tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/history-of-is-24786/articlesHistory of IS – The Conversation2016-03-01T19:05:58Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/546442016-03-01T19:05:58Z2016-03-01T19:05:58ZHow the political crises of the modern Muslim world created the climate for Islamic State<p><em>How do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State? <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">Our series on the jihadist group’s origins</a> tries to address this question by looking at the interplay of historical and social forces that led to its advent.</em></p>
<p><em>In the penultimate article of the series, Harith Bin Ramli traces the Muslim world’s growing disaffection with its rulers through the 20th century and how it created the climate for both the genesis of Islamic State and its continuing success in recruiting followers.</em></p>
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<p>Islamic State (IS) declared its re-establishment of the caliphate on <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/29/isis-iraq-caliphate-delcaration-war">June 29, 2014</a>, almost exactly 100 years after the heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, <a href="http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/archduke-franz-ferdinand-assassinated">was assassinated</a>. Ferdinand’s death set off a series of events that would lead to the first world war and the fall of three great multinational world empires: the Austro-Hungarian (1867-1918), the Russian (1721-1917) and the Ottoman (1299-1922). </p>
<p>That IS’s leadership chose to declare its caliphate so close to the anniversary of Ferdinand’s assassination may not entirely <a href="http://www.jonathanhtodd.com/2014/06/27/6-degrees-geopolitcal-separation-franz-ferdinand-isis/">be a coincidence</a>. In a sense, the two events are connected. </p>
<p>Ferdinand’s assassination and the events it brought about (culminating in the <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-i/treaty-of-versailles">1919 Treaty of Versailles</a>) symbolised the <a href="http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/2/463.full">final triumph of a new idea</a> of <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/">sovereignty</a>. This modern conception was based on the popular will of a nation, rather than on noble lineage. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1038&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1038&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1038&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was assassinated on June 28, 1914.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/Archduke_Franz_Ferdinand_of_Austria_-_b%26w.jpg">Carl Pietzner [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>In declaring the resurrection of a medieval political institution almost exactly 100 years later, IS was announcing its explicit rejection of the modern international system based on that very idea of sovereignty. </p>
<h2>Early secularisation</h2>
<p>Other than the Ottoman Sultanate’s <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-11-19/myth-caliphate">very late and disputed claim</a> to the title, no attempt has been made to re-establish a caliphate since the fall of the Abbasid dynasty at the hands of the Mongols in 1258. In other words, Sunni Islam has carried on for hundreds of years since the 13th century without the need for a central political figurehead. </p>
<p>If we go further back in history, it seems that <a href="http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100141493">Sunni political theory</a> had already anticipated this problem. </p>
<p>The Abbasid caliphs began to lose power from the mid-ninth century, effectively becoming puppets of various warlords by the tenth. And the caliphate underwent a serious process of decentralisation at the same time. </p>
<p><a href="http://ilsp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/hurvitz.pdf">Key contemporary texts on statecraft</a>, such as Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi’s (952-1058) Ordinances of Government (<em>al-Ahkam al-sultaniyya</em>), described the caliph as the necessary symbolic figurehead providing constitutional legitimacy for the real rulers – emirs or sultans – whose power was based on military might. </p>
<p>As in the case of the <a href="http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/buyids">Shi'i Buyid dynasty (934-1048)</a>, these rulers didn’t even have to be Sunni. And they were often expected to provide legislation based on practical and functional, rather than religious, considerations. </p>
<p>The Muslim world, then, had arguably already experienced secularisation of sorts before the modern age. Or, at the very least, it had for quite some time existed within a political system that balanced power between religious and worldly interests. </p>
<p>And when the caliphate came to an end in the 13th century, both the institutions of kingship and the religious courts (run by the scholar-jurists) were able to carry on functioning without difficulty.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AWilayah_Abbasiyyah_semasa_khalifah_Harun_al-Rashid.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>It was the 19th-century Muslim revivalist and anti-colonial movement known as <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1819?_hi=3&_pos=1">Pan-Islamism</a> that was responsible for reviving the Ottoman claim to the caliphate. The idea was revived again briefly in early 20th-century British India as the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/event/Khilafat-movement">anti-colonial Khilafat movement</a>. </p>
<p>But anti-colonial efforts after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, even those primarily based on religious beliefs, have rarely called for a return of the caliphate. </p>
<p>If anything, successors of Pan-Islamism, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, have generally worked within the framework of nation states. Putting aside doubts about their actual ability to commit to democracy and secularism, such movements have generally envisioned an Islamic state along more modern lines, with room for political participation and elections.</p>
