tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/greece-elections-3226/articlesGreece elections – The Conversation2019-07-09T16:33:24Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1200292019-07-09T16:33:24Z2019-07-09T16:33:24ZWhat victory for Kyriakos Mitsotakis means for Greece’s relationship with the EU<p>Victory for the centre-right New Democracy party in Greece’s July 7 elections brought to an end four years in power for the radical Syriza government of prime minister Alexis Tsipras, marked by turbulent relations with the EU. But what does the victory for New Democracy leader Kyriakos Mitsotakis mean for Greece’s relationship with the EU, and does it signal the country’s return to the European mainstream? </p>
<p>Since it came to power in Greece in 2015, Syriza maintained a steady path of austerity, despite promising the opposite. It signed <a href="https://fortune.com/2016/06/03/greece-eurozone/">an additional bailout agreement</a> with the EU and deepened cuts in welfare, pensions and the public sector. Nonetheless, it also insisted on shifting the blame for Greece’s predicament onto the EU. </p>
<p>In August 2018, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-bailout-tsipras/tsipras-declares-day-of-liberation-after-greece-exits-bailout-idUSKCN1L60PX">Tsipras declared Greece’s exit</a> from bailout supervision, but the country remains bound by an agreement to complete reforms and sustain a direction of fiscal discipline. Greek voters’ disappointment with Syriza continued, leading to a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-48420697">landslide victory</a> for the centre-right New Democracy party in the European parliamentary elections in May.</p>
<p>Tsipras called a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e9d234c6-8ba4-11e9-a24d-b42f641eca37">snap election</a> for July 7 as the ultimate political solution. The result brought the centre-right New Democracy back to power with an <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/242311/article/ekathimerini/news/tsipras-concedes-defeat-in-election">overall parliamentary majority</a>. But the road ahead is rocky for Mitsotakis. </p>
<p>The new government has a short grace period both domestically and with the EU. Despite Greek calls to postpone discussing the economy’s progress at a Eurogroup meeting of ministers on <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/07/08/remarks-by-mario-centeno-following-the-eurogroup-meeting-of-8-july-2019/">July 8</a> because of the elections, Greece remained on the agenda. Europe is clearly continuing to monitor the Greek economy’s performance closely. </p>
<p>At the same time, New Democracy promised to introduce a number of tax cuts, increase foreign investment flows and make further reforms to the public sector. Tax cuts require savings to be found elsewhere, and that means Mitsotakis is likely to follow an austerity agenda too. But he must remember that the Greek electorate punished Tsipras for doing just this, and voters have now placed significant hopes on new leadership and a new direction. Mitsotakis will have to perform a balancing act between delivering on his promises and satisfying the EU – but he has little time to act, as both the EU and the Greek electorate want quick results. </p>
<h2>Austerity repackaged</h2>
<p>Since 2010, Greece’s reputation within the EU has been heavily scarred by the financial crisis and the bailout agreements. Seen as a pariah state and a peripheral country, its negotiating capacity diminished alongside its ability to project its national interests within Europe. Brussels may see new opportunities for a strong centre-right government to push a fresh austerity agenda.</p>
<p>Mitsotakis certainly has allies at the European level. The newly configured European institutions means he is surrounded by friendly political actors, ideologically aligned with his centre-right policy platform of stability. </p>
<p>While the EU need not worry about a U-turn in public policy in Greece, a prolonged agenda of stability – essentially a codename with which to reframe austerity – could bear significant political cost to New Democracy. As minister of administrative reform between 2013-15, Mitsotakis was linked to a number of important public sector reforms included in the previous Greek bailout packages, and he will carry that legacy with him during his term as prime minister.</p>
<h2>Repositioning Greece within the EU</h2>
<p>Beyond the economy, Greece has three more burning issues to consider in the context of its European relationship.</p>
<p>The first surrounds migration flows and refugees. The rise of far-right party Golden Dawn in the past pushed New Democracy further to the right on some issues, such as migration. Some less hardcore Golden Dawn supporters may have also been attracted to New Democracy by its promise for stronger immigration control and border security. Delivering on that promise will require further cooperation with the EU, including financial help to accommodate refugees on Greek soil. Given the current views on immigration in Europe, including those of New Democracy’s <a href="https://www.eppgroup.eu/newsroom/publications/position-paper-on-migration">sister parties</a> at EU level, which have become increasingly conservative when it comes to border policy, this presents another challenge ahead.</p>
<p>The second issue is over North Macedonia. Tsipras was credited by Brussels with the successful completion of the 2018 Prespa agreement, in which Greece recognised its neighbouring country’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/north-macedonia-name-change-both-heals-and-divides/a-48194331-0">name as North Macedonia</a>. The deal was opposed by New Democracy and it cost Tsipras votes in the north of Greece. The normalisation of relations with North Macedonia, and the implementation of other aspects of the agreement, remain a challenge for a patriotically oriented party such as New Democracy, which may not attempt to stir matters further.</p>
<p>Third is the issue of Turkey and Cyprus. Tsipras left Greek-Turkish relations in a state of brinkmanship over the exploitation of gas and oil fields in the seabed south of Cyprus. While European companies were tasked with drilling in these fields, the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, questioned Greek sovereignty and international sea borders. Yet, he was the first foreign leader to <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkish-president-congratulates-greek-premier-elect/1525663">congratulate Mitsotakis</a> on his victory, which could signal a new period of rapprochement.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cyprus-dangerous-row-over-gas-exploration-dates-back-to-british-colonial-meddling-119331">Cyprus: dangerous row over gas exploration dates back to British colonial meddling</a>
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<p>Political analysts should not be quick to dismiss left-wing populism altogether in Greece. As <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jcms.12093">research</a> my colleagues and I have done has demonstrated, populism is widespread across the spectrum of Greek political parties. Syriza’s vote percentage will allow it to use its well-tested left-wing populist strategy in opposition to the new government, which could prompt New Democracy to respond with right-wing populism. </p>
<p>This strategy is likely to involve wooing political elements who are less prone to domestic reform, and could put New Democracy at odds with its own European agenda. So while Europe hopes for change in Greek politics, politics in Greece may not have changed after all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120029/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theofanis Exadaktylos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The road ahead remains rocky for Greece’s newly elected prime minister.Theofanis Exadaktylos, Senior Lecturer in European Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/516422016-01-01T10:19:48Z2016-01-01T10:19:48Z2015: the year in elections<p><em>It’s been a dramatic year in elections around the world: old leaders were toppled, upstarts and novices seized the helm, and embattled governments somehow managed to cling on. Here, the experts who covered them take stock of what’s happened – and look at what’s in store for 2016.</em></p>
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<h2>Zambia: praying for rain</h2>
<p><strong>Stephen Chan, SOAS</strong></p>
<p>Zambia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-a-stormy-election-dark-clouds-still-loom-over-zambia-36705">2015 election</a> was triggered when the incumbent president, Michael Sata, died in office. Constitutionally, after a period of acting presidency by the vice-president, Dr Guy Scott – who, for a short time, had the distinction of being a <a href="https://theconversation.com/guy-scotts-whiteness-is-not-the-issue-in-zambia-33690">white president of a black country</a> – any chosen successor had to face the polls. Edgar Lungu was picked after a fractious process and ultimately beat off a strong challenge from opposition leader, Hakainde Hichilema. </p>
<p>Lungu’s time in office may be brief, since he was elected only to fill out the term until full elections in September 2016. He has had to preside over a grave economic downturn and has <a href="http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-10-16-divine-intervention-lungu-calls-for-a-day-of-prayer-and-fasting-to-save-the-kwacha">called days of prayer</a> instead of coming up with technocratic solutions. A catastrophic shortage of rain exacerbated power shortages as hydroelectric production literally dried up and the country’s brief economic bubble has burst. </p>
<p>He is dogged by rumours of ill health and Zambians now joke about whether he will join the country’s roster of presidents who have died in office. Whoever wins the 2016 elections may come up with an economic plan to overcome the curse of plunging international copper prices – but may yet be reduced to praying for rain.</p>
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<h2>Israel: zero sum game</h2>
<p><strong>Yoav Galai, University of St Andrews</strong></p>
<p>This year’s election was framed by identity politics as a zero-sum game. That much was clear from the decision of four different (mostly) Arab parties to run together as the “Joint List”, a banner under which they became the third-largest party in parliament.</p>
<p>Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party trounced the Labour opposition – and Netanyahu is now set to become the longest running prime minister in Israeli history. Unlike his previous coalition government, he had no need to cross ideological lines to compose a coalition – and this government is his most right-wing yet.</p>
<p>This was a big surprise; even on the day of the elections the polls predicted a draw with Labour. Netanyahu then delivered a warning that “the Arabs are coming to the polling stations in droves”. The false and racist statement painted the participation of Israel’s Arab minority in the national elections as illegitimate, but it worked wonders.</p>
<p>Some of the racist inclinations of the other side became visible too. At an anti-Netanyahu rally in March, prominent left-wing intellectual Yair Garbuz <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/.premium-1.646038">drew a direct line</a> between criminality, anti-Arab racism and Mizrahi Jews, the majority of Israel’s Jewish population who have roots in Arab countries – and, looking back at the election, Labour leader Shelly Yechimovich <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/.premium-1.648196">conceded</a> that Garbuz’s statements may have been partly to blame for her party’s loss.</p>
<p>With a fragile majority of one, the coalition can easily be pushed into extremism by the Nationalist Religious Jewish Home party and by the Likud’s more right-wing ministers. With no clear plan regarding Palestinians except the normalisation of settlement activity, attention has returned to zero sum identity politics, with the general categories of Arabs and left as the targets of legislation and policy.</p>
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<h2>Nigeria: matters of urgency <a id="nigeria"></a></h2>
<p><strong>Catherine Gegout, University of Nottingham</strong></p>
<p>When Muhammadu Buhari was <a href="https://theconversation.com/buhari-wins-but-the-new-president-of-nigeria-faces-an-enormous-challenge-39291">elected president of Nigeria</a> in March, he certainly had his work cut out. Nigeria’s economy badly needs to be diversified; petroleum exports revenue represents <a href="http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm">more than 90% of total export revenue</a>, even as only half of all Nigerians <a href="http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2015/10/20/the-way-forward-for-electricity-supply-in-nigeria/">have access to electricity</a>. Education is in a dismal state, especially in the north, where <a href="https://theconversation.com/buhari-wins-but-the-new-president-of-nigeria-faces-an-enormous-challenge-39291">only 6% of children have primary education</a>. </p>
<p>There have already been some promising moves. Buhari has renewed Nigeria’s beleagured fight against corruption, including <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-34580862">oil corruption</a> and both he and his deputy <a href="http://www.africareview.com/Special-Reports/What-African-presidents-are-paid-and-why-it-matters/-/979182/2802868/-/c59muuz/-/index.html">took a symbolic pay cut</a>. He must now start honouring his promise to improve <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/president-buhari-nigeria-women-politics">gender representation</a> in politics. Currently, only 16% of cabinet members are women, and only 6% of senators and members of the House of Representatives. </p>
<p>Then there’s the fight against Boko Haram. Approximately <a href="http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/11/26/nigeria-boko-haram-cannot-be-crushed-by-december">1,500 people have been killed since June 2015</a>, there is the serious prospect of <a href="http://www.jeuneafrique.com/284717/politique/jean-yves-le-diran-ministre-francais-de-la-defense-le-rapprochement-entre-daesh-et-boko-haram-est-un-risque-majeur/">true co-operation between the group and Islamic State</a> and the group is still <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/report/102274/is-education-boko-haram-s-biggest-victim">targeting the north’s few schools</a>.</p>
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<h2>United Kingdom: political carnage</h2>
<p><strong>Louise Thompson, University of Surrey</strong></p>
<p>Almost every poll of the British electorate failed to predict the result on the night, which was ultimately heralded by a <a href="https://theconversation.com/john-curtice-how-we-called-the-election-right-on-polling-night-more-or-less-41556">shocking exit poll</a> that turned out to be correct. </p>
<p>The election ultimately <a href="https://theconversation.com/britains-election-is-over-so-what-does-it-all-mean-41261">returned a familiar face</a> to Downing Street in the form of David Cameron, but the turmoil of the losing parties had huge implications for the British political system. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/lib-dem-wipeout-prompts-clegg-to-hint-he-will-step-down-41512">Liberal Democrats</a> went from a party of government to a party of the (very) backbenches, while Labour’s loss (and near-wipeout in Scotland) was followed by a messy post-election leadership battle and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-corbyn-wins-the-class-of-1983-looks-set-to-reshape-labour-once-again-47291">surprise ascendancy of left-winger Jeremy Corbyn</a>. The result is an opposition more divided than any party in recent memory. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aftershocks-of-the-snps-success-will-be-felt-throughout-the-next-parliament-41127">Scottish National Party</a> took almost all the Scottish seats. It has so far maintained this momentum at Westminster, marking itself out as the party to watch. </p>
<p>One thing is certain: there will be even more division and discord at Westminster in 2016, as Labour infighting continues and the parties prepare for the impending EU referendum campaign.</p>
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<h2>Poland: right turn</h2>
<p><strong>Simona Guerra, University of Leicester, and Fernando Casal Bértoa, University of Nottingham</strong></p>
<p>Even though Poland has low levels of unemployment and inflation and an overall positive macro-economic outlook, its people still <a href="https://theconversation.com/surprise-election-loss-for-polish-president-spells-trouble-for-governing-party-42367">threw out</a> the incumbent Civic Platform party president in favour of the opposition Law and Justice (PiS) candidate. A socially conservative party, PiS doubled down on its success in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-polands-political-landscape-was-redrawn-overnight-49697">October’s legislative polls</a>, when it <a href="http://www.the-plot.org/2015/12/09/polish-politics-in-2015-all-the-power-to-the-right/">won in almost all regions</a> and across different demographics.</p>
<p>Since then, PiS has been on a tear, not least with some rather sobering appointments. Controversial nationalist <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/10/polish-defence-minister-condemned-over-jewish-conspiracy-theory">Antoni Macierewicz</a> is still minister of defence despite allegations of explicit anti-semitism, while Zbigniew Ziobro became minister of justice despite having already been in the spotlight after a number of <a href="https://polishpoliticsblog.wordpress.com/2015/11/30/how-will-polands-law-and-justice-party-govern/">politicised prosecutions</a>.</p>
<p>The party also holds serious sway over the Polish Constitutional Court, which has sole authority to declare laws unconstitutional – and because of impending retirements and amendments, PiS is moving forward the controversial debates on the court’s future. As Poland becomes more Eurosceptic, more protective of Polish interests and more disinclined to accept refugees, PiS now has a chance to implement its own distinctive version of law and justice.</p>
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<h2>Denmark: holding together (just)</h2>
<p><strong>Martin Vinæs Larsen, University of Copenhagen</strong></p>
<p>Denmark’s parliamentary election ended with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/danish-government-voted-out-but-who-moves-in-depends-on-a-battle-of-wills-on-the-right-43417">victory for the Liberal-Conservative bloc</a>, which ousted the Social Democratic prime minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt.</p>
<p>But her successor at the helm, the Liberals’ <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17930161">Lars Løkke Rasmussen</a>, saw his own party severely weakened at the election. Instead, he had to rely on the right-wing populist party, the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/19/danish-peoples-party-dahl-border-controls-election">Danish People’s Party</a>, to gain a majority. The People’s Party had an outstanding election, becoming the second largest party in the new parliament.</p>
<p>The outlook was therefore somewhat bleak for the new prime minister, who now leads one of the smallest minority governments in the country’s history. In spite of this, he has managed to manoeuvre through the difficult parliamentary situation, shepherding through several important reforms of the labour market and new laws dealing with the refugee crises. But it remains to be seen how long he can hold his right-wing coalition together.</p>
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<h2>Sri Lanka: end of an era</h2>
<p><strong>Oliver Walton, University of Bath</strong></p>
<p>Mahinda Rajapaksa’s nine years in power <a href="https://theconversation.com/sri-lanka-stunned-as-rajapaksa-election-gamble-fails-to-pay-off-35971">came to an abrupt end</a> in January, when the former president suffered an unexpected defeat at the hands of his one-time ally Maithripala Sirisena. </p>
<p>Sirisena’s victory was widely seen as marking a revival of democratic governance in Sri Lanka, and was consolidated with another victory in <a href="https://theconversation.com/sri-lankas-election-thwarts-rajapaksa-and-sets-the-scene-for-deeper-reform-46059">August’s parliamentary elections</a>. </p>
<p>The new government has begun a constitutional reform process and cooperated with a UN-mandated mechanism for investigating war crimes, but concerns persist over the continued heavy military in the north and continuing <a href="http://www.freedomfromtorture.org/feature/out_of_the_silence/5979">evidence</a> of arbitrary detention and torture. </p>
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<h2>Guatemala: all change</h2>
<p><strong>Neil Pyper, Coventry University</strong></p>
<p>Guatemala’s presidential race produced a surprise outcome, while also <a href="https://theconversation.com/latin-american-leaders-wobble-and-topple-as-patience-with-corruption-runs-out-48778">shaking up the rest of Central America</a>. Until almost the eve of September’s first round, it seemed inevitable that Manuel Baldizon of the Renewed Democratic Freedom (Libre) party would win relatively comfortably. </p>
<p>But mass protests about a corruption scandal that eventually brought down the outgoing president, Otto Perez Molina – as well as his vice president and numerous ministers – drastically eroded support for Baldizon, as questions about wrongdoing within his party mounted. They also led to the rapid rise of political outsider Jimmy Morales, a well-known television personality. Morales topped the poll in the first round and won the subsequent run-off by a landslide. </p>
