, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1623652021-06-16T12:24:41Z2021-06-16T12:24:41ZJürgen Conings: the case of a Belgian soldier on the run shows how the pandemic collides with far-right extremism<p>A soldier has been <a href="https://www.interpol.int/How-we-work/Notices/View-Red-Notices#2021-13279">on the run</a> from police in Belgium since mid-May after being implicated in the theft of weapons from a military base in Flanders.</p>
<p>The federal prosecutor charged Jürgen Conings with attempted murder and the <a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/news/belgium-all-news/170779/far-right-terrorist-manhunt-marc-van-ranst-ludivine-dedonder-alexander-de-croo-the-hunt-for-jurgen-conings-a-timeline/">illegal possession of weapons in a terrorist context</a> after he was connected with threats to kill Belgium’s top pandemic virologist, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57358492">Marc Van Ranst</a>.</p>
<p>The case highlights the country’s much overlooked problem with extremism on the right – and how these politics have become entangled with the pandemic. </p>
<h2>Pandemic politics</h2>
<p>It is not just fringe far-right conspiracy groups, such as QAnon and <a href="https://www.viruswaanzin.be/">Viruswaanzin</a>, that have been exploiting the COVID-19 crisis. Several Belgian right-wing parties and movements are using the pandemic to spread misinformation and fuel resentment. </p>
<p>These mostly conservative, pro-Flemish-independence parties include the right-wing New Flemish Alliance (<a href="https://english.n-va.be/">N-VA</a>) and the extreme far-right <a href="https://www.vlaamsbelang.org/the-party/">Vlaams Belang</a>. Both have been vocal about the way the caretaker governments led by former temporary prime minister Sophie Wilmès have handled the pandemic. The criticism grew even louder when a seven-party coalition took over in October 2020. Even though N-VA and Vlaams Belang were the largest elected parties in Flanders in 2019, they have been reduced to an opposition role in the current federal government. </p>
<p>This has been a bitter pill to swallow, especially for Vlaams Belang, which had hoped to form a coalition with the N-VA in order to bypass a <a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/news/belgium-all-news/57347/the-rule-to-keep-the-far-right-out-of-parliament-what-is-the-cordon-sanitaire/">1989 ruling</a> aimed at keeping it out of government because of its extreme politics. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="'International search warrant depicting suspect Jürgen Conings'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405512/original/file-20210609-14856-11fmb3r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C768%2C705&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405512/original/file-20210609-14856-11fmb3r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405512/original/file-20210609-14856-11fmb3r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405512/original/file-20210609-14856-11fmb3r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405512/original/file-20210609-14856-11fmb3r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=693&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405512/original/file-20210609-14856-11fmb3r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=693&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405512/original/file-20210609-14856-11fmb3r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=693&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Interpol search warrant out for Conings.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-Red-Notices#2021-13279">Interpol</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The tense political climate has been further exploited by the Flemish alt-right movement <a href="https://www.diggitmagazine.com/column/model-behind-schild-en-vrienden">Schild & Vrienden</a> to sow even more division. </p>
<p>It is in this complex context that pro-Conings groups have been popping up online ever since his news of disappearance was broadcast in May. </p>
<h2>Homegrown extremism</h2>
<p>Conings had been on <a href="https://cuta.belgium.be/who-are-we/">a terror watch list</a> since February as a <a href="https://ocad.belgium.be/gezochte-militair-is-een-potentieel-gewelddadige-extremist-wat-betekent-dat/?cn-reloaded=1">“potentially violent extremist”</a> and was known to be <a href="https://www.apache.be/nl/2021/05/21/bloed-bodem-eer-trouw-ook-in-de-zaak-jurgen-conings">connected</a> to another former soldier, convicted neo-Nazi <a href="https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2014/02/07/tot_5_jaar_cel_voorbloedbodemeerentrouw-kopstukken-1-1865391/">Tomas Boutens</a>. Yet neither the Belgian army nor the Belgian minister of defence appear to have been <a href="https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2021/05/25/dedonder-persco-jc/">informed about this</a>.</p>
<p>A Facebook group supporting Conings soon attracted more than 50,000 members <a href="https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2021/05/25/facebookgroep-als-1-man-achter-juergen-verdwenen/">before being banned</a> and relocating to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/technology/telegram-signal-apps-big-tech.html">encrypted messaging app Telegram</a>, which is harder to regulate. Posts praised his actions with fascist memes – which are <a href="https://www.vrtsales.be/productions/current-affairs/behind-scenes-flemish-alt-right-shield-friends">popular among the Flemish alt-right</a> and extreme far-right.</p>