<h2>Modern utopias and old dynasties</h2>
<p>So why evoke the caliphate in the first place? The simple answer is that it has never been completely dismissed as an option. </p>
<p>In Sunni law and political theology, once <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e989?_hi=0&_pos=3182">consensus</a> over an issue has been reached, it is hard for later generations to go against it. This was why Egyptian scholar <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/apr/09/religion-islam-secularism-egypt">Ali Abd al-Raziq</a> was removed from his post at <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Azhar_University">Al-Azhar University</a> and attacked for introducing a deviant interpretation after he wrote an argument for a secular interpretation of the caliphate in 1925.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=962&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=962&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=962&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Thinkers such as Abul Ala Mawdudi tried to place a revived caliphate within some type of democratic framework.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AAbul_ala_maududi.jpg">DiLeeF via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>As <a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-inevitable-caliphate/">many</a> <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/13267/new-texts-out-now_madawi-al-rasheed-carool-kersten">recent</a> <a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/recalling-the-caliphate/">studies</a> show, the idea of the caliphate and its revival has had a certain utopian appeal for a wide spectrum of modern Muslim thinkers. And not just those with authoritarian or militant inclinations. </p>
<p>Some leading Muslim revivalists such as <a href="http://muhammad-asad.com/Principles-State-Government-Islam.pdf">Muhammad Asad (1900-1992)</a> and <a href="http://www.meforum.org/151/islams-democratic-essence">Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979)</a>, for example, have tried to place a revived caliphate within some type of <a href="https://www.academia.edu/421254/Democracy_in_Islam_The_Views_of_Several_Modern_Muslim_Scholars">democratic framework</a>.</p>
<p>But, in practice, the dominant tendency here too has really been to seek the liberation or revival of Muslim societies within the nation-state framework. </p>
<p>If anything, national aspirations and the desire to modernise society existed before the formation of the new political order after the first world war. The majority of the populations of Muslim lands welcomed the fall of the three empires, or at least didn’t feel very strongly about the survival of traditional ruling dynasties. </p>
<p>And, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, most dynasties that stayed in power did so by reinventing their states along modern, mainly secular, models. </p>
<p>But this did not always succeed. The waves of <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/7/newsid_3074000/3074069.stm">revolutions</a> and <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/1/newsid_3911000/3911587.stm">military coups</a> that swept the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world throughout the 1950s and 1960s amply illustrate that popular sentiment identified traditional dynasties with the continuing influence of colonial powers. </p>
<p>In Egypt, under the Muhammad Ali dynasty (1805-1952), for example, the control of the then-French Canal epitomised the interdependent relationship between the dynasty and Western power. This was why <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/02/200852517252821627.html">Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970)</a> made great efforts to regain it in the name of Egyptian sovereignty when he became the country’s second president in 1956.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Inauguration of the Suez Canal at Port Said, Egypt, in 1869.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ASuezkanal1869.jpg">Public domain via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<h2>Dissolving political legitimacy</h2>
<p>Either way, the success of the new Muslim nation states could be said to be predicated on two major expectations. The first was improvement of citizens’ lives – not only in terms of material progress, but also the benefits of freedom and the ability to represent the popular will through participatory politics. </p>
<p>The second was the ability of Muslim nations to unite against outside interference and commit to the liberation of Palestine. On both counts, the latter half of the 20th century witnessed abysmal failures and an increasing sense of frustration with Muslim leaders. </p>
<p>In many places, populism eventually gave way to authoritarianism. And the loss of further lands to Israel in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War">1967 Six-Day War</a> revealed the inherent weakness and lack of unity among the new Muslim nations.</p>
<p>Anwar Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel after the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/6/newsid_2514000/2514317.stm">1973 Yom Kippur War</a> was widely seen as an act of betrayal, for breaking ranks in what should have been a united front. His decision to do so despite lacking popular support in Egypt only revealed the extent to which the country had evolved into a dictatorship. </p>
<p>Sadat’s consequent <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/6/newsid_2515000/2515841.stm">assassination</a> at the hands of a small radical splinter group of religious militants acted as a warning to other Muslim leaders. Now they couldn’t simply ignore or lock away religious critics, even if the majority of the population still subscribed to the secular nation-state model. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel was widely seen as an act of betrayal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3APresident_Anwar_Sadat_of_Egypt_arrives_in_the_United_States.JPEG">US Department of Defence Visual information via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>This idea was reinforced by Iran’s <a href="http://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution-of-1978-1979">1979 Islamic Revolution</a>, as well as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Mosque_seizure">failed religious revolution</a> in the holy city of Mecca the same year. </p>