<p>He takes office in January, but faces the unenviable task of satisfying the public appetite for fundamental overhaul of the political system.</p>
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<h2>Greece: accepting austerity</h2>
<p><strong>Sotirios Zartaloudis, Birmingham</strong></p>
<p>Alexis Tsipras’ decision to <a href="https://theconversation.com/greek-election-tsipras-trounces-his-opponents-but-at-what-cost-47790">call snap elections in September</a> turned out to be a masterstroke of Machiavellian political ingenuity. </p>
<p>On one hand, the Syriza prime minister managed a very efficient manoeuvre to get rid of his anti-Euro internal opposition; on the other, he saved face for his anti-austerity U-turn, and now has the legitimacy he needs to implement the three extra years of harsh measures he agreed to before the elections. </p>
<p>It remains to be seen how his transformation from a hard-left radical to a pro-austerity premier will turn out, but so far, he has escaped punishment from the electorate despite reneging on almost all of his pre-2015 promises.</p>
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<h2>Singapore: marching on</h2>
<p><strong>Afif Pasuni, University of Warwick</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/singapores-ruling-party-heads-off-dissent-with-media-blitz-47332">Singapore’s election</a> was expected to trouble the country’s one-party system. It ultimately failed to change much – and the People’s Action Party (PAP) is still going strong after more than half a century of rule. Thanks to consistent economic progress, the party’s critics failed to gain much of a foothold.</p>
<p>But even though it won the election, the party is at a crossroads. Strict media controls and persistent socio-economic interventions are still the norm, but there are also signs that the government’s tight grip is relaxing. Still, while the state is not blithely ignoring to the demands of its critics, 2015 reminded us that surprises are still an alien concept in Singaporean politics.</p>
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<h2>Canada: a new generation rises</h2>
<p><strong>Steve Hewitt, University of Birmingham</strong></p>
<p>Led by three-term prime minister Stephen Harper, Canada’s Conservatives <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-canadas-conservative-party-is-brazenly-playing-the-terrorism-card-45916">waged an election campaign based on fear</a>, focusing on the threat posed by Syrian refugees specifically and Muslims more generally. The party duly held on to its base vote, but they were not able to go beyond it – while optimism helped Justin Trudeau’s Liberals increase their vote by over 4m. </p>
<p>Justin Trudeau’s election represents a generational change in terms of attitudes toward drugs. Whereas no other national leader in a Western democracy has both admitted using drugs and then promised to legalise them nationally, after Trudeau admitted in 2010 that he had smoked pot, he not only refused to apologise but also pledged to legalise marijuana if his Liberal Party won the election. That promise was <a href="http://news.liftcannabis.ca/2015/12/04/22122/">reiterated</a> in this year’s <a href="http://speech.gc.ca/">throne speech</a>. </p>
<p>Trudeau is a sign of things to come as a new generation takes power around the world. As in the 2015 UK result and recent US presidential elections, most major Canadian cities – often increasingly diverse with citizens drawn from around the world along with youth and dynamism – voted for left-of-centre parties, while older and more homogenous suburban and rural voters opt for right-of-centre parties. The divide is growing, and it won’t start to close anytime soon. </p>
<p>This is the politics of the 21st century – and Justin Trudeau has harnessed it capably. </p>
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<h2>Turkey: deep trouble</h2>
<p><strong>Bahar Baser, Coventry University</strong></p>
<p>Turkey’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-your-guide-to-turkeys-general-election-42438">June election</a> was ripe with possibility, both good and bad. The pro-Kurdish leftist party, the HDP, was taking a major risk by participating in the elections for the first time, and the results of the elections were expected to determine whether the country would start moving towards a more authoritarian presidential system. </p>
<p>In the end, the HDP <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-the-kurds-after-turkish-election-success-of-hdp-42979">passed the 10% threshold</a> needed to enter parliament and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its absolute majority – but the country’s various parties could not agree on a coalition government, and a snap second election was called for November. </p>
<p>Between the two polls, the Kurdish peace process stalled completely and the Turkish army and police forces began cracking down on Kurdish majority areas, causing numerous civilian casualties in the process. Then there was a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ankara-bombing-kills-dozens-calling-for-peace-in-turkey-48942">massive bombing in Ankara</a>, the worst in Turkey’s recent history. </p>
<p>But instead of haemorrhaging votes as some predicted, the AKP <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-election-erdogan-and-the-akp-get-majority-back-amid-climate-of-violence-and-fear-49963">won an outright majority in November</a> by charming nationalist voters, paving the way for a transition to a more authoritarian system under one-party rule. The HDP once again cleared the 10% threshold, but with fewer votes.</p>
<p>All this bodes ill for 2016. The PKK and the Turkish state will be forced to find a way forward, while a crackdown on freedom of speech and human rights is already underway. And all the while, Turkey must struggle to manage its increasingly complex position in the Syrian crisis. </p>
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<h2>Myanmar: a new dawn?</h2>
<p><strong>Andrew Fagan, University of Essex</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/aung-san-suu-kyi-victory-will-test-commitment-to-human-rights-in-myanmar-50041">first credible general elections</a> to be held in Myanmar for more than 50 years took place this November. Everyone predicted that Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) would win, but few expected the landslide scale of the victory. Crucially, the large number of votes the NLD secured from Myanmar’s multitude of ethnic minorities, who this time around have placed their hopes for real change in the NLD rather than their own ethnicity-based political parties. </p>
<p>Still, despite voting for the NLD, many remain unconvinced by its commitment to genuinely ending the discrimination and persecution of Myanmar’s minorities . This is especially the case with respect to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-persecution-of-rohingya-muslims-is-producing-a-ready-supply-of-slaves-46108">Rohingya</a>, who are classified by the UN as one of the most persecuted minorities in the world. The NLD’s commitment to human rights will ultimately be measured by its ability to confront and overcome ethnic and religious conflict. </p>
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<h2>Argentina: let’s change</h2>
<p><strong>Juan Pablo Ferrero, University of Bath</strong></p>
<p>Mauricio Macri won Argentina’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/argentina-departs-from-the-kirchner-model-but-mauricio-macri-now-has-to-govern-a-divided-nation-51060">first ever presidential run-off</a> by a narrow margin, making him the first ever democratic president to come from a third party. His coalition, Let’s Change, ran on a minimalist platform that targeted middle-class concerns, emphasising meritocracy and difference over equality and social rights. </p>
<p>Macri’s win matters for the whole region because it is the first presidential election lost by a coalition of the centre-left – playing into the narrative that Latin America’s leftist political era is <a href="https://theconversation.com/latin-americas-leftism-looks-paler-than-ever-as-trailblazers-stumble-and-fall-51528">coming to a close</a>. </p>
<p>Still, any hopes Macri will dismantle Argentina’s post-neoliberal consensus are premature – any such attempt will face organised resistance from social movements and opposition parliamentarians. The country is divided in two opposing cultural blocs roughly equal in political heft and with roughly equivalent representation throughout the system, so making policy without resorting to presidential decrees will be tough. </p>
<p>The government’s main challenge will be to turn its electoral victory into a broader political consensus that can keep Argentina governable – and the opposition must reflect about why the same sectors of the middle class that supported its ascent have now brought it down. </p>
<hr>
<h2>Venezuela: the dream is over</h2>
<p><strong>Marco Aponte-Moreno, University College London</strong></p>
<p>Venezuela’s congressional election marked <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-this-the-end-of-the-socialist-dream-in-venezuela-49859">the end of 16 years of hegemony</a> for the late Hugo Chávez’s socialist party. </p>
<p>In a historic vote with a turnout of almost 75%, the opposition obtained a supermajority of two-thirds of the legislature. These results will allow the opposition to call a referendum to remove the country’s unpopular president, Nicolás Maduro, from office once his term reaches its midpoint in mid April 2016.</p>
<p>The opposition will also try to pass an amnesty to release jailed opposition leaders and remove judges installed by court-packing. Meanwhile, for many voters, the decisive issue was Venezuela’s dire economic performance. Addressing <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/venezuelas-food-shortage-keeps-getting-worse-2015-8?IR=T">desperate shortages</a> of food and basic goods will be a challenge for the opposition and the “chavistas” alike. </p>
<hr>
<h2>Spain: ¡sí, se puede!</h2>
<p><strong>Paul Kennedy, University of Bath</strong></p>
<p>Spain’s political system had shown signs of fracturing for some time, but on December 15 the country’s two-party system was <a href="https://theconversation.com/spain-votes-for-change-but-has-no-idea-what-government-itll-end-up-with-52583">finally consigned to the history books</a>. The ruling People’s Party remained the largest in parliament but came up well short of a majority; the once-governing Socialists were very nearly one-upped by leftist insurgents Podemos.</p>
<p>The upshot is that no obvious political partners have the seats to assemble a parliamentary majority – and given the Catalan nationalists’ wholehearted push for independence, bringing them into a coalition will be more politically tricky than ever before. Whoever gets to do it, governing Spain for the four years until the next scheduled election will be a fraught business indeed.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Stay with The Conversation in 2016 for our coverage of elections in the US, Peru, the Philippines, and many more.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51642/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Gegout has received funding from the British Academy and the European Union. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oliver Walton receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steve Hewitt has in the past received funding from the British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Afif Pasuni, Andrew Fagan, Bahar Baser, Fernando Casal Bértoa, Juan Pablo Ferrero, Louise Thompson, Marco Aponte-Moreno, Martin Vinæs Larsen, Neil Pyper, Paul Kennedy, Simona Guerra, Sotirios Zartaloudis, Stephen Chan, and Yoav Galai do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For better or for worse, various countries around the world charted a new course last year. What lies ahead for 2016?Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonAfif Pasuni, PhD Candidate, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of WarwickAndrew Fagan, Co-Director of Postgraduate Studies, Human Rights Centre, University of EssexBahar Baser, Research Fellow, Coventry UniversityCatherine Gegout, Lecturer in International Relations, University of NottinghamFernando Casal Bértoa, Nottingham Research Fellow (politics), University of NottinghamJuan Pablo Ferrero, Lecturer in Latin American Studies, University of BathLouise Thompson, Lecturer in British Politics, University of SurreyMarco Aponte-Moreno, Senior teaching fellow in leadership, UCLMartin Vinæs Larsen, PhD Student, Department of Political Science, University of CopenhagenNeil Pyper, Associate Head of School, Coventry UniversityOliver Walton, Lecturer in International Development, University of BathPaul Kennedy, Lecturer in Spanish and European Studies, University of BathSimona Guerra, Lecturer in Politics, University of LeicesterSotirios Zartaloudis, Lecturer in Politics, University of BirminghamSteve Hewitt, Senior Lecturer in the Department of History , University of BirminghamYoav Galai, PhD candidate in the School of International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/478732015-09-21T12:33:57Z2015-09-21T12:33:57ZQ&A: Thomas Piketty responds to surprise Greek election result<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95533/original/image-20150921-31500-1ple6h7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Time for some real proposals on Greek debt.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/universitatpompeufabra/14922738754/">Universitat Pompeu Fabra</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the wake of a surprise re-election of Alexis Tsipras and Syriza, Thomas Piketty discusses the need for a more active approach from European leaders when it comes to the Greek question – and for a eurozone parliament to be established.</p>
<p><strong>The Tsipras victory has come as a surprise to some. What has changed for Greece?</strong></p>
<p>Normally, we would expect some stability in the coming years. But above all, Greece and Europe need to make up for lost time. Until now, Europe has obstinately refused to talk seriously about restructuring Greece’s debt. That was what caused the downfall of the last government.</p>
<p>Europe had in effect implied that it would reconsider the debt as soon as the Greeks managed to balance their budget with a small primary budget surplus – which meant Greece would have more revenues than public spending. But when the Greeks appealed for help in December 2014, Europe said “no”. That is what ultimately opened the path for Alexis Tsipras. </p>
<p>And the situation continued. Between January and July 2015, Europe refused to reopen talks. Now it’s September and the new support package that was discussed this summer has led to the further postponement of debt negotiations. If Europe insists on repayment, there will be fresh crises and the problem will not be resolved. </p>
<p><strong>Why does the dialogue between Europe and Greece need to change?</strong></p>
<p>Europe has other problems to tackle. There is the migrant crisis and the wider economic situation. Europe, Germany and France can’t exist in a permanent state of crisis. Europeans need to adjust their position. And for that to happen, France needs to have more courage – others too. Perhaps the elections in Spain at the end of this year will change things. All these elements can combine to influence majority politics in Europe when it comes to the Greek question.</p>
<p><strong>What should Tsipras’s economic priorities be from now on?</strong></p>
<p>Modernising the tax system is clearly the priority. It needs to be fairer and more efficient. But that can only really be done with Europe’s cooperation – and if Europe sets an example.</p>
<p>We have to remember that the biggest businesses in Europe often pay less tax than small- and medium-sized businesses. That’s because governments do deals that will lead to favourable conditions for their own national industry. That’s without even considering that the European Commission has a president who, as prime minister of Luxembourg, signed deals with multinational corporations that allowed them to pay just 1% to 2% tax.</p>
<p>Europe can’t just hand out advice without itself committing to fiscal transparency. That goes to the heart of the system – German and French banks are only too happy to handle the funds of rich Greeks.</p>
<p><strong>What should French president François Hollande do about Greece?</strong></p>
<p>This summer, François Hollande started to make suggestions about making the eurozone more democratic. In particular, he spoke about establishing a parliament for eurozone countries. But that’s still too timid and too vague. If he wants to do something to save his second term, and above all improve the governance of the eurozone, he needs to make more precise proposals. </p>
<p>I believe there would have been less austerity in Greece, and more solutions would have emerged if there had been public, democratic discussions in a eurozone parliament, populated with representatives from each national parliament.</p>
<p>The trouble is, the eurozone is currently governed as a technocracy. The heads of state meet behind closed doors. They send out incredible proposals in the middle of the night – like privatising 50 billion euros of Greek assets – while everyone knows it will be a veritable fire sale. As if the Greek economy could sell its assets under these conditions!</p>
<p>This happened without legal deliberation and without the motives behind the decision being interrogated. We need to put an end to this Europe and start again with a eurozone parliament that allows everyone’s motives to be made public. What is important now is that France – and all the countries that want to make progress – set out clear proposals to democratically restructure the eurozone.</p>
<p><strong>Should we still fear a Grexit?</strong></p>
<p>Yes. The risk is that in delaying discussions about restructuring the debt, we realise in one or two years that the terms of the bailout package will not be respected.</p>
<p>We want Greece to keep a huge primary budget surplus for 20 to 30 years, which will mean setting aside an enormous budget for repayments. </p>
<p>How do you justify that to young Greeks? It would be reasonable to say that until the Greek economy has been rebuilt, a reduced primary budget surplus, around the level of GDP, will have to do. That’s normal and not excessively punitive. </p>
<p>I worry that some people continue to bet on a Grexit, setting objectives that are impossible to meet so that when Greece fails, it can be pushed towards the exit. That is still a risk, which is why we need clarity and realistic objectives – and quickly.</p>
<p><em>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/grece-il-faut-que-la-france-ait-plus-de-courage-47872">original version</a> of this article appeared on The Conversation France.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47873/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Piketty ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The economist and author backs calls for a eurozone parliament.Thomas Piketty, Economiste, Directeur d'études à l'EHESS Professeur à l'Ecole d'économie de Paris/Paris School of Economics, Paris School of Economics – École d'économie de ParisLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/477902015-09-21T12:01:27Z2015-09-21T12:01:27ZGreek election: Tsipras trounces his opponents, but at what cost?<p>In the latest episode of the seemingly never-ending Greek crisis, the election of September 20 marked another <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/20/greece-election-result-the-key-numbers">decisive victory for Syriza</a> – and especially for its leader, Alexis Tsipras. </p>
<p>As in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-polls-got-it-so-wrong-in-the-british-election-41530">UK elections</a>, opinion polls failed to predict the considerable gap between Syriza (35.5% of the vote) and centre-right opposition party New Democracy (28% of the vote), with most pre-election surveys indicating a very close battle. </p>
<p>In another surprise, no seats were won by Syriza’s splinter party <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-alexis-tsipras-has-called-a-snap-election-in-greece-46496">Popular Unity</a>, which accused Tsipras of treason for signing Greece up to a deal with the so-called “troika” (the European Commission, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank). </p>
<h2>Natural coalition</h2>
<p>Further confounding predictions was the popularity of Syriza’s populist right-wing coalition partner, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/26/greece-elections-who-are-independent-greeks">Independent Greeks</a> (ANEL). Contrary to the polls, the party managed to enter parliament with ten seats. Its leader, Panos Kammenos, announced that the Syriza-ANEL coalition government will be renewed, while Tsipras promised a four-year government.</p>
<p>It should be noted that ANEL was supported enthusiastically by Tsipras, who claimed numerous times that ANEL was the only party he was willing to collaborate with, and that any other coalition would be “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34249754">unnatural</a>”. Despite their differences, Syriza and ANEL have an ideological affinity over <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2015/02/05/greek-elections-2015-the-beginning-of-the-end-or-the-end-of-the-beginning/">anti-western populism</a>. This paradoxical coalition, however, is now expected to implement a western-led austerity package in order to satisfy the troika. </p>