<p>At least three support marches have taken place since his search warrant was issued – one of them <a href="https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20210529_94934601">coinciding with</a> protests against COVID-19 measures in Brussels.</p>
<h2>The right-wing trolling of experts</h2>
<p>A number of scientific experts have become targets during the pandemic. As well as Van Ranst, <a href="https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2021/05/26/virologe-erika-vlieghe-over-bedreigingen-tegen-collega-van-ranst/">infectious diseases specialist Erika Vlieghe and vaccinologist Pierre Van Damme</a> have had to endure online attacks. </p>
<p>Belgium’s <a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/belgium/124777/belgium-breaks-own-record-for-longest-period-without-government/">record-breaking federal government formation talks</a> did not help either. Politicians from the caretaker government quickly passed on all responsibility to a team of scientific experts at the start of the crisis. Trying to save political face, most of the pandemic communication was left to the experts. This is how Van Ranst, head of Belgium’s pandemic planning team and an opinionated Twitter user, became the personification of the pandemic.</p>
<p>Mainstream politicians from the traditional right and extreme far-right have played a part in fuelling personal attacks against experts. Calling Van Ranst <a href="https://twitter.com/FranckenTheo/status/1039036971539210240">“doctor Hatred”</a> in a previous Twitter dispute, N-VA politician Theo Francken, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/theo-franckenthe-man-who-broke-belgium-government">infamous for his anti-immigration stance</a>, set the tone again at the start of the crisis. Quoting a satirical article, he sent out and subsequently deleted a tweet targeted at Van Ranst. The tweet combined the Dutch word for “pandemic” with the gay slur “sissy”, suggesting the virologist was being overly dramatic about the pandemic. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405518/original/file-20210609-14884-1pplgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405518/original/file-20210609-14884-1pplgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405518/original/file-20210609-14884-1pplgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=674&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405518/original/file-20210609-14884-1pplgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=674&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405518/original/file-20210609-14884-1pplgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=674&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405518/original/file-20210609-14884-1pplgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=846&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405518/original/file-20210609-14884-1pplgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=846&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405518/original/file-20210609-14884-1pplgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=846&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Francken’s pande-mietje Tweet.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Twitter Marc Van Ranst</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Van Grieken and his party have taken advantage of their social media know-how during the pandemic, often publicising content from <a href="https://www.knack.be/nieuws/belgie/valt-t-scheldt-politici-aan-in-opdracht-van-vlaams-belang/article-longread-1735465.html">Vlaams Belang-linked</a> “alternative” news sites, such as the Flemish nationalist <a href="https://www.tscheldt.org/">‘t Scheldt</a>. Recurrent themes are xenophobic <a href="https://twitter.com/vlbelang/status/1341374008453947393">conspiracy theories</a> and the constant suggestion that Van Ranst is the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/vlbelang/posts/10158155584451505">“leftist hand puppet”</a> to Belgium’s “illegitimate” federal government, associating him with China’s alleged communist dictatorship.</p>
<p>Dries Van Langenhove, Schild & Vrienden’s leader and now independent Vlaams Belang politician, has participated in the bashing of Van Ranst as well. In a recent meme-packed video, he even compared Van Ranst to Stalin for advising against reopening hospitality businesses too soon.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405520/original/file-20210609-15121-1hswtdo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405520/original/file-20210609-15121-1hswtdo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405520/original/file-20210609-15121-1hswtdo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405520/original/file-20210609-15121-1hswtdo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405520/original/file-20210609-15121-1hswtdo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405520/original/file-20210609-15121-1hswtdo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405520/original/file-20210609-15121-1hswtdo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Van Langenhove with Van Ranst depicted as Stalin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kies Dries YouTube channel</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This excessive trolling, often accompanied by death threats, has had a concrete impact on all experts involved: before the Conings case, Van Ranst already spoke about being prank-called by groups of drunk youngsters, often ending their calls by singing the Flemish national anthem and calling him <a href="https://www.demorgen.be/nieuws/van-ranst-geterroriseerd-door-nachtelijke-telefoons-ze-zijn-jong-dronken-en-in-groep%7Ebc119046/">“leftist vermin”</a>.</p>
