tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/iaea-7752/articlesIAEA – The Conversation2022-09-12T12:14:26Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1901002022-09-12T12:14:26Z2022-09-12T12:14:26ZIran and the US appear unlikely to reach a new nuclear deal – leaving everyone more unsafe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483764/original/file-20220909-22-qg7ha0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=335%2C73%2C5111%2C3456&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man reads an Iranian newspaper with a headline in Farsi that says, 'The night of the end of the JCPOA,' or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/man-reads-the-iranian-newspaper-etemad-with-the-front-page-title-in-picture-id1242542718">Atta Kenare/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Iran’s standoff with the United States over its potential nuclear weapons program is unlikely to ease anytime soon. </p>
<p>The U.S. and Iran launched talks in 2021 to renew a <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran">now-defunct political deal</a> that would curb Iran’s nuclear program. </p>
<p>But the window for Iran and the U.S. to rejoin and return to compliance of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal">lapsed 2015 nuclear deal</a>, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, is quickly closing. China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. all agreed to the plan with Iran in 2015. The U.S. pulled out of the deal in 2018, effectively derailing it.</p>
<p>But U.S. officials told Israel’s Prime Minister Yair Lapid <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-07/us-told-israel-that-iran-nuclear-deal-unlikely-soon-report-says">on Sept. 7, 2022</a>, that despite ongoing talks in Vienna, it was unlikely the group of countries would sign a deal anytime soon. </p>
<p>European Union Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell previously emphasized <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/004f0d5a-0eca-4ea0-a423-0184481d033c">on Sept. 5, 2022</a>, that efforts to reach a new agreement are “in danger” due to recent divergences between the U.S. and Iranian positions. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/nina-srinivasan-rathbun-1333993">worked</a> and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/price-of-peace-motivated-reasoning-and-costly-signaling-in-international-relations/931AC830FEB7D24D26800E22558D9F9D">researched</a> nuclear nonproliferation and <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-90978-3">U.S. national security</a> for two decades. When diplomacy fails to prevent nuclear proliferation, particularly by a state like Iran that engages in <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/regional-perspectives-iran-0">malicious acts</a> throughout the region, everyone in the world is less safe. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A middle aged man with salt and pepper hair and a beard wears a dark suit and waves." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Bagheri Kani, waves in Vienna on Aug. 4, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/irans-chief-nuclear-negotiator-ali-bagheri-kani-waves-as-he-leaves-picture-id1242298742">Alex Halada/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>US and Iran reach a deal – temporarily</h2>
<p>The U.S. and its allies have been concerned about Iran’s possible pursuit of nuclear weapons since intelligence uncovered its covert nuclear program, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/04/world/middleeast/04intel.html">suspended since 2003</a>. Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons would undermine U.S. and its allies’ security and destabilize the Middle East, likely encouraging more Middle Eastern countries to try to develop the weapons themselves.</p>
<p>After decades of disagreement, the U.S. and Iran signed <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/index.htm">a deal in 2015</a> that halted Iran’s development of nuclear technology and stockpiling of nuclear material in exchange for lifting multiple <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/s/res/1737-%282006%29">international economic</a> sanctions <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/s/res/1929-%282010%29">placed on</a> Iran.</p>
<p>This was significant because it lengthened the amount of time it would take Iran to stockpile the nuclear material to build a nuclear bomb to over a year. It halted Iran’s development of more advanced enrichment capabilities.</p>
<p>It also gave the <a href="https://www.iaea.org">International Atomic Energy Agency</a>, a nuclear watchdog organization that is part of the United Nations, more oversight over Iranian nuclear activity, letting U.N. inspectors regularly observe all of Iran’s nuclear sites. </p>
<p>But the deal <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/new-iran-deal-means-old-chaos">fell through in 2018</a> when the U.S. withdrew from the agreement under former President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">Donald Trump</a> and reimposed hundreds of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/11/05/664275967/new-u-s-sanctions-against-iran-go-into-effect">economic sanctions</a> on Iran. </p>
<p>Iran waited until 2019 before it officially <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-iaea/iran-has-gone-beyond-nuclear-deals-uranium-enrichment-limit-iaea-idUSKCN1U31Y1">broke the 2015 agreement</a> by enriching uranium enrichment above the permitted 3.67% purity levels set by the deal. This alone did not substantially rule out eventually returning to the 2015 agreement. </p>
<p>Since then, however, Iran has developed its nuclear technology – but has <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/jan/27/bill-burns-iran">not developed actual nuclear bombs</a>. </p>
<h2>Returning to the 2015 deal</h2>
<p>If Iran rejoined a nuclear agreement with the U.S., it would need to export its stockpile of enriched uranium, allow the U.N. nuclear watchdogs to oversee all of its nuclear facilities and stop research into nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>It is extremely difficult to return to a diplomatic agreement in which one side has to make additional concessions and return to a previous status quo.</p>
<p>When I worked in multilateral nuclear diplomacy for the U.S. State Department, we saw talks fail regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks">2009, after six years</a> of on-and-off progress. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, Iran seems to be on a similar path. </p>
<p>In April 2021, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/11/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-natanz.html">an explosion</a> that caused a blackout occurred in Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment facilities. Iran then began enriching uranium to its highest level of purity ever documented, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-uranium-enrichment-60-percent-ed89e322595004fddc65fd4e31c1131b">above 60%</a> – a level that is very close to what is required to get weapons-grade uranium.</p>
<p>Iran’s decision <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/chronology-of-key-events">over the past few years</a> to reduce access to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s monitoring equipment and to begin research into uranium metals, necessary for weaponization, also moved it further away from the possibility of returning to the 2015 deal.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The backs of two men in suits are shown as they have their arms around each other. The European Union and Iran flags are on either side of them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Iran Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, left, welcomes Josep Borell, the European Union’s foreign affairs and security representative, in Tehran in June 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/irans-foreign-minister-hossein-amirabdollahian-welcomes-josep-borell-picture-id1241518184">Atta Kenare/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Iran today</h2>
<p>Iran currently has the <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-nuclear-bomb-claims-technical-ability-to-build-israel-us/">technical ability</a> to produce a nuclear bomb within a few weeks, though not the weaponization knowledge necessary to build it. <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00254-7">A different kind of technology</a> is needed to actually design and manufacture a bomb, which may take Iran about two years to develop.</p>
<p>Iran’s technical ability to develop a nuclear weapon <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-the-fran-eizenstat-and-eizenstat-family-memorial-lecture-series/">reduces the value</a> for the U.S. government of returning to the 2015 deal since Iran’s knowledge cannot be put back into Pandora’s box. </p>
<p>A return to the agreement, however, could help the U.S. and Iran step back from the edge, build trust and perhaps develop better political relations. Both sides would benefit from this stabilization: Iran economically from being reintegrated into the international system, and the U.S. from a verifiable lengthening of the time it would take Iran to break out.</p>
<p>None of this is guaranteed.</p>
<p>While both sides <a href="https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/report_iranians-americans-support-mutual-JCPOA-return.pdf">expressed support</a> for a return to the 2015 deal in early 2021, and continue to do so, there remain a number of sticking points that prevent progress. </p>
<p>Priorities for Iran include the U.S. removing the Iranian paramilitary group <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps</a> from its list of foreign terrorist organizations and getting a guarantee that no future U.S. president would renege on the renewed nuclear deal. </p>
<p>The main issues for the U.S. center around the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/17/iran-still-has-three-american-hostages-so-far-trump-has-done-little-free-them/">American hostages</a> currently held in Iran and the desire to lengthen the time it would take Iran to stockpile material for a nuclear bomb. </p>
<p>The European Union’s <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-nuclear-deal-eu-text-responses/31980637.html">final text for the proposed agreement</a> from August 2022 presents a last-ditch attempt to map out a return to the advantages of the nuclear deal. </p>
<p>Unless Iran accepts European reassurances, a deal seems increasingly unlikely. Unfortunately, Iran is then likely to increase its nuclear capabilities toward weaponization and further undermine the International Atomic Energy Agency’s monitoring of its program. Such escalations would precipitate increasingly confrontational responses, making any new agreement extremely unlikely, while heightening tensions and increasing the possibility of regional conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190100/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nina Srinivasan Rathbun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A nuclear nonproliferation expert explains why Iran was always unlikely to return to the 2015 international agreement that limited its nuclear weapon development.Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, Professor of international relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1899272022-09-07T13:46:20Z2022-09-07T13:46:20ZZaporizhzhia: proposals for demilitarised zone around Europe’s biggest nuclear power plant are unprecedented – expert reveals<p>Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-62816114">has welcomed an international proposal</a> for a demilitarised zone around Europe’s biggest nuclear plant, currently occupied by Russia. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/09/ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf">a much-anticipated September 6 update</a>, the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommended this safety and security zone be put around the Zaporizhzhia plant in southeastern Ukraine to avoid a nuclear disaster.</p>
<p>“What is urgently needed, now, today, is that we agree on establishing a protection … a shield, a bubble around the perimeter of the facility,” IAEA director general Rafael Grossi <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/06/europe/iaea-report-ukraine-nuclear-plant-intl/index.html">told CNN</a>. He urged all parties to cooperate in the protection of the facility and establishment of the zone, saying the IAEA would reach out to all sides “very very soon, with very concrete steps <a href="https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1k/k1k7je8du6">for your consideration</a>”.</p>
<p>This would be the first time an international body has overseen an endangered nuclear plant during a war. In previous military actions involving nuclear power plants, they were <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.559021">destroyed outright</a> by aerial bombing – but mostly while under construction, before they were operational, or before building up inventories of hazardous spent nuclear fuel in vulnerable <a href="https://www.radioactivity.eu.com/site/pages/IS_Spent_fuels.htm">cooling ponds</a>. </p>
<p>Previously, the IAEA has only been able to gain access to such sites afterwards, <a href="https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1k/k1k7je8du6">“to pick up the pieces”</a>. For the IAEA to intervene directly in the delivery of safety and security would be unprecedented, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340210381421">legally and practically very challenging</a>.</p>
<p>There has been no agreement yet from Russia to these proposals.</p>
<p>The IAEA has <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/09/ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf">also asked</a> for:</p>
<p>1) The return of full control over plant security to Ukrainian personnel;</p>
<p>2) The removal of Russian military vehicles from safety- and security-critical areas;</p>
<p>3) The removal of Russian nuclear experts and military personnel from control over nuclear operations at Zaporizhzhia, where they compromise established chains of command in safety/security incident management;</p>
<p>4) The urgent repair and reconnection of off-site electrical supplies, which are vital for the plant’s safety systems to have sufficient backup power sources; and</p>
<p>5) The re-establishment of supply chains for necessary equipment and materials to the plant, and of reliable communications with key bodies in Ukraine and internationally. </p>
<p>This report follows a long-awaited visit by IAEA experts, who began inspecting the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-united-nations-ce8c3e254c8dd44b8ae4eb3cea3c5907#:%7E:text=ZAPORIZHZHIA%2C%20Ukraine%20(AP)%20%E2%80%94,the%20urgency%20of%20the%20task">Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant</a> on September 2. The plant has been occupied by Russian forces since March, with Ukrainian staff working under stressful conditions to prevent <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/director-general-grossi-alarmed-by-shelling-at-ukraine-npp-says-iaea-mission-vital-for-nuclear-safety-and-security">a nuclear disaster</a>. Since August, the plant has been shelled many times, damaging critical safety equipment and services. Both Russia and Ukraine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-accuse-each-other-shelling-around-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-2022-08-27/">blame each another</a> for these attacks.</p>
<p>IAEA member states, including Russia and Ukraine, are responsible for their own nuclear <a href="https://www.iaea.org/publications/factsheets/nuclear-facility-safety#:%7E:text=Nuclear%20facility%20operators%20are%20ultimately,people%2C%20society%20and%20the%20environment.">safety and security</a>. They have a right to use nuclear technology <a href="https://npolicy.org/the-npt-iaea-safeguards-and-peaceful-nuclear-energy-an-inalienable-right-but-precisely-to-what/">for peaceful purposes</a>, even in times of war. </p>
<h2>What is the IAEA?</h2>
<p>Based in Vienna, the IAEA is a UN body that brings together nuclear experts and diplomats, and is often called the world’s “nuclear watchdog”. It was set up in the 1950s as a result of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2015.1129607">international nuclear fears</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/shelling-of-europes-biggest-nuclear-power-plant-exposes-multiple-risks-a-nuclear-expert-tells-us-what-they-are-189078">Shelling of Europe's biggest nuclear power plant exposes multiple risks – a nuclear expert tells us what they are</a>
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<p>The IAEA upholds the deal that states, including Russia and Ukraine, made in the international <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/">Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</a>, under which they agree to not develop nuclear weapons and, in return, are eligible to receive help on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.</p>
<p>To do so, the IAEA implements <a href="https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1525379">“safeguards”</a> – inspections and technical measures to verify that nuclear materials are not being diverted from peaceful applications into weapons programmes. As one of the five nuclear weapons states under the treaty, Russia is not obliged to submit to safeguards, but <a href="https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/text-agreement-21-february-1985-between-union-soviet-socialist-republics-and-agency-application-safeguards-union-soviet-socialist-republics">does so voluntarily</a> for its civil nuclear facilities.</p>
<p>The IAEA also <a href="https://www.iaea.org/events">brings together experts</a> to address scientific and political issues in nuclear power, such as nuclear safety and security.</p>
<p>Normally, the agency conducts inspections at nuclear facilities globally on a regular, usually annual, basis. <a href="https://www.iaea.org/publications/8695/safeguards-techniques-and-equipment">It also receives data regularly from these nuclear facilities</a>, ensuring that it remains informed even when not on site. However, the war in Ukraine has disrupted this process greatly, with monitoring systems down and the information flow disrupted. In this information vacuum, both sides have made numerous claims about the Zaporizhzhia plant and one another, while documented evidence has been scarce.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Press conference with IAEA director general Rafael Mariano Grossi upon his return from Ukraine, September 2, 2022.</span></figcaption>
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<p>With IAEA experts now <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/two-iaea-inspectors-stay-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-permanently-russian-envoy-2022-09-02/">permanently on site</a>, the agency will be able to receive direct updates from its own personnel. They will be able to report on conditions for Ukrainian staff, as well as the status of nuclear safety and security equipment and military actions.</p>