<p>Shockingly, neo-Nazi party <a href="https://theconversation.com/for-the-sake-of-greece-they-must-get-the-golden-dawn-trial-right-41395">Golden Dawn</a> remains Greece’s third party, winning almost 7% of the vote (slightly higher than the January 2015 elections) even after its leader publicly accepted the “<a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/201623/article/ekathimerini/news/golden-dawn-chief-accepts-partys-political-responsibility-in-fyssas-murder">political responsibility</a>” for the assassination of a left wing musician Pavlos Fyssas. </p>
<p>Golden Dawn’s persistence shows that a part of the Greek electorate openly supports a neo-Nazi party which uses violence as political strategy and tool and remains loyal to its message of hate and nationalistic totalitarianism. </p>
<p>It should be noted that Golden Dawn (along with Syriza) is predominantly supported by <a href="http://greece.greekreporter.com/2014/10/20/why-do-young-greeks-vote-for-golden-dawn/">young voters</a>. Greeks have had many options to punish the establishment by voting for any of the country’s array of protest parties; voting Golden Dawn in this election shows there’s a cohort of voters doggedly loyalty to the party, potentially a considerable problem for Greece’s future political stability. </p>
<h2>Pyrrhic victory</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the biggest winner in the September election was Tsipras. </p>
<p>His <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-alexis-tsipras-has-called-a-snap-election-in-greece-46496">call to hold snap elections</a> turned out to be a masterstroke of Machiavellian political ingenuity. </p>
<p>On one hand, Tsipras managed a very efficient move to get rid of his internal opposition without even facing them in public. On the other hand, he saved face for his anti-austerity u-turn and now has legitimacy to implement three more years of harsh austerity which he agreed before the elections. That means Tsipras’s power is now more assured than ever, and his popularity clearly intact.</p>
<p>Still, one could argue that Tsipras’ victory was rather pyrrhic. The elections show the <a href="http://greece.greekreporter.com/?s=abstention+rate">highest abstention rate in Greece’s modern history</a> with almost half of eligible voters not turning out. This shows the disappointment of many voters as well as their silent acceptance that there is <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/07/greek-austerity-dead-long-live-austerity-150712083735451.html">no alternative to austerity</a>, and implies that almost half of Greeks do not feel that any of the existing parties represents them. </p>
<p>Greece is still coming off a prolonged period of reform inertia and political instability. That turbulence can be traced back to Syriza’s victory in the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/26/syriza-european-elections-greece">2014 European elections</a>, after which the Samaras government did little to implement much needed reforms for fear of unpopularity. Then the economy almost stalled after Syriza’s win in <a href="https://theconversation.com/syriza-sweeps-to-victory-in-greek-election-promising-an-end-to-humiliation-36680">January 2015</a>, while the imposition of capital controls dramatically undermined economic stability and confidence both within and outside Greece on economic recovery. </p>
<p>The worst is yet to come. The new government will have to implement a series of unpopular measures such as pension and labour market reforms, privatisations, liberalisation of professions and other structural reforms in healthcare and public administration that will alienate key parts of the Greek electorate. </p>
<p>Still, Tsipras has proven to be a remarkable political maverick. He is greatly skilled in electioneering, and his natural charisma keeps him very popular among Greeks (especially younger ones). It remains to be seen how his transformation from a hard-left radical to a pro-austerity premier will turn out, but so far, he has escaped punishment from the electorate despite reneging on almost all of his pre-2015 promises. </p>
<p>One may argue that Tsipras faces a considerable danger to turn into an unpopular leader as soon as austerity hits Greek voters. As Thomas Hobbes wrote in <a href="http://www.notable-quotes.com/h/hobbes_thomas_ii.html#TJFb0tbh61ljzcgg.99">Leviathan</a>, “where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruin”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47790/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sotirios Zartaloudis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Syriza lives to fight another day, but the omens for Greece’s future are as ominous as ever.Sotirios Zartaloudis, Lecturer in Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/476012015-09-17T10:28:11Z2015-09-17T10:28:11ZWhy leaving the euro is back on the agenda in the Greek election<p>Greece leaving the euro is old news. Since the former Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, <a href="https://theconversation.com/greece-a-bad-deal-for-everyone-44627">agreed to a third bailout</a> in July, the perception of Grexit as an immediate threat has subsided – or at least disappeared from commentary.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, while appetite for Grexit outside Greece has abated, the traumatic seven months of wrangling over its bailout with Europe produced a significant domestic demand for a return to the national currency. </p>
<p>Polls <a href="http://greece.greekreporter.com/2015/09/13/greek-election-polls-syriza-slightly-leading/">suggest</a> that a quarter of the electorate are likely to select Grexit-favouring parties including Popular Unity (the Syriza splinter group), Golden Dawn and KKE (the communist party). While the allure is there, a Greek exit from the European Union is unmistakably a bad idea. </p>
<h2>Drachma drama</h2>
<p>Riding the wave of popular discontent galvanised by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-no-vote-was-a-triumph-of-democracy-over-austerity-44316">No (OXI) campaign</a> in the referendum over Greece’s bailout, drachma advocates argue that shaking off the shackles of the euro will allow for an end to austerity and for national <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/greece-bailout-update-national-sovereignty-conditions-climbdown-cabinet-reshuffle-2015-7">self-determination</a>. Echos of former prime minister, Andreas Papandreou –- who campaigned in 1981 for national independence, popular sovereignty and social liberation – permeate a population oppressed by five years of economic dislocation.</p>
<p>But how can a return to the national currency enable Greece to achieve the dual aim of reviving its depressed economy and regaining sovereignty? Here, despite its face value appeal, the argument becomes less clear.</p>
<p>One of the key “advantages” of rejecting the bailout and leaving the euro is the possibility of defaulting on Greece’s debt, widely regarded as unmanageable and unsustainable. It is claimed that a comprehensive default on external debt will ease pressure on the government, which will then be able to recapitalise banks and inject liquidity into the economy via borrowing from the newly freed Bank of Greece (effectively printing money).</p>
<p>While everyone agrees (even Germany) that <a href="https://theconversation.com/greece-when-is-it-time-to-forgive-debt-44022">some type of debt relief is needed</a> for Greece, defaulting leaves a grand problem. Cancelling sovereign debt does not mean that the government and private parties will not have ongoing payment obligations denominated in foreign currencies. Even if all sovereign bonds are scrapped, how will the government buy goods and services from abroad? Having the Bank of Greece print money only works in an entirely closed economy.</p>
<p>As the Greek state <a href="http://chrysogonos.blogspot.co.uk/2015/06/19-2015.html">lacks</a> foreign exchange reserves, it will need to prop up a new currency and the value of the drachma would drop like a rock. There is no evidence that it would even be accepted as payment abroad. And what about private parties who have external obligations? How will manufacturers buy materials (denominated in dollars or euros) with drachma that counter-parties are unlikely to accept? </p>
<p>The only way a new drachma could find its feet would be via loans in hard currency, probably from the IMF. Therefore, German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble’s plan for a temporary Grexit (<a href="http://www.focus.de/finanzen/news/staatsverschuldung/finanzministerium-verschickt-papier-schaeuble-schlaegt-grexit-auf-zeit-vor_id_4810445.html">with generous support</a>) is a better prospect than any unilateral exit plan. A path to the drachma with humanitarian assistance and some support for the re-introduced currency (a la Schäuble) would help ameliorate some of the dangers of Grexit.</p>
<p>Otherwise, a post-euro Greek finance minister would be begging for loans soon after defaulting on external obligations. Oh, and let us not forget that while this would all be happening, the value of deposits in Greek banks would be massively reduced in real terms through the re-denomination to drachma.</p>
<h2>Attempting to overturn austerity</h2>
<p>Austerity is the other big issue for Grexit advocates. They argue that leaving the euro would allow for a more <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/25/greece-blackmailed-eurozone-troika-syriza-common-currency">“progressive” development plan</a> that is not dependent on the cuts needed to balance Greece’s fiscal deficit. The plan relies on replacing foreign imports with domestic production. And, in a way, this would be the inevitable result of a return to the drachma. As imports will soar in price and trade networks will be disrupted, native low skill manufacturing may replace some imports.</p>
<p>But this would be limited to low-skill, low-value manufacturing. High-tech, high-value, complex manufacturing relies on significant capital investment that no private party would be willing to supply to Greek firms in the medium term. The government won’t be able to finance the proclaimed large investment projects for the same lack of capital explained above. So the conclusion is this: Yes, there is capacity in Greece for industrial development and domestic production. But this will be done at the bottom end of the production level and will generate employment and wages worse than Bulgarian <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Minimum_wage_statistics">standards</a>.</p>
<p>There is opportunity for growth in the Greek economy and large opportunity for improvements in productivity. Nonetheless, all of these are dependant on developing and liberalising the private sector. </p>
<p>If a drachma development plan is based on state spending in the long run, unchecked monetary expansion will lead to runaway inflation. A South Korea-style national industrialisation plan is not possible in 21st-century Greece.</p>
<p>The sad conclusion is this: a return to the national currency could lead to growth eventually, but it will entail a severe drop in living standards, economic dislocation unlike anything experienced so far and (most probably) high levels of borrowing at disadvantageous rates. If, accepting these constraints, the Greeks want to choose the “freedom” of the drachma, they are entitled to do so. But a return to the national currency seems less a solution and more a Chimera.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ioannis Glinavos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Greece’s bailout may have allayed fears of a eurozone exit, but euroscepticism remains high in Greece’s election build up.Ioannis Glinavos, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/464962015-08-21T16:57:29Z2015-08-21T16:57:29ZWhy Alexis Tsipras has called a snap election in Greece<p>Alexis Tsipras, the prime minister of Greece, has <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/20/greek-bailout-alexis-tsipras-call-snap-elections">announced he is stepping down and has called a snap election</a> for September 20, less than a year since he took office as the leader of the left-wing coalition Syriza. </p>
<p>The move marks another episode in the long-running and seemingly never-ending Greek crisis. It is evidence of the pitfalls of Tsipras’ populist discourse. His strategy has rendered Greece almost ungovernable for more than a year.</p>
<p>Since the Greek crisis of 2010, Alexis Tsipras had <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2015/02/05/greek-elections-2015-the-beginning-of-the-end-or-the-end-of-the-beginning/">accused</a> previous Greek governments and opposition members of subservience to Germany’s austerity programme. His anti-austerity and pro-Euro platform won him the <a href="https://theconversation.com/syriza-risks-an-eu-exit-in-a-referendum-wracked-with-problems-44118">January 2015 elections</a> with 36% of the vote and almost half the seats in parliament.</p>
<p>However, Tsipras failed miserably in delivering this promise. After seven months of political theatre and <a href="https://theconversation.com/syriza-risks-an-eu-exit-in-a-referendum-wracked-with-problems-44118">erratic brinkmanship</a>, Tsipras signed the most austere bailout programme yet, lasting until 2018.</p>
<h2>Splinters on the left</h2>
<p>Calling the election, Tsipras spoke of two key signs of his government’s success – the latest austerity package and the return to normality of the Greek banking system.</p>
<p>This is yet another example of his demagogic politics: the man who railed against austerity is now defending a new bailout programme that will result in more austerity. The man who implemented the closure of the Greek banks and the imposition of capital controls boasts that Greek banks will be functioning as they should sometime in the future.</p>
<p>The decision to call this election was dictated mostly by internal party politics. Syriza brings together socialists, Maoists, communists and disillusioned social-democrats (who constitute the minority in the party).</p>
<p>The largest leftist group in Syriza, the radical pro-socialist and pro-Russia Left Platform led by Marxist Socialist MP <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/17/alexis-tsipras-reshuffles-cabinet-bailout-dissidents">Panayiotis Lafazanis</a>, could not accept Tsipras’ U-turn. Its members have rejected the government’s new pro-euro policy.</p>
<p>Left Platform’s MPs have been openly against Euro and EU membership. They want Greece to turn to Putin’s Russia for help. Tsipras has only been able to hold power thanks to support from the vilified opposition parties New Democracy, The River and PASOK.</p>
<p>Lafazanis has now announced plans to launch a new party called “Popular Unity”, which will call for the return to a national currency and immediate default on the Greek debt. It should be noted that the only other party openly supporting a Euro-exit is the Neo-Nazi <a href="https://theconversation.com/for-the-sake-of-greece-they-must-get-the-golden-dawn-trial-right-41395">Golden Dawn</a>.</p>
<h2>What next for Syriza?</h2>
<p>Syriza’s break-up marks the end of a symbiotic relationship between the Left Platform and the so-called “Proedrikoi” (in Greek: the men of the president).</p>
<p>These groups tolerated each other while in opposition. The hard-left Syriza members provided the organisational and activist militancy, while the Proedrikoi brought the populist flair of Tsipras. Even now, he remains the most popular party leader in Greece.</p>
<p>Tsipras seems determined to bring a more centrist position to Syriza, replicating PASOK – a party that traditionally combined leftist and nationalistic populism and continued commitment to the EU.</p>
<p>So far, it seems that his populist strategy is working, but nobody knows how the disillusioned Greeks will react on election day when Tsipras asks them to support him for another three years of austerity. It would be safe to assume, however, that like an ancient Greek demagogue, he will manage to persuade Greeks to trust him again in another uncertain trip towards normality.</p>
<p>The best option for Tsipras would be to abandon his populism and demagoguery. He should be honest with Greek voters about the need for painful and unpopular reforms, such as better tax collection, pension and labour market regulation, reduction of <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/10/27/lower-levels-of-clientelism-in-portuguese-politics-explain-why-portugal-handled-austerity-better-than-greece-during-the-crisis/">clientelism</a>, and an increase of Greek competitiveness to attract foreign investment.</p>
<p>This would be a truly revolutionary move – a word he and other Greek politicians have used and abused. As George Orwell wrote in his novel 1984: “In a time of universal deceit – telling the truth is a revolutionary act.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46496/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sotirios Zartaloudis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After 206 turbulent days in power, Alexis Tsipras now presides over a coalition in tatters.Sotirios Zartaloudis, Lecturer in Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/370782015-02-02T21:50:54Z2015-02-02T21:50:54ZGreece: many questions, few answers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70862/original/image-20150202-13063-2spmus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Orestis Panagiotou</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There is something rather appropriate about Greece being at the centre of the European Union’s growing political and economic crises. Greece, after all, is the historical home of democracy and foundation of much of that we associate with Western civilisation. If things fall apart in Greece, the knock-on effects could be profound.</p>
<p>Given that Greece represents less than 2% of European GDP, one might wonder what all the fuss is about. If Greece’s economy collapses it will be ordinary Greeks who are the principal victims. In the all-too-likely event that Greece cannot or will not pay its debts, its creditors will survive. As journalist Martin Wolf has <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/44c56806-a556-11e4-ad35-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3Q5Y7UdZP">pointed out</a>, two-thirds of the loans provided by the IMF and the Eurozone were used to underwrite Greece’s outstanding debts.</p>
<p>At the very least, the election of the left-wing Syriza government means that business as usual is no longer possible. This may be no bad thing. Under the existing EU-inspired austerity campaign, unemployment is more than 25% – more than 50% among the young – and the economy has shrunk by more than a quarter from its position before the crisis. No government, let alone one that repudiates the very system that brought this national crisis about, could live with such numbers.</p>
<p>There is no doubt that “Greece” should bear some of the responsibility for the situation it finds itself in. Successive governments played fast and loose with the accession rules when it joined the Eurozone, and the Greek economy was able to take on unsustainable levels of debt as a consequence. But while all Greeks may have enjoyed a short-term boost to living standards, its former political leaders clearly played a greater role in creating the preconditions of the current crisis.</p>
<p>The question now is whether all Greeks and the current government should be held responsible for the actions of a political elite that benefited disproportionately from self-serving, unsustainable policies. If there is no political constituency within Greece that is willing to take responsibility for fulfilling its external obligations, should someone else force them to do so?</p>
<p>This is where the problems of a small, peripheral economy begin to assume an outsize and unlikely importance. If Greece can “get away with” bad behaviour and irresponsibility, will this encourage a chain reaction among similarly indebted, austerity-weary populations in Spain, Italy and elsewhere?</p>
<p>There are two distinct but interconnected questions about the European crisis that will help to determine its outcome. First, is the claim that forcing Greece to accept responsibility for its misdeeds sustainable on normative or technical grounds? </p>
<p>There is an unresolved debate about the merits of austerity versus greater economic stimulus – one that is reflected in the EU’s own simultaneous adoption of quantitative easing while insisting that debtors honour obligations. Forcing ordinary Greeks into further penury in such circumstances looks heartless and potentially counterproductive.</p>
<p>The second question is about the role of Europe’s de facto hegemon. Will Germany’s visceral aversion to fiscal irresponsibility and an increasingly widespread contempt of Greek fecklessness leave little room for compromise? Whatever Angela Merkel’s private views on this subject may be, her government may find it difficult to take a lenient view of Greek failings.</p>
<p>It is Greece’s location in the political and economic architecture of the EU that makes this crisis so novel and important. Whether or not you agree with Syriza’s analysis of the crisis and the best way to restore some sort of prosperity in Greece, does the new government actually have the autonomy, the authority or more importantly the capacity to actually do anything about it? It is one thing to vote for change – it is quite another to enact it.</p>
<p>The reality is that while Greece remains a member of the EU it will have to negotiate with the likes of the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB for its part needs to take the wishes of the leaders of Europe’s most powerful economy seriously. National autonomy for the small, the weak and the dependent is a negotiated and compromised entity at best in such circumstances, despite all the bluster and bravado from Syriza.</p>
<p>There is the nuclear option, of course, in which Greece either quits or is expelled from the Eurozone and perhaps the EU itself. But this would almost certainly guarantee the economic devastation of Greece. An estimated €1bn is being withdrawn from Greek bank accounts every day since the new government came to power.</p>