<h2>Lessons for the future</h2>
<p>The pandemic climate has proven to be an excellent breeding ground for extremists. It has provided them with an excuse to go after what they see as the “freedom-destroying” establishment. </p>
<p>In this climate, Conings is portrayed as a Flemish “resistance fighter” by many sharing his feelings of exclusion – despite being wanted for extremely serious crimes. The way people have responded to his case shows there is an urgent need to more closely inspect Belgium’s homegrown far-right extremism problem. </p>
<p>In my research, I have been looking at how continental urban terrorist violence materialises both online and offline in the aftermath of the Paris 2015 and Brussels 2016 attacks. This pandemic-driven case teaches us that present-day terrorist threats do not only stem from Jihadist milieus, as is often assumed. The actions of people such as Conings – who appear, on the surface, to be outliers or lone wolves – need to be analysed as part of a wider sociopolitical environment, particularly when political parties appear to feel so comfortable spreading misinformation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162365/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Evelien Geerts is part of the ERC-funded research project European Terrorism in Europe (2004-19): Remembering, Imagining, and Anticipating Violence.</span></em></p>A soldier is on the run after being charged with the attempted murder of the government’s leading pandemic expert.Evelien Geerts, Research Fellow, Department of Modern Languages, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1485812021-02-22T12:13:26Z2021-02-22T12:13:26ZWill European countries ever take meaningful steps to end colonial legacies?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384239/original/file-20210215-15-17l11am.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C12%2C2148%2C1415&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Europa_regina#/media/File:Europe_as_a_queen_map.JPG">Wikimedia Commons</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Centuries of European colonialism have had a tremendous impact on shaping inequities within and among countries, many of which are yet to be effectively addressed. This may seem like a trivial statement, but it is only recently being recognised by EU countries. </p>
<p>In 2019, the European Parliament passed a <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0239_EN.html">Resolution on the Fundamental Rights of People of African Descent</a>. It called for a comprehensive perspective on colonialism and slavery, which recognises their historical and contemporary adverse effects on people of African descent.</p>
<p>Similarly, last year’s ambitious <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-anti-racism-action-plan-2020-2025_en">anti-racism action plan</a> for 2020-2025 declares that colonialism is embedded in European history and has profound consequences for society today.</p>
<p>Still, the EU has some way to go to fully recognise, let alone address, the structural legacies of colonialism – for example, the racial dividing lines between white people and people of colour within the EU. In all major areas of society across the EU, people of colour tend to be the <a href="https://fra.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/data-and-maps/survey-data-explorer-second-eu-minorities-discrimination-survey">most discriminated against</a>. Yet, speaking of race and differences between white people and people of colour is not part of the political and legal discourse in the EU.</p>
<h2>Sweden as a case study</h2>
<p>Regarding Europe’s dawning recognition of colonial legacies, Sweden is a case in point. After the second world war it projected itself as a “moral superpower” without any of its own issues with colonialism and racism. It was a champion for equal rights, global justice and solidarity. </p>
<p>From the early 1960s, it stood up against <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Independence.aspx">colonialism at the UN</a> and actively supported anti-colonial struggles. It funded the ANC in South Africa.</p>
<p>Today, Sweden remains among the world’s <a href="https://www.government.se/government-policy/sweden-and-the-un/sweden-and-the-un-in-figures/">largest donors of development aid</a>, despite being a relatively small country. Until recently, Sweden had the most generous admission of refugees per capita in Europe. If we are to believe the <a href="https://index.goodcountry.org/">Good Country Index</a>, there is no country in the world that contributes more to the common good of humanity than Sweden. </p>