<p>The best possible course of action for nuclear safety and security would be a halt to hostilities and a controlled but rapid withdrawal of occupying forces from around the Zaporizhzhia facility. However, the statement of the Russian envoy to the <a href="https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1k/k1k7je8du6">UN Security Council</a>, Vasily Nebenzya, on September 6 doesn’t suggest the Kremlin is about to agree to the IAEA plan.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ross Peel is affiliated with the Centre for Science and Security Studies, a multi-disciplinary research and teaching group within the Department of War Studies at King's College London. Through King's, he is also a member of the World Nuclear Association.</span></em></p>Plans to create a safe zone around the massive nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia require Russian agreement, which so far looks unlikely.Ross Peel, Research and Knowledge Transfer Manager, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1894292022-08-26T12:19:56Z2022-08-26T12:19:56ZUN nuclear agency calls for protection zone around imperiled Ukrainian power plant – a safety expert explains why that could be crucial<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483071/original/file-20220906-22-a9szl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C52%2C1022%2C714&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Damage at the Zaporizhzhya facility.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/iaea_imagebank/52328919198/">International Atomic Energy Agency</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The United Nations’ nuclear watchdog has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-united-nations-government-and-politics-d65a057bbb9dc1e59171fdad1fd3c3f0?utm_source=homepage&utm_medium=TopNews&utm_campaign=position_1">called on Russia and Ukraine</a> to set up a “safety and security protection zone” around the embattled Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station in the Ukrainian city of Enerhodar. The plea, made on Sept. 6, 2022, by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), comes amid mounting concern that the facility – Europe’s largest nuclear power plant – is vulnerable to nearby fighting, and that damage to the site could cause a catastrophic accident.</em></p>
<p><em>Shelling has already <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-93-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine">damaged power and communication lines to the plant</a>, prompting <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-nuclear-plant-escapes-meltdown-zelenskiy-says-moscow-kyiv-trade-blame-2022-08-25/">fears for the plant’s safety</a> and evoking painful memories in a country still scarred by the world’s worst nuclear accident, at Chernobyl in 1986.</em> </p>
<p><em>In addition, Russian authorities have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/24/revealed-russian-plan-to-disconnect-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-from-grid">developed plans to disconnect the plant</a> from Ukraine’s power grid – in the event of damage to the plant, according to the Russians, as a prelude to switching the plant to the grid in Russian-occupied territory, according to the Ukrainians. Disconnecting the plant from the grid is a risky operation.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked <a href="https://sites.usc.edu/meshkati/">Najmedin Meshkati</a>, a professor and <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/thirty-three-years-catastrophe-chernobyl-universal-lesson-global-nuclear-power-industry">nuclear safety expert</a> at the University of Southern California, to explain the risks of warfare taking place in and around nuclear power plants.</em></p>
<h2>How safe was the Zaporizhzhia power plant before the Russian attack?</h2>
<p>The facility at Zaporizhzhia is the largest nuclear plant in Europe and one of the largest in the world. It has six <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/pwrs.html">pressurized water reactors</a>, which use water to both sustain the fission reaction and cool the reactor. These differ from the <a href="https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/appendices/rbmk-reactors.aspx">RBMK</a> reactors at Chernobyl, which used graphite instead of water to sustain the fission reaction. RBMK reactors are not seen as very safe, and there are <a href="https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/appendices/rbmk-reactors.aspx">only eight remaining in use</a> in the world, all in Russia.</p>
<p>The reactors at Zaporizhzhia are of moderately good design, and the plant has a decent safety record, with a good operating background.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Qthg5xE196w?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant uses pressurized water reactors.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Ukrainian authorities tried to keep the war away from the site by asking Russia to observe a 30-kilometer (nearly 19-mile) safety buffer. But Russian troops surrounded the facility and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-everything-you-need-to-know">seized it in March</a>.</p>
<h2>What are the risks to a nuclear plant in a conflict zone?</h2>
<p>Nuclear power plants are built for peacetime operations, not wars.</p>
<p>The worst thing that could happen is if a site is deliberately or accidentally shelled. If a shell hit the plant’s <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/pools.html">spent fuel pool</a> – which contains the still-radioactive spent fuel – or if fire spread to the spent fuel pool, it could release radiation. This spent fuel pool isn’t in the containment building, and as such is more vulnerable.</p>
<p>Containment buildings, which house nuclear reactors, are also not protected against deliberate shelling. They are built to withstand a minor internal explosion of, say, a pressurized water pipe. But they are not designed to withstand a huge explosion.</p>
<p>As to the reactors in the containment building, it depends on the weapons being used. The worst-case scenario is that a bunker-buster missile breaches the containment dome – consisting of a thick shell of reinforced concrete on top of the reactor – and explodes. That would badly damage the nuclear reactor and release radiation into the atmosphere, which would make it difficult to send in first responders to contain any resulting fire. It could be another Chernobyl.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier stands in the foreground as a half dozen people in hazmat suits and gas masks stand near stretchers outside a large tent" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481180/original/file-20220825-26-qlt1zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian Emergency Ministry personnel conducted a drill in the city of Zaporizhzhia on Aug. 17, 2022, to prepare for a possible radiation leak from the nuclear power plant near the city.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-emergency-ministry-rescuers-attend-an-exercise-in-news-photo/1242554458">Photo by Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What are the concerns going forward?</h2>
<p>The safety problems I see are twofold:</p>
<p><strong>1) Human error</strong></p>
<p>The workers at the facility are working under incredible stress, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/23/world/europe/ukraine-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant.html">reportedly at gunpoint</a>. Stress increases the chance of error and poor performance.</p>
<p>There is a human element in running a nuclear power plant – operators are the first and last layers of defense for the facility and the public. They are the first people to detect any anomaly and to stop any incident. Or if there’s an accident, they will be the first to heroically try to contain it.</p>
<p>This concern was highlighted in the International Atomic Energy Agency report, which noted that the Ukrainian staff at the plant were working under “constant high stress and pressure” – something that could have consequences for nuclear safety.</p>
<p><strong>2) Power failure</strong></p>
<p>The second problem is that the nuclear plant needs constant electricity, and that is harder to maintain in wartime.</p>
<p>Even if you shut down the reactors, the plant will need off-site power to run the huge cooling system to remove the residual heat in the reactor and bring it to what is called a <a href="http://neinuclearnotes.blogspot.com/2011/12/what-is-cold-shutdown.html">cold shutdown</a>. Water circulation is always needed to make sure the spent fuel doesn’t overheat.</p>
<p>Spent fuel pools also need constant water circulation to keep them cool, and they need cooling for several years before they can be put in dry casks. One of the problems in the 2011 <a href="https://theconversation.com/10-years-after-fukushima-safety-is-still-nuclear-powers-greatest-challenge-155541">Fukushima disaster</a> in Japan was the emergency generators intended to replace lost off-site power got inundated with water and failed. In situations like that, you get “<a href="https://allthingsnuclear.org/dlochbaum/nuclear-station-blackout/">station blackout</a>” – and that is one of the worst things that could happen. It means no electricity to run the cooling system.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="hundreds of square openings lie at the bottom of a large pool of water in an industrial building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Spent nuclear fuel rods are stored at the bottom of this pool, which requires constant circulation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-shows-the-cooling-pool-of-the-switched-off-unit-1-news-photo/524200126">Guillaume Souvant/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In that circumstance, the spent fuel overheats and its zirconium cladding can create hydrogen bubbles. If you can’t vent these bubbles, they will explode, spreading radiation.</p>
<p>If there is a loss of outside power, operators will have to rely on emergency generators. But emergency generators are huge machines – finicky, unreliable gas guzzlers. And you still need cooling waters for the generators themselves. </p>
<p>My biggest worry is that Ukraine suffers from a sustained power grid failure. The likelihood of this increases during a conflict because power line pylons may come down under shelling, or gas power plants might get damaged and cease to operate. And though Ukrainian intelligence services <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-russia-plans-disconnect-nuclear-plants-blocks-grid-2022-08-19/">claim that the Russians intend to stockpile diesel fuel</a> to keep these emergency generators going, it is unlikely that Russian troops will have excess fuel given their need to fuel their own vehicles.</p>
<h2>How else does a war affect the safety of nuclear plants?</h2>
<p>One of the overarching concerns about the effects of war on nuclear plants is that war degrades <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK253947/">safety culture</a>, which is crucial in running a plant. I believe that safety culture is analogous to the human body’s immune system, which protects against pathogens and diseases. Safety culture is pervasive and has a widespread impact. “It can affect all elements in a system for good or ill,” <a href="https://www.safetymattersblog.com/2014/11/a-life-in-error-by-james-reason.html">according to</a> <a href="https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/fellows/jim-reason-FBA/">psychologist James Reason</a>.</p>
<p>The tragic situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant violates every universally accepted tenet of <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1500/ML15007A487.pdf">healthy nuclear safety culture</a>, especially the maintenance of an environment where personnel can raise safety concerns.</p>
<p>War adversely affects safety culture in a number of ways. Operators are stressed and fatigued and may be scared to death to speak out if something is going wrong. Then there is the maintenance of a plant, which may be compromised by lack of staff or unavailability of spare parts. </p>
<p>Governance, regulation and oversight – all crucial for the safe running of a nuclear industry – are also disrupted, as is local infrastructure, such as the capability of local firefighters. In war, everything is harder.</p>
<h2>So what can be done to better protect Ukraine’s nuclear power plants?</h2>
<p>The only solution is declaring a demilitarized zone around nuclear plants, similar to the the protection zone urged by the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, Russia has previously rejected United Nations Secretary General António Guterres’ <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15003.doc.htm">plea for declaring a demilitarized zone around the plant</a>. </p>
<p>I believe an optimal though not ideal solution is to bring the two operating reactors to a cold shutdown before any further loss of off-site power and risk of station blackout, store more fuel for emergency diesel generators at different locations at the plant site, and keep only a skeleton caretaker staff to look after the spent fuel pools.</p>
<p>Admittedly, this is only a stopgap measure. In parallel with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s effort under the leadership of its Director, General Rafael Mariano Grossi, I believe that the U.N. Security Council should immediately empower a special commission to mediate between the warring parties. It could be modeled after the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations-Monitoring-Verification-and-Inspection-Commission">United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission</a> in 2000, and appoint a prominent, senior international statesman as its head. </p>
<p>I believe the person should be of the caliber and in the mold of the legendary former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, <a href="https://worldleaders.columbia.edu/directory/hans-blix">Hans Blix</a> of Sweden. Blix led the agency at the time of the Chernobyl accident in 1986 and commands respect in today’s Russia and Ukraine.</p>
<p>War, in my opinion, is the worst enemy of nuclear safety. This is an unprecedented and volatile situation. Only through active, pragmatic <a href="https://www.sciencediplomacy.org/sites/default/files/engineering_diplomacy_science__diplomacy.pdf">engineering and nuclear diplomacy</a> can an amenable and lasting solution to this vexing problem be found.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-troops-fought-for-control-of-a-nuclear-power-plant-in-ukraine-a-safety-expert-explains-how-warfare-and-nuclear-power-are-a-volatile-combination-178588">an article</a> originally published on March 4, 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189429/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Najmedin Meshkati received research funding from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in mid-1990s.</span></em></p>Artillery shelling, stressed-out technicians and power supply disruptions increase the chances of catastrophe at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, Europe’s largest.Najmedin Meshkati, Professor of Engineering and International Relations, University of Southern CaliforniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1785882022-03-04T23:36:53Z2022-03-04T23:36:53ZRussian troops fought for control of a nuclear power plant in Ukraine – a safety expert explains how warfare and nuclear power are a volatile combination<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450124/original/file-20220304-23-pfhpx5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C5%2C3442%2C2282&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rafael Mariano Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, points to the training facility hit by Russian artillery at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/AustriaNuclearRussiaUkraineWar/86fb83c01e9149b3a9bb7c09dccc0157/photo">AP Photo/Lisa Leutner</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Russian forces have taken control of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-everything-you-need-to-know">shelling the Zaporizhzhia facility</a> in the Ukrainian city of Enerhodar.</em></p>
<p><em>The overnight assault caused a blaze at the facility, prompting fears over the safety of the plant and evoking painful memories in a country still scarred by the world’s worst nuclear accident, at Chernobyl in 1986. The site of that disaster is <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-action-in-radioactive-chernobyl-could-be-dangerous-for-people-and-the-environment-177992">also under Russian control</a> as of Feb. 24, 2022.</em> </p>
<p><em>On March 4, Ukrainian authorities <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-11-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine">reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency</a> that the fire at Zaporizhzhia had been extinguished and that Ukrainian employees were reportedly operating the plant under Russian orders. But safety concerns remain.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked <a href="https://sites.usc.edu/meshkati/">Najmedin Meshkati</a>, a professor and <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/thirty-three-years-catastrophe-chernobyl-universal-lesson-global-nuclear-power-industry">nuclear safety expert</a> at the University of Southern California, to explain the risks of warfare taking place in and around nuclear power plants.</em></p>
<h2>How safe was the Zaporizhzhia power plant before the Russian attack?</h2>
<p>The facility at Zaporizhzhia is the largest nuclear plant in Europe, and one of the largest in the world. It has six <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/pwrs.html">pressurized water reactors</a>, which use water to both sustain the fission reaction and cool the reactor. These differ from the <a href="https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/appendices/rbmk-reactors.aspx">reaktor bolshoy moshchnosty kanalny</a> reactors at Chernobyl, which used graphite instead of water to sustain the fission reaction. RBMK reactors are not seen as very safe, and there are <a href="https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/appendices/rbmk-reactors.aspx">only eight remaining in use</a> in the world, all in Russia.</p>
<p>The reactors at Zaporizhzhia are of moderately good design. And the plant has a decent safety record, with a good operating background.</p>
<p>Ukraine authorities tried to keep the war away from the site by asking Russia to observe a 30-kilometer safety buffer. But Russian troops surrounded the facility and then seized it.</p>
<h2>What are the risks to a nuclear plant in a conflict zone?</h2>
<p>Nuclear power plants are built for peacetime operations, not wars.</p>
<p>The worst thing that could happen is if a site is deliberately or accidentally shelled and the containment building – which houses the nuclear reactor – is hit. These containment buildings are not designed or built for deliberate shelling. They are built to withstand a minor internal explosion of, say, a pressurized water pipe. But they are not designed to withstand a huge explosion.</p>