<p>Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Muslim leaders around the world increasingly made compromises with religious reactionary forces, allowing them to expand influence in the public sphere. In many cases, these leaders increasingly adopted religious rhetoric themselves.</p>
<p>Showing support for fellow Muslims in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1987) or the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Intifada">First Palestinian Intifada</a> provided an opportunity to manage the threat of religious radicalism. National leaders probably also saw this as an effective way to deflect attention from the authoritarian nature of many Muslim states. </p>
<p>And, as demonstrated by <a href="https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2015/09/12/did-saddam-hussein-become-a-religious-believer/">Saddam Hussain’s turn to religious propaganda</a> after the 1990-91 Gulf War, it could be used as a last resort when other ways of demonstrating legitimacy had failed.</p>
<h2>The longer view</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.britannica.com/event/Persian-Gulf-War">The Gulf War</a> also brought non-Muslim troops to Arabian soil, inspiring <a href="http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military-july-dec96-fatwa_1996/">Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad</a> against the Western nations that participated in it. And it eventually led to the US invasion of Iraq. That set off a chain of events that created in the country the chaotic conditions that enabled the rise of Islamic State. </p>
<p>If the IS leadership is really an <a href="http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate/">alliance between ex-Ba'athist generals and an offshoot of al-Qaeda</a>, as has often been depicted, then we don’t have to go far beyond the events of this war to explain how the group formed. But the rise of Islamic State and its declaration of the caliphate can also be read as part of a wider story that has unfolded since the formation of modern nation states in the Muslim world. </p>
<p>As <a href="http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/86c958c2-ff78-11e3-8a35-00144feab7de.html#axzz367SAUfPl">some commentators</a> have pointed out, it’s not so much the Sykes-Picot agreement and the drawing of artificial national borders by colonial powers that brought about IS. </p>
<p>The modern nation-state model – as much as it’s based on <a href="https://nationalismstudies.wordpress.com/2012/10/24/benedict-anderson/">a kind of fiction</a> – is still strong in most parts of the Muslim world. And, I believe, it’s still the preferred option for most Muslims today. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People of Arak toppled the Shah’s statue in Bāgh Mwlli (central square of Arak) during 1979 revolution.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AIranian_Revolution_in_Arak.jpg">Dooste Amin [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>But the long century that has passed since the first world war has been increasingly marked by frustration. It’s littered with the broken promises of Muslim rulers to bring about a transition to more representative forms of government. And it has been marked by a sense that Western powers continue to control and manipulate events in the region, in a way that doesn’t always represent the best interests of Muslim societies.</p>
<p>An extreme <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/the-arab-spring-five-years-on-a-season-that-began-in-hope-but-ended-in-desolation-a6803161.html">high point of frustration</a> was reached in the events of the so-called <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12813859">Arab Spring</a>. The wave of popular demonstrations against the autocratic regimes of the Arab world were seen as the first winds of change that would bring democracy to the region. </p>
<p>But, with the possible exception of Tunisia, all of these countries underwent either destabilisation (Libya, Syria), the return of military rule (Egypt), or the further clamping down on civil rights (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and other Gulf monarchies). </p>
<p>I would hesitate to describe IS’s declaration of a caliphate as a serious challenge to the modern nation-state model. But the small, albeit substantial, stream of followers it manages to recruit daily shows it would be wrong to take for granted that the terms of the international order can simply be dictated from above forever. </p>
<p>When brute force increasingly has the final say over how people live their lives, it becomes harder for them to differentiate between the lesser of two evils.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is the eighth article in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/54644/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harith Bin Ramli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The rise of Islamic State and its declaration of the caliphate can be read as part of a wider story that has unfolded since the formation of modern nation states in the Muslim world.Harith Bin Ramli, Research Fellow, Cambridge Muslim College & Teaching Fellow, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/520702016-02-17T19:18:44Z2016-02-17T19:18:44ZIf Islamic State is based on religion, why is it so violent?<p><em>Islamic State’s seemingly sudden prominence has led to much speculation about the group’s origins: how do we account for forces and events that paved the way for its emergence?</em></p>