<p>But Sweden has always participated in, benefited from and even contributed to the <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12142-018-0510-x">international racial divisions of colonialism</a>. Between the first and second world wars, the Swedish parliament voted for the establishment of a state institute for studying, promoting and conserving the race biology of the nation. The commonplace conception at the time was that ethnic Swedes belonged to a superior Nordic type of white Europeans. </p>
<p>Nor was Sweden a mere bystander to the racial ordering of world affairs that began with European expansion during the late 15th century. It participated in the scramble for overseas colonies, holding onto the island of St Barthélemy in the Caribbean, for nearly a century. This became a significant free port where the treatment of enslaved Africans was no different than on neighbouring islands.</p>
<p>Today, people of non-European descent make up roughly 15-20% of the Swedish population, a segment of society that has much higher levels of unemployment than white Swedes. While the employment rate for native-born Swedes is close to 100%, <a href="https://www.scb.se/contentassets/d1119bacc6cb472093d01f95e86dbe1f/uf0529_2018a01_br_a40br1901.pdf">for those born in Asia and Africa it is 55-60%</a>. </p>
<p>The more educated you are as an African Swede, the larger the pay gap when set against other Swedes with the same educational attributes – and the more difficult it is to find a job that <a href="https://www.lansstyrelsen.se/download/18.4e0415ee166afb5932419bf7/1542881639062/Rapport%202018-22%20Anti-Black%20racism%20and%20discrimination.pdf">matches your qualifications</a>. Native-born African Swedes with a university education make approximately 49% less than the rest of the population with similar qualifications. </p>
<p>These hierarchies in Swedish society are part of a global pattern that has come about as a result of a shared colonial history.</p>
<h2>Addressing colonial legacies</h2>
<p>Despite efforts in some respects, Sweden and other European countries do not properly recognise the many global inequities that are the legacy of colonialism. As the United Nations <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-07-18/secretary-generals-nelson-mandela-lecture-%E2%80%9Ctackling-the-inequality-pandemic-new-social-contract-for-new-era%E2%80%9D-delivered">secretary-general, António Guterres, put it</a>, colonialism still reverberates in social injustices, the global economy and international power relations. </p>
<p>Former colonial powers are refusing to give up their domination at the UN, World Bank and International Monetary Fund, for example. Many European nations have consistently opposed and ignored UN resolutions passed with overwhelming majority by the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3894848?ln=en">calling for a democratic and equitable international order</a>. </p>
<p>This year marks the 20th anniversary of the World Conference Against Racism in South Africa and the world’s most comprehensive human rights instrument against racial discrimination. Among other things, this <a href="https://www.un.org/WCAR/durban.pdf">Durban Declaration and Programme of Action</a> calls for an end to the racial structures established by colonialism and for concerned states to halt and reverse the lasting consequences of the transatlantic slave trade. </p>
<p>The UK, France and other European countries have opposed the implementation of the Durban Declaration – and Sweden has supported them. For example, on New Year’s Eve 2020 the UN General Assembly passed <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3896585?ln=en">a resolution</a> for a comprehensive implementation of the declaration, also endorsing the decision to establish a UN permanent forum on people of African descent. When put to a vote, 106 countries <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3896183?ln=en">supported the resolution</a>. Only 14 voted against – among them the UK, France and the Netherlands. Another 44 abstained, including Sweden. </p>
<p>Still, EU countries seem to be slowly coming around to recognising the global impact of colonialism. In December 2020, the European Parliament held an inaugural <a href="https://www.ardi-ep.eu/inaugural-european-parliament-commemoration-of-the-european-day-for-the-abolition-of-the-slave-trade/">European Day for the Abolition of the Slave Trade</a>. In Sweden, a <a href="https://www.levandehistoria.se/english">government agency</a> is making efforts towards raising public awareness of Sweden’s participation in the racialised order of European colonialism. That includes its colonisation of Europe’s only recognised indigenous peoples, the Saami.</p>
