tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/goodluck-jonathan-10478/articlesGoodluck Jonathan – The Conversation2020-11-23T15:23:00Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1462442020-11-23T15:23:00Z2020-11-23T15:23:00ZThe perils of mixing music and politics in Nigeria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/370510/original/file-20201120-13-1l32dnj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigerian pop star D'banj performing on stage in London. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Robin Little/Redferns/Getty</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Musicians play a prominent role in Nigeria’s dynamic political landscape, especially since the country became a democracy. Politics and music have always enjoyed a symbiotic relationship, even during austere military regimes. For example, in 1995, the late dictator, General Sani Abacha (1993-1998) commissioned highlife maestro, King Oliver de Coque to record an album titled <a href="https://rateyourmusic.com/release/album/oliver_de_coque/democracy/"><em>Democracy</em></a>. The project was designed to launder his image, and position him as an aspiring democratic president.</p>
<p>Popular musicians endorsing politicians and their parties are common in Nigeria during elections. One particular episode stands for its post-electoral significance. Local pop star <a href="https://encomium.ng/untold-story-of-dbanjs-interview-with-president-jonathan/">D'banj</a> got into bed with a former president, Goodluck Jonathan, who ruled Nigeria from 2010 to 2015. Jonathan took power in 2010 after the death of the incumbent, and went on to win a presidential election held in 2011.</p>
<p>During his campaign, Jonathan ducked multiple debates, choosing instead to organise a special live interview. D'banj was contracted as the celebrity interviewer to help cast Jonathan in good light. The singer only asked three prearranged questions, curated to improve the president’s chances at the polls.</p>
<p>That performance negatively affected D'banj’s reputation. The interview offended Nigerians and, before long, calls to boycott D'banj’s music gathered steam. The controversy affected D’banj, who needed an inventive damage control strategy to bring the public around.</p>
<p>He succeeded. All was forgiven a year later, when D’banj released the smash hit <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CQP-etYU1ps"><em>Oliver Twist</em></a>. The party record completely turned around the singer’s fortunes and pulled him back into public favour. Barely six months after the elections which Jonathan won, all was well with D'banj’s world.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14725843.2020.1796590">my paper</a>, I unpack these events. I highlight the nexus between music and politics in Nigeria, exploring how corruptible art is, and the fickle nature of public opinion.</p>
<h2>From D’banj to Oliver Twist</h2>
<p>D’banj dropped his debut album <em>No Long Thing</em> in 2005. Two years later, he won Best African Act at the MTV Europe Music Awards and also became MTV Africa’s Artiste of the Year in 2008 and 2009. Now with five recorded pop albums, 2010 marked his entrance into and his first involvement in the political space.</p>
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<span class="caption">Nigeria’s ex-President Goodluck Jonathan casts his ballot in a local election.</span>
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<p>Soaring high with a growing loyal fanbase across Africa, he was prime choice for politicians looking to sway public opinion. D'banj was signed on to President Jonathan’s reelection efforts, starred in a promo jingle, and conducted the interview.</p>
<p>During the fallout from his political involvement, he recorded the single <em>Oliver Twist</em>, to manage the damage.</p>
<p>In <em>Oliver Twist</em>, D’banj deploys the cultural symbolism of namedropping to connect with fans. Each of the twelve names mentioned in the song lyrics belong to black luminaries. Beyoncé, Nicki Minaj and Rihanna are American cultural icons, while Omotola Jalade-Ekeinde, Genevieve Nnaji and Nadia Buari are African actresses. Others include Don Jazzy, 2face Idibia, Fally Ipupa, Trey Songz and JAY-Z.</p>
<p>D'banj also launched an <em>Oliver Twist</em> dance video competition on his website to gauge the public mood towards him. The competition was an overwhelming success and the song crossed over into the United Kingdom and became a global hit.</p>
<h2>A people obsessed with the foreign</h2>
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<p>Among other things, the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/livestreaming-lekki-digital-evidence-of-endsars-shooting-in-nigeria-makes-impunity-much-harder-148696">#EndSARS</a> protests has shown that Nigerian leaders and celebrities are obsessed with international media. After all, the average Nigerian loves to seek validation from the ‘international community’. </p>
<p>The reception of <em>Oliver Twist</em> in 2011 and 2012 also drew from this foreign fascination. The Nigerian audiences’ obsession with the dance competition getting global recognition, made them forget all that had transpired in the buildup to the elections. To the public, all that mattered was uploading dance videos for international audiences. </p>
<p>In the official music video, D'banj featured a cast of American and British acts, including Kanye West and Bricka Bricka. On the surface, it appeared the singer had scored a masterstroke in public manipulation. But all he had done was take advantage of Nigeria’s fascination with Western validation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146244/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Garhe Osiebe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When pop star D'banj signed up to help get Goodluck Jonathan elected president, fans turned on him. But a hit song turned things around.Garhe Osiebe, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1176932019-06-03T13:15:10Z2019-06-03T13:15:10ZGhana’s president has donned the mantle of football mediator – will it work?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277363/original/file-20190531-69091-19fl893.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ghana's Asamoah Gyan at the World Cup 2014 in Brazil.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Marius Becker/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many African politicians have found it hard to resist meddling in their countries’ football. The latest example is Ghana’s President Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, just weeks ahead of the start of the 32nd <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/africannationscup">Africa Cup of Nations</a> (Afcon) being hosted by Egypt. He recently waded into the politics of the national <a href="https://www.sport24.co.za/Soccer/AFCON/ghana-name-ayew-new-afcon-captain-20190524">team captaincy</a> to mediate a conflict that had exploded into the Ghanaian public discussion.</p>
<p>To be sure, Akuffo-Addo’s <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/SportsArchive/Bury-your-egos-and-play-for-each-other-Nana-Addo-tells-Black-Stars-players-750988">intervention</a> is not unique in African football. Six years ago, Nigeria’s then President Goodluck Jonathan <a href="https://www.codewit.com/nigeria-news/5403-nigeria-president-jonathan-s-intervention-forced-keshi-to-withdraws-his-resignation">stepped in</a> to persuade coach Stephen Keshi not to quit shortly after winning Afcon. Keshi’s decision was prompted by the Nigerian Football Federation’s intense scheming to replace him. In the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/26/sport/football/drogba-toure-ivory-coast-football/index.html">Ivory Coast</a>, political leaders have used the captainships of Yaya Touré (from the north of the country) and Didier Drogba (from the south) to seek ethnic political appeasements.</p>
<p>In Ghana, the trouble began when the country’s national team captain, 33-year-old Asamoah Gyan, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sport/soccer/africa/asamoah-gyan-retires-in-protest-of-ghana-coachs-afcon-plan-23646784">released a statement</a> announcing his retirement from international football when coach Kwasi Appiah informed him that he (Gyan) was to be replaced as the team captain. Gyan was clearly miffed and it <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/SportsArchive/Gyan-s-tirade-Akufo-Addo-s-intervention-criticised-748274">showed</a> in his <a href="https://www.pulse.com.gh/sports/football/here-is-why-asamoah-gyan-resigned-from-black-stars/b770skn">letter</a> where he pointed to his record and his financial assistance to the team, as well as his service to his country.</p>
<p>Importantly, it was clear that he was not happy that his replacement was his rival, <a href="https://www.pulse.com.gh/sports/football/afcon-2019-profile-of-black-stars-captain-andre-ayew/88drmhs">Andre Ayew</a>. As Ghanaians <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/SportsArchive/Ghanaians-divided-over-Asamoah-Gyan-s-retirement-from-Black-Stars-748097">weighed in</a> on the conflict, the country’s president invited the coach for a meeting and subsequently had a telephone chat with Gyan. </p>
<p>Akufo-Addo was playing the role of “Father of the Nation”. He was the mediator. The result was that Gyan, who has captained the Black Stars for a record seven years, was <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/SportsArchive/Asamoah-Gyan-elevated-to-General-Captain-748970">given</a> the position of “General Captain”.</p>
<p>Akufo-Addo’s intervention marks a continuing move by African political leaders to use football to advance or affirm political situations. But there are pitfalls. A quick intervention – where the position of presidency offers tremendous power – may appear to solve the conflict. In reality, the conflict may fester underneath the surface.</p>
<h2>Power vested in the president</h2>
<p>Clearly, this is not the usual mediator that one encounters in every day conflicts. A mediator is usually an acceptable third party who intervenes but has limited or no authoritative decision making power over the disputants. While mediators may be people of authority, their authority is often limited to the respect that they accumulate in public roles. </p>
<p>That, certainly, is not the case with Akufo-Addo’s intervention. The president has tremendous powers and the disputants are keenly aware of this. The consequence of going against the president’s wishes can be significant and reverberate over a long period of time. The president can deny the disputants benefits that ordinarily accrue to the country’s citizens.</p>
<p>This, perhaps, explains why this type of mediation ends very quickly with disputants claiming the conflict has been settled. In reality, they may have acquiesced simply because the consequences for not doing so are much higher. Moreover, the excuse for giving in can always be the ready use of a face saver: </p>
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<p>The President appealed to me, who am I to refuse?</p>
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<p>For the mediator, the benefit of intervention is remarkably high. He is the man who has supposedly united the national team. If Ghana wins the Afcon in Cairo in July, much of the glory will surely be attributed to him. His political calculation here is deft and comes with few risks, if any.</p>
<p>But, ultimately, has the conflict disappeared? The answer is: unlikely. Successful mediation requires that disputants feel their deep interests have been met. It is obvious from Gyan’s initial statement of retirement that his interest is to remain captain of the team and not step in as “general captain”, the role that was offered by coach Appiah. </p>
<h2>Unresolved</h2>
<p>“General captain” is only a title; it is without designated or significant duties. It often means the holder plays a reduced role that may even mean not being included in the starting line-up. </p>
<p>Yet, after the President’s intervention, Gyan has seemingly accepted this reduced role and the fact that his rival will now be the team’s captain. He conveniently referred to the president as “The Father of the nation” and then to his commitment to Ghana. Gyan did not refer to his conviction that his personal interests have been served. While this is public, it remains to be seen what his every day attitude with the team and the coach will be. </p>
<p>Maybe, just maybe, his real interest is to feel loved. If that’s the case the president has demonstrated just this by personally talking with him and “appealing” to that interest. </p>
<p>On coach Appiah’s part, he obviously wants a team free of conflict – hence his offer of “general captain”, hoping to appease Gyan. The fact that Gyan initially declined the offer but then accepted it after pressure from the president may lead to the attitude of a horse dragged, against his volition, to the water hole.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117693/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chuka Onwumechili does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Akufo-Addo’s intervention marks a continuing move by African political leaders to use football to advance or affirm political situations.Chuka Onwumechili, Professor of Communications, Howard UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1129652019-03-05T14:24:32Z2019-03-05T14:24:32ZWhy Buhari won even though he had little to show for first term<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262129/original/file-20190305-48429-t5lhj0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Muhammadu Buhari (left) and Vice President Yemi Osinbajo during a campaign rally in Akure, Ondo State.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A close race was predicted between Muhammadu Buhari and his main rival Atiku Abubakar. In the end the incumbent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-election-announcement/nigerias-electoral-commission-declares-buhari-winner-of-presidential-election-idUSKCN1QG0C1">won</a> the Nigerian presidential election with almost four million votes. </p>
<p>After the results were declared, <a href="https://twitter.com/atiku/status/1100682572181504000">Atiku cried foul</a>, pointing out numerous flaws and manipulations of the electoral process. He also threatened legal action although it remains to be seen if the Peoples Democratic Party candidate will file suit within 21 days of the vote as required. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, international leaders have already <a href="https://punchng.com/us-france-congratulate-buhari/">congratulated Buhari</a> and his All Progressives’ Congress. This is to be expected. External actors have often tended to prefer stability over denunciation when it comes to incredulous election results. </p>
<p>Hence this still begs the question: did Buhari actually win? Several problems marked the electoral process itself. But, in my view, while the election results were prone to manipulation, the result indicates that Buhari’s party did in fact win. </p>
<p>The question is: how did he do it given his poor track record in his first term? Several factors stand out from the election results: Buhari’s continued popularity in the north, combined with voter apathy in the south. And the fact that Atiku was an uninspiring contestant.</p>
<h2>Buhari’s failures</h2>
<p>Buhari came to power in 2015 after defeating incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan with around 2.5 million votes. His victory at the time can be attributed to his tough stance on corruption, his <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056244.2018.1456415">poverty alleviation promises</a>, and the Jonathan administration’s failure to curb the Boko Haram crisis.</p>
<p>In addition, Jonathan’s decision to run again as a Southern candidate had caused rifts in the Peoples Democratic Party with many, especially northern, political stalwarts defecting to the All Progressives’ Congress during his presidency. Buhari’s candidacy had already been strengthened by his coalition with the south-western Action Congress of Nigeria.</p>
<p>Buhari’s first term in office can be rated rather poorly. </p>
<p>His administration was struck with the double whammy of a severe recession and a drop in revenues from oil due to <a href="https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/pause-thought-pace-growth-has-slowed-drop-oil-prices">falling oil prices</a>. The government’s responses were slow and mostly inadequate. This was partly due to Buhari’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/after-long-absence-due-to-ill-health-nigerias-president-muhammadu-buhari-slams-divisions-terror/a-40175197">long absence from home</a> undergoing treatment for an undisclosed illness.</p>
<p>The Buhari government also didn’t perform very well on the security. While the Boko Haram crisis was pushed back during his first year in office, it resurfaced as the group <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-potentially-more-sinister-threat-in-boko-harams-split">split into several deadly factions</a>. <a href="https://theconversation.com/growing-herdsmen-militancy-is-adding-to-west-africas-security-threats-81966">Farmer-herder conflict</a> in the Middle Belt has also spun out of control. And the roots of new violent crises may have been laid with the brutal repression of the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra movement as well as the arrest of Muslim clerk El-Zakzaky and violence against his followers.</p>
<p>Finally, while Buhari has indeed taken <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-banks/nigeria-central-bank-suspends-nine-banks-from-fx-market-sources-say-idUSKCN10Y282">actions against corruption</a>, the battle against graft has often appeared to be a battle against political enemies. And little has been achieved at the policy level due to severe legislative-executive <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/nigeria-oil/update-1-nigerias-presidency-rebuffs-landmark-oil-reform-bill-in-current-form-idUKL3N1VJ55M">gridlock</a> during his first term. </p>
<h2>So why the win?</h2>
<p>In the end <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47385552">the electoral map of 2019</a> closely resembles <a href="https://www.nigerianmuse.com/20150411041722zg/elections-2015/monday-quarter-backing-preliminary-analysis-of-the-2015-presidential-elections-in-nigeria-just-the-numbers-please/">that of 2015</a> with most northern and south-western states going to the All Progressives’ Congress. In Lagos, the All Progressives’ Congress won a slight majority in the face of economic decline, but campaigned primarily to get voters to go to the polls. This only partly succeeded. </p>
<p>In the north, the All Progressives’ Congress’s vote share generally dropped on a <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/data-nigerian-election-results-analysis/">state-by-state level</a>, but turnout was high enough vis-à-vis the south to win the elections overall. </p>
<p>The Peoples Democratic Party did not substantially increase its leverage in the Middle Belt states, which are most affected by the herdsmen-farmer conflict. Particularly noteworthy is Atiku’s poor performance in the North in general. His home state of Adamawa was only won with a slim majority. </p>
<p>Buhari’s continued popularity in the North can partly be explained by the fact that the region is more insulated from international market dynamics. This means that the effects of the recession were less severe. While poverty remains more entrenched in the region, this was to some extent alleviated by <a href="https://www.efficiencyview.com/fg-farmer-moni-loan-geep-initiative/">the government’s subsidy programmes</a>. These also extended patronage to localities which had before largely been excluded from such networks. </p>
<p>Besides this, and from a more emotional perspective, many of Buhari’s supporters still continue to view him as their political messiah. </p>
<h2>Atiku had his weaknesses</h2>
<p>After its loss to the All Progressives’ Congress in 2015, the Peoples Democratic Party itself remained for a long time mired in internal conflict. In the middle of a <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2016/11/17/pdp-leadership-crisis-makarfi-and-sheriff-renew-hostilities">leadership crisis</a>, the party lost political elites and followers, also due to the sudden cut-off from patronage resources. </p>
<p>The party came together again <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/12/pdp-chairmanship-final-battle/">near the end of 2017</a>, but had to rebuild its grassroots structures in many areas. This could have led to the lack of mobilisation in the south. While the All Progressives’ Congress lost important political figures, the party also convinced some powerful Peoples Democratic Party politicians in the South to <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2018/11/28/pdp-senator-defects-to-apc/">defect</a> in the run-up to the elections. </p>
<p>Another factor was that, while <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00358539608454292">rotational politics</a> necessitated a northern candidate, Atiku’s candidacy may not have resonated particularly strongly in the south.</p>
<p>Besides his regional origin, Atiku as a candidate also had his weaknesses, including a credibility problem due to the riches he collected during his time in office as vice-president and his old age. For many voters in both the north and the south, Atiku represented a return to the past rather than a break from traditional Nigerian politics. </p>
<p>Buhari’s first term record has little to show for it, but it is in the end still possible that he did win the elections, simply because the Peoples Democratic Party could not provide any viable alternative.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112965/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leila Demarest does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the end, Buhari possibly won simply because the Peoples Democratic Party wasn’t offering a viable alternative.Leila Demarest, Assistant Professor of African Politics, Institute of Political Science, Leiden UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1101962019-01-27T09:13:28Z2019-01-27T09:13:28ZBuhari failed to fix Nigeria’s economy. But he may still have the edge<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254934/original/file-20190122-100273-1ao0mbl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A hawker sells clocks on a roadside in Nigeria's oil rich Bayelsa state.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Tife Owolabi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Muhammadu Buhari’s election four years ago as Nigerian president was greeted with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32141703">great enthusiasm, and expectation</a>. US President Barack Obama invited him to the White House less than two months after his inauguration, an honour rarely accorded to newly elected African leaders. Many Nigerians saw Buhari as a messiah rescuing them from years of economic disempowerment, institutionalised corruption and insecurity.</p>
<p>These high hopes were unsurprising. The Nigerian economy, though growing at a robust rate, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/toward-inclusive-growth-in-nigeria/">wasn’t benefiting most Nigerians</a>. Unemployment, especially among young people, was <a href="https://qz.com/africa/999641/the-unemployment-rate-in-nigeria-has-climbed-for-nine-consecutive-quarters/">widespread and growing</a>. The World Bank estimated Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/middle-east-and-africa/nigerias-renewal-delivering-inclusive-growth">poverty rate to be as high as 70%</a>, an embarrassing number given that the country is ranked as the eighth largest oil exporter in the world. </p>
<p>The result of the toxic combination of high joblessness and poverty rates, is a life expectancy of 55 years, one of the <a href="https://www.who.int/countries/nga/en/">lowest in developing countries</a>.</p>
<p>As Buhari prepares to go to the polls, pundits have been analysing his scorecard and asking whether he deserves another four years in office. </p>
<p>What is clear is that, this time around, his re-election campaign has not been greeted with the same level of enthusiasm. Some analysts, including the London-based Economist Intelligence Unit, have gone as far as to <a href="https://www.pulse.ng/news/politics/economist-magazine-says-buhari-will-lose-2019-election/ncm7eg4">predict</a> that he will lose the election. </p>
<p>Why the change of fortunes? The answer seems to lie in the fact that most of the things Nigerians complained about in 2015 are still unresolved. In particular, unemployment, poverty and economic disempowerment remain firmly in place. </p>