<p>It is not known whether the Russian forces deliberately shelled the Zaporizhzhia plant. It may have been inadvertent, caused by a stray missile. But we do know they wanted to capture the plant.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/kK7xG_Q0Tkg?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Tracer rounds and flames can be seen in this video of the fight for control of the nuclear power plant.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If a shell hit the plant’s <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/pools.html">spent fuel pool</a> – which contains the still-radioactive spent fuel – or if fire spread to the spent fuel pool, it could release radiation. This spent fuel pool isn’t in the containment building, and as such is more vulnerable.</p>
<p>As to the reactors in the containment building, it depends on the weapons being used. The worst-case scenario is that a bunker-buster missile breaches the containment dome – consisting of a thick shell of reinforced concrete on top of the reactor – and explodes. That would badly damage the nuclear reactor and release radiation into the atmosphere. And because of any resulting fire, sending in firefighters would be difficult. It could be another Chernobyl.</p>
<h2>What are the concerns going forward?</h2>
<p>The biggest worry was not the fire at the facility. That did not affect the containment buildings and has been extinguished. </p>
<p>The safety problems I see now are twofold:</p>
<p><strong>1) Human error</strong></p>
<p>The workers at the facility are now working under incredible stress, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-04-22/h_1f73598a8edc48dcd10cea81c3c37be5">reportedly at gunpoint</a>. Stress increases the chance of error and poor performance.</p>
<p>One concern is that the workers will not be allowed to change shifts, meaning longer hours and tiredness. We know that a few days ago at Chernobyl, after the Russians took control of the site, they <a href="https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/IAEA-chief-warns-over-pressure-on-Ukraine-nuclear">did not allow employees</a> – who usually work in three shifts – to swap out. Instead, they took some workers hostage and didn’t allow the other workers to attend their shifts.</p>
<p>At Zaporizhzhia we may see the same.</p>
<p>There is a human element in running a nuclear power plant – operators are the first and last layers of defense for the facility and the public. They are the first people to detect any anomaly and to stop any incident. Or if there’s an accident, they will be the first to heroically try to contain it. </p>
<p><strong>2) Power failure</strong></p>
<p>The second problem is that the nuclear plant needs constant electricity, and that is harder to maintain in wartime.</p>
<p>Even if you shut down the reactors, the plant will need off-site power to run the huge cooling system to remove the residual heat in the reactor and bring it to what is called a “cold shutdown.” Water circulation is always needed to make sure the spent fuel doesn’t overheat.</p>
<p>Spent fuel pools also need constant circulation of water to keep them cool. And they need cooling for several years before being put in dry casks. One of the problems in the 2011 <a href="https://theconversation.com/10-years-after-fukushima-safety-is-still-nuclear-powers-greatest-challenge-155541">Fukushima disaster</a> in Japan was the emergency generators, which replaced lost off-site power, got inundated with water and failed. In situations like that you get “<a href="https://allthingsnuclear.org/dlochbaum/nuclear-station-blackout/">station blackout</a>” – and that is one of the worst things that could happen. It means no electricity to run the cooling system. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="hundreds of square openings lie at the bottom of a large pool of water in an industrial building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450128/original/file-20220304-21-hirerv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Spent nuclear fuel rods are stored at the bottom of this pool, which requires constant circulation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-shows-the-cooling-pool-of-the-switched-off-unit-1-news-photo/524200126">Guillaume Souvant/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In that circumstance, the spent fuel overheats and its zirconium cladding can cause hydrogen bubbles. If you can’t vent these bubbles they will explode, spreading radiation.</p>
<p>If there is a loss of outside power, operators will have to rely on emergency generators. But emergency generators are huge machines – finicky, unreliable gas guzzlers. And you still need cooling waters for the generators themselves. </p>
<p>My biggest worry is that Ukraine suffers from a sustained power grid failure. The likelihood of this increases during a conflict, because pylons may come down under shelling or gas power plants might get damaged and cease to operate. And it is unlikely that Russian troops themselves will have fuel to keep these emergency generators going – they <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60596629">don’t seem to have enough fuel</a> to run their own personnel carriers.</p>
<h2>How else does a war affect the safety of nuclear plants?</h2>
<p>One of the overarching concerns is that war degrades <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK253947/">safety culture</a>, which is crucial in running a plant. I believe that safety culture is analogous to the human body’s immune system, which protects against pathogens and diseases; and because of the pervasive nature of safety culture and its widespread impact, according to <a href="https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/fellows/jim-reason-FBA/">psychologist James Reason</a>, “<a href="https://www.safetymattersblog.com/2014/11/a-life-in-error-by-james-reason.html">it can affect all elements in a system for good or ill</a>.”</p>
<p>It is incumbent upon the leadership of the plant to strive for immunizing, protecting, maintaining and nurturing the healthy safety culture of the nuclear plant.</p>
<p>War adversely affects the safety culture in a number of ways. Operators are stressed and fatigued and may be scared to death to speak out if something is going wrong. Then there is the maintenance of a plant, which may be compromised by lack of staff or unavailability of spare parts. Governance, regulation and oversight – all crucial for the safe running of a nuclear industry – are also disrupted, as is local infrastructure, such as the capability of local firefighters. In normal times you might have been able to extinguish the fire at Zaporizhzhia in five minutes. But in war, everything is harder.</p>
<h2>So what can be done to better protect Ukraine’s nuclear power plants?</h2>
<p>This is an unprecedented and volatile situation. The only solution is a no-fight zone around nuclear plants. War, in my opinion, is the worst enemy of nuclear safety.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 150,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-150ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178588/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Najmedin Meshkati received research funding from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC in mid-1990s.</span></em></p>The world held its collective breath as Russian troops battled Ukrainian forces at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. The battle is over and no radiation escaped, but the danger is far from over.Najmedin Meshkati, Professor of Engineering and International Relations, University of Southern CaliforniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1555412021-03-05T20:14:26Z2021-03-05T20:14:26Z10 years after Fukushima, safety is still nuclear power’s greatest challenge<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387881/original/file-20210304-13-1jbe3ct.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3008%2C1999&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An International Atomic Energy Agency investigator examines Reactor Unit 3 at the damaged Fukushima Daiichi plant, May 27, 2011.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://flic.kr/p/9MsNf9">Greg Webb, IAEA/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ten years ago, on March 11, 2011, the biggest recorded earthquake in Japanese history hit the country’s northeast coast. It was followed by a tsunami that traveled up to 6 miles (10 kilometers) inland, reaching heights of over 140 feet (43.3 meters) in some areas and sweeping entire towns away in seconds.</p>
<p>This disaster left nearly 20,000 people dead or missing. It also destroyed the <a href="https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-daiichi-accident.aspx">Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station</a> and released radioactive materials over a large area. The accident triggered widespread evacuations, large economic losses and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan. A decade later, the nuclear industry has yet to fully to address safety concerns that Fukushima exposed.</p>
<p>We are scholars specializing in <a href="https://viterbi-web.usc.edu/%7Emeshkati/">engineering</a> and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/Kiyoshi-Kurokawa-2163025935">medicine and public policy</a>, and have advised our respective governments on nuclear power safety. Kiyoshi Kurokawa chaired an <a href="https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/report/">independent national commission</a>, known as the NAIIC, created by the Diet of Japan to investigate the root causes of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Najmedin Meshkati served as a member and technical adviser to a committee appointed by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences to <a href="https://www.nap.edu/catalog/18294/lessons-learned-from-the-fukushima-nuclear-accident-for-improving-safety-of-us-nuclear-plants">identify lessons from this event</a> for making U.S. nuclear plants safer and more secure.</p>
<p>Those reviews and <a href="https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf">many</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2014.0379">others</a> concluded that Fukushima was a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/06/why-fukushima-was-preventable-pub-47361">man-made accident</a>, triggered by natural hazards, that <a href="https://thenewpress.com/books/fukushima">could and should have been avoided</a>. Experts widely agreed that the root causes were lax regulatory oversight in Japan and an ineffective safety culture at the utility that operated the plant. </p>
<p>These problems are far from unique to Japan. As long as commercial nuclear power plants operate anywhere in the world, we believe it is critical for all nations to learn from what happened at Fukushima and continue doubling down on nuclear safety. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ZK8UBHMo04U?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">How the 2011 earthquake and tsunami crippled the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, filmed one month after the disaster.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Failing to anticipate and plan</h2>
<p>The 2011 disaster delivered a devastating one-two punch to the Fukushima plant. First, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Japan-earthquake-and-tsunami-of-2011">magnitude 9.0 earthquake</a> knocked out off-site electric power. Next, the tsunami breached the plant’s protective sea wall and swamped portions of the site. </p>
<p>Flooding disabled monitoring, control and cooling functions in multiple units of the six-reactor complex. Despite heroic efforts by plant workers, three reactors sustained severe damage to their radioactive cores and three reactor buildings were damaged by hydrogen explosions. </p>
<p>Off-site releases of radioactive materials contaminated land in Fukushima and several neighboring prefectures. Some 165,000 people left the area, and the Japanese government established an exclusion zone around the plant that extended <a href="https://www.britannica.com/story/nuclear-exclusion-zones">over 311 square miles</a> (807 kilometers) in its largest phase. </p>
<p>For the first time in the history of constitutional democratic Japan, the Japanese Parliament passed a law creating an <a href="https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/resources/">independent national commission</a> to investigate the root causes of this disaster. In its report, the commission concluded that Japan’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_Nuclear_Safety_Commission">Nuclear Safety Commission</a> <a href="https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/report/">had never been independent from the industry</a>, nor from the powerful Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, which promotes nuclear power. </p>
<p>For its part, plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Company, or TEPCO, had a history of disregard for safety. The company had recently released an error-prone assessment of tsunami hazards at Fukushima that significantly <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsta.2014.0379">underestimated the risks</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387889/original/file-20210304-13-n1rm6p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387889/original/file-20210304-13-n1rm6p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387889/original/file-20210304-13-n1rm6p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387889/original/file-20210304-13-n1rm6p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387889/original/file-20210304-13-n1rm6p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387889/original/file-20210304-13-n1rm6p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=718&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387889/original/file-20210304-13-n1rm6p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=718&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387889/original/file-20210304-13-n1rm6p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=718&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nuclear power generates about 10% of the world’s electricity (TWh = terawatt-hours). About 50 new plants are under construction, but many operating plants are aging.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/nuclear-power-in-the-world-today.aspx">World Nuclear Association</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Events at the Onagawa Nuclear Power Station, located 39 miles (64 kilometers) from Fukushima, told a <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2014/03/onagawa-the-japanese-nuclear-power-plant-that-didnt-melt-down-on-3-11/">contrasting story</a>. Onogawa, which was owned and operated by the Tohoku Electric Power Company, was closer to the earthquake’s epicenter and was hit by an even larger tsunami. Its three operating reactors were the same type and vintage as those at Fukushima, and were under the same weak regulatory oversight. </p>
<p>But Onogawa shut down safely and was remarkably undamaged. In our view, this was because the Tohoku utility had a <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/03/14/commentary/japan-commentary/culture-of-safety-can-make-or-break-nuclear-power-plants/">deep-seated, proactive safety culture</a>. The company learned from earthquakes and tsunamis elsewhere – including a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Chile-earthquake-of-2010">major disaster in Chile in 2010</a> – and continuously improved its countermeasures, while TEPCO overlooked and ignored these warnings. </p>
<h2>Regulatory capture and safety culture</h2>
<p>When a regulated industry manages to cajole, control or manipulate agencies that oversee it, rendering them feckless and subservient, the result is known as <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/3003160">regulatory capture</a>. As the NAIIC report concluded, Fukushima was a textbook example. Japanese regulators “<a href="https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/NAIIC_report_lo_res10.pdf">did not monitor or supervise nuclear safety</a>….They avoided their direct responsibilities by letting operators apply regulations on a voluntary basis,” the report observed.</p>
<p>Effective regulation is necessary for nuclear safety. Utilities also need to create internal <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/safety-culture">safety cultures</a> – a set of characteristics and attitudes that make safety issues an overriding priority. For an industry, safety culture functions like the human body’s immune system, protecting it against pathogens and fending off diseases. </p>
<p>A plant that fosters a positive safety culture encourages employees to ask questions and to apply a rigorous and prudent approach to all aspects of their jobs. It also fosters open communications between line workers and management. But TEPCO’s culture reflected a Japanese mindset that emphasizes hierarchy and acquiescence and discourages asking questions. </p>
<p>There is ample evidence that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/108602669100500203">human factors</a> such as operator errors and poor safety culture played an instrumental key role in all three major accidents that have occurred at nuclear power plants: <a href="https://www.osti.gov/biblio/5395798-three-mile-island-report-commissioners-public-volume">Three Mile Island</a> in the U.S. in 1979, <a href="https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub913e_web.pdf">Chernobyl</a> in Ukraine in 1986 and <a href="https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf">Fukushima Daiichi</a> in 2011. Unless nuclear nations do better on both counts, this list is likely to grow. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1366694917045690369"}"></div></p>
<h2>Global nuclear safety grade: Incomplete</h2>
<p>Today there are some <a href="https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/plans-for-new-reactors-worldwide.aspx">440 nuclear power reactors operating</a> around the world, with about 50 under construction in countries including China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>Many advocates argue that in light of the threat of climate change and the increasing need for carbon-free baseload electricity generation, nuclear power <a href="https://cen.acs.org/energy/nuclear-power/nuclear-power-help-save-us/97/i37">should play a role</a> in the world’s future energy mix. Others call for <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2019/08/the-false-promise-of-nuclear-power-in-an-age-of-climate-change/">abolishing nuclear power</a>. But that may not be feasible in the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>In our view, the most urgent priority is developing tough, system-oriented nuclear safety standards, strong safety cultures and much closer cooperation between countries and their independent regulators. We see worrisome indications in the U.S. that <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Confessions-of-a-Rogue-Nuclear-Regulator/Gregory-B-Jaczko/9781476755779">independent nuclear regulation is eroding</a>, and that nuclear utilities are resisting pressure to learn and delaying adoption of internationally accepted safety practices, such as <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aal4890">adding filters</a> to prevent radioactive releases from reactor containment buildings with the same characteristics as Fukushima Daiichi. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388064/original/file-20210305-19-otg7wg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Man in protective radiation suit and respirator." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388064/original/file-20210305-19-otg7wg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388064/original/file-20210305-19-otg7wg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=987&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388064/original/file-20210305-19-otg7wg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=987&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388064/original/file-20210305-19-otg7wg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=987&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388064/original/file-20210305-19-otg7wg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1241&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388064/original/file-20210305-19-otg7wg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1241&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388064/original/file-20210305-19-otg7wg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1241&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Author Najmedin Meshkati holding an earthquake railing in a Fukushima Daiichi control room during a 2012 site visit.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Najmedin Meshkati</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The most crucial lesson we see is the need to counteract nuclear nationalism and isolationism. Ensuring close cooperation between countries developing nuclear projects is essential today as the forces of populism, nationalism and anti-globalism spread. </p>