<p>So far, no steps have been taken towards redress, but maybe we are witnessing the beginning of an honest reckoning of the past and its impacts on the present.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148581/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael McEachrane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Plans are being adopted and resolutions made, but moving forward means facing difficult truths about the past.Michael McEachrane, Visiting Researcher at the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Lund UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1534632021-01-18T13:01:55Z2021-01-18T13:01:55ZUnrest in the US has prompted soul-searching in Europe<p>In the wake of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/us-capitol-incursion-98314">shocking events</a> in Washington, DC, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, published a <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/91278/events-washington-and-what-it-means-europe_en">blog</a> laden with sound and fury, beseeching Europeans to heed the “wake-up call for all democracy advocates around the world world” and to “stand up immediately to every violation of the independence of democratic institutions”.</p>
<p>Many Europeans have felt downcast about the precipitous slide away from cardinal values, including democracy, instigated under President Donald Trump since his 2016 election. Egged on by the continued egregious allegations by Trump of election fraud, a large body of his supporters seized the opportunity to surround and ultimately break into the Capitol Building while members of Congress endeavoured to approve the results of the 2020 election. </p>
<p>Europeans are still trying to figure out what happened. Was this flashpoint merely an opportunity for an ill-informed group of violent Trumpites to further express their anger, or was it a localised example of deep-seated discontent that has taken permanent root in America?</p>
<p>And is it only in America that people have been duped by their leader? A fair bit of duping has been occurring too in some European nations, inflicting serious damage to its democratic credentials.</p>
<p>For Borrell, democracy itself is at stake, both as a value, and mode of government. He too argues that there is a need to “fight harder against disinformation”. Faith in democracy must be found anew and and those European institutions in which democracy rests must be defended. This means fighting back against governments in EU countries that have turned away defiantly from democracy towards unconstrained populism and authoritarian rule.</p>
<h2>Tech is too big</h2>
<p>For <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/opinion/after-trump-we-must-fight-to-rebuild-the-ruins-of-democracy/">Věra Jourová</a>, European Commission <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/jourova_en">vice president</a> for values and transparency, the problem is simple. In Europe and America alike, “people have simply lost trust in democratic institutions”. Rebuilding that trust means taking aim at a few key antagonists: big tech and social media, lax regulations, unethical coding, and unaccountable algorithms. </p>
<p>If these seem rather unlikely enemies of the state, for Jourová, they represent the building blocks of digital accountability that make up democracy in a digital age. Without them, neither freedom of expression nor the ability to eradicate disinformation and fake news campaigns can be guaranteed.</p>
<p>Jourová suggests that the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2250">European democracy action plan</a> – a broad roadmap of how 2021 Europe can galvanise faith in democratic governments – should be underwritten by sharper use of new rules and regulations, including an ongoing plan to <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-markets-act-ensuring-fair-and-open-digital-markets_en">curb tech monopolies</a>.</p>
<h2>Problems at home</h2>
<p>Europe is going to need something really substantial to rebuild trust in democracy at home. While Biden is fighting to rebuild his country, the EU needs to accept that it has permitted some perfidious descents of its own in both its domestic and foreign policy.</p>
<p>In Poland, EU leaders and institutions alike have tolerated or even wilfully ignored how Jarosław Kaczyński’s incongruously named Law and Justice party has eroded a whole series of norms, including the independence of the judiciary. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/hungary-1451">Hungary</a>, the Fidesz party under Viktor Orbán has exercised breath-taking examples of undemocratic governance, from snuffing out freedom of the press, independent academic institutions and NGOs, and misappropriation of EU funds.</p>
<p>Romania and Bulgaria are exhibiting similar erosions of democracy, rule of law and good governance. Externally, from lacklustre attitudes to Belarus and its own near neighbourhood, to exclusively interest-based dealings with China and Russia, the “pragmatic turn” appears to have taken precedence, rather than balance, with the EU’s former canon of value-led foreign policy designs.</p>
<p>Optimists, however, may argue that there’s no time like the present. Trust in democracy at home, and soft power aboard, is at rock bottom. What better time to turn with unflinching eye and renewed zeal to addressing the torn fabric of European democracy? To call out the false prophets. To sanction the offenders. To remedy the transgressed. </p>
<p>A good place to start might be the European People’s Party group in the European Parliament, which ought to expel the Fidesz party from its membership instead of just <a href="https://euobserver.com/political/147975">repeatedly suspending it</a>. Next could be the European Council, which must start insisting that EU funds will only be available to nations who uphold the rule of law, thus ensuring that no European leader can act with impunity.</p>