<p>Since Buhari came to power, Nigeria’s unemployment rate has <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/unemployment-rate">more than doubled</a> from 10.4% in January 2016 to 23.1% in July 2018. In June last year CNN <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/26/africa/nigeria-overtakes-india-extreme-poverty-intl/index.html">reported</a> that Nigeria had overtaken India as the country with the largest number of people living in extreme poverty. About 87 million Nigerians, or half the population, live on less than $1.90 per day.</p>
<p>The big question is: can Buhari win reelection amid his disappointing economic performance? I believe that he will, in fact, win the election. But this will be for reasons to do with the weakness of other candidates, rather than his own strengths.</p>
<h2>Economic performance</h2>
<p>When he came to power in 2015, Buhari promised to tackle three interrelated problems: corruption, insecurity and the economy. Of the three, Nigerians regarded <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32905067">economic problems as paramount</a>. But the administration appears to have focused on corruption and security issues and paid less attention to the economy. </p>
<p>For example, Buhari failed to prevent an impending <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-37228741">recession</a> that followed the collapse of oil prices in 2015. This was because he didn’t prioritise the economy and took too long to articulate an economic transformation strategy. </p>
<p>Another example of lack of focus on the economy was his meeting with US President Donald Trump in April 2018. Buhari asked for <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/world/trump-gives-buhari-banned-military-aircraft-14724854">fighter jets</a>, not economic support. </p>
<p>Critics also point to the fact that Buhari ceded the management of the economy to his vice president Yemi Osinbajo. Though a brilliant lawyer, Osinbajo had no background or experience in economics. To make matters worse, Osinbajo surrounded himself with incompetent and inexperienced advisers.</p>
<p>Buhari claimed he was unable to jump-start the economy because of falling oil prices and dwindling government revenue. Before he came to power the oil price was <a href="https://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/6188.pdf">as high as $108 per barrel</a>. It <a href="https://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/6188.pdf">plummeted precipitously to $63</a> the month he was sworn in as president. The oil price continued to slide during the early stages of his administration, reaching an all-time low of $35 per barrel in February 2016.</p>
<p>The collapse affected Buhari’s ability to put together a coherent budget. For instance, his 2016 budget had a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-budget-idUSL5N16V360">deficit of over 2.2 trillion Naira</a>. His attempt to borrow $30 billion to finance the deficit was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-budget/update-1-nigerian-senate-rejects-buharis-plan-to-borrow-30-billion-abroad-idUSL8N1D2450">vehemently opposed by the country’s lawmakers</a>. Nor was public opinion favourable about an external loan. This forced the administration to pare down the number of projects it intended to undertake. </p>
<p>Because of the administration’s inability to implement an expansionary fiscal policy, the economy has been grappling with anaemic growth since Buhari’s election. The country went into recession in 2016 followed by a rebound to about 2% in 2018. But the IMF <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2015&ey=2023&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=19&pr1.y=10&c=694&s=NGDP_RPCH&grp=0&a">projects</a> that growth will remain weak at an annual average of about 1.9% from 2019 to 2023.</p>
<h2>Anti-corruption scorecard</h2>
<p>Buhari’s scorecard in fighting corruption has been mixed. On the one hand, he has prosecuted high-profile politicians, civil servants and retired military officers for corruption and secured convictions in a handful of cases. His administration has also recovered billions of Naira in stolen assets from corrupt Nigerians. </p>
<p>Scores of corrupt politicians and government officials, including the Chief Justice of the country’s Supreme Court, are currently undergoing trials for various forms of financial impropriety. </p>
<p>But Buhari’s anti-corruption efforts have been marred by the perception that they have been selective and targeted mostly at members of the main opposition party, the People’s Democratic party. </p>
<p>And his failure to prosecute a prominent state governor who is one of his close political allies, after the governor was shown on video collecting several thousand dollars in bribes, has accentuated the perception that he is only interested in prosecuting his political enemies. </p>
<p>Another political ally, a former Secretary to the Government of the Federation, also got a pass from Buhari after being credibly accused of corrupt practices.</p>
<p>Despite these shortcomings, Buhari’s campaign against corruption is regarded by many Nigerians as the most intense the country has ever seen.</p>
<h2>Hobbesian choice</h2>
<p>Buhari is likely to win not because he has fulfilled the expectations of Nigerians, but because his main opponent, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, is a weak candidate who carries a lot of baggage. </p>
<p>Abubakar is a very prominent and wealthy businessman. But his business credentials and <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/atiku-abubakar-nigerias-perennial-presidential-hopeful-20181008">the source of his wealth are controversial</a>. Many believe he made his money through cronyism and questionable activities rather than through genuine entrepreneurship. </p>
<p>Nigerians will be faced with a Hobbesian choice between two problematic candidates. In that choice, Buhari seems to have an edge over Abubakar.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110196/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Onyeiwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most of the things Nigerians complained about in 2015 are still unresolved – unemployment, poverty and economic disempowerment.Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor and Chair of the Economics Department, Allegheny CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/996912018-07-11T12:23:10Z2018-07-11T12:23:10ZYoung Nigerians have made their mark, but odds are still with the old in 2019<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227126/original/file-20180711-27033-b0q5oh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Despite a new law allowing younger candidates to run, Nigeria isn't ready for this transition.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The presidency of Muhammadu Buhari continues to <a href="http://thenationonlineng.net/fg-delivering-election-promises-lai-mohammed/">lay claim</a> to achievements in the fight against corruption in Nigeria as well as the war against Boko Haram. But its record leaves a lot to be desired.</p>
<p>The state has been unable to tackle the problem of poverty. The US-based research house, the Brookings Institution, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/06/19/the-start-of-a-new-poverty-narrative/">recently reported</a> that Nigeria has overtaken India as the country with the largest number of extreme poor in early 2018. For its part, Transparency International has <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2018/02/21/transparency-international-ranks-nigeria-148th-worlds-least-corrupt-country">reported</a> that Nigeria is sliding backwards when it comes to corruption. </p>
<p>Added to this is the fact that nearly 7.5 million people have lost jobs and the <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/01/7-5m-nigerians-jobless-since-2016-nbs/">unemployment rate is increasing</a>. Young people are alienated while <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/05/16/about-120-people-kidnapped-along-road-in-nigeria-s-kaduna-state//">kidnapping-for-ransom is on the rise</a>. </p>
<p>It’s against this background that Buhari announced that he will be contesting next year’s elections. There were mixed reactions to the news. Some hold the view he is <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/01/obasanjo-rejects-buharis-2019-bid/">too old to grasp how to deal decisively</a> with the challenges of a modern state. His supporters believe there is <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/04/no-alternative-buhari-2019-forum-tells-northern-elders/">no better alternative</a> to Buhari, who will be 76 years by the time he contests a second term in office in 2019. </p>
<p>Nigeria has a population of 180 million, <a href="http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/index.php">60%</a> of whom are between the age of 18 and 35. Yet the state has been unable to translate the energy of its young population into development. </p>
<p>Young Nigerians don’t only suffer marginalisation from a government that is run by a gerontocracy. They are also the victims of bad governance. </p>
<p>This is what lies behind the recent call for younger people to be able to run for office. Yet, despite a new law <a href="http://punchng.com/breaking-buhari-signs-not-too-young-to-run-bill-into-law/">being promulgated</a>, it’s obvious that the gerontocracy in power isn’t ready for a transition. Buhari is playing political games – and for time. </p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>In most Nigerian cultures, starting in the family, roles are assigned based on age. In the political arena, the country has been through periods of being run by young men. </p>
<p>In pre-colonial Nigeria, young people acted as the vanguard by providing security of their societies and serving to check or remove tyrannical rulers. </p>
<p>The post-colonial environment gave rise to young people in military uniform taking over government through a series of coup. These <a href="http://www.tribuneonlineng.com/113367/">post-colonial coup beneficiaries </a>were mostly under 40. They included Aguiyi Ironsi (42), Yakubu Gowon (31) , Murtala Muhammed (37) and Olusegun Obasanjo (38). </p>
<p>Student activists such as the late Segun Okeowo led the National Union of Nigerian Students to fight for welfare of students and protest against draconian policies during the famous <a href="https://guardian.ng/opinion/ali-must-go-and-the-nigerian-left/">“Ali must go protest”</a> staged nationwide against “bad” education policy. This was the peak of active youth involvement in ensuring good governance. The current leadership of the students’ movement have lost the ideology of the early years and have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27756290?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">been co-opted by the ruling class</a> in Nigeria. </p>
<p>The signing into law of the <a href="http://punchng.com/breaking-buhari-signs-not-too-young-to-run-bill-into-law/">not-too-young to run bill</a> has been widely applauded as a step aimed at democratising the political space. But the facts contradict this. </p>
<p>The law reduces the age for contesting for president from 40 to 35; governor from 35 to 30; senator from 35 to 30; House of Representatives membership from 30 to 25 and State House of Assembly membership from 30 to 25. </p>
<p>But Buhari has asked Nigeria’s young people <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/05/2019-drop-presidential-ambition-now-buhari-begs-youths/">to wait</a> until 2023 before contesting any elections. This is clearly a cynical political strategy designed to capture the vote of young people but leaving the status quo intact.</p>
<h2>Young candidates</h2>
<p>The National Youth Policy of Nigeria and the African Youth Charter <a href="https://www.africa-youth.org/resources/#1459861241522-7a839c69-3f45">pegs the age </a> of youth between 18-35 years of age.</p>
<p>But there’s no consensus on this in practice. Most political parties are much more interested in experienced, versatile and loyal mobilisers. They are less interested in age than they are in candidates who have passion, energy and show enough enthusiasm and have political capital. </p>
<p>In pre-2015 presidential campaign, Nigerians were asked <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/03/dame-jonathan-in-onitsha-describes-apc-as-expired-drug/">to choose between </a> Goodluck Jonathan, who was 58 at the time, and Buhari, who was 73. Adverts were placed in newspapers warning against voting for an older person, pointing to the challenges of ill-health and inability to understand and cope with demands of modern governance.</p>
<p>As 2019 elections draw near, <a href="https://newtelegraphonline.com/2018/01/2019-young-inexperienced-presidential-aspirants/">about 18 young people</a> have indicated interest in the presidency. Ranging between the ages of 33 and 46, they come both from the diaspora as well as from within the country. Two of them, Fela Durotoye and Omoyele Sowore, have <a href="https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2018/04/08/of-sowore-durotoye-fasua-rupturing-the-fetish-of-political-experience/">moved around the country</a> to test the ground. They have expressed distrust in the Buhari leadership and promised to edge him out of power in 2019. </p>
<p>Buhari’s Minister of Communication, Adebayo Shittu, has described them as <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2018/04/08/%E2%80%98you-are-inconsequential%E2%80%A6go-contest-councillor%E2%80%99-nigerian-minister-tells-sowore">inconsequential</a>. That may be true given that the candidates have yet to connect with the real voters. And being young may not be an asset to leadership unless aspiring young leaders have the capacity and capability to govern.</p>
<p>The young aspirant politicians lack structures and the money, both of which remain strong factors in deciding politics in Nigeria. For example, the Young Democratic Party lacks the structure to change the political equation. </p>
<p>On top of this, those contesting positions in popular parties are former governors, former vice president, who are billionaires and have the structures to back them up. </p>
<p>A new paradigm is being championed by <a href="http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/irinw52799.html">former President Olusegun Obasanjo</a>, now 81 years old, who ran the country between 1999 and 2007. He supported Buhari in 2015 but is <a href="https://guardian.ng/politics/obasanjos-coalition-adopts-adc-to-unseat-buhari-in-2019/">spearheading a movement</a> that hopes to support a qualified younger presidential aspirant to unseat Buhari. This <a href="http://thenationonlineng.net/2019-pdp-38-other-parties-form-coalition-against-buhari/">coalition</a> of 38 political parties including Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and marginalised members of the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC) have signed Memorandum of Understanding. But even if this works, gerontocrats would still be playing backroom politics and assuming the role of godfathers to the ‘young’ leaders. </p>
<p>The implication of is that the odds favour the old in 2019 elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99691/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oludayo Tade does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Young aspirant politicians lack support structure and the money, both of which remain strong factors in deciding politics in Nigeria.Oludayo Tade, Lecturer of Criminology, Victimology, Deviance and Social Problems, University of IbadanLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/938642018-03-23T13:03:37Z2018-03-23T13:03:37ZClaims about Cambridge Analytica’s role in Africa should be taken with a pinch of salt<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211682/original/file-20180323-54903-1vik3c8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, left, and his successor Muhammadu Buhari. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Deji Yake</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Election manipulation is a hot story. In the last few days, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/22/cambridge-analytica-scandal-the-biggest-revelations-so-far">Cambridge Analytica</a>, which claims to use data to change behaviour including that of voters, has been accused of breaching Facebook rules in its efforts to collect personal data and use them to bring Donald Trump to power. </p>
<p>Cambridge Analytica is accused of interfering in elections on a very broad canvas. In Nigeria, it’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/21/cambridge-analyticas-ruthless-bid-to-sway-the-vote-in-nigeria">said to have used underhand tactics</a> to try and secure the re-election of then President Goodluck Jonathan in 2015. </p>
<p>Allegations in Kenya have focused on claims that Cambridge Analytica helped president Uhuru Kenyatta to retain power in 2017 by designing <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/03/20/how-cambridge-analytica-poisoned-kenyas-democracy/?utm_term=.6236050c6e12">divisive campaigns that demonised opposition</a> candidate Raila Odinga, bringing the country closer to civil conflict.</p>
<p>But caution is required, at least when it comes to the stories about interference in Nigeria and Kenya. The company’s impact has in fact been massively exaggerated as a result of claims made by Cambridge Analytica itself.</p>
<p>Speaking about the campaign of Kenyatta’s Jubilee Party, managing director <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-facebook-cambridge-analytica-kenya/cambridge-analytica-stage-managed-kenyan-presidents-campaigns-uk-tv-idUKKBN1GV302">Mark Turnbull</a> has been caught on camera claiming to have “staged the whole thing”. Unsurprisingly, given the willingness of employees of the firm to talk about the use of underhand strategies such as honey traps and fake news, opposition leaders are up in arms. National Super Alliance official Norman Magaya has called for a full investigation into Cambridge Analytica’s role, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43471707">accusing</a> it, and the ruling party, of trying to</p>
<blockquote>
<p>subvert the people’s will.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But while such investigations need to be conducted and questions raised by the opposition need to be answered, we should also ask a prior question: can Cambridge Analytica deliver on its claims? </p>
<p>The evidence from Africa is no. </p>
<p>This is not to say that Cambridge Analytica doesn’t present a threat to democracy, or that it should not be ashamed of itself or face investigation. But it is to say that its impact in Africa has been over-hyped because it serves a variety of interests to do so. </p>
<h2>Failures in Nigeria and Kenya</h2>
<p>In Nigeria, the company was brought in to save President Jonathan by wealthy supporters desperate for him to stay in power. It failed. In the 2015 elections, Jonathan became the first ever Nigerian leader to <a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/04/economist-explains-2">lose at the ballot box</a>. In fact he didn’t only lose. He was soundly beaten by an opposition party competing with one hand tied behind its back in a political system that conferred massive advantages of incumbency.</p>
<p>There are also reasons to think that the company’s impact has been overstated in Kenya. It is true that Kenyatta was eventually declared the winner of the election – though the first contest was nullified by the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-11-15/why-kenyas-supreme-court-cant-solve-countrys-electoral-crisis">Supreme Court for procedural irregularities</a> and the opposition did not take part in the re-run – but there is little evidence that Cambridge Analytica’s much vaunted ability to manipulate “big data” was the reason for this.</p>
<p>Take the question of targeted social media campaigns. It is true that material was circulated attacking Odinga as a <a href="http://www.pressreader.com/china/global-times/20170718/281706909732026">dangerous and irresponsible leader</a>. Cambridge Analytica may have advised the government to adopt this strategy – although we know that some of the worst videos were actually made by another company <a href="https://privacyinternational.org/press-release/955/press-release-texas-media-company-hired-trump-behind-kenyan-presidents-viral">Harris Media</a>. </p>
<p>But even if they did, there are two reasons to doubt that it was a new or particularly effective tactic.</p>
<p>First, these messages do not appear to have been targeted. Ahead of the elections, and as part of a comparative research project on elections in Africa, we set up multiple profiles on Facebook to track social media and political adverts, and found no evidence that different messages were directed at different voters. Instead, a consistent negative line was pushed on all profiles, no matter what their background. </p>
<p>Second, the <a href="http://www.dotsavvyafrica.com/the-5-biggest-social-media-platforms-in-kenya/">vast majority of Kenyans</a> are not on Facebook, and so there is no reason to think that messages circulated in this way would swing the wider electorate. Instead, surveys show that radio remains the <a href="http://www.itwebafrica.com/unified-communications/657-kenya/238860-kenyans-dont-trust-news-about-the-general-elections-that-are-shared-on-social-media-geopoll-596f3d39b1b25">major source of information</a>, and that Kenyans are highly sceptical of the reliability of social media.</p>
<p>In other words, the campaign led by Cambridge Analytica does not seem to have been that different to the ones that preceded it. For all the claims of a hi-tech innovative strategy, their real role appears to have been to advocate negative campaigning. But there is nothing new about this. </p>
<p>Back in 2007, when Raila Odinga’s opposition appeared to be on the brink of winning power, his rivals claimed that his victory would lead to the country’s collapse and circulated flyers with his <a href="http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/108/430/1.full.pdf">head superimposed on Idi Amin’s body</a> to drive the point home. This was well before Cambridge Analytica was even formed, and stands as proof that Kenyan leaders don’t need foreign consultants to tell them the value of ethnic scaremongering.</p>
<p>It is also important to keep in mind that you cannot simply use messaging to win votes in a system in which the ethnicity, patronage and credibility of candidates are <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-elections-are-much-more-than-just-a-ruthless-game-of-thrones-81957">major drivers of voter behaviour</a>. To mobilise voters to the polls, leaders reinforce their support base by attending funerals and giving generously to the bereaved; attending church and contributing to building funds; turning up at parent-teacher meetings and paying school fees for poor children. </p>
<p>To show generosity at these events is to demonstrate that the candidate acknowledges the morality of voters’ claims and will not forget them once elected. If you don’t do this you will not win, no matter what your PR team is doing.</p>
<h2>Exaggerated claims</h2>
<p>The tendency to exaggerate Cambridge Analytica’s powers is no accident. Exaggerated claims are part and parcel of the company’s <a href="https://ca-political.com/?__hstc=163013475.98b7519b832f0a523b96ce41a80956c6.1521732839909.1521732839909.1521732839909.1&__hssc=163013475.1.1521732839910&__hsfp=700733249">marketing strategy</a>. For journalists, the more powerful the company, the bigger the story. For opposition parties, the more effective Cambridge Analytica is seen to be, the more it can be blamed for an electoral defeat.</p>
<p>There is also something more profound at work: the suspicion that Africa is the victim of European or American schemes is a powerful one. Many, in Africa and elsewhere, will see this as further evidence of that eternal truth. And we are all increasingly suspicious of the power of big data, uneasily aware that we may not have fully grasped the small print of our deal with the tech companies. </p>
<p>We may have good reason for that suspicion – but we should beware of flattering those firms by exaggerating their power and reach.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93864/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabrielle Lynch receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council under grant ES.L002345.1.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justin Willis receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council under grant ES.L002345.1 . </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman receives funding from UK Economic and Social Research Council under grant ES.L002345.1.</span></em></p>Claims about Cambridge Analytica’s role in elections in Nigeria and Kenya have been overstated.Gabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickJustin Willis, Professor of History, Durham UniversityNic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/868672017-11-09T12:39:27Z2017-11-09T12:39:27ZVigilantism is flourishing in Nigeria – with official support<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193574/original/file-20171107-1041-quur74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the Civilian Joint Task Force, a vigilante group battling Boko Haram in north east Nigeria.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Akintunde Akinleye</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Concerns about safety and security are substantial in Nigeria. Here, <a href="http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary?queries%5bsearch%5d=crime">crime is high</a> and the police are <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/08/corruption-nigerian-police-scrutiny/">considered corrupt</a> and inefficient. The structure of law enforcement does not help. Police are run at the federal level despite <a href="https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2017/07/22/revisiting-state-police-debate/">long-standing calls</a> for state forces. Given that Nigeria has many diverse languages, cultural practices and terrain, the centralised police face many difficulties.</p>