<p>Devastating as this would be for Greece, the rest of the EU could also be at risk in a way that belies Greece’s economic significance. The possibility of a break-up of the Eurozone and perhaps even the EU itself would be back on the agenda. </p>
<p>For all its lack of conventional authority and power and all its problems and diminished status, the paradoxical reality is that Greece is more than just a symbolic threat to the European order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37078/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
There is something rather appropriate about Greece being at the centre of the European Union’s growing political and economic crises. Greece, after all, is the historical home of democracy and foundation…Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/367872015-01-27T15:18:12Z2015-01-27T15:18:12ZHow can the radical left and far-right work together in Greece?<p>The victory of the radically left Syriza in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/greek-elections"> Greek election</a> is a historical moment for the country. It is the first time since the modern Greek state was founded in 1832 that a left-wing party will govern. It’s also the first time that traditional <a href="http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2015/01/greek-political-dynasties-will-bide-their-time/">political families</a> will not participate in the government. </p>
<p>But Syriza secured only 149 out of the 151 seats it needed to win an absolute majority in parliament and has decided to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/27/greek-pm-alexis-tsipras-economist-yanis-varoufakis">form a government</a> with Independent Greeks. This is a right-wing party that believes in nationalism and strict immigration controls. It came in sixth place in the election with 4.75% of the vote and 13 parliamentary seats. </p>
<p>While the partnership might seem an unlikely one, the potential for a coalition bringing together Syriza and Independent Greeks has been cultivated ever since the latter was established in 2012 in reaction to the terms set for the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/index_en.htm">Greek bailout</a>.</p>
<p>In fact, the coalition is consistent with Syriza’s pre-election commitment to ally only with anti-austerity political parties. With the Greek Communist Party refusing to cooperate and the centrist Potami unclear about its position on austerity, Independent Greeks has emerged as the most sensible choice. </p>
<p>And indeed, the manifesto put forward by Independent Greeks is not incompatible with Syriza’s <a href="http://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aid=631486">Thessaloniki Programme</a>. The party favours also debt relief, austerity easing and the restoration of salaries and pensions to pre-2009 levels. It wants to restore Labour relations, alleviate poverty and punish those responsible for the crisis. Like Syriza, it also believes in constitutional reform to repair the political system.</p>
<h2>Fragile friendship</h2>
<p>All that said, there are disparities between Syriza and Independent Greeks that could shake the coalition. The smaller coalition partner wants the European bailout programme to be unilaterally denounced, while Syriza’s Thessaloniki Programme includes renegotiating with the EU over the Greek debt. The course of these negotiations and the compromise to be reached are fundamental to the economic future of the country, the longevity of the coalition and possibly the unity of Syriza itself. </p>
<p>Then there are the deep ideological disparities that separate the two parties. The manifesto of Independent Greeks declares their commitment to the values of the Greek Orthodox Church, the defence of the Greek nation and the protection of the family. Not surprisingly, it was pushing for and eventually gained control of the Ministry of defence as the government line-up was announced. Syriza, in contrast, is committed to the separation of the state from the church and believes in cutting arms spending.</p>
<p>New prime minister Alexis Tsipras is also committed to an inclusive immigration policy – a stance that doesn’t chime particularly well with its choice of coalition partner. Panos Kammenos, leader of Independent Greeks, has made <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/11369309/Greek-election-who-are-Independent-Greeks.html">xenophobic and racist comments</a> about immigrants and ethnic minorities in the past.</p>
<p>Perhaps even more importantly for their working relationship, there are disparities in terms of social ethics. Kammenos’s party was formed by a number of breakaway members of <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/411357/New-Democracy-ND">New Democracy</a>, a party that appeals to traditional voters. Along with PASOK, it has shaped and perpetuated the forces of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402388408424473?journalCode=fwep20#.VMebxWTF98s">clientelism and patronage</a> that drive Greek politics.</p>
<p>According to a recent study by Transparency International, the majority of Greeks believe that bribery and “string-pulling” are <a href="http://www.publicissue.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NSCG-2013.pdf">acceptable parts of getting along</a> and have little faith in the idea of justice towards fellow citizens.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70130/original/image-20150127-18527-4n5pvw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70130/original/image-20150127-18527-4n5pvw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70130/original/image-20150127-18527-4n5pvw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70130/original/image-20150127-18527-4n5pvw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70130/original/image-20150127-18527-4n5pvw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70130/original/image-20150127-18527-4n5pvw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70130/original/image-20150127-18527-4n5pvw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Alexis Tsipras with Pablo Iglesias, leader of Podemos, another emerging party on the left of Europe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Like other left-wing groups in Europe, Syriza is expected to have little tolerance for this kind of thinking. The Thessaloniki Programme involves transforming Greek politics by curtailing parliamentary immunity. It also includes introducing institutions based on direct democracy and self-organisation, such as a people’s legislative initiative, a people’s veto and a people’s initiative to call a referendum.</p>
<p>Syriza MPs already contribute 20% of their monthly salary to fund Solidarity for All, an umbrella organisation that provides logistical support to grassroot actions that help <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/23/greece-solidarity-movement-cooperatives-syriza">vulnerable people</a>. </p>
<h2>We can work it out</h2>
<p>Despite these stark differences, it would be premature and fatalistic to say that the coalition between Syriza and Independent Greeks cannot last. Syriza is aware that this is a historical moment and is committed to succeeding.</p>
<p>If the coalition manages to end austerity without damaging the European profile of the country, then Independent Greeks will be the only right-wing party to have contributed to the Greek revival.</p>
<p>Failure would plunge the country deeper into crisis and austerity. It would probably annihilate Independent Greeks and the left as a political force – not just in Greece but in other countries too – for many years to come. The stakes are high. Tsipras has already adopted a more <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/da236d24-9ff9-11e4-9a74-00144feab7de.html">conciliatory discourse</a>. He also made an experienced journalist and member of Independent Greeks responsible for the coalition communicative strategy, in an effort to ensure the it will speak with one voice</p>
<p>Success also depends on how the left in Europe reacts. This could significantly influence the dynamics of negotiations and potentially recalibrate the process of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/13608746.2012.757455#.VMbKamTF98t">European integration</a>. If the left can rise in other member states, Syriza’s chances of success are increased. In the meantime, the party needs to smooth out its differences with Independent Greeks – or at least work out how to keep them contained – to get this coalition up and running.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36787/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eleni Xiarchogiannopoulou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The victory of the radically left Syriza in the Greek election is a historical moment for the country. It is the first time since the modern Greek state was founded in 1832 that a left-wing party will…Eleni Xiarchogiannopoulou, Post-doctoral research fellow, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/367352015-01-26T17:30:21Z2015-01-26T17:30:21ZSyriza’s ambitious plan to rescue the Greek health system<p>In 2010, the Greek economy entered a deep, structural and multi-faceted crisis, the main features of which were a large fiscal deficit, huge public debt and the continuous erosion of the country’s competitive position. In order to address the problem, the Greek government requested a support mechanism from the EU and the IMF, adopted a strict fiscal and income policy and increased direct and indirect taxes. In addition flexibility in the labour market was increased and public spending was cut, especially in health, welfare and education. </p>
<p>After five years of austerity, this structural adjustment programme has failed to deliver the expected results. Indicative of this is the fact that government deficit in 2013 reached 12.2% of GDP; debt shot <a href="http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/General/greek_economy_23_1_2015.pdf">up to 174.9% of GDP</a>; unemployment reached 27.5%; more than a third of the population (35.7%) is at risk of poverty or social exclusion; and the <a href="http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/General/LivingConditionsInGreece_0115.pdf">inequality of income distribution increased</a>. Public health expenditure decreased by €4.2 billion between 2009 and 2012 and <a href="http://www.epeksa.gr/assets/variousFiles/file_1.Economou-Kaitelidou.pdf">more than 2.5m people</a> lost their health insurance. </p>
<h2>The four pillars</h2>
<p>In this context, Syriza’s election win came as no surprise. Based on an alternative policy proposal of a <a href="http://syriza.net.gr/index.php/en/theseis/45-what-the-syriza-government-will-do">national reconstruction plan</a>, Syriza put forward an optimistic vision that was desperately needed. </p>
<p>The plan focuses on four major pillars to reverse the social and economic disintegration, to reconstruct the economy and exit from the crisis. The four pillars are: confront the humanitarian crisis; restart the economy and promote tax justice; regain employment; and transform the political system to deepen democracy.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70046/original/image-20150126-24505-hqwpst.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70046/original/image-20150126-24505-hqwpst.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70046/original/image-20150126-24505-hqwpst.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70046/original/image-20150126-24505-hqwpst.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70046/original/image-20150126-24505-hqwpst.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=660&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70046/original/image-20150126-24505-hqwpst.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=660&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70046/original/image-20150126-24505-hqwpst.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=660&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An optimistic vision.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/aster-oid/3383912837/sizes/o/in/photolist-6a2roM-dFJJtJ-ckpANj-bW4uTe-upYS2-4nJQMZ-c8bNnd-bijaUX-4nSsnS-4nJPGV-7AmKr4-4nSvM5-4nNXQA-4nNYRh-6x3a6S-9XLFUU-yLkGY-wS8ay-LyADK-LyADp-8F1gfV-8bLmit-6o5rSE-LyADP-6o5qBy-89vAbK-MfD48-4nNY9d-4nK1gX-6xzhNE-4nJR6n-9o2Fss-63tFfh-8bLm2H-6xwvGW-gitUNn-2jQfgp-qJjqYt-4nSkZ7-7PXNdc-MfD4g-4nNsSM-kUeYNo-qJtWva-7ZugVn-6WDokx-M9AAX-73uctr-4nSEEQ-4nNsWz-9WmW5V/">Aster-oid</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Measures to immediately confront <a href="https://theconversation.com/suicide-hiv-and-infant-deaths-soar-in-post-crash-greece-23492">the humanitarian crisis that has been happening in Greece</a> include the provision of free electricity to households under the poverty line and meal subsidies to families without income. These have been a real problem in the day-to-day lives of many in Greece. Alongside these the party has promised to provide free medical and pharmaceutical care for unemployed people without health insurance – a big problem in Greece <a href="https://theconversation.com/suicide-hiv-and-infant-deaths-soar-in-post-crash-greece-23492">that affects access to care</a>.</p>
<p>Housing guarantees, rent subsidies, transport discounts for long-term unemployed and those under the poverty line aim to tackle issues related to poverty along with the restitution of the €12,000 annual income tax threshold and restoring the minimum wage to €751.</p>
<h2>Health a priority</h2>
<p>The health sector will be one of Syriza’s priorities, with emphasis on securing access for the uninsured to health services, staffing the national health service with the recruitment of the necessary number of medical and nursing personnel and increasing the budget for health. </p>
<p>Primary health care is also a target with an aim for a referral system based on GPs and primary health care teams. Promotion and prevention will be upgraded with the provision of school health programmes, family planning and measures for public health. For public hospitals, Syriza advocates opening hospitals outside business hours for emergencies, and in order to avoid long waits.</p>
<h2>How will this be achieved?</h2>
<p>All of this will be done through an increase in public spending – something which is in sharp contrast with the provisions of austerity plan that Greece has been under. However, according to Syriza, the €11.4 billion cost of this is possible, to be covered by measures and procedures of settlement and clearance of arrears in taxes and social insurance contributions, by decisively combating tax evasion and smuggling, and by establishing a public development bank as well as of special-purpose banks financed from the so-called “comfort pillow” of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund and other specialised European instruments.</p>
<p>The most difficult task the party has will be to convince the EU and troika that a new European deal for Greece is needed in order to secure a socially viable solution to Greece’s debt problem. Only then will the country be able to pay off the remaining debt from the creation of new wealth and not from primary surpluses which have only deprived society and deteriorated the human condition. The effort of the new Greek government will be successful if based on well documented evidence based policy proposals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36735/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charalampos Economou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In 2010, the Greek economy entered a deep, structural and multi-faceted crisis, the main features of which were a large fiscal deficit, huge public debt and the continuous erosion of the country’s competitive…Charalampos Economou, Associate Professor in Health and Social Policy, Panteion UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/366212015-01-26T17:06:01Z2015-01-26T17:06:01ZGreek election exposes the dilemmas of democracy in a globalised world<p>The defining image of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/greek-elections">Greek election</a> will surely be the sight of jubilant Syriza supporters in the streets of Athens. In the wake of the far-left coalition’s victory, there is much talk of hope for an alternative future.</p>
<p>In his acceptance speech Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras spoke of “cohesion”, “solidarity”, an end to austerity and “dignity”, underlining that an aggressive negotiation with Europe would be needed to restore Greek national pride.</p>
<p>The far-left Syriza won this election by taking 600,000 votes from <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22025714">Pasok</a> and Dimar – both parties in the governing coalition during the past two-and-a-half years. But this was not about ideological choices. Most voters would admit that, on balance and in spite of the euphoria, this election presented them with a choice that amounted to the lesser of two evils. </p>
<p>The call for an end to austerity seems unequivocal, but what happens next remains the source of great equivocation. In the immediate aftermath, Tsipras will have to work out how to provide what has been promised – the re-employment of public sector workers, electricity for those who have been cut off, re-starting investments and tax reductions.</p>
<p>By any stretch, this is a radical agenda and there is a sense even amongst ardent supporters that he will not be able to deliver. Critics argue his programme is <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/11367785/Nothing-will-be-solved-by-Syrizas-empty-promises.html">unfundable and unworkable</a>.</p>
<h2>Modern democracy</h2>
<p>When elections are about choosing the lesser of two evils, it shows how far from actual democracy we are when it comes to our existing electoral mechanisms. Structures of representation are thought to allow for a semblance of democracy in large, complex societies. Elections allow voters to authorise a representation to act (on their behalf, in their own interests, or instead of them) and hold them accountable for what they’ve done since they were last authorised.</p>
<p>On this view we might say that Greeks voted in order to punish former prime minister Antonis Samaras for his poor performance in government and to authorise Tsipras to pursue a different political agenda. The extent to which this is true is questionable though.</p>
<p>Though voters have ostensibly authorised Tsipras, they have done so because there is no alternative. The austerity programme has eroded middle class life and has been a matter of life or death for the poor.</p>
<p>The character of these elections was punitive but not in terms of linear accountability. Austerity was imposed by the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15149626">Troika</a>, not the governing parties. For the Greeks it was a political abnormality that social-democratic parties dedicated to social welfare agreed to such harsh austerity policies. For the same reason, Tsipras won’t be held to account for over-promising on a massive scale. Greece’s room for manoeuvre is limited. </p>
<h2>Obeying the eurozone</h2>
<p>Forces outside the Greek electoral framework are crucial as this situation unfolds. As soon as it became clear that Syriza was going to win the vote, a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-30977714">warning</a> rippled out from the eurozone that Greece would still be required to meet the agreements that have already reached on reducing the deficit. Those doing the warning were clearly oblivious to the fact that this was an agreement made with a government that Greek voters held accountable by removing from office. </p>
<p>That parliaments cannot bind governments to fulfil promises made by their predecessors sits uneasily with the extra-parliamentary governance of the single currency. And yet, in turn, it exposes another democratic dilemma – paying for Tsipras’ proposed reforms will ultimately fall to taxpayers in other European member states – and they didn’t vote for Tsipras.</p>
<p>In any case, Syriza is reaping the benefits of reaching a point of no return on austerity and the punitive tendency towards abnormalities of the political tradition. Whether the new government will manage to satisfy expectations and be consistent to what people consider rational is a task so far untested in an era of universal realignment. </p>
<p>What happens now in Greece matters to the whole world for a number of reasons, not least because this curious state of affairs is a feature not only of all eurozone states but also any democratic state that exists in a situation of international interdependence – and these days, that’s all of them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36621/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ioannis Zisis receives funding from University of Hull for his Doctoral studies.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elizabeth Monaghan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The defining image of the Greek election will surely be the sight of jubilant Syriza supporters in the streets of Athens. In the wake of the far-left coalition’s victory, there is much talk of hope for…Elizabeth Monaghan, Lecturer in Politics, University of HullIoannis Zisis, Doctoral Researcher in Politics, University of HullLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/367182015-01-26T14:16:54Z2015-01-26T14:16:54ZWith Greece backing euro but Syriza in government, another election may beckon<p>Thousands of Greeks poured into the streets of Athens to rejoice Syriza’s win and to crown its leader, Alexis Tsipras, as Greece’s next prime minister. Most of them were the same people who, five years ago, spilled out into the streets celebrating PASOK’s triumph, applauding its leader, George Papandreou, who was prime minister from 2009-2011. </p>