<p>In their global dealings, European leaders must speak and act more strongly. Shouting down Trump wasn’t that difficult, especially towards the end. What is more challenging will be ensuring that Europe’s bilateral deals with China and Russia – and indeed the US under Biden – all resolutely promote democracy as a global value, and its role as the keystone of liberal internationalism. The same applies in its dealings with key global clubs, including the UN (and the World Health Organization), NATO and the G20.</p>
<p>Too idealistic? Certainly, no liberal state or organisation can ever operate wholly on the basis of liberal principles. There will always be pragmatism and even hypocrisy in how national communities choose to govern as liberal democracies. The point is simply to keep at it. Even flawed liberal democracies – simply by continuing to operate and seasonally rededicating themselves to their founding ideals – provide the opportunities for the very struggles that return us to healthy democratic practices. </p>
<p>Do it right, and both the US and Europe will be on surer footing through the difficult times ahead in 2021. Fail to do it, and the entire governing philosophy of western liberal democracy will carry a mortal wound well into the middle of the century.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153463/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amelia Hadfield receives funding from the Erasmus+ programme, supporting the Centre for Britain and Europe at the University of Surrey.</span></em></p>European figureheads have spoken out against Capitol rioters but also know they have problems in their own back yard.Amelia Hadfield, Head of Department of Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1502392020-11-26T12:32:32Z2020-11-26T12:32:32ZThe end of Golden Dawn: has Greece shown us how to deal with neo-Nazis?<p>When a wave of right-wing extremism hit Greece in 2012, few would have predicted that Golden Dawn, one of the groups involved, would grow to become the third largest party in the Greek parliament. This was the beginning of a long period of <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/522081">turmoil</a> in Greek politics that saw a violent street movement become a viable political force.</p>
<p>But this neo-fascist “fairy tale” ended in what was considered the biggest Nazi trial since Nuremberg. Golden Dawn has been declared a <a href="https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/en/legislation/grc/penal_code/book_one/article_187/article_187.html">criminal organisation</a> and its leaders <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b2903dee-cd5f-403e-913e-f6d9ab5e9caa">jailed</a>, because of their involvement in unlawful activities – including murders, attacks on migrants, illegal possession of weapons and racketeering.</p>
<p>The leadership was also found guilty of ordering the <a href="https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-murder-of-pavlos-fyssas">murder</a> of leftist rapper Pavlos Fyssas.</p>
<p>Prior to that, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2012/08/12/158371570/migrants-targeted-amid-rise-of-greek-extremists">another murder attempt</a> on Egyptian fisherman Abuzid Embarak in 2012, showed that the party was deliberately trying to incite violence, something that has been previously described by a number <a href="https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/23655">academics</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/mar/03/golden-dawn-the-rise-and-fall-of-greece-neo-nazi-trial">journalists</a> as an attempt to target minorities.</p>
<p>The trial lasted more than five years due to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/21/world/europe/golden-dawn-trial-greece.html">numerous delays</a> and setbacks that turned the whole process into a never-ending chaos. In the meantime, the party was free to stand candidates in general and local elections without restrictions.</p>
<p>In total, 37 members of Golden Dawn were convicted – including leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos and 17 MPs – who have now been convicted and sentenced by the Greek court. Ioannis Lagos, Golden Dawn’s only remaining member of the European parliament, is likely to have his parliamentary immunity revoked any day now. Lagos is best known for <a href="https://www.ekathimerini.com/249452/article/ekathimerini/news/neo-nazi-mep-penalized-for-tearing-up-turkish-flag">ripping up</a> a Turkish flag during a debate.</p>
<h2>Why Golden Dawn was different</h2>
<p>Every European country has fringe groups like Golden Dawn. They are often part of larger <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26470450">right-wing extremist networks</a> with small but loyal bases.</p>
<p>Golden Dawn went mainstream soon after announcing its first major election campaign. Timing was crucial. The growing political instability in the country meant three general elections were held between 2009 and 2012. All major parties were losing public approval over their handling of the fiscal crisis.</p>