<p><em>In today’s instalment of <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">our series on the origins of Islamic State</a>, religious studies scholar Aaron Hughes considers whether this jihadist group’s violence is inherent to Islam.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Despite what we’re told, religion isn’t inherently peaceful. The assumption is largely based on the Protestant idea that religion is something spiritual and internal to the individual and that it’s corrupted by politics and other mundane matters. </p>
<p>But people kill in the name of religion, just as they love in its name. To claim that one of these alternatives is more authentic than the other is not only problematic, it’s historically incorrect. </p>
<p>The Crusades, attacks at abortion clinics, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Yitzhak_Rabin">some political assassinations</a>, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Israeli_price_tag_attacks">price-tag attacks</a> – to name only a few examples – were and are all motivated by religion. </p>
<p>This is because religion is based on the metaphysical notion that there are believers (in one’s own religion) and non-believers. This distinction is predicated on “good” versus “evil”, and can be neatly packaged into a narrative to be used and abused by various groups.</p>
<h2>An imagined past</h2>
<p>One such group is Islamic State (IS), which is inherently violent and claims it mirrors the Islam of the Prophet Muhammad. In this, it’s like other reformist movements in Islam that seek to recreate in the modern period what they imagine to have been the political framework and society that Muhammad (570-632 CE) and his immediate followers lived in and created in seventh-century Arabia. </p>
<p>The problem is that we know very little about this society, except what, often, much later sources – such as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prophetic_biography">Biography (Sira) of Muhammad</a> and the work of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Tabari">historians such as al-Tabari</a> (839-923 CE) – tell us it was like. </p>
<p>A central ideal for IS is that of restoring the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caliphate">caliphate</a>. A geopolitical entity, the caliphate was the Islamic empire that stretched from Morocco and Spain in the West, to India in the East. It symbolises Islam at its most powerful. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>When it was spreading across the Middle East and the Mediterranean region in the seventh century, Islam was highly apocalyptic. Many early sources, such as the second caliph <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/1508294?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">Umar’s letter to the Byzantine Emperor Leo III</a>, as well as contemporaneous non-Muslim sources, such as the mid-eighth-century Jewish apocalypse <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Secrets_of_Rabbi_Simon_ben_Yohai">The Secrets of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai</a> and the seventh-century polemic <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teaching_of_Jacob_">Doctrina Jacobi</a>, speak about the coming destruction of the world as we know it.</p>
<p>The destruction is to begin with a battle between the forces of good (Muslim) versus those of evil. And IS has adopted this <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/08/world/middleeast/us-strategy-seeks-to-avoid-isis-prophecy.html">apocalyptic vision</a>.</p>
<p>Again, though, it’s worth noting two things. The first is that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/cultural-muslims-like-cultural-christians-are-a-silent-majority-32097">majority of Muslims today</a> don’t buy into this apocalyptic vision; it’s mainly something recycled by groups such as Islamic State. </p>
<p>Second, such an “end of days” vision is by no means unique to Islam; we also see it in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Temple_Mount_and_Eretz_Yisrael_Faithful_Movement">Judaism</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_right">Christianity</a>. In these other two traditions, as in Islam, such groups certainly do not represent orthodox belief.</p>
<h2>Medieval tolerance</h2>
<p>But apocalypse aside, was Islam particularly violent in the seventh century? One could certainly point to three of the first four of Muhammad’s successors (caliphs) having been assassinated. </p>
<p>One could also point to the tremendous theological debates over who was or was not a Muslim. And such debates included the status of the soul of grave sinners. Was such a sinner a Muslim or did his sin put him outside the community of believers? </p>
<p>What would become mainstream Muslim opinion is that it was up to God to decide and not humans. But groups such as Islamic State want to make this distinction for God. In this, they certainly stray from orthodox Muslim belief. </p>
<p>While this doesn’t make them “un-Islamic”, to say groups such as IS represent medieval interpretations of Islam is not fair to medieval Islam. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110739/original/image-20160209-12814-rxd6ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110739/original/image-20160209-12814-rxd6ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110739/original/image-20160209-12814-rxd6ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110739/original/image-20160209-12814-rxd6ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110739/original/image-20160209-12814-rxd6ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=767&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110739/original/image-20160209-12814-rxd6ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=767&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110739/original/image-20160209-12814-rxd6ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=767&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Manuscript with depiction by Yahya ibn Vaseti found in the Maqama of Hariri depicts the image of a library with pupils in it, Baghdad 1237.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2c/Maqamat_hariri.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The eighth century, for example, witnessed the establishment, in Baghdad, of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Wisdom">Bayt al-Hikma (The House of Wisdom)</a>, which symbolised the so-called golden age of Islamic civilisation. This period witnessed, among other things, Muslim, Jewish and Christian scholars studying the philosophical and scientific texts of Greek antiquity. </p>