<p>We also believe the <a href="https://www.iaea.org/">International Atomic Energy Agency</a>, whose mission is promoting safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, should urge its member states to find a balance between national sovereignty and international responsibility when it comes to operating nuclear power reactors in their territories. As Chernobyl and Fukushima taught the world, radiation fallout does not stop at national boundaries. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 100,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>As a start, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/01/world/middleeast/uae-nuclear-Barakah.html">Persian Gulf countries</a> should set aside political wrangling and recognize that with the startup of a nuclear power plant in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/01/world/middleeast/uae-nuclear-Barakah.html">United Arab Emirates</a> and others planned in <a href="https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsconstruction-of-egypts-first-nuclear-plant-to-begin-in-2021-8100216">Egypt</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-21/saudi-atomic-reactor-progresses-with-inspectors-still-frozen-out?sref=Hjm5biAW">Saudi Arabia</a>, they have a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0018720815623143">common interest in nuclear safety</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-016-0099-0">collective emergency response</a>. The entire region is vulnerable to radiation fallout and water contamination from a nuclear accident <a href="https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.7b00688">anywhere in the Gulf</a>.</p>
<p>We believe the world remains at the same juncture it faced in 1989, when then-Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43309384">made this perceptive argument</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“A decade ago, Three Mile Island was the spark that ignited the funeral pyre for a once-promising energy source. As the nuclear industry asks the nation for a second look in the context of global warming, it is fair to watch how its advocates respond to strengthened safety oversight. That will be the measure of whether nuclear energy becomes a phoenix or an extinct species.”</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155541/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kiyoshi Kurokawa, MD, MACP, is Professor Emeritus at the University of Tokyo and Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo. He served as Chairman of the National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, which released its official report in July 2012. The English translation of his book, Regulatory Capture: Will Japan Change? is expected to be released in 2021.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Najmedin Meshkati, Ph.D., CPE, is a Professor of Civil/Environmental, Industrial & Systems Engineering, and International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC). He teaches and conducts research on technological systems safety and has visited many nuclear power stations around the world, including Chernobyl (1997), Mihama (1999), and Fukushima Daiichi and Daini (2012). He served as a member and technical advisor on the U.S. National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council Committee on Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants.</span></em></p>On the 10th anniversary of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, two experts explain why human choices are more important to nuclear safety than technology, and why the job is far from finished.Kiyoshi Kurokawa, Professor Emeritus, University of TokyoNajmedin Meshkati, Professor of Engineering and International Relations, University of Southern CaliforniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/963262018-05-10T18:03:04Z2018-05-10T18:03:04ZWhat torching Iran deal says about US commitment to nuclear security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218504/original/file-20180510-34027-7tlhm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iranian demonstrators burn a picture of the U.S. President Donald Trump.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Vahid Salemi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">pulling the U.S. out</a> of the Iran nuclear deal flies in the face of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-11/iran-nuclear-inspections-double-under-deal-questioned-by-trump">hundreds of inspections</a> that showed Iran was meeting its end of the bargain.</p>
<p>It’s a move that many leaders in the international community opposed, including all other parties to the deal – France, Germany, the U.K., Russia and China. Trump’s decision has generated a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2018/may/08/iran-nuclear-deal-donald-trump-latest-live-updates">firestorm of commentary</a> about what may come next.</p>
<p>But what stands out to me as <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=dCRySjIAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">a researcher</a> on energy policy and nuclear policy, is what it says about the agency that carried out the inspections – the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-worlds-nuclear-energy-watchdogs-4-questions-answered-93690">International Atomic Energy Agency</a> – and <a href="https://www.iaea.org/nuccomtoolbox/knowwtsay/know07.html">its mission</a>.</p>
<h2>Inspections in Iran</h2>
<p>In July 2015, after the Iran deal was signed, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution that <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/03/gov-2018-7-derestricted.pdf">requested the IAEA carry out</a> the monitoring and verifying of Iran’s compliance with its nuclear commitments. Between January 2016 and February 2018, the agency conducted more than <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-11/iran-nuclear-inspections-double-under-deal-questioned-by-trump">400 site visits and dozens of unannounced</a>, or “snap” inspections. It installed cameras and employed satellites to perform surveillance work. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-IAEA-confirms-iranian-cooperation-0603187.html">The visits</a> covered more than 190 buildings, and the agency’s investigations used hundreds of thousands of images. From this extensive activity, the IAEA <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors">repeatedly declared</a>, up through the most recent director’s report of March 2018, that Iran was in compliance. </p>
<p>None of this is affected in the least by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/netanyahu-iran-nuclear-deal/559250/">recent presentation</a> about Iran’s nuclear program, which was based on information <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/netanyahu-iran-nuclear-program/559295/">dating from</a> well before the Iran deal was even conceived.</p>
<p>And yet, Trump referenced the Israeli intelligence documents as “definitive proof that this Iranian promise was a lie,” <a href="https://www.wsbradio.com/news/national/full-transcript-trump-speech-pulling-out-iran-nuclear-deal/htdRdreVy4HqnREDhO8n3O/">in his speech</a> announcing the U.S. was leaving the agreement.</p>
<p>By pulling out of the deal, Trump discounts the IAEA’s findings and signals to the world that he has little faith in it. As I see it, he is effectively saying it cannot be trusted to perform its most critical work in nuclear security.</p>
<p>Further, Trump’s action suggests that officials and intelligence agencies of all other parties to the Iran deal are gullible. Trump’s position is ironic, given that the IAEA was an <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-worlds-nuclear-energy-watchdogs-4-questions-answered-93690">invention of the U.S.</a> It is not, however, unprecedented.</p>
<h2>US commitment to nuclear security</h2>
<p>In 2002, the Bush administration claimed Iraq was building a nuclear arsenal. They stated that <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21854-2005Apr2.html">the results</a> of IAEA inspections, which indicated no evidence of weapons, could not be trusted. History has since <a href="https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/09/08/the-lies-that-led-to-the-iraq-war-and-the-persistent-myth-of-intelligence-failure/">shown</a> the Bush administration was wrong about the accuracy of the IAEA’s work.</p>
<p>What, in the end, may really stick is the repeated example of U.S. leaders invalidating a crucial instrument for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. I would argue that Trump has deepened the world’s dangers two-fold, by walking away from a successful nuclear deal and by showing a lack of respect for a key aspect of the IAEA’s mission to stop the spread of nuclear weapons around the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96326/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott L. Montgomery does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Does the work of the international agency responsible for verifying whether Iran was in compliance with the deal matter to the US?Scott L. Montgomery, Lecturer, Jackson School of International Studies, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/936902018-05-04T10:47:53Z2018-05-04T10:47:53ZThe world’s nuclear energy watchdogs: 4 questions answered<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217656/original/file-20180503-138586-1w91g72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An International Atomic Energy Agency inspector at Iran's Natanz facility, 2014.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/IRNA, Kazem Ghane</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>North Korea <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-04-30/real-path-peace-korean-peninsula">has promised</a> to get rid of its nuclear weapons, but how will the world know if it actually follows through?</p>
<p>There is only one international agency in the world that could verify their compliance, the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, North Korea <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/chronology-of-key-events">canceled its membership</a> to the organization in 1994. When the IAEA demanded to inspect certain facilities in North Korea, they backed out and <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards">eventually expelled</a> all nuclear inspectors in 2009.</p>
<p>Since then, North Korea has remained outside the IAEA’s jurisdiction. While it isn’t clear whether the agency will be called upon if a deal on denuclearization is reached, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/yukiya-amano-nuclear-watchdog-north-korea-global-threat/">IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano has said</a> the agency is prepared to send a team of inspectors should a diplomatic agreement be reached.</p>
<p>So, with that possibility in mind, let’s look at how the agency operates and all the other nuclear energy challenges it faces beyond North Korea.</p>
<h2>1. What is the International Atomic Energy Agency?</h2>
<p>The IAEA was <a href="https://www.iaea.org/about/overview/history">founded in 1957</a>, inspired by U.S. President Eisenhower’s “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110330222020/http://www.world-nuclear-university.org/about.aspx?id=8674&terms=atoms%20for%20peace">Atoms for Peace</a>” speech promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. From the beginning, its task has been to spread and monitor the application of nuclear technology for non-military uses and make sure that such technology is not diverted to build weapons.</p>
<p>Its creators had a mixture of pragmatic resignation and long-term hope about nuclear technology. They recognized that the Cold War meant that nuclear weapons would continue to exist. Yet the <a href="http://iaea-history.univie.ac.at/the-iaea-at-sixty/the-creation-of-the-iaea/">thinking was</a> that their existence might be significantly curtailed if nations were drawn to other applications of the technology like medicine, agriculture, industry and power generation.</p>
<p>Headquartered in Vienna, Austria, the agency is <a href="https://www.iaea.org/about/statute">a membership organization</a> that reports annually to the United Nations, but is independent of it. Member nations must obey its rules and requirements in order to receive the knowledge and technology it provides.</p>
<p>Currently, 169 countries are <a href="https://www.iaea.org/about/governance/list-of-member-states">members</a>. </p>
<h2>2. What are the agency’s main responsibilities?</h2>
<p>The agency is best known for its work <a href="https://www.iaea.org/about/organizational-structure/department-of-nuclear-safety-and-security">in two areas</a>. The first is nuclear safety: protecting people and the environment from harmful radiation. The second is nuclear security, which focuses on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, including threats of nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p>This watchdog role requires determining whether any member country might be developing nuclear weapons – specifically nations that have signed international treaties. For example, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the world’s most important legally binding agreement for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. At present, a <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/">total of 191 states</a> have joined the treaty. Three nuclear weapons states – Israel, India and Pakistan – have not signed and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/four-nuclear-outlier-states">North Korea withdrew</a> from it in 2003.</p>
<p>The IAEA evaluates compliance with other treaties including those governing <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/nwfz/">nuclear free zones</a> and important safeguard agreements with as many as 181 nations.</p>
<p>In the past, some states like West Germany and Italy, and more recently Iran, have viewed the agency’s authority as <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/11/06/why-does-iaea-do-what-it-does-pub-74689">unfairly restricting</a> their sovereignty over their nuclear facilities. Yet support for the agency’s authority has grown strongly with time, due to its key role in difficult cases, like that of Iran itself.</p>
<h2>3. How does the agency verify how nuclear material is being used?</h2>
<p>Among the more than <a href="https://www.iaea.org/about/staff">2,500 people</a> who staff the IAEA, only about 385 are inspectors. They come from 80 nations and mainly hold backgrounds in physics, chemistry and engineering.</p>
<p>Routine <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/a-day-in-the-life-of-a-safeguards-inspector">inspections involve</a> verifying whether a member’s report about its nuclear facilities and material is accurate. Depending on the size of the facility, this might take a few hours for one or two people or two weeks for 10 inspectors. They do this in a number of ways, including the collecting of samples of nuclear material, measuring levels of radioactivity, checking plans and blueprints against actual construction, and interviewing officials, engineers and others involved in nuclear work.</p>
<p>Over time, the agency has had to make changes in its inspection processes. For example, before 1997, inspectors were limited to examining only facilities that member states had declared. After discovering that Iraq had lied about the true extent of its nuclear program, the IAEA board of governors <a href="https://www.iaea.org/topics/additional-protocol">approved a protocol</a> to allow inspectors to access undeclared sites that might be involved in nuclear work. </p>
<p>Inspectors have also found themselves in the line of political fire. For example, between 2002 and 2003, the Bush administration wanted evidence that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had an active nuclear weapons program. U.S. attempts to pressure the agency did not alter IAEA findings that such evidence <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/status-nuclear-inspections-iraq-update">could not be found</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, the agency <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-complying-nuclear-deal-iaea-says-donald-trump-united-nations/">has stood its ground</a> in favor of the Iran nuclear deal and Iran’s compliance in the face of President Trump’s continued criticism of the agreement.</p>
<h2>4. What are the main challenges facing the agency?</h2>
<p>There are myriad challenges facing the IAEA.</p>
<p>Expanding demands on the agency have come from developing nations with growing economies such as Thailand and Chile that want to use nuclear science in medicine, agriculture and industry. <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx">Growth of nuclear power</a> into new areas of the world is bringing concern about the development of weapons and terrorist groups acquiring nuclear material.</p>
<p>North Korea, whose weapons program may or may not be halted by talks with the U.S., has plutonium and uranium that could be sold without international approval or safeguards. </p>
<p>Then there is the Trump administration’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43985255">threat to abandon</a> the Iran nuclear deal, a move that would dismiss years of effort by the IAEA to head off an arms race in the region. At the same time, any future need to verify that Iran is not building a weapon would almost certainly rely on IAEA inspectors. Similarly, it seems likely that a deal between the U.S. and North Korea would require the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to rejoin the agency and have any denuclearization efforts confirmed by it as well. </p>
<p>Such realities only heighten the importance of the IAEA. No other organization exists to do its essential work. One of its most successful and farsighted efforts has been to work with nations individually in creating blueprints for safe nuclear science and nuclear power programs.</p>