<p>On top of that, the only active far-right party in parliament back then (the Popular Orthodox Rally) had agreed to participate in a provisional coalition government organised by Lucas Papademos to get the country out of crisis. This move was seen as a betrayal by supporters. </p>
<p>The Greek far-right scene seemed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13608746.2013.782838?src=recsys">weak</a>, allowing Golden Dawn to step in and fill that gap without facing competition. Its monopoly allowed it to act in the most politically aggressive way. It embraced national purity, anticommunism, and promised mass migrant deportations. This rhetoric and an obsession with the refugee crisis started to pay off very quickly.</p>
<p>Calls for more aggressive migration policies <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d88eab00-5d30-11e5-a28b-50226830d644">became central</a> to its election campaigns. <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-analysis/article/waking-up-the-golden-dawn-does-exposure-to-the-refugee-crisis-increase-support-for-extremeright-parties/C50A127CC517968F2D0FA42A2A23FF85">Recent academic findings</a> showed that exposure to the refugee crisis in rural Greece increased support for Golden Dawn. </p>
<p>The party secured a shocking 9.4% of the vote in the European Parliament election of 2014, while in September 2015 it peaked nationally with 7%.</p>
<h2>Who fills the void?</h2>
<p>During the early years of the Greek economic crisis, it looked as though the public was trying to punish the political system through the ballot box. It is widely believed that this age of anger had passed by 2017, which was when Golden Dawn’s downfall began. Greece rejected populism and abandoned fringe politics, allowing mainstream parties to become popular once again.</p>
<p>In the general election of 2019, Golden Dawn <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/07/greeks-choose-between-beach-and-ballot-in-first-post-debt-bailout-poll">lost all its parliamentary seats</a> and had to shut down most of its branches to survive financially.</p>
<p>However, the party casts a long shadow and continues to shape Greek politics. The more mainstream New Democracy, for example, has opened its doors to a number of far-right politicians, who ran successful campaigns in the recent election. Some of them had previously expressed strong <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/migration-divides-greek-government-refugees-antonis-samaras-kyriakos-mitsotakis-syriza/">xenophobic</a> and <a href="https://www.ekathimerini.com/215660/article/ekathimerini/news/nd-spokesman-georgiadis-apologizes-for-anti-semitic-comments-in-past">antisemitic</a> views.</p>
<p>Kyriakos Velopoulos’ ultranationalist party Greek Solution, meanwhile, won ten seats in the Greek parliament after a long period of <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/greek-solution-far-right-kyriakos-velopoulos-unorthodox-migration-votes/">campaigning against migrants</a>. Golden Dawn’s spokesperson Ilias Kasidiaris has formed a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/10/14/923605755/golden-dawn-leader-of-greek-neo-nazi-party-sentenced-to-13-years-in-prison">new movement</a> called Greeks for the Fatherland – even though he, too, is now in jail.</p>
<p>Kasidiaris has attempted to distance himself from neo-Nazi ideology in the wake of the Golden Dawn trial but his commitment to that change is yet to be tested. The same voters who embraced violence and legitimised Golden Dawn for its violent practices could support a similar movement. We might expect any such party to be less aggressive and neo-Nazi than Golden Dawn, but its values will be similar.</p>
<p>Greece has shown us how to deal with neo-Nazis. But when it comes to extremism, it is important to recognise the years of antifascist activism during Golden Dawn’s rise. It was a fight that, at times, seemed like <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/18/greek-prosecutor-urges-acquittal-of-neo-nazis-in-murder-trial">a lost cause</a>.</p>
<p>Democracy managed to pass an important test in the prosecution and sentencing of this criminal organisation. The court ruling was enough to eradicate Golden Dawn, but fascist remnants are still out there, reorganising and planning their next move.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150239/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgios Samaras does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Members of the far-right group have been found guilty of crimes including racketeering and murder.Georgios Samaras, PhD Research Associate, Department of European and International Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1468952020-10-28T11:01:24Z2020-10-28T11:01:24ZHow COVID-19 is shaping the way Europeans think about politicians<p>COVID-19 is an unprecedented doom loop between a severe health crisis and grave economic repercussions. Government interventions to handle the outbreak and its aftermath first stopped public life in its tracks and then entirely reshaped it. This has left us in a kind of “new normal”, in which social interactions and labour conditions will probably never be the same again.</p>
