tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/evo-morales-10626/articlesEvo Morales – The Conversation2023-04-04T12:19:38Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2031002023-04-04T12:19:38Z2023-04-04T12:19:38ZHow the indictment of Donald Trump is a ‘strange and different’ event for America, according to political scientists<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518856/original/file-20230401-26-vgxsr6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C0%2C6002%2C4001&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">It was big news when a grand jury voted to indict former President Donald Trump.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/newspaper-front-pages-with-former-us-president-donald-trump-news-photo/1250118227?adppopup=true">Ed Jones/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-indictment-wont-keep-him-from-presidential-race-but-will-make-his-reelection-bid-much-harder-197677">indictment of a former president</a> of the United States, Donald Trump, is history happening in real time. The Conversation asked political scientists <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=FlYT3TEAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">James D. Long</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=W54pBFgAAAAJ">Victor Menaldo</a>, both at the University of Washington, to help readers understand the meaning of this moment in the U.S. The two scholars have written about the lessons other democracies can teach the U.S. about <a href="https://theconversation.com/prosecuting-a-president-is-divisive-and-sometimes-destabilizing-heres-why-many-countries-do-it-anyway-188565">prosecuting a president</a> and provide the context for Trump’s arraignment in a Manhattan courthouse.</em> </p>
<h2>What was the first thing you thought when you heard that the grand jury voted to indict Trump?</h2>
<p><strong>James Long</strong>: The first thought I had was about the grand jury, and how much work it is to be on a grand jury. It becomes a part-time job. And how wonderful that we live in a country where that’s how these things are decided. Twenty-three people performed this service that is so critical to the functioning of our country and our democracy. They do it not just for Donald Trump’s case, but for many types of cases. There was something very touching about it.</p>
<p>The strength of our legal system is the thing that makes me proud. What makes me sad is that we’re in this situation. If you think about all the battles that have been fought to make our democracy better, stronger and more inclusive over more than 200 years – we’re now at a place where someone has threatened that to pursue their own interests. That’s just a sad thing to have to experience as a country. I’m glad that we’re going through it following the rule of law, as opposed to fighting it out as a political matter in the streets or fighting a war or something else disastrous, as other countries have done.</p>
<p><strong>Victor Menaldo</strong>: I thought of cases that are similar, analogs in other parts of the world. Prime Minister <a href="https://theconversation.com/prosecuting-ex-presidents-for-corruption-is-trending-worldwide-but-its-not-always-great-for-democracy-156931">Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel</a> came to mind. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/caribbean-evo-morales-bolivia-50747531a0c6a757cd5f423ccf8e84d5">Evo Morales in Bolivia</a> came to mind. A <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190321-brazil-fall-three-former-presidents">bunch of Brazilian former presidents</a> <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/10/31/lula-looks-to-restore-brazils-tarnished-global-stature">came to mind</a> – the past four, in fact – who went through different stages of prosecution or impeachment, or some were arrested, some spent time in jail.</p>
<p>I also thought about the politics and how Trump might continue down the path he’s been on – getting folks inflamed and throwing fireballs and muddying the waters. How far will he go, and what purposes will that serve – maybe intimidating judges, witnesses and juries and the like – in terms of bolstering his campaign?</p>
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<span class="caption">Former President Donald Trump after speaking during a rally at the Waco Regional Airport on March 25, 2023, in Waco, Texas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/former-u-s-president-donald-trump-prepares-to-depart-after-news-photo/1476375191?adppopup=true">Brandon Bell/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>What can this indictment do to America?</h2>
<p><strong>James Long</strong>: My generation lived through <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/legacy/Clinton-Lewinsky-story.pdf">President Bill Clinton’s impeachment</a>. As I’ve grown older, I’ve seen other things that other presidents have gotten away with. So I probably thought the indictment would not have been that surprising. </p>
<p>Yet the indictment is shocking to me now. It’s also just shocking in the sense that Trump has spent his entire life in litigation and either getting away with stuff or not, but never being potentially held at a personal level legally liable in a criminal matter – although he does still have the presumption of innocence. It was very shocking to me to think that this has finally happened – like, this really is strange and different.</p>
<p><strong>Victor Menaldo</strong>: I tend to see the U.S. as less exceptional these days, at least politically, because of Trump. The various <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/trump-investigations-civil-criminal.html">investigations of Trump</a>, and now the indictment, are less surprising than they might have been at one time. Americans had anticipated that a shoe would drop eventually, and this indictment was the shoe, or one of the first shoes. It was bound to happen, because Trump has been pushing the envelope for so long.</p>
<p>I <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/authoritarianism-and-the-elite-origins-of-democracy/29C0246C5474CBC5184B2967AD4206ED">co-authored a book in 2018</a> with <a href="https://political-science.uchicago.edu/directory/michael-albertus">Michael Albertus</a>. Our fundamental premise was that the fear of prosecution drives a lot of politics, across countries and across time. It’s basic to whether you’ll have a democracy or whether the democracy will weaken. </p>
<p>So if you’re afraid of prosecution, you might, if you’re a dictator, prevent democracy at all costs. If you were very nasty, you’d make sure that democracy doesn’t happen or that it happens on your terms, because if it happens on someone else’s terms, you’re going to end up in a prison. You’re going to try to craft a system where the judiciary is beholden to you so you don’t get in any trouble.</p>
<p>My other thought is, thank goodness that this happened once Trump was out of power. You don’t control the machinery of government when you’re out of power. You don’t control the Justice Department. Your power is weak politically, even though Trump is the putative <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/03/30/trump-indictment-republicans-rally/">leader of the Republican Party</a> and <a href="https://morningconsult.com/2024-gop-primary-election-tracker/">front-runner in the GOP</a> for the 2024 nomination. But he lacks the cachet he once had and he lacks the powers he would otherwise use to cause much damage. That gives me optimism that this prosecution might not be as existential to our system as it would have been, let’s say, when he was still in power.</p>
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<span class="caption">New York Police Department workers set up barricades outside the offices of the Manhattan district attorney on April 1, 2023, in New York City.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/workers-with-the-nypd-set-up-barricades-outside-the-offices-news-photo/1250351591?adppopup=true">Kena Betancur/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Are the arrest and booking symbolically important in the grand story of Trump and America?</h2>
<p><strong>James Long</strong>: Certainly. I think that is going to be the image that is next to his obituary – a former president’s mug shot.</p>
<p>I believe that Trump’s political stock has declined every day since he’s left office. I think he thinks this prosecution will help him, and it might short term. I think he’s going to try to use that image, much like Jesus on the cross, to say, essentially, “Here I am being martyred at the hands of a Democratic DA in a Democratic state among a grand jury probably made up of citizens who are all Democrats out to get me, and a judge out to get me!”</p>
<p>That mug shot might be an image he’s going to exploit, but ultimately, I believe it’s going to be embarrassing to him. I don’t think moderate Republicans will vote for somebody who is being prosecuted. I think they’re going to shop around. The <a href="https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/2024-state-primary-election-dates">first primary is a little less than a year</a> away. There’s a long time for the Republicans to politically realign themselves behind another candidate.</p>
<p><strong>Victor Menaldo</strong>: Trump’s best move, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/the-mind-of-donald-trump/480771/">according to his theory of the world</a>, is to be a martyr and to weaponize the symbolism of a former president being indicted and claim it’s totally politicized.</p>
<p>I would say that anyone who cares about the rule of law in general, Democrats and the folks in these judicial proceedings, in particular, they have to be very careful not to reinforce that weaponization narrative there. I believe the prosecutors will probably do unconventional things and treat Trump differently from your typical defendant. They’ll reduce the odds that there is going to be some mug shot that goes viral, they won’t cuff him, won’t do the perp walk. They’ll treat him with respect and dignity. </p>
<p>How they handle his arraignment is going to be a fascinating game to observe – how to lower the profile of that moment. Their best strategy would be to play it down and try to uphold the dignity of the office or former office. Trump’s best move is to say this prosecution is weaponization of the legal system, milk the idea he’s being persecuted for all it’s worth and some of that will probably stick with his core supporters.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203100/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For the first time, a former US president has been indicted, and two scholars describe what it means for democracy – and for them.James D. Long, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of WashingtonVictor Menaldo, Professor of Political Science, Co-founder of the Political Economy Forum, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1982322023-01-20T18:25:16Z2023-01-20T18:25:16ZPeru protests: What to know about Indigenous-led movement shaking the crisis-hit country<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505644/original/file-20230120-22-9yc830.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=27%2C179%2C4573%2C2883&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A movement on the march.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/thousands-of-protesters-coming-from-all-over-the-country-news-photo/1246378481?phrase=peru%20indigenous%20protest&adppopup=true">Carlos Garcia Granthon/Fotoholica Press/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Peru is in the midst of a political and civil crisis. Weeks of protest have culminated in thousands descending on the capital amid violent clashes and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/20/peru-protests-running-battles-police-lima-thousands-march">running battles with police</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Triggered by the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/amid-coup-countercoup-claims-what-really-went-down-in-peru-and-why-196207">removal from power of former leader</a> Pedro Castillo, the protests have exposed deep divisions within the country and are being encouraged by a confluence of internal factors and external agitators.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked Eduardo Gamarra, an <a href="https://pir.fiu.edu/people/faculty-a-z/eduardo-gamarra1/eduardo-gamarra.html">expert on Latin American politics</a> at Florida International University, to explain the wider context of the protests and what could happen next.</em></p>
<h2>What sparked the protests in Peru?</h2>
<p>The immediate trigger was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-63895505">events on Dec. 7, 2022</a>, that saw now-ousted President Castillo embark on what has <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/what-pedro-castillos-failed-coup-attempt-means-for-peru">been described as an attempted coup</a>. But whether it was a “coup” is subject to debate. Castillo’s supporters say he was trying to head off a different type of coup, one instigated by Congress.</p>
<p>Castillo – a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-57941309">leftist, Indigenous former teacher</a> from the country’s south – tried to shut down a Congress intent on impeaching him over <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2022-10-12/president-pedro-castillo-of-peru-faces-new-corruption-accusation.html">corruption claims</a> and <a href="https://peoplesdispatch.org/2022/11/24/peruvian-constitutional-court-annuls-treason-complaint-against-president-pedro-castillo/">accusations of treason</a>. He called on the military to support him, and his intention was to form a constituent assembly to reform the country’s constitution. But his plan didn’t work. The military rejected Castillo’s ploy, and Congress refused to be dissolved and <a href="https://theconversation.com/amid-coup-countercoup-claims-what-really-went-down-in-peru-and-why-196207">went ahead with its impeachment vote</a>, removing him from power.</p>
<p>The events of that day set off the protests that have built in momentum over the subsequent weeks. </p>
<p>But while the events of Dec. 7 were the immediate trigger, it is important to understand that this crisis was long in the making.</p>
<h2>What is the wider background of the political crisis?</h2>
<p>The crisis is rooted in the nature of Peru’s political system. In part by design, the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Peru_2021.pdf?lang=en">country’s constitution</a>, which was adopted in 1993 but amended a dozen times since, creates ambiguity in who has the greater power – the president or Congress. Constitutionally, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/12/07/1141372595/peru-s-president-dissolves-congress-and-imposes-a-curfew">Congress is given enormous scope</a> to limit executive power, including removal through impeachment. The idea was to serve as a bulwark against the excesses of authoritarian-minded presidents. But in reality, it encourages instability and a weak executive. The constitution is so ambiguously written that it also gives wiggle room for presidents who want to shut down Congress, as Castillo unsuccessfully tried to do.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Peru has seen a dismantling of its old, established political party system. Once-powerful parties no longer exist or struggle to get support. As a result, the country’s party system has fractured – more than a dozen parties are represented in Congress, which makes it hard for any one leader or party to achieve a majority. In short, it makes it hard to govern when you have no legislative base to do so. For example, Castillo had the support of only 15 members of his own party in the 130-seat assembly.</p>
<p>On top of all that, the country is deeply polarized and divided along a number of different lines: ethnic, racial, economic and – as the protests have fully shown – regional.</p>
<h2>Who is protesting and just how large is the movement?</h2>
<p>First off, they are Castillo supporters. While he had no real power base in the country’s capital, Lima, Castillo – as the first real rural president the country has had – had <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/16/the-forgotten-ones-rural-supporters-stand-by-perus-castillo">significant support in the south</a>. </p>
<p>The protests have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/7/anti-government-protesters-attempt-to-take-over-an-airport">concentrated around the city of Puno</a>, but support has come from the whole high Andes of southern Peru.</p>
<p><iframe id="9Py5M" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/9Py5M/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The area is predominantly <a href="https://minorityrights.org/minorities/highland-aymara-and-quechua/">Quechua and Aymara</a> – the two major Indigenous groups in the Peruvian south. Peruvian Quechua and Aymara are “first cousins” to the same groups over the border in Bolivia. And this is important in the context of the current protests.</p>
<p>Evo Morales, the former president of Bolivia, has long <a href="https://peoplesdispatch.org/2021/04/27/runasur-a-new-latin-american-regional-integration-mechanism-created-in-bolivia/">talked about “runasur</a>” – the concept of uniting Indigenous people across the Andes region. </p>
<p>Morales <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/10/evo-morales-barred-peru-bolivia-pedro-castillo">has been blamed by the Peruvian government</a> for stirring up the protests – indeed he has now been banned from entering Peru. No doubt, <a href="https://elcomercio.pe/politica/gobierno/evo-morales-quienes-son-ocho-operadores-del-expresidente-boliviano-que-no-podran-ingresar-al-peru-y-cual-es-su-historial-pedro-castillo-mas-ipsp-puno-dina-boluarte-cusco-dini-protestas-noticia/">Bolivian allies have been in Peru’s south</a> mobilizing the movement, and some have been arrested. </p>
<p>But what you are really seeing is a “Bolivia-ization” of the protest movement in Peru. The tactics of the protest movement in Peru are similar to those of the forces behind the pro-Morales <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/14/international/americas/death-toll-rises-in-antigovernment-protests-in.html">unrest in Bolivia of both 2003</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-politics/supporters-of-bolivias-morales-march-with-coffins-of-dead-protesters-idUSKBN1XV1O3">and 2019</a> – the road blockades, the violence against police that has seen <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/peru-police-officer-burned-death-patrol-car-casualties-violent-post-election-protests-reaches-47">at least one officer killed</a> and others injured. That in no way excuses the the brutal response by police, which has seen <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/17/world/americas/peru-protests-democracy.html">more than 50 demonstrators killed</a>.</p>
<p>But even in the treatment of these deaths you see echoes of Bolivia. Just as in Bolivia, protesters are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/11/genocide-investigation-opened-against-peru-president-after-protest-deaths">framing the anti-demonstration violence by authorities as a “genocide</a>” – claiming that police are targeting Indigenous groups because of who they are.</p>
<p>In my view, that is incorrect. The police are obviously using excessive force, but the officers involved are themselves, in many cases, Indigenous.</p>
<h2>What are the demands of protesters?</h2>
<p>Primarily they are trying to force the government in Lima to agree to a <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/peru-proposed-constitutional-reform-bring-forward-elections-and-shorten-presidential-and">constituent assembly</a> to devise a new constitution; what that new constitution would look like is a secondary concern.</p>
<p>They are also trying to force the resignation of the woman brought in to replace Castillo, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/07/americas/dina-boluarte-profile-intl-latam/index.html">Dina Boluarte</a>. I believe that is an achievable goal. Boluarte suffers from many of the same problems as her predecessor – she has little real support in Congress and no support in the streets. On top of that, having not been elected into office, she lacks democratic legitimacy in the eyes of many.</p>
<p>President Boluarte has said she <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/peru-protesters-pour-remote-andean-regions-demand-president-resign-rcna66580">will not resign</a>. She is studying the possibility of calling early elections, but there is little chance of her agreeing to a constituent assembly at this time.</p>
<p>As to how this movement will advance the concept of a regional runasur, that is difficult to judge. Certainly the Peruvian situation is no longer just a Peruvian issue – it involves Bolivia, and the protest has vocal support from the Latin American left.</p>
<p>But it is tough to say how well supported the protest movement is within Peru, given how divided the country is. It certainly hasn’t got the backing of urban areas in the north of the country.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, it has shown the mobilizing capacity of Indigenous people – just as in Bolivia. And the goal of many is not to win support, but to demonstrate this strength.</p>
<h2>Will Peru’s protest follow the course of past unrest in the region?</h2>
<p>That is anybody’s guess. If you follow the logic of the Bolivian comparison you will see increasing turmoil, and potentially more violence – such as that country experienced in 2003 and 2019. If that is the case, returning Peru to the old style Lima-centric politics will be difficult. The deep divides in Peruvian society and the fracturing of its political system make it hard to envision a political force emerging that can deal with all of these issues. And that is what makes the current situation so difficult to resolve.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, comparisons to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/07/29/peru-inaugural-incites-protests-against-fujimori/0b8296b0-299a-414a-8bcc-b3bbf5c04789/">protests in Peru that ousted Alberto Fujimori</a> in 2000 may be misplaced. Those protests took place in a very different context – Fujimori was perceived by then as a dictator who had plundered the country of billions of dollars. It was an uprising to remove a dictator.</p>
<p>What you have now is an unpopular ex-president in jail and an unpopular president with contested claims to legitimacy in power. It is very different context. It isn’t a transition from authoritarianism to democracy; it is protest resulting from an inefficient democratic system at a time of a deeply divided country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198232/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>As an academic and as director of a university research center, I've received funding from foundations, US government agencies, and multilateral institutions.