<p>These scholars also made many advances in disciplines, such as mathematics, astronomy, medicine, alchemy and chemistry, to name only a few. Within a century of its founding, Islam <a href="https://theconversation.com/islam-the-open-civilisation-confounds-closed-minds-44416">represented a cosmopolitan empire</a> that was nothing like the rigid and dogmatic interpretation of the religion seen in the likes of IS.</p>
<h2>A powerful tool</h2>
<p>Observers in the West who want to claim that Islam is to blame for IS and use it as further proof that the religion is inherently violent, ignore other root causes of the moment. </p>
<p>These include the history of European colonialism in the area; US and European support for a number of ruthless Middle Eastern dictators; and the instability created by the American invasion of Iraq after the events of September 11, 2001. </p>
<p>It’s juxtaposed against these recent events that groups such as IS dream of reconstituting what they romantically imagine as the powerful Islamic caliphate.</p>
<p>The fact is that religion’s ability to neatly differentiate between “believer” and unbeliever", and between “right” and “wrong”, makes it a powerful ideology. In the hands of demagogues, religious discourses – used selectively and manipulated to achieve a set of desired ends – are very powerful. </p>
<p>While it would be incorrect to say that the discourses used by IS are un-Islamic, it’s important to note it represents one particular Islamic discourse and that it’s not the mainstream one.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article is the third in <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">our series on understanding Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52070/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aaron W. Hughes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite what we’re told, religion isn’t inherently peaceful. People kill in the name of their religion, just as they love in its name.Aaron W. Hughes, Philip S. Bernstein Professor of Jewish Studies, University of RochesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/532252016-02-16T18:23:45Z2016-02-16T18:23:45ZIslamic State lays claim to Muslim theological tradition and turns it on its head<p><em>How do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State? <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">Our series on the jihadist group’s origins</a> tries to address this question by looking at the interplay of historical and social forces that led to its advent.</em></p>
<p><em>Today, historian of Islamic thought Harith Bin Ramli explains how Islamic State fits – or doesn’t – in Muslim theological tradition, and incidentally addresses a question often levelled at adherents of the religion living in the West.</em></p>
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<p>For Muslims around the world, it’s become an almost daily heartbreaking experience to see Islam associated with all the shades of <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/isis-confirms-and-justifies-enslaving-yazidis-in-new-magazine-article/381394/">cruelty</a> and <a href="http://www.raqqa-sl.com/en/">inhumanity</a> of so-called Islamic State (IS). It’s tempting <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-call-it-the-un-islamic-state-say-muslim-groups-as-another-hostage-is-murdered-9731823.html">to dismiss</a> the group as lying beyond the boundaries of Islam. But this way of thinking leads down the same route IS has taken. </p>
<p>Let me explain.</p>
<p>Ever since the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, there hasn’t been a single central authority that all Muslims have unanimously agreed on. The first generation of Muslims didn’t just disagree, they battled over the succession to leadership of the community. </p>
<p>The result of this division was the formation of the main <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/subdivisions/sunnishia_1.shtml">Sunni and Shi’i</a> theological traditions we see to this day. But the blood spilt over the issue also resulted in a general sense of concern about the consequences of political and theological differences. </p>
<p>A consensus quickly emerged over the need to respect differences of opinion. And it was considered important to “disassociate” oneself from anyone who had differing views on these key issues. But as long as the person in question affirmed the basic tenets of Islam, such as the unity of God and the prophecy of Muhammad, he or she was still considered a Muslim.</p>
<h2>Similar detractors</h2>
<p>The one dissenting theological view on this matter was held by a group known as the Kharijites. It adopted the view that dissenting or corrupt Muslim leaders, by their actions, had become “apostates” from Islam altogether. </p>
<p>Sub-factions of this group increasingly extended their definition of apostasy to include any Muslim who didn’t agree with them. They declared these Muslims infidels who could be killed or enslaved.</p>
<p>The brutality of these extreme Kharijites never attracted more than a minority of Muslims, and other Kharijites adopted <a href="http://islam.uga.edu/ibadis.html">a more peaceful position</a> more in line with the emerging consensus. </p>
<p>Widespread horror at the early divisions of the Muslim community and the terrors unleashed by Khariji extremism ensured that Islam generally embraced a pluralistic approach to differences of opinion. This emerged hand in hand with a culture of scholarship, based on the idea that the endeavour to seek the “true” meaning of scripture is an ongoing and fallible human effort. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>Beyond a number of issues over which there was unquestionable consensus, different interpretations could be tolerated. </p>
<p>What makes IS different to traditional Islam isn’t necessarily the religious texts the group uses. To justify their practice of slavery or war against non-Muslims, they appeal to parts of the Qur'an or prophetic traditions, or legal works that are fairly mainstream and representative of the medieval Islamic tradition. </p>