<p>This time the supporters were fewer and looked older, but sadly not wiser. Some Greeks never learn, despite the warning of Athenian poet Menander, who wrote in the fourth century BC: “The wise man does not make the same mistake twice.”</p>
<p>In one way, the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/jan/26/greece-election-syriza-victory-alexis-tsipras-coalition-talks-live-updates#block-54c5ef41e4b0bff06d866231">results</a> do not look much different from the previous elections of 2012. Syriza moved to first place with 36% of the total votes from its second place in 2012. It will govern in coalition with right-wing, anti-austerity party <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30981950">Independent Greeks</a>, which won 13 seats.</p>
<p>However, the party won fewer votes than the political parties which formed the coalition governments in 2012. These represent what Tsipras calls “austerity” parties (New Democracy, LAOS, PASOK, Democratic Left, KIDISO, and POTAMI). These parties won 43% of the total votes. Under a different electoral system, they would have more seats in the Greek parliament than Syriza. And this despite the three years of very unpopular economic policies and cutbacks. These political parties now have the right to question Syriza’s political legitimacy.</p>
<p>In 2012, coalition parties had the support of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_legislative_election,_June_2012#Results">48% of Greeks</a>. The percentage of Syriza and Independent Greeks is 41%.</p>
<p>Syriza’s government will be a minority with no political legitimacy right from the start. It will be the figment of the electorate rule which gives the first political party a boon of 16.7% seats of the 300 seats of the Greek parliament. Tsipras promised to scrap it. Regardless, Tsipras’ governing party will be the first since the collapse of the dictatorship in 1974 to be formed with less than 40% of votes. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69982/original/image-20150126-24515-9i31ds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69982/original/image-20150126-24515-9i31ds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69982/original/image-20150126-24515-9i31ds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=124&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69982/original/image-20150126-24515-9i31ds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=124&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69982/original/image-20150126-24515-9i31ds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=124&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69982/original/image-20150126-24515-9i31ds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=156&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69982/original/image-20150126-24515-9i31ds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=156&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69982/original/image-20150126-24515-9i31ds.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=156&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gregory T Papanikos</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>* The incumbent government was voted down.</em><br>
<em>** Interim government</em></p>
<p>But this is not the only difficulty. Syriza would not have the support of the majority of Greeks to implement its very controversial and cloudy program.</p>
<h2>The key issues</h2>
<p>Since 2009, three issues have been debated in election campaigns: the traditional ideological separation between right and left; the split between those who want to stay in the eurozone and those who want to pull out; and the division between those who are against the fiscal consolidation measures and those who believe they are necessary, if Greece is to stay in the eurozone. The main difference between the “triumphant” Syriza and the three-party coalition government of June 2012 was austerity.</p>
<p>The following table shows the voting distribution of the 2015 and 2012 elections on these three issues. This year, 22 political parties were competing for the votes of 9.9 million Greeks.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69983/original/image-20150126-24546-16vmkv4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69983/original/image-20150126-24546-16vmkv4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69983/original/image-20150126-24546-16vmkv4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=127&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69983/original/image-20150126-24546-16vmkv4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=127&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69983/original/image-20150126-24546-16vmkv4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=127&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69983/original/image-20150126-24546-16vmkv4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=160&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69983/original/image-20150126-24546-16vmkv4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=160&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69983/original/image-20150126-24546-16vmkv4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=160&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gregory T Papanikos</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>Note: The percentages of the austerity measures do not add up to 100% because the political parties which are against Greece’s participation in the European Union and the eurozone are not included.</em> </p>
<p>The first thing to note is that 58.2% voted for left-wing political parties. This represents an increase in popularity for the left in Greece. The division between right and left is important because Syriza has a mass nationalisation program of airlines, ports and telecommunications. Even social democratic parties, which in the table are included in the left side of the political spectrum, do not support such a response in an era of massive sovereign debt.</p>
<p>Second, the great majority of Greeks voted for political parties which support staying in the eurozone. More than 87.3% of Greeks voted for the euro. This is important because a minority of Syriza’s party members <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-syriza-win-is-unlikely-to-cause-a-grexit-36553">support a Grexit</a>. These results confirm what all polls have indicated: more than 80% of Greeks want to stay in the eurozone. The question is how?</p>
<p>On the lethal issue of the necessity of austerity measures to stay in the eurozone, 46% of Greeks voted for political parties which claim that fiscal consolidation and cutbacks are necessary because other eurozone countries would not accept a write-off of Greek debt. On the other hand, 41% of Greeks voted for parties that claim this is not necessary. Syriza is an enthusiast supporter of this idea, at least officially. But what if eurozone partners do not accept it? Syriza is mute on that. </p>
<p>Greeks will find out in a few days how far is Syriza willing to go on this issue. In any case, Syriza lacks the political legitimacy to get Greece out of the eurozone with or without austerity measures. </p>
<p>Is Greece heading for another election pretty soon? Probably. Further elections can only be avoided if Syriza does a u-turn, which is very common in Greek politics, or the eurozone countries yield to Tsipras’ charm. His charm was very important in winning votes in Greece but it is unlikely that will have any affect in solving Greece’s problem with its eurozone partners.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory T. Papanikos is affiliated with the Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER), a world association of academics based in Athens.</span></em></p>Thousands of Greeks poured into the streets of Athens to rejoice Syriza’s win and to crown its leader, Alexis Tsipras, as Greece’s next prime minister. Most of them were the same people who, five years…Gregory T. Papanikos, Honorary Professor, Department of Economics, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/367072015-01-26T02:39:31Z2015-01-26T02:39:31ZGreece – the Moment of Dignity<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69973/original/image-20150126-24510-y47zeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69973/original/image-20150126-24510-y47zeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69973/original/image-20150126-24510-y47zeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69973/original/image-20150126-24510-y47zeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69973/original/image-20150126-24510-y47zeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69973/original/image-20150126-24510-y47zeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69973/original/image-20150126-24510-y47zeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69973/original/image-20150126-24510-y47zeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Boarded-up shops in an area of downtown Athens ruined by austerity.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Helen Sotiriadis/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During the past three years, several anguished and rather melancholy ‘Democracy Field Notes’ tried to analyse the causes of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/greece-debt-crisis-threatens-democracy-2122">Greek crisis</a> and the terrible <a href="https://theconversation.com/tunisian-hope-and-greek-despair-a-week-in-the-life-of-democracy-4083">pain and misery</a> unfairly inflicted on many millions of Greek citizens by European austerity politics. </p>
<p>Overnight, as if the local deities had suddenly decided to offer lavish comforting gifts to poor, picked-upon Greece, things have changed. Votes are still being counted throughout the country, yet it now looks certain that the Syriza coalition, with its refusal of rule by austerity and commitment to revive the spirit and substance of democratic politics, is headed for a near-absolute majority of seats in the Greek parliament. </p>
<p>To capture something of the mood of the moment, I reproduce below a short exchange of text messages with a dear friend and trusted colleague, who was among many tens of thousands of Greek citizens who returned to Athens, especially to cast their ballots. </p>
<p>‘My dear John!’, began the exchange, just over a day ago. ‘I’m already in Athens catching up on sleep, social life, politics.’ She added: ‘Exciting times also full of apprehension.’ Then came a playful afterthought: ‘Is it ethical to bet on the electoral results?:-)’</p>
<p>I wrote back: ‘Kalimera! never mind the gambling. Plz just make sure that Samaras & Venizelos & Papandreou are thrown out into the streets. Michaloliakos & his [Golden Dawn] friends should of course stay put [in prison]’. I added: ‘the deities know the rest :-) & wise citizens know something else: not to invest great hopes in elections. I shall be thinking of you good luck!’</p>
<p>My friend replied instantly: ‘I know! and older people suggest it feels like 1981 all over again [when PASOK, led by Andreas Papandreou, won a landslide victory and formed the first socialist government in the history of Greece] but with more depressed spirits. Let’s see.’ </p>
<p>A few seconds later, an image of Alexis Tsipras, about to cast his vote, looking jubilant, came through from Athens. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69972/original/image-20150126-24515-1pynl59.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69972/original/image-20150126-24515-1pynl59.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69972/original/image-20150126-24515-1pynl59.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69972/original/image-20150126-24515-1pynl59.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69972/original/image-20150126-24515-1pynl59.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69972/original/image-20150126-24515-1pynl59.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69972/original/image-20150126-24515-1pynl59.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69972/original/image-20150126-24515-1pynl59.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The leader of Greece’s left-wing Syriza party Alexis Tsipras arrives to cast his ballot at an Athens polling station, January 25, 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Louisa Gouliamaki/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Then up jumped the moment of elation, this morning’s early breaking news. My friend bubbled with joy. ‘U know i’m kind of blasé and don’t hold much hope for Greece’s future’, she wrote, ‘but today’s voting experience was really a religious one. The hope and the trepidation. A special feeling. And the moment I was thinking exactly that the Sunday morning church bells next to my parents’ flat started to chime.‘ </p>
<p>My fumbling reply tried to capture the moment when millions of Greeks trapped in squalour suddenly acted in solidarity, to reclaim their stolen democratic rights: 'Kalimera! It’s dawn here - and dawn in Athens :-) just watching every channel I can get my eyes on, with great excitement (& I confess some tears of joy) a thumping victory! perhaps even an outright majority! Tsipras is surely right’, I wrote. ‘Whatever happens hereon, this is an important moment of dignity (and 'democracy, solidarity and cooperation’, he said) when the people who were the first to suffer and suffered the most are now the vanguard of a real european alternative to the widespread prevailing misery’. </p>
<p>As for the strangely mystical feelings that sometimes grip democracies at the moment of sweet victory in a hard-fought free and fair election, I could think of just these few parting words. ‘Transcendence yes & little wonder the bell ringers struck @ your heart it is an unforgettable democratic moment congratulations, dear citizen!’</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36707/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
During the past three years, several anguished and rather melancholy ‘Democracy Field Notes’ tried to analyse the causes of the Greek crisis and the terrible pain and misery unfairly inflicted on many…John Keane, Professor of Politics, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/366802015-01-25T23:36:36Z2015-01-25T23:36:36ZSyriza sweeps to victory in Greek election, promising an end to ‘humiliation’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69968/original/image-20150125-24515-1h6wbzn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras addresses his public.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Michael Kappeler</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As had been widely predicted, the left-wing party Syriza has secured a victory in the Greek election. Having finished with just short of enough seats in parliament for a majority, leader Alexis Tsipras has agreed to form an anti-austerity coalition with the right-wing party Greek Independents.</p>
<p>Throughout the short campaign, it appeared the relative newcomer to Greek politics, led by the charismatic Tsipras, would win. Now it appears he has done so by a significant margin.</p>
<p>Speaking in the wake of the victory, Tsipras said the vote would end years of “destructive austerity, fear and authoritarianism” and that his country could now leave behind the “humiliation” it has suffered. </p>
<p>The last half of 2014, which became essentially a prolonged general election campaign, saw the Syriza leadership (especially Alexis Tsipras) toning down its extreme rhetoric. Instead of pushing for radical reform, it focused on promising simply to abandon austerity and challenge Greece’s external debt commitments. </p>
<p>Syriza has pledged to tackle what it calls Greece’s “<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-18/what-syriza-says-about-greece-s-economy-its-debt-and-the-euro.html">humanitarian crisis</a>”. It plans to feed and house the worst affected by the crisis, providing them with free electricity and medication, and reintroducing a higher minimum wage.</p>
<p>Internationally, it has promised to bring Greece’s creditors to the negotiating table, with the intention of thrashing out a deal more favourable to Greece. In essence, this will amount to requesting debt redemption, or a “<a href="http://www.dw.de/marcel-fratzscher-greece-needs-a-new-haircut/a-18188295">haircut</a>”. </p>
<p>This toned-down platform may have won Syriza the election by attracting enough of the political centre, but it may not be enough to sustain the support of the more radical elements in the party’s leadership and political base. </p>
<p>The worry is that the whiff of power may not be strong enough to placate radical elements, who really do want radical domestic policies. They would like to see austerity abandoned and replaced by increased government spending across the board, and the restitution of public salaries and pensions. The public sector workers made redundant over the past four years would be re-employed and state property nationalised.</p>
<p>They also want a more confrontational policy towards Greece’s creditors and the so-called troika (the EU, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund). This could ultimately result in the dreaded <a href="https://theconversation.com/grexit-deja-vu-is-europe-really-ready-to-let-its-grecians-go-35888">Grexit</a>. </p>
<p>If Syriza’s more radical elements feel betrayed by watered-down policies, the party faces the prospect of internal division, and Greece could soon see social unrest and demonstrations. That would weaken the new government dramatically, and could further destabilise the country at a very delicate moment.</p>
<p>Despite the scene of triumph, Greece is entering a period of deep uncertainty, and Syriza’s victory may indeed turn out to be pyrrhic. It is confronted by the immense task of governing at a time when Greece may be ungovernable, while also facing a potentially divisive internal struggle. International partners have also made it clear that the new Greek government, whatever its makeup, will have to honour the country’s existing agreements and commitments. </p>
<p>If Greece’s international creditors don’t come through with quick concessions, or if radical opposition rears its head against Syriza’s more moderate approach, this could trigger an uncontrollable reaction based on fear of uncertainty. That could lead to an accidental default, which would have disastrous consequences for Greece.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36680/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Spyros Economides does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As had been widely predicted, the left-wing party Syriza has secured a victory in the Greek election. Having finished with just short of enough seats in parliament for a majority, leader Alexis Tsipras…Spyros Economides, Associate Professor of International Relations and European Politics, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/365652015-01-23T06:25:55Z2015-01-23T06:25:55ZExplainer: why the Greek election is so important<p>This Greek election is the most important in recent memory. It appears <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30975437">Syriza has won by a large margin</a>, ending four decades of two-party rule in Greece. </p>
<p>Since 2010 – and as a result of austerity measures – the country has seen its GDP <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623742-getting-greeks-pay-more-tax-not-just-hard-risky-treasures">shrink by nearly a quarter</a>, its unemployment reach a third of the labour force and nearly half of its population fall below the poverty line.</p>
<p>With the slogan “hope is coming” Syriza, a party that prior to 2012 polled around <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_legislative_election,_2007#Opinion_polls.2C_January.E2.80.93August_2007">4.5% of the vote</a>, seems to have achieved the impossible: creating a broad coalition that, at least rhetorically, rejects the TINA argument (There Is No Alternative) that previous Greek administrations have accepted. In its place, Syriza advocates a post-austerity vision, both for Greece and Europe, with re-structuring of sovereign debt at its centre.</p>
<p>How significant is this victory for Europe and the rest of the world? Comments range from <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-syriza-election-win-would-be-a-serious-setback-for-greece-35576">grave concerns</a> about the impact on the euro and the global economy to jubilant support for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrizas-not-so-radical-politics-and-europes-economic-choice-36229">renewal of the European left</a>. For sure, Syriza is at the centre of political attention in Europe.</p>
<h2>What is Syriza?</h2>
<p>The origins of the party are to be found in a series of splits and consolidations involving various left-wing political groupings that, in one form or another, were originally related to the Communist Party of Greece. Syriza in its current form is a strategic coalition comprising a variety of political platforms that include social democrats, radical socialists and communists, environmentalists, anti-globalisation campaigners and human rights advocates. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69804/original/image-20150122-12113-hrdzm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69804/original/image-20150122-12113-hrdzm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69804/original/image-20150122-12113-hrdzm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69804/original/image-20150122-12113-hrdzm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69804/original/image-20150122-12113-hrdzm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69804/original/image-20150122-12113-hrdzm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69804/original/image-20150122-12113-hrdzm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A broader base.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/popicinio/7005766326/in/photolist-bF5ofA-noso6Q-c3B9ab-bJwWhR-bvCaAf-dvmxLZ-dvs8pq-dvs8j3-68J9ma-6sS8bX-nETmPS-c3B9EN-c3B9sm-c3B9m9-c3B9go-c3B9cU-c3B96Y-c3B93w-c3B8Zh-5HYXh2-noqdB2-4Yt7E6-nr7Brq-nr8nBa-5J4fSw-5HYV6Z-nra9pv-nreGnz-6VXA69-6q2UR8-5J4hSd-e2BKrg-e2BJCr-e2HnFm-e2Hnbf-e2BGyZ-e2BFUp-e2HjAd-e2BDXi-e2Hicw-e2HhCy-e2BCaP-e2Hgof-e2HfGL-e2Hf1L-e2Bzzg-e2Bz5M-e2BymV-e2BxLZ-e2Bx7v">Adolfo Lujan/DISO Press</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Its original base comprised small business owners, academics and teachers with very little appeal among traditional working class voters. But the party’s current appeal is far broader, extending to the middle classes that were hit so hard by austerity measures (especially those associated with the public sector), as well as self-employed people, ex-small business owners, unemployed and underemployed people (especially youth). </p>