<p>The most enduring difficulty facing the IAEA, however, lies with the U.S. and Russia. Despite reducing their nuclear arsenals hugely since the Cold War, both still possess <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat">around 7,000 weapons</a>, immense numbers considering each one’s destructive power. Both nations, moreover, have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/us/politics/trump-nuclear-russia.html">recently and openly declared</a> a new era of modernization and diversification for these arsenals. </p>
<p>In their very existence, these weapons are a rationale for other countries to want them. How else will they deter aggression from either nation? It remains a stark truth, a difficult one for the IAEA, that while it works to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, the U.S. and Russia forge a path for weapons states in exactly the opposite direction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott L. Montgomery does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Who do you call when there’s a nuclear crisis? The International Atomic Energy Agency, unless the crisis involves North Korea – then things get complicated.Scott L. Montgomery, Lecturer, Jackson School of International Studies, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/579422016-04-25T13:49:12Z2016-04-25T13:49:12ZForget Fukushima: Chernobyl still holds record as worst nuclear accident for public health<p>The 1986 Chernobyl and 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant accidents both share the notorious distinction of attaining the highest accident rating on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) <a href="http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/ines.asp">scale of nuclear accidents</a>. No other reactor incident has ever received this Level 7 “major accident” designation in the history of nuclear power. Chernobyl and Fukushima earned it because both involved core meltdowns that released significant amounts of radioactivity to their surroundings.</p>
<p>Both of these accidents involved evacuation of hundreds of thousands of residents. Both still have people waiting to return to their homes. And both left a legacy of large-scale radioactive contamination of the environment that will persist for years to come, despite ongoing cleanup efforts.</p>
<p>So the tendency is to think of these accidents as similar events that happened in different countries, 25 years apart.</p>
<p>But the IAEA scale isn’t designed to measure public health impact. In terms of health ramifications, these two nuclear accidents were not even in the same league. While <a href="http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/a_e/fukushima/faqs-fukushima/en/">Fukushima</a> involved radioactivity exposures to hundred of thousands of people, <a href="http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2005/pr38/en/index1.html">Chernobyl</a> exposed hundreds of millions. And millions of those received substantially more exposure than the people of Fukushima.</p>
<p>On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the April 26, 1986 Chernobyl accident in Ukraine, we do well to reflect on the health burden it caused – and compare it with what we expect to see from Japan’s Fukushima nuclear accident. As I report in my book “<a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10691.html">Strange Glow: The Story of Radiation</a>,” from a public health standpoint, there’s really no comparison between the two events. </p>
<h2>Higher doses of radiation, more health harm</h2>
<p>Chernobyl was by far the worst reactor accident of all time. A total of 127 reactor workers, firemen and emergency personnel on site sustained radiation doses sufficient to cause radiation sickness (over 1,000 mSv); some received doses high enough to be lethal (over 5,000 mSv). Over the subsequent six months, <a href="http://pegasusbooks.com/books/atomic-accidents-9781605984926-hardcover">54 died from their radiation exposure</a>. And it’s been estimated that 22 of the 110,645 cleanup workers may have <a href="https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2012/11/13087/chernobyl-cleanup-workers-had-significantly-increased-risk-leukemia">contracted fatal leukemias</a> over the next 25 years.</p>
<p>In contrast, at Fukushima, there were no radiation doses high enough to produce radiation sickness, even among the reactor core workers. Two Fukushima workers who had leaky respirators received effective doses of <a href="http://pegasusbooks.com/books/atomic-accidents-9781605984926-hardcover">590 mSv and 640 mSv</a>. That’s above the Japanese occupational limit for conducting lifesaving rescue work (250 mSv), but still below the threshold for radiation sickness (1,000 mSv). Due to their exposure, the two workers’ lifetime cancer risks will <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10691.html">increase about 3 percent</a> (from the 25 percent background cancer risk rate to about 28 percent), but they are unlikely to experience other health consequences.</p>
<p>Beyond just the plant workers, over 572 million people among 40 different countries got at least some exposure to Chernobyl radioactivity. (Neither the United States nor Japan was among the exposed countries.) It took two decades to fully assess the cancer consequences to these people. Finally, in 2006, an international team of scientists completed a comprehensive <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ijc.22037">analysis of the dose and health data</a> and reported on the cancer deaths that could be attributed to Chernobyl radioactivity.</p>
<p>Their detailed analysis included countrywide estimates of individual radiation doses in all 40 exposed countries, and regionwide estimates for the most highly contaminated regions of the most highly contaminated countries (Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine).</p>
<p>Using statistical models, the scientists predicted a total of 22,800 radiation-induced cancers, excluding thyroid cancers, among this group of 572 million people. Thyroid cancer warranted separate special scrutiny, as we will discuss presently; this hormonally important gland is uniquely affected by a specific radioactive isotope, iodine-131.</p>
<p>So that’s 22,800 non-thyroid cancers in addition to the approximately 194 million cancer cases that would normally be expected in a population of that size, even in the absence of a Chernobyl accident. The increase from 194,000,000 to 194,022,800 is a 0.01 percent rise in the overall cancer rate. That’s too small to have any measurable impact on the cancer incidence rates for any national cancer registries, so these predicted values will likely remain theoretical.</p>
<h2>Chernobyl’s iodine-131 thyroid effects far worse</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, at Chernobyl, the one type of cancer that could have easily been prevented was not. The population surrounding Chernobyl was not warned that iodine-131 – a radioactive fission product that can enter the food chain – had contaminated milk and other locally produced agricultural products. Consequently, people ate iodine-131-contaminated food, resulting in thyroid cancers.</p>
<p>For the local population, iodine-131 exposure was a worst-case scenario because they were already <a href="http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/chernobyl/backgrounder/en/">suffering from an iodine-deficient diet</a>; their <a href="http://www.thyroid.org/iodine-deficiency/">iodine-starved thyroids</a> sucked up any iodine that became available. This extremely unfortunate situation would not have happened in countries such as the United States or Japan, where diets are richer in iodine.</p>
<p>Thyroid cancer is rare, with a low background incidence compared to other cancers. So excess thyroid cancers due to iodine-131 can be more readily spotted in cancer registries. And this, in fact, has been the case for Chernobyl. Beginning five years after the accident, an increase in the rate of thyroid cancers started and continued rising over the following decades. Scientists estimate that there will ultimately be about <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ijc.22037">16,000 excess thyroid cancers</a> produced as a result of iodine-131 exposure from Chernobyl.</p>
<p>At Fukushima, in contrast, there was much less iodine-131 exposure. The affected population was smaller, local people were advised to avoid local dairy products due to possible contamination and they did not have iodine-deficient diets.</p>
<p>Consequently, typical radiation doses to the thyroid were low. Iodine-131 uptake into the thyroids of exposed people was measured and the <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep00507">doses were estimated to average</a> just 4.2 mSv for children and 3.5 mSv for adults – levels comparable to annual background radiation doses of approximately 3.0 mSv per year.</p>
<p>Contrast this to Chernobyl, where a significant proportion of the local population received thyroid doses in excess of 200 mSv – 50 times more – well high enough to see appreciable amounts of excess thyroid cancer. So at Fukushima, where iodine-131 doses approached background levels, we wouldn’t expect thyroid cancer to present the problem that it did at Chernobyl. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, there has already been one report that <a href="http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160307/p2a/00m/0na/022000c">claims there is an increase</a> in thyroid cancer among Fukushima residents at just four years post-accident. That’s earlier than would be expected based on the <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/sj.bjc.6601860">Chernobyl experience</a>. And the study’s design has been criticized as flawed for a number of scientific reasons, including the <a href="http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/mystery-cancers-are-cropping-children-aftermath-fukushima">comparison methods used</a>. Thus, this report of excess thyroid cancers must be considered suspect <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jjco/hyv191">until better data arrive</a>.</p>
<h2>Chernobyl has no comparison</h2>
<p>In short, Chernobyl is by far the worst nuclear power plant accident of all time. It was a totally human-made event – <a href="http://pegasusbooks.com/books/atomic-accidents-9781605984926-hardcover">a “safety” test gone terribly awry</a> – made worse by incompetent workers who did all the wrong things when attempting to avert a meltdown.</p>
<p>Fukushima in contrast, was an unfortunate natural disaster – caused by a tsunami that flooded reactor basements – and the workers acted responsibly to mitigate the damage despite loss of electrical power.</p>
<p>April 26, 1986 was the darkest day in the history of nuclear power. Thirty years later, there is no rival that comes even close to Chernobyl in terms of public health consequences; certainly not Fukushima. We must be vigilant to ensure nothing like Chernobyl ever happens again. We don’t want to be “celebrating” any more anniversaries like this one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57942/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy J. Jorgensen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The meltdown at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in 1986 exposed 572 million people to radiation. No other nuclear accident holds a candle to that level of public health impact.Timothy J. Jorgensen, Director of the Health Physics and Radiation Protection Graduate Program and Associate Professor of Radiation Medicine, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/534852016-02-03T11:09:54Z2016-02-03T11:09:54ZIran nuclear deal: how to ensure compliance?<p>The U.S. and European countries lifted <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/world/middleeast/iran-sanctions-lifted-nuclear-deal.html">nuclear-related sanctions</a> against Iran on January 16 as part of a deal in which the country agreed to limit its nuclear activities and accept a new system of international inspections. Last week Iranian President <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-europe-rouhani-idUSKCN0V51QA">Hassan Rouhani was in France</a>, seeking to rekindle long-dormant Western business connections.</p>
<p>The issue now is how the international community can be confident that Iran is not violating the deal, formally referred to as the <a href="http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/">Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</a>. A helpful approach is to ask two questions:</p>
<ol>
<li>Could Iran collect the nuclear material needed to build a weapon?</li>
<li>Could the international community discover those efforts before it was too late?</li>
</ol>
<p>Iran agreed never to develop nuclear weapons when it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. There’s no ironclad method to prevent Iran from breaking its promise and developing nuclear weapons, but this new agreement builds in a number of strong protections. In conjunction with U.S. and allied intelligence capabilities, these rules mean even a sophisticated and carefully executed secret plan would carry a high risk of detection.</p>
<h2>Three steps of development</h2>
<p>There are three major tasks involved in building a nuclear weapon: acquiring the nuclear fuel, constructing the other components of a nuclear bomb or warhead and developing a delivery system. </p>
<p>Given Iran’s history with <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-congress-idUSKBN0U02CH20151217">ballistic missiles</a>, it is best to assume that Iran would have relatively little difficulty developing a suitable delivery system.</p>
<p>A December 2015 report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) explored the so-called “<a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-68.pdf">possible military dimensions</a>” of Iran’s nuclear program, but Iran’s research and development activities in the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/martin-malin-/iaea-iran-report-takeaways_b_8735838.html">field of weaponization</a> remain uncertain. Some of these activities, such as performing computer simulations for weapons design, are fairly easy to hide. Others, like developing high-speed electronic switches, have applications in both nuclear weapons and nonnuclear industries, meaning Iran could conceal military intentions under cover of peaceful work. It is best to assume that Iran would be able to quickly assemble a bomb in a hidden location if it ever acquired enough weapons-usable nuclear fuel.</p>
<p>Consequently, the focus of international effort should be on blocking Iran’s access to nuclear material, and rapidly detecting any clandestine attempts to acquire it.</p>
<h2>Making the fuel</h2>
<p>There are two basic routes to acquiring the fuel for a nuclear bomb. One involves separating and concentrating one isotope of uranium, a process called enrichment. If uranium is enriched by a small amount, then it may be used to generate electricity in a nuclear power reactor. If uranium is enriched to high levels, then it may be used in a nuclear bomb.</p>
<p>The other route to acquiring the fuel for a nuclear bomb is called reprocessing. It involves separating plutonium from the byproducts of running a nuclear reactor.</p>
<p>Experts tend to focus on the enrichment route because Iran has built <a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/irans-uranium-enrichment">gas centrifuge enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow</a> (Qom). In addition, the restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program under the deal virtually eliminate Iran’s capability to use reprocessing as a route to nuclear weapons, according to <a href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25599/iran_nuclear_deal.html">research</a> by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.</p>
<p>Assuming Iran pursued enrichment, it would have to choose whether to exploit its declared centrifuge facilities or attempt to conduct all operations in clandestine locations.</p>
<p>Under the deal, Iran can keep some centrifuges at Natanz, to make a small amount of fuel for nuclear power reactors, and at Fordow for various medical applications. IAEA safeguards make it almost impossible for Iran to secretly switch these centrifuges from peaceful use to the production of fuel for nuclear weapons. Inspectors have daily access to the facilities, plus equipment continuously monitoring the level of enrichment being achieved by Iran’s centrifuges. That would detect any switch from producing reactor fuel to weapons fuel. The IAEA also uses tamper-indicating seals and surveillance systems to verify that equipment is not being removed or altered when inspectors are away.</p>
<p>For the next 10 years, the deal also strictly limits the numbers and types of centrifuges, which slows down Iran’s ability to enrich uranium. If Iran decided to break the deal and started using all its known centrifuges to produce weapons-usable nuclear fuel, it would take <a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/reports/Solving-the-Iranian-Nuclear-Puzzle-The-Joint-Comprehensive-Plan-of-Action/2015/08/Section-3-Understanding-the-JCPOA">roughly 12 months for the centrifuges to produce enough fuel for one weapon</a>. That would give other countries time to stop Iran, including by threatening to destroy, or actually destroying, the Natanz and Fordow sites.</p>
<h2>Building a clandestine facility</h2>
<p>Iran could try to build a clandestine enrichment facility. While it would not necessarily stand out in satellite imagery, Iran would, nevertheless, face a series of technical and practical challenges.</p>
<p>A past attempt at a secret enrichment plant <a href="http://www.isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/iran-building-nuclear-fuel-cycle-facilities-international-transparency-need/8">was detected</a> by Western intelligence agencies and exposed by the <a href="http://www.ncr-iran.org/en/">National Council of Resistance of Iran</a>, well before it could become fully operational. There is little reason to think Iran would be more successful in concealing a facility today.</p>
<p>Iran also would have trouble secretly building enough centrifuges to fill a hidden enrichment plant. Some of the basic materials, such as high-strength aluminum and steel, could be diverted from Iran’s existing nonnuclear industrial activities. However, many other essential components, particularly for the centrifuge bearings, vacuum systems and sensitive electronics, could realistically be acquired in sufficient quantities only by importing them.</p>
<h2>Restricted imports</h2>
<p>Under <a href="http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11974.doc.htm">UN Security Council Resolution 2231</a>, which accompanies the deal, all countries must get Security Council approval before transferring any “<a href="http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/guidelines">dual-use</a>” technology to Iran, such as vacuum pumps and precision machining tools. These are items that could be used in nuclear work but also have peaceful applications such as information technology and medicine. As a result of this restriction, Iran would almost certainly need to build a sophisticated smuggling operation.</p>