<p>But these texts – scripture or otherwise – have always been read through the mediation of past and continuous efforts of interpretation by communities of scholars. As theology scholar <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20944/beyond-authenticity_isis-and-the-islamic-legal-tra">Sohaira Siddiqui of Georgetown University points out</a>, groups like IS deviate from mainstream Islam by their rejection of this culture of scholarly interpretation and religious pluralism, that is, the means by which the texts were interpreted. </p>
<p>This approach has roots in the group’s main theological inspiration, the Wahhabi movement. Founded on a radical interpretation of the 14th-century theologian <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-read-the-medieval-scholar-the-islamic-state-used-to-justify-al-kasasbeh-murder-37293">Ibn Taymiyya</a>, it dismissed any Muslim who didn’t subscribe to its strict interpretation of monotheism as an “apostate”. </p>
<p>It can also be traced back to radical political theorists of the 20th century, such as <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/01/afghanistan.terrorism3">Sayyid Qutb</a>, who rejected the modern state and attendant ideologies, including nationalism and democracy, as “idolatrous” and not based on the rule of God. </p>
<p>By declaring the revival of the Caliphate, IS claims to have created an alternative to the prevailing political order. </p>
<h2>Harms of hastiness</h2>
<p>Adopting a simple “with us or against us” approach lets IS justify denouncing Muslim rulers as “tyrants” and the religious figures who support them as “palace scholars”. In general, Muslims who don’t “repent” and support their beliefs are at risk of being denounced as “apostates” who can be killed. </p>
<p>Effectively, the group has revived the age-old Kharijite tendency in the form of a deadly modern political ideology. </p>
<p>IS is right about one thing: the solution to the widespread problems of the Muslim world cannot lie in the reaffirmation of status quo politics and the hypocritical employment of religion to prop up corrupt and oppressive regimes. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">By declaring the revival of the Caliphate, IS claims to have created an alternative to the prevailing political order.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Umit Bektas</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But its dismissal of the culture of scholarly pluralism and religious tolerance seems like an easy way to select interpretations of the scripture and religious tradition to suit its political aims, not the other way round. </p>
<p>Leading Muslim religious authorities, such as the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2015/02/azhar-egypt-radicals-islamic-state-apostates.html">Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar</a>, have refrained from denouncing IS as “apostates”, even though they have called for the use of <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/02/04/Al-Azhar-calls-for-killing-crucifixion-of-ISIS-terrorists-.html">full military force</a> against them. Their hesitance may be due to an awareness that such a move would simply drag the Muslim community down to the level IS wants them to be on. </p>
<p>Instead of labelling IS un-Islamic, the global Muslim community would do better to reaffirm its commitment to its culture of pluralism. This approach may also open up a crucial conversation that must take place about <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion-politics/">the relationship between state and religion</a> in contemporary Muslim societies. </p>
<p>Many Muslims might share the IS view that there are already many signs that the end of times is approaching. But the group departs from mainstream Muslim apocalyptic theology in two respects. </p>
<p>First, its literature seems to omit any mention of the awaited Mahdi (the Guided One) and the return of Jesus the son of Mary, who is prophesied to defeat the Great Pretender (Dajjal, or anti-Christ). And second, in contrast to the average Muslim believer who acknowledges only a limited ability to fully grasp the meaning of these prophecies, IS arrogates for itself a central role in the unfolding of such events. </p>
<p>In other words, instead of waiting for God to bring about the end of times, IS hopes to prompt it through its own actions. In this respect, it has something in common with extreme forms of <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-heilbroner/evangelicals-israel-and-t_b_391351.html">Christian</a> and <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/extremist-group-offers-jews-500-to-pray-on-temple-mount/">Jewish religious Zionism</a>.</p>
<p>If one were to give IS’s followers the benefit of the doubt, excluding those with mainly criminal motives, it seems that theirs is an ideology fuelled by a hasty desire for the implementation of the will of God. And an even hastier dismissal of the more careful and humble approach of other Muslims. </p>
<p>As the Qur’an states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“<a href="http://quran.com/21/37">man was created hasty by nature</a>” (21:37), and “<a href="http://quran.com/103">all mankind is at loss, except for those who believe and advise one another concerning the Truth, and concerning patience</a>”. (103:2-3) </p>
</blockquote>
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<p><em>This article is the second in our <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">series on understanding Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53225/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harith Bin Ramli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What makes Islamic State different to traditional Islam isn’t necessarily the religious texts the group uses.Harith Bin Ramli, Research Fellow, Cambridge Muslim College & Teaching Fellow, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/521552016-02-15T19:21:12Z2016-02-15T19:21:12ZUnderstanding Islamic State: where does it come from and what does it want?<p><em>Since announcing its arrival as a global force in June 2014 with the declaration of a caliphate on territory captured in Iraq and Syria, the jihadist group Islamic State has shocked the world with its brutality.</em> </p>