<p>Unlike other EU countries, these parts of the Greek electorate are not attracted to ultra-nationalist Eurosceptic parties. As traditional left-of centre voters they find attractive Syriza’s political narrative, a combination of anti-establishment discourse, mild left-wing patriotism, a vision that another Europe is possible and a vague hope for improving their economic and social condition.</p>
<h2>What about the right?</h2>
<p>Not all are convinced by Syriza, however. The voters attracted to far-right party Golden Dawn are traditional anti-communists who used to belong to the conservative New Democracy party or LAOS, a smaller nationalist ultra-right party. </p>
<p>Their appeal is among the lower middle classes (and some ultra conservative working class) who have been also hit hard by austerity. These voters have bought into the rhetoric that culprits behind Greece’s demise are the corrupt political elite and the large number of illegal migrants.</p>
<p>Golden Dawn’s popularity has fallen slightly in recent months, but it is still strong and <a href="http://metapolls.net/category/europe/greece/#.VME8AWSsVM4">according to recent polls</a> it is likely to gain 6% of the vote. But the party is politically isolated, with its leadership in prison and no access to mainstream media. It is unlikely that will play any role in the forming of any government in future.</p>
<h2>Will Greece leave the euro?</h2>
<p>How likely is that Alexis Tsipras, Syriza’s charismatic 4o-year-old leader, will be “the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/alexis-tsipras-of-syriza-is-far-from-greek-orthodox-the-communist-harry-potter-who-could-implode-the-eurozone-9992788.html">Communist Harry Potter</a> who could implode the eurozone”?</p>
<p>Despite the scaremongering that often surfaces in media reports, it is clear that the majority of Syriza representatives <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-syriza-win-is-unlikely-to-cause-a-grexit-36553">want to avoid having to take Greece out of the common currency</a>. Despite some eurosceptic voices in the party, the leadership can hardly be characterised as anti-European. In internal discussions, various factions within Syriza have argued for introducing a national currency but these have remained, so far, a minority voice within the party. </p>
<p>Instead, the current leadership of Syriza has made numerous statements that <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/23/syriza-john-milios-greece-eurozone">it does not intend to destroy the euro</a> or force Greece out of the eurozone. But they also mentioned that they are not willing to keep Greece into the eurozone at any cost. If Greece leaves the euro under Syriza, it will happen not because its leadership wants to but because it will be forced to. </p>
<p>This rather ambivalent message has served Syriza well both domestically and externally. Domestically, it alleviated the fears of many disaffected middle class voters who are very sceptical about a return to Drachma. </p>
<p>Externally, it indicates the spirit with which Syriza will approach any forthcoming negotiations with the troika (the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission). Namely, that Syriza does not share the same neoliberal economic policy agenda as Greece’s lenders – and certainly challenges Germany’s insistence on continuation of austerity – but it is willing to compromise over a mutually beneficial deal.</p>
<h2>What does it mean for Europe?</h2>
<p>In terms of political rhetoric, Syriza has stated its political ambition is to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/11/europe-looks-syriza-hope-change">change Europe</a> as well as Greece. In what is admittedly a clever political move Syriza refused to accept the narrative of Greek exceptionalism when it comes to sovereign debt. </p>
<p>While attacking the incompetence and corruption of the two-party establishment that has run Greece since the 1970s, Syriza has framed the issue of Greek sovereign debt as part of the wider issue of European economic governance and, most recently, promoted the idea of a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/18/should-greece-debt-forgiven-new-idea-europe-syriza">European summit on debt</a>. In this way it opened a political space both for itself and other European political forces to change the dominant economic narrative in the EU. </p>
<p>Is the EU establishment going to respond? The announcement of new <a href="https://theconversation.com/ecb-injects-1-trillion-into-eurozone-but-members-arent-off-the-hook-yet-36557">quantitative easing measures</a> from the ECB marks a change in economic policy but according to chief Mario Draghi, Greece could be <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jan/22/ecb-unveils-1-trillion-qe-plan-stimulate-eurozoen-economy">treated differently</a> and any help will come with conditions. The months ahead will be tense and uncertain but one thing is for sure: nothing will be the same in Greek and European politics after Monday. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>More coverage of the Greek election:</em></p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-syriza-win-is-unlikely-to-cause-a-grexit-36553">Why a Syriza win is unlikely to cause a Grexit</a><br></li>
<li><a href="https://theconversation.com/ecb-decision-should-be-good-news-for-greece-but-syriza-will-get-in-the-way-36578">ECB decision should be good news for Greece, but Syriza will get in the way</a><br></li>
<li><a href="https://theconversation.com/syrizas-not-so-radical-politics-and-europes-economic-choice-36229">Syriza’s not-so radical politics and Europe’s economic choice</a></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36565/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theo Papadopoulos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>This Greek election is the most important in recent memory. It appears Syriza has won by a large margin, ending four decades of two-party rule in Greece. Since 2010 – and as a result of austerity measures…Theo Papadopoulos, Lecturer, Department of Social & Policy Sciences, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/365782015-01-22T14:50:22Z2015-01-22T14:50:22ZECB decision should be good news for Greece, but Syriza will get in the way<p>The European Central Bank’s decision to spend <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-22/ecb-announces-asset-purchase-plan-of-60-billion-euros-a-month.html">60 billion euro a month</a> to buy sovereign debt in order to fight deflation and revive the crumbling eurozone coincides with a snap Greek parliamentary election on January 25.</p>
<p>If Syriza wins, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/21/us-greece-election-poll-idUSKBN0KU0YW20150121">as all polls indicate they will</a>, this might be a serious setback for Greece, just at the time when the Greek economy was emerging out of a five-year deep recession. </p>
<p>Economic turmoil is expected, primarily because Syriza insists on achieving a cut to Greek sovereign debt. Germany and other eurozone countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-can-germany-throw-greece-a-lifeline-and-save-the-euro-35870">consider this unacceptable</a>. </p>
<h2>A parade of ex-prime ministers</h2>
<p>The threat of a Greek breakaway is <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-syriza-win-is-unlikely-to-cause-a-grexit-36553">not considered serious by some analysts</a>. After the Greek elections, they expect a compromise, even if Syriza wins. Since 2009, Greece has had five prime ministers: three elected and two appointed. None lasted for long, primarily because they did not live up to their unrealistic promises.</p>
<p>Is this the fate of Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras? Probably. If he becomes the next prime minister of Greece he will face the leviathan he created: a mass of people who want more jobs in the public sector (<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-21/syriza-pledges-300-000-new-jobs-higher-wages-before-greek-vote.html">more than 300,000 are waiting</a>) and a considerable raise in private and public wages. He simply cannot do it. Nobody will give him the money to start a new public spending spree. </p>
<p>But if he does not deliver, then he will be forced to confront not only public anger, but his numerous clans inside his own party. He is doomed to fail. The sooner the better. The longer this lasts, the longer political uncertainty reigns, not only in Greece, but in the eurozone countries as well. It seems that if nothing else, the recent crisis has been successful in producing ex-prime ministers.</p>
<h2>Taking on the tax evaders</h2>
<p>Tsipras, along with the many political leaders before him, thinks he will find the money in the notorious Greek “lake” of tax evasion. In Greece, <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/the-roots-of-the-greek-tragedy-bloated-bureaucracy-and-tax-evasion/article582943/">tax evasion and tax avoidance is an art</a>, which the majority of Greek taxpayers have learned to perform well over the years. Ingenuity and practice is the secret.</p>
<p>Tsipras thinks he would succeed where others had failed. He is daydreaming. Nobody can beat tax evasion in Greece. Greece has one of the <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/business/small_business/2012/07/the_small_business_problem_why_greece_italy_and_spain_have_too_many_small_firms_.html">highest concentrations of small businesses</a> in the world – close to 2.5m. There are 1.5m self-employed people in Greece, <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm">representing a third of all Greek employment</a>. They are also the source of most tax evasion in Greece. They do not pay any Value Added Tax and “naturally” they do not pay income tax. The cost of auditing them exceeds any tax revenue benefit. If the political cost is added, then it is impossible to reduce tax evasion. Most of these self-employed vote for Syriza.</p>
<h2>Good news, bad timing</h2>
<p>This is too bad because under tranquil political conditions, the ECB announcement on quantitative easing would have been wonderful news for the Greek economy. Greece needs this more than any other country in the eurozone for at least four reasons.</p>
<p>First, an expansionary monetary policy will keep the euro exchange rate low and this would be more than welcome in Greece, which depends on a low value of the euro to boost its international tourism receipts. The chart below shows that the value of the euro relative to the US dollar is much higher than its 2002 value, the inaugural year of the euro. </p>
<p>A devaluation of the euro is what Greece needs. And it comes at the right time because many European tourists are now deciding where to spend their summer holiday. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69746/original/image-20150122-12105-f01eyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69746/original/image-20150122-12105-f01eyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69746/original/image-20150122-12105-f01eyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69746/original/image-20150122-12105-f01eyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69746/original/image-20150122-12105-f01eyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69746/original/image-20150122-12105-f01eyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69746/original/image-20150122-12105-f01eyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69746/original/image-20150122-12105-f01eyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Euro-US dollar exchange rate.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html">ECB</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Second, the ECB’s policy of buying sovereign debt comes at the moment where the whole debate on the Greek debt has resurrected the speculation about Greece leaving the euro. If monetary policy becomes more accommodating, the risk of Greece defaulting on its debt and exiting the eurozone becomes infinitesimal small.</p>
<p>Third, and most important, is the impact of ECB’s initiative on the borrowing rates for the private sector. Greece faces the <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html">highest nominal interest rates in the eurozone</a>. Real borrowing rates are even higher because <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html">Greek deflation</a> is also the highest in the eurozone. With such rates hardly anybody would want to invest in Greece. But if interest rates are brought down and the cost of borrowing diminishes, the private sector can invest again, creating jobs and growth.</p>
<p>Finally, the ECB’s policy would bring down the interest rates in all eurozone countries. Private investment will pick up, generating more jobs and more income. This will have an additional positive impact on the Greek tourism industry since many international tourists come from the eurozone countries.</p>
<p>For all these reasons, the Greek elections this coming Sunday are crucial for the future course of the Greek economy. Whoever becomes the next prime minister must balance citizens’ overwhelming desire to stay in the eurozone with their insatiable hunger for more debt financing public spending. A herculean task indeed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory T. Papanikos is affiliated with the Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER), a world association of academics based in Athens.</span></em></p>The European Central Bank’s decision to spend 60 billion euro a month to buy sovereign debt in order to fight deflation and revive the crumbling eurozone coincides with a snap Greek parliamentary election…Gregory T. Papanikos, Honorary Professor, Department of Economics, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/365532015-01-22T12:04:02Z2015-01-22T12:04:02ZWhy a Syriza win is unlikely to cause a Grexit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69722/original/image-20150122-27517-2ojsjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Storm in a teacup?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/theo_reth/4644831425">Theophilos Papadopoulos</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/21/us-greece-election-poll-idUSKBN0KU0YW20150121">polls</a> are pointing to an election victory for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/syriza">Syriza</a> party in Greece’s election on January 25. The radical left party’s popularity comes from its <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite2_1_20/01/2015_546356">opposition to the austerity policies</a> that have been implemented by the governments of Greece’s two mainstream parties, Pasok and New Democracy in obedience to their eurozone financiers. </p>
<p>It is important to note, however, that Greek elections are taking place increasingly often. In theory, elections should only happen every four years. Yet, after the 2009 elections (which the mainstream, centre-left Pasok party won with a clear majority), there were two successive elections (in May 2012 and in July 2012) and now another. Some political parties speculate that, if a stable government fails to emerge, a second round of elections <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_08/01/2015_546049">might happen again within a month</a>.</p>
<p>This constant changing of government is not good for a country’s economy, disrupting the implementation of economic policies and undermining any meaningful investment in the country. It does mean, however, that whatever the result is on January 26, it is not set in stone and Syriza may not have all the power that is hoped or feared (depending who you support). And though Syriza are popular, they are unlikely to win a majority and will have to form a coalition, unless they want to provoke a second round of elections. This may influence their policy options.</p>
<h2>Dealing with debt and the eurozone</h2>
<p>The prospect of a Syriza win has led to rumours that Greece might leave the eurozone if, for instance, the eurozone’s core (<a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-can-germany-throw-greece-a-lifeline-and-save-the-euro-35870">Germany</a> in particular) refuse to negotiate with them over repaying the country’s debt.</p>
<p>It is so far unclear how Syriza will proceed – even if they win the election by a majority. Though they have repeatedly said they will negotiate a further cut in Greece’s debt, they have not explained how they will make this happen. Their desire to stay in the eurozone is clear, but they have threatened that, if negotiations with the eurozone fail, they may not pay back part of Greece’s debt obligations.</p>
<p>But can Greece actually pay back its debt obligations? To answer this, we note that Greece’s debt, <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/greece/government-debt-to-gdp">currently at 175% of its GDP</a>, is substantially bigger than the debt burden in other peripheral countries. Indeed, in 2014, Italy’s debt stood at <a href="http://ieconomics.com/italy-debt-to-gdp">133% of its GDP</a>. Portugal’s debt stood at <a href="http://ieconomics.com/portugal-debt-to-gdp">129% of its GDP</a>. Spain’s debt stood at <a href="http://ieconomics.com/spain-debt-to-gdp">92% of its GDP</a>. Compare all these figures with Germany’s debt which stood at “only” <a href="http://ieconomics.com/germany-debt-to-gdp">77% of its GDP</a> (UK public debt is at 80.9%). </p>
<iframe width="100%" height="325" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" src="https://www.google.co.uk/publicdata/embed?ds=ds22a34krhq5p_&ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=gd_pc_gdp&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=country_group&idim=country:el:it:es:uk:de:pt&ifdim=country_group&tstart=948499200000&tend=1358812800000&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false"></iframe>
<p>More importantly, Greece needs to pay back <a href="http://www.kathimerini.gr/796774/article/oikonomia/ellhnikh-oikonomia/hmeromhnies-oroshmo-gia-tis-daneiakes-ypoxrewseis-ths-elladas-kata-to-2015?utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=twitterfeed">€22.37 billion (around 11.9% of its GDP) in 2015</a>. This is a huge obligation. Greece urgently needs financial support coming from an agreement with the so-called Troika (that is, the European Commission, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund). </p>
<p>The alternatives are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Greece rolls-over its debt obligations by borrowing directly from the financial markets. This is almost impossible because Greece can currently borrow at around 9% (at a ten-year horizon) or, even worse, at around 12% (at a three-year horizon).</p></li>
<li><p>Greece refuses to pay the €22.37 billion it owes in 2015 (or part of this money) and therefore defaults.</p></li>
<li><p>Greece borrows domestically, that is from Greek residents by raising taxes. This option will definitely be very unpopular as Greek residents will be unwilling to lend to the government especially if they believe that the country will default and return to the drachma.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>With all of the above in mind, the risk of a Grexit is unlikely. At this stage, it is more likely than not that the eurozone’s core and a Syriza government will come together to find a new financial agreement, which would not deviate substantially from what the current government has agreed to. </p>
<p>Should a Grexit take place, it will affect Greece more negatively than anyone else. This is especially the case now the European Central Bank has <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-30915210">implemented a program of quantitative easing</a>.</p>
<p>All this, with an important caveat: in her visit to The London School of Economics shortly after the 2008 financial crisis, Queen Elizabeth famously <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/theroyalfamily/3386353/The-Queen-asks-why-no-one-saw-the-credit-crunch-coming.html">wondered why economists failed to predict it</a>. Seven years on, it is not clear to me whether our economic predictions have actually become much more accurate. In other words, claiming that a possible Grexit will leave the eurozone immune, is definitely bold.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36553/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Costas Milas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The polls are pointing to an election victory for the Syriza party in Greece’s election on January 25. The radical left party’s popularity comes from its opposition to the austerity policies that have…Costas Milas, Professor of Economics, Finance and Accounting, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/359382015-01-16T06:17:16Z2015-01-16T06:17:16ZGreece’s choice: vote for Germany or suffer the consequences<p>A joke that is often told among European leftists these days portrays the current situation between Germany and Greece quite accurately. An officer at the passport control at Athens airport asks a tourist: “What is your nationality?” He replies: “German.”</p>