<p>An <a href="https://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2020/working-paper/wind-change-experimental-survey-evidence-covid-19-shock-and-socio">experimental research study suggests</a> that when people are thinking about the health crisis, they express less trust in politicians and political institutions such as the European Union. That’s even more the case when they are thinking about the economic ramifications of the situation we are all currently experiencing.</p>
<p>This is what the findings from four online surveys conducted in Italy, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands as part of the study suggest. The surveys were conducted well into the first wave of the epidemic (May-June) and had more than 2,000 respondents per country.</p>
<p>Some respondents were first asked about their experience of the COVID crisis, and then asked about their political opinions. They were asked, for example, if they knew anyone who had been diagnosed with COVID, and whether they were concerned about their health. That meant that, for this group, the health crisis was put front and centre in their minds. Their answers were then compared with respondents that were not given such “priming” questions at the beginning of the survey and were therefore not necessarily thinking about the pandemic. “Primed” respondents were 5% less likely to trust their national politicians and 12% less trustful of the European Union. When asked whether their country benefited from EU membership, they were 10% less likely to reply “yes”.</p>
<p>When posed priming questions about the economic consequences of the crisis, such as on job security or future opportunities, respondents were even more disappointed in their political institutions. They were also less willing to give up personal freedom in exchange for individual and public safety. </p>
<p>Similar bolts of “disillusion” have occurred before, often in the wake of natural disasters or economic shocks. Such events will always overwhelm political institutions to some degree. Clearly citizens expected their institutions to be better prepared for the shock of the pandemic, and to be quicker on the ball to manage its fallout.</p>
<p>This disillusion also seems to chip away at another pillar of society, as the survey shows that support for financing the welfare state with taxes also goes down. This is true for all spending categories – poverty alleviation, health expenditure, unemployment benefits and pensions – and coincides with a higher dissatisfaction with the general tax burden.</p>
<h2>The return of the expert</h2>
<p>The news isn’t all bad though. Support for scientists and experts was 8% higher among respondents primed to think about health and economic issues first. This is especially true for the group receiving additional priming questions that cast the crisis as a conflict. When respondents were asked whether they perceive the crisis as a struggle against an invisible enemy, and whether they see national solidarity as the best way forward, support for competence and expertise rose by a whopping 28%.</p>
<p>This result suggests a “rallying around the flag” effect is at play as well, to some extent mitigating the disillusion effect. Precisely because a crisis is an extraordinary event, citizens are more easily united around a common cause and are willing to put their shoulders under any kind of competent crisis response with enthusiasm. </p>
<h2>A new political divide?</h2>
<p>Surprisingly, and although we learn from the survey that faith in political institutions and the EU is wavering, “populist” attitudes have weakened as well. Support for a strong leader to deal with a crisis decreased by 5% for all primed respondents. They were also 5% less keen to let the “people” make the most important policy decisions instead of politicians. Support for populist political parties, if anything, is in retreat too.</p>
<p>In line with these findings, the latest <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2ac8b5ff-2068-4ee3-acb8-2ca11cc083b1">polls</a> show that populist parties are losing ground across Europe. This suggests that we may have reached a critical juncture, with the crisis potentially pushing our societies onto a different path.</p>
<p>Of course, the way in which governments manage the economic recovery and the resurgence of the virus in the months and years to come will be a crucial factor here. It will be interesting to see if the rising demand for competence that the survey uncovers, is met in the future. Or whether the “disillusion” effect of the crisis is eventually channelled in renewed, or even bolstered support for <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-wont-kill-populism-even-though-populist-leaders-have-handled-the-crisis-badly-145309">populist parties</a>. </p>
<p>In this sense, a new fault line in the political arena may be opening up, setting simple policy solutions against the complexity of nuanced, yet competent approaches.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146895/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Citizens feel disillusioned, but it’s not all bad news.Willem Sas, Lecturer, Economics Division, University of StirlingGianmarco Daniele, Assistant Professor at University of Milan and Executive Director of the CLEAN Unit on the economics of crime at Bocconi University, Bocconi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.