<p><em>Its seemingly sudden prominence has led to much speculation about the group’s origins: how do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State?</em></p>
<p><em>In the article kicking off <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">our series on the genesis of the group</a> below, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History James Gelvin cautions against easy answers. It’s a logical fallacy, he adds, to think that just because one event followed another, it was also caused by it.</em> </p>
<p><em>Far better to look at the interplay of historical and social forces, as well as recognising that outfits such as Islamic State often cherry-pick ideas to justify their ideas and behaviours.</em></p>
<p><em>Our series attempts, in a dispassionate way, to catalogue many of the forces and events that can arguably have played a part in creating the conditions necessary for these jihadists to emerge. We have tried to spread the net wide, but we make no claim to being comprehensive or having the final word on the origins of Islamic State.</em></p>
<p><em>Over the next two weeks, a selection of religious studies scholars and historians – modern and medieval – from around the world will bring their expertise to our discussion of what led to the most notorious jihadist group in recent history.</em></p>
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<p>How far back in history does one have to go to find the roots of the so-called Islamic State (IS)?</p>
<p>To the <a href="http://vm136.lib.berkeley.edu/BANC/ROHO/projects/debt/oilcrisis.html">oil shock of 1973-74</a>, when Persian Gulf oil producers used the huge surplus of dollars flowing into their coffers to finance the spread of their severe interpretation of Islam?</p>
<p>To the end of the first world war, when the victorious Entente powers sparked resentment throughout the Arab world by <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553">drawing artificial national borders</a> we hear so much about today? </p>
<p>How about 632 AD, the date of the <a href="http://www.cyberistan.org/islamic/death.html">death of the Prophet Muhammad</a>, when the early Islamic community split on who should succeed him as its leader — a breach that led to <a href="http://origins.osu.edu/article/tradition-vs-charisma-sunni-shii-divide-muslim-world/page/0/0">the Sunni-Shi'i divide</a> that IS exploits for its own ends?</p>
<p>The possibilities seem endless and would make for an entertaining variation on the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Degrees_of_Kevin_Bacon">Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon</a> parlour game (which suggests any two people on earth are six or fewer acquaintance links apart) were the subject not so macabre. </p>
<p>But to look at any and all historical phenomena through a simple string of causes and effects is to ignore the almost infinite number of possible effects that might follow from any one purported cause. </p>
<p>It also opens the door to one of the most pernicious logical fallacies historians might commit: <em>post hoc, ergo propter hoc</em> (after this, therefore because of this). So rather than tracing the rise of IS to one or more events in the past, I suggest we take a different tack.</p>
<h2>A long line</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Muhammad Ahmad, one of a long line of self-professed redeemers of the Islamic faith.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Ahmad#/media/File:Muhammad_Ahmad_al-Mahdi.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>IS is an instance of a phenomenon that recurs in most religions, and certainly in all <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/monotheism">monotheistic religions</a>. Every so often militant strains emerge, flourish temporarily, then vanish. They are then replaced by another militant strain whose own beginning is linked to a predecessor by nothing more profound than drawing from the same cultural pool as its predecessor.</p>
<p>In the seventh century, there were <a href="http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0047.xml">the Kharijites</a> (the first sect of Islam), a starkly puritanical group that assassinated two of the early caliphs. Like IS, the Kharajites thought they knew best what and who were truly Islamic, and what and who were not.</p>
<p>In the 18th century, there were the followers of <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Muhammad-ibn-Abd-al-Wahhab">Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab</a>, a central Arabian preacher whose followers included <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_bin_Saud">Muhammad ibn Saud</a>, the founder of the Saudi dynasty. Believing that the worship of saints and the construction of mausoleums were impious acts, ibn Saud’s army destroyed sites holy to both Sunnis and Shi‘is in Arabia and present-day Iraq, much as <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/isis-destruction-of-palmyra-syria-heart-been-ripped-out-of-the-city">IS targets sites from antiquity</a> today. </p>
<p>During the 19th century, <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Muhammad_Ahmad">Muhammad Ahmad</a>, a member of a religious order in what is now Sudan, proclaimed himself mahdi (redeemer of the Islamic faith), just as <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27801676">Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a>, inventor and leader of IS, recently proclaimed himself caliph (leader of the Islamic faith) — a more prosaic position. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Khartoum">Ahmad’s army overran Khartoum</a>, where it massacred a British-led garrison and beheaded its commander.</p>
<p>Between Muhammad Ahmad and al-Baghdadi there were many, many others.</p>