<p>These conditions are conducive for vigilantes – civilians who undertake their own crime control. Although vigilantes can be effective in providing safety and security, their use poses several problems. They sometimes take the law into their own hands and dispense justice as they see fit. Yet in Nigeria they often have authorities’ approval.</p>
<p>The Borno vigilantes fighting against Boko Haram, whose activities have attracted <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/05/nigerian-vigilantes-aim-rout-boko-haram-2014526123758444854.html">widespread media coverage</a>, illustrate this well. Referred to as the Civilian Joint Task Force, they began in 2013 as a group of local hunters intending to protect their communities, but quickly became <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/sierra-leone/251-double-edged-sword-vigilantes-african-counter-insurgencies">integrated into the government’s official counter-insurgency</a>.</p>
<p>With greater knowledge of the local community and terrain than officials, the Civilian Joint Task Force has been <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/244-watchmen-lake-chad-vigilante-groups-fighting-boko-haram">successful</a> in identifying Boko Haram members and limiting their attacks. Nevertheless, they have been <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/news/2013/12/12/civilian-vigilante-groups-increase-dangers-northeastern-nigeria">implicated in abuses</a>, including extrajudicial killings. There are <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/244-watchmen-lake-chad-vigilante-groups-fighting-boko-haram">fears</a> that they could evolve into an ethnic militia or be used for political means.</p>
<p>The Civilian Joint Task Force is not the only example. The use of vigilante groups to protect lives and property, with official support, has become part of the fabric of Nigerian society.</p>
<h2>Profiles of the main groups</h2>
<p>Vigilantism is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. Traditional hunter guards have <a href="https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00629061/document">pre-colonial origins</a>, and were authorised by the British regime during World War Two. The politicisation of hunter guards after independence led to prohibition. However, vigilantism continued, with groups proliferating in the 1990s:</p>
<p><strong>The Bakassi Boys</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4486721?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">Originally a group of shoe producers</a> patrolling the Ariaria market in Aba 1998, the Bakassi Boys quickly spread across the city. They were successful in preventing crime. The state government renamed them the Abia State Vigilante Service in 2000, providing them with funds and equipment.</p>
<p>That same year, the Anambra State governor <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0258900022000005188?journalCode=cjca20">invited the Bakassi Boys</a> to deal with heightened crime at the Ontisha market. Subsequently, the State House of Assembly passed a law to legitimise the group as the Anambra Vigilante Services. A nearby state, Imo, followed suit. </p>
<p>In all three areas, the vigilantes were controlled by an official committee. However, this did not quell <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/nigeria2/nigeria0502-03.htm">executions and other abuses, including political killings</a>. Efforts by the federal government to ban these groups <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/44545/262362_de.html">failed</a>, and the Bakassi Boys continue to operate.</p>
<p><strong>Oodua People’s Congress</strong> </p>
<p>The Oodua People’s Congress, based in Southwest Nigeria, was founded by Yoruba intellectuals to promote Yoruba historical and cultural research after the <a href="http://adst.org/2015/12/the-stolen-victory-and-mysterious-death-of-moshood-abiola/#.We8ZE8baS00">Moshood Abiola debacle</a>. Abiola, a Yoruba, won the 1993 presidential election which was annulled by the military government. He was jailed and later died in prison. In 1996 the group’s mandate was expanded to include vigilante activities. </p>
<p>As members opposed military rule, they became <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/240697124_Ethnic_Vigilantes_and_the_State_The_Oodua_People%27s_Congress_in_South-Western_Nigeria">involved in political vigilantism</a> during the 1999 election. When former army general Olusegun Obasanjo won, he banned the group.</p>
<p>This ban failed to stop the Oodua People’s Congress from operating and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/02/28/oodua-peoples-congress-opc/fighting-violence-violence">committing violent acts</a>. They became increasingly politicised. By supporting President Goodluck Jonathan in the 2015 elections they <a href="http://www.informationng.com/2015/06/lagos-apc-hails-fg-for-stopping-pipelines-surveillance-contract-with-opc.html">were awarded a contract</a> to guard the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation pipelines. This contract was withdrawn after Muhammadu Buhari was elected instead. </p>
<p>Although the Oodua People’s Congress’ relationship with the federal government is unstable, it tends to have state support. They recently <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/07/inside-badoo-cult-by-gani-adams-opc-leader/">collaborated with the Lagos police</a> to combat the murderous Badoo cult.</p>
<p><strong>The Hisbah</strong> </p>
<p>Many states in northern Nigeria have implemented Sharia law. In 2000, the Hisbah vigilante group was set up in Zamfara and Kano states in northern Nigeria amongst claims that the federal police failed to effect Sharia. When <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40027367">complaints of extrajudicial killings escalated</a>, the state governments set up monitoring committees. </p>
<p>By 2003, laws to regulate the Hisbah were passed. They became a highly structured organisation, operating in uniforms and marked vehicles, and even broadcasting a weekly radio programme. Again, official regulation did not prevent <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0904/8.htm">abuses</a>. While the Hisbah enjoy state support, they have clashed with the federal police. This peaked with a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4700314.stm">federal ban in 2006</a>, but the group <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/16311947">continued to operate and spread</a> to other northern states.</p>
<p><strong>Groups in the Niger Delta</strong> </p>
<p>The Niger Delta is rich in oil, yet local communities are excluded from the benefits of this resource. This has been the driving force behind the emergence of various ethnic vigilante groups there. </p>
<p>For example, the <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/940936/download">Egbesu Boys</a> formed in the early 1990s as a response to oil exploitation on Ijaw land. A clash between the Okrika and Eleme communities over land ownership where the Port Harcourt refinery is situated <a href="http://www.africanleadershipcentre.org/attachments/article/390/Vigilante%20Arming%20Final%20PDF%20Copy.pdf">produced the Okrika Bush Boys</a>. Both groups have allegedly gained support from politicians.</p>
<p>Port Harcourt has also seen <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/nigeria0205/3.htm">violent clashes</a> between the Ijaw groups Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force and Niger Delta Vigilante, with the state government <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigerias-oil-war-who-are-niger-delta-militants-1520580">supporting the latter</a>. This official alliance <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/nigeria0205/3.htm">precipitated the 2004 Nigerian oil crisis</a>. </p>
<p>Federal attempts to <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/200205140308.html">ban</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-amnesty-efforts-in-the-niger-delta-triggered-new-violence-74085">disarm</a> various Niger Delta groups have been unsuccessful.</p>
<p><strong>Vigilante Group of Nigeria</strong> </p>
<p>The countrywide Vigilante Group of Nigeria originated in Benue and <a href="http://www.vgnbenuecommand.com/pages/about_us.html">registered as an NGO in 1999</a>. The group is highly structured and collaborates with the police and military. Like the Civilian Joint Task Force, it has also played a role in <a href="http://www.sensornewsonline.com.ng/nass-concludes-vgn-public-hearing-igp-coas-back-recognition-vigilante-group/">combating Boko Haram</a>. </p>
<p>With an understanding of the local communities in which they work, the Vigilante Group of Nigeria has been very successful. Recently, the House of Representatives passed <a href="http://nass.gov.ng/document/download/8449">a bill authorising the group</a>. However, its members have not been exempt from <a href="http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/94f665de-d201-4dcd-9e9a-fa7504ef9250/pdf">committing abuses</a>.</p>
<p>This is not an exhaustive list. Vigilantes cooperate with the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14678802.2016.1200314">police and military</a> amidst farmer-pastoralist conflicts in Plateau state. In Kano, aside from the Hisbah, operates <a href="http://books.openedition.org/ifra/739?lang=en">several vigilante groups</a> registered with and funded by the state. In October, the Nasarawa Commissioner of Police <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/10/police-partner-hunters-vigilante-patrol-difficult-terrain-nasarawa-state/">announced a partnership</a> with local hunters and vigilantes. </p>
<h2>Regulation and bans</h2>
<p>Although official regulation has not completely eradicated abuses, it appears more fruitful than bans. Moreover, the effectiveness of vigilantism in combating crime <a href="http://gjournals.org/GJSC/Publication/2016/October/HTML/101416161%20Chikwendu%20et%20al.htm">cannot be contested</a>. With enhanced training and accountability mechanisms these groups could provide an important component of community policing. </p>
<p>Indeed, nongovernmental organisations <a href="http://www.cleen.org/informalpolicing.html">CLEEN</a> and <a href="https://www.britishcouncil.org.ng/justice-for-all-nigeria/about/safety-security/voluntary-policing-sector">J4A</a> have successfully trained vigilantes and improved their relations with police. Conversely, it has been argued that improvement of official law enforcement <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/06/01/recognition-for-the-vigilante-groups/">should be prioritised</a>, which would remove the need for vigilantism. </p>
<p>But for now, these groups are here to stay.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86867/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Inefficient policing in Nigeria has forced many communities to rely on vigilante groups for security. Despite using force and violence, many groups even have support from authorities.Leighann Spencer, PhD Candidate in Criminology, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/600742016-07-04T04:02:29Z2016-07-04T04:02:29ZBoko Haram: why jaw-jaw might be better than war-war for Nigeria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128721/original/image-20160629-15263-a9rdxj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Residents view an army poster of wanted Boko Haram suspects in Bayelsa, Nigeria. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Tife Owolabi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is just over a year since General Muhammadu Buhari swept to power amid promises to the Nigerian people that he would succeed where his predecessor Goodluck Jonathan had failed – by defeating the Islamist militant group Boko Haram.</p>
<p>Buhari’s approach has been twofold: he has pursued a determined military onslaught against Boko Haram and taken some significant steps to boost security in the most affected northeastern states. And he has started rooting out corruption in the military. </p>
<p>On Jonathan’s watch, three Nigerian states – Adamawa, Borno and Yobe – were placed under a state of emergency because of the deadly insurgency. Several communities in these states had fallen to the terrorist group. Millions of people have been <a href="http://www.tv360nigeria.com/people-displaced-boko-haram-now-2-17-million/">internally displaced</a>, sheltering in refugee camps within Nigeria. Others have fled to neighbouring states.</p>
<p>On taking office the former military leader-turned-president set December 2015 as the deadline within which to conclusively obliterate Boko Haram. Despite the bold steps he’s taken, the insurgents remain undefeated six months after the deadline expired. </p>
<p>Instead, they have brazenly engaged the Nigerian military in direct combat resulting in the deaths of people. They have also taken to detonating explosives in public places – including <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/boko-haram-children-suicide-bombers-160412093755915.html">suicide attacks</a> in northeastern towns in Nigeria including Zaria, Malari, Potiskum and Zambari Muna near <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/07/suicide-bombers-kill-over-30-in-cameroon-and-nigeria.php">Maiduguri</a>.</p>
<p>Despite the intransigence and deadly attacks, some progress has been made since Buhari assumed office. But more needs to be done.</p>
<p>As unpalatable as it may seem to many, the Nigerian government cannot shy away from the fact that it will need to sit down with Boko Haram and begin the process of peace building. After all, there are precedents in <a href="http://colombiapeace.org/">Colombia</a> and <a href="http://www.cfr.org/peace-conflict-and-human-rights/northern-ireland-peace-process/p31552">Northern Ireland</a> and elsewhere, where deadly foes eventually met to make peace. </p>
<h2>What’s been done so far</h2>
<p>In his <a href="http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/05/read-president-buhari-inaugural-speech/">inaugural address</a> as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on May 29 2015 Buhari ordered the relocation of the army headquarters from Abuja to Maiduguri, capital of Borno State, in the heart of the insurgency. He pledged that the army headquarters would remain there until Boko Haram was defeated.</p>
<p>The president also reorganised the military in an effort to <a href="http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/05/corruption-military-responsible-nigerias-loss-14-lgas-boko-haram-buhari/">end corruption</a> and restore the dented image of the Nigerian army. He replaced top military commanders deemed to have either corruptly enriched themselves with funds meant for military, or who had acted unprofessionally by indulging in politics.</p>
<p>The move lifted the morale of despondent soldiers who had been deprived of essential equipment, often due to the corruption and greed of their superiors.
The new commanders also set to work restoring the army’s battered image.</p>
<p>The “cleansing” of the military afforded Nigeria the opportunity to reestablish trust with leading states in the global fight against terrorism, notably France, the United Kingdom and the US. All <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201605160925.html">pledged their support</a> in sharing intelligence information with the new administration in its effort to defeat Boko Haram.</p>
<p>Another plus was that cross border Boko Haram activities saw Nigeria and its neighbours put aside their longstanding border disputes to confront their common enemy. The terrorist group now finds itself facing an <a href="http://pncp.net/news/regional-multinational-joint-task-force-combat-boko-haram">8,700-strong</a> multinational joint task force composed of soldiers from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria.</p>
<p>The military offensive has succeeded in the recapture of territories previously held by the militants. It’s important to note, though, that some of the feats of success occurred a few weeks into Buhari’s administration. This was due to the <a href="http://www.channelstv.com/2015/03/22/nigerian-forces-show-readiness-to-provide-adequate-security-during-elections/">pre-electoral security measures</a> put in place by the Jonathan administration.</p>
<p>Thus, one year after Buhari became president, the terror acts that made Boko Haram the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-boko-haram-is-the-worlds-deadliest-terror-group-54216">deadliest terrorist group</a> in the world have been <a href="http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/03/21/defeating-boko-haram/">significantly contained</a> – largely thanks to the multinational joint task force’s efforts. But the menace has yet to be totally eliminated. </p>
<p>Attacks on communities in the northeastern states – where people now face <a href="http://news.trust.org/item/20160524174947-7p1kt">famine</a> – and communities in Cameroon and Chad, which border with Nigeria, continue. A number of issues still need to be addressed. </p>
<p>So far only two out of the more than <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36338989">200 kidnapped Chibok girls</a> have been rescued by the Nigerian military. Most of the girls are still being held in the fortress of the militants – the <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/the-forest-concealing-boko-haram/3343895.html">Sambisa forest</a>. </p>
<p>Buhari has pledged his government’s resolve to negotiate the release of the girls since he assumed office. But there is no evidence of progress. In addition, thousands of people are still displaced, both internally and externally. And the militants continue to attack communities. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128724/original/image-20160629-15282-198owr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128724/original/image-20160629-15282-198owr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128724/original/image-20160629-15282-198owr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128724/original/image-20160629-15282-198owr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128724/original/image-20160629-15282-198owr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128724/original/image-20160629-15282-198owr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128724/original/image-20160629-15282-198owr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nigerian military with young men rescued from suspected Boko Haram terrorists after an operation in Borno State.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The insurgency also continues to have a debilitating effect on the livelihoods of the people living in the three most heavily affected northeastern states, and hopelessness reigns. </p>
<h2>Let peace building begin</h2>
<p>The war is certainly not over, and it is puerile to assume that war against terrorism can be won with only <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/19/opinion/can-boko-haram-be-defeated.html?_r=0">military might</a>.</p>
<p>It is indeed obvious that military power has not succeeded in eliminating global terrorism. In Nigeria, no matter what the challenges associated with the intransigence of militants are, the political strategy suitable for getting the country back is effective peace building. Admittedly, this is not the preferred approach of the <a href="https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/5141-legitimacy-and-complexity-in-terrorist-conflicts--">global hawks</a> in the fight against terrorism</p>
<p>The challenge is that peace building takes longer to fully realise its objectives. But Buhari would do well to follow the advice of the 19th century Prussian military strategist, <a href="https://global.britannica.com/biography/Carl-von-Clausewitz">Carl Von Clausewitz</a>. He famously asserted that warfare was a continuation of politics by other means:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We see, therefore, that War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by <a href="http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/clausewitz-war-as-politics-by-other-means">other means</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>British prime minister <a href="https://global.britannica.com/biography/Winston-Churchill">Winston Churchill</a> remarked: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>To jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war" (and) In war, resolution; in defeat, defiance; in victory, <a href="http://townhall.com/columnists/johnhawkins/2013/01/19/the-40-greatest-quotes-from-winston-churchill-n1492794">magnanimity</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>These point to one thing – peacemaking. Their argument is simple: military action alone is not sustainable and risks failing unless it is founded on a concrete political strategy that sustains it. </p>
<p>What would it involve? A peace process would provide amnesty for former combatants as well as their reintegration into the civilian life. It would also provide for a process of reconciliation. </p>
<p>In the case of Nigeria, it would also require the provision of socioeconomic opportunities for the devastated northeastern states, which are important for sustainable peace to be achieved in the long run. </p>
<p>The President’s decision to negotiate for the release of the Chibok girls is the first peace overture to be extended to the militants. The government needs to follow through with it and not relent, no matter the difficulties.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60074/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdul-Jalilu Ateku receives funding from the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the UK for a doctoral degree at the University of Nottingham</span></em></p>Despite military successes against Boko Haram, Nigeria needs to face up to the unpalatable truth that military force alone will not win the deadly war, and start discussions about peace building.Abdul-Jalilu Ateku, PhD Candidate in International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/554372016-03-02T19:05:50Z2016-03-02T19:05:50ZOut of the ashes of Afghanistan and Iraq: the rise and rise of Islamic State<p><em>Since announcing its arrival as a global force in June 2014 with the declaration of a caliphate on territory captured in Iraq and Syria, the jihadist group Islamic State has shocked the world with its brutality.</em></p>
<p><em>Its seemingly sudden prominence has led to much speculation about the group’s origins: how do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State? In the final article of <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">our series examining this question</a>, Greg Barton shows the role recent Western intervention in the Middle East played in the group’s inexorable rise.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Despite precious little certainty in the “what ifs” of history, it’s clear the rise of Islamic State (IS) wouldn’t have been possible without the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. Without these Western interventions, al-Qaeda would never have gained the foothold it did, and IS would not have emerged to take charge of northern Iraq.</p>
<p>Whether or not the Arab Spring, and the consequent civil war in Syria, would still have occurred is much less clear. </p>
<p>But even if war hadn’t broken out in Syria, it’s unlikely an al-Qaeda spin-off such as IS would have become such a decisive actor without launching an insurgency in Iraq. For an opportunistic infection to take hold so comprehensively, as IS clearly has, requires a severely weakened body politic and a profoundly compromised immune system. </p>
<p>Such were the conditions in Goodluck Jonathan’s Nigeria from 2010 to 2015 and in conflict-riven Somalia after the fall of the Barre regime in 1991. And it was so in Afghanistan for the four decades after conflict broke out in 1978 and in Pakistan after General Zia-ul-Haq declared martial law in 1977. </p>