</span></em></p>Thousands of demonstrators have descended on Lima amid violent clashes with police. The protest movement could be taking cues from earlier mobilizations in neighboring Bolivia.Eduardo Gamarra, Professor of Politics and International Relations, Florida International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1483552020-10-19T13:54:30Z2020-10-19T13:54:30ZBolivia elections: socialist Luis Arce celebrates projected victory amid democratic fragility<p>Luis Arce, former finance minister in the government of Evo Morales, celebrated with his campaign team in La Paz in the early hours of October 19 as <a href="https://www.la-razon.com/nacional/2020/10/19/segun-datos-de-boca-de-urna-luis-arce-del-mas-gana-en-primera-vuelta-con-524/">an exit poll</a> forecast his victory in the country’s presidential elections. Although the official results will not be announced before October 25, all signs point to Arce’s Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-bolivia-election/bolivia-polls-start-to-close-in-crossroads-election-as-socialists-eye-return-idUKKBN27407Q?il=0">winning the presidential elections</a> in the first round. </p>
<p>Arce, one of the key architects of economic policy during the Morales presidency, succeeded the former socialist leader – who remains in exile in Argentina – as the leader of the MAS. Although Arce does not come from any of the social movements at the base of the party, he is seen as a leader capable of bringing the party, and country more generally, together.</p>
<p>Despite some heated discussions around polling stations, election day in Bolivia proceeded without a hitch, with many in the country breathing a collective sigh of relief. Nevertheless, Bolivian democracy still faces a number of challenges.</p>
<p>Almost exactly a year has passed since the 2019 vote, which was marred by accusations that the incumbent Morales had committed electoral fraud. After 14 years in power, he was finally <a href="https://theconversation.com/bolivia-in-crisis-how-evo-morales-was-forced-out-126859">forced from office</a> by a <em>coup d’état</em> in early November 2019, with state-perpetrated violence after the putsch leaving <a href="https://woborders.blog/2020/01/04/2019-crisis-deaths-analysis/">scores dead</a>. </p>
<p>There is still much we do not know about those dark days, while many of the issues raised by the 2019 political crisis remain unresolved. The strength of liberal democracy remains weak and the country’s political arena split between those that believe Morales and the MAS were ousted by a coup and those that believe the 2019 elections were fraudulent. </p>
<p>COVID-19 has poured fuel on the fire, as the interim government of Jeanine Añez consistently used the pandemic as a means to consolidate her own political project and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-politics-election-idUSKCN24O2PY">delay elections</a>. </p>
<h2>Liberal democracy in Bolivia</h2>
<p>Bolivia’s liberal democratic institutions <a href="https://www.viewpointmag.com/2016/02/18/the-latest-turn-of-bolivias-political-merry-go-round-the-constitutional-referendum/">do not match up</a> to the complex political reality at the best of times, but changes in the past decade to the body responsible for overseeing elections further eroded public trust in democracy. Morales’s political opponents believed the executive branch of government had undue influence over Bolivia’s new Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). These suspicions were, in their minds, confirmed in 2017 when <a href="https://www.hispantv.com/noticias/bolivia/360967/justicia-permite-repostulacion-evo-morales-presidenciales">the TSE accepted</a> Morales’s candidacy for the 2019 elections despite limits on constitutional terms which should have precluded him. </p>
<p>Morales was allowed to run for a fourth term on the grounds of his human rights to democracy, but the price was high. His political opponents mounted a sustained attack on the TSE and painted the 2019 elections as fraudulent in the months leading up the ballot. This was so effective that by September 2019, <a href="https://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2019/9/29/segun-la-encuesta-68-cree-que-habra-fraude-electoral-232481.html">68% of Bolivians</a> polled believed there would be fraud in the upcoming elections. </p>
<p>For its part, the TSE did its best to lose what credibility it had left. In October 2019, on the night of the elections, the quick count system known as TREP was stopped unexpectedly. The TSE gave no fewer than four conflicting explanations, angering protesters already suspecting fraud and leading to mass violence in cities across the country. </p>
<p>The Organisation of American States then waded into the fray, <a href="https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-085/19">publicly voicing</a> its concern about electoral fraud in a report that has since received <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/07/world/americas/bolivia-election-evo-morales.html">substantial criticism</a>. The vice president of the TSE, Antonio Costas, then <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4493-the-eighteenth-brumaire-of-macho-camacho-jeffery-r-webber-with-forrest-hylton-on-the-coup-in-bolivia">resigned</a>, leaving its reputation in tatters. </p>
<p>The TSE has fared little better in 2020 under its new president, Salvador Romero. Persistent suspicions of fraud led <a href="https://www.la-razon.com/nacional/2020/10/18/el-trep-la-otra-suspension-que-genero-la-anulacion-de-las-elecciones-de-2019/">Romero to cancel</a> the new quick count system, the DIREPRE, a day before the October 18 elections. Until the official count is in, nothing can be taken for granted.</p>
<h2>Competing narratives of crisis</h2>
<p>The streets are still one of the principal sites of Bolivian politics. Violence marked the run up to the 2020 elections, leading <a href="https://www.la-razon.com/nacional/2020/10/07/naciones-unidas-la-ue-y-la-iglesia-piden-a-los-partidos-contribuir-al-clima-de-paz-y-tolerancia/">international observers</a> to call for calm. </p>
<p>Following the events of October 2019, the country polarised around two competing narratives: <em>coup d’état</em> or electoral fraud. These narratives were staked out in the streets. </p>
<p>On the one hand, fraud was initially denounced in massive <em>cabildos</em> (public assemblies) in the weeks preceding the 2019 vote and later through the burning of electoral counting houses. More recently, <a href="https://correodelsur.com/seguridad/20201006_resistencia-cochala-intensifica-protestas-en-sucre-fiscalia-ratifica-que-lanchipa-no-renunciara.html">right-wing motorcycle gangs</a> took to the streets in the cities of Cochabamba and Sucre to defend against the return of the MAS. </p>
<p>On the other hand, protests against the coup in El Alto, a majority indigenous city, and Sacaba, the stronghold of the coca growers’ union and the MAS, were met with <a href="https://woborders.blog/2020/01/04/2019-crisis-deaths-analysis/">brutal state violence</a>. Human Rights Watch has accused the Añez government of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/09/11/justice-weapon/political-persecution-bolivia">wielding the justice system “as a weapon”</a> against these protesters. </p>
<p>Thankfully, the elections have proceeded peacefully so far. But Bolivia is like a powder keg and the stakes remain high. </p>
<p>As the pandemic rages and Latin America remains in the grip of economic decline, Arce’s new administration will face an uphill struggle . The October 18 vote is not the last word and the powerful interests behind the toppling of Morales remain in the shadows. Bolivian society continues to be divided and its liberal democracy fragile.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148355/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Angus McNelly's research is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council.</span></em></p>Exit polls suggest Luis Arce, a former finance minister under Evo Morales, has won Bolivia’s presidential elections.Angus McNelly, Honorary Research Fellow in Latin American Politics/International Development, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1293992020-02-11T11:37:22Z2020-02-11T11:37:22ZBolivia: contribution of indigenous people to fighting climate change is hanging by a thread<p>Earth’s forests oxygenate the atmosphere and store vast quantities of planet-warming carbon dioxide (CO₂). But research suggests that the health of these vast ecosystems in large part depends on the work of indigenous people. </p>
<p>Indigenous territories and protected areas cover 52% of the Amazon forest and store 58% of its carbon. <a href="https://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1913321117">A recent study</a> found that these areas had the lowest net loss of carbon between 2003 and 2016, with 90% of net emissions coming from outside these protected lands.</p>
<p>“Where indigenous people live, [in Central America] you will find the best preserved natural resources,” <a href="https://www.iucn.org/content/map-shows-indigenous-peoples-guardians-central-american-ecosystems">declared</a> the International Union for Conservation of Nature in 2018. A <a href="https://theconversation.com/indigenous-peoples-are-crucial-for-conservation-a-quarter-of-all-land-is-in-their-hands-99742">study</a> published that year found that “indigenous people are crucial for the conservation of a quarter of the land of the Earth”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-being-an-environmental-activist-in-some-countries-is-much-more-dangerous-than-in-others-127956">Colombia: being an environmental activist in some countries is much more dangerous than in others</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.wri.org/blog/2019/08/ipcc-calls-securing-community-land-rights-fight-climate-change">In the forest territories that indigenous people maintain</a> deforestation is lower, more carbon is stored and less emitted, biodiversity is better conserved, and resources are more sustainably and fairly managed.</p>
<p>But indigenous territories and the biodiversity and carbon they protect are under siege. For indigenous people to continue in this invaluable role, they need secure land tenure and strong local governance systems. Nowhere is this currently more apparent than in Bolivia.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314509/original/file-20200210-109896-1bl1lnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314509/original/file-20200210-109896-1bl1lnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314509/original/file-20200210-109896-1bl1lnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314509/original/file-20200210-109896-1bl1lnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314509/original/file-20200210-109896-1bl1lnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314509/original/file-20200210-109896-1bl1lnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314509/original/file-20200210-109896-1bl1lnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A native tour guide traverses the jungle of Madidi National Park, Bolivia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/native-tour-guide-jungle-madidi-national-434788141">Matyas Rehak/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<h2>From championing to co-opting indigenous rights</h2>
<p>On indigenous territories in Bolivia that have secured property rights, deforestation rates are <a href="https://www.wri.org/publication/climate-benefits-tenure-costs">2.8 times lower</a> than outside of them. Such lands cover 20% of the country’s territory, so the contribution of indigenous peoples in Bolivia to fighting climate change is substantial.</p>
<p>But this situation has been undermined by Bolivia’s development policies, and could be threatened further with the recent shift to a right-wing government.</p>
<p>In the last two decades, Bolivia has led the world in championing indigenous rights. Upon taking power in 2006, Evo Morales helped write a new national constitution. It paved the way to redistribute land to indigenous peoples and support their claims for self-government. </p>
<p>Morales also put indigenous peoples at the forefront of climate change discussions, when in 2010, he organised the <a href="https://therightsofnature.org/cochabama-rights/">People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth</a>. The <a href="https://therightsofnature.org/wp-content/uploads/Cochambamba-Peoples-Agreement.pdf">People’s Agreement</a> that emerged highlighted the important role that indigenous peoples play safeguarding the planet.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314508/original/file-20200210-109935-nyg87v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314508/original/file-20200210-109935-nyg87v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314508/original/file-20200210-109935-nyg87v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314508/original/file-20200210-109935-nyg87v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314508/original/file-20200210-109935-nyg87v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314508/original/file-20200210-109935-nyg87v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314508/original/file-20200210-109935-nyg87v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Evo Morales swept to power in 2005, and was re-elected in three consecutive elections.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/potosi-bolivia-jan-6-scene-on-160257788">De Visu/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>But during his second term in power, the government’s commitment to indigenous rights and to the fight against climate change faltered. In 2010, Morales approved the construction of a road through an <a href="http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292017000200373">indigenous territory and protected area</a>, which was bitterly resisted by the Mojeño people, alongside other indigenous peoples of the lowlands and highlands.</p>
<p>Morales announced his intention in 2013 to <a href="https://www-sciencedirect-com.uea.idm.oclc.org/science/article/pii/S0013935115301092">expand farming lands from three to 13 million hectares</a> over ten years – allowing agriculture businesses to encroach on indigenous homelands. Morales then increased the area of land that small producers are allowed to deforest from five to 20 hectares, and made the conditions <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2015/06/bolivias-aggressive-agricultural-development-plans-threaten-forests/">more flexible for this process to continue</a>. Support for biofuel production from soya plantations and cattle grazing for beef export encouraged the opening up of new lands, with people using fire to clear forests for farming.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/defending-the-environment-now-more-lethal-than-soldiering-in-some-war-zones-and-indigenous-peoples-are-suffering-most-118098">Defending the environment now more lethal than soldiering in some war zones – and indigenous peoples are suffering most</a>
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<p>Between August and September 2019, Bolivia was wracked by the worst forest fires of the last two decades. A total of 3.6 million hectares were burned, and <a href="http://www.ftierra.org/index.php/component/attachments/download/194">two</a> <a href="https://www.iwgia.org/es/recursos/publicaciones/3470-incendios-en-territorios-indigenas-y-areas-protegidas-en-bolivi">reports</a> showed that 57% of these fires were set in state-owned lands (which are largely composed of protected areas) and indigenous titled territories. </p>
<p>The push to expand agriculture has continued with Bolivia’s new government. Shortly after Morales resigned on November 10 2019, the legislative assembly of Beni – a lowland region – approved a law which would <a href="https://www.paginasiete.bo/sociedad/2019/11/27/promulgan-ley-de-plan-de-uso-del-suelos-del-beni-en-medio-de-cuestionamientos-238753.html">open 42% of the land to farming and industrial activities</a>. On December 16 2019, Beni’s Indigenous <a href="https://www.paginasiete.bo/economia/2020/1/2/agroindustria-tomara-10-mm-de-hectareas-de-territorio-de-beni-242158.html">declared a state of emergency</a>.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314507/original/file-20200210-109939-1ewl35w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314507/original/file-20200210-109939-1ewl35w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314507/original/file-20200210-109939-1ewl35w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314507/original/file-20200210-109939-1ewl35w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314507/original/file-20200210-109939-1ewl35w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314507/original/file-20200210-109939-1ewl35w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314507/original/file-20200210-109939-1ewl35w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Bush fires ravaged the Chiquitos region of Bolivia in late August, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://webgate.epa.eu/webgate">EPA-EFE/Martin Alipaz</a></span>
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<h2>Indigenous autonomy in the balance</h2>
<p>By granting autonomy rights to indigenous people, the state would effectively recognise their right to govern themselves in matters related to the land and natural resources. Without this, people have no real control of their territories, and there is little that indigenous people can do to control environmental degradation.</p>
<p>Out of 33 claims for territorial self-government that were raised between 2009 and 2019, only three have been approved by the Bolivian government. <a href="http://www.uea.ac.uk/documents/18634712/20350354/Territorios%2C+justicias+y+autonomias_Bolivia.pdf/1675affd-69d0-6f99-eef8-b8078d7454c0">Our research suggests</a> that the main reason so few have succeeded is the new laws enacted during the Morales era, which make autonomy claims a complex and cumbersome process.</p>
<p>We’ve been working with the Monkoxi Indigenous Nation from the Bolivian lowlands since 2013, <a href="https://www.uea.ac.uk/documents/18634712/20350354/LIBRO+LOMERIO+2DA+EDICIO%5FN+DIGITAL+FINAL.pdf/c9516012-f562-7993-4c3c-b058e1e65bd1">to help advance their claim</a> to political autonomy in their territory. The Monkoxi belong to one of the 30 groups that are still waiting for their rights to be recognised, having initiated the legal claim in 2009.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314716/original/file-20200211-146690-1bo4reb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314716/original/file-20200211-146690-1bo4reb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314716/original/file-20200211-146690-1bo4reb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314716/original/file-20200211-146690-1bo4reb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314716/original/file-20200211-146690-1bo4reb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314716/original/file-20200211-146690-1bo4reb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314716/original/file-20200211-146690-1bo4reb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Autonomy rights allow indigenous people to govern their lands independent of the state.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Iokiñe Rodríguez</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>Bolivia is now in the hands of an interim conservative leader, Jeanine Añez, who has been accused by <a href="https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/cultural-survival-stands-indigenous-peoples-bolivia">indigenous rights organisations</a> of holding strong anti-indigenous convictions.</p>
<p>Since expansion of the farming frontier was agreed between the right and Morales while he was in power, it’s doubtful the former will change this arrangement if they remain in power after general elections in May 2020. The pending autonomy claims that would allow indigenous people to consolidate their territorial control are also likely to stagnate.</p>
<p>The recent history of Bolivia shows the danger of allowing the fight for indigenous rights and climate action to be co-opted. To ensure that indigenous rights and climate change remain high in the next goverment’s agenda, indigenous peoples must work hard to reunite and recover the independence that they once had from mainstream politics.</p>
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/imagine-newsletter-researchers-think-of-a-world-with-climate-action-113443?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=Imagineheader1129399">Click here to subscribe to our climate action newsletter. Climate change is inevitable. Our response to it isn’t.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129399/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Iokiñe Rodríguez receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). She works for the School of International Development at the University of East Anglia, UK </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mirna Inturias does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new study revealed that indigenous territories store more than half the carbon in the Amazon forest.Iokiñe Rodríguez, Senior Lecturer in Environment and Development, University of East AngliaMirna Inturias, Lecturer in Environmental Justice, Universidad NurLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1269982019-12-05T12:39:18Z2019-12-05T12:39:18ZBolivia after Morales: An ‘ungovernable country’ with a power vacuum<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305263/original/file-20191204-70155-hdjvii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5472%2C3628&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A supporter of former Bolivian president Evo Morales tells a police officer to respect the nation's indigenous people, in La Paz, Bolivia, Nov. 12, 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Bolivia-Protests/5ae96e714ec94682b7bbd9bba640d028/57/0">AP Photo/Natacha Pisarenko</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Evo Morales is hardly Bolivia’s first president to be ousted in a mass uprising. </p>
<p>Both of his immediate predecessors – <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25676070?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2005.tb00319.x">Carlos Mesa</a> – resigned after waves of mass protest. So did at least <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/212465/summary">seven other Bolivian presidents</a> since 1870. </p>
<p>The power of the Bolivian people is so formidable that former president Mesa, upon resigning in 2005, declared the country “<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2005.tb00319.x">ungovernable</a>.” </p>
<p>Bolivia’s new interim president, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/14/bolivia-president-jeanine-anez-cabinet-indigenous">Jeanine Añez</a>, may well echo the sentiment. Deadly protests have gripped Bolivia since she took power on Nov. 11, and Morales’ socialist party, MAS, retains a <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/bolivia-caught-in-a-power-struggle-between-anez-at-home-and-morales-in-exile">two-thirds majority</a> in both the lower and upper houses of Congress. </p>
<p>Añez, a former senator from Bolivia’s weak opposition, has virtually no power. Her party stands little chance of passing legislation. And <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/11/29/actualidad/1575039515_623830.html">protests against her government</a> continue.</p>
<h2>Power to the people</h2>
<p>Throughout Bolivian history, protests have been an important way indigenous people and rural peasants, long excluded from the halls of power, have <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498543569/Fragile-States-in-the-Americas">made their voices heard</a>. </p>
<p>Whether to force more equitable land distribution in the 1952 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1557-203X.2011.01110.x">Bolivian National Revolution</a>, demand the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/01/landlocked-bolivias-request-for-chile-to-grant-ocean-access-rejected-by-un">return of the coastal province</a> conquered by Chile in 1883 or call for the <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/whith18&div=17&id=&page=">nationalization of resources such as oil and gas</a>, these marginalized communities have often earned major concessions via protest. </p>
<p>As I have argued in my <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2007.0001">political analyses of the South American country</a>, Bolivian government institutions are so weak that effective governance requires at the least some populist compromise. </p>
<p>Indigenous Bolivians organize massive marches, <a href="https://eldeber.com.bo/156899_cocaleros-piden-renuncia-de-jeanine-anez-y-amenazan-con-bloqueo-indefinido-de-carreteras">blocking roads into major urban centers</a> to prevent food and fuel from entering and <a href="https://time.com/5727991/clashes-bolivia/">exploding dynamite</a> to highlight their dismay. By paralyzing cities, including the seat of government, these indigenous protest strategies have effectively overwhelmed numerous Bolivian governments.</p>
<p>That’s how <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/brownjwa23&div=10&id=&page=">Morales himself rose to power</a>: He was the highly visible leader of the 2003 and 2005 protests that ousted his immediate predecessors. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305265/original/file-20191204-70116-12hbn5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305265/original/file-20191204-70116-12hbn5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305265/original/file-20191204-70116-12hbn5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305265/original/file-20191204-70116-12hbn5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305265/original/file-20191204-70116-12hbn5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305265/original/file-20191204-70116-12hbn5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305265/original/file-20191204-70116-12hbn5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305265/original/file-20191204-70116-12hbn5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A roadblock on a freeway into the Bolivian capital of La Paz was part of weeks-long protests against President Carlos Mesa, June 3, 2005.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Bolivia-BOL-/dc0d69a228e1da11af9f0014c2589dfb/102/0">AP Photo/Juan Karita</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A military mutiny</h2>