<p>The officer then asks: “Occupation?”</p>
<p>Whereupon the tourist replies: “No, only visiting.”</p>
<p>The German tourist stands for the ambiguous position that the government in Berlin takes towards Greece: today the Germans might be just visiting, but Berlin’s intervention in Greece’s domestic politics might well have permanent effects.</p>
<h2>Your money or your life</h2>
<p>Only weeks before legislative elections in Athens, German politicians and press are confronting Greek voters with a choice that can more or less be rendered as “your money or your life”: vote for the status quo, or risk being kicked out of the eurozone. </p>
<p>Syriza, which is <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/07/us-greece-election-polls-idUSKBN0KG1OP20150107">performing well</a> in pre-election polls, demands a cancellation of a big part of the country’s crushing debts. In the run-up to the election, Der Spiegel <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/merkel-and-germany-open-to-possible-greek-euro-zone-exit-a-1011277.html#ref=plista">reported</a> that Angela Merkel was ready to accept the exit of Greece from the eurozone if a new Greek government would not hold tight to austerity measures; a German government official was quoted saying that “resourceful lawyers will find a way” to kick Greece out.</p>
<p>Greece was confronted with another non-choice three years ago. Former Greek prime minister George Papandreou suggested <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/caretaker-government-in-athens-greece-backs-away-from-referendum-plans-a-795746.html">holding a referendum</a> on the EU bailout package. Merkel and former French prime minister Nicolas Sarkozy reacted promptly and threatened to suspend their financial warrents for Greece. The humiliated Papandreou could not keep his promise to hold a referendum in the face of their opposition, and his tenure was soon over.</p>
<p>But Syriza’s leaders have made it absolutely clear they have no intention of leaving the euro. Their promises <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/augstein-kolumne-griechenland-und-seine-schulden-a-1010909.html">focus on the domestic realm</a>: improving the health care for those that suffered most in the crisis, introducing a minimum wage, and raising taxes on the rich. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the party’s demand for <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-syriza-election-win-would-be-a-serious-setback-for-greece-35576">debt cancellation</a> worries the German political elite less than it would have a couple of years ago. This time, rather than being bailed out, Greece could simply be asked to leave.</p>
<h2>Double standard</h2>
<p>A glance at history immediately clarifies the real difference between “good” and “bad” debts. The first countries to break the Maastricht Treaty, which bound all European signatories to keep their annual deficits below 3% of GDP, were Germany and France. At that stage in the early 2000s, and for those countries, rigid financial discipline was deemed narrow-minded. </p>
<p>As Der Spiegel <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-ticking-euro-bomb-how-the-euro-zone-ignored-its-own-rules-a-790333.html">recounts</a>, the Franco-German behaviour at the time was resolute: “Determined not to submit to sanctions, [they] managed to secure a majority in the EU’s Council of Economic and Finance Ministers to cancel the European Commission’s sanction procedure.”</p>
<p>Conversely, Greek political scientist Yannis Stavrakakis <a href="https://www.academia.edu/8727834/Debt_Society_Greece_and_the_future_of_Post-democracy">remembers</a> how his country became “overnight” the “sick man of Europe, a <em>bête noire</em> to be ridiculed, condemned and disciplined in the most severe way”. As he sees it, debt is being used as a tool in today’s Euro crisis “to threaten, subject, and control” countries that do not want to adhere to austerity politics made in Germany. </p>
<p>There are some voices in Germany taking a more circumspect line. The government’s chief economist, Marcel Fratzscher, recently <a href="http://greece.greekreporter.com/2015/01/10/diw-berlin-50-of-the-greek-debt-should-be-written-off/">floated</a> the idea that Germany “should probably reduce Greece’s public debt to half, which means €120 billion should be written off”. But he also acknowledged that this would harm Germany, and is highly unlikely ever to happen.</p>
<p>On January 25, the Greeks will decide who is going to become their next president, but the German government has already decided who it shouldn’t be. How sad that Germany’s contemporary politics are putting in jeopardy the very European democracy that they once helped build.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35938/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jasper Finkeldey receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).</span></em></p>A joke that is often told among European leftists these days portrays the current situation between Germany and Greece quite accurately. An officer at the passport control at Athens airport asks a tourist…Jasper Finkeldey, PhD student, Centre for Work, Organization, and Society, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/360342015-01-14T06:10:52Z2015-01-14T06:10:52ZMarkets threaten Greek democracy ahead of election<p>Greece faces a decisive moment on January 25 in a snap election that could see major gains for the extreme left and right. But anyone worried about how Syriza on one side, or Golden Dawn on the other, might handle power, should consider a far more sinister force that has conspired to keep Greece away from recovery for years – the international markets.</p>
<p>If <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/07/us-greece-election-polls-idUSKBN0KG1OP20150107">recent polls are accurate</a> Syriza, an alliance of left-wing parties firmly opposed to the country’s harsh bailout terms, will take office. To do that, it has to first overcome the relentless, and staunchly anti-democratic, warnings being issued by some upholders of capitalism’s vested interests. </p>
<p>The coalition that currently mis-governs Greece has done its best for two years to implement dutifully draconian austerity packages. With support now flagging, it hopes to receive a renewed mandate for this at the ballot box. Its austerity packages are designed by pseudo-technocrats at the European Commission in Brussels and enthusiastically backed by the German Bundesbank. </p>
<p>The proclaimed purpose of Greece’s austerity measures does not even end at deficit elimination. The Greek government has been tasked not merely with balancing the books, but with generating a surplus too. The surplus would go to reduce the country’s public debt, which currently stands at almost <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/publicdata/explore?ds=ds22a34krhq5p_&met_y=gd_pc_gdp&idim=country:el:it:es&hl=en&dl=en#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=gd_pc_gdp&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=country_group&idim=country:el&ifdim=country_group&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false">130% of GDP</a>.</p>
<h2>Ravaging of Greece</h2>
<p>The global financial crisis of 2008 resulted in fiscal deficits throughout the world, with EU member states hit particularly hard. In 2009, the Greek fiscal deficit stood at <a href="http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2013/9/cjv33n3-13.pdf">-15.6%</a> – the largest relative to GDP for any eurozone country. In absolute terms this 15.6 per cent represented about than €36 billion.</p>
<p>The deficit had dropped by a third by the end of 2010 to just under €24 billion. But this substantial decline failed to satisfy the austerity appetites of the European Commission, the German government or Bundesbank. By the end of 2014 the Greek fiscal balance was projected to drop to about -3% of GDP or €6.5 billion, as the chart below shows. The chart also shows one indicator of the enormous cost of that reduction in the public deficit; a drop in national income of 18% (26% lower than in 2008). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68484/original/image-20150108-23807-145560m.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68484/original/image-20150108-23807-145560m.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68484/original/image-20150108-23807-145560m.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68484/original/image-20150108-23807-145560m.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68484/original/image-20150108-23807-145560m.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68484/original/image-20150108-23807-145560m.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68484/original/image-20150108-23807-145560m.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Preliminary estimates for 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">http://www.oecd.org & http://www.statista.com/statistics/270398/budget-balance-in-greece/</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These policies brought a reduction of the fiscal deficit by €17.4 billion, at a cost in national income of more than double that figure. No western European country has suffered such a collapse of GDP since the end of World War II. We cannot find one example of a developed capitalist country with a lower national income than it had four years previously in any year between 1945 and 2010.</p>
<p>There have been no signs of respite, though, from Greece’s austerity enforcers. The ideologues in the European Commission and the Bundesbank apparently remain committed to destroying the Greek economy in order to save it.</p>
<p>This ravaging of the economy is evidenced by almost every measure of human welfare in Greece, to the extent that some now refer to a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/11/greece-humanitarian-crisis-eu">“humanitarian crisis”</a> in the country.</p>
<p>Total household consumption adjusted for inflation is now 20% lower than it was in 2010. And that measure includes rich households whose wealth could <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/capital-flight-southern-european-money-migrating-north-to-safety-a-818436.html">protect them</a> from the brunt of austerity. The decline for households below the average income was certainly in excess of 25% and perhaps over 30%. Four in ten children are being <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/oct/28/child-poverty-developed-world-unicef-report-global-recession">brought up in poverty</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68485/original/image-20150108-23812-abmt0d.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68485/original/image-20150108-23812-abmt0d.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68485/original/image-20150108-23812-abmt0d.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68485/original/image-20150108-23812-abmt0d.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68485/original/image-20150108-23812-abmt0d.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68485/original/image-20150108-23812-abmt0d.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68485/original/image-20150108-23812-abmt0d.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Preliminary estimates for 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.oecd.org</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Greece’s level of unemployment challenges the imagination. It has stood at 25% or more for two years – the same as the rate in the US in the 1930s during the great depression. Since the end of World War II <a href="http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/353/2iie3438.pdf">no European market economy</a> suffered unemployment of half the current Greek rate. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68487/original/image-20150108-23810-1182lgx.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68487/original/image-20150108-23810-1182lgx.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68487/original/image-20150108-23810-1182lgx.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68487/original/image-20150108-23810-1182lgx.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68487/original/image-20150108-23810-1182lgx.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68487/original/image-20150108-23810-1182lgx.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68487/original/image-20150108-23810-1182lgx.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.oecd.org</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Things are even worse for young people. Less than <a href="https://ycharts.com/indicators/sources/eurostat">50%</a> were in employment in 2014, and that statistic excludes those in education. These employment figures are but the tip of a human disaster iceberg; health and education are both steadily worsening below the waterline of publicity.</p>
<h2>Speculators vote with their money</h2>
<p>It is little wonder that the only major party opposed to austerity, Syriza, enjoys a lead in the opinion polls. The only surprise is that this anti-austerity party did not win the election in 2012, though it did have the second largest number of seats. </p>
<p>The primary reason for the failure of anti-austerity parties to win the election was the systematic scare campaign carried out by the European media, enthusiastically aided and abetted by the European Commission and every major EU government without exception.</p>
<p>The source of this putative reign of terror would be none other than the infamous “financial markets”, and the warning is <a href="http://time.com/3648338/greece-financial-crisis-election/">again pouring forth</a> at full volume, alongside more <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/world/europe/greeces-relationship-with-eurozone-is-tested-by-election.html?_r=0">threats from politicians</a> of the eurozone.</p>
<p>These warnings have a real basis. The blue bars in the chart below show the index of the Athens stock market and the red bars the interest rate on Greek government bonds. From the beginning of 2012 interest rates rose and the stock market plunged, as the lords and ladies of finance quivered with anxiety that a democratic election might bring an end to austerity in Greece.</p>
<p>To the relief of speculators throughout Europe, Greek voters returned the right-of-centre government to carry on the lowering of living standards. The relief of speculators at escaping democratic accountability is shown in falling interest rates and a recovering Athens stock market over the next two years. But now the spectre of a citizen’s revolt again stirs anxiety. Interest rates have crept up over the past three months and <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/snap-election-fears-are-tanking-the-greek-stock-market-2014-12">stock prices declined</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68488/original/image-20150108-23792-kz0unw.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68488/original/image-20150108-23792-kz0unw.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68488/original/image-20150108-23792-kz0unw.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68488/original/image-20150108-23792-kz0unw.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68488/original/image-20150108-23792-kz0unw.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68488/original/image-20150108-23792-kz0unw.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68488/original/image-20150108-23792-kz0unw.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.bankofgreece.gr & www.investing.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Democracy or dictatorship?</h2>
<p>In the same election that anti-austerity Syriza won 71 seats, the overtly fascist <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_Dawn_%28political_party%29">Golden Dawn party</a> won 18. Among the far-right parties that have thrived on a diet of austerity-depressed countries, Golden Dawn is perhaps the most dangerous. In October of last year the Greek public prosecutor ordered all Golden Dawn members of parliament to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/16/greece-golden-dawn-mps-tried-criminal-offences">stand trial</a> for inciting, supporting and carrying out acts of political violence.</p>
<p>Without doubt Golden Dawn and all parties like it, such as the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-eu-27571116">Jobbik party</a> in Hungary, are clear and immediate threats to democracy. But they do not present the biggest threat to the democratic process. Considerably more dangerous and infinitely more powerful are the eponymous financial markets. Always alert to any democratic revolt against their privilege to loot and plunder, speculators and the more superficially respectable international bankers have the power to bring down governments and pervert election results. </p>
<p>Europe and most countries of the world need radical measures to restrict – or better still eliminate – the power of finance. The choice is democracy, however flawed it might be, or the dictatorship of finance. It really is that simple.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Weeks does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Greece faces a decisive moment on January 25 in a snap election that could see major gains for the extreme left and right. But anyone worried about how Syriza on one side, or Golden Dawn on the other…John Weeks, Professor Emeritus, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/359652015-01-09T11:44:47Z2015-01-09T11:44:47ZWhy are European leaders so afraid of Greece’s Syriza party?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68354/original/image-20150107-1985-1sd48vw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Alexis Tsipras is on track to win the Greek election.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/home_of_chaos/14274791564/in/photolist-nKq3cW-nsY83t-oZix82-4fw4C9-aBA6JJ-5BvCxF-5BzSJb-5BvBkM-5BvAjn-bWGoiy-dCYY8Y-dCYYbh">thierry ehrmann</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The calling of a snap election in Greece for January 25 has been met with great <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30623421">concern in political circles</a>, prompted direct interventions by <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/14/greece-election-eu-finance-chief-athens-grexit-fears">top European officials</a> and alarmed markets and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/30/fitch-snap-greek-elections-add-to-credit-idUSFit88538020141230">credit rating agencies</a>.</p>
<p>This is all because Syriza, the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left, is being tipped to win the election. It is currently the largest opposition party in the Greek parliament and consistently leads the polls as the vote approaches. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="http://www.ft.com/fastft/257212/syriza-set-decisive-victory-report">latest polls</a> Syriza’s vote share could stretch anywhere between 36% to 40%, with the centre-right New Democracy trailing by at least three percentage points. Anything above 36% gives Syriza not only an electoral victory but an outright governing majority in the Greek parliament because the winning party is automatically handed a <a href="http://metapolls.net/country-facts-2/greece/greek-electoral-system/">50-seat bonus</a> in the 300-seat parliament.</p>
<p>Opponents claim that Syriza would renege on Greece’s international obligations if it came to power and that efforts to reform the country would be halted. <a href="https://theconversation.com/january-poll-puts-syriza-in-driving-seat-and-greece-on-course-for-economic-turmoil-35824">Political instability</a> would ensue and the eurozone would again be plunged into crisis. Talk of Greece leaving the euro has been particularly prominent of late.</p>
<h2>Syriza’s roots</h2>
<p>Syriza emerged as a unified party just before the elections of June 2012 but it brings together political groups with long histories. It can be seen as the accomplished product of an effort to unite the Greek left that spans nearly 50 years. </p>
<p>Syriza’s political strategy draws heavily on the principles of the Euro-communist <a href="http://www.transform-network.net/cs/casopis/vytisk-132013/news/detail/Journal/what-syriza-will-propose-to-europe.html">“democratic road to socialism”</a>. Its values, organisation and mobilisation are influenced by the global justice movement. </p>
<p>The party advocates an eclectic egalitarian economic programme that draws on Marxism, Keynesianism and more recent Latin American economic experiments. It goes hand-in-hand with claims for the expansion of social and political rights, pacifism and environmentalism, as articulated by European and global social movements since the 1960s. This also ties in with a staunch, albeit critical, Europeanism that aims to build alliances with other progressive political and social forces in Europe in order to achieve radical root-and-branch reform of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/13608746.2012.757455#.VKvxkiusXTo">European integration</a>.</p>
<h2>The manifesto</h2>
<p>According to the <a href="http://www.businessinsider.sg/what-syriza-stands-for-2014-12/">Thessaloniki programme</a> that lies at the heart of Syriza’s election pledges, the party is committed to renegotiating Greece’s colossal debt. Despite five years of extreme austerity, this still exceeds 170% of GDP. Syriza wants a 50% debt write-off as part of a wider European Debt Conference along the lines of the German debt <a href="http://www.dw.de/german-economic-miracle-thanks-to-debt-relief/a-16630511/">write-off of 1953</a>. </p>
<p>The programme also includes a promise to replace the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/mou/2012-03-01-greece-mou_en.pdf">2010 bail-out agreement</a> signed with the Europe with a long-term national plan aimed at the reconstruction of the Greek economy.</p>