<p>While tempting, it would be a mistake to believe that each militant group “gave rise to” the next (although later militants have sometimes drawn from or been inspired by their predecessors). That would be the equivalent of saying that <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/Zealot">the ancient Zealots</a> (a Jewish sect that fought the Romans) gave rise to militant Israeli settlers on the West Bank, or that <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/crusades">medieval Crusaders</a> gave rise to abortion-clinic bombers. </p>
<h2>The right stuff</h2>
<p>From time to time (it’s impossible to predict when), some figure emerges in each tradition who puts his own spin on that tradition. To be successful, that spin must capture the imagination of some of that tradition’s adherents, who then try to put it into practice. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A newspaper featuring former al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ali Jasim/Reuters</span></span>
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<p>Some spins, such as that of contemporary <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-wahhabism-in-saudi-arabia-36693">Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabis</a>, have sticking power. This is not because they are somehow “truer” than others, but because those who advocate for them are better able to mobilise resources – a core group of committed followers, for instance, military capabilities, or outside support – than others. Most do not.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27801676">Al-Baghdadi</a> is one such figure (as was al-Qaeda founder <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10741005">Osama bin Laden</a>). His spin melds together three ideas that come from the Islamic tradition. </p>
<p>The first is <em>khilafa</em> (caliphate). Al-Baghdadi believes that Islam requires a caliphate — governance in accordance with Islamic law over territory that’s under the authority of a caliph (a righteous and knowledgeable descendant of the prophet). </p>
<p>When <a href="http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/100620153">his forces took over Mosul</a> in the summer of 2014, al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself caliph and burnished his credentials for the job by changing his name to Caliph Ibrahim al-Quraishi al-Hashimi. The last two names signify he’s a member of the tribe of Muhammad and a descendant of the prophet.</p>
<p>The second idea al-Baghdadi brought into the mix is <em>takfir</em> – the act of pronouncing Muslims who disagree with IS’s strict interpretation of Islamic law to be apostates, which makes them punishable by death. This is the reason for IS’s murderous rampages against Shi‘is; rampages that even al-Qaeda central finds counter-productive, if not repugnant.</p>
<p>Resurrecting the concept of <em>takfir</em> was the idea of <a href="http://www.cfr.org/iraq/profile-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/p9866">Abu Musab al-Zarqawi</a>, founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq. His strategy was to use the concept to tighten communal ties among Iraq’s Sunnis by mobilising them against its Shi‘is, thus making post-American-invasion Iraq ungovernable. </p>
<p>Al-Baghdadi has gone one step further, finding the concept useful in his effort to purify the territory of the caliphate which, he believes, will soon stretch across the Islamic world.</p>
<p>Finally, there is <em>hijra</em>, the migration of Muslims from <em>dar al-harb</em> (the abode of war, that is, non-Muslim majority countries) to <em>dar al-Islam</em> (the abode of Islam) – just as Muhammad and his early companions migrated from Mecca to Medina, where they established the first permanent Islamic community. </p>
<p>IS wants a great incoming of Muslims into the caliphate. This is both because it needs skilled administrators and fighters and because it considers emigration from “non-Muslim territory” to “Muslim territory” a religious obligation. </p>
<h2>A dangerous distraction</h2>
<p>According to some commentators, al-Baghdadi brought a fourth idea to the table: <a href="http://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250080905">an apocalyptic vision</a>. They base this on the name of IS’s glossy magazine, Dabiq (the site in northern Syria where, Islamic tradition has it, the Battle of Armageddon will take place), articles in the magazine and propaganda videos.</p>
<p>It’s not too much of a stretch to attribute an apocalyptic vision to IS — after all, just as every monotheism is prone to militant strains, all are prone to apocalyptic visions as well. Nevertheless, I remain unconvinced that the concept represents a significant part of IS’s worldview. </p>
<p>Whatever the future may hold, IS, like some <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/06/end-of-world-7-october-ebible-fellowship">apocalyptic Christian groups</a>, has proved itself so tactically and strategically adept that it has obviously kicked any “end of days” can well down the road (roughly the same distance al-Qaeda kicked the re-establishment of the caliphate can).</p>
<p>Further, much of the IS leadership consists of hard-headed <a href="http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate/">former Iraqi Ba‘th military officers</a> who, if they think about an apocalypse at all, probably treat it much as Hitler’s generals treated the purported musings of Nazi true believers – with a roll of their eyes. </p>
<p>Foregrounding IS’s apocalyptic worldview enables us to disparage the group as irrational and even medieval – a dangerous thing to do. If the recent past has demonstrated one thing, it’s that IS thrives when its adversaries underestimate it.</p>
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<p><em>This is the first article in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52155/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James L. Gelvin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How far back in history does one have to go to find the roots of the so-called Islamic State? The first article in our series on the genesis of the terrorist outfit considers some fundamentals.James L. Gelvin, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.