<p>Sadly, but even more clearly, such are the circumstances in Iraq and Syria today. And that’s the reason <a href="http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf">around 80% of all deaths due to terrorist attacks</a> in recent years have occurred in five of the six countries discussed here, where such conditions still prevail.</p>
<h2>An unique opportunity</h2>
<p>The myth of modern international terrorist movements, and particularly of al-Qaeda and its outgrowths such as IS (which really is a third-generation al-Qaeda movement), is that they’re inherently potent and have a natural power of attraction. </p>
<p>The reality is that while modern terrorist groups can and do operate all around the globe to the point where no country can consider itself completely safe, they can only build a base when local issues attract on-the-ground support. </p>
<p>Consider al-Qaeda, which is in the business of global struggle. It wants to unite a transnational <em>ummah</em> to take on far-off enemies. But it has only ever really enjoyed substantial success when it has happened across conducive local circumstances. </p>
<p>The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s provided an opportunity uniquely suited to the rise of al-Qaeda and associated movements. It provided plausible justification for a defensive jihad – a just war – that garnered broad international support and allowed the group to coalesce in 1989 out of the Arab fighters who had rallied to support the Afghans in their fight against the Soviets. </p>
<p>Further opportunities emerged in the Northern Caucasus, where local ethno-national grievances were eventually transformed into the basis for a more global struggle. </p>
<p>The declaration of independence by Chechnya in 1991 led to all-out war with the Soviet military between 1994 and 1996, when tens of thousands were killed. After a short, uneasy peace, a decade-long second civil war started in 1999 following the invasion of neighbouring Dagestan by the International Islamic Brigade. </p>
<p>The second civil war began with an intense campaign to seize control of the Chechen capital, Grozny. But it became dominated by years of fighting jihadi and other insurgents in the Caucasus mountains and dealing with related terrorist attacks in Russia. </p>
<p>In Nigeria and Somalia, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab now share many of the key attributes of al-Qaeda, with whom they have forged nascent links. But they too emerged primarily because of the failure of governance and the persistence of deep-seated local grievances.</p>
<p>Even in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda struggled to transform itself into a convincing champion of local interests in the 1990s. After becoming increasingly isolated following the September 11 attacks on the US, it failed to gain support from the Afghan Taliban for its global struggle.</p>
<p>But something new happened in Iraq beginning in 2003. The Jordanian street thug <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/">Musab al-Zarqawi</a> correctly intuited that the impending Western invasion and occupation of Iraq would provide the perfect conditions for the emergence of insurgencies. </p>
<p>Al-Zarqawi positioned himself in Iraq ahead of the invasion and deftly rode a wave of anger and despair to initiate and grow an insurgency that in time came to dominate the broken nation. </p>
<p>Initially, al-Zarqawi was only one of many insurgent leaders intent on destabilising Iraq. But, in October 2004, after years of uneasy relations with the al-Qaeda leader during two tours in Afghanistan, he finally yielded to Osama bin Laden’s request that he swear on oath of loyalty (<em>bayat</em>) to him. And so al-Zarqawi’s notorious network of insurgents became known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). </p>
<h2>From the ashes</h2>
<p>Iraq’s de-Ba'athification process of May 2003 to June 2004, during which senior technocrats and military officers linked to the Ba'ath party (the vehicle of the Saddam Hussein regime) were removed from office, set the stage for many to join counter-occupation insurgent groups – including AQI.</p>
<p>Without the sacking of a large portion of Iraq’s military and security leaders, its technocrats and productive middle-class professionals, it’s not clear whether this group would have come to dominate so comprehensively. These alienated Sunni professionals gave AQI, as well as IS, much of its core military and strategic competency.</p>
<p>But even with the windfall opportunity presented to al-Zarqawi by the wilful frustration of Sunni interests by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nouri_al-Maliki">Nouri al-Maliki’s</a> Shia-dominated government from 2006 to 2014, which deprived them of any immediate hope for the future and confidence in protecting their families and communities, AQI was almost totally destroyed after the Sunni awakening began in 2006. </p>
<p>The Sunni awakening forces, or “Sons of Iraq”, began with tribal leaders in Anbar province forming an alliance with the US military. For almost three years, tens of thousands of Sunni tribesmen were paid directly to fight AQI, but the Maliki government refused to incorporate them into the regular Iraqi Security Force. And, after October 2008 – when the US military handed over management of these forces – he refused to support them.</p>
<p>The death of al-Zarqawi in June 2006 contributed to the profound weakening of the strongest of all post-invasion insurgent groups. AQI’s force strength was reduced to several hundred fighters and it lost the capacity to dominate the insurgency.</p>
<p>Then, in 2010 and 2011, circumstances combined to blow oxygen onto the smouldering coals. </p>
<p>In 2010, the greatly underestimated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a local Iraqi cleric with serious religious scholarly credentials, took charge of AQI and began working to a sophisticated long-term plan.</p>
<p>Elements of the strategy went by the name “breaking the walls”. In the 12 months to July 2013, this entailed the movement literally breaking down the prison walls in compounds around Baghdad that held hundreds of hardcore al-Qaeda fighters. </p>
<p>Islamic State, as the group now called itself, also benefited from the inflow of former Iraqi intelligence officers and senior military leaders. This had begun with de-Ba'athification in 2003 and continued after the collapse of the Sunni awakening and the increasingly overt sectarianism of the Maliki government. </p>
<p>Together, they developed tactics based on vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and the strategic use of suicide bombers. These were deployed not in the passionate but often undirected fashion of al-Qaeda but much more like smart bombs in the hands of a modern army. </p>
<p>And the US military withdrawal from Iraq in late 2011, well telegraphed ahead of time, provided an excellent opportunity for the struggling insurgency to rebuild. As did the outbreak of civil war in Syria.</p>
<h2>A helping hand</h2>
<p>Al-Baghdadi initially dispatched his trusted Syrian lieutenant, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, to form a separate organisation in Syria: the al-Nusra front. </p>
<p>Jabhat al-Nusra quickly established itself in northern Syria. But when al-Julani refused to fold his organisation in under his command, al-Baghdadi rebranded AQI (or Islamic State in Iraq) Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham/the Levant (ISIS/ISIL).</p>
<p>Then, a series of events turned IS from an insurgency employing terrorist methods to becoming a nascent rogue state. These included: the occupation of Raqqa on the Syrian Euphrates in December 2013; the taking of Ramadi a month later; consolidation of IS control throughout Iraq’s western Anbar province; and, finally, a sudden surge down the river Tigris in June 2014 that took Mosul and most of the towns and cities along the river north of Baghdad within less than a week.</p>
<p>IS’s declaration of the caliphate on June 29, 2014, was a watershed moment, which is only now being properly understood. </p>
<p>In its ground operations, including the governing of aggrieved Sunni communities, IS moved well beyond being simply a terrorist movement. It came to function as a rogue state ruling over around 5 million people in the northern cities of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and defending its territory through conventional military means.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took charge of AQI and began working to a sophisticated long-term plan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Furqan Media</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At the same time, it skilfully exploited the internet and social media in ways the old al-Qaeda could not do – and that its second-generation offshoot, al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), had only partially achieved. </p>
<p>This allowed IS to draw in tens of thousands of foreign fighters. Most came from the Middle East and Northern Africa, but as many as 5,000 came from Europe, with thousands more from the Caucasus and Asia. </p>
<p>Unlike the case in Afghanistan in the 1980s, these foreign fighters have played a key role in providing sufficient strength to take and hold territory while also building a global network of support.</p>
<p>But without the perfect-storm conditions of post-invasion insurgency, this most potent expression of al-Qaedaism yet would never have risen to dominate both the region and the world in the way that it does. </p>
<p>Even in its wildest dreams, al-Qaeda could never have imagined that Western miscalculations post-9/11 could have led to such foolhardy engagements – not just in Afghanistan but also in Iraq. </p>
<p>Were it not for these miscalculations, 9/11 might well have precipitated the decline of al-Qaeda. Instead, with our help, it spawned a global jihadi movement with a territorial base far more powerful than al-Qaeda ever had.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is the final article in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55437/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton is co-director of the Australian Intervention Support Hub, a CVE capacity-building initiative supported by the Australian government and based at the ANU and Deakin University. He previously led an ARC Linkage grant project researching radicalisation and disengagement from violent extremism. He is currently a research professor at the Alfred Deakin Institute.</span></em></p>The final article of our series on the historical roots of Islamic State examines the role recent Western intervention in the Middle East played in the group’s inexorable rise.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation; Co-Director, Australian Intervention Support Hub, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/508002015-11-17T04:26:15Z2015-11-17T04:26:15ZBuhari’s cabinet: solid choices, but too few women and too elitist<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/102044/original/image-20151116-4980-j9u5ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigeria's newly appointed government ministers attend their swearing-in ceremony in Abuja.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Afolabi Sotunde</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigeria’s new cabinet, perhaps the most awaited in the history of constitutional democracy in Africa, has finally been sworn in. The wait involved at first a shocking and unexplained silence, and then the release of a partial list which was approved by the Senate in October – a full 131 days after the president was sworn in. Ministers apparently got to know of their respective portfolios 35 days later. It was shambolic.</p>
<p>Clearly the governing party had not listened to the message delivered on behalf of Tony Blair, the former UK prime minister, about the importance of the first 100 days of office. In a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T38QK1CQ_MY">keynote address</a> at a special two-day policy dialogue held in Abuja immediately after the party secured victory in May, Blair, through his former advisor Peter Mandelson, said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You will have more good will and more authority to do the difficult things at the beginning of your term than at the end.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>No-one at that stage imagined that it would take more than 100 days to even form a cabinet. But then Nigeria is no ordinary country and it has its own inherent logic.</p>
<p>Eventually nearly all appointees came from inside Nigeria and were quite well-known, if not predictable faces from the coalition-opposition. </p>
<p>Some have suggested that President Muhammadu Buhari needed time to fish out the very best from home and abroad. Others point to the fact that he needed time to understand the rot in the system and put in a host of ingenious strategies to fix loopholes that made <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-type-of-corruption-is-really-hampering-nigerias-economy-46155">corrupt practices</a> easy. </p>
<p>But the wait could very easily be due to party intrigues and sloppy handling of the task.</p>
<p>The country could ill afford the long wait. Longstanding energy <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-nigeria-can-do-to-weather-low-oil-prices-and-slow-economic-growth-46694">instability</a> is taking its toll on industry. Unemployment is <a href="http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/nbs-unemployment-rate-climbs-to-7-5-in-first-quarter/211449/">skyrocketing</a>.</p>
<p>With a depressed economy, <a href="https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17577">crime rates</a> have begun to rise. Things are getting so worrisome that stocks on the Nigerian Stock Exchange continued to <a href="http://punchng.com/ministers-inauguration-fails-to-lift-nse/">fall</a> as investors reacted indifferently to the inauguration of the new ministers.</p>
<h2>All the president’s men</h2>
<p>The list of new ministers appears to have generally gone down well with the public. Citizens were so fed up with the last <a href="http://peoplesdemocraticparty.com.ng/">Peoples Democratic Party</a> government that the first 50 names in the telephone directory would have been preferable to the status quo. There are some notable personalities in the new cabinet.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Babatunde Fashola, former governor of Lagos state with a population of 18 million, is now minister of power, works and housing. </p></li>
<li><p>Kayode Fayemi, former governor of Ekiti state, is minister of solid minerals. Both Fashola and Fayemi have enviable records of performance and the halo of much-needed technocratic competence.</p></li>
<li><p>It would have been unimaginable for the brilliant communicator, Lai Mohammed, not to be the minister of information. He was virtually the only authentic voice of the opposition even before there was an effective opposition party. </p></li>
<li><p>Transportation Minister Rotimi Amaechi is experienced and is expected to flourish.</p></li>
<li><p>The corporate and political gravitas of a politician like senator Udo Udoma, minister of budget and national planning, is expected to come in handy. </p></li>
<li><p>Abubakar Malami (Kebbi), the minister of justice, is young, dynamic and belongs to Buhari’s political circle. He has an enviable legal practice record but is relatively new to government. </p></li>
<li><p>Then there are younger northern stars like senators Hadi Sirika, Ibrahim Usman Jibril and Ahmed Musa Ibeto, who are ready to earn their stripes on a national stage. They have enviably clean records and are expected to be massively loyal to Buhari. He will need lots of loyalty given the tumultuous times ahead.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The list is quite short on academics and intellectuals. There is only one professor, and Fayemi, who has an academic history.</p>
<p>Buhari himself has a keen and trained mind even though he has <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3011024/Nigeria-court-delays-ruling-Buharis-school-certificate.html">no degree</a>. This is notable because only two Nigerian presidents have had a degree. Modern African political scientists lament the near total absence of the <a href="http://www.africaknowledgeproject.org/index.php/war/article/view/1658">philosopher king</a> in modern African states. </p>
<p>On the other hand, the immediate past president, <a href="http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/LinksReadPrint.asp?blurb=640">Goodluck Jonathan</a>, brandished a doctorate degree but had little luck putting it to use. </p>
<h2>But there are gaps</h2>
<p>The gender balance is disconcerting even by African standards. Just five out of 37 ministers are women. But it is significant that the economy is in the hands of a woman – former investment banker Kemi Adeosun.</p>
<p>It is not that women hold the key to all positive change in Nigeria. Nigeria has had its fair share of rogue female leaders. Buhari’s predecessor as prime minister for petroleum, <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/diezani-alison-madueke-ex-nigeria-oil-minister-sees-27000-seized-held-until-april-2016-1523127">Diezani Alison-Madueke</a>, is being held in the UK and faces up to ten years in jail for corruption and money laundering.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the appointment of Taraba’s first female attorney-general, Aisha Jummai Al-Hassan, as minister of women’s affairs is commendable. It is hoped she’ll make a meaningful impact on empowering women, particularly in the northern regions of the country where paternalistic attitudes and religion are <a href="http://www.epdc.org/epdc-data-points/schooling-northern-nigeria-challenges-girls-education">very oppressive</a>.</p>
<p>There are other shortcomings in the appointments. For example, the spread is very elitist and there is little hope of a left-leaning agenda – at least at this stage.</p>
<p>This is a shame because there is a massive percentage of the population needing directed socialist policies to lift them out of severe hardship, chronic poverty and generational underachievement.</p>
<h2>Lessons to be learnt</h2>
<p>The Nigerian government must learn to communicate better. Silent governance is fast receding as an effective strategy everywhere. It is quite unforgivable that in nearly six months there was no systematic communication to the citizenry on a new cabinet. At the very least this was disrespectful.</p>
<p>It was also awkward from an international relations point of view. As <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T38QK1CQ_MY">Mandelson</a>, the UK’s renowned “Prince of Spin” himself, explained in Abuja recently:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Strategy without communications is like a car without headlights.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There is no excuse for Buhari’s shoddy handling of the appointments. On his wide shoulders lie the fate of 150 million people that sorely yearn for successes. And the emergence of Nigeria as a truly great African nation will have spillover effects that can lift an entire region out of stark mediocrity. </p>
<p>He has been entrusted with possibly the most difficult job of any leader on the continent. Now he must perform in a way that promotes transparency. He must nurture Africa’s largest economy back to strength. This entails transforming its agricultural, financial and industrial base into that of a 21st-century jet-stream economy.</p>
<p>There is little doubt that Buhari is a man of conviction and a patriot. But he must become a phenomenal leader.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50800/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gbenga Oduntan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>No-one imagined that it would take Muhammadu Buhari more than 100 days to form a cabinet. But, then again, Nigeria is no ordinary country and it has its own inherent logic.Gbenga Oduntan, Senior Lecturer in International Commercial Law, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/427122015-06-04T04:37:53Z2015-06-04T04:37:53ZWhy Africa needs Buhari and Zuma to forge a strong alliance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/83829/original/image-20150603-2951-ghmbe8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muhammadu Buhari's victory in Nigeria emboldens him to play a leading role in African affairs.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Muhammadu Buhari’s <a href="http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2015/06/01/nigeria-president-muhammadu-buharis-inauguration-address/">inauguration</a> as Nigeria’s president presents new opportunities for reinvigorating relations between Nigeria and South Africa, the continent’s biggest economies.</p>
<p>Since the 1990s, the collective leadership of Nigeria and South Africa has been vital in providing the foundations for <a href="http://www.nepad.org/system/files/Nepad.pdf">African renewal</a>, the creation of institutions on the continent and the mobilisation of African voices in the global arena.</p>
<p>The hallmark of this leadership was demonstrated during the time of former presidents <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a> (1999-2008) and <a href="http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/423633/Olusegun-Obasanjo">Olusegun Obasanjo</a> (1999-2007). Both were instrumental in crafting the current <a href="http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf">African security</a>
and development frameworks.</p>
<p>These frameworks have frayed and lost direction on the watch of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12192152">Goodluck Jonathan</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17450447">Jacob Zuma</a>. </p>
<p>The African Union remains <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-2935107/No-strings-attached-African-Union-seeks-financial-independence.html">underfunded</a> and has made paltry efforts to generate additional resources. The flagship <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/african-peer-review-system-fading-fast-1.1861201">African Peer Review Mechanism</a> program has no money to conduct country reviews to gauge adherence to good governance.</p>
<p>But it is not too late to return to the quest for African <a href="http://www.afdb.org/en/annual-meetings-2014/the-next-50-years-%E2%80%9Cthe-africa-we-want%E2%80%9D/">prosperity</a>, security and dignity under a Buhari-Zuma leadership. </p>
<h2>The Mbeki-Obasanjo partnership</h2>
<p>Efforts to find multilateral approaches and reverse Africa’s <a href="http://www.nber.org/digest/jan04/w9865.html">international decline</a> hinge, more than ever before, on vigorous leadership, backed by solid domestic support for promoting Africa’s development. Without domestic backing on African issues, Nigeria and South Africa will not succeed in projecting their power on the continent.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://thefutureafrica.wordpress.com/2013/05/06/lessons-from-mbeki-and-obasanjo/">Mbeki-Obasanjo alliance</a> was propelled by the demands of the early 2000s, particularly the need to reshape African institutions in the direction of renewed mandates and responsibilities.</p>
<p>These goals were achieved with the formation of the <a href="http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell">African Union</a> in 2002, the <a href="http://www.dfa.gov.za/au.nepad/nepad.pdf">New Partnership for Africa’s Development</a>, and the African Peer Review Mechanism, the voluntary body for assessing Africa’s performance. </p>
<p>Mbeki and Obasanjo led confidently on continental affairs because they were elected by comfortable majorities at home and had solid control of their political parties. </p>
<p>In contrast, Jonathan’s regime collapsed partly because he lost control over his <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/amid-nigeria-gubernatorial-elections-2015-peoples-democratic-party-defections-stir-1875582">People’s Democratic Party</a>. Under his presidency, Nigeria was gradually descending into state failure, with dire consequences for the region. </p>
<p>Zuma has faced a fractious <a href="http://reconciliationbarometer.org/newsletter/volume-ten-2012/factions-cabals-and-the-politics-of-leadership-composition-in-the-anc/">African National Congress</a>, but so far has survived internal challenges to his leadership.</p>
<p>Buhari’s electoral <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Buhari-takes-historic-victory-in-Nigeria-20150401">victory</a> reinforces the consolidation of Nigeria’s credential as Africa’s largest democracy. This victory should embolden him as he confronts the menace of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501">Boko Haram</a> and much-needed military reforms to restore Nigeria’s role as a force for stabilisation in West Africa.</p>
<p>Zuma is still distracted by the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Nkandla-matter-may-go-to-court-says-Madonsela-20150602">Nkandla scandal</a> involving public money being spent on his family home. Questions over the expenditure have led to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/12/us-safrica-zuma-idUSKBN0LG2HN20150212">unruly scenes in parliament</a>. </p>