<p>The United States, its allies, and like-minded countries have been moderately successful in intercepting suspicious transfers of nuclear-related technology, even when suspect countries hide behind front companies. The most famous example is the 2003 interception of centrifuge parts aboard the freighter <a href="http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/24832/message_from_tripoli_part_5.html">BBC China</a>, which unraveled Libya’s nuclear weapons program. But with dual-use technology, one of the challenges has been distinguishing suspicious transfers from legitimate ones.</p>
<p>This deal is quite clear: All transfers of dual-use technology from any country to Iran, even for use in nonnuclear industries, are prohibited unless the supplier has received approval from the Security Council. If an intelligence organization detects the transfer of any sensitive piece of technology that has not been preapproved by the Security Council, it will stand out as a clear violation.</p>
<p>Iran would also need to staff its covert operations. It has many scientists and engineers, but diverting enough people from their regular jobs to a covert facility would be difficult to hide, particularly from watchful dissident groups like the National Council of Resistance of Iran.</p>
<h2>Keeping the plant operating</h2>
<p>Assuming that Iran managed to construct, equip and staff the covert enrichment plant, the next challenge would be to operate the plant for long enough to produce enough enriched uranium for at least one nuclear weapon without being discovered. </p>
<p>The IAEA has the right to request access to suspected covert nuclear sites. Once there, inspectors can <a href="http://www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/detail/kalaye/">test the environment</a> – swabbing building walls or collecting soil samples to test for nuclear material. This has previously detected small covert enrichment operations in Iran.</p>
<p>If Iran refuses access, then it must quickly prove the site is benign. It would not be able to stall for long enough to remove or decontaminate an enrichment plant so completely as to foil expert detection. An outright refusal to allow inspectors access to the site would be open defiance of the deal – allowing other countries to infer that it is in fact a covert nuclear site.</p>
<p>Looking at the deal as a whole, Iran’s best strategy for acquiring nuclear weapons would simply be to wait for restrictions on its declared enrichment program to be lifted.</p>
<p>Assuming that the deal does not fall apart sooner, most of those provisions are scheduled to expire in 2030. In the meantime, the deal helps make a nuclear-armed Iran a less immediate prospect.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53485/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kalman Robertson receives funding from the Stanton Foundation. Kalman Robertson is a postdoctoral fellow in the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
The views expressed here are those of the author and not those of any institution.</span></em></p>How can the international community be sure Iran is living up to its end of the new nuclear deal?Kalman Robertson, Postdoctoral Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/490922015-10-19T13:50:49Z2015-10-19T13:50:49ZIran’s tentative nuclear deal may not mean an international oil boom<p>The merest hint of a successful deal over Iran’s nuclear programme <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/038166e0-2b09-11e5-acfb-cbd2e1c81cca.html#axzz3ocj2nMrR">is enough to get people excited</a>. And as the country emerges from economic isolation, nowhere is the enthusiasm more keenly felt than in the huge oil firms with a chance to make a splash in one of the <a href="http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/">world’s most resource-rich nations</a>. But are the conditions really there for a boom that will ripple across our lives?</p>
<p>The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed between Iran and the so-called P5+1 nations (China, France, Russia, the UK, the US and Germany) brings the prospect of an end to international sanctions. There were threats that the deal might be blocked by the US Congress, which <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/us/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-senate.html">were eventually overcome</a>, and this week has apparently seen the green light in Tehran <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/nuclear-deal-wins-final-iran-approval-151014164725034.html">from parliament and the Guardian Council</a>. </p>
<h2>Sanctioned</h2>
<p>In theory, it looks simple from here. The agreement is that the sanctions would be lifted on the “day of implementation” provided that Iran complies with its promises to restrict its nuclear programme. While both the American and Iranian governments seem willing to move towards practical implementation, there remain doubts surrounding the legislative foundation on which this rests. This political fragility – and one crucial detail in the agreement – are a spanner in the works for delivering what would amount to a revolution in global oil markets.</p>
<p>The appeal is clear to <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/10/09/uk-iran-nuclear-usa-exclusive-idUKKCN0S32O320151009">Royal-Dutch Shell, France’s Total and Italy’s Eni</a>. Iran is home to vast oil and gas reserves which to date have not been effectively tapped due to international restrictions. Iran had planned to introduce a new variety of flexible, <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/92402244-2975-11e5-8613-e7aedbb7bdb7.html#slide0">less risky contracts</a> as well as 50 new production projects to the international petroleum market in a conference to be held in London at the end of this year, but has since been postponed for the fourth time, <a href="http://www.ft.com/fastft/396711/iran-oil-conference">to early 2016</a>.</p>
<p>The Iranian regime’s inconsistent implementation of the agreement has created a confusing situation. On the one hand, the head of the <a href="https://www.iaea.org/">International Atomic Energy Agency</a> was permitted to visit Iran’s most controversial military site, Parchin, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34315492">as recently as September 21</a>, contrary to the recent parliamentary interpretation of the deal excluding such inspections. In contrast, in October Iran successfully fired a long-range ballistic missile and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/15/iran-reveals-huge-underground-missile-base-with-broadcast-on-state-tv">revealed one of its missile bases</a> hidden in a mountain, in what seems to be a deliberately provocative act, undermining their commitments under the agreement. </p>
<h2>Political will</h2>
<p>This odd chain of events highlights the idea that the agreement’s apparent political success remains shaky, and far from solid ground for major corporate decision making. Legislative obstacles and provocative military actions make it clear that enforcement of an agreement is heavily dependent on the simple political will of the parties involved. </p>
<p>As an example, we can view the involvement of the Iranian parliament in ratifying the JCPOA as a device to mirror the debates within the US senate, rather than a genuine act of parliament. The law that confers the power on parliament to scrutinise international agreements is outlined <a href="http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution-6-2.html">in Article 77 of the Iranian Constitution</a> which mandates that: “International treaties, protocols, contracts and agreements must be approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly”. </p>
<p>That means that by referring to the agreement as a “Plan of Action”, the Iranian government avoids the JCPOA being treated as an international treaty requiring domestic ratification. Rather than conferring obligations on any of the parties, it was intended, at least as claimed by the Iranian government, to be of a voluntary nature. Its implementation was said to be contingent on the actions of the other parties. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98506/original/image-20151015-30744-1y6ce7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98506/original/image-20151015-30744-1y6ce7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98506/original/image-20151015-30744-1y6ce7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98506/original/image-20151015-30744-1y6ce7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98506/original/image-20151015-30744-1y6ce7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98506/original/image-20151015-30744-1y6ce7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98506/original/image-20151015-30744-1y6ce7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98506/original/image-20151015-30744-1y6ce7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Iranian president Hassan Rouhani speaks at the UN.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/21608904059/in/photolist-yVvhkn-gbv7ad-gbvpcB-gbuTPu-vGg7Vp-gbvq72-m6T6et-vZ94rq-gboxBh-gboxCu-gbooZP-gauA5M-gauA1Z-gauzZB-gauk5r-gidPDV-gidin4-gid6NS-gido1y-ozm4PY-gidoos-iAmrZa-nE5BRw-npCB97-qkB9uT-aEUi4Z-aEUhye-kTViAG-wmD2Mc-ganstw-aEUidR-aEY8Us-aEUi9n-aEUi6X-aEUi2D-aEUi1k-aEY8FQ-aEY8DE-aEUhUt-aEY8A1-aEY8yJ-aEUhNH-aEY8vm-aEY8tL-aEY8sf-aEY8qY-aEY8ps-aEUhEV-aEUhCn-aEUhzT">United Nations Photo</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This allowed the government of president Hassan Rouhani to resist submitting the agreement to the parliament in the form of a bill. In fact, under the Iranian constitution, simply by not signing the JCPOA, Rouhani removed a further prompt which would have required parliamentary approval. </p>
<p>And then we have the idea, <a href="http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2015/8/5/should-irans-islamic-assembly-vote-on-the-nuclear-deal">frequently claimed</a>, that it is not in any case the responsibility of parliament to deal with nuclear agreements. The idea being that such power has been specifically conferred to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) under the constitution. </p>
<p>And so, this “plan of action” accepted by the Rouhani government on the basis of the negotiating parties’ good faith has weight right now, but is subject to his political influence. Looking ahead to more solid foundations, were the ratification of the JCPOA by parliament and the Guardian Council to be combined with the signature of the president, then that would render the deal as domestic law. That would bind not only Rouhani’s government but any future government to come which would be a positive development. </p>
<h2>An uncertain future</h2>
<p>Any foreign company, in the current environment, would be well served to hold themselves back and wait until they can verify the agreement has entered into an established implementation phase. The current position remains economically fragile and crucially, subject to shifting political sands. If you want further proof of this fragility then <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7bbbc08e-6c44-11e5-aca9-d87542bf8673.html#axzz3odOJfAt6">look no further than the intention</a> of the US government to maintain sanctions against the <a href="http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-revolutionary-guards/p14324">Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps</a>.</p>
<p>The Corps was established to defend the Islamic Republic against internal and external threats but has expanded to exert great influence over the Iranian oil and gas industry through hundreds of companies within its control. Even if there is a smooth path to ending sanctions under the current deal, then investors must ensure that their Iranian counterparts and contractors are not still subject to restrictions due to their connection with the Corps.</p>
<p>It is a worrying wrinkle in the works among many and the coming months will be crucial in determining whether the force of political will can overcome the obstacles thrown in its path, and open up a secure new front for eager, but hopefully cautious, businesses.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammad Hedayati-Kakhki does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The merest hint of a successful deal over Iran’s nuclear programme is enough to get people excited. And as the country emerges from economic isolation, nowhere is the enthusiasm more keenly felt than in…Mohammad Hedayati-Kakhki, Co-founder and Special Advisor of the Islam, Law & Modernity Research Group, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/444252015-07-15T05:22:58Z2015-07-15T05:22:58ZNuclear deal done – so what next for Iran?<p>The P5+1 powers have concluded <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-iran-nuclear-deal-means-and-what-it-doesnt-44685">a historic deal with Iran</a> to curtail its progress towards nuclear enrichment. The significance of this news should not be underestimated; concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities have ranked high on the international agenda for over a decade now, and the latest series of talks has been ongoing since 2013. And while a <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-celebrates-historic-nuclear-deal-all-eyes-now-on-supreme-leader-39528">political framework</a> was agreed in Lausanne in April 2015, the prospect of a final, detailed agreement was never assured.</p>
<p>On both sides, domestic opposition from hardline political groups has threatened to derail the talks; at the negotiating table, diplomats have delicately probed the limits of compromise on issues ranging from the possible military dimensions to Iran’s past activities to the timing of sanctions relief. Indeed only the week before the deal was done, US Secretary of State John Kerry claimed that the talks <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/at-iran-nuclear-talks-a-last-minute-tightrope-walk/2015/07/05/a5d38d8c-7336-490f-8041-94c7c5d46e4b_story.html">could go either way</a>.</p>
<p>But the parties have nonetheless produced an agreement that will both limit Iran’s nuclear activities and facilitate Iran’s economic re-engagement with the international community. What, then, does the deal actually involve?</p>
<h2>From Lausanne to Vienna</h2>
<p>The contours of the deal set in Lausanne remain largely unchanged. We already knew, for example, that Iran has agreed to reduce by its number of installed centrifuges by approximately two thirds, to reduce its stockpile of low enriched uranium by over 90%, and to limit its uranium enrichment to 3.67% for some 15 years.</p>
<p>We knew that Iran has agreed to redesign the heavy water reactor at <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/iran-nuclear-program-what-know-about-fordow-arak-reactor-facilities-proposed-changes-1868430">Arak</a> so it produces a greatly reduced amount of plutonium (another potential route to the bomb), and submit to a wide-ranging inspection and verification regime overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).</p>
<p>We also knew that, in return, the P5+1 has agreed that all nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be lifted. UN Security Council Resolutions will also be replaced once Iran has addressed key concerns.</p>
<p>But while the political framework agreed in Lausanne comprised a couple of pages of broad points, the Vienna agreement is a <a href="http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150714_01_en.htm">lengthy document that includes five annexes</a>.</p>
<h2>The nitty-gritty</h2>
<p>Of the many issues covered in the deal, three deserve particular attention: the oversight and verification regime that will monitor Iran’s activities and ensure it adheres to its commitments; the possible military dimensions to Iran’s past activities; and the timing of sanctions relief.</p>
<p>Clearly the issue of oversight is crucial. If the deal is to hold, the international community must have full confidence that Iran is adhering to its commitments. Under the terms of the deal, Iran has agreed to an inspection regime that goes beyond anything in place in other countries – and yet, the agreement does leave it room for manoeuvre. </p>
<p>Iran will allow inspectors access to sites of interest, including military sites, where inspectors have grounds to suspect undeclared or illicit activities are taking place. In the case of Iranian objections, the particulars will be referred to a new Joint Commission composed of representatives of the P5+1 and Iran where a majority vote will determine the outcome.</p>
<p>The possible military dimensions to Iran’s past activities represent another key issue that has long been a source of controversy and debate. To date, opinion has largely been divided between two camps: those who believe that progress towards a solution cannot be achieved until Iran comes clean on past weaponisation activities, and those who think past activities simply don’t matter as much as future behaviour.</p>
<p>This issue has always been a catch-22 for Iran. Having built a narrative around peaceful nuclear activities for decades, the government would find it almost impossible to acknowledge any past work on nuclear weapons. On this issue, the agreement refers to the newly agreed <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-director-generals-statement-and-road-map-clarification-past-present-outstanding-issues-regarding-irans-nuclear-program">Roadmap for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme</a>. Under the terms of this roadmap, all outstanding issues will be resolved by the end of the year. It is not clear if and how questionable past activities will be revealed.</p>
<p>Finally, a major sticking point in the negotiations has been the timing and structure of sanctions relief. Iranian negotiators have been pushing for all sanctions to be lifted as soon as an agreement is signed. On the other side, the P5+1 have sought a phased removal of sanctions that would align with the implementation of specific aspects of the deal by Iran. The P5+1’s thinking has also been influenced by the possibility that sanctions might need to be rapidly reimposed if Iran were caught cheating.</p>
<p>According to the deal, a new UN Security Council Resolution will be sought promptly to replace previous ones related to Iran’s nuclear programme. This will form part of a broader move to lift all national and multilateral sanctions relating to Iran’s nuclear programme on “Implementation Day”, the point at which IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures to limit the Iranian programme is achieved. </p>
<p>These measures are wide-ranging and are set out in one of the annexes to the agreement. The agreement makes no mention of the conditions under which sanctions might be reimposed, but presumably this will be included in the new UN Security Council Resolutions.</p>
<h2>A lasting solution?</h2>
<p>Even as the deal was announced, critics were clamouring to attack it. In Israel, prime minister Netanyahu described the deal as “<a href="https://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/netanyahu-iran-deal-historic-mistake-world_990659.html">an historic mistake for the world</a>”, while in Washington, Republican Senator Tom Cotton decried it as a “<a href="http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2015/07/14/tom_cotton_terrible_dangerous_mistake_which_will_pave_irans_path_to_a_nuclear_weapon.html">terrible, dangerous mistake</a>”. And despite the optimism around the deal, there are challenging days ahead. The US Congress, for example, has 90 days to consider the terms of the agreement and may well move to block it.</p>