<p>Syriza will also put in place a set of emergency measures meant to alleviate what it calls the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-18/what-syriza-says-about-greece-s-economy-its-debt-and-the-euro.html">“humanitarian crisis”</a> caused by austerity. Minimum wages and public investments will be increased to trigger consumer demand, create jobs and kickstart growth. Only then, Syriza argues, will the country be able to repay its debt. Exhaustive negotiations will be conducted with creditors and European partners but Greece will remain in the eurozone.</p>
<p>The reforms envisaged involve the democratic refoundation of the Greek state. This means unsettling decades of collusion between big business, media groups and political parties. Syriza may indeed be well placed to make such a radical change work since it has not been a party of government and has not been involved in such practices.</p>
<p>Syriza also believes that Europe as a whole must be reformed. German-inspired austerity politics, the party argues, are leading the whole enterprise to ruin. The party wants a new deal for the EU involving public investment, financed by the European Investment Bank. It supports a shift towards quantitative easing by the European Central Bank that involves direct purchases of sovereign bonds. This is, in many ways, Syriza’s most ambitious goal and probably the hardest to achieve.</p>
<p>How far Syriza gets will depend on the magnitude of political support it can muster at home but also on the alliances it builds beyond the limited forces of Europe’s radical left, even counting <a href="https://theconversation.com/meet-podemos-the-party-revolutionising-spanish-politics-33802">an emergent Podemos</a> in Spain and the German <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30342441">Die Linke</a>.</p>
<p>The party’s success in the forthcoming election may mark a turning point in Europe. It would be a step away from austerity and towards a resurgence of the left. But this is not the social democratic left. It is a radical new experiment. It is perhaps this, and not the potential for economic turmoil under a Syriza government that scares European leaders the most.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35965/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Myrto Tsakatika is a member of Syriza</span></em></p>The calling of a snap election in Greece for January 25 has been met with great concern in political circles, prompted direct interventions by top European officials and alarmed markets and credit rating…Myrto Tsakatika, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/355762014-12-16T19:26:42Z2014-12-16T19:26:42ZA Syriza election win would be a serious setback for Greece<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/67370/original/image-20141216-14154-8ju7sm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rebuilding Greece's economy – a Sisyphean task?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mopic via shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Greek economy, after five years of recession, has nearly reached the top of the hill it has been climbing. But there is a real threat that in just a few months it will roll back down again. </p>
<p>Like Sisyphus, the ill-fated king in Greek mythology, Greece’s achievements are at risk with the looming parliamentary election of a new president, which the official opposition (the Coalition of the Radical Left, better known as Syriza) is <a href="https://theconversation.com/snap-election-and-market-collapse-show-greece-is-still-crippled-by-crisis-35347">intent on blocking</a> in order to call for early general elections. The group is <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30481307">tipped to win</a> and there is no doubt that this would roll Greece back down to where it started in 2010, if not even deeper into the abyss. It is more probable now than ever before.</p>
<p>This need not be the case even if early elections are called. The problem is that <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/greek-leftist-party-syriza-spooks-some-investors-1418310035">Syriza is scaring investors away</a> with its polyphony on important economic matters such as foreign direct investments and badly needed structural reforms, whether or not the austerity measures are continued. Syriza is also scaring the governments of other eurozone countries because its erratic policy on Greece’s debt could destabilise the euro and eventually force Greece out of the eurozone. Most importantly, though, it is scaring Greek consumers away by shaking their confidence on the future course of the Greek economy, which might possibly result in a bank run.</p>
<h2>Dealing with the debt</h2>
<p>The most important problem which faces the Greek economy is its excessive sovereign debt, and early elections would not reduce this. Unfortunately, the Greek political parties are heavily divided on how to tackle the country’s deficit. But most importantly Syriza believes that a huge rewrite, at the cost of the taxpayers of the other eurozone countries, could be acceptable. </p>
<p>The alternative is to unilaterally default. But the moment that happens, they would have to go to the international capital markets to borrow more than €10 billion to finance their programme of bringing salaries back to pre-2010 levels, hire hundreds of thousands of new public employees and even re-nationalise private enterprises such as Olympic Airways and the Telecommunications Company.</p>
<p>All this makes international capital markets very nervous. Some Greeks believe that Syriza, which is currently leading the polls, would never implement these policies either because they would not be able to find the money or because they would probably give up their rhetoric and collaborate with the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF to continue with the implementation of the austerity programme. This, however, is a very dangerous gamble. It would see Greece entering into a long and unknown labyrinth, with the Minotaur waiting at every turn to tear the country apart. </p>
<h2>A simple solution</h2>
<p>Of course there is a solution, but no political party in Greece wants to implement it. The Greek debt would have been wiped out if Greece’s tax authorities were able or, more accurately, were willing to collect the due taxes. Tax evasion and tax avoidance is as old as Greek history itself.</p>
<p>Greece is a rich country with high per capita income and even higher per capita wealth. The current crisis did not change this. The lowest per capita income of the 21st century is <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm">higher than the highest per capita income</a> of the 20th century. More than a quarter of the actual output produced in the country <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00036846.2014.896984">goes unreported</a>. This year, with an unprecedented flow of international tourists, especially on the popular islands, <a href="http://greece.greekreporter.com/2014/11/26/tax-evasion-from-greek-tourism-to-reach-e1-5-billion-in-2014/">tax evasion was rife</a> and at its peak. Very few businesses were issuing receipts and even fewer tourists were asking for them.</p>
<p>The solution is to tax wealth, and not income and consumption. A Greek proverb states that you cannot hide two things: your cough and your wealth. A tax on wealth which includes a tax on property and bank deposits, is the solution to the notorious Greek tax evasion. This will generate sufficient revenue to cope with the excessive debt. But political will is needed and, despite all the party posturing, it is currently lacking in Greece.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35576/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory T. Papanikos is affiliated with the Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER), a world association of academics based in Athens.</span></em></p>The Greek economy, after five years of recession, has nearly reached the top of the hill it has been climbing. But there is a real threat that in just a few months it will roll back down again. Like Sisyphus…Gregory T. Papanikos, Honorary Professor, Department of Economics, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/76672012-06-18T09:31:40Z2012-06-18T09:31:40ZIt ain’t easy being Greek: fragile coalition faces a Herculean task<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/11866/original/249vy8gr-1340008145.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">New Democracy leader Antonis Samaras has promised a "new salvation" for Greece.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> EPA/Alexandros Vlachos</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Greece is a land of high drama. </p>
<p>As fires ranged across the south of the country, stretching the emergency services to the limit; in the afterglow of their national soccer team’s astonishing win over Russia in the European Cup and thus advancing to the quarter-finals against (ironically!) Germany; and on the eve of the G-20 summit in Mexico; Greeks went back to the polling booths six weeks after their last election. </p>
<p>In a way, the elections a month before proved to be a precursor reaffirming the most fundamental change of Greece’s political landscape since the beginning of the <em>Metapolitefsi</em> period (Greece’s change of polity to parliamentary democracy following the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1974).</p>
<p>If there was any doubt about the fundamental shift from the ruling centrist parties of PASOK, and to a lesser degree of New Democracy, who between them had governed Greece for the past 38 years, these elections scuppered it. </p>
<p>PASOK <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18482415">continued its downward spiral</a>, registering 12.28% (33 seats) of the popular vote – dropping a further 0.9% and eight seats from the May elections six weeks ago. At 4.5%, the traditional Communist Party of Greece (KKE), the only party that consistently advocated for Greece’s withdrawal from the Eurozone, had its support base halved and with 12 seats trailed behind the fascist Golden Dawn Party, who retained their 7% vote with 18 seats.</p>
<p>However, to get a true appreciation of the change in Greece’s political landscape we need to project and compare the 2012 results (both May and June’s) with those of the 2009 elections. </p>
<p>Back then Syriza, the Coalition of Radical Left, registered only 4.6% of the vote and with 13 seats had even dropped by one parliamentary seat from the 2007 election. As Greece’s sovereign debt crisis morphed into political and social unrest, Syriza’s electoral fortunes catapulted to 16.8% in May’s elections and to 26.9% in yesterday’s electoral contest. </p>
<p>With an overall rise of 25% since 2009, Syriza constitutes the formal opposition party in Greece, less than 3% behind front-runners New Democracy who are poised to form a coalition government. </p>
<p>But listening to Syriza’s leader Alexis Tsipras throughout the campaign, you cannot help but detect echoes of Andreas Papandreou’s radical populism so prevalent during PASOK’s flamboyant ascension to power in the mid-to-late 1970s. </p>
<p>As a matter of fact, the synergy between Syriza and PASOK is not restricted to the hemorrhage of PASOK voters, but was preceded by the defection of apparatchiks, unionists and parliamentarians. In this respect there is some truth to KKE’s General Secretary Aleka Papariga’s condescending remarks that Syriza is the “new PASOK”.</p>
<p>In terms of issues, as with the May elections, yesterday’s contest was conducted along the pro/anti bailout/austerity faultline. </p>
<p>Right-left ideological differences, which have permeated Greek political discourse throughout the post-war period, suddenly gave way to a new dichotomy: one equally marred by polarised sentiments, polemical politics and foreign interference (by European – ostensibly German – politicians and technocrats), amplifying populist rhetoric to create an sense of confusion and abhorrence for all things political. </p>
<p>It was not surprising that at 62%, yesterday’s elections recorded the lowest voter turnout in Greece’s contemporary history – no doubt the majority being disillusioned PASOK voters.</p>
<p>So what’s next for Greece? In the short term the formation of a government with a parliamentary majority. </p>
<p>With 129 seats, the pro-bailout New Democracy conservative party is poised to form a “national salvation government”. Mathematically, this means that its leader Antonis Samaras needs an additional 22 seats to get over the 150+1 majority threshold. </p>
<p>PASOK’s 33 seats would guarantee him the required majority, but PASOK has insisted all along that a true government of national unity means that other parliamentary parties (with the exception of Golden Dawn) should participate. </p>
<p>PASOK, and its leader Evangelos Venizelos, in particular want Syriza to be part of a coalition government in order to make them accountable and take responsibility for the hard political decisions that are destined ahead. Syriza, however, has made it perfectly clear that it will not be part of any such pro-bailout coalition government and would rather lead the opposition. </p>
<p>Despite PASOK’s insistence, pressure from within and without Greece would demand, that they once again forego any “party interest” for the “national good”. But having a veracious anti-bailout opposition could also prove a tactical advantage for a Samaras government in his dealings with The Troika (a nickname for the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund). </p>
<p>This would require political finesse, coalition building with like-minded European sufferers (such as Portugal, Spain and Italy), with socialist-led France at the helm, to loosen the austerity-driven Troika spearheaded by Germany. </p>
<p>While such a campaign is pursued in Europe, a domestic reform agenda needs to be enacted to usher in a raft of structural changes. These pertain to corruption, tax evasion, democratic governance, separation of judiciary from political interference, accountability and scrutiny of public funds and projects, while also trying to stimulate growth and employment. </p>
<p>Quite a Herculean feat for any generation, let alone a coalition government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/7667/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michalis S. Michael does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Greece is a land of high drama. As fires ranged across the south of the country, stretching the emergency services to the limit; in the afterglow of their national soccer team’s astonishing win over Russia…Michalis S. Michael, Deputy Director, Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/77182012-06-17T00:57:11Z2012-06-17T00:57:11ZGreece’s choice: bargaining versus pleading<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/11808/original/nhgks4qt-1339894480.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Greece's citizens are faced with an unenviable choice.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Orestis Panagiotou</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When two sides bargain, their interaction reflects a potential mutual benefit but also a measure of conflict. For instance, when a firm and its supplier reach a deal, there is often more than one price where both will benefit. The high end of the range favours the supplier while the lower advantages the firm. So, when bargaining leads them to an agreement on the final price, they unlock a mutual benefit and resolve a potential conflict.</p>
<p>Now, bargaining only makes sense if both sides enjoy a modicum of bargaining power. And what determines that? </p>
<p>The simple answer is: a readiness to draw a “line in the sand” and credibly resolve to walk away from the negotiations if that line is crossed. Thus, a buyer determines a maximum price, and the seller a minimum price, and commits to scuttle the deal if the opposite side refuses to grant at least this minimalist demand. If one of the two bargainers cannot envision circumstances under which she will prefer to reject the other’s offer, and this is transparent, negotiations are pointless. The party that cannot imagine saying “no” should desist from bargaining and simply plead with the other side, appealing to its kindness, generosity and, in desperate cases like Greece’s, sense of mercy.</p>
<p>Today, Greek voters are going to the polling stations torn by the momentous choice that they must make. Should they vote for a party (Syriza) promising to bargain with Europe for better terms and conditions, or for parties (primarily conservative New Democracy and/or the socialist PASOK) that are, effectively, proposing to plead with Europe for better terms and conditions? </p>
<p>Ostensibly, both sides of the argument are promising to negotiate with the <em>troika</em> (the European Central Bank, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund). However, in truth, the so-called pro-bailout parties (ND and PASOK) are running on a platform that any deal with Greece’s official creditors is better than no deal. So, in view of the preceding definition of genuine bargaining, they are ruling genuine negotiations out, courtesy of their determination not to draw a “line in the sand”.</p>
<p>The voters’ dilemma gets worse because of the risks involved either way. Pro-bailout parties argue against the “line in the sand” strategy because they believe that such a “line”, if it must be adhered to (e.g. following a tough negotiating line by the <em>troika</em>), will lead Greece out of the euro, thus costing Greece more than toeing the <em>troika</em>’s ‘line’ (i.e. Greece is doing as it is told). In sharp contrast, Syriza is arguing (drawing upon the sorry experience of kowtowing to the <em>troika</em>’s every whim during the past two years) that the greatest risk facing Greece is sticking to the present course of precipitous degeneration which inexorably, and speedily, leads Greece … out of the euro.</p>
<p>In the background of this dilemma, lies another fundamental difference of Greek opinion regarding Europe’s handling of the Crisis in countries other than Greece. </p>
<p>On the one hand, the pro-bailout parties maintain a touching faith in Europe’s powerful nations to ride the present storm. While they concede that the past two years have been replete with a sequence of errors on the part of Berlin, Paris, Brussels and Frankfurt, pro-bailout parties are clinging on to the theory that “this is how Europe makes progress”; to the optimistic view that Europe will, in the final analysis, manage to do what is necessary in order to save the euro and, with it, snatch the European Ideal from the jaws of the unfolding disintegration. </p>
<p>Based on this muted optimism, they argue that Greece’s optimal strategy today is to do what it is told (even if what it is told makes little rational sense) so as to maximise its chances of staying within the European fold until Europe’s long-awaited “final solution” to the Crisis arrives. Their nightmare scenario would see Greece fall out of the Eurozone just before the Eurozone is “fixed” through a combination of fiscal transfers, federal moves, debt mutualisation etc.</p>
<p>On the other side of the argument (which has, incidentally, been my own viewpoint for a long while now), a completely different view of what Europe is up to dominates. </p>
<p>It is the view of European elites engulfed in a spectacular coordination failure that cannot resolve itself endogenously. They resemble American Pentagon generals of the early 1970s, who could see that the Vietnam War could not be won and was a train wreck in slow motion, but who had no means of combining this realisation into a coordinated attempt to change course. </p>
<p>Similarly in the corridors of power in Northern Europe today, everyone can see that the Eurozone is heading for a major defeat, in the hands of this vicious Crisis, but no one dares speak the words that might lead to a collective, a European, re-set that will avert the inevitable disaster. In this view of developments in the European Metropoles, we need a circuit-breaker. Something must give. Some discontinuity is necessary, to interrupt the unfolding train wreck of the Eurozone. A Greek vote for a party, like Syriza, that is prepared to bargain (i.e. a party that is prepared to draw a “line in the sand”) may provide this circuit-breaker. Through this prism, a Greek “no” to the <em>troika</em> is not in the slightest anti-European. Indeed, it is the only good service Greek voters can perform on behalf of the European Project.</p>
<p>If the essence of tragedy is essentially good people being caught up in a vicious dilemma that make it impossible for them clearly to distinguish the virtuous from the disastrous choice, Greek voters are, today, experiencing a very real, very personal tragedy. </p>
<p>For my part, I have little doubt what the virtuous choice is: bargaining is infinitely more sensible than pleading, particularly when the <em>troika</em> is terribly bad at knowing where its own interests lie. Greek voters today have a unique opportunity to jolt Europe out of a complacency that is leading our Continent to a despicable <em>peripeteia</em>.</p>
<p><em>This article will appear on the Huffington Post later today.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/7718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yanis Varoufakis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When two sides bargain, their interaction reflects a potential mutual benefit but also a measure of conflict. For instance, when a firm and its supplier reach a deal, there is often more than one price…Yanis Varoufakis, Professor of Economics, University of AthensLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.