<p>But Zuma should seize the chance to reinvent himself as an African statesman by reaching out to Buhari in new initiatives to address the malaise facing African institutions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/83839/original/image-20150603-2943-194tsig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/83839/original/image-20150603-2943-194tsig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/83839/original/image-20150603-2943-194tsig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/83839/original/image-20150603-2943-194tsig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/83839/original/image-20150603-2943-194tsig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/83839/original/image-20150603-2943-194tsig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/83839/original/image-20150603-2943-194tsig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Then-Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo talks with South Africa’s then-president Thabo Mbeki in 2006.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Leading Africa</h2>
<p>The resurgent Nigeria and South Africa should make no pretences to hegemony – that crude inclination toward unilateral approaches. Leadership on African issues needs to be collective and consensus-based, reflecting the realities of scarce resources in the context of complex and multifaceted needs. </p>
<p>Although both countries will not replicate the strengths and advantages of the Mbeki-Obasanjo era, they have no choice but to improvise on strategies to check the steady deterioration of institutions and frameworks.</p>
<p>South Africa and Nigeria can provide optimal leadership when they work with other like-minded African countries in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building initiatives. </p>
<p>Leadership often entails sub-contracting roles to regional institutions which are better at galvanising political attention and resources.</p>
<p>The priority for both countries should be to return to the agenda of strengthening the security and economic capacities of bodies such as the <a href="http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/">Southern African Development Community</a>, the <a href="http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/ecowas-economic-community-west-african-states-0">Economic Community of West African States</a>, and the <a href="http://www.eac.int/">East African Community</a>.</p>
<p>More importantly, the African Union has wandered off-course in recent years because of a lack of clear direction. Some of its core institutions, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism, are in profound crisis due to a lack of funding and waning resolve about their continuation.</p>
<h2>Reinvigorating peer review</h2>
<p>Buhari and Zuma should organise an urgent conference in Africa to raise funds to rescue peer review from collapse. There should also be pressure on all countries that have not signed up to do so before the end of 2016. How will Africa forge common governance values when half of the African Union member states are afraid to be reviewed by their peers?</p>
<p>Reinvigorating the mechanism is necessary to boost the frameworks of the <a href="http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_CHARTER_ON_DEMOCRACY_ELECTIONS_AND_GOVERNANCE.pdf">African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance</a> which came into force in 2012.</p>
<p>The charter needs champions. There are already severe reversals in democratic gains. <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/climate-fear-engulfs-burundi-ahead-polls-160153901.html">Burundi</a> and <a href="http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/?marker=33">South Sudan</a> are good examples.</p>
<p>Africa and the international community invested considerable resources in the stabilisation in Burundi and South Sudan. The negotiation of pacts paved the way for democracy and power sharing, paving the way for the return of peace and stability. But erratic elites are single-mindedly leading these countries back into civil wars.</p>
<p>Nigeria and South Africa should lead from the front in defending the sanctity of democratic values and practices in Africa.</p>
<h2>The International Criminal Court</h2>
<p>As part of fresh commitments to end impunity and enhance accountability and justice, Nigeria and South Africa need to marshal the authority to repair Africa’s relations with the <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/14/africa-attacks-international-criminal-court">International Criminal Court</a>. </p>
<p>The African Union is not the ideal forum for Africa to pronounce itself on the court. While there are genuine complaints about the court’s role in Africa, the African Union has taken unhelpful positions on African cases that have potentially undermined its reputation and stature.</p>
<p>The majority of countries that signed up to the <a href="http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf">Rome Statute</a> that created the court are African. These countries have signalled their distinctive domestic value systems that distinguish them from countries that have procrastinated on joining it.</p>
<p>Nigeria and South Africa are parties to the court. They need to bring the African Union to order on the subject.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42712/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gilbert M. Khadiagala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Former presidents Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo led confidently on African affairs because they were elected by comfortable majorities at home and had solid control of their political parties.Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations and Head of Department, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/412142015-05-12T04:17:31Z2015-05-12T04:17:31ZEnduring tensions bedevil Nigeria-South Africa relations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/80672/original/image-20150506-22668-1kzwf2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The relationship between Nigeria and South Africa has again been strained following xenophobic attacks in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Relations between South Africa and Nigeria have always had some turbulence. In the latest tense episode, Nigeria <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2015/04/26/Nigeria-officially-recalls-its-ambassador">withdrew</a> its ambassador, Uche Ajulu-Okeke, and its high commissioner, Martin Cobham, after a series of <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2015/04/30/sa-police-arrest-nearly-200-immigrants-in-post-xenophobic-attacks-raid">xenophobic attacks</a> in South Africa in April.</p>
<p>Behind this latest quarrel lies a deeper and more enduring tension between the two countries rooted in their pursuit of global relevance and prestige. Both, for example, are competing for the yet-to-be established <a href="http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/10/09/africa-on-the-un-security-council/">permanent African seat</a> on the United Nations Security Council. </p>
<p>The big question is: will relations improve with the arrival of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/buhari-wins-but-the-new-president-of-nigeria-faces-an-enormous-challenge-39291">new administration</a> in Nigeria? That depends, in part, on how president-elect Muhammadu Buhari chooses to manage the decision made by outgoing President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration.</p>
<h2>Historical tensions</h2>
<p>On gaining independence in October 1960, the Nigerian government joined the United Nations and vowed to fight for the liberation of other African countries that were still languishing under colonial rule. </p>
<p>As South Africa was under apartheid, Nigeria had no intention to forge relations with it. South Africa was a pariah state in the international community. These sour relations continued until 1991, when the end of apartheid ushered in democracy in South Africa.</p>
<p>Despite Nelson Mandela’s election as South African president in 1994, relations between the two nations continued to be edgy. During this period it was South Africa that harboured unease, expressing concerns about <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/83449.stm">military rule</a> in Nigeria. </p>
<p>In 1995, these hostile relations came to a head when Mandela <a href="http://www.ipsnews.net/1995/11/commonwealth-nigeria-after-heinous-act-mandela-urges-expulsion/">called for</a> Nigeria’s expulsion from the Commonwealth on the grounds that Sani Abacha’s government in Nigeria had no respect for human rights. The action that tipped the balance for Mandela was the Abacha government’s decision to <a href="http://remembersarowiwa.com/background/the-death-of-ken-saro-wiwa/">execute</a> Ken Saro-Wiwa, an esteemed Nigerian writer and activist, and the rest of the <a href="http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/how-abacha-plotted-execution-of-saro-wiwa-others/134961/">“Ogoni Nine”</a>. </p>
<h2>The post-Mandela era</h2>
<p>In 1999, Thabo Mbeki took over from Mandela. During the same year Nigeria returned to civilian rule under President Olusegun Obasanjo. These two developments brought Nigeria and South Africa closer. </p>
<p>The two new leaders had a good personal relationship. While in exile in the 1970s Mbeki had established contact with Obasanjo. Under their leadership, relations between the two countries became cordial. Mbeki and Obasanjo made concerted efforts to revive African continental diplomacy through the <a href="http://www.nepad.org/">New Partnership for Africa’s Development</a> and the <a href="http://www.au.int/">African Union</a>. The <a href="http://sa-ncc.co.za/component/eventlist/details/2-south-africa-nigeria-binational-commission">South Africa-Nigeria Binational Commission</a> was established and sustained.</p>
<p>The African National Congress’s decision to <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2008-09-20-anc-recalls-mbeki">recall</a> Mbeki from office in September 2008 triggered a great deal of speculation about what future relations between the two countries might hold. But Kgalema Petrus Motlanthe, who was interim president until May 2009, managed to maintain cordial ties. After taking office Jacob Zuma continued where his predecessors left off and sustained good relations with Nigeria. </p>
<p>A change of leadership in Nigeria, with the replacement of Obasanjo by Alhaji Umaru Yar'Adua in 2007, was also weathered well by the two countries.</p>
<p>Yar'Adua flew to South Africa on a <a href="http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2008/nige0602.html">state visit</a> in 2008 as a gesture that the two countries were prepared to consider closer ties. His successor, Jonathan, also paid a <a href="http://www.ventures-africa.com/archives/26023">state visit</a> to South Africa in 2013.</p>
<p>Despite these overtures, relations between the two countries have never been as strong as they were during the Mbeki and Obasanjo years. For example, when South African immigration officials <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-03-08-gloves-come-off-in-sa-and-nigeria-diplomatic-feud/">deported</a> Nigerian nationals who landed in South Africa without yellow fever certificates in 2010, Nigerian authorities subsequently retaliated by doing the same to South Africans who landed in Lagos. This incident <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2013/04/15/zuma-visits-nigeria-to-mend-bridges">forced</a> Zuma to fly to Nigeria in an attempt to mend ties. </p>
<p>This was followed by the acrimonious battle for the chairperson of the African Union. South Africa pulled out <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2012-01-27-gloves-off-in-battle-for-dlaminizuma/">all the stops</a> to get one of its ministers, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, appointed to the post. But the tactics used by South Africa to secure <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/16/african-union-first-female-leader">a victory for her</a> left a bitter taste, particularly for Nigeria which supported the incumbent Jean Ping of Gabon. </p>
<h2>What the future holds</h2>
<p>Buhari inherits a difficult situation that will require the utmost diplomacy if the current tension between the two countries is to be eased. He will firstly have to get a good grasp on why the outgoing administration took such a drastic step only a few weeks before his inauguration.</p>
<p>Understanding whether the Nigerian government had exhausted other diplomatic options to address the issue before making its decision will be a crucial first step. Buhari may have some room for manoeuvre considering that Nigeria recalled its diplomats even though no Nigerians were among those <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/xenophobia-death-toll-climbs-to-7/">killed</a> in the attacks. </p>
<p>Buhari may be able to rekindle the goodwill felt by the Nigerian government in the wake of the death of 86 South Africans when a <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2014/11/16/74-nigerian-church-collapse-bodies-back-in-sa">church collapsed</a> last year. Despite considerable local pressure, the South African government chose to respect Nigerian laws and processes.</p>
<p>What is certain is that both countries recognise that they are better off having cordial relations than not. The ball is now in Buhari’s court.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41214/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bheki Mngomezulu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The relationship between Africa’s two great powers, Nigeria and South Africa, has had its ups and downs, but has been relatively cordial since 1999.Bheki Mngomezulu, Senior Lecturer and Academic Leader, International & Public Affairs, University of KwaZulu-NatalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/396192015-04-01T08:26:15Z2015-04-01T08:26:15ZBuhari wins as Nigeria turns its back on Jonathan<p>In the end, the margin was too decisive. Goodluck Jonathan, the incumbent president of Nigeria, had no choice but to telephone his challenger Muhammadu Buhari and concede <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-32139858">defeat</a>. </p>
<p>It was a rare moment of grace in an election <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/mar/29/wole-soyinka-interview-nigeria-corruption-goodluck-jonathan">characterised</a> by Wole Soyinka, Nigeria’s grand old man of letters, as the election of the Vs: vicious, violent, venal. </p>
<p>He had a point. Too much money was spent, a remarkable variety of dirty tricks were played, and very little love lost between a president who proved too small for the office he inherited and an ageing former dictator turned democratic saviour.</p>
<p>Yet Soyinka might, in retrospect, admire the dogged determination of his fellow citizens, who went to the polls in their millions despite rumours of fixing, and despite attacks by Boko Haram that left dozens dead.</p>
<h2>No plan</h2>
<p>In the end, only about 300 of the elaborate electronic verification units failed in an election with tens of thousands of polling stations. And the same machines, since most of them did work, were probably a key safeguard against rigging. </p>
<p>Soyinka might have despaired at the unedifying campaign, and he might complain that a general election in Africa’s most populous and richest country could still revolve around two major candidates with severely tarnished records. </p>
<p>But the real complaint should be that neither man actually stood on policy platforms that explained how they would take the country forward.</p>
<p>Neither properly addressed the drop in oil incomes, the underdevelopment of alternative productive sectors, and the huge gap between oligarchs and the poor. Not even Buhari, a man of the north, could say persuasively how he would improve the lack of development in the northern states that, in the end, voted overwhelmingly for him.</p>
<h2>Fighting chance</h2>
<p>So Buhari has his work cut out. First of all, he will certainly take the fight to Boko Haram. He will do this militarily, but also because he is in a position to leverage northern unity in this fight – bringing together generals, traditional rulers, Islamic leaders, and northern technocrats like the former central bank governor, Lamido Sanusi, <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigeria-bank-governor-suspension-adds-to-fears-of-a-more-turbulent-economy-23744">sacked</a> by Jonathan for complaining about corruption.</p>
<p>He will try to rein in corruption, though his chances of success are hard to gauge. Nigerian corruption has become, at its highest levels, extremely sophisticated and technologised – and is part of a global network of laundering through chains of phantom companies in a dozen jurisdictions. Corruption, in short, works, and making it not work will be harder than it looks. </p>
<p>Perhaps he will look to <a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-down-a-big-tiger-wont-end-chinas-ingrained-corruption-29932">Xi’s example in China</a> and focus on gathering a number of famous scalps to prove he is serious. But as Xi has found, netting a few individual crooks is one thing – dismantling the structure of corruption quite another.</p>
<h2>Chin up</h2>
<p>Still, there is plenty to be optimistic about. Buhari garnered much support in Lagos State, so the financial sector appears to be with him. There will be wind in his sails; he will move swiftly to reassure investor confidence, international markets and global financial institutions. He will seek entry to Beijing for the 2016 G20 summit and in general will try to show that Nigeria has finally arrived as a mature world player.</p>
<p>But the new president will have to learn about the outside world fast. Foreign policy was not an issue in this election – indeed, his party’s foreign policy platform was written by outsiders hired to prepare those parts of the platform that were deemed unimportant to the immediate needs of the campaign (declaration: I was myself approached at an early stage to do this.) </p>
<p>This will have to change now a Buhari government is to be formed. As Nigeria moves on from the Jonathan era, its status in the world will be as important as Buhari’s performance on the home front.</p>
<p>Nothing is certain about the coming years, except that change is long overdue. Whatever Buhari’s tenure looks like, no-one will long lament the passing of the Jonathan era: a lightweight in a heavy seat was never going to take such a dense and complex country forward.</p>
<p>Where this triumphant former military dictator of 72 will take it instead remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/39619/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
In the end, Nigeria managed what once seemed impossible and transferred political power relatively peacefully. What now?Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/394162015-03-31T23:40:56Z2015-03-31T23:40:56ZBuhari’s victory in Nigerian election has global significance<p>Muhammadu Buhari’s convincing <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32139858">defeat</a> of incumbent Goodluck Jonathan in the Nigerian presidential election is an event of global significance. To his credit, President Jonathan promptly conceded defeat, thereby discouraging any attempt to impede the transfer of power. </p>
<p>The election was held even as the world’s attention was further drawn to the gruesome brutalities committed by the Boko Haram insurgency. Inexplicably, Africa’s largest armed force, which has been given enormous financial outlays, has not been able to subdue a ragtag militia.</p>
<p>The world desperately needs a victory against cultist jihadism. Nigeria can provide it. As commander-in-chief, Buhari can oversee a coordinated effort to squelch the insurgency. </p>
<p>His victory is also significant because it has been achieved via democratic elections. </p>
<p>In no other large country, with an almost equal number of Muslims and Christians, is such a process conceivable. The subsiding of the Arab Spring deflated hopes for a new concordance between Islam and democracy.</p>
<p>A Nigerian constitutional democracy, led by a former military dictator and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12890807">avowed supporter</a> of Shari’a law, will be a powerful counterpoint to the autocratic upswing symbolized by Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah el-Sissi.</p>
<h2>New hope that corruption will be reduced</h2>
<p>A third notable fact about Buhari’s victory is the hope it rekindles for drastically reducing corruption. You cannot build capable state institutions when the prime motivation of office-holders is to drain the public purse into their pockets, and those of their cronies and kinfolk. </p>
<p>Three decades ago I called this bane of Nigerian political life <a href="https://africaplus.wordpress.com/2013/07/26/prebendalism-and-dysfunctionality-in-nigeria/">“prebendalism.”</a> Goodluck Jonathan, with no claim to high office except his luck in finding himself in the chain of regionalized political patronage, was unable to get off this tiger. The more his administration sought to accomplish, the bigger the problem became, until the surfeit of <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/27/us-nigeria-jonathan-idUSKBN0IG1E220141027">financial scandals</a> and depletion of government revenues eroded his presidency.</p>
<p>Buhari first came to power in December 1983 in a coup d'état as a military disciplinarian determined to punish those accused, and then summarily convicted, of corruption. </p>
<p>In the three decades since he was toppled from the presidency in 1985, he has demonstrated that his passion for public service is not fueled by greed. For example, as chairman of the Petroleum Trust Fund in the 1990s, he oversaw the use of its resources primarily for development projects. At 72 years of age, he has the opportunity to accomplish something that few of his predecessors, military or civilian, have even attempted: serving the nation and its citizens rather than members of the political-business-military class. </p>
<p>Politics in Nigeria often resembles a game of musical chairs. When the music stops, seats are snatched, and the looting commences. In the past, martial tunes would sometimes be heard, and the constitutional edifice would be constructed anew – all at enormous cost to the treasury. </p>
<p>This time around, after the ballot box became the music box, corruption can again be rigorously but lawfully tackled.</p>
<h2>Plaudits to the Nigerian people</h2>
<p>Among the champions of the 2015 national elections, the Nigerian people, collectively, must be saluted. </p>
<p>As Nigerian Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka once stated: “The Nigerian people have always approached democracy and the elites have always turned them back.” Nigerians have often been enticed to the polls by the promise of holding elected officials accountable and even changing them. But politicians, with their well-heeled patrons, thugs-for- hire, and the complicity of electoral staff could usually warp the process. </p>
<p>To obtain more than an “election-like event,” to quote the words of the former US ambassador to their country, John Campbell, Nigerians needed an electoral commission that lived up to its name of being “independent” and “national.”</p>
<p>Thanks to Professor Attahiru Jega, an American-trained political scientist who served as Chairman of Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission, Nigerians are finally endowed with such a commission. </p>
<p>Professor Jega withstood unimaginable <a href="http://www.informationng.com/2015/03/nigeriadecides-were-not-under-pressure-to-declare-elections-inconclusive-jega.html">pressures</a> as the Jonathan political and security team realized that their man’s prospects were dimming. In the face of the acute tensions of catering to nearly 30 million voters, including displaced communities, Jega conducted himself with grace and high professionalism. The Nigerian nation owes him a great debt of gratitude. </p>
<h2>Campaign money tossed around like confetti</h2>
<p>The election campaigning itself, as Soyinka <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/mar/29/wole-soyinka-interview-nigeria-corruption-goodluck-jonathan">declared,</a> was “an embarrassing exercise,” with money thrown about like confetti. </p>
<p>Despite the Boko Haram atrocities, the sharp decline of oil income, missing billions in government revenue and two-thirds of the population mired in poverty, Nigerians were deluged incessantly with campaign giveaways. </p>
<p>In the midst of it all, however, they saw that the gates of political freedom were opening. They came to believe that a born-again democrat, who thrice sought the presidency and now led an historic reconfiguration of political forces, was their best chance to shed the carcass of a crippled giant. </p>
<p>They also took Goodluck Jonathan at his word that, if he lost the election, he would be the first Nigerian president to yield power peacefully to the opposition. </p>
<p>No one should expect that the way forward will be smooth. </p>
<p>Nigeria remains a complex and contentious polity. Nevertheless, the Jonathan administration had become a bridge to nowhere. The manner of his going can now match in dignity how he skillfully <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/%7E/media/research/files/articles/2010/5/nigeria-joseph/05_nigeria_joseph.pdf%5D">wrested power</a> five years ago. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the victor, Muhammadu Buhari, can begin restoring the tattered image of Nigerian governance at home and abroad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/39416/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard A Joseph does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What appears to be a peaceful transference of presidential power in Nigeria – unprecedented in the country’s history – has global significance in the fight against cultist jihadism.Richard A Joseph, Professor , Northwestern UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/392912015-03-31T17:22:09Z2015-03-31T17:22:09ZBuhari wins – but the new president of Nigeria faces an enormous challenge<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/76655/original/image-20150331-1256-1aq93hq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Second time round for Buhari.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.epa.eu/politics-photos/elections-photos/presidential-election-in-nigeria-photos-51865208">EPA/STR</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigerians have chosen General Muhammadu Buhari, a former military ruler, over incumbent Goodluck Jonathan, to be their president. Following an election that saw <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/nigerians-turn-en-masse-critical-presidential-vote-29971743">41 people</a> killed in the north of the country, Goodluck conceded defeat, and congratulated Buhari on his victory. </p>
<p>Buhari’s military regime from 1983 to 1985 <a href="https://theconversation.com/at-72-muhammadu-buhari-could-yet-be-nigerias-comeback-kid-37728">was draconian</a>: he systematically repressed freedom of expression through the jailing of journalists, radical public intellectuals, and student protesters. <a href="http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/prospects-for-democratic-consolidation-in-africa-nigeria-s-transition/202871">He is now saying</a> that “the global triumph of democracy has shown that another and a preferable path to change is possible”.</p>
<p>Nigerians and the international community will be watching whether this time around Buhari will work for the common good in Nigeria.</p>
<h2>Corruption and crisis</h2>
<p>The general political and economic situation in Nigeria is problematic. Nigeria is home to a corrupt government. According to Transparency International, Nigeria is ranked 136 out of 175 states in terms of <a href="http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results">perceptions of corruption</a>. Women are underrepresented in political affairs: until now, the House of Representatives had only one female principal officer, and <a href="http://www.premiumtimesng.com/features-and-interviews/179136-analysis-2015-elections-hold-no-promise-for-improved-women-representation-in-nigerian-politics.html">only 7%</a> of the 362 members were women. The <a href="http://www.aitonline.tv/post-female_lawmakers_want_more_women_in_parliament#sthash.09hpizmt.dpuf">House of Representatives committee on women</a> has called for more participation from women in the nation’s politics. We will now see if the new government responds to this demand. </p>
<p>The economy is in crisis: Nigeria has an unhealthy dependence on its oil exports, which represent more than 80% of its national income. There has now been a drop in oil prices, which means that <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/peteguest/2015/03/18/is-nigeria-heading-for-an-economic-crisis/">public sector jobs will have to be cut</a>; 24% of Nigerians are unemployed. Nigeria must double its <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/06/14396143/nigerias-infrastructure-continental-perspective">investment</a> in infrastructure, and improve its power sector, the water and sanitation sector, its road networks, and its air transport safety.</p>
<p>Nigeria has to be serious about health. The World Health Organisation recommends that governments spend 15% of their budget on health, but Nigeria spends <a href="http://nigeriahealthwatch.com/analysis-of-nigerias-budget-for-health-in-2014/">only 6%</a> of its budget. Nigeria had <a href="http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/786">40,000 pregnancy-related deaths</a> a year account for approximately 14 percent of the world’s total in 2012. </p>
<h2>Northern exposure</h2>
<p>The situation in northern Nigeria is critical. Since 2014, more than 6,000 civilians <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jan/23/boko-haram-nigeria-civilian-death-toll-highest-acled-african-war-zones">have been killed by Boko Haram</a>. Around one million Nigerians <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/nigeria/figures-analysis">have been forcibly displaced</a> within the country, and 200,000 have fled to Cameroon, Niger or Chad. Colonel Joseph Nouma of the Maroua Defence Regiment in the Nigerian army <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/report/101198/no-shortage-of-recruits-for-boko-haram-in-cameroon-s-far-north">told the IRIN news service</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>When you go to border villages, all you see are women and children and old people. Young [men], between the ages of ten and 45 are no longer there. They are across the [Nigerian] border with Boko Haram militants.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the north, regional actors have been more active than the Nigerian government in fighting Boko Haram. With the approval of the African Union, Nigeria and its neighbours – Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Benin – have deployed a 8,700-strong Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to fight <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/06/us-nigeria-violence-bokoharam-idUSKBN0LA2J120150206">around 4,000-6,000</a> Boko Haram Islamist militants. </p>
<p>Presidents from the Economic Community of Central African States (ECOWAS) pledged in early 2015 to create a US$87m emergency fund for military, medical, and logistical support for the MNJTF. Nigeria’s current president expects Boko Haram <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20150320-boko-haram-defeat-less-month-nigeria-president-jonathan/">to be defeated within a month</a>. However, even with the presence of regional allies, Boko Haram is likely to go into hiding and conduct a <a href="http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/178925-reclaiming-territories-not-end-to-boko-haram-experts-warn.html">guerrilla campaign</a>.</p>
<h2>Past policy vacuum</h2>
<p>The way the government has addressed violence in the north has been abysmal: very few measures have been taken. Muslim clerics identified lack of good governance as the primary reason Boko Haram succeeded in recruiting members. According <a href="https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUJA1422_a.html">to a US official</a>, “they warned that similar crises would occur if the government failed to address social problems”.</p>
<p>In terms of social measures, when Boko Haram started fighting in 2009, a “societal reorientation programme” was created in the north. However, <a href="https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUJA1410_a.html">according to one US official</a>, this programme only made it possible for Boko Haram to “recruit more members”, as it had no impact on the population’s well-being.</p>
<p>Military action against Boko Haram has been deplorable, probably because Boko Haram <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/14/boko-haram-why-nigerian-militant-group-powerful">had clear connections to the government</a>. The Nigerian army committed <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/nigeria__more_than_1500_killed_in_armed_conflict_0.pdf">serious human rights violations</a> in its response to Boko Haram. Hundreds of civilians and suspected Boko Haram members <a href="http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/videos/all/dispatches-nigerias-hidden-war">have been killed</a>, and detainees have died in military custody.</p>
<p>In 2015, President Jonathan’s national security adviser, Sambo Dasuki, only mentioned the creation of a single <a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150122NigeriaSecurityQA_0.pdf">social policy</a> – in Kuje prison in the capital Abuja which aims at deradicalising former insurgents. The new government will have to develop social policies to reduce inequalities in order to prevent further violence.</p>
<h2>What the new government has to do</h2>
<p>The economic involvement of the Nigerian government is inadequate. Only half of the investment projects in the north were completed in 2014. </p>
<p>In 2015, the government created a US$133m emergency fund for the north in order to finance 94 different projects such as road construction, railways, energy and agriculture, but the precise use of this fund <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/report/101198/no-shortage-of-recruits-for-boko-haram-in-cameroon-s-far-north">remains to be seen</a>.</p>
<p>The new president will have to address three long-standing and critical issues in the north: economic development, education and health. Economic development is needed to counter Boko Haram, which is <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/report/101198/no-shortage-of-recruits-for-boko-haram-in-cameroon-s-far-north">paying men around US$700-a-month</a> to join its ranks. </p>
<h2>The economy</h2>
<p>The new government must tackle the difficult issue of unemployment which, among all age groups, is at least 75%. Many young people, especially recent graduates, say it is <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/report/101198/no-shortage-of-recruits-for-boko-haram-in-cameroon-s-far-north">impossible to find decent work</a>. For the few who do have a job, the minimum wage is US$70 a month. The new government will also have to address the lack of economic resources and food in the north. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75870/original/image-20150324-17678-1slzsqy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75870/original/image-20150324-17678-1slzsqy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75870/original/image-20150324-17678-1slzsqy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75870/original/image-20150324-17678-1slzsqy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75870/original/image-20150324-17678-1slzsqy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75870/original/image-20150324-17678-1slzsqy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75870/original/image-20150324-17678-1slzsqy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75870/original/image-20150324-17678-1slzsqy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">GDP Index (per capita).</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.jica.go.jp/activities/issues/poverty/profile/pdf/nig_02.pdf">UNDP (2009) Human Development Report Nigeria 2008-2009</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The map above of GDP per capita, and below for malnutrition, show the important north-south economic divide.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75869/original/image-20150324-17716-kwhmym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75869/original/image-20150324-17716-kwhmym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75869/original/image-20150324-17716-kwhmym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75869/original/image-20150324-17716-kwhmym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75869/original/image-20150324-17716-kwhmym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75869/original/image-20150324-17716-kwhmym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75869/original/image-20150324-17716-kwhmym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75869/original/image-20150324-17716-kwhmym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Severe acute malnutrition: 2015 burden and prevalence in the Sahel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2015%20Regional%20HNO%20Final%202014Dec17.pdf">OCHA 2015 Humanitarian Needs Report</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Education</h2>
<p>The new Nigerian government will have to prioritise education. When Boko Haram started attacking civilians in 2009, it was known <a href="https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10LAGOS13_a.html">to oppose “western education models”</a>. However, young men fighting for Boko Haram <a href="http://www.jica.go.jp/activities/issues/poverty/profile/pdf/nig_02.pdf">could not have had much knowledge of education</a>. In 2011 in northern Nigeria, half of the men had no education at all, only 7% completed primary education, and only 6% completed secondary education. Education in the north should therefore be a priority for whoever has power next. This is important not only for men, but it is also essential for women: in 2011, 65% of women had no education, 6% completed primary education, and 3% completed secondary education.</p>
<h2>Health</h2>
<p>The new president will be held accountable for improving health in the north, as clinics are under-staffed, and women are <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/report/95812/nigeria-bridging-the-north-south-maternal-death-divide">ten times</a> more likely to die in childbirth than in the south.</p>
<p>With these conditions Boko Haram filled a vacuum. The militants will now be much harder to remove but ultimately, the next government can take steps to start tackling the problems that allowed them to gain a foothold.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/39291/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Gegout does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A historic win for a former military ruler in a democratic election and a man who ran out of luck. But Nigeria’s new President Muhammadu Buhari has his work cut out for him.Catherine Gegout, Lecturer in International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/394772015-03-30T10:43:11Z2015-03-30T10:43:11ZNigerians defy violence and bad technology in chaotic election<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/nigeria-election-2015">2015 elections in Nigeria</a> were chaotic, but the country’s voters displayed immense courage in showing up at all. More than 20 people were <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-32095283">killed</a>, not in electoral violence between competing parties but by gunmen who didn’t want the elections to happen at all. A further 23 were rumoured <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/23-beheaded-ne-nigeria-eve-election-lawmaker-nurse-165210240.html">beheaded</a> on the eve of the vote. </p>
<p>But even in the troubled north of the country, people stubbornly queued for hours to participate in an exercise that they hoped against hope would not be rigged or violated.</p>
<p>Past elections in Nigeria have been marked by vast and brazen bribery and corruption. Parties and presidential candidates who had not cared for their constituencies suddenly reappeared to bestow lavish gifts on voters and officials alike – an unedifying spectacle of civilian democracy that still seemed preferable to the decades of military rule that had gone before.</p>
<p>But not every military ruler was a tyrant. The presidencies of Generals Gowon, Olusegun Obasanjo, and current candidate <a href="https://theconversation.com/at-72-muhammadu-buhari-could-yet-be-nigerias-comeback-kid-37728">Muhammadu Buhari</a> were dictatorial, yes – but in many ways, they were also aimed at reinvigorating a divided nation. </p>
<h2>Technical hitch</h2>
<p>Today, there seems to be an evolution underway. Nigeria’s corrupt governors will still steal, but they’ll also very conspicuously and publicly endow vast public works both with safeguarded public funds, and with their “own” funds which they acquire. It’s a best of both worlds scenario, where one both steals from the state and is praised for helping the poor with the resources one stole. </p>
<p>Both tendencies are on full display at these elections, but it is unlikely there will be any outright theft of the results. Instead, those who voted found a spectacle of monumental inefficiency and technological confusion. </p>
<p>In an effort to safeguard the vote and count against rigging, the electoral commission introduced one of those longwinded processes that’s too clever by half: prior registration got each voter an electronic voting card, complete with scanned fingerprint. At the polling station, one had to insert the card into something that resembled a credit card machine; the card was verified, and then one’s real fingerprint was also scanned by the machine and compared with the electronic version. </p>
<p>Many of these machines simply didn’t work properly. Even Jonathan himself ended up waiting nearly an hour for his fingerprint to be verified; <a href="http://www.channelstv.com/2015/03/28/card-reader-fails-recognise-jonathans-finger-print-as-buhari-gets-accredited/">it never was</a>, and he had to come back to be processed manually. </p>
<h2>Slow to catch on</h2>
<p>Adding to the confusion, it is close to impossible to distinguish the policies of the two leading candidates.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-election-delay-shows-depths-to-which-goodluck-jonathan-will-sink-37594">Goodluck Jonathan</a> has an appalling track record, and his insouciance has embarrassed Nigeria around the world. </p>
<p>In the face of Boko Haram’s atrocities, he barely seemed to understand his country was in dire peril. He seems genuinely not to have cared about the kidnapped Chibok <a href="https://theconversation.com/boko-haram-announces-truce-to-release-kidnapped-schoolgirls-but-deal-is-plagued-by-doubts-33170">schoolgirls</a>, thinking at first the whole thing was a stunt pulled by his northern political rivals. </p>
<p>In fact, in its first incarnation some years ago, Boko Haram did involve northern politicians seeking leverage, but they have been left behind as the group has morphed. Jonathan did not realise until late in the game that what was afoot was an attempt to carve a separate nation out of Nigeria – not a conventional state, but a Nigerian edition of a caliphate. </p>
<p>He also seems to think that corruption is natural in Nigeria. Instead of taking the chance to tackle it, he sacked the internationally acclaimed central bank governor <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-26270561">Lamido Sanusi</a> for daring to complain about malfeasance. </p>
<p>One would think that Jonathan would want Sanusi’s support and advice. Here is someone who can command respect while speaking to both modernity and tradition, who has international support, and who can claim to understand how a financial capital like Lagos in the south actually works – but no.</p>
<h2>Man of the north</h2>
<p>By contrast, Buhari is an austere man. He seems relatively free from corruption, at least by the standards of Nigeria’s candidates. He is not the first military ruler in civilian clothes: <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-27427213">Obasanjo</a> became a civilian president years after his military rule came to an end, and his tenure went well. But Buhari may not be as open to new ideas. </p>
<p>Buhari is also very much a man of the north, and although he has strong organisational support from some southern governors, he may not have electoral support in the south. He has not declared a convincing agenda for the region – and not even for Lagos, Nigeria’s financial hub. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, while 70-year-old Buhari is not the face of a “new generation”, he has managed to muster a new movement behind him. He played his hand well to secure the nomination of the new All Progressive Congress (<a href="http://thinkafricapress.com/nigeria/all-progressive-congress-apc">APC</a>) party, which broke away from Jonathan’s PDP. </p>
<p>Governors and senators began defecting from Jonathan in astonishment at his ineptitude, and at the conceit that prevented him from realising how inept he was. Then, against all odds, they put aside their differences and came together in a single serious party. </p>
<p>This remarkable opposition unity is quite an accomplishment, and it shows that a government as poor as Jonathan’s will eventually become too much to bear. But the results are not in yet, and the violence and technical chaos of the election have made the state of Nigerian democracy plain to see. </p>
<p>And given the strange blend of great progress and terrible under-development over which Goodluck Jonathan has presided, it is perhaps fitting that his own fingerprint could not be verified when he tried to vote for himself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/39477/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The 2015 elections in Nigeria were chaotic, but the country’s voters displayed immense courage in showing up at all. More than 20 people were killed, not in electoral violence between competing parties…Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/361642015-03-27T12:48:44Z2015-03-27T12:48:44ZBoko Haram’s six years of terror have revealed the depth of Nigeria’s troubles<p>As Nigeria’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-election-delay-shows-depths-to-which-goodluck-jonathan-will-sink-37594">rescheduled election</a> approaches, the international community, especially Europe and <a href="http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/pr_03212015.html">America</a>, have insisted that the will of the people should and must be heard – since the “<a href="http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/178950-falana-warns-of-coup-says-elections-may-not-hold.html">security concerns</a>” that shifted the elections have apparently been substantially addressed. </p>
<p>But many commentators take a different view, and see critical <a href="http://newafricanmagazine.com/winning-easy-part/">challenges</a> in Nigeria’s immediate future, regardless of whether Goodluck Jonathan survives or loses. And there is scarcely a more terrifying challenge on the horizon than the lethal six-year insurgency fought by Boko Haram.</p>
<h2>Rotten record</h2>
<p>Ever since coming to prominence in 2002, the Jama’atu Ahl us-Sunnah Li’da’awati Wal Jihad (The Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Struggle) saga, popularly referred to as Boko Haram (loosely, “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501">Western Education is Forbidden</a>”, has made a mockery of all Nigeria’s state institutions, and its military above all. </p>
<p>Claiming to be the <a href="http://www.salafimanhaj.com/?p=44">Firqat un-Naji’ah</a> (the “Saved” sect), Boko Haram seeks to create a “pure” Islamic state, in which it <a href="https://theconversation.com/boko-haram-the-terror-group-that-kidnapped-200-schoolgirls-25931">implements a brand of Sharia law</a> under which Muslims, Christians and atheists who oppose their doctrine <a href="http://zainabusman.wordpress.com/2014/11/01/what-does-boko-haram-want-insights-by-ahmad-salkida/">must face death</a>.</p>
<p>Nigeria’s relatively poor governance has provided a febrile atmosphere for the group. With widespread corruption, poverty, security force abuses and impunity, there has been little to stop Boko Haram’s troops from repeatedly attacking strategic <a href="http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/category/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/">targets</a>, destroying lives and property and <a href="http://www.channelstv.com/2014/02/25/students-killed-in-fresh-school-attack-in-yobe/">slaughtering</a> almost everyone in their path. </p>
<p>Since a <a href="http://www.dw.de/nigerias-state-of-emergency-a-failure/a-18079380">state of emergency</a> was imposed in three states in North Eastern Nigeria (Borno, Yobe and Adamawa) in 2012, the Nigerian state charged with the responsibility of securing and protecting lives and property seems incapable of the great task of providing a safe and <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2014/10/28/displaced-documentary-about-nigerians-turned-refugees-inside-their-country-boko-haram">protected environment</a> for its citizens.</p>
<h1>BringBackOurGirls</h1>
<p>On April 14 2014, 276 girls were kidnapped from the Girls Secondary School in Chibok, setting off a roller coaster of inconsistencies and walk-backs that in the end have come to nothing.</p>
<p>The response to the kidnapping was greatly complicated not just by the fear instilled by the sect, but also by the response of the Nigerian government and its sympathisers. The messages coming out of Abuja about the girls’ fate have been conflicted and confusing to say the least. </p>
<p>In place of decisive and effective action to find the girls, <a href="http://leadership.ng/news/370096/falana-condemns-patience-jonathan-others-claim-chibok-girls">questions have been raised</a> about the real motive behind the attacks and the actual number of girls kidnapped. At one point, the <a href="http://abusidiqu.com/chibok-girls-rescue-chronicle-false-narratives-inconsistencies-nigerian-government-sesugh-akume/">director of Defence Information</a> announced the rescue of 129 girls – but then retracted his statement the next day. </p>
<p><a href="http://time.com/3540263/girls-boko-haram-escape/">57 of the 276 girls escaped</a>, The Nigerian military’s inability to <a href="http://www.hrw.org/reports/2014/10/27/those-terrible-weeks-their-camp-0">locate</a> and rescue the remaining 219 girls led to local and international outrage, even as the <a href="http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/167179-day-130-bringbackourgirls-protest.html">#BBOG</a> movement seeking the girls’ <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-29762252">release</a> spread around the world. By the end of 2014, the response had descended into depressing <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-16-battling-boko-haram-and-apathy">apathy</a> – and the schoolgirls have <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/missing-nigeria-girls-fade-from-election-campaign-1423785791">hardly featured</a> in the 2015 presidential campaign. </p>
<h2>Chaos reigns</h2>
<p>The same confusion and impotence that hobbled the search for the girls has marked the whole of Nigeria’s response to Boko Haram’s unpredictable and murderous advance.</p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.thecable.ng/boko-haram-release-chibok-girls-monday">ceasefire deal</a>, announced on October 17 2014, which was brokered by the Nigerian state through the Chadian government, was <a href="http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/170441-full-transcript-of-shekaus-latest-video-on-ceasefire-deal-chibok-girls.html">denied</a> by Abubakar Shekau, the acclaimed leader of the sect, further debunking <a href="http://www.thecable.ng/breaking-boko-haram-announces-ceasefire">statements</a> by the Nigerian state, as well as the bogus identities of the Boko Haram negotiators. </p>
<p>Since being dislodged from Maiduguri and relocating to the Sambisa forest in southern Borno State after a joint offensive of the Nigerian military and the civilian vigilante militia (CJTF), Boko Haram has hardly backed down.</p>
<p>It declared a <a href="http://www.punchng.com/news/boko-haram-declares-gwoza-caliphate/">caliphate</a> with headquarters at Gwoza in August 2014, which was again put under its draconian flavour of <a href="http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31522469">Sharia</a>. The January 3 2015 <a href="https://theconversation.com/baga-devastated-a-horror-story-however-many-people-died-36093">assault on the border town of Baga</a> on Lake Chad and the camp of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-30672391">MNJTF</a>) was possibly the <a href="http://www.afp.com/en/node/3277712#.VRCTCfmsV8E">deadliest massacre</a> the group has ever perpetrated. It also exposed the cripplingly low <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2014/12/23/why-we-cant-defeat-boko-haram-army-commander-and-family-threatened-over-letter-jonathan">morale</a> and professionalism that hobbles the Nigerian military.</p>
<p>With <a href="http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31113509">tensions</a> rising as a result of the presidential <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/13/nigeria-election-divisions_n_6669550.html">elections</a> scheduled for February 2015 – and facing a credible <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2015/03/20/video-we-made-jega-shift-election-because-it-was-clear-buhari-would-win-february-14th-dr">threat</a> from a strong and viable <a href="http://aguntasolo.com/2014/12/30/why-buhari/">opposition</a>, the Nigerian government <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2015/03/20/video-we-made-jega-shift-election-because-it-was-clear-buhari-would-win-february-14th-dr">orchestrated</a> a six-week postponement of the polls till March 28, citing some bogus <a href="http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31296078">security</a> reasons.</p>
<p>Suddenly, what seemed impossible to achieve in six years was being promised in <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11485024/We-will-eradicate-Boko-Haram-within-a-months-says-Nigeria-president.html">six weeks</a>. With the approval of the African Union, a multinational response spearheaded by Cameroon, Chad and Niger, with Nigeria in <a href="http://www.punchng.com/news/bharam-nigeria-pays-chadian-nigerien-soldiers-n146m-monthly/">tow</a>, which has led to Boko Haram fighters fleeing from several locations in the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/21/world/africa/nigerian-army-noticeably-absent-in-town-taken-from-boko-haram.html?_r=1">north-eastern</a> part of Nigeria, is still plagued by operational <a href="http://www.buzzfeed.com/aramroston/blackwater-founder-erik-prince-pitched-private-fighting-forc#.xf9rjjKYB">inconsistencies</a> from the Nigerian side as a result of six years of inaction.</p>
<p>All in all, the progress of the anti-Boko Haram coalition has been marred by <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31162979">cross-border attacks</a> and competing claims and denials about <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-32058172">new kidnappings</a> – so much so that it is very difficult to know where the battle against Boko Haram stands. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the chaos of the whole Boko Haram affair has done nothing to ease the <a href="http://businessdayonline.com/2014/09/heda-seeks-icc-intervention/#.VKo9vyusV8E">mood of Nigerian society</a>. People are sceptical, doubtful, disappointed and angry with the poor show of political will and outright incompetence with which the authorities have met the six-year insurgency. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.huhuonline.com/index.php/opinions/4287-challenges-of-governance-in-era-of-insurgency">road map</a> to counter the Boko Haram insurgency may be finally working by some measures, but the integrity of the nation is at stake. Whoever wins the election has a daunting task ahead: to cast aside the political and ethnic constraints that have <a href="http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/176310-jonathan-unveils-new-nigeria-security-strategy.html">weakened</a> the legitimacy of the state and the military for too long.</p>
<p>The bodies lying in Boko Haram’s wake are the measure of that failure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36164/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zainab Mai-Bornu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Nigeria goes to the polls, the fight against Boko Haram may be reaching a turning point – but in whose favour?Zainab Mai-Bornu, PhD Student, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/372592015-03-27T11:35:23Z2015-03-27T11:35:23ZExplainer: What’s at stake in the Nigerian election?<p>Africa’s largest economy and biggest democracy will hold a hotly contested <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/nigerias-elections-2015-144340601.html">presidential election on March 28</a>. In addition to Nigeria’s perennial <a href="http://example.com/">problem of corruption</a>, the major issues at stake are national and regional security alongside the country’s economic future. </p>
<p>Responsible for killing many thousands and displacing a million and a half people in the country’s northeast, the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram constitutes a serious threat not only to Nigeria but to West Africa more generally. At the same time, falling global prices for the oil produced in Nigeria’s Niger Delta have contributed to a significant decline of national revenue. Ratings agency Standard & Poor’s <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0703eb54-cf37-11e4-b761-00144feab7de.html">downgraded Nigeria’s sovereign rating</a> on March 20, citing the oil price among other concerns. </p>
<p>The two main contestants for the presidency are the incumbent president, Goodluck Jonathan of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP), a Christian from Nigeria’s predominantly Christian Niger Delta, and the northern Nigerian Muslim leader, <a href="https://theconversation.com/at-72-muhammadu-buhari-could-yet-be-nigerias-comeback-kid-37728">Muhammadu Buhari</a>, of the All Progressives Congress (APC). </p>
<p>Originally slated for February 14, the Nigerian elections <a href="https://theconversation.com/suspicion-runs-high-in-nigeria-after-government-delays-election-37382">were postponed to March 28</a> by the National Electoral Commission in order to give a military task force time to secure parts of north-eastern Nigeria which had fallen under the control of the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram. The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-31917421">opening successes</a> of this military intervention have been an important factor for the outcome of the forthcoming elections. </p>
<h2>The gift of incumbency</h2>
<p>The PDP has been in power since Nigeria’s return to civilian politics in 1999. This is partly due to its ability to negotiate Nigeria’s main political division between a predominantly Muslim north and a largely Christian south, and partly because of its ability to manage relations with the military after almost two decades of military rule. </p>
<p>After the former military head of state Olusegun Obasanjo, a southern Christian, held power as a civilian president between 1999 and 2007, the presidency passed on to Umaru Yar’Adua, a northern Nigerian Muslim. When <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8663824.stm">Yar’Adua died in office in 2010</a>, Goodluck Jonathan, as vice-president, took over the administration. Jonathan’s emergence as the PDP’s presidential candidate in the election that followed in 2011 drew strongly on his incumbency. It was especially hailed in his home region, the oil-producing Niger Delta, as the first recognition of the region’s immense contribution to the country’s national income.</p>
<h2>Religious divisions</h2>
<p>But Jonathan’s electoral victory in 2011 also <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/18/nigerian-election-marred-by-violence">led to widespread violence</a> in northern Nigeria, where Buhari had established himself as the country’s main opposition leader. According <a href="http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR359-Religion-and-Conflict-in-Nigeria.pdf">to official figures</a>, Buhari won 64% of the vote in the 12 “core” northern states in 2011. </p>
<p>But <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12890807">Buhari’s endorsement</a> of the introduction of Islamic or “sharia” law from 1999 in 12 northern Nigerian states divided the northern vote along religious lines and alienated him from the northern Christian population. </p>
<p>After his loss in 2011, Buhari began to adopt a more collaborative approach. He took a lead <a href="http://www.theafricareport.com/West-Africa/nigeria-united-they-stand-against-goodluck-jonathan.html">in uniting the national opposition</a> under the banner of the APC in 2013, and has since gained a convincing foothold in the south. </p>
<p>Anecdotal evidence from this region suggests that voting intentions do not always reflect religious identification. But the fact that southern support for Buhari is strongest in the religiously mixed south-west means that his <a href="http://www.washingtonpost%20Washington'sWashingtonians%20.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/30/nigerians-go-to-the-polls-in-a-tight-race-amid-concerns-about-election-safety-credibility/">support base is strongest</a> in states with a significant Muslim population. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/76239/original/image-20150327-16105-dpbw6g.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/76239/original/image-20150327-16105-dpbw6g.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/76239/original/image-20150327-16105-dpbw6g.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=290&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76239/original/image-20150327-16105-dpbw6g.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=290&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76239/original/image-20150327-16105-dpbw6g.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=290&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76239/original/image-20150327-16105-dpbw6g.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76239/original/image-20150327-16105-dpbw6g.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76239/original/image-20150327-16105-dpbw6g.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Presidential voting intentions by zone, 2014 for PDP (Jonathan) and APC (Buhari).</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno11.pdf">Afrobarometer</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In turn, Jonathan has openly pursued Christian endorsements ahead of the 2015 election, for example embarking on a shared <a href="http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR359-Religion-and-Conflict-in-Nigeria.pdf">Christian “pilgrimage” to Jerusalem</a> with Ayo Oritsejafor, the president of the Christian Association of Nigeria in October 2014.</p>
<p>But together with his lack of military links, Jonathan’s open identification with Christian interests may have limited his chances for re-election. He has been <a href="http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/4474/Fuel_fraud_fans_public_anger">seemingly unwilling</a> to address large-scale corruption or sustained reforms to improve the provision of basic services such as electricity. Initial enthusiasm for a raft of reforms to the <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/27/uk-nigeria-election-electricity-idUKKBN0MN0SH20150327">power sector has stalled</a>, and little has changed on the ground. </p>
<p>Jonathan has also failed to deal successfully with the challenge of Boko Haram, even after international attention was drawn to the threat posed by the group after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/boko-haram-the-terror-group-that-kidnapped-200-schoolgirls-25931">kidnapping of about 200 school girls</a> from the town of Chibok in April 2014. </p>
<p>As most victims of Boko Haram have been Muslim, Jonathan’s inactivity was perceived both as a sign of weakness and as an indication of his disregard for Muslim voters. In contrast, Buhari – who, like Obasanjo, was a former military head of state in the 1980s when he became famous for his “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12890807">war against indiscipline</a>” – has to some seemed better positioned not only to tackle Boko Haram but also to address the country’s corruption and infrastructural problems. </p>
<h2>Security may be trump card</h2>
<p>But if some observers speculated that Jonathan was the likely loser of the elections ahead of the original February date, the military successes of the past six weeks have levelled the playing field again. Confirming his ability to engage with both Boko Haram and the Nigerian military, the recent campaign has established that Jonathan can provide firm leadership. </p>
<p>This may be enough for those voters who are painfully aware that the relative peace in the Niger Delta owes much to Jonathan’s presidency. Officially, disarmed militant groups still have excellent access to small arms, often obtained in return for their toleration of illegal refineries. There is little doubt that, if provoked, Niger Delta groups are capable of limiting Nigeria’s oil production and so further reducing the national revenue and creating considerable unrest in the south of the country. Some <a href="https://theconversation.com/militants-that-terrorised-nigeria-before-boko-haram-resurface-for-the-election-38737">militants have called for action</a> should Buhari win. </p>
<p>Voters’ concerns about regional security vie with economic, political and religious interests. An electoral victory for Jonathan promises relative economic stability and peace in Nigeria’s south, but it is not likely to bring political reform. </p>
<p>By contrast, a victory for Buhari might limit Nigeria’s economic development if unrest resumes in the Delta, but it offers a realistic chance of improved security in the north as well as of much-desired political change. Yet, given Buhari’s authoritarian record while in power in the 1980s, a vote for change is, for many voters, an expression of faith that the bearer of their hopes himself has changed. </p>
<hr>
<p>Click here for articles on <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/nigeria-election-2015">Nigeria’s 2015 election</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37259/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Insa Nolte receives funding from the European Research Council (ERC).</span></em></p>Nigeria heads to the polls on March 28 to choose between incumbent Goodluck Jonathan and former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari.Insa Nolte, Senior Lecturer in African Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/387372015-03-25T06:32:13Z2015-03-25T06:32:13ZMilitants that terrorised Nigeria before Boko Haram resurface for the election<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75367/original/image-20150319-1604-1p604sw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Five years after amnesty, how serious are threats from some former militants?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">George Esiri/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The security threat posed by Islamist group Boko Haram in the north-east of Nigeria has attracted international attention – and been cited as the reason for the postponement of the country’s elections until March 28. Less, however, is heard of the Niger Delta militants, who have said they will respond violently should incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan lose his re-election bid.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75234/original/image-20150318-2490-12mrtiq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75234/original/image-20150318-2490-12mrtiq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75234/original/image-20150318-2490-12mrtiq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75234/original/image-20150318-2490-12mrtiq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75234/original/image-20150318-2490-12mrtiq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75234/original/image-20150318-2490-12mrtiq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75234/original/image-20150318-2490-12mrtiq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75234/original/image-20150318-2490-12mrtiq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Niger Delta: no good luck needed for Jonathan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodluck_Jonathan#/media/File:Goodluck_Jonathan_World_Economic_Forum_2013.jpg">World Economic Forum</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The militants, who made headlines by blowing up pipelines and kidnapping foreign workers in a bid to control oil revenue, reached a negotiated settlement with the Nigerian state in 2009 – reportedly <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22357597">at a cost of US$500m a year</a>. But <a href="http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/178213-therell-be-no-war-whether-jonathan-loses-or-not-ex-niger-delta-militants.html">some former militants have called</a> for action should Jonathan’s main challenger, Muhammadu Buhari win the election. Other former militants have said they would not react. But drawing on Nigeria’s history of violence around elections, it would be foolish to ignore the warning signs.</p>
<h2>Election violence</h2>
<p>The main candidates in the election hail from two of Nigeria’s major volatile areas. Buhari is of Fulani origin and is popular in the north, including his home state of Katsina – one of the northern states ravaged by Boko Haram – and around the capital Lagos. Jonathan, however, is an Ijaw from Bayelsa State in the south-east, <a href="http://qz.com/364283/nigerias-jonathan-doesnt-need-good-luck-for-votes-in-his-delta-region-stronghold/">where he has a stronghold</a> and where the Delta militants are based. </p>
<p>As is characteristic of Nigeria’s elections, Jonathan and Buhari’s political campaigns have <a href="http://www.cknnigeria.com/2014/04/pdp-once-again-accuse-apc-of-being.html">been acrimonious</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31111572">violent</a>. This kind of violence has historically gone hand-in-hand with questions over the quality of freeness and fairness of elections, with frequent accusations of fraudulent activity. <a href="http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0604/nigeria0604.pdf">The 2003</a> and <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/04/24/nigeria-presidential-election-marred-fraud-violence">2007 elections</a> were marked by dissatisfaction of election observers, candidates, supporters of candidates and parties, voters, and in some cases the country’s election authority itself, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).</p>
<p>The 2011 elections were generally claimed to be the <a href="http://www.loc.gov/law/help/nigeria-election-law/index.php#_ftn17">most credible to be organised</a> since 1999 (they were judged free and fair by observer groups such as Amnesty International, ECOWAS Observation Mission, and the European Union Election Observation Mission to Nigeria), but even then <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/-/1066/1148266/-/12k89km/-/index.html">violence was high</a>, claiming <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800">around 800 lives</a> in the northern states of Bauchi, Adamawa, Kano and Kaduna (all strongholds of Buhari, who also ran in 2011). It was described in many quarters as the bloodiest election recorded in Nigeria.</p>
<p>If Buhari loses <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/220-nigeria-s-dangerous-2015-elections-limiting-the-violence.aspx">this may happen again</a>. But the potential removal of Jonathan, a key ally in office, will make the Niger Delta unhappy. The rejection of the son of their soil (he is commonly referred to as “The One” in the region) could stir violence – even if Buhari wins the elections in a free, fair and transparent manner. </p>
<p>But it may be more than this. As vice-president, Jonathan was also instrumental in the negotiated settlement of the militants and their whopping US$500m-a-year package. His removal may have dire implications, and one way militants can demonstrate they still have power should Jonathan lose the election is through violence.</p>
<h2>In the event of violence</h2>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75366/original/image-20150319-1562-1r8a7au.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75366/original/image-20150319-1562-1r8a7au.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75366/original/image-20150319-1562-1r8a7au.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75366/original/image-20150319-1562-1r8a7au.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75366/original/image-20150319-1562-1r8a7au.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75366/original/image-20150319-1562-1r8a7au.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75366/original/image-20150319-1562-1r8a7au.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Buhari of the APC this year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/chathamhouse/16628699446/in/photolist-49MVL-rfbug3-2rphd-2rvL5-2rx5S-2rx5T-2rx5Q-k1EJP3-dE1EyL-k1EJQW-nTRG79-rkqr1A-9tW1dT">Chatham House</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Before the 2011 elections, Buhari <a href="http://www.nairaland.com/615556/april-polls-lynch-anybody-attempts">reportedly urged</a> supporters to remain in polling stations after casting their votes, and lynch those who attempted any electoral fraud on behalf of opponents. He subsequently lost the election and inevitably claimed it was rigged. Prior to Jonathan leading the PDP in the 2011 elections, a leading member of his own party, Lawal Kaita, said the north was determined <a href="http://dailyindependentnig.com/2012/06/making-nigeria-ungovernable-for-president-jonathan/">to make the country “ungovernable”</a> in the event that Jonathan or any southerner came to power. </p>
<p>Jonathan, of course, did become president and the security situation since then has deteriorated. Any election-security analyses of the 2011 election and beyond must consider a symbiotic relationship between the threats of violence, the subsequent killing of 800 in 2011 and the deterioration of security in Nigeria. </p>
<h2>Maturity and leadership: a tough ask</h2>
<p>The state has never adequately punished criminality – either the threat of violence and instability before and on polling day or the violence perpetrated afterwards. If Delta violence did break out, would either Jonathan, on his way out, punish wrongdoers, or would Buhari, as a new president, be able to ensure peace? The inability of the state to punish impunity in the past means it is unlikely to lead happen.</p>
<p>What Nigeria needs as a solution in the short term is a show of utmost maturity and leadership by the main contestants and an acceptance of the election verdict. Any complaint must go through official procedures to resolve election disputes rather than inciting supporters to engage in violence. While the Niger Delta militants may not accept a verdict that removes Jonathan from office, the latter could still reach out to his kinsmen to respect the verdict of the people. If Buhari loses, one hopes he would do the same.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75233/original/image-20150318-2506-1jlezjs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75233/original/image-20150318-2506-1jlezjs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=614&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75233/original/image-20150318-2506-1jlezjs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=614&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75233/original/image-20150318-2506-1jlezjs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=614&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75233/original/image-20150318-2506-1jlezjs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=772&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75233/original/image-20150318-2506-1jlezjs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=772&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75233/original/image-20150318-2506-1jlezjs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=772&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Healing the divides.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niger_Delta#/media/File:Nigerdelta_NASA.jpg">NASA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But in the long term, the solution that Nigeria needs is national healing through dialogue that addresses ethno-religious differences. The state has yet to take responsibility to heal the great wounds caused by the Biafran War, which ran for over two years from 1967 and claimed thousands of lives, let alone uniting all citizens. It now also has Boko Haram to deal with. We can only hope that the Delta militants who claim they will not react in the event of a Buhari win have the upper hand.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/38737/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdul-Jalilu Ateku receives funding from Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the UK working on security issues in West Africa in my University. </span></em></p>Islamist group raises real fears over security around national vote, but there are others threatening the peace.Abdul-Jalilu Ateku, PhD Candidate in International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/361822015-01-13T06:07:22Z2015-01-13T06:07:22ZGoodluck Jonathan: president went dancing two days after Boko Haram massacre at Baga<p>In France 13 people <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30708237">are murdered</a> by Islamic terrorists and it becomes a global news event, with around 50 world leaders visiting the country to take part in the mourning. In Nigeria, up to 2,000 people <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/09/boko-haram-deadliest-massacre-baga-nigeria">are murdered</a> by Islamic terrorists and it barely makes headlines at all. </p>
<p>Someone at most news outlets took the decision last week and elsewhere that the Nigerian slaughter in the town of Baga was far less newsworthy. Without overstating the point, that just wasn’t the right thing to do. It shouldn’t matter to journalists where the news is. It should simply about reporting the biggest stories of the day. </p>
<p>But however disappointed by this difference in treatment, Nigeria’s government has to take some responsibility. A couple of days after the atrocity President Jonathan thought it appropriate to allow the wedding of his foster daughter to go ahead – and to be <a href="http://www.romancemeetslife.com/2015/01/president-goodluck-jonathan-dances-with.html">seen to be</a> dancing during the celebration. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68753/original/image-20150112-23782-19z9a78.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68753/original/image-20150112-23782-19z9a78.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68753/original/image-20150112-23782-19z9a78.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68753/original/image-20150112-23782-19z9a78.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68753/original/image-20150112-23782-19z9a78.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68753/original/image-20150112-23782-19z9a78.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68753/original/image-20150112-23782-19z9a78.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68753/original/image-20150112-23782-19z9a78.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Jonathan dancing at his foster daughter’s wedding.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.romancemeetslife.com/2015/01/president-goodluck-jonathan-dances-with.html">Instagram</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Wherever the president goes, the media follows. When you have a president who thinks that the best thing to do is to go dancing, it shows he has no respect for the people who died. Compare that with President Hollande of France <a href="http://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/446581--world-leaders-condemn-attack-on-satirical-paris-magazine">visiting the crime scene</a> shortly after the Charlie Hebdo massacre. Do you think his daughter’s wedding would have gone ahead (grandly) 48 hours after the country went into mourning?</p>
<h2>The ongoing mystery</h2>
<p>Another reason, I think, for the relative lack of coverage over Boko Haram’s worst atrocity is that the terrorist group is still a mystery to us and its impact is thought to be confined to Nigeria. It is a very different movement to the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11467394">MEND</a>, which everyone knew was all about oil, a commodity of utmost global importance. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68752/original/image-20150112-23782-1cf69u8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68752/original/image-20150112-23782-1cf69u8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68752/original/image-20150112-23782-1cf69u8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68752/original/image-20150112-23782-1cf69u8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68752/original/image-20150112-23782-1cf69u8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68752/original/image-20150112-23782-1cf69u8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68752/original/image-20150112-23782-1cf69u8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68752/original/image-20150112-23782-1cf69u8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Confusing motives: Boko Haram.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Logo_of_Boko_Haram.svg">Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The only thing we can say with any confidence about Boko Haram is that it opposes any form of Western civilisation. The real reason why is unclear, except to say that its members think the West corrupts “true” Islamic virtues. Of course most of the people who were killed in the town of Baga are likely to have been Muslims, but as far as Boko Haram is concerned they were clearly not true Muslims as they were open to some western ideals. Equally the group <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/10934291/Boko-Haram-kill-Christian-worshippers-and-burn-churches-in-latest-Nigeria-attack.html">has targeted</a> churches, however, so its main objectives are vague. </p>
<p>It is equally difficult to say where it is getting the funding from and who is supplying its weapons. There are <a href="http://anglicanink.com/article/islam-not-poverty-driving-boko-haram-terror-campaign-says-archbishop">pointers to</a> al-Qaeda and <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/missing-nigeria-schoolgirls/boko-haram-trades-terrorist-tactics-somalias-al-shabaab-n140456">some mentions</a> of the Sudanese group al-Shabaab, and <a href="http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/australian-negotiator-names-ihejirika-sheriff-as-sponsors-of-boko-haram/187635/">northern Nigerian politicians</a> but Boko Haram has not revealed clear links with anyone. The lack of specificity in Boko Haram’s motives makes it difficult to link it directly to any other groups – note the very clear distinction here with the Charlie Hebdo attackers, who were both linked to militants elsewhere and were clearly reacting against cartoons that they saw as blasphemous. </p>
<h2>Election purdah</h2>
<p>While <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/12/paris-attacks-france-guard-vulnerable-locations-hayat-boumeddienne">France is taking</a> immediate strong steps to deal with its terrorist problem, it is clear that Nigeria will have to wait until after the national elections on February 14 to have a clear picture of what will happen next with Boko Haram. </p>
<p>It appears that one of the things that is limiting the ability of the military to tackle the group at present is the absence of a clear offensive mandate. It seems that the military strategy has been about limiting Boko Haram’s incursion cautiously rather than overrunning it – some would say to mask the reality that the armed forces are ill-prepared for going into battle. Indeed some <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-30526725">Nigerian soldiers</a> were recently court-martialed and sentenced to death for refusing to continue fighting Boko Haram on the basis that they weren’t given adequate arms and ammunition, among other things. </p>
<p>If Jonathan wins the election, people think the same indecisive approach will continue. There is a feeling that things will be different if his main challenger for president, Muhammadu Buhari, wins. Buhari is both a northerner and a former military leader and is expected to have more understanding of, and control over, the armed forces. </p>
<h2>Who will win?</h2>
<p>It is very difficult to say who will win the election at this stage. Jonathan has the advantage of incumbency and his party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) has raised <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2014/12/21/govs-businessmen-others-donate-n2127bn-jonathan">far greater amounts</a> for the campaign. However, many people are generally tired of the years of non-progress and would say that any change would be good. Besides, Buhari has positive records of discipline and non-corruption. </p>
<p>The critical question is how many will vote. Many middle-class people often abstain from voting because they think the elections are rigged but the the rise of social media has made a difference in recent elections. Clearly it is much harder to rig elections now. </p>
<p>The north of the country will probably vote for Buhari, while the south, where Jonathan comes from, will probably vote for him. So the election will probably be decided in the east and south-west. The latter is where Buhari’s running mate Yemi Osinbajo is from. He’s a professor with a good track record in public office (in Lagos state). These make him an attractive prospect for the electorate. </p>
<p>Where does the latest Boko Haram atrocity fit into this picture? It certainly will not have helped the incumbent. One of the things going against Jonathan is the pervasive sense of insecurity. Combine that with the fact that he chose to go dancing at a family wedding just after up to 2,000 people had been killed – it doesn’t look good. </p>
<p>This will make it easier for Buhari to cash in on his military background. Boko Haram members will not vote, one assumes. But if they did, they would vote for Jonathan. They will certainly not have much to worry about unless and until he is ejected from office.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36182/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rhuks Ako does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In France 13 people are murdered by Islamic terrorists and it becomes a global news event, with around 50 world leaders visiting the country to take part in the mourning. In Nigeria, up to 2,000 people…Rhuks Ako, Lecturer, University of HullLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/274662014-06-02T12:20:58Z2014-06-02T12:20:58ZBeatings, embarrassments and bad luck bedevil African leaders
<p>It has been an interesting month for leaders across Africa. Goodluck Jonathan finally declared a “<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/29/goodluck-jonathan-nigeria-war-against-terrorists_n_5408989.html">total war</a>” against Boko Haram despite not having the means to wage one, and after a puzzlingly sluggish response time (“Lightning Jonathan” might well become his new ironic nickname). He was taken for a total lightweight by the assembled world leaders at May’s Paris summit, who came away muttering that they were less than impressed by Nigeria’s <a href="http://nigeriaworld.com/articles/2014/may/272.html">accidental</a>, lacklustre and luck-free president.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, South Africa’s re-elected Jacob Zuma gave a <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=17419">victory speech</a> that crowed at his defeated opposition, while including nothing but platitudes about the state of his country and its people and what he would do for them. But he also finally did something genuinely symbolic: he appointed the first openly gay cabinet minister in the continent of Africa, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/26/south-africa-appoints-gay-minister-lynne-brown">Lynne Brown</a>. </p>
<p>This was of course in keeping with the South African constitution, which remains the most advanced in the world on the measure of guaranteed equality for all groups and persuasions. If it was meant to send a signal to a seemingly homophobic continent, it still did nothing to stop the inauguration of Ugandan foreign minister <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/01/uganda-anti-gay-minister-human-rights-kutesa">Sam Kutesa</a> as head of the UN General Assembly. </p>
<p>That was an ill-starred appointment indeed. Kutesa supported the Ugandan legislation that proscribed homosexuality and set terrifyingly harsh penalties for its practice, and said himself that Africa abhorred homosexuality. The Ugandan gay community has shown much defiant resistance. It held a <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/second-annual-gay-pride-parade-held-in-uganda/1723313.html">gay pride march</a> on August 4 2013, which was mercifully unmarked by violence. But the climate of Ugandan politics and the new legislation make a repeat highly unlikely.</p>
<p>The same cannot be said for the Zimbabwean riot police, sent into Harare’s Budriro township to warn the <a href="http://www.thezimmail.co.zw/2014/05/30/multimedia-violence-erupts-at-johane-masowe-shrine-in-budiriro-2/">Johane Masowe Chishanu Apostolic sect</a> against their controversial behaviour. Clad in their white robes, the sect confronted the riot police and beat them to a pulp. </p>
<p>Members of the opposition MDC, often beaten to a pulp themselves by the same riot police, might take some pleasure in videos of the spectacle and the hip-hop soundtrack that has been married to the footage in <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2014/05/31/budiriro-mapostori-remix/">viral videos</a>. </p>
<p>But the sect was targeted after accusations of abuse against women and children, and that reflects one thing that has gone right in Zimbabwe: the adoption last year of a strange new constitution. It is studded with “exceptional” clauses that allow the ruling ZANU-PF party to behave exactly as it wishes to for the next ten years – but it is also <a href="http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2014/01/24/fight-womens-rights-far/">very strong on gender rights</a>. So here we have the riot police going in to enforce gender rights and taking a beating which, from the footage, appeared comprehensive. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in the north of the continent, Egyptian military leader Abdufattah al-Sisi turned the clock back to the days of Mubarak, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27614776">using elections as a tool</a>; in neighbouring Libya, rogue general <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/id/101718068">Khalifa Hafta</a> similarly set about crushing Islamic militias on the pretext of maintaing stability, while a fractious and useless civilian leadership fumed and continued to argue with itself. “Wait until elections,” cried the Libyan leaders – but in such a <a href="https://theconversation.com/nato-must-take-responsibility-for-spiralling-violence-in-libya-27050">mismanaged</a> country, elections will not solve anything for now.</p>
<p>Nor will they solve anything in Malawi, where the <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/035f6a4c-e968-11e3-bbc1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz33Tk5blI6">election of Peter Mutharika</a> restablished another old order after the blip of Joyce Banda’s presidency. Brother of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17636393">Bingu</a>, the late president whom Banda succeeded, Mutharika defeated the second-placed candidate, Lazarus Chakwera, who himself represented an even older order – that of Hastings Banda, and the shadow of his <a href="http://www.nyasatimes.com/2014/05/02/mcp-brutal-past-forgiven-but-not-forgotten/">totalitarianism</a>. </p>
<p>Joyce Banda came a poor third, victim of her own appalling <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/29/malawian-president-joyce-banda-faces-electoral-humiliation-possibly-jail">inability to govern</a> or recognise what good government might mean. Those who follow her might not know either – but it is a sorry shame for Africa’s first female president south of the equator.</p>
<p>All in all, May 2014 hardly presented a spectacle of brilliant, wise, perceptive, forward-looking, strategically-informed, democratically-committed, well-advised African leaders with both a common touch and common sense. It has all been fodder for Afro-pessimists, and for those who delight, even if for the wrong reasons, in the spectacle of Zimbabwean bully boys finally getting their comeuppance in a flurry of white robes, shepherd staves and vengeful, pent-up fury. </p>
<p>And unless they learn to lead their people to something resembling a better future, similar explosions of fury may yet engulf many other lacklustre and misguided African leaders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27466/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
It has been an interesting month for leaders across Africa. Goodluck Jonathan finally declared a “total war” against Boko Haram despite not having the means to wage one, and after a puzzlingly sluggish…Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/267182014-05-19T05:08:18Z2014-05-19T05:08:18ZBoko Haram and the state of failure in Nigeria<p>Earlier this month, Nigeria marked a most unwelcome anniversary; a year of special measures in the three northern states of <a href="http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/few-gains-after-nigeria-s-year-long-state-of-emergency-524519">Adamawa, Borno and Yobe</a>. Located in the north east corner of the country, snug against the international borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroon, these blighted provinces are the birthplace and main operational area of <a href="https://theconversation.com/boko-haram-the-terror-group-that-kidnapped-200-schoolgirls-25931">Boko Haram</a>, the insurgent group which recently achieved new levels of infamy following its abduction of more than 200 schoolgirls. </p>
<p>Indeed, the special measures introduced by the Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan, were a direct response to the group and its activities, an attempt by Abuja to better assist the security forces in their efforts to destroy it. </p>
<p>Yet the measures are also a confession. They are an admission by President Jonathan that Boko Haram is an increasingly serious threat and that <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201404170133.html">Nigeria is a failed state</a>. Hopes of containing and defeating the group within the confines of everyday legal parameters have been well and truly smashed. Boko Haram demands additional attention beyond what the police, armed forces and security services normally provide.</p>
<p>The group is both a cause and a manifestation of Nigeria’s failure. It is a cause as its actions are placing parts of the country beyond the direct control of the Nigerian government. Abuja no longer exercises a monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion throughout the whole of its sovereign territory. It is a manifestation as it is, in part, a response to the government’s failure to provide Nigerians with the public goods that they have a reasonable right to expect to receive.</p>
<p>While the identification and classification of Nigeria as a failed state is entirely consistent with both academic and practioner definitions of failure, questions can be raised over <a href="http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/failed-states.html">what this label truly means</a>. Certainly, it is now a widely accepted shorthand for political limitation, and widespread hardship and suffering. And certainly, these connotations are entirely consistent with Nigeria’s condition. Abuja’s writ is curtailed. The living standards of thousands of ordinary Nigerians are diminished. </p>
<p>Yet if this label is to be applied, great care must be taken when doing so. Not least, because of the implied temporal break inherent within it, the suggestion that there was a time before failure when Abuja exercised the necessary monopoly and furnished Nigerians with the public goods they deserve.</p>
<p>Clearly though, and in keeping with the view of Boko Haram as a manifestation of failure, Nigeria’s demise predates the introduction of the special measures and the group itself. </p>
<p>But if there was a time before failure, when and why did it end? The implications of this consideration reach far beyond Nigeria’s borders. The concept of state failure is premised on an idealised understanding of what a state is and should be doing that is rooted in European experience. But if the benchmark of statehood is European in origin, how applicable is it to Africa? </p>
<p>If successive governments of Nigeria, Niger and Mali have long struggled to fully control their territories and provide their citizens with public goods then how much of a departure from established practice do their current failures represent? Can they be labelled failed if they have rarely, if ever, conformed to this idealised notion? Or are they simply acting in ways entirely consistent with past behaviour? In which case, can they be described as failed since there is no significant change in what they are doing?</p>
<p>Such questions have political implications. The profound changes in international attitudes which helped lead to the demise of Europe’s overseas empires and the establishment of Africa’s independent states – and subsequent emergence of the phenomenon of state failure – preclude the renegotiation of the continent’s national borders. In the past 50 or so years since the “winds of change” brought independence to the African continent, only two new states (Eritrea and South Sudan) have formally been allowed to come into being. The international community has committed itself to working with the states that exist no matter how failed they might be. </p>
<p>This decision, by extension, obliges European and North American governments to encourage and assist their Nigerian, Nigerien and Malian counterparts to develop and behave in ways that they perhaps never have. The time may very well be nigh for a more fundamental rethink about the state of the state in Africa today. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/26718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Hill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Earlier this month, Nigeria marked a most unwelcome anniversary; a year of special measures in the three northern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Located in the north east corner of the country, snug…Jonathan Hill, Senior Lecturer, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.