<p>But the dissenters’ criticisms are vastly outweighed by the deal’s positive aspects. No side views the deal as perfect, but perhaps that is the clearest sign of successful negotiations. And what was the alternative? Allowing the Iranian nuclear programme to progress unfettered? Engaging in military action to slow the programme down? Neither of these options is realistic or desirable.</p>
<p>The deal is a triumph of diplomacy. The international community has established the basis for a peaceful and lasting solution to a pressing security issue in the world’s most volatile region. Of course, the announcement of a deal is only the first stage in a lengthy process, and implementation is the only real measure of success here. </p>
<p>The deal’s consequences will have to be managed carefully; Iran’s illicit behaviour over the past decade has implicitly been recognised and legitimised, and this is not be lost on its neighbours. On the whole, however, the deal should be acknowledged for the positive step it represents.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44425/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Moran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran’s path back to nuclear acceptability is now set out. Let the real work begin.Matthew Moran, Lecturer in International Security, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/256872014-05-15T05:13:24Z2014-05-15T05:13:24ZThe IAEA demands nations open up to its inspectors, yet is itself a tightly shut box of secrets<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/48526/original/dvmp9nzg-1400097280.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Getting information out of the IAEA: hard.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SixPartWoodKnot.jpg">Andreas.Roever</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When we agree to send our young men and women to war, we expect the reasons why to be made clear. At least some of us will want to subject that explanation to scrutiny at the time, and often even more so with hindsight. That’s why having access to historical documents is an important democratic right.</p>
<p>The US sent hundreds of thousands of troops into the disastrous eight-year war in Iraq, propelled by Iraq’s supposed breaches of agreements under the <a href="http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/npt/index.shtml">Non-Proliferation Treaty</a> (NPT) and guided by rules negotiated at the International Atomic Energy Agency (<a href="http://www.iaea.org">IAEA</a>). </p>
<p>The IAEA, founded in 1957, was set up to champion the peaceful use of nuclear science (“atoms for peace”). The NPT, established in 1968, was intended to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the nuclear states of the US, USSR, UK, France and China by regulating the movement of uranium and other nuclear material and equipment across national borders. Not only has it failed to do so – Israel, India and Pakistan have acquired nuclear weapons since – but in Iraq we had an example of IAEA rules, and the inspectors that ensure they are followed, being used to justify conventional wars.</p>
<p>While this was evident in Iraq, the same game of nuclear brinkmanship is being played out now <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/13/uk-iran-nuclear-iaea-idUKKBN0DS11Y20140513">through negotiations</a> dragged out over several decades between the political leadership of Iran and the IAEA’s various member nations.</p>
<p>Yet, for all the IAEA’s demands of openness, peering into the organisation’s workings and history is like trying to prise open an impossibly stubborn black box.</p>
<h2>Do as I say, not as I do</h2>
<p>Why is it so difficult for researchers to obtain useful documentation from the IAEA archives? Perhaps there are reasons to remain opaque <a href="http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2014/prn201410.html">about ongoing discussions</a>. However, if our elected officials are pushing Iran (or any country) on their nuclear programs, it is our responsibility to take a hard look at the history of the negotiations. That means reading through the detailed discussions at the IAEA, not just about Iran or Iraq, but about the whole nuclear industry.</p>
<p>What technologies were originally considered dangerous, when the first nations signed on to the NPT? What attitudes about national sovereignty and commercial development prevailed then? What concerns about an imperial, European- and US-dominated nuclear world were vented in these early discussions? This history is key to making informed contemporary decisions about fairness, good faith, promises made, and promises kept.</p>
<p>Fortunately some of this documentation is available, scattered in national archives and private collections throughout the world. But you won’t find it at the IAEA in Vienna.</p>
<h2>Conducting a paper chase</h2>
<p>At a recent <a href="http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-making-of-the-nuclear-order">academic conference</a> on the origins of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a fellow panelist surprised me by noting how frustrated she’d felt in reading my pre-circulated paper. I braced for a withering critique but instead was complimented on how, while she’d searched in vain at the IAEA archives for even basic negotiating documents on nuclear safeguards, my paper cited meetings of the IAEA Board of Governors. I had found them in the <a href="http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/">UK National Archives</a>, as at IAEA they are still under wraps.</p>
<p>I have spent many years triangulating Cold War stories between the archives of governments, international agencies, personal papers, and independent bodies. Sometimes what is considered sensitive in one country can be found in perfectly open, long-declassified documents in another. Why does the IAEA continue to guard secrets from decades past?</p>
<p>The IAEA claims it is obliged to withhold documents until all of the countries mentioned in them agree to declassification. In practice, this guarantees permanent secrecy.</p>
<p>I understood my colleague’s frustration, as I have also met a blank wall working in the IAEA archives. Years ago I discovered a trove of documents about <a href="https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/nra/onlinelists/GB%200440%20Silow.pdf">Ronald Silow</a>, a scientist who had, after working at a joint <a href="http://www-naweb.iaea.org/nafa/">FAO-IAEA</a> unit on agricultural applications of atomic energy, penned memos denouncing what he saw as the agency’s unethical behaviour. </p>
<p>I found the documents in Rome, at the archives of the Food and Agriculture Organisation. But when I looked into Silow’s story in the official history of the IAEA, I found only obscure references to him, his name unmentioned. When I searched the IAEA archives, the trail led nowhere: no documents related to his case were available. One document listing employees simply showed his name, crossed out.</p>
<h2>Chequered history</h2>
<p>The IAEA is different from other agencies in the United Nations system. Unlike the agencies devoted to food and agriculture, global health, or to science, education, and culture, the IAEA’s remit is to promote a single set of technologies – but its remit also hands it the position of both chief salesman and chief arbiter of controversies about peaceful and military uses. It is a hammer in search of nails, but is uncomfortable with historical facts about the quality of its workmanship.</p>
<p>The agency has a long way to go to demonstrate it understands the need for transparency. The standards it has set since the 1960s are at the cornerstone of today’s major controversies, leading to years of deadly war and leaving countries riven by internal strife. Differences of interpretation of them make the positions of the US and Iran appear irreconcilable. We are in the ridiculous position of asking experts at the IAEA for guidance that may or may not lead to more young men and women being placed in harm’s way, simply to prevent dangerous material from falling in the wrong hands. The IAEA owes us access to its history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/25687/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacob Hamblin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When we agree to send our young men and women to war, we expect the reasons why to be made clear. At least some of us will want to subject that explanation to scrutiny at the time, and often even more…Jacob Hamblin, Associate Professor of History, Oregon State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/221382014-01-20T06:11:17Z2014-01-20T06:11:17ZWatershed moment in nuclear standoff with Iran over its right to enrich uranium<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/39330/original/gn2mn7fd-1389982837.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The IR-40 nuclear reactor at Arak. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nanking2012</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Amid warnings from Washington that the US will be watching very closely, the interim deal agreed late last year to scale-back Iran’s nuclear programme <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25706409">has come into force</a>, a positive development in a slow-burning crisis that has built up dangerous levels of heat in the past few years. </p>
<p>Carved out in negotiations between Iran and the permanent UN Security Council members, the US, Britain, Russia, China and France, plus Germany, this freeze or strategic stalemate is clearly preferable to military action led by the US or Israel. That would inevitably only herald yet more major instability in the Middle East.</p>
<p>But this agreement is no panacea. It addresses only part of the problem – Iran’s programme of enriching uranium to weapons-grade level – and only for a limited time of six months. So the real challenge is to turn this temporary freeze into a long-term concrete deal. Assuming, of course, that both sides keep to the spirit of the arrangement.</p>
<h2>Watershed moment</h2>
<p>The heart of the deal reached in November is that Iran, in return for a temporary lifting of the economic sanctions that have devastated its economy, has agreed to three things. It will stop building uranium enrichment centrifuges and plutonium re-processing facilities – the two materials necessary to build a nuclear bomb. It will cap uranium enrichment – bringing it down to well below weapons-grade levels, around 95%-pure uranium-235, but high enough (around 3-4% uranium-235) to be used in civilian power reactors. And it will allow extensive oversight and <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iran-agrees-to-daily-inspections-as-it-reaches-interim-nuclear-deal-with-world-powers-9055269.html">regular inspection by IAEA monitors</a> of its IR-40 nuclear reactor and heavy water plant at Arak, and other declared facilities.</p>
<p>This is a watershed moment. The Iranian right to enrich uranium, a necessary step in producing the fissile material required for civilian reactors and nuclear weapons, has been at the centre of the dispute for nearly a decade. If Iran can’t enrich uranium to high levels of purity or separate large amounts of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel then it cannot build a nuclear warhead.</p>
<h2>Claim and counter-claim</h2>
<p>Throughout the last decade, Iran has consistently claimed its uranium enrichment programme is for civilian purposes, that is, for generating power and medical isotopes, as is their right under the <a href="http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml">Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</a> (NPT). The international community, represented by the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/">five permanent members</a> of the UNSC and Germany (the P5+1), has always argued that Iran uses the civilian exclusions of the NPT as cover for a nuclear weapons programme. Given the vast oil and gas reserves Iran enjoys, this is a fair point.</p>
<p>Complicating matters further are the previous revelations of secret facilities, evidence that Iran has worked secretly to develop nuclear warhead technology and that the Iranian leadership has continually mislead and frustrated <a href="http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/inspectors.pdf">IAEA weapons inspectors</a>. So it’s entirely possible that there could be further undeclared nuclear or weaponisation facilities in Iran that will continue working despite this agreement. Essentially, the problem is that any state with an advanced military force, particularly in respect of its ability to deploy ballistic missiles, and sufficient technological sophistication to enrich uranium can theoretically build a nuclear weapon.</p>
<p>In fact the standoff with Iran is an example of a enduring trend in nuclear proliferation, where states can all but acquire the capability to build a nuclear bomb, without technically breaking international law. This, known as <a href="http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/nuclear_latency_and_nuclear_proliferation/">nuclear latency</a>, may well be what the Iranian leadership seeks, rather than building a bomb outright. </p>
<h2>Hiding behind civilian shroud</h2>
<p>The problem is that international law makes it possible for states to move very close to weaponisation before they actually contravene the NPT or other international laws. India, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa initially developed nuclear weapons under a civilian guise. Israel, while it still <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/15/truth-israels-secret-nuclear-arsenal">neither confirms nor denies</a> possessing nuclear weapons, did the same. And many other states such as Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan used the same rouse before abandoning their nuclear ambitions. Others, notably Japan, currently have the ability and know-how to quickly build a nuclear bomb should they decide to, because of their advanced civilian nuclear industry. So really, Iran is in many ways merely the latest manifestation of a predicament that has dogged nuclear non-proliferation since the 1960s.</p>
<p>As a result the Geneva deal, while praiseworthy, is only a first step in finding a lasting resolution with Iran. The temporary freeze on enrichment does not involve giving up fissile material stockpiles, nor surrendering centrifuges or facilities. At best the deal opens the door to a peaceful resolution to a potential conflict that neither the West nor Iran wants. At worst it merely postpones difficult decisions.</p>
<p>It’s possible that the Iranian leadership, difficult to read at the best of times, may not have come to a decision on the nuclear programme. As such, any move to prevent full weaponisation must be vigorously pursued. But recent history is littered with states – most recently North Korea – that have taken advantage of similar diplomatic thaws to carry on regardless.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/22138/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Futter currently receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for research into cyber weapons and nuclear strategy.</span></em></p>Amid warnings from Washington that the US will be watching very closely, the interim deal agreed late last year to scale-back Iran’s nuclear programme has come into force, a positive development in a slow-burning…Andrew Futter, Lecturer in International Politics, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/213052013-12-11T14:49:20Z2013-12-11T14:49:20ZNations’ nuclear ambitions not discouraged by few suppliers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/37348/original/tv6fc3hc-1386676668.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">This Russian-built nuclear power plant in India may be one of many soon appearing in developing countries.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rafiq Maqbool/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>UN inspectors <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/09/uk-iran-nuclear-idUKBRE9B704320131209">descend on Iran this week</a> to visit the Arak heavy water plant, and engineers at the wrecked Fukushima nuclear power plants in Japan attempt one of the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/dec/03/fukushima-daiichi-tsunami-nuclear-cleanup-japan">most challenging nuclear salvage operations</a> ever. But below the headlines is a potential expansion of nuclear energy not seen since the 1970s and 80s.</p>
<p>According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN’s international nuclear watchdog, <a href="http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC56/GC56InfDocuments/English/gc56inf-6_en.pdf">29 countries</a> are considering constructing their first nuclear power plant. There <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421510007925">are doubts</a> as to which of these nuclear “newcomer” countries can actually succeed and join the <a href="http://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/n/nuclear-power-plant-world-wide.htm">31 countries</a> that already operate nuclear reactors. One thing’s for sure: these countries will need to import the technology and most of the skilled manpower required from existing nuclear operators to get their programmes off the ground.</p>
<p>But newcomers to nuclear energy have found that this is a market with few suppliers. According to last year’s <a href="http://globalenergyassessment.org">Global Energy Assessment</a>, only 12 companies in just eight countries have the capacity to construct the pressure vessels which are central to the construction of a nuclear power plant. So, while nuclear power can shield countries from the price volatility of gas and coal – the main competitors to nuclear-generated electricity – those states wishing to deploy it must deal with an industry with the most concentrated supply chain of any of the major energy sources today.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/37360/original/4n69gf9f-1386691506.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/37360/original/4n69gf9f-1386691506.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/37360/original/4n69gf9f-1386691506.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/37360/original/4n69gf9f-1386691506.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/37360/original/4n69gf9f-1386691506.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/37360/original/4n69gf9f-1386691506.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/37360/original/4n69gf9f-1386691506.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/37360/original/4n69gf9f-1386691506.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Only a few countries, and only a few companies worldwide have the expertise to deliver nuclear power plants.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Global Energy Assessment</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Plenty of buyers, few suppliers</h2>
<p>However, according to a study from 2011, very few newcomers have the <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421510007925">capacity and motivation necessary</a> to build a nuclear power plant. Of the 30 countries with operating nuclear power plants today, all were started before 1986, the year of the fateful Chernobyl accident. Historically, countries started nuclear power programs to increase electricity generation in response to rising demand. Most of these countries were rich and politically stable with economies big enough to absorb the necessary state investment.</p>