<p>The shocked tone of Morales’ <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QkQxs6nMHAI">last press conference as president</a>, held on Nov. 10, made clear his outrage at <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20191117-la-paz-is-a-city-under-siege-bolivia-s-capital-struggles-as-food-runs-out-1">being on the receiving end</a> of a similar mass mobilization.</p>
<p>Morales was forced to resign amid protest after he <a href="http://www.startribune.com/the-latest-morales-leads-bolivia-vote-but-runoff-likely/563515732/">declared victory</a> in Bolivia’s contested Oct. 20 presidential election. Few doubt that he won the race, however. What was in dispute is whether he won by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-election-idUSKBN1X31M4">a margin of 10%</a> – enough to avoid a runoff with his closest competitor, <a href="https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/07/an-interview-with-former-bolivian-president-and-current-presidential-candidate-carlos-mesa/">the former president Carlos Mesa</a>, who 12 years ago resigned amid protests.</p>
<p>Morales and his most ardent supporters said he beat Mesa by just over 10%. Opposition parties, their supporters and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/bolivia-morales-calls-elections-oas-audit-191110110329121.html">Organization of American States</a> found the narrow margin suspicious and called for a new vote.</p>
<p>Morales eventually agreed amid wild protest, but not before a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-election-ticktock-insight-idUSKBN1XO2PQ">police mutiny</a> encouraged <a href="http://www.resumenlatinoamericano.org/2019/11/10/bolivia-queman-la-casa-de-la-hermana-del-presidente-esther-morales-en-oruro/">violence</a> against <a href="http://www.la-razon.com/ciudades/seguridad_ciudadana/Bolivia-oruro-renuncia-alcalde-quema-casa_0_3254674555.html">his political allies</a>. The military announced that it <a href="https://www.eltribuno.com/jujuy/nota/2019-11-9-19-50-0-fuerzas-armadas-se-pronuncian-sobre-la-crisis-y-anuncian-que-nunca-se-enfrentaran-con-el-pueblo">would not use force</a> to subdue anti-Morales protesters. Soldiers looked on as demonstrators <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/bolivia-latest-evo-morales-resignation-coup-la-paz-protest-military-fire-house-a9198211.html">looted</a> and <a href="https://correodelsur.com/local/20191110_gobernador-de-chuquisaca-anuncia-su-renuncia-al-cargo.html">burned</a> to the <a href="https://www.eldeber.com.bo/156441_vandalos-rondan-en-rodados-de-la-policia-hay-zozobra-en-yapacani">ground</a> the houses of some MAS party members. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the police and military compelled Morales to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2019/11/10/world/americas/10reuters-bolivia-election-military-stability.html">resign</a>. It was clear he had lost control. </p>
<h2>Complete paralysis</h2>
<p>Yet Morales opponents weren’t necessarily eager to see Carlos Mesa, who <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/10/14/how-evo-morales-running-again-again-undermines-bolivias-democracy/">still commands very little devotion</a>, elected president. They just wanted Morales out. And though Morales’ base <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17442222.2013.808495">has frayed somewhat</a> over 14 years due to his government’s pursuit of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13642987.2016.1179869">natural gas development in indigenous areas</a>, he remains by far the most popular politician in Bolivia. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305264/original/file-20191204-70167-1wr8nyz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305264/original/file-20191204-70167-1wr8nyz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305264/original/file-20191204-70167-1wr8nyz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305264/original/file-20191204-70167-1wr8nyz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305264/original/file-20191204-70167-1wr8nyz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305264/original/file-20191204-70167-1wr8nyz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305264/original/file-20191204-70167-1wr8nyz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305264/original/file-20191204-70167-1wr8nyz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Evo Morales went into exile in Mexico after he was forced by police and the military to resign on Nov. 10.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/The-Week-That-Was-in-Latin-America-Photo-Gallery/6134495460d041c19e0784649d1eb1b0/1/0">AP Photo/Marco Ugarte</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Morales is now <a href="https://twitter.com/evoespueblo">leading by tweet</a> from exile in Mexico, urging his supporters to wage their own mutiny against the new interim government and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/bolivia-evo-morales-finish-term-191117051645116.html">hinting at his return</a>.</p>
<p>“[T]he struggle continues,” he wrote in <a href="https://twitter.com/evoespueblo/status/1195522207868432386">a Nov. 15 tweet</a> that painted Bolivia’s history as a fight between indigenous people and the powers that would oppress them. “I will return and I will be millions.” </p>
<p>Massive protests have virtually paralyzed Bolivia, as <a href="https://www.jornada.com.mx/ultimas/mundo/2019/11/17/largas-filas-en-bolivia-por-comida-y-gasolina-por-bloqueos-carreteros-4672.html">indigenous roadblocks</a> keep food and fuel from La Paz and angry protesters attempt to march on the presidential palace itself. The city of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/16/bolivia-protests-five-killed-in-rally-calling-for-exiled-moraless-return">Cochabamba</a> and its surroundings are also rocked by violent protest. Thus far, Bolivian military and police have <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/bolivia-crisis-evo-morales-deaths-protests-jeanine-anez-united-nations-a9206266.html">shot dead</a> at least <a href="https://www.france24.com/es/20191116-bachelet-advierte-que-la-situaci%C3%B3n-en-bolivia-puede-salirse-de-control">14 people</a>.</p>
<h2>Ungovernable country</h2>
<p>While the new government has the support of both the Bolivian military and the police, this does not make the country governable. </p>
<p>Añez, ruling without a mandate, has only one real responsibility: to <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/11/20/actualidad/1574261743_294861.html">organize elections</a>. The Congress has now voted on a plan to hold another presidential vote, although no date has been set, and Morales has agreed he will not be a candidate.</p>
<p>Setting new elections without Morales is a win for the opposition in Bolivia and a fundamental step toward restoring a semblance of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/23/bolivia--slides-into-chaos-mountain-barricades-city-protests-morales">normalcy</a>. </p>
<p>But Morales’ base is unlikely to simply accept the results, whatever they may be.</p>
<p>To paraphrase the Bolivian historian Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, the indigenous Bolivians who adore Morales are “<a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/oppressed-but-not-defeated-peasant-struggles-among-the-aymara-and-qhechwa-in-bolivia-1900-1980/oclc/16518379">oppressed but not defeated</a>.” </p>
<p>[ <em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marten W. Brienen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Evo Morales is at least the ninth Bolivian president to by forced out of office by a mass uprising. But even in exile he remains by far the most popular politician in the country.Marten W. Brienen, Lecturer in Global Studies, Oklahoma State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1269612019-11-26T11:52:29Z2019-11-26T11:52:29ZNow Evo Morales is out, Bolivia’s celebrated ‘plurinational revolution’ has an uncertain future<p>Just over a decade ago in late January 2009, I was standing in front of the Palacio Quemado, the government headquarters in the heart of the Bolivian administrative capital La Paz, amid a crowd of euphoric Bolivians. A quilt of national tricolour flags and multicolour wiphalas, the traditional Andean flags, was waiting for President Evo Morales to appear and celebrate the overwhelming results of a referendum that had just ratified a new constitution. </p>
<p>That was perhaps the last epic moment of the “plurinational revolution” that began with Morales’s election in 2005 and the installation of the first Bolivian government led by a popular coalition of peasant and indigenous movements. </p>
<p>Today, the epic tale of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Evo-Morales">Bolivia’s first Indian president</a> has reached a tragic end. Morales and most of his close political entourage <a href="https://theconversation.com/bolivia-in-crisis-how-evo-morales-was-forced-out-126859?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=facebookbutton&fbclid=IwAR2_-UggI8KrF7TTEuC0PlDee2KMVkUPUC8upwJ1KD0RPBNBQc06Z1ZeUJU">resigned on November 10 and left the country</a> after mass protests and pressure from the military precipitated a political crisis triggered by the disputed results of October’s presidential elections. </p>
<p>Since Morales’s departure, confrontations between his supporters and armed forces have <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-50497632">left at least 32 people</a> dead and hundreds wounded. The UN <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/bolivia-crisis-evo-morales-deaths-protests-jeanine-anez-united-nations-a9206266.html">warned</a> in late November that the unrest could “spin out of control”. </p>
<p>The political crisis has sparked a deep polarisation between those condemning an “illegitimate coup” and those celebrating the “return of democracy” in Bolivia. This polarisation has grown out of the complexity of Morales’s legacy, his government’s unprecedented achievements and its inability to overcome authoritarian tendencies. </p>
<h2>A nation changed</h2>
<p>This dramatic outcome for a government that still showed rates of support <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/25/bolivia-evo-morales-narrowly-wins-fourth-presidential-term">of over 40%</a> after 14 years in office was hardly predictable, even for its political opponents. The longstanding political loyalty of many Bolivians to Morales is partly due to the fact that he represented traditionally excluded sectors of society, mainly peasant and, at least initially, indigenous peoples. </p>
<p>He also cultivated pragmatic relationships with economic elites and the armed forces. At the same time, cautious management of the economy, particularly of the revenues from natural resource exports, supported significant efforts to redistribute the country’s wealth. During Morales’s time in office, the number of people in extreme poverty fell from <a href="https://www.bolpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/xxx.pdf">38% to 18% of the population</a>. Bolivia also transitioned to become <a href="https://www.economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/index.php?id_idioma=2&opcion=com_prensa&ver=prensa&id=1467&seccion=78&categoria=20">a middle-income country</a>. </p>
<p>Alongside other countries of the so-called <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4311957.stm">Pink Tide</a> – the wave of leftist governments elected across Latin America in the first decade of the new millennium – Morales’s Bolivia embraced a commitment to championing socio-economic rights, as well as newer rights, such as cultural and environmental rights. Some key examples were the creation of indigenous autonomous territories, as well as the historic 2010 <a href="http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/law/the-mother-earth-law-and-integral-development-to-live-well-law-no-300/">Law of Mother Earth</a>, which guaranteed the rights of nature. </p>
<h2>Concentration of power</h2>
<p>The alleged <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2019/11/11/world/americas/11reuters-bolivia-election-audit-factbox.html">electoral fraud</a> in October was the tipping point that led to Morales’s ousting. However, it followed a series of violations, manipulations and peculiar interpretations of fundamental democratic principles by the government. </p>
<p>At the same time, little had been done to strengthen Bolivia’s institutions. As my colleague <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/dech.12418">Jean Grugel and I have argued</a>, in Bolivia, as in other like-minded countries in the region, the strengthening of socio-economic, cultural and environmental rights came at the expense of other rights, namely political rights and civil liberties. According to data from <a href="http://www.humanrightsdata.com/">CIRI Human Rights Dataset</a> and <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018">Freedom House</a>, Bolivia is significantly below the Latin American average in its respect for association and organisation rights, freedom of expression and belief, rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights.</p>
<p>One of the root causes of this problem was the concentration of power in the hands of a strong and close executive, with a strict control over the state apparatus and authoritarian ways of managing dissent. Few incentives existed for co-operation with the opposition, or for a collegial approach to power that would favour leadership transitions. In the classic Latin American tradition of strongman leadership, Morales tried to perpetuate his power by circumventing democratic institutions and the will of the majority. </p>
<p>He ignored the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/22/bolivia-evo-morales-president-national-referendum-fourth-term">results of the 2016 referendum</a> in which Bolivians voted no to his re-election and, with the support of a Constitutional Tribunal, changed the constitution to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-42161947">allow his candidacy</a> for a fourth mandate. </p>
<p>Morales’s government was also incapable of including the urban middle classes in its reform process. It was the <a href="https://theconversation.com/bolivia-in-crisis-how-evo-morales-was-forced-out-126859">middle classes</a> who strongly reacted to his abuses of power and eventually took to the streets of major Bolivian cities demanding his resignation. </p>
<h2>An uncertain future</h2>
<p>Morales certainly holds political responsibility for the conditions underlying the current crisis. But rather than focusing on his administration’s culpability, it’s now urgent to address the question of how to safeguard the process of social and economic inclusion that he started. Over the past few decades, Bolivia has transformed in a way that many considered irreversible – but perhaps it was premature to assume that.</p>
<p>In recent weeks there has been a resprouting of racism and intolerance in Bolivia and the rise of a new ultra-right opposition with <a href="https://theconversation.com/old-religious-tensions-resurge-in-bolivia-after-ouster-of-longtime-indigenous-president-127000">fundamentalist religious narratives</a>. These should be warning signs for a country, and a region, where revolutions and counter-revolutions are all too common avenues of political expression.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126961/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lorenza Fontana receives funding from the European Commission Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions. </span></em></p>Many thought Bolivia had changed for good under Evo Morales – but perhaps that thinking was premature.Lorenza Fontana, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Global Fellow, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1271382019-11-20T09:23:28Z2019-11-20T09:23:28ZFrom Zimbabwe to Bolivia: what makes a military coup?<p>Evo Morales, president of Bolivia since 2006, <a href="https://theconversation.com/bolivia-in-crisis-how-evo-morales-was-forced-out-126859">resigned</a> on November 10 following weeks of demonstrations triggered by a disputed election in October. Morales won the election amid allegations that the result was rigged in his favour. </p>
<p>The turning point in Morales’s departure from office was the intervention of Williams Kaliman, commander of the Bolivian armed forces. Speaking at a press conference, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-50369591">Kaliman urged Morales</a> to resign “for the good of our Bolivia”. Morales has since gone into exile in Mexico and the manner of his departure has sparked <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/world/americas/bolivia-evo-morales-coup.html">passionate debate</a> about whether it was tantamount to a military coup.</p>
<p>Two years ago this month, the Zimbabwean military placed former President Robert Mugabe under house arrest. Subsequently, SB Moyo, a major general in the army, accompanied by a high-ranking air force officer, <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/full-statement-by-zim-army-on-state-broadcaster">publicly broadcast the message</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>This is not a military takeover of government. What the Zimbabwe Defence Forces is doing is to pacify a degenerating social, political and economic situation in our country. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The military insisted it was only targeting criminals around Mugabe who were perpetrating “crimes that are causing social and economic suffering in the country”. The officers vowed that the situation would return to normal, once they brought the “criminals” to justice. The “criminals” were never brought to justice, but Mugabe resigned from office a week later. </p>
<p>Like the recent case in Bolivia, the Zimbabwean military’s intervention generated animated discussion about whether it was actually a military coup. Some Zimbabwean ruling political elites, international media and political commentators described it as a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/b134-zimbabwes-military-assisted-transition-and-prospects-recovery">“military-assisted transition”</a>, “<a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-20-zimbabwe-when-is-a-coup-not-a-coup/">non-coup-coup</a>”, and a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/21/zimbabwes-strange-crisis-is-a-very-modern-kind-of-coup">“modern”</a> intervention, among other names.</p>
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<h2>Call it by its name</h2>
<p>My <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/advance-article/doi/10.1093/afraf/adz024/5607894?searchresult=1">new research</a> provides some clarity on how to understand the Zimbabwean military’s action in November 2017: the intervention was a coup bearing substantial commonalities with historical coups in Africa. </p>
<p>The coup happened because Zimbabwe’s generals were dissatisfied with Mugabe’s demotion of those who had fought in the country’s 1970s liberation struggle within the structures of the ruling ZANU PF party. Mugabe’s waning authority also coincided with growing political ambitions of some generals and insecurity in the military’s higher ranks caused by job insecurity and fear of criminal prosecution.</p>
<p>The way the military justified its political manoeuvres were similar to justifications used by other military forces in Africa since the 1960s. Crucially, the military also violated <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013.pdf">Zimbabwe’s constitution</a> by deploying without the president’s authorisation. </p>
<p>These and other indicators that the military’s action was a coup went largely unrecognised at the time by many commentators and journalists. Mugabe was also <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2014.933646?journalCode=cjss20">a demonised politician</a>, particularly by sections of the Western media and diplomats, who were keen to see him leave political office.</p>
<p>The more coups have <a href="http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/8211%7Ev%7EThe_African_Union_as_a_norm_entrepreneur_on_militarycoups_detat_in_Africa__19522012___an_empirical_assessment.pdf">become widely unacceptable</a> in Africa since the early 2000s, the more pervasive strategic uses and misuses of the term coup have become. Mugabe’s international adversaries chose not to call the military’s intervention a coup, lest that saved him from an ignominious fall from power. In a volte-face, when <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">Mugabe died in September 2019</a>, Western media and diplomats often described him, in their <a href="https://theconversation.com/mugabe-is-dead-but-old-men-still-run-southern-africa-123611">obituaries and commentaries</a> on his political career, as having lost power in a military coup. </p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">Robert Gabriel Mugabe: a man whose list of failures is legion</a>
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</em>
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<p>Subjective uses of the word coup risk banalising and misrepresenting a term that has a clear meaning. Patrick McGowan, an accomplished researcher on coups in Africa, has offered a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/african-military-coups-detat-19562001-frequency-trends-and-distribution/C7E923CE86B78DD099FDEFAF89F1F88E">usefully precise definition</a>. Coups are ejections from power of political leaders, through unmistakably unconstitutional means, mainly by part of the army: “Either on their own or in conjunction with civilian elites such as civil servants, politicians and monarchs.” Zimbabwe’s 2017 coup played out along the lines of McGowan’s definition. </p>
<p>Whether events in Bolivia constitute a military coup will become clearer in the coming weeks and months as researchers and investigative journalists uncover the elite politics at play behind the scenes and the exact motivations of Kaliman and his fellow military commanders. </p>
<h2>In the aftermath</h2>
<p>In Zimbabwe today, the state of affairs looks much like the aftermath of first-time coups seen in African countries such as Benin in 1963 or Uganda in 1971. First-time coups are often extremely popular, so a government that emerges as a result of such a “maiden” coup commands significant legitimacy early on. </p>
<p>But that legitimacy soon fades when pledges to deliver a credible post-coup election and to conduct substantive political, social and economic reforms do not materialise. As legitimacy wanes, authoritarianism re-emerges. </p>
<p>This is a key part of the post-coup situation in Zimbabwe today. Two years on, reforms are cosmetic and proceed slowly. And an election held in July 2018 was not deemed credible by <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/zimbabwe-election-commonwealth-releases-observer-group-report">Commonwealth</a>, <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/eu-observers-say-zimbabwe-election-fell-short-on-fairness-20181010">EU</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/e460f71c3e7b477cbff3cf58484370d9/The-Latest:-US-based-election-observers-criticize-Zimbabwe">American</a> election observers. Legitimacy has dwindled and authoritarianism returned, as demonstrated by the military’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ffd8b486-1b45-11e9-9e64-d150b3105d21">strong repression of protests</a> against fuel price increases in January 2019.</p>
<p>In 1970, the South African scholar and anti-apartheid activist <a href="https://www.ruthfirstpapers.org.uk/term/cluster/barrel-gun">Ruth First warned</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Once the army breaks the first commandment of its training – that armies do not act against their own governments – the initial coup sets off a process… the coup spawns other coups. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Perhaps First is wrong and Zimbabwe’s 2017 coup was simply an aberration, a never-to-be-repeated occurrence now consigned to the history books. But one can never be too certain. The quip by American historian <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/advance-article/doi/10.1093/afraf/adz024/5607894?searchresult=1#165697513">Walter Laqueur</a> rings true: “Coups d’état are annoying not only for practising politicians but also from the point of view of the political scientist”, because they are capricious.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127138/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Blessing-Miles Tendi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When the military intervened against Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe in 2017, it wasn’t widely called a military coup. New research shows that’s exactly what it was.Blessing-Miles Tendi, Associate Professor in the Politics of Africa, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1270002019-11-19T17:04:49Z2019-11-19T17:04:49ZOld religious tensions resurge in Bolivia after ouster of longtime indigenous president<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302485/original/file-20191119-111697-1qxs8f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=25%2C12%2C4264%2C2843&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of former Bolivian president Evo Morales rally with indigenous flags outside the city of Cochabamba, Bolivia, Nov. 18, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Bolivia-Protests/b6e54609714043fdb19cf2f3b991f2bb/10/0">AP Photo/Juan Karita</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Days after the powerful Bolivian leader Evo Morales was forced to resign as president after <a href="https://www.as-coa.org/articles/poll-tracker-bolivias-2019-presidential-race">allegations of election fraud</a>, Bolivia’s new interim president made her <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/world/americas/evo-morales-mexico-bolivia.html">first public appearance</a>. </p>
<p>Climbing to the balcony of the Presidential Palace in La Paz, Jeanine Áñez – formerly a senator representing Bolivia’s weak political opposition – grabbed a Bible. </p>
<p>“This Bible is very important to us. Our strength is God,” <a href="https://twitter.com/LaRazon_Bolivia/status/1194405431625560065">said the 52-year-old politician from the lowlands province of Beni</a>, holding the modern, pink-covered book up for the cameras. “Power is God.”</p>
<p>Invoking a Christian god as the source of political power, while commonplace in many countries, is a radical departure in Bolivia after Morales’ 14-year tenure. </p>
<p>Morales, a native Bolivian of Aymara indigenous descent, was the South American country’s first indigenous leader since independence from Spanish colonial rule in 1825. Indigenous people and symbols – like the <a href="https://chiletoday.cl/site/the-wiphala-what-does-this-indigenous-flag-mean/">multicolored Wiphala flag</a> that represents the many Andean indigenous groups, and the Andean cross, or <a href="https://www.prensaindigena.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25254:peru-wayra-katari-y-la-nueva-historia-andina&catid=86&Itemid=435">chakana</a> – filled the halls of power in Bolivia during his three terms.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301814/original/file-20191114-26222-yiaieu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C17%2C6000%2C3844&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301814/original/file-20191114-26222-yiaieu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301814/original/file-20191114-26222-yiaieu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301814/original/file-20191114-26222-yiaieu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301814/original/file-20191114-26222-yiaieu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301814/original/file-20191114-26222-yiaieu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301814/original/file-20191114-26222-yiaieu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bolivia’s new interim President, Jeanine Añez, has ties to conservative Christian groups, Nov. 13, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Bolivia-Protests/e63c10cabadc43eb8c24c1332f135730/14/0">AP Photo/Juan Karita</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Indigenous religiosity</h2>
<p>Bolivia, a mountainous country north of Argentina, is 41% <a href="https://www.iwgia.org/en/bolivia">indigenous</a>, according to the 2012 census. Most of the rest of Bolivia’s 11 million people consider themselves to be mixed race, though analysts say that self-reported census data <a href="http://www.cejis.org/bolivia-censo-2012-algunas-claves-para-entender-la-variable-indigena/">tends to undercount the indigenous population</a>. </p>
<p>Religion does not map neatly onto ethnic divisions in Bolivia. Only around 4% of Bolivians claim to practice indigenous religions. The majority – about 75% – are Catholic, and 18% belong to <a href="http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/world/stand-in-president-brings-back-bible-to-bolivian-politics/article/561763">evangelical or other Protestant denominations</a>.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://asu.academia.edu/MatthewPeterCasey">as my ongoing research shows</a>, religion, ethnicity and culture are tightly woven together in the Andes region. In Bolivia, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/day-of-the-dead-from-aztec-goddess-worship-to-modern-mexican-celebration-124962">elsewhere in Latin America</a>, indigenous people may belong to Christian churches and also observe native religious practices. </p>
<p>Since independence, Bolivian political leaders have promoted the country’s Hispanic and Catholic heritage, not in addition to its indigenous history but to the exclusion of it. In the 20th century, indigenous people who <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-18727510">revolted against their economic and social marginalization</a> were brutally repressed.</p>
<p>Throughout the Cold War, <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/book/14026">Bolivian Fascist party</a> members pushed for a Catholic republic modeled on Francisco Franco’s Spain. Generations of Catholic school students were taught <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/fascismo-en-bolivia-tactica-y-estrategia-revolucionarias/oclc/14370576">Christian nationalism from their Spanish Jesuit teachers</a>. </p>
<p>Morales, a former coca farmer, recognized indigeneity as the heart of Bolivian nationhood. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302480/original/file-20191119-111640-c1v6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Evo Morales (center) was Bolivia’s first indigenous president.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Peru-Americas-Summit/8a54f2daee0248929e1d7709c9783efe/20/0">AP Photo/Martin Mejia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Under Morales’ leadership, Bolivia’s name was changed to the Plurinational State of Bolivia in 2009, and the law now <a href="https://www.opinion.com.bo/articulo/pais/las-36-naciones-de-bolivia/20130806020300444625.html">recognizes 36 indigenous languages and ethnicities</a>. Morales also protected the right of indigenous communities to practice their religion. August became the Month of Pachamama, the Andean mother earth – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/21/world/americas/21witch.html">30 days of ancestral celebrations</a> kicked off by the ritual sacrifice of llamas and other animals on the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KyhEon3LgXE">banks of Lake Titicaca</a>.</p>
<p>Morales also built a new government building designed to acknowledge the country’s indigenous heritage. The 29-story <a href="https://www.dw.com/es/evo-morales-inaugura-monumental-casa-grande-del-pueblo-en-la-paz/a-45030140">Casa Grande del Pueblo</a> – “Big House of the People” – blends hyper modern design with indigenous artistic flourishes. The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-45229290">interior decor</a> is inspired by the ceremonial ruins of the pre-Inca civilization of Tiahuanaco, located 40 miles east of La Paz.</p>
<h2>Distancing Bolivia from Catholicism</h2>
<p>Morales, who has taken asylum in Mexico since resigning as president, also worked to separate church from state in Bolivia. Bolivia’s new <a href="https://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-CPE-20090207.html">constitution, written in 2009</a>, formally ended the Catholic Church’s designation as the protected religion of the state.</p>
<p>Morales is <a href="https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/mundo/tras-salida-de-evo-morales-la-biblia-y-el-poder-politico-cristiano-irrumpen-en-bolivia">Catholic</a>. But he is openly critical of the Catholic Church, which supported <a href="https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=acls;iel=2;view=toc;idno=heb03631.0001.001">the Spanish colonization of Latin America</a> in the 16th century and, throughout the 20th century, aided <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/transatlantic-fascism">Fascist party organizing</a>. </p>
<p>In 2015, he famously gave Pope Francis a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/10/americas/pope-crucifix/index.html">hammer and sickle crucifix</a> designed by the Bolivian priest Luis Espinal before his assassination in 1980 – a symbol of Liberation Theology, a <a href="https://www.alainet.org/es/active/66203">progressive Latin American strand of Catholicism</a> that challenged dictatorships and championed the cause of the poor during the 1970s and 1980s.</p>
<p>Morales’ secular agenda was met with criticism from conservative Christian groups. Some viewed the reforms as fomenting “<a href="https://www.actuall.com/laicismo/evo-morales-pretende-meter-la-carcel-obispos-curas-predicar-evangelio/">paganism</a>.” Others said he promoted <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aI0x5b8nOcc">atheistic socialism</a>.</p>
<h2>A Christian nationalist revival</h2>
<p>The interim administration in Bolivia has ties to the <a href="https://www.pagina12.com.ar/231205-satanas-fuera-de-bolivia-el-ritual-de-camacho-y-sus-seguidor">conservative Christian groups</a> that were highly critical of Morales throughout his administration.</p>
<p>As senator, interim President Áñez made <a href="https://www.laprensagrafica.com/internacional/Estos-son-los-agresivos-tuits-contra-originarios-e-indigenas-que-borro-Jeanine-Anez-la-presidenta-de-Bolivia-20191116-0518.html">openly anti-indigenous statements</a>. In a 2013 tweet, now deleted, she referred to native Aymara celebrating their new year with ancestral rituals as “satanic.”</p>
<p>And just <a href="https://factual.afp.com/estos-son-los-agresivos-tuits-contra-originarios-e-indigenas-que-borro-la-presidenta-interina-de">five days before her innaugeration</a>, Áñez mocked a group of indigenous Quechua men on Twitter because they were dressed in ritual vestments with modern shoes and blue jeans, writing, “Original Peoples???”</p>
<p>Her rise to power has reignited some of the anti-indigenous sentiment that was so dominant in Bolivia before Morales’ administration. Since Morales’ ouster, there are reports of Wiphalas flags being torn down and burned. Police officers and military members were <a href="https://magnet.xataka.com/en-diez-minutos/que-hace-ejercito-cortando-banderas-conflicto-etnia-clase-religion-crisis-bolivia">filmed</a> cutting the indigenous flag from their uniforms.</p>
<p>“Bolivia for Christ, Pachamama will never again enter this palace,” said the protest leader Luis Fernando Camacho, an Áñez ally, <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/bloggers/Bolivia-golpe-de-Estado-y-la-irresuelta-guerra-entre-la-Biblia-y-la-Wiphala-20191113-0001.html">kneeling before the Bible on the Bolivian flag</a> at the government palace on Nov. 10. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302478/original/file-20191119-111630-izh2ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Security forces block supporters of former President Evo Morales outside Cochabamba, Bolivia, Nov. 18, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Bolivia-Protests/f056effea372414d9e630e6b402a6e77/7/0">AP Photo/Juan Karita</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Indigenous Bolivians fearful</h2>
<p>Indigenous Bolivians are concerned about the direction their country is headed under Áñez, though she may only be in power for a few months until new elections are called.</p>
<p>In the days since Morales left office, masses of Morales supporters have marched in from the countryside to convene in Bolivian cities, where they’re <a href="https://twitter.com/Marco_Teruggi/status/1196514476784263168">calling for the end to the interim government</a>. </p>
<p>Many say they fear repression from the military under the interim government. They worry that the political violence that has gripped Bolivia since its Oct. 20 election will turn into a racialized, religious violence targeting indigenous people. </p>
<p>“All of us who have Indian-looking faces are signaled as part of Morales’ party, especially indigenous women,” the feminist activist Adriana Guzmán <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/news/caracter-racista-golpe-estado-bolivia-comunidad-indigena-20191113-0035.html">said to the news outlet Telesur news after Morales’ removal</a>.</p>
<p>With dozens dead and more than 700 injured in <a href="https://www.pagina12.com.ar/231398-carta-blanca-para-la-represion-y-la-impunidad-en-bolivia">military opperations ordered by Áñez</a> “to re-establish order,” the political situation <a href="https://www.msn.com/es-us/noticias/mundo/la-cidh-denuncia-que-hay-al-menos-23-muertos-y-715-heridos-desde-el-inicio-de-la-crisis-en-bolivia/ar-BBWSGBX">remains volatile</a>. </p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Casey-Pariseault does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Indigenous people, symbols and religious practices filled the halls of power in Bolivia during Evo Morales’ 14-year tenure. Now a new conservative Christian leader seems to be erasing that legacy.Matthew Casey-Pariseault, Clinical Assistant Professor of History, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1271392019-11-15T17:03:55Z2019-11-15T17:03:55ZBolivian lithium: why you should not expect any ‘white gold rush’ in the wake of Morales overthrow<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301967/original/file-20191115-66921-127w1cn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Salar de Uyuni salt flat contains much of the world's lithium.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ksenia Ragozina / shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The overthrow of Bolivian president Evo Morales shows how the politics of environmentalism and social justice intersect in a silvery-white metal. As Morales flew to exile in Mexico, commentators <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/11/12/after-morales-ousted-coup-lithium-question-looms-large-bolivia">wondered</a> what will become of Bolivia’s lithium, a strategic resource used in consumer electronics and electric cars. </p>
<p>Lithium batteries are the most energetic ever created, and have inspired hopes that electric vehicles can help <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-dumbest-experiment-2018-9?r=US&IR=T">reverse</a> climate change, as well as expectations of a boom in “white petroleum” or “white gold,” as boosters refer to lithium. These are loaded analogies in a country defined by the brutal legacy of the Spanish conquest, and this history has guided how the Morales government approached the question of natural resources. </p>
<p>Its goal with lithium was to produce raw materials and battery components as part of a plan to foster domestic industrialisation. Depending on your ideological perspective, the fall of Morales either signals a return to the <a href="https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/bolivia-coup-against-morales-opens-opportunity-for-multinational-mining-companies/">bad old days</a> or heralds an era of <a href="https://twitter.com/jczuleta/status/1194486117099331584">rational resource development</a>.</p>
<p>Will Bolivia get its white gold rush under new management? The short answer is probably not, for reasons that have as much to do with the paradoxes of public policy and the global market for electric cars as with persistent north-south inequity. </p>
<h2>Electric cars caused a lithium boom</h2>
<p>Essentially, Bolivian lithium gained value thanks to California air quality policy. In 1990, the Golden State basically <a href="https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/zero-emission-vehicle-program">forced</a> the auto industry to produce battery electric vehicles. Automakers were aghast because batteries have shorter lifespans than electric motors, and this durability dilemma primarily rewards battery-making, not auto-making. In response, they fiercely lobbied to delay their commitments, infamously recalling and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BaZSeuIWqEk">“killing”</a> their small fleets of leased electrics around the turn of the millennium. </p>
<p>In the late 2000s, though, electrics staged a comeback, largely thanks to Tesla Motors, a start-up that benefited from heavy <a href="https://cleanvehiclerebate.org/eng/ev/incentives/state-and-federal">state</a> and federal <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/01/tesla-and-its-subsidies-phil-kerpen/">subsidies</a>. In turn, Tesla’s survival led some mainstream automakers to grudgingly reconsider electrics.</p>
<p>And that stimulated the global lithium industry, especially in South America, home to the <a href="http://blogs.reuters.com/photographers-blog/2013/04/05/the-lithium-triangle/">“lithium triangle”</a>, a vast area of lithium-rich salt pans in the Andean high desert that overlaps Argentina, Bolivia and Chile. Over the past decade, Bolivia’s neighbours became important exporters of lithium carbonate, the basic form of refined lithium, and the Morales government wanted in, too. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301984/original/file-20191115-66941-1v2u668.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301984/original/file-20191115-66941-1v2u668.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301984/original/file-20191115-66941-1v2u668.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301984/original/file-20191115-66941-1v2u668.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301984/original/file-20191115-66941-1v2u668.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301984/original/file-20191115-66941-1v2u668.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301984/original/file-20191115-66941-1v2u668.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301984/original/file-20191115-66941-1v2u668.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">There’s white gold in them thar salt flats.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">elleon / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bolivia has at least a quarter of the world’s lithium, including the single largest deposit in the Salar de Uyuni, a salt pan so large it can be seen from <a href="https://www.space.com/37431-satellite-sees-bolivian-salt-plain-photo.html">space</a>. In 2008, the government started work on a pilot plant to refine lithium carbonate and in 2018 struck a <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-lithium/bolivia-to-invest-in-billion-dollar-lithium-deal-with-aci-systems-idUKKBN1HS0RW">deal</a> with a German company called ACI Systems to build an integrated plant producing lithium compounds and battery components.</p>
<h2>Isolated, impure and hard to extract</h2>
<p>Sceptical observers <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-12-03/bolivia-s-almost-impossible-lithium-dream">pointed out</a> that this ambitious scheme faced a host of serious technical, economic and geopolitical obstacles from the outset. Lithium is mined in two ways: from hard rock, as in <a href="http://www.lithiummine.com/lithium-mining-in-australia">Australia</a>, one of the world’s largest producers, or by evaporating the thin layer of brine that covers salt pans. This is how it is done in the Chilean and Argentine deposits. </p>
<p>But the Uyuni is wetter and at a higher altitude (3,656 metres), so evaporation there is less efficient. Moreover, Bolivian lithium contains more impurities, <a href="https://www.mining.com/bolivia-walks-away-from-lithium-project-with-german-company/">complicating</a> the extraction process. ACI said it could overcome these problems with new technology, but delays and disputes about royalties led the Bolivian government to <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/bolivia-scraps-joint-lithium-project-with-german-company/a-51100873">cancel</a> the deal in early November. Days later, Morales was deposed.</p>
<p>It is impossible to abstract lithium politics from Bolivia’s longstanding social crisis, often characterised as a <a href="https://www.alongdustyroads.com/posts/2016/4/14/santa-cruz-bolivia-guide-things-to-do-backpacking-activities">struggle</a> pitting white economic elites based in the lowland city of Santa Cruz, the commercial centre, against the largely indigenous political class in highland La Paz, the national capital. Critics argued that the integrated lithium operation had been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-lithium-analysis/bolivia-seeks-investors-to-power-up-lagging-lithium-output-idUSKBN1EL1JB">ill-coordinated</a> and some <a href="https://twitter.com/jczuleta?lang=en">welcomed</a> the coup as an opportunity to reorganise and speed up the effort.</p>
<h2>Electric vehicle uncertainty is bad for business</h2>
<p>The reality is that Bolivia is beholden to forces largely out of its control. Its lithium reserves are isolated and hard to process, but the main factor preventing a white gold rush is the uncertain market for all-battery electric vehicles. </p>
<p>There are around <a href="https://www.iea.org/gevo2019/">5 million</a> electric vehicles in the world today. An impressive figure in historical context, but electric cars still represent only <a href="https://www.iea.org/tcep/transport/electricvehicles/">0.7%</a> of overall production, and mainstream automakers are not keen to ramp it up. The cars generally lose money and remain <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/50135750">expensive</a>. </p>
<p>Because the electric vehicle fleets are so new, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/billroberson/2019/09/30/the-clock-is-ticking-on-electric-car-batteriesand-how-long-they-will-last/">nobody knows</a> what battery lifetime and lifecycle costs might be and who is going to pay for replacement packs. Right now, those costs are decoupled from market demand and obscured by public subsidies that in some cases are being <a href="https://www.energy.gov/eere/electricvehicles/electric-vehicles-tax-credits-and-other-incentives">phased out</a>.</p>
<p>And these uncertainties are bad news for lithium producers. Expecting an electric vehicle boom, they overinvested and created a <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/articles/why-lithium-has-turned-from-gold-to-dust-for-investors">supply glut</a> that slashed the price of lithium carbonate from US$25,000 to US$10,000 per metric tonne over the past two years. You might think that this would make for cheaper batteries, but battery packs are actually <a href="https://about.bnef.com/blog/behind-scenes-take-lithium-ion-battery-prices/">less sensitive to the prices of commodity materials</a> than typically assumed – instead, much of the cost comes from <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-01/panasonic-says-gigafactory-profit-in-sight-as-tesla-ramps-output">manufacturing inefficiencies</a>. </p>
<p>If the coup-makers believe that getting rid of Morales is going to change any of this, they are likely to be disappointed. The former president represented a <a href="http://www.amigosdeboliviayperu.org/NewsStories2012/B680BolOpensFirst%20LithiumPlant.html">constituency</a> that is in no hurry to develop the country’s resources if that means giving control and most of the profits to outsiders. The changing fortunes of the electric car industry, symptomatic more of a vast experiment than a true commercial enterprise at this stage, bear out this cautious approach. What is certain is that the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-50413981">civil unrest</a> provoked by the coup will not do Bolivia’s lithium industry any good.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Eisler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Bolivia’s huge lithium reserves are isolated and hard to extract, and global uncertainty over electric vehicles is bad for business.Matthew Eisler, Strathclyde Chancellor's Fellow, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Strathclyde Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1263062019-11-14T12:59:24Z2019-11-14T12:59:24ZUrban unrest propels global wave of protests<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301580/original/file-20191113-77291-1nxmrnz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C6%2C4176%2C2792&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chilean police clash with anti-government demonstrators during a protest in Santiago, Chile, Nov. 12, 2019. Santiago is one of a dozen cities worldwide to see mass unrest in recent months.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Chile-Protests/349587027bf24a9d9cb1d90de10bf884/11/0">AP Photo/Esteban Felix</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/why-are-there-so-many-protests-across-the-globe-right-now/2019/10/24/5ced176c-f69b-11e9-ad8b-85e2aa00b5ce_story.html">Numerous anti-government protests</a> have paralyzed cities across the globe for months, from La Paz, Bolivia, to Santiago, Chile, and Monrovia, Liberia, to Beirut.</p>
<p>Each protest in this worldwide wave of unrest has its own local dynamic and cause. But they also <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/10/25/global-wave-protests-share-themes-economic-anger-political-hopelessness/">share certain characteristics</a>: Fed up with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-50123743">rising inequality, corruption and slow economic growth</a>, angry citizens worldwide are demanding an end to corruption and the restoration of a democratic rule of law.</p>
<p>It is no accident, as <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-america-caribbean/2019-10-29/why-latin-america-was-primed-explode">Foreign Affairs recently observed</a>, that Latin America – which has seen the most countries explode into the longest-lasting violent protests – has the slowest regional growth in the world, with only 0.2% expected in 2019. Latin America is also the world’s <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/inequality-is-getting-worse-in-latin-america-here-s-how-to-fix-it/">region</a> with the most inequality.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/10/world/americas/evo-morales-bolivia.html">Bolivia’s once-powerful president</a>, Evo Morales – whose support was strongest in rural areas – was forced out on Nov. 11 by a military response to mass urban unrest after alleged electoral fraud. </p>
<p>In October, <a href="https://theconversation.com/lebanon-uprising-unites-people-across-faiths-defying-deep-sectarian-divides-125772">Lebanon’s prime minister</a> also resigned after mass protests. </p>
<p>One under-covered factor in these demonstrations, I would observe as a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Dv_-dxQAAAAJ&hl=enhttps://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Dv_-dxQAAAAJ&hl=en">scholar of migration</a>, is domestic, rural-to-urban migration. All these capital cities gripped by protest have huge populations of desperately poor formerly rural people <a href="https://www.cairn.info/mediterra-2018-english--9782724623956-page-101.htm">pushed out of the countryside</a> and into the city by <a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-is-making-soils-saltier-forcing-many-farmers-to-find-new-livelihoods-106048">climate change</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-struggling-agricultural-sector-what-went-wrong-20-years-ago-45171">national policies</a> that hurt small farmers or a <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-is-responsible-for-migrants-108388">global trade system that impoverishes local agriculture</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301593/original/file-20191113-77326-6t9jol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301593/original/file-20191113-77326-6t9jol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301593/original/file-20191113-77326-6t9jol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301593/original/file-20191113-77326-6t9jol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301593/original/file-20191113-77326-6t9jol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301593/original/file-20191113-77326-6t9jol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301593/original/file-20191113-77326-6t9jol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301593/original/file-20191113-77326-6t9jol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Backers of ousted Bolivian president Evo Morales march in La Paz, Bolivia, Nov. 13, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Bolivia-Elections/bf7e9e9d1762473c952642cba48435d8/2/0">AP Photo/Natacha Pisarenko</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Rapid urban growth</h2>
<p>Cities worldwide have been growing at an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/jul/12/urban-sprawl-how-cities-grow-change-sustainability-urban-age">unsustainable pace</a> over the past seven decades. </p>
<p>In 1950, the New York metropolitan area and Tokyo were the world’s only megacities – cities with more than 10 million people. By 1995, 14 megacities had emerged. Today, there are 25. Of the 7.6 billion people in the world, 4.2 billion, or 55%, <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/2018-revision-of-world-urbanization-prospects.html">live in cities and other urban settlements</a>. Another 2.5 billion people will <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/2018-revision-of-world-urbanization-prospects.html">move into cities in poor countries by 2050</a>, according to the United Nations. </p>
<p>Most modern megacities are in the <a href="https://qz.com/africa/688823/80-of-the-worlds-megacities-are-now-in-asia-latin-america-or-africa/">developing regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America</a>. There, natural population increases in cities are aggravated by surges in rural migrants in search of a better life. </p>
<p>What they find, instead, are sprawling <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/south-america-drug-slums-jurisdiction-organized-crime/">informal settlements</a>, frequently called <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-humanitarian-summit-urban-crisis-idUSKCN0Y80GA">urban slums</a>. </p>
<p>These marginalized parts of cities in the developing world – called “favelas” in Brazil, “bidonvilles” in Haiti and “villas miserias” in Argentina – <a href="https://blogs.unicef.org/east-asia-pacific/the-dark-of-day-life-in-jakarta-urban/">look remarkably similar across the globe</a>. Ignored by the municipal government, they usually lack sanitation, clean drinking water, electricity, health care facilities and schools. Informal urban settlements are usually <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/massive-urban-slums-1435765">precariously located</a>, near flood-prone waterfronts or on steep, unstable mountainsides. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301583/original/file-20191113-77305-nugz0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301583/original/file-20191113-77305-nugz0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301583/original/file-20191113-77305-nugz0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301583/original/file-20191113-77305-nugz0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301583/original/file-20191113-77305-nugz0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301583/original/file-20191113-77305-nugz0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301583/original/file-20191113-77305-nugz0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301583/original/file-20191113-77305-nugz0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An urban slum in Jakarta, Indonesia, April 3, 2017. Jakarta has seen regular outbreaks of protest since May 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Indonesia-Daily-Life/50adf90547c94f898ba7b39c5342e8b8/18/0">AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Their economy and, to a significant degree, politics, are <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/bringing-the-state-to-the-slum-confronting-organized-crime-and-urban-violence-in-latin-america/">infiltrated by gangs</a> – organized crime groups that profit off the illegal trafficking of drugs, people and weapons. These gangs, in turn, may be <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/massive-urban-slums-1435765">linked to political parties</a>, serving as their <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40553119?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">armed enforcers</a>.</p>
<p>Many rural migrants, who lack identity documentation, social entitlements, housing and financial services, are forced to work in these illicit labor markets. </p>
<p>This system replicates in a predatory, illegal form the <a href="https://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100310810">patron-client relationship</a> still common in many developing countries, in which a rural economic elite provides employment, loans, seeds, cash or protection for farmers in exchange for “taxes” – usually a share of the farmer’s produce – and political fealty. </p>
<p>In the unstable market economy of the urban slum, <a href="https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Challenge%20of%20Slums.pdf">gangs are the patron</a>.</p>
<h2>A staging ground for discontent</h2>
<p>The injustices of this daily life underlie the anger of many of today’s protesters. From Quito, Ecuador, to Beirut, the extreme marginalization of so many people living in big, dysfunctional and dangerous places has boiled over into deadly unrest. </p>
<p>In Haiti, for example, the majority of demonstrators who’ve staged <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/opinion/haiti-protests.html">nine straight weeks of massive protests</a> against documented official corruption, gasoline shortages and food scarcity are extremely poor Port-au-Prince residents. They are highly motivated to keep protesting because they are facing starvation.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301591/original/file-20191113-77342-1krg6v2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301591/original/file-20191113-77342-1krg6v2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301591/original/file-20191113-77342-1krg6v2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301591/original/file-20191113-77342-1krg6v2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301591/original/file-20191113-77342-1krg6v2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301591/original/file-20191113-77342-1krg6v2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301591/original/file-20191113-77342-1krg6v2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301591/original/file-20191113-77342-1krg6v2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People in the Cite Soleil slum, in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, wait for government-distributed food and school supplies, Oct. 3, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Haiti-Political-Crisis/0fab5cb697ef4794b291c63bd3f1a76f/1/0">AP Photo/Rebecca Blackwell</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even Chile, which technically is the wealthiest Latin American country, has an awful lot of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-50123743">very poor people struggling to get by</a>. Its current protests, which began in mid-October with a hike in the Santiago subway fare, are disproportionately composed of youth and rural migrants from Santiago’s poor outskirts. Among Latin American countries, Chile has the second-highest rate of internal migration in <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5362059/">all of Latin America</a>, second only to Panama. Bolivia ranks fifth in the region.</p>
<p>It is not the actual movement of rural people into cities that <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0738894215581315">creates social upheaval</a>, according to a 2015 analysis of 20 years of data on internal migration, poverty and inequality for 34 cities in Africa and Asia. Rather, it’s the overall poor and unequal educational and housing opportunities that rural-to-urban migrants face in cities – coupled with their <a href="https://homerdixon.com/tag/project-on-environment-population-and-security/">socioeconomic marginalization</a> – that <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0738894215581315">spurs urban discontent</a>. </p>
<p>People who fled impoverished countryside only to find poverty in the city, too, are demanding more. Two centuries after the <a href="https://mappinghistory.uoregon.edu/english/EU/EU06-00.html">peasant rebellions that toppled monarchies across Europe</a>, cities have become the stage for the kind of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-50123743">resentment and frustration</a> that can destabilize entire nations.</p>
<p>[ <em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126306/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henry F. (Chip) Carey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From Santiago and La Paz to Beirut and Jakarta, many of the cities now gripped by protest share a common problem: They’ve grown too much, too fast.Henry F. (Chip) Carey, Associate Professor, Political Science, Georgia State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1268592019-11-12T13:01:32Z2019-11-12T13:01:32ZBolivia in crisis: how Evo Morales was forced out<p>Evo Morales has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-50383608">left Bolivia</a> on a plane for Mexico, a day after he resigned as president. Morales and his vice-president, Álvaro García Linera, stood down <a href="https://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2019/11/11/la-renuncia-de-evo-deja-un-vacio-de-poder-no-se-sabe-quien-asumira-las-riendas-del-pais-237040.html">from office</a> on November 10, following a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/political-vacuum-bolivia-morales-announces-resignation-191111043447380.html?fbclid=IwAR2ABXrp4JHOvKkokgBPsi5dQwXEP-7E2I9mXop7R9QSXXfefaXpRzs_08U">suggestion</a> by the head of the military, Williams Kaliman. </p>
<p>Met with jubilation and despair by different sectors of Bolivian society, the resignations were the culmination of weeks of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-50134451">unrest following presidential and parliamentary elections</a> on October 20. Morales initially appeared to have won in the first round, but the whole process was overshadowed by accusations of electoral fraud and the spectre of military intervention. </p>
<p>Nothing at the moment is black and white. The events represent both a military coup d’état and a moment of mass protest that unseated the government.</p>
<h2>For and against Morales</h2>
<p>The social base of Morales’s political party, Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), are the peasant organisations of the Andean highlands <em>altiplano</em> and the semi-tropical valleys of Cochabamba, alongside a group of unions and federations which represent peasants and rural proletarian labourers. They have an <a href="https://www.cis.gob.bo/publicacion/no-somos-del-mas-el-mas-es-nuestro-historias-de-vida-y-conversaciones-con-campesinos-indigenas-de-bolivia/">organic relationship</a> with the MAS and as such will all turn out to vote for and defend it on the streets. </p>
<p>This hard core of social support is complemented by those who work in sectors that have benefited from the politics of the MAS. These include swaths of the informal petty commodity producers and hidden wage labourers found in the popular economy, miners employed by both the state and cooperatives, and sections of the lower middle and professional classes who feel Morales has reduced the stigma they confront in their day-to-day lives. These groups, as I <a href="https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/60636">examined in my own PhD research</a>, felt excluded and unrepresented within the liberal parliamentary democracy before the election of Morales in 2006.</p>
<p>The opposition to Morales is also comprised of multiple different – and contradictory – currents. First, there is a group concerned with the abstract notion of representative democracy, comprised of the urban middle-classes and university students. This is probably the largest opposition group and is found in all nine departmental capitals. </p>
<p>The second are indigenous groups which do not share the developmental agenda of the MAS government, and are in the pathways of extractive or large-scale infrastructure projects. The most visible of this opposition has come from the lowland indigenous groups, particularly those in the Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory and groups in the Chaco regions affected by hydrocarbon extraction. Others include groups in the Madidi national park opposing the megadams Bala and Chapete and the <em>ayllus</em>, socio-territorial units of Aymara indigenous communities, of North Potosí. </p>
<p>Increasingly powerful regional opposition groups are also concerned with the distribution of power and resources within the country. The indigenous opposition to Morales in the city of Potosí can be categorised as part of this group, as can the civic committees of the departments of Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz and Tarija.</p>
<h2>Coup d'état?</h2>
<p>Time accelerated in the period following presidential and parliamentary elections in Bolivia on October 20, with a decade’s worth of political events unfolding in the space of a couple of weeks, reorienting the political terrain. Yet time has also slowed down, with observers from afar looking on as if at a car crash in slow motion.</p>
<p>That Morales and García Linera stood down at the behest of the military is no surprise, and the possibility of a coup became increasingly likely in the days of protests and civic strikes between election day and November 10.</p>
<p>But the story of a coup d’état is by no means the whole story – and the ability of the three opposition groups to construct a multitude of popular forces powerful enough to direct the political currents in this moment has been astounding. In the wake of the election, the city of Santa Cruz was shut down for weeks by <a href="https://eldeber.com.bo/155997_la-ciudad-es-una-boca-que-grita-un-cuerpo-que-no-duerme-ni-se-cansa">a general strike</a> – the longest in the city’s history – while the streets of La Paz, Oruro, Potosí and Cochabamba were also barricaded.</p>
<p>The disorganised masses who congregated and <a href="http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/animal_electoral/violencia-apoderan-Santa-Cruz-indefinido_0_3243275701.html">burnt down</a> vote counting stations in Oruro, Potosí, Santa Cruz and Tarija following the suspension of the quick count broadcast on the night of October 20, coalesced into a movement strong enough to coordinate and sustain political activity against the MAS government. </p>
<p>During Morales’s final days in office, they were joined by social groups once supportive of the MAS, including the <a href="https://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2019/11/10/la-cob-pide-la-renuncia-de-evo-morales-236994.html">Bolivian Workers’ Central</a>. In this sense, the resignation of Morales and García Linera follows weeks of massive social protest.</p>
<p>Probably the most remarkable dynamic in this sped-up unfurling of history is the emergence of Luis Fernando Camacho, head of the Pro Santa Cruz Committee, from the backwaters of regional, right-wing politics in Santa Cruz to a political figure on the national scene. The arrival of the evangelical right to Bolivian politics – first in the form of presidential candidate Chi Hyun Chung and now in the figure of Camacho – has been a long time coming, but is nothing to celebrate. </p>
<p>Camacho, who speaks of bringing the bible to Bolivian politics, has been one of the more prominent figures <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20191103-bolivia-opposition-figure-calls-on-military-in-election-crisis">calling for military intervention</a>. The far-right currents in the opposition movements have created the conditions that allowed more extreme opposition groups to burn down the houses of <a href="https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/incendio-casa-hermana-evo-morales.html">several prominent MAS allies</a> during the night of November 9.</p>
<p>These acts of violence, coupled with the initial findings of an audit of the election by the <a href="http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/animal_electoral/bolivia-elecciones-informe-oea-irregularidades-manipulacion_0_3255274450.html">Organisation of American States</a> of the elections, led Morales to call for new elections, overseen by a reconstituted Supreme Electoral Tribunal. But by the day of Morales’s resignation the demands of many protesters had surpassed the call for new elections and now only Morales’s exit would do. </p>
<h2>Power vacuum</h2>
<p>In the wake of the resignations, both <a href="http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/animal_electoral/Mesa-OEA-confirmo-Evo-Alvaro_0_3255274462.html">Carlos Mesa</a>, Morales’s main electoral opponent and Camacho demanded new elections without the participation of Morales. The urban support base of the MAS took to the streets in violent protest. </p>
<p>The preliminary report from the <a href="http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/animal_electoral/bolivia-elecciones-informe-oea-irregularidades-manipulacion_0_3255274450.html">OAS audit</a> into electoral fraud – whose methodology has been <a href="http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/bolivia-elections-2019-11.pdf?v=2">questioned by some experts</a> – stated that even though there were numerous voting irregularities, it’s highly probable that Morales would have captured the largest share of the vote anyway. </p>
<p>Without Morales on the ballot paper in a future election, a large section of the electorate will not be able to vote for their candidate. This is a situation that some will call justice, given the way Morales skirted around the constitutional term limits, but that will leave a large, mainly rural, indigenous section of the population disenfranchised. Such frustration will lead to further violence if left unresolved. </p>
<p>The resignation of Morales and García Linera has now left a power vacuum. The deputy head of the senate, <a href="https://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2019/11/11/quien-es-jeanine-anez-la-posible-futura-presidente-bolivia-237051.html">Jeanine Anez</a>, is likely to step into the breach as interim president, but the route to new elections under a reconstituted Supreme Electoral Tribunal remains far from clear.</p>
<p>In 1983, Bolivian social theorist René Zavaleta Mercado noted the inability of Bolivian democracy to represent its <em>sociedad abigarrada</em> – its motley society. In 2019, the route forward appears to be the exclusion of a large proportion of Bolivians. The <em>wiphala</em>, the square banner that has long been a symbol of indigenous peoples and resistance, has been torn from government buildings and <a href="https://twitter.com/BenjaminNorton/status/1193689050894475264?s=20">unceremoniously burnt</a>. </p>
<p>If <a href="https://jornada.com.mx/2019/11/11/politica/008n2pol">Camacho’s proclamation</a> that “Pachamama (indigenous people) will never return to the palace. Bolivia is Christ” is anything to go by, Bolivian democracy remains incapable of managing the country’s motley society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126859/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Angus McNelly received funding for his doctoral research from the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p>Recent events in Bolivia represent both a military coup d'état and a moment of mass protest.Angus McNelly, Lecturer in Latin American Politics/International Development, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1223352019-08-23T16:36:58Z2019-08-23T16:36:58ZIt’s not just Brazil’s Amazon rainforest that’s ablaze – Bolivian fires are threatening people and wildlife<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289258/original/file-20190823-170927-vafbh2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1270%2C741&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Firefighters and volunteers have been working around the clock to tackle the flames.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ipa Ibañez</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Up to <a href="https://www.paginasiete.bo/sociedad/2019/8/23/incendios-se-extienden-cerca-de-800-mil-ha-en-la-chiquitania-228448.html">800,000 hectares</a> of the unique Chiquitano forest were burned to the ground in Bolivia between August 18 and August 23. That’s more forest than is usually destroyed across the country in two years. Experts say that it will take <a href="https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20190821/fuego-avanza-charagua-calculan-2-siglos-reparar-dano-ecologico?fbclid=IwAR1UJ6-5KJK3pu1WRNORuIpqShh0w9UPPbE5C71Y9tqZLV5dXm6I5Fg6RtE">at least two centuries</a> to repair the ecological damage done by the fires, while at least <a href="https://www.eldeber.com.bo/santacruz/500-especies-en-riesgo-a-causa-del-incendio-en-el-Bosque-Chiquitano-20190820-9590.html">500 species</a> are said to be at risk from the flames.</p>
<p>The Chiquitano dry forest in Bolivia was the <a href="https://www.worldwildlife.org/ecoregions/nt0212">largest healthy tropical dry forest in the world</a>. It’s now unclear whether it will retain that status. The forest is home to Indigenous peoples as well as iconic wildlife such as jaguars, giant armadillos, and tapirs. Some species in the Chiquitano are found nowhere else on Earth. Distressing photographs and videos from the area show many animals have burned to death in the recent fires.</p>
<p>The burnt region also encompasses farmland and towns, with thousands of people evacuated and many more <a href="https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/cochabamba/20190823/sube-contaminacion-ciudad-incendios-chiquitania">affected by the smoke</a>. Food and water are being <a href="https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20190822/llega-ayuda-humanitaria-san-ignacio-velasco-pero-aun-peligra-fauna-flora">sent to the region</a>, while children are <a href="https://www.eldeber.com.bo/santacruz/Se-suspenden-las-clases-en-Robore-por-el-humo-y-mala-calidad-del-aire--20190820-0020.html">being kept home from school</a> in many districts where the air pollution is <a href="https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20190820/suspenden-clases-robore-intensa-humareda-mala-calidad-del-aire">double what is considered extreme</a>. Many families are still without drinking water. While the media has focused on Brazil, Bolivians are asking the world to notice their unfolding tragedy – and to send help in combating the flames.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289215/original/file-20190823-170931-ieluug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289215/original/file-20190823-170931-ieluug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289215/original/file-20190823-170931-ieluug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289215/original/file-20190823-170931-ieluug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289215/original/file-20190823-170931-ieluug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289215/original/file-20190823-170931-ieluug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289215/original/file-20190823-170931-ieluug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dry forests of the Chiquitanos before the fires.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alfredo Romero-Muñoz</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It’s thought that the fires were started deliberately to clear the land for farming, but quickly got out of control. The perpetrators aren’t known, but Bolivian President Evo Morales has justified people starting fires, <a href="https://www.paginasiete.bo/sociedad/2019/8/20/tras-incendios-en-santa-cruz-morales-justifica-los-chaqueos-228093.html">saying</a>: “If small families don’t set fires, what are they going to live on?”</p>
<p>The disaster comes just a month after Morales announced a new “supreme decree” aimed at increasing beef production for export. <a href="https://www.noticiasfides.com/economia/21-organizaciones-civiles-condenan-decreto-que-permitio-quema-en-el-bosque-seco-chiquitano-400187">Twenty-one civil society organisations</a> are <a href="https://www.paginasiete.bo/sociedad/2019/8/20/tras-incendios-en-santa-cruz-morales-justifica-los-chaqueos-228093.html">calling for the repeal of this decree</a>, arguing that it has helped cause the fires and <a href="http://www.bad-ag.info/bolivia-legalises-and-expands-savage-deforestation-for-china-and-russia-beef-deals/">violates Bolivia’s environmental laws</a>. Government officials say that <a href="https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20190821/fuego-avanza-charagua-calculan-2-siglos-reparar-dano-ecologico?fbclid=IwAR1UJ6-5KJK3pu1WRNORuIpqShh0w9UPPbE5C71Y9tqZLV5dXm6I5Fg6RtE">fire setting is a normal activity</a> at this time of year and isn’t linked to the decree.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289259/original/file-20190823-170922-15w23pl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289259/original/file-20190823-170922-15w23pl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289259/original/file-20190823-170922-15w23pl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289259/original/file-20190823-170922-15w23pl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289259/original/file-20190823-170922-15w23pl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289259/original/file-20190823-170922-15w23pl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289259/original/file-20190823-170922-15w23pl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fires burn across Santa Cruz state.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ipa Ibañez</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Morales has repeatedly said that <a href="https://www.eldeber.com.bo/santacruz/Morales-informa-que-los-incendios-se-redujeron-en-un-70-en-Robore-20190819-9137.html">international help isn’t needed</a>, despite having sent just <a href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Bolivias-Evo-Morales-Visits-Fire-Affected-Eastern-Region-20190819-0005.html">three helicopters</a> to tackle the raging fires. He argued that the fires are dying out in some areas – although they continue to burn in others and have now reached <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-latin-america-11050704/bolivia-wildfires-continue-to-spread">Bolivia’s largest city</a>, Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Many say that the fires could have been contained far sooner with international help, as videos show volunteers trying to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-latin-america-11050704/bolivia-wildfires-continue-to-spread">beat back the fires with branches</a>.</p>
<p>As the fires worsened, people gathered to protest in Santa Cruz state. Chanting “<a href="https://twitter.com/pagina_siete/status/1163989442526437377">we want your help</a>”, they complained that the smoke was so bad they were struggling to breathe. They want Morales to request international aid to fight the fires. While firefighters and volunteers struggle to tackle the <a href="https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20190823/400-bomberos-voluntarios-sofocan-incendios-soportando-mas-55-degc">blaze in 55°C</a> heat, Bolivians have set up a <a href="https://www.gofundme.com/f/chiquitaniabolivia">fundraiser</a> to tackle the fires themselves. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289271/original/file-20190823-170951-xlv595.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289271/original/file-20190823-170951-xlv595.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289271/original/file-20190823-170951-xlv595.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289271/original/file-20190823-170951-xlv595.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289271/original/file-20190823-170951-xlv595.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289271/original/file-20190823-170951-xlv595.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289271/original/file-20190823-170951-xlv595.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The extreme heat has made fighting the fires intolerable for those involved.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ipa Ibañez</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A fortnight after the fires began, a <a href="https://twitter.com/evoespueblo/status/1164859086673985536">supertanker aeroplane</a> of water arrived, hired from the US. But if the reactions to the <a href="https://twitter.com/evoespueblo/status/1164206110213103618?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fcdn.embedly.com%2Fwidgets%2Fmedia.html%3Ftype%3Dtext%252Fhtml%26key%3Da19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07%26schema%3Dtwitter%26url%3Dhttps%253A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2Fevoespueblo%2Fstatus%2F1164206110213103618%26image%3Dhttps%253A%2F%2Fi.embed.ly%2F1%2Fimage%253Furl%253Dhttps%25253A%25252F%25252Fpbs.twimg.com%25252Fprofile_images%25252F721003588919640064%25252FmG0g1mmc_400x400.jpg%2526key%253Da19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07">president’s announcement</a> on Twitter are anything to go by, many Bolivians think this is too little, too late. Morales is fighting a general election and has faced <a href="https://twitter.com/evoespueblo/status/1163855354586894337">criticism</a> for staying on the campaign trail while the fires spread.</p>
<p>Some Indigenous leaders are asking for a trial to determine responsibility for the fires, and the response to them. <a href="https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2019/08/21/desastre-ambiental-por-incendios-forestales-en-bolivia-fuertes-criticas-de-indigenas-y-ambientalistas-a-evo-morales/">Alex Villca</a>, an Indigenous leader and spokesperson, said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is President Evo Morales who should be held accountable. What are these accountabilities going to be? A trial of responsibilities for this number of events that are occurring in the country, this number of violations of Indigenous peoples and also the rights of Mother Nature.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289252/original/file-20190823-170927-klah9k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289252/original/file-20190823-170927-klah9k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289252/original/file-20190823-170927-klah9k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=733&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289252/original/file-20190823-170927-klah9k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=733&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289252/original/file-20190823-170927-klah9k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=733&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289252/original/file-20190823-170927-klah9k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=921&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289252/original/file-20190823-170927-klah9k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=921&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289252/original/file-20190823-170927-klah9k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=921&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The dry forest understorey ignites while firefighters deploy fire breaks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ipa Ibañez</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>President Morales came to power in Bolivia in 2006, on a platform of socialism, Indigenous rights, and environmental protection. He passed the famous “<a href="https://theconversation.com/evo-morales-champions-indigenous-rights-abroad-but-in-bolivia-its-a-different-story-38062">Law of the Rights of Mother Earth</a>” in 2010, which placed the intrinsic value of nature alongside that of humans. His environmental rhetoric has been strong but his policies have been contradictory. Morales has <a href="https://rdcu.be/bEAux">approved widespread deforestation</a>, as well as roads and gas exploration in national parks.</p>
<p>While the fires in the Chiquitano have dominated the media within the country, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-latin-america-11050704/bolivia-wildfires-continue-to-spread">hundreds more</a> rage across Bolivia, assisted by the recent drought. It’s unclear whether the response to these fires will affect the October election outcome, but sentiments are running high in the country, where more than 70% of people <a href="http://www.cis.gob.bo/publicacion/encuesta-mundial-valores-bolivia-2017/">prioritise environmental protection</a> over economic growth. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/message-to-the-eu-you-have-the-chance-to-stop-fuelling-devastation-in-the-amazon-115465">Bolsonaro</a> and Brazil might grab the headlines, but Bolivia too is now host to a desperately serious humanitarian and environmental situation.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/imagine-newsletter-researchers-think-of-a-world-with-climate-action-113443?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=Imagineheader1122335">Click here to subscribe to our climate action newsletter. Climate change is inevitable. Our response to it isn’t.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122335/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claire F.R. Wordley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While the world watches the Brazilian Amazon burn, across the border in Bolivia it’s also ablaze.Claire F.R. Wordley, Research Associate, Conservation Evidence, Department of Zoology, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/932532018-04-11T10:45:25Z2018-04-11T10:45:25ZBolivia is not Venezuela – even if its president does want to stay in power forever<p>When Latin America’s elected leaders gather in Peru later this week to <a href="http://www.summit-americas.org/viii/prog_en.pdf">discuss democracy in their region</a>, one topic will likely be high on the agenda: Venezuela, which was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-peru-venezuela-politics/peru-to-maduro-youre-still-not-welcome-at-summit-of-americas-idUSKCN1HA2HS">barred from attending this year’s Summit of the Americas</a> because it has an authoritarian government.</p>
<p>Several countries have criticized Venezuela’s exclusion, <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/news/evo-morales-utilizan-cumbre-americas-agredir-venezuela-20180217-0013.html">chief among them Bolivia</a>. Bolivian president Evo Morales, a close ally of its late populist president Hugo Chávez, has long defended the Venezuelan regime against its foreign critics.</p>
<p>Venezuela and Bolivia are so politically tied, in fact, that it has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/%20monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/28/bolivias-president-thinks-hes-irreplaceable-what-does-this-mean-for-democracy-there/">some democracy observers concerned</a>. Is Morales taking Bolivia down the same dangerous path that led nearby Venezuela into dictatorship? </p>
<h2>Bolivia looks a little like Venezuela</h2>
<p>In 2016, Bolivian voters <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-referendum-idUSKCN0VX09E">rejected a referendum</a> on whether incumbent presidents – then <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-42165258">limited to two consecutive five-year administrations</a> – should be able to run for reelection. Morales, then in his third term because of a technicality related to Bolivia’s new 2009 Constitution, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/22/bolivia-evo-morales-president-national-referendum-fourth-term">promised to respect</a> the “will of the people.” No fourth term, he said.</p>
<p>That was then. Morales has since decided to run for reelection next year after a December 2017 Supreme Court ruling <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/world/americas/bolivia-evo-morales-elections.html">abolishing term limits for Bolivian elected officials</a>. </p>
<p>As social scientists who specialize in Latin America, we understand the temptation now to compare Bolivia with Venezuela. Both countries have embraced charismatic political leaders who run their nations by force of personality. </p>
<p>President Chávez, who ruled Venezuela from 1999 to 2013, consolidated his power by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/16/hugo-chavez-indefinite-rule">abolishing term limits</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/06/16/rigging-rule-law/judicial-independence-under-siege-venezuela">attacking judicial independence</a> and curtailing <a href="https://cpj.org/reports/2012/08/after-years-of-assault-venezuelas-independent-pres.php">press freedoms</a>. He died shortly into his third term. </p>
<p>Chávez’s hand-picked successor, Nicolás Maduro, has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/world/americas/venezuela-populism-authoritarianism.html">expanded these tactics</a>, jailing dissidents and neutering Parliament. Despite overseeing the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-venezuelas-crisis-7-essential-reads-89018">descent into economic chaos</a>, Maduro is widely expected to win his bid for a second term in 2018. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07/world/americas/venezuela-maduro-election.html">Most opposition candidates are either imprisoned or banned from politics</a>.</p>
<p>Bolivia and Venezuela are also outspoken critics of the United States and founding members of the so-called <a href="https://albainfo.org/what-is-the-alba/">Bolivarian Alliance</a>, a leftist grouping of Latin American and Caribbean nations started by Chávez and Fidel Castro in 2004. </p>
<p>After the White House passed sanctions against Venezuela, in November 2017, Morales <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Evo-Morales-Latin-America-Is-No-Longer-a-Yankee-Colony-20171112-0001.html">bristled</a>. “Latin America is no longer a Yankee colony,” he exclaimed.</p>
<h2>No oil diplomacy</h2>
<p>There are, however, pronounced political and social differences between Bolivia and Venezuela that should prevent Morales from following in Chávez’s footsteps. </p>
<p>Bolivia’s resources pale in comparison to Venezuela’s. Petroleum gas is Bolivia’s <a href="https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/bol/">main export</a>, but Venezuela has the <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2018/02/12/news/economy/venezuela-oil-production/index.html">world’s greatest crude oil reserves</a>. </p>
<p>Chávez used Venezuela’s oil riches to shower benefits on Bolivia and other neighbors, sending subsidized oil to countries across <a href="http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/uncertain-energy-the-caribbean-s-gamble-with-venezuela">Central America and the Caribbean</a>. </p>
<p>Today, Maduro needles the United States by having Citgo – a U.S.-based subsidiary of the state-owned Petróeos de Venezuela – <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-30/venezuela-offers-5-million-to-aid-harvey-victims-via-citgo">provide cheap gasoline to Americans in need</a>. The company recently offered US$5 million in oil aid to victims of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/30/venezuela-enemy-of-the-u-s-offered-5-million-in-aid-to-harvey-victims/">Hurricane Harvey in Texas</a>.</p>
<p>Morales has stewarded Bolivia’s economy well, and <a href="https://search.proquest.com/docview/1866259473?pq-origsite=gscholar">gross domestic product has tripled during his 12 years in office</a>. But Bolivia’s economy is still one-fifth the size of Venezuela’s, and the country ranks <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ZJ-CL">among the poorest nations in South America</a>. </p>
<p>Morales is the president of a small, landlocked Andean nation. He simply cannot wield his country’s wealth, Chávez-style, to win friends and antagonize enemies. </p>
<h2>Constraints on power</h2>
<p>Bolivia’s booming economy has certainly empowered Morales at home, allowing him to fund a range of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/mar/21/bolivia-washington-consensus">popular social programs</a>. These include cash payments to poor families, a minimum wage hike, pensions for people with disabilities and major infrastructure projects. </p>
<p>Quality of life has gone up enormously since Morales was first elected in 2005. Between 2005 and 2016, the population living in poverty declined <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Bolivia-Has-Cut-Extreme-Poverty-in-Half-Since-2006-20160830-0021.html">from 61 percent to under 40 percent</a>.</p>
<p>Such successes have largely muted Morales’s domestic critics. But he is also constrained domestically, kept in check by the same social movements that catapulted him to power. </p>
<p>Morales’s political career began when he was elected to head Bolivia’s largest federation of coca growers in 1988, a post he still holds. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-coca-leaf-not-coffee-may-always-be-colombias-favourite-cash-crop-74723">Coca leaf</a>, the active ingredient in cocaine, is a mild stimulant traditionally chewed or brewed as tea throughout the Andean highlands. Coca has been <a href="https://news.vice.com/article/bolivia-ended-its-drug-war-by-kicking-out-the-dea-and-legalizing-coca">legal in Bolivia since 2004</a>.</p>
<p>Under Morales’s leadership, the coca farmers – who, like most Bolivians, are <a href="http://www.boliviainfoforum.org.uk/inside-page.asp?page=43%C2%A7ion=2">ethnically indigenous</a> – militantly <a href="https://nacla.org/article/price-success-bolivias-war-against-drugs-and-poor">resisted such U.S.-backed state counternarcotics policies</a> as forced eradication, fumigation and crop substitution schemes. </p>
<h2>Indigenous resistance</h2>
<p>Morales gained national prominence in the early 2000s when he <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23648-2005Apr3.html">led numerous mass marches and strikes</a> to protest government efforts to privatize utilities and tax public employees’ salaries. </p>
<p>Throughout this period, Morales claimed to be “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/mar/02/bolivia-evo-morales">leading by obeying</a>” his constituency. He relied on popular referendums to inform his policies and respected the collective decision-making processes typical of Bolivia’s indigenous communities. </p>
<p>As such, he said, his actions directly represented the people’s will.</p>
<p>Morales has continued to make this claim as president. He describes his Movimiento al Socialismo, or MAS, not as a political party – though technically it is – but as an expression of Bolivian <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/lap_policy_Bolivia1.pdf">social movements</a>. </p>
<p>His legitimacy thus depends on faithfully advancing the priorities of the MAS’s grassroots and indigenous base. Whenever his supporters believe that Morales is imposing his own political agenda, they’re quick to oppose him. </p>
<p>In 2011, Morales was forced to abandon <a href="https://newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2011/10/28/evo-morales-bolivia-rainforest">plans to build a highway</a> through a national park occupied by indigenous communities after over 1,000 local residents undertook a 360-mile protest march to Bolivia’s capital. They were violently repressed by police along the way. </p>
<p>When he recently decided to revive the road project, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/sep/11/they-lied-bolivia-untouchable-amazon-lands-tipnis-at-risk-once-more">indigenous residents of the park again mobilized in resistance</a>.</p>
<p>Similarly, Morales’s decision to ignore the results of the 2016 referendum on term limits spurred swift retaliation. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-politics/bolivias-morales-says-hell-seek-fourth-term-spurs-protests-idUSKBN1DU1ZL">The president’s approval ratings</a> – which <a href="http://www.lavozdelsandinismo.com/internacionales/2014-12-24/evo-morales-termina-2014-con-elevada-aprobacion-popular/">have hovered around 75 percent</a> – dropped <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-03-05/bolivia-s-president-evo-morales-doesn-t-deserve-a-fourth-term">as much as 50 percent, according to some polls</a>. </p>
<h2>A distinctly Bolivian leader</h2>
<p>Morales’s desire to stay in office indefinitely may recall Venezuela’s Chávez. But ultimately we see him as a distinctly Bolivian kind of left-wing leader, constrained by economic and political forces that do not exist in Venezuela. </p>
<p>To win Bolivia’s October 2019 presidential election, Morales must uphold the social contract he made with the country’s popular and indigenous majority. </p>
<p>If Morales takes a Chávez-like turn, we believe Bolivians will ensure that his fourth term is a short one. After all, authoritarianism is the antithesis of “leading by obeying.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Albro has received funding from the National Science Foundation, Carnegie Council, Mellon, Rockefeller and Luce Foundations. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael McCarthy has received funding from the Inter-American, Ford, and Fulbright Foundations, and founded and edits Caracas Wire — a newsletter on politics in Venezuela and geo-politics in Latin America. </span></em></p>Bolivia’s populist leader has been in office for 12 years. He’s a thorn in the US’s side and an ally of the late Hugo Chávez. Now he’s running for a fourth term. But that doesn’t make him a dictator.Robert Albro, Research Associate Professor, American UniversityMichael McCarthy, Research Fellow, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/759512017-04-13T01:38:05Z2017-04-13T01:38:05ZVenezuela has lost its democratic facade<p>Although the Venezuelan government has become increasingly authoritarian since the early 2000s, last week was the first time it openly attacked democracy.</p>
<p>On March 29, the Venezuelan Supreme Court, controlled by the executive branch, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/world/americas/venezuelas-supreme-court-takes-power-from-legislature.html">took over</a> the functions of the National Assembly. Although this is not the first time the Venezuelan government tried to expand its control over other institutions, unlike previous power grabs, so far, this decision has worked against President Nicolás Maduro’s administration and could potentially ignite regime change.</p>
<h2>Eroding democracy</h2>
<p>For the past two decades, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/why-latin-america-is-becoming-less-democratic/277803/">democracy in Latin America has eroded</a>. Democratically elected presidents like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (replaced by Nicolás Maduro in 2013), Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua have used constitutional amendments to increase the powers of the executive and stay in office indefinitely. Alone, each of their amendments did not represent a strong threat against democracy. But together, they have turned these countries into competitive authoritarian regimes.</p>
<p>For the most part, the international community has watched the erosion of democracy in Latin America, and in particular in Venezuela, from the sidelines. Pro-democracy tools like the Inter-American Democratic Charter, approved by the Organization of American States in 2001, were designed to deal with overt threats against democracy, such as civilian or military coups.</p>
<p>But a slow erosion of democracy does not quite fit that bill. Unlike the military dictatorships that governed countries like Brazil (1964-1985), Chile (1973-1990), Argentina (1976-1983) and Uruguay (1973-1985), Chávez, Morales, Correa and Ortega did not take power by force. They did not close Congress or the courts, or cancel elections. On the contrary, they called for nationally elected constitutional assemblies, held referendums and further legitimized their authority using special elections. </p>
<p>In Venezuela, Chávez and, more recently, Maduro, held a total of 11 elections, while they concentrated executive power, destroyed the system of checks and balances and curtailed civil rights. Imposing international sanctions against a regime that keeps such a democratic façade is hard. Without a clear threat against democracy, any move by the international community could be seen as a violation of Venezuela’s sovereignty. </p>
<p>Domestically, groups opposing presidents attempting to erode democracy face a difficult situation as well. Unlike civilian or military coups, the erosion of democracy happens over time, giving the opposition ample opportunities to <a href="https://lgamboag.files.wordpress.com/2016/12/gamboa_opposition2017.pdf">fight back</a>. Because they keep a democratic façade, however, presidents willing to undermine democracy are hard to “delegitimize.” </p>
<p>It was easy to claim that Augusto Pinochet in Chile was a dictator. He attained power by force and immediately closed democratic institutions, canceled elections and began killing, torturing and detaining his opponents. Not so much Hugo Chávez. He came to power democratically, left Congress and courts open, held elections and allowed the opposition to run for office. Even though electoral contests have not been free or fair in Venezuela since 2008, the democratic façade has made it hard to convince citizens to turn against the government.</p>
<h2>The mask of democracy comes off</h2>
<p>The mask of democracy in Venezuela, therefore, has put both domestic and international actors in a difficult position. Last year, the government <a href="http://theconversation.com/venezuela-on-the-verge-of-dictatorship-can-dialogue-or-demonstrations-turn-it-around-68042">canceled a recall referendum</a> against the president and indefinitely postponed regional elections. Even then, the opposition was unable to galvanize enough support for regime change domestically or abroad.</p>
<p>The Venezuelan Supreme Court rulings changed that. In practice, the government had been circumventing the National Assembly since January 2016, arguing it was in <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-venezuela-parliament-court-20160111-story.html">contempt</a>. However, up until March 29, the administration had been able to deflect criticisms. After all, Congress was there: Its members held sessions and produced legislation. The government just failed to follow, enforce or abide by it. For example, last year, the Supreme Court accepted Maduro’s economic emergency <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/12/venezuela-under-economic-emergency-as-court-gives-maduro-decree-powers">decree</a>, which sought to widen his powers for 60 days.</p>
<p>The minute the Supreme Court said it would take over the National Assembly’s functions, however, the democratic façade fell off. This decision is comparable to former Peruvian President <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/self-coup-rocked-peru-197280">Alberto Fujimori’s to close Congress and rule by decree for seven months</a>. Similar to what happened then, two weeks ago, several countries in the region, including the U.S., made strong pronouncements against the Venezuelan court’s rulings. Regional organizations like the <a href="http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-022/17">OAS</a> and <a href="http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2017/04/01/america/1491076022_326137.html">Mercosur</a> drafted resolutions asking the government to fully restore the powers of the National Assembly and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-peru-venezuela-idUSKBN1712SA?il=0">Perú recalled its ambassador</a>. </p>
<p>Domestically, there were also important consequences. The opposition coalition, MUD, strongly condemned the decision. The president of the National Assembly publicly ripped up the rulings’ transcripts. Since then, the MUD has organized <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/venezuela-protests_us_58ea4aa1e4b05413bfe3981f">nonviolent protests</a> every other day asking the government to remove the justices and schedule elections. More importantly, perhaps, high-level Chavistas, supporters of former president Chavez, dissented for the first time in a long time. On March 31, the Attorney General Luisa Ortega, who so far had been loyal to the regime, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/congress/venezuela-court-says-it-can-take-over-congress-powers/2017/03/30/5874b9e8-15ab-11e7-bb16-269934184168_story.html?utm_term=.9b23002451e6">denounced the rulings</a> as unconstitutional and called the government to restore the powers of the National Assembly. </p>
<p>It’s unclear what will come of all of this. </p>
<p>So far, it seems that neither opposition nor government is ready to back down. Maduro has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/world/americas/venezuela-maduro-protests-supreme-court.html">used violence to repress</a> the opposition’s peaceful demonstrations, but the MUD keeps calling people to the streets. </p>
<p>With these rulings, the government unwillingly opened a window of opportunity for the opposition. By overtly threatening what little was left of Venezuela’s democracy, the administration decreased its legitimacy domestically and abroad. In that context, peaceful protests are a valuable tool. They are likely to increase pressure against the government, and with it, perhaps deliver some concessions to the MUD. Although this outcome will not automatically deliver a return to a true democracy, it could potentially pave the way for one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75951/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laura Gamboa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Rather than an outright coup, Venezuela’s government has slowly eroded its democratic institutions and processes, until now.Laura Gamboa, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Utah State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/544382016-02-10T15:20:26Z2016-02-10T15:20:26ZIf Zuma cast himself as a climate emergency president and statesman, this is what he would say<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110982/original/image-20160210-12170-1z0jt95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Environmental activists demand a fair climate change deal outside the United Nations Climate Change conference in South Africa recently. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Post the Cold War and in the age of high finance, the performance of narrow representative democratic politics has spawned three types of presidential politics</p>
<p>There are the populist presidents. These include Italy’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11981754">Sylvio Berlusconi</a> the US’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/presidents/georgewbush">George Bush</a> and South Africa’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/list_by.php?by=Jacob%20Zuma">Jacob Zuma</a>. Policy is made on the hoof, is erratic, and there is no moral and intellectual leadership except to allow markets to rule.</p>
<p>Then there is the technocratic ruler guided by the numbers, markets and keen to ensure policy-making is about certainty and the right signals. This is about being a manager of deep globalisation. <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/presidents/williamjclinton">Bill Clinton</a>, Germany’s <a href="http://www.biography.com/people/angela-merkel-9406424">Angela Merkel</a> and South Africa’s <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a> epitomised this.</p>
<p>Finally there is the statesman who is a visionary trying to ensure a home grown master narrative and a strategic class project. They carry a cross section of social forces and invent innovative engagements to shape a globalised political economy. Bolivia’s <a href="http://www.biography.com/people/evo-morales-37952">Evo Morales</a> and <a href="http://mandela.gov.za/biography/index.html">Nelson Mandela</a> stand out.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.sabc2.co.za/sabc/home/sabc2/news/details?id=6b28e6f0-b411-47e2-b252-a678843074c2&title=Preparations%20for%20SONA%202016%20underway">2016 State of the Nation Address</a> provides President Zuma with the opportunity to make a clean break with his populist leadership style and take the sort of actions that are likely to make him unpopular. But, that might be a very tall order for Zuma.</p>
<h2>What it will take for Zuma the statesman to emerge</h2>
<p>Zuma can be a statesman if he embraces and articulates the following three priorities.</p>
<p>Firstly he needs to call for a new mode of governance to tackle the ecological crises facing the world, South Africa and Africa. As the starkest expression of this crisis he actively champions climate emergency governance to ensure systemic adaptation and mitigation. </p>
<p>This means the drought narrative is shifted away from being a national disaster to being part of the “new normal” of climate shocks that requires a new paradigm of state practice, governance and citizenship. He stakes this out as a response to the crises of capitalist civilisation and the need for a just transition to sustain life. Central to this is reaffirming a non-racial approach to these challenges to unify South Africa.</p>
<p>Secondly he affirms a policy shift to climate emergency governance. This means moving policy in the direction of a new metric of sustaining life and a low carbon society. He actively calls for transitional policies that deepen mass initiative. These could include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>climate jobs,</p></li>
<li><p>a universal basic income grant set at a high level to enable choice,</p></li>
<li><p>integrated public transport,</p></li>
<li><p>food sovereignty pathways,</p></li>
<li><p>solidarity economies,</p></li>
<li><p>participatory budgeting at municipal level,</p></li>
<li><p>zero waste,</p></li>
<li><p>socially owned renewables,</p></li>
<li><p>the lifting on the ceiling of renewables in the national energy mix and calls for the establishment for a socially owned renewables parastatal,</p></li>
<li><p>rights of nature legislation,</p></li>
<li><p>scaling up cooperative banking in every locale,</p></li>
<li><p>a new sustainable water management framework,</p></li>
<li><p>a suite of new progressive carbon taxes and the retrofitting of households, government buildings and private corporations with locally manufactured renewable energy technology.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>At the same time, he announces an end to fracking and all nuclear deals and sets a deadline to stop producing coal. In addition, he calls on unions to work with government to ensure workers use the <a href="https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/legislations/national_climatechange_response_whitepaper.pdf">climate jobs policy</a> and <a href="http://www.basicincome.org/bien/pdf/2002Bhorat.pdf">universal basic income grant</a> to leave behind dirty industries.</p>
<p>He streamlines government by introducing a new democratic planning ministry to work with local governments. It absorbs trade and industry, minerals, energy, environment, water, public transport, local government, agriculture, local development, housing and the finance ministries. And he commits to dismantling provinces through a constitutional amendment to be replaced with three inter-provincial administrations.</p>
<p>He calls for a new policy on politicians’ salaries and perks so they are not so excessive. To professionalise the public sector, he calls on the <a href="http://www.psc.gov.za/">public services commission</a> to improve working conditions for health professionals, teachers, municipal workers and government administrators.</p>
<p>Finally, he announces a revamp of foreign policy which entails re-priorisiting Africa, instead of the <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/03/economist-explains-why-south-africa-brics">BRICS</a>. Africa has and will be hit hardest by climate warming. Yet it does not have the necessary finance, technology and institutional capacity to deal with this. Commitments made by Western countries to Africa at <a href="http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf">Cop 21</a> are dismal. Africa is meant to be a zone of climate chaos.</p>
<p>Zuma needs to challenge this by calling for the development of a just transition and climate emergency plan for Africa through the <a href="http://www.au.int/">African Union</a>. All foreign engagements would be realigned with this imperative.</p>
<h2>Why none of this will happen</h2>
<p>All of this will not happen because Jacob Zuma is not a statesmen. It also won’t happen because the <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2051">ANC-led alliance</a> is married to a fossil fuel and extractivist accumulation path and fixated on a growth-centred version of deep globalisation. This despite the fact that it has not worked and is the opposite of remaking society to fit into ecological constraints to survive. </p>
<p>Finally it will take more climate shocks to wake up the world’s ruling elites and citizenry to understand we have entered unchartered territory in human history.</p>
<p>We are now officially at a 1°C increase in planetary temperatures since the industrial revolution. And we are rapidly heading towards a 2°C increase this century. We need to think, act and govern differently if we are to survive and ensure future generations have hope.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/54438/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vishwas Satgar has received funding from the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences. He also chairs the board of the Cooperative and Policy Alternative Centre. He supports #ZumaMustFall and #FeesMustFall.</span></em></p>The 2016 State of the Nation Address provides President Zuma with the ideal opportunity to be statesman-like. That would require bold action of his part, something that he is unlikely to do.Vishwas Satgar, Senior Lecturer, Department of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/515282015-12-15T13:24:15Z2015-12-15T13:24:15ZLatin America’s leftism looks paler than ever as trailblazers stumble and fall<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/106045/original/image-20151215-23176-1rm4rgd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The way we were.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://pictures.reuters.com/archive/ARGENTINA-MERCOSUR--GM1E86U0GXW01.html">Reuters/Enrique Marcarian</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It suddenly feels as if the sun is setting on the bold leftism that bedded in across Latin America in the 2000s – and some of the region’s biggest players are drifting (or in some cases lurching) noticeably to the right.</p>
<p>Not so long ago, it seemed the 21st century would belong to the left. Left-wing governments were elected in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and (briefly) Honduras; left-of-centre parties repeatedly won elections in Argentina and Brazil. Though the centre-right <a href="http://www.forbes.com/profile/sebastian-pinera/">Sebastian Piñera</a> did serve one presidential term, even former neoliberal poster child Chile was generally run by a centre-left government.</p>
<p>But now, two of the region’s big leftist beasts look set to radically change tack. The surprise <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/22/argentina-election-exit-polls-buenos-aires-mauricio-macri">election of Mauricio Macri</a> as president of Argentina heralds the end of the boisterous big-government ways of “Kirchnerismo”, while Venezuela’s socialist project has finally been dealt a <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-this-the-end-of-the-socialist-dream-in-venezuela-49859">serious body blow at the ballot box</a>. </p>
<p>And the course correction isn’t confined to the boldest left-wing states. More moderate left-of-centre governments have also run into trouble: see for example the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/business/international/effects-of-petrobras-scandal-leave-brazilians-lamenting-a-lost-dream.html?_r=0">corruption scandal</a> relating to state-controlled oil company Petrobras that’s engulfing the centre-left Rousseff administration in Brazil. This has led to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/02/brazil-dilma-rousseff-impeachment-proceedings">impeachment proceedings</a> being initiated against the president herself.</p>
<p>The chaos on the left isn’t quite as sudden a downturn as it seems. While the administration of President Nicolás Maduro has undoubtedly been hurt by a <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c9c4b05c-0b81-11e5-994d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3tG9q0kjk">slump in oil prices</a>, Venezuela’s brand of socialism has simply proven untenable without Chávez’s energy and charisma. And even as Maduro has become <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/dissent-in-venezuela-maduro-regime-looks-on-borrowed-time-as-rising-public-anger-meets-political-10070607.html">increasingly authoritarian</a> in his attitude to dissent, his government’s economic incompetence is now impossible to refute. </p>
<p>The Petrobras corruption scandal, meanwhile, has been rumbling for some time, and was making trouble even before a rash of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-27811657">huge demonstrations</a> over high levels of spending on the 2016 Rio Olympics and 2014 World Cup. </p>
<p>But the shrivelling of the left has been going on for longer even than this. Take a closer look at the way these governments have acted since the 2000s and we can see that while their rhetoric has been sharply ideological, their policies have often been far more moderate.</p>
<h2>Feeling their way</h2>
<p>Dilma Rousseff’s Workers’ Party has been relatively pragmatic ever since <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-lula-poll-idUSTRE6BF4O620101216">wildly popular</a> former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was first elected in 2002. Its economic policies in particular have been relatively <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/05/opinion/05iht-edbremmer.html?_r=0">non-ideological</a>, notably its <a href="https://nacla.org/article/introduction-lula%E2%80%99s-legacy-brazil">enthusiastic embrace of large-scale agriculture</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, despite plently of fiery anti-capitalist and anti-US statements, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa has <a href="http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/latinfinance-names-rafael-correa-president-of-ecuador-as-person-of-the-year-2015-1999239.htm">proved more pragmatic than radical</a>, again particularly on economic policy. This has even been the case in Bolivia, which is still governed by left-wing icon <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/13/us-bolivia-election-idUSKCN0I21MD20141013#5cEoSrmtkxMfjhuT.97">Evo Morales</a>. While he made several high-profile nationalisations early in his term, especially in the <a href="http://www.cfr.org/world/bolivias-nationalization-oil-gas/p10682">oil and gas sectors</a>, and has sought to increase the state’s role in the economy, Morales is also respecting private property and has proven to be relatively pragmatic, now pursuing a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/17/world/americas/turnabout-in-bolivia-as-economy-rises-from-instability.html?_r=0">macroeconomic policy</a> revolving around substantial foreign currency reserves.</p>
<p>Nicaragua’s president, Daniel Ortega was once a hero of the left as leader of the Nicaraguan revolution. But now he’s <a href="http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/2015/03/12/feature-07">co-operated with Washington to combat drug trafficking</a> and kept Nicaragua a committed member of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (<a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/10/daniel-ortegas-reality-check/">DR-CAFTA</a>) – which is designed to open up the region’s markets to the US.</p>
<p>In any case, the much-ballyhooed shift to the left was not really a uniform one in the first place. Peru, for instance, has seen a string of leaders <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c8244050-a96e-11e1-9972-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3tG9q0kjk">shift noticeably to the right</a> after being elected on centre-left platforms.</p>
<p>However, many of the right-of-centre governments actually pursued quite similar social policies to their counterparts on the left. Successive Peruvian governments reduced inequality substantially through increased welfare spending in the form of <a href="http://www.unicef.org/files/Conditional_Cash_Transfers_In_Peru_-_Tackling_The_Multi-Dimensionality_Of_Poverty_And_Vulnerability.pdf">conditional cash transfers</a>, payments to poor families in return for vaccinating children or sending them to school. This was also a banner policy of centre-right National Action Party (PAN) governments <a href="http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00819C/WEB/PDF/CASE_-62.PDF">in Mexico</a> from 2000-2012.</p>
<p>All of this has taken place against a backdrop of a remarkably long period of stable democratic government. Yes, concerns have been raised about the transparency and human rights records of some governments (Venezuela’s especially). Nonetheless, the international condemnation that followed the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/29/world/americas/29honduras.html">coup that removed Honduran President Manuel Zelaya</a> in 2009 was a reminder that violent interruptions to democratic rule are now exceptional. This is in sharp contrast to the 1970s, when most of the region was ruled by sometimes brutal unelected and military governments and polarisation between left and right was particularly marked.</p>
<h2>How times change</h2>
<p>So why is this happening, and why now? Certainly, economic management in most of Latin America during the global financial crisis was <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13259.pdf">strikingly prudent and competent</a>, largely because of painful memories of financial crises in the relatively recent past.</p>
<p>Similarly, past crises, mismanagement and high profile corruption mean that most of Latin America holds its politicians <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/16/the-rise-of-outsider-politicians-in-latin-america-and-europe/">in exceptionally low regard</a>. While some charismatic presidents may have periods of very high popularity, generally this does not extend to their ministers or to elected representatives in other branches of government.</p>
<p>Latin American citizens have a deep reserve of painful memories. Plenty of voters and politicians alike remember the repression and in many countries the downright incompetence that accompanied previous periods of intransigent undemocratic rule, and they have no wish to go back.</p>
<p>The mismatch between fiery rhetoric and pragmatic policy can no longer be ignored, while diehard holdouts can no longer sustain their projects. For all that it has been celebrated by some 21st century leftists as an anti-capitalist or socialist laboratory, Latin America may turn out to have been a region of pragmatic centrists all along.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51528/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Neil Pyper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Latin America suddenly seems to be lurching to the right – but was it ever that far left in the first place?Neil Pyper, Senior Lecturer, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/380622015-02-27T06:30:21Z2015-02-27T06:30:21ZEvo Morales champions indigenous rights abroad, but in Bolivia it’s a different story<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/73064/original/image-20150225-1780-9dr16m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Affection for Bolivia's president depends very much on who you are</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/alainbachellier/146124155/in/photolist-dUWi1-dUWhZ-naZPDu-dUVBW-dUVBZ-nbggZf-igrLbe-igtWhG-5uuExK-5uz3GG-dUUpr-dUVC2-qU8J3V-dUTjp-dUVBX-7Vw5g5-5unRjV-5umYot-dUUpq-dUTjj-dbydRQ-dUTjh-pQrJnQ-foCTEj-7EPpUM-qTXvri-qU3eCf-qByapW-DFWZb-cbeZDE-cbeX6N-cbeVjE-dUUpt-dUUpw-dPzgaS-3cSasw-dUTjk-6qcpst-6Z3JM5-dbybSH-dAdRTD-3cMJNX-3cSavY-3cS9hS-3cSbxq-3cS95j-fXjfW9-fJLqLd-7Qj3QU-fJLCe7">Alain Bachellier</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Now that the dust has settled on Evo Morales’ election to a third term as president of Bolivia, it is time to wonder what he is going to do with it. He certainly couldn’t ask for more power. Last October’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/13/bolivia-evo-morales--president-third-term">landslide election</a> victory for his MAS (Movement to Socialism) party means that he once again has enough votes in congress to override the opposition parties. </p>
<p>At <a href="http://upsidedownworld.org/main/bolivia-archives-31/5199-the-power-of-the-spectacle-evo-morales-inauguration-in-tiwanaku-bolivia">last month’s inauguration</a>, which included a spectacle of indigenous power at the ancient archaeological site of <a href="http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/567">Tiwanaku</a>, Morales used his speech to emphasise indigenous resistance, anti-capitalism and the environment. </p>
<p>Coming from an indigenous background himself, he rejected colonial notions that insist that, “to modernise and civilise us, indigenous peoples had to disappear from the Earth”. He added: “We must defend life, save planet earth and finish off capitalism and imperialism.” </p>
<h2>The domestic contrast</h2>
<p>Those were words primarily for an international audience, however. At home, Morales’ popularity is based less on things like indigenous resistance or environmentalism than on his commitment to social welfare and infrastructure spending. </p>
<p>The benefits of these policies, financed by <a href="http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=bl">hydrocarbon revenues</a>, primarily from natural gas, have been distributed throughout broad sectors of the population. Morales’ economic stewardship of Bolivia has also earned him <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/14/evo-morales-reelected-socialism-doesnt-damage-economies-bolivia">praise from</a> the likes of the IMF and the World Bank. </p>
<p>Yet this has come at <a href="http://ftierra.org/index.php/opinion-y-analisis/465-los-pueblos-indigenas-fueron-excluidos-del-proceso-de-cambio">significant cost</a> to Bolivia’s indigenous peoples, particularly in the Amazonian lowlands in the north and east of the country. The government has repeatedly stalled on land-titling for indigenous territories; created bureaucratic obstacles to the implementation of promised indigenous self-determination; and continues to pursue environmentally destructive projects on indigenous lands. In the most recent example, the Bolivian government is <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/andes-to-the-amazon/2015/feb/23/bolivia-frack-mother-earth">keeping its options open regarding fracking</a> of shale gas and oil. </p>
<h2>Moxos rising</h2>
<p>I am currently undertaking fieldwork in the northern town of San Ignacio de Moxos, which has a population of around 15,000 and is one of the principal battlegrounds for indigenous rights in the lowlands. For most of Bolivian history, municipal politics in San Ignacio have been dominated by a handful of families. Though the population is overwhelmingly indigenous, with a majority of people identifying as Moxeños, a number of white families own the vast majority of private land. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/73221/original/image-20150226-1795-snqtg8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/73221/original/image-20150226-1795-snqtg8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/73221/original/image-20150226-1795-snqtg8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/73221/original/image-20150226-1795-snqtg8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/73221/original/image-20150226-1795-snqtg8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/73221/original/image-20150226-1795-snqtg8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/73221/original/image-20150226-1795-snqtg8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/73221/original/image-20150226-1795-snqtg8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Google Maps</span></span>
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<p>Those in inherited positions of power are known as “patrón”, or “master”. Cowhands are referred to as “mozos”, roughly translated as “boys”, and they spend months at a time living on their patrones’ ranches. This mutual dependence results in a multi-generational, racially marked system of labour exploitation in which entire families of indigenous peasants are tied to particular patrones. </p>
<p>Over the past three decades, Moxeños have made concerted efforts to overturn this system through political mobilisation. In the 1980s they were among the first indigenous groups to form organisations to represent their interests, playing a key role in bringing indigenous rights to a national stage. Their efforts were fundamental to the rise of Morales and his MAS party. </p>
<h2>The parting of the ways</h2>
<p>Within the past ten years, that mobilisation has gained momentum in San Ignacio itself. Indigenous leaders allied with MAS have achieved unprecedented political representation, winning the mayor’s office twice, as well as several departmental and national legislative offices. </p>
<p>In the current municipal elections, though, the alliance between MAS and the organisations representing Moxeños seems to have encountered difficulties. I witnessed meetings in which these indigenous organisations negotiated a consensus for candidates for MAS with the party’s national representatives. </p>
<p>These were then rejected days later in favour of members of the cattle-ranching elites, who have long dominated local politics through other parties. In other municipalities, similar top-down approaches to naming candidates have alienated local activists. </p>
<p>The direct cause of this estrangement between MAS and the indigenous organisations of Moxos was a <a href="http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/12/13/tensions-between-bolivian-government-and-indigenous-groups-deepen-67414">conflict over</a> the planned construction of a major road through the Isiboró-Securé Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS). </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/73068/original/image-20150225-1758-199od4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/73068/original/image-20150225-1758-199od4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/73068/original/image-20150225-1758-199od4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/73068/original/image-20150225-1758-199od4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/73068/original/image-20150225-1758-199od4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/73068/original/image-20150225-1758-199od4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/73068/original/image-20150225-1758-199od4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/73068/original/image-20150225-1758-199od4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">TIPNIS demonstrators in La Paz in 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/mywayaround/6262906010/in/photolist-ca876C-cazkwQ-axr2L7-axqJMQ-aJrr3T-caz9Uu-cazi4G-cazgoh-caz6J5-ca85xW-cazdfA-asgyay-ca7Thh-caz2pJ-cayPh9-cayV7G-ca7VpA-caz4du-ca83Qs-cayYh5-caySjh-ca7XNs-ca81DE-ae8E6V-aebtGq-apQB49-apMW8k-axCdxe-apN5WX-aqCfEH-axCjYr-apN8LF-axoc3P-aRH2Xx-axorrv-axr85y-axr29L-axogXB-axr4cW-axoj3D-axodmz-axqJ7f-axoqyX-axoeuV-axo5UP-axopdB-axqVBb-axob7V-axqVTm-axojXF">Szymon Kochański</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<h2>The 2025 Patriotic Agenda</h2>
<p>The TIPNIS conflict was widely reported in the international press and sparked a public rupture when Bolivian police <a href="https://nacla.org/blog/2011/9/28/police-attack-tipnis-marchers-roils-bolivia">violently suppressed</a> indigenous marchers. But anti-indigenous tendencies in Morales’ government began much earlier than that. </p>
<p>In 2007 and 2008 I carried out research with another anthropologist in the Amazonian foothills in the north of La Paz department in western Bolivia. This region is home to the Mosetén indigenous people and their ancestral lands, as well as large numbers of Aymara and Quechua migrants from the highlands. In its population and history it is similar to the Chapare region, where Morales moved as a young adult and rose through the ranks of the of colonist unions. </p>
<p>In La Paz department, colonists and indigenous people have competed for access to land and natural resources for decades. Moseténes argue that their future depends on continued access to their ancestral land. Colonists argue that their future depends on their ability to extract wealth from the land and invest it in other productive activities. </p>
<p>Some observers linked the Moseténes’ lower level of social development with their continued dependence on forest resources and unwillingness to engage in market investments. Many environmentalists and indigenous activists see such attitudes as crucial to efforts to preserve large tracts of forested land. Others see them as an obstacle to development and national progress. </p>
<p>The government’s ambitious agricultural plans indicate that it shares the latter view. In 2013 Morales presented the “2025 Patriotic Agenda”, a blueprint for development of the country tied to its 200th anniversary. The plan <a href="http://www.elmundo.com.bo/elmundo/noticia.php?id=4426">calls for</a> nearly quadrupling the area of agricultural production in the country over the next ten years, from 3.5m to 13m hectares. </p>
<p>Such massive expansion will require a mechanised and industrial approach to agricultural production, involving the agro-industrial elites of Santa Cruz department in the east, home to Bolivia’s biggest city. Several years ago the country’s vice-president, Alvaro Garcia Linera, <a href="http://ibce.org.bo/images/publicaciones/ce_214_encuentro_agroindustrial_productivo.pdf">publicly promised that</a> the state would invest $6bn per year in agricultural production.</p>
<h2>Morales’ back is turned</h2>
<p>The conclusion? While MAS’s rise to power depended on the participation and support of indigenous organisations in the lowlands, it has since shifted allegiances. Now it measures its success in terms of national production. </p>
<p>Morales’ natural allies in this effort are the “productive sectors”, including traditional land-owning and cattle-ranching elites. Indigenous people who don’t live up to this standard are unlikely to see the same favoured treatment. </p>
<p>The irony is this. While Morales proclaims himself a champion of indigenous resistance on an international stage, at home his government is avidly applying the very measures of progress and advancement that have been used against indigenous people throughout the history of colonial encounters.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/38062/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chuck has a fieldwork grant from the Santander Foundation</span></em></p>The president of Bolivia styles himself as a champion of his indigenous peoples. In reality, he has turned his back on them and aligned himself with the colonial elites.Chuck Sturtevant, Research postgraduate, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/327192014-10-09T14:14:32Z2014-10-09T14:14:32ZSocial welfare and energy policy drive Evo Morales to brink of historic third term in Bolivia<p>Evo Morales appears poised to win a third term as president of Bolivia in an election on October 12 at the helm of his “Movement Towards Socialism” (MAS) party. Yet he remains a controversial figure both inside and outside the country. </p>
<p>His <a href="http://www.informationliberation.com/test.php?id=10216">close relationship</a> with Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro set him up for criticism as a radical leftist right from the beginning of his presidency in 2006. His anti-imperialist rhetoric might have been popular at home, but it has been hard for the US to swallow. On the other hand he has received significant criticism in Bolivia for perceptions that he is <a href="http://blog.panampost.com/roberto-ortiz/2014/09/25/bolivias-inflated-electoral-participation-is-a-fraud/">unfairly manipulating</a> electoral courts. Yet he remains broadly popular in many sectors of the population. Even the IMF <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2014/pr1445.htm">has acknowledged</a> that he has managed the economy prudently and effectively, spurring growth and managing inflation. </p>
<h2>The court of public opinion</h2>
<p>At the moment I am carrying out ethnographic field work in <a href="http://www.boliviabella.com/beni.html">Beni department</a>, the province in the eastern lowlands that is often held up as a centre of resistance. Some indigenous groups feel that Morales has failed to follow through on his promises to guarantee them greater autonomy in their territories. </p>
<p>The 2010 protests over the construction of a road through the indigenous territory in the TIPNIS national park sparked a series of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17442222.2013.808495#.VC2LeVcpp0s">marches and police repression</a> that presented a serious challenge for Morales’ government, as it pitched indigenous opponents into an awkward alliance with landed elites, whose opposition to Morales is often phrased in overtly racist terms. They <a href="http://www.fidh.org/en/americas/bolivia/14221-bolivia-tipnis-construction-project-postponed-until-2015">have succeeded</a> in having the road postponed, but only until next year.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/61261/original/j3sgqykr-1412849901.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/61261/original/j3sgqykr-1412849901.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/61261/original/j3sgqykr-1412849901.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=622&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61261/original/j3sgqykr-1412849901.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=622&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61261/original/j3sgqykr-1412849901.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=622&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61261/original/j3sgqykr-1412849901.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=782&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61261/original/j3sgqykr-1412849901.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=782&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61261/original/j3sgqykr-1412849901.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=782&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4d/Bolivia_rel93.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
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<p>On the other hand, many of the people I have been working with plan to vote for Morales. The government’s vast spending on infrastructure projects, flood relief and social welfare programmes in the region appears to be paying off in terms of gaining support for the MAS. </p>
<p>Such banal political manoeuvrings make for boring news, but they do a much better job of accounting for Morales’ popularity than the more fantastic theories that <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/violeta-ayala/is-bolivia-the-new-afghan_b_4214292.html">some in the US</a> have floated. Some US reports have noted as many as 1,000 practising Muslims in Bolivia (probably an over-estimate) and <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/06/16/bolivia-becoming-hotbed-islamic-extremism-report-concludes/">conclude that</a> the country is “becoming a hotbed of Islamic extremism”. </p>
<p>It is easy to dismiss this rhetoric as hyperbolic nonsense or <a href="http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/2073/1/#_edn3">old-fashioned racism</a>, but pressing the idea that Bolivia is incapable of governing itself has more traction that you might think. When a colleague at a US military university found out I worked in Bolivia, his first reaction was to exclaim that it is in terrible shape. In Latin America – with its long history of US complicity in campaigns to overthrow governments from Guatemala and Chile to Venezuela – such a remark from a US official would hardly pass as idle chatter. One of the most effective tools in these campaigns has been influencing the court of international public opinion, which is sometimes used to legitimise aggressive interventions. </p>
<p>There have not yet been any coup attempts in Bolivia, but the persistent image of Evo Morales as a radical indigenous leftist has serious implications nonetheless. How many heads of sovereign states have been stopped and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-23158242">had their presidential jet searched</a> without international incident? </p>
<h2>Energy the bottom line</h2>
<p>I suspect that energy goes to the heart of the US’s concerns over Bolivia. Throughout the campaign, Morales <a href="http://www.cambio.bo/?q=tarija-tendr%C3%A1-gas-garantizado-por-dos-d%C3%A9cadas-gracias-al-gasoducto">has been</a> inaugurating natural gas facilities and <a href="http://www.cambio.bo/?q=ende-analiza-interconexi%C3%B3n-el%C3%A9ctrica-con-brasil-argentina-chile-y-per%C3%BA">championing</a> Bolivia’s plans to export electric energy to its neighbours. He has campaigned on the message that “whoever has control over energy has political power”. </p>
<p>Indeed, energy politics have always been central to Morales’ plans for the country. He was elected after protests over his <a href="http://darkmatterpolitics.typepad.com/dark_matter_politics/2006/05/evo_morales_bol.html">predecessors’ plans</a> to export the country’s vast natural gas reserves via Chile in a deal that was seen as far more favourable to Western petroleum companies than to the Bolivian people. He acted quickly to bring these resources under stricter national control, generating significantly higher revenues. </p>
<h2>Gasolinazo</h2>
<p>The most significant threat to Morales’ presidency was also related to energy. This was in the wake of the “gasolinazo”, the <a href="http://nacla.org/news/gasolinazo-challenges-bolivia%E2%80%99s-process-change">government’s decision</a> on December 26, 2010 to cancel fuel subsidies, which massively increased the cost of fuel. This was seen as the very kind of neo-liberal reform that Morales had generally opposed. Hundreds of thousands across the country took to the streets and blockaded roads, demanding his resignation. </p>
<p>By New Year’s Day, Morales had reversed course. Soon afterwards he plastered the capital, La Paz, with billboards with his photo, and a caption that read “mandar obedeciendo” (“leading by following”). This representation is surprisingly accurate and reflects a major reason for his popularity. </p>
<p>Morales is far from perfect. He has failed to deliver on many of his promises to indigenous peoples. He plays political hardball in ways that push the boundaries of decency, not least in his <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22605030">controversial decision</a> last year to change the constitution to allow himself a third term.</p>
<p>But he also promotes the interests of wide sectors of the population – at least as they see them – whether through infrastructure construction or natural resource policies that support a centralised welfare state. When the likes of Norway, or for that matter nearly half of the Scottish population, vote to use energy revenues to fund social welfare states, we recognise it as the rational decision of a competent political body. If and when Bolivia does the same, why should anyone judge it differently?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32719/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chuck has a fieldwork grant from the Santander Foundation</span></em></p>Evo Morales appears poised to win a third term as president of Bolivia in an election on October 12 at the helm of his “Movement Towards Socialism” (MAS) party. Yet he remains a controversial figure both…Chuck Sturtevant, Research postgraduate, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/270852014-06-03T15:06:01Z2014-06-03T15:06:01ZIndigenous Bolivians are seething over mining reforms<p>The government of president Evo Morales has approved a new mining law for Bolivia. It received virtually no international news coverage, yet is proving highly divisive within the country. </p>
<p>A previous version of this law was passed by Bolivia’s lower house of parliament on March 29 but had to be revised by the upper house amid violent conflicts that also brought down the mining minister. </p>
<p>Miners from cooperatives who led the protests and represent most of those who work in the sector had caused 16 separate conflicts between January 2013 and March 2014. Then on March 31 they mobilised, blockading the main roads across the country, leading to 30 arrests; 43 policemen taken as hostages; 85 miners and 20 policemen injured; and two miners dead. </p>
<p>A truce has been declared, but now various other groups are protesting the proposals, notably those representing indigenous Bolivian interests. The law may have passed, but it is far from clear whether it will stay in force. </p>
<h2>From silver to tin</h2>
<p>Mining is deeply embedded in Bolivia’s national identity. During colonial times, so much silver was transported from mines in the <a href="http://www.boliviabella.com/potosi.html">southern region of Potosí</a> to Europe that people used to say a bridge of pure silver could be built from the top of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/10/bolivia-cerro-rico-mountain-sink-city-potosi">Cerro Rico mountain</a> to the royal palace’s door in Spain. It came at an exorbitant price. An estimated <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/linda-xiao/the-mines-of-potosi-boliv_b_1349295.html">eight million slaves</a> died in Potosí alone.</p>
<p>By the time mining was nationalised after the <a href="http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/bolivia52.htm">1952 national revolution</a>, tin had long since supplanted silver as the main mineral product. The industry was privatised again <a href="http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Bolivia.pdf">in the 1980s</a> during the era of neoliberal shock therapy, starting with the notorious <a href="http://www.internationalist.org/jeffreysachsows1110.html">Decree 21060</a> of 1985. </p>
<p>By 1991 <a href="http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=10270">at least 45,000</a> state mining jobs had gone. More reforms in the 1990s then further reduced the state’s role in the sector. This culminated in the <a href="http://ain-bolivia.org/2007/06/part-ii-an-emerging-mining-policy-for-bolivia/">1997 mining code</a>, which is what the current reforms are replacing. </p>
<h2>The future is mine</h2>
<p>Today Bolivia is part of the Latin American <a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-pink-tide-in-latin-america-an-alliance-between-local-capital-and-socialism/5333782">“pink tide”</a>. The left-leaning government of <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1003403/Evo-Morales">Evo Morales</a> and his Movement to Socialism (MAS) party was elected in 2005. </p>
<p>His government has acted on social-movement demands to renationalise strategic resources, particularly hydrocarbons. Mining has generally been left in private hands though, <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/feff7e00-ded6-11da-acee-0000779e2340.html">contrary to promises</a> early in his tenure. </p>
<p>Mining is the country’s second-most important natural resource sector after hydrocarbons in terms of production volumes and income. In 2012 it contributed approximately 6.8% of Bolivia’s GDP and 37.3% of exports, according to the National Institute of Statistics. </p>
<p>But the state is not a great beneficiary. Because mining has not been renationalised and taxes and royalties have not been significantly increased, there have not been the same rises in state rent collections as in hydrocarbons. Hence it only contributes 7% of state revenues while oil and gas contributes 36%. </p>
<p>The extra revenue from renationalising mining could finance a political set-up more attuned to the needs of the country’s different ethnic groups. With more than 60% of Bolivians <a href="http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/449">identifying</a> as indigenous-peasant, and Morales the first president from that background, their representative groups want to redesign state institutions according to their forms of organisation. This would be in line with the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/26/world/americas/26bolivia.html?_r=0">aims of the new Bolivian constitution that was approved in 2009</a>. </p>
<p>During the president’s two administrations, mining cooperatives expanded, having previously mushroomed in the neoliberal 1980s. These are not social enterprises that redistribute profits among their members, but mainly small businesses with high levels of labour exploitation and no sense of social or environmental responsibility. </p>
<p>According to Bolivian government data, by 2011 these businesses employed more than 60,000 people and produced 31% of the country’s mineral output (though less than 9% of the sector’s tax revenues). </p>
<p>In comparison, state mining company COMIBOL employed less than 6,000 and accounted for 9% of production. Larger-scale private mining employed fewer than 5000 people but produced 60% of the minerals and contributed nearly 90% of tax revenues. </p>
<p>The cooperative miners’s protests came despite their being heavily involved in negotiating the new law – unlike indigenous organisations, which were excluded. These “cooperativistas” are represented in Morales’s executive and legislative, but have been ambivalent about their commitment to strengthening and transforming the state. </p>
<p>Hence they demanded to continue to be allowed to sign contracts directly with private companies. The fact that parliament rejected this request was behind the March clashes, and it <a href="http://www.mining.com/bolivias-new-mining-law-to-move-forward-after-deal-with-cooperatives-56402/">took a partial U-turn</a> by lawmakers to bring them to heel. To cement this new entente cordiale, the governemnt organised a public event near the capital of La Paz last week where it publicly donated 100 dumper trucks worth $8m (£5m) to the cooperative miners’ federation. </p>
<h2>The neoliberal hangover</h2>
<p>Overall the new proposals are a mixed bag that still include some worrisome continuities from the neoliberal regime. In keeping with the principles of the 2009 constitution, they do provide for the state to have more presence in mining. They also acknowledge the need to reduce the current focus on exports in favour of using and processing more minerals in the country. </p>
<p>But they also enhance opportunities for foreign investors, guaranteeing them legal security and a competitive tax regime. This limits the state’s ability to nationalise resources and collect revenues.</p>
<p>The new proposals clearly favour mining over indigenous and peasant demands, including rights to non-contaminated territories. They also limit indigenous involvement in decision-making around new mining projects. They have not been given a veto and their consultation rights extend only to actual mining, not exploration work. </p>
<p>Some changes are also merely nominal. While mineral resources are declared to be the property of the Bolivian people, once extracted they become the property of the mining companies. </p>
<p>Hence the indigenous protests. Also taking to the streets have been irrigators’ associations concerned with access to water and women’s collectives demanding attention to gender issues. </p>
<p>On May 8 and 9, a national social summit took place in La Paz. The country’s main indigenous organisations and tens of other groups fully rejected the proposals and demanded to start the process anew with their full participation. </p>
<p>Nevertheless Morales allowed the law through, showing the difficulty in trying to incorporate principles of indigenous self-determination and resource democracy in the context of an <a href="http://bakerinstitute.org/files/6119/">intense mining boom</a> in the region. </p>
<p>Now he faces the prospect that this indigenous-led coalition will lodge an appeal of unconstitutionality. This could force a review by the country’s constitutional tribunal that could lead to the law being blocked. With demonstrations also on the cards, it is hard to say how the situation will end.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Isabella Radhuber has received funding from the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in the Netherlands for a research project
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Diego Andreucci receives funding from the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) of the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme; under REA agreement Nº 289374</span></em></p>The government of president Evo Morales has approved a new mining law for Bolivia. It received virtually no international news coverage, yet is proving highly divisive within the country. A previous version…Isabella Radhuber, Lecturer and Research Group "International Political Ecology", Universität WienDiego Andreucci, PhD Student of the Institute for Environmental Science and Technology, Universitat Autònoma de BarcelonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.