<p>But few countries match this profile – in fact a third of newcomer states rank among the 50 most unstable countries in the world such as Bangladesh, Nigeria and Egypt. There are only a few examples of nuclear power programmes that began during periods of political instability, and those went along with the pursuit of nuclear weapons (in Argentina, Brazil, India and Pakistan). This gives some indication of the degree of political commitment required to overcome investor anxiety in the face of an unpredictable political landscape.</p>
<p>Even with the limited choice of suppliers, newcomers have found willing partners eager to expand into new markets, as some existing markets decline following the disaster at Fukushima in 2011. The prime minister of Japan recently signed export agreements with Turkey and the UAE, and Russia has agreed to finance nuclear power plants in Turkey and Belarus. Nicolas Sarkozy, former French president and a famous proponent of expanding nuclear power into the developing world (it already provides more than two thirds of France’s electricity), went <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fd5ee326-dbb9-11df-a1df-00144feabdc0.html">so far as to say</a> the industry holds “the reputation and image of France in their hands”. Few other industries receive such high level financial and rhetorical support.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/37361/original/tmzgj7c8-1386691895.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/37361/original/tmzgj7c8-1386691895.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/37361/original/tmzgj7c8-1386691895.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/37361/original/tmzgj7c8-1386691895.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/37361/original/tmzgj7c8-1386691895.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/37361/original/tmzgj7c8-1386691895.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/37361/original/tmzgj7c8-1386691895.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/37361/original/tmzgj7c8-1386691895.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Many countries wish to talk the nuclear talk, far fewer can walk the walk.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jessica Jewell/Energy Policy</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Belarus and UAE, states in which construction has started on their first nuclear power plant, nuclear suppliers are playing a critical role. This is most pronounced in Belarus – a small country with a limited domestic electricity grid, it would not be able to afford such a project without Russian finance. Ironically, this is also the country where the benefits of nuclear power could be the lowest: the deal would diversify the nation’s energy supply from today’s reliance on gas from Russian state-owned gas firm Gazprom, only as far as adding nuclear power from Russian state-owned nuclear firm Rosatom.</p>
<h2>The ‘wrong hands’</h2>
<p>The spread of nuclear technology raises <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Non-Proliferation/Safeguards-to-Prevent-Nuclear-Proliferation/">three main concerns</a>: safety, physical security and proliferation. Safety means preventing accidental system and equipment failures. Physical security means guarding against nuclear materials or fissile material falling into the wrong hands. Proliferation involves the spread of nuclear weapons or other fissile material to new countries.</p>
<p>In terms of accidents, there is nothing intrinsically unsafe about more countries operating nuclear power plants. Nuclear newcomers should and presumably will be held to the same safety standards as existing nuclear operators. A <a href="http://nuclearprinciples.org/">new code of conduct</a> for Nuclear Power Plant Exporters commits to adhering to international safety requirements. Some experts argue that after Fukushima, newcomers are that much more concerned about implementing the highest safety procedures.</p>
<p>A similar argument could be made in terms of physical security, but the instability of some states with nuclear ambitions causes concern, such as the Chinese deal to <a href="http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/27/behind-the-chinese-pakistani-nuclear-deal/">supply nuclear tech to Pakistan</a>. The <a href="http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/cppnm.asp">Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material</a> is meant to combat the risk of nuclear power falling into the wrong hands. But of the three countries which have already signed a contract for their first nuclear power plant, only the UAE has ratified the Convention.</p>
<p>Perhaps the trickiest risk to counter is that of proliferation. Nuclear Power Plant Exporters provide nuclear power “exclusively for peaceful purposes”. Additionally, the nuclear supply chain companies typically restrict the sale of uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing equipment. For example, in the UAE’s nuclear deal with the US – hailed as a model – the UAE agreed to forgo domestic uranium enrichment, the part of the nuclear cycle most closely linked to proliferation. Conventional wisdom is that countries which pursue nuclear power are not more likely pursue nuclear weapons, however <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.fuhrmann.pdf">a recent study</a> found that even civilian nuclear co-operation increases the risk of nuclear proliferation by spreading material, equipment and know-how.</p>
<p>If even half of the national plans for nuclear power plants materialise, the geography of nuclear energy would radically change and could revitalise a stagnant industry. But given the obstacles to starting a national nuclear power programme even for rich and stable countries, it’s not likely to happen quickly elsewhere.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/21305/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica Jewell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>UN inspectors descend on Iran this week to visit the Arak heavy water plant, and engineers at the wrecked Fukushima nuclear power plants in Japan attempt one of the most challenging nuclear salvage operations…Jessica Jewell, Research Scholar, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/197032013-11-05T16:20:55Z2013-11-05T16:20:55ZContainment, not rollback, is the key to Iran’s nuclear future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34450/original/5mvhx75y-1383651784.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">New best friends? Catherine Ashton and Iran's Javad Zarif in September</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">European External Action Service</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>To gauge just how important a successful outcome to the latest round of nuclear negotiations with Iran is to the West – and how far the thaw with new president Hassan Rouhani has progressed – you only have to look at the newspapers. </p>
<p>According to <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/article3913183.ece">reports from the US</a>, Washington is considering an initiative that would allow Iran to access some of the oil revenues that have been frozen under US-imposed sanctions that have been gradually throttling Iran’s economy for 30 years.</p>
<p>This would represent a significant softening of the US position, given that it is sanctions that have largely been credited with driving Iran to the negotiating table. Rouhani was elected largely on the promise that he would prioritise an end to the sanctions. It appears that his charm initiative has begun to bear fruit.</p>
<p>In recent months, the dynamics of the Iranian nuclear challenge have changed. The very antithesis of his predecessor, Rouhani has tried hard to allay concerns that Iran has military, and not just peaceful, intentions for its nuclear programme. The initial signs have been positive: the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Catherine Ashton <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24542216">said</a> that recent meetings in Geneva were the scene of the “most detailed talks ever” on the nuclear issue. </p>
<p>But while the context framing the Geneva negotiations has altered, so too have the potential scenarios in which an agreement might be reached. Crucially, while it was once possible to envisage an Iran without a uranium enrichment capability this is no longer the case. The Iranian nuclear programme has progressed far enough to guarantee the continuity of enrichment in some form as part of any negotiated solution. The nature of domestic politics in Iran would not accommodate a complete reversal anyway.</p>
<p>If there is to be a solution, it will need to be based on containment rather than rollback of the nuclear programme: containing Iranian technical advancements and placing limits on further progress. Some may regard this as an unpalatable concession; but a more holistic approach to understanding Iran’s nuclear trajectory reveals that containment represents a pragmatic approach rather than a defeatist one.</p>
<p>Indeed, our research suggests this is the only likely path to a diplomatic solution.</p>
<h2>Nuclear ‘hedging’</h2>
<p>Since 2002, Tehran’s approach appears to have been based on “nuclear hedging” – where Iran has sought to develop the technical wherewithal for producing weapons but has stopped short of taking a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. The concept of hedging is an abstract one. As part of our research we have developed a more nuanced approach to understanding hedging and applied this to Iranian proliferation behaviour.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34449/original/tffs49h5-1383651358.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34449/original/tffs49h5-1383651358.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34449/original/tffs49h5-1383651358.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34449/original/tffs49h5-1383651358.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34449/original/tffs49h5-1383651358.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34449/original/tffs49h5-1383651358.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34449/original/tffs49h5-1383651358.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34449/original/tffs49h5-1383651358.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, was chief nuclear negotiator in 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mojtaba Salimi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Given the highly secretive nature of nuclear decision-making, it is extremely difficult to find explicit evidence - so to shed light on hedging is a matter of identifying indicators, individual pieces of evidence and insights that together form a broader picture.</p>
<p>To fully understand Iran’s nuclear trajectory, then, three levels of analysis must be applied. First, Iran’s nuclear activities must be considered in terms of <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/toward-nuclear-opacity-middle-east.html">opaque proliferation</a> – that is the extent to which Iran has covertly developed its nuclear programme, as well as its moves towards <a href="http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/nuclear_latency_and_nuclear_proliferation/">latency</a> – or its ability to acquire nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>Central to hedging is an ability to maintain opacity, or at least partial opacity, vis-à-vis intent, capability, or both, as are coherent efforts to achieve latency. This is most likely to happen both through the covert procurement of nuclear materials and using civil nuclear development as a partial cover. It is also important to consider the level of coherence between Iran’s nuclear capabilities and the stated civil rationale of the regime, as well as any evidence of military involvement in the nuclear programme.</p>
<p>On all these counts, Iran has acted in a manner that is consistent with hedging. The nuclear programme now extends far beyond what is strictly necessary for a civil programme and the Iranian case has been characterised in part by its covert development of sensitive nuclear facilities. Moreover, a recent <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/331">report</a> by the UN Panel of Experts revealed that Iran continues to advance its nuclear infrastructure using complex and illicit procurement methods. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has <a href="http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-40.pdf">also gathered evidence</a> suggesting military involvement.</p>
<p>Second, it is necessary to understand the narrative around a nuclear programme, that is to say, the manner in which the state’s nuclear activities are represented by decision-makers and the political elite more broadly. </p>
<p>Successive administrations in Tehran have infused the nuclear programme with political symbolism. In Iranian political discourse, the nuclear programme is linked to national pride, scientific advancement and Iran’s rights and progress as a nation-state. In this context, issues of non-compliance with obligations under the NPT have been submerged by a powerful narrative of nuclear nationalism. It is for this reason that the nuclear programme has garnered support from across the domestic political spectrum.</p>
<p>Third, Iran’s diplomatic behaviour must also be examined from the point at which suspicions were raised regarding the country’s nuclear activities. Since the 2002 revelations regarding its undeclared nuclear activities, Iran has used negotiations as a diplomatic smokescreen while buying time to advance its nuclear capabilities. Tehran’s <a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran">diplomatic track record</a> has been marked by a series of failed negotiations, reneged agreements and intransigence. </p>
<h2>Pragmatic politics</h2>
<p>In combination each level of analysis provides considerable evidence that Iran is engaged in an approach based on hedging. But how do we know that Iran does not intend to follow North Korea’s path? What differentiates a hedging approach from a circuitous route to the bomb as typified by the regime in Pyongyang?</p>
<p>Two factors tip the case in favour of hedging. First, Iran views itself as a major power in the international arena and a country that should have a decisive influence on regional relations and politics. </p>
<p>Iran has no desire to be the “North Korea of the Middle East” and so a latent weapons capability that allows for the possibility of international engagement is a more attractive option than the isolation that nuclear weapons acquisition would guarantee.</p>
<p>Second, and more important, Iranian politicians of all ideological colours have embraced the nuclear programme as a symbol of sovereign rights and progress. This unity is rare in a domestic political arena that is heavily factionalised and notoriously combative. Crucially, however, the consensus on the nuclear programme does not extend to weapons and, consequently, any deviation from the peaceful nuclear narrative would leave the regime open to attack domestically.</p>
<p>So it makes sense that hedging is the only strategy for a regime that, on one hand, appears to have taken steps down the nuclear weapons path, yet on the other, is bound by the constraints of its own efforts to imbue the country’s civil nuclear programme with nationalist sentiment. This is not necessarily “hedging by design”, but may be better characterised as “hedging by default”. It is the only approach that allows the regime to reconcile any potential moves towards nuclear weapons with the strong consensus that exists on civil nuclear advancement. Furthermore, this same political context makes it very difficult for Iranian decision makers to slow or to reverse course. </p>
<p>This is not to say that Iran will not attempt to cross the nuclear threshold at some point - but there is no evidence as yet to indicate that since 2002 this has been the desired end-point of the programme. </p>
<h2>The solution</h2>
<p>If we accept that Iran is hedging, containment emerges as the only realistic means of achieving a peaceful solution. Tehran has come too far to give up its nuclear programme and any significant concessions would be perceived within Iran as a capitulation to Western powers which would come with a significant domestic political backlash.</p>
<p>A more realistic goal is to focus on containing Iranian advancements. Such an approach entails an implicit acceptance of “hedging by default” in the Iranian context. This would involve keeping Iran as far as possible from a credible breakout capability, but at the same time allowing Tehran to retain its programme in some form. Of course, the limits of how this might look are open to debate. There are a number of issues to be considered, from enrichment levels to stocks of fissile material. Another issue to be addressed is the advancement of the Arak heavy water reactor that, when completed, could potentially give Iran a source of plutonium and another route to the bomb.</p>
<p>The trade-off here would come in the form of greater transparency and increased oversight, with IAEA inspectors being provided with all necessary access and support to verify declared activities and rule out any further undeclared work. This idea of comprehensive oversight as part of a trade-off for enrichment is not new but it assumes new significance when considered in the cultural and political context that our understanding of hedging provides.</p>
<p>The new regime in Tehran brings with it the potential for real progress on the nuclear issue. The new president is a pragmatist who realises the scale of the challenges that the nuclear programme presents. Economic sanctions have crippled Iran and the threat of military action continues to loom. An agreement would start the process of rehabilitating Iran’s international reputation. Moreover, securing a deal that permitted Iran to retain a limited level of latency could be sold domestically as a “win”.</p>
<p>This would not represent a failure with regard to the Iranian nuclear challenge. It advocates pragmatism in the face of certain cultural, political and technical challenges. Tehran must be held to account for its non-compliance to date and be made to accept deeper oversight of its nuclear activities. But it is clear that ignoring the domestic political constraints that Iranian leaders – particularly the more moderate ones – must operate within, is a recipe for failure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/19703/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wyn Bowen has received research funding grants from the MacArthur Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Moran has received research funding from the MacArthur Foundation.</span></em></p>To gauge just how important a successful outcome to the latest round of nuclear negotiations with Iran is to the West – and how far the thaw with new president Hassan Rouhani has progressed – you only…Wyn Bowen, Professor of Non-Proliferation & International Security, King's College LondonMatthew Moran, Deputy Director for Research